Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 4044

 1                           Wednesday, 18 August 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Good morning to everybody.  The witness should be

 6     brought in, please.

 7                           [The witness takes the stand]

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Good morning, sir.

 9             THE WITNESS:  Good morning, sir.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  May I remind you again that the affirmation to

11     tell the truth still applies.  And I suppose Mr. Tolimir has some more

12     questions for you.

13             Mr. Tolimir, please.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  May

15     peace be in this house.  I would like to welcome everybody, including

16     General Nicolai, and may God's will be done and not mine.  Thank you very

17     much.

18                           WITNESS:  CORNELIS NICOLAI [Resumed]

19                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

20                           Cross-examination by Mr. Tolimir: [Continued]

21        Q.   [Interpretation] Yesterday we discussed the smuggling of goods in

22     Srebrenica and people who were discussed in that smuggling.  However, we

23     failed to arrive at any conclusions during that discussion.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the court please produce P620.

25             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Page 4045

 1        Q.   General, the Prosecutor tendered this document through you and

 2     the document is dated 4 July 1995.  It's Karremans' report about the

 3     worsening of the situation in Srebrenica.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please produce page 2 for

 5     the witness and can we also look at paragraph 6, line 10 in the English

 6     language.  And it is also page 2, line 6 in the Serbian version.  We can

 7     see both versions on the screen -- or rather, both pages are in English.

 8             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   I'm sure that you will be able to read it in English.  I don't

10     have the Serbian version.  In any case, it's page 2, paragraph 2, line 6.

11     We are interested in the smuggling channels which have been closed.  This

12     is a letter dated 4 July.  You spoke about this document in

13     examination-in-chief, and the only thing that I'm interested here is this

14     term "smuggling channels."  Could you please tell us what smuggling

15     channels are referred to herein?

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer, I think you will help us.

17             MR. THAYER:  Yes.  Two things.  Good morning, Mr. President.

18     First, it's a communication dated 4 June 1995, just so we get ourselves

19     orientated correctly.  And I think General Tolimir called out paragraph 6

20     in the English, and if that's correct then we've just got it up on the

21     B/C/S and it is on the English version, but I'm not sure if that's the

22     paragraph he's interested in.  But we do now have both correct versions

23     on e-court.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, can you confirm that this number 6

25     is the paragraph you were referring to.

Page 4046

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Microphone not activated]

 2             [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  That's correct.  I

 3     called out paragraph 6, line 10 in English, and in Serbian it is

 4     paragraph 6, line 7, where it says:  "Smuggling routes have been closed."

 5     This is what I'm reading.  If General Nicolai sees that in English in the

 6     sixth paragraph, maybe he can confirm whether he can see the paragraph

 7     where it says the "smuggling routes have been closed."  Thank you.

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I have little to add to this.

 9     This is an announcement that I simply accepted in light of the

10     announcements in this report.  This one did not strike me the most and I

11     can't elaborate on it.  I believe that Colonel Karremans or his deputy

12     would be more able.

13             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Nicolai.  Have these documents been introduced

15     through you and on examination-in-chief did you indeed say things about

16     smuggling routes; if that is the case, then we can move on.  Thank you.

17        A.   I believe that this document was submitted by the Defence, but

18     the report was drafted by Colonel Karremans.  I'm familiar with the

19     report but I have nothing to add to it.

20        Q.   Thank you.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the court please produce P607,

22     page 2.

23             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   This is a statement by a member of Dutch Battalion, Mr. Franken.

25     You can see the English version at the moment, page 1.  Can we also look

Page 4047

 1     at the Serbian version, also page 1, and can we also look at page 2 of

 2     his statement in Serbian, paragraphs 4 and 5.  And in the English version

 3     it's the last paragraph on page 1 and the first paragraph on page 2.  And

 4     I'm reading.  The fourth paragraph of the Serbian version says:

 5             "During that time Serbs suggested that they should trade with

 6     Muslims at the prices that prevailed on the black market.  When I say

 7     'trade' I mean trade in everything except weapons.  After several rounds

 8     of negotiations, the civilian authorities in the enclave allowed the

 9     Serbs to supply the enclave ... and the goods were being sold in the

10     enclave at prices lower than the market prices and the DutchBat did not

11     play any commercial role in this.

12             "This filled in well with the vision that we had in our attempts

13     to normalise relations between the warring factions.  Rumours spread that

14     the initiative was not viewed well by the groups that controlled the

15     black market.  The business was stopped by the military leadership.  It

16     was said by the local military leadership that the prohibition had come

17     from the top of the military leadership, although such things worked well

18     in Gorazde, and I presume that the initiative to boycott the business had

19     really come from the military leadership of the enclave."

20             My question to you is this:  Did you receive reports about things

21     mentioned by Mr. Franken in this statement of his?  Thank you.

22        A.   No, I never received any reports about that, but that there was

23     trading between local Serbs and Muslims does not truly surprise me and

24     that people trading on the black market ran into problems is perfectly

25     understandable to me.  But otherwise, these matters were not so important

Page 4048

 1     that they needed to be reported to Sarajevo.

 2        Q.   Thank you, General.  Did you receive reports about those groups

 3     which controlled the black market in the Srebrenica enclave, in view of

 4     the fact that your battalion was there and that you had special relations

 5     with that battalion?  Thank you.

 6        A.   No, I did not receive any reports about that.

 7        Q.   Thank you, General.  In the Popovic case on page 18458, lines 15

 8     through 24, you said the following, and I quote you:

 9             "I did not have any formal direct contacts with the commander of

10     the DutchBat because there was a level between the two of us.  Strictly

11     speaking, I was supposed to communicate with them through the staff in

12     Tuzla.  On the other hand, given the fact that I was the highest-ranking

13     Dutch officer in the command, I was authorised to contact directly with

14     my fellow citizens and I did that.  I had a direct line of communication

15     and I regularly informed myself about the situation, especially when

16     things didn't go well.  And obviously I contacted the commander of the

17     DutchBat more often in order to inform myself about problems."

18             My question to you is this:  Who was that person in Srebrenica

19     with whom you were mostly in contact with?

20        A.   That should be clear, with the DutchBat commander,

21     Colonel Karremans.

22        Q.   Thank you, General.  Do you think that the information you

23     received from the Dutch Battalion and the staff in Tuzla, either orally

24     or verbally, was absolutely identical and reflected the real situation on

25     the ground?  Thank you.  Or do you expect that there were discrepancies

Page 4049

 1     and that in view of the fact that you had personal contacts in addition

 2     to the official ones?

 3        A.   Well, if I've learned one thing from my time in Bosnia it's that

 4     things are not always the same in reality as they may initially appear to

 5     be, but I am not trying to suggest that Colonel Karremans deliberately

 6     provided me with inaccurate information or information other than what he

 7     sent me via the official reports, by the headquarters in Tuzla.  So I

 8     assume that what he told me was the truth, or in any case, what he

 9     regarded as being the truth.

10             To give you an example of things that are sometimes different

11     than they appear to be, during the period that Sarajevo was surrounded

12     and no supplies were coming in, the UN tried to supply the city from the

13     air.  And when there was shooting at such an aircraft, you would assume

14     that it was being done by the units surrounding Sarajevo, the Serbs, but

15     that was not always the case.  Sometimes the shooting came from Muslims,

16     purely because if too many goods came in, then the price would drop on

17     the black market.  And there were people in Sarajevo who benefited from a

18     few supplies arriving.  This is an example to indicate that things are

19     not always the way you might at first think they were.

20        Q.   Thank you, General.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think we have to stop here.  There is a problem

22     with the transcript.  It stopped at page 6, line 7.

23                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I formed the impression that everything is okay

25     now.  Then, sir, could you please look at the screen.  You said:

Page 4050

 1             "So I assume that what he told me was ..." and then nothing else

 2     on the screen but it was quite important what you told us about aircraft

 3     supply for the population.  Please repeat that for the record.

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'll repeat my statement.  I was

 5     regularly in touch with Colonel Karremans, who would tell me about the

 6     situation in the enclave.  I assume that what he told me was the reality

 7     or, in any case, what he perceived as the reality and did not deviate

 8     from what he communicated to the headquarters in Sarajevo via the

 9     official reports up to the headquarters in Tuzla.  But I'll add - and

10     this is what I learned in Bosnia - that things are not always as they

11     initially appear to be.  So it's perfectly possible that the reality that

12     Colonel Karremans perceived deviated from what was actually happening and

13     I'll give you an example to illustrate that.

14             In the period that Sarajevo was surrounded and the supplies were

15     cut off, the UN tried to supply the city from the air.  Sometimes the

16     aircrafts were shot at and the first idea you would think of is that the

17     troops surrounding the city were doing this, so the Serbs.  But in

18     reality, this also happened by the Muslims purely because they had an

19     interest in not having too many goods enter because otherwise the prices

20     on the black market would drop too much.

21             So when you observe something, you have to investigate very

22     thoroughly what is actually happening because sometimes the reality is

23     just slightly different than it appears to be.  So it's perfectly

24     possible that Colonel Karremans told me things sometimes, assuming that

25     they were correct, but that might have differed from the reality.

Page 4051

 1             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Thank you, General.  I apologise that you had to repeat your

 3     answer twice.  At the end of session before the recess, you denied that

 4     you ever saw a report on the vehicles that were stolen and smuggled from

 5     Zepa through Srebrenica.  On page 3955, line 24, through line -- 3956,

 6     you say:

 7             "I never received a report about APCs of the United Nations from

 8     Zepa.  It sounds totally incredible to me in view of the fact that the

 9     enclave was completely encircled by Bosnian Serbs.  I really can't

10     imagine how they could have reached the Srebrenica enclave or how those

11     APCs could have ended up in the hands of the Muslim forces.  I really

12     can't imagine how that could have been possible."

13             Based on what you have said, I would like to read to you one part

14     of Franken's testimony here in this courtroom.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the court please produce the

16     transcript from Franken's testimony of the 1st July 2010, page 3459, and

17     on the other side can we see document 1D207.  We don't see it on the

18     screen yet.  When we do see it, when paragraph 1 of this reconstruction

19     of the interview with Franken was shown in the courtroom and when

20     Mr. Franken was asked to comment, on page 3450, lines 14 through 19,

21     Franken said, and I quote --

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, it would be helpful if you could

23     wait that we have it on the screen, then we can immediately follow what

24     you are quoting from.  Just a short moment that we have both documents on

25     the screen.

Page 4052

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 3450, can we see it and display

 2     lines from 14 to 19.  All I can see here is lines 21 to 25 -- no, no,

 3     it's okay.  I apologise.  3450.  No, it's not okay.  No.  Now we can see

 4     it.  Thank you.

 5             Lines 14 through 19, and I quote:

 6             "... smuggled through the north not through the south, of course.

 7     And I saw the logistics report of the Ukrainian Battalion in Zepa,

 8     because this is the information that we received from the UN" --

 9             Because of the comment and the exchange between myself and my

10     legal assistant, the page should be 3459, not 3450, and that will allow

11     us to follow what I'm reading, lines from 14 to 19.

12             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   And I will quote again.

14             "... allegedly through the north but through the south, of

15     course.  And I saw that the Ukrainian unit in Zepa, in a logistics

16     report, because that's the kind of information we got from the UN,

17     reported the missing of five armoured personnel carriers."

