Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 3486

 1                           Tuesday, 6 July 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 2.17 p.m.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Good afternoon to everybody in the courtroom.

 6             At the outset of today's hearing, the Chamber wishes to issue an

 7     oral decision concerning one witness who is scheduled to give evidence

 8     this week.  The Chamber is seised of the Prosecution's 92 bis and

 9     92 ter motion for the five witnesses filed confidentially on the

10     26th of April this year in which the Prosecution inter alia seeks that

11     evidence of witness 65 ter number 139, a proposed 92 bis witness, be

12     instead admitted pursuant to Rule 92 ter and hereby renders its decision

13     insofar as Witness 139 is concerned.

14             The Prosecution submits that the evidence of Witness 139 --

15     sorry, relates to the situation in Bratunac following the fall of

16     Srebrenica, and that, in light of the specific factual challenges raised

17     by the accused in his pre-trial brief and the positions he has otherwise

18     taken in respect of core facts alleged in the indictment, his evidence

19     would most efficiently and effectively be presented pursuant to

20     Rule 92 ter.

21             The Prosecution further submits that the accused would be able to

22     put his case to, and fully cross-examine this witness.  In his response,

23     filed on the 26th of May, 2010, the accused did not oppose this

24     particular request.

25             The Chamber considers that it would be in the interest of justice

Page 3487

 1     to receive the proposed evidence pursuant to Rule 92 ter, subject to the

 2     tendering of transcripts reflecting the official record.  The Chamber

 3     therefore grants the request and provisionally admits Witness 139's

 4     evidence pursuant to Rule 92 ter.

 5             In addition, the Chamber notes that there are no protective

 6     measures currently in place for this witness and that the Chamber is not

 7     seised of any motion in this respect.

 8             Now we should turn to the continuation of the evidence of the

 9     last witness.  He should be brought in.

10             Mr. Thayer.

11             MR. THAYER:  Good afternoon, Mr. President.  Just a quick update

12     for the Trial Chamber regarding the continual translations.  The B/C/S

13     translation of 65 ter 6287, which is P242, has been uploaded into

14     e-court.  That had been previously MFI'd.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you for this information.  The document

16     will be received as an Exhibit.

17                           [The witness takes the stand]

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Good afternoon, sir, please sit down.  I would

19     like to remind you that the affirmation to tell the truth still applies.

20     And Mr. Tolimir has some more questions for you.

21             THE WITNESS:  Very well, Your Honour.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  May

24     there be peace in this house for all those present, and this trial.  And

25     may God's will be done in these proceedings.  And may the outcome be as

Page 3488

 1     God wishes and not as wish.  I would like to bid Mr. Franken good

 2     afternoon, and I hope that he will be comfortable here.

 3                           WITNESS:  ROBERT FRANKEN [Resumed]

 4                           Cross-examination by Mr. Tolimir:  [Continued]

 5        Q.   I would now like us to continue where we stopped last time.  Let

 6     me remind you where it was.  You were trying to explain the position

 7     vis-à-vis the Defence of the enclave, and you said that you did not side

 8     with any of the factions but that you simply defended the enclave.

 9             At page 62, when I asked you about Colonel Brantz with whom you

10     were on good terms, as you stated yourself, you said Charlie Brantz is a

11     Dutch Colonel from the north-east sector command.  In fact, he was our

12     higher echelon in the staff of the unit, that was, in fact, our higher

13     echelon, and because we knew each other from before, from the

14     Netherlands, it was easier for us to be on good terms with him, quite

15     unlike the situation that would be if he had been somebody else from the

16     international community we did not know.

17             Now, my question is, first of all, I would like us to look at D2.

18     It's a document dated the 12th of July, 1995.  It's a document generated

19     by the BH Army, signed by Brigadier Enver Hadzihasanovic.  And it details

20     his conversations with Colonel Brantz in the corps command.

21             And let me read from this document, and then I would like you to

22     give me some answers in the context of what we discussed last time.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Would you please tell us which part of this

24     document you will read?  It makes it easier for the interpreters.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Okay, yeah, we can see here -- we

Page 3489

 1     need paragraph 4, although I can't see it here in its entirety.  I will

 2     quote from it, because it flows on to the next page.  Could you just move

 3     it a little bit to the right so that I can read it.  Just a little bit.

 4     Thank you.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Ah, to the right.  On the left side, we can't see

 6     the whole document.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Yes, I can see it now.

 8             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   "At 800 hours this morning, the commander of UNPROFOR for the

10     north-east, Colonel Brantz, paid us a visit.  The subject was the current

11     situation in Srebrenica.  Brantz briefed us that the forces of the

12     Dutch Battalion and the BH Army managed, in a joint effort, to defend

13     Srebrenica on Monday, and that NATO air support was approved at

14     0445 hours yesterday."

15             As you can see, this was written on the 12th of July by

16     General Enver Hadzihasanovic, the Chief of the General Staff, and he had

17     talks with Colonel Brantz.

18             Now, I want to ask you this:  Whether this report by

19     Enver Hadzihasanovic sent to the president of the Presidency of

20     Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1st Corps command is in line with what you

21     stated at page 80, lines 14 and 15, where you state clearly, and I quote:

22             "Again, I disagree with you regarding your conclusion that

23     UNPROFOR took sides when it comes to my battalion.  I am explaining this

24     again, and I don't think that what we did was tantamount to siding with

25     one of the factions."

Page 3490

 1             So I've now read all this out to you.  This was a rather

 2     comprehensive introduction to my question.  I would like to ask you to

 3     comment on all this, and I would like to ask you whether this was,

 4     indeed, your position and whether you agreed with the colonel when it

 5     came to the defence of the enclave?

 6        A.   As far as my former statement is, that I am not -- I still

 7     disagree on the conclusion that UNPROFOR, being, in this case,

 8     DutchBat III, took side in my question.  I remember saying, and when I'm

 9     right, that I do not know how my higher echelons put that in the words or

10     in words.  Then again, if you see the report of the BiH general, he

11     speaks of a joint effort to defend Srebrenica.

12             As far as I can see, he refers to the attack of the VRS on the

13     city itself, which we -- on which we responded by starting firing upon

14     the VRS.  In that time, BiH was still present, and, of course, they were

15     firing as well on the VRS.  And that is not in contradiction what I said

16     before when I tried to explain to you that, in my view, there was no

17     co-ordination or co-operation.

18             Does that answer your question?

19        Q.   Thank you.  Now, I would like you to give me a direct answer to

20     my question.  Well, I asked several questions and you answered to the

21     best of your abilities.  But it says here:

22             "Brantz briefed us that that the forces of the Dutch Battalion

23     and the BH Army succeeded, in a joint, effort to defend Srebrenica on

24     Monday."

25             What you've just told us, how can it be reconciled with what

Page 3491

 1     Colonel Brantz told the Chief of the Main Staff of the BH Army on that

 2     occasion?

 3        A.   Yes, again, I'll try to use other words.  He refers to a joint

 4     effort, and I think that he referred to that attack I described to you in

 5     my former answer.  You could use that word; and, again, I do not know

 6     whether he used these words, because this is a message of the BiH general

 7     who probably uses his own words.  So I don't know whether Colonel Brantz

 8     really said that.  But, again, you can't speak of a joint effort when

 9     there are three parties in a location; being VHS attacking Srebrenica,

10     then still parts of the 28th BiH division, and my battalion.

11             The VRS attacks, we opened fire, and the 28th Division opened

12     fire on that same VRS.  That doesn't prove that in that action there has

13     been any co-operation or coordination.  As I stated before, we had a

14     mutual enemy, being the VRS, and if he is attacking the city of

15     Srebrenica, it's quite clear that both parties - and I mean VRS and

16     DutchBat - opened fire.  If you want to conclude then that there must

17     have been any co-ordination or co-operation in that case, again I say

18     there was not any co-ordination, co-operation.  Coordination other than

19     that meeting I had in March, as we referred to earlier in my testimony.

20     And co-operation, well, you brought several documents where you could see

21     that there was absolutely no co-operation with the BiH, the opposite.  I

22     referred to events at Mike, the killing of my soldier, et cetera.

23             Is this a direct and complete answer, sir?

24        Q.   Thank you.  Yes, I understand your point.  But, now, in your

25     answer you said, and I quote:

Page 3492

 1             We had a joint enemy, the VRS.

 2             We, the Dutch Battalion.  Is that so?  So how did you have a

 3     joint enemy, and why did you consider the Republika Srpska army to be

 4     your enemy?

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

 6             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, I'm reluctant to intervene so early

 7     in the session, but we really have gone over this again and again and

 8     again.  If General Tolimir wants to spend his limited cross-examination

 9     time on this topic, fine, but we are really wasting time.  I don't think

10     there's another way that Colonel Franken can answer the same question.

11     He's trying; he said himself, I'll try to use other words.  But, frankly,

12     this has been asked and answered and asked and answered, and the answer

13     has been consistent for days now.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  You heard the objection and the comment of

17     Mr. Thayer, and if I compare your last question with the first question

18     of today, I don't see the difference.  You were referring exactly to the

19     answer you have got by the witness already, and you should think about

20     the time you are using in court.  Perhaps you move to another topic.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  The

22     witness has just said, and Mr. Thayer himself heard it, We had a joint

23     enemy and that was the Republika Srpska army, end of quote.  Now I want

24     to ask the witness why the Army of Republika Srpska was a joint enemy to

25     him and to the Muslims, and does it not indicate that he and the Muslims

Page 3493

 1     were on one side and the Republika Srpska army on the other.  Thank you.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think you are now repeating the same question

 3     again.  Let's hear the answer of the witness to this question, but then

 4     please not again the same question.

 5             THE WITNESS:  With "we" in that sentence, I meant, indeed, the

 6     Muslim army and my battalion.  That the Army of the Republika Srpska was

 7     my enemy was quite clear, and more or less in or around to the order I

 8     got from the UN to defend a city against an approaching armed force,

 9     being the VRS.  And, in general, you defend against an enemy and not

10     against friends.  Is that -- just hold; I'm reading.  And if you say it

11     does indicate that we are on one side, yes.  If you keep on explaining

12     the situation that being there are two parties, one attacking, two of

13     them defending, then we were, the ABiH and UNPROFOR, being my battalion,

14     were on the defending side.  So in that sense it could indicate we were

15     on one side.  But if it implicates that we had co-ordinated and

16     co-operation of each other, that is incorrect.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Please carry on and move to another field.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

19             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Sir, this position that you just explained to us, the Republika

21     Srpska army was my enemy, did it affect your partiality or your possible

22     bias if your evidence here before this Tribunal?  Thank you.

23        A.   I don't think that in my evidence I have any partiality.  I

24     explained last week, before, that it is for me not of any interest to

25     which my order to defend the city was referring, whether that would have

Page 3494

 1     been the VRS, the ABiH, or some other army.  I had order as a soldier to

 2     defend it to an approaching party.  And I'm giving my answers as factual

 3     as possible.  So I'm just referring to facts.  And if I give an opinion,

 4     it is on your request.  I'm just giving the facts, so there is, as far as

 5     I'm concerned, and I'm watching that, you can't speak of any partiality

 6     or whatever.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Well, I've asked you, you've given me your answer,

 8     and now I'm asking you:  On the basis of your evidence, who ordered you

 9     to defend the town?  Who relayed this order to you personally?  Thank

10     you.

11        A.   Personally, of course, my CO, the commanding officer of DutchBat.

12     But being briefed by him, I understood it that the order came from, if

13     you want a person, General Nicolai being at the HQ at Sarajevo.

14        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Franken.  Now, I would like you to tell us whether

15     Colonel Karremans, your immediate superior, or anyone else from the

16     Dutch Battalion from your command had made any promises to the Muslims

17     that there would be air-strikes against VRS positions and that the

18     UNPROFOR would take part in the effort to defend the town against the

19     Serbs?  Thank you.

20        A.   Your first question I thought I answered that last week.  In the

21     night from the 10th to the 11th, Colonel Karremans had a meeting with the

22     staff of the 28th Division in the city of Srebrenica, and then he

23     informed them about the air attack and other details which were important

24     for them because they had to be sure that they wouldn't be in a certain

25     area.  Perhaps you remember my killing-zone story.

Page 3495

 1             Then, secondly, UNPROFOR would take part in the effort to defend

 2     the town.  I do not know exactly what Colonel Karremans said to the

 3     28th Division, so I can't confirm that.  Probably he would have

 4     said -- but again that's an assumption - he would have said that DutchBat

 5     is going to defend the town, but I don't know what words he used because

 6     I was not present.

 7        Q.   Thank you.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now, I would like to ask you to

 9     show 1D218.  Thank you.

10             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   It's a statement by brigadier General Nicolai, Cornelis Nicolai,

12     you mentioned him just now.  He gave it on the 18th of November, 1996.

13     Well, we can see the front page of that statement in Serbian.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, can we look at page 11.  We

15     can see that it is probably an authentic signature that's affixed there.

16             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Are you able to verify that this is General Nikolai's signature?

18        A.   I see a page in English, and I do not know whether that -- you

19     mean the sign on the right bottom side of the document?  I can't confirm

20     that is his signature because I really don't know.  I never worked during

21     long times directly --

22        Q.   Thank you.

23        A.   [Previous translation continues] ... under the general.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Well, we will hear this witness, and we will ask him,

25     for the benefit of the Trial Chamber, whether he did in fact sign the

Page 3496

 1     statement.

 2             But let us now look at paragraph 2 of his statement where he

 3     says:

 4             "I further contacted General Tolimir at 1750 hours.  I expressed

 5     my deep concern for the situation which was developing in the Srebrenica

 6     enclave.  I told him that his forces, having penetrated into the enclave,

 7     was deemed to be an attack on the safe area and asked him to withdraw his

 8     troops to 4 kilometres' distance to the south, which was the original

 9     confrontation line.  His response was that I expected -- was what I

10     expected, to deny that his troops were attacking into the enclave.  I

11     further requested that he order his troops not to use their anti-aircraft

12     guns to attack our helicopter which was already underway to carry out the

13     evacuation of the DutchBat soldier's body."

14             And so on.  End of quote.

15             Now, I would like you to tell us, do you know what time-period we

16     are talking about regarding this conversation between General Nicolai and

17     General Tolimir?  Thank you.

18        A.   Yeah, well, I only see a timing, and then I have to guess on

19     which date that would occur.  I presume that this could have been on the

20     10th, as I see the description of the situation that General Nicolai

21     gives, and -- please hold.  Yeah, well, that will answer your question,

22     but, again, this is an assumption.  It is a timing of 1750 hours.

23     Probably on the 10th.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

25             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, it might be helpful just to go to the

Page 3497

 1     prior page in the English version of the statement and let

 2     Colonel Franken look at that.  If you look at the bottom of the prior

 3     page, I think we may see a date.  That's all General Tolimir needs to do

 4     to help the witness.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Witness, could you -- can you see that?

