Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 6818

 1                           Wednesday, 27 October 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.13 a.m.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Good morning to everybody.

 6             This morning we start some minutes later than usual because of

 7     technical problems here in the courtroom.

 8             And the witness should be brought in, please.

 9                           [The witness takes the stand]

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Good morning, Mr. Rave.  Welcome back to the

11     courtroom.  I have to remind you that the affirmation to tell the truth

12     you made at the beginning of your testimony yesterday still applies.

13                           WITNESS:  EVERT RAVE [Resumed]

14             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, good morning.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, please continue your

16     cross-examination.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

18             I greet everyone.  I wish peace unto this house, and I wish that

19     this trial and the judgement and the day end in keeping with God's will,

20     not necessarily mine.  I also welcome the witness and wish him a pleasant

21     stay here in the courtroom.

22                           Cross-examination by Mr. Tolimir: [Continued]

23        Q.   I have three questions left over from yesterday before I move on

24     to a new topic.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] First of all, P996 is the exhibit I

Page 6819

 1     need displayed in e-court, page 3.  This relates to the question I asked

 2     about the so-called Carter Agreement the witness said he was unable to

 3     answer at the moment.  And we'll see if this is going to remind him of

 4     anything.  What we see here is a diary.  Can we see page 3, please.

 5             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   This is Mr. Kingori's diary, where he mentioned, as a UN

 7     observer, this Carter Agreement.

 8             First of all, let me ask you, do you know Mr. Joseph Kingori, and

 9     was he a UN observer while you were in Srebrenica?

10        A.   Yes, I know him.

11        Q.   From his diary we see that he refers to the control of movement

12     towards Zepa in keeping with the so-called Carter Agreement; that's the

13     four bullet point on the right side -- sorry, on the left side.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Aleksandar.

15             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   I asked you yesterday what the Carter Agreement means and we see

17     from this diary that the Carter Agreement had to do with controlling

18     movement towards Zepa.

19             Can you now remember what the Carter Agreement is about?

20        A.   Yesterday I went to my diary and to my notebooks and I did not

21     find any information about a meeting in which the Carter Agreement was

22     mentioned, and I was not able yesterday to go, for example, on the

23     internet to read the Carter Agreement.  And from my memory now, I really

24     don't know what is in the Carter Agreement.  If there is information

25     about movements towards Zepa, I really don't know.  I was not able to

Page 6820

 1     find out yesterday.  And I was not in a meeting -- at least I have no

 2     notes about being in a meeting in which the Carter Agreement was

 3     mentioned.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Since you know nothing about that agreement, I will

 5     have no further questions about it.

 6             Just in response to Mr. McCloskey -- it's 6526 page of the

 7     transcript, lines 16 to 18, testimony of Mr. Kingori.  Thank you.

 8             You said yesterday that the commander of the UNPROFOR decided

 9     that you should not control inside the area known as the Bandera

10     Triangle, and then you added it was not the commander of the UNPROFOR but

11     the commander of the DutchBat.

12             Can you tell us, finally, who decided you should not patrol in

13     the Bandera Triangle?

14        A.   Of course, I got my orders from the commander of the

15     Dutch Battalion in the enclave and it might be possible that he got the

16     orders from commander UNPROFOR, but I really don't know.  I know that

17     finally the commander of DutchBat ordered his troops not to patrol in the

18     area.  Although we tried it several times and I figured out yesterday

19     some things in my notebook in which we tried to patrol inside the area,

20     but it was commander of the Dutch Battalion I got the information from.

21        Q.   Did the commander of the DutchBat or perhaps the commander of the

22     UN force who gave orders to the commander of the DutchBat have the right

23     to change the mandate of the UNPROFOR force in Srebrenica?

24        A.   I don't know if it was a change in the mandate.  I think it was a

25     way of acting inside the enclave.  And, of course, I think that the

Page 6821

 1     DutchBat commander is free to do his job in the way he thinks is the best

 2     to do, and I don't think that they changed the mandate by not patrolling

 3     in an area.  I think we tried several times do our job over there without

 4     making casualties on both sides, and we tried to negotiate with, inside,

 5     the army of the BiH, and outside with the VRS army, to do our job

 6     properly.  And I think it's not correct if you state that he changed the

 7     mandate.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, sorry for interrupting you.  You

 9     were referring to page 6526, lines 16 to 18 on page 3 of today's

10     transcript, but, in fact, this is not the right page because Mr. Kingori

11     testified much earlier.  Perhaps you should check at a later stage the

12     right reference so that Mr. McCloskey and everybody can find the

13     testimony of Mr. Kingori.  But perhaps for now you should continue.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

15             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   You said yesterday you had the mandate to disarm the Muslims in

17     the protected area in keeping with the agreement on demilitarisation.

18     Will you just answer me to the best of your knowledge, was it your

19     mandate or not?

20        A.   Yes, it was our mandate to disarm the Muslims in the enclave.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Was that mandate consistent with the agreement on

22     demilitarisation?

23        A.   If you don't mind, I don't know exactly what's in the agreement

24     because I don't know the agreement 15 years later, and -- from my head,

25     and I don't have it over here.  So -- but I think, yes, it was in --

Page 6822

 1     inconsistent with the agreement.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  If that was consistent with the agreement, did one of

 3     the parties, or perhaps the UNPROFOR commander who was in charge of

 4     demilitarisation in keeping with the agreement, did any one of them have

 5     the right to change that mandate?

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think everybody saw that in the transcript you

 7     see the last answer of the witness.

 8             "... but I think, yes, it was inconsistent with the agreement."

 9             But I'm quite sure that this was not what you intended to answer.

10             THE WITNESS:  No, it was consistent with the agreement.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.  And now please answer the

12     last question of Mr. Tolimir, if you recall it.

13             THE WITNESS:  I think that the agreement was signed by the UN and

14     not by commander UNPROFOR, so I don't think that commander UNPROFOR in

15     Bosnia or the commander of the Dutch Battalion had a right to change the

16     mandate, so I don't think they would change the mandate.

17             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Thank you.  For your information, do you know this agreement was

19     signed by General Morillon, the then force commander?

20        A.   With respect, I think this is what I mean.  Maybe we are talking

21     about different mandates, and I really don't know the mandate what we are

22     talking now about.  But the only thing I can say after 15 years, I don't

23     have the mandate, I don't think that commanders on the ground are able to

24     change mandates given or signed by the UN.

25        Q.   How do you then explain that the commander changed your mandate

Page 6823

 1     as far as this Bandera Triangle was concerned when it was not stipulated

 2     by the agreement and no one had the right to change the agreement without

 3     the consent of all parties?

 4        A.   As you know, at the time I was a warrant officer 2nd Class,

 5     sergeant-major in the Dutch army, I had a lieutenant-colonel as a

 6     commander; and as you know, in the army it's not regular in a time that

 7     you do your job that all the time you get orders from your commander, you

 8     go into agreements or other things because you doubt about the orders

 9     commanders are giving you.  I think when you have the opinion that the

10     commander of the Dutch Battalion changed the mandate, I think you have to

11     ask him the question, because I can't answer it for you.

12        Q.   Do you know whether the Serbs had given their approval to change

13     the agreement so that you do not control the Muslims in the

14     Bandera Triangle?

15        A.   No, I have no information about that.

16        Q.   Thank you.  I have no more questions about this.

17             There was one more question left over from yesterday.

18     Mr. McCloskey asked for a reference concerning a witness who participated

19     in the attack on Kravica which you described as never having participated

20     in combat.

21             It's 6213, lines 18 through 20 of the 16 October transcript.  My

22     question was:

23             "Can you tell us in which places your battalion Biljeg was

24     involved in combat?"

25             The witness answered:

Page 6824

 1             "In Skelani and for a minor part in Kravica."

 2             The rest is not relevant to this subject.  This is just for your

 3     information and for purposes of verification.  We also discussed

 4     Mr. Naser Oric yesterday.  I asked the witness if he was aware that

 5     Naser Oric had stated that he had not carried out demilitarisation.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would now ask for 1D39 --

 7     sorry, 329.  1D329.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Gajic.

 9             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] While we're waiting for the document,

10     I'd just like to correct the transcript.  The reference is 5625,

11     lines 17 and 18.  That's Mr. Kingori's testimony.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  While we are dealing with corrections, you see on

13     page 6, line 16, a reference to hearing of the 16th of October.  At that

14     day, we had no hearing; but I think, Mr. Tolimir, you were referring to

15     the 6th of October, if I'm not mistaken.  Perhaps you can clarify that.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  That's

17     right.  I had in mind the 6th of October.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

19             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes, Mr. President.  Clearly the General has a

20     list of documents he's going to be using for cross, so could we be

21     provided that as per the court order.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  We

23     provided Naser Oric's interview, 1D329.  We provided it yesterday to

24     Mr. McCloskey.  We see it on the right-hand side here.

25             And this is an interview given by Naser Oric to the daily --

Page 6825

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, may I interrupt you.  The problem is

 2     that it is not part of your list of potential exhibits to be used with

 3     this witness.  And I think Mr. McCloskey was asking for a complete list.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Immediately before this

 5     witness appeared in the courtroom, that document was uploaded in e-court.

 6     If it cannot be used, I can certainly take Mr. McCloskey's request into

 7     consideration.  Thank you.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

 9             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I have no problem with this document or, really,

10     any others, but I would like General Tolimir to follow the orders and the

11     rules that we live by in this courtroom.  We would like a list.  We have

12     no list.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Didn't you receive any list?

14             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Ms. Stewart didn't, and I don't see one

15     immediately on my list.  So if there is such a list, if they could send

16     it to Ms. Stewart, I -- we'd be fine.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The Chamber has received a list some days ago,

18     but this specific document is not included in the list of the documents

19     to be used with this witness.

20             Mr. Gajic.

21             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, just before the

22     beginning of today's session, this document was uploaded in e-court.

23     Since we were not confident that we would be able to do it early this

24     morning, it's not on the list, and we didn't know whether we would be

25     using it at all.  Since the document was mentioned yesterday, Mr. Tolimir

Page 6826

 1     finally decided to show it to the witness today.  An updated list will be

 2     provided to the OTP hopefully during this session.  Thank you.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

 4             Mr. McCloskey.

 5             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Again, in cross-examination documents come up at

 6     the last minute and I don't -- wouldn't expect every document to be on a

 7     cross-examination list.  I have no problem with that.  I'm sure we'll be

 8     doing the same.  But Ms. Stewart cannot find any list because she has

 9     none.  So if we could just get whatever list you've got to her then we'll

10     be fine and there should be no problem.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think this time there was just a mistake

12     because the Chamber has received a list.  Perhaps it was not sent to the

13     OTP in time.  But Mr. Gajic promised to do that during the first session

14     of today.

15             Mr. Tolimir, please continue your cross-examination.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] As I've already said it -- thank

17     you, Mr. President.  As I've already said it, this is an interview

18     entitled, "Naser Oric's confession."  It was given to the daily

19     "Oslobodenje" on Friday, 23rd of August, 1996.

20             The ERN number is 0042-9641.  I emphasise this because you can't

21     see it in the right-hand-side corner.  Can the document please be

22     scrolled a little, the right-hand side to the left, and now you can see

23     the ERN number.  And can the document now please be scrolled up a little,

24     we would like to see the entire content down to the signature.  And I'm

25     going to be using that particular passage in the text.  Thank you.

Page 6827

 1             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   The last passage has been blown up, and we will be reading from

 3     the text:

 4             "When UNPROFOR troops set up their check-points and observation

 5     posts, we immediately realised that we could not rely on them.  A team of

 6     my lads who were not militarily trained but they were reliable ..."

 7             I can't read this, I'm sorry.

 8             "... reserve units decided to establish our lines, our own lines,

 9     to organise our own monitors.  The system functioned in the following

10     way:  When an UNPROFOR patrol was approaching, our guys on the lines

11     informed us so we could remove the weapons.  If the UNPROFOR soldiers

12     asked about the presence of our lads on those lines, we answered that we

13     couldn't trust them and that we were afraid of Chetniks, so we wanted to

14     have our own guards.  They showed understanding for that, which was not

15     the case when we dug our trenches and fortifications."

16             My question for you, sir, is this:  Did you know that Muslims

17     were covering up all of their activities and that they were pretending to

18     be just common folks, unarmed civilians?  Thank you.

19        A.   I think that of course in the situation the former Yugoslavia was

20     in both parties played the same game.  In this statement in the

21     newspaper, Naser Oric stated the way they acted.  In a meeting from the

22     23rd of February, from the commander DutchBat with Naser Oric, he told

23     that -- he told the population of the enclave that he trusts the UN, he

24     will -- that the UN will defend the enclave so that they should hand over

25     their weapons.

Page 6828

 1             And, of course, in the end we saw that they did not hands over

 2     all their weapons because there still were weapons, and the enclave was

 3     not demilitarised.  But, of course, when they had weapons and when they

 4     did military activities, they would not show it to us and they would hide

 5     it, especially in the same way as also the Serbs did because we got the

 6     same information, only information, from commanders who tell us that

 7     nothing was going on and in the other way we discovered that they were

 8     frequently fighting and had fire fights.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Since you are drawing a parallel here, were there any

10     Serbs in the demilitarised zone?  Thank you.

11        A.   As I stated yesterday, when I saw the map, I saw two lines.  We

12     were not all talking about the same line of a demilitarised zone.  The

13     Serbs had their own ideas about it, the Muslims had their own ideas about

14     it, and we were in between.  We had our own map that we took over from

15     our predecessors, and it was discussed several times with the Muslims and

16     the Serbs.

