1 Thursday, 19 May 2011
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.
5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Good morning to everybody in the courtroom.
6 If there are no procedural matters, the witness should be brought
7 in, please.
8 [The witness takes the stand]
9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Good morning, sir. Please sit down.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.
11 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness's microphones be turned on,
13 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Welcome back to the courtroom. I have to remind
14 you that the affirmation to tell the truth still applies.
15 Mr. Tolimir is continuing his cross-examination.
16 Mr. Tolimir.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
18 I'd like to greet everyone present. May there be peace in this
19 house and may these proceedings of today and in general be concluded
20 according to God's will and not my own.
21 WITNESS: MANOJLO MILOVANOVIC [Resumed]
22 [Witness answered through interpreter]
23 Cross-examination by Mr. Tolimir: [Continued]
24 Q. I would like to greet Mr. Milovanovic and I wish him a pleasant
25 stay in the courtroom with us. Thank you.
1 General, yesterday, for the most part, we discussed the cessation
2 of hostilities and parts of activities related to it. We'll have a look
3 at a number of documents, including some OTP documents.
4 In order to conclude the topic, please tell us this. Did we, in
5 the Main Staff, mainly receive requests on the passage of humanitarian
6 convoys so that we could provide appropriate security at check-points for
7 their passage? And did we have the right to stop and check the contents
8 of such convoys along the route?
9 A. According to an initial agreement that was reached in the first
10 half of 1992, it was agreed between the UNPROFOR BiH command and the
11 Main Staff that humanitarian aid convoys can traverse RS territory to
12 finally reach Muslim or Croat-held territory. However, as far as I was
13 concerned, they had to have been announced at least 24-hours in advance.
14 That announcement should also contain the route, the proposed route of
15 the convoy, the contents, those in charge of the convoy, and it was our
16 obligation, just before they left the RS and entered the Muslim-Croat
17 coalition territory, to carry out a check. At first, some tests runs
18 were performed means that those in charge of the check-point could decide
19 whether each and every vehicle would be inspected or whether that could
20 be done at random. He may well have chosen a single vehicle in the whole
21 convoy. It all functioned properly until sometime in the middle of the
22 war. Actually, it functioned until the safety areas or the enclaves were
24 Later on, we began seeing that some vehicles were transporting
25 unannounced goods or those goods that were not permitted. We increased
1 our checks, and we always cautioned UNPROFOR about what was going on. So
2 sometime in mid-1994 when the enclaves were in full operation, our
3 inspections were very strict. In addition to those inspections, if there
4 were any aircraft involved, they were always told to land somewhere near
5 Sokolac, if their final destination was one of the enclaves. Sometimes
6 convoys were even returned if we discovered ammunition, weapons, or
7 impermissible goods.
8 Therefore, General, there was agreement in place on the passage
9 of convoys until UNPROFOR, whose only obligation was to escort those
10 convoys, began making mistakes.
11 Q. Thank you, General. I believe everyone understood what you just
12 said. I have just a short follow-up question.
13 Were humanitarian aid convoys approved by the coordination body
14 of the RS and did the VRS approve and check only UNPROFOR convoys? This
15 is to be able to note the difference between humanitarian aid convoys and
16 UNPROFOR convoys.
17 A. General, I'm not quite familiar who each convoy belonged to.
18 What I know is that I was asked to cease all combat activity if it was
19 along the route of humanitarian convoys. Humanitarian aid convoys were
20 UNHCR convoys but they were escorted by UNPROFOR. As for UNPROFOR
21 convoys, which were there to supply things for their own troops, that's a
22 different matter. They could transport such goods as ammunition, if
23 needed by their troops. However, we had problems there too. Once the
24 safety area of Gorazde was established --
25 Q. Thank you. But let's deal with the convoys first.
1 A. Yes, there were two different convoys. Humanitarian aid convoys
2 and UNPROFOR convoys aimed at UNPROFOR troops within the enclaves.
3 Q. Thank you.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let's look at P689, please. It
5 should be page 726. It's a decision on the formation of a state
6 committee for cooperation with international organisations, including
7 international humanitarian organisations.
8 Thank you.
9 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
10 Q. You can see the Official Gazette in which the decision was
11 published. Let's have a look at the next page in the Serbian, as well as
12 in English.
13 Here it says decision on the formation of state committee for
14 cooperation with the UN and international organisations. I wanted to
15 read out Article 1.
16 "Hereby a state committee is formed with cooperation with
17 United Nations and international humanitarian organisations. The
18 president -- or the representative -- no. The president of the republic
19 appoints the president, deputy president and members of the committee by
20 special decree.
21 Article 2: "The committee is hereby formed with the aim of
22 improving cooperation with the United Nations ..."
23 And in Article 5, we see who the members of the committee were.
24 Actually the working bodies of the committee.
25 Let's look at the next page to see those. Thank you.
1 Can you please move the text to the left. That was it.
2 It is on the next page in English, towards the bottom of the page
3 it says: "Decision on the appointment of representatives. President and
4 members of the state committee for cooperation with the UN and
5 international humanitarian organisations."
6 Could we please go to the next page in English. It says here
7 that "Professor Nikola Koljevic, deputy president of Republika Srpska is
8 hereby appointed president of the state committee for cooperation with
9 the UN and international humanitarian organisations.
10 "Maxim Stanisic is hereby appointed deputy president of the state
11 committee for cooperation with the UN and international humanitarian
13 What follows are the nine members of the committee. In number 7
14 there seems to be a military man, Colonel Milos Djurdjic. You mentioned
15 him yesterday. He acted as coordinator?
16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir. You were reading very fast again,
17 and a specific part of your reading was not recorded. You see it on page
18 5, line 10. You only see the name of Maxim Stanisic, but not his
19 function because you were too fast. Slow down, please.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I will
22 "Maxim Stanisic is hereby appointed deputy president of the state
23 committee for cooperation with the UN and international humanitarian
25 In Article 2 we see the members of the committee. There are nine
1 in total, including a military officer of the Main Staff in number --
2 under number 7. It is Colonel Milos Djurdjic, coordinator for the
3 committee's relations with the Ministry of Defence and the Main Staff of
4 the Army of Republika Srpska. He was discussed here yesterday.
5 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Do you recall that he was a member of the committee in charge of
7 relations with military structures?
8 A. I do. He was a member of the committee, and as of the moment the
9 committee was formed, the job of the Main Staff and myself was made much
10 easier. I no longer had to think whether I should let through a convoy.
11 I simply knew that I had to cease all combat activities if they were en
12 route of a particular convoy. Therefore, it wasn't up to the Main Staff
13 to decide anymore whether the convoy would be let through or not. It was
14 actually the task of the Main Staff to let it through and to carry out
16 Q. Thank you, General.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we next have 65 ter 3322 in
18 e-court. Thank you. While we're waiting for it, I will say for the
19 record that it is a Main Staff document from the sector of intelligence
20 and security of the 12th of February, 1995. It is signed by assistant
21 commander, Major-General Zdravko Tolimir. I will quote the first
22 paragraph only.
23 "UNPROFOR representatives, through the work of regional joint
24 commissions, keep putting forth the issue of increased freedom of
25 movement of UNPROFOR across front lines with the aim of getting
1 authorisation to cross the front line, move in the territory of the RS on
2 the lower regional levels while not having to notify the Main Staff of
3 the VRS of all movements and not having to wait for authorisation by the
4 Main Staff of the VRS before doing so.
5 "This is how UNPROFOR representatives wish to avoid complying
6 with the obligation they undertook when they signed the obligations set
7 out in the agreement on the principles of freedom of movement signed on
8 31 January 1995 by the Main Staff of the VRS,
9 Major-General Zdravko Tolimir, and the UNPROFOR command for the former
10 BiH, General Briquemont. We hereby forward the entire text of the
12 I won't go into the rest of the contents.
13 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Please tell us this. Do you know that we demanded that the
15 agreement be implemented in full. It was the agreement imposed, so to
16 say, by UNPROFOR, and UNPROFOR was a signatory to it, together with thee
17 VRS, concerning their freedom of movement.
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Thank you, General. I would like to ask for page 2 to be shown
20 on the screen for the General where we can see the items of the
21 agreement. And after that, also to show page 3.
22 And on page 3, let us read the last paragraph. I'm quoting:
23 "These freedom of movement principles refer only to convoys and
24 single UNPROFOR vehicles and not to convoys of international humanitarian
25 organisations. Regarding convoys of international humanitarian
1 organisations, implement the procedure and checks agreed upon so far.
2 Assistant Commander, Major-General such and such."
3 Is this a reflection of what you told us a moment ago, namely,
4 that your work became easier after the establishment of the state
5 committee? Or let me reformulate my question. Or maybe you can answer
6 already? Maybe it is not necessary for me to reformulate my question.
7 A. Yes, it's the same topic we discussed a moment ago. But there's
8 something that I would like to add.
9 Let me go back to the convoys of supplies for UNPROFOR. In
10 April 1994, there was a certain conflict between myself and
11 General Van Baal who was Chief of Staff for the BH UNPROFOR. He was
12 asking for a unit, I think it was a Ukrainian contingent in Gorazde, he
13 was asking for them to be supplied with ammunition, and I asked him
14 whether there were any combat activities in Gorazde during the previous
15 week. He said no. And I then asked him, But didn't you already resupply
16 the same unit just a week before that? And he didn't respond to that.
17 And they gave up on this idea. And our conclusion was that they are
18 using their convoys to bring ammunition into enclaves and everybody knew
19 that the 81st Muslim Division was established within the 3 kilometre
20 diameter there in the enclave, with 6.500 troops and there -- no one
21 shouldn't have been there armed and the problems between us and UNPROFOR
22 were related to supplies of ammunition.
23 Q. Thank you, General.
24 I would like to ask for this document that's in e-court, 03322,
25 that's the 65 ter number of the Prosecutor, I would like to tender it.
1 Thank you.
2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 3322 shall be
4 assigned exhibit number D254. Thank you.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
6 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Yesterday there was some discussion about cessation of
8 hostilities. We showed two documents from the two meetings. The first
9 meeting and the second meeting.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 65 ter 05838, please, if we can
11 have that on the screen so that we can see that these meetings were held
12 regularly, every week. Once we will have the document on the screen -
13 there it is - and it's a Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska
14 document, dated 6th of February, 1995. And it's headed meeting of the
15 Joint Central Commission.
16 And in the first paragraph it is stated:
17 "On 5 February 1995, a meeting of the Joint Central Commission
18 was held at the Sarajevo airport chaired by the Chief of Staff of
19 UNPROFOR's command, General Briquemont. The delegation was led by
20 Lieutenant-General Milan Gvero, the HVO delegation by
21 Major-General Budimir, and the Muslim delegation by
22 Brigadier General Hadzihasanovic. The following decisions were ...
23 adopted and signed in the meeting of the Joint Central Commission."
24 Under number 1 we see: "To retain the principles of full freedom
25 of movement for all the delegations to and from the location where the
1 Central Joint Commission is meeting.
2 And the second item says: "All decisions of the regional joint
3 commission shall be certified by the Central Joint Commission.
4 And the third one is that "the regional joint commission shall
5 continue identifying the line of defence around Sarajevo as per
6 agreement" ...
7 And so on and so forth.
8 So this is my question to you. The central joint military
9 commissions, were they signing all their decisions and forwarding them to
10 Main Staffs for verification and then further to subordinated units in
11 accordance with the agreement on cessation of hostilities? You can, of
12 course, present only the position of the VRS.
13 A. Based on what I see in front of me, I can tell that you regularly
14 informed not only the Main Staff but also the Supreme Command. And if
15 you can show me the last page of the document, I'd be able to verify
16 whether you regularly signed it as well.
17 Q. Thank you.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please show the last page
19 of the document where we can see the stamp, received stamp, after the
20 document had been received.