 6             THE WITNESS:  I can see it, sir.  I'm just reading it.  Yeah,

 7     well, I can see it, it's on the 9th now.  But it has been 15 years, and

 8     my memory is pretty good but.  It could cope to a situation on the 10th

 9     as well.  But I see now it was on the 9th of July.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

11             Mr. Tolimir.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, sir.

13             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Mr. Franken, I saw that this was on the 9th.  But do you remember

15     that you said that on the 9th, the 10th, and the 11th you were fighting

16     the VRS and that it was then that you issued a green order?  Yes or no?

17     Thank you.

18        A.   The green order was issued on the 9th.  And as of the 9th or

19     before that, starting with the attack on Echo, we had contact with the

20     VRS.  That's correct.

21        Q.   Were you in engagement?  Did you engage the VRS?  Was there fire

22     exchanged between you and the VRS?

23        A.   If you mean as of the attack on Echo, yes.  Occasionally, yes.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Can you now please have a look at paragraph 3, where

25     once again General Nicolai talks about what he said, and he says:

Page 3498

 1             "Tolimir decided once again to concentrate his responses on our

 2     requests, and he said that VRS was not attacking UNPROFOR or the civilian

 3     population in Srebrenica."

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Are you on the same page?

 5             THE WITNESS:  I don't think I have the correct page in front of

 6     me.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I don't think so.  We have to move to the next

 8     page.  Page 11.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's page 11 in English, and I'm in

10     line 5.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Which paragraph?

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That is paragraph 3, the third

13     line.

14             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Let me repeat:

16             "Tolimir again chose to focus his answers to our demands by

17     saying that the VRS was not attacking UNPROFOR nor the civil population

18     in Srebrenica.  He did make false allegations that the ABiH were using

19     former UN APCs in the enclave and also using heavy weapons from the

20     enclave.  This was not true, as we knew that Colonel Karremans had

21     offered the ABiH their own weapons from the weapon collection point, due

22     to the threatening situation.  But the ABiH had declined to take up his

23     offer.  Tolimir did say ..." and so on.

24             My question is the following:  If, on the 10th, and the Muslims

25     as well, in the area in front of your APCs, attacked the

Page 3499

 1     Army of Republika Srpska, was Tolimir lying when he said that both the

 2     UNPROFOR and the BH Army were firing against his army from Srebrenica?

 3     Because you said that on the 9th, the 10th, and the 11th you were in

 4     conflict with the Army of Republika Srpska and that this happened even

 5     sometime before that.

 6        A.   If your question is that whether there was firing contact with

 7     the VRS on the 10th of July, I only can confirm that.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Witness, please don't touch the microphone.

 9             THE WITNESS:  Sorry, sir.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It gives additional noise.

11             THE WITNESS:  Okay.  Excuse me.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

13             Sorry, I didn't see you, Mr. Thayer.

14             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, again, the question, which I presume

15     is based on this statement that General Tolimir is showing to

16     Colonel Franken, does not accurately reflect the statement that he is

17     showing him.  And I'll quote from what this statement says:

18             "Tolimir again chose to focus his answers to our demands by

19     saying that the VRS was not attacking UNPROFOR nor the civil population

20     in Srebrenica."

21             The question that General Tolimir just asked was:

22             "Was Tolimir lying when he said that both the UNPROFOR and the

23     BH Army were firing against his army from Srebrenica?"

24             That's different.

25             And if he is going to be citing from the document to ask

Page 3500

 1     questions, then he should make it clear when he is citing from the

 2     document and then when he is putting a different proposition.  Otherwise,

 3     he is misleading the witness.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer, this witness is a very experienced

 5     person, not only in military terms but also in testifying before this

 6     Court.  I think he is capable to answer the question in the way which is

 7     helpful for the understanding of the whole case and for the Chamber.

 8             Nevertheless, Mr. Tolimir, please be very careful by quoting and

 9     phrasing your questions to the witness.  Please carry on.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  The

11     witness has answered my question.  As he said, on the 10th he was in

12     conflict with the Army of Republika Srpska.  This is the time which is

13     covered by the conversation with General Nicolai.

14             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   As the witness now mentioned heavy weapons offered by

16     Colonel Karremans to the ABiH, can you tell us whether he handed over

17     these weapons, when did he hand them over, and when did they take them

18     over?  Thank you.

19        A.   I know that my CO offered the ABiH the weapons still preserved in

20     a so-called "weapon collection point" that were light and heavy weapons

21     that were in the context of the demilitarisation of the enclave were

22     gathered by DutchBat I and kept there more or less in custody.  And I

23     know as well that the ABiH was not interested.  So there was not an

24     actual handing over or taking over.

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 3501

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now please have a look at

 2     the 12th paragraph on page 3 both in English and in B/C/S.  I did not say

 3     it correctly, it is page 12, paragraph 3, rather than the other way

 4     around.  Please excuse me.  My legal assistant has just brought this to

 5     my attention.  Thank you.  There it is.  Thank you.

 6             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   This paragraph, if you had a look, says:

 8             "Then the confusion started.  Colonel Karremans was concerned

 9     that using close air support, not [as interpreted] only on the attacking

10     front, was not sufficient due to the VRS having the ability to retaliate

11     with their heavy weapons which were situated all around the enclave."

12             Can you see what I'm reading from?

13        A.   I can.

14        Q.   Thank you.

15             "He wanted an attack to take place on all of the positions of the

16     VRS.  During the night, the air operation centre asked Colonel Karremans

17     for all VRS positions.  Karremans expected that air-strikes would be

18     carried out the next morning and not the close air support.  He contacted

19     the local Bosnian authorities to warn them to be prepared for proper

20     air-strikes.  Colonel Karremans did not realise that there was never any

21     consideration given to air-strikes but only to close air support.  That

22     night the VRS attack stopped."

23             Can you please describe to us in more detail these contacts which

24     Colonel Karremans had with the Muslim army, considering that we have seen

25     here that when he met General Mladic and told him he had handed over 300

Page 3502

 1     rifles to Muslims.  Thank you.

 2        A.   I already -- I think I already answered that question, and,

 3     again, it was on the night of the 10th to the 11th where

 4     Colonel Karremans, as I said before, visited the staff of the

 5     28th ABiH Division in Srebrenica.  There he informed them about the air

 6     support.

 7             And concerning your last remark, do you mean by that that he,

 8     being Colonel Karremans, handed over 300 rifles to the Muslims?  If that

 9     happened, and I would be very surprised, I do not know about that.

10        Q.   Thank you.  We will have a look at that if we have enough time so

11     you will see that this did happen and that the rifles were handed over to

12     the Muslims, because they were not found and you did not take them with

13     you.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please now show

15     Exhibit P607.  It is a statement -- your statement, Mr. Franken, and

16     we'll have a look at page 9 in B/C/S, paragraph 3.  And in English

17     version, it's page 7, paragraph 6.

18             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   You can see the paragraph now, paragraph 6 on page 7 in the

20     English version.  You have probably read it already, so I don't have to

21     read it.  It is brief.  And so I can ask you questions, I will just say

22     for the purpose of the transcript:

23             "On the evening of the 10th of July, there was a meeting between

24     Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans and the civilian and military authorities in

25     the enclave.  The same evening, at the market in Srebrenica, he saw about

Page 3503

 1     1500 BH men in uniform, armed with small weapons.  I then gave orders to

 2     prepare for the defence of Srebrenica.  There was then a discussion about

 3     the role of BH in this situation and about filling the gaps in our ranks

 4     with them."

 5             Can you tell us now, based on what we have just read, where did

 6     Colonel Karremans hold the meeting with the Muslims in Srebrenica with

 7     their civilian and military authorities, and who of the civilian and

 8     military representatives attended the meeting, if you know, and who

 9     proposed that the Muslims should fill in the gaps in your ranks?  Thank

10     you.

11        A.   It was in the centre of the city, a post office, a well-known

12     post office.  There he saw those 1500 BiH soldiers.  In this statement it

13     looks as that was the reason why I gave orders to prepare for the

14     defence, but that was originated on the order I got by the UN to defend

15     Srebrenica; in time there is a parallel.  I'm surprised by the word the

16     "gaps in our ranks" because there was never, as far as I know, any

17     discussion about filling gaps in our ranks.  Again, this should refer to

18     the March agreement, so to say, where we agreed upon filling the spaces

19     not covered by us between or on the flanks of our positions.  As far as I

20     know, there has never been a discussion, at least not by me, about

21     filling gaps in the ranks because that would mean that we had a defensive

22     positions within that position Dutch and BiH soldiers, which was not

23     applicable, was not done.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Can you please tell us whether you had a chance to

25     review this statement previously; and, if so, when?  Thank you.

Page 3504

 1        A.   I don't know whether I had a chance to read this statement.  I

 2     read a lot of them.  But if I did, I didn't -- probably I did not see or

 3     read over the fact that they use -- "gaps in our ranks" is used.  To my

 4     view and to my knowledge, that is, as I said, incorrect.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  I just wish to be correct concerning both your

 6     opinion and the facts.  You did give this statement, and the statement

 7     was submitted to me by the Prosecution.  And I had to prepare for my

 8     cross-examination on the basis of it.  And it is present here as a fact.

 9             I'm just asking you to tell us, Who did you discuss this

10     possibility with, namely that the BH soldiers might fill in the gaps of

11     the UNPROFOR ranks?  Thank you.

12        A.   That is, as I stated before, somewhere in March/April, and I

13     discussed that with the Chief of Staff of the 28th Division, a man known

14     to me as Ramiz.  And I do not recollect his last name; could be Becirevic

15     or something.  But with that man, Chief of Staff, 28th Division.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us whether you agreed then that members

17     of the BH Army might fill in the UNPROFOR ranks?  Thank you.

18        A.   As I stated before, to me never -- to me there has never been

19     spoken about filling up the ranks.  There has been -- we spoke about

20     filling up the gaps between our positions, as I stated before.  And so

21     there's not -- I can't speak of agreement because it was not proposed by

22     the ABiH as well.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer, I wanted to hear the answer of the

24     witness.  And as I indicated earlier, this witness is capable even to

25     answer repeated questions.

Page 3505

 1             Mr. Thayer.

 2             MR. THAYER:  I recognise that, and I certainly agree with that,

 3     Mr. President.  Nevertheless, we have General Tolimir repeatedly

 4     incorporating into his questions misstatements of fact.  This witness

 5     testified clearly that there was no discussion about filling in ranks.

 6     He builds that into the very next question, I let it go because I can't

 7     stand up every time that happens.  He gets an answer, and then he repeats

 8     that misstatement a second time.  And he's going to keep doing it and

 9     waste more time, through this method of misstating the record.

10             I understand that Colonel Franken is experienced and is capable

11     of answering the questions, but when we have these types of misleading

12     questions in the record, what happens then is the answer that is given

13     is -- does not make clear whether he is accepting that misstatement of

14     fact.  And it should not be a burden upon the witness for every

15     misleading question for the witness to have to correct the General's

16     misleading statement of fact.

17             And we see as an example, I let it go, Colonel Franken answers

18     the question, and then he asks the misleading question again, and then

19     Colonel Franken corrects him the second time around.  But now we have a

20     question that could conceivably be read to accept that misleading

21     statement that was not objected to.  And I -- again, I'm reluctant to

22     have to do this, but I feel that for the clarity of the record and to not

23     place that burden on the witness I have to intervene.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The view of the Chamber, Mr. Thayer, there were

25     some repetitions in your statement as well at the moment.  And on the

Page 3506

 1     other hand, I would like to repeat the position of the Chamber.  You may

 2     raise these concerns during your re-examination.  On the other hand, it's

 3     up to the accused to fill his time in that way or that way.  He was -- he

 4     has indicated to finish in ten hours, and he has to do that, of course.

 5     Not to waste time of the Court.  But, on the other hand, if, I think this

 6     witness is not in a position to be misleaded by a question.  And not the

 7     accused is giving evidence, but the witness.  And if there's a

 8     misstatement in the question, the Chamber is able to realise that.

 9             We should continue.  And I think both parties should be aware of

10     the fact that he is a witness, an important witness, and we should use

11     his evidence for the best of the Chamber and the whole proceeding.

12             Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

14             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Mr. Franken, I apologise that we have frequent interpretations

16     just like now.  I had no bad intentions.  You mentioned Becirevic

17     yourself; I then decided to ask you something about that because you

18     mentioned that it could have happened at a certain point.  I will now

19     move on to another topic so that we will not waste any more time on this.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now please show, once again,

21     1D207.  Paragraph 11.  It is a document entitled "Interview with Franken"

22     dated the 31st of March, 1999.  Thank you.

23             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Before we start reading, let me just ask you:  Did you

25     personally, supposing that there would be some air-strikes, receive an

Page 3507

 1     information to that effect from someone?  And if yes, who did you receive

 2     it from?  Thank you.

 3        A.   To answer your first question, would there be some air-strikes,

 4     and I think you refer to the 11th of July when those air-strikes were

 5     promised, no, and that refers to -- or no, and that is based on the fact

 6     that after the attack on OP Echo where all conditions were filled to give

 7     us close air support or any air support, it was refused by the UN.  Then

 8     I did not believe any more that we would get any air support any time.

 9             Then the fact that the air-strike on the 11th -- or at least air

10     support on the 11th would take place was given to me by my CO,

11     Colonel Karremans.

12        Q.   Thank you.  I already got the answer that I wanted to hear.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now please show 1D218.

14     Thank you.  Thank you.

15             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

16        Q.    We can see here that this is a statement given by

17     General Nicolai.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please have a look at page

19     12 of this statement on which Mr. Nicolai says the following.  I will

20     quote it once we can see it on the screen.  It has to do with what you

21     just mentioned, namely the air-strikes.  Here it is.  It is paragraph 2

22     in B/C/S.  I think it is paragraph 3 in English.

23             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   It says:

25             "The next day, the 11th of July, started with a confusing

Page 3508

 1     situation.  While Colonel Karremans was waiting for the air-strikes, we

 2     were waiting for him, the ground commander, to call in close air

 3     support."

 4             Close air support; I think this is what the abbreviation stands

 5     for.

 6             "After some time, the VRS continued their attack.  Then there was

 7     some misunderstanding between Tuzla, HQ Sector North-East, and DutchBat.

 8     I only learned about this later.  Karremans made a call for air support

 9     but used his normal channel through the Sector HQ at Tuzla and did not

10     call us direct.  I was never able to establish why he did this during

11     this very urgent situation."

12             Last time, at the end of your testimony, you explained the

13     situation with the Pakistanis.  Now you told us what you thought about

14     the air support.  My question is the following:  The request for close

15     air support or air-strikes, were you the one who made this request, or

16     was it Colonel Karremans?

17             You said that you did it and that you contacted the HQ in Tuzla,

18     in the opinion of two Pakistanis.  Now, here, we can see a different

19     information provided by General Nicolai.  Can you please tell us, What is

20     this all about?  Thank you.

