1 Thursday, 14 July 2011
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Good morning to everybody in the courtroom.
6 I think I should note the following fact: I was told this
7 morning that this is day 200 in this trial. I think we did a lot of
8 work, and I'm very grateful that we had such a good working atmosphere in
9 the courtroom. The contribution of the parties and the whole staff for
10 the successful trial is really appreciated. We should note that, and we
11 should continue in that way and try to finish the trial successfully.
12 Is there anything to discuss before the witness will be brought
14 Mr. McCloskey.
15 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes. Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours,
17 Yes, Mr. President, I -- the Prosecution very much appreciates
18 the pace that the Court has set with this trial. It's been a good, tough
19 pace, but I think it's been just right, from the Prosecution's
21 I've had a chance to speak briefly with Mr. Gajic this morning
22 about a document Mr. Vanderpuye reminded me about. Before General Savcic
23 left the stand, Mr. Vanderpuye was questioning him on a MUP statement he
24 had given. It was on 23 June 2011, at transcript 15980 to 81, relating
25 to Mr. Pecanac. Mr. Vanderpuye meant to offer it into evidence, but as
1 you recall, General Savcic left and then we decided it wasn't needed to
2 recall him.
3 So if I could offer 65 ter 7440 into evidence. And I've been
4 able to discuss this briefly with Mr. Gajic.
5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Gajic.
6 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, as far as the
7 statement of Mr. Savcic is concerned, the Defence has no objection.
8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: The document will be received into evidence.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 7440 shall be
10 assigned Exhibit P2523. Thank you.
11 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much.
12 The witness should be brought in, please.
13 MR. McCLOSKEY: And just as a reminder, we left off at 65 ter 56,
14 which was at tab 103, and I'll be continuing on that for a bit.
15 [The witness takes the stand]
16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Good morning, Mr. Butler. Welcome back to the
18 THE WITNESS: Good morning, sir.
19 JUDGE FLUEGGE: The affirmation to tell the truth still applies
21 WITNESS: RICHARD BUTLER [Resumed]
22 THE WITNESS: I understand, sir.
23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
24 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
25 Examination by Mr. McCloskey: [Continued]
1 Q. Mr. Butler, we're still on -- it should be tab 103 in your
2 binder. We already have it in the e-court. It's Mr. Vasic, the chief of
3 the Zvornik CJB's report -- one of his reports of 12 July. You told us
4 briefly about point 1, who Miroslav Deronjic was.
5 Point 2 is a reference to:
6 "A meeting with General Mladic and General Krstic was held at the
7 Bratunac Brigade headquarters at," I think it says, "0800 hours in which
8 tasks were assigned to all those involved."
9 How, if at all, does this fit into your opinion about General --
10 about the army and the command relationship between the MUP?
11 A. Yes, sir. I believe this particular sentence again reflects the
12 fact that the police forces there are taking their orders from the senior
13 army commanders on the ground.
14 Q. All right. And then let's just look down it. We see number 3:
15 "The Turks are fleeing towards Suceska, while the civilians are
16 gathered in Potocari."
17 I think we've heard quite a bit about that.
18 Number 4 is talking about setting up a police station in
19 Srebrenica, which I don't think we need to go into.
20 Number 5, it's:
21 "A meeting will begin at 1000 hours with representatives of
22 UNPROFOR and the International Red Cross ..."
23 It talks about:
24 "... an agreement will be reached on the evacuation of the
25 civilian population from Potocari to Kladanj."
1 What meeting, in your view, does this refer to?
2 A. This refers to what we call the third meeting that occurred at
3 the Hotel Fontana between the VRS, the Dutch Battalion members, and the
4 Muslim representatives from Srebrenica.
5 Q. All right. And number 6:
6 "Joint police forces are advancing on Potocari with the aim of
7 taking UNPROFOR personnel prisoner, surrounding the entire civilian
8 population and cleansing the area of enemy troops."
9 So from the documents and your knowledge, have you an opinion
10 whether or not at this -- at this time, that joint police forces were
11 advancing on Potocari?
12 A. Yes, sir. And, in fact, at the time or shortly after this 8.00
13 meeting, Special Police forces did advance towards Potocari, breaching
14 the minefield with some help from the engineers, and their actions were
15 as described.