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I see that the document was sent
22 via teletype without your actual signature, Probably with SR. I don't
23 see that SR. But I do see the stamp, the receipt stamp, of the last
24 teletype station which is air force command. So you informed the Supreme
25 Command, the Main Staff, and, from here, we see also the subordinated
2 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Thank you.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this
5 document and I would like us to see the next document dated 6th of
6 January, 65 ter number 05835. Or D225.
7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Document on the screen will be received.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 5838 shall be
9 assigned exhibit number D255. Thank you.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. So now, please, 65 ter
11 05835, or D225.
12 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Again, a document from the Main Staff of the Army of
14 Republika Srpska dated 7th January 1995, and it's entitled: Meeting of
15 the Joint Central Commission and a report about it.
16 And it is stated here:
17 "The third meeting of the Joint Central Commission for
18 implementing the agreement of cessation of hostilities was held at
19 Sarajevo airport at 1200 hours on 1st January 1995. The meeting was
20 chaired by Lieutenant-General Michael Rose and Mr. Viktor Andreev, the
21 representatives of Republika Srpska were Professor Aleksa Buha and
22 General Zdravko Tolimir. The Muslim side was represented by
23 Hasan Muratovic and General Mustafa Hajrulahovic.
24 "The following was agreed that on 8 January 1995 an exchange of
25 liaison officers between UNPROFOR and VRS is to be conducted. And this
1 is my question. Was General Tolimir present at this meeting, together
2 with the representatives of the government of Republika Srpska? In other
3 words, Minister Buha, and was Minister Buha at the time of the meeting
4 there in place of Professor Koljevic, because he was his deputy in the
5 committee for relations with international representatives?
6 A. Aleksa Buha was minister of foreign affairs in the RS and, of
7 course, it is logical that he stood in for Professor Koljevic. But as I
8 can see from this document, it is dated on the 7th of January, 1995.
9 That was Christmas Day. I looked at the document of 2nd of January, 1995
10 yesterday, so this is seven days later. And in the morning, I also
11 saw -- today in the morning I also saw a document dated 12th of February.
12 So it seems that meetings of the Central Committee were held every five
13 to seven days. I don't see anything contentious in relation to your
14 presence there, so I agree that you were present, and I believe that this
15 should be then the second meeting since the establishment of the
16 Central Joint Commission.
17 Q. Thank you General. Maybe confusion can be caused by the fact
18 that I wrote as the date the 7th and the meeting was on the 6th, but
19 that's because I was writing my reports on the 7th.
20 Now can you tell me whether I was summoned by the -- or was I
21 being invited by representatives of UNPROFOR to come to the meetings
22 although I didn't know what the topics would be, or the results? Thank
24 A. I can see that you regularly attended the meetings you were
25 invited to. And I also can tell that UNPROFOR also made sure that the
1 meetings were held regularly, and I don't see anything strange in the
2 fact that we would be called or invited to come to the meeting without
3 telling us what the topic would be. That was something happening all the
4 time. They would just invite us there and when we would be there, then
5 they would tell us what the topic was. They would never call us to just
6 buy us drinks or anything.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this
8 document -- oh, no, I understand that it's already part of the evidence
10 Can we please have 1D719 on the screen, and we'll move to the
11 topic mentioned by General Milovanovic in his last sentence, namely, how
12 did each side keep their promises. Thank you. This document 1D719 is a
13 document by General Staff of Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina that was at
14 the time in Kakanj. The date is 1st of January 1995 and the title is
15 agreement on cessation of hostilities with guidelines. General Delic
16 sent this document to all his subordinates.
17 Can we please see page 3 of the agreement. We'll see the text of
18 the agreement itself, and then we'll go back to the guide-lines issued by
19 the General.
20 Can we scroll down so that the General would see the text of the
21 agreement on complete cessation of hostilities.
22 In the first item it is stated: "The following agreement on
23 cessation of fire dated 23 December 1994, by it the sides are agreeing to
24 complete cessation of hostilities with the start of 2000 hours of the 1st
25 of January, 1995 along all confrontation lines. This agreement will be
1 in effect for initially a period of four months and will be renewed under
2 the same condition with the agreement of the parties."
3 Item number 2. In the second line we can see mention of the
4 Central Joint Commission that shall be established under the auspices of
5 UNPROFOR with initial meetings to be held at the Sarajevo airport and
6 there will also be regional joint commissions that will be established
7 which will constantly be in session. Thank you. That was the end of my
8 quotation and this is my question.
9 Can we please only see before that the last page of the
10 agreement. Here we can see the last page. It was signed by
11 Alija Izetbegovic, Karadzic, Rasim Delic, Mladic, Akashi and Rose. One
12 party to the conflict did not sign it and that was HVO and their
13 representative, the representatives of the so-called Herceg-Bosna.
14 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
15 Q. This is my question to you: Did the VRS abide by this agreement
16 on complete cessation of hostilities that was reached on 1st of
17 January 1995? Thank you.
18 A. Thank you, General, for showing this document to me. I have been
19 searching for it for 17 years. I've -- was involved in making --
20 reaching the agreement in Bihac. It was reached primarily because of
21 Bihac under the guidance of Jimmy Carter. I didn't even know that
22 General Dudakovic at the time acted wilfully. I believe that he was
23 ordered to do what he was doing from his Supreme Command. I wanted just
24 to add that he violated the agreement only 13 days after it was concluded
25 at the time of the Orthodox New Year.
1 This agreement involves all safe areas. It is not strange that
2 the Croats didn't have to sign this because they were not in charge of
3 any of the safe areas. I don't yet understand what is it that you want
4 me to do now. Am I supposed to confirm this document because it's not in
5 our document; it's a document by the Muslim Supreme Command, although one
6 can take it as such, because it includes signatures of our supreme
7 commander and the commander of the Main Staff. It's a valid, correct
8 document, although issued by the enemy, and this document resolved all
9 the dilemmas about my entering into Bihac or not.
10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, I would like to clarify one matter.
11 Mr. Milovanovic, on page 14, line 15, and I read it to you: "I
12 didn't know that General acted wilfully. I believe that he was ordered
13 to do with -- he was doing from his Supreme Command ..."
14 I recall that you mentioned a name which was not recorded. Can
15 you please repeat the name of this General?
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I suggest I repeat the whole
17 sentence because I still have it fresh in my recollection.
18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Please do that.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I thought, up till now, that
20 General Atif Dudakovic, the commander of the 5th Corps of the Muslim army
21 was ordered to violate the cease-fire, the four-month one. However I see
22 from this document that General Dudakovic acted wilfully, and on the 13th
23 of January, 1995, he violated the agreement which was signed by his
24 supreme commander, Alija Izetbegovic, and the commander of the army,
25 Rasim Delic, who ordered him to respect the agreement. So this would be
1 the same as if I were to violate an order of the supreme commander,
2 Karadzic, and Commander Mladic.
3 Dudakovic was not held responsible for that, either to his
4 commander or the UNPROFOR command who was a guarantor of the agreement
5 and he was not prosecuted by any judicial organs.
6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you --
7 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness be asked to repeat the last
9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Could you please repeat the last sentence? The
10 interpreters didn't catch it. Only the last sentence.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Although there have been, so far,
12 four reports against him for carrying out crimes against the Serbian
14 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Judge Nyambe has a question.
15 JUDGE NYAMBE: I just wanted some clarification. I am unable to
16 clearly place the names that you have just mentioned to be able to
17 appreciate whether you've actually answered the question that was asked,
18 which was: Did the VRS abide by this agreement on complete cessation of
19 hostilities that was reached on the 1st of January 1995?
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
21 JUDGE NYAMBE: Thank you.
22 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could we see the
24 original document with the signature in e-court. It's P1011, a document
25 with the signatures of the signatories of this agreement. This is P1011.
1 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
2 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
3 Q. We can see the agreement on the cessation of hostilities, which
4 we sent to our Main Staff, which is what you said.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at page 3 to see who
6 the signatories are. Thank you.
7 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
8 Q. We're obliged here to provide a correction. I said that the
9 Croats did not sign the agreement, but, actually, the Croatian
10 representative of the HVO, Kresimir Zubak, signed it, as well as
11 Vladimir Soljic. This was also signed by Akashi and Rose. All of those
12 who were supposed to sign the document did actually sign it. In order to
13 verify the document, we are now able to see all of this here on the
14 screen. Thank you.
15 My question is: Were all parties obliged to respect the
16 provisions of the agreement? The Muslims, the Serbs, the Croats, and
17 UNPROFOR? All the parties that signed it.
18 A. Yes. But there is one signature missing here, and that is the
19 signature of the representatives of the state of Croatia, because they
20 were a warring party to Bosnia-Herzegovina, and they already had their
21 forces, the equivalent of 14 brigades, on the territory of
22 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Since this is an agreement for the entire territory
23 of Bosnia-Herzegovina and they were supposed to sign it or they should
24 have been forced to sign it, because the agreement was signed on
25 23 December. And you remember yourself very well that you, or the
1 Main Staff, on the 25th of December after Bihac transferred me to the
2 Glamoc front because the Croat, regular Croat army, not the HVO, the
3 regular Croat army began attacking from Livanjsko Polje towards Grahovo
4 and Glamoc. So they were not subject to this agreement, and now I see
5 that they did not even sign the agreement so they were not really obliged
6 to be bound by the agreement.
7 Q. Thank you, sir. In view of everything that you have said, is it
8 correct that UNPROFOR did not oblige them to sign the agreement, because
9 they assumed that they would continue with their actions until they
10 complete what they planned because the UNPROFOR could also have called
11 the Croats and everyone. They could have invited Brussels as well, to
12 sign the agreement. Yes or no?
13 A. The answer is yes, with a criticism of UNPROFOR.
14 UNPROFOR did not punish the Muslims when they attacked Grmec from
15 the Bihac security area and even though they were supposed to respect
16 this four-month cease-fire agreement they were not obliged to do that. I
17 already said that they violated the agreement on the 13th of January,
18 only 13 days after it was signed, and again they were not punished. When
19 I got close to the Bihac security area, General Rose personally hit me
20 from the air for three days.
21 Q. Thank you. Could you please tell us the dates when this occurred
22 for the transcript? And if you are able to say, are you able to tell us
23 which targets were struck at this time?
24 A. The units under my command in that section of the front moved to
25 counter-strike on the 3rd of November, 1994. In 16 days, we re-took the
1 captured territory, some 250 square kilometres, bringing us to the edge
2 of the river Una and dangerously close to Bihac the town, because there
3 was no boundary to the security area. Rose warned me to stop, otherwise
4 I would be subject to NATO air-strikes.
5 I replied that I didn't know, there was no marked boundary of the
6 Bihac security zone, so I was subject to strikes on the 21st of November,
7 my birthday, then the 22nd, and the 23rd of November. The 23rd of
8 November he stopped because in the meantime we downed six aircraft.
9 Then he called me in the evening and he promised to send me a
10 letter of intent when the bombing had already been finished.
11 In any event, he tried to strike at our personnel, our troops,
12 but the day before I got infantry close to the other infantry, so he
13 couldn't selectively hit just the Serbs but he would have had to hit
14 Muslims as well, which he did not dare. He sent me the letter of intent
15 on the 24th. I was expecting a letter of intent. Actually I received an
16 envelope on the 24th of November in the evening. It was brought by some
17 officer, a messenger of UNPROFOR. There would say no letter in the
18 envelope. It contained a large-scale map of Bihac with its environs,
19 marking the boundary of the Bihac security zone for the first time. I
20 don't know whose administration made the error, but the boundary of the
21 security area of Bihac was signed by Boutros-Ghali on that same day when
22 I received it on the 24th of November, 1994, while it was proclaimed a
23 security zone a year before, in April 1993.