21        A.   If I take your question literally, it is about air support.  But

22     there are a couple of situations, even here, confused.  The situation

23     with the Pakistanis was before-done air-support requests in support of

24     the attack on one of the OPs so can't be connected to the air-strikes

25     story on the 11th.  That has been on the 9th or something like that.

Page 3509

 1             Then I was informed, as I told before, by Colonel Karremans, that

 2     he was -- got information from UN that there would be air-strikes next

 3     morning.  An air-strike needs information where to fly to and what to

 4     attack.  That is the information I gathered, and that is the request I

 5     send to Tuzla because that would have been the normal way, next higher

 6     echelon.

 7             Now, I might not comment that.  Is that an answer to your

 8     question?

 9        Q.   Thank you.  There is only one thing that remains unclear to me,

10     and it's a small matter.  You may call it close air support or

11     air-strikes, but was it requested directly from Tuzla, and did you

12     overstep the command of the Sarajevo Sector and therefore General Nicolai

13     as well?  Thank you.

14        A.   Tuzla, just for your information, is a lower echelon than

15     Sarajevo.  So overstepping the higher echelon and contact Tuzla is not

16     applicable.  The normal echelon that I should contact with all my

17     information would have been Tuzla Sector North-East.  During these

18     events, Sarajevo, General Nikolai's staff or General Nicolai in person,

19     made contact to DutchBat, being the CO, Colonel Karremans, and kept on

20     doing that.  And the request was not from Tuzla, the request was sent to

21     Tuzla, as I tried to make clear before.  The request for the targets that

22     would be attacked in the air-strike on the 11th.

23             And, again, I say air-strike because our position was:  We were

24     informed there was an air-strike, so the whole discussion about what kind

25     of planes and who is waiting for who or who thinks that the other one

Page 3510

 1     thinks something - and I don't want to add to the confusion - but it

 2     looks like that everybody thought that the other party thought something

 3     but nobody asked, is in that sense, for us, for me at battalion level at

 4     that moment, not interesting.  I was informed air-strike is coming in; I

 5     presented a list of targets and sent that list of targets to Tuzla, my

 6     next higher echelon, Sector North-East.

 7        Q.   Thank you for this explanation.  Now I would like us -- well, I

 8     asked you this because General Nicolai asked this question.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please look at page 10.

10     Paragraph 4 of the statement made by General Nicolai.  That's 1D218.

11     Thank you.

12             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   I hope you can see this paragraph 4 where it says "On Sunday ..."

14     begins with the words "on Sunday."

15             Now we will skip all that.  We move on to line 5 in paragraph 4

16     where it says:

17             "Zagreb made it clear that General Janvier did not want to use

18     this ultimate solution without DutchBat having first used their weapons.

19     He wanted a step to be taken before the calling in of air-strikes.

20     According to the results of those consultations, we gave orders to

21     DutchBat to take blocking positions south of Srebrenica town so that if

22     the VRS attacked the town, this would not only be an attack on the

23     civilian population but also an attack on the UNPROFOR troops.  In this

24     case, all the conditions for using air power would be met.  This order

25     was carried out by the DutchBat.  At the same time we sent a message to

Page 3511

 1     the VRS leadership."

 2             This is what General Nicolai stated.  Is there any mention here

 3     of the use of weapons or only of taking blocking positions?  Thank you.

 4        A.   Well, the text used there are the words of General Nicolai, and

 5     if you want an explanation, then please ask him.  The only thing I know

 6     that I got order to defend with all means the city of Srebrenica, which

 7     is including, with all means, including the use of weapons.  The only

 8     thing that surprises me that there had been attacks on several OPs, as we

 9     mentioned before, and probably -- or I can only conclude that they did

10     not see that as an attack on UNPROFOR, and further on asked

11     General Nicolai.

12        Q.   Thank you.  At any rate, I will do so.  But I would just like to

13     ask you to tell me whether you received this order from Nicolai, this

14     order to defend Srebrenica at all costs, or whether somebody else issued

15     this order to you?  Thank you.

16        A.   The first time I heard of it, I was informed by my CO.  As I

17     stated before, Colonel Karremans told me that we got ordered to defend

18     the city of Srebrenica.  And then I started working on that green order.

19     And later on there was something, or a telegram or something, but whether

20     that was signed or originated by General Nicolai or somebody of his staff

21     or even higher command, I do not recollect.

22        Q.   Thank you.  You will remember that your commander ordered you to

23     open fire on the VRS on the 9th, the 10th, and the 11th; yes or no?

24     Thank you.

25        A.   The commander didn't order me.  The position was clear, OPs,

Page 3512

 1     observation posts, knew that they had to defend, when attacked, had to

 2     defend their OPs.  And then they open fire.  There was one occasion where

 3     I repeated that order to use weapons, that is, when the VRS attacked the

 4     city of Srebrenica itself.  It was reported to me that the VRS infantry

 5     was descending from the high grounds in the south, and I ordered

 6     commander B Company to open fire.  But, in fact, he already knew that he

 7     should do that, but that is what happened.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  I kindly ask you for your patience.  I need the

 9     answer that I want to get.  General Nicolai says here:

10             "According to the result of those consultations, we gave orders

11     to DutchBat to take blocking positions south of Srebrenica town so that

12     if the VRS attacked the town, this would not only be an attack on the

13     civilian population but also an attack on UNPROFOR troops."

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, I think there's no need to read this

15     portion again and again.  We have it on the screen and on the record and

16     the witness has heard it.  We have it on the record and the original

17     document.  Please put questions to the witness.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

19             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Well, my question on the basis of what I've just read would be

21     this:  Was this all about creating conditions on the ground for

22     air-strikes to be carried out, or was it something else?

23        A.   I don't have the faintest idea.  The only thing I know, I was to

24     defend a city.  And what the second thoughts or deeper thoughts of my

25     higher, higher echelon was, I was not informed about.  I took it that the

Page 3513

 1     order to defend the city was to simply prevent the VRS of entering the

 2     city.  As simple as that.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Please tell us, before the 9th, before issuing the

 4     green order, were you in any way involved in the discussion as to how

 5     your battalion should act in order to ensure air support or air-strikes?

 6     Thank you.

 7        A.   No, this is not -- as far as I knew, it was not depending on the

 8     acting of my battalion; it was more depending on the actions taken by a

 9     aggressor in this case, particularly the VRS.  And as I said before, air

10     support could be called in the very moment a UN unit was attacked, and

11     the boundaries of the enclave were passed by the VRS.  And there were two

12     other conditions, but I can't recollect them, but they were not

13     important.  The fact was, UN attacked, VRS coming into the enclave was

14     given enough reason to ask for air support.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Well, we have seen what General Janvier thought of

16     that.  But now I would like to ask you, on the basis of your answers:

17     Why do you call --

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  You just mentioned General Janvier; was that

19     correct?

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, that's correct, Your Honour.

21     He said -- well, in fact, I quoted what General Janvier said.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Were you referring to General Nicolai perhaps,

23     and not to General Janvier?

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, I meant General Janvier, the

25     UNPROFOR force commander, who said that air-strikes should not be used.

Page 3514

 1     And I said Zagreb made it clear.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.  I just wanted to avoid any

 3     misunderstanding.  You were referring to General Janvier.  Please carry

 4     on.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 6             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Sir, if you look at the transcript, you said the aggressor, VRS,

 8     did I understand you correctly?  And what do you mean when you say the

 9     aggressor, the VRS?

10        A.   Well, what I mean is that in case of a status quo, there is a

11     party attacking, then I call him an aggressor.  And in this case, it was

12     the VRS.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Did you adopt that term from the Muslims, or would

14     you use the same term for any attack?  Would you call any attack an

15     aggression?

16        A.   That is too generalising for me.  I can't answer that question.

17     I did not adopt the term from the Muslim.  It is a general definition of

18     aggressor.  Aggressor is somebody who attacks another party, in my view.

19     And in this case it was the VRS.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Well, of course, you are entitled to your opinion and

21     you can explain your positions and I have nothing against that.  But

22     could you please tell me this:  When you received the order to take

23     blocking positions to the south, as you've just told us, were you

24     notified in any way of the purpose of taking those blocking positions,

25     and was it one of the preconditions for UNPROFOR to come under an attack

Page 3515

 1     to provoke the VRS into attacking them and then to use it as a pretext

 2     for calling in air support?  Thank you.

 3        A.   Well, again, all kinds of considerations that took place on my

 4     higher, higher, and higher echelons I do not know of.  Just picking up

 5     the order I got, it was the aim of my defensive positions, blocking

 6     positions, was to prevent the VRS to enter the city of Srebrenica.  And

 7     that's it.  For me there were no secondary or even further-away reasons

 8     to do it.  Simple.  Defend it.  Enemy not coming in to the city.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Your APCs that took the blocking positions, were they

10     dug in, sheltered, or were they out there in the clear as perfect targets

11     for the tanks?  Thank you.

12        A.   We tried to find positions to dig them in.  That did not succeed

13     because the kind of ground in that area.  We took as much cover as

14     possible, but that was not very successful everywhere because you had

15     to -- have to use your own weapons systems as well, so you couldn't hide

16     them away, as far as is possible with a hail-white vehicle, so they were

17     out in the clear.

18        Q.   Thank you.  If they were out in the clear, and I have no reason

19     to doubt you there, were they a useful target, and could they have been

20     destroyed with anti-armour weapons or tanks?

21        A.   Whether they were a useful target, I can't judge that.  But they

22     could have been destroyed with anti-armour weapons and tanks with a

23     proper gunner, yes, but ...

24        Q.   Were any vehicles destroyed at those blocking positions that you

25     took there to the south?  Thank you.

Page 3516

 1        A.   Now, in those blocking positions, two vehicles were damaged by

 2     near misses, as far as we could trace back, by a Tango 55.  Tango 55,

 3     sorry, is a main battle tank used by the VRS.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  And were you told by your superior command that the

 5     VRS ordered its troops not to open fire on UNPROFOR and UNPROFOR combat

 6     vehicles?  Thank you.

 7        A.   No.  As you asked me last week, no, I was not aware of the fact

 8     that VRS ordered things like that.

 9        Q.   Thank you.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I please have 1D207 up on the

11     screen.  It's an interview with Franken.  I'm interested in page 1,

12     paragraph 11.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, and what about the previous

14     document, 1D218?  Are you tendering it, or do you prefer to tender it

15     with the witness Nikolai?

16             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President, for

18     reminding me.  I would like to tender it into evidence because it will be

19     used in the testimony of General Nikolai before this Tribunal.  Thank

20     you.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  65 ter 1D218 will be Exhibit D70.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

24             Please carry on, Mr. Tolimir.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

Page 3517

 1             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Now, Mr. Franken, please look at paragraph 11 on page 1.  You

 3     say:

 4             "Voorhoeve told Karremans that he had to defend the enclave to

 5     the extreme but that absolutely no body-bags were allowed to go home.

 6     Karremans then asked Voorhoeve, 'Can you tell me, how I am supposed to

 7     carry out this defence?'  He did not get any answer from this question to

 8     the minister, however."

 9             So could you please tell us who is Voorhoeve and what his

10     function was and whether he was your superior in the chain of command?

11        A.   Voorhoeve was the minister of defence of the Netherlands.  And in

12     my chain of command, but I suggest you mean the chain of command for

13     DutchBat, my chain of command was very easy; there was my CO, of course,

14     and there it ended.  But the chain of command for DutchBat, he had no

15     position because we were in the command of the UN.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Sorry, please don't touch the microphone again.

17             THE WITNESS:  I'm doing it again.  I'm very sorry, Your Honour.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Please carry on.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Mr. Franken, now, could you tell us whether the Dutch defence

22     minister overstepped his authority when he issued orders to you, given

23     that you were part of the UN chain of command, and whether you were

24     actually duty-bound to comply with his orders?  Thank you.

25        A.   To be clear, what was meant here that within the context of the

Page 3518

 1     order to defend the city of Srebrenica, the minister had obviously some

 2     restraints.  He did not order us to defend it in that way, but he knew,

 3     of course, about that.

 4             Just reading.  Well, you can't step -- overstep an authority

 5     which you do not have, because he didn't have any authority within the UN

 6     chain of command.  If you had formally -- if he wished something, he,

 7     theoretically, had to bring that in in the top of the UN line, and not

 8     directly to the commander of DutchBat, of course.  And I was not

 9     duty-bound to comply his orders.  But then again, I was not in discussion

10     with him.  I was not the receiver of these guide-lines.  I know, of

11     course, my CO came to me and said, Listen, that is a guide-line from

12     Holland.  And I would not likely be too -- prepared to repeat exactly

13     what I said in this court because that would be inappropriate.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Yes, I understand you.  Can you tell us, now that

15     we -- so that we don't have to go into that any deeper, whether your

16     battalion, when it carried out the order to take those blocking

17     positions, was it in a position to actually defend Srebrenica?  Did it

18     have enough strength to defend Srebrenica?

19        A.   A simple and short answer:  No.  Absolutely not.

20        Q.   Thank you.  So did you knowingly do that task counting that there

21     would be air support?

22        A.   As I told before, that I personally did not believe in air

23     support any more, after the air support comedy about OP Echo I told you

24     about, asking for airplanes were not available, et cetera.  No, I did not

25     count on air support.  I was very happy to hear later on that there would

Page 3519

 1     be air support, which, after all, did not come.  I refer to the

 2     air-strike situation on the morning of the 11th.  But I just did it with

 3     the means I had and hoped the best for it.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  As you received the order to set up blocking

 5     positions regardless of the fact that you couldn't defend the town, given

 6     the -- your strength, as you could see, the Republika Srpska army was

 7     issued orders by the corps commander General Zivanovic not to open fire

 8     on UNPROFOR on the 8th.  Now I'm asking you this:  You obeyed the orders

 9     that you received, they obeyed the orders that they received, but because

10     the VRS did not fire on UNPROFOR on the 9th, the 10th, and the 11th, did

11     it result in the postponement of mass air-strikes?  Was that the reason

12     why there were no mass air-strikes?

13        A.   To begin with the last question, I really don't know where there

14     were no air-strikes because, again, I thought that our request responded

15     to all the conditions the UN had.

16             Then you say that the VRS obeyed the orders, et cetera.  We

17     discussed that last week, that there was firing of VRS on UN positions.

18     And when you told me that they were ordered not to, I told you that then

19     obviously they did not follow their orders.

20             I think that answers the question.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Now I need you to answer the following question for

22     me:  Setting up the blocking positions of UNPROFOR to the south of the

23     enclave, was the sole purpose of that to provoke the Republika Srpska

24     army into attacking UNPROFOR troops which was to result in the NATO

25     air-strikes targeting the Republika Srpska army?  Thank you.

Page 3520

 1        A.   As I told you a couple of minutes ago, the purpose of those

 2     blocking positions was to prevent the VRS to enter the city of

 3     Srebrenica.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Did this have anything to do with the wish to ensure

 5     that there would be NATO air-strikes?