16 Q. And was Mr. Borovcanin, who we've heard was a deputy commander of
17 the Special Police, involved in this action?
18 A. Yes, sir, he was.
19 Q. And will we, a little bit later on in our chronology, see some
20 reports from Mr. Borovcanin describing this?
21 A. Yes, sir.
22 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. I'd offer this into evidence.
23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 56 shall be
25 assigned Exhibit P2524. Thank you.
1 MR. McCLOSKEY: And let's now go to 65 ter 2231. It's a similar
2 report from Mr. Vasic. In fact, this last one was number 277. This
3 current one that's coming up is number 278. It's two pages in English,
4 and it's not very legible in the B/C/S. So I have concluded it's from
5 Vasic, but we do see, in the English, "The chief of the CJB."
6 Q. So can you remind us, who was the chief of the CJB, whose name
7 should have been under that that we can't quite see?
8 A. That should be Dragomir Vasic.
9 Q. Okay. And then looking at this report, we see it's in a similar
10 setup as the last one, and it talks about now:
11 "At 1030 hours, a meeting was held at the hotel in Bratunac,
12 attended by the following:"
13 And we see the group that it's talking about. And is that the
14 meeting that we see parts of on this video that is an exhibit in the
16 A. Yes, sir, although I should note that the individuals listed in
17 line A representing the Serb side, there were clearly, as the video
18 shows, many more members of the VRS and the Drina Corps present at that
19 meeting than are actually listed by Mr. Vasic.
20 Q. Can you remind us who some of those other key players are that
21 are seen in the video?
22 A. Off -- off of memory: General Krstic, I believe Colonels Kosoric
23 and Popovic, Colonel Jankovic is there, General Mladic is there.
24 That's -- from the military side, that's all I recall at the moment.
25 Q. All right. And, B, it says Colonel Karremans was there. Was
1 there some other DutchBat personnel there as well, in your view, if you
3 A. Yes, sir, I do recall from the videotape that there were several
4 other Dutch Battalion members. I believe Major Franken was -- either
5 Major Franken or Rava [phoen] or Boering was present, one of those two,
6 and then Sergeant-Major Rava was also there. I think it was -- Boering
7 was the officer present with Colonel Karremans.
8 Q. All right. Well, we've got the video for that. And we see the
9 Muslim representatives listed as well. And can you remind us what
10 happened if you -- to Ibro Nuhanovic after these days, if you remember or
11 recall, and his wife.
12 A. To be fair at this point, I don't recall what happened to
13 Mr. Nuhanovic and his wife at this juncture. It's been too many years.
14 Q. Okay. Let's look at the conclusions:
15 "According to the Muslims ..."
16 We need to go over in the B/C/S, I believe:
17 "... there were 25.000 people in the base in Potocari (mainly
18 small children, women and elderly) and only 10 per cent are conscripts
19 from 17 to 60 years old."
20 What do you make of this comment to his superiors about men from
21 17 to 60 years old that Vasic is putting in this report?
22 A. One of the critical underlying issues for the army at this point
23 in time and, in fact, for the previous evening hours, was trying to
24 determine where were the men of the 28th Infantry Division, what were
25 they doing, and a lot of efforts to get intelligence. When one looks at
1 the military dispositions, the VRS, going into the early-evening hours of
2 the 11th of July and the early-morning hours of the 12th of July, was
3 looking for the 28th Infantry Division and expected to find the remnants
4 of the division in an area of the former enclave known as the
5 Bardera [phoen] Triangle. As we've indicated in earlier intercepts, in
6 fact, they're not in the Bardera Triangle. The division is starting to
7 assemble into this column and start to excultrate [sic] from the enclave.
8 This word and this realisation obviously takes time from the people on
9 the ground who are observing it before it finally makes its way to the
10 leadership of the VRS so they can react to it. Again in this particular
11 context, they are asking the Muslim representatives, Where are the
12 members of the 28th Division, where are all the able-bodied men? And the
13 response is -- that they're getting back in Potocari is that there aren't
14 enough able-bodied men there and none of them are military members, as
15 far as they're able to determine. So this is all part of this larger
16 question of: Where are -- where is the 28th Infantry Division, where are
17 the military-aged men, and what actions are they doing right now?