18             And then on page 3461, lines 8 through 9, 3461, lines 8

19     through 9, Mr. Franken says, and I quote:

20             "My observation post saw them entering the enclave through the

21     southern border."

22             Thank you.  And based on what I have just read, I would like to

23     put several questions to you, sir.

24             First of all, do you perhaps remember now that the

25     Dutch Battalion reported to you that the observation post in the south of

Page 4053

 1     the enclave saw two APCs that had entered the enclave?  Thank you.

 2        A.   No, I still don't.

 3        Q.   Does that mean that you weren't informed about this, the topic

 4     that Mr. Franken testified about here and the portion I quoted from the

 5     transcript?  Thank you.

 6        A.   Yes, that sounds like the most likely explanation to me.  If it's

 7     about something so important as UN vehicles that are not part of DutchBat

 8     entering the enclave, then that incident would be so important you would

 9     never forget about that.  So had that been reported, then I would

10     undoubtedly still remember that to this day.

11        Q.   Thank you, General.  But are these Mr. Franken's words, because I

12     quoted them directly from the transcript?  Is that what he said in his

13     testimony?  Thank you.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

15             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, I've not objected up to this point

16     just because it would be too time-consuming, I think, to break it up and

17     I think the General is capable of answering the questions as they've been

18     put, but I think we all know the background to General Tolimir's

19     examination of Mr. Franken, what Colonel Franken had to say about this

20     reconstructed transcript.  Now we're at the point where General Tolimir

21     is asking General Nicolai to comment on what Colonel Franken said before

22     this Trial Chamber a couple of months ago, and, number one, I submit that

23     that's not helpful to anybody to have General Nicolai tell the Court

24     whether or not these are Colonel Franken's words.  And if he is going to

25     ask that question, then he needs, I think, to show General Nicolai all of

Page 4054

 1     Colonel Franken's words, for example, where Colonel Franken says at 3461,

 2     line 10:

 3             "I didn't get exactly when, in what period or where those large

 4     number of vehicles, UN vehicles, were seen.  Is that referring to the

 5     Srebrenica area or any other area?

 6             "Then again, we only saw two and never saw them again, but if you

 7     ask me if anything is possible, I can confirm that."

 8             That's just one example of Colonel Franken's words on this topic

 9     that General Tolimir did not put before General Nicolai.  And if he's

10     going to ask these kinds of questions, I think he needs to show

11     General Nicolai all of the related testimony from Colonel Franken.  I

12     don't think that's fruitful, so I, frankly, think we should move on.

13     Unless there are more focused, particular questions, then we have no

14     objection to this line of questioning as such.  It's just this last line,

15     I think, is not going to be very helpful for anybody.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, about the concerns of the

17     Prosecution, I would recommend that you ask about facts and not about the

18     words in the transcript.  Everybody can read the transcript of a previous

19     testimony of another witness.  If -- of course this witness today is not

20     in the position to confirm that Mr. Franken said, really said, this what

21     is recorded on the transcript.  We have on the transcript and that's all.

22     Please ask questions related to the facts you want to know.  Carry on,

23     please.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

25             Thank you, Mr. Thayer.

Page 4055

 1             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Now, General, sir, is it a fact that the officers of your

 3     battalion in Srebrenica say that they saw two APCs coming into the

 4     enclave from the south which did not belong to the United Nations?  Thank

 5     you.

 6        A.   I'll repeat what I said earlier.  It was never reported to me

 7     that UN vehicles not pertaining to DutchBat entered the enclave, so I

 8     can't elaborate on that.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

10             MR. THAYER:  We have the answer and that -- I've got no objection

11     to, I think, what General Tolimir was asking, but the question he asked

12     does not reflect even what's in the transcript.  I think to the extent

13     that Colonel Franken testified about some UN DutchBat soldiers seeing

14     APCs, I think the testimony was clear that those APCs did have

15     UN markings.  And the question that -- General Tolimir, I think that's

16     reflected in LiveNote, is that they did not have UN markings.  So I

17     just -- you know, the issue is becoming less clear the further we're

18     going on and I just want to make that clear.  I don't know if that was

19     just simply General Tolimir misspeaking, but I think the evidence is

20     clear from the record what Colonel Franken reported.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer, I think this way of dealing with the

22     kind of questioning should be out of your re-examination.  I think

23     according to my recommendation Mr. Tolimir asked about facts and not

24     related to the testimony of Mr. Franken.  I think we should continue --

25     Mr. Tolimir should continue, and then you are in a position to deal with

Page 4056

 1     it in re-examination.

 2             Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

 4             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   General, sir, did you ever receive or see or hear about a

 6     logistics report in which it was stated that the Krajina people needed

 7     five APCs more and that this information was forwarded to the

 8     United Nations in the so-called position report?  Thank you.

 9        A.   Well, I don't really know what this is about, but it doesn't

10     sound like it has anything to do with what we were just talking about.

11     So perhaps General Tolimir could clarify what this relates to.

12        Q.   Thank you, General.  The United Nations, in their logistics

13     reports, did they present the information reported by individual units

14     and it was the Ukrainian Battalion that notified of the disappearance of

15     the vehicle --

16             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction:  Not the Krajina

17     people, Ukrainian.

18             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   So is this the kind of information that would be forwarded once

20     it is reported officially?  Thank you.

21        A.   Well, that seems obvious.  Missing five vehicles that are

22     moreover recognisable as UN vehicles is a serious incident and should

23     certainly have been reported because the risk that the vehicles would be

24     abused was very high and we should warn all units about this.  But I

25     never received such a report.

Page 4057

 1        Q.   Thank you, General.  My next question is this:  Did you ever,

 2     from the Dutch Battalion in the reports and communications that you

 3     maintained regularly with them, did you ever ask them whether the BH Army

 4     in Srebrenica was arming itself illegally?  Thank you.

 5        A.   I don't remember that.  I did receive a report that they never

 6     succeeded fully in entirely disarming the Muslims within the enclave.

 7     They did manage to take receipt of their heavy arms and place them in

 8     storage, but if we're talking about smaller fire-arms, they're so easy to

 9     hide, it was never possible to seize all of those.  And whether any

10     weapons were smuggled in during the interim was not reported to me, but I

11     don't consider it unlikely that that happened from time to time.  Given

12     the surroundings of Sarajevo, that's -- it's certainly not impossible to

13     secretly smuggle weapons in.

14        Q.   Thank you, General.  For the Trial Chamber to understand this

15     correctly and since you know the situation well and are best placed to

16     tell me, tell me this:  What was the relationship between the enclaves,

17     or rather, the UN forces in the enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa?  Since

18     the BH Army relations were tied up in -- and Srebrenica, in Zepa and

19     Srebrenica.  So the Ukrainian Battalion, what was that linked to?  And it

20     was in control of Zepa.  And what was the Dutch Battalion linked to,

21     controlling Srebrenica?  Thank you.

22        A.   Well, as far as I know, there was no direct contact between the

23     UN troops in the Zepa enclave and the DutchBat in Srebrenica.  Both

24     reported to their commanders, but as far as I know, there was never any

25     direct contact between the two enclaves.  But Karremans or Franken would

Page 4058

 1     be better able to answer those questions than I.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Now could you tell us whether there were any

 3     proposals for the commands to be united, the command structures of the

 4     UNPROFOR forces in Zepa and Srebrenica, that they should be joined up,

 5     since the enclaves were next door to each other?  Thank you.

 6        A.   No such proposal was ever made, no.

 7        Q.   Thank you.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we now have 1D33 called up on

 9     e-court, please.

10             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   It's a document from the BH Army.  It is Naser Oric's order dated

12     the 19th of May, 1995, and in paragraph 1, which is the one I'd like us

13     to focus on, it says - it hasn't come up on our screens yet so we'll just

14     take a moment.  It's up on the B/C/S in Serbian and you can see it now in

15     English.  It says in paragraph 1:

16             "We have received intelligence from the Main Staff of the BH Army

17     that members of the Dutch Battalion of UNPROFOR might leave the area of

18     responsibility of the 28th Division and that's Srebrenica and Zepa.

19             "So we issue an order in relation to that."

20             And the order is:

21             "1.  Prevent UNPROFOR members from leaving the zone of

22     responsibility of the 28th Division in accordance with previous orders

23     and plans for the prevention of their departure."

24             You've been able to read point 1 there now.  And here's my

25     question relating to that:  When this order was issued, and the date is

Page 4059

 1     the 19th of May, 1995, was there a plan whereby the members of the

 2     Dutch Battalion should leave Srebrenica enclave; and if such a plan did

 3     exist, what did it consist of?  And did you look into the possibility of

 4     having DutchBat replaced by somebody else in Srebrenica in the month of

 5     May?  Thank you.

 6        A.   Mr. President, I can't provide a brief answer to this, but I hope

 7     you'll give me the latitude to provide a detailed answer here.  We need

 8     to distinguish a few things.  In May 1995, the Dutch government already

 9     intended to end the mission in Srebrenica and the Dutch government was

10     trying to find a country that would be willing to take over the duties in

11     Srebrenica.  The Dutch government had not succeeded yet in May, so

12     specific plans as to which plan would replace the Netherlands in

13     Srebrenica did not exist at that time.  I don't think that the order

14     displayed on the screen related to that.

15             There were plans in case of an emergency to attempt to break out

16     and to have DutchBat use violence to attempt to return to safe territory.

17     If such a situation made it inevitable.  For example, if there was a

18     danger that the supplies would be completely exhausted, but in mid-May

19     the situation did not yet justify this and it was not yet time for the

20     emergency plan.  That's why it's unclear to me what this order refers to.

21             The supply situation in May was definitely cause for concern,

22     though, and Colonel Karremans reported that he had trouble performing his

23     duties, but the possibility of retreating from Srebrenica was not

24     considered at that time, it wasn't relevant, and that was already

25     discussed in previous questions.  Even in early June when he said he

Page 4060

 1     couldn't perform his duties properly anymore, he insisted on continuing

 2     to have his observation posts manned.  So abandoning his mission was

 3     never a point to him which the UN leadership in Sarajevo would have

 4     agreed, even if the UN leadership in Sarajevo had agreed to abandon the

 5     observation posts.  So I certainly don't understand what this order

 6     refers to.

 7        Q.   Thank you, General.  I asked you and you answered.  Now, may we

 8     have D70, page 8, of your statement called up on e-court, please, the

 9     statement that you gave to the Prosecutor.  Now, on page 8 of that

10     statement you talk about the consultations you had with NATO and that you

11     prepared a plan for delivering supplies to the enclave.  And I'm going to

12     quote from that page once it comes up on our screens.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 8, please, the penultimate

14     paragraph.  And it's also on page 8 in the Serbian.

15             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   "Many problems developed from then on in trying to supply the

17     enclaves.  The VRS would only give permission for some of the convoys to

18     proceed.  Then they would block access to some of these convoys.  I was

19     asked by General Smith to prepare a more sophisticated plan to supply the

20     enclaves.  Some of the factors required to carry out such a plan were

21     creating air routes, preparation for air cover and protection, to arrange

22     for air refuelling planes, air rescue helicopters, and teams being made

23     available.  This plan was prepared together with much consultation with

24     NATO.  This plan was made known to the national governments of the troops

25     and equipment involved, as it was not a normal peacekeeping action.  This

Page 4061

 1     resulted in some governments not giving full permission for this course

 2     of action.  This plan was never allowed to be put into effect."