17             On the 28th of February, we had a meeting with Major Nikolic, and

18     we had a discussion about the confrontation line, so also for them it was

19     not exactly clear.  Of course, they wanted more into the zone and the

20     Muslims wanted them more out of the zone.  The proposal was to look if we

21     were talking about the same line, and we proposed that, especially in the

22     western part, Major Sarkic from the Milici Brigade and an UNMO could go

23     into the field to check if we were talking exactly about the same line

24     and the same positions of the demilitarised zone.

25             Major Nikolic stated that we could not go into the area because

Page 6829

 1     there were mines.  And he stated that when you go in there it was not

 2     very, very wise to do so.  So we were not allowed to go with impartial

 3     observers to check the line and see if we were talking about the same

 4     line.  So it's very difficult to say if Serbs went into the demilitarised

 5     zone or Muslims went out because we are talking about different lines.

 6        Q.   And those lines that were manned by Serbs, were they included

 7     into the demilitarised zone?

 8             Could you please provide direct answers and short answers.  And

 9     only if the Trial Chamber allows you, you can go on talking.  Otherwise,

10     we are going to waste time without completing our task.  Thank you.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, if you ask a question, you should

12     allow the witness to answer in the way which is a proper way to deal with

13     the problems you raise with your questions.  There may be some instances

14     that a witness is not answering just -- and focusing and the core of your

15     question, but this was not necessary to remind the witness at this stage.

16             Please continue.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

18             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Witness, please could you listen to this and answer my questions

20     that I will have after I have read the text.  This is what Naser Oric is

21     saying, and I'm quoting from the penultimate paragraph, the one above the

22     last one.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the text please be scrolled

24     down a little so I can read from it.  And it is the previous page in

25     English.  Thank you.  We can see it now.

Page 6830

 1             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   This is the text entitled, "Guards Along the Lines."  And I

 3     quote:

 4             "We didn't want Chetniks to see the weapons that we had not

 5     handed in.  That would have been an argument for them to refuse signing

 6     the agreement, or to do who knows what.  We had some 2.000 barrels; I

 7     knew that for a fact.  And I didn't even know about all of the weapons.

 8     The weapons were being hidden.  We kept some 20 cannons with four

 9     barrels.  We made single barrel cannons of them so in the end we ended

10     with a kind of anti-aircraft cannons.  Let me explain.  We hid every

11     single barrel that we managed to capture from Chetniks, and when there

12     was an action, we took them out.  Everybody hid weapons from everybody

13     else.  Only the boldest ones, real soldiers, reported what they had.

14     Others were keeping them in hiding until they were needed.  It is all

15     understandable.  So we had probably approximately 4.000 barrels."

16             And then he goes on to say that that became manifest during the

17     breakthrough towards Tuzla, without a brigade in Zepa.

18             Please tell us, were you aware of Muslims hiding the quantity,

19     such a large quantity of weapons, as described by Naser Oric in this

20     interview?

21        A.   As I stated yesterday, we were aware that there were weapons

22     hidden by the Muslims inside the enclave.  We were not aware of the

23     amount of weapons that were hidden, nor the sort of weapons that were

24     hidden.  The only thing we could do is whenever we saw armed men or

25     weapons in houses where we were able to go into, to confiscate them and

Page 6831

 1     store them in the weapon collection sites.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  And when Muslims left the area, did it turn out that

 3     they indeed had about 4.000 barrels as Naser Oric states in this

 4     interview?  Did that turn out to be true during the breakthrough towards

 5     Tuzla?

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

 7             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Perhaps the General or the witness can give us an

 8     idea of barrels.  I know barrels of oil and barrels of wine, but barrels

 9     of weapons, I'm not sure anyone here knows precisely what he's talking

10     about.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

12             Perhaps the witness should answer the question first.

13             THE WITNESS:  I think when we are speaking about barrels, we are

14     speaking about long-rifled guns, long weapons.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The question was if it turned out "that they

16     indeed had about 4.000 barrels," whatever that is, "as Naser Oric states

17     in his interview."

18             Do you have any knowledge about that?

19             THE WITNESS:  No.  But when we are talking about 4.000 barrels,

20     in my imagination we are talking about 4.000 weapons, so that can be

21     pistols, that can be long rifles, but also rocket launchers, small rocket

22     launchers, or small hand-grenade launchers.  That's, in my opinion, the

23     translation of the barrels he is stating over there.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  As you indicated earlier, you have no information

25     about the amount of weapons?

Page 6832

 1             THE WITNESS:  No, we have no information about the amount of

 2     weapons.  And maybe I can directly answer the question of Mr. Tolimir.

 3     When a lot of men between 17 and 60 left the enclave on the 10th of July,

 4     I saw a lot of men gathered in the town of Srebrenica, lots of them were

 5     armed, but of course it was -- it was dark, and lots of them were already

 6     moving in the north-western direction.  We didn't know where they would

 7     go.  But at that moment we saw that there were armed men walking in the

 8     north-western direction.  And also at that moment we did not know the

 9     amount of weapons they carried with them.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

12             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   People whom you saw, did they participate in the breakthrough

14     that is referred to by Naser Oric in his interview, or did they go in

15     some other direction?

16        A.   The people I refer to went in a big column in the north-western

17     direction out of the town of Srebrenica, and I don't know where they

18     went.  And, later, I heard that there was a try to break through in the

19     direction of Tuzla, but at that moment I did not know where they went.

20        Q.   Thank you.  During your patrols before the fall of Srebrenica,

21     did you see armed Muslims walking around, and how often did you see them?

22        A.   Yes, we have seen armed Muslims walking around.  I don't know the

23     frequency of it, but we saw them frequently.  All the time we saw armed

24     Muslims.  As I told you, we tried to disarm them and store the weapons in

25     the weapon collection points.

Page 6833

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Could you tell how successful your attempts were?

 2     Could you translate your success into a certain quality -- quantity of

 3     weapons that were taken from the Muslims?

 4        A.   No, I can't give you a quantity because we did our utmost to get

 5     the weapons without going so far that it was the ultimate goal to get the

 6     weapon and even try to shoot people to get the weapons.  We just tried to

 7     catch them and disarm them.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the Court please produce the

 9     second column of this interview, the third paragraph, under the title:

10     "The Demilitarisation of Srebrenica."  Can you see where it says "the

11     demilitarisation of Srebrenica," can you please move the document to the

12     right -- or, rather, to the left.  Thank you.  And it is page 2 in

13     English.  Now we can see it.

14             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Where it says "the demilitarisation of Srebrenica," I'm reading

16     the first paragraph -- or, rather, the second paragraph:

17             "So we handed over to the UNPROFOR only some of the weapons, for

18     instance, two tanks.  We had had five tanks, but since we didn't have any

19     fuel for them, we had to burn some down."

20             Could you please look at the advice provided to him by Naser Oric

21     when it came to surrendering weapons.  Could you please look at the

22     penultimate line in the interview just below the image depicted in the

23     text, the second paragraph.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And below the photo, could you

25     please show the second paragraph, the sixth line through the tenth line

Page 6834

 1     in that paragraph.  Thank you.  Go a bit further to the right, please.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, I'm not aware that the witness is

 3     able to read Serbian language.

 4             THE WITNESS:  No, I'm not.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  So that you should give an indication where in

 6     the English translation he will find this passage.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's the third page in English.

 8     And here we see the penultimate paragraph, line 6 in that paragraph, the

 9     second from the bottom.

10             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Sefer Halilovic also participated in this interview, and he says:

12             "I ordered that those things that were not in a good working

13     order be surrendered."

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And can we now continue with the

15     column on the right-hand side.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, I would like to know the exact part

17     in English.  I don't find it.  The witness will not find it as well.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise, Mr. President.  It's

19     the fifth paragraph on the English side where it says, "Sefer Halilovic

20     intervenes."  That's in the first line of that paragraph.

21             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   I read the part where it says:

23             "I ordered you to hand over the weapons that were out of order,

24     and that's what you did.  And we're talking about 200 barrels all

25     together, including those home-made and useless rifles, plus some heavy

Page 6835

 1     weaponry, which you couldn't hide."

 2             My question is this:  Firstly, does it transpire from this that

 3     Naser Oric, when he mentions 200 barrels, uses that word to describe

 4     long-rifled guns?  Thank you.

 5        A.   I can't look in the mind of Naser Oric, but when we are speaking

 6     about the barrels as stated before, I think we are talking about weapons,

 7     long and short weapons, pistols, and all those kind of things.  And when

 8     we are talking about the 200 rifles now in this context, I think those

 9     were also the small arms, so the pistols and the hand-made guns that were

10     stored in the weapon collection point.  They were not only the hand-made

11     weapons in the weapon collection point but also a lot of very good and

12     useful weapons which were taken from the Muslims.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Does it transpire from the interview which also

14     involved Sefer Halilovic who was commander during the demilitarisation

15     that the commander of the BiH army ordered Naser Oric not to hand over

16     all the weapons to UNPROFOR?

17        A.    That's what I read over there.  But when we are talking about

18     the period that this happened, I think it started in the period when

19     General Morillon declared it as a safe haven in Srebrenica, a Canadian

20     company came in, and they started to disarm the Muslims.  And I think

21     after that, from January 1994, the first Dutch Battalion came in and went

22     on with the demilitarisation.

23        Q.   Based on what you have just told us, can you tell us whether it

24     was General Morillon who declared Srebrenica a safe haven or whether it

25     was owing to the Security Council and the agreement signed by the parties

Page 6836

 1     to that effect?

 2        A.   Okay.  Thank you, I think I have to -- mind my words a little

 3     bit.  As we all know, General Morillon was standing on the PTT building

 4     in the town of Srebrenica and declared that he would take care of the

 5     population and made a statement as if it was a safe haven.  I think

 6     that's what I remember now.  And, of course, we come to the same point as

 7     we stated before: it's not for a commander on the ground to declare an

 8     area as a safe haven; it is a UN topic, and it has to be done by the UN,

 9     of course.

10        Q.   Thank you.  We're not going to go into the origins of the

11     agreement on demilitarisation and who signed it and how the area fled.

12     We have already had testimony about that.

13             We will move now to a different topic that I announced yesterday,

14     mainly what I asked you yesterday:  Was the attack on the enclave

15     announced to you beforehand.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But before we move on to that

17     topic, I would like to tender this document.  1D329.

18             Thank you, Aleksandar.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D126, Your Honours.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

22             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   We'll now go back to a passage that I quoted to you yesterday

24     from your statement, page 3, paragraph 5, where Colonel Vukovic told you,

25     if you remember, that due to constant incidents at Observation Post Echo,

Page 6837

 1     the Serbian forces were forced to intervene.  So it was announced to you.

 2     Let me ask you, did the UNPROFOR command in Sarajevo ever send a protest

 3     note picking up on the information they got from Serbs about the attacks

 4     emanating from the protected areas of Zepa and Srebrenica?

 5        A.   I think I cannot answer that question because I was not in the

 6     direct line of command of UNPROFOR in Sarajevo, so I think this is a

 7     question for commander of the Dutch Battalion.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Could you then answer a question that you do know an

 9     answer to.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If we can see 1D350.

11             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   It is a statement you gave in Zagreb on the 22nd July, 1995, just

13     after the end of your mission in Srebrenica, and you said something I'm

14     interested in on page 2 in Serbian.

15             I'm quoting what you said, and now we have it in English.  Now

16     both are in English.  In fact, it's Dutch and English.  You say:

17             "The conduct of the BH army at OP-F was the straw that broke the

18     camel's back.  As the Bosnian Serb army," you call it Bosnian Serb army

19     instead of VRS, "as the Bosnian Serb army continued to advance, the BH

20     kept taking positions behind the observation posts, but the personnel of

21     the observation posts were snappy after the fall of OP-E and the death of

22     van Renssen and kept calling Section 5 forward.  Rave and Captain Melgers

23     had spent two days holding discussions with Ramiz, and that's

24     Ramiz Becirovic, the Muslim commander in Srebrenica.  They kept holding

25     discussions with Ramiz to enforce freedom of movement for vehicles.  But

Page 6838

 1     Ramiz did not have central leadership of the troops and did not have any

 2     information on the attacks.  And Section 5 could not take over leadership

 3     of the BH."

 4             Have you read this passage in your language?  Can you tell me

 5     what does the acronym CE 5 mean?

 6        A.   The Section 5 was -- were the liaison officers.

 7        Q.   You say this communication section could not take over leadership

 8     of the BH army.  Was the situation so critical that somebody needed to

 9     take over command of the BH army?

10        A.   It was not the communication section, it was the liaison section.

11     The situation was that Ramiz was not able to order all his troops to

12     guarantee our freedom of movement, so, of course, we had a feeling that

13     nobody was really in charge, because when the highest commander on the

14     scene is not able to order his troops what to do, then you've got a

15     problem.  And, of course, we were also not able to take over from Ramiz

16     and command the BiH army over there.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Now, after reading this, can you recall whether

18     van Renssen died at Observation Post E, how he died, and who killed him?

