Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 6734

 1                           Tuesday, 26 October 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 2.16 p.m.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Good afternoon to everybody in the courtroom and

 6     to those listening to our procedures.  Before the next witness will be

 7     brought in, we have to deal with one problem related to a document.  This

 8     is the transcript of the testimony of this witness in the Krstic case.

 9     This is still under seal.  We raised this problem last Thursday and I

10     take it that the Prosecution is moving for lifting the confidentiality.

11     If this is my -- the correct understanding, perhaps you can help me,

12     Mr. McCloskey, then we have to deal with that.

13             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes, Mr. President.  We will move that.  That

14     will obviously make my summary easier.  I can refer to his testifying and

15     as well as the whole process and it fits with everything we are trying to

16     do and this witness' desires.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Is the witness aware of the fact that the

18     previous testimony in the Krstic case will no longer be under seal but

19     that the confidentiality will be listed?  Does the witness know that?

20             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes, we've spoken and basically told him that

21     with his new view of things, that now everything would likely become

22     public and that I'm not sure I gave him the details of where we were in

23     that, but I am confident he understands that it's all a public now and he

24     is fine with that.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  If I recall correctly, Mr. Gajic, you have

Page 6735

 1     indicated last week that the Defence has no problem with lifting the

 2     confidentiality of this exhibit; is that correct?

 3             MR. GAJIC:  [Interpretation] Your Honours, yes, you are right.

 4     We support the motion.  Actually, the Prosecutor pre-empted us with the

 5     request to lift the protective measures.  Even before the Prosecution

 6     proposed that, we had already prepared a motion for the lifting of the

 7     confidentiality from the Krstic transcript to be lifted.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.  Further to the Chamber's

 9     oral ruling of the 10th of September this year, in light of both parties'

10     submissions, the Chamber orders that the confidentiality of Rave's prior

11     testimony in the Krstic case will be lifted pursuant to Rule 75 (G)(ii).

12     The witness should be brought in now.

13             Mr. McCloskey.

14             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Mr. President, I believe we've estimated an hour

15     and a half for this witness, and I hope to take much less than that,

16     though I have made my summary a little bit longer than I sometimes

17     normally do, but I hope to be much less than an hour and so I hope we are

18     not going that far, but my outline suggests that to me right now.

19                           [The witness entered court]

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  When you mentioned the time of one hour, you are

21     not referring to your summary but to the examination-in-chief, I suppose?

22             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes, yes.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

24             Good afternoon, sir, Mr. Rave.  Welcome to the Tribunal.  Would

25     you please read aloud the affirmation on the card which is shown it to

Page 6736

 1     you now.

 2             THE WITNESS:  I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

 3     whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

 4                           WITNESS:  EVERT RAVE

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.  Please sit down.

 6             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  You know unlike your prior testimony in another

 8     case, you are now testifying in open session without protective measures.

 9     We have heard from the Prosecution that you gave your consent with this

10     variation of the previous protective measures.  You are in agreement with

11     that?

12             THE WITNESS:  Yes, that's correct.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.  Mr. McCloskey will have

14     some questions for you.

15             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you, Mr. President.

16                           Examination by Mr. McCloskey:

17        Q.   Can you fist tell us your name and spell your last?

18        A.   My name is Evert Albert Rave.  And Rave is R-a-v-e.

19        Q.   All right.  And can you recall testify in the Prosecution versus

20     General Krstic back in March of 2000?

21        A.   Yeah, I do.

22        Q.   And was that testimony true and correct?

23        A.   Yes, it was.

24        Q.   And if you were asked the same questions, would your answers be

25     the same?

Page 6737

 1        A.   Yeah, they would exactly be the same.

 2        Q.   And have you had a chance to review your transcript in that case?

 3        A.   Yeah, and it's still the same.

 4        Q.   And we all notice that you are speaking in English.  You are

 5     Dutch by nationality; is that correct?

 6        A.   Yes, I'm Dutch.

 7        Q.   And was it your choice to speak in English?

 8        A.   Yes.  I did it in the Krstic case exactly the same, I think, and

 9     shouldn't be a problem to do it again in English.

10        Q.   All right.  Thank you.

11             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And at this time, Mr. President, I would offer

12     P01004 which is the transcript from the Krstic case into evidence.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received as a public exhibit.

14             MR. McCLOSKEY:  As well as the material noted that came in

15     through him in that case, P01005, a video still; P01006, another video

16     still of Lieutenant-Colonel Svetozar Kosoric.  It may be PO as I'm

17     looking at this.  PO 1107.  Sorry, I'm told it is a zero.  P01007 is the

18     video still of Colonel Radoslav Jankovic.  And then we have the segment

19     P00991 of the Srebrenica trial video, and the transcript of the

20     Srebrenica trial video is P01008.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  These documents will be received but I have to

22     note that P991 is already an exhibit.

23             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes, thank you.  And the Court will remember

24     seeing the video in other formats before.  All right.  Now, I will read a

25     summary of your testimony before and then ask you a few questions.

Page 6738

 1             In 1995, Evert Rave was a warrant officer 2nd class with the

 2     Dutch army.  And he was a member of the Dutch Battalion deployed to the

 3     Srebrenica enclave on 3 January 1995.  His rank was that of

 4     sergeant-major.  In July, 1995, Mr. Rave was assigned to the

 5     Dutch Battalion base in Potocari and held the position of a liaison

 6     officer and advisor of field security for the commander of the

 7     Dutch Battalion, Colonel Karremans.

 8             As liaison officer, Mr. Rave had regular contacts with the

 9     civilian and military people from the Muslim community inside the enclave

10     and various officers of the VRS located outside the enclave.  As field

11     security officer, Mr. Rave advised the commander on protective measures

12     relating to personnel, materiel, information, and other military issues.

13             As liaison officer for DutchBat, Mr. Rave had contact with the

14     commander of the Drina Corps, General Zivanovic, Major Momir Nikolic from

15     the Bratunac Brigade, a VRS interpreter known to him as "Petar" and

16     others.  Major Nikolic was Mr. Rave's principal contact for issues

17     related to the enclave and the VRS.

18             On 31 May, Mr. Rave was at a meeting with Major Nikolic and a VRS

19     officer named Vukovic where the VRS officers told DutchBat that DutchBat

20     would have to leave OP-Echo or the VRS would take it by force.

21             On 3 June, the VRS attacked OP-Echo and the DutchBat soldiers

22     stationed there withdrew from the OP.

23             On 6 July, the VRS began attacking the enclave, targeting UN OPs

24     during the attack.  The attack continued through 11 July.  During that

25     time, VRS shells fell near the UN compound in Potocari and the UN

Page 6739

 1     compound in Srebrenica.  The OPs were targeted causing Dutch soldiers

 2     inside the OPs to surrender to the Serb forces to avoid being targeted by

 3     Muslim soldiers who were angered by the Dutch withdrawal from the OPs.

 4             At times, Muslim soldiers would fire at the VRS forces from

 5     around the area of the OPs in order to draw VRS fire on the OPs.  In

 6     Mr. Rave's view, this was done by the Muslim forces in an effort to get

 7     the UN to fire on the VRS.  According to Mr. Rave, the enclave was never

 8     fully demilitarised.

 9             On 9 July, the UNMOs had to leave Srebrenica because it was no

10     longer safe there.  Also on 9 July, the roughly 4.000 Muslims living at

11     the Swedish Shelter Project south of Srebrenica began fleeing to the town

12     of Srebrenica.

13             On 10 July in the evening, DutchBat commander Colonel Karremans

14     and Mr. Rave met with civilian and military representatives of the Muslim

15     population in Srebrenica.  At that meeting Colonel Karremans told the

16     Muslims that air-strikes would occur on the VRS forces if the VRS attacks

17     continued the next day.

18             Mr. Rave spent the night in the Srebrenica UN compound, known as

19     "Bravo Company."  On the morning of 11 July, the VRS attack continued and

20     shells fell in and around Srebrenica town, including inside Bravo

21     compound, wounding several people.  At 3.00 p.m., Major Boering, a

22     DutchBat officer, and Mr. Rave left Srebrenica to Potocari in a jeep

23     crowded with Muslim refugees.  On the way to Potocari, shells fell along

24     the road and Rave felt the VRS were using their fire in an attempt to

25     move the crowd in the direction of Potocari.  On that day there were

Page 6740

 1     brief air-strikes but they had no significant effect on the assault and

 2     did not last long.

 3             At 5.00 p.m., Rave returned to the Potocari base and estimated

 4     about 10- to 15.000 frightened Muslims were in the area around the UN

 5     base.  At 7.00 p.m., Colonel Karremans ordered Rave to go to a meeting

 6     with Karremans and Major Boering, the Hotel Fontana in Bratunac.  Rave

 7     arrived at the Hotel Fontana at 8.00 p.m. with Colonel Karremans and

 8     Major Boering.  Upon entering the hotel, Mr. Rave saw several UN soldiers

 9     who had left their OPs and surrendered to the VRS.  In addition, Rave

10     identified the following people present and inside the hold:

11     General Mladic, General Zivanovic, Colonel Jankovic, an officer

12     introduced to him as Kosoric, and Major Nikolic and Petar, the

13     interpreter.

14             Mr. Rave testified that he remembered that General Mladic

15     personally yelled at both he and Major Boering, just as can be seen he

16     did to Colonel Karremans on a video of that meeting.  However, Mr. Rave

17     stated that the tape did not contain the segments where Mladic yelled at

18     him and Boering.

19             Mr. Rave also testified that General Mladic told them if there

20     were more air-strikes, Mladic would shell the UN compound and the

21     refugees gathered in Potocari and would also target the UN soldiers held

22     at the Hotel Fontana.  These comments by Mladic were also not on the film

23     segment that Rave watched.

24             At that time, Mr. Rave felt that it was possible that he,

25     Karremans, and Boering would be taken outside and shot.

Page 6741

 1             General Mladic told Karremans to find a Muslim representative and

 2     bring him back to the hotel at 11.00 p.m., among other things at the

 3     meeting.  Rave testified they went back to Potocari where they were able

 4     to find Nesib Mandzic, who they knew as a teacher from the secondary

 5     school in Srebrenica and brought him to the Hotel Fontana at 11.00 p.m.

 6     as a civilian representative.

 7             At the second meeting where they were taken in and sat down,

 8     Mr. Rave was unable to follow much of what Mladic was saying because

 9     Petar was translating for Colonel Karremans, and Rave was unable to hear

10     the complete translation because Colonel Karremans and Petar were seated

11     away from him.  Mr. Rave described a pig being slaughtered just outside

12     the meeting room window and he felt this was done to intimidate DutchBat

13     and Mr. Mandzic.

14             Mr. Rave testified and described the continuing meeting as

15     sometimes, and I quote, "rather relaxed," and other times, and I quote,

16     "very mean" on Mladic's part.

17             On 12 July, Mr. Rave spent the morning at the compound in

18     Potocari.  Rave described the VRS entering the compound at Potocari area

19     and the frightened reactions of the Muslim population.  Rave witnessed

20     the separation of Muslim men from their families and the boarding of men

21     on buses.  He described that he saw men hit and kicked on to the bus at

22     one point when they tried to get away.

23             On the morning of 13th July, Mr. Rave received a report that

24     DutchBat soldiers found nine Muslim bodies near the compound, who had

25     been shot in the back.  Photos were taken of the bodies by DutchBat.

Page 6742

 1             Mr. Rave saw Colonel Jankovic in and around the Potocari on both

 2     the 12th and 13th of July.  On 13 July, a VRS officer named Acamovic

 3     arrived in Potocari and took part in organising the transport of the

 4     Muslims.  Acamovic was provided a list of local Muslims employed by

 5     DutchBat and other international organisations in Srebrenica, such as

 6     MSF.  That list was provided to him by DutchBat.  By 8.00 p.m. on 13

 7     July, the Muslim population of the enclave had been transported out of

 8     the enclave.  On 21 July, DutchBat and local staff left the enclave and

 9     travelled to Zagreb.

10             That concludes the summary of the Krstic testimony.

11        Q.   And Mr. Rave, was there anything inaccurate that you recall in

12     the summary?

13        A.   No, I think it's a correct summary from the statement.

14        Q.   All right.  And I notice you have a binder in front of you and I

15     can see there's some coloured books in there.  Can you tell us what that

16     material is?

17        A.   Yes, I brought my notebooks which I used during all the meeting

18     we had and with the Muslims and with the Serb soldiers we dealed with,

19     which I took my notes just when former commander or just to analyse what

20     was going on or just reminders for myself.  And I brought my diary in

21     which I wrote every evening small part what happened that day and more or

22     less my own feelings.

23        Q.   Did you have a chance to review that material as well as the

24     different statements you made prior to your testimony back in 2000 in the

25     Krstic case?

Page 6743

 1        A.   Yes, I had the possibility and I also did.

 2        Q.   All right.  And have you had a chance to review that material

 3     again before testifying here today?

 4        A.   Yes, the same answer, I had the possibility and I also did.

 5             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Mr. President, all that material has been

 6     provided to the Defence.  Some of it for quite a long time, others of

 7     which we had expanded the area of the diary a bit and it's all been

 8     translated into B/C/S and provided with the Defence also.  It's not my

 9     intension to make it exhibits.

10        Q.   But Mr. Rave, if you need to refer to that to help refresh your

11     recollection, I don't think that will be any problem, but if you could

12     let us know what you are referring to to do that so that we understand

13     what that is.  All right?

14             Okay.  You testified that, I believe it was on 11 July, a shell

15     fell in the Srebrenica compound injuring some people.  Can you tell us

16     what people did you mean in the Krstic transcript?

17        A.   On that morning, a lot of civilian people from Srebrenica were

18     gathered outside of the compound and would not be allowed to go into the

19     compound.  At one time there were so many people and they broke through

20     the fences and went on the compound because they were looking for a safe

21     place to stay.  In their point of view, the UN compound was safe for them

22     to go there.  So a lot of Muslim, especially women and children, were

23     gathered on the compound of the Bravo Company and also elderly men, and

24     at a certain time a mortar shell, I think at least it was a mortar shell,

25     it was a shell, landed between two APCs on the compound, luckily between

Page 6744

 1     two APCs so only a few people were wounded by that shell, so civilian

 2     Muslim people were wounded by that shell and after that treated by the

 3     medical personnel that was on the Bravo compound.