24 This means that for a year and a half, the Tuzla security zone,
25 the Bihac one, and the Sarajevo one were not delineated and that is why
1 he was not able to punish General Dudakovic for leaving the security zone
2 but he could punish me when I approached his imaginary security zone.
3 The way it was marked on that map, the boundary of the security zone was
4 actually crossing the forward end of my forces, so I had not actually
5 entered or crossed that boundary. And this is where the -- the lines
6 were located one month later when this cease-fire went into effect.
7 Q. Thank you, General, sir.
8 Please, had the NATO bombing not stopped the Republika Srpska
9 troops under your command, would the Muslims have been defeated at that
10 time in the Cazin Krajina and would you have threatened significantly
11 Bihac and all the other territories from where they carried out their
12 counter-attacks? Thank you.
13 A. The Muslims had already been defeated. I'm talking about the
14 5th Corps; that corps was already defeated. It had withdrawn in disarray
15 to the town of Bihac. Before pulling out, or before the withdrawal
16 began, they collected all Muslim villages from the entire Cazin Krajina
17 and placed them in Bihac, just like they did in the Srebrenica area and
18 Zepa the year before. So according to estimates at that time, there were
19 about 180.000 refugees in Bihac at that point in time. I don't know what
20 its population was before the war. Dudakovic was pulling everybody back
21 into the town knowing that we would not fire at the town. And it's true,
22 we did not fire at the town with large-calibre weaponry. We did use
23 smaller calibres in the surrounding. I was afraid that some unit would
24 not actually enter the town. We had just reached the hospital area. So
25 I had left a 4 kilometre buffer area between the Una river and the
1 village of Pokoj. So that that population, if our forces did break
2 through, because I did not have a decision by the Supreme Command to
3 enter Bihac, if there was a breakthrough by our forces, so that the
4 people would have a route to leave because I really afraid our forces
5 would enter Bihac and I was afraid of possible retaliation. So I issued
6 an order that I had forgotten about. I found it somewhere on the
7 Internet while I was preparing for this testimony about the conduct of
8 units in the event they entered Bihac.
9 However, it never occurred to me to actually enter Bihac and you
10 know very well, General, that I was a victim of the withdrawal of the
11 Army of Republika Srpska from the strangest security area on the planet,
12 this is Igman and Bjelasnica. For months I was trying to get that army
13 to pull back to Igman and Bjelasnica and then it was up to me to turn
14 them back from Igman and Bjelasnica. And, again, UNPROFOR violated the
15 agreement and or actually permitted the Muslims to capture or retake
16 those territories just one month later.
17 Your question, I think, is more or less referring to where I was
18 struck, where the strikes were. First, the Udbina airport was hit, this
19 airport of the Serbian army of the Krajina. Then there was an attempt to
20 strike the forward end of the Serbian forces and this could not be done
21 because of the proximity of the Muslim forces. Then they hit the rear
22 behind the front lines. However, there was a miracle from that area. He
23 did not strike at my command post even though it was exposed and open to
25 I don't know why he did not hit the personal command post. It's
1 something that I never discussed with General Rose.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: [Previous translation continues] ...
4 Mr. Milovanovic, I didn't interrupt you while you were answering at
5 length but I would like to invite you as well to slow down a bit. I
6 think some sentences are not properly recorded because of the speed of
7 your answer and this is very difficult for the interpreters and for the
8 court recorder.
9 Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.
10 Mr. Gajic.
11 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I wanted to intervene
12 at page 20, line 13, it says [In English]: "Dudakovic was pulling
13 everybody back into the town."
14 [Interpretation] I believe the witness said that he pulled all of
15 his troops inside the town, and perhaps that should be clarified.
16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It is up to your client, Mr. Tolimir, to clarify
17 that. You are his advisor.
18 Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.
19 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Thank you, Mr. Milovanovic -- actually, Mr. President.
21 Mr. Milovanovic, for the record, can you tell us whether
22 Dudakovic pulled both his soldiers and the population inside Bihac so as
23 to make it clear.
24 A. General Dudakovic at the time was the absolute master in Bihac
25 and its surrounding. He held in his hands both the military and civilian
1 powers because a few days before that the minister of the interior was
2 killed. He clashed with the rebelled soldiers of Fikret Abdic. Until
3 the problem with Abdic and the Serbs was resolved, he was accorded
4 absolute authority by Izetbegovic. He probably intercepted my orders not
5 to fire at Bihac with artillery. He made use of that to move his units
6 of his corps and the brigade to initially pull back into town for rest
7 and later, when he had to withdraw all of his troops before my advancing
8 forces, he withdrew his front lines to Bihac as well.
9 At the same time, he gathered all of the population around Bihac
10 from the Cazin Krajina into Bihac so as to have the population mix with
11 the troops, much as they did in Srebrenica. In this way, he wanted to
12 ensure that I could not target the soldiers without firing at civilians.
13 Otherwise, what would have occurred would have been this fantastic
14 construction of NATO called collateral damage because no one would
15 acknowledge that I was trying to fire at soldiers.
16 In other words, Dudakovic gathered both soldiers and civilians
17 into the town itself, in order to protect his troops.
18 Q. Thank you, General. In your answer, you said that NATO aviation
19 bombed the airport at Udbina which is -- which was in the protected zone
20 of UNPROFOR in the RSK. It was the so-called UNPA area. Is this the
21 first occasion in the wars in the territory of the former FRY when NATO
22 bombed an area under its own protection when Serbs were in question and,
23 on the other hand, they never bombed UN-protected areas where the Muslims
25 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, was that a question?
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
2 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Did NATO ever bomb territories protected by the UN where there
4 were Muslims?
5 A. Before that, NATO had bombarded the safety area of Gorazde but
6 not the Muslims. They targeted the Serbs approaching Gorazde. On this
7 occasion they bombed the airport at Udbina, and it was the first occasion
8 on which they bombed an UNPROFOR-protected area. The Vance Plan was in
9 force in the RSK and UNPROFOR was the guarantor of it, as well as the
11 However, when Udbina was bombed, it had far more reaching
12 consequences. On the 20th of November, that is to say, a day before, in
13 Zagreb, General Novakovic, Mile Novakovic Commander-in-Chief of the Army
14 of the RSK signed agreement with the Commander-in-Chief of the
15 Croatian army, General Bobetko, to place Udbina airport out of operation.
16 It had been agreed that the Serb side was to implement it in the
17 following way, by pulling out old trucks and tanks and placing them on to
18 the air strip so as to make any sorties impossible by Serb planes.
19 In the evening of that day General Novakovic indeed did so. He
20 placed a number of vehicles on the runways. And the next day, on the
21 21st of November, they became ideal targets for NATO pilots. They
22 destroyed the runways. I know that two people were killed in the air
23 traffic tower, a lieutenant and an operator. There were a number of
24 wounded, and, of course, all of the vehicles on the runways were
25 destroyed. They were made use as targets by NATO pilots.
1 It was NATO who targeted UNPROFOR-protected areas, and I stress
2 that it was done by NATO, not by UNPROFOR. NATO, in that year, took over
3 from UNPROFOR as being the only armed force of the Security Council. I
4 heard rumours that it was not approved by the Security Council. I never
5 tried to research that any further, but I also know that they did not
6 have permission to bomb Yugoslavia, and yet they did.
7 Q. Thank you, Mr. Milovanovic. We will later on look at what
8 Mr. Rose had to say about it in his testimony. Was there basically a
9 coordination action between NATO and the Croatian army when the airport
10 at Udbina was targeted? When they targeted the vehicles that were placed
11 there under the agreement? Was this a coordinated action between the two
12 forces, including NATO planes? And was it a mere coincidence or a
13 planned activity?
14 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
15 MR. McCLOSKEY: I would -- could we get some indication of the
16 relevance of this detailed account of NATO and UNPROFOR in periods and
17 places that I -- have no apparent connection to our case?
18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, can you help us?
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President, and I'd
20 like to thank you Mr. McCloskey.
21 The relevance is that it speaks to the behaviour of UNPROFOR at
22 the time of the cessation of hostilities. That is to say, their
23 behaviour towards the Serbs who honoured the agreement and the behaviour
24 towards the Muslims who broke the agreement. Later on, we'll get to the
25 results of such conduct by UNPROFOR and NATO.
1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: What do you mean by that?
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm trying to say, Mr. President,
3 that this agreement on the cessation of hostilities was supposed to be in
4 force by the initial four months and that the VRS abided by it.
5 The General told us how his forces were bombed and whenever
6 Muslim forces launched an attack in the latter period of the four months,
7 they were supported in doing so. Ultimately, NATO planes took part in
8 the bombing of war positions in Republika Srpska, including a number of
9 bridges. A number of bridges were targeted, say, in Serbia even, which
10 existed on places which could be simply crossed on foot. The rivers were
11 that shallow in certain places.
12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, every incident has a history.
13 That's true. There are always some events preceding the relevant events,
14 relevant to this case and to the indictment.
15 I would like to invite you to focus on the events relevant to the
16 indictment period, mid-1995. This would be much more helpful for your
18 Please carry on.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. We are
20 going straight to mid-1995.
21 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
22 Q. My question is this: Would the events in Srebrenica and Zepa
23 have taken place which is something I'm accused of, had the truce been
24 honoured, had it been prolonged in April? And had there been no further
25 increase in combat activities?
1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
2 MR. McCLOSKEY: That's extremely vague. We need to know what he
3 is talking about. Otherwise, the answer has no meaning. When he says
4 the events that is he charged with, is he talking about the murders, is
5 he talking about the other events? I mean, there's quite a bit to that.
6 So that is, in my view, has to be more particular as to have meaning.
7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir.
8 [Trial Chamber confers]
9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Carry on, please, Mr. Tolimir.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I don't know what
11 I'm supposed not to say. I was accused of contributing to the Muslim
12 defeat in Srebrenica. As part of that indictment, I have to start with
13 the facts which caused the Srebrenica enclave to become a source of
14 threat for the VRS. It was supposed to have been a demilitarized zone,
15 and instead it was a well-armed area. If I'm not allowed to pursue that
16 line of questions I can only thank the General for his testimony and then
17 we can move on to whatever Mr. McCloskey wishes to pursue or what you may
18 wish to ask.
19 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, this is a misrepresentation of what
20 Mr. McCloskey said. And what I was saying to you, invited you to focus
21 more on the events mid-1995. You can't draw from the record anything
22 like that you just have said that are you not allowed to pursue that line
23 of questions. This is some guidance and some assistance for your case,
24 Mr. Tolimir. You should understand that.
25 Mr. McCloskey.
1 MR. McCLOSKEY: Just to make it absolutely clear, I have no
2 problem with questions to General Milovanovic about the causes or the
3 reasons why the VRS felt it would be necessary to attack the Srebrenica
4 enclave. In fact, as I've said over and over again, we agree with many
5 of those reasons and understand them and they're part of our case. If
6 that's the question, that's no problem. I don't mind the question of why
7 is it that -- you know, the murders took place. But it just needs to be
8 the question. We can't tell what the question is by the way he asked it.
9 It is not the subject matter. It's just the vagueness of the question
10 that concerns me.
11 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, you have heard everything. Please
12 carry on your questioning.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have, Your Honour. But in order
14 to get to Srebrenica, we need to see what caused Srebrenica and Zepa.
15 Could we please look at D53. Then we can see the relevance of
16 that document in relation to the events in question.
17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, we have to make clear what you want
18 to do with the document, 1D719. The document signed by Mr. Delic.
19 What is your intention?
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The intention is for the General to
21 see who it was sent to. If I'm forbidden to say anything or to mention
22 names, then can I address a single village --
23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: [Previous translation continues] ... Mr. Tolimir,
24 this is really an incorrect response. I am asking what are you doing
25 with the -- are you tendering the document you have used. Please focus
1 on what I'm saying. That was really not correct.
2 I want to know if you are tendering 1D719.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise, Your Honour. I
4 thought you were just asking me about the document I just called up and
5 not the previous one. I apologise again.
