Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 3318

 1                           Wednesday, 30 June 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Good morning to everybody in the courtroom and

 6     watching, listening to our proceedings.  I would like to mention

 7     something -- I think we have a problem with the transcript.  Something is

 8     wrong with it.  That should be resolved.

 9             At the outset of today's hearings, I would like to mention a

10     problem with scheduling in July.  In the second week, the Chamber has

11     some problems because of overlapping with other trials and other

12     commitments, and we would like to suggest that we sit in the week

13     commencing on the 5th of July, four days instead of three, and the

14     following week only two days instead of three.  Our proposal would be to

15     sit as scheduled, but in addition in the week commencing on the 5th of

16     July, a hearing on the 6th of July in the afternoon, 2.15, and we should

17     cancel the hearing on the 15th of July.  Is there any problem for calling

18     witnesses or other problems?

19             Mr. McCloskey.

20             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes, I can see, Mr. Thayer, who is the master of

21     the witness --

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Please carry on.

23             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Mr. Thayer is sorting out, he is the witness

24     organiser so he will be able to give us an answer.  We will, of course,

25     endeavour to do that.  Ms. Stewart informs me we have Dutch interpreters

Page 3319

 1     coming and -- for General Nikolai.  And Dutch interpreters, once you get

 2     a date it's very hard to change, but we'll certainly endeavour to do that

 3     and I think be able to get back to you pretty soon if there's any really

 4     significant problems.  I know Mr. Thayer has the next witness so -- but

 5     we will discuss this at the break and take a good look, but we normally

 6     can move things around.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.  And the Defence,

 8     Mr. Tolimir, is there any problem with this cancelling the hearing on the

 9     15th of July, instead of that we would like to sit additionally on the

10     6th of July in the afternoon.  Everything else should be as scheduled

11     earlier.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, could you please just

13     tell me whether we work on the 16th, then.  Thank you.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  No, there will be no hearing.  There's nothing

15     scheduled for that day.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  The Defence agrees and

17     you can adjust it to your needs, the needs of this Tribunal.  Thank you.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

19             And the Prosecution will figure out if that is possible, perhaps

20     during today's hearing.  We come back to that later.  Now the witness

21     should be brought in.  Thank you.

22             Mr. Thayer.

23             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, while the witness is being brought in

24     if I could just alert the Trial Chamber to one administrative matter, as

25     it were.  We have an exhibit listed for Colonel Franken, P620.  As I was

Page 3320

 1     getting ready for his testimony, I noticed that that document has never

 2     been used before and it does not have a 65 ter number for it, so --

 3     because we -- I believe, to comply with the Trial Chamber's preference,

 4     because we need formally apply in a motion to add that to our 65 ter list

 5     of exhibits, I will not be showing this exhibit to Colonel Franken during

 6     his testimony.  I'll simply ask him about it, but because we haven't gone

 7     through the formality of applying for the 65 ter number and the Court

 8     hasn't had an opportunity to review that application, I'll simply ask him

 9     about it.  We won't show it to him, and I will use it certainly with

10     another witness, most likely General Nikolai, who will be coming in July.

11     So we can cross off P620 for the purposes of today's proceedings.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

13                           [The witness entered court]

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Good morning, sir.

15             THE WITNESS:  Good morning, Your Honour.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Welcome to the Tribunal.  Would you please read

17     aloud the affirmation on the card that it shown to you now.

18             THE WITNESS:  I will.  I solemnly declare that I will speak the

19     truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much, please sit down.  As it is

21     not the first time that you are giving evidence here in the Tribunal, you

22     know the procedure.  Mr. Thayer has some questions for you.

23             MR. THAYER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

24                           WITNESS:  ROBERT FRANKEN

25                           Examination by Mr. Thayer:

Page 3321

 1        Q.   Good morning, sir.

 2        A.   Good morning to you.

 3        Q.   Do you recall testifying in this building almost four years ago

 4     in October of 2006?

 5        A.   I do recall that, yes.

 6        Q.   And did you recently read all of your testimony in that case, the

 7     Popovic case?

 8        A.   I did.

 9        Q.   Can you attest before this Trial Chamber that what you read

10     accurately reflects what you said during that trial?

11        A.   That matched exactly what I said, yes.  That's correct.

12        Q.   And, sir, can you further attest that, were you asked the same

13     questions today that you were asked back in October of 2006, that your

14     answers would be the same?

15        A.   That is correct because there's just one story.

16        Q.   Okay.  Thank you.

17             MR. THAYER:  At this time, Mr. President, the Prosecution would

18     tender P597 and P598, Colonel Franken's Popovic testimony, the former

19     being under seal.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  They will be received.

21             MR. THAYER:  Given the extensive nature of Colonel Franken's

22     prior testimony, I have a 92 ter summary that may take a couple of

23     minutes, so please sit back and I'll have about three and a half pages to

24     read.  I've tried to reduce it, but Colonel Franken's level of knowledge

25     and participation was extensive in these events, so I want to do the

Page 3322

 1     prior testimony justice in terms of the summary for the Trial Chamber.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  If that is really a summary, we would appreciate

 3     that.

 4             MR. THAYER:  It is a summary, albeit a long one, Mr. President.

 5             The witness served in the Royal Netherlands Army in various

 6     command and staff positions.  He retired after 33 years in service with

 7     the rank of colonel.  He arrived in Bosnia in January 1995 as a major and

 8     was the deputy commanding officer and logistics officer of DutchBat III,

 9     headquartered at Potocari.  His immediate superior was the DutchBat

10     commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans.  Beginning in April 1995, the

11     VRS increased its firing upon DutchBat patrols and OPs.  In addition,

12     civilians were wounded by shelling and shooting and were taken to the

13     Srebrenica hospital by DutchBat armoured ambulances.

14             Colonel Franken described the DutchBat resupply process, which

15     required VRS approval for both the contents and number of trucks in every

16     convoy.  In addition, the VRS categorically denied anything relating to

17     weapons systems, spare parts, testing devices, ammunition, and

18     communications equipment.  The VRS restrictions on convoys increased

19     after February, when the last fuel convoy was approved by the VRS.  UNHCR

20     was subject to the same approval process and restrictions by the VRS.

21             Colonel Franken testified about the effect which the VRS

22     restrictions on fuel convoys had on DutchBat's ability to carry out its

23     mission:  They had to patrol the enclave on foot and chop wood for heat;

24     they could not keep their medical dressing station operational; nor could

25     they purify water or cook food.  They also had to close down their mobile

Page 3323

 1     Red Cross point in several villages, which gave medical care directly to

 2     the population.

 3             He further described how DutchBat's weapons and ammunition became

 4     severely reduced and inoperable because the VRS convoy restrictions

 5     prevented their necessary maintenance and replacement.  He also testified

 6     about the VRS restrictions on DutchBat personnel rotations, such that

 7     when he arrived, the battalion's strength was over 300, but by July 1995

 8     was down to 147 peacekeepers.  Colonel Franken referred to these

 9     collective VRS convoy restrictions as "convoy terror."

10             He also testified about the VRS attack on Observation Post Echo,

11     OP Echo, by approximately 40 Serb infantry, supported by a T-55 battle

12     tank, which forced the peacekeepers out of the OP after firing on it and

13     striking its observation tower.  Following this attack, Colonel Karremans

14     described the critical situation of the battalion and the local

15     population in a commander's assessment.

16             Colonel Franken then described the VRS attack on the enclave that

17     began on 6 July, including VRS direct firing on OPs, such as OP Foxtrot,

18     in which a VRS tank blew away the OP's defence wall; random shelling of

19     Srebrenica town; and firing at the UN Potocari compound and direct

20     surroundings, resulting in civilian casualties.  Because the VRS had not

21     permitted the battalion operations officer to rotate back in, Colonel

22     Franken assumed tactical command duties during the VRS attack and spent

23     most of his time in the operations room.  Nevertheless, he made rounds

24     outside at least twice daily to see the situation for himself.

25             He also discussed his 9 July order to form blocking positions

Page 3324

 1     with APCs to prevent further VRS penetration into the safe area and to

 2     force VRS the stay static enough to be struck by close air support.

 3     These APCs also came under direct VRS tank and artillery fire, resulting

 4     in one APC being shot off the road and shrapnel wounds and light injuries

 5     to DutchBat peacekeepers.  A recovery vehicle sent to retrieve the APC

 6     came under fire from an anti-tank gun and a T-55 tank, and had to

 7     withdraw.

 8             By 10 July, there was massive shelling of Srebrenica, including

 9     the UN Bravo Company compound, resulting in further casualties.

10     Colonel Franken further testified that the VRS issued an ultimatum to

11     civilians, BiH soldiers, DutchBat, and UNHCR to leave by 0600 hours on

12     11 July.  UNPROFOR responded with an ultimatum of its own that the VRS

13     should withdraw to the so-called Morillon lines by 0600 the next morning

14     or there would be massive air-strikes.

15             By 11 July, however, the ABiH had disappeared, and the VRS had

16     completely surrounded the OPs, and had infantry poised at heights around

17     Srebrenica town as, one by one, the OPs continued to fall to the Serbs.

18     Peacekeepers formerly manning OPs were taken to Bratunac where they were

19     held prisoner by the VRS, not free leave.  The civilian population was

20     fleeing in great numbers from Srebrenica town to the Potocari compounds,

21     with Bravo Company peacekeepers accompanying the column and bringing up

22     the tail.  And the column was shelled by mortar and artillery, the

23     wounded being picked up along the way.  Had the VRS wanted to kill

24     everybody in that column, it could have done so.  In total, 114 wounded

25     were brought to Potocari.

Page 3325

 1             The peacekeepers guided the refugees towards the back of the

 2     Potocari compound and away from the road directly in front of it because

 3     Colonel Franken believed that if the refugees entered from the front, the

 4     VRS would fire upon them with an anti-tank gun, T-55 tank, and multiple

 5     rocket-launcher to the north of the compound near OP Papa.  When the

 6     compound filled with refugees, they were directed to abandoned factories

 7     and a bus compound to the south.  By the night of 11 July, they estimated

 8     there were between 800 and 1.000 Muslim men inside and outside the

 9     compound.

10             After close air support was delivered in the afternoon of

11     11 July, Colonel Franken received a threat that if close air support

12     continued, the VRS would shell the compound and the refugees there, and

13     kill the peacekeepers held prisoner in Bratunac.  He took the threat to

14     shell the compound seriously, because the Serbs had used artillery before

15     randomly on Srebrenica town, on the area of Potocari, and on the refugees

16     fleeing Srebrenica for Potocari, and he thought that if they wanted to do

17     it again, they probably would.  Shortly after that threat, there was

18     mortar shelling of the bus compound area and a full round from the

19     multiple rocket system towards Potocari, resulting in wounded and panic

20     among the refugees.

21             In the morning of 12 July, he observed the Serb forces advancing

22     towards Potocari from the north, and sometime after noon or around noon,

23     a large number of buses and trucks began arriving.  That day, he met two

24     VRS Colonels, one named Acamovic, who identified himself as a logistics

25     officer, and one named Jankovic, who identified himself as being from

Page 3326

 1     Pale and said his mission was to prepare and co-ordinate DutchBat's

 2     withdrawal.

 3             As the first buses had already started to leave, Colonel Franken

 4     assigned Major Boering and Captain Voerman to escort the first convoy.

 5     He received reports that the first and second convoy went well, but

 6     thereafter, the VRS stopped all of the UN escorts, thus taking away, as

 7     Colonel Franken put it, his eyes and ears.

 8             THE INTERPRETER:  Could you please read slower, please.

 9             MR. THAYER:  The escorts were stripped of their vehicles,

10     weapons, equipment and clothing in such a way that he concluded that it

11     was organised and designed to prevent the UN from witnessing whatever

12     happened to the convoys.  He complained to Colonel Jankovic but did not

13     see any results.

14             Mladic had announced that men would be separated, so except for

15     the first convoy, men were separated immediately after they left the

16     perimeter secured by peacekeepers, and taken to the White House, from

17     which they were transported in the direction of Bratunac.  The Serbs

18     consistently thwarted efforts to escort the buses containing men.  In

19     addition, the Serbs prevented peacekeepers from investigating the

20     treatment of the men in the White House.  He complained again, without

21     results, to Colonel Jankovic.  The men had to leave their belongings in

22     front of the White House in a large pile, which the Serbs later burned.

23             Colonel Franken also testified about efforts he made to register

24     the men at the UN compound and informed Colonel Jankovic that he had done

25     so.

Page 3327

 1             One of Colonel Franken's OP crews also reported seeing a large

 2     group of men kneeling on a soccer field, next to a road, in rows, with

 3     their hands on their necks.  Colonel Jankovic had contacted

 4     Colonel Franken for a truck to bring that OP crew back.

 5             After the population was moved out, there were still wounded

 6     Muslims remaining in Potocari and in Bratunac.  The Serbs wanted to keep

 7     them in Serb territory, but Franken contacted the ICRC and MSF to

 8     evacuate them.  On 17 July, Colonel Jankovic led a Serb delegation,

 9     including Momir Nikolic, to arrange the evacuation of the wounded.  After

10     which Nikolic inspected the wounded at the hospital to determine whether

11     they were soldiers or war criminals.

12             Jankovic then summoned Nesib Mandzic and asked him and

13     Colonel Franken to sign a declaration Jankovic produced that stated that

14     the transportations had been performed according to international law and

15     the Geneva Conventions.  The declaration's content was nonsense because

16     the population did not have a realistic opportunity to stay.  Colonel

17     Franken signed the declaration because Colonel Jankovic had indicated

18     that doing so would facilitate the evacuation of the wounded.  When an

19     ICRC truck was stopped at the Serb border, during this meeting, Colonel

20     Jankovic was able to resolve the problem with a single phone call.

21             Mr. President, at this time I would also offer Exhibits P599 to

22     619, which are the exhibits admitted through Colonel Franken in the

23     Popovic case or which were shown to him during the course of his

24     testimony in Popovic but tendered through other witnesses.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  They all will be received with exhibit numbers

Page 3328

 1     already given to them.