 4        Q.   Did you actually see the shell land or see the impact of the

 5     shell as it landed or sometime afterward?

 6        A.   Just sometime afterward because I was not on the spot at that

 7     moment.  I heard that a shell landed and directly after that we were

 8     confronted with the wounded.

 9        Q.   When you say you heard that the shell landed, did you hear that

10     from word of mouth that a shell had landed or did you actually hear the

11     sound of the shell?

12        A.   I heard the blast of the shell.

13        Q.   And how far away was that impact from you when you went out to

14     see it?

15        A.   I think between 25 and 50 metres because the parking-lot of the

16     compound was just beside the buildings and we were in or just outside the

17     buildings.

18        Q.   All right.  You also testified explaining how you were trying to

19     get the Muslims to go in the direction of Potocari.  Why did you and the

20     DutchBat do that?

21        A.   There were so many people gathered on and around the compound of

22     the Bravo Company that we could not do anything with the people.  The VRS

23     attack still continued, and in our opinion it was the best and the safest

24     place to go northwards to the bigger compound in Potocari.  So we tried

25     to inform the people that it was better for them to go to Potocari, but

Page 6745

 1     there was of course a problem.  They had the idea that they were in a

 2     safe haven at that moment and they didn't want to go there until, I

 3     think, 2.00 in the afternoon.  There were some air-strikes at that

 4     moment, the people got a little bit trust that something was done to the

 5     VRS in the southern part of the enclave, and don't know why, but at that

 6     moment we were able to send them northward to the Potocari area.

 7        Q.   You described your ride in that jeep, the 5 kilometres to

 8     Potocari, you described shells falling around.  Can you describe that for

 9     the Court, how -- where these shells were falling, how far away they were

10     from you as you were travelling?

11        A.   The road from Srebrenica to Potocari is in a valley, and in my

12     impression all the time shells were falling between the 150 and more

13     metres on both sides of the road.  And I had the idea that it was just to

14     keep the people on the road and to move them in the northern direction so

15     that the VRS could get all Srebrenica in their hands.

16        Q.   Can you describe the road, clearly you are on the road, is

17     anybody else on the road?

18        A.   The refugees from Srebrenica went up to the northern part to

19     Potocari and I think that the road was overcrowded with thousands of

20     people walking with all their luggage with them.  Some UN vehicles from

21     the Bravo Company, especially trucks with also the wounded from the

22     hospital in Srebrenica were on the road, so the road was also

23     overcrowded, and driving on that road was just going step by step in a

24     vehicle over that road.

25        Q.   Do you know what kind of shells were falling?  Were they mortar

Page 6746

 1     shells, artillery shells?

 2        A.   No, in my opinion, but I have to recollect it now, and it's 15

 3     years ago, I think it were mortar shell.  But I also did not write it

 4     down in my diary, just that there were shells falling.

 5        Q.   Did you see any potential target for those shells, any

 6     Muslim Army or any other target for these shells to be falling on either

 7     side of the road as you have described, as this massive group of people

 8     is walking along?

 9        A.   No, there were no military targets.  In my impression it was the

10     only opportunity to steer people from Srebrenica in the northern

11     direction towards Potocari.

12        Q.   Okay.  We are now getting to -- I want to take you to the first

13     meeting at the Hotel Fontana.

14             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Your Honours, you may remember, it was a long

15     time ago, we actually played this meeting with no witnesses, I believe we

16     had a video day where we just played it.  I would like to play part of it

17     today so Mr. Rave can add a few details, but I don't intend to play all

18     of it.  So if we could start with that video.  It's Exhibit P00991, and

19     we are starting at 003649.9.

20        Q.   Before we start the video, we recall from the summary, have you

21     had a chance to review the video that we showed you of that first

22     meeting?

23        A.   Yes, I had.

24        Q.   Was that a complete video of everything that you recall happening

25     at that meeting?

Page 6747

 1        A.   No, as you stated before, I missed some parts of the things that

 2     happened over there, especially the part that when General Mladic

 3     shouting to Colonel Karremans.  After that he did the same to us, me and

 4     Mr. Boering, well this, at least not on the video.

 5        Q.   All right.  Let's, I would like to play the video and see if we

 6     can tell what you were talking about.

 7                           [Video-clip played]

 8             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Again we are at 36.56.7.

 9        Q.   And can you just -- let's go from left to right, and I think we

10     all recognise General Mladic on the far left.  Were you introduced to the

11     person next to him?

12        A.   Yes, that's the Colonel Jankovic.  And after that, to the right

13     in the middle, you can see the Colonel Karremans and then myself.

14        Q.   And so you are on the far right?

15        A.   Yes.

16        Q.   Had you ever seen Colonel Jankovic before that?

17        A.   No, I've never seen him before.

18        Q.   And did you see him at the second Hotel Fontana meeting that

19     night at 11.00 p.m.?

20        A.   Yes, he was also there.

21        Q.   And did you see him in and around Potocari on the 12th and 13th

22     of July?

23        A.   Yes.  Colonel Jankovic was all the time around even to the last

24     day as we left the enclave near Yellow Bridge -- near the iron bridge in

25     Bratunac he was also there, so from that moment on we saw him the first

Page 6748

 1     time until we left the enclave he was frequently there all the time.

 2        Q.   Okay.  Let's -- well, as we see is there any translation going on

 3     here or attempting to go on?

 4        A.   I missed the video now, but at that moment there was no

 5     interpreter.  Colonel Jankovic spoke English and acted at that moment as

 6     a translator.

 7        Q.   Did that change at some point?

 8        A.   Yes, before the real interrogation or accusation by Mladic

 9     started, the interpreter Petar came in.

10             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Okay.  I think let's -- let's just watch this for

11     awhile and I'll just have a couple of questions.

12                           [Video-clip played]

13             THE WITNESS:  I have no video at this moment.

14             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Do you have it now?

15             THE WITNESS:  Yes, I've got it now.

16             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I think we are okay.

17                           [Video-clip played]

18             MR. McCLOSKEY:

19        Q.   Here it appears we see Colonel Karremans saying he is not the one

20     that requested the air support.  Was that true?

21        A.   I think he requested the air support, fired in the normal chain

22     of command.

23             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  Let's continue.

24                           [Video-clip played]

25             MR. McCLOSKEY:  We are stopping at 50.22.6.

Page 6749

 1        Q.   We did see awhile back General Mladic had raised his voice quite

 2     a bit.  Is that what you were talking about when you say he raised his

 3     voice at General Mladic -- excuse me, at Colonel Karremans?

 4        A.   Yes, he seemed to be very angry at Colonel Karremans because of

 5     the loss of his soldiers in the attacks by the aeroplanes.

 6        Q.   We don't see as this tape continues any screaming at you or

 7     Boering.  Can you recall where that happened in this sequence of events?

 8        A.   Yeah, I think in my opinion it was also directly after the

 9     screaming to Colonel Karremans that he also started screaming to me and

10     to Mr. Boering, so this, at least, part I'm missing in this tape.

11        Q.   How about the threat as you described against the -- well, why

12     don't you in your own words tell us what the threat was that he made

13     against who?

14        A.   The way he acted now against Colonel Karremans, he did the same

15     to Mr. Boering and to myself.  The way he was looking, the way he was

16     shouting, the way he was acting, the way it was translated by the

17     interpreter was so threatening to us that I, in the first ten minutes I

18     think, and that's what I wrote down in my diary, the first ten minutes I

19     thought we will end up in the garden and he will shoot us.

20        Q.   What particular threats did he make?

21        A.   During the whole meeting, he gave us the impression that he is

22     the boss, we had shot at his soldiers so he would do the same to us,

23     that's the impression he gave us.  And somewhere in the meeting, I think

24     it is a little bit further on, he gave the impression that if there

25     should be any air-strikes again, that he would target the compound, the

Page 6750

 1     refugees and also the soldiers that were held hostage or POW in the

 2     Hotel Fontana at that moment.

 3        Q.   Now, I don't think the tape shows any of those direct threats

 4     towards the UN compound, the refugees, or the Dutch soldiers?

 5        A.   No, I have not seen that on the tape.

 6        Q.   And do you know in this sequence at the Hotel Fontana when he

 7     made those threats?

 8        A.   In my opinion, it was also in the beginning of the meeting when

 9     he was shouting and when he was threatening us because after those

10     threats it became a little more calm, and, well, at least at that moment,

11     we could hear the demands of General Mladic because there was no

12     negotiation going on, it was just hearing his demands.

13        Q.   All right.

14             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Unless the Court want to hear the rest of it, we

15     have our witness presents, I'm satisfied that the transcript is there,

16     and, of course, General Tolimir can play more on cross if he'd like.  But

17     I think to save some time, I don't think we need to play the rest of it,

18     unless you'd like to see it.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think we are in agreement with your proposal.

20     Judge Nyambe has a question.

21             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Just a clarification:  Did I understand to mean

22     that this meeting was requested by General Karremans?

23             THE WITNESS:  I don't know, that might be possible.  The only

24     thing I know that at about 7.00 in the evening I got the order to join

25     Colonel Karremans to the meeting in the Hotel Fontana.  And I don't know

Page 6751

 1     if it was on the request of General Mladic or the Serb side, or it was on

 2     the request of the Colonel Karremans.  As it seems now on the tape, it

 3     stated that it was on the request of Colonel Karremans.  That might be

 4     possible.

 5             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Thank you.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Judge Mindua.

 7             JUDGE MINDUA:  [Interpretation] Yes, I have a question.

 8     Mr. McCloskey, you say that you are not going to continue playing the

 9     video.  Does this mean that today we are not going to see the passage

10     where there's the pig, the pig that was slaughtered?  Is this what you

11     were saying?

12             MR. McCLOSKEY:  What I meant by that is that this is still the

13     first Hotel Fontana meeting as we call it, and I thought that it wasn't

14     necessary to show any more of that.  I have been going back and forth in

15     my head whether I should show the pig, and I think we can show that pig

16     part briefly and ask this witness about it.  So I think, especially given

17     your question, it's probably a good idea to show that part and ask him

18     about it.  That's at the second meeting and we'll get to that.

19             JUDGE MINDUA:  [Interpretation] Very well.  So we'll come back to

20     this because I believe that it is very important for me, and you also

21     mentioned this in the summary of the statement that you read earlier, so

22     I would like to come back to this issue.

23             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you.  That helps me decide that point which

24     I've been going back and forth in my head.  These 92 ter witnesses, we

25     try to give you what we think is most important and that helps me quite a

Page 6752

 1     bit.  All right.  We'll let that be in the record.  The transcript and

 2     the video is something the Court should have, as you know we are

 3     endeavouring to let you have good CDs of that.

 4        Q.   And we know from the summary that you were told to -- by Mladic

 5     to go get civilian and military representatives and bring them back for

 6     an 11.00 meeting.  And did you do that?

 7        A.   Yes.  At that moment I think we told already General Mladic that

 8     it was very problematic for us to get in touch with the military

 9     leadership in the enclave because we had no contact at that moment with

10     them.  So we informed them already at that moment, but we were able to

11     find a civilian representative that we met before in the enclave and who

12     was willing to join us to the 11.00 meeting.

13        Q.   And who was that?

14        A.   It was director of the secondary school in Srebrenica,

15     Mr. Nesib Mandzic.

16        Q.   All right.  And what do you recall about the beginning of that

17     meeting and the pig?

18        A.   In that meeting we came into the room again, sat down.  At that

19     moment, I don't know if the window and the curtains were already open or

20     were opened at that moment, but the window at least was open and after

21     that the meeting started.  I think the meeting, from my notes, the

22     meeting started 11.00, and five minutes later, I had the impression that

23     beneath the window that was opened and the curtains were open, that a pig

24     was slaughtered outside just to intimidate the people inside the briefing

25     room where we were sitting, and, of course, not the Serb side because at

Page 6753

 1     least lieutenant, and seemed to be Lieutenant-Colonel Kosoric, started

 2     smiling and also other people were grincing [phoen] when the pig were

 3     slaughtered, at least when we heard him scream, and when it hardly ended

 4     they closed the window and closed the curtains again, so at least the

 5     meeting started with an intimidation towards us.

 6        Q.   So you said people were smiling and grinning?

 7        A.   Grincing I had the impression that it was all arranged in advance

 8     and people knew what was happening or was going to happen.

 9        Q.   Can you describe what window you are talking about, where it was

10     in relation to where you were sitting and where General Mladic was

11     sitting?

12        A.   It was the window behind General Mladic and to the right side of

13     myself.  Most right corner of the window when you entered the room, the

14     main entrance and then you look towards the window, and on the most right

15     side there was a window that was opened and also the curtains were

16     opened.

17        Q.   And you said you had the impression that a pig was being

18     slaughtered.  Was that only an impression or what did you mean by when

19     you said you had the impression?

20        A.   Well, I wrote also down in my diary that a pig was slaughtered.

21     Of course I did not see that it was slaughtered so it can also be treated

22     very bad, but I think that it was slaughtered, at least I have heard that

23     scream from a pig before when it's slaughtered and --

24        Q.   Well, tell us about that.  When, if ever, had you ever

25     experienced the slaughtering of a pig?

Page 6754

 1        A.   My grandfather was a farmer and I've seen slaughtering of a pig

 2     over there, so I recognised, at least, that sound and that's the sound I

 3     related to the sound I heard that evening.

 4        Q.   You also just said something about a pig makes a noise if you

 5     treat it very badly.  Can you tell us having had some farming experience

 6     what is the difference, in your view, between a pig being slaughtered and

 7     a pig being, you know, held up by it's legs or something like that?