 3             That's the whole paragraph and now my question is this.  Since we

 4     can see that this plan involved the engagement of joint NATO and UNPROFOR

 5     resources, my question is:  Was it a plan to prepare rapid intervention

 6     forces, generally speaking?  Thank you.

 7        A.   At that time UNPROFOR did not yet have rapid intervention

 8     capabilities, so that wasn't relevant yet.  The rapid intervention

 9     capability was brought into Bosnia-Herzegovina only in late June 1995.

10     So the only opportunity to deploy other means was by air and a plan was

11     drafted for that purpose.  And the plan was held intact, but upon

12     execution would require the consent of the concerned countries and they

13     were willing to grant such consent only if there was no other means of

14     rescuing the troops in the enclaves.

15        Q.   Thank you, General.  Can you tell us which countries, as you say

16     in the statement of yours, were opposed to the plan and which countries

17     did not give full approval for acting in this way, and what did you mean

18     by "full permission "?  So which countries did not provide full

19     permission and what do you mean by "full permission"?

20        A.   When I say "full permission," I mean unconditional permission,

21     which means that those countries delegated full say over deployment of

22     their air force to UNPROFOR.  That's what they didn't want.  The

23     countries specifically concerned I can't tell you.  Those negotiations

24     were conducted from Zagreb and all I was told was that they had not

25     succeeded in getting that commitment from the troop-supplying countries

Page 4062

 1     and that this would be negotiable only when the situation in the enclaves

 2     became so desperate that the survival of the troops was in jeopardy.

 3        Q.   Thank you, General.  My next question is this:  For the

 4     transcript can you tell us when the rapid intervention forces arrived in

 5     Bosnia and who was -- which was their first combat assignment.  Thank

 6     you.

 7        A.   Yes, the rapid intervention troops arrived in June and the plans

 8     drafted for these intervention troops were basically -- they were still

 9     only in draft form, but some involved making access to the city of

10     Sarajevo to enable supply and drafting a plan to enable a supply route to

11     the enclaves.  Those are two that I know about, but as you also know,

12     having an idea of what you want to do with troops is one thing but

13     elaborating a plan to make this feasible is the second thing and that's

14     considerably more time-consuming.  And I believe that in that period,

15     especially early June 1995, those plans were not ready yet.

16             I'd like to add something.  One task that the intervention troops

17     did carry out was bringing heavy weapons to Mount Igman.  That's the

18     mountain close to Sarajevo.  And when I say "heavy weapons," I'm

19     referring to artillery and mortars.  And the purpose of those heavy

20     weapons was to fight the heavy weapons by the Serbs when those were

21     deployed against the Sarajevo population.  That plan was carried out and

22     in practice ultimately in August 1995 was implemented.

23        Q.   Thank you, General.  [Microphone not activated]

24             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

25             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Page 4063

 1        Q.   Before August 1995 was the heavy weapons of the Army of

 2     Republika Srpska set aside under special -- and put under special control

 3     of UNPROFOR?  And if that happened, was it during your mandate?

 4        A.   Are you referring to the heavy weapons of the Bosnian Serb

 5     republic?  Did I understand that correctly?

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Yes, that's correct, General.  And before that, were

 7     the heavy weapons collected from the Army of Republika Srpska and handed

 8     over to UNPROFOR to be safe-guarded at special points?

 9        A.   Well, I can't give you a brief answer to this either.  Based on

10     resolutions by the Security Council of the United Nations, the heavy

11     weapons in the immediate surroundings of some of the enclaves, in any

12     case the Sarajevo enclave, all heavy weapons located within a certain

13     distance of that city considered to be a threat were gathered at what

14     were known as weapon collection points and they were under UNPROFOR

15     supervision.  The troops were allowed to maintain their weapons, but

16     UNPROFOR ensured that they were not used.  And this concerned only the

17     weapons within those immediate surroundings.  Still, the Bosnian Serb

18     republic did have heavy weapons that were not in the immediate

19     surroundings of Sarajevo.  So that was the situation at that point in

20     time.  And as for the other enclaves outside the Zepa and Srebrenica

21     enclaves, there were no weapon collection points, so heavy weapons were

22     still -- of the Bosnian Serb republic were still located around those

23     enclaves and could still be used.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir was asking you about the heavy

25     weapons of the Army of Republika Srpska, the Bosnian Serb army.  Now you

Page 4064

 1     were referring to the Bosnian Muslim, the BH army.  Is that correct?

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, Mr. President, that's not

 3     correct.  I specifically answered about the heavy weapons of the

 4     Bosnian Serbs.  As for the heavy weapons of the Muslims, those were all

 5     in weapon collection points within the enclaves and under strict UNPROFOR

 6     supervision.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.  That was my mistake.  I misunderstood

 8     you.

 9             Please carry on, Mr. Tolimir.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   General, let's clarify one thing.  Was only Muslim weaponry under

13     the supervision of UNPROFOR or was it also the weaponry belonging to the

14     Bosnian Serbs in Sarajevo and within the 20-kilometre perimeter of

15     Sarajevo?

16        A.   I'll repeat what I just answered.  The heavy weapons of the

17     Bosnian Serbs within a radius of 20 kilometres of the city of Sarajevo

18     were gathered in weapon collection points, and those were under UNPROFOR

19     supervision.  And I can illustrate this because the impetus for the air

20     attacks conducted in late May at UNPROFOR's request were carried out

21     because weapons of the Bosnian Serbs had disappeared from those weapon

22     collection points and the UN set an ultimatum for the return and said

23     that otherwise there would be air-strikes.

24        Q.   Thank you, General.  Now we have clarified things and we

25     understand that we are talking about the heavy weapons of the Army of

Page 4065

 1     Republika Srpska.  You said clearly in your statement that the Army of

 2     Republika Srpska did not have any heavy weaponry in the vicinity of

 3     Sarajevo but it did have it in the vicinity of Zepa and Srebrenica.  Is

 4     that correct?

 5        A.   That's partially correct.  The last part is certainly right.

 6     Heavy weapons around Zepa and Srebrenica, pertaining to the Bosnian

 7     Serb -- Bosnian Serbs, were never gathered in weapons collections points.

 8     That was the case, that did happen around Sarajevo, but I never alleged

 9     that all heavy weapons of the Bosnian Serbs around Sarajevo were placed

10     in the weapon collection points.  And this is clear from the fact that

11     despite the existence of weapon collection points, the city of Sarajevo

12     was nonetheless often shot at by the Serbs.

13        Q.   Thank you, General.  Could you please tell us, did the rapid

14     intervention forces arrive in Bosnia with the consent of the

15     Security Council and was there a resolution in place to that effect?

16        A.   The first is correct.  Those forces arrived with permission from

17     the UN, and that must mean that there was also a resolution about that.

18     But the booklet I have listing Security Council Resolutions was presented

19     to me before I travelled to Bosnia.  So that resolution is obviously not

20     listed there so I can't check, but I'm sure the Trial Chamber can verify

21     that.  I can't imagine that those forces were brought there without a

22     Security Council Resolution.

23        Q.   Thank you, General.  Could you tell us, please, do you know

24     whether there was resolution?  Are you sure there was one?  Or are you

25     not?  And I'm talking about the arrival of Rapid Reaction Forces.

Page 4066

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  This question is already answered.  There was a

 2     clear answer by the witness on that point.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  However,

 4     in the transcript it says they did not come without the permission of the

 5     United Nations, but what I want to know whether there was a resolution in

 6     place to that effect.  They could have been given permission by the

 7     Secretary-General of the United Nations.  What I'm interested in is

 8     whether there was a resolution that preceded their arrival in Bosnia and

 9     Herzegovina.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Again, Mr. Tolimir, this question is already

11     answered.  The witness said that he doesn't know about that, but that

12     then, I quote:

13             "I can't imagine that those forces were brought there without a

14     Security Council Resolution."

15             But he doesn't know.  Please carry on to another topic.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

17             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   General, did you negotiate with the warring parties about the

19     arrival of the Rapid Reaction Forces?  If that was indeed the case, who

20     did you negotiate with, or rather, who did you not negotiate with?  Thank

21     you.

22        A.   Well, the last part of your question is the easiest to answer.

23     There were no negotiations with the Bosnian Serbs.  There were

24     negotiations with the representatives of the BiH and with the government

25     of the Bosnian part because those troops had to be placed on that -- in

Page 4067

 1     that area and that would require permission from the government in charge

 2     of that area.  So we consulted with the government in Sarajevo as to

 3     where those troops should be placed and what the potential objectives

 4     might be of these forces.

 5        Q.   Thank you, General.  Does that mean that those forces were

 6     intended only for actions outside of Bosnia and Herzegovina where they

 7     were deployed, for example, actions against the HVO or the Army of

 8     Republika Srpska?  Thank you.

 9        A.   Well, that was basically left up to UNPROFOR.  The troops brought

10     in were not presented with a specific objective.  This even led

11     General Smith to make a cynical remark, "Now I have even more mouths to

12     feed."  So it was basically left up to General Smith to determine what he

13     wanted to use these troops for.  And theoretically, they could also be

14     used against the Muslims or against the Croatians; but given the

15     situation at the time, deployment against the Bosnian Serbs was the most

16     plausible option.

17        Q.   Thank you, General.  We will continue discussing this topic.

18             And now, since other witnesses have also dealt with the issues

19     and some witnesses even said that you participated in those negotiations,

20     I would like to announce our topic for tomorrow and I would like to ask

21     you whether there were discussions about the deployment of Rapid Reaction

22     Forces during the events in Srebrenica and Zepa.  And were those forces

23     actually deployed anywhere near those enclaves?

24        A.   I was involved in negotiations about the deployment and placement

25     of the Rapid Reaction Forces.  There were also negotiations about

Page 4068

 1     displacing the heavy weapons of those forces to the surroundings of

 2     Sarajevo.  In practice, those -- some of those heavy weapons were, in

 3     fact, transferred before the government in Sarajevo had granted

 4     permission for that, so we basically anticipated such permission because

 5     we urgently needed heavy weapons in the area of Sarajevo.

 6        Q.   Thank you, General.  Were Rapid Reaction Forces located or

 7     deployed in the sector of Zepa; or to be more precise, on Boksanica hill

 8     and whether that was legal and whether they were closer to UNPROFOR in

 9     that way?

10        A.   Well, I'm not sure whether the translation I received was

11     entirely correct, but if the question is about whether the intervention

12     forces were already deployed near the Zepa surroundings, the answer is

13     no.  We were still in the midst of examining deployment opportunities,

14     and I've already answered that the only part of the Rapid Reaction Forces

15     deployed were the artillery and mortars and they were deployed in the

16     surroundings of Sarajevo from Mount Igman.  And other -- in all other

17     respects during my period there were only plans and nothing beyond that.

18        Q.   Thank you, General.  We can continue discussing this topic

19     tomorrow after you've had a thought.  And now I would like to move on to

20     agreements on demilitarisation.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the court please produce

22     document D21, page 2.  This is an agreement on demilitarisation.

23             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   And while we are waiting for the document to appear on the

25     screen, I have a question that has nothing to do with the document.

Page 4069

 1     Before you were deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, did you have an

 2     occasion to analyse the demilitarisation agreement that was signed in

 3     1993 by the VRS and the Army of the Federation?  And your troops were

 4     already in one of those zones, as we know.  Thank you.