 2             Mr. Thayer, as everybody can see, we have a problem with the

 3     transcript of today, the transcript in e-court is different from that in

 4     LiveNote, not only the lines are different, but there are many obviously

 5     technical problems so that it will be quite difficult during the

 6     testimony of this witness to refer to several portions of the transcript,

 7     so that I conferred with the Registrar to figure out the possibility what

 8     to do.  We should prefer to have a break now to resolve this problem so

 9     that we have a clear and reliable transcript.  Sometimes the problems

10     occurred on the left screen, sometimes on the right screen, there's no

11     common understanding, so that, as I propose, we should have a break now

12     in order to resolve this technical problem.  Then we resume as soon as

13     possible when the problem is solved.  Thank you very much.

14             We adjourn.

15                           --- Break taken at 9.26 a.m.

16                           --- On resuming at 9.47 a.m.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Let's start again.  I hope the technical problems

18     will be not as concerning as at the beginning.

19             But I've heard, Mr. Thayer, that the interpreters didn't catch

20     the last part of your witness summary, so that you should -- I've heard

21     you have liaised with the B/C/S booth and know which part was missing,

22     but especially for the accused, it's necessary to have the full text

23     translated.

24             MR. THAYER:  Very well, Mr. President.

25             Colonel Franken also testified about efforts he made to register

Page 3329

 1     the men on the Potocari compound, compiling a list of men who were

 2     willing to have their names placed on it, and Colonel Franken told

 3     Colonel Jankovic that he had done so.  One of Colonel Franken's OP crews

 4     also reported seeing a large group of men kneeling on a soccer field,

 5     next to a road, in rows, with their hands on their necks.

 6     Colonel Jankovic had contacted Colonel Franken for a truck to bring that

 7     OP crew back.

 8             After the population was moved out, there were still wounded

 9     Muslims remaining in Potocari and Bratunac.  The Serbs wanted to keep

10     them in Serb territory, but Franken contacted the ICRC via MSF to

11     evacuate them.

12             On 17 July, Colonel Jankovic led a Serb delegation, including

13     Momir Nikolic, to arrange the evacuation of the wounded, after which

14     Nikolic inspected the wounded to determine whether they were soldiers or

15     war criminals.  Jankovic then summoned Nesib Mandic and asked him and

16     Colonel Franken to sign a declaration, which Jankovic produced, and which

17     stated that the transportations had been performed according to

18     international law and the Geneva Conventions.

19             The declaration's content was nonsense because the population did

20     not have a realistic opportunity to stay.  Colonel Franken signed the

21     declaration because Colonel Jankovic had indicated that doing so would

22     facilitate the evacuation of the wounded.

23             When an ICRC truck was stopped at the Serb border,

24     Colonel Jankovic was able to resolve the problem with a single phone

25     call.

Page 3330


 2        Q.   Colonel, I have a few questions to put to you on three or four

 3     topics.  The first concerns three borders around the enclave which you

 4     testified about in Popovic.  You refer to them -- and for the record this

 5     is at transcript pages 2477 and 2645.  You referred to three borders

 6     around the enclave.  Would you please give the Trial Chamber a

 7     description of what you were referring to when you spoke about three

 8     borders.

 9        A.   I will.  There was what I call the UN border said as well --

10     named as well as the Morillon Line.  And there was with the Serbs quite

11     another idea, that the border was up until 1 kilometre within the enclave

12     that should have been the correct border.  And the Muslims had the idea

13     that the border was up to 1 kilometre outside the UN border.  So in fact,

14     there were more or less three enclaves, a UN enclave, that's what the

15     Serbs considered as being border of the enclave and that what the Muslims

16     considered being the enclave.  Is that enough?  Is that an answer?

17        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.  And was there a relationship between the

18     UN border, as you described, and the location of the observation posts?

19        A.   The observation posts were on the -- mostly on the very edge of

20     the UN border, so directly in front of the observation posts there was

21     the UN border of the enclave.

22        Q.   Colonel, was there ever one border that everybody agreed upon,

23     the UN, the Serbs, and the Muslims, around the Srebrenica enclave?

24        A.   Not to my knowledge.  There should be formed a so-called

25     Joint Commission, three parties, being UN, Serbs, and the Muslims, to

Page 3331

 1     agree upon the order of -- the border of the enclave.  That never came to

 2     an actual situation because they didn't want to speak to each other, so

 3     it was pretty difficult to coordinate the exact consented border of the

 4     enclave.  So we kept as to the UN border being the real one.

 5        Q.   Next topic, Colonel, Observation Post Echo.  You testified in

 6     Popovic, and this is at transcript page 2452, about how on the

 7     3rd of June, 1995, the VRS attacked that OP and forced the peacekeepers

 8     out of it.  How was this information being relayed to you at the time,

 9     and how involved were you personally with the events concerning the VRS

10     attack on OP Echo?

11        A.   OP Echo was in the area of responsibility of my B Company, who

12     was responsible for the southern part of the enclave.  The OP reported to

13     the company and the company to me, so I got the information through the

14     HQ of the company, that in the morning there was some movement in front

15     of the OP, which in the end showed -- proved to be an attack on Echo,

16     about 40 infantry men supported by a T-55, that's a main battle tank, and

17     then the anti-aircraft gun on the high ridge directly on the western part

18     of that area.

19             They asked me permission to withdraw.  I did not give that

20     permission.  Because I wanted to be sure that that there was actually an

21     attack and the Serbs opened fire, and the very last moment or the last

22     possibility, I allowed the OP to withdraw which they did.

23        Q.   Now, when you say, "They asked me for permission to withdraw,"

24     who are you referring to when you say "they"?

25        A.   Company asked me permission to withdraw that OP.  Perhaps of any

Page 3332

 1     interest is that the Serbs, before they started the attack, summoned the

 2     OP crew to leave the OP, and they did that by means of a loud-speaker, in

 3     English.  Which we refused.

 4        Q.   Now, can you describe for the Trial Chamber the design, the size,

 5     the appearance of these OPs, to give the Trial Chamber an idea of what we

 6     are talking about when we talk about one of these observations posts?

 7        A.   The observation posts were, in fact, militarily seen, a complete

 8     joke.  Because they were out in the open, on the top of hills or directly

 9     in a valley, where they, in fact, didn't hardly see anything because they

10     had to deter by presence.  They had to be seen by all parties that we

11     were there.  They were painted white and by night we had to put on lights

12     on it so that even at night everybody could see that UN was there.  So

13     the military position was absolutely ridiculous.  For instance, Echo was

14     down on the road, 5 metres on the left side, there was a slope up to

15     10 metres, and woods on it, on the right side there were bushes and a

16     part of a river and buildings.  And that is not a position which you

17     would choose if you reckoned with defending that position, because that

18     is absolutely idiotic.  You can't control the approaches and you can't

19     can be outmanoeuvred on your left and right flank whenever the opponent

20     wants because you can't fire in that area.  You can't bring your weapons

21     to action, in fact, to that area.

22             So the aim of the observation post was only to show the flag, to

23     show that we were there.  But then again, a military defence position, I

24     would have fired the officer that would have chosen that location to

25     defend that area.

Page 3333

 1        Q.   And this will probably come up during your testimony and

 2     throughout the trial, so can you briefly explain the difference between

 3     what we refer to sometimes as indirect fire and direct fire?  What does

 4     that mean?

 5        A.   Well, direct fire is when the gun or the weapons system directly

 6     sees the target and fires on it.  Indirect firing is, for instance,

 7     artillery or mortars who fire in a - what do you call it? - a bow.  And

 8     mostly is led by an observer which controls and corrects that fire.  So

 9     the indirect firing, the weapons system can't see the target and fires at

10     it on indication of an observer or on a coordinate, but that gets a bit

11     technical now.  Direct firing is, for instance, a tank seeing a target,

12     firing at that target.  Is that enough an answer?

13        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.

14             The reports that you were receiving concerning the attack on OP

15     Echo, were you getting report that this was direct fire or indirect fire

16     on that OP?

17        A.   Reports as I recollect were direct firing.

18        Q.   And what was the damage, if any, that was done to the OP?

19        A.   I know the tower, the observation tower, was hit, was a big hole

20     in that.  And the defence wall was damaged.

21        Q.   Now, you refer to a defence wall, Colonel.  What is a defence

22     wall?

23        A.   Well, some kind of a container existing of metal threads and

24     filled with small rocks and sand, about the height of about 2 metres and

25     the width is about 150.  And in general, it protects against direct

Page 3334

 1     firing.  Initially, I should say.

 2        Q.   Just follow up on that, what do you mean by "initially"?

 3        A.   Because if you keep on firing on a defence wall by a heavy

 4     weapons system, like a main battle tank, you'll blow the defence wall

 5     away.  That's what I meant with "initially."  The first hit it can

 6     manage, second probably as well, but a third hit, it's gone.

 7        Q.   When this attack on OP Echo occurred, Colonel, did you seek any

 8     support from the higher command in the UN?

 9        A.   Yes.  We thought that the conditions for air support were

10     fulfilled and we asked for air support.

11        Q.   And why did you feel justified in seeking air support?

12        A.   It was a direct attack on UN facilities, on UN troops.  The Serbs

13     were entering the enclave and that were both -- and there were what they

14     called smoking guns, which meant that there was an actual fire contact.

15     And that were three of the conditions UN had for allowing air support.

16        Q.   And how important was air support to you and your mission,

17     Colonel?

18        A.   My initial mission was, of course, to deter by presence, so we

19     were not equipped to -- for a real fight, nor weapons systems, nor the

20     number of troops I had.  So to equalise the lack of fire-power I had on

21     the ground, I absolutely needed air support to give enough fire-power to

22     do the job, being there and defending an OP or whatever.

23        Q.   Now, you said equalise, what did you need to equalise to?

24        A.   The lack, the lack of fire-power I had compared to the VRS.

25        Q.   And from your experience, from what you could see from the VRS

Page 3335

 1     side, how much of a concern to the VRS was the potential of NATO air

 2     support?

 3        A.   Sorry, just reread that question.  Well, in other regions, they

 4     showed that they -- it was proved that they were pretty -- under the

 5     impression of air support were more or less petrified when that came in.

 6     So I thought again that it was a very good means to stop that attack.

 7        Q.   Now, you testified in Popovic, and this is at transcript 2450,

 8     about a meeting you had with the Muslim military leadership about what

 9     DutchBat would do and what the Muslim forces in the area would do in the

10     event of a VRS full-on attack on the enclave.  What prompted that

11     meeting?

12        A.   Well, in fact, I could not completely coordinate any action in

13     case of an attack because I was still a UN unit and supposed to be, not

14     only supposed to be, but I was impartial, so I couldn't take a side

15     before things happened.  Through a pretty complicated discussion, we

16     concluded that UN would, as ordered by the UN, would defend its OPs, and

17     the BiH would cope with the area between the OPs without a really fire

18     co-ordinated fight, because I was not allowed to do that.  But in fact,

19     we said, We'll defend the OPs, and the BiH said, Okay, then we'll defend

20     the area between the OPs.  OPs being observation posts.

21        Q.   Do you recall whether this meeting was before or after the attack

22     on OP Echo?

23        A.   That was before.

24        Q.   So was there anything in particular that prompted this meeting

25     that you had concerning what you might do in an event of an attack?

Page 3336

 1        A.   I don't know exactly the period, but somewhere in beginning of

 2     May, this meeting took place on the initiative of the Chief of Staff of

 3     the 28th Muslim Division.  And they thought that a Serb attack was

 4     evident in that time.  Well, we didn't have any indication that that was

 5     correct, but after that being established, we had this discussion.  They

 6     thought the Serbs would come in and were, of course, curious what

 7     DutchBat would do.

 8        Q.   And was there any relationship between the increase in close

 9     firing incidents in which DutchBat patrols and OPs had been fired at by

10     VRS soldiers or positions?

11        A.   Yes.  As stated before, there was a pretty massive increase in

12     firing at our patrols and at certain OPs.  But to us, that was not a

13     direct indication that an attack would be evident.  Probably for the BiH

14     it was or they had information I didn't because, you know, the normal

15     military intelligence did absolutely not work there.  I got no

16     information whatsoever from the UN about troop movements or whatever the

17     Serbs did.

18        Q.   Now, during the attack on OP Echo, what happened to any elements

19     of Bosnian Muslim forces that may have been in the area, if they were in

20     the area?

21        A.   They were in the area, but what proved to be later on a kind of

22     bad habit, they -- we, in that discussion which I had with the Chief of

23     Staff of 28th, we agreed that the Muslim forces would inform us when they

24     would withdraw from their positions, logically, because otherwise my OPs

25     were defending, like, just one little spot surround by Serbs, and that is

Page 3337

 1     a bad thing to do.  But the first time at Echo, the BiH disappeared

 2     without notifying us and that is why the Serbs got the opportunity to

 3     come that close and come on my flanks.

 4        Q.   And when the VRS was firing directly at the OP, were there Muslim

 5     forces in or near the OP such that the Serbs might have been firing at

 6     them?

 7        A.   No, absolutely not.  There were no BiH soldiers in positions in

 8     that area that could interfere with the fight or the attack on Echo.

 9        Q.   Now, you testified in Popovic at transcript 2455, about a

10     commander's assessment which Colonel Karremans sent following the

11     increase in firing incidents and the attack on OP Echo, and as you put

12     it, the increasing vulnerability of the Swedish Shelter Project.  Did you

13     have an opportunity recently to read a copy of that assessment?

14        A.   I did read it, yes.  It coped with my memory.

15        Q.   Do you recall the date of that report?

16        A.   4th of June.  As far as I know, early in the morning.

17        Q.   And do you recall to whom Colonel Karremans sent that report?

18        A.   He sent that to UN headquarters in Sarajevo and a copy went to

19     the Sector North-east, which officially was our direct higher echelon.

20        Q.   And Sector North-east, where is that based, sir?

21        A.   Tuzla.

22        Q.   What in particular do you recall about that report, if anything

23     stands out?

24        A.   Well, he described the situation.  He described the attack.  He

25     assessed what the meaning of that attack was.  That far is normal.  And

Page 3338

 1     he described the position of the state the battalion was in, and by that

 2     I mean the absolute lack weapons system, heavy weapons systems,

 3     ammunition, the lack of fuel, et cetera, so the logistic situation with

 4     all these limitations to the operational possibilities.  And he described

 5     the situation of the people of the enclave, the civil people, being a

 6     very bad situation because there was hardly any food, et cetera,

 7     et cetera.

 8        Q.   And there will probably be some reference in the future to the

 9     Swedish Shelter Project.  Can you just briefly describe what that is for

10     the Trial Chamber, please.