 8        A.   Yeah, when you keep a pig with his legs or on his tail or on his

 9     ears, then it starts screaming and stops when you stop.  And in this

10     case, I had the impression that it faded away slowly, so maybe his throat

11     was cut or something like that.  Because that's the impression I still

12     have and what I find in my diary that the pig was slaughtered, so I made

13     at that time directly the connection that the pig was slaughtered.

14        Q.   Can you read -- can you go to your diary, if that is all right,

15     and just read specifically what you say about that?  You've mentioned

16     that several times.  And before you read it, can you tell us when you

17     wrote the notes in this diary?

18        A.   These notes were written down during the meeting, so when we

19     started the meeting, I started to wrote down the meeting I saw in the

20     meeting.  We started it was three people DutchBat, on the 11th of July at

21     2300 hours.  The people who were there.  And then the first note I made

22     2305 pig slaughtering on film, sound, window, curtain open, smile, men

23     with cigar pipe and moustache and tank, I know now that was

24     Lieutenant Kosoric, I refer to in this one.

25        Q.   What does the tank have to do with Colonel Kosoric?

Page 6755

 1        A.   In my recollection, he has the tattoo of a tank on his arm --

 2     yeah, tattoo on a tank -- tank tattoo on his arm.

 3        Q.   All right.  And you read out your notes in English.  Are they in

 4     English or in Dutch?

 5        A.   No, they are in Dutch.  I can read them in Dutch, if you like.

 6        Q.   Why don't you do that just for the record, in case it's an issue.

 7     It's all right.  We hear a lot of Dutch around.  It's only a few words so

 8     if you could just say it.

 9        A.   [Dutch spoken]

10             [In English] That is on Kosoric.

11             MR. McCLOSKEY:  We'll get a translation of that for the record,

12     Mr. President.  I don't normally like doing that, but I just, as I'm

13     concentrating through this, I thought that was a good thing to get down

14     so it's been so interested by the Court.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It's, of course, not on the record, but it was

16     taped and perhaps we have the chance to get a proper translation of that.

17             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I'm sorry about that, just seemed like something

18     we should get.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Judge Nyambe has a question.

20             MR. MCCLOSKEY:  Yes, I have no further questions, so I turn you

21     over to the witness.  Thank you.

22             JUDGE MINDUA:  [Interpretation] Yes, I thank Judge Nyambe for

23     letting me put my questions first.  Witness, as you probably know, I went

24     to Sarajevo and I also went to Hotel Fontana, I saw the briefing room.

25     Now, this is my question:  Are you sure that the pig was slaughtered in

Page 6756

 1     the street or was he slaughtered -- or was this pig slaughtered in the

 2     kitchen of the hotel?  That's my first question.  Okay.  You gave us your

 3     impression of the situation.  I thank you for that.  You told us what

 4     your impression was when it comes to the slaughtering of the pig, but

 5     this is what I would like to know, I'd like to know whether after the

 6     fact you actually discussed with the Muslims to see what they felt about

 7     what had occurred and whether you discussed also this incident with the

 8     Serbs?  Thank you.

 9             THE WITNESS:  Well, I think you are asking me three questions

10     now.  I think that the kitchen of the Hotel Fontana, in my opinion, was

11     not at the outside of the window where the window was open and the

12     curtains were open.  I think that's somewhere outside the hotel and I

13     don't know exactly if the window has a view on the street or in a garden

14     or something else, but at least not in a kitchen.

15             It just happened and I think we might have spoken about it

16     afterwards, but not at that moment during the session we had in the

17     briefing room over there, and I also don't think that we spoke with the

18     Serbs afterwards about the incident.  It was just one of the things that

19     happened, and, well, it was just one of the intimidating things.  That's

20     it and I think we had a lot of more important problems to solve than this

21     at the moment.

22             JUDGE MINDUA:  [Interpretation] Thank you.

23             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I did mean to play that segment which may be

24     helpful for any future questions so that we can see the area and get an

25     idea what we are talking about.

Page 6757

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think that would be helpful, but before that

 2     Judge Nyambe has a question.

 3             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Yes, like Judge Mindua before me I've had the

 4     opportunity to visit Hotel Fontana and being in the actual meeting room

 5     that you referred to.  My question is:  Having stated yourself that you

 6     are a farmer and you've dealt with pigs, and you are familiar with what

 7     happens to pigs when they were being slaughtered, what is it about the

 8     slaughter of this pig that you perceive as an intimidation towards you?

 9             THE WITNESS:  I think first I have to take away a little mistake,

10     I think.  I'm not a farmer, my grandfather was farmer and there I heard

11     and saw the slaughtering of a pig.  And because I knew the sound of the

12     slaughtering of a pig and heard that sound the same evening we were in

13     the Hotel Fontana, that's why I made the connection of a slaughtering of

14     a pig.  Because when you slaughter a pig, it starts screaming and yelling

15     in a terrible way, at least for normal people, I think.  In my opinion,

16     it gave the impression:  What we can do to the pig, we can also do to the

17     Muslims.  That's what the impression what I got at that moment.  It was

18     pure intimidating.

19             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Thank you.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

21             MR. McCLOSKEY:

22        Q.   Were you aware of any special or significance of a pig or a pork

23     in the Islamic religion?

24        A.   Yes, of course.  Of course in the Islamic religion it's not

25     allowed to eat pork or -- and normally they also don't have pigs,

Page 6758

 1     although in the enclave we were, there were also Muslims who had pigs and

 2     who slaughtered pigs.  Sometime when we had no fuel anymore, we had to

 3     close down our cooling facilities, we had a lot of pork meat and also a

 4     lot of other meat, we asked the Muslim leadership in the enclave if it

 5     was allowed for us to give the pork meat to the Muslims in the enclave.

 6     They refused because they said it doesn't fit into our religion.  So we

 7     don't accept it.  So we gave it to the Serbs to deal with both sides.

 8        Q.   Do you know if you considered this the religious tradition when

 9     you were thinking whether -- this issue about intimidation or not?

10        A.   No, I don't think I connected it to a religious thing.  Just more

11     intimidation of slaughtering, in this case a pig, but it also could have

12     been a dog or something else.

13             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Okay.  Let's play the segment.  And we are at

14  And this is the beginning of the meeting.

15                           [Video-clip played]

16             MR. McCLOSKEY:

17        Q.   Now we are at  We can see Colonel Jankovic and we can

18     see the left hand, do you know who that is sitting next to

19     Colonel Jankovic who we can't quite see, do you remember?

20        A.   Yes, was sitting there, that's Petar the interpreter next to

21     Jankovic, then the Colonel Karremans and then Nesib Mandzic.  And the guy

22     who is standing over there is the man who I frequently saw near the

23     General Mladic and I think he was a body-guard of General Mladic.

24        Q.   And do you know who is sitting next to Jankovic who we can't see,

25     all we can see his left hand?

Page 6759

 1        A.   Left to Jankovic is General Mladic.

 2        Q.   Can you tell from this video where the window might be that you

 3     are talking about?

 4        A.   The man who is standing over there is standing in the open, I

 5     don't know if it's open, standing there near the window.  I think it's

 6     open at that moment.

 7        Q.   All right.  And could you tell where the sound of the pig was

 8     coming from?

 9        A.   From the direction the man is looking toward now.

10             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  And let's play the rest of it and see

11     if there's any questions.

12                           [Video-clip played]

13             MR. McCLOSKEY:

14        Q.   Okay.  We are now at  And I think we'll all agree for

15     several seconds before this we heard a very loud screeching sound.  Was

16     that what you are talking about?

17        A.   Yes, that's, in my opinion, the slaughtering of the pig.

18        Q.   And you said that Kosoric was smiling.  Where was Kosoric sitting

19     when you noticed him smiling?

20        A.   He was sitting opposite me.

21        Q.   So opposite across the table from you?

22        A.   Yes, yes.

23        Q.   Was he smiling before that terrible noise?

24        A.   No, he was just making note of -- taking notes.  And when this

25     happened, he started smiling and grincing in a way, so nice trick isn't

Page 6760

 1     it, that's the way he looked.

 2        Q.   We all noticed Colonel Karremans didn't look up, didn't appear to

 3     make -- have any reaction at all.  Do you have any explanation for that?

 4        A.   No, I think it's amazing that he doesn't react at all.  I think

 5     he is so into his own mind, busy with in dealing things, that he want to

 6     bring across the table to the General Mladic that I don't even know if he

 7     recognised it.

 8        Q.   Later on in this video we see General Mladic speaking to

 9     Mr. Mandzic and says something to the effect that, Nesib, the future of

10     your people is in your hands, whether they survive or disappear.  Have

11     you seen this on this video?

12        A.   Yes, I've seen that part of the video.

13        Q.   Do you remember it happening in the room or was that something

14     that you couldn't catch the translation of because, as you've described,

15     the translator was not right there?

16        A.   In my notes, I can't find it.  I can read in my notes that about

17     2315 he shows us a shield from the opstina, tells a story, and then makes

18     a show about that he found nothing in the hospital, medicines, and after

19     that he had a real, in my opinion, a relaxed discussion with Mr. Mandzic.

20     After that Mladic gave a statement it was about 20 minutes after 11.00,

21     and directly after the statement of Mladic -- statement of Mandzic,

22     Mr. Mladic gave a statement towards Mandzic again and he was accusing him

23     and had a mean look in his eyes that it was all their fault, and I think

24     in that part he also told that the future of his people were in his

25     hands.

Page 6761

 1             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  I have nothing further.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Is that the end of your examination-in-chief?

 3             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes, Mr. President.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

 5             Mr. Tolimir, do you have cross-examination with this witness?

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, thank you, Mr. President.  I

 7     would like to welcome the witness.  May God's peace reign in this

 8     courthouse and may his will be done and not necessarily mine.

 9                           Cross-examination by Mr. Tolimir:

10        Q.   [Interpretation] Witness, let's start with the scene that we saw

11     last, with the last video-clip that we saw and what you said on page 27

12     of today's transcript from line 10 onwards, when you spoke about your

13     feelings and impressions.  Kindly listen and see the video-clip again.

14     You say that you heard a pig.  Could you please try and reflect whether

15     you heard -- whether that was indeed a pig or some sort of poultry.

16     Thank you.  After that, we will continue our conversation.  Thank you.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation]  Could the Prosecutor please play

18     that part of the video-clip if the witness wants to listen to it again.

19     Thank you.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

21             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes, of course, Ms. Stewart will endeavour to

22     find that spot where it starts.  And maybe I can, just for the record,

23     state where it starts.  We are starting at --

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  The sound starts at

25     01.17.30, thank you, on the video.  Thank you.

Page 6762

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  No, this is not correct.  This is

 2                           [Video-clip played]

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to thank you,

 4     Mr. President.

 5                           [Video-clip played]

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 7             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Since you mentioned your grandfather having been a farmer, would

 9     you say that this is the screeching of a pig or of some other animal?

10        A.   In my opinion, this is the screaming of a pig.

11        Q.   Are you sure of that, of what you are saying?

12        A.   Of course I'm sure.  And that in my opinion, this is the

13     screaming of a pig.  If any other animal that is slaughtered makes the

14     same noise, that could be possible of course.  But in my opinion, this is

15     a slaughtering of a pig.  And that's what I think now, but that's what I

16     also felt in the evening we were sitting there and that's what I also

17     find in my notes so that's the only recollection I've got.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Since nobody reacted, Karremans didn't, Mladic

19     didn't, Petar the interpreter didn't react, how do you account for that,

20     how come nobody reacted to the sound?

21        A.   I think I can only give my impression and what I think.  Because

22     if you want to know why they don't react, I think you should ask them.

23     As I said, I think it was all preset.  It was arranged in advance and

24     maybe before we entered the room, as DutchBat representatives, the rest

25     of the people might have been already informed that this was happen.  In

Page 6763

 1     my opinion, it's amazing for me to see that Colonel Karremans does not

 2     react at all, and I think he might be so intense with his notes and with

 3     the way he brings it up to the General Mladic that that might be the

 4     reason that he doesn't react.  But I don't know, I think you should ask

 5     Colonel Karremans in showing him this why he doesn't react.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Could you tell me whether there were any people who

 7     did not know and they didn't react?  Karremans didn't react, and we can

 8     see on your face that you didn't react either.  We can replay the video

 9     again.  Mandzic, for example, he didn't react either.

10        A.   I didn't see on the video during the slaughtering of the pig the

11     face of Mandzic or myself because I was not sitting next to Mandzic.

12     There was another person sitting next to Mandzic.  I did not see myself

13     and I did not see any other reactions and only the face of Petar and

14     Colonel Karremans.  Maybe we can try the video again and see if there's

15     anybody else not reacting.

16        Q.   And before we ask the Prosecutor to play the video again, would

17     you say that Muslims would be intimidated by the slaughtering of the pigs

18     if they, themselves, were eating pigs?  You said it yourself that there

19     were Muslims who kept pigs and ate pigs.  It was not uncustomary in

20     Bosnia for Muslims to eat pigs.  There were those who were religious and

21     didn't eat pig, and on the other hands there were those who did.  So once

22     again were there Muslims in Bosnia who did keep pigs and who also ate

23     pigs?

24        A.   I know that in the enclave there were Muslims that kept pigs and

25     were eating pigs.  But the intimidation, I think, is very clear.  After

Page 6764

 1     having been in a real war situation for several days, being shelled for

 2     several days, more than 15.000 people running and fleeing because they

 3     are threatened to death, I think, gathered around the compounds with no

 4     idea what is going on, what is happening with them, then especially

 5     Mr. Mandzic picked up as a representative from the refugees going with us

 6     to meeting where we did not know what to expect again after the first

 7     meeting, we only got a lot of orders from the General Mladic what he

 8     wanted.  After that, we went there with a frightened civilian with us who

 9     was not allowed to go out of the enclave for several years, was going out

10     now for the first time to the Serb side, did not know what he could

11     expect.  So he was frightened already, and I think at that moment

12     slaughtering a pig beneath the window, it was enough intimidating and not

13     only normal slaughtering of a pig that happened when people want to eat

14     the pigs they raise themselves.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Can you please tell us whether the scared civilian

16     was a soldier, and do you know that that person ventured as far as 15

17     kilometres into the Serbian territory and killed every person to the last

18     in Kravica?  Do you know that or perhaps not?