6 I seek to tender the previous document. And we now wanted to
7 look at the current document.
8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: We have to go back to 1D719. I would like to see
9 the document itself and then the attachment. Perhaps not the attachment
10 but one part of it. I would like to see the signature.
11 Mr. Milovanovic -- no, not this part. I want to see 1D719. The
12 signature of Mr. Delic who is supposed to have signed it. It was just on
13 the screen before. Yes, thank you very much.
14 Mr. Milovanovic, when did you see this document the first time?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, here, now.
16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.
17 Mr. Tolimir, can you explain how we could authenticate this
18 document. There is no signature. We have only the B/C/S text without
19 any translation. The witness couldn't say anything about its content.
20 He saw it the first time here in the courtroom. He saw the original
21 agreement with the documents -- with the -- with the signatures. This is
22 P1011. This is already in evidence. But this document, he can't say
23 anything about it.
24 Can you help us?
25 Perhaps Mr. McCloskey can help us.
1 Mr. McCloskey.
2 MR. McCLOSKEY: Ms. Stewart tells me that she has sent the
3 translation recently and they may not have had time to put it into
4 e-court. But there should be a translation of this document that's on
5 the screen.
6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: But is there any document with a signature?
7 MR. McCLOSKEY: Apparently not, Mr. President.
8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: And the agreement, I would like to see the
9 signature block of the agreement again. That could be or should be the
10 next page.
11 It is interesting to see that there is no signature at all and
12 that two names are missing. The names of Mr. Soljic and Mr. Zubak, the
13 representatives of the army. There is some doubt that this is really the
14 original document. I have no idea why these names are missing.
15 Can you help us, Mr. Tolimir?
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
17 That was the reason why I showed the 1D719 and its content
18 because the content is identical to what's in P1011, which does include
19 signature and can confirm the authenticity of the document signed by
21 I understand the General. Of course, he could not have seen
22 documents drafted by the opposing side or the enemy. This is a document
23 that drafted on 1st of January, 1995 on cessation of hostilities signed
24 by Delic. But we can see Delic's actual signature on the other document.
25 If that is not sufficient, well, we, of course, cannot have it admitted.
1 There's nothing I can do about it in that case.
2 [Trial Chamber confers]
3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Can we please see the letter -- the page with the
4 name Rasim Delic again.
5 Mr. McCloskey.
6 MR. McCLOSKEY: If it is of any help, I can tell you,
7 Mr. President, the document on the left, the B/C/S document, was obtained
8 by the OTP from the Republika Srpska archives in Banja Luka where we have
9 obtained other materials. So that's where it is -- it is from. I -- I
10 can't tell immediately by looking at it if it is a teletype. But, as you
11 know, teletypes don't have signatures. That's where it comes from, if
12 that is at all helpful.
13 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It might be a teletype. But there is no stamp,
14 there is nothing, which is usually combined with the teletype document
15 sent out or received by somebody. There's exactly nothing on it.
16 MR. McCLOSKEY: Absolutely. And I -- of course, we can't tell
17 how a document might have ended up in an archive, a draft or something
18 else. But it did come from this official government archives is,
19 unfortunately, all I can tell you about it.
20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.
21 [Trial Chamber confers]
22 JUDGE FLUEGGE: The Chamber will -- the Chamber will postpone a
23 decision until we have received the translation of the document. Then we
24 can compare the content and if it is really the same document or not.
25 For today, we just mark it for identification.
1 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 1D719 shall be
2 assigned exhibit number D256, marked for identification, pending further
3 identification. Thank you. Pending translation. Thank you.
4 JUDGE FLUEGGE: No, not pending translation. We decide on the
5 admission of this document after having received a translation. This is
6 different. We didn't decide about the admission yet.
7 We should have D53 on the screen now, please.
8 Mr. Tolimir, now the document is on the screen. You should
9 continue your questioning.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
11 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
12 Q. This document was received also from the OTP. These are the
13 documents by the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and their General Staff.
14 Documents that were not being delivered to the VRS.
15 We can see a document dated 17th of June, 1995 before us,
16 General. It's called: Preparations for offensive combat operations
17 order. It was delivered to the command of the 28th Division of KoV. I
18 will read the first paragraph and items in the order.
19 I quote: "Pursuant to verbal order issued by the commander of
20 the General Staff of the BH army, army General Rasim Delic, and on the
21 occasion of the great success achieved by units of the BH army in the
22 wide area around Sarajevo and Gorazde ... as well as on the basis of
23 intelligence that ... commands of the AS of the protection regiment in
24 Han Pijesak is holding part of its units in reserve to intervene in the
25 event of an attack by our forces from Zepa. I hereby issue the following
2 "1, execute all preparations in the command of the 28th Land Army
3 Division to execute offensive combat operations with a view to liberating
4 the territory of BH, overextending the AS and inflicting losses on them,
5 coordinating action with the BH army forces carrying out operations in
6 the broader Sarajevo area.
7 " ... plan realistic tasks," and so on and so forth.
8 In item 3, it is stated: "The General Staff of the BH army will
9 regulate, by an order, the commencement of offensive combat activities in
10 the zone ...
11 "Chief of Staff of the 2nd Corps, Brigadier Sulejman Budakovic."
12 In other words he spend that order from the 2nd Corps command of
13 the 28th Division which encompassed the forces from Zepa and Srebrenica.
14 And this is my question: Can we see from this document that the
15 BH army is carrying out active operations in Sarajevo, as is stated here,
16 and that he is asking for all of his forces to start activities, even
17 those in the demilitarized zones? And, please, any further comments on
18 the document, if you have them.
19 A. General, this document is not a document I'm seeing for the first
20 time. I have seen it during the activities of the commission of the
21 Republika Srpska government on determining facts. I have seen another
22 document that you may also have issued by the same Chief of Staff to the
23 Supreme Command, in relation to an attack they carried out against our
24 Main Staff.
25 However, you put a question to me first, and then there was a
1 discussion, namely, the question was whether the four-month truce had any
2 impact on what happened in Srebrenica and Zepa later on. That was my
3 understanding at least. I'm not sure that the others present here
4 understood you in the same way.
5 No, the truce mediated by Carter did not influence situation in
6 Srebrenica and Zepa but something else did. And that was failure to
7 abide by Article 60 of the First Protocol of the Geneva Conventions,
8 actually, Articles 58 and 60 that discussed organisation of safe areas
9 and the rules on behaviour within such areas. One of the elements was
10 that if one side violates the agreement, then the other side is not
11 obliged to abide by it. The agreement on safe areas - Srebrenica was
12 signed on 8th of May, and I think Zepa on 18th of May - was immediately
13 violated by the party that guaranteed the agreement, namely, UNPROFOR.
14 And the Muslim side as well. And they continued violating it until the
15 month of July 1995, when Serb forces entered Srebrenica.
16 In what way? First of all, UNPROFOR failed to disarm the Muslims
17 in Srebrenica and Zepa. They incorrectly informed or reported to the
18 Supreme Command of the VRS and the UN Security Council that Muslims in
19 Srebrenica and Zepa were disarmed.
20 I mentioned yesterday it was determined that 1.200 barrels of
21 obsolete infantry and hunting weapons were handed over, that UNPROFOR
22 received about 900 barrels of similar type of weaponry. In other words,
23 weapons remained both in Srebrenica and Zepa.
24 In January 1994, in the enclaves of Srebrenica, Zepa, and
25 Gorazde, there were functioning commands in Srebrenica of the
1 28th Operative Group, Eastern Bosnia, that was its name. Unit of a
2 division strength. In Zepa, the command of the light infantry brigade,
3 or of a light infantry brigade. And in Gorazde, command of the
4 81st Muslim Division. All under wings of UNPROFOR. In other words,
5 Muslims were armed and organised, and UNPROFOR knew about it, but
6 according to the agreement, it was not supposed to be that way.
7 Secondly, from the safe area of Gorazde, starting in late
8 March 1994, armed formation of Muslim whose strength was about 750
9 troops, which is a weak brigade or a very strong battalion level, they
10 broke out, got through UNPROFOR deployment area, managed to get through
11 our positions and make an incursion into Sjemec mountain area which is
12 between Ustipraca, Visegrad, and another location. The commander was
13 Mr. Sedic. They caused havoc; killing, raping, looting. Following that
14 group, Lieutenant-Colonel Zivko [as interpreted] Pandurevic whose unit
15 was in the area of Sjemec because for a period of time he was the
16 commander of the Visegrad Brigade. So he is following Sedic and
17 approaching Gorazde. The commander of the Herzegovina Corps reaches the
18 conclusion that the right bank of Drina needs to be put under our control
19 because UNPROFOR is obviously not doing it, so following this group that
20 made an incursion against our territory out of Gorazde and then Muslims
21 start complaining.
22 General Rose, who had just arrived in the area, goes to Gorazde,
23 to see for himself whether Serbs were destroying Gorazde as claimed or
24 not. I think he managed to get in in his second attempt and realizes
25 that the buildings destroyed in Gorazde were destroyed about two years
1 before that, and that they were destroyed by Muslims who were driving
2 Serbs out of Gorazde.
3 So let us go back to the beginning of 1994. In Srebrenica, Zepa
4 and Gorazde there is 16.500 armed Muslim troops organised in a military
5 matter, and all this with UNPROFOR knowledge. Yesterday I mentioned
6 Operation Parachute and ammunition that was found, ammunition
7 12.7-millimetres and downwards, all of that packed into flour sacks. We
8 registered all such incidents and reported them to UNPROFOR but no action
9 is being taken. And here is this order then. I believe this is an order
10 issued by the Supreme Command because I can see it says at the top
11 "Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina". And here they're ordering the
12 28th division, which was a successor of the operative group Eastern
13 Bosnia, under the command of Naser Oric. He was responsible for killing
14 for thousands of Serbs in the area of Srebrenica, wider area of
15 Srebrenica, until we managed to suppress his forces. Now this -- Oric is
16 doing the same as the officer from Gorazde was doing. He would go out,
17 loot, take food, rape and pillage and kill people there and then return
18 to Srebrenica and nobody does anything.
19 We knew, unlike in case of Operation Storm by Croats, Tolimir, we
20 knew that the Muslims are preparing an offensive. It was scheduled to
21 start on the 16th of June, 1995. It lasted for a period of nine days and
22 it failed. As part of that offensive, and we can see this in the
23 document before us, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina orders the
24 28th Division to tie up the forces in the area so that the Main Staff
25 could not use them and send them to help the defence of Sarajevo.
1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I'm very, sorry, Mr. Milovanovic, your answer
2 took, up to now, nearly -- more than ten minutes. I was not expecting
3 such a length of your answer. We are running out of time. We must have
4 our first break now. Otherwise, the tape will be -- has -- the tapes
5 have to be rewound. I'm very sorry for interrupting you during your
6 answer, but I'm sure you will be able to say, after the break, what you
7 have to say.
8 Thank you very much. We must adjourn, and we will resume ten
9 minutes past 11.00.
10 --- Recess taken at 10.43 a.m.
11 --- On resuming at 11.14 a.m.
12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Before the break, we heard a very lengthy answer
13 by Mr. Milovanovic.
14 I would like to raise one matter. There's no doubt that there is
15 was a war in the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and there's no doubt
16 that many crimes were committed by several parties and people. I think,
17 Mr. Tolimir, you should realize that you are charged in this Tribunal and
18 in this case with several crimes, and you should ask questions about the
19 background, about this -- these charges, about the indictment against
21 And I would like to ask the witness to focus on this indication
22 and to listen carefully to the questions put to you and to answer these
23 questions and not to give lengthy explanation of all details of specific
24 periods of the war.
25 We should all do our best to use the court time properly and not
1 to waste time. We have to make sure that this trial is fair but also
3 Please carry on and put the next question to the witness.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
5 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Please, General, since you've seen the order I asked you about,
7 let me repeat me question.