 5             Now we can see the provisions of the agreement on the

 6     demilitarisation that was signed by General Sefer Halilovic and

 7     Colonel Ratko Mladic and that was on the 8th of May, 1993.  That

 8     agreement was in force until the expiry of the term of deployment of your

 9     troops in Srebrenica.  Thank you.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, I have a problem to understand your

11     question.  Could you perhaps break up your long and different questions.

12     At the end there is no question, only at the first part of your

13     statement.  Please repeat your question.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  I repeat

15     the question.

16             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Did you have an occasion to familiarise yourself with the

18     agreement on the demilitarisation of Zepa and Srebrenica before assuming

19     your duties in Bosnia and Herzegovina?  Thank you.

20        A.   No, that was not the case.  I learned about -- I first learned

21     about this during the briefing from my predecessor, General Brinkman, and

22     that was after I had arrived in Sarajevo.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Later on, did you realise what the obligations of

24     UNPROFOR was according to that agreement and what tasks did it have to

25     perform during the deployment in the UN protected areas?

Page 4070

 1        A.   Yes.  If I've understood your question correctly, then the answer

 2     is as follows.  The UN was responsible for ensuring that heavy weapons

 3     within a given distance of the city of Sarajevo so that they posed a

 4     threat, that they were stored in weapon collection points and that they

 5     would not be used by the parties who owned them.  The troops did have

 6     permission to maintain their weapons.

 7        Q.   Thank you, General.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the court please produce

 9     paragraph 5 in this agreement where it says -- we will see it in a

10     minute, paragraph 5.  And I quote from the paragraph -- I will actually

11     quote from it when I see it on the screen.  I don't see it yet.  Now I

12     do.

13             "UNPROFOR shall control the demilitarised zone.

14             "To be able to implement this, an UNPROFOR unit and UNMOs with

15     sufficient strength to control the area shall be present in the

16     demilitarised zone.  Until the contracting parties agree otherwise, the

17     UNPROFOR strength shall be of at least a company group with command and

18     supplying elements in each demilitarised zone.

19             "In order to be able to resupply and rotate the unit, UNPROFOR

20     shall have freedom of movement to and from the demilitarised zone."

21             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   My question is this:  Did UNPROFOR have the freedom of movement

23     as is stipulated here in Article 5?  Thank you.

24        A.   If you mean the demilitarised zone around Sarajevo, that was the

25     case until the end of May.  After the incident in which heavy weapons

Page 4071

 1     were removed from the weapon collection points in the subsequent

 2     air-strikes, there was no more freedom of movement.  In fact, the troops

 3     at the weapon collection points that were located, they were more or less

 4     held hostage by the Bosnian Serbs.

 5        Q.   Thank you, General.  My question was about the agreement on the

 6     demilitarisation of Srebrenica and Zepa, so I was asking about

 7     Srebrenica.  And let's do it once again and let's be very precise.  Let's

 8     look at paragraph 4 and 5 -- or rather, Article 5 where it says:

 9             "Non-combatants who are in or who are willing to enter the

10     demilitarised zone except members of UNPROFOR are not permitted to have

11     in their possession any weapons, ammunition, or explosives.  Weapons,

12     ammunition, and explosives in their possession shall be seized by

13     UNPROFOR."

14             And paragraph 5 where it says:

15             "Combatants will not be allowed to enter or to be in the

16     demilitarised zone."

17             Did you see that?  Thank you.

18        A.   Yes, I see that.  As far as I know, no demilitarised zone was

19     ever accomplished in the surroundings of Sarajevo.  There were no

20     UNPROFOR troops outside the enclave and everywhere around the enclave

21     Bosnian Serb troops were present and heavy weapons were located there.

22        Q.   Thank you, General.  I'm asking you about Srebrenica, because

23     this demilitarisation agreement concerns Srebrenica which enjoyed the

24     status of a demilitarised zone, unlike Sarajevo.  I'm asking you about

25     Srebrenica and my complete question is this:  In Srebrenica were your

Page 4072

 1     troops, or rather, did the Dutch Battalion have any restrictions on

 2     movement in and around the demilitarised zone of Srebrenica?

 3        A.   I'll repeat what I just said.  As far as I know, no demilitarised

 4     zone was ever realised around Srebrenica.  Within the enclave, UNPROFOR

 5     had freedom of movement.  Outside the enclave, this was not possible

 6     without permission from the Bosnian Serb authorities.

 7        Q.   Thank you, General.  What you have just stated, does this mean

 8     that the zone was never demilitarised?  Thank you.

 9        A.   As far as I know, that's the case.  In any case, it should be

10     clear that for months, especially in June and July, the enclave was

11     regularly shelled from outside the enclave.

12        Q.   Thank you, General.  Was the impression in the media, both in

13     Bosnia and in the United Nations, wrong about the zone being

14     demilitarised, although, as you have just stated, there were people

15     carrying weapons around Srebrenica contrary to the provisions of the

16     agreement that I have just quoted from?

17        A.   I remember very clearly that there was a difference between

18     demilitarised zones around Srebrenica and Sarajevo.  I had a map of the

19     surrounding of Sarajevo clearly indicating a border within which no heavy

20     weapons were allowed except in weapon collection points, and I never saw

21     such a map of the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves.  This means that

22     apparently the negotiations had yet to take place about that and that

23     such a zone was never actually realised.  And the only thing you could do

24     up to that point was that the moment heavy weapons were used in the

25     immediate surroundings of the enclaves, then we could have used air force

Page 4073

 1     against that.

 2        Q.   Thank you, General.  Please, in order to avoid any confusion we

 3     are now talking about Srebrenica and Zepa.  We are no longer discussing

 4     the issue of Sarajevo.  I have a document before me about the

 5     demilitarisation of Srebrenica which was signed by Halilovic and Mladic.

 6     And in the first paragraph that I see before me on the screen it says:

 7             "Non-combatants ..."

 8             And I'm quoting from paragraph 4 and 5 of Article 5.

 9             "Non-combatants who are in or who are willing to enter the

10     demilitarised zone except members of UNPROFOR are not permitted to have

11     in their possession any weapons, ammunition, or explosives.  Weapons,

12     ammunition or explosives in their possession shall be seized by UNPROFOR.

13             "Combatants will not be allowed to enter or to be in the

14     demilitarised zone."

15             Do you see that in the English language?  Thank you.

16        A.   Yes, I see that in front of me.

17        Q.   My question was about that.  Was that zone indeed ever

18     demilitarised?  If not, were you abreast of that situation?  Were members

19     within the zone disarmed by UNPROFOR or did they continue carrying

20     weapons?  Thank you.

21        A.   If you mean the fighters within the enclave, then I can tell you

22     that UNPROFOR relieved them of their heavy weapons, and I've said that

23     earlier in this session.  UNPROFOR never succeeded in obtaining all

24     handguns and I said earlier that they're easy to conceal and it's

25     difficult to ensure that they've all been seized.  Outside the enclave we

Page 4074

 1     never managed to carry out this mission.  So there were no weapon

 2     collection points outside the enclave in which heavy weapons of

 3     Bosnian Serbs were stored.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, I think we got this answer from the

 5     witness much earlier already.  He discussed it several times the same,

 6     and you should focus on specific topics you are interested in.

 7     Otherwise, it's really a waste of time if you repetitively ask the same

 8     questions several times.

 9             Now we reach the point of the first break.  We adjourn and resume

10     at 11.00.

11                           --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.

12                           --- On resuming at 11.03 a.m.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  At the outset of this session, I would like to

14     mention in brief that we checked the legal situation about protective

15     measures.  And now we came to the conclusion that our Chamber is one

16     Chamber of the second proceedings.  There is no Chamber of third

17     proceedings in our Rules.  Pursuant to Rule 75(F)(i):

18             "... protective measures shall have effect mutatis mutandis in

19     any other proceedings before the Tribunal ..."

20             Therefore, our recommendation is to file such an application, if

21     you want to do that, related to protective measures for a certain witness

22     before this Chamber.

23             Mr. Tolimir, could you indicate when will you submit such an

24     application?  Mr. Gajic.

25                           [Defence counsel confer]

Page 4075

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  If it's

 2     urgent then, with my signature, my assistant Aleksandar Gajic will send

 3     it by e-mail, with your permission, because we have agreed what it should

 4     contain rather than having the person coming in and so on.  So if you

 5     grant permission, then we can use this -- we can do this by e-mail.

 6     Thank you.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  In this exceptional situation, I think there's no

 8     concern about that and we would like to receive an immediate response by

 9     the Prosecution so that we can deal with this problem immediately.  Thank

10     you very much.  I think this is enough for the moment to this problematic

11     matter and we shall continue with the examination of the witness.

12             Please carry on, Mr. Tolimir.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

14             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Witness, since you and I have discussed various topics up till

16     now, we're now going to look at demilitarised zones.  And the status of

17     demilitarised zones according to an agreement between the warring sides

18     were only two:  Srebrenica and Zepa.  Those were the only two zones that

19     had the status of a demilitarised zone.

20             Now, I would like you to tell me whether you received reports

21     from your units about whether Zepa and Srebrenica were actually

22     demilitarised zones or whether there were weapons there.  Thank you.

23        A.   I believe this is the third time I'm being asked this question.

24     I've said previously that troops in the enclave were disarmed or in any

25     case relieved of their heavy weapons.  I can't guarantee that they were

Page 4076

 1     relieved of handguns.  The heavy weapons around the enclave were never

 2     removed.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Indeed, Mr. Tolimir.  Just before the break I

 4     advised you that you shouldn't repeat this question again and again.

 5     Please carry on but with a new question, please.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I have to ask the

 7     question for the transcript.  I have to ask whether the General received

 8     reports and whether the zone was demilitarised or not.  I can't get an

 9     answer yes or no.  I'm not asking him about heavy weapons.  That wasn't

10     in the agreement, the one that I quoted and the one that General looked

11     at.

12             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Because if the Serb side, General, grants Srebrenica a

14     demilitarised zone status --

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.  I'm very sorry, Mr. Tolimir.  This

16     is not an appropriate way.  You have your questions on the transcript and

17     you have the answers on the transcript several times and it's not

18     necessary to have it a third or fourth or fifth time on the transcript.

19     Please carry on, and not repeat the same question again.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President, but I

21     didn't ask whether the Army of Republika Srpska withdrew its heavy

22     weapons around the zone which was given the status of a demilitarised

23     zone.  I haven't asked that yet and that's what I'm getting in the

24     answer.  So that's not the question.  The question was whether the zone

25     was demilitarised.  So I'm repeating my question on the basis of your

Page 4077

 1     answers.  The possession of light weapons by persons --

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, this is not acceptable.  You have

 3     asked this question several times and you got the answer this witness is

 4     able to provide.  You got an answer.  Please carry on.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

 6             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Now, General, the Muslim forces, were they in the demilitarised

 8     zone and disarmed?  Were their light weapons taken away from them?  Thank

 9     you.

10        A.   In the actual enclave all the heavy weapons were seized.  I

11     cannot guarantee that that was the case for the handguns.

12        Q.   Thank you, General.  Now, do you know the contents of Article 60

13     of the Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions which regulates

14     the question of demilitarised zones and their status or do you wish me to

15     read it out?  Thank you.