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

20             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Objection.  That kind of vulgar misstatement and

21     accusation is uncalled for.  It should not be allowed on the record and I

22     would ask that General Tolimir never repeats such vulgarities again.

23     Unless he has evidence, if he has proof of something, he can say -- or

24     evidence of something he can put that in a question, but there's no

25     evidence of any murders by Mr. Mandzic.

Page 6765

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, if you want to know something from

 2     this witness, you should rephrase your question.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. President, a witness stated

 4     before this Trial Chamber that he was in Kravica.  Another witness stated

 5     that everything was torched and everybody killed there.  If this is not

 6     proof, what is proof?  I can't bring you people who were killed and

 7     that's why I asked him that, that's why I said what I did.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  No, this is not true, Mr. Tolimir.  You were

 9     directly referring to Mr. Mandzic in two sections.  Please rephrase your

10     question and then put it to the witness.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

12             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Sir, do you know that Mr. Mandzic participated in sabotage and

14     assault actions during which Serbian villages were torched and Serbian

15     population killed together with everybody else who was in those villages?

16     Thank you.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, you should rephrase your question.

18     You have heard the objection of Mr. McCloskey.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I heard the objection, but I don't

20     know what you want from me.  The witness said that that person was

21     scared, that he never left the enclave.  I'm asking him whether he knows

22     that he actually did participate in fightings and that he participated in

23     sabotage actions.  I hope you can allow me to put that question to the

24     witness.  If not, then that's a different matter.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Rave, may I ask you, do you know anything

Page 6766

 1     about Mr. Mandzic participation in combat activities?

 2             THE WITNESS:  No, the only thing from Mr. Mandzic I know that he

 3     was a teacher before the war, and he was a teacher during the war.  And I

 4     have no information that Mr. Mandzic played a role as a soldier or

 5     anything else and went out of the enclave to do whatever is suggested.

 6     So I have no information about that at all.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. President, thank you.

 9             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Mr. Rave, you are not a protected witness, I may as well call you

11     by your name.  Mr. Rave, could you please tell us whether your

12     impressions and your feelings, and so on and so forth, is something that

13     you shared with any of the participants in that meeting that had been

14     called on Karremans' request that evening in order to discuss the

15     evacuation of the Muslims from the enclave?

16        A.   I don't understand the question.  Do you want to know if we later

17     on discussed the information we got on that meeting?  Yes, of course,

18     after we came back to the compound we had a meeting and we discussed what

19     was said during the meeting and what were the first important steps we

20     had to deal with, and that was put on paper by Colonel Karremans, and on

21     that we acted further.  I think that he sent the information also in his

22     chain of command upwards.

23        Q.   And did you discuss the intimidation with anybody on the Serb

24     side, the intimidation that you have just described for us?

25        A.   No, because after we -- it was not discussed during the meeting

Page 6767

 1     and not directly after the meeting.  That were the only moments we were

 2     in contact with the Serbs, and for us this was just one of the incidents

 3     that at that moment happened and we had to deal with more important

 4     things because we had 15- or 20.000 refugees without any food, water, or

 5     sanitary things.  So it was just an incident that happened at that moment

 6     and we had to deal with more important things than only slaughtering of a

 7     pig.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, I think it's the right time for our

 9     first break of today's hearing.  We will adjourn and resume quarter past

10     4.00.

11                           --- Recess taken at 3.47 p.m.

12                           --- On resuming at 4.17 p.m.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

15             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Witness, would you please tell us, had you been to Fontana Hotel

17     before these events, before the conflict broke out?

18        A.   Yes, I've been there several times before.  The first time was in

19     the, I think the 6th of January, 1995 when we had our hand-over meeting

20     with the previous battalion, and we also did it in Hotel Fontana over

21     there.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Were you able to observe if this Fontana Hotel had an

23     economic section, some courtyards, something like that?

24        A.   No, the only thing I've seen from the hotel that when we were

25     brought there most of the time we were accompanied by one of the soldiers

Page 6768

 1     who brought us over there was that we entered in the hotel, were brought

 2     to one of the briefing rooms and because I think there were more and I

 3     can't recollect especially, but I think there were more briefing rooms.

 4     And we were seated in the briefing room, and the first meeting we had

 5     over there they preferred -- they prepared the food for us and all the

 6     time they were serving drinks and small food, so ...

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember that on that footage the body-guard

 8     of General Mladic stood by the open window?  My question is:  Would he

 9     have observed or seen or heard something going on outside the hotel and

10     would he have maybe opened the window to see if there was some threat to

11     the person he was guarding?  Why would he have opened that window?

12        A.   As I said, in my opinion it was all pre-arranged.  I don't know

13     if he opened the window by himself or that he got a sign from somebody to

14     open the window at that moment.  The same for closing the window.  I

15     don't know if he decided it for himself when to close the window or that

16     he got a sign that he could close the window at that moment.  At that

17     moment I have not seen him before afterwards I seen him several times

18     accompanying General Mladic and I've not seen that he took decisions by

19     himself, only when he was ordered by the general or just doing the normal

20     protective thing, normal protective measures for the general.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Since you were in charge of security in the field,

22     would you able to tell us whether a body-guard in war time can take any

23     security measure without the approval of the person he is guarding?

24        A.   I'm not a specialist in body-guard measures, but I think that a

25     body-guard is always able to take protective measures, also in war time

Page 6769

 1     because there are, of course, lots of threats he has to be aware of, and

 2     I think that they should be trained in protecting the man who he is in

 3     charge for.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Could you tell us if the Fontana Hotel, which you had

 5     visited in January and at other times, was privately owned and did it

 6     operate normally under the circumstances because it was not directly on

 7     the front line?

 8        A.   I have no idea if the hotel was really in use as a hotel because

 9     I only visited for the meetings we had with the Serbs over there.  I know

10     that one of our logistic NCOs went there to trade with the owner of the

11     hotel, and I think it was the owner because that's what the my opinion

12     was told all the time for buying some beer or refreshments to use for us

13     inside the enclave because we had nothing and we had the possibility and

14     were able to go to the Hotel Fontana and deal over there.

15        Q.   Thank you.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now show to the witness

17     D37.

18             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   It's a document dated 10 July 1995.  The title is "Approval to

20     slaughter and distribute livestock."

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  While this will be appear on the screen, I have a

22     question for the witness.  Sir, Mr. Rave, could you perhaps -- are you

23     able to recall, I am not referring to this document, I'm still dealing

24     with the video of the Hotel Fontana meeting.  Do you recall what the

25     body-guard at the window did later?  Was he remaining at this position or

Page 6770

 1     what did he do?  Do you remember that?

 2             THE WITNESS:  No, the only thing I can tell you is that on the

 3     video I see that he is walking behind Colonel Karremans and so I don't

 4     think that he was standing at the window, but I can't recall what he did

 5     and even if he stayed in the room or might have gone outside.  In my

 6     opinion, he was one of the guys who stayed all time in the briefing room,

 7     but not on the place where he was -- when the window was opened, but near

 8     the door.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  You just said that you saw on the video that he

10     was leaving his position at the window behind Colonel Karremans?

11             THE WITNESS:  Yeah, I saw somebody walking.  In my opinion it was

12     the body-guard who was walking from the window back to the door where I

13     think he stayed.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  At which point in time did that happen, do you

15     recall?

16             THE WITNESS:  I don't know exactly then.  We should see the video

17     again, but ...

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Okay.  That's fine for the moment.

19             Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

21             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Now, please, Mr. Rave, could you look at this document, the

23     English version is on the left, and see that it's a document from the

24     Drina Corps command dated 10 July 1995, that's the day before the event.

25     They did not know that Colonel Karremans would be asking to meet Mladic

Page 6771

 1     in the hotel, and it says:

 2             "To be sent to the Bratunac army-operated farm,

 3     Captain Mirko Blagojevic.  So they sent this permission to slaughter and

 4     distribute livestock."

 5             And it says, paragraph 2:

 6             "It is hereby approved that for the purposes of the UN soldiers

 7     billeted in the hotel in Bratunac, you may slaughter and deliver one hog

 8     up to 80 kilos."

 9             From this we see that UN soldiers who were billeted, were staying

10     at the hotel in Bratunac and they were ordering certain foodstuffs that

11     they needed; is that correct?

12        A.   This is very interesting.  As I told you, and you might know,

13     that the soldiers that were in the Hotel Fontana, were, in my opinion,

14     hostages or POWs as you might call them during that time because I think

15     there was a war going on at that time.  I have not the impression that

16     the soldiers were free to do what they wanted, and of course they could

17     demands for a pig or whatever they wanted, but I think that there was

18     only one person who granted their demands and that was Colonel Mladic.  I

19     think they were not -- well, they might be billeted in the hotel, but not

20     as we see it now as billeted in the hotel, and also myself, free to go

21     and free to order what I want.

22             So I don't think that the soldiers were able to order a pig for a

23     barbecue or whatever.

24        Q.   Since you don't seem to believe me, I'll read this whole thing

25     once again:

Page 6772

 1             "It is hereby approved that for the purposes of the UN soldiers

 2     staying in the hotel in Bratunac, you may slaughter and deliver the

 3     following:  One hog weighing up to 80 kilos.  The hog shall be delivered

 4     through the hotel in Bratunac on orders from the commander of the

 5     Drina Corps.  In selecting the livestock for slaughter, make sure that

 6     these animals are not suitable for fattening and breeding."

 7             And this is dated a whole day before that meeting.

 8             Now, could this assistant commander for logistics who signed this

 9     have known that Colonel Karremans would be asking to meet General Mladic

10     in the Fontana Hotel precisely on the 18th [as interpreted] when you came

11     there for the second time.

12        A.   As I told you before, I don't know who arranged the meeting.  I

13     don't know if Colonel Karremans asked for the meeting or if

14     General Mladic or somebody else asked for the meeting.  And of course, I

15     also can't tell you what happened before we had a meeting over there.  So

16     I don't know who filled out this form, where it was sent to and I've

17     never seen it before, so I have no idea about the logistics at that

18     moment in and around the Hotel Fontana because the 10th we were not

19     there, and the 10th I think I was in Srebrenica myself.  And we didn't

20     even know that on the 10th in the evening we had to go there.  At least I

21     didn't know that.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

23             MR. McCLOSKEY:  It may be a translation issue, but it says he

24     went there on the 18th.  Just alert that.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

Page 6773

 1             MR. TOLIMIR:  [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Said 11th, not 18th, and here in the telegram it says the

 3     telegram was sent on the 10th of July at 1210 hours, and it was

 4     transmitted at 1300 hours.  My question is:  The owner of the hotel or

 5     General Mladic, could they have known a day before at 12.00 or 1.00 p.m.

 6     that Colonel Karremans would be asking for a meeting at the hotel the

 7     next day?

 8        A.   Sorry, sir, I won't be rude but I can't get in the mind of the

 9     hotel owner or General Mladic on the 10th of July.  Sorry.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Can you see from this document that a whole day of

11     preparation is needed to slaughter a pig and that an order is necessary

12     from the person who issues approvals normally to distribute animals to

13     the UN, for instance?

14        A.   I'm not aware of the internal logistic lines of communication

15     within the VRS or within the town of Bratunac, so, well, if it's stated

16     over here and it takes that time, well, it will be so.  I don't know.

17        Q.   Do you know whether there were UNPROFOR soldiers in the Bratunac

18     hotel, soldiers to whom this document refers, people who ordered a pig to

19     be slaughtered?

20        A.   When we came in the meeting at 8.00, the soldiers from our OPs in

21     the southern part of the enclave were brought to Bratunac were assembled

22     in one of the briefing rooms in the hotel.  Mr. Boering went in with

23     Colonel Karremans and myself and visited in advance of the meeting the

24     soldiers just for a short time.  After the 8.00 meeting, we had all the

25     possibility to go into that room, shake hands with the guys.  I do not

Page 6774

 1     know if they were living in the hotel or somewhere else, but they were in

 2     Bratunac.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us whether it's obvious from this

 4     document that the slaughtering of one hog weighing up to 80 kilos was

 5     approved for them?

 6        A.   Again, I don't know the logistic rules of the VRS at that time.

 7     And I think that a young pig and a hog is ordered over there, that

 8     doesn't say anything to me.

 9        Q.   In the Fontana Hotel, were there any other UN soldiers apart from

10     Dutch men, and did you see Dutch men in the Hotel Fontana, Dutch

11     soldiers?

12        A.   The only Dutch soldiers that were in the hotel were our people

13     who were made POW on the OPs on the southern part of the enclave, and the

14     three of us who were attending the meeting, so Mr. Karremans, Mr. Boering

15     and myself.  That were the only people that I know that were there.  So

16     no United Nations military service or anybody else, only the people from

17     the battalion including the three I just mentioned.

18        Q.   [No interpretation]

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  No interpretation.

20             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Can you tell us how long had the soldiers been in the

22     Fontana Hotel before that meeting?

23        A.   I don't know how long they were in the Fontana Hotel.  I didn't

24     ask it myself to them.  I know and I should look into my notes when the

25     OPs were taking over by the Serbs and when they surrendered to the Serbs

Page 6775

 1     and after that were taken to the Hotel Fontana.  I think it was on the

 2     10th of July that they moved forward because they were not able to go

 3     backwards because they were stopped by the Bosnia -- the BiH soldiers

 4     over there, so they had to go forward then were captured and then were

 5     brought to Bratunac, and I don't know if they directly were brought to

 6     the hotel or were somewhere else.

 7        Q.   Thank you.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we show P994 to the witness

 9     in e-court.  Page 5, paragraph 5.  Thank you.