11        A.   Yes, before DutchBat III came in, and I don't know exactly when

12     it was built, it was built by an NGO in a kind of village with barracks.

13     And in those barracks there were housing about 3.000 refugees, being

14     people that came to the enclave from the area outside the enclave in

15     1992, I suppose.

16        Q.   Just roughly, geographically in the enclave, where was it

17     located?

18        A.   About 800 metres west of OP Echo, direct north of Delta and Kilo.

19     So let's say, in general the southeastern part of the enclave.  South,

20     southeastern part.

21        Q.   Okay.  And we'll look at a map in a couple of minutes with those

22     OPs on them.

23             I want to turn your attention now to the period of the actual

24     VRS attack on the enclave.  And I want to show you P621, which actually,

25     I don't think we looked at during your proofing, but I think you can

Page 3339

 1     handle it, Colonel.  Tell me when you see it on your screen and when

 2     you've had an opportunity to familiarise yourself with it.

 3        A.   I see some text on the right side.  And as far as I can see it

 4     is, yeah, another assessment of Colonel Karremans.  Just hold.  I more or

 5     less read the first four points and it looks like an assessment of the

 6     situation.

 7        Q.   Okay.  Let's just go to page 2, if we could, and then we'll go

 8     back to page 1 after you've had a chance to look at page 2.

 9        A.   Yes.  Thank you.  Very small.  Okay.  I read it.

10        Q.   Colonel, how personally familiar are you with the topics that are

11     discussed in this report from Colonel Karremans?

12        A.   I didn't read this one before but the assessment is correct.  I

13     didn't read or know about his advices in the point 10, that's new to me.

14        Q.   Okay.  Well, let's go back to page 1 and we'll focus on some

15     particular points in this report.  We can see that it's dated 9 July,

16     1995.

17        A.   Mm-hmm.

18        Q.   And Colonel Karremans starts out by talking about, as of

19     Thursday, 6 July, the VRS, he refers to it as BSA, but we'll continue to

20     refer to it as VRS, started offensive operations, shelling OPs, battalion

21     headquarters, Srebrenica itself, and refers to civilian casualties.

22             Were you, yourself, personally receiving reports of this

23     activity, Colonel?

24        A.   Yes, because the ops room directly -- the ops room, sorry, that

25     is the nerve centre of the battalion where all the information came in,

Page 3340

 1     operations room.  And I always got directly the information from that

 2     operation room.  Mostly in these days summaries, but I can confirm that

 3     this happened.  And I mean the events as described in 1, and 2, and 3,

 4     et cetera.

 5        Q.   If we look at paragraph 2, he refers to attacking ABiH, that's

 6     Muslim Army, and UN positions, shelling the enclave and suppressing

 7     DutchBat through intimidation by using artillery, mortars, and MLRS,

 8     overhead compound Potocari with over 200 soldiers.

 9             First of all, what's MLRS stand for, Colonel?

10        A.   Multiple launch rocket system.  It's a system with - what do you

11     call that? - pipes on it where rockets are in and they are able to give,

12     this type, as I remember well, eight rockets at a time, which covers an

13     area of 400 by 400 metres in a devastating way, for soft targets, of

14     course.  Is that too military technical or is that an explanation?

15        Q.   I think somebody will let you know if it's too much.

16        A.   Perhaps it's a modern version of the old RussianKatyushas, some

17     people know that.  Stalinorgel or Stalin organ they called it in the

18     Second World War.

19        Q.   Okay?

20        A.   Perhaps that makes it clear what I mean.

21        Q.   Now, Colonel Karremans goes on and he says:

22             "Most of my OPs have been shot by mortars."

23        A.   That's correct.

24        Q.   "BSA does exactly know what they are doing, until how far they

25     can go.  They do execute their operations according to a predominated and

Page 3341

 1     well-organised plan."

 2             Based on your observations, the information you are receiving,

 3     your experience there at the time, what is Colonel Karremans saying here?

 4     What is he communicating to the higher command?

 5        A.   He is communicating that, to his conviction and mine, it was a

 6     co-ordinated plan and there were patterns recognisable in firing.  It was

 7     clear that they were firing and shooting at the area of the HQ for

 8     intimidation, which happened in the same time as shelling our OPs, and

 9     that can't be incidental or something, that must have been co-ordinated

10     and ordered.

11        Q.   And when he refers to "until how far they can go," what is he

12     talking about there and what do you understand that to mean?

13        A.   Probably -- but as I don't know because I don't know what his --

14     the reasons or his arguments were to say this, but it is an assumption

15     what I'm doing now.  I think that he meant that, in this day then, we

16     already knew that the BSA had quite a lot of artillery mortars, and that

17     they were trying to give just that amount of fire to immobilise DutchBat

18     and to try to make us prepared to surrender or to stop fighting or to

19     stop opposing them.  I think that is what he meant.  But again, we didn't

20     discuss this and I have to try to find arguments why he said that.  But

21     that is what I see as a reason for this remark.

22        Q.   In paragraph 3, he writes that:

23             "Yesterday at 1400 hours, OP F, Foxtrot, did receive another

24     three hits by T-55, while ABiH positions were already left due to heavy

25     fighting and have been disabled."

Page 3342

 1             What does that refer to?

 2        A.   Well, in fact, I said that about Echo, the first time that the

 3     ABiH left the positions on our flanks without telling us so.  This is the

 4     second time they did that.  And so the OP Foxtrot was, as we call it, in

 5     the air, alone, on the top of a hill, in sight for every weapons system

 6     the VRS could bring up.

 7        Q.   And do you recall what effect that direct tank firing --

 8        A.   Yeah, the northern part of the defence wall, north-eastern part

 9     of the defence wall was blown away, so they were in the open.

10        Q.   And if we could go to page 2 of this document, sir.  If we look

11     at paragraph 6, we see a reference to the Swedish Shelter Project in the

12     south being shelled.  Is that what you were talking about a few moments

13     ago?

14        A.   Yes.  That's the same project I was talking about, yes.

15        Q.   And in paragraph 7 under the heading "Commander's Assessment,"

16     Colonel Karremans refers to the VRS taking positions around Zeleni Jadar

17     and what he expects them to do next, and he says, "I did express these

18     concerns already last month."

19             Does that reference to expressing his concerns last month refer

20     to any particular report, to your knowledge?

21        A.   Not to my knowledge, but again we talked about that before, the

22     increase of close firing and pressure and, well, violence at the VRS site

23     was not direct reason for us to think they would attack the -- on short

24     term attack the enclave, but we thought that the situation was

25     deteriorating.  And I think he -- without any doubt, he reported that to

Page 3343

 1     the higher echelon, and that's what he is referring to.

 2        Q.   And on the transcript, I note that what is written here says,

 3     "close firing and pressure and violence at the VRS site."  Is that what

 4     you meant to say or did you mean to say something else than at the VRS

 5     site?

 6        A.   Well, it's strange to say, but he meant probably by the VRS, but

 7     he wrote at the VRS site.  But this is what I meant to say, yes.

 8        Q.   Okay.  Now, paragraph 10, Colonel Karremans says that:

 9             "Using close air support, CAS, in all possible ways is, in my

10     opinion, not feasible yet.  It will provoke the BSA in such a way that

11     both Srebrenica itself and OPs and compounds will be targeted by all

12     means."

13             Then he refers to:

14             "Especially the MLRS north of OP P, Papa, the MLRS within

15     Bratunac, and all their artillery and mortars will launch their missiles

16     and rounds at fixed targets.  Unless these weapons systems could be

17     eliminated in once, which is hardly impossible."

18             Can you explain whether you and Colonel Karremans had discussions

19     about what is contained in this paragraph, and if you could expand on

20     what this paragraph means a little bit for the Trial Chamber, please,

21     especially in regards to what you were facing at this period during the

22     VRS attack?

23        A.   Having read it completely now, I think it's based on advice I

24     gave.  I happened to be close air support specialist for armored infantry

25     brigade.  And what he referring to is that it's great to have an

Page 3344

 1     aeroplane destroy one tank, but the consequence will be that the VRS will

 2     use all its artillery to respond, so the only way to do this is take

 3     their hardware, their artillery and their tanks, as far as we knew where

 4     they were, take them out, then close air support is evident again.  And

 5     that's -- probably we'll come to that, that's the story of the

 6     air-strike, why we gave later the advice and asked for an air-strike,

 7     it's an air request where we gave all the targets we knew with the

 8     request to wipe them out in a short period.

 9             To make clear what I mean, if there are 30 guns, artillery pieces

10     or mortars or whatever, and you take just one out, the other will respond

11     and fire increasingly with the same damage.  So it's little use to take

12     out just that one piece.  The VRS had, compared to us, an overwhelming

13     amount of artillery and we, ourselves, didn't have weapons systems to

14     cope with that.  We couldn't attack them because they were out of sight

15     and it didn't have anything to reach them.  So the only way then to

16     neutralise the plus and fire-power the VRS had compared to us, is take

17     all their hardware, all their artillery you know of, take them out in one

18     big blow and then you are pretty successful in getting even -- more or

19     less even amounts of fire-power at our side and the VRS side.

20             I hope I made myself clear because it's getting a bit technical,

21     but I can't help that.

22        Q.   Let's --

23        A.   Sorry, but the sum and effect what he says here is, close air

24     support is not feasible yet, we shoot, do an air-strike, take all their

25     hardware out, and then when they come with a single tank or some tanks or

Page 3345

 1     what, then we can use close air support.  And that, I suppose, is based

 2     on a discussion he had with me about air support.  I hope I made myself

 3     clear.

 4        Q.   You referred to the term "forward air controller."  Just briefly,

 5     what is that?

 6        A.   There are a lot of possibilities to oppose the -- your enemy with

 7     air support.  One of them is close air support, what that does mean is

 8     that the enemies came quite close to your own positions, so to prevent

 9     the pilots of making mistakes, and by mistakes I mean attack own troops

10     and not the enemy, there's an observer who has contact with the plane and

11     leads him to that target.  And that's called a forward air controller.

12     The other system is battle-field air interdiction, and that is what we

13     meant later on with the air-strike.  Then their own troops can't see the

14     target but know where it is, and the pilot finds it himself.

15             MR. THAYER:  Let's take a look at a map, and is P00104, please.

16     This is page 8, please, of the map book.  If we could scroll down and if

17     it's possible to blow up the purple ring area that's marked with the

18     letters a little bit, maybe centre that if we could in the -- blow up and

19     centre it a little bit in the screen.  Perfect.  Great, thank you.

20        Q.   Sir, I think we'll all agree what we are looking at is a map that

21     shows the locations of the UN OPs; correct?

22        A.   That's correct.

23        Q.   I'm going to ask you to do something a little probably imprecise

24     for your taste, but if you could take the pen that's connected to the

25     computer there, the Trial Chamber has seen now various references in your

Page 3346

 1     testimony and the documents to these weapons systems, those VRS weapons

 2     systems that were located to the north of the Charlie Company compound at

 3     Potocari, the UN base in Potocari, near OP Papa, I think you said.  Can

 4     you just draw some lines to indicate where these weapons systems were and

 5     what their line of fire was, whether it was a direct line or indirect

 6     line of fire.  You referred in your testimony, for example, to not

 7     wanting the refugees to enter the front of the compound because you were

 8     afraid that they would be fired upon.  If you could just identify the

 9     locations of those weapons systems, maybe with a 1, 2, and 3, and define

10     which each was?

11        A.   I'll try.  There was a high edge here, that is, I'll try,

12     number 1, being the anti-tank gun sitting in a saddle on that high ridge,

13     having view and possibility and did fire like this.  But again, it's

14     pretty inaccurate what I'm doing now.  Directly northwest of it was the

15     position that, I'll number that 2.

16             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness kindly speak into the

17     microphone.  Thank you.

18             THE WITNESS:  Sorry.  I leaned forward too much.  Position 2 is

19     one of the positions the main battle tank had, the T-55, but that

20     switched positions oftentimes, which is usual.  But that is the initial

21     position, and the multiple launch rocket system was around here, as far

22     as we know.  The tank, the number 1 and number 2 had a view and a reach

23     or a fire zone more or less given on the map by the red lines.  And the

24     multiple launch rocket system is a system which fires indirectly.  As far

25     as I know, the reach of that system was, in fact, the complete enclave.

Page 3347

 1             MR. THAYER:

 2        Q.   And you've indicated that MLRS system with a circle; is that

 3     correct?

 4        A.   Yes.

 5        Q.   Just for the record.

 6        A.   I'll put 3 in it.

 7        Q.   Okay.  Thank you.

 8        A.   There you go.

 9        Q.   All right.

10        A.   But we didn't know the exact position.  We extracted that from

11     the times that he fired.  So on hearing of the firing, we guessed his

12     position.  It's somewhere in that area.  We didn't see the thing actually

13     because it was behind that high ridge.

14        Q.   All right.  Thank you, Colonel.

15             MR. THAYER:  I think we are done with this.  If we could save it

16     and I would tender this exhibit at this time, Mr. President.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  This marked map will be received.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P627.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  And I take the opportunity to do something that I

20     forgot when you tendered several documents with this witness.  The

21     documents P606, P608, P610, P618, and P619 have no translation yet.  So

22     these will be marked pending translation.

23             We must have our first break now, I think, and during the break,

24     the system shall be restarted so that have we no longer any problems with

25     it.

Page 3348

 1             We resume at 11.00.

 2                           --- Recess taken at 10.37 a.m.

 3                           --- On resuming at 11.02 a.m.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, Mr. Thayer.

 5             MR. THAYER:  Thank you, Mr. President.  Two quick issues.  First

 6     is, we will be able to have our witnesses here, given the change in the

 7     schedule.  We might have to change the order around, because of flights

 8     and so forth, but it will be the same witnesses and we'll be able to fill

 9     the time.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The Chamber is very grateful for that.

11             MR. THAYER:  Number two is, I'm mindful of the time I estimated

12     for this witness and I've already exceeded it.  I've reduced some of the

13     areas I had for Colonel Franken further, but I do seek the Court's

14     permission for some additional time with Colonel Franken.  I think some

15     of these issues are, I hope, helpful to the Trial Chamber, and I'd like

16     to continue with the areas I have to cover with him.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Could you give an indication about the time.