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, I think, repeatedly, the witness has

 7     answered this question.  It's really a repetition.  Carry on with another

 8     question.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

10             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Well, since you've answered this question and the Trial Chamber

12     is cognizant of it, I would now like us to move on to another topic and

13     that's the convoys, smuggling of humanitarian aid, and the conflicts of

14     UNPROFOR, UNHCR, and so on.  Thank you.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, in that case, if you are really

16     moving to another topic, it is a convenient time, I think, for a break

17     now, the first break, on technical reasons, to rewound the tapes.

18             We have our first break now and resume quarter past 4.00.

19                           --- Recess taken at 3.45 p.m.

20                           --- On resuming at 4.17 p.m.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, at the beginning of the testimony of

22     this witness, you indicated you need ten hours for cross-examination.  At

23     the end of today's hearing, you will have used approximately nine hours.

24     I am told that the witness has a problem to come back to the court

25     tomorrow if we don't finish today.  Could you indicate if it is possible

Page 3521

 1     to finish with the examination of this witness today?

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

 3     Considering what you've just said, I will try and I will ask the witness

 4     to answer as briefly as possible, and then we will most probably manage

 5     to complete this today.  Thank you.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I have an additional idea:  To avoid any

 7     repetition of a question would save time as well.

 8             Please carry on, Mr. Tolimir.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

10             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Mr. Franken, in the summary, both in the Popovic case and here,

12     called the control of the convoys at terror against the convoys.  Can you

13     tell us, What were the various difficulties that you had, considering

14     everything that you said in the transcript in the Popovic case 3322 and

15     3323, in these pages?  Thank you.

16        A.   Okay.  As a battalion, we had our logistic needs, and they were

17     to be addressed to by coming in logistic convoys from our logistic base

18     in the area of Busovaca.  The procedure was, when we arrived, that every

19     time we wanted a convoy to come in, there has to be the consent of the

20     VRS, not only about the fact that the convoy came and when it came, but

21     even about the contents of that convoy.  And because on one hand the

22     convoys were refused many, many times and then even the contents were

23     refused or partially refused, we could not meet our logistic needs.  And

24     that's what I meant by calling it convoy terror.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Do you mean just the convoys that had to do with

Page 3522

 1     UNPROFOR or do you also imply the UNHCR convoys?  Thank you.

 2        A.   My answer was concerning my convoys, so the UNPROFOR convoys.  I

 3     know about the fact that UNHCR had problems, but I don't know about

 4     details, these convoys, concerning.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  As for the restrictions that are implied in your

 6     answer, namely obtaining equipment by the convoys, did this imply

 7     restrictions that had to do with weapons, ammunition, and other materiel,

 8     which is called the technical equipment for equipping vehicles and other

 9     combat equipment?  Thank you.

10        A.   It had to do with that as well; but for food and fuel, et cetera,

11     the same problem was there.

12        Q.   Thank you.  In the Popovic case on page 3323, lines 3 to 5 of the

13     transcript, in your testimony you said -- I apologise.

14             In the summary of your testimony on page 3323 in lines 3 to 5 in

15     the transcript in the Popovic case - this is the summary of your

16     testimony read out by the OTP - it is emphasised that you said how the

17     weapons and ammunition of the Dutch Battalion were reduced and became

18     inoperative because the VRS restricted convoy access because there was a

19     need to maintain and replace some of the equipment.

20             So does your assessment follow what you mention in this summary

21     read out in the Popovic case?  Thank you.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, I'm not sure if the page is the

23     right one.  I don't think so because I have a different page number of

24     the Popovic transcript.  And the second is:  The summary read out by the

25     OTP is not part of the evidence.  To be able to follow what you are

Page 3523

 1     putting to the witness, we would like to know the exact reference.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  If you remember,

 3     Mr. President, on the first day of the testimony of this witness, the

 4     Prosecutor read out the summary of his testimony in the Popovic case.

 5     Therefore, on page 3323 --

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.  This is quite different.  You said

 7     the Popovic -- you were quoting the Popovic transcript.  Now you are

 8     quoting the transcript of this trial.  Thank you.  That clarifies the

 9     situation.

10             What is the question for this witness?

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  I do

12     apologise.  My mistake.  I am sorry for causing confusion.  Let me repeat

13     what the Prosecutor has said.  They said --

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Please don't repeat.  Just put a question to the

15     witness.  You have read it into the transcript and now put a question to

16     the witness.

17             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Can you tell us, What were the weapons that in a short period of

19     just a few months became inoperative and could not be used any longer?

20     Thank you.

21        A.   First remark:  It does not concern a short period of a few months

22     because we took over the equipment of DutchBat II and those limitations

23     to convoys already existed in the period they were there.

24             Then to answer your question, I can give you some examples.  Even

25     my rifles were -- to explain that, I'm getting technical, but even my

Page 3524

 1     rifles need repair.  All my anti-tank systems should have been tested and

 2     repaired.  Ammunition for my mortars and ammunition for my anti-tank

 3     systems was put out of action by the influence of moisture, and so I can

 4     give quite a lot.  But the fact is concern about all my weapons systems.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us whether these systems were used to

 6     attack until the moment when the green signal was issued?  Thank you.

 7        A.   As you know, none of my systems were used to attack.  And having

 8     stated that they were not operational, I not even could use them in

 9     defence.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Then please tell us, What was the average consumption

11     of ammunition of the Dutch Battalion in Srebrenica, and where was this

12     ammunition used?

13        A.   I don't know numbers about the average consumption because in the

14     period that there was actual contact with the VRS, it could have been

15     reported but not on the command net, and I was not interested at that

16     very moment.  I ordered that within the unit they had to change numbers

17     of available ammunition or exchange, change between the platoons so that

18     everybody got some ammunition.  I can tell you that [indiscernible] and I

19     were a logistic report; we had not more than 16 per cent of the

20     ammunition we should have had in the beginning.  And ammunition is not

21     only used by firing it, but keeping it long in the open, not in the

22     proper packages, ammunition devaluates as well, as you know.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Can you please tell us whether your needs to obtain

24     ammunition and reserve parts for weapons are consistent with the period

25     in March and April, or is another month in question?  Thank you.

Page 3525

 1        A.   I'm not sure I understand the question.  But the fact is there --

 2     when we came there and we took over from DutchBat II, we had already a

 3     big need for ammo, spare parts, et cetera, and that just increased during

 4     the period we were there.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  In the requests you made until the month of May,

 6     let's say, 1995, did you request that the weapons systems, the ammo, and

 7     the weapons be replaced, or did this only happen after the month of May?

 8     Thank you.

 9        A.   It started to happen in January and all the first requests, and

10     it stayed the whole period that way.

11        Q.   Thank you.  In the Popovic case, as stated in the summary of your

12     testimonies in this case, which the OTP read out, you said that the

13     battalion did not have sufficient ammo and other military equipment; is

14     that correct?  Thank you.

15        A.   That is correct.  And that is in fact what we said, that we took

16     over at a too-low level.

17        Q.   Thank you.  My question is the following:  Can you tell us as an

18     officer whether it is reasonable to allow armed forces to arm themselves,

19     even if these are UNPROFOR forces, if there is a danger that the weapons

20     might be used against you, whether by being seised by members of the BiH

21     army, and there were instances of that, of which we warned the UNPROFOR,

22     or if the UNPROFOR would use these weapons against you because, as you

23     told us, the VRS was viewed as the aggressor?  Thank you.

24        A.   To start with, UNPROFOR was within the enclave with the consent

25     of both parties.  Even in the face that that was so, there were

Page 3526

 1     limitations to whatever could be brought into the enclave.  If you are

 2     there as an UNPROFOR force with the consent of both parties, I do not

 3     understand that there would have been a fear that we should use those

 4     weapons against you, and I think you mean VRS.  Because they were aware

 5     of our orders, and we just had to deter any party by presence, and we did

 6     not -- and within our mandate there was not in any way the possibility

 7     that we would attack or whatever or start firing upon any of the parties.

 8             Then again, whether I think it's reasonable for any party to

 9     think whatever, I don't think that is applicable.  If you are there in an

10     enclave with the consent of both parties, I do not understand why you do

11     not allow to get the unit, in fact, working for you as well in a phase,

12     to get the supplies he needs.  And not only army and equipment, because,

13     again, even food and even blood was rejected.  And blood, not to eat, but

14     for our dressing station, for our hospital.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us whether this was usual after the

16     month of May when the air-strikes were carried out against the centre of

17     Republika Srpska, Pale and so on, that we should allow the UNPROFOR to

18     arm themselves in order -- in accordance with their requests, while, on

19     the other hand, the UNPROFOR and NATO used weapons only against

20     Republika Srpska?  Thank you.

21        A.   I'm thinking of the fact -- or stating that the situation in

22     Srebrenica, being in an isolated location, I can't react on the fact that

23     something was usual because it was a very unusual situation.  And then

24     again, I've just given evidence of the fact that we were a subject of

25     what I called convoy terror.  Justifying the one way or the other way,

Page 3527

 1     telling you and the Court that we didn't get the supplies and everything

 2     else we needed to do our job, is just what I mean in my answers.  And any

 3     justification or arguments or conditions or thoughts by any party, sorry,

 4     I can't answer that.  And I don't think it's applicable for me to answer

 5     that.  I'm just stating we got too less stuff of anything.  That was the

 6     reason that, in the end, the situation of the battalion was bad.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Last Thursday, we saw, and you said in the interview,

 8     and General Gvero said while he talked with General Nicolai, and I also

 9     told him, that in Zepa a number of APCs were stolen and that the unit in

10     Zepa had five APCs missing.  If one combat vehicle such as APC is stolen,

11     and it's not easy to hide one, is it possible that other weapons systems

12     that are smaller might be stolen as well?  Thank you.

13        A.   Everything is possible, Mr. Tolimir.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Was it then justified for Republika Srpska not to

15     give the weapons to those who might lose them, such as the APCs were

16     lost?  Thank you.

17        A.   Well, I come back to one answer I gave you before.  I'm just

18     giving the -- one of the causes or the reasons why our operational

19     situation was as bad as it was.  Cause was that VRS didn't allow anything

20     we wanted to come in.  And what the reasons for the VRS were, whether

21     they were justified or not, sorry, I can't be and I don't want to be the

22     judge of that.

23        Q.   Thank you.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now please see 1D173.

25             While we are waiting for it appear on the screen.  Let me say

Page 3528

 1     what it is.  It's an order from the Main Staff of the Army of

 2     Republika Srpska dated the 28th of February, 1995, from which one can see

 3     that the VRS assessed that the BH Army would begin offensive operations.

 4     And the document is signed by General Manojlo Milovanovic.  Let's see

 5     what it says.  We can see that it's a short document, and I only intend

 6     to read out something from the first paragraph.

 7             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   "Having monitored the situation and then an assessment of the

 9     intentions and capabilities of the Muslim forces, I believe that they

10     will not respect the signed cease-fire and cessation of hostilities for

11     four months but will begin in early March their announced spring

12     offensive and will, as part of it, attempt to link up the Zepa and

13     Srebrenica enclaves and then direct their forces towards Kladanj, Olovo,

14     and Tuzla."

15             My question, based on this, is as follows:  According to

16     information you had, was this assessment made by General Milovanovic in

17     February justified, and did the so-called spring offensive begin in the

18     month of March?  Many witnesses have said here that for 20 days there was

19     an attack carry out from Sarajevo against Ilidza, and there were also

20     sabotage activities of the Muslims who reported that they had killed

21     60 members of the VRS and so on and so forth.  They were doing it from

22     the enclave in which you were.  Thank you.

23        A.   Well, again, we were on a -- pretty isolated, and I did not know

24     or I believe I did not have this information you are referring to.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Did you receive any references from your command in

Page 3529

 1     Sarajevo about the complaints of the Army of Republika Srpska to the

 2     effect that attacks were being carried out from the Srebrenica enclave

 3     against the surrounding areas and the population?  Thank you.

 4        A.   What I remember, that in two cases we had contact with the

 5     liaison of the VRS, being in this case Major Nikolic of the Bratunac

 6     Brigade, which on one occasion complained about an action the Muslims

 7     would have taken in the area north of the enclave, that coped with a

 8     report of my observation post Mike about battle noise and, by daylight,

 9     smoke north of the enclave.  We asked then Major Nikolic whether we were

10     allowed to go down there and get the information he has about how many

11     and do you know where they came from, because we didn't see them.  Well,

12     you know the problems we had with the location of the OPs.

13             And second occasion, he came with -- an incident that took place

14     south of the enclave, having an ambush by the BiH, by the Muslim army in

15     that area, and in that ambush, as I recollect well, 10 or 12 Serb

16     soldiers were killed.

17             In the last case, we asked him to provide or allow us to get in

18     more material so we could build more OPs in the southern edge.  We

19     already had Kilo and Delta new, but we needed more there because we could

20     not control that hilly area without building up more OPs.  But then the

21     logistics for building an OP were, again, rejected by the VRS.

22             So that's two occasions that I recollect that were reported to me

23     and that led to complaints by the VRS to the battalion itself.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Please tell us whether you and your monitors noticed

25     that in the spring the Muslims intensified the carrying out of the

Page 3530

 1     so-called sabotage activities and the control of the Zepa-Srebrenica

 2     corridor?  Thank you.

 3        A.   About control of the Zepa-Srebrenica corridor, I do not anything

 4     about.  And as far as the other part of your question is concerned, I

 5     think I already answered that in my answer in the last question.  I know

 6     of -- actually of two events well described to you in the answer I gave

 7     you on my last -- on your last question.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Can you then tell me whether you ever had the

 9     occasion during your mandate and your stay in Srebrenica to learn that

10     Muslims were taking away the weapons and the equipment of UNPROFOR?  Were

11     there any such incidents, and did you ever report about them?  Thank you.

12        A.   If you mean the equipment of UNPROFOR, the equipment of the

13     battalion, then the answer is that the only case where that was done, the

14     only occasion that that was done when they took over or they attacked

15     OP Charlie and that was, as call it in the end phase, there were attempts

16     to steal equipment from observation posts.  They were, as far as I know,

17     denied.  Two exceptions, but that concerned two small tanks with diesel.

18     If you mean UNPROFOR, the total one, I already told you that I found back

19     a report but not exclusively but within the logistic report system that

20     the Ukrainian unit in Zepa lost five APCs that were reported stolen.

21        Q.   Thank you.

22             Now I would like us to look at your statement.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] P607.  Page 1 in the English

24     language, that's page 2 in the Serbian language.

25             [Microphone not activated]

Page 3531

 1             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

 2             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Let's look at the second paragraph, where it says:

 4             "During the first few months of our stay, there were very view

 5     incidents worth mentioning."

 6             That's a brief description of the first period.  And then it goes

 7     on to say in the third paragraph:

 8             "In this period, there was a proposal by the Serbs to do business

 9     with the Muslims..."