16        A.   What I know about demilitarised zones appears in the

17     corresponding Security Council Resolutions.  If I remember correctly,

18     those are, for example, 824 and 836, which stipulate in any case that

19     heavy weapons that were a threat to the enclaves concerned need to be at

20     a sufficient distance so that they were no longer a threat to those

21     enclaves or stored at weapon collection points under UNPROFOR's

22     supervision.

23        Q.   Thank you, General.  Does that refer to the protected areas or to

24     the demilitarised zones?  Thank you.

25        A.   That refers to the protected areas.

Page 4078

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Now, Srebrenica and Zepa, before the proclamation of

 2     the protected zones, did they -- were they given the status of

 3     demilitarised zones?  Thank you.

 4        A.   I really wouldn't know that.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Now, you see when the agreement was drawn up - and

 6     that was in 1993 we said earlier on - and what about the resolution on

 7     protected zones, when was that -- when did that come into force?

 8        A.   I don't know.  We'd have to check the dates of the relevant

 9     Security Council regulations [as interpreted].  I don't know that off the

10     top of my head.  They predate my arrival in Sarajevo.

11        Q.   Thank you, General.  Now tell me, please, whether when the

12     measures were discussed that needed to be taken by UNPROFOR with respect

13     to the attack on Srebrenica, did they take into account Article 7 --

14     Article 60, paragraph 7 of the Additional Protocol which states, and I

15     quote:

16             "If one of the Parties" -- so Article 60 in the Additional

17     Protocol of 1977.

18             If one party in the conflict makes a material infringement of the

19     para 3 and 6, the other side will be free of its obligations in the area

20     that has the status of demilitarised zone.

21             So did you bear in mind what it says in Article 60 of the

22     Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols of 1977 on the protection

23     of prisoners of war and so on?

24        A.   I'm not familiar with this article, so I didn't take that into

25     consideration.

Page 4079

 1        Q.   Thank you, General.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we now have Exhibit P592.  It's

 3     a report of the United Nations peace forces about the situation in the

 4     field from the -- and it's dated the 10th of July, 1995, and we're

 5     interested in page 14 of this document.  It's paragraph 3 in Serbian and

 6     page 6, paragraph 3 of the English.  Thank you.

 7             Let me repeat.  Page 14 of the Serbian, paragraph 3, please, so

 8     not page 18 but page 13.  And page 6 in English, paragraph 3.  Thank you.

 9             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   We're looking at paragraph 3 in the two versions, and I'm going

11     to quote from it.

12             "The Bosnian Serbs could halt their advance pending a number of

13     conditions:  The complete demilitarisation of the enclave will probably

14     be their highest priority.  This would also serve their primary goal of

15     freeing troops from around the enclave for other purposes."

16             Now, my question on the basis of this is the following:  Did

17     UNPROFOR consider this report, this UN peace forces report, and look at

18     the option presented in this analysis, that is, the complete

19     demilitarisation of Srebrenica in conformity with the agreement reached

20     in 1993?  Thank you.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

22             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, just as a courtesy to the witness if

23     General Tolimir is going to continue to ask him questions about this

24     report, such as did the UN rely on the report, then I think the witness

25     should be allowed to look at the report.  If nothing else, look at the

Page 4080

 1     first page of the report so he knows what it is.  We have no idea what it

 2     is -- we've all seen this with the prior witness, but I don't know if

 3     General Nicolai has ever been shown this before.  So perhaps just a

 4     moment for the witness to familiarise himself with the report before he

 5     begins his answer would be helpful.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.  This is a very helpful

 7     advice.

 8             Could we move to the first page, please.  We need the second

 9     page.  This seems to be a cover page.

10             Mr. Nicolai, do you recall this report?  Have you ever seen it?

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Not as far as I know.  The report

12     was drafted in Zagreb, so it is probably a report that was sent to

13     New York.  I see it's addressed to Mr. Annan.  So this is not a report

14     that was sent to Sarajevo.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.  I think now we may continue and go

16     back to the page we have seen earlier.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

18             Could the witness now be shown page 6, paragraph 3, and I would

19     like to have page 14, paragraph 3 in Serbian.

20             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   I kindly ask you to tell me now --

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

23             MR. THAYER:  I'm sorry, Mr. President.  I remember this document

24     somewhat.  I don't have it because it wasn't on the cross-examination

25     list, but if my recollection is correct, the prior page to what's on here

Page 4081

 1     is actually the beginning of this section that General Nicolai is being

 2     asked about with -- it states what it is and what the source is.  I think

 3     that page might be helpful for General Nicolai to see just because

 4     it's -- we're looking at a paragraph here and I think it starts on the

 5     other page.  So it may be useful -- I can't remember whether it's a long

 6     passage or a short passage, but I remember that I think it starts on the

 7     prior page.  I just simply ask that he be given an opportunity to see the

 8     section we're talking about here.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Let's go to the previous page.  Perhaps one page

10     back.

11             Mr. Thayer, is this the page you were referring to?

12             MR. THAYER:  Yes.  I think this is -- as everybody can see, it's

13     a long document, it's 14 pages because it's a report from various

14     sectors, and the sector involving Srebrenica I think begins here with the

15     section headed "Sector North East," and that's reporting on the events in

16     Srebrenica.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

18             Now we should go back to the page Mr. Tolimir was asking for.

19             Mr. Tolimir.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   General, can you tell us on the basis of which at the top command

23     level documents of this kind are compiled and sent to the UN.  Is it

24     basis on -- based on the situation on the ground or on personal

25     assessment, and this particular document what -- how was that drafted, on

Page 4082

 1     what basis and grounds?  Thank you.

 2        A.   These reports are drafted based on the reports from the

 3     sub-commanders.  So if Sector South West issues an assessment, then they

 4     do this based on reports received from the troops under their command.

 5     So, for example, DutchBat in Srebrenica.  On the one hand, you base it on

 6     events that took place; on the other hand, expectations are stated based

 7     on those events as to what the future course of events will be.  So

 8     generally such reports start with a fact report of what took place and

 9     that's usually followed by an assessment of the subsequent course of

10     events, so expectations of those.

11        Q.   Thank you.  I'll read it out, but just tell me for the record

12     whether UNPROFOR ever considered the possibility, based on this report as

13     we've just read it out, about the demilitarisation of Srebrenica in

14     conformity with the 1993 agreement, as it says in the paragraph that I've

15     just put to you.  Thank you.

16        A.   I'm going to emphasise again - I believe this is the fifth

17     time - that as to the demilitarisation of the enclave, we managed to

18     seize and store the heavy weapons in the enclave but did not succeed in

19     doing so for the handguns.  And given the minimal number of troops in the

20     enclave at that time, that would have been impossible.

21        Q.   Thank you, General.  Now let's take a look at the following:

22     Page 14 of the Serbian and page -- and the same page in English.  So

23     page 14 in both Serbian and English, paragraph 6.  Thank you.  I see it

24     in the Serbian and it reads as follows:

25             "The pressure from the Army of Republika Srpska on the enclave

Page 4083

 1     will lead to increased movements of civilians to the already overcrowded

 2     urban areas.  This will affect the relations between the local population

 3     and the UN forces.  If the local authorities find that UNPROFOR is not

 4     doing enough to protect the enclave, retaliation against UN forces

 5     (blocking of compounds, harassment) can be expected."

 6             Now, my question on the basis of that is the following.  This

 7     document was compiled on the 10th of July, as we saw on page 1.  Can you

 8     tell us what the indices were, or rather, the -- what of this was

 9     included in the report that was sent to Kofi Annan?  Thank you.

10        A.   I'm not sure I've understood the question properly, but what this

11     reads is that as a consequence of the pressure on the enclave, the local

12     population in the enclave sought safety by fleeing to the cities or the

13     villages in the areas, so towards the city of Srebrenica, which meant

14     that the population was concentrated in a small area.  And it was

15     expected that if the UN did not manage to provide sufficient protection

16     to the local population that they would retaliate to the UNPROFOR troops,

17     for example, by blocking compounds or by impeding movement of troops,

18     which did in fact happen once.

19        Q.   Thank you, General.  Was that UNPROFOR's obligation, to comply

20     with the demands made by the Muslim side regardless of demilitarisation

21     and the agreement which was in existence between the two warring parties?

22             So did UNPROFOR in the enclave have to meet the requirements of

23     the Muslim and local population?

24        A.   I'm sorry, but I think there may be some problems with the

25     translation.  I don't understand the question.

Page 4084

 1        Q.   Thank you, General.  I'll repeat the question.  In this paragraph

 2     that you have just repeated speaks about a possible conflict between the

 3     local authorities and UNPROFOR.  Did UNPROFOR avoid such conflicts by not

 4     enforcing the agreement on demilitarisation; or in other words, did

 5     UNPROFOR choose to leave the weapons in the possession of those people in

 6     order to avoid any conflicts with them?  Thank you.

 7        A.   The answer is no.  Until just before the fall -- until just

 8     before the fall of the enclave, UNPROFOR prevented Muslim troops from

 9     having heavy weapons at their disposal in the enclave.  Regarding the

10     light weapons, as I said, it was always our intention to disarm Muslim

11     warriors within the enclave, but we were physically unable to do so, and

12     the situation at the time described here was no different.

13        Q.   Thank you, General.  The UNPROFOR command or UNPROFOR in the

14     field, did they fear from Muslim local forces -- did they believe that

15     Muslims might be able to attack UNPROFOR and take their positions in Zepa

16     and Srebrenica?

17        A.   No.  We never feared that and it never became apparent that

18     Muslim warriors intended to take over those positions.  What we did fear

19     was that out of dissatisfaction with the lack of protection provided by

20     the UN troops, the Muslim warriors would impede the movements of the

21     UNPROFOR troops within the enclave, and that happened, for example, on

22     Saturday, 8 July.  I'm familiar with an incident where a DutchBat soldier

23     was killed.

24        Q.   Thank you, General.  Was UNPROFOR's movement ever restricted by

25     Muslims within the UN protection zones?

Page 4085

 1        A.   No.  Until the period concerned in early July, that was never a

 2     problem.  It was only in the final days before the fall of the Srebrenica

 3     enclave that UNPROFOR was restricted, and this was because the Muslim

 4     soldiers wanted to try to stop DutchBat soldiers from leaving their

 5     observation posts.

 6                           [Defence counsel confer]

 7             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Thank you, General.  Do you know anything about the so-called

 9     problem of the triangle in Srebrenica and the way that problem was being

10     dealt with?  Was that something that was dealt with at your level by your

11     command?

12        A.   I have no idea what you're talking about now or which triangle.

13     I assume it's something that did not involve the headquarters in

14     Sarajevo.

15        Q.   Thank you, General.  I'll try and introduce you to the problem.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] First of all, can the court produce

17     D66.  Thank you.  Thank you.  We have it on the screen in the Serbian.

18     Could the General please be provided with the English version.

19             This report was drafted in January 1995, on the 28th of January,

20     1995, by Naser Oric, and in this report Naser Oric informs the command of

21     the BiH army and the command of the 2nd Corps:

22             "Due to the events which took place in Podgaj village section on

23     9 January 1995, of which you were informed in a timely measure, the

24     command of the 8th Operation Group has restricted the movement of the

25     UNPROFOR forces in the wider region of Suceska and Podgaj."  So he's

Page 4086

 1     talking about the restriction of movement of UNPROFOR.

 2             "At about 1100 hours today, the commander of the Dutch Battalion

 3     in Srebrenica ordered his patrols to enter the movement restriction area.