18             MR. THAYER:  I think it's going to be another half an hour,

19     Mr. President.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  This seems not to be a problem.

21             MR. THAYER:  Thank you.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Please proceed.

23             MR. THAYER:

24        Q.   Now, good morning again, Colonel.  You testified about the direct

25     firing by this T-55 tank at OP Foxtrot, blowing away its defence wall.

Page 3349

 1     Again, you spoke about the situation at OP Echo a month earlier.  Let me

 2     ask you again, with respect to this direct firing by the tank, given your

 3     experience as a trained infantry officer, is there any way that

 4     OP Foxtrot was fired at accidently by the VRS on that occasion?

 5        A.   Absolutely not.  The distance that Tango 55 from the OP was about

 6     150, 200 metres.  Alas, we didn't have means to deal with that tank

 7     because I didn't have any anti-tank weapons anymore.  But from a distance

 8     of about 150 up to 200 metres, on an OP which is completely in the open,

 9     without any targets in the area, it can't be by accident.  That would be

10     nonsense.

11        Q.   Did you request close air support or air support of any kind that

12     day, Colonel?

13        A.   On Foxtrot we did again, yes, because we did that many times,

14     but -- and I don't know what excuse there was on this occasion, but we

15     didn't get it.  There were several reasons given by the UN why air

16     support was not possible.

17        Q.   Just briefly, what were some of those reasons, sir?

18        A.   There were no planes available.  They didn't consider it as an

19     attack or a heavy attack enough to justify air support.  The other reason

20     I got was that, to their opinion, my own infantry and the Serb infantry

21     were mixed, so air support was impossible, which was nonsense, et cetera.

22     Reasons like that, sir.

23        Q.   And again, what was your justification for requesting air support

24     at that time?

25        A.   More or less the same reasons.  Direct attack on a UN unit, Serbs

Page 3350

 1     entering the enclave, well, that were the main reasons and that coped

 2     with the conditions the UN had for air support.

 3        Q.   And I think we are all agreed that shortly after that direct fire

 4     at the OP Foxtrot, Private Van Renssen was killed by ABiH fire.  Can you

 5     tell the Trial Chamber why DutchBat didn't request any kind of air

 6     support with respect to the Muslim forces?

 7        A.   The killing of Private Van Renssen was when OP Foxtrot withdrew

 8     to his base again, being B Company in Srebrenica.  The fact that ABiH

 9     fired at DutchBat couldn't be seen as a real attack.  Perhaps I should

10     explain that.  ABiH had massive disciplinary problems.  Local commanders

11     did exactly what they would and not what the division said.  It led even

12     to us picking up the Chief of Staff of the 28th Division, brought him

13     into the line of fighting to get his local commanders to reason.  So this

14     was a tragedy, in fact, but we saw it as an incident because there was

15     not -- you couldn't speak of an organised attack or whatever.  It was,

16     alas, a BiH, more or less, soldier who went bananas.

17        Q.   Now, other than the OP structures themselves, you've described

18     damage to the watch-tower, the observation tower, the defence wall

19     getting blown away on another one.  Did DutchBat lose any particular

20     pieces of equipment to direct VRS firing?

21        A.   Yes.  As far as I recollect, one or two unarmed vehicles, jeeps,

22     and three APCs.  That's correct, three APCs, yes.

23        Q.   I want to show you another document, Colonel.

24             MR. THAYER:  This is P602.  I've been told by our language people

25     that both the English and the B/C/S translations which we have and are

Page 3351

 1     trying to improve are a little rough.

 2        Q.   So what I'd like to ask to you do, Colonel, is simply to read --

 3             MR. THAYER:  If we could have the Dutch original on the screen.

 4     It's a pretty short document.

 5        Q.   If I could ask to you simply read the essential text of this

 6     document and explain to the Trial Chamber what it's about.

 7        A.   That is information for Captain Groen, being the commander of

 8     B Company, the company stationed in the south part and his base camp in

 9     the city of Srebrenica.  And that concerned a message we got from the

10     BSA, sorry, VRS and an ultimatum we got from the VRS and a UN reaction

11     with an ultimatum to the VRS.  Why in writing?  Because I was pretty busy

12     in the location of our headquarters so I couldn't go in the direction of

13     the captain, and I wouldn't like to use the command net radio

14     communications we had for messages like this because he was busy leading

15     his company, and then you don't interfere with messages like this on his

16     command net.  It comes to the fact that the other commanders were by

17     hand, they were all stationed with their HQs in Potocari, quite next to

18     my own HQ, so I could tell them, and Captain Groen, commander B Company,

19     had to be informed in this way.

20        Q.   If I could ask you to just translate what you've written here in

21     this in this message to the captain with respect to the VRS ultimatum?

22     What was the ultimatum here that you wrote?

23        A.   Well, the VRS gave us a message by radio saying, The UN did not

24     or doesn't disarm the ABiH so we will do that as of 11, 600 hours.  11 is

25     the date, 600 hours is 6 o'clock in the morning.  Plus 48 hours.

Page 3352

 1     Civilians, soldiers of ABiH, so Muslim soldiers, and DutchBat, turn in

 2     their weapons and leave the enclave through Yellow Bridge.  Yellow Bridge

 3     is a location in the north of the enclave, the entrance of the enclave

 4     next to that Observation Post Papa you saw before on the map.  The

 5     reaction of the UN, you want that as well?

 6        Q.   Please.

 7        A.   The UN then sent ultimatum to the VRS.  VRS is to withdraw after

 8     the lines -- behind the lines of Morillon, being our UN border I

 9     described before, with [indiscernible] it says the old enclave as we --

10     that looked as we came in.  "Every VRS attack has to be stopped.  As of

11     600 hours tomorrow morning the withdrawal has to start.  If not," the

12     text stops.

13        Q.   Okay.  I think what happened in the last trial was either we

14     didn't have the second page or we forgot about the second page but we

15     didn't talk about the second page, although you talked about the

16     substance of the second page.

17             MR. THAYER:  So if we could go to page 2 of the original Dutch,

18     which hopefully will be in the system.  There we go.

19        Q.   I think at the top it says:  "If not," and if you could translate

20     for us.

21        A.   "Massive air attacks on all VRS targets in and around the

22     enclave.  Mission as of 600 hours, take cover."  It's a normal procedure

23     when you get massive air support, then you have to -- everything that is

24     not necessary outside, you want them in cover.  "Vehicles without the

25     compounds marked."  Marked is with orange flags on the top of a vehicle,

Page 3353

 1     so all the pilots can recognise own troops.  That is a NATO procedure,

 2     and that is done again when close air support is delivered so the pilot

 3     can't make a mistake who is the enemy.

 4        Q.   Okay.

 5        A.   And then it's underlined, it's a mistake or repeating of the same

 6     message probably printed and there is a cross through it, but it's the

 7     same text as at page 1.

 8        Q.   And this refers to --

 9        A.   Sorry, I forgot one.  There's a note then writ:  "Your mission to

10     defend the city is still evident."

11        Q.   And the original VRS ultimatum spoke about, as you said, by 0600

12     on the 11th of July, plus 48 hours, everybody leaves.  So what day did

13     you send this message to the captain?

14        A.   Oh, that's good question, just try to recollect that.  I suppose

15     it is the 10th.

16        Q.   Okay.

17             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, I would tender P602 at this time.  Is

18     that already in?  That's one of the original documents.  Being redundant,

19     I'll withdraw that request, Mr. President.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.  But perhaps you can tell us if

21     there's an English translation?

22             MR. THAYER:  There is.  There is an English translation, again

23     though it's -- I'm being told by our language people that it's a little

24     rough, so we'll get a better one and upload that as soon as possible, and

25     it's being worked on.

Page 3354

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  In that case we should mark it for

 2     identification, pending English translation.

 3             MR. THAYER:  And I guess technically, Mr. President, page 2 of

 4     this document was not part of, from what I can see, the original document

 5     in Popovic.  So maybe I need to formally tender it now just to be on the

 6     safe side.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The second page will be part of this document.

 8             MR. THAYER:

 9        Q.   Colonel, during these events, this VRS attack on the enclave,

10     things were clearly moving pretty quickly.  You are receiving a lot of

11     information, making a lot of decisions, making a lot of calls, receiving

12     a lot of information and reports.  How confused were you, was DutchBat,

13     about who was shooting at you?

14        A.   I was not confused about who was shooting at me.  There were some

15     incidents with BiH, but without shooting at us, where they didn't allow

16     us to withdraw or to move with our vehicles.  But the shooting was quite

17     clear to me it was done by the VRS, and to DutchBat as well, not only me.

18        Q.   And when Private van Renssen was killed, you knew that that was

19     by the BiH and not by anybody else, is that fair to say?

20        A.   That's correct.  That is correct.

21        Q.   How were your communications functioning during this period of

22     time?

23        A.   With my units, good.  At least the units that were not taken POW

24     by the VRS, but with my units, with my companies, it was perfect.  No

25     problem.  We had some problems with communications to the higher

Page 3355

 1     echelons, but they were not severe that we couldn't speak or for a longer

 2     time didn't have any communications to the UN.

 3        Q.   Now, you testified in Popovic that Mladic had announced that

 4     there would be separation of the men.  This was at transcript page 2496.

 5     When did you first hear, to the best of your recollection, that

 6     General Mladic had made this announcement?

 7        A.   Could have been the night of the 11th, when Colonel Karremans

 8     came back from his second meeting, but I'm sure I heard it on the debrief

 9     on the 12th, when he came back from his final meeting.  But I -- as far

10     as I recollect, I already knew about that the 11th, late.

11        Q.   And do you recall any particular ages that were mentioned, age

12     range of men that would be separated?

13        A.   Men from 16 up till 60.  1-6 till 6-0.

14        Q.   You've testified and we've spoken about today this

15     Colonel Jankovic, and I want to show you a photograph.  We are going to

16     do this on Sanction as opposed to e-court and just ask you if you

17     recognise any of the people in the picture.  If you can tell the

18     Trial Chamber who they are.

19             MR. THAYER:  And this, for the record, is P624.

20             THE WITNESS:  The right side is the -- by -- mentioned by you the

21     Colonel Jankovic, and the left side it's quite clear who he is.

22             MR. THAYER:  Your Honour, I would tender P624 at this time.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The witness, you didn't mention the name of that

24     man --

25             THE WITNESS:  Sorry, on the left side was Mladic.  Yes, sorry.

Page 3356

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.  It will be received.

 2             MR. THAYER:

 3        Q.   Did Colonel Jankovic ever tell you what his actual position was?

 4        A.   No, he did not.  He introduced himself as being the officer,

 5     again, from Pale.  They all said they came from Pale.  And his job was to

 6     coordinate and make arrangements for the withdrawal of DutchBat.

 7        Q.   Did you ever ask him to try to find out what his actual position

 8     was?

 9        A.   Of course I did, but I didn't get an answer.  Answers like, Well,

10     it's not evident, it's not important, my job now is clear, I hope,

11     et cetera.  Answers like that.  He never gave his correct position on

12     what staff or what function.

13        Q.   Now, from what command level did you understand Colonel Jankovic

14     to be from?

15        A.   Main Staff, sir.

16        Q.   And after the -- well, I'll withdraw that and save some time.

17             Did Colonel Jankovic ever provide you with information about what

18     was going on outside the compound?

19        A.   Well, he was the one that informed me that the -- the Muslims,

20     being parts of the 28th Division plus plus, and -- broke out of the

21     enclave in northern direction and had contact with the VRS.  And by that

22     occasion, he reported to me that they already had about 6.000 prisoners

23     taken.

24        Q.   Do you recall whether Colonel Jankovic referred to any particular

25     location when he referred to that break-out and taking those prisoners?

Page 3357

 1        A.   Yeah, well, not -- I do not remember a city or a town or

 2     something like that, but I know he said that they broke out from the

 3     enclave in northern direction and that's the information he gave.  I

 4     don't recollect villages or whatever.

 5        Q.   Let me just quote you a section from your OTP statement and see

 6     if this refreshes your recollection, whether you agree with it or not.

 7     This is from page 7 of the English and page 9 of the B/C/S.  We don't

 8     need to put it up on e-court but it's P607 if anybody wants to check.

 9     You say in that statement that:

10             "Jankovic told me that the BH Army had tried to get through

11     Kasaba and then further on to the north in the direction of Zvornik."

12             Does that refresh your recollection about the location?

13        A.   Yes, that sounds a bell but I couldn't remember at the very

14     moment.

15        Q.   I want to turn your attention now, Colonel, to the issue of the

16     evacuation of the wounded people who remained at the Potocari compound

17     and some of whom were also at the hospital in Bratunac.

18             MR. THAYER:  And in that connection, if we could see P626,

19     please.

20        Q.   What we have here is a report from Colonel Jankovic to the

21     Main Staff intelligence and security sector.  I want to focus your

22     attention on paragraph 1.  Colonel Jankovic refers to the completion of

23     the removal of the entire Muslim population, and then he refers to the

24     numbers of wounded who remained.  Do you see where it says:

25             "A list of names has been taken from the UNPROFOR."

Page 3358

 1        A.   Yes.

 2        Q.   Can you comment on that at all, Colonel?  Do you know anything

 3     about a list of the names of wounded?

 4        A.   Yes, because we tried to get them out by UN means which was a

 5     NORMEDCOY, a Norwegian unit being in the area of Tuzla who was supposed

 6     to get the wounded out.  We had to start a procedure of asking permission

 7     for a permission of a convoy again and an absolute demand was then that

 8     there were lists with the exact names of every person, being UN member or

 9     not, in that convoy.  That's the reason why they had that list.

10        Q.   Now, if we go down a little further in that paragraph, it reads:

11             "The deputy commander of the battalion has told me that he will

12     try to arrange this with international humanitarian organizations so that

13     their medical treatment can continue in the FRY."

14             Now, and we see immediately after that that Colonel Jankovic is

15     recommending that they -- those wounded be transferred to Zvornik to get

16     treatment there.  Why did you want to arrange for an international

17     organisation to take over those wounded?