10             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   You see paragraph 5, and I will now quote from your statement

12     written in July 1995 just after the events:

13             "We arrived at the Hotel Fontana about 2000 hours.  As we

14     entered, we noticed that in a separate room, some Dutch soldiers who had

15     been manning the OPs were held under guard by the VRS soldiers.  We were

16     initially not permitted to see them.  The hostages appeared relaxed and

17     in no immediate danger.  I understand that Major Boering did, in fact,

18     manage to get access to them for a few minutes before the meeting

19     started."

20             Now, my question is:  Did members of your delegation in the

21     Hotel Fontana, like Major Boering, see the hostages?  Did they really

22     look relaxed and did they tell you that they had voluntarily moved to the

23     territory controlled by the VRS because the Muslims did not let them

24     cross their territory and one soldier was even killed while attempting to

25     do so, and because also they were asked to shoot at members of the VRS?

Page 6776

 1        A.   I think you've got a lot of questions at this moment.  And I

 2     think I will answer them and try to answer them one by one.

 3     Major Boering, when we entered the hotel, just bluffed and went into the

 4     room where our soldiers were, so they got -- he got access to them for a

 5     few minutes before the meeting.  So, yes he saw the hostages.

 6             And what he told them and what I later on saw that they looked

 7     rather relaxed because they really didn't know what was going on.

 8             They voluntarily moved forward, and I think then Mr. Tolimir is

 9     mixing up some things, that one of the soldiers was killed, this has

10     nothing to do with going forward from the other OPs.  When the OPs in the

11     south were attacked by the VRS, they tried to do their normal military

12     job, that means as the General will know, going backwards, finding a new

13     position to do your job, maybe to shoot at your attackers.

14             The Bosnian army was there, was standing behind our APCs and was

15     not allowing them going backwards to do their job in the way they learned

16     and then they should do the job.  The Bosnians -- the Muslims had only

17     one idea, your enemy is in front of you so you have to go forward and if

18     you go backward, we'll shoot you in one way or another.  So there was

19     only one way for the manning on the OPs, that was going forward and

20     surrender to the VRS.  So that's what they did.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Could you tell the Trial Chamber, if you know, who

22     killed one of your soldiers during your withdrawal through the Muslim

23     territory to the base in Potocari?

24        A.   When they returned from the OP, and I don't know exactly, I

25     should look in my notes from which OP returned, a lot of people on a dirt

Page 6777

 1     road tried to stop the APC because they had the same intention, they had

 2     to go forward.  At that moment, the commander of the APC took the

 3     decision to drive through something, people, I think, put on the road.

 4     At that moment, and I still don't know either there was a hand-grenade

 5     thrown or there was a shot from a gun that hit one of our soldiers and

 6     later on the day he died.  But that was a civilian population near the

 7     OP.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know if those civilians were Serbs or Muslims?

 9        A.   The civilians were Muslims.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Were those civilians armed or not?

11        A.   Well, as I say, that they either --

12             THE INTERPRETER:  Give a pause.

13             THE WITNESS: -- shoot or threw a hand-grenade and that implicates

14     in my opinion that they were armed.

15             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Thank you.  Did DutchBat soldiers who were at the Fontana Hotel

17     complain in any way of anything that was provided to them at the hotel,

18     either food or something else?  Did they complain to those who were in

19     contact with them, those from the Dutch Battalion?

20        A.   At the moment we spoke to them, that was on the end of the 8.00

21     meeting, I got no complaints from them.  They only wanted to know what

22     was going on and when they were able to return to the battalion.

23     Afterwards, I have not spoken to them what happened in the hotel and if

24     they had any complaints.  I even don't know exactly when they returned to

25     the battalion.

Page 6778

 1        Q.   Thank you.  In your answer you just said that they didn't know

 2     anything and they were relaxed.  They didn't know what was going on.  A

 3     relaxed person, would you say that that person is relaxed because he

 4     doesn't know what is going on or whether he is just confused?

 5        A.   I think that they didn't know what was going on, they were in a

 6     situation that they were hostages or POWs and just were waiting what was

 7     going on, then you can do -- can do several things.  You can get very

 8     nervous and do all strange kind of things, but you can also be relaxed

 9     and hope that the problems will be solved, and when you see your

10     battalion commander passing by, then I think you get some hope and hope

11     that your problems will be solved, because, in my opinion, it's the most

12     important thing for them, their security and their return to the

13     battalion to go back to their own jobs.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Those soldiers or those prisoners or hostages as you

15     call them, had they voluntarily surrendered to the VRS?  Could they have

16     done it to the Muslim army or could they have returned to their base

17     across the Muslim-held territory?

18        A.   No, as I stated before, they were not able to do their military

19     job in a way they are trained to do their job because they were

20     threatened by the Muslim Army to go forward and fight to the VRS.  So

21     they voluntarily surrendered to the VRS.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Could you please answer the following question:

23     Prisoners of war and hostages, are they allowed to order anything from

24     the hotel restaurant, for example, a pig weighing 80 kilos, as we have

25     seen in the document?

Page 6779

 1        A.   Of course I can write in a document whatever I want when I'm in a

 2     situation that I'm a hostage or a POW.  I can ask, of course, as much as

 3     I want and I will ask as much as I can, but if it is allowed and you get

 4     your demands, depends on the hostage-takers, so.

 5        Q.   Thank you for your answers about this issue.  We'll come back to

 6     that issue later.  On page 823, lines 13 through 18 of the Krstic case

 7     transcript, you were asked by the Prosecution to describe the

 8     peacekeeping mission.  You answered, and I quote:

 9             "We were supposed to protect people within the enclave.  We were

10     supposed to provide assistance to NGOs, Medecins Sans Frontieres, the

11     NHCR, and we're also supposed to assist them with the supplies of food

12     and other things in the enclave for the civilian population.  We had men

13     at observation posts and we possibly also could avert attacks."

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  For the record, this is P1004.  Please continue.

15             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   My question based on what I've just quoted is this:  The role of

17     the Dutch Battalion in Srebrenica, was it based on what you described or

18     was it rather the demilitarisation of the area?

19        A.   I think it was both.  We had to demilitarise the Bosnian army,

20     the Muslim army in the enclave, and further on protect as much as

21     possible and help as much as possible the civilian population and the

22     NGOs in the enclave.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Did the Dutch Battalion demilitarise the population

24     in the enclave?

25        A.   We demilitarised as much as possible in the enclave, and that

Page 6780

 1     already started some years before when the Canadian army was in the

 2     enclave, they started to collect the weapons and demilitarise the

 3     enclave, that went on with the first and the second Dutch Battalion in

 4     the enclave.  We collected lots of weapons.  We took care that there were

 5     no military activities in the enclave.  And, of course, at the end we

 6     discovered that although we did our utmost to especially disarm most of

 7     the people, we did not completely succeed in disarming them all because

 8     there still remained a lot of weapons hidden in the civilian population.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the Court please produce D20.

10     This is a report based on the debriefing about Srebrenica.  Page 12,

11     paragraph 22 and 23.  Thank you.  I apologise, it is not page 12, but

12     page 10.  Thank you.

13             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   This report says:

15             "The Dutch Battalion has been provided with the aforementioned

16     tasks which were based on the agreement on cease-fire.  Firstly, to

17     monitor compliance with the cease-fire.  Secondly, to disarm the BiH

18     army.  Thirdly, to assist with the delivery of humanitarian aid."

19             And then in paragraph 2.30 which we are going to see in a

20     minute --

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can it be displayed, 2.30?

22             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Where you can see it serves as the last paragraph on the page, it

24     says:

25             "The mission of DutchBat.  The military task was to maintain the

Page 6781

 1     status quo.  As a result of the UN presence, the VRS was to be deterred

 2     from launching an offensive on the enclave and the BiH was to respect the

 3     demilitarised status of the enclaves.  Several heavy weapons and a large

 4     number of hand-held weapons surrendered by BiH personnel were held in the

 5     weapon collection point controlled by DutchBat, located at the compounds

 6     in Srebrenica."

 7             Thank you, end of quote.  My question, based on what I've just

 8     read, in practice was one of the tasks of the DutchBat to disarm the BiH

 9     army?

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

11             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Could the General tell the witness and, well, for

12     the rest of us, what report this is?  There's many, many, reports.  If we

13     could have the first page just so we know which one you are talking

14     about.  That's all.  And if you have a list of cross documents,

15     Ms. Stewart would gladly accept it.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I was going to request the same so that we know

17     who wrote the report and the date of the report.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is D20, and I said that it is a

19     report based on a debriefing about Srebrenica.  Page 10, paragraph 223,

20     and this report was published in Assen on the 4th of October, 1995, and

21     now you can see the title page of the debriefing.  We can see it on the

22     screen.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I'll repeat the

25     question for the benefit of the witness.

Page 6782

 1             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   In practice, was one of the tasks of the Dutch Battalions to

 3     demilitarise Srebrenica, rather to disarm the BiH army?  Thank you.

 4        A.   Yes, it was one of the tasks.  And as I said, it started with the

 5     Canadian company who was there, and after that, the first and the second

 6     Dutch Battalion we went on with trying to demilitarise the whole enclave

 7     by collecting as much weapons as we saw.  We were in a rather good

 8     contact with the civilians and the military leaders in the enclave, and

 9     we spoke to them several times and that people were not allowed to carry

10     weapons that they were ordered to deliver the weapons to the patrols or

11     to DutchBat.  And the other way, all the time we saw people armed in the

12     enclave we tried to disarm them, collect the weapons and store them in

13     the weapon collection points.

14        Q.   In paragraph 27, you say -- and the mike is on, I believe, yes.

15     You saw in paragraph 27, can you please show it to the witness, 27 to 30,

16     where it says, you can see it now, where it says that the BiH Army was

17     supposed to honour the demilitarised status of the enclave.  My

18     question --

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Just for the sake of the record, Mr. Tolimir, are

20     you referring to 2.27 or to another paragraph?

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Paragraph 27, 2.30

22     which we see in front of us.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  In front of us we have 2.27.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise.  2.30 is what we need.

25     I misspoke when I said 27.  2.30.  I apologise, Mr. President.  Thank

Page 6783

 1     you.

 2             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   It says here that the BiH army was supposed to honour the

 4     demilitarised status of the enclave.  You can see it in line 4.  It says:

 5             "The demilitarised status of the enclave."

 6             Thank you.  My question based on this, could you explain to us

 7     the meaning of these words:  Demilitarised status of the enclave, what

 8     does that mean?

 9        A.   That at that moment the status was demilitarised.  At least I

10     think that's what you want to hear.  And that that status should be

11     respected.  Well, I think that that status was not -- not reached yet and

12     so we went on with the demilitarisation of the enclave.

13        Q.   Thank you.  During the DutchBat mandate, did any of the weaponry

14     that you had taken from BiH army members arrive in your weapon collection

15     point, do you know that?

16        A.   Yeah, it happened several times that weaponry that was taken not

17     from BiH army members, but from people in the enclave, and I don't know

18     if it were army members, but it were armed people in the enclave, the

19     weapons were taken and storaged in the weapon collection site.

20        Q.   Thank you.  I asked you whether you know if the number of barrels

21     of 300 at the beginning was increased by a single barrel during mandate

22     of the Dutch Battalion?  That's what I asked you.

23        A.   I can't tell you the exact number of barrels in the weapon

24     collection point, the only thing I can tell you that is that during the

25     DutchBat III period, and that's what I'm talking, not over the DutchBat I

Page 6784

 1     or II periods, but in the DutchBat III period, I know for sure that we

 2     took several weapon from people inside the enclave and stored them in the

 3     weapon collection point.  I don't know the exact numbers that were there

 4     when we got into the enclave, and I don't know the exact number of

 5     weapons that were there at the end.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Did you know that Muslims were being armed with

 7     additional weapons in the enclave?  And you already answered those

 8     questions during the cross-examination.  Thank you.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  If you have already received an answer, you

10     should move to the next question.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I did move on to a different topic

12     and I asked the witness whether he knows that Muslims were additionally

13     armed in the enclave and how were they armed.  He only touched upon that

14     subject in the cross-examination.

15             THE WITNESS:  Well, I can give you an answer again, I don't have

16     any information that Muslims were additionally armed during the period

17     that DutchBat III was in charge over there, so that weapons came into the

18     enclave.  We have no information that that they additionally got armed

19     again.

20             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Thank you.  Please, could you tell us if you heard from your

22     predecessors or was it conveyed to you if the Muslims in the enclave were

23     being additionally armed and if so, how was that done, which routes were

24     used to additionally arm Muslims with weaponry?

25        A.   I have also no information from the previous battalions that they

Page 6785

 1     were additionally armed in one way or another.  So the only information I

 2     can give you is that we all as the first and the second in the Serb

 3     battalion did the utmost to disarm people in the enclave and to take care

 4     that all the weapons were stored in the weapon collection points.

 5        Q.   Do you know anything about Muslims being armed from helicopters

 6     from Zepa to Tuzla, or rather from Tuzla to Zepa and then a land route

 7     which was taken to transport those weapons from Zepa to Srebrenica?

 8        A.   As I stated before, I have no information that Muslims having

 9     been armed during the period that we were there in charge of neither by

10     foot, neither by donkeys, neither by helicopters, neither by fixed

11     aeroplanes.  In no way or another I've got information that they got

12     armed additionally.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the witness please be shown

14     D67.  Thank you.

15             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Look at the document, sir.  The Trial Chamber already knows it,

17     Prosecution knows it, so I won't be reading it, I'm just going to have

18     questions for you once you have looked at the document.  And I

19     particularly ask you to look at bullet point 2, as well as bullet point

20     4, starting with the words:

21             "Preparations for future operations to merge the enclaves for

22     brigade commanders and the Chief of Staff of the 28th Division."

23             Thank you.  Were you able to look at the two bullet points that I

24     asked you to look at?

25        A.   Yeah, but I would like to start on the top.  I don't know when

Page 6786

 1     this should have happened, it's a report from the 13th of July.  I don't

 2     know what period we are talking about.  When we could go back to the

 3     first page it's a document stated -- the date is 13th of July, 1500

 4     hours.  I don't know about which period that we are talking about 17

 5     helicopter flights are carried out.  Is that on the 13th of July, is that

 6     before?  I don't see any dates.