8 What were the consequences of this order, in relation to events
9 in Srebrenica and Zepa? Is there any link between them? Was this maybe
10 a cause of the events that I'm being charged with here?
11 A. This order and orders such as this one were directly linked with
12 what happened in, first, Srebrenica and then Zepa.
13 The units of the 28th Division were, even prior to receiving this
14 order, had attacked a village of Visica, a Serbian village, that is in
15 the vicinity of Srebrenica on their way to our Main Staff. I think that
16 was the fourth Muslim attack against the Main Staff. On three occasions,
17 I was in charge of the defence. All of the four attacks came from
18 Srebrenica and Zepa. First one was on the 7th of August, 1992. The
19 forces started -- set off from Zepa. The second one was in the period
20 between 11 and 16th of December, 1992. The forces set out from
21 Srebrenica. The third one was a minor --
22 JUDGE FLUEGGE: [Previous translation continues] ... sir, I have
23 to interrupt you. Now are you talking about 1992. The document is from
24 the 17th of June, 1995. And the question was: What were the
25 consequences of this order?
1 Please focus on this question.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Direct consequences of this order
3 was an attack against a command post of the Main Staff. In repelling
4 that attack, the units, first, of the Main Staff, and, then, later on of
5 the Drina Corps, who were chasing away the Muslim army after their attack
6 against the Main Staff in Visica, following them, approached Srebrenica.
7 An army that has been attacked is entitled to follow and destroy the
8 attacking forces.
9 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Thank you, General. You were interrupted sometime ago while you
11 were talking about the Sarajevo offensive that lasted for nine days and
12 about the events in Srebrenica where a bloodshed occurred and in which
13 Naser Oric participated.
14 My question is the following: The events in Sarajevo and the
15 events from 1993 in Srebrenica, did they have any consequences on the
16 events that took place later on, in 1995, in July and 1995, and for which
17 I am charged? Thank you.
18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, this is a very vague question, very
19 vague. Did events in Sarajevo and events from 1993 in Srebrenica have
20 any consequence on the events that took place later on. What do you mean
21 by that? Please put a specific question. Otherwise we will get into
22 history and get very lengthy answers. This is not helpful for your case.
23 Please put a specific question to the witness which can be answered in
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, President.
1 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Please, was the commander of the Main Staff of the BH army making
3 combat disposition of their forces in order to spread out our forces
4 during the main operation of unblocking the siege of Sarajevo at the time
5 of this nine-day offensive you just mentioned?
6 A. Yes. Because the Supreme Commander of the Muslim forces used the
7 safe areas as areas from which surprise operations were carried out
8 against VRS.
9 Q. Thank you, General.
10 Was the VRS forced to repel such attacks coming from enclaves
11 towards the areas outside of the enclaves and the Main Staff? Was that a
12 legitimate military action?
13 A. When the Muslim forces began their incursions into RS territory
14 from Srebrenica, the VRS was relieved of its obligation to honour
15 Article 60 of the First Protocol to the Geneva Conventions and was free
16 to respond.
17 What I said a moment ago, we were then entitled to pursue the
18 enemy to its complete elimination and until it ceases to be a threat to
19 us, which is as long as they were in the enclave.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please have a look at
21 P193, page 9, to see what General Smith had to say about that period. He
22 was the UNPROFOR commander in Bosnia at the time, and had data on their
23 weapons. And it was immediately prior to their total annihilation in
24 Srebrenica and Zepa.
25 This is his statement of 14th August 1996 and he repeated this in
1 his testimony. Could we look at the next page, paragraph 5, it says as
2 follows: "The eastern enclaves were" --
3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: [Previous translation continues] ... Mr. Tolimir,
4 could you please give a reference to the English version of it.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. As I
6 don't speak English, my legal assistant will tell you.
7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: [Overlapping speakers] ...
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] [Overlapping speakers] ...
9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: [Previous translation continues] ... Your legal
10 assistant should have helped you before our hearing. Find it immediately
11 and not to waste time. And note that this document is not listed in your
12 list of documents to be used during cross-examination.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It isn't?
14 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I don't find it.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I
16 omitted to tell him that I would refer to this document; in all other
17 respects he is very diligent. By your leave, I wanted to quote from the
18 second line of the fifth paragraph, on page 10. In the English version.
19 Actually, it's page 8.
20 It begins with the words: "The eastern enclaves ..."
21 JUDGE FLUEGGE: [Previous translation continues] ... This is not
22 on the --
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 8 in the English please. Can
24 we have it on the screen, please.
25 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Gajic, please assist your client so that we
1 can find the respective page.
2 Mr. Gajic.
3 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Apologies, Mr. President. It is the
4 next page in the English version.
5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Which paragraph?
6 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] The third.
7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, please go ahead.
8 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Your microphone is off, Mr. Tolimir. Your
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
12 "The eastern enclaves were too strong and the Bosnian army within
13 them constituted a clear threat, particularly as the Bosnian Serb army
14 felt they were likely to face attacks on multiple fronts. In the
15 enclaves, the UN were being used as shield by the Bosnians and a hostage
16 by the Serb."
17 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
18 Q. This is my question: Did the UNPROFOR command, too, know that
19 there were strong forces in the enclaves that were armed to their teeth?
20 A. Yes, they knew that throughout the war.
21 Q. Thank you. Let's look at page 11 of the statement in the
22 Serbian. In the English language, it is page 12. It is the first
23 paragraph on the Serbian page, beginning at the words: "During
24 April ..."
25 It is the second paragraph in the English version.
1 Mr. Smith says as follows: "During April the situation in Bosnia
2 worsened. The enclaves were so logistically pressed that I drew up a new
3 plan of supplying them by helicopter. This was -- meant provoking the
4 VRS to attack the helicopter and then to bomb them."
5 Actually another sentence: "This plan was put before the UN
6 forces command in Zagreb and New York but was seen as too risky and
8 My question is this --
9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: For the record, it is not page 12 in English but
10 page 10, which is now on the screen.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] You are correct, Mr. President. It
12 is the last paragraph on page 10.
13 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
14 Q. My question is this: --
15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: [Previous translation continues] ... not the last
16 paragraph. Sorry. We have it now and we see it in the middle of the
17 page. Now your question please.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. Given
19 that I don't speak the language, I won't try to pin-point any portions
20 anymore in that way.
21 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
22 Q. My question is this: General, would it have been more logical
23 for General Smith to ask for approval to demilitarise the zones instead
24 of looking for an excuse to bomb the VRS, which would have produced
25 better results, in terms of reducing any further combat activities and
1 minimizing any further escalation of the war?
2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Your answer, please.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was waiting for the transcript,
4 Your Honour.
5 One can foresee my answer because it is only logical.
6 Rupert Smith was new. I could see that he had previously established
7 that the enclaves had not been disarmed, and he should have done what his
8 predecessors failed to do. The predecessors being Morillon and
10 Instead of finding ways to supply the enclave, he was supposed to
11 perform the job as ordered to UNPROFOR by the Security Council. My
12 response is simply that by acting this way, Smith simply deepened the
14 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Thank you, General. Given the different treatment by NATO and
16 UNPROFOR toward -- to the two opposing sides, was any activity undertaken
17 by the Muslims tolerated by UNPROFOR and NATO and even supported, and any
18 activity on the part of the VRS was suppressed and punished by
20 A. I can only speak to the parts of the front that I was at, and
21 there, it was true. Any mistake by Muslims was forgiven, whereas, any
22 mistake made by the Serbs, punished. The examples are the ones I used
23 already, Mount Igman and Bjelasnica. When my units were withdrawing at a
24 check-point in the presence of UNPROFOR, Muslims killed 37 unarmed
25 soldiers of mine and wounded another 34. I sent a letter of protest with
1 a threat to General Rose. He did not react to it, but he did not fail to
2 mention it later on in his memoirs and he said I was right, but he also
3 failed to explain what it was that he did.
4 Q. Thank you. I would like to thank my legal assistant. It seems
5 that it was not recorded that they were killed in the presence of
6 UNPROFOR. Could you please repeat that part.
7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Sir, the transcript has finished. We are waiting
8 for your answer.
9 Mr. Tolimir asked to you repeat a specific part which is supposed
10 not to have been translated and recorded.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Apologies. I was trying to figure
12 out which of the 13 UNPROFOR checkpoints it was. I think it was the
13 Tresnjevo Brdo checkpoint. It was in the presence of UNPROFOR. From
14 that hill they were supposed to prevent the Muslims from capturing
15 Mount Igman and Bjelasnica. Our forces were in withdrawal. The UNPROFOR
16 came to take up their duties and a group of Muslim soldiers came, killing
17 37 and wounding 34 soldiers.
18 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Thank you, General. If, throughout the war, UNPROFOR treated the
20 VRS and the Muslims differently, and if the VRS was prevented from
21 defending its territory and people, could that have had consequences for
22 the overall conduct of the Muslim army vis-a-vis their obligations under
23 the agreement on the cessation of hostilities?
24 A. Yes, without fail.
25 Q. Thank you. You participated in the end-game operations, and you
1 can testify to it. Can you tell us whether, at that time, members of
2 UNPROFOR and NATO also displayed bias, tolerating Muslim activities and
3 punishing the Serbs for any legitimate resistance operation? Was that
4 so, and did that situation culminate on the 13th of August, when VRS
5 units, as well as all of its communications and command centres, were
7 A. In the theatre where I was defending our part of the country from
8 Operation Storm, which means to the west, UNPROFOR and the European Rapid
9 Intervention Corps, commanded by General Soubirou, a French general,
10 offered fire support to the Croats, the regular Croat army. The Muslims
11 also supported the Croats by manoeuvres and fire support --
12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: [Previous translation continues] ...
13 Mr. Milovanovic, may I interrupt you. You were asked about the 13th of
14 August, and we were dealing with the war and crimes in -- committed in
15 the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and not the war related to
16 Operation Storm.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. President, it may be my fault
18 for not displaying a document, in which case I will. It's a document
19 about the bombing of VRS positions towards the end of the war. I believe
20 I am entitled to address that issue because it may be relevant to prove
21 bias on the part of NATO and UNPROFOR when treating the Serbs and Muslims
22 and Croats.
23 Could we please have 1D776.
24 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone.
25 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
1 Q. We see that this is a document from the Main Staff of the VRS
2 dated the 30th of August, 1995. The title is: NATO aviation strikes in
3 the area of responsibility of the corps specified, information.
4 I quote: "Early in the morning, on 30th of August, 1995, NATO
5 forces carried out two extensive air-strikes on targets chosen
6 beforehand. The first strike took place between 1.40 and 2.40 hours with
7 40 planes, of which 30 were assault aeroplanes. The combat lasted for
8 ten minutes between 1.55 and 2.05 hours. The second comprehensive attack
9 included 30 planes of which 20 were assault jets, between 3.40 and 4.45.
10 The combat itself lasted for ten minutes, between 4.00 and 4.10."
11 Let's look at the beginning of the second paragraph: "During
12 these two comprehensive air-strikes, the enemy attacked the general
13 region of the command of the Main Staff without any consequences. They
14 also attacked the radar positions at Jahorina, Stolice, Krug, as well as
15 the post and telegraph relay station at Straziste, Cajnice, Trebevic.
16 The former radio relay station at Zlovrh, as well as the self-propelled
17 rocket battery in the general area of Sokolac. At 3.20 they also
18 attacked the communications facility Kraljica at Mount Ozren. The enemy
19 inflicted losses in terms of personnel and caused damage to the
20 facilities. Obviously the goal of enemy action was to damage and destroy
21 command and communications centres in order to eliminate the chain of
22 command and control at strategic and operational levels."