19        A.   I think we answered the question yesterday.  I don't know

20     exactly.  I think it was OP Foxtrot he came from, when the manning of the

21     OP returned via dirt road.  Muslim civilians tried to stop him on the end

22     of the road, they tried to stop the APC.  The APC did not stop, carried

23     on, and at that moment either a hand-grenade was thrown or a gun was shot

24     that caused the death, at the end of the day, of the soldier van Renssen.

25        Q.   Thank you.  In this passage I read, you referred to

Page 6839

 1     Ramiz Becirovic.  Is that the Ramiz Becirovic who in practice and

 2     officially stood in for Naser Oric?

 3        A.   Yes, that's the same person.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us briefly what were these discussions

 5     with Ramiz about?

 6        A.   What discussions are you referring to?  Because all the time

 7     during the six months we dealt with Ramiz.  So could you be a little bit

 8     more specific?

 9        Q.   I meant the discussions referred to in this passage I quoted

10     where you say that there was a straw that broke the camel's back and you

11     talked to Ramiz for two days to get freedom of movement for vehicles.  If

12     you have anything to add to that, that would be nice.  If not, I'll take

13     it that you have given your answer already.

14        A.   Yeah, it is the same answer as I gave you yesterday.  When the

15     OPs in the southern part were attacked, at that moment we also had no

16     freedom of movement to play the game of going back and going forward in

17     the way we used to do.  That was the problem for us, that our hands were

18     tied to do our job in a normal military way because the Muslims stood

19     behind us and had only one thing, that was, UNPROFOR should go forward

20     and attack the enemy.  That does not fit in our military way of acting,

21     and that was the reason, for example, why the southern OPs went forward

22     and surrendered to the Serbs.  And, of course, that was -- this was going

23     on also in the western part - correction, in the eastern part - and we

24     had no freedom of movement and could not do our job in the way that we

25     wanted to do it.

Page 6840

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Can you look at the last paragraph on the right page

 2     which begins with the words "note," and it says, "Rave".  NB, nota bene,

 3     Rave.  Rave says what is described in the next passage happened on the

 4     11th of July, but the incident took place on 10 July.  PG, according to

 5     Rave, the BH army had taken an M-4S tank, or an M-48 tank, and were using

 6     it to fire on Position B4.  As a result, Hageman moved forward to the

 7     south and took fire from the BH army tank.  According to Rave, it later

 8     became clear that this was a Bosnian Serb army tank.

 9             S5 then went to Ramiz to calm the spirits among the ranks of the

10     BH army.  Ramiz then went forward and came back with a message that the

11     BH Army did not have a tank there, and that the BH army in place had been

12     ordered to grant the UNPROFOR freedom of movement.

13             While pulling out one of the APCs of the UNPROFOR, Hageman again

14     took fire from - and there is something illegible, we don't know whom he

15     took fire from.  So this is the end of the quote.

16             When exactly did the BH army seise that one tank that I -- that

17     is referred to in this passage?

18        A.   I can't even remember that I ever stated that the BiH had an M-48

19     tank.  And when I read this passage now, I think they also didn't.  I

20     think there was a misunderstanding that maybe somebody thought that the

21     BiH had an M-48 tank, and the only thing I know from I think it was

22     Captain Hageman during that time, he was the one on the 11th of July,

23     early in the morning, went forward with his APC to see if the Serb attack

24     still was going on because that was one of the things we needed to be

25     aware of for asking support from our higher echelons.

Page 6841

 1        Q.   When you speak of support, can you tell us if you know when you

 2     were able to ask for support from the higher echelons of your force?

 3        A.   In my knowledge, on the 10th of July we had a meeting, commander

 4     DutchBat had a meeting and I attended also the meeting, with the Muslim

 5     and the civilian leaders in the enclave, where command of DutchBat

 6     informed them that there would be air support.  When the VRS attack

 7     continued the next morning by daylight, to be sure that the VRS was

 8     continuing their attack, we had to send forward an APC to check if it

 9     really was true.  And when the APC was shot at by the VRS, it was

10     confirmation.  And I think that was also the time that commander of the

11     Dutch Battalion asked for air support.

12        Q.   Did you have to go into reconnaissance to see if it was an attack

13     on the -- of the Bosnian Serb army or could you see it with the naked

14     eye?  If they were attacking you, you must have seen they were attacking.

15        A.   During the night, the attacks stopped.  And in the morning, early

16     in the morning, an APC went forward to see what would happen and to see

17     how far they could go forward.  At least, that's the impression I've got

18     now.  And at that moment when he was going forward, he was attacked by

19     VRS fire.  So that was first confirmation that the attack was still going

20     on.  And from that moment on, I remember that the attacks started again

21     and the VRS moved farther upward north.

22        Q.   Did they, that APC, provoke the attack?  Did it go into the VRS

23     territory without prior notification?  Did it get out of bounds of the

24     demilitarised zone?

25        A.   The APC was in the town of Srebrenica that night.  It went to the

Page 6842

 1     southern border of the town of Srebrenica, so it was inside the enclave

 2     several kilometres.  So the VRS was already several kilometres inside the

 3     enclave.  So normally we should have had freedom of movement over there,

 4     because we were clearly visible as UN troops because we were in white

 5     APCs with big UN letters on it.

 6        Q.   Can you tell us, on the 10th and the 11th, these white APCs with

 7     the UN logo, did they fire on the firing positions of the Army of

 8     Republika Srpska as they were ordered?

 9        A.   I was not on the spot and I think I can be for sure that they got

10     the order to fire overhead and not to fire on the positions of the

11     Bosnian Serb army -- the VRS army.

12        Q.   Thank you.  We'll look at that later.  Can you now explain to the

13     Trial Chamber where is this B4 position from which the Muslim side fired

14     at you using seised M-48 tank, the incident after which you discussed

15     something with Ramiz?

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

17             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Objection.  That is a misstatement of the record,

18     and it's contrary to the document he read from and contrary to the

19     witness's answer on that point.  That's inappropriate thing to do.  That

20     throws chaos and falsity into the record and should not be done.  That

21     has been cleared up.  Clearly, I've not objected to this time, but that

22     kind of injection of material is inappropriate.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, are you referring to this debriefing

24     note we had on the screen when you have formulated your question?  And if

25     so, can you tell us which part of it.

Page 6843

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm referring to this nota bene

 2     from the text.  In the Dutch version, it's the second sentence.  And at

 3     the end of the sentence, we see Position B4.  I asked the witness to

 4     explain where this B4 position is in relation to what I've just read.  In

 5     English, it's the previous page.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Let's go back to the previous page.

 7             Mr. McCloskey.

 8             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I have no problem with the witness explaining B4.

 9     The problem is General Tolimir's question assumed and contained the --

10     that there was a BiH tank.  And there was no such BiH tank.  The BiH did

11     not have a tank.  That's clear in the thing he referred to, somebody at

12     first thought they might have had one and then by the end of the

13     paragraph it's clear that was mistaken; it was a Serb tank.  The witness

14     cleared that up and said there was no tank.  And now he's gone back and

15     said, Where is the -- or, Talk to us about the tank that the BiH had.  I

16     mean, that's just absurd.  It's game playing.  It's the same games he was

17     playing with UNPROFOR at the time and it's not appropriate for the

18     courtroom.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Rave, can you --

20             Mr. Gajic.

21             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I believe it is

22     completely inappropriate for Mr. McCloskey to say that it's the same game

23     that Mr. Tolimir had played with the UNPROFOR back in 1995.  It's very,

24     very inappropriate, especially in this context.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Rave, can you explain the sentence:

Page 6844

 1     According to Rave, the BiH had taken an M-4S tank and were using it to

 2     fire on position B4?

 3             Can you explain this sentence.

 4             THE WITNESS:  Yes, I can do it in the same way as I did before.

 5     I think there was a rumour that the BiH had an M-48 tank from the VRS and

 6     that they were shooting at the position B4.  The question was,

 7     Position B4, I really don't know where it is because that's the

 8     operational situation from the Bravo Company at that moment.  Later on,

 9     it seemed that it was not an M-48 tank that was in hands of the BiH, but

10     it was a VRS tank.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  There's, again, a translation problem.  In the

12     English text it is M-4S, but in the Dutch version it is M-48.

13             THE WITNESS:  It's an M-48 tank.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.  May I ask you, have you

15     seen this document called "Debriefing Sergeant Major 1B Rave" before?

16             THE WITNESS:  No, I've never seen it before.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Has this debriefing taken place on the

18     22nd of July, 1996?

19             THE WITNESS:  We had an operational debriefing in Zagreb on that

20     date.  It was just an odd debrief.  Never saw the results of those -- of

21     this debriefing.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Who was the person who interviewed you that day?

23             THE WITNESS:  That day, I was interviewed by the

24     Colonel Lemon [phoen], the second in command of the 11th Air

25     Mobile Brigade.

Page 6845

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Do you know a person of the name

 2     Professor Dr. P.H. Groen?

 3             THE WITNESS:  I've heard the name before.  And as you can see, at

 4     the end of the text, he is the investigation leader from the section

 5     military history from the Dutch army, and I don't know if he was on the

 6     spot at that moment.  I only know that I was debriefed by the

 7     Colonel Lemon at that moment.  And all the, let's say, key players, I

 8     think 20 or 25 persons who had possibly useful information were debriefed

 9     at that moment in Zagreb.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  You didn't sign this document?

11             THE WITNESS:  No, I didn't sign it.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

13             THE WITNESS:  And that's what's also stated in the end of the

14     text.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes.

16             Mr. Tolimir, have you finished your examination on this document?

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  I do not

18     intend to ask anything further about this document because the Prosecutor

19     seems to mind.  I was not quoting my words, I was quoting from the

20     witness's statement given in Zagreb.  But I have nothing further on it.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Gajic.

22             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] With your leave, just a moment.  As

23     for notification of potential evidence and exhibits we wanted to use, by

24     mistake unfortunately it was not sent to Ms. Stewart but it was sent to

25     Mr. McCloskey, Mr. Vanderpuye, Mr. Elderkin, and other members of the

Page 6846

 1     OTP.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  You mean the list of exhibits to be used with

 3     this witness?  That may be checked by the OTP.

 4             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honours.

 5             MR. McCLOSKEY:  We've determined that is -- that is correct, and

 6     I'm sure it won't be a problem again.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

 8             Mr. Tolimir, are you tendering this document?

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President.  Thank you for

10     reminding me.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be admitted as an exhibit.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D127, Your Honours.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.  There are some minutes left before

14     the break.  Please continue, Mr. Tolimir.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Since there are just a few minutes, I won't move to the next

18     topic.  I just want to ask you, Were you in Srebrenica on the 11th and

19     12th of July when the people gathered around the petrol station where

20     Ramiz Becirovic was giving his speech?  Sorry, it was the 10th and the

21     11th July, 1995.

22        A.   The 10th of July, I was in Srebrenica.  I don't know if

23     Ramiz given a speech over there.  I could look in my notes specifically

24     where I was at that time.  In the evening, I think around 11.00, I went

25     with commander of the Dutch Battalion to the PTT building where the

Page 6847

 1     military and civilian leaders of the enclave were assembled, and we had a

 2     meeting over there and --

 3        Q.   Thank you.  We'll come back to that later.

 4             Were you at the gas station when a mortar fire was opened?  We

 5     saw it in that video-clip, if you remember.

 6        A.   I don't know what video-clip you are referring to.  And on the

 7     gas station where mortar fire was opened, the only thing we talked about

 8     yesterday was possible mortar fire, at least a grenade was falling on the

 9     compound of the Bravo Company.  So I don't know what gas station you are

10     referring to.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  This part of the trial video was not used

12     yesterday during the examination of Mr. Rave.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I had in mind the Muslim mortar

14     fire on the 10th, when people gathered in Srebrenica.  We are going to

15     show you the scene or a still from the film.  My assistant is going to

16     show you, and then I will continue putting questions.  Thank you.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think we should do that after the break.  We

18     must have our first break now, and we will resume at 11.00.

19                           [The witness stands down]

20                           --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.

21                           --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Will the witness be brought in.

23                           [The witness takes the stand]

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, Mr. Gajic, please continue.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

Page 6848

 1     Mr. Gajic will now play this footage so we can ask our questions of the

 2     witness, because we seem to have put some questions to him that he was

 3     unable to answer.

 4                           [Video-clip played]

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 6             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Now, please, having seen this scene, can you tell us if you were

 8     there, and do you remember that this mortar fired from this position at

 9     the petrol station?

10        A.   No, I wasn't there, and I have not seen this mortar fired.  I

11     even don't know exactly where this spot is at this moment.  So I was not

12     there, and I have not seen anything.

13        Q.   Thank you.  How far is it from the Bravo base?

14        A.   As I just said, I really don't even recognise the spot exactly

15     where this is because I haven't been in Srebrenica for the last 10 or

16     12 years I think.  So I don't recall the spot at this moment.

17        Q.   Very well.  Since you can't remember, I won't have any more

18     questions for you.  I have to tell you that this scene depicts the mortar

19     fire from the position and it hadn't been provoked by the fire from the

20     VRS.  I just wanted to ask you whether the monitors registered this

21     incident and whether they reported it or recorded it in their log-book

22     regarding firing activities on the ground?

23        A.   I don't know if monitors registered it because I don't have the

24     possibility to look inside the registers of the UN monitors.

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 6849

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the Court please produce D20,

 2     page 38, paragraph 3.58.

 3             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   This is a report based on a debriefing which says, amongst other

 5     things -- and I'm going to quote once we receive paragraph 3.58 and when

 6     we receive it in the English version for your benefit, sir.  Thank you.