18        A.   Because I wanted them without the grip or influence of the VRS,

19     and the international organisation was because the UN units, Norwegian

20     Medical Company, tried to reach us but they did not succeed crossing the

21     CL in their area -- sorry, confrontation line in their area, whether that

22     was by fire or whatever.  But I was reported that it was impossible for

23     the UN unit to come and evacuate those wounded.  As I said before, I

24     didn't want them to come into the hands of the VRS.  The only solution

25     was try the ICRC to get them out, International Red Cross.  And through

Page 3359

 1     MSF I finally succeeded in arranging that.  MSF is Medecins Sans

 2     Frontieres, an NGO.

 3        Q.   Why didn't you want those wounded to be in the custody of the

 4     VRS, Colonel?

 5        A.   Experience we had.  We tried to bring the wounded out during the

 6     evacuation.  We had a hell of a lot of trouble at the crossing point in

 7     the area of Kladanj.  People were beaten, bandages were taken from the

 8     people to see whether they were really wounded or not, and they were sent

 9     back.  That is where a couple of them landed in Bratunac because the

10     Serbs took them out, and just a few of them, of which one died already,

11     came back to the camp.  So having that experience, I absolutely didn't

12     want those wounded in the hands of the VRS.  I hope that's an answer.

13        Q.   And was there -- did you have any concerns for their overall

14     physical safety at that point, and if so, what was the basis of the

15     concern?

16        A.   Well, that is what I tried to explain.  Seeing -- having

17     experience how the VRS handled those wounded, I didn't have a reason to

18     believe that it would be different if I handed them over now, and I

19     wanted those people in security.  So the only way to do that is bring

20     them out of -- through the VRS area, out of that area, and it could only

21     be done by the ICRC, obviously.

22        Q.   And by that time, on or about the 17th of July, had you received

23     any reports of executions or other atrocities that had been committed by

24     the VRS?

25        A.   Yes, proven were nine dead in the vicinity of our main gate, west

Page 3360

 1     of the so-called White House, a building right in front of our main gate.

 2     We had a report of the execution of one man by two VRS soldiers in the

 3     area of the bus station, just out of the parameter of the UN at that

 4     time.  And there were, of course, all kinds of rumours but not proven.

 5     Every time when we got a report out of the civil population, we tried or

 6     we went out to see whether executions had been performed or there were

 7     dead, but we never found them.  And then again, it was not that far

 8     because we were not allowed or it was impossible to go out, by occasion,

 9     400 or 500 metres out of the compound because then our patrols were

10     blocked by the VRS.

11        Q.   Now, if we go back up to this first paragraph.  Colonel Jankovic

12     writes that:

13             "A doctor from the UNPROFOR has stayed in the hospital in

14     Bratunac at the request of the hospital staff, to make sure that the

15     patients are properly treated.  I intend to send him away tomorrow, under

16     the pretext that his help is not necessary."

17             Do you have any knowledge, sir, whether that actually happened on

18     or about the 13th of July?

19        A.   It did not.  That happened -- no, he was not sent away, but the

20     wounded he was supposed to watch over.  That's why we left him there.  I

21     don't know anything about a request of the hospital staff.  We left him

22     there to watch over the wounded to be sure that they were treated

23     properly.  Later than 13th of July, and I don't recollect exactly the

24     date, he was called away for a lunch, invited for a lunch with the

25     hospital staff.  And when he came back the wounded were gone.  That made

Page 3361

 1     his job there oblivious.

 2        Q.   You testified about this meeting that was led by Colonel Jankovic

 3     on the 17th of July, regarding the evacuation of these wounded.  Is it

 4     fair to say that this was sort of a two-part process that day; the first

 5     part having to do with identifying the wounded who were actually going to

 6     be permitted to leave and then a second part dealing with something else?

 7        A.   In fact, the reason for that -- that meeting was to transfer the

 8     wounded to the ICRC and arrange or coordinate the actual leave of the

 9     wounded of the VRS area and, of course, my compound.  Nikolic,

10     Major Nikolic, Bratunac Brigade, insisted on checking the wounded,

11     whether there were soldiers amongst them, and he demanded that they were

12     then -- should have been -- wrongly, sorry, I correct.  That they should

13     be handled like POWs.

14             ICRC consented that inspection.  I sent some of my soldiers

15     along.  And in the time that inspection took place, Jankovic presented to

16     my surprise, a declaration which he spoke of before, a declaration in

17     which the representative of the civil population, in this case being

18     Mr. Mandzic, declared that everything went according to rules and nothing

19     happened during the evacuation.

20        Q.   Okay.  We'll look at that in just a moment.

21             MR. THAYER:  Your Honour, first I'd like to tender P626, which is

22     the report of Colonel Jankovic.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.  And at this point in time,

24     I would like to take you back to a tendered photograph, P624.  I was told

25     that this whole document contains 105 pages.

Page 3362

 1             MR. THAYER:  Yes, Mr. President.  We are at this time seeking

 2     only to tender that one photograph.  I think at a later time, you will

 3     hear testimony from one of our investigators about how that book was put

 4     together.  For the time being, we would tender just that page

 5                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  To make the situation very clear, it should be

 7     uploaded as a single document, this photo, and it will be received with a

 8     separate document number.

 9             MR. THAYER:  Okay.  In that case, Your Honour, I think what we'll

10     do, it might be easier, if we could, just to MIF it and then wait until

11     we get the whole thing in evidence through the investigator so we don't

12     have little bits and pieces with different numbers.  If it's all the same

13     to the Trial Chamber, if we just MIF it for the time being, and then when

14     we get the whole thing in it will be part of that exhibit.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I'm told that it is already marked for

16     identification.

17             MR. THAYER:  Okay.  Then we'll just status quo.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you, please carry on.

19             MR. THAYER:  Ms. Stewart has let me know that I also neglected to

20     tender P621, which was the 9 July report sent by Colonel Karremans to his

21     superior command, and Colonel Franken looked at that and testified about

22     that a little earlier.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received as P621.

24             MR. THAYER:

25        Q.   Now, Colonel --

Page 3363

 1             MR. THAYER:  If we could look at P28, please.

 2        Q.   You just told us that Colonel Jankovic shows up at this meeting

 3     for the evacuation, to arrange the evacuation of these wounded and he

 4     produces a declaration.  And if we could take a look at it, I don't want

 5     to go over it in much detail since it's in the Popovic transcript, but

 6     it's dated the 17th of July.  That's four days after the last of the

 7     population had been removed; is that correct?

 8        A.   That is correct.

 9        Q.   We see here --

10             MR. THAYER:  If we could scroll down just a little bit.

11     Actually, if we can go to the next page in English.  I see that this has

12     been -- and the page after that.  There should be a version that you

13     signed, I can see it's been uploaded in a slightly different order.  If

14     we can go to the next page, please, in English.  Okay.  Let's try

15     65 ter 20 because that might have the full version.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I'm told, Mr. Thayer, that is this is exactly the

17     same document.

18             MR. THAYER:  With the same number of pages, Madam Usher?

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes.

20             MR. THAYER:  Okay.  So, unfortunately, we've not uploaded every

21     pages of this document.

22        Q.   In any event, then we can see here on the unsigned version that

23     it says on Jankovic's declaration:

24             "No incidents were provoked by any side during the evacuation,

25     and the Serbian side observed all the regulations of the Geneva

Page 3364

 1     Conventions and the International Law of War."

 2             And you added something in your own handwriting:  "As far as

 3     convoys actually escorted by UN forces are concerned."

 4             What did you try to achieve by writing that?

 5        A.   The text preliminary to my handwritten sentence was, in fact,

 6     nonsense because it was not correct.  Colonel Jankovic gave to me that

 7     the signing of this declaration was, well, more or less a condition to

 8     get the wounded out properly.  So by adding this sentence in, to my

 9     opinion, I made this document worthless because I say all the, I would

10     almost say, bullshit mentioned before does only concern the convoys

11     escorted by UN forces, and as you know by former testimony, we were only

12     able to escort the first and second convoy.  And that is correct, the

13     first and second convoy nothing happened.  So that is what I meant by

14     adding this sentence because there were incidents we couldn't escort

15     because we couldn't see happened to the people.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer, now we have the second page in B/C/S

17     on the screen with three signatures.  Perhaps you can clarify the

18     handwritten portion above the signatures.  It seems to be in B/C/S.

19             MR. THAYER:  Yes.  Mr. President, there is a version that was

20     translated on the spot, I think as Colonel Franken has testified, that he

21     wrote in English on -- this language that we see translated on the right,

22     and then that was in turn translated into the B/C/S at the time on this

23     copy that you see here.  What I was hoping to be able to show

24     Your Honours was the copy of the English translation, which was done at

25     the time that Colonel Franken wrote his sentence in English but we don't

Page 3365

 1     have that right now, but we can certainly get that soon enough for you.

 2     So that's what we see here.

 3        Q.   And, Colonel Franken, can you comment on that all and is that

 4     accurate?  Or do you have anything to add?

 5        A.   I can't see whether the text in B/C/S is accurate but I can

 6     recognise my signing it, my name, and on the left on the side of that

 7     B/C/S page, and I know there's an English version that is a look-a-like,

 8     only in English.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  May I ask, who did this handwriting in the B/C/S

10     version?

11             THE WITNESS:  My interpreters.  To be brief about it and perhaps

12     for your information, Jankovic presented that declaration in B/C/S to me,

13     so I said, Well, I can't read that.  So I had my own UN interpreters

14     translate it in an English version, and then I added in handwriting that

15     sentence we spoke about and he wrote it in the B/C/S translation, the

16     same sentence, but in Bosnian Croatian language.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

18             Mr. Thayer, please carry on.

19             MR. THAYER:

20        Q.   Colonel, you mentioned a few moments ago that you tried to make

21     this declaration worthless by --

22        A.   That's correct.

23        Q.   -- by adding the language that you added.  Whether you added

24     anything to this declaration or not, and let's just focus, for example,

25     on this reference to the Serbs -- the Serbian side observing the

Page 3366

 1     regulations of the Geneva Conventions and international law.  Based on

 2     what you observed and what you had reported to you at the time, how does

 3     this invocation of the Geneva Conventions and the international law

 4     square with what you saw and what you had reported to you was happening

 5     at the time?

 6        A.   I could compress my comment to nonsense.  It's incorrect.  Some

 7     of the -- I can give some examples.  We had those nine deaths, we had the

 8     execution at the -- proven execution at the bus station.  The time my

 9     patrols could get into the house because we want to check how they were

10     treated, we cut some men loose who were hung to the ceiling at their

11     thumbs, we cut them loose and then stayed around.  I had my UNMOs, sorry,

12     United Nations Military Observers, who were not under my command but

13     there was a team of UNMOs within the enclave, I had them check at least

14     how many men went in and how many went out.  There was -- in fact they

15     were treated badly.  I gave you one example.  And when we tried to

16     control that and to correct that, in the end or pretty soon we were

17     blocked by armed Serb soldiers, number about 40, who absolutely blocked

18     over the street our approach to that house.  So only these examples is

19     for me a reason to say that the declaration is incorrect.

20        Q.   Now, can you identify for the Trial Chamber the various issues

21     about which you complained to Colonel Jankovic?

22        A.   Yes.  I complained to Jankovic about the treatment of the men in

23     the White House, about the fact that we were not able to control that, to

24     be present, although we were -- initially we were allowed to escort and

25     to control the whole evacuation.  I complained about him -- to him about

Page 3367

 1     the robbing of my escort teams and the losing of weapons and vehicles.  I

 2     asked him why still there were not medical supplies allowed to be brought

 3     in, because we were out of it.  I asked him and complained about the fact

 4     that any logistic transport could take place now to improve the situation

 5     for the civil population as well because they needed water, for instance,

 6     and I didn't have any, or hardly.  Well, all these, probably there are a

 7     lot more of examples, but just for the record.  I complained and spoke to

 8     him or made him responsible for all things that went wrong in my opinion.

 9     And if the next question is did anything happen, no.  He said, I'll see

10     to it, I'll see in that.  Nothing happened.  One of his answers was,

11     Well, we are another army than your army, orders are not always followed

12     by everybody, and that's it.

13        Q.   Based on your interactions with him, Colonel, did you believe

14     that he didn't have the power to influence the situation?

15        A.   Well, his point of view was, I'm only here to coordinate the

16     withdrawal of DutchBat so all the other things is not my piece of cake

17     and I can inform the commanders doing that, but, yeah, I don't know

18     whether they do anything with it.  And I do not believe that if he really

19     wanted he couldn't.  There's a nice example where with one phone call he

20     had that ICRC truck pass the border within minutes, which meant to me

21     that he had influence.  He could obviously give orders which were

22     followed.

23        Q.   You testified in Popovic about seeing Nesib Mandzic, one of the

24     Muslims who had been selected to represent the community during the

25     meetings with General Mladic, after he returned from the second Fontana

Page 3368

 1     meeting in the evening of 11 July and that he was in a state of panic.

 2     Do you recall the -- one of the other representatives, a woman whose

 3     first name was Camila?

 4        A.   Yes, I did.

 5        Q.   Can you tell the Trial Chamber what happened to her, basically

 6     after this?

 7        A.   She was one of the three members of that committee that should

 8     and would represent the civil population, the Muslims in our area.  And

 9     on my request, that committee was registering the men within the UN

10     parameter.  We spoke of that before.  When she came out of our camp to

11     register the men in the area of the bus station, she was provoked or

12     handled by the VRS in that way that she -- well, she broke down.  After

13     that she was a patient in the hospital as well.  She was completely,

14     yeah, what do you say, off the world.  She was intimidated in such a way

15     that she really broke down, completely.  And she went, in the end, out as

16     a patient when the battalion went out.

17        Q.   Just a couple of more questions for you, Colonel.  In connection

18     with your testimony in the Slobodan Milosevic case, do you recall

19     reviewing a large stack of UNMO and UNPROFOR reports dated 6 July through

20     the 18th of July?

21        A.   Yes, I saw them, yes, yes.

22        Q.   And do you recall at that time reading them and being asked to

23     indicate which -- whether each report appeared to you to be authentic and

24     whether each report accurately described the events?

25        A.   As far as I remember, they were correct, yes.

Page 3369

 1             MR. THAYER:  Let me show you P623, please.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The Defence would kindly ask that

 4     we be given a reference as to where these excerpts are in the Milosevic

 5     transcript.  Thank you.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

 7             MR. THAYER:  I'll have to get back to the Court to give you that

 8     exact cite about where it is in the Milosevic transcript.  I don't think

 9     there's any question that in connection with that case, Colonel Franken

10     was shown these UNMO reports and confirmed, in this document that we see,

11     its contents, but I'll get back to you.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  No dispute about that --

13             MR. THAYER:  There's no dispute about that --

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  -- but it is necessary to have the reference.