18 Q. And do you recall whether the evidence has indicated if Mladic
19 said anything at this 10.00 meeting about doing anything with the
20 able-bodied men roughly 16 to 60 years old, or thereabouts, if you
22 A. Yes, sir, I do.
23 Q. What is your recollection?
24 A. General Mladic had indicated that there would be some form of a
25 vetting process for the men of this particular age group in order to
1 ensure that they had not been involved in crimes against the Serbs.
2 Q. And a separation of able-bodied men to be interviewed, reviewed,
3 and vetted for possible war criminals, is there anything wrong with that,
4 in your view?
5 A. No, sir. And, in fact, during the morning hours of 12 July, the
6 Bratunac Brigade Intelligence and Security shop actually produced a list
7 of Bosnian Muslims who they believed were involved with crimes against
8 the Serbs, so there was actually a list by which to start vetting these
9 people against. That is a legitimate act.
10 Q. Now, as evident in the case, that men were separated and
11 detained, is there any indication that they were provided with the
12 appropriate logistical support of food, water, medicine, support, that --
13 well, as you see was required by law? And I'm talking about the Potocari
14 men, able-bodied men.
15 A. No, sir. The only -- the only people who were provided that were
16 those men who were wounded and were under the Dutch care, medical care,
17 and then were transported to Bratunac, where they remained under
18 observation of the Dutch. If you weren't a member of that group, as the
19 investigation has determined, you were put in a number of facilities in
20 Potocari. Your identification was taken away from you, as well as all
21 your other personal goods, and then you were part of that process that
22 ultimately went from Potocari, through Bratunac, and then to various
23 sites in Zvornik where they were subsequently executed.
24 Q. All right. Let's now look at this. As we go down, number 2
1 "They want to leave the camp voluntarily and go to Tuzla or
2 Kladanj, and they request assistance."
3 We'll leave that for consideration to others.
4 Number 3:
5 "They also request free passage for able-bodied men because,
6 allegedly, they are unarmed and they are not in contact with their army
7 in the woods."
8 So which able-bodied men are these, in your view?
9 A. These are Bosnian Muslim men from the enclave who fall within the
10 age bracket; in this case, 17 to 60. Many [Realtime transcript read in
11 error "men"] of them are not associated with the 28th Infantry Division.
12 What the Muslim representatives are noting at this juncture is that there
13 are two separate groups. One group is an army group, and another group
14 is just Bosnian Muslim men who are seeking to flee, but who are not
16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: May I ask you for a clarification.
17 Did you say "many of them are not associated with the
18 28th Infantry Division" or did you say "men of them"?
19 THE WITNESS: Many, sir.
20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.
21 THE WITNESS: Most of -- the size of the 28th Division, in terms
22 of manpower, was actually larger than the amount of weapons that the
23 units had available. So, generally, they had more soldiers, and the
24 practice in the enclave was that when one group of soldiers went off
25 duty, another group of soldiers would come in and take those weapons. So
1 the fact that there are unarmed men in the woods is not the same as
2 saying they're not soldiers, so that's why I have to be careful and
3 differentiate between, you know, those individuals who are armed members
4 of the 28th Division, those individuals who are soldiers -- who are
5 members of the 28th Division but, because of circumstances, are not
6 armed, and then the third body, which is men who fall into that able-body
7 range but who are -- and have no association with the military.
8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
9 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes.
10 Q. And that third group you mentioned, were any of those in Potocari
11 at the 12th of July, if you know?
12 A. Yes, sir. I would say that many of those men in Potocari were
13 not associated with the military, and because they had no military
14 association, they chose to accompany their families to Potocari rather
15 than flee into the woods.
16 Q. All right. And number 4:
17 "It was decided to grant their requests, and with UNPROFOR
18 assistance (presence and provision of fuel for transportation) and the
19 trucks provided, boarding of vehicles will commence at 1400 hours and the
20 escort will be provided 'til Kladanj."
21 Do you recall yesterday a document from General Zivanovic, where
22 he did not know the final destination of the group?
23 A. Yes, sir.
24 Q. Does this indicate by the morning of the 12th there is a
25 destination? Is this related to -- I should say: Is this related to the
1 same subject that Zivanovic was talking about?
2 A. Yes, sir. I think if you look in time, General Zivanovic's
3 message relating to acquiring the buses comes several hours prior to this
4 particular document which reflects that a decision has been made where
5 they are going.