 7             We will see it in a minute, I suppose.

 8             Paragraph 3.58.  Thank you.

 9             It's the last paragraph, and we can see it now.  It says in the

10     first sentence, and I'll read:

11             "On Monday 10 July, the commander of OP-M received orders from

12     the C-Company commander to co-ordinate with the BiH army.  That same

13     evening, fighting broke out among the BiH army soldiers, resulting in

14     dead and wounded."

15             And thereafter, towards the end, it says:

16             "When the two BiH army soldiers with the anti-tank weapons

17     attempted to prevent their departure, they were shot in the head by the

18     BiH army leader."

19             Could you tell the Trial Chamber anything about what happened

20     there, about this fighting that broke out among the BiH army soldiers and

21     the resulting casualties?  Thank you.

22        A.   The only thing I know about this incident is approximately what

23     is stated in this debriefing.  I was not there on the spot, and I have no

24     more information from my memories.  I -- for sure nothing in my notebooks

25     about this incident, so I really can't give you any more information

Page 6850

 1     about this.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Since you can't tell us anything, I won't have any

 3     more questions with this regard.

 4             And now could you please tell us whether, during the night

 5     between the 10th and 11 July, 1995, the DutchBat commander held a meeting

 6     with the military and civilian authorities in Srebrenica in the postal

 7     office building?

 8        A.   Yes, that's correct.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In order for me to be able to put

10     questions to you, I would like the Court to produce 1D351.  This is an

11     additional statement that this witness provided in Assen on the

12     3rd of October, 1995.  Thank you.

13             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   You stated in Assen, and I quote:

15             "During the night between the 10th and 11th July" --

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, which page are you reading from?

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could you please produce the second

18     page.  I didn't notice that what we see is the first page only.  Can we

19     see the first paragraph on page 2.

20             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   It says here:

22             "On the night of 11 July 1995, he attended a meeting at which the

23     entire ABH military and civilian leadership and the civilian authorities

24     in the enclave were present.  During that meeting,

25     Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans stated that unless the Bosnian Serb army

Page 6851

 1     withdrew from the enclave and stopped the attack on Srebrenica and the

 2     blocking positions, a massive air-strike would ensue.  There was no

 3     mention of the number of aircraft, but, rather, of the fact that all

 4     targets in the immediate surroundings of the enclave would be put out of

 5     action.  Colonel Karremans even spoke of sections of an area of one

 6     square kilometre which would disappear from the map."

 7             And based on what I've just quoted, could you tell us what you

 8     remember from that meeting?  What did Karremans say about NATO

 9     air-strikes at that meeting?

10        A.   I think that all I remember is stated in this debriefing.  He was

11     speaking about a massive air-strike, so not close-air support but a

12     massive air-strike.  And I think at that moment he explained to the

13     leaders in the enclave what he meant was a massive air-strike, there

14     would be a fixed-wing aircraft with a lot of arms, even cannons, in it,

15     and they would be able to wipe out a square kilometre in a part of the

16     enclave.

17        Q.   [Microphone not activated] ... thank you.

18             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone for the accused, please.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise.

20             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   How could Mr. Karremans promise such an intense air support and

22     air-strikes on the positions of the Army of Republika Srpska?  What did

23     he base that on?

24        A.   As you can see in the same point, I state over there that I

25     really don't know where the information is coming from, but I suspect

Page 6852

 1     that the source is either not his command or BH command.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Could you please tell us whether that meant any

 3     changes to the agreement on the demilitarisation of Srebrenica if NATO

 4     used massive air-strikes on the Republika Srpska targets?

 5        A.   Again, I think I'm not the right person to ask that question.  I

 6     think that's a question that should be asked in the chain of command a

 7     little bit higher up.  I even think somewhere in Sarajevo or maybe even

 8     in New York.

 9        Q.   Thank you.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this document be admitted,

11     please, in view of the fact that the witness speaks about the same things

12     in the following parts of his debriefing.  Thank you.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

14             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Mr. President, the witness is here testifying.

15     He certainly can be and should be questioned about his prior statements,

16     but putting in the complete statement of a witness each time he testifies

17     is really -- I don't know the reason for that.  He's here to be

18     questioned, and it's a precedent that would potentially swamp you with an

19     untold number of statements.

20             So unless there's a particular reason, it would not be, in this

21     system, I think, appropriate.  Unless there's a reason the Court wants to

22     see it.  And we can also arrange, as I think I've done before, to provide

23     Courts with all statements of all witnesses, which it may be more

24     appropriate in other systems, though that would incredibly swamp you,

25     given how long this case has gone.  So unless there's a particular reason

Page 6853

 1     for this, I would -- I would object.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Rave, do you remember this statement?  Have

 3     you ever seen it before?

 4             THE WITNESS:  Yes, I've seen this statement before.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Did you sign it?

 6             THE WITNESS:  I signed this one, yes.  But I signed it -- I think

 7     this is the debriefing.  I don't know, is this from the summary or my own

 8     debriefing?  Because we gave our first debriefings in Assen during that

 9     time, and I think this is from the debriefing in Assen, and I think this

10     is only a part of my statement.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Can we perhaps see the last page of it.  If I'm

12     not mistaken, this is the third page.

13             THE WITNESS:  Yeah, this is the last page, I think, because this

14     statement was made after a telephone call and not signed, on the

15     2nd of October, I think.  But in my opinion it belongs to two or three

16     parts of the debriefing Srebrenica we gave.  In the first part of the

17     debriefing, we had interviewers who were not exactly aware about all the

18     abbreviations and the whole situation in the enclave, so -- and in that

19     debriefing I also told at the end that the big lines were correct but in

20     detail there could be a lot of mistakes because of the interviewers did

21     not exactly know what happened during that time, did not know exactly the

22     acronyms and all those kind of things.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  You see on the left side of the screen

24     handwriting, a signature.  Is that your signature?

25             THE WITNESS:  That's my signature.

Page 6854

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, you have heard the objection by

 2     Mr. McCloskey.  Can you give us further information about the purpose of

 3     tendering this?

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  The

 5     witness attended the meeting during which the UNPROFOR mandate was

 6     changed, as well as the agreement which was unilaterally changed by the

 7     UNPROFOR commander.  I would like that to be admitted.  The witness said

 8     that he signed the statement, he said that he stated that, and that's why

 9     I'm tendering this into evidence.

10             Besides, you can see that one side was being stopped by an

11     attempt to destroy everything within a one-kilometre zone.  Did UNPROFOR

12     have the right to do that?  Did they have the right to interfere and by

13     assisting one side, destroy the other side?  Was that the UNPROFOR

14     mandate indeed?  The witness did not want to respond; rather, he

15     suggested that I should ask others about that.  Thank you.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Rave, did you attend that meeting of the

17     11th of July, 1995?

18             THE WITNESS:  I think we are speaking about the meeting on the

19     10th of 1995 --

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  10th, yes.

21             THE WITNESS: -- in which Colonel Karremans announced the possible

22     air-strikes.

23             I also told that I'm willing to answer the question but I'm not

24     able to answer a question about decisions taken on the level of the UN --

25     sorry.

Page 6855

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I just wanted to know if you personally attended

 2     that meeting.

 3             THE WITNESS:  Yes, I attended the meeting.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

 5                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  This document will be received as an exhibit.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D128, Your Honours.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Of course, we can discuss at length if we need

 9     every document.  But on the other hand, this is a document signed by this

10     witness related to this case.

11             Please carry on, Mr. Tolimir.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

13             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   On page 853 in the Krstic case transcript, and that's the same

15     page where the same meeting is discussed, it says, and I quote:

16             "At that moment, outside of the postal office building, there

17     were a lot of armed men who carried rifles, machine-guns,

18     rocket-launchers, and hand-held rocket-launchers.  When we entered the

19     postal office building, the military and civilian authority members were

20     all there.  They were all wearing uniforms.  And there were a lot of them

21     who also carried arms."

22             My question to the witness based on what I have just read is

23     this:  Did you ask anybody among them where all those weapons had come

24     from?  How come they had so many weapons on them?  Thank you.

25        A.   No, we didn't ask that question.  And I also don't know -- well,

Page 6856

 1     I can imagine why we didn't ask that question, because there were a lot

 2     of other important things that happened at that moment.  The enclave was

 3     attacked.  So I think that's why we not even thought about it, at least I

 4     didn't think about it.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Did you send a report to your superior command in

 6     Sarajevo or in Zagreb about what you had seen in the postal office

 7     building and also about what had been said at the meeting in the postal

 8     office building?

 9        A.   I did not send a report because that was not up to me to do, but

10     I can imagine that Colonel Karremans, as battalion commander, sent a

11     message up in the chain of command.

12        Q.   Were they informed that you had promised or threatened that you

13     would destroy everything within a one-kilometre zone around Srebrenica?

14        A.   When you say "were they informed," I think you mean the higher

15     echelons.  As I stated before, I don't know what was in the report of

16     Colonel Karremans to the higher echelons, so I can't answer the question.

17        Q.   On page 857, lines 11 through 23, you explained some of the

18     events which took place on the 11th of July, and I quote:

19             "At that moment, we did not have any other option but to try and

20     take people to Potocari because Potocari was probably the only safe place

21     for us.  We realised that the VRS army had taken over Srebrenica, and

22     that's why we asked them to start moving to Potocari.  But there was a

23     problem there; they didn't want to leave the base because that was the

24     place where they felt safe.  And then at 2.00 air-strikes began.  There

25     were several aircrafts involved.  And I believe that after that the local

Page 6857

 1     population started trusting us a bit more because something had happened

 2     and they tried to move in the direction of Srebrenica."

 3             Based on what I have just read, my question is this:  Whose idea

 4     was it for you to take the population from the base where they were at

 5     the moment to the base in Potocari?  Just give us a name.  Thank you.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Before we receive an answer, I would like to know

 7     the page number of the Krstic transcript because it was not -- is not in

 8     our today's transcript.

 9             Mr. Gajic.

10             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, that's page 857,

11     lines 11 through 23.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

13             Mr. McCloskey.

14             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And could we check to see if -- that "moving in

15     the direction of Srebrenica" is correct.

16             THE WITNESS:  I can't see the document at all.

17             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I think, in the context, that might have been

18     Potocari.  But, again, I don't know.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It is P1004, page 857.  We should have that on

20     the screen.

21             Mr. Gajic.

22             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, maybe to save time,

23     just as Mr. Tolimir said, and I quote from the transcript page:

24             "They did try to move in the direction of Potocari."  That's what

25     Mr. Tolimir said.

Page 6858

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We need page 857.  Yes.  Thank you.

 2             Can you see that passage on the screen now.

 3             THE WITNESS:  Yes, I've got it.  Mr. Tolimir asked me the

 4     question to give him a name who decided to send the people up to

 5     Potocari.  Well, I can't give him a name.  I think it was something that

 6     grew during that time.

 7             The compound of Bravo Company was overcrowded, a lot of refugees

 8     were around the compound.  We were not able to bring the wounded who came

 9     from the hospital to the trucks on the compound of the Bravo Company to

10     put the wounded in the trucks and then bring them to Srebrenica, so we

11     had to do -- to Potocari.  We had to do something.  And I think it grew

12     and we all together decided - and all together I mean the commander of

13     the Bravo Company; Major Boering, who was there; and myself - that the

14     best way was to get refugees towards Potocari because there was much more

15     space than on the small compound in Srebrenica.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   So you can't give us any names.  But could you tell us whether

19     that was at the initiative of UNPROFOR representatives from the

20     Bravo Company that you just mentioned?  Just tell us that for the record,

21     please.

22        A.   Yeah, I think it was an initiative of the UNPROFOR to get the

23     people to the best place where they could stay.

24        Q.   Had you already prepared that Potocari base for the accommodation

25     of the civilian population that would be sent from the Bravo Company base

Page 6859

 1     to Potocari?

 2        A.   No, nothing was prepared.  The only thing I know is -- was that

 3     the base in Potocari was much bigger than the base in Srebrenica.  And I

 4     also don't think that we communicated with the base in Potocari, because

 5     a lot of refugees were already going in the direction of Potocari.  And

 6     the only thing we tried to do is to get the people from the compound,

 7     because they broke through the fences, also in that direction.

 8             On the compound in Srebrenica, we had no possibility to do

 9     anything else than dealing with refugees.  So our normal military jobs,

10     for example, going in or out with APCs, was not possible at that moment.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Who was it who transported people from the Bravo base

12     in Srebrenica?

13        A.   Most of the refugees went up to Potocari themselves, walking,

14     because we had no possibility to bring them.  We had some trucks at the

15     Bravo Company.  Most of the trucks were used to put wounded in, the

16     wounded from the hospital, to bring them up to Potocari.  The other

17     trucks that were there were practically taken over by the refugees.  They

18     climbed into it, could open the roofs, and then the drivers drove up to

19     Potocari.

20             At the end of -- no, in the middle of the afternoon, I think,

21     3.00 or 4.00, myself and Mr. Boering took a jeep because we couldn't do

22     anything more on the spot of the Bravo Company at that moment, we took a

23     jeep with a lot of refugees in it and also drove to Potocari.

24        Q.   And did you use that jeep to transport refugees?

25        A.   We used that jeep to take some elderly people who couldn't walk

Page 6860

 1     themselves, to bring them to Potocari.