23 By virtue of this bombing in August, did the NATO Alliance,
24 attacking the RS throughout its territory, side with the Croat-Muslim
25 Federation, assisting the attack from Croatia by destroying
1 communications and command centres throughout RS territory?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Thank you, Mr. Milovanovic.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please now have 1D774 on the
5 screen, and I would also like to tender the previous document.
6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be marked for identification, pending
8 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 1D776 shall be
9 assigned exhibit number D257, marked for identification, pending
10 translation. Thank you.
11 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. Thanks
13 to the e-court, we have the document before us. This is a document
14 issued by the Main Staff of the VRS, dated 21st of September, 1995. And
15 what is discussed in this document are the consequences and the
16 resolution of the consequences of the air-strikes. The commander is here
17 issuing an order regarding the consequences of the air-strike in the
18 barracks in Han Pijesak, and I will just read the first item.
19 "The commander of the Han Pijesak barracks will, together with
20 the commander of the 67th Communications Regiment, engage all available
21 troops and start with the repairing and making the facilities functional
22 again in accordance with the plan made by the commander of the
23 Han Pijesak barracks."
24 In the introduction, we can read the following: "After the NATO
25 Alliance air-strikes against Han Pijesak barracks, a damage was caused
1 which made those facilities completely ineffective."
2 Can we please see the last page so that we can see the signature
3 in the document, on the document.
4 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
5 Q. As can you see, this is an order issued by General Mladic.
6 Did you also know about the air-strikes against the barracks in
7 Han Pijesak, and did you see their activities and the consequences of
8 those activities on the facilities in Han Pijesak and facilities around
9 the Main Staff? Thank you.
10 A. I did hear about the operations, partly from this order that I
11 also received. I did not have any troops or barracks that were attacked
12 by NATO, except those that had to do with communication hubs, and I also
13 felt the fire that was used by the Euro Corps and I don't know why was I
14 not allowed to talk about it. But the Euro Corps was the fifth military
15 power that appeared in the theatre of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It
16 represented an attempt by the European Community to create a military
17 organisation of its own, similar to the NATO Alliance, and they used
18 Bosnia as their trial theatre of war. This rapid intervention corps
19 which consisted of Spanish and some other forces. It was under command
20 of a French general and the Chief of Staff was an American general,
21 General Sylvester. The corps commander carried out operations against my
22 forces from the area of Duvansko Polje [phoen]. They were using
23 ammunition with white signs on it. Croats did not have such ammunition
24 or the amounts that were used. Chief of Staff, General Sylvester was
25 supporting the Muslims during the Sarajevo offensive that started in
1 June, and where the positions from Mount Igman were used to fire against
2 Serbian positions around Sarajevo.
3 In the period between the 29th of August and the 14th of
4 September, there were intense NATO Alliance combat activities, not of
5 UNPROFOR, but of the NATO Alliance, against units of the VRS. At a later
6 stage, I heard that 110 civilians were also killed somewhere in
7 Eastern Bosnia, but I don't know much about that, because I wasn't paying
8 much attention to that.
9 So these 15 days of air-strikes was something that I will use a
10 specific expression, allegedly Markale II, but the real intention was to
11 defeat the VRS.
12 Q. Thank you, General.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this
14 document. In the meantime, let me call the next --
15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: [Previous translation continues] ... It will be
16 marked for identification, pending translation.
17 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 1D774 shall be
18 assigned exhibit number D258, marked for identification, pending
19 translation. Thank you.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we please have
21 1D767 now on the screen so that we can see what the consequences of the
22 operations discussed a moment ago were and to see how VRS was being
23 prevented from resisting the attacks against them. This is a document
24 issued by the Main Staff of the VRS dated 9th of September. It is about
25 the changes in the system of communications and courier services.
1 An order. And I quote: "Because of the problems caused by
2 air-strikes of the NATO against radio-relay hubs and postal telegraph and
3 telephone facilities and communications facilities in the areas of
4 responsibility of Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, Herzegovina Corps, Drina Corps
5 and East Bosnia Corps, and until alternative lines of communications are
6 established with the purpose of more urgent and better-organised sending
7 and receiving of telegraphs and written information, I order:
8 "1. Establish a temporary forward office of the Main Staff of
9 the VRS at the command post of the East Bosnia Corps for the purpose of
10 receiving all types of written documents, telegrams and written
11 documents, issued by the forward command post 1 of the Main Staff of the
12 VRS, 1st and 2nd Krajina Corps, military schools, the 14th
13 Logistics Base, the 1st Motorised Rocket" --
14 It is very difficult to read this. "And the 35th
15 Logistics Base ..."
16 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
17 Q. And this is my question to you, General: Were you also required
18 to organise courier service between you and the Main Staff from the
19 location where you were at the forward command post because all
20 communications system within the republic was disrupted and we could not
21 use phones, telegraph or anything else? Thank you.
22 A. Yes. On the 9th of September, a simultaneous attack was carried
23 out against all 13 communication hubs in the VRS. All of our
24 communication hubs. And that was the first time during the war that we
25 did not have radio or telegraph communications.
1 I remember this document really well because I was asked to set
2 up this office in Banja Luka and not in Bijeljina, but I could not accept
3 that because the fate of Banja Luka was not secure. Operation Storm may
4 have continued. Tudjman was saying that he intends to drink coffee in
5 Hotel Banja Luka and I didn't want to be the one who had to make this
6 coffee for him.
7 Q. Thank you, General.
8 Can we please have this 1D767 entered into evidence. Thank you.
9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Before we come to that, I would like to clarify
11 I can't see the date in the heading of this page. Could that be
12 enlarged, please.
13 It seems to be the 6th of September, 1995. In your list of
14 documents, you have listed it as a document from the 3rd of September,
15 1995. That -- I just want to clarify that.
16 And I would like to put a question to the witness.
17 This document, obviously from the 6th of September, how does it
18 relate to the 9th of September? You just testified that there was an
19 attack -- the first attack on -- against all 13 communication hubs in the
20 VRS. The 9th of September should be a date after this document was
21 drafted and sent.
22 Could you please help to clarify that?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] On the screen before me, it is hard
24 to tell whether it's the 6th or the 8th. The air-strike took place on
25 the 9th or, rather, the air-strikes started on the 24th of August, and --
1 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: 29th of August.
2 A. And lasted until 14th of September. I remember the air-strike
3 that was carried out on the 9th because then all communications were
4 interrupted. I remember having a discussion with Mladic about what to do
5 if the command post gets destroyed and how to organise the office for
6 receiving and sending of mail. Initially the idea was to do it in
7 Banja Luka, and I explained why not there. But we still had
8 communications up until the 9th, and, on that day, the repeater near
9 Mrkonjic Grad was destroyed. I had a visitor, two bishops, rather,
10 Atanasije Jevtic, and another bishop. So that's how I remember the
11 air-strike against our repeater. It does not matter when the air-strike
12 was carried out. Commander may have expected this air-strike, but this
13 one huge simultaneous air-strike against all repeaters was on the 9th and
14 I even had two soldiers who were casualties of the air-strike, because
15 they were at the repeater at the moment.
16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you. The document will be marked for
17 identification, pending translation.
18 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 1D767 shall be
19 assigned exhibit number D259, marked for identification, pending
20 translation. Thank you.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. Could we
22 have 1D770, please. A report about a press conference. We do have a
23 translation. There's also a cassette we received from the Prosecution.
24 Thank you.
25 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Please take a look at this document drafted on
2 26th September 1995. And in there, we have all the NATO operations
3 enumerated for the entire period of the air-strikes. And that's why the
4 order was issued, the order that was in the previous document.
5 I will only quote the sixth paragraph thereof, starting with the
6 words: "International community ..."
7 "According to the Vance Plan, the international community gave
8 guarantees for safety of the Serbian people in the Republika Srpska of
9 Krajina but failed to fulfil them. We are witnessing the consequences of
10 such an aggression which resulted in the greatest ethnic cleansing in
11 this century in Europe. It was done to the Serbian people and a part of
12 the international community offered assistance and support to Croatia in
13 doing it.
14 "More than 700.000 Serbs were driven away from the ancient
15 territories and all their estates were robbed and burned down. At the
16 same time, the members of the Croatian Armed Forces committed mass crimes
17 throughout the Republika Srpska Krajina. At the press conference, there
18 was also mention of the units that were fighting against VRS and also
19 against Republika Srpska Krajina."
20 Were you informed about the events discussed there, and was the
21 Croatian population informed about the fact that in the enter period of
22 the war, UNPROFOR and NATO sided with the Croats and the Muslim army?
23 Thank you. Can you please tell us whether the international community
24 did anything to prevent this?
25 A. Mr. President, do I have to answer this question? Because I
1 believe I have already answered it.
2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: If you have already answered it, it's fine.
3 Indeed, there are some repetitions in answering.
4 Mr. Tolimir, the witness refers to his previous answer. Please
5 carry on.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. Since
7 the witness told us that he already answered the question, I would like
8 to tender this document, 1D770. This will save us some time as well.
9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
10 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Mr. President. I would object until we can
11 get some more information on where this came from. It doesn't have an
12 ERN on it, and so if the General could tell us where it came from, where
13 he got it, I -- we don't see the bottom of it either, so we need some
14 basics on something like this.
15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Could we please scroll down or go to the next
17 Is there another page? It isn't.
18 Mr. Milovanovic, do you know this document on the screen?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. But I am familiar with the
20 contents of the document. I was familiar with the contents throughout
21 the whole war because it had to do with the answer that Tolimir wanted me
22 to give him the answer if NATO supported the Muslims, and I already
23 answered that.
24 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Indeed. I want to know if you are familiar with
25 this document on the screen. Do you know anything about a press
1 conference at that time, 26th of February, 1995, given by the commander.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. He had a lot of press
4 conferences. I don't know if I knew of this one or not. I really cannot
6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, can you help us with the source of
7 this document?
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
9 The document was given along with the video cassette containing
10 footage of that conference, and this is an original translation, in order
11 to inform the public about what was happening -- the international
12 public, about what was going on during the war in Republika Srpska.
13 JUDGE FLUEGGE: You said the document was given. By whom?
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] There is a cassette that was
15 provided by the Prosecution, and it's in the archives. It's a video
16 cassette of a press conference that is in evidence. And then there is an
17 original translation of the document attached with this, and this was
18 done by the General Gvero Defence, I think. Because this is his
19 document. Thank you.
20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
21 MR. McCLOSKEY: That's -- doesn't tell us anything. If -- if it
22 is -- if there is an cassette that was provided by the Prosecution in a
23 previous case, there'll be a number, and if they could tell us that
24 number, then we can -- then we're fine.
25 If it's something -- and I -- General Gvero sometimes got
1 material from his own sources, so if it's one of those, we need to know
2 where it came from, who provided it, and that's just, of course, normal.
3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, can you give more information,
5 [Defence counsel confer]
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
7 I am taking into account what the Prosecutor said. We are going
8 to check when the cassette was disclosed and what the number was, and
9 we're going to provide all this information in the course of the next few
10 days so that we don't lose any more time on that in the courtroom at the
12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: More important is to know the convenience -- the
13 provenance of this document on the screen you are tendering.
14 But we will wait for additional information. You may come back
15 to that.
16 Please carry on.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
18 Can we have 1D773 now, please.
19 So that we don't lose any more time here, we can see a document
20 drafted by this witness. We can see the witness's signature.
21 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
22 Q. So my question is: Is this a document that you drafted at the
23 General -- at the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska, and is this
24 your signature? Is this the document that you referred to during the
1 A. The signature is mine, and what I am seeing on the last page of
2 the document indicates that that is my work. It's a description by the
3 Main Staff, or of the Main Staff. I gave that to the Prosecution last
4 week, and they said that they would show it to you.
5 Q. All right. Thank you.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we show the first page of this
8 Can we show the witness the first page so that we can finish with
9 this document, in order to be rational with the time that we have.
10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Now we have a different document on the screen.