15             MR. THAYER:  I'll see if I can get the reference for you.

16        Q.   Now, Colonel, we have here an itemisation of these UNMO reports

17     that you reviewed, and we can see your comments.  Are those your initials

18     in the lower right-hand corner?

19        A.   That's correct.

20             MR. THAYER:  And if we could go to the last page of the document.

21        Q.   Is that your signature there, sir?

22        A.   That's my signature, yes.

23        Q.   Okay.  Do you stand by the comments that you made and are

24     contained in this document about these UNMO reports, sir?

25        A.   Yes.

Page 3370

 1             MR. THAYER:  Your Honour, I would tender P623 at this time.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received with this P number.

 3             MR. THAYER:

 4        Q.   Now lastly, Colonel, we have 65 ter 427.

 5             MR. THAYER:  If we could see that on the screen, please.  Okay.

 6        Q.   Do you see a document that's popped up on the right?

 7        A.   I do.

 8        Q.   Okay.  And what is that, sir?

 9        A.   That's the declaration presented to me and signed by me on the

10     17th of July, during that meeting originally meant for the coordination

11     of the transfer of the wounded out of the area.

12        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.

13             MR. THAYER:  Your Honour, I would tender 427 at this time.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Do I take it that this is the same document now

15     with a signature of the witness on the English version; is that correct?

16             MR. THAYER:  Yes, we are talking about the same things, but this

17     is the English translation which wasn't included in the exhibit that was

18     uploaded into e-court previously.  We just have it for some reason under

19     a separate number.  They got split up.

20                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer, I was told that page 2 and 3 of this

22     document contain B/C/S text.  Could you please clarify that before we

23     receive it.

24             MR. THAYER:  Yes, why don't we -- just to make everything crystal

25     clear, let's forget about P28 for the moment.  Pretend we didn't see

Page 3371

 1     that, and we'll just proceed through 427 and we'll see if we can clarify

 2     to the Trial Chamber what documents we have here.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  And you are referring to 65 ter 427?

 4             MR. THAYER:  427, Mr. President, yes.

 5        Q.   So we've, I think, explained that this is the English translation

 6     which was done by your translator on the spot; is that correct, Colonel?

 7        A.   That is correct.

 8        Q.   And if we note here, if we look at the fourth paragraph, it's one

 9     of the larger ones that lists all the various participants, just for the

10     record and I'll tie this up in a minute, we have various individuals

11     listed, Mr. Simic, Davidovic, Vasic.  Then we see a reference to

12     General Krstic, corps security chief, Mr. Popovic, and then we have

13     listed here a Colonel Krstic.  I just note that for the record, we'll tie

14     that up in a second, as I said.  So we've got two references to a Krstic

15     in the English translation that was done by your interpreter; correct?

16        A.   That's correct.

17             MR. THAYER:  Okay.  Could we see the next page, please, and see

18     what we are looking at.

19        Q.   And now what we see here, obviously, is something that's not in

20     your language?

21        A.   No.

22        Q.   And we can see, if we look at the translation of this document,

23     which is to the left, in that big paragraph where there are a number of

24     names listed, we see in the B/C/S original of this declaration that we

25     have Mr. Vasic, General Krstic, Mr. Popovic, and then Colonel Kosoric.

Page 3372

 1     So instead of two Krstics in the original declaration which

 2     Colonel Jankovic presented to you, we have here Colonel Kosoric

 3     identified.  Do you see that, sir, in the translation?

 4        A.   I'm doing my best.  Yes, I see it.  Yes.  Okay.

 5        Q.   All right.  So I put it to you that what happened was, when your

 6     interpreter translated this document on the fly on the 17th of July, he

 7     simply instead of writing "Kosoric" in the English version that you

 8     signed, mistakenly repeated Krstic, and that's why we saw two Krstics in

 9     the first version that we looked at, the one that you signed.  Would you

10     accept that?  Does that make sense to you?

11        A.   Yeah, it does make sense, yes.

12        Q.   Okay.  All right.

13             MR. THAYER:  I think we are done with this document.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Are you tendering it now?

15             MR. THAYER:  Yes, Mr. President, I think we are ready to tender

16     that.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received, including the B/C/S part.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P628.

19                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

20             MR. THAYER:  Lastly, Mr. President, just to get back to you about

21     the citation in the Milosevic trial, just by way of background, in that

22     case Colonel Franken's testimony was introduced via 98 bis with

23     cross-examination.  So there was a dossier of documents that came in

24     associated with Colonel Franken and then he was made available for

25     cross-examination by Mr. Milosevic in that case.  So if we look at

Page 3373

 1     transcript page 28998 to 28999, we have the Prosecutor reviewing the

 2     contents of the dossier including, it's listed here as Exhibit 594, tab

 3     18, this document that has now been introduced as P623, Colonel Franken's

 4     comments authenticating the UNMO reports based on his experience.

 5             And again, I apologise, for exceeding the time.  I appreciate the

 6     Court's indulgence with that.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  And this concludes your examination-in-chief?

 8             MR. THAYER:  It does, Mr. President.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

10             Mr. Tolimir, now it's your turn.  No, before you get the floor,

11     Judge Mindua has a question for the witness.

12             JUDGE MINDUA:  [Interpretation] Yes, I do have a question.

13     Witness, I believe that your testimony is extremely important, like any

14     other, actually, but yours is extremely important.  You are a member of

15     UNPROFOR, the United Nations forces on the field when these events

16     unfolded, the events that this Trial Chamber must rule on.  You were a

17     seasoned infantry officer, you are a colonel now, and so as far as I'm

18     concerned, your approach as a military person is extremely important.  I

19     have three questions for you.

20             If we -- on today's transcript page 3, line 18, you mention

21     Colonel Jankovic who arrived on July 17th with Colonel or Major Nikolic,

22     and when Mr. Nikolic was touring the wounded, he was touring the wounded

23     to check who was a soldier or who was a war criminal among these wounded.

24     I don't really understand, you're a war criminal or a soldier?  How can

25     you explain this?

Page 3374

 1             THE WITNESS:  It's a matter of speaking.  The VRS, especially

 2     Mr. Nikolic, spoke of every ABiH soldier as a war criminal.  So there for

 3     him it's a synonym.  It's the same because he thought that every ABiH

 4     soldier being -- the enclave being demilitarised, there couldn't be

 5     soldiers.  So everyone who took up a weapon and did anything against the

 6     VRS was, in fact, an armed civilian and, by that, a war criminal because

 7     he was not authorised to use force in the direction or towards the VRS.

 8     But for him, in his way of speaking, it is the same.  We said soldiers,

 9     and he was keen on finding out all those war criminals who shot at or

10     fought with the VRS.  Is that enough an answer, sir?

11             JUDGE MINDUA:  [Interpretation] Thank you, yes.  Thank you.  A

12     second small question:  When the facts occurred, we have heard a number

13     of victims here in this courtroom and they sometimes regretted that the

14     UN forces were unable to protect the civilian population.  In the

15     transcript on page 6, line 17, and page 7, line 1, you say, and I find

16     this extremely interesting, you say, that the military position of your

17     observation posts was nonsense, was ridiculous.  The purpose of these

18     observation posts was just to show the presence of the UN and the flag of

19     the UN and just to show that you were present.

20             So I'm wondering the following:  Who decided on where these

21     observation posts should be located?  Was it military people in the UN or

22     political people?  Wasn't there a way to locate these observation posts

23     in a way that they would be seen but that, militarily wise, they could be

24     defended because later on, after soldier van Renssen was killed,

25     obviously there was a problem.  So how can you explain this, the location

Page 3375

 1     of these posts?

 2             THE WITNESS:  Before DutchBat III, being the battalion I belonged

 3     to, arrived, there were two other battalions in that area.  And they, the

 4     first battalion in fact determined where the OPs, observation posts, had

 5     to come.  And within the UN, what do you call that, order we had, we

 6     should deter by presence, and that is the motivation that the members of

 7     that first battalion put the OPs in these ridiculous spots.  Because in

 8     that time, nobody -- there was ceasefire agreements and obviously nobody

 9     thought of the possible event that there was a war again in that area.

10             Just for your information, we did expand the number of OPs as we

11     came there, we made three new ones, and they were positioned in another

12     way and dug in deeper and not on the soil, so that looked more like a

13     defensive position than the ones we had to take over from the former

14     battalions.  Does that answer your question, sir?

15             JUDGE MINDUA:  [Interpretation] Yes, thank you, I understand.

16     Thank you.  And my last question is the following.  Transcript page 10,

17     line 17 and 18.  You say once again, regarding the way the UN forces

18     operate, you say that the normal military intelligence did not work at

19     all, that you had no information, at least you didn't have the necessary

20     information coming from the UN as far as movement of troops is concerned,

21     or as far as anything coming from the Serbs.

22             Now, here is my question:  Your DutchBat, the DutchBat, your

23     battalion, I know normally that in NATO troop organisation or in all

24     US-type armies, there's always an intelligence side, you know, G2 for the

25     staff, and for the lower troops there's Bureau 2 or S2, that's the

Page 3376

 1     intelligence component to the forces.  So who do you blame here?  Was it

 2     because DutchBat didn't have a Bureau 2 or was it the entire UNPROFOR

 3     that did not have an intelligence component?

 4             THE WITNESS:  DutchBat did not have a Bureau 2 because the

 5     organisation of the battalion was given to us, ordered by us, but my G2

 6     officer, captain, and his sergeant major were in -- were part of the crew

 7     of the operations room.  He was one of the chiefs of the operations room

 8     and he did, on my order, his normal G2 work.  Problem was that within

 9     UNPROFOR we got so-called intelligence reports, but, well, I don't have

10     them anymore, but the only one with any content otherwise than on NTR,

11     November Tango Romeo, nothing to report, was a report that some special

12     unit of the VRS was moving from the Croatian area in the direction of

13     Srebrenica.  When I asked then, okay, where is he, what is his -- how is

14     he composed, it's nice that you tell me that Black Tigers or something or

15     coming down, what are they, how big are they, what arms do they have, do

16     you have any idea about their intention, I never got an answer.  Which

17     means, and that is what I said, there never was any information otherwise

18     that we could see from our static positions about the strength, the

19     components, and the weaponry of the VRS in our area.

20             When I was back in Holland, I saw that this information was

21     available on the very moment that it -- these events occurred.  There

22     were satellite photos of the most astonishing details, single guns of the

23     Serbs, the positions where they were, troops of soldiers gathered in a

24     wood, assembly areas, et cetera, et cetera.  That is why I said the

25     intelligence procedures and the intelligence within UNPROFOR did not

Page 3377

 1     work, or they had a reason not to give it to me, but that is ...

 2             JUDGE MINDUA:  [Interpretation] Thank you very much.  Thank you.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Judge Nyambe has another question.

 4             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Thank you very much.  I take you back to

 5     transcript page 39 and to your question put by Mr. Thayer about whether

 6     you added anything to this declaration or not.  Your answer is:  "I could

 7     surprise my comments to nonsense."  I don't know what the word "surprise"

 8     there means in the transcript.  It is incorrect.  Can you just explain to

 9     me exactly what you did to this document in the context of your answer

10     which you say, "I could surprise my comments to nonsense," which I mean

11     you are saying your comments were nonsense and the fact that you are

12     saying it is incorrect.

13             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour, I think surprise I -- used the word

14     "compress" and I take it we are talking about the declaration or the

15     agreement that was signed by me on the 7th of July, because I can't refer

16     to what you said to me, transcript page 39 --

17             JUDGE NYAMBE:  I can explain for you a little bit.  I'm

18     particularly referring to this part:

19             "No incidents were provoked by any side of the evacuation, and

20     the Serbian side observed all the regulations of the Geneva Conventions

21     and the International Law of War."

22             So this question is asked in the context of that addition to that

23     document.

24             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour, what I tried to say is that I could

25     comment every single point of the declaration but I tried to shorten it

Page 3378

 1     to a general comment, that what standing there, what was mentioned there

 2     or declared there was actually nonsense because it was not applicable.

 3     It was not the way the declaration says it was.  And probably I use the

 4     wrong word, sorry for that.  But that is why I said I could compress my

 5     comment to the word "nonsense," and that is exactly the reason why I did

 6     handwrite the sentence we spoke about.  I hope I gave an answer.  No.

 7             JUDGE NYAMBE:  To what are you referring to as being incorrect?

 8     The sentence you added or the document to which you added the sentence?

 9             THE WITNESS:  The document, Your Honour.  The content of the

10     document was incorrect and to make that clear, that that was my position,

11     I added that sentence.  And I already thought I made clear why was what

12     the argument.

13             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Thank you.

14             THE WITNESS:  I hope I answered your question.

15             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Yes, thank you.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Now, again, Mr. Tolimir, it's your turn.  Please,

17     cross-examination.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  I would

19     like to greet everyone present here, including the witness.  May the Lord

20     give peace to this courtroom, and I wish for this trial to be concluded

21     according to the God's will and not according to what I wish.

22             After we look at document P607, which is the statement given by

23     witness, I would like to put a few questions to him, so could we please

24     have that document on our screens.  Thank you.

25                           Cross-examination by Mr. Tolimir:

Page 3379

 1        Q.   [Interpretation] We can see here the statement given on the

 2     22nd and 27th September, 1995.  To whom did you give this statement?  Did

 3     you give it to members of the Dutch army, or did you give this statement

 4     to representatives of the International Tribunal, because there's no

 5     indication about that in this statement?

 6        A.   I'm just trying to read it, and seeing the fact that it was given

 7     within the military barracks in Holland, that would be probably given to

 8     the commission assigned by the Ministry of Defence after we came back to

 9     investigate the situation, or what happened in the enclave.  But that is

10     the only reason -- location where this statement was made, that is the

11     base of my conclusion, I should say.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

13             THE WITNESS:  Excuse me, because I gave that much statements that

14     I can't recognise it from paper where I give it, but that is logical.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

16             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, maybe just to save some time, if the

17     witness can be shown page 8 of the English and page 11 of the B/C/S, that

18     just might help move things along on this issue.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  If you may look at the witness acknowledgement on

20     the bottom of that page, perhaps you can identify the people you gave the

21     statement to.