 2        Q.   Thank you.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now play the video.  And

 4     let's see how refugees were being accommodated in the Potocari base.

 5             After that, I'll have questions for you, sir.  Thank you.

 6                           [Video-clip played]

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Aleksandar.  That's

 8     enough.

 9             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Whose trucks are these which brought the refugees, and who

11     organised this?

12        A.   Those were trucks who were at the spot of the Bravo Company and

13     went from the Bravo Company with the refugees, as you see most women and

14     children, towards Potocari.

15             As you can see, those trucks went into the compound and into the

16     factory where the headquarter of the battalion was stationed and also the

17     Charlie Company.  Only, I think, about 5.000 refugees were able to go to

18     the compound; the rest stayed outside the compound in the several

19     factories around the compound.

20        Q.   Can you tell us where the men were, because, as you mentioned, we

21     can only see women and children here?

22        A.   As you might have read in some of my statements or testimonies,

23     in the night from the 10th to the 11th, most of the men between 17 and

24     60 years old went in the north-western direction and left the town of

25     Srebrenica.  In the town stayed only women children, elderly men, or

Page 6861

 1     wounded.  Also in these trucks and also in our jeep we drove to Potocari

 2     were those kind of people, so elderly people or very young people.

 3        Q.   Can you tell us whether the UNPROFOR assumed the obligation to

 4     put up the women and children at their base in Potocari and to evacuate

 5     them, as requested by General Nikolai and Karremans that was conveyed to

 6     Mladic, while the men would go off with their weapons on foot from

 7     Srebrenica to Tuzla?

 8        A.   I think we are mixing up now some things.  We have to do it, I

 9     think, in my opinion, in the right sequence.  When the enclave fell in

10     the night, men with weapons on foot went from Srebrenica in a

11     north-western direction.  We didn't know where they went to at that

12     moment.  Then on the 11th, the VRS moved forward towards Srebrenica.  A

13     lot of refugees were going northward.  The best thing we could do to

14     provide them as much safety and security as possible was put them in the

15     vicinity of the compound or even on the compound in Potocari; although, I

16     also got the information that the VRS, and I don't really know how -- who

17     told this, that the refugees were not allowed to go onto the base in

18     Potocari.

19             So because of preventing that they would see that we let refugees

20     on the base, they made a whole in the fence in the south-eastern part of

21     the compound and the people, most of the refugees, went to the base, went

22     through the fence in the south-eastern part where the VRS in the northern

23     part not could see that they entered the compound.

24             And when you are talking about evacuation as requested by

25     General Nikolai, that is stated afterwards, because that's the first

Page 6862

 1     thing that was brought up by Colonel Karremans in the 8.00 meeting in the

 2     Hotel Fontana.  So between the starting of the flow of refugees from

 3     Srebrenica to Potocari, that's part one.  Then we got the invitation for

 4     a meeting or arranged the meeting that we -- was -- we discussed

 5     yesterday.  And then we went to Hotel Fontana, where Karremans told - and

 6     that was also new for me - that he had had contact with the

 7     General Nikolai to arrange an evacuation.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Since General Nikolai asked Colonel Karremans to

 9     organise an evacuation, was that before this scene that we are now

10     looking at?  And when exactly was this happening, this scene we are

11     seeing on the monitor now?

12        A.   I can't specifically answer that question because I was in the --

13     with the refugees and Colonel Karremans had telephone calls with, I

14     think, north-east command and BH command where General Nikolai was.  So I

15     think somewhere in the afternoon of the 11th General Nikolai and

16     Colonel Karremans had contact and discussed this, but I wasn't there, so

17     I can't answer this question.

18        Q.   To avoid mistakes on the record, just tell us, the refugees that

19     you transported in your vehicle from Bravo Company, were they all coming

20     on the 10th, or was it also on the 11th?

21        A.   It was only on the 11th.  On the 10th, nothing happened.  Of

22     course, people were walking around, but in the morning from the 11th,

23     people broke through the fence of the Bravo Company and after that, in

24     the end of the morning and the beginning of the afternoon, we tried to

25     get them off the compound in the direction of Potocari.  And after this,

Page 6863

 1     so on the 11th, you get the images from overcrowded trucks bringing

 2     refugees into the compound in Srebrenica.  The rest of the refugees are

 3     walking the road from Srebrenica to Potocari.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I'm not sure if you really mean Srebrenica.  You

 5     are recorded having said:

 6             "... after this, so on the 11th, you get the images from

 7     overcrowded trucks bringing refugees in toward the compound in

 8     Srebrenica."

 9             THE WITNESS:  Yes, in my opinion, it's the 11th that the video we

10     just saw, that the 11th in the afternoon, the trucks, the overcrowded

11     trucks, come to the compound in Srebrenica.  The left compound --

12     correction, it's the compound in Potocari.  Thank you.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  This is the reason why I asked you.

14             THE WITNESS:  Thanks.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.  That is corrected now.  Thank you.

16     Please carry on, Mr. Tolimir.

17             One question by Judge Mindua.

18             JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Yes, witness, you were there

19     during the evacuation of these people, evacuation to Potocari.  Now, I

20     would like to know what you felt.  Maybe you had the opportunity to talk

21     to some of these people.  What was their feeling at the time?  Did they

22     feel that they were leaving for good or that they would come back?  Did

23     they feel that they were leaving on their own volition or were they

24     forced to leave?  Were you able to talk to the people?

25             THE WITNESS:  I was not able to talk to the people at that moment

Page 6864

 1     because we hardly had no interpreters on the spot at that moment.  The

 2     attack was launched, and, of course, most of the people had experiences

 3     with attacks from the VRS towards them, so they had very bad experiences.

 4     And it was their free will to take what they could take and try to find a

 5     safe place to go.  For them, UNPROFOR was the only place in their mind

 6     where it was safe to go, because they still had the idea that we were

 7     able to protect them.

 8             And I don't know if they had the idea that they were leaving for

 9     good.  I think they just fled because an attack was launched.  Mortar

10     shells and grenades landed into the town of Srebrenica and for them that

11     was enough reason to try to flee.

12             JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.

13             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   A moment ago you said in one of your answers that Muslims from

15     the Bravo Company did not want to go to Potocari when you were trying to

16     persuade them, and you finally gained their confidence after the NATO

17     air-strikes and that is when they went to the Potocari base; is that

18     correct?

19        A.   That's correct.  A part of the refugees, of course, went in the

20     northern direction depending where they lived.  But when they were on the

21     compound of the Bravo Company, they didn't want to leave because they

22     felt safe over there.  We tried to convince them that we had to do our

23     job there and this was not the best place to be, but they didn't want to

24     leave.  One way or another, after the air-strikes took place, they got

25     the confidence, well, something is happening, let's go a little bit

Page 6865

 1     farther to the north.  At least that's my feeling with it.  And that was

 2     the reason why they went to Potocari.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Could you explain to the Trial Chamber whether

 4     Potocari is located in the centre of the demilitarised zone or on the

 5     outskirts of the demilitarised zone relative to the Bravo Company

 6     headquarters from which the refugees set out towards the base according

 7     to your advice?

 8        A.   The Potocari compound is located in the northern part of the

 9     enclave.  It's about 5 or 6 kilometres north of Srebrenica.  So north of

10     the base in Srebrenica from the Bravo Company.

11        Q.   Thank you.  We will not waste any more time on this.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see D20 in e-court.

13     Page 46, paragraph 4.13.  It's about the activities of the BH army during

14     the attack on the enclave.  That's written on the report based on

15     debriefing on events in Srebrenica.  We'd like to see paragraph 4.13.

16     That's page 46.  My legal advisor tells me it's on page 46.

17             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   We see it now.  It's the last but one paragraph.  You say:

19             "BH army soldiers complete with blue caps came within a distance

20     of 15 metres from one of the observation posts.  Resembling UN personnel,

21     they opened fire from this position in the direction of the BSA front

22     line so that it seemed as if the UN had opened fire.  In this way, they

23     attempted to draw fire from the Bosnian Serb army on the observation

24     point and thus involve DutchBat in the combat actions."

25             Then in paragraph that follows, you say:

Page 6866

 1             "It also happened that the BH army soldiers were not always

 2     recognisable as military personnel."

 3             And finally - we need to turn the page - the last quotation:

 4             "These men had been seen in uniform, fighting in the southern

 5     section of the enclave, were recognised by DutchBat personnel when the

 6     former had mingled in civilian clothing among the refugees moving from

 7     Srebrenica to Potocari or when they were on the compound in Potocari.

 8     Local women, known to be members of the BH army, were also seen later

 9     civilian clothing."

10             Would you tell us on what locations exactly were BH army soldiers

11     seen wearing UN insignia?

12        A.   First I want to state that this is a summary from several

13     debriefings.  I do not recognise this as my statements in this

14     debriefing.  But I can explain that I don't know exactly, even I don't

15     know if it's true, that BiH soldiers fought in UNPROFOR uniforms.  We had

16     rumours about this, but I have not seen them myself, and I can only tell

17     you that I heard the rumours that they did.

18             What I can tell you is that on several occasions we got reports

19     from the OPs that BiH men, not in uniform, were in the vicinity of our

20     OPs, firing to the VRS, tried to get fire on the UN OPs, to involve the

21     UN in fighting to the VRS.

22        Q.   In paragraph 414 in the last sentence, you say:

23             "Some local women" -- that's part of your debriefing.  It says:

24             "Some local women, known to be members of the BH army."

25             Now, my question is:  Did the DutchBat have information, did it

Page 6867

 1     have knowledge, that women were also members of the BH army?

 2        A.   First I want to state this is not my debriefing.  This is a

 3     summary.  And I don't think I gave this statement in my debriefing.  And,

 4     no, we had, at least I had, no information that women were members of the

 5     BiH army.

 6        Q.   In paragraph 4.14 that I quoted from, it says that the DutchBat

 7     personnel recognised some people who had been seen in uniform before

 8     fighting in the southern section of the enclave.

 9             My question is:  Did you know that there were such men, did you

10     see such men in Potocari as well?

11        A.   No, the same answer again.  This is not my statement, and I can't

12     remember that personnel what was recognised fighting in military clothes

13     in the southern part now showed up in civilian clothes in the Dutch

14     compound.

15        Q.   Thank you.  On page 850, line 21, and page 851, line 4 in the

16     transcript from the Krstic case, you said --

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  This is P1004.

18             MR. TOLIMIR: [No interpretation]

19        Q.   [Microphone not activated]

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Your microphone.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

22             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   "On the 10th of July, we took up blocking positions in the

24     southern section of Srebrenica, and as I told you, intending just to

25     block the road to Srebrenica, to stop the Bosnian Serb army, we had,

Page 6868

 1     again, discussions with Ramiz regarding freedom of movement which was a

 2     big problem because the VRS continued advancing.  We were looking for

 3     close-air support, but they told us it was not available, and we did not

 4     get it."

 5             Now, my question is:  Who gave you the order to take up the

 6     blocking positions you mentioned here?

 7        A.   I think that the commander of the second in command of DutchBat

 8     gave the order to the Bravo Company to take up blocking positions in the

 9     southern part.

10        Q.   Do you mean Franken?

11        A.   When I'm talking about the second in command of the battalion,

12     then I mean Mr. Franken; yes, that's correct.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Did soldiers and officers of the DutchBat on the

14     ground know that without an attack by the Bosnian Serb army against

15     UNPROFOR positions there could be no close-air support, in other words,

16     the bombing of Bosnian Serb army positions?

17        A.   Yes, I think this was common knowledge, and that was also

18     communicated by the battalion staff.  We were attacked, and this was one

19     of the things we discussed this morning before when Captain Hageman went

20     forward to see if the VRS attack went on.  He was shot at.  So he got a

21     confirmation that the UN was attacked, and that was enough for close-air

22     support.

23             And I can't exactly recall what happened the night before, from

24     the 10th to the 11th, how often UN personnel or vehicles were targeted.

25     But I can imagine that when battalion commander of the second -- or the

Page 6869

 1     second in command gave -- asked for close-air support, they are convinced

 2     that we were attacked, ourselves, so the UN battalion was attacked.

 3        Q.   Tell us, was the primary aim of taking up these blocking

 4     positions to provoke the BH army into attacking the UNPROFOR so that

 5     close-air support is obtained?

 6        A.   I think that taking the blocking positions was a new form of OPs.

 7     The only thing we could do, we did in the confrontation line, so in the

 8     line around the enclave, try to deter an attack.  So it was not to

 9     provoke the army, the BH army -- no, the VRS army, but only to deter the

10     attack and protect the people in the town of Srebrenica and the rest of

11     the enclave.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Did you, together with the order to take up blocking

13     positions, also get the so-called green order that the DutchBat engage

14     the VRS in combat?

15        A.   I did not get that order because I was not in the line of that

16     military operation.  We only had to deal as liaison officers with, in

17     this case, the BiH to create freedom of movement.  The rest of the

18     military operation was in the hands of the commander of the

19     Dutch Battalion, his second in command, and in the southern part, the

20     commander of the Bravo Company.  So I don't know exactly in what way the

21     military operation proceeded from blue to green.

22        Q.   [Microphone not activated]

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Judge Mindua wants to ask a question.

24             JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Mr. Tolimir, I do apologise, but I

25     think that this is rather confusing.

Page 6870

 1             Sir, the air-strikes.  The air-strikes were targeting the Army of

 2     the Republika Srpska at that stage; is that the case?