11 We need the first page of 1D773.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 772.
13 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, we were looking at the -- at a
14 page - I don't know which one - of 1D773. But this is page 9, obviously,
15 of a document. We don't have a different -- other pages, 1 through 8.
16 Mr. Gajic.
17 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, the correct number is
18 1D772. Mr. Tolimir made an error. It was a slip of the tongue. He said
19 773. So I see that there is some confusion in the e-court.
20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Gajic, 1D772 is not on the list of documents
21 to be used. Yes, it is. Sorry. Undated document from VRS headquarters;
22 I see that. Thank you.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
24 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
25 Q. General, if you look at this document and headings and
1 subheadings, we're looking at the heading: The forming of the Main Staff.
2 On page 12, during the examination-in-chief, line 1, you said something
3 about how the Army of Republika Srpska is going to be formed; and you
4 also talked about those being put forward by the commander for different
5 posts. Can you tell us if you remember that, and if this is the document
6 that you wrote and handed over to the Prosecution? Thank you.
7 A. Yes, I remember everything. This is a document that I wrote. I
8 can tell also by the fact that my printer is always printing at an angle.
9 Q. Thank you. Can you please tell us whether you talked about the
10 content of the document during the examination-in-chief so that we can
11 tendered this document into evidence.
12 A. I gave answers to the Prosecutor's questions regarding the
13 organisation and structure of the Main Staff, and all of that was based
14 on what is in this document.
15 Q. Thank you, General.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please tender 177 -- 1D772
17 so that we don't have to put questions again to the witness that he
18 already answered during the examination-in-chief.
19 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Could we please see the last page of this
20 document? Yes, page 9 with a signature.
21 Mr. Milovanovic, when did you draft and write this text of nine
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I wrote this text last year on the
24 occasion of Army Day of the Army of Republika Srpska. There was a
25 round-table in Banja Luka that was held about the establishment and the
1 development of the Army of Republika Srpska, and it was my task, as the
2 war Chief of the Main Staff, to write about two topics. One topic was
3 the Main Staff. I had to write a presentation nine pages long. And then
4 another topic, the Creation and Development of the Army of Republika
5 Srpska, and that presentation was supposed to be 12 pages long. I did
6 respect or keep to that number of pages, and I gave both of those
7 presentations to the Prosecutor.
8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much.
9 Mr. McCloskey.
10 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, just to finish up the orientation. As the
11 General -- he just gave those to us a few days ago, so we copied them and
12 gave them to the Defence, and that's how they came into our possession
13 and into the courtroom.
14 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much. The document, 1D772, will
15 be marked for identification, pending translation.
16 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It was just, during our discussion, uploaded into
18 e-court. I mean the English translation. We should have a look on the
19 screen. And to see it. Thank you very much.
20 It will be received as an exhibit.
21 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 1D772 shall be
22 assigned exhibit number D260. Thank you.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
24 Could I ask the e-court now to show 1D771, please, in relation to
25 which the witness said just a little bit earlier, that he wrote it. So
1 to avoid repetition, can we now look at the first page and then I'm going
2 to put a question. The document is: The creation and the development of
3 the Army of Republika Srpska during the defence homeland war in Bosnia
4 and Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995. It was written by
5 General Manojlo Milovanovic, the wartime Chief of the Main Staff of the
6 VRS, Colonel-General, retired.
7 Can we now visually show the rest of the pages now, including the
8 last page of this document. Thank you.
9 Thank you, Mr. President. And thank you to e-court.
10 Mr. President, since the witness said a little bit earlier that
11 he presented this document at the same time as the other one, I would
12 just like the witness to confirm whether this is a document that he wrote
13 and handed over to the Prosecution, and I would like to tender this into
14 evidence because this document was referred to during the
15 examination-in-chief. Thank you.
16 A. Yes, this is a document that I wrote.
17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Is English translation available?
18 MR. McCLOSKEY: Almost. It's -- the revision, I think, is being
19 worked on. So I think in the next day or so, we should have it.
20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: The document will be marked for identification,
21 pending translation.
22 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 1D771 shall be
23 assigned exhibit number D261, marked for identification, pending
24 translation. Thank you.
25 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I would ask for
2 65 ter 04071 to be shown. Thank you.
3 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
4 Q. General, sir, we can see now a document by the Main Staff,
5 intelligence and security sector, of the 28th of July, 1995. It's an
6 intelligence report which states, I am quoting from the first paragraph:
7 "The west continues to threaten Serbs, demonstrate their force and
8 provide political and diplomatic support to the Croat-Muslim offensive
9 operations, as well as political and diplomatic support to the
10 Croat-Muslim offensive operations."
11 Thank you, General.
12 "At this stage, they are focussed on protecting the Muslim
13 enclaves of Gorazde and Sarajevo and it is not being ruled out that they
14 will use force to protect the so-called Bihac safe area. They
15 demonstrate determination to use force in case that delivery of
16 humanitarian assistance is obstructed."
17 And then paragraph 2: "The plan of NATO air force operations in
18 the area of Bihac is being mapped out, but a number of sources indicate
19 that the situation in Cazin Krajina is vague and that the use of NATO
20 forces is not very likely."
21 General, sir, did you receive this information from the
22 intelligence and security sector at the forward command post and do you
23 recall receiving information of this type? Did this information arrive
24 on a daily basis at the forward command post where you were located?
25 Thank you.
1 A. This information did not reach the forward command post. It
2 reached the command of the 2nd Corps where I would hand them over. I
3 simply did not want to open an office for incoming and outgoing mail at
4 the forward command post.
5 I'm sorry that I cannot read all of this report to see if there
6 was information that day about me losing Grahovo and Glamoc with my units
7 that day.
8 Q. All right. Thank you very much.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at the last page of
10 this document. This is page 4 in the English. Thank you.
11 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
12 Q. And you can see this last page now. It was sent out to everyone.
13 And it states: "The Army of the Independent State of Croatia regrouped
14 their forces in the directions leading to the western parts of the
15 Republic of the Serbian Krajina. Units are at full combat readiness, and
16 prepared to start an attack immediately. They think that the Army of
17 Yugoslavia will not react and they are spreading information that the SVK
18 will not be allowed to launch attacks in Baranja, Easter Slavonia and
19 Western Srem or move the present line of engagement."
20 Chief Major-General Zdravko Tolimir, and it also states this was
21 sent to IKM 1 the forward command post of the Army of Republika Srpska to
22 such and such a person. The name is not mentioned here but was that you,
23 who were there at IKM 1 of the Main Staff of the VRS and perhaps this is
24 something that actually stands in for your first and last name, in a kind
25 of code?
1 A. Yes. My forward command post was command post number 1. I can
2 see that you had 2 and 3 in Eastern Bosnia. I don't know to whom this
3 was addressed but, in any event, the document did reach me, either
4 through the IKM or through the 2nd Corps command. I don't know what I'm
5 supposed to answer, whether I'd seen the document before or ... ?
6 Q. Thank you. My first question, before you asked to look at the
7 last page was this. The West, in this offensive by the Muslims and
8 Croats, which was being conducted even from the territory of Croatia
9 against the Army of Republika Srpska, state political, diplomatic, and
10 all other kinds of threats towards Republika Srpska at that particular
11 time and supported the Muslim army, the Croat army, and the army of the
12 Republic of Croatia? Thank you.
13 A. I spoke about that already when I talked about the support of the
14 Euro Corps to the Croatian army. So my answer remains yes.
15 But from what I can see, you are again trying to blame the West.
16 I actually would blame the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia more than the
17 West because the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was obliged to guarantee
18 or to support the Vance Plan, and it even said in one provision, even at
19 the cost of use of force or arms. So practically Yugoslavia was supposed
20 to declare war against Croatia. But it failed to do that.
21 Q. Thank you, General. You also wanted to see if the information
22 covered the status of the Glamoc and Grahovo front.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please look at page 2 in
24 e-court. Paragraph 5. This is the following page in the English in the
25 e-court, and we can see here where it says:
1 Q. "The Ustasha forces" --
2 A. "The Ustashas started --
3 Q. "The Ustasha offensive in the direction of Kupres started on 29
4 July 1995 with heavy artillery support and the focus on (illegible). In
5 the direction of Grahovo and Glamoc, they're carrying out fortification
6 works at the reach [as interpreted] lines and bringing in fresh forces in
7 order to carry out combat operations for relief of units" --
8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Please slow down.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: We don't receive interpretation at the moment.
11 Please slow down and read what you want to read.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] "Considering the fact that they did
13 not get in contact with our units at that part of the front, offensive
14 activities are likely to continue in the direction of Glamoc, Sipovo,
15 Jajce, and Grahovo - Knin."
16 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
17 Q. My question is: This information, did it report realistically on
18 the state of affairs that they were already fortifying in Glamoc and
19 Grahovo and that they were planning further actions from those locations?
20 Thank you.
21 A. Yes, that is correct. And thank you for that information,
22 because all along I thought that no one cared about my situation.
23 Q. Thank you, General.
24 JUDGE FLUEGGE: We must have our second break now, Mr. Tolimir.
25 We will resume at 1.00.
1 --- Recess taken at 12.31 p.m.
2 --- On resuming at 1.03 p.m.
3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Yes, Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
5 I wanted to seek to tender this document just before the break.
6 Hence, I'm tendering it now so as to be able to move to the next
8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 4071 shall be
10 assigned exhibit number D262. Thank you.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
12 Could we next have 65 ter 04081. I wanted to say for the
13 transcript that it's a Main Staff of the VRS document, dated the 6th of
14 October, 1995. It is the text of the agreement on the cessation of
15 hostilities. It was forwarded to those specified on a different page.
16 This document was signed by Major-General Zdravko Tolimir.
17 And I quote: "Please find attached the integral text of the
18 cease-fire agreement in the former BiH which will come into effect at
19 0000 [as interpreted] hours on 10 October 1995. Signed by
20 Major-General Zdravko Tolimir."
21 Thank you.
22 We can see the text of the cease-fire agreement for BiH dated the
23 5th of October, 1995. There are no further comments. And it was
24 forwarded to the end users. It also refers to the end of the war in
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the first paragraph, a cease-fire is discussed,
1 as well as in the second.
2 The third paragraph refers to the implementation of the
4 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
5 Q. My question is this: Was this agreement forwarded to the forward
6 command post and did all units within your area of responsibility abide
7 by it?
8 A. The agreement was forwarded to the forward command post, but the
9 Muslim side did not honour it. At the time of its coming into effect, we
10 lost the last town we held on to in the Bosnian Krajina in the west,
11 which is Bosanski Most.
12 Q. Tell us briefly how did the international community react to it,
13 and did they try to return the Muslim side to their initial positions as
14 they existed before the agreement was signed?
15 A. I could not feel the reaction of the international community
16 because having lost Sanski Most I was forced to disband the
17 2nd Krajina Corps following a decision that was made by the Main Staff.
18 Q. Thank you.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May this be admitted into evidence,
20 please. And then we can move on to the next issue.
21 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I would like to see the list of addressees of
22 this document and the signature block. The last page. The end of the
23 page. This seems to be the last page.
24 Mr. Milovanovic, can you help us? You stated that you received
25 it at the forward command post, if I'm not mistaken. Do you know to whom
1 this document was sent?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know who it was sent to. I
3 read it at the command post of the 2nd Corps at the time it still
5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
6 MR. McCLOSKEY: I think we should just clarify. I don't know if
7 the General, I don't think he said it, but I think the 2nd Corps, I think
8 he meant the 2nd Krajina Corps, just not to be mixed up with another
9 2nd Corps.
10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Milovanovic, perhaps you can help us.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I believe I said the 2nd Krajina
12 Corps. The only thing I can add is of the VRS.
13 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you. Sometimes during the interpretation
14 something is missed -- something is missing. We can't verify where it
15 was sent to; nevertheless, we will receive it as an exhibit.