10             And then you go on to say:

11             "When I say business, I mean business in everything except

12     weapons."

13             Then we go on to the fourth paragraph.  You say:

14             "This jibed with our idea of how the relationship between the

15     warring factions should be normalised."

16             Thank you.  End of quote.

17             Now, I would like to ask you what you can say about this

18     situation and how long it persisted during your stay in Srebrenica?

19     Thank you.

20        A.   I take it you refer to the situation of the trade between both

21     parties?  Well, it never came to a practice, as stated there as well.  In

22     the end it was denied, and as I remember it, it was denied or it was

23     forbidden by the staff of the 28th Division, so we came very far in

24     details, negotiating that the Serbs would provide the enclave, the Muslim

25     population, with all kinds of stuff, being food, et cetera, et cetera.

Page 3532

 1     And then in the end of that procedure, when we came to a de facto

 2     decision when it would take place for the first time, the Muslims said,

 3     No, we reject it, we won't do it, et cetera.  And to my information I got

 4     then from the local population, the staff of the 28th Division forbade

 5     that.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  In paragraph 5 - could you please look at it - you

 7     say that this situation continued by the end of May and that by the end

 8     of May the parties came into conflict because of all sorts of things.

 9     Can you please explain to us what you mean?  How come that the two sides

10     parted ways here?

11        A.   Sorry, I have to read your question.  Moment, please.

12        Q.   Look at paragraph 5 of your statement and then please give us

13     your answer.

14        A.   Yes, I think you are referring to paragraph 2 of this second page

15     or at least the page I see now.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, that is the right part, yes.

17             THE WITNESS:  Is correct.

18             By the end of May, there were more conflicts between both

19     parties.  And what I meant by this is what I reported before, increasing

20     close firing, firing, et cetera, et cetera.  So, light hostilities.  That

21     is what I mean came into conflict.  And it was, of course, then,

22     completely impossible to come to an agreement.  And I suppose the

23     agreement refers to that trade agreement we were talking about.

24             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Thank you.  And, now, these conflicts that you talk about, the

Page 3533

 1     skirmishes, are you talking about the two, both sides, until the end of

 2     May, or was it something that was characteristic of just one side?  Thank

 3     you.

 4        A.   The skirmishes firing, the increasing close firing and firing at

 5     the enclave, was done at VRS, but in that period we -- I was reported

 6     that there was fire with small arms from outside the enclave -- or from

 7     inside the enclave in the direction of the VRS as well.  And that is what

 8     I meant with increasing the skirmishing.  Yes.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  And can you tell us whether in this time-period the

10     sabotage activities were stepped up?  I'm talking about those activities

11     launched from inside of the enclave towards the outside of the enclave.

12     You did not answer my question when I asked you.

13        A.   I'll try to answer now.  As I told you before, I know of two

14     cases of actual actions of the ABiH where the VRS complained about to the

15     battalion.  So whether actions stepped up or increased or whatever, I do

16     not know about that.

17        Q.   Thank you.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please look at 1D182.  I'm

19     interested in paragraph 2, line 1 and line 2.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  This is Exhibit D52.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

22             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Well, we can see here, the date is the 8th of July, 1995, and the

24     place is Tuzla.  And the 2nd Corps command states as following:

25             "60 Chetniks were killed.  And according to unconfirmed reports,

Page 3534

 1     the aggressor suffered even greater losses and had many wounded."

 2             And then he goes on to say how many weapons of what kind were

 3     seised.  The third paragraph goes on to say:

 4             "In the village of Visnjica, large quantities of ammunition were

 5     seised, but the soldiers were exhausted, and it was impossible to remove

 6     all of it, so the ammunition was destroyed, as were all the facilities

 7     that the aggressor could have used for military purposes."

 8             Thank you.  End of quote.

 9             Now, my question based on this is the following:  Were you aware

10     of it, and were you able to hear the explosions?  Were you able to hear

11     the exchange of gun-fire?  Because these are all areas close to you and

12     the whole village was burnt down.  Were you able to see those houses on

13     fire?

14        A.   To answer your first question, I was not aware of it, at least

15     not this result.

16             And to answer your next question, I'm sorry, but I do not know

17     where that village is by head, probably knew 15 years ago but not now.

18     And it could comply with the report or the report I got of that smoke and

19     battle noise by OP Mike.

20        Q.   Thank you.  In your view, the number of 60 villagers killed in an

21     action launched from inside of the so-called demilitarised zone, the

22     enclave, is it a great number or a small number?  And is it something

23     that is actually permissible or not?  Thank you.

24        A.   To answer your last question, in any conflict it is never

25     authorised or permissible to kill civilians, if that number of 60 refers

Page 3535

 1     to civilians, of course.  And if it's a great number, yes, it's a massive

 2     number, but, again, you have to make some - how do you call it? - to see

 3     it in a context.  Because, one, I don't know the village, I don't know

 4     how many people were there were, I don't know how big the attacking force

 5     was, and I don't know whether and in what way it was defended.  So in

 6     that case ...

 7             But when it concerns killing civilians, even one is a great

 8     number.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  You saw when I read this out a little while ago that

10     this was a report on operations launched by sabotage and reconnaissance

11     units that were infiltrated, that infiltrated the territory controlled by

12     the Republika Srpska army from the protected areas.  So they were not

13     involved in operations at the front to inflict those casualties, but they

14     inflicted casualties.  They killed and wounded whoever they encountered

15     on the axis of their advance of their attack, civilians or otherwise.

16             Did you ever discuss those protests made by Nikolic or by other

17     people sent through the Sarajevo command of UNPROFOR about the military

18     operations launched by the demilitarised zone in Srebrenica with the

19     Muslims?

20        A.   Yes, well, first, you suggest that those actions were taken from

21     out the enclave, so from out the UN protected zone.  I do not know

22     whether that is correct.  But the two complaints we got were by

23     Major Nikolic were passed through to our higher echelon, reported, and

24     those complaints were put down at the staff of 28th Division as well.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Did you ever disarm the BH Army units in Srebrenica?

Page 3536

 1     And that was part of your mandate.  Thank you.

 2        A.   First don't -- as far as I'm concerned, the demilitarisation of

 3     the enclave, I stated that before.  We did not manage to do that.  And we

 4     did by occasion, and, again, I have to dig in my memory, but on two or

 5     three occasions we managed to block BiH patrol and took their weapons and

 6     brought them to the WPC, weapon collection point, where the other weapons

 7     from the Muslims were as well, in custody of the UN.  That was within the

 8     compound of B Company within the city of Srebrenica.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Now, can you tell us, because I want to go back to

10     our basic topic and that's corruption and weapon smuggling, which groups

11     controlled the black-market that you speak about in your statement?  And

12     if you need me, I will quote from it.  Thank you.

13        A.   We never found proof who controlled it, but we were convinced of

14     the fact that it couldn't exist without the consent or even co-operation

15     of both military and civil authorities within the enclave.

16        Q.   Thank you.  And could you tell me, What goods were traded on the

17     black-market?

18        A.   I don't know exactly what, but what we could see was that there

19     were cigarettes, sometimes - what do you call that? - well, food issues,

20     et cetera.  Things like that were traded at the black-market.  But that

21     was the open black-market in the actual market in the city of Srebrenica.

22     What all happened back doors or wherever in other location, I do not know

23     of what the contents of that were.

24        Q.   Thank you.  So these were food and items such as clothing.  What

25     actually could be bought at this open-air market that you are talking

Page 3537

 1     about -- or, rather, black-market?

 2        A.   Well, actually, as I told you, cigarettes, sometimes certain food

 3     articles.  I don't remember clothing, but mostly that were the subjects

 4     that could be bought in open on the market in Srebrenica.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us whether there were items that had

 6     come in on the humanitarian aid convoys that were traded on this open

 7     black-market?  After all, your unit conducted controls of those convoys.

 8     Thank you.

 9        A.   First, I can't.  We never had proof or -- that it came in with

10     humanitarian aid convoys, for instance, UNHCR, and my control of the

11     convoys was very limited.  The only control I had was that we were

12     ordered to accompany them from OP Papa, so the northern entrance of the

13     enclave, to the warehouse where we secured them during the unpacking of

14     the trucks.  And then it was up to the opstina, the civil authorities, to

15     divide it or distribute it, et cetera.  So I did not -- never have

16     exact -- sorry, I knew on paper what was in the convoys, I had no reason

17     to believe that there was anything else in the convoys, and I never found

18     that there was anything else in the convoys.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Now, I would like us to look at document 1D034, where

20     Muslims themselves speak about the black-market.  It's a document

21     entitled, "Analytical Overview on the Causes of the Fall of Srebrenica

22     and Zepa," sent by the brigadier-general of the BH Army,

23     General Jusuf Jasarevic, commander of the Main Staff -- to the commander

24     of the Main Staff of the BH Army, Rasim Delic.

25             Could you please look at page of this document and tell us what

Page 3538

 1     is stated there.

 2             Okay.  Yes.  We can see the third paragraph:

 3             "The international players' calculation and indecision regarding

 4     the safe areas and smuggling and profiteering by members of UNPROFOR were

 5     also a factor which had a significant impact on the overall security

 6     situation in Srebrenica and Zepa."

 7             So could you please tell us whether this analysis presented by

 8     the brigadier-general, who was a commander in the BH Army, really was

 9     relevant for the situation in Zepa and Srebrenica?

10        A.   Well, as Zepa is concerned, I couldn't say anything, of course,

11     because I do not know anything about the situation, then, in Zepa.  And

12     if a BiH general concludes something out of his knowledge, et cetera,

13     well, again, don't ask me for it.  The total thing, conclusion, well, it

14     is his conclusion.  And what do you want me to say about that?  I don't

15     share it.

16        Q.   Thank you.  And you tell me, then, whether you have any knowledge

17     of the smuggling and profiteering by the UNPROFOR members as described

18     here by the brigadier-general?  Thank you.

19        A.   If you mean UNPROFOR members being members of DutchBat, we had

20     one event where we discovered smuggling, and the soldier that took part

21     of that, is, according to our rules, punished and prosecuted.  And

22     further, we would -- I do not know about any events that members of

23     DutchBat are engaged with this.

24        Q.   Thank you.  And can you tell us what that soldier actually

25     smuggled and when it happened?  I'm talking about the year and the month.

Page 3539

 1        A.   The year is obviously 1995.  It concerned a pretty vast amount of

 2     money.  About - what was it? - about 300.000 Deutschemarks, and it was

 3     contained in canned soup.  And we found that because, due to limitations

 4     to leave convoys, quite a lot of our guys were in Zagreb and couldn't

 5     return.  But miraculously before, during their leave, there came in

 6     packages sent by the families.  And as the battalion had a pretty severe

 7     shortage of food, we decided to use the food in those packages sent by

 8     the family.  And to our surprise in one of the packages we opened it and

 9     thought we would find tomato soup, which was incorrect.  We found many

10     Deutschemarks.  And that is the only actual case that I -- the

11     Deutschemarks were - there was a list with names - meant for local

12     Muslims.  And that's the only event that I -- that we found proof of

13     smuggling by DutchBat members.

14        Q.   Thank you.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please look at page 4 of

16     this document that we have here in e-court.  And I would like to thank

17     you for your answer.

18             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Could you please look at paragraph 2, where it says:

20             "Among the residents of Srebrenica, there is an ever-increasing

21     mistrust towards the civilian and military leadership fostered by or

22     fermented by the unjust distribution and various mechanations [as

23     interpreted] with the humanitarian relief.  And Naser Oric and the

24     municipal officials Osman Suljic, Adem Salihovic, and Hamdija Fejzic were

25     involved in that.  There are reports, intelligence, indicating that these

Page 3540

 1     people smuggled humanitarian relief, weapons, oil, and so on, and that in

 2     their smuggling activities they worked together with the UNPROFOR and

 3     what they called the aggressor."

 4             So my question to you is this:  Several names are mentioned here,

 5     and UNPROFOR is mentioned too.  So what can you tell us about this, and

 6     are you familiar with these names and these people?

 7        A.   Yes, I heard the names.  I couldn't find them as -- oh, yeah, I

 8     see them now.  No, those names are not familiar to me, except, of course,

 9     the name of Naser Oric, being the commander of the 28th Division.

10             And then your second question is UNPROFOR is mentioned too.

11     Well, again, as I stated before, I know of one case that we found out

12     that personnel or a soldier of DutchBat was guilty of smuggling, and,

13     well, we took our proper measurements.  But further on there were no

14     indications even or rumours that that was done by more members than that

15     one soldier who was punished.

16             As far as the VRS was involved, there's just one occasion that I

17     know of - I don't mean the rumours, because there were a lot of rumours -

18     that is, when we contacted an empty Pony Express - I explained to you

19     last week - with some guards with it, at the moment we contacted them or

20     we stopped them they were unarmed, and we asked them, Where are you

21     coming from?  And he pointed down south in the direction of Zepa, because

22     that was in the area of OP Delta, and patrol commander asked him, How is

23     that possible, because the VRS is there?  Oh, and he said, probably -

24     forgive my pronunciation - Nema problema, Chetniks, no problem,

25     Deutschemarks.

Page 3541

 1             That was an indication that VRS personnel was involved as well.

 2     But that was the only indication we got more or less an indication or

 3     proof of it.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Now, could you please tell me whether UNPROFOR

 5     controlled humanitarian convoys and whether it had any influence over the

 6     distribution of the humanitarian aid inside the enclave?  Thank you.

 7        A.   Again, I take it that in this case you mean by UNPROFOR DutchBat.

 8     I told that you that we did not control them, not the contents of them.

 9     We saw the papers and there it was reported what was in it.  And the only

10     control we did is that it came from the trucks into the warehouse where

11     it was under the control of UNHCR, and they were concerned, together with

12     the opstina, the civil authorities in the enclave, they were responsible

13     for the distribution, et cetera.  But there was no role for DutchBat in

14     that.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Please tell me whether you know if the goods brought

16     in as humanitarian aid ended up in the hands of the BH Army, and was it

17     them that decided how it would be distributed and used subsequently?

18        A.   There were rumours about that.  One of my officers asked the

19     UNHCR representative about that.  He denied, and that's it.

20        Q.   Thank you.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now, I would like 1D034 to be

22     admitted into evidence.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Please repeat the number; it's not recorded

24     properly.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like 1D034 to be admitted

Page 3542

 1     into evidence.  It's the Muslim report on the situation in the enclaves

 2     of Srebrenica and Zepa.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received, but at this stage I would

 4     like to note that many of or some of the documents you have used are not

 5     in your list we received before court today.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  This will be Exhibit D71.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Please carry on.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  I will

 9     check why that was the case, and I think this document should be.  Thank

10     you.

11             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Mr. Franken, in the Popovic case at transcript page 2447, lines 4

13     through 5, you stated, and I quote:

14             "The battalion needed 8- to 9.000 litres of fuel a day in order

15     to be able to do its job."