 3             THE WITNESS:  No, I think - at least I think you're looking at

 4     me; I have to answer the question, I think - I think we have to follow --

 5     we have to follow the right timetable in the night from the 10th to the

 6     11th of July.  The VRS was moving forward towards Srebrenica in the night

 7     the attack stopped.  Before it stopped - and I don't know exactly if that

 8     happened - air-strikes were recommended, but we didn't get the

 9     air-strikes.  I think that the air-strikes were asked by the battalion

10     because the battalion was attacked by the VRS.  This is the first part of

11     the air-strikes.

12             Then we get a night from the 10th to the 11th where it's rather

13     quiet.  And the next morning, the Captain Hageman goes forward in his

14     APC, is attacked again, and that was the reason for the battalion to ask,

15     again, for -- or air-strike or close-air support.

16             JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Very well.  It's very good that

17     you are giving us the different dates, the 10th and the 11th of July,

18     because I could not understand why, according to you, some members of the

19     Muslim or the Bosnian army were firing or shooting at the DutchBat and

20     why the DutchBat was recommending air-strikes against the Serbs because

21     they thought that the Serbs had shot at him.  In principle, the UNPROFOR

22     was supposed to be informed, and it must have known that sometime the

23     Bosnians were also shooting at them?

24             THE WITNESS:  Again, I think we are mixing up some things.  In

25     the night from the 10th to the 11th, we had not the idea that the Bosnian

Page 6871

 1     army in the enclave was shooting at us.  During that period, they

 2     prevented us to do our military job in the way we wanted.  We wanted the

 3     freedom of movement, to go forward, backward, and take new positions.

 4     They stopped us by pointing guns or even other weapons at us but did not

 5     shoot at us.  The only attack came from the VRS side, who went from the

 6     south to the north to the town of Srebrenica.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

 8             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes, I am -- there may be a translation issue

 9     in -- with French because as the witness just said, that is the only

10     evidence there has ever been of any targeting by the BiH on the -- on

11     UNPROFOR, is the killing of van Renssen and what the witness has just

12     described.  So if there's anything else that you've gotten, it's a

13     translation error, in my view.  Aside -- as -- so, I just wanted to make

14     that clear, as the witness did, I'm sorry I can't follow the French.

15             JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Yes, sir, just correct me if I'm

16     mistaken.  According to the Prosecutor, the Bosnians shot at the

17     UNPROFOR, just did it once, that's when the soldier van Renssen died.

18     But according to what you are telling us, in all the other cases it was

19     always the Serbs who shot at the UN, and sometimes there were

20     air-strikes; is that the case?

21             THE WITNESS:  Two things I want to say to this:  The Bosnian army

22     did not shoot our soldier; it was a civilian who killed the man.  That

23     was the only case that we were shot at by the BiH, in my opinion.  And

24     sometimes there were air-strikes in that case.  We never had air-strikes.

25     The only air-strikes we had were on the 11th at 2.00 in the afternoon

Page 6872

 1     with, I think, two airplanes for close-air support.

 2             JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, sir.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  But it remains quite unclear at the moment.  You

 4     said the soldier van Renssen was shot by a civilian.  I suppose a Muslim

 5     civilian.  Then you said:  "That was the only case that we were shot at

 6     by the BiH."

 7             THE WITNESS:  Excuse me, no, it's not by the BiH.  Shot at by the

 8     Muslims from the enclaves.  That's correct.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, that was the first confusion.

10             And the other, Judge Mindua asked you if only the VRS attacked

11     the UNPROFOR, the DutchBat, which was then the trigger for asking for

12     air-strikes; is that correct?

13             THE WITNESS:  That is correct.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Judge Nyambe has a question.

15             JUDGE NYAMBE:  I need a further clarification on the issue of who

16     shot the DutchBat soldier.  Correct me if I'm wrong, you were present at

17     the time when this soldier was shot?

18             THE WITNESS:  No, I was not on the spot when the soldier was

19     shot.  It happened when an APC from OP Foxtrot, I think, returned via a

20     dirt road to the big road in Srebrenica.  The local population, so the

21     Muslims, tried to stop the APC.  The people in the APC wouldn't stop.  At

22     that moment, either a hand-grenade was thrown or a gun was shot or a

23     pistol was shot, but at least the soldier was hit and died that same day.

24             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Do you know for sure that the hand-grenade or the

25     shot was shot by a civilian?

Page 6873

 1             THE WITNESS:  Yes, it was nobody in uniform, and that was the

 2     information we got.  So that's the only thing I can say for sure.  That's

 3     the information I've got.  I've not seen it myself.

 4             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Okay.  The second question I want to ask is

 5     page 49 of today's transcript, lines 20, just a clarification.

 6             "We were attacked, and this was one of the things we discussed

 7     this morning ..."

 8             You mean this morning or that morning when this happened?

 9             THE WITNESS:  I don't have the transcript, I think.

10             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Page 49, line 22, actually.  I just want a

11     clarification, which morning do you mean: this morning or a morning in

12     the past?

13             THE WITNESS:  I still don't have it on the screen, so.

14             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Okay.  I'll just read the context.

15             "We were attacked, and this is was one of the things we discussed

16     this morning before when Captain Hageman went forward to see if the VRS

17     attack went on.  He was shot at."

18             So I just want to clarify which morning you were talking about

19     there?

20             THE WITNESS:  Then I'm talking about the morning of the 11th.

21             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Thank you.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.

23             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Based on what you have just said in your answer to the Judges'

25     questions, how can you tell that fire was opened on an UNPROFOR member by

Page 6874

 1     a civilian as opposed to being opened by a soldier?  How do you know?

 2        A.   The manning of the APC reported that they were stopped by

 3     civilians and that one the civilians either threw the hand-grenade or

 4     shot.  So I only can quote the reports that came to me.  And I think it

 5     was even a verbal report.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Did Muslim soldiers in Srebrenica use civilian

 7     clothes to camouflage themselves and portray Srebrenica as being

 8     demilitarised?

 9        A.   During the whole period which we were there, so from January til

10     July, we dealed with the civilian and military authorities in the enclave

11     and that all the time we saw Muslim men walking around in military

12     clothes, that it was not allowed.  And I think we managed it for most of

13     the time not to see men in military clothes, so looking at military men

14     in the enclave.  At the end of our tour over there, so from, I think, the

15     9th or the 10th, we saw more men in military clothes, because at that

16     moment I think there was a real war going on and at that moment they

17     changed from civilians into members of the ABiH.

18        Q.   Thank you, in any case, for this answer of yours.  Was the Dutch

19     soldier killed with a dum-dum bullet?  And did civilians have any dum-dum

20     bullets, or was it only given to members of the army?

21        A.   You are telling me now that you are aware that there were dum-dum

22     bullets in the enclave; I don't know that they were there.  And as I

23     stated several times now, I don't know for sure if he was shot or hit by

24     a hand-grenade.  So more specific, dum-dum, no information about that.

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 6875

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the Court please produce D20,

 2     page 47, paragraph 4.15.  Thank you.

 3             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Please look at paragraph 15 and tell us whether it says here that

 5     the soldier was killed by a dum-dum bullet.  This is part of the

 6     debriefing about Srebrenica.

 7        A.   Well, I can read the same as you do.  I was not there.  I was not

 8     with the abduction of the soldier.  And I don't know this information.

 9             And when there's a medic, and I don't know if it's a medic or it

10     should be a doctor who does this kind of things, makes these statements;

11     and, again, this is a summary from several debriefings, I think, because

12     this is the end debriefing signed by the general [indiscernible].  This

13     is a summary.  And when you want an answer on this one, I think you have

14     to go into the separate debriefings and especially, in this one, from a

15     medic.

16        Q.   Thank you.  I'm happy with your answer.  During the critical

17     events, did the VRS cause the death of any UNPROFOR troops?

18        A.   No, we had no losses during that period.

19        Q.   Thank you.  And when it comes to UNPROFOR troops, did they open

20     fire on the firing lines of the VRS during the critical period?

21        A.   I think I have to make a little bit a statement to the former

22     point.  When we talk about the critical events, I think we talk about

23     critical events in the enclave, from the 9th or the 10th up to the 13th.

24             In that period, we took several times the blocking positions.

25     And I know for sure that the commander of the Dutch Battalion gave the

Page 6876

 1     order to fire overhead and not target the VRS during the attack, unless

 2     they were attacked themselves and they were in a lot of danger.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Judge Nyambe has a question.

 4             JUDGE NYAMBE:  I was just observing that you have not answered

 5     the last question, which was that did the VRS cause the death of any

 6     UNPROFOR troops?  Thank you.

 7             THE WITNESS:  I think in line 7 or line 6 I stated:

 8             "No, we had no losses during that period."

 9             So they didn't cause the death.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to thank Judge Nyambe.

12             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   In this case, Colonel Franken, who was the second in command in

14     Srebrenica, on the 1st July, 2010, on transcript page 347, line 6,

15     answered the question about an order having been issued by him.  That

16     must have been on the 9th of July.  And then on page 343, he explained

17     what the green order meant.  And I quote from line 16 through 19:

18             "The rules of engagement we were given as a UN unit specified the

19     use of weapons only in self-defence as one of the biggest problems, and

20     those were not applied anymore and we had to go back to the use of

21     weapons in engagement."

22             And then he continues to say:

23             "From the time when the green order was issued, we were in combat

24     with the VRS.  For us, the VRS was a target and vice-versa.  And that was

25     realistic and correct."

Page 6877

 1             And then on page 3848, lines from 1 through 6, Mr. Franken said

 2     the following, and I quote:

 3             "My mandate changed considerably from the moment when the

 4     United Nations had ordered me to defend Srebrenica, and that's why I

 5     issued the green order.  And after that rule of engagement and so on and

 6     so forth, all the restrictions on the use of arms disappeared because

 7     those rules went hand in hand with the order to defend something."

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Gajic, I assume that there are some

 9     corrections to be made.  The page numbers can't be correct.

10             MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] That's true, Your Honour.

11     Mr. Tolimir read the correct references, and those are page 3473, line 6;

12     3453, lines 16 through 19; and then from 23 through 25; and, finally,

13     transcript page 3484, lines 1 through 6.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

15             Mr. Tolimir, now your question for the witness.

16             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Are you familiar with the green order that Mr. Franken testified

18     about?  Was that communicated to all UNPROFOR members, since it deals

19     with the engagement or combat between UNPROFOR and the VRS?  And was that

20     communicated to you when you were issued order about blocking their

21     positions, because he said that that had taken place on the 9th?

22             Thank you.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  These were, in fact, three questions put

24     together, and this is quite complicated for a witness.  The first one:

25     Are you familiar with the green order that Mr. Franken testified about?

Page 6878

 1             THE WITNESS:  I will try to answer all the three questions.  I

 2     know there was a green order.  No, I've not seen the order myself.  I

 3     know that the order was given to the Bravo and Charlie Company

 4     commanders.  It was not communicated to us as liaison officers.

 5             And how to deal with this, the only thing I know is the last

 6     order to fire overhead and not target the VRS.  And it might be possible

 7     that Mr. Franken called blocking positions the places where the OPs

 8     positions were taken in the southern part, because the attack, of course,

 9     started on the 9th, and then we had to take positions, and you can call

10     them blocking positions, but they had to take the positions in the

11     southern part.  The only thing I know were the last blocking positions in

12     the town of Srebrenica.

13             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Do you know if UNPROFOR in Srebrenica had a mandate to defend

15     Muslims from VRS attacks and to change the balance of powers?

16        A.   I don't think we had the mandate to defend.  It was to -- of

17     course, the mandate was to protect the Muslims in the enclave.  The

18     mandate was to deter attacks.  And can you explain what you mean with "a

19     change of balance of powers"?

20        Q.   Thank you.  Let it be how you just explained it.  Did you have a

21     mandate to protect Muslims?

22        A.   I think the same mandate we had as protecting ourselves.  I can't

23     remember exactly what the mandate was, but I think when the life of a

24     Muslim was threatened - not only a life of a Muslim was threatened by

25     Serbs, also when Serbs were threatened by Muslim - I think we had a

Page 6879

 1     mandate to protect them because that's what we tried to do at least all

 2     of the time, to be partial and protect as well the Muslims inside the

 3     enclave and the Serbs outside of the enclave, by disarming Muslims in the

 4     enclave and, of course, by talking as much as possible with the VRS

 5     outside the enclave.

 6        Q.   The sides had given you the mandate to demilitarise the zone, and

 7     that mandate could not have been changed without a prior consent of the

 8     two sides.  In this particular case, issuing an order on opening fire on

 9     the VRS positions, did that mean that your mandate that you had been

10     given pursuant to the agreement was changed?

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think the witness has answered this question

12     already and in detail.  Please move on to a next topic.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

14             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Did you ever open fire on the Muslims when they threatened the

16     Serbs?  And did they indeed ever pose a threat to the Serbs outside of

17     the enclave?  Did they act from the inside of the enclave and pose threat

18     to the Serbs?

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Again, two questions put together in one

20     question.