22             THE WITNESS:  Yes, that more or less confirms me my previous

23     statement, that this statement was given to the committee that, on order

24     of the Ministry of Defence, did survey to the way of things in the

25     enclave when we returned, sir.

Page 3380

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

 2             Please carry on, Mr. Tolimir.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 4             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Franken.  It's clear now to whom you gave this

 6     statement.  It is important for us that we see that it's authentic, that

 7     you actually did give it, and that I can ask questions on the basis of

 8     that statement.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please look at page 2 in

10     Serbian, and I'd like to keep page 1 in English.  Thank you.  Thank you.

11             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   In the period while the DutchBat was deployed in Srebrenica, you

13     were deputy battalion commander of Colonel Karremans, and you were head

14     of the logistics as well, and all this is stated in the first paragraph

15     of your statement; is that correct?

16        A.   Correct.

17        Q.   Thank you.

18             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise to the interpreters.

20             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Please, can you tell us, when you took over the duty, had you

22     been briefed previously about the situation pertaining to the enclave?

23        A.   Yes, during the preparation of the battalion before we went

24     there, there was a weekly brief about the situation.  And I took over on

25     the 15th.

Page 3381

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Can you please tell us, had you received any specific

 2     information about deployment, arms, and locations where members of the

 3     VRS were, and things of that nature?  Thank you.

 4        A.   That information I got from DutchBat II, which was the battalion

 5     was -- we were -- that was there before us.  And we got some information

 6     about VRS, some brigade structures were recognised, and there was

 7     information about personnel or the liaisons with which we had to deal.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Can you please supplement this answer that you have

 9     given me by telling me whether you had any information about members of

10     the BH army, its members and the lines that they held?

11        A.   That is correct.  In fact, the same sort of information we knew

12     that the BiH had a brigade structure as well within the enclave.  We more

13     or less knew which brigade was operating in which zone, and we knew that

14     they still had about 4.000, 4500 rifle-like weapons, mostly the

15     Kalashnikov AK-47.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Can you please tell us, were you surprised by the

17     fact that you arrived in a demilitarised zone and that in spite of that,

18     there were two parties to the conflict and that they were both armed?

19        A.   No, I was not surprised because the information I already got in

20     Holland was that the ABiH was not completely demilitarised in the area.

21     I knew that.

22        Q.   Now, you said that they had brigades within their structures, you

23     knew their locations, and that they had about 4.500 people armed with

24     Kalashnikovs; is that correct?

25        A.   That's what I said, yes.

Page 3382

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us, according to what you knew, what was

 2     the strength of a BH brigade?

 3        A.   Well, they had not an organisation and not every brigade was as

 4     big as the other one.  A brigade more indicated that they had some kind

 5     of an area of responsibility and they called that a brigade.  I know of

 6     the units being responsible for the area around our HQ was not bigger

 7     than about 200, 300 men, but we never saw them together.  It was guessing

 8     and just extracting from pieces of information we got.  For instance, the

 9     brigade in the Bandera triangle, as we call it, it's the area in the

10     southwest of the enclave, was much stronger.  But how big exactly, we

11     don't know.  We didn't know, I should say.

12        Q.   Thank you.  When you mentioned this triangle, there were soldiers

13     of yours there who had been disarmed, we can deal with that later.

14     However, what is your assessment?  What was that force that took prisoner

15     100 of your soldiers?

16        A.   Just to be clear, I was one of those soldiers.  We were not

17     disarmed and we were not taken prisoner, but probably we come to that

18     later.

19             Your question was, what was that force that took prisoner of 100.

20     Well, they didn't take prisoner, but I think you mean what was the unit

21     in the Bandera triangle.  It was an area where we did not have freedom of

22     movement.  We tried to establish that on orders of Sector North-east, did

23     not succeed, and when we tried to push on, so do that more massively, the

24     UN withdrew his order and said, okay, leave it.

25             In that area, there was -- at the outside it looked like a more

Page 3383

 1     or less organised unit, and the leader of the -- the brigade commander,

 2     who I know by the name of Zulfo, well, that's a fact the --  everything

 3     we know about it because we were not allowed to enter that area, so what

 4     exactly was this that area we did not know.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us whether the villages in the area that

 6     you controlled, where the population from which the BH Army had been

 7     recruited lived, did they have armed units?  Were they organised on the

 8     basis of villages in terms of their army, because here we have maps and

 9     other documents relating to the Army of Republika Srpska for brigades and

10     whatever, but now let us see what it was that you had concerning that

11     enclave.  Thank you.

12        A.   The only thing we knew about their local organisation was the

13     Bandera triangle unit was organised based on villages and the area around

14     that, so they recruited the soldiers locally from those villages.  How it

15     worked in the rest of the enclave, we did not know.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Does that mean that you only studied that part of the

17     enclave where you came into conflict with them, where you encountered

18     certain problems when carrying out your own tasks?  Thank you.

19        A.   No, that does not mean that we tried to get information only

20     about the units in the Bandera triangle.  We tried to get that

21     information from the other units as well, but on questions, we didn't get

22     an answer.  And seeing the fact that the ABiH was not uniformed in any

23     way, it was incredibly difficult to try to identify units or the, what do

24     you say, the number of members of a unit because, yeah, well, if we are

25     all civilians and only they knew who was a soldier and who was not a

Page 3384

 1     soldier.  We could not identify units.  Again, they were not uniformed.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Did they carry rifles when they wore civilian

 3     clothing, when you say that it was hard to tell who was who because they

 4     didn't have uniforms?  Did your superior command ever ask you for a

 5     report on how many armed groups were there and how they used these

 6     weapons, in shifts, two or three shifts, various positions?  Because

 7     during your examination, you said that there were three lines of

 8     separation.  I'm sure that you toured these lines of separation.  Thank

 9     you.

10        A.   Your first question, they did not carry rifles because the few

11     times that we discovered them carrying rifles, we tried to unarm them.

12     We had one small problem, the very moment they flew into a house, we were

13     not authorised to enter that house and we had to call the local police

14     and then have them check the house.  So that was not very effective, so

15     to say.

16             Your second question was, my superior command never asked me

17     details about the present ABiH which should have been logical, but awhile

18     ago I already told that you the whole intelligence cycles didn't work

19     within UNPROFOR.  And lines of separation between the brigades, I assume

20     you mean, no, I did not tour them because I never could find any

21     confirmation of the fact that there was a line of separation.  When there

22     were people around, there were civilians and they never -- we never saw,

23     until the final attack, that all the positions were taken or there was

24     personnel in their ditches, et cetera.  It was once in awhile and

25     occasionally on different spots, so it was very difficult so if not

Page 3385

 1     impossible, again, to identify units and their lines of separation and

 2     their operation zone.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, I think we have reached the time to

 4     have the second break, then after that you may continue your

 5     cross-examination.

 6             We adjourn now and resume at 1.00.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

 8                           --- Recess taken at 12.37 p.m.

 9                           --- On resuming at 1.03 p.m.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, Mr. Tolimir, please proceed.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  I would

12     like to thank the witness, too.

13             And I would now like to have a look at P107 that was tendered by

14     the Prosecution.  Could we have that in e-court.  We see what the

15     deployment of forces was there, we can see what the UNPROFOR had and what

16     other parties had, and you could explain this to us.

17             P107 in e-court, please.  Thank you.  Thank you.  Could you

18     please show in e-court the map where there were translations into both

19     languages so that the witness could see that.  Could you please display

20     the map with the translation.  Thank you.  Thank you.  Could you please

21     zoom in the part where there is the text in Serbian and in English that

22     pertains to Srebrenica.  Thank you.

23             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   There is Zepa and Srebrenica here, but we are going to look at

25     what has to do with Srebrenica.  Can you read it --

Page 3386

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Actually, can you zoom in a bit

 2     more.  Thank you.

 3             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation].

 4        Q.   Now we see that it says what the population is, between 35- and

 5     38.000.  The forces of the 28th Division of the 2nd Corps of the ABiH are

 6     in the enclave.  The division consists of the following brigades:  The

 7     280th, the 281st, the 282nd, the 283rd, the 284th, and the battalion of

 8     the Light Infantry Brigade.  The division has about 5.000 to

 9     5.500 troops.  Police forces have 200 to 250 men.  Muslim forces in

10     Srebrenica are armed --

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, it's not necessary to read the whole

12     text on the record because we have this as an exhibit already.  Perhaps

13     you just -- and the witness can read it.  Just put the question to the

14     witness.

15             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Did you know that there were five brigades there, as written

17     here, and that the Muslim forces were armed, as is written here, and as

18     you could read for yourself because I did not read out the whole text to

19     you.  Thank you.

20        A.   Please give me a moment to read the whole text, just hold.  Yes,

21     I read the text about the Muslim forces.  As I recollect we identified

22     four brigades, not five.  The number of troops they had were, to my

23     knowledge, 4.500, the not number standing here.  The police force

24     astonishes me.  When you have a police force of about 50, 60 men, so I

25     can't imagine where the number -- at least the number 200, 250 is strange

Page 3387

 1     to me.  The arms that are described there, I only can confirm that we

 2     knew they had semi-automatic and automatic rifles and some light

 3     machine-guns.  The hand-held rocket launchers, well, rumours about them

 4     but never saw them.  The heavier weapons were, as far as I can see, all

 5     in the weapon collection point at the compounds of B Company in

 6     Srebrenica.  The amount of ammunition I did not know or at least I knew

 7     not that there should have been enough.

 8             Commander Naser Oric is known to me.  Then UNPROFOR, Dutch

 9     battalion did not have 550 troops to the extent within the enclave we

10     claimed to 312.  21 APCs is correct, only the anti-tank missile systems

11     are connected to the APCs here, that's incorrect.  They were portable

12     systems.  There are currently, I don't know what currently is,

13     340 soldiers in the enclave, yeah, well, I don't know the date but they

14     thought about saying 340 but that is the max, a bit less but the max we

15     had in the enclave before.  As a result of what we called convoy terror,

16     that number was diminished.  Is that an answer?

17        Q.   Thank you.  Thank you.  Could you just tell us, for the sake of

18     the transcript, you said there were only 500 soldiers, but a moment ago

19     you said that there were between 4.000 and 4.500 and that there was an

20     equal number of rifles.  Is that what you said here?  Is that what you

21     actually said or did you misspeak perhaps or was this a mistranslation?

22        A.   Well, I -- the number 500 was, as far as I know, not spoken by

23     me, but I meant to say that there were about 4.500 armed men within the

24     enclave being a member of the ABiH, as far as we knew.

25        Q.   Thank you.  May I state that in addition to the corrections that

Page 3388

 1     you made, you assessed all the rest as being realistic, except that you

 2     said that there were four brigades rather than five as stated here?

 3     Thank you.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Sir, could you answer this question.

 5             THE WITNESS:  Sorry.  I didn't recognise it as a question.  Yes,

 6     to my knowledge, there were only four brigades.  I am sorry, Your Honour,

 7     I thought it was a statement not a question.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It's a mixture of a statement and a question.

 9             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   I would now like to ask you -- well, thank you once again.

11             THE ACCUSED:  [Interpretation] Could you please show in e-court

12     what the deployment of forces was.  Can you enlarge the red and blue

13     lines so that the witness could see that.  Thank you.  Thank you, that's

14     right.  Could you scroll down a bit more so that we see Srebrenica rather

15     than Zepa.  Thank you.  Thank you.  This is what we were interested in.

16             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Could you please indicate to us here where the Bandera triangle

18     is because that is what we'll be dealing with in our next questions.

19     Thank you.

20        A.   Yes.  That would be approximately because to give it --

21        Q.   I will appreciate that.  Thank you.

22        A.   About this area, like that.  And it's not adequate, but then I

23     have to see a further in-zooming of the map, but that's the Bandera

24     triangle.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Tell me, while we are looking at the map, can you

Page 3389

 1     infer why you were blocked by the BH Army and why you were not allowed to

 2     move about?

 3        A.   Yes.  Then I have to pick up some history.  When we took over

 4     from DutchBat II, there was not a freedom of movement in that area

 5     because the local brigade commander didn't want UN to come in.  That had

 6     something to do with an incident of a not -- just a temporary OP, being

 7     Bravo, in the midst of that Bandera triangle, more or less around that

 8     point.

 9             That was reported to the UN, of course, and the -- in January,

10     when we just arrived, we got order to restore or try to restore our

11     freedom of movement in that Bandera triangle.  We made our plan and had

12     about, let me just think, totally six patrols who were bound to enter the

13     Bandera triangle.  The first patrol that went in was led by me with the

14     purpose of establishing a new OP in the centre of that area so we would

15     have that under control.

16             Doing so, I was blocked by the brigade commander and about

17     40 armed infantry men, my patrol was seven men, who tried to get us out

18     of there.  I did not respond and took a route generally west through the

19     area.  In the meantime, the other patrols were started and entered that

20     area.  Well, to make a long story short, we were all blocked by superior

21     forces and we couldn't return to our base.  That's when I decided to go

22     with my patrol and a battalion reserve we met, about 3, 4 APCs who was

23     waiting to, if necessary, help within the Bandera triangle, to retreat to

24     OP Charlie, being an observation post to the CL directly on the south

25     border of the Bandera triangle.

Page 3390

 1             And then we -- I proposed to my battalion commander to get in

 2     again and with more force.  I don't know whether he had some -- some

 3     discussion with the UN or not, but that was not done, and I had to stay

 4     on my spot and wait.  They were negotiating.  That is the story you

 5     meant.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Can you just tell us whether this point that is

 7     marked with a black circle here, where you put a blue marking, a blue

 8     triangle, was that removed afterwards, after this protest by the Muslims?

 9     Was this UNPROFOR checkpoint moved away and could you mark that also,

10     using the blue colour, where it was moved to?

11        A.   I understand your question, but I have to make something clear.

12     If the black point is our OP Bravo, which I so to see is, OP Bravo was

13     not always teamed, not always manned.  So in the time this took place,

14     OP Bravo was not manned; there was just the infrastructure of that OP was

15     present.

16             What I meant by the aim of my patrol was that directly eastly of

17     Bravo there's a high ridge and the idea was to make a new -- to establish

18     a new OP in that area, so you couldn't speak of removing anything.  We

19     never came to establish that new OP, and the old Bravo was not manned, so

20     empty.  Is that an answer to your question?