16             And then you go on to say:

17             "When the fuel supplies decreased, 250 litres of fuel were used

18     daily."

19             I don't know if I quoted you correctly.  Could you please correct

20     me if that is not the case.  But if yes, could you please explain why did

21     you need such vast quantities of fuel, 8 to 9.000 litres a day?

22        A.   Yes, I can't see, because I don't see a document, whether you

23     quoted me correctly, but I think I can answer the question anyway.  The

24     battalion needed 8- to 9.000 litres of fuel because we had to do a lot of

25     patrolling.  And, in fact, it was meant to be done by APC or, not in the

Page 3543

 1     area of the confrontation line, by wheeled vehicle.  Secondary, there was

 2     no -- any kind -- there was not any kind of energy in the enclave, so no

 3     electricity, no drinking water, et cetera, so we had to use generators,

 4     et cetera, et cetera, which consumed fuel, to purify our water, to keep

 5     up energy for our communications.  Well, I can make a whole list, but you

 6     can imagine yourself that if you do not have energy at all, you have to

 7     raise it yourself, that consumes quite a lot of fuel.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  So you maintain that you needed 9 tonnes [as

 9     interpreted] of fuel a day; yes or no?  Thank you.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Sorry.  Not 9.000 tonnes, but 8- to 9.000 litre

11     of fuel.  This is the correct quotation of the transcript in Popovic.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  I made a

13     mistake.  I meant 9.000 litres or 9 tonnes of oil.  Thank you.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The witness has explained that, according to the

15     transcript in Popovic.  What are you asking?

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  The

17     witness said that he was not sure whether he said 8 or 9 tonnes, so I'm

18     asking him, for the transcript, whether daily they needed 9 tonnes of

19     fuel.  However, I will rephrase my question.

20             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Where did you storage the 9 tonnes of fuel a day?  Thank you.

22        A.   Well, I had a fuel storage in the form of big sacks and a couple

23     of tanks on the main -- on each compound.  And we had fuel reserves on

24     every OP because they had to raise all their energy as well, of course.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Do you have any documents from which one can see how

Page 3544

 1     the fuel was distributed on a daily basis and what was the consumption

 2     and what were the requests for new supplies?  Thank you.

 3        A.   I had an NCO who was concerned with that, but I really do not

 4     recollect or have any papers with this detailed logistic items.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Please tell us, Is it possible that, if you receive

 6     9 tonnes of fuel a day, a certain part of that might be taken away or end

 7     up, as you said, on the black-market?  Thank you.

 8        A.   Well, your assumption that receiving 9 tonnes of fuel a day --

 9     again, I just stated that my needs were 8- up till 9.000 litres a day.

10     And it is impossible, absolutely impossible, that when it came to our

11     OP Papa, say, within our area of responsibility, that it would end on the

12     black-market.

13             As I stated before, I know of a couple of cases where what we

14     call jerrycans were stolen from OPs with diesel.  And where that ended

15     up -- did end up, I do not know of.  But properly coming in with a convoy

16     and the amount of diesel coming in at OP Papa, at our north entrance,

17     it's impossible that even a small part of it landed on the black-market

18     or came into the hands of the ABiH or whatever.

19        Q.   Thank you.  When there were no restrictions imposed, did you

20     receive the 9 tonnes which was as much as you needed, or were you never

21     receiving that quantity?  Thank you.

22        A.   I can't remember when there were no restrictions imposed, so when

23     I came there the supplies of DutchBat II were diminished already.  And I

24     never received an amount of fuel that much that it could cope with my

25     daily need.

Page 3545

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us, In what way did members of the

 2     BH Army in the enclave manage to obtain fuel, if you know that?  Was

 3     there any legal channel to bring fuel into the enclave which could have

 4     been used to supply their army?  Thank you.

 5        A.   How they did supply their need for fuel, I do not know.  There is

 6     a possibility, but we checked that regularly, we supplied fuel for the

 7     bakery in the town so it would be possible to make bread for the civilian

 8     population in that bakery.  And that, in fact, is the only places I

 9     remember it, and I think that I am correct, the only spot where -- which

10     was not under our direct control where fuel was present in order to allow

11     the bakery to bake bread.

12        Q.   That you.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please now show a

14     video-clip.  This is 1D211.  And these are short clips from news shows

15     which show that the UNPROFOR and UNHCR convoys were used to smuggle

16     weapons for the needs of the BH Army.  We only have the transcript for

17     the first and last part of this video-clip, and therefore I would ask the

18     interpreters to interpret simultaneously into English what is being said.

19     The total length of the clip is about 10 minutes.  I would ask the

20     interpreters to interpret from the video-clip directly.  Thank you.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  For better understanding for the Chamber, it

22     would be helpful to indicate the source of this clip.  Where is it from?

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I have said that these

24     are excerpts from news shows which were broadcast publicly and were also

25     presented as exhibits in the Popovic case.

Page 3546

 1             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  When we do not have the

 2     transcript, we normally do not interpret directly from video-clips.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Before you continue, could you tell us which TV

 4     channel this was taken from, if you know?  And do you have the full text

 5     in B/C/S of the -- what we are going to hear, for the sake of the

 6     interpreters?

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I do not have the complete text,

 8     and this is why I asked the interpreters to interpret simultaneously for

 9     these ten minutes into English so that you could see what it is about.

10     As for the image, it tells for itself.  And this was used as an exhibit

11     in the Popovic et al. case.  Thank you.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We heard from the interpreters that they normally

13     don't interpret without having the text.  It's a question of accuracy of

14     the text, the translation, and the transcript.  I hope they can manage

15     it; but if not, you will see what will happen.  Please carry on.

16                           [Video-clip played]

17             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  This is too quick.

18             [No interpretation]

19             [Voiceover] "Ammunition was found because there was a double

20     bottom, and this is the second time that it happens in our zone of

21     responsibility.  In humanitarian aid, we found aid which consists in

22     weapons and ammunition.

23             Question:  Do you know where this ammunition comes from?

24             Answer:  It is all produced in Konjic, and it was brought to the

25     Sarajevo airport and then by land.  This time it was brought by the

Page 3547

 1     French troops who were escorting.  From those in authority in UN, we

 2     requested an official information, but we couldn't get it because they

 3     said they were not authorised.  Unofficially, in conversation, UNHCR

 4     representatives said that they had nothing to do with these trucks or

 5     containers and that they were only responsible for what was carried in

 6     the containers.  What was under the containers they were not interested

 7     in.  The representatives of the French UN apologised, saying that they

 8     were just the escort, whereas the UN police said that they would

 9     investigate and timely inform us about the result.  Whoever it was who

10     loaded this at the airport remains a secret for us.  How many such

11     convoys have already passed, we do not know, but it is a fact that, once

12     again, we have unmasked UNPROFOR who brings in and distributes weapons

13     and ammunition for Muslims under the cloak of humanitarian aid."

14             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  This is just a partial

15     interpretation, as the text is being read out in the news very quickly.

16             [Voiceover] "In the UN convoy which was checked, it was

17     established that the blue helmets have a surplus of weapons.  These were

18     five automatic rifles and 20 Zoljas.  You can see how the rifles are

19     being discovered.  You can see the blue helmets themselves know where

20     they placed the weapons which they were carrying towards Visoko and

21     Kiseljak.  And they are not listed in the specification.  No automatic

22     rifles or Zoljas are mentioned here.  You can see for yourselves how the

23     rifles look.  As this trick was unsuccessful, the UN trucks turned back

24     and returned to their base in Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  How they

25     are going to explain to Serbs that this was humanitarian aid to Muslims

Page 3548

 1     will be very difficult, especially if one talks about their bias.  It

 2     would be certainly different if the world new about the real truth in the

 3     ground.  There were false accusations used by those who should bring back

 4     truth and trust into this region.  The London Guardian says today that

 5     the commander of the UNPROFOR for the former Bosnia-Herzegovina,

 6     Michael Rose, sent four members of the British Intelligence Service,

 7     rather than military monitors of United Nations, to Gorazde.  Once again,

 8     the peacekeeping forces had a surplus of weapons today.

 9             "Here is a report of our reporters:  Yesterday, at about

10     1700 hours, a convoy moving from Kiseljak to Sarajevo was stopped.  It

11     included three APCs, three trucks, and 15 members of the Swedish and

12     Norwegian Battalions.  After a regular and routine control, Serbian

13     border policemen found a large amount of explosives, ammunition, and

14     weapons in the vehicles of Swedish soldiers.  Today we had a case that

15     there was somewhat more ammunition, anti-tank mines, and

16     7.62 millimetres, as well as plastic explosive in these vehicles, around

17     120 kilos.  As they have three APCs, that means that the weapons should

18     be different.  I doubt that they need explosives and so on.  However,

19     they declared they had it, so we can say it's correct.  However, these

20     rocket guns, signal ammunition, and so on and so forth, whatever has not

21     been reported, we'll have to seise that, and we'll give them some papers

22     for that.  Once they receive an approval from the Main Staff of the VRS,

23     we'll allow them to have it.  How did this confusion take place?  How can

24     the ...

25             "The convoy is still at the Kobiljaca border post and is waiting

Page 3549

 1     for papers and the result of the agreement between the Serbian

 2     authorities and the command of UNPROFOR.  After that, it will return on

 3     its way to Sarajevo or go back to Kiseljak.

 4             [No interpretation]

 5             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] I apologise, I just received

 6     information that there is no sound.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We didn't receive any sound for the last couple

 8     of minutes.

 9             MR. GAJIC:  I thought that it is a problem in my earphones.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  No, no.  At the beginning, we had no translation.

11     Then the interpreters - and I think we all should be grateful for

12     that - tried to catch as much as possible.  And at the end we didn't hear

13     anything.

14             MR. GAJIC:  [Interpretation] I apologise, I really do not know

15     what the problem is because this worked until recently.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Thanks to Aleksandar.

17     I think this is sufficient for me to be able to ask the witness a

18     question.

19             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Can you please say whether you were aware that in some

21     humanitarian aid convoys weapons were being smuggled, as we could see

22     from these video-clips, even in flour which was intended for the civilian

23     population in the enclaves?  Thank you.

24        A.   I was not aware of that.  And as far as the area of Srebrenica

25     and the DutchBat is concerning, I am -- I never had report, indications,

Page 3550

 1     rumours, or whatever that that took place in my area of responsibility as

 2     well.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  To clarify the transcript, on page 61, line 10,

 4     Mr. Gajic was speaking.

 5             And if I'm -- I was told that the 65 ter number, 1D211, is in

 6     fact a book and not a video.  You should try to figure out the correct

 7     number.  And then carry on, please.

 8             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I apologise.  The

 9     correct number is 1D212.  And the interpretation of the first and last

10     parts of what is being said in the video-clips are documents 1D216 and

11     1D217.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It would have been helpful to get this

13     information earlier.

14             You wanted to put questions to the witness, Mr. Tolimir; do it.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Mr. Franken, did you have any instructions that you received from

18     the sector command, the Sector Sarajevo or the Sector Tuzla, that to the

19     effect that the humanitarian convoys are being used to smuggle weapons

20     and military equipment?  Thank you.

21        A.   No.

22        Q.   Was it usual that the VRS, if it discovered that the convoys were

23     being used as we have just seen now, to put in double bottoms under flour

24     and so on, that it should control and check the convoys which enter

25     enclaves?  Thank you.

Page 3551

 1        A.   I take it that with "usual" you mean logical or comprehensible.

 2     Yes, of course, I can imagine, if you have incidents like that, that you

 3     want to check whether the contents of a convoy are -- conformed the list

 4     of containments presented.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Did you, as the deputy commander, ever receive

 6     information from anyone that a convoy with humanitarian aid is being used

 7     to transport weapons and materiel?  Thank you.

 8        A.   As I stated before, no.

 9        Q.   Thank you.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I tender the video-clip 1D212 and

11     the transcripts of the initial and final parts of this video-clip, namely

12     1D216 and 1D217 into evidence.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

14             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, I just want to know when or if we can

15     expect to be provided with any specific information along the lines that

16     Your Honour had asked about pertaining to what these videos actually

17     depict, i.e., dates, locations, what television stations these were being

18     reported over, any particulars so that the Court may be assisted to know

19     whether these particular incidents have any relevance, temporally,

20     geographically, or in any other way to what was going on in Srebrenica

21     and Zepa.  As it stands, we have none.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, your comment on this?

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  In the

24     transcript, which we did not hear, it is stated in which locations this

25     was found and when.  And as for the video-clip, I said that these were

Page 3552

 1     excerpts from the public media, the public service of the radio and

 2     television of Republika Srpska.  If we need to describe what is not --

 3     what was not heard here because we had no sound, we will then submit a

 4     separate document to the Trial Chamber.  Thank you.

 5                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I would just like to

 7     add one thing before you rule:  This document -- or, rather, this

 8     videotape was disclosed to the Defence by the Prosecution, and it was

 9     used and admitted into evidence in the Popovic case.  Thank you.

10                           [Trial Chamber confers]

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  For the Chamber, there's not enough information

12     about the source and the background and the date this video-clip was

13     taken, so that we will mark it for identification.  The Defence may add

14     some information to it and submit it to the Trial Chamber.  At this stage

15     of the proceedings, the Chamber is not in the position to receive it as

16     an exhibit on which anybody can rely on.

17             We must have our final break now for today.  I would like to

18     know, do you need the whole last 45 minutes for the completion of your

19     examination, or is it possible to leave some time for the Prosecution for

20     re-examination, Mr. Tolimir?

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  I will

22     do my best to reduce the number of questions.  Thank you.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

24             We adjourn and resume a little bit earlier, ten minutes past

25     6.00.

Page 3553

 1                           --- Recess taken at 5.48 p.m.

 2                           --- On resuming at 6.12 p.m.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Before you proceed, Mr. Tolimir, the Registrar

 4     has to give us a number and I think for all three documents, video and

 5     the two transcripts we have seen before the break.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  Thank you, Your Honour.  1D212 is now Exhibit

 7     D72, marked for identification.  The transcript will be attached.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.  Please carry on, Mr. Tolimir.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

10             Now I would like us to look at document 1D213 in the e-court.

11     It's a report drafted by Captain Slavko Novakovic, and the report

12     describes the way in which convoys were controlled, the check-points, the

13     routes, and the way in which those humanitarian aid convoys were put to

14     malicious use.

15             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Yes, well we can see the front page now.  It just specifies the

17     locations.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now, can we please look at page 3.