 7        Q.   You were wondering who drafted the document.  The document was

 8     drafted by the BiH army.  It was dispatched on the 13th of July, 1995, as

 9     you can see at the top, and it was sent to the

10     Brigadier-General Hajrulahovic to be forwarded to the president of the

11     Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mr. Alija Izetbegovic.  And you will

12     see later that the document was signed by Rasim Delic.  And in this

13     document, he informs the president of the Presidency as to what he had

14     done in order to strengthen Srebrenica in military terms.  I quoted from

15     bullet point 4 where it explains in the last sentence why the division

16     commander did not come back.  The division commander who was meant to go

17     on the next helicopter flight did not return.  After the final flight

18     ended tragically, Naser stayed behind.

19             My question is this:  Do you know if Naser was in Srebrenica

20     during the time of the events about which you are testifying in this

21     courtroom?  Thank you.

22        A.   I think that I can state that Naser was in the enclave, and I

23     have to look in my notes until when.  I think until March or April when

24     we could negotiate with him.  After that he disappeared.  Nobody will

25     tell us where he was and I have not seen Naser after March/April in the

Page 6787

 1     enclave anymore.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Does this report then relate to the time during which

 3     you also were in the enclave?  It says that the helicopters were flying

 4     and Naser did not come back because the penultimate helicopter had been

 5     brought down.  And it all happened in the year 1995.

 6        A.   As I can state, I don't know if Naser was in a helicopter that

 7     was brought down.  I only know that I didn't see Naser after March/April

 8     any more.  Maybe I can say that there was a rumour that the second in

 9     command from the BiH army in the enclave was told that he went down with

10     a helicopter.  I don't know exactly where because that was a topic that

11     could not be discussed with the BiH because nobody would tell us

12     something about it and we had no information that there was a really

13     helicopter crashed or helicopters came into the enclave.

14        Q.   Did you know that before the VRS attack started in order to

15     demilitarise Srebrenica, that the Muslims launched attacks from the

16     enclave in the depth of the Serbian-held territory?

17        A.   There were a lot of rumours, especially coming from Major Nikolic

18     when we dealed with him as liaison officers, that he was telling us that

19     people were going in and out the enclave and doing attacks on Serbian

20     targets.  We have never been able to prove it.  We were also not able to

21     patrol and to check the whole enclave.  The biggest problem from us was

22     that I think in February we got our convoy with fuel, so from that time

23     on it got less and less and we were not able to patrol with vehicles,

24     just only go around by foot.  So we were not able to do our job very

25     properly, and all the time we asked Mr. Nikolic that if he was

Page 6788

 1     complaining that Muslims were going out of the enclave, we told him that

 2     he had to allow fuel to get into the enclave so we could do our job

 3     properly.  He had never shown us the proof that Muslims went out of the

 4     enclave, so it was for us no more than a rumour.  And, of course, when we

 5     got the information that in a specific area, the VRS told us that Muslims

 6     were going out of the area, we tried to patrol over there as much as

 7     possible.  But we have never been able to prove that Muslims went out of

 8     the area to attack VRS targets.  And, of course, if we had known it, we

 9     would have taken actions to prevent it.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now see P994 page --

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, for the sake of the record, you were

12     referring to the earlier to a part of the Krstic transcript.  This is on

13     page 44 -- 45, sorry.  You said on page 823, lines 13 through 18 of the

14     Krstic case, transcript, but the testimony of this witness starts only at

15     page 830.  So for the sake of the record it would be helpful if you can

16     provide us with the correct quotation.  Mr. Gajic.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  It could be a mistake.

18     I should have said 832 instead of 823.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the Court kindly show P994,

21     page 3, paragraph 5.  That's the last paragraph we see here on the screen

22     from your statement.

23             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   You say:

25             "The 31st May meeting was held at Observation Post Echo.  The

Page 6789

 1     Serbian side was represented by Colonel Vukovic and Major Nikolic.

 2     Captain Melchers and myself attended from the Dutch Battalion side.  At

 3     the meeting Colonel Vukovic made several main points concerning

 4     activities inside the enclave.  First, he explained that Muslims were

 5     leaving the enclave and were killing Serbs as they were leaving.  He said

 6     that the situation was deteriorating around the location of OP-Echo, as

 7     the Muslims were attacking Serbian positions through the timber factory

 8     in river Jadar.  As a result of this, he said the Serbian troops needed

 9     to move in to occupy the area around the observation point."

10             Now, my question:  At this meeting in May, did the VRS announce

11     to you that Muslims were making incursions from the enclave into

12     Republika Srpska, that they were killing Serbs and that because of that

13     an intervention was needed to prevent it?

14        A.   I have my notebook over here, and in that meeting I think that it

15     was Colonel Vukovic, because I think he did the speaking at that moment,

16     told us that five men were killed and two were killed short time ago.  He

17     told us that, as stated also in my statement over there, that they went

18     through the factory to the wood factory, and that he would not attack but

19     that he had positions in the southern part of south of the enclave.  It's

20     the same as what Major Nikolic told us several times, that BiH soldiers

21     or civilians don't know at least Muslims from the enclave went out of the

22     enclave and killed people outside.  In this case, he directly told us

23     that people were going out via the wood factory in the southern part near

24     OP-Echo and I don't know if you know the situation over there, but I

25     think that the factory and the observation post I think there might be

Page 6790

 1     100, 150 metres between, so if it was possible for the Muslims to go

 2     through the factory, then I think that most the time, of course, people

 3     from the OP-Echo had seen it and had stopped him.

 4             I don't know -- of course this is a statement of the

 5     Colonel Vukovic and I can't imagine why he is telling us this and why he

 6     has concrete to the point telling us that they are going through the

 7     factory, because I think it all fits in the plan that they already had

 8     made.  So the point of view from which you are looking at it, for me it's

 9     just one of the statements from the VRS that Muslims are going out of the

10     enclave, one side.  We should protect the Serbs by keeping the Muslims

11     inside the enclave.  The VRS is taking all the measures to that care that

12     we can't do our job properly and we are not able and were not provided

13     with the things we needed to build new OPs to do our jobs mobile, by

14     vehicles, because we had no fuel.  So it's a circle that is going around

15     and around, and the only thing I can see also in this one is that we are

16     making a lot of excuses why things are going wrong.  And at the same time

17     I think that we find a lot of possibilities to show what is wrong and to

18     create a situation that they have to attack us because we are not able to

19     protect them.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Now, if all that is preplanned and designed, as you

21     say, is it also predesigned that these Serbs were to be killed in the

22     territory under the control of the Army of Republika Srpska?

23        A.   I don't know if it's preplanned.  I only know that there were

24     lots of rumours in that Muslims went out of the enclave to kill Serbs.

25     Outside the enclave I have seen some results from attacks inside the

Page 6791

 1     enclave where people were killed that we found, the one that was guilty

 2     for that.  I only know that the feeling at the moment I was in that

 3     meeting, that was that Colonel Vukovic was looking for possibilities to

 4     show us that we did not want to do our job properly, and he told us that

 5     he needed the road south of the OP-Echo, we had to withdraw and if he

 6     would stay on the OP-Echo, we had to take the consequences.

 7             And also, and that he stated in advance in one of the previous

 8     meetings that of course we showed him that also VRS people came into the

 9     enclave to kill Muslims.  At that moment he told us, Well, you are free

10     to kill every BSA soldier or every Serb [sic] man in the enclave.  In the

11     meeting of the 31st, he told us that he can no longer stay, to his point

12     of view, that all BSA men in the enclave may be killed.

13             So it's a game from one part to the other and, yeah ...

14        Q.   Thank you, I did not stop you.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now see D53 in e-court.

16             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   It's a document of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina dated 17th

18     June, 1995.  It was written by the General Staff of the ABH, and it was

19     sent to the command of the 28th Division of their land forces that were

20     in Srebrenica.  It's called:  "Preparation for offensive combat

21     operations.  Order."  You can see it now.  It was signed by

22     Sulejman Budakovic.  It's not Vukovic.  In fact, you will see whether

23     Vukovic had any influence on the writing of this.  It says:

24             "Pursuant to a verbal order issued by the commander of the

25     General Staff of the BH army, Army General Rasim Delic, and on the

Page 6792

 1     occasion of the great success achieved by units of the BH army in the

 2     wide area around Sarajevo and Gorazde, as well as on the basis of

 3     intelligence that the Serbian army command of the protection regiment in

 4     Han Pijesak is holding parts of its units in reserve so that they can

 5     intervene in case we attack from Zepa, I here by issue the following

 6     order:"

 7             Now, I'm reading paragraph 1:

 8             "Execute all preparations in the command of the 28th Land Army

 9     Division to execute offensive combat operations."

10             Paragraph 2:

11             "Plan realistic tasks which will assure certain success on the

12     basis of an accurate assessment, and the potential of our forces in

13     Srebrenica and Zepa."

14             And 3:

15             "The General Staff of the BH Army will regulate, by an order to

16     follow, the commencement of offensive combat activities in the zone of

17     responsibility of the 28th Army Division."

18             And it was signed by Brigadier Sulejman Budakovic.  Now, my

19     question is:  Is this a preparatory order written based on offensive

20     operations by the VRS or based on offensives by the BH Army against the

21     VRS and certain attacks originating from the enclave in which they had

22     certain success?

23        A.   I think in my opinion this is just a preparation order for the

24     command of the 28th Division and that's it.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now, could the e-court show D52,

Page 6793

 1     which is a document created on the basis of this preparatory order, which

 2     is not the end of the story.  Thank you, now we have the document.

 3             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   And in line 1 you see:

 5             "The soldiers of the 28th Ground Forces Division located in

 6     Srebrenica and Zepa," so this division is in Srebrenica, "although

 7     completely encircled and facing major problems relating to survival and

 8     the obligation to protect free territory, decided to contribute as much

 9     as possible to the fight against the aggressor ...," and so on and so on.

10             Now the first bullet point says:

11             "60 Chetniks were liquidated, and according to unconfirmed

12     reports, the aggressor suffered even greater losses and had many

13     wounded."

14             Then they enumerate all the things that were burned, seised, and

15     what livestock was stolen.

16             And then it says:

17             "In the village of Visnjica large quantities of ammunition were

18     seised, but the soldiers were exhausted and could not remove it, so the

19     ammunition was destroyed, as were all the facilities that the aggressor

20     could use for military purposes."

21             This was written on the 8th of July, 1995, at the command of the

22     28th Division of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and they talk about the

23     successes they have scored.  Now, my question is:  Was that preparatory

24     order something that was followed up?  Did it have certain consequences

25     on the activities originating from the enclave, activities that you see

Page 6794

 1     referred to in the first line?

 2        A.   As I told you, we have no information about military activities

 3     or preparations in what military form ever.  So I did not know the

 4     existence of this order because one of the problems, of course, was that

 5     although one of my specialties was military security, the people from the

 6     BiH army had a very good military security and were very keen not telling

 7     what happened, so we were not aware of this.  And, of course, again we

 8     face now in this document we can see now that 60 Chetniks were liquidated

 9     and all those kind of things.

10             I only can refer to all the stories we heard when we were in the

11     enclave speaking to either the Colonel Vukovic or Major Nikolic asking

12     them to provide us with all the things we needed to do our job properly,

13     I'm for sure that also the UNMOs asked several times to go with, for

14     example, Major Nikolic outside the enclave to the spots where those kind

15     of things happened and I don't deny that they might have happened, but we

16     were never able to go there to check all those things.

17             And of course, this is in a document of the Muslim Army when they

18     stated that they have done this and seised all those material.  Inside

19     the enclave we don't have -- at least I didn't have the information that

20     this was going on outside the enclave because we did not get those

21     reports from our OPs, as far as I know.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Why then didn't you believe Vukovic and Nikolic and

23     other Serbs when they were telling you that Muslims were launching

24     activities from the protected area?

25        A.   I don't say that we didn't believe them.  Of course we believed

Page 6795

 1     them, but when we got to the point and wanted more information or wanted

 2     to check on the spot what happened, even where it exactly was, just to go

 3     there, even with an unarmed military observer who should have their

 4     freedom of movement to go out there and check all those stories they were

 5     telling us, we could do it for a big part inside the enclave because we

 6     were able to go there, but also in the enclave, they played the same

 7     game.  We also had not in the whole enclave, the freedom of movement to

 8     go wherever we wanted.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  You said a moment ago that the Muslims had good

10     security training, good security protection, or good security culture,

11     whichever you call it, and they did not discuss their actions.  Now, what

12     else do you imply?  What else do you mean by that?

13        A.   I mean nothing else.  The problem was that there was no standing

14     army in the enclave.  We had representatives from the Muslim Army who

15     told us what they were, what their -- in some cases what their ranks

16     were, but the way they acted at the moment we were there was not as a

17     standing army.  So we did not get any information about how their army

18     was organised, and it was very difficult to get the information because

19     they did no military training.  We saw no military activities and they

20     had no military headquarters or anything else.  They were just

21     representatives.  And as you know, we had representatives, civilians and

22     military, but at the end when the enclave fell, it was just mixed up and

23     we saw that as well the civilians, as the military, all wore uniforms and

24     had weapons, although we did our utmost to disarm them, they were there.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Are you familiar with the statement made by

Page 6796

 1     Naser Oric that there were 4.000 rifles in Srebrenica during the

 2     withdrawal and the break-out of men from the Srebrenica enclave, of the

 3     Srebrenica troops from the enclave?

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

 5             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Can we get a citation to a statement of Mr. Oric

 6     on this point, or at least give us an idea of where you are getting it

 7     from.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Indeed that would be helpful for everybody.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  We will

10     provide a reference and the quotation tomorrow in e-court because it's a

11     statement made by Naser Oric to the press after the fall of Srebrenica

12     where he mentions both the break-out and the number of weapons.  We'll

13     find it tomorrow among the documents if we don't have to do it now.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

15             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I have no problem with such a simple prospect as

16     he heard such a statement, but I would like to know what the point of all

17     this is.  What is its relevance?  I think at this point the General must

18     know that the Prosecution actually has presented most of the guts of what

19     he is talking about, the Muslim attacks and their policies and what was

20     going on.  It doesn't appear he is doing it for the credibility of this

21     witness.  So what really is the point?  We have some six, seven-hour

22     estimate here.  I don't see any point to this.  At some point time has to

23     be compared to the point of the -- of what the Defence is doing, and I

24     don't see the point.  It's not contested.  Fundamentally, these issues

25     are not contested.  In fact, they are, as we've stated, part of the

Page 6797

 1     adjudicated facts, part of the Prosecution's case.  How many hours are we

 2     spending on non-contested issues that don't relate to the credibility of

 3     the witness on documents that this witness has never seen?  At some

 4     point, if he could tell us, then I might be able to understand it, but I

 5     can't understand it at this point because he has not made any particular

 6     showing of what the point is.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.  Mr. Tolimir, are you able to help

 8     us, the Chamber and the Prosecution and especially the witness about the

 9     position of Mr. McCloskey?