16 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, 65 ter document 4081 shall be
17 assigned exhibit number D263. Thank you.
18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. Could we
20 please have 65 ter 05834 shown in e-court.
21 We can see it. It's a Main Staff document of the VRS, dated the
22 11th of October. It was sent by courier because the communications lines
23 were down. The same thing applied to the agreement on the cessation of
24 hostilities. That is why there are no other signatures than of the
25 person who sent it.
1 This has to do with blocking the enemy offensive on the western
2 RS front. Order by the commander of the Main Staff.
3 Could we please go to the last page to see the commander's
4 signature? Page 2 in the Serbian, which is difficult to read.
5 In any case, it reads: "Commander, Colonel General Ratko Mladic."
6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: We tried to believe it, although we can't really
7 make it out. Oh, there's another page now. In the translation and in
8 the B/C/S version on the screen, we can see now it is said:
9 "General Pukovnik, Ratko Mladic."
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
11 If we look at page 1 -- actually, the first paragraph on this
12 page, it reads: "Chief of the Main Staff of the VRS,
13 Lieutenant-General Manojlo Milovanovic is to manage the entire operation
14 and coordinate combat activities of the corps, operational groups, and
15 brigades from the forward command post of the Main Staff of the VRS in
16 Banja Luka."
17 Next we have specified what each of the assistants was to do, in
18 order to stabilize the front lines.
19 Could we go back to page 1.
20 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
21 Q. General, can you tell us whether you received this commander's
22 order? And what can you tell us about the way the forces were
23 stabilized, meaning to say those that were under your command.
24 A. I did not receive this order by mail or courier, because I
25 drafted it, together with General Mladic. We were together at the
1 forward command post. There was some discussion as to why I was to
2 command, when he was there, but you know well that by that time he was an
3 ill man. This was the final stage of defensive operations of Banja Luka
4 when we had to pull out the 30th Division to the Ugar river. That was
5 the last stand, so to speak, and we managed to complete our task.
6 I received this order orally from General Mladic and later on he
7 must have converted it into written form, as I can see now.
8 I believe I discussed the issue of Mladic appointing certain
9 assistants of his to command specific parts of the front line.
10 Q. Thank you, General.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document.
12 And next I would like to have 1D618 shown in e-court.
13 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received.
14 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, 65 ter document 5834 shall be
15 assigned exhibit number D264. Thank you.
16 MR. McCLOSKEY: Excuse me, Mr. President.
17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Sorry, I didn't see you.
18 MR. McCLOSKEY: General Tolimir had put in the record that this
19 was not a teletyped document, it was a couriered document. If we could
20 have some foundation in the record, I would appreciate it, since he has
21 offered it now into evidence because it looked like a teletyped document.
22 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Are you referring to the last one we admitted
23 into evidence?
24 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Mr. President.
25 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Then we should have it back on the screen, D264,
1 page 1 in both versions.
2 I was going to ask Mr. Tolimir as well about this -- the source
3 of this comment. But, you see, behind the words "very urgent," "deliver
4 by courier."
5 I think Mr. Tolimir was referring to this part of the document.
6 Mr. McCloskey.
7 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President. That's all I needed.
8 I did not see that.
9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you. Problem resolved. Let's move to the
10 next document.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. 1D618, please.
12 It is it another Main Staff document of January 1, 1995, sent to
13 all commands. The title is: Implementation of the agreement on complete
14 cessation of hostilities with the Muslim side, order.
15 I seek to tender it so as to show that the agreement that was
16 forwarded in its original form and was not admitted was implemented by
17 virtue of this order.
18 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
19 Q. General, did you see or receive this order, and did you implement
20 it? Do the contents of the document jog your memory as to some
21 activities you managed during the war?
22 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
23 MR. McCLOSKEY: If we could just get the basics of what this
24 says, just who -- who it is to, what the subject matter is. Then I don't
25 need the whole thing read, of course, but that doesn't -- the question
1 doesn't help us at all if we have no idea what this is. Just a brief
2 idea of what it is.
3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Indeed, that would be helpful. We don't have the
4 English translation and don't know anything about that.
5 And your comment, "I seek to tender it so as to show that the
6 agreement that was forwarded in its original form."
7 I don't understand what are you referring to. This was page 70,
8 lines 12 and 13. Please help to us understand, Mr. Tolimir.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I'll
11 This is a Main Staff document of the VRS dated the 1st of
12 January. It was very urgent, delivered to the commands of all the units
13 as specified here, per establishment. Personally to their commanders or
14 Chiefs of Staff. The title is: Implementation of the agreement on the
15 complete cessation of hostilities with the Muslim side, order.
16 It reads in the first paragraph: "On 31st of December, 1995, an
17 agreement was signed on a complete cessation of hostilities between the
18 forces of the RS and Muslim forces in the former Bosnia and Herzegovina."
19 I wanted to have this document admitted to corroborate the other
20 document where we did not know who it was sent to. It was something we
21 used a moment ago. I believe it was 65 ter 04081, and it was forwarded
22 to the units, much the same way as this one. It concerned the same
23 topic, which is cessation of hostilities.
24 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Could the witness please tell us whether he, too, as the chief of
1 the Main Staff, received this document and whether he acted by it.
2 A. This agreement has no apparent connection to the previous one.
3 This is agreement on a four-month truce, the so-called Carter truce, and
4 we have discussed it already this morning.
5 The other agreement we saw a moment ago, dated the 10th of
6 October, is the agreement on the cessation of hostilities. I believe you
7 used an inexpert phrase when YOU said that it was agreement on the end of
8 the war, but that was obviously wrong. The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina
9 actually never ended because such a decision was not formally made.
10 All I can say about this is that I know that it was not honoured
11 by the Muslim agreement. This was an agreement between us and the
12 Muslims. The other warring factions, that is to say, the Croats, were
13 not included. The other agreement we saw a moment ago is an agreement on
14 cessation of hostilities in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
15 meaning it encompassed all of the warring parties. Practically speaking,
16 that was the agreement about the end of the war, and it was drafted in
17 order to pave a way for the Dayton peace talks. You may remember that we
18 then flew to Belgrade together because Mladic was unable to take that
19 flight. We were there to meet the leadership of the FRY to harmonise our
20 positions as Milosevic had been appointed as the head of the Serb
22 Q. Thank you, General. Thank you for correcting me. I showed you
23 the agreement of the 1st of January, 1995, thinking that it was actually
24 the one from the 1st of October and that is an error that created the
25 confusion. Now you have clarified that.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So this document, 1D618, could we
2 please have that admitted into evidence.
3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I'm still slightly confused. We have now figured
4 out, due to the assistance of Mr. Milovanovic, that there were two
5 different instances, in January, and in October. But what is this
6 document about? I don't understand B/C/S. I can't read it. I have no
7 idea. I don't know who signed it, what is the content, if this is an
8 attachment. We just see one page. And I really don't know what it is
9 about. It seems to have something to do with an agreement from the 1st
10 of January, 1995, but that's all I know.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
12 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
13 Q. General, sir, are you able to tell the Trial Chamber if this is
14 an order by the commander on the implementation of the agreement that was
15 signed on the 1st of January, 1995, and that's why we have two documents.
16 Thank you.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I ask e-court to show the
18 first page to the General so that he could see it. Thank you.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. The agreement that we're
20 looking at right now from the 1st of January, 1995 does not have any
21 physical or other connection with the agreement of the 10th of October.
22 This agreement that we're looking at right now of the 1st of
23 January is of a limited scope and only refers to Serbs and Muslims in
24 Western Bosnia, in the Bihac area, thus. An attempt by the international
25 community to save Bihac or to keep it under the Muslim control and to
1 prevent the Serbian forces from taking it.
2 The second agreement of the 10th of October is a comprehensive
3 one, including the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and it is aimed at
4 ending the war among all the warring parties, among the Serbs, the
5 Croats, the Muslims and NATO, wherever they were located.
6 Q. General, thank you.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please tender this document.
8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, [Overlapping speakers] ...
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D618. Thank you.
10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, the witness said it only refers to
11 Serbs and Muslims in Western Bosnia in the Bihac area.
12 What is the relevance of this document to our case here in this
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
15 It doesn't have to be tendered, because the document signed by
16 the Muslims on the cessation of hostilities of the 1st of January 1995
17 was not admitted with your explanation that you don't know what that
18 document was about. But I don't have any need to have it admitted. I
19 mean, it's already here, and that's why I suggested it be tendered. If
20 not, well, never mind. I'm just going to put my final questions to the
21 witness. Thank you.
22 JUDGE FLUEGGE: If you are not able to help us to understand the
23 relation between our case and the Bihac area, then you should move on.
24 Mr. Gajic.
25 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I see that the problem
1 is in the lack of translation of the document. The document clearly
2 states that this is about the implementation of the order on the complete
3 cessation of hostilities and that is the agreement which was admitted,
4 and it has number P1011.
5 So this is an order seeking the implementation of that agreement
6 on the Serbian side, or by the Serbian side.
7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Milovanovic, is that your understanding of
8 this document?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I would like the lawyer, if he
10 could, to just repeat what he said.
11 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] I apologise, I would just like to
12 point to the first paragraph which states that: "On the 31st of
13 December, 1994 agreement was signed on the complete cessation of
14 hostilities between the forces of the RS and the Muslim forces in the
15 former BiH."
16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Milovanovic.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] All right. Very well. I have
18 understood the lawyer right now. It's correct. It states in the
19 territory of the former BiH. However, this morning I already talked
20 about this document. That agreement was not honoured. That is the
21 Carter agreement. It was not honoured. It was violated already on the
22 13th of January by the Muslim forces.
23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Milovanovic, of course, you told us about
24 that. The question was a different one. Is this an order of
25 General Mladic to implement the agreement we have seen signed by
1 Izetbegovic, Karadzic in the presence of Mr. Akashi?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know if Akashi was present,
3 but I know that Jimmy Carter was. He was the organiser of the
4 negotiations in the actual signing of the agreement.
5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: In the absence of a clarification, we will mark
6 it for identification, and we will come back to that later.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 1D618 shall be
8 assigned exhibit number D265, marked for identification. Thank you.
9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
11 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Thank you, Mr. Milovanovic, for coming to testify before this
13 Tribunal. Thank you for everything. Excuse me, for putting questions
14 that may have caused some confusion like this last one was. Thank you
15 for all your clarifications and assistance during your testimony. I'm
16 wishing you a safe return home. May God bless you. I hope you enjoy
17 your deserved retirement since you were at the most exposed part of the
18 front, the most difficult part in Republika Srpska, and I wanted to ask
19 you if there's anything that you like to say that I did not ask you but
20 that you would like to take the opportunity and say now? Thank you.
21 JUDGE FLUEGGE: No, this is it not a proper conducting of a
22 cross-examination. If you have no more questions, then it's fine that
23 this will be the end of your cross-examination.
24 I take it you're finished your cross-examination, Mr. Tolimir?
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. You are
2 Q. I would like to wish General Milovanovic a safe and blessed
3 return home to his family and this is all the questions that the Defence
4 has for this witness. Thank you.
5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much.
6 Mr. McCloskey, your re-examination.
7 MR. McCLOSKEY: I have no further questions, Mr. President.
8 [Trial Chamber confers]
9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Sir, you will be pleased that this concludes your
10 testimony here in this trial. Thank you very much that you were able to
11 come again to The Hague and to undergo such a lengthy experience. Thank
12 you very much for your attendance here. You may now return to your
13 normal activities.
14 There is no possibility to start with the next witness. We have
15 to adjourn for the week, and we will resume on Monday in the afternoon,
16 2.15 in this courtroom.
17 We adjourn.
18 [The witness withdrew]
19 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.36 p.m.,
20 to be reconvened on Monday, the 23rd of May, 2011,
21 at 2.15 p.m.