 4     In co-ordination with the commander of the 8th Operation Group,

 5     respecting the agreement reached with the UNPROFOR liaison officer, after

 6     the warning was issued not to move in the aforementioned area, the

 7     commander of the 281st Eastern Bosnia Light Brigade blocked all UNPROFOR

 8     patrols and is still keeping them blocked.  It was requested from the

 9     Dutch Battalion commander that this area be immediately visited by the

10     UNPROFOR commander for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the

11     representatives of the Army of Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the

12     2nd Corps --

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Please slow down.  Please slow down, Mr. Tolimir.

14     Too fast again.  Please slow down.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President, for the

16     warning.  I apologise to the interpreters.

17             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Did you, General, follow the situation and do you now understand

19     and realise that UNPROFOR's movements was indeed restricted as is

20     reported here by Naser Oric, commander of the BiH army, not of the VRS,

21     mind you.

22        A.   Now this is about document drafted in Sarajevo a month before I

23     arrived regarding an event that took place a month before I arrived in

24     Sarajevo.  I know nothing about this, and during my period as

25     Chief of Staff, nothing was reported to me indicating restrictions of

Page 4087

 1     UNPROFOR movement within the enclaves.

 2        Q.   Thank you, General.  During your term in office as the chief of

 3     UNPROFOR staff, was there a ban on the movement of UNPROFOR throughout

 4     the Podgaj sector?  Do you know anything about that?

 5        A.   I'll repeat the answer I just gave.  During my period as

 6     Chief of Staff, nothing was reported to me regarding any restrictions on

 7     the movements of UNPROFOR within the enclaves.

 8        Q.   Thank you, General.  Is it possible that you were not informed

 9     about the activities in that zone, although your commanders knew that

10     there was a ban on their movement and they say that that had been ordered

11     to them by the superior command, and we'll show you where that was

12     ordered.  Is it possible that at your level you did not know that there

13     was a restriction on the movement of your troops in Srebrenica and the

14     so-called Bandera Triangle?

15        A.   Well, I would like to answer that theoretically anything is

16     possible, but this is highly improbable unless it concerns an agreement

17     reached before I entered office here and others were aware of it.  But I

18     was never told anything about this and I would find it particularly

19     strange if such an agreement existed and my predecessor didn't tell me

20     about it when the position was transferred to me.

21        Q.   Thank you, General.  On page 3411, the deputy battalion commander

22     speaks about that and he said that he had received an order from his

23     superior command not to move through that area.  He testified here before

24     this Court.  Let's not go over the same ground and repeat things that are

25     already known by the Trial Chamber.  I'm just asking you whether it is

Page 4088

 1     possible that you, yourself, were not informed that your unit was not

 2     allowed to move through the Podgaj sector area?  Thank you.

 3        A.   Well, I'll tell you for the third time that I was not aware of

 4     this and that I think it's highly improbable that an agreement existed

 5     that I didn't know about.

 6        Q.   Thank you, General.  Let's not waste any more time on the event

 7     that you're not familiar with.  The Trial Chamber was informed about all

 8     that by a witness who had been an eye-witness to the events.  Thank you.

 9             Thank you.  Was Gorazde also under your control?  Thank you.

10        A.   Gorazde was part of the Sarajevo sector and was certainly under

11     UNPROFOR command.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know that UNPROFOR was blocked or restricted

13     in their movement in Gorazde as well by Muslim forces?

14        A.   I am not aware of any restriction of movement by the Muslim

15     forces.

16        Q.   Do you know that General Smith wrote to General Rasim Delic on

17     the 5th of June, 1995, he sent him a letter dealing with relations

18     between UNPROFOR and Muslim forces.  The document number is 1D187.  After

19     you've had a look at the document, could you please tell us what you know

20     about that.

21             Thank you.  Please look at the last paragraph.  I will base my

22     questions on that paragraph.  Do you know that the Army of Bosnia and

23     Herzegovina requested from UNPROFOR command to co-operate with the Muslim

24     forces against the Army of Republika Srpska?  Thank you.

25        A.   Yes, I've read this.  Could you perhaps repeat your question.

Page 4089

 1        Q.   There were two questions actually.  The first one was this:  Were

 2     UNPROFOR forces in Gorazde blocked by Muslims?  And the second question

 3     was this:  Did the Muslims requested from UNPROFOR command, more

 4     specifically, from General Smith, to co-operate with the Muslim forces

 5     against the Army of Republika Srpska?  In order to make things easier,

 6     look at the last sentence -- last paragraph, the last sentence, where

 7     General Smith says:

 8             "Some observation posts in the Gorazde sector are currently

 9     occupied by members of the BiH army."

10             And that's in respect of the first question.  And the second

11     question where General Smith says in the last sentence:

12             "However" -- or the penultimate sentence where he says:

13             "However, I remain" -- where it says:

14             "... we cannot co-operate actively with the BiH army forces."

15     That's the penultimate sentence.  Thank you.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The question Mr. Tolimir put to you to remind you

17     are the following:  Were UNPROFOR forces in Gorazde blocked by Muslims?

18     And the second question:  Did the Muslims requested from UNPROFOR command

19     to co-operate with the Muslim forces against the Army of Republika

20     Srpska?

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I heard and

22     understood your question.

23             I don't remember that observation posts in Gorazde were impeded

24     in their duties by BiH troops, but when I read this text by General Smith

25     that must have been the case and perhaps my memory doesn't serve me well

Page 4090

 1     here.  In this letter General Smith indicates clearly that it's not

 2     possible that UNPROFOR is working with one of the parties against one of

 3     the other parties.  And apparently such a request was presented to him,

 4     but I don't remember anything about that.

 5             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Thank you, General.  Did General Smith inform you about those

 7     requests?  Were you aware of those letters?  Did you participate in any

 8     of these events?  You told us yesterday that one of your tasks was to

 9     prepare all the documents and materials for General Smith.  So was one of

10     your tasks to look into that matter as well?

11        A.   No.  Of course we prepared many letters and reports for

12     General Smith, but that does not mean that General Smith couldn't write a

13     letter himself.  And I've told you, I don't remember this letter.  But it

14     would be standard practice for him to write such a letter and send it to

15     General Delic, that if he does so he would notify his staff and Chief of

16     Staff about that.  He probably did so, but I just don't remember anything

17     about that.

18        Q.   Thank you, General.  Do you remember that UNPROFOR troops were

19     indeed blocked in Gorazde and did you receive any report to that effect?

20     I don't believe that General Smith wrote this letter based on his own

21     observations.  Do you remember that such things did happen in Gorazde?

22        A.   I repeat that I can't remember that.

23        Q.   Thank you, General.  Since you don't remember, we will no longer

24     talk about this document or those events.  But let's put it this way:

25     Your own commander dealt with that.  In this document your commander also

Page 4091

 1     deals with the use of NATO air force in the last sentence, where it says

 2     that they should be used wherever necessary.  Since General Smith speaks

 3     about the use of air force, did he speak to you about that and what were

 4     the criteria to use air-strikes against one of the warring parties?

 5     Thank you.

 6        A.   Well, I know that at that point in early June that was not an

 7     issue.  Earlier in this case we spoke about the consequences of the

 8     air-strikes carried out at the end of May and the restrictions imposed

 9     within the UN later on on the use of air force.  So in early June, use of

10     air force would be allowed only in extreme emergencies.

11        Q.   Thank you, General.  Now let's deal with several excerpts from

12     Louis Fortin's diary.  Dealing with the topical events in 1995, he was

13     major at the time, and we will deal with those parts where he mentions

14     you as General Nicolai.  Since we're dealing with confidential documents,

15     we will not broadcast them outside of the courtroom.  And when I have to

16     quote parts of the diary I will request the Chamber to move into private

17     session.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the previous document which

19     deals with a blockade of forces in Gorazde, the letter by General Smith,

20     be tendered into evidence?  Thank you.

21                           [Trial Chamber confers]

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  This document will be received.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  65 ter 1D187 will be Exhibit D81.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

25             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Page 4092

 1        Q.   Before we move on to the next set of questions, please tell us

 2     for the record, do you remember Colonel Louis Fortin?  Was he there

 3     during your term in office in UNPROFOR?  And after you have answered

 4     that, we will move on to the next set of questions.  Thank you.

 5        A.   As far as I remember, he was the military assistant to

 6     General Gobillard.

 7        Q.   Thank you.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the court please produce P85,

 9     page 86 in Serbian and in English page 78, bearing in mind that the

10     document should not be broadcast outside of this courtroom.

11                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  This document will not be broadcast out of the

13     courtroom, and if you are dealing with the content of it, we should move

14     into private session.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, General -- thank you,

16     Mr. President.

17             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Could the General please look at the relevant page, page 78,

19     which is 48 in the French original.  Paragraphs 3, 4, 5, and 6.  The

20     notes were taken on the 3rd of July and they speak about a meeting

21     attended by Gobillard, Nicolai, and Baxter.  Mr. Fortin was also there.

22     And then I will have some questions for the witness.  Whenever I have to

23     quote from the document before I put my questions to the witness, I will

24     ask the Court to move into private session.  Thank you.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  We have

Page 4093

 1     instructed the witness to look at the relevant paragraphs.  He doesn't

 2     have to read them.  I'm going to quote from them and let's please not

 3     broadcast the document.  Thank you.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think we should turn into private session.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

 6                           [Private session]

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 4094

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19                           [Open session]

20             THE REGISTRAR:  We're back in open session.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We would like to see the previous page, but the

22     last line.  This was not shown to us in English.

23             Please carry on, Mr. Tolimir.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

25             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Page 4095

 1        Q.   Now, General, my question was this:  Can you explain to us, here

 2     and now, what restrictions in movement were imposed upon you by the

 3     Bosnian authorities?

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We have lost the right page we have seen before.

 5     We would like to see that again but including the last line of that page,

 6     that page Mr. Tolimir was quoting from.

 7             MR. THAYER:  If I may, Mr. President.  I think that's page 78 of

 8     the English that's being shown.  If we go back to page 78, I think that's

 9     the page.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much, Mr. Thayer.

11             Exactly.  Now we see also the last line.

12             Mr. Tolimir, carry on, please.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

14             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   General, let me repeat my question.  Can you tell the

16     Trial Chamber what restrictions of movement were imposed upon UNPROFOR by

17     the Bosnian authorities?  Thank you.

18        A.   Yes, the BiH government and the BiH army leadership were very

19     dissatisfied with UNPROFOR's results in providing protection and said

20     it's very unfair that you accept all kinds of movement restrictions on

21     Bosnian Serb territory, that you have to request permission for convoys

22     and permission for displacements in advance, although you move freely

23     across our territory.  So basically he wanted us to make the same

24     agreements with his party and request permission for convoys in advance

25     as well.

Page 4096

 1             On the Muslim territory, increasing check-points were set up

 2     where they blocked and inspected convoys.  I spoke with Minister

 3     Muratovic about this, who was responsible for contacts with the UN.  I

 4     objected and I said that we already regretted restrictions imposed on us

 5     on the Bosnian Serb territory and certainly did not accept having the

 6     same restrictions imposed on us on their territory.  Well, there was some

 7     discussion about this, and in practice this did not lead to the

 8     elimination of all check-points but we never had to register our convoys

 9     in advance.