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Certainly.  This witness denied any

11     military activity originating from the demilitarised zone.  I pointed out

12     a part of his statement in which Colonel Vukovic told him about it, then

13     I pointed out a passage where the Muslims themselves talked about these

14     activities.  I showed him a preparatory order made by their

15     General Staff.  He says it's just a preparatory order.  I was trying to

16     tell him that it's common knowledge among everyone, except perhaps the

17     Dutch Battalion.  I want to see if he knows or perhaps he justifies the

18     activities of the Muslims and the lack of activity on the part of the

19     Dutch Battalion, and I want to find out what the command of the

20     Dutch Battalion thought about it because this witness was an advisor to

21     the command of the Dutch Battalion.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

23             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And I appreciate that, but of course he is

24     misstating the witness's testimony.  The witness denied not that it

25     happened, but denied having knowledge of it.  Now, of course he can bring

Page 6798

 1     up these things to show it happened, but that is -- is he really

 2     challenging the credibility of the witness?  If so, it's been challenged,

 3     how many more documents does he want to bring up on this point.  There

 4     needs to be some limit because we are fighting the war all over again

 5     here and I think the point has been made, and if he is really going after

 6     his credibility like he says, let him do it.  Do it.  I have no problem

 7     with that.  But let the witness know what he is doing as opposed to just

 8     having the witness read documents and quiz the witness on what is in the

 9     documents.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Indeed that was my understanding of the answers

11     of the witness as well, that he denied having knowledge of these

12     activities.  This is indeed a difference to -- that he, as you said, that

13     he denied these activities.  This is indeed the difference.

14             I think it's a good point in time for the second break and you

15     should consider the objection of Mr. McCloskey, or indeed not the

16     objection, but the request of Mr. McCloskey to focus on that what this

17     witness can provide.  We adjourn and resume ten minutes past 6.00.

18                           --- Recess taken at 5.44 p.m.

19                           --- On resuming at 6.09 p.m.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, Mr. Tolimir.  I hope you considered with

21     your legal advisor during the break how to speed up the examination, and

22     now please carry on.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  We will

24     finish as we planned.  It was necessary to ask those questions in order

25     to present the witness with a view of the general situation in which the

Page 6799

 1     attack on enclave took place.  Thank you.

 2             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   You spoke about the freedom of movement, that's where we left it

 4     off before the break.  When it comes to the freedom of movement of the

 5     Dutch Battalion within the enclave, can you tell us something about that?

 6        A.   Yes.  We had freedom of movement in the enclave until a certain

 7     moment and I don't know exactly when, one of our OPs was not manned and

 8     we tried to man it, the military people from the BiH in the enclave did

 9     not agree with the location of the OP because they thought they had much

10     better places to put an OP over there in the western part of the enclave,

11     and at a certain moment, they denied us access to a triangle in the

12     western part of the enclave, so we had no freedom of movement over there.

13        Q.   Were you a member of the battalion when the movement or the

14     freedom of movement was restricted, and can you remember the month when

15     that happened?

16        A.   I have to check in my notes, but I think it was in the

17     beginning -- I think it was in February or March, just from my head now

18     but I don't know the exact date now.  But I can find it out.

19        Q.   Thank you.  We don't need a date, we just need to know whether

20     you were in Srebrenica when that happened, and if you say that that

21     happened in March, that means that you were there; right?

22        A.   Yes, I was there.  I was in the enclave.

23        Q.   You also said that in your statement.  You stated that you

24     arrived on the 4th or 5th of January, 1993.  My next question is this --

25        A.   Maybe I can interrupt.  I think there is a little mistake.  I

Page 6800

 1     arrived on the 3rd of January, 1995.

 2        Q.   Yes, you arrived -- I must have misspoken.  I'm reading from your

 3     statement where it says that you arrived on the 4th or 5th January, 1995,

 4     so I must have misspoken and we have to have a straight record.  You

 5     arrived in 1995 and the events that you are describing for us happened

 6     later.

 7             Did you call the sector the Bandera Triangle?

 8        A.   That's correct.

 9        Q.   Were you allowed to move within that Bandera Triangle?  If not,

10     could you tell us why?

11        A.   Well, I've got a problem to remind exactly why not.  We were from

12     the moment on that we had the problem over there with the Muslim army or

13     the local Muslims over there, it wasn't really the army, it was the local

14     Muslims over there denied us the access in the area.  And I don't know

15     exactly why it was.  I know that we tried to create a new OP over there,

16     the former OP-Bravo was over there, was removed.  We wanted to create a

17     new OP over there, and were not allowed to do it in the way we wanted it.

18     After that we started patrolling in that triangle, in the Bandera

19     Triangle, and also in the places where we tried to create a new OP, but

20     in a certain moment, the access was denied and we had not the freedom of

21     movement to go in there.

22        Q.   Why were you not allowed access into that area?

23        A.   I'm just looking in my notes, I don't know exactly what the

24     reason was that we were not allowed to go in that area.

25        Q.   While you are looking at your notes, could you please tell us

Page 6801

 1     whether you ever attended meetings which discussed the problem of the

 2     freedom of movement in the so-called Bandera Triangle?

 3        A.   Yeah, I have some information for you just after a quick look,

 4     here the 28th of February that we are trying -- we are talking about the

 5     Bandera Triangle with the UNMOs.  The UNMOs were also not allowed to go

 6     into the Bandera Triangle, so that was at least in February that problem

 7     arose.

 8        Q.   Will you allow me to jog your memory and maybe you will be able

 9     to provide us with some details.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the Court please produce D66.

11     Thank you.

12             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   It is not my goal to contradict you.  I am talking about some

14     documents that you may not have seen and that's why I would like to show

15     them to you.  We can now see a document, or Exhibit D66, which was

16     drafted by the BiH army.  The document hails from the command of the

17     8th OG in Srebrenica and the date is 28th January, 1995.  And the OG sent

18     that to the General Staff of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well

19     as to the command of the 2nd Corps.  It was signed by Naser Oric.  The

20     document speaks about the situation in the sector of Podgaj village, as

21     it was on the 9th of January, 1995, and the restriction of movement of

22     the UNPROFOR forces in the wider region of Suceska and Podgaj.  And in

23     the second paragraph it says that there will be a restriction of movement

24     in the area for UNPROFOR troops.

25             Have I been able to jog your memory of the events?

Page 6802

 1        A.   Yes.  Well, we are talking about the same and I'm also looking in

 2     my notes.  I have not read this specifically before, so it's just from my

 3     memory or I have to take some time and look in my diary or in my notes

 4     about those periods.  Yeah, just from my memory, I can recall that indeed

 5     they wanted to speak, but that happened several times, with the commander

 6     of UNPROFOR.  And from my memory, I think that even commander UNPROFOR

 7     visited the enclave and I don't know exactly when, and I also don't know

 8     if he spoke to Naser Oric at that moment.  But that rings a bell, but I

 9     don't know exactly how or when.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us whether you were the UNPROFOR liaison

11     officer at the time, in January, that is?

12        A.   As stated in the beginning of the session, I had a double task.

13     I was the responsible for the field security and advice commander of the

14     Dutch Battalion on the field security.  That was my main task.  And after

15     that, and parallel to that, I was the liaison officer.  So all the time I

16     played a double role being liaison officer, talking to civilian and

17     military people and advising commander on the field security issues.  So

18     although you ask me a lot of questions up until now, I also have the

19     impression that I was a kind of operation officer and know exactly all

20     the military operations that were going on.  Of course, I knew a lot of

21     them, but some of the things I was not involved in, so also in my notes

22     I've got not everything about what happened within the battalion, within

23     the several companies in the area.  And, of course, when you've got

24     particular questions, I can try to check in my diary and in my notebooks

25     if I got information about it, but you have to be a little bit specific

Page 6803

 1     and tell me what you want to know so I can check because I provided

 2     the -- Mr. McCloskey with big parts of my diary and from my notebooks,

 3     but I don't think that we went back until February with the copying of

 4     the notebooks.  And if you're interested, it's no problem for me to make

 5     a copy and provide you with the information.

 6             At this moment, maybe you can feel from my answers, I've got a

 7     problem, I have facts that are in my notes and in my diary, and I've got

 8     memories, and the problem is that now and then I've got a memory who

 9     don't fits into my notebooks and I think the notebook should be leading

10     because those are the facts, and in 15 years' time memories change.

11        Q.   Thank you for the offer, we will be grateful to have it.  The

12     document that is before you, could you please look at its second

13     paragraph or rather, the third line in that paragraph.  It says here:

14             "The commander of the 281st Eastern Bosnia Light Brigade, in

15     co-operation with the commander of the 2nd Corps after a warning that

16     UNPROFOR troops should not move within a certain area, has enclosed the

17     area."

18             That's from lines 3 to 5.  Are you the liaison officer which is

19     mentioned here as having reached an agreement with the commander of the

20     281st Brigade?  Are you that liaison officer?  Were you that liaison

21     officer or not?

22        A.   I don't even know the existence of the 281st Eastern Bosnian

23     Light Brigade.  The only people we dealed with were from the

24     8th Operational Group which was called later on, I think, the

25     28th Operational Group and not specifically the 281st Light Brigade.

Page 6804

 1     There were several commanders in that part and I think that in that area

 2     one of the commanders was Zuzo Tuzanovic [phoen].  I don't know exactly

 3     what area his responsibility was but when we are talking about the

 4     Bandera Triangle, I think that Zuzo Tuzanovic was responsible over there.

 5     And I never dealed with him because he was not available for us to do

 6     business with.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Did you meet with any officer, if you did not meet

 8     with the commander, as you say, in respect of the problems that arose in

 9     this sector of Suceska and Podgaj villages, and did you take any

10     positions with regard to that situation?

11        A.   No, as I remember now, the only officers we dealed with were

12     Naser Oric and his second in command, Ramiz, at that time, and not with

13     the other commanders in the field.  Most of the time, the company

14     commanders from the Bravo Company and the Charlie Company, the

15     Bravo Company was stationed in Srebrenica town and the Charlie Company

16     was stationed in the compound in Potocari, they also had divided the

17     whole enclave.  And I don't know if commander of the Bravo Company or the

18     commander of the Charlie Company maybe dealed with this commanders.  I

19     really don't know.  The only people we dealed with were the top of the

20     HOG.

21        Q.   Did you have any contacts with those men from the top echelons of

22     the Srebrenica enclave command to discuss the problems that we are

23     talking about right now, and that's the restriction of movement in the

24     sector of Suceska and Podgaj?

25        A.   In my memory, we talk about this with Naser Oric and with Ramiz,

Page 6805

 1     his second in command.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Could you please tell the Trial Chamber what was it

 3     that you discussed with Naser Oric and his second in command, Ramiz?

 4        A.   I have to do this from my memory because I don't have the facts

 5     so at this moment.  But of course, we tried to get the freedom of

 6     movement again in that area and they denied so that was a problem.  And

 7     as we dealed with the VRS who did not allow UNPROFOR to do what he had to

 8     do, it was the same with the Bosnians, the Bosnian army in the enclave in

 9     this case, in the Bandera Triangle.  And I think, but that's also just

10     from my memory, that commander DutchBat didn't want to create a big

11     problem in the enclave because we also had a lack of everything, so not a

12     possibility to go in there in a military way and just take over the area.

13     Not only because we had no -- not the means, but also not the personnel

14     to do it.

15        Q.   And when it comes to the agreement, were representatives of the

16     Army of the Republika Srpska duty-bound to ensure your unrestricted

17     movement wherever you wanted in their territory at your request?

18        A.   I think the agreement for the freedom of movement from the VRS

19     was very clear.  It started for me on the 3rd of January when we went

20     into the enclave.  We were not free as UNPROFOR to go freely into the

21     enclave, to take over from our predecessors the enclave, and just go and

22     do our job over there.  We had to stop on several check-points.  We were

23     checked and were not allowed to bring in all the things we needed.  It

24     was already seen with the 1st and 2nd Battalion that they were not

25     allowed to bring in all the ammunition and all the other things they

Page 6806

 1     needed in the enclave, so that part of the freedom of movement was not

 2     there at all.  And that stayed all the time because we were not allowed

 3     to act outside of the enclave, out of the red line as we drew it on the

 4     map, because the VRS did not agree that we went out of the enclave to go

 5     anywhere.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Since you are drawing a parallel between the freedom

 7     of movement within the Bandera Triangle and the freedom of movement

 8     across the entire Republika Srpska, could you tell us, is the

 9     Republika Srpska to be blamed for your restricted movement in the area

10     known as Bandera Triangle that you were supposed to supervise according

11     to the agreement?

12        A.   I think we are getting now to a political part of the whole

13     story.  When you send as UN a battalion to a certain area, I think as UN

14     you have the responsibility to arrange that they go in there as a

15     battalion being able to do a military job if needed.  If you accept from

16     in this case the VRS, that you sent in a battalion partly demilitarised,

17     having not enough weapons, having not enough ammunition, having not

18     enough other logistic means to do the job in a proper way, then I think

19     we should blame the UN, and of course the VRS did it in their way but had

20     a possibility to do it in their way.  And that's of course the same for

21     the Muslims in the enclave because when you don't have, for example,

22     enough diesel to travel around in your vehicles, then you give them the

23     possibility to play with you.