21        Q.   Thank you.  You did give an answer, but could you just mark the

22     place where you were, because you were not in this triangle, so could you

23     please mark the place where you were that was closest to the triangle.

24     Thank you.

25        A.   Probably a misunderstanding.  I was in the triangle because I

Page 3391

 1     personally commanded the first patrol that went in.  And I came - just

 2     hold please - around here.  There I was stopped by the ABiH, as described

 3     before, and I went out in this direction, came out at this point.  There

 4     we were blocked by and out-forced by the ABiH, and that's the point where

 5     I decided to withdraw to OP Charlie, which should have been here more or

 6     less.  Is that clear, sir?

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  For the sake of the record, could you please put

 8     a number 1 near to the first spot you marked.  And a number 2 to the

 9     second spot.

10             THE WITNESS:  [Marks]

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Okay.  And a number 3 to the third spot.

12             THE WITNESS:  [Marks]

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  And to make it very clear, could you very shortly

14     tell again what is indicated -- depicted with number 1 in the map.

15             THE WITNESS:  Number 1 is location of a UN observation post

16     called Bravo, B.  Not manned.  Number 2 is the farthest limit that I got

17     with my patrol, starting from thousand direction, came to 2, was blocked

18     by ABiH, and proceeded in the direction that the arrow indicates.  Number

19     3 is the existing and manned Observation Post Charlie, C, where I

20     withdrew with my means and had to stay there in order of my CO.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

22             Mr. Tolimir.

23             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Thank you, sir.  Can you tell us, within this blue triangle where

25     you put numbers 1 and 2, later you were denied access because of the

Page 3392

 1     protests by the Muslims; is that correct?

 2        A.   Yes.  The situation was that we did not have -- we were not able

 3     to restore that freedom of movement because the order to do so was

 4     withdrawn by the UN.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know what was so important even for the UN to

 6     decide that you shouldn't be there and you were supposed to monitor and

 7     control the demilitarised zone?

 8        A.   To prevent any misunderstandings, the UN first ordered us to

 9     restore our freedom of movement there, but then when it escalated, they

10     withdrew the order.  Important, of course, for the UN was that DutchBat

11     had the complete control over the area, and important to the Muslims was

12     an act that's only guessing.  They didn't want us to see what they were

13     doing there, I suppose.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Was there any strategic significance for the Muslims

15     that they went to such length to bring this issue before the UN, and that

16     is to say that there were discussions between your superior command,

17     Sarajevo, Zagreb, and the UN headquarters, was that point so

18     strategically important?

19        A.   If you look to defensive strategy, it is in that way important

20     that it is one of the easier approaches within -- into the enclave,

21     seeing the terrain there.  If you should look offensively, it is not

22     important because it's only of interest for armoured forces, and they

23     didn't have armour.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Concerning the first answer, when you said that these

25     two enclaves were close to one another, can you tell me how fast one

Page 3393

 1     could pass from one enclave to another?

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please have the image back

 3     on the screen in e-court.  Thank you.

 4                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think there happened a mistake.  The markings

 6     were lost.  We have to do them again, if you want to tender the marked

 7     map, Mr. Tolimir.  I think it is appropriate to have it done again.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That was precisely what I wanted,

 9     and I would kindly ask the witness to put the triangle again and numbers

10     1, 2, and 3, so that we can admit this thus marked map into evidence.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, please repeat that again, sir.

12             THE WITNESS:  Okay.  That should do, Your Honour.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.  This marked map will be

14     received as an exhibit.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D65.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

17             Please carry on, Mr. Tolimir.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   While we still have the map on the screen, can you please draw

21     this path that was connecting the two enclaves and you said that was very

22     important in view of the closeness between the two enclaves?

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The map should be scrolled up a little bit.  Yes.

24     And now please try to mark this corridor.

25             THE WITNESS:  I will as far as possible, Your Honour.  The only

Page 3394

 1     thing I know is that there were movements of the ABiH in the direction of

 2     Zepa, but we thought to know where they go -- went out, that's one of the

 3     reasons where we build a new OP, Observation Post Delta, but what path

 4     they followed, I don't have a clue.  So I can't draw that path.  The fact

 5     is that Zepa and Srebrenica enclaves were relatively close.

 6             Another question of Mr. Tolimir that I -- whether I could give an

 7     indication how long it would take to go or how fast one could pass from

 8     one enclave to the other, I can't give that answer this way because I'll

 9     have to study the terrain, and I suppose that he means by foot, and that

10     would be theoretically -- I don't have the knowledge which path and how

11     long it took.  The only thing I can see, as you can, is that both

12     enclaves are pretty close together.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

14             Mr. Tolimir.

15             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Thank you.  Since we keep losing this image with the triangle,

17     can you please use this other map and mark the entry to the enclave by

18     using a number 4, because you knew where that was because you wanted to

19     install your observation post so that you can know where the point of

20     entry was for them.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Just to clarify the situation, the marked map is

22     not -- was not lost again, but it's an exhibit.  And if you want to have

23     an additional marking to the marked map, you should indicate that,

24     otherwise this one should be marked.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Before it was admitted,

Page 3395

 1     I wanted the witness to mark the entry point to Srebrenica from Zepa

 2     which is where they wanted to install their point, and that was the

 3     reason that sparkled the conflict in which the UN was involved.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Should we have the map D65 again on the screen.

 5     There it is.  Now, you could ask the witness to mark.

 6             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Yes, we can see the map.  Could you please just indicate with an

 8     arrow the entry point next to which you wanted to set up your point.  So

 9     just put an arrow as an entry point into this zone by unauthorised

10     persons.

11        A.   Yes, first a remark, I did not know exactly where it was.  We had

12     one report that's a column of police came in and so we concluded that

13     that was at least one of the routes where the ABiH went out of.  That's

14     in the area of Delta.  And it is -- sorry, in this area.  The other one

15     we suggested and not confirmed that was a possibility was in the area of

16     Kilo, I suppose you want all the routes we estimated as very possible,

17     was here.

18             Another route there, in this area, and, yeah, well, I can't

19     pinpoint it, is directly beneath the Bandera triangle, where you see all

20     those brown lines, was impossible to establish an OP there because we did

21     not have the means anymore, which meant we were not able to build

22     anything there, infrastructure, and that had something to do with what I

23     called convoy terror.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Would you please put a 5, near the last --

25             THE WITNESS:  Sorry, yes, I will, Your Honour.

Page 3396

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

 2             Mr. Tolimir, is this sufficiently marked and would you tender

 3     this document?

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 5             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   One more thing, was there any spot within the triangle from which

 7     one can exit the zone and go to another zone, and you said that you had

 8     been driven from that point next to the road, your OP, actually, which

 9     was installed by the road was removed?  Thank you.

10        A.   Sorry, I have to ask you a question just to make sure that I

11     understand the question correct.  You asked me to a spot in the triangle

12     and my OP actually was installed by the road and removed.  I did not

13     understand that.  What are you referring to, sir?

14        Q.   You understood it well.  Can you please mark where this

15     observation point, where you didn't have any people manning it, and to

16     which you had no access any longer?

17        A.   Well, I don't usually ask questions when I understand something,

18     but I now understand that you meant OP Bravo and it's already marked with

19     the figure 1.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Please, for having your marks admitted, next to

21     number 1, can you put an X, because we have no legend in this map.  Or

22     rather mark it with a number 6.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, it is marked with a number 1.  At

24     the outset, the witness indicated that this is the observation point --

25     Observation Post Bravo.  It is not necessary to mark it again with a

Page 3397

 1     different letter.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  This

 3     could have been Bravo post just like any other post, however, this one

 4     was strategically important and that was why UNPROFOR was driven away

 5     from it.  That's why I'm asking the witness to put an X or any other mark

 6     indicating the place from which they had been chased out.

 7             THE WITNESS:  Okay.  I'll put an X additional to the 1.  There

 8     you are.

 9             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Thank you.  Later, because today we are not going to have enough

11     time, we are going to see in Muslim documents why this was strategically

12     important and that's why I asked you to do the markings as I did.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So I would kindly ask now for this

14     map with all the markings inserted by the witness to be admitted into

15     evidence.  Thank you.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Should that replace D65?  To have all markings on

17     one map?  It will be received, and I would like to ask the Registrar to

18     tell us the right number now.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  The new -- the map with the new markings has now

20     been saved as D65.  Therefore, has replaced the previous exhibit.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

22             Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

24             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Thank you, Witness, for clarifying this situation regarding the

Page 3398

 1     Bandera triangle to all of us.  Now, I would kindly ask the witness to

 2     lay a foundation for something that I would like to know whether I

 3     understood properly.  This was the deployment of forces 1 and 2, blue

 4     were the Muslims and the red were the Serbs.  As for UNPROFOR, can you

 5     please use a pencil that you, as UN, marked as a line, and you were asked

 6     about this by the Prosecution.  You can probably connect these dots, if

 7     possible.  Can you please say which particular line you had in mind.

 8     Thank you.

 9        A.   I take it you refer to what I call the UN boundary; is that

10     correct, sir?

11        Q.   That's correct.  Thank you very much.

12        A.   Well, when I connect the points, being our OPs, just like this,

13     then probably it wouldn't be very accurate because then I have to look in

14     detail.  But generally, the UN border, it's almost impossible to do that.

15     It's 15 years ago that I was there.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Was this UN line coinciding with the Muslim line, the

17     Serbs line, or was it somewhere in between?  You referred to it as the

18     Morillon line, can you indicate where it was?

19        A.   It was in general, when I can see it like this, in between those

20     lines.  It was further outside the enclave as the blue line marked on

21     this map, and it was farther inside the enclave as the red line, the red

22     positions marked on this map.  But it's impossible for me to put a line

23     on this map with any accuracy, and I hope you understand that.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Before this -- now the map disappeared.

25             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Page 3399

 1        Q.   Thank you, Witness.  Can you please put a dotted line indicating

 2     this imaginary line, we are not going to consider it a real one, and you

 3     can indicate in your own handwriting that it was an imaginary line

 4     stretching and running between the lines held by the two warring parties?

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

 6             MR. THAYER:  Two issues, Mr. President.  The first is I think

 7     Colonel Franken has been clear that it's, and I'm just quoting from his

 8     last answer, "It's impossible for me to put a line on this map with any

 9     accuracy, and I hope you understand that."

10             The second issue is, General Tolimir is showing Colonel Franken a

11     map that has different coloured circles on it, as we see, these

12     representations, and I think it's incumbent upon him to lay a foundation

13     or at least tell Colonel Franken what his position is with respect to

14     when this map was created, what period of time these boundaries as

15     reflected on the map reflect, as of what time, and then ask

16     Colonel Franken if he insists, and if the Trial Chamber insists, on

17     Colonel Franken trying to draw this line that he has said it's impossible

18     for him to draw.  Otherwise, I don't think this is going to be very

19     helpful to anybody if we don't have any date context or even any idea of

20     what exactly these lines are supposed to represent.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, you should carry on, but take into

22     account that the witness said, "It's impossible for me to put a line on

23     this map with any accuracy."  What is the purpose to draw a line without

24     any accuracy?

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

Page 3400

 1             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Sir, can you indicate the so-called Morillon line, because you

 3     had spoken about three lines, so in order for all of us to have a clear

 4     picture about this problem, you should do this because it was something

 5     that the Prosecutor asked you about as well.

 6        A.   Well, yes, I can indicate, and I already indicated, that the --

 7     let's start it another way.  I take it that the blue lines on this map

 8     are more or less the defensive positions of the ABiH.  And the red lines,

 9     I recognise a lot of VRS positions.  Well, let's be clear about that.

10     The so-called Morillon line is in between those lines and only, as I

11     recollect, in the north-western part, the line went exactly between those

12     two OPs directly, really straight, not recognisable in the area.  So

13     there you could say the blue positions are a bit out of the UN line as I

14     see it now on this map.  But then again, I take it the blue lines or more

15     or less the positions the ABiH had prepared for defence, and I can't

16     guarantee that they are accurately on the spot.  That's impossible on

17     this map.  And I take it the red lines are VRS positions.  And I already

18     described Morillon line is in between there, these positions.

19             So it means that positions of the ABiH are more or less within

20     the Morillon lines, not denying the fact that they already discussed

21     about that the Morillon line was not the correct line, but that is the

22     actual situation I see on this map.  Morillon line somewhere between the

23     blue lines and the red line.

24             And again, Your Honour, it's absolutely impossible to -- even if

25     I indicated with dots, it is more or less useless because that can differ

Page 3401

 1     4- or 500 metres.  We are talking about a confrontation line, 400,

 2     500 metres accuracy or lack of accuracy is deadly, is nonsense.  So I

 3     hope I gave an answer and answered your question, Mr. Tolimir.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you, Witness.  I think, Mr. Tolimir, this

 5     very precise description of the recollection of this witness should be

 6     sufficient for your purposes in comparison to this map shown to the

 7     witness.

 8             We have only two or three minutes left, please carry on.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

10             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Thank you very much, Mr. Franken, for your explanation.  Can you

12     just tell me this:  Was the Morillon line the line that existed in the

13     gap that was between the red line and the blue line?

14        A.   Yes, that is what I tried to make clear in my former statement.

15     Yes.

16        Q.   Thank you very much.  You have clarified the position of that

17     line and it will become even more clear tomorrow when we discuss other

18     documents.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And with this, I would like to

20     conclude.  I'm not going to raise a new topic because we only have two or

21     three minutes, if you agree, Mr. President.  And I would like to thank

22     everyone for the assistance with my Defence.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much, Mr. Tolimir.  I'm not sure

24     if there was another problem with the marked map, so I would like to have

25     D65 again on the screen.  Yes, we see the cross has disappeared again.

Page 3402

 1     Would you please, for the second time, put a cross below the number 1.

 2             THE WITNESS:  I'm happy to.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Just a moment.  Yes, there's the cross.  It

 4     should be saved now, and this new marked map should replace D65 so that

 5     we have a complete picture.

 6             Thank you very much.  We have reached the end of today's hearing.

 7     We adjourn and resume tomorrow morning.  And, sir, you have to come back

 8     tomorrow morning, and please be reminded that it is not appropriate to

 9     have contact to either party on the content of your testimony.  We

10     adjourn and resume tomorrow at 9.00.

11                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.46 p.m.,

12                           to be reconvened on Thursday, the 1st day of

13                           July, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.