19     Thank you.

20             MR. TOLIMIR: [No interpretation]

21             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, your microphone should be switched

23     on.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

25             Now I would like us to look at page 1 of this text -- or, rather,

Page 3554

 1     page 2.  Because I believe we are now at page 3.  So could we please look

 2     at page 2.  Both in the Serbian language -- or, rather, page 2 in the

 3     Serbian language, and page 1, the last paragraph on that page, in the

 4     English language.

 5             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

 6             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Well, if we look at the last paragraph on page 1 in the Serbian

 8     language, it's the next page in the English language.  Thank you.  I will

 9     try -- well, thank you, yes.  It says in the last paragraph in the

10     Serbian language and in the English:

11             "Understandably, most cases of attempting smuggling of goods were

12     in the convoys for Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde, which had the fewest

13     possibilities for being provisioned, apart from humanitarian aid.  The

14     following goods were smuggled in in most of the cases:  Video cameras,

15     cameras, films, weapons, radio sets, satellite equipment, and aerial

16     signalling communication equipment, optical devices, night vision

17     devices, engine oil, various parts for devices, anti-freeze, chemical

18     manure, oxygen cylinders, flak jackets, helmets, sleeping bags, military

19     clothing and footwear, and various food stuffs."

20             Please, since you had an opinion on those convoys, I would like,

21     now, to show you the following analysis contained in page 3 of this

22     document.  This is an analysis by Captain Slavko Nikovic

23     [as interpreted].

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So could we please look at page 3.

25     That's the next page.  Also in the English language.  Thank you.

Page 3555

 1             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   So it's the third paragraph in the Serb language and also in the

 3     English language.  When it says:

 4             "When the representatives of UNPROFOR and humanitarian

 5     organisations complain about the procedure of the organs at the

 6     check-points, in the majority of the cases, their aim is to use

 7     counter-accusations to lessen their own responsibility, owing to the

 8     attempts to abuse their humanitarian function and to play fast and loose

 9     with the mandate entrusted to them.  However, not all of their

10     accusations can be dismissed because our side has not been blameless in

11     the procedure of inspection, which is something that is rarely repeated."

12             So my question based on this is the following:  So based on the

13     practice that was prevalent in Srebrenica, can you please comment on this

14     analysis by the captain, and were those items really controlled, and were

15     they, in most cases, the object of controversy in those convoys?  Thank

16     you.

17        A.   As I see it, the analysis of the captain mentioned by you is

18     concerning humanitarian aid.  In the case of Srebrenica in the period I

19     was there, these convoys were executed by UNHCR.  Stated before, I know

20     not of actual smuggling into the Srebrenica area by UNHCR.  I told you

21     before.  So ... well, in fact, that is my answer.

22        Q.   Thank you.  And can you tell me whether you, your unit, the

23     DutchBat, whether you controlled the UNHCR convoys in any conditions, or

24     did you at least check the documents that accompanied the convoys?  Thank

25     you.

Page 3556

 1        A.   The only thing that happened, and I -- as I said before, I did

 2     not actually control the contents of the UNHCR convoys.  I told you what

 3     the job was we had to do, accompany, secure, til in the warehouse, then

 4     UNHCR was responsible for distribution.  And we were presented the

 5     contents or the -- the papers belonging to that convoy and that the only

 6     thing we thought that there was wheat in it or clothing or whatever, any

 7     humanitarian thing, and that's all I can answer you to your question.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  He speaks about the things that are contained in

 9     humanitarian aid convoys, and he even showed some self-criticism here,

10     saying that there were some omissions, some errors made by the

11     Republika Srpska army when it controlled the convoys.  He's not making

12     any accusations against UNPROFOR or UNHCR, he's just talking about the

13     goods, the items in those convoys which were smuggled in most of the

14     cases, and these are goods that were banned.  Did you notice, when you

15     carried out your checks, any of those items?  Thank you.

16        A.   Yes, again, Mr. Tolimir, concerning the UNHCR convoys, I did not

17     check.  The only thing I was informed about:  What were, according to the

18     papers, the contents of that convoy.  But we did not enter the trucks or

19     inspect the undersides of the trucks or whatever.  The only thing we did,

20     as I said before, accompany them to the warehouse, secure the unloading,

21     and then UNHCR was responsible for the further actions taken with those

22     supplies.

23        Q.   Thank you.  And were you notified by the UNHCR that parts of

24     consignments were kept or seised at the check-points manned by the

25     Republika Srpska army on some occasions, and were you told why?

Page 3557

 1        A.   No.  I was not informed by UNHCR about things like that.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  So you do not have any complaints about the way in

 3     which the UNHCR brought the humanitarian aid into the enclaves?

 4        A.   No.  When they arrived, they brought stuff that was necessary, as

 5     far as I knew and was concerned, necessary for the population, and so I

 6     was happy when they came in.

 7        Q.   Thank you.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now, I would like this report, this

 9     analysis on the UNHCR convoys that reached the enclave, be admitted into

10     evidence since it contains an overview which I did not read out here.

11     And the witness said that he -- or, rather, his officers and soldiers had

12     seen the documents that accompanied the convoys.  Thank you.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I would like to see the first page again.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.  Thank you.  Could we please

15     look at it on the first -- could we please look at page 1 in the e-court.

16     Thank you.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  With some additional information, I don't see a

18     heading of this page.  Who is the institution who produced this report?

19     I don't see any date.  Can you give some additional information,

20     Mr. Tolimir?

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  I said

22     that this was a report drafted by Captain Slavko Nikolic --

23     Slavko Novakovic, I'm sorry - showing the way in which convoys were

24     checked.  The routes and check-points.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  This was not my question, Mr. Tolimir.  We have

Page 3558

 1     that on the record.  I asked for something else.  Who provided this

 2     document?  Who produced it?  There's no headline.  I don't know -- no

 3     heading, no date.  I have no idea what it is about.  And who is

 4     Captain Slavko Novakovic?

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Captain Slavko Novakovic actually

 6     carried out the checks of the convoys that reached -- that entered

 7     Srebrenica, and he made this analysis at the behest of the

 8     Republika Srpska army.  And we will see later on some analysis made by

 9     General Milovanovic and others for the purpose of the Main Staff.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE: [Previous translation continues] ... I have to

11     stop you, to save time.  This was not the question.

12             Can we please see the last page.

13             Again, I can't see any date of this report.  On the left side, in

14     B/C/S, there is a signature.

15             Mr. Franken, do you know a person with a name Slavko Novakovic?

16             THE WITNESS:  I do not, sir.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer, do you want to comment on the

18     application of Mr. Tolimir?

19             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, the only additional assistance I can

20     lend is I believe this document may be a Drina Corps collection document,

21     but we're in the same boat.  We have no idea when this was created.  It

22     appears to have been created sometime after 1994; there's reference to

23     1994.  I think Captain Novakovic may have been an officer in the

24     Drina Corps.  If my recollection serves, he was a listed Defence witness

25     for one of the Popovic Defendants, but I don't believe he ever testified,

Page 3559

 1     so I don't think we actually have any evidence on the record that will

 2     assist us further with the providence of this document.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

 4                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The Chamber is of the view that this document

 6     can't be received as an exhibit to date.  It will be marked for

 7     identification.  We have no date.  We don't know anything about the

 8     institution on behalf of that, this certain Mr. Captain Slavko Novakovic

 9     had drafted this document, there's no stamp and no indication about

10     reliability and the source.  You may decide, Mr. Tolimir, if you would

11     like to give more information for the Chamber or call Mr. Novakovic as a

12     witness for the Defence at a later stage.

13             Please carry on now.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  One moment, one moment.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  1D213 will be Exhibit D73, marked for

17     identification.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Now carry on, please.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

20             Now I would like us to look at 1D214.  It's a document from the

21     Main Staff of the VRS drafted by Colonel-General Manojlo Milovanovic, the

22     chief of the Main Staff.  It's a weekly plan for the deliveries of

23     humanitarian aid between the 13th and 19th of May, 1995.  Thank you.

24     Thank you.

25             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Page 3560

 1        Q.   Well, we can see here that the convoys left for Srebrenica on the

 2     16th of May.  It's the third line here.  And again at line 6 it says

 3     Karakaj Srebrenica.  And then on the 17th of May and so on.  The 18th of

 4     May.

 5             So now I would like to as you this:  You have this document in

 6     English, and it's actually more legible.  We can see from this document

 7     that the VRS Main Staff approved the movement of those convoys that

 8     carried large quantities of foodstuffs.  For instance, on the

 9     15th of May, there were 72 tonnes of flour carried --

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE: [Previous translation continues] ... what is your

11     question, Mr. Tolimir?

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I simply wanted the witness to see

13     the quantities of flour that were being delivered over just two days.

14     And I wanted to ask him if this was restrictive or not, because the

15     witness was speaking of restrictions.  Thank you.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  And what is the question?

17             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   The question is: Since we can see from this overview, which I

19     cannot read now, that 72 or 16 tonnes of flour were transported daily,

20     32 tonnes of flour, 16 tonnes of sugar, and so on, my question is:  If

21     Srebrenica had 35.000 of people who depended on humanitarian aid, and we

22     can see that a total of 111 tonnes of flour were approved to be

23     delivered, that means that each person received 3.15 kilos of flour a

24     week.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, you are not giving evidence.  You

Page 3561

 1     are the accused.  I'm very sorry to remind you.  Put a question to the

 2     witness.  I haven't heard any question yet.

 3             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   My question is:  Was this how flour was distributed?  If -- or,

 5     rather, whether this kind of quantity of 3.15 kilos per person was this

 6     something that was acceptable as normal, or was it restrictive?  Thank

 7     you.

 8        A.   To answer your last question, I don't have the faintest idea.

 9     I'm not a professional on this.  At least I can conclude that there came

10     in -- probably came in flour in that period for the -- for the

11     population.  And your question whether the flour was distributed, I

12     suppose it is.  But, then again, UNHCR coped with that and arranged that

13     and there was no role for DutchBat in that distribution.

14        Q.   Thank you.  So my question is whether UNPROFOR in Srebrenica at

15     any point in time sent any requests for greater quantities of

16     humanitarian aid, food for Srebrenica, for its population in relation to

17     the quantities that were actually delivered?

18        A.   Yeah, well, I do not know whether how many times and in what

19     amounts UNPROFOR in Srebrenica - you say -- you mean probably UNHCR in

20     Srebrenica - asked for food for the population.  Again, UNPROFOR is not

21     the party who was initiating these kind of convoys.  So I can't further

22     answer that question.

23        Q.   Thank you.  I'm happy with your answer.  So UNPROFOR did not do

24     that.

25             In this document it shows that a large quantity of materials came

Page 3562

 1     in for a major Swedish construction project.  Can you tell us something

 2     about this major construction project in this area that you -- that was

 3     under your control?  Thank you.

 4        A.   I take it that the one who made this report or this text refers

 5     to what I called before the Swedish Shelter Project, being the refugee

 6     camp in the south of the enclave I told you about last week.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Please just answer this one more question.  As for

 8     fuel which arrived for the population in the enclave by humanitarian

 9     convoys, what can you tell us about that?  Thank you.

10        A.   Sorry, lost my ... I know that fuel came in, but still we were

11     providing fuel from our storage for that bakery, so I can't comment on

12     amounts, necessity, daily use of the population, et cetera.

13        Q.   Thank you.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I thought not to show a document,

15     but I will.  It is 1D215.  Can we please see it on the screen.  Thank

16     you.  Can we please show page 7 of this document in both B/C/S and in

17     English.  It is one page from the section entitled "Experience."

18             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   You can see it on the screen now.  Just below the word

20     "experience," I will read and quote.  It is an interview which you gave

21     on the 13th of September, 1995.  This is what it says:

22             "As for the UNHCR, Franken said that, in his view, this

23     organisation, whose aim was to fulfill all its procedures, and thereby

24     losing sight of the actual objective, he failed to understand that they

25     stopped humanitarian aid supplies because they disapproved of the 1.000

Page 3563

 1     litres ever fuel given to the Serbs or because they were searched.  An

 2     example of this situation was when the BH Army said that they intended to

 3     set up roadblocks in the enclave because many white vehicles had been

 4     seised by the BSA.  Franken said that he would not accept this under any

 5     circumstances, and, if necessary, he would prevent it by force.  However,

 6     in order to avoid an escalation, he offered to subject incoming convoys

 7     to a brief inspection by his own staff.  This brought about another

 8     series of protests from the UNHCR, and two convoys were held back which

 9     resulted in aid supplies, including baby food, running out in the

10     enclave.  This was used as a coercive measure."

11             My question, based on everything that I just read out, is the

12     following:  Can you please clarify for us, now, why the UNHCR protested

13     if the convoys were searched by the UNPROFOR, and what was the specific

14     reason which the UNHCR mentioned in their protest notes?  Thank you.

15        A.   I have to dig deep in my memory now.  The first thing that I did

16     not understand was that they -- at a check-point they were asked to give

17     1.000 but an amount of fuel to the Serbs and then they went back.  And

18     there were other occasions where they reported to me that they had

19     convoys turning back to their original base because they had a reason.

20             Secondly, I indeed remember that I said to the ABiH who claimed

21     that Serb soldiers were coming into the enclave in the vehicles, in white

22     vehicles, which I proclaimed as being nonsense, but then I said, Okay,

23     we'll have a check.  Practically the check never took place, but that was

24     a reason for the UNHCR to say we do not want to be checked by you.  So if

25     you do that, we will not come anymore.

Page 3564

 1             Now, I don't know exactly the period afterwards where I said,

 2     Okay, then we won't check; no problem.  But I was informed that, on basis

 3     of that protest, they stopped about two convoys on their way down to the

 4     enclave.

 5             I take it this answers your question.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Was this protest of UNHCR a reason why the enclave

 7     was running out of some crucial foodstuffs, such as the baby food, for

 8     example?

 9        A.   The protest was not, as far as I can concede, because that

10     protest was towards DutchBat who had the plan of just make a check, and

11     as -- saying that, that had no influence on the requests on UNHCR convoys

12     nor their contents.  Presumably, and that's what I stated before in the

13     document you presented, two convoys were redirected, with which I mean

14     sent back, by the UNHCR.  On the very moment or very shortly after, I

15     told them that we would do a quick inspection of the convoys to

16     neutralise the agony at the ABiH site.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Can you just briefly tell us, on page 7 of this

18     document, you said, stating your experience about doctors without

19     borders, Medecins Sans Frontieres, you said that some had a positive

20     opinion of it.  And then you talk about a Flemish predecessor who was

21     only interested in power politics.  What do you think about power

22     politics?  In what way was he interested in that?  What do you mean to

23     say by this?  Thank you.

24        A.   What I did mean, that, is - and I'll try to give a short

25     answer - normally an arrange was that civil workers for MSF, Medecins

Page 3565

 1     Sans Frontieres, and the DutchBat, a new group would come in, as far as I

 2     recollect, the 1st of April.  Okay.  Why?  The opstina wanted everybody

 3     as much -- as much -- as much people as possible to be -- to profit from

 4     the fact that they had work, either UN base, so they got money and

 5     things, et cetera.