24        Q.   Thank you.  And now could you please answer the following

25     question:  Why were you not allowed to move around in the

Page 6807

 1     Bandera Triangle, although you had every right to do so according to the

 2     agreement?  Do you know it now and did you know it at the time when the

 3     ban was imposed?

 4        A.   No, I have to take a look in my notes.  I can't scan them now as

 5     quick as I would like, but I can't give you an answer right now.  And I

 6     don't know if it's in my notes because it's an operational question and I

 7     should find something from one of the meetings with the leaders of

 8     operational group, but I can't find it at this moment.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Maybe you can tell us tomorrow when you find the

10     notes.  And now, please tell me this:  The restriction of movement in the

11     so-called Bandera Triangle, was that imposed upon you because the Muslims

12     were preparing to join up the enclaves of Zepa and Srebrenica of the sort

13     described in the document that I had showed you just awhile ago?

14        A.   Again, I have to do it from my mind now and seeing the map in my

15     mind.  The Bandera Triangle was in the middle of the enclave.  So in the

16     southern part we were able to patrol and to be in our OPs and when you

17     want to connect Zepa and Srebrenica, then it should be the southern part

18     that you deny UNPROFOR the access and not in the middle of the enclave.

19        Q.   Thank you.  I asked you whether that was one of the reasons, and

20     I pointed to it in document D52 where it says literally joining up the

21     enclaves.

22             And in that document, Rasim Delic reports to Alija Izetbegovic

23     about the joining up of the enclaves.  Was that a possible reason or one

24     of the possible reasons?  You will remember that that is a document I was

25     reading from just before the break.  Thank you.

Page 6808

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

 2             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Could we have the document on the screen, if he

 3     is going to be asking specific questions about it so the witness can have

 4     a chance to review it.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  That would be helpful.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  The

 7     document was displayed just a minute ago and that's one of the bullet

 8     points that I wanted the witness to read.  And in that bullet point

 9     Mr. Delic reported to Alija Izetbegovic about what had been done with

10     helicopter sorties and then you protested because I was showing the

11     document.  Can we again see D67, the document which talks about

12     helicopter sorties.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I must confess that I'm confused now.  You were

14     first referring to the document D52, then Mr. McCloskey asked that we can

15     see that and now you are referring to another, D67.  What are you talking

16     about, Mr. Tolimir?

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  I'm

18     talking about D67.  I may have switched the numbers in my previous

19     request.  Can we please look at D67 again, page 1, bullet point 4.  Thank

20     you.  And in English it's on page 2, bullet point 2.  Thank you.

21             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Let's not waste time, I'll read from bullet point 4 in the

23     Serbian and you should look at bullet point 2:

24             "In preparations for a future operation to link up the enclaves,

25     we brought in and took back four brigade commanders, two brigade Chiefs

Page 6809

 1     of Staff, and the 26th Division Chief of Staff.  The division commander

 2     who was meant to go on the next helicopter flight did not return.  After

 3     the final flight ended tragically, Naser remained."

 4             You said that for awhile Naser was not in the enclave, that he

 5     was replaced by Becirovic.  Does this document speak about the linking up

 6     of the enclaves, and was your restriction of movement in the

 7     Bandera Triangle perhaps related to the process to link up the enclaves,

 8     or the preparations to do so?  Thank you.

 9        A.   I'm now acting on the strategic level from the BiH command, I

10     think.  Of course, there might be a possibility, but from my point of

11     view, the Bandera Triangle was in the middle of the enclave, from the

12     middle of the enclave going a little bit to the west and then opens up as

13     a triangle.  The only direction I can face in this case is the direction

14     of Sarajevo, but there is so many territory between the western part of

15     the enclave and Sarajevo that is for me no logical explanation that this

16     should be a link to another enclave and especially not to Zepa because

17     Zepa was in the southern part of the enclave.

18        Q.   Thank you.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now see D65.  Can this be

20     blown up and can the blown-up version be shown to the witness, please.

21     Thank you.

22             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Do you see the triangle with numbers 1, 2, and then a letter X

24     and then arrow?

25        A.   Yes, I see them.

Page 6810

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Was that perhaps the area where it was forbidden to

 2     you to move around?

 3        A.   In my first opinion I say, yes, this is the area.  This is the

 4     Bandera Triangle.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Is it in the centre or on the outskirts of the

 6     enclave?

 7        A.   You see the smallest part of the triangle is in the middle of the

 8     enclave and then it's going westwards and opens because I can't see

 9     exactly.  But I think that the red line is the enclave -- is marking

10     enclave, maybe the black line, I don't know exactly, but from the middle

11     of the enclave westwards.

12        Q.   The black line denotes parties to the conflict.  The red line

13     also and in between them is the interval, the no-man's land.  Does that

14     mean anything to you?  Were you able to move within this triangle, you,

15     the UN force?

16        A.   I think you explain now that there's a red line and a black line

17     and no-man's land in between.  What I can recall in my memory is that we

18     only had one red line that was a circle around the enclave and there was

19     no space and no doubt about it.  And of course, Muslims and Serbs were

20     angry and about where the line should be and which tree was Serb or

21     Muslim tree, but we never used a map like this.  And as I stated, the

22     blue triangle, as you can see it over there, is, in my opinion, so the

23     Bandera Triangle.

24        Q.   Thank you.  In your tenure in Srebrenica from January to July

25     1995, was the UNPROFOR allowed to move within this blue triangle?

Page 6811

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

 2             MR. McCLOSKEY:  That has been asked and answered several times.

 3     I would also like to know the relevance at this point.  The

 4     Bandera Triangle and the fact that UNPROFOR did not have movement there

 5     is not a contested issue.  That the Muslims intended to join the enclaves

 6     is not a contested issue.  These don't appear to be going to credibility.

 7     Can we have some idea of where this is going?  What the relevance of this

 8     is?  I still don't understand.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, can you help us?

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Yes, I can respond.  We

11     are talking about the reasons for the attack against the enclave and we

12     are still going in circles about the questions I asked and never got an

13     answer to.  And I'm asking again, who approved for the Muslims to set up

14     complete control over the Bandera Triangle.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, I think this is not correct.  The

16     witness answered several times that the UNPROFOR had no access to this

17     triangle.

18             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Perhaps --

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

20             MR. McCLOSKEY:  -- it would be helpful but one of stated reasons

21     in the attack plan of the Serbs to attack Srebrenica was to separate the

22     two enclaves, Zepa and Srebrenica.  It's the position of the Prosecution

23     that that was a legitimate concern and a legitimate objective of the VRS

24     because of the -- what was going on inside the enclaves.  We agree with

25     that.  That is a part of our case.  That's part of our expert report.  So

Page 6812

 1     I agree with -- if that's Mr. Tolimir is trying to justify that part of

 2     the attack, I agree that that was legitimate.  But when there are more

 3     than one reasons for an attack and other reasons are illegitimate, that

 4     is the part we are focusing on and that was the -- our position that the

 5     attack was also to remove the civilian population which is a crime.  But

 6     I agree that General Tolimir, if that's what he is trying to do, that the

 7     Muslims caused trouble, as this witness has talked about, and one of the

 8     reasons for the attack was to stop that trouble.  We agree with that.

 9     That's part of our case.  It's in our reports.  If that's where he is

10     going, maybe we can save some time.  But it's his case, but it's nice to

11     know that is where he going because he just said that, but for whatever

12     it's worth that's the Prosecution's position on that direction.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, I refer you to page 76, line 11 and

14     12, and again you asked, I quote:

15             "In your tenure in Srebrenica from January to July 11, 1995 was

16     the UNPROFOR allowed to move within this blue triangle."

17             And this was the trigger of the concern of Mr. McCloskey and

18     we've received a lot of information from this witness.  Please use your

19     time of cross-examination in the best way and carry on.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, I would like correction

21     to the record.  I asked:  Do you know whether it is the case that from

22     January until July 1995 the UNPROFOR was not allowed to move within the

23     Bandera Triangle.

24             Perhaps it was not interpreted fully or accurately because we

25     were speaking very fast and that's possible.

Page 6813

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It's exactly the same formulation of the question

 2     again.  And the witness said they had no access to that triangle.  Please

 3     go ahead.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I did not ask a question.  I just

 5     said the transcript needed to be corrected.  What I said was from January

 6     to July, not just July.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  That is exactly what is recorded.  Indeed I see

 8     now on page 78, line 3, this is the wrong quotation of your words in July

 9     11, 1995.  There must be a mistake, but carry on, I think we all know

10     what you are talking about.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

12             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Please, be so kind as to tell us, the activities that the BH army

14     carried out in the area called the Bandera Triangle, were they known or

15     unknown to the UNPROFOR?

16        A.   As you know, from the moment on the Bandera Triangle existed we

17     were not allowed to go in, and I can't recall at this moment and I have

18     no all the reports, of course, if we discovered any military activity and

19     if we acted against it.  I think I can state that if we saw any military

20     activity in the enclave, I would have known it and I would have brought

21     it up in a meeting with Ramiz or with Naser Oric.

22        Q.   Thank you.  In another answer you said the UNPROFOR commander

23     dealt with the Bandera Triangle problem.  Can you tell us how exactly he

24     dealt with it and what orders were you given as a result?

25        A.   No, I don't know exactly at this moment.  It's just I'm still

Page 6814

 1     looking in my diary what exactly happened and what was the reason of the

 2     existence of the Bandera Triangle.  And I also don't know what the orders

 3     of the commander DutchBat were.

 4        Q.   Is it true that you said a moment ago that it was the UNPROFOR

 5     commander who dealt with and resolved this, or did I mishear you?

 6        A.   I think when we are talking about the UNPROFOR commander, I think

 7     I'm talking about commander DutchBat because that was the commander I'm

 8     talking about all the time.  I had no connections or information --

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Do you have information whatsoever about so-called

10     Carter Agreement?

11        A.   It doesn't ring a bell at this moment.  What do you mean with the

12     Carter Agreement and what information should I have about it?

13        Q.   Thank you.  Some of the information available to military

14     observers who are present at the meetings where the problem of the

15     Bandera Triangle was dealt with, there are entries referring to the

16     Carter Agreement.  You can look it up tomorrow and you can answer

17     tomorrow, if you wish, because you say you are not prepared to do so now.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think you should help the witness and explain

19     why -- what do you mean by Carter Agreement.  The witness doesn't know

20     that and you should put the question in an appropriate way to him.

21             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   If you want to answer now, then tell us if you know anything,

23     anything at all about the Carter Agreement that has to do with

24     Srebrenica?

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The witness answered this question already with a

Page 6815

 1     word:

 2             "It doesn't ring a bell at this moment.  What do you mean with

 3     the Carter Agreement and what information should I have about it."

 4             That was page 79, line 23 and 4.  He asked you to explain what do

 5     you mean by the Carter Agreement.  You should help him.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

 7             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   I explained that one of the participants in the meetings where

 9     this was discussed said that a decision had been made in keeping with the

10     Carter Agreement, and I asked this question without meaning any offence

11     or without meaning to test your credibility, but you were present at the

12     meetings where the UNPROFOR commander dealt with this issue.  If you

13     don't know, then we can move on.  I don't mind.

14        A.   I don't know at this moment.  As I said, it doesn't ring a bell

15     and I don't have information about a meeting at this moment where the

16     Carter Agreement was discussed or referred to.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think then, indeed, you should move on.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

19             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Could you please tell us whether the DutchBat had information

21     that there would be an attack against the enclave?

22        A.   No, we had not the information that an attack was planned against

23     the enclave.  But planning on this session, I read my diaries from I

24     think April or May up until July, and what I analyse now is seeing what

25     happened in whole Bosnia, seeing what was happening in and around the

Page 6816

 1     enclave, it's amazing that we didn't see it before and not only we,

 2     because we were only a part of the whole thing, of course, we sent our

 3     information to north-east command and from there to BH command.  I think

 4     that from my point of view when we get all the information that we face

 5     now and when I see if from my diaries, what I write and the information

 6     what I get is that it was clear from me that it is not strange that an

 7     attack should take place.

 8             But we had not specific information that an attack would take

 9     place on the enclave.  Of course, we got several signs that commanders

10     told us and that started on the 3rd or 6th of January, where

11     General Zivanovic told us that the enclave of Srebrenica was his, at

12     least the southern part of the enclave was his, not from Mladic, not from

13     Karadzic, not from anybody but it was his.

14             So on the 6th of January, in my opinion, he announced already

15     that he wanted back his part of the enclave.  And I think that was one of

16     the things that was in our mind when finally the enclave -- when indeed

17     the attack on the enclave started, the words of the General Zivanovic,

18     which we thought of course was responsible for the attack because it was

19     in his area of responsibility in our point of view, that he would take

20     the southern part of the enclave because it was his enclave or his

21     territory.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We have to adjourn now.  We just passed 7.00 and

23     we will resume tomorrow in the morning at 9.00 in this courtroom.  Please

24     be reminded that you are no allowed to have contact about the content of

25     your evidence to either party.

Page 6817

 1             Mr. McCloskey.

 2             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Could we get an estimate of the remaining cross

 3     just for everyone's planning purposes.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  I've

 5     stressed already, we will finish within the time we were given.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The time you have given, you have given, six

 7     hours.  But after the experience of today, perhaps you can indicate if it

 8     is possible to finish during the first session of tomorrow's hearing or

 9     at a later stage, that will be really helpful for the Chamber and for the

10     parties.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We announced six to seven hours and

12     I don't think we have used up that time, and we cannot use it up even if

13     we continue the whole day tomorrow.  I will do my best to finish

14     tomorrow, if that is helpful to the Prosecution.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think we don't receive any indication today.

16     We will see what happens tomorrow.  We adjourn and resume tomorrow

17     morning.

18                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.05 p.m.

19                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 27th day of

20                           October, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.