21             THE WITNESS:  The first question, if you ever opened fire on the

22     Muslims when they threatened Serbs, no, we didn't.  And I don't know if

23     they -- if there was a threat to the Serbs outside.  Of course, we

24     discussed it several times because we got - and that's what I told you

25     several times - the information either from Mr. Nikolic or from the BiH

Page 6880

 1     in the enclave that both sides attacked each other.  And I don't have the

 2     information that Muslims from inside the enclave posed a threat to the

 3     Serbs outside the enclave.  The only thing I can give you with a lot of

 4     dates, when we got the information that fire fights were going on,

 5     especially in the Bandera Triangle, between BiH and VRS soldiers.

 6             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   You asked me what the balance of powers means, and I said the

 8     ratio forces or the ratio of powers.

 9             Let me rephrase my question and ask you this:  Did UNPROFOR

10     change the ratio of forces on the ground if they put all of their

11     military potentials in the service of one of the sides, and if NATO

12     forces were also put on the side of only -- of one of the sides as

13     Mr. Karremans announced in his report?

14        A.   I don't think that the ratio of forces on the ground put all the

15     military potential on one of the sides.  I think we tried to deter the

16     attack of the VRS with our potential, and we kept on talking as much as

17     possible to the BiH to prevent that they were attacking the VRS.

18             No, I don't think that we changed our mindset and gave more

19     potential to one or the other sides.  Of course, when you are attacked, I

20     think at that moment most of your potential is towards your attacker.

21     And, of course, when you are attacked, then I think that when

22     Colonel Karremans - and I don't know what report you are referring to -

23     but when Colonel Karremans is asking for air-strikes or air support,

24     well, he will do that because he wants to stop the attacking party.

25        Q.   Did the commander change the mandate by asking NATO to destroy

Page 6881

 1     all targets within one kilometre in Srebrenica?  Did that change the

 2     balance of power?

 3        A.   I don't know exactly how and where and when Colonel Karremans

 4     asked this.  I don't think that he asked for air support to destroy a

 5     square kilometre in the enclave, so it's difficult for me to answer that

 6     question again.  I think the commander did not change the mandate.  I

 7     think he asked in the chain of command for military support, just to

 8     deter and attack from the VRS towards the enclave.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We have received this answer several times

10     already.  Mr. Tolimir, we must have the second break now, and you should

11     be advised you should try to finish your cross-examination today.  You

12     have used more than five hours up to now, and there are three-quarters of

13     an hour left.  Are you able to finish your cross-examination today?

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  I can

15     finish, as long as the witness stops giving answers that are four times

16     as long as the question and if he stops talking beside the point.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, you have another opportunity to

18     shorten the cross-examination if you put a question only once and not

19     several times.  It is up to the witness to answer the question and the

20     way he can provide you with an answer.  Not all of your questions are to

21     be answered with yes or no.  This is a very normal situation.  Sometimes

22     an answer needs an explanation.  Try to focus on your question and don't

23     repeat it so many times.  You should try to finish today.

24             We adjourn now and resume at 1.00.

25                           --- Recess taken at 12.33 p.m.

Page 6882

 1                           --- On resuming at 1.02 p.m.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, Mr. Tolimir.  Please carry on.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I kindly ask the

 4     electronic courtroom to show P1008.  It's a transcript of the video of

 5     the first meeting at Fontana Hotel.  Page 16 in Serbian and page 7 in

 6     English.

 7             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   We see that General Mladic says -- it's the last paragraph we see

 9     here.  After the question on weapons, I quote General Mladic:

10             "What do you want?  You asked for a meeting, now, let me hear

11     you."

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, I'm not sure we have the right

13     English page on the screen.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 19 in English.  That's what my

15     legal advisor says.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It is indeed different from page 7.  Thank you.

17             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   So General Mladic says:

19             "You asked for a meeting, so let me hear what you have to say."

20             Colonel Karremans says:

21             "I spoke to General Nikolai two hours ago and with the national

22     authorities about the request on behalf of the population.  It's a

23     request because I'm not in a position to demand anything.  The Sarajevo

24     command said the enclave was lost, and I got orders from the UNPROFOR

25     command for Bosnia to take care of the refugees.  At this moment in the

Page 6883

 1     camp at Potocari I have 10.000 -- approximately 10.000 women and

 2     children, and the BH command for Bosnia requests to negotiate the

 3     conditions of evacuating these people.  There are several women who speak

 4     English, and what I've heard from all the soldiers who are now working

 5     to, let's say, ease the pain for the population, is that there are --

 6     they want to leave the enclave."

 7             First, how did Karremans get these requests from General Nikolai

 8     and from the command, and how did he hear about these requests and wishes

 9     of the population, do you know?

10        A.   I don't know, but I think that he got the request from

11     General Nikolai by a telephone call, because it was the only way to

12     communicate and to talk with him.  And I don't know if he already at that

13     moment -- he is stating it, so it will be true, but if he already at that

14     moment had the information that people would like to leave the enclave.

15        Q.   Since that's what he says, he says that some women speak English

16     and he presents that request, was he conveying the wish of the civilian

17     population at that first meeting with General Mladic at the Fontana Hotel

18     that you attended?

19        A.   I don't know he was speaking for the civilian population.  What I

20     can tell you, that in the months before we had several plans from the VRS

21     side that they gave us the opportunities to evacuate people from the

22     enclave, that they were free to go.  Sometimes we managed to have talks

23     and create situations that we even knew what people would like to leave

24     the enclave and who would like to go.  All the times it stopped and there

25     were no clearances to let people out of the enclave.

Page 6884

 1             I don't know if Karremans is referring to all those things that

 2     happened in advance, but at that moment I don't know if he was able to

 3     speak to refugees on the compound, because I saw Colonel Karremans just

 4     before we left the compound in Potocari towards the Hotel Fontana, so

 5     that might be half an hour, three-quarters of an hour before.  So I don't

 6     know where he got this information from.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  He says, speaking to General Mladic:

 8             "But I heard from my soldiers who are working to ease the pain of

 9     the people is that they are waiting for buses in order to be able to

10     leave the enclave."  Doesn't this show that he is conveying what he heard

11     from his soldiers who are in direct contact with the civilians?

12        A.   Yeah, of course it could be a wish that buses would come, or even

13     trucks would come, or maybe even an airplane or helicopters to take them

14     out.  I think that most of the people want to be evacuated.  And, of

15     course, most -- one of the most reasonable things is to do this in a bus.

16             I don't know what soldiers are working to ease the pain, where

17     they got the information from, but I can imagine that a lot of people

18     asked to be evacuated, because all the time people wanted to leave the

19     enclave, wanted to go to safe areas, and wanted to go to freedom.

20        Q.   Is it now clear that the first meeting was initiated by Karremans

21     who addressed Mladic with these requests?  Because you said at first it

22     was not clear to you.  Isn't it now clear from this transcript that it is

23     Karremans who asked for the meeting?  And Mladic indeed says, What do you

24     want, you asked for a meeting?

25        A.   The only thing I know in this transcript is that General Mladic

Page 6885

 1     is telling Colonel Karremans that he asked for a meeting, so I can

 2     imagine that it's true.

 3        Q.   I did not quite understand.  Could you repeat that?  Did you mean

 4     Karremans asked for a meeting or Mladic?

 5        A.   In the transcript is that General Mladic stated that

 6     Colonel Karremans asked for a meeting, so I can imagine that it is true.

 7     But in the same meeting and in the meetings afterwards, I heard several

 8     promises and talks from General Mladic that seemed not to be true and

 9     promises not be kept, so for me this is just a statement on a piece of

10     paper.

11        Q.   Thank you for saying for the record which one of them asked for a

12     meeting.

13             My next question has to do with the selection of Mr. Mandzic as

14     representative of the civilian population.  On page 883, lines 8

15     through 13 of the transcript of the Krstic case, you said, I quote --

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, I want to interrupt you.  The first

17     sentence is not correct, when you say:

18             "Thank you for saying for the record which one of them asked for

19     a meeting."

20             This witness didn't say that.  The witness said he can read on

21     the record that Mladic is quoted that he said you asked for a meeting.

22     This witness denied knowledge about the fact who asked for the meeting.

23     This is a misstatement.  Please be careful with that and carry on.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I read the transcript based on the

25     video footage shown to the witness.  I just asked him because he used the

Page 6886

 1     pronoun "he," which one asked for a meeting.  I wanted the name instead

 2     of the pronoun "he" on the record.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  You got the answer.  And please carry on.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 5             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   On page 883, lines 8 through 13 of the Krstic transcript, you

 7     said, I quote:

 8             "We knew Mr. Mandzic because we had seen him several times in the

 9     secondary school in Srebrenica and we thought he would be a good

10     representative if he were willing to do it for us.  We asked him, and he

11     said he was ready to come with us."

12             Now, did any one of the representatives of the VRS force Mandzic

13     to be a representative of the refugees, and had he been in any contact

14     with the VRS before he was elected representative?

15        A.   I don't know if he was in contact with the VRS.  I know that he

16     knows a lot of people living in the area who might be now members of the

17     VRS, so before the war or maybe in the beginning of the war he might have

18     been in contact with the VRS people.  During the time we were in the

19     enclave, I don't have the information that Mr. Mandzic was in contact

20     with the VRS and -- because Mr. Mandzic was selected by us.  He was not

21     forced to be selected or elected as a representative.

22        Q.   Thank you.  This will suffice.  I have to shorten my questioning

23     on this subject.

24             We are moving on to the second meeting at the Fontana Hotel.  At

25     the second meeting at the Fontana Hotel, General Mladic talked to

Page 6887

 1     Mr. Mandzic.  And on page 887, lines 10 through 13, you said, I quote:

 2             "We were talking in general terms and Mladic explained to Mandzic

 3     that the civilian population had to choose who wants to go where when

 4     they leave the enclave.  It was also a possibility for them to stay, but

 5     I don't think it was a realistic option."

 6             On page 883, line 2, you say:

 7             "It was a calm conversation."

 8             Now, my question is:  Since you're talking about a meeting where

 9     you yourself were present, did Mladic in any way threaten or humiliate

10     Mr. Mandzic in the presence of other negotiators including you?

11        A.   I have here my notes from that meeting.  About 2315 he shows us a

12     shield from the opstina he had taken, and he has a relaxed talk with the

13     director of the school, in this case, I mean Mr. Mandzic.

14             At 2322, there's a statement from Mr. Mandzic towards Mr. Mladic

15     in Serbo-Croatian.  And after that a statement from Mladic.  In that

16     statement, he has - and that's what I read from my notes now - a mean

17     look in his eyes, and he's accusing Mladic from -- Mandzic from several

18     things.  I can't specify this any more or any further because I have no

19     more notes.  But the only thing I added to it: it's the old story and the

20     old history.  So I think accusing each other about committing crimes and

21     all those kind of things.

22             Of course, this was the Serbo-Croatian statement of

23     General Mladic, which I could only follow and look but I couldn't

24     understand it, of course, because there was no translation for me because

25     it was a statement from General Mladic towards Mr. Mandzic.

Page 6888

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Just for the record --

 2             THE WITNESS:  And I think, the second part of the question, if

 3     Mr. Mandzic was threatened or humiliated, well, I think the way in which

 4     General Mladic talked to him was very humiliating, and I think that all

 5     the things that he told him, what I saw from the videos later on, that he

 6     put the future of the Muslim people in the enclave in the hands of

 7     Mr. Mandzic.  And I just have to remember now, I think he even threatened

 8     him that they had the possibility to disappear completely.  But then we

 9     should look at the video again because I don't know exactly, but that's

10     the feeling I've got now.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Just for the sake of the record, the passage, the

12     quotation on page 67, line 18, it was a calm conversation.  It's not to

13     be found on page 883, but 888 of the Krstic transcript, P1004.

14             Please carry on.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President, for this

16     correction.  I don't have the time or the intention to watch the video

17     again, as the witness asks.  There is a transcript, and the video is

18     available.

19             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   I just want to ask the witness if he can remember any other

21     threatening word from Mladic except his words "you can survive or

22     disappear, your fate is in your hands"?

23        A.   No, at this moment this is the only thing that's in my mind now

24     from the videos I've seen.  And, of course, as I stated, the statements

25     of Mladic were in Serbo-Croatian, so I couldn't understand them.

Page 6889

 1        Q.   Thank you.  If Mladic says to Mandzic, Your fate is in your

 2     hands, you can survive or disappear, on whom does it depend whether they

 3     will survive or disappear?

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

 5             MR. McCLOSKEY:  This is very important to get this right.  That's

 6     not what was said.  He needs -- and let's hope it's a translation issue,

 7     but what he said was, "the fate of your people is in your hands."  And so

 8     by misquoting it, he is not taking us anywhere; in fact, he's confusing

 9     the record.  So he needs to get this right.  He's not -- he's speaking

10     about the fate of your people is in your hands, they are the ones that

11     will survive or disappear.  So take his time and get it right.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.  Please rephrase your question and put

13     it to the witness.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Prosecutor.

15             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   If Mladic said exactly as the Prosecutor says, and I have no

17     reason to doubt it, the fate of your people is in your hands, you can

18     survive or disappear, on whom did it depends whether they would survive

19     or disappear?

20        A.   I think at that moment it was clear that everything was in the

21     hands of General Mladic.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Why was then Mladic saying, Your fate or the fate of

23     your people is in your hands, you can survive or disappear?  Aren't these

24     two options on an equal footing; aren't they two equal alternatives?