10        Q.   Thank you, General.  Now, when I read out the first sentence, you

11     certainly noted that it said you had become useless.  Now, my question

12     is:  Why does it say that UNPROFOR has become of little use as far as the

13     Bosnians were concerned?

14        A.   Well, that's very easy to explain.  UNPROFOR did not sufficiently

15     succeed in preventing the Muslim population in Sarajevo and the other

16     enclaves from being shot at by the Bosnian Serbs.  We didn't manage to

17     provide sufficient protection nor did we manage to keep supplies at the

18     appropriate levels.  So if the Muslim population in these enclaves did

19     not have sufficient supplies, then UNPROFOR would receive part of the

20     blame and we had to rectify this.  So that's why this party was extremely

21     dissatisfied.

22        Q.   Thank you, General.  Now, did you point out to them that from

23     zones such as Sarajevo, Zepa, and Srebrenica they were conducting combat

24     operations so that that was the reason for the restrictions, because the

25     person whose report we quoted spoke about 20 daily reports from Sarajevo

Page 4097

 1     to Ilidza and I quoted documents here and showed that attacks took place

 2     between the zones of Zepa and Srebrenica into the rear of the Army of

 3     Republika Srpska following orders by the BiH command and forces around

 4     Sarajevo.  So did you point that out to them, the circumstances of this?

 5     Thank you.

 6        A.   I don't know whether that matter surfaced specifically in this

 7     case, but during my term of office as Chief of Staff, several times there

 8     were objections also to the Muslims concerning actions that they

 9     undertook violating the agreements and we mentioned the potential

10     consequences for them.  The standard response was - and this is the same

11     as happened when accusations were made to the Bosnian Serbs - was that

12     they were denied in the majority of cases.

13        Q.   Thank you, General.  We saw an agreement yesterday signed between

14     your predecessor, General Brinkman, and myself pertaining to the movement

15     of UNPROFOR in the territory of Republika Srpska which I signed on behalf

16     of the Republika Srpska army.  So did you sign a similar agreement with

17     the Muslims?  Thank you.

18        A.   Fortunately not.

19        Q.   Thank you, General.  Can you tell us why Mr. Akashi, who at that

20     time was the number one man in UNPROFOR for the former Yugoslavia, and

21     General Janvier, the top military representative, why they weren't

22     welcome and why Muratovic told them they were no longer persona grata for

23     negotiations with the Bosnian government.  Thank you.  Could you explain

24     the posts that these two men occupied, which positions did they hold for

25     the record?  You would do it more precisely perhaps than me.

Page 4098

 1        A.   Well, I'm convinced that you're just as aware as I am of their

 2     posts, but for the record, Mr. Akashi was the deputy general [as

 3     interpreted] and the highest UN politician present in Bosnia and

 4     responsible for the entire area of operations, and General Janvier was

 5     the highest military authority in that area, so the supreme commander of

 6     all UN troops in former Yugoslavia.  And your preceding question as to

 7     why they became persona non grata at that moment, that was one of the

 8     ways for the Bosnian authorities to express their dissatisfaction at the

 9     inadequate results achieved by UNPROFOR.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Witness, just a question.  It is recorded that

11     you said Mr. Akashi was the deputy general -- I think you were talking

12     about the deputy Secretary-General?  Thank you.

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, the deputy Secretary-General.

14     That was my response.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you, because he was a civilian.

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's correct.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Judge Nyambe has another question.

18             JUDGE NYAMBE:  I just have a question or clarification for you,

19     General.  In the -- General Tolimir has asked you a question in line 12

20     of the transcript, page 53.  He says:

21             "We saw an agreement yesterday signed between your predecessor,

22     General Brinkman, and myself pertaining to the movement of UNPROFOR in

23     the territory of Republika Srpska, and I signed on behalf of the

24     Republika Srpska army.  So did you sign a similar agreement with the

25     Muslims?"

Page 4099

 1             And your answer was:

 2             "Fortunately not."

 3             Can you explain why you are saying "fortunately not."

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I'll be happy to explain that.

 5     Yesterday in the hearing I also said that I was particularly unhappy

 6     about this agreement reached.  That held true not only for me; it also

 7     held true for General Smith.  Basically a UN peacekeeping force can

 8     perform its duties as a peacekeeping force properly only if they have

 9     total freedom of movement in the area of their responsibility.  Only then

10     can you inspect sufficiently what is happening and can you take action

11     against misconduct or violations of the agreements reached.  Any

12     restriction to that freedom of movement also restricts the peacekeeping

13     force in performing its duties.  And that's why I'm so happy that in any

14     case we did not reach such agreement regarding these restrictions with

15     the Muslims, and I regret the fact that we did with the Bosnian Serbs.

16             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Thank you.

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You're welcome.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   General, in the last sentence of the quotation, to avoid going

22     back to private session, but anyway we saw that you were warning

23     Muratovic that the humanitarian aid intended for civilians -- was

24     intended for civilians and not the Bosnian army.  Now, my question is

25     this -- you remember that, I'm sure.  Can you explain to us whether there

Page 4100

 1     were instances where humanitarian aid was given to the army and not the

 2     civilians for whom it was intended?  Thank you.

 3        A.   Well, I don't remember exactly, but the principle is, of course,

 4     that UNHCR supplied the local population and not the armed forces of the

 5     warring parties.  And to my knowledge, UNHCR never supplied those warring

 6     parties directly.  Conceivably, though, those troops at a certain point

 7     may have tried to get their hands on supplies in storage, but I don't

 8     remember any specific examples of this.

 9        Q.   Thank you, General.  Then I'll move on to another area --

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

11             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   -- and if -- other questions I just ask you because of that

13     reference.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

15             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, I just wanted to again put on the

16     record that it is the -- it is not a matter of dispute as far as the

17     Prosecution's concerned - and I believe we have an adjudicated fact on

18     this issue - that a portion of humanitarian aid did wind up in the hands

19     of the Armija throughout the war, just as humanitarian aid also fell into

20     the hands of the VRS.  But that is not a matter of dispute.  I didn't

21     know how long General Tolimir was going to continue with that.  He says

22     he's moving on to another area, but just, again, so there's no question,

23     there's no dispute from the Prosecution about that.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

25             Please carry on, Mr. Tolimir.

Page 4101

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Thayer.  I'm not

 2     going to ask the witness any more questions about that.  Thank you for

 3     saying what you have.  I just want the witness to tell us why Muratovic

 4     was angry because the agreement on supplies via Belgrade was signed.

 5             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Why were the Muslims concerned about that?  Thank you.

 7        A.   I think they were concerned because in that respect they had no

 8     more control or oversight over what was happening anymore.  They may also

 9     have been worried that the parties would benefit in the sense of import

10     tariffs and they preferred those supplies to be transported across their

11     territory as much as possible.

12             And to follow-up on what I just said, I would like to remark if

13     the President allows me, I am not aware of any cases where supplies were

14     stolen from storage sites.  But what did happen is that when passing

15     check-points, they might be asked to give up some of the supplies in

16     return for permission for the convoy to pass.  That happened repeatedly.

17     And -- but UNPROFOR explicitly prohibited complying with such requests.

18     So there were attempts, but we never obtained free passage on those

19     conditions.

20        Q.   Thank you, General.  My question is the following:  Do you know

21     why the High Representative, Carl Bildt, in Bosnia on the 6th of July,

22     1995, while he was not appointed to that duty, came to visit nonetheless?

23     Thank you.

24        A.   I know that Mr. Bildt did come to visit once.  I'd have to check

25     my diaries to verify exactly when that was, but it could have been early

Page 4102

 1     July.  And at the time he inquired extensively at the Sarajevo

 2     headquarters about the state of affairs at that time and that was a very

 3     logical request because he was negotiating on behalf of the UN, and in

 4     that case you need to be well aware of the current situation.

 5        Q.   Thank you, General.  Now we can move into private session if you

 6     want to take a look at document P585.  It's page 94 in Serbian and in the

 7     original English it is on page 43 and 44.  Thank you.  So if you'd like

 8     to take a look at that first and then I'll go on with my questions.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  If that is -- that should not be broadcast

10     outside the courtroom.

11             Why is it necessary to go into private session?  Are you going to

12     quote from this document, Mr. Tolimir?

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's right, Mr. President.  I

14     would like to quote from the document.  It's a document that we were

15     discussing yesterday and was mentioned again today.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Then we turn to private session.

17             Mr. Thayer --

18                           [Private session]

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 4103











11 Pages 4103-4106 redacted. Private session.















Page 4107

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 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23                           [Open session]

24             THE REGISTRAR:  We're back in open session.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We must have our second break now and we resume

Page 4108

 1     at five minutes past 1.00.

 2                           --- Recess taken at 12.38 p.m.

 3                           --- On resuming at 1.09 p.m.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, Mr. Tolimir.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

 6             Could the court please produce P858, page 97 in Serbian and 90,

 7     91 in English.  In the original it's page 45.  I would like the witness

 8     to look at paragraph 6 based on which I'm going to have some questions.

 9     We don't have to move into private session.  Thank you.  After the

10     witness has looked at the paragraph, paragraph number 6, I'm going to put

11     questions to him.  May the witness please alert me that he has found the

12     requested paragraph and that he has read it.  Once again --

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir --

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- pages 90 and 91 in English.

15     Thank you.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It's still the same document which should not be

17     broadcast outside the courtroom.  Is this correct?

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President, that's

19     correct.  And that's why I said that it shouldn't be broadcast.  I'm not

20     going to be reading from it.  I would like the witness just to have a

21     look at it.  I'll have questions after that and this will save us from

22     having to go into private session.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Go ahead, please.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

25             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Page 4109

 1        Q.   Mr. -- or General, sir, who is this gentleman and what was his

 2     position in UNPROFOR?  He participated in the same meeting that you

 3     attended, do you know?

 4        A.   I'm looking for the name of this person because the name Novin

 5     does not ring a bell.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Can you please look at the previous page, maybe that

 7     will help you identify the person.  Thank you.

 8        A.   As far as I remember, Mr. Corwin at that point was the head of

 9     the civil affairs department.  During my term there were a few changes of

10     command and I believe that Mr. Corwin was the last in the series.

11        Q.   Thank you, General, sir.  Did you share his opinion at the time,

12     that Bosnians had too many expectations with regard to what the

13     international community was prepared to do for them?  Thank you.

14        A.   Yes, I can confirm that.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Could you please tell us, he's speaking about Bosnian

16     propaganda and how it had peaked about that time.  What did he mean or,

17     rather, what did you mean when you said that?  How did you understand

18     those words and how was that propaganda implemented?  Maybe you can look

19     at page 3, lines 1 and 2.  I want to avoid reading from this text, maybe

20     that will help you.

21        A.   At the time what Mr. Corwin was alleging was that militarily the

22     Serbs were the most successful, and at the same time the Bosnians were

23     doing the best in propaganda because they weren't successful.  They were

24     able to capitalise on their role as victims and thereby hoped to get the

25     international community to intervene in their favour.

Page 4110

 1        Q.   Thank you, General, sir.  To avoid going into private session, we

 2     are still looking at P585.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at page 100 in Serbian

 4     and 95 in the English translation.  Can you please look at the second

 5     paragraph that consists of only two sentences, and for the record, in the

 6     original it's on page 46.  I want to avoid going into private session.

 7     Let's have the witness read from the text and then I'll have questions

 8     for him.  Thank you.

 9             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Did you see the sentence where your name is mentioned?  Thank

11     you.