 6             In April, the Medecins Sans Frontieres refused that.  They did

 7     not want that.  Then there was a conflict between the opstina and

 8     Medecins Sans Frontieres, and that escalated more or less, resulting in

 9     the fact that -- that the MSF was stopping any medical aid to the civil

10     hospital or to the population because they wanted it the way they thought

11     it should be.  Nevertheless, the fact that there was an arrangement and

12     it was arranged that 1st of April, we would change personnel.  That's

13     what I meant when, an issue like this, you let it prevail over the

14     humanitarian aid.  Then you are doing politics and you are not delivering

15     humanitarian aid.

16             A successor was quite different type who had the humanitarian aid

17     high.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Before you continue, Judge Nyambe has a question

19     for the witness.

20             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Thank you, Mr. President.

21             I have a question for the witness.  At page 75, line 20 to 23.

22             "... I don't know exactly the period afterwards where I said,

23     Okay ..."

24             I just want to ask about the protests by UNHCR that you mentioned

25     in that paragraph.  For how long was the protest?

Page 3566

 1             THE WITNESS:  I think, as I recollect, Your Honour, it was one

 2     protest at our HQ.  And the consequences lasted about two or three days

 3     because then the question was cleared.  In that period of two or three

 4     days, I later on heard that two convoys were sent back.

 5             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Then a follow-up question:  Two convoys were

 6     redirected, which means that they were sent away from the enclave?

 7             THE WITNESS:  That's correct, Your Honour.

 8             JUDGE NYAMBE:  So the supplies were never -- never reached the

 9     enclave?

10             THE WITNESS:  Well, I can't say that.  But the supplies --

11             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Okay.

12             THE WITNESS: -- on that moment did not arrive, as planned, in the

13     enclave.  That is correct, Your Honour.

14             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Thank you.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   So we would finish, as requested, because you have some

19     obligations.  I just have one additional question.  Did you personally or

20     your soldiers or your predecessors who were there before you have any

21     knowledge about military equipment and weapons being thrown by parachute

22     into Srebrenica or that Srebrenica was being armed via the Tuzla airport?

23     Thank you.

24        A.   I can only speak for myself and eventually reports I got about

25     that.  Thrown by parachute, no.  I know it is possible, even radiographic

Page 3567

 1     controlled parachutes exist.  Never had a report that or had, myself,

 2     knowledge of that.  Being armed through Tuzla airport, I told you

 3     about -- or last week already we spoke about that unknown or unidentified

 4     Hercules planes coming down in Tuzla, and a good week or ten days later

 5     we saw new weapons in Tuzla.  And there was a link laid by me then in my

 6     interview I gave, but, then again, I said it is an assumption.  It

 7     was -- I don't have any proof of that.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Did you have any knowledge as to whether the new

 9     weapons which appeared in Tuzla were being supplied to the enclaves,

10     either Zepa or Srebrenica, in any way?

11        A.   First, I did not know the contents of that mysterious Hercules

12     planes.  Then, secondly, I can't tell whether, if there were weapons in

13     there, those weapons went to our enclave.

14        Q.   Thank you.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you for your detailed

16     answers.  Excuse me for asking you many things that I'm interested in,

17     because they are the reasons for which I'm here.  Thank you.  I wish you

18     all the best in your future life and work.  God bless you.  That was all

19     from me.  Thank you, Mr. President.  Thanks to the interpreters who

20     attempted to interpret even what was very fast in the video-clip.

21     Thanks, everyone who helped the Defence today on behalf of the Defence.

22     Thank you for the assistance you provided.  Thank you.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much, Mr. Tolimir.  When you were

24     saying, "Excuse me for asking you many things that I'm interested in ..."

25     I can only agree with you.  This is your right.  This is the purpose of

Page 3568

 1     every examination, especially your cross-examination.

 2             Mr. Thayer, do you have re-examination?

 3             MR. THAYER:  Thank you, Mr. President.  I do.

 4                           Re-examination by Mr. Thayer:

 5        Q.   I'll try to compress it to the seven minutes I have.

 6             Good evening, Colonel.

 7        A.   Good evening.

 8        Q.   I want to pick up on a question that Her Honour Judge Nyambe

 9     asked you a moment ago.  And if -- well, I think we may have lost the

10     document that was up on the screen that led to that question, but you

11     just referred to two convoys which were redirected away from the enclave,

12     and I'll just quote from the document that was up there.  There it is

13     again.

14             "It resulted in aid supplies, including baby food, running out in

15     the enclave."

16             Okay.  Now, what does -- based on your experience, can you give

17     the Trial Chamber some idea, using this as a potential example, of how

18     scarce the humanitarian aid was in Srebrenica during this period?  And

19     we'll just talk about the period when you were there up through

20     July of 1995.  And I don't need you to give us a month-by-month, but

21     let's just focus for the time being before the VRS attack in

22     July of 1995.  Can you give the Trial Chamber a sense of what the

23     humanitarian situation was like.

24        A.   If I would speak generally of about those six or seven months we

25     were there, it was at the minimum level or less.  Once in a while a peak,

Page 3569

 1     but then much too short.  If we are speaking about the period, say July,

 2     it was devastating.  As far as I know, and I'm supposed to know that,

 3     there was no food supplies any more available.  There was hardly any

 4     medical supplies available.  There was no water available.  Consequence

 5     of the lack of medical supplies was that a major part of the population,

 6     when they arrived in what I call the little safe area in Potocari, was

 7     exhausted, sick, or in any other way damaged.

 8             Does that answer your question?

 9        Q.   Yes.  Thank you, Colonel.  So, based on your experience, if even

10     a single convoy were denied by the VRS, could that have and did that have

11     an effect on the humanitarian situation in Srebrenica at the time?

12        A.   Yes, because the levels were very low.  And every time something

13     did not come in, it meant that the situation became worse, directly.

14        Q.   And during your time in Srebrenica, you've testified about

15     contacts with Momir Nikolic, for example, did you receive any complaints,

16     whether it be from Momir Nikolic or any other VRS representative, that

17     UNHCR convoys or UNPROFOR convoys were being abused in any way in terms

18     of smuggling goods?

19        A.   No, I did not.

20        Q.   And based on your experience with Momir Nikolic and other VRS

21     representatives, had there been such an incident, would they have

22     reported that kind of thing to you, based on your experience, and

23     complained?

24        A.   Yes, they would have been very happy to do that, loud and clear.

25        Q.   General Tolimir asked you some questions about trying to foster

Page 3570

 1     trade between the Serb and the Muslim communities in the enclave.

 2             Let me just ask you, Colonel:  What would have been the simplest

 3     way to ensure that the civilian population in Srebrenica had more than

 4     the minimum or below the minimum amount of basic foodstuffs and amenities

 5     to make their life less miserable?

 6        A.   No limitations to any humanitarian aid convoys.  That's quite

 7     clear.

 8        Q.   Now, I want to take you back to the VRS attack on the enclave.

 9     For the record, you testified in the Popovic case at transcript page 2457

10     about the first couple of days of the attack.  The focus on OP Foxtrot

11     we've heard a lot about, and you also testified, and this is at line 13,

12     that Bravo Company reported random shelling of the city.  And you later

13     testified on that same page that you received reports of civilian

14     casualties and that UNPROFOR assisted in transporting those wounded.

15             What I want to ask you about is:  There was a lot of testimony, a

16     lot of questions, about what happened from the period of 9 July forward,

17     after you issued the green order.  You testified today about a point at

18     which Serb infantry could be seen approaching the town of Srebrenica.

19             The first question I have is:  Prior to you issuing the green

20     order, did you receive reports of shelling of the town of Srebrenica?

21        A.   Yes, not only of the town, but of another village, as I remember

22     as well.  The village of Slatina was pretty massively sheltered --

23     shelled, I mean, sorry.

24        Q.   And from the reports that you were receiving, was there any

25     military justification for that shelling?

Page 3571

 1        A.   For Slatina, I can't comment because in the direct neighbourhood

 2     of Slatina there were BiH units.  So I don't know whether, during the

 3     shelling, they were present.  For Srebrenica, I can't comment because, of

 4     course, there were -- there was one legitimate military target in

 5     Srebrenica, the post office being HQ of 28th Division, but the way the

 6     city was shelled, that was absolutely the complete surroundings of the

 7     city or the city itself, the complete city.  Then you must shoot at

 8     random, because if you aim at the post office, you can't have massive

 9     detonations about 7-, 800 metres away from your target.  That is

10     absolutely military scene nonsense.  And that happened before the green

11     order as well.  And I don't know whether the green order is taken as a

12     change in events because parties didn't know I issued a green order.

13        Q.   So from where you stood, receiving these reports, prior to you

14     issuing that green order, was the town of Srebrenica attacked by the VRS?

15        A.   In fact it was.  By artillery mortars.

16        Q.   Now, you were asked a lot of questions about whether the blocking

17     position order had been given in order to provoke the VRS into attacking

18     UNPROFOR.  I want to first ask you a little bit -- ask to you provide a

19     little bit of context to those questions.  And in order to do that, let

20     me just quote to you from your parliamentary testimony where you were

21     talking about this very topic.

22             MR. THAYER:  This is at page 0308-0482 of the English, which is

23     page 28 of the B/C/S.

24        Q.   But let me just quote to you a question and answer.  You were

25     asked the question:

Page 3572

 1             "Was the purpose of taking up blocking positions to draw fire in

 2     order that way to get air support, or would they also have been

 3     sufficient if the Bosnian Serbs crossed the imaginary line, horizontal 84

 4     it was called?"

 5             Your answer was:

 6             "What was becoming more important was the smoking gun principle.

 7     It went roughly like this:  We will only deploy air support if it is

 8     clear who has been shot at and with what weapons system.  The purpose of

 9     the battalion's blocking positions what certainly to ensure that we would

10     stay between the Serbs and the Muslim population.  I have already

11     outlined to you what I actually thought of the defensive assignment in

12     the usual military sense of the word 'defence.'  Drawing fire did not

13     require an extra assignment.  In effect, we had already been doing it

14     quite happily for weeks.  That it was a condition of air support that

15     there should be a smoking gun was no problem at all, since people were

16     shooting at us all the time."

17             So, first, can you just clarify or explain what you meant in your

18     parliamentary testimony in 2002 in that regard?

19        A.   Yes, well, in fact, it was, given the answer to the same answer I

20     had here, that the purpose was another one as the real purpose the

21     blocking positions had.  I say it here in different words, but it comes

22     to the fact that the blocking positions were to prevent the Serbs to

23     enter the city.

24             The whole nonsense of drawing fire, et cetera, et cetera, well,

25     as I say there, we have been, and the population as well, we were under

Page 3573

 1     fire during some days.  And not only that; we have been under fire, all

 2     those close firing reports, increasing during May and June.  So that is

 3     not applicable.  The condition, and that is what I meant before, that

 4     there were two conditions I couldn't reproduce in my testimony before.

 5     But one of that was a smoking gun, and it is described already there.

 6     You can only get air support if somebody is firing at you and you

 7     identify it, what it was, and where it was; that's a smoking gun

 8     principle.  But that was no problem over there.  We were under fire by

 9     several means, by several guns, and we did report, and we knew their

10     location.

11        Q.   And just to be clear for the record about two things:  One, whose

12     guns were those?

13        A.   Sorry, VRS guns.

14        Q.   And two:  Was 9 July the first time that UNPROFOR had been

15     targeted by those guns, or had you been targeted prior to 9 July?

16        A.   We have been targeted before.  The first time that it was not at

17     random but really to a purpose was, in fact, the attack on OP Echo and

18     then go on the attack on Foxtrot, the shelling of the town, the shelling

19     of Bravo 1 up til 4, the blocking positions, et cetera.  And the blocking

20     positions were fired at before that green order moment.

21        Q.   Now, you were asked a lot of questions about the Bandiera

22     triangle, all kinds of hypotheticals about what might be hidden there,

23     but let me just get us back to the reality of the situation as it was

24     being reported to you.  Did you ever receive any reports of the ABiH

25     using tanks?

Page 3574

 1        A.   No.

 2        Q.   How about heavy mortars?

 3        A.   No.  Light mortars we estimated them as 81 millimetres.  And then

 4     for their mortar, 82 millimetre.

 5        Q.   How about artillery?

 6        A.   None.

 7        Q.   How about multiple-launch rocket systems like were aimed at you

 8     and being fired at you?

 9        A.   None.

10        Q.   During this attack, did you receive any reports whatsoever of

11     ABiH soldiers wearing UNPROFOR equipment or uniforms?

12        A.   No, I did not.

13        Q.   General Tolimir asked you some questions about what was a

14     legitimate target at a particular time, specifically whether the UN

15     became a legitimate target of the VRS at a particular time.

16             Do you remember those questions?

17        A.   I do.

18        Q.   Let me ask you this:  Was it -- is it -- was it legitimate for an

19     armed force to enter a UN-declared safe area by force of arms in

20     July of 1995?

21        A.   No.  Let's be clear about that.  No, absolutely not.  I was

22     referring to the fact that the VRS shot at our positions in a later

23     phase.

24        Q.   General Tolimir asked you some questions about the legitimacy of

25     taking the DutchBat soldiers as POWs, and you agreed that it might be

Page 3575

 1     legitimate to take captive people that you considered your enemy.  Let me

 2     ask you this:  Is it legitimate to threaten those POWs with execution if

 3     close air support continued?  Is that legitimate, sir?

 4        A.   No, absolutely not.

 5             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, I'm cognizant of the time, and I

 6     think I'll just leave it where it is and let Colonel Franken go home and

 7     maybe catch part of the match tonight.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  His country is deeply involved tonight.

 9             THE WITNESS:  Not in my case, Your Honour, but there are other

10     reasons why I'm not available tomorrow.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  And I take it this concludes the re-examination.

12             MR. THAYER:  It does, Mr. President.

13                           [Trial Chamber confers]

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  First of all, I would like to thank you, sir, for

15     attending the court again and to help us to assist us to find the truth.

16     You are free to return to your normal activities, and there's no need to

17     come back.  Not at this stage.

18             The second is, I would like to thank the interpreters and the

19     court recorder and to all the staff who assisted us for the length of

20     today's hearing.  I apologise for that.

21             And I apologise to the parties.  I think you both are not very

22     happy about some time restraints.  But, on the other hand, Mr. Tolimir

23     indicated ten hours, he used approximately eight hours, thank you for

24     that.  It was -- and the Prosecution was also under some pressure.  In

25     future, we should -- perhaps, the parties should liaise a little bit more

Page 3576

 1     effectively about the use of time.  If a witness is only available a

 2     certain day, then the Chamber itself feels under a certain pressure to

 3     come to an end with the examination perhaps a little bit earlier than

 4     indicated.

 5             I hope with these words we can leave it for today.  And we resume

 6     tomorrow morning at 9.00.  I think in Courtroom II, but I'm not sure

 7     about that.  Thank you very much.  We adjourn.

 8                           [The witness withdrew]

 9                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.13 p.m.,

10                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 7th day

11                           of July, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.

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