25        A.   I don't think so.  In my opinion, it's just a real threat from

Page 6890

 1     Mladic towards Mr. Mandzic.  He is giving him no opportunity, although

 2     Mandzic tried to explain that he is not able to do all the things that he

 3     could do, and he could not accept that the fate of his people are in his

 4     hands now because he has no means to do anything for his people, only

 5     follow the orders of the General Mladic.  Because there was no

 6     discussion, it was just dictating, This is the way we are going to do it.

 7     And, of course, you can make a nice present of it, but at the end, it's

 8     just a dictation of orders.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  I will leave it to the Trial Chamber to decide

10     whether it was indeed "diktat" or whether Mladic was speaking indeed in a

11     threatening tone or a peace-loving tone.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the electronic courtroom

13     please show 1D350.

14             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   This is part of your statement, page 5.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see page 5 in Serbian.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  This is now Exhibit D127.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I asked for 1D350.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  And this is now D127.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  In English it's page 4.

21     I can't remember what is indeed an exhibit and what's still on the

22     65 ter.

23             The witness is able to view it now, and I will read in my own

24     language.

25             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

Page 6891

 1        Q.   1200 hours:

 2             "At 1200 hours C-5 Boering and Rave were supposed to go to

 3     Bratunac to talk about evacuation.  The idea was to gain time."

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We need the next page in English.

 5     My assistant tells me it's not the right page now.  I asked page -- for

 6     page 5.  Next page.  It's in the first paragraph.  It's just one

 7     sentence.

 8             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   "The idea was to gain time in this way."

10             Have you read the sentence?

11             "The purpose of this" - the interpreter found it in the text -

12     "was to delay proceedings."

13             The sentence begins:  "At 1230 hours ..."

14             My question, based on this, is:  Did the Dutch Battalion use

15     negotiations to gain time?  And in such a humanitarian situation with a

16     large number of people accumulating in Potocari, why was it necessary to

17     play for time?  Wasn't that prolonging the evacuation at the expense of

18     the civilian population?

19        A.   I don't know in what direction this is going, because DutchBat

20     had lost the war at that moment with -- the negotiations were ordered to

21     us.  We didn't try to gain time.  The only thing we tried in the

22     negotiations to get information about the situation to improve the

23     situation for the civilian population.

24             In the session of 11.00 in the evening before, we talked about

25     food, medevac, UNHCR, diesel, buses, time schedules, and all those kind

Page 6892

 1     of things.  There were no specific answers on all those questions.  The

 2     next morning, there was a negotiation between DutchBat and the three

 3     representatives of the Muslim population.  I was not present, myself,

 4     over there.  And, again, I got, afterwards, the information that no

 5     specific deals were made.

 6             So at 12.00, after Karremans and Boering returned to the

 7     compound, Mr. Boering and myself got the order to go to Bratunac to the

 8     Hotel Fontana to see if there was anybody available to give us time

 9     schedule and to give us information how to proceed, because the problem

10     of the buses and all those kind of things were still not arranged.

11             When we came in the Hotel Fontana, there was nobody over there.

12     Within a short period of time, Mr. Nikolic and Kosoric showed up.  They

13     were a little bit confused that we were there.  And at that moment they

14     told us that we had to go back to the compound because buses were already

15     there.

16             So I don't think that DutchBat in any way tried to delay the

17     whole situation, but tried to improve the situation for the civilian

18     population.  And the problem was that we only could ask.  And for the

19     rest, General Mladic dictated how it should happen.  And that what we

20     saw.  When buses arrived, we had no influence at all how to arrange it,

21     although there was an appointment that when the evacuation should start,

22     first sick and wounded people would go out; after that, elderly people;

23     and after that, women and children.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Since you have used up the time during which you were

25     supposed to answer my several next question -- I just quoted from your

Page 6893

 1     statement, I didn't add a word of my own.  On page 897, line 15, to

 2     page 898, line 5 in the Krstic case, you describe the events on the

 3     12th of July, 1995, and you say the following, and I quote:

 4             "Of course, the refugees were scared to death.  When they saw the

 5     buses, that was a sign for them that they would be taken to a safe place,

 6     and that's why they hurried to the buses.  And let's get on the buses as

 7     soon as possible, I'll go first.  There were some references as to how we

 8     would board the buses.  Mr. Mandzic insisted on the sick getting on the

 9     buses the first and then women."

10             Did I properly quote you, and was it Mr. Mandzic who said that

11     the sick and the wounded would go first and that they would be followed

12     by women and the elderly?

13        A.   It was part of the negotiations in what sequence people would be

14     evacuated from the enclave.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Was Mr. Mandzic the one who decided on the sequence,

16     and the sequence being first the elderly and then the women?  Or was it

17     somebody else who made that decision?

18        A.   I think it was already a discussion on the evening of the 11th in

19     the second meeting about the sequence we would use.  After that, there

20     was a meeting with the civilian representatives, Mr. Nuhanovic, and

21     Camila - I don't know exactly her name - but -- and we talked about it,

22     and in our opinion, so from the civilian population, the representatives,

23     and DutchBat, it was the most normal sequence to follow.  First of all

24     the elderly and the sick, then women and children.

25             And, of course, when you plan an operation like this, evacuating

Page 6894

 1     or deportating [sic] so many people, then you have to make a nice time

 2     schedule, planning, and you have to communicate with all the people who

 3     are involved.  When you don't tell people who are involved what you are

 4     going to do and you surprise them with 15 buses and then open a gate and

 5     give scared people the possibility to run into buses because that's their

 6     goal, they want to go away from the terrible situation they were in, then

 7     I think you create a problem yourself, and I think that problem was not

 8     caused by the UN Battalion over there, nor by the civilian population.

 9        Q.   Thank you for the answer that you have just provided.  I have no

10     more time, therefore I'll skip a few questions that you've already

11     answered for that matter.

12             I'm just going to mention those things that you, yourself, said.

13     In your answers, you mentioned Camila and you said that you didn't know

14     her last name.  Did you mean Camila Omanovic, per chance?

15        A.   I'm look at my notes now.  Yes, Camila Omanovic; that's correct.

16        Q.   Thank you.  On page 914, line 22, and 915, line 3 in the Krstic

17     case, you described a situation on the 13th of July involving

18     Camila Omanovic and her brother, and I quote your words:

19             "Camila Omanovic broke down on that day.  Her brother was also in

20     the base.  He was a cook for the Medecins Sans Frontieres, and he was

21     also on the list of our local staff.  He had the possibility to leave

22     with us.  He was very frightened as to what would happen.  He was so

23     scared that he carried a rope in his pocket and he said that he would

24     hang himself the moment the Serbs entered the base."

25             Did you inform anybody about what you heard from Camila's

Page 6895

 1     brother, the one who worked for the Medecins Sans Frontieres?  Thank you.

 2        A.   Yes, I did.  Our medical personnel from the hospital were aware

 3     of this situation, command of DutchBat, and also the second in command,

 4     Mr. Franken, were aware of the situation, so I think most important

 5     people who should know what was going on were aware of this.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Did they take any measures to prevent the gentleman

 7     in question, Camila's brother, from following up on those words and

 8     hanging themselves with that piece of rope in his pocket?

 9        A.   I don't know exactly what preventive measures they took.  I spoke

10     several times to the brother of Camila.  He would not hand over the rope.

11     But I think that at the end we managed that he was on a list of the local

12     personnel, just as the rest of the MSF.  And Serb soldiers did not come

13     on the compound to get him or to take him away, so I think we solved the

14     problem, and he managed to go out of the enclave with the battalion.

15        Q.   Could you please tell us whether the situation involving Camila's

16     brother had any impact on Camila and the way she felt?  Because you

17     yourself said that Camila Omanovic had broken down on that day.  Could

18     her brother's situation be the cause of her nervous breakdown on that

19     day?

20        A.   I'm not a doctor, but I think, just as a normal human being,

21     thinking that Camila was in a terrible situation, was with us to

22     General Mladic, saw the hopeless situation and -- so that we didn't get

23     the results we wanted.  Then, of course, she saw the situation of her

24     brother and I think that should be enough in the situation they were in

25     to have a breakdown.  It's not only for Camila; I think that was for a

Page 6896

 1     lot of people inside the enclave.

 2        Q.   Could Camila also leave the enclave?  Hadn't she been offered by

 3     General Mladic that he himself would transfer both her and her daughters?

 4     Do you know anything about that?

 5        A.   No, I don't know about that, but for me that's just words from

 6     General Mladic.  And as I stated before, General Mladic promised me what

 7     would happen with a lot of people and a lot of men who were brought out

 8     of the enclave in buses and who should have been brought to Bijeljina to

 9     a prisoner of war camp and eventually being exchanged with Serb prisoners

10     of war, nothing of that came out.  So I think that if Camila - and now

11     I'm speaking for her, I think - did not trust General Mladic, I think she

12     was right.

13        Q.   Thank you.  I'm asking you whether you know if Camila left

14     Srebrenica and arrived in the territory under the control of the BiH army

15     to which everybody was being evacuated?  When she arrived there, was she

16     in a good state, was she healthy and sane?

17        A.   I know that she was able to leave the enclave.  I don't know in

18     what way she left the enclave, because I think in 1999 I met her in

19     Holland and she was not very willing to speak to me about the way she

20     left the enclave, but at that moment - in 2000, excuse me - in 2000 she

21     was in very good shape.  And I don't know in what shape she was when she

22     left the enclave.

23        Q.   So five years after she had left the enclave you met her in

24     Holland; right?

25        A.   Yes, that's correct.

Page 6897

 1        Q.   Did you hear anything about her brother on that occasion?  Did

 2     she tell you anything?

 3        A.   Yes.  After we returned in 1995 from Srebrenica, I went several

 4     times to Bosnia for other missions and I was able to visit Srebrenica, I

 5     think, in 2000.  And also in 2000, I met her brother, who was living in

 6     Srebrenica in his own house again.  He was one of the brave men, I think,

 7     as a Muslim, returning so short after the war to his own house and

 8     starting up building the town of Srebrenica again.

 9        Q.   Thank you for the answers you have provided.  Thank you for

10     coming here to testify in my case.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I would like to

12     thank everybody who have been listening to us for the past few days.  I

13     would like to thank the interpreters who have invested a lot of effort

14     into interpreting properly what we have tried to cover at a high speed

15     without making any pauses.  I would like to thank everybody that has

16     helped me to bring this testimony to an end.  As far as I'm concerned,

17     this concludes the cross-examination of this witness within the dead-line

18     planned.

19             As for the questions that I did not put to this witness, there

20     will be witnesses coming from the same contingent that Mr. Rave was a

21     member of, and I will put my questions to them.  Thank you.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

23             Mr. McCloskey, do you have re-examination?

24             Before you get the floor, Judge Nyambe has a question.  Sorry for

25     that.

Page 6898

 1             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Just one small question for the witness.  At

 2     page 73, line 20 to 21, you are recorded as saying:

 3             "It was part of the negotiations in what sequence people would be

 4     evacuated from the enclave."

 5             Right?

 6             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

 7             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Was this sequence agreed at these negotiations,

 8     the one that was followed at the actual evacuation of the people?

 9             THE WITNESS:  During the negotiations, we could not make any

10     clear appointments.  And at the end, the things we wanted and the

11     sequence of the evacuation did not take place in the way we wanted it and

12     we planned it and we discussed it, at least.  Because I tell you all the

13     time that we were negotiating.  It was not negotiating; it was demanding

14     and further on getting orders how it would -- how it would be done.

15             JUDGE NYAMBE:  What was the sequence that was arrived at, at the

16     negotiations?

17             THE WITNESS:  First the wounded, then the elderly and the sick

18     people, then women and children.

19             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Thank you.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

21             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I have probably 20 minutes.  I might clear up one

22     last point, I think, there on Judge Nyambe's questions.

23                           Re-examination by Mr. McCloskey:

24        Q.   You mentioned, I think, two negotiations: negotiations between

25     you and the Muslim representatives and then negotiations between you and

Page 6899

 1     the VRS and Mladic.  You just said there was no real negotiations.  Which

 2     one were you referring to when you said there was no real negotiations,

 3     just orders, et cetera?

 4        A.   The negotiations with General Mladic.

 5        Q.   Okay.  So the negotiations you had with the Muslim

 6     representatives about, among other things, the order and the evacuation,

 7     was that more of a real negotiation, if you recall?

 8        A.   Yes, it was a real negotiation.  It was talking about

 9     possibilities and non-possibilities, how to go on.

10        Q.   All right.  Thank you.

11             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I hope that clears up that issue.  And I have

12     about 15 or 20 more minutes.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I tried to figure out, in the mean time, if we

14     can have 15 minutes' extended sitting today, if everybody would agree,

15     that we could finish with this witness.  Or do you prefer to continue

16     tomorrow morning?

17             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I could go on, but it would be probably neater

18     and my references to the B/C/S pages and the English pages of things

19     would be neater.  We might save some time that way.  I've managed to try

20     to collect that as I go, but -- and we would be able to provide the

21     Defence with most of the documents I intend to use as well.

22             I hate to keep the witness one more day, but it looks like that's

23     where we are.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Okay.  In that case, we should adjourn for today

25     and resume tomorrow morning at 9.00 in this courtroom.

Page 6900

 1             You have to come back, I'm sorry for that, but I hope you can

 2     finish quite early tomorrow morning.

 3             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We adjourn and resume tomorrow at 9.00 in this

 5     courtroom.

 6                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.47 p.m.

 7                           to be reconvened on Thursday, the 28th day of

 8                           October, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.