12        A.   Yes, I've seen it.  But I have no idea what document this is

13     about.

14        Q.   Can you just tell us -- thank you.  Well, I've told you what this

15     document is.  We're talking about the same notes, page 2 of his statement

16     in Serbian, the fourth and the fifth passage in the Serbian version, and

17     now you've seen it in the English version on page 2, paragraph number 1,

18     and you have seen your name in relation to another person, another

19     interlocutor.

20             Can you tell us what you said to that interlocutor and what your

21     words refer to?  Maybe you can look at the screen in front of you, the

22     third line, the second bullet point, the third line.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think the witness found the relevant portion

24     but the background is not very clear.

25             Mr. Thayer.

Page 4111

 1             MR. THAYER:  Yes, Mr. President.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Are you going to help us again?

 3             MR. THAYER:  Well, I'll do my best.  Mr. President, the witness

 4     has stated that he's not sure what this is all about.  And if he could

 5     just be shown page 92 of the English translation, we'll see that the

 6     excerpt that General Tolimir is showing is related to another meeting,

 7     not the first meeting that we read from a moment ago.  It's a different

 8     meeting.  So I think it would be helpful for the witness if we just went

 9     back to page 92 so the witness can orient himself by looking at what this

10     portion that's being read to him has to do with.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I see my expectation was correct, that was very

12     helpful.

13             Now we are dealing with the meeting on the 7th of July.

14             Mr. Nicolai, did you take part in that meeting?

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Not to my knowledge.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  If the General did not

18     attend the meeting, if he didn't say what is stated herein, then I don't

19     have any questions for him.

20             Can the court please produce P585, page 103 in the Serbian

21     language, and page 96 in English, paragraph 3.  For the record, in the

22     original it's page 47, the last paragraph.

23             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   This is a note from a meeting which took place on the 8th of July

25     and at which General Gobillard and General Nicolai were present.  Can

Page 4112

 1     General Nicolai read just that one sentence where his name is mentioned

 2     and the telephone conversation with another person whose name is also

 3     mentioned in here, and after the witness has read that sentence I'll have

 4     some questions for him.

 5             I can perhaps be of some assistance.  Your name is mentioned in

 6     the eighth line.  Can you please read that.

 7        A.   I've seen my name twice, first in line 6 and then in line 9, and

 8     I've read both sentences.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, what is your question?

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Since the General has found both

11     sentences, my question is this:  Did he have a telephone conversation, as

12     it is stated herein, who did he talk to, who was it that heard his

13     proposal that air-strikes should not be used because the observation

14     point had already been evacuated?  Thank you.

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That Saturday afternoon in

16     question, I spoke with the deputy force commander of General Janvier, a

17     Canadian major-general whose name escapes my mind at this time, but if I

18     check my notes I could get you his name very quickly.  And I informed him

19     about the situation at the time and about the fact that deployment of air

20     support at that moment was not really obvious.

21             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Thank you, General, sir.  My question is this:  When it comes to

23     air support, was it only allowed during attacks against UNPROFOR and not

24     if the threat against UNPROFOR no longer existed?

25        A.   Close air support was possible to protect UNPROFOR.  Deployment

Page 4113

 1     of air force was also an option if the civilian population was

 2     threatened.  So Security Council Resolutions allowed for the use of air

 3     force in both cases.

 4        Q.   Thank you, General.  Could you please look at page 108 in the

 5     same document, 585.  Let's avoid broadcasting the document.  In the

 6     Serbian language the paragraphs are 4, 5, and 6; in the English version

 7     it's page 102, the last two paragraphs, and the first paragraph on

 8     page 103.  And in the original it's page 50 in both versions.  And the

 9     note is dated 10 July 1995.  Thank you.

10             Thank you.  Did you read it?  Can I put my questions to you, sir?

11        A.   Yes, certainly.  Go ahead and ask your question.

12        Q.   Here you say for the transcript, who was it who killed that

13     UNPROFOR soldier?  Thank you.

14             Thank you.  Actually, my question was going to be this.  Can you

15     say for the transcript which side was responsible for the death of that

16     Dutch soldier?  Thank you.

17        A.   That's a very simple question.  The soldier concerned was shot by

18     Muslim forces.

19        Q.   Thank you.  My second question based on this text is this:  Tell

20     us, which heavy weaponry was deployed in the vicinity of the tactical air

21     control?  Thank you.

22        A.   I have no idea.

23        Q.   Thank you.  My third question is this:  Were the soldiers set

24     free in the manner described by myself and Colonel Kitch [phoen], the

25     liaison officer?

Page 4114

 1        A.   Yes, I assume you're referring to the soldiers who surrendered to

 2     Bosnian Serb forces?

 3        Q.   Yes.  We said that they would be let go, and were they eventually

 4     set free?  Thank you.

 5        A.   Eventually, but that was several days later, they were released.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Now, General, I'd like us to look at page 111 in

 7     Serbian, which is page 51 of the original.  It's in English, and we're

 8     interested in paragraphs 7 and 9, marked 7 and 9.  So could you read them

 9     through to yourself and then confirm whether they correctly reflect the

10     contents of the meeting that you had with these people.  Thank you.  So

11     read it to yourself so that we don't have to move into private session.

12     Thank you.

13        A.   Could the text perhaps be enlarged a bit.  It's difficult for me

14     to read.  Thank you very much.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Paragraphs 7 and 9.

16             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Look at the paragraphs 7, 8, and 9.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

19             MR. THAYER:  Without having to change pages, if I can just put on

20     the record - I don't think there will be any dispute and perhaps this

21     will assist the witness - on the prior page the diary indicates that this

22     has to do with a meeting with Bosnian government and Bosnian army

23     representatives on 10 July at 1000 hours at the Presidency involving

24     General Gobillard; General Nicolai; Lieutenant-Colonel Baxter;

25     Major Fortin; and Mr. Muratovic; General Hajrulahovic, Talijan; and

Page 4115

 1     Colonel Bugujnic, just to orient ourselves for what that meeting was

 2     about and who the participants were.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you again for this clarification.

 4             Mr. Nicolai, did you get a chance to read this?

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I've read it, Mr. President.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  And now your question, please, Mr. Tolimir.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 8             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   My question was this:  You were present at this meeting with the

10     participants as Mr. Thayer said and you met Muratovic there and you said,

11     and I quote:

12             "The excursions of the BH army outside the enclave provoking the

13     Serbs."

14             Can you tell us what you meant by those excursions and can you

15     remember some reports about that that you received and forwarded?  Thank

16     you.

17        A.   Yes.  In that period it was observed now and then that Muslim

18     warriors left the enclave, and, of course, we weren't able to see where

19     they went but these excursions did elicit reactions from the Bosnian Serb

20     armed forces and we pointed this out to the Muslim authorities.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us the contents of the discussion at

22     this meeting, what was discussed based on what you know, and you've just

23     seen the references made in paragraphs 7, 8, and 9.  Thank you.

24        A.   Yes.  I think that what this text states is a fairly accurate

25     reflection of what was discussed.  We were interested in expressing our

Page 4116

 1     concern about the fact that the Muslim armed forces were preventing

 2     UNPROFOR from performing their duties.  In fact, they had even shot at

 3     UNPROFOR and that simply had to stop, and they also had to desist from

 4     all actions that would provoke the Bosnian Serb armed forces.

 5        Q.   Thank you.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we now turn to page 114 of this

 7     same document in Serbian and it is page 52 in the original.  So the next

 8     page, please, for the English -- or rather, in English the page is 106,

 9     dated the 10th of July, 1995, at 2230 hours, the note made at 2230 hours.

10     Thank you.  It's page 106 in the English.

11             May we go into private session, please, for me to ask my

12     question.  Thank you.  And to quote from this report.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Private.

14                           [Private session]

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 4117

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 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14                           [Open session]

15             THE REGISTRAR:  We're now in open session.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

18             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   General, were steps taken to organise this meeting between

20     General Gobillard and General Tolimir and why was Srebrenica selected

21     particularly as the venue for the meeting?  Do you know anything about

22     that?  Thank you.

23        A.   No, I can't remember anything about an agreement or such a

24     meeting, but it's been 15 years.  So it's perfectly possible that there

25     was an agreement about that, but it was never implemented in practice.  I

Page 4118

 1     was present at that time at the meeting and I was also present at the

 2     telephone conversation that General Gobillard had with General Janvier,

 3     also regarding the agreements reached about the presence of air support

 4     the next morning.

 5        Q.   Thank you, General.  Now, do you know why General Gobillard, on

 6     the 12th, as was agreed, failed to turn up to the meeting in Srebrenica?

 7     Was that a decision made by the sector command or the UNPROFOR command?

 8     Thank you.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

10             MR. THAYER:  Two points, Mr. President.  The first is what the

11     basis is for a question about a meeting scheduled for the 12th of July

12     between Generals Gobillard and Tolimir.  I think what we're seeing here

13     is talk of a meeting that was to be held on the 11th of July.  So I don't

14     know if that's just General Tolimir misspeaking and whether that can be

15     corrected now or whether there is a basis for the suggestion that there

16     was an actual meeting scheduled for the 12th of July which

17     General Tolimir is alleging General Gobillard actually failed to attend.

18     And I'm just wondering what the factual basis is for that.  I'd like to

19     hear that, if that's based on a document or somebody's testimony.  If

20     it's General Tolimir simply investigating in his cross, no problem with

21     that, but I think it would be helpful to have a factual basis for that

22     statement in the question.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, can you clarify that?

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  Yes, I

25     had in mind where it says:

Page 4119

 1             "Tolimir agreed to meet General Gobillard in Srebrenica ..."

 2             And the person writing these reports, not having to go back into

 3     private session, this is something that he emphasises in his statement

 4     and his reports that were the subject of conversation when -- and

 5     discussion when he testified and during the examination-in-chief as well.

 6     Thank you.  So that's why I'm asking the General, since he said he

 7     attended the meeting between General Gobillard and Janvier, what he knows

 8     about that and why the scheduled meeting subsequently never took place.

 9     Thank you.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  This is now an open question without suggesting

11     any date.  Perhaps we can receive the answer.

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'll try to answer this as best I

13     can.  First, I don't remember that Gobillard said he had made an

14     arrangement with General Tolimir regarding a meeting in Srebrenica, but

15     that may be my defective memory.

16             What I do know is why on Wednesday, 12 July, no meeting took

17     place in Srebrenica.  You know that by that time the Srebrenica enclave

18     had fallen and General Mladic had stated explicitly that he was perfectly

19     capable of wrapping up the negotiations with Colonel Karremans and all

20     efforts to send high-ranking negotiators to Srebrenica were rejected by

21     him.  So that's a clear explanation for why no such meeting took place

22     there.

23             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Thank you, General.  We have dealt with that part of the report

25     where the subject crops up.  It's not essential, but all I wanted to show

Page 4120

 1     was that the meeting never took place.  Now, my next question would be --

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Your next question should be put to the witness

 3     tomorrow.  We have reached the end of today's hearing and you are leaving

 4     the last subject.  I think now is the appropriate time for adjournment.

 5             We adjourn and resume tomorrow at the same time, 9.00, in this

 6     courtroom.

 7             I'm very sorry, sir, that you have to appear again before this

 8     Chamber, but the cross-examination will continue.  We adjourn.

 9                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.46 p.m.,

10                           to be reconvened on Thursday, the 19th day of

11                           August, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.