6 Q. Okay. And then this line:
7 "After the inspection, depending on Mladic's decision,
8 able-bodied men may be allowed to go in order to have the others from the
9 woods to surrender, since our command urged them to do so."
10 Now, this idea mentioned here, that after the inspection of the
11 able-bodied men, depending on what Mladic decides, they may allow those
12 able-bodied men to go as some sort of impetus to get the men from the
13 woods to come down, is that shown on the video anywhere, these comments
14 from Mladic of this meeting?
15 A. I don't recall the details of that in the video. It may be there
16 are. I just don't recall them at the moment.
17 Q. And do you know for a fact where Vasic actually got this from?
18 A. This particular line?
19 Q. Yes.
20 A. No, sir, I don't.
21 Q. All right. And then number 5, we see it's a discussion about
22 President Karadzic setting up forces for a police station in Srebrenica,
23 mentioning the 2nd Company of the Zvornik PJP.
24 He also, in number 6, if we go to the next page in English,
25 mentions the 1st Company is carrying out tasks.
1 Now, you have mentioned the 2nd Company of the PJP and the
2 1st Company, I think, in relation to Mr. Borovcanin. Can you explain:
3 How is it that Vasic is reporting on these folks, and is this different
4 from Borovcanin's folks? As much as you can tell us on that.
5 A. Yes, sir. I mean, the command relationships between the police
6 bear some discussion. The 1st Company that he is discussing, of course,
7 is the 1st PJP Company. It is, at that point, under the direct command
8 of Mr. Borovcanin, but they are still Vasic's police. So it would be
9 natural for him to discuss what their role was and what missions they
10 were performing. Of the PJP companies, that is the only PJP company that
11 is specifically -- had been previously re-subordinated to Mr. Borovcanin.
12 The other PJP companies that have been mobilised and are operating
13 around -- in and around Srebrenica and other locations remain subordinate
14 at this juncture to Mr. Vasic, as the head of the CJB. And, of course,
15 in this context, Vasic is taking his orders also from the army, and he's
16 keeping his chain of command and the police forces and police staff
17 informed in detail as to what those orders are.
18 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. I'd offer this document into
20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received.
21 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 2231 shall be
22 assigned Exhibit P2525. Thank you.
23 MR. McCLOSKEY: And if we could go to P1565A. And we'll see that
24 this is an intercept. It's from 12 July, from other documents, but all
25 we see, really, is a transcript of the intercept here. It's at 1240
1 hours, and it's from Panorama, who is X, and Y, who is barely audible.
2 And we see Y say:
3 "We are starting the evacuation of those who want to go towards
5 And X, from Panorama says:
7 Q. What is Panorama?
8 A. Panorama is the telephonic code-name for the Main Staff
10 Q. Okay.
11 And Y says:
12 "Pass it on ... just let ... provide transportation."
13 X can't be heard.
14 Then Y says:
15 "And reinforce ... with trucks and buses, and a water tank should
16 be sent to give them water and food. This morning we organised it here,
17 we'll give them everything. I talked to them, and we'll accept all of
18 the civilians who want to and they can stay. Those who don't want to can
19 choose where they'll go."
20 X can't be heard.
21 Y says:
23 First of all, who do you think Y is talking about here? That is,
24 he's providing them with water and food and accepting that they can go or
1 A. I believe that Y is talking about the civilian population that is
2 at this time presently in Potocari.
3 MR. McCLOSKEY: Okay. Let's go to the next document. That one's
4 already in evidence. This is another intercept 10 minutes later, 1250
5 hours. It looks like the same channel and the same frequency.
6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: May I interrupt you for a moment.
7 There is something missing on page 13, line 4. You said, sir,
8 Panorama is the code-name for a certain headquarters. Could you repeat
9 that, please?
10 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. That would be the Main Staff
12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much.
13 Mr. McCloskey.
14 MR. McCLOSKEY: P241 is the next exhibit. It's an intercept,
15 12 July. It's, as I mention, the same frequency, same channel as the
16 last one, but 10 minutes later, and it's identified by the intercept
17 people of the Tuzla CSB as a conversation between General Mladic and an
18 unidentified male they call X.
19 Q. And X says:
20 "Go ahead, General."
21 Mladic says :
22 "Have these buses and trucks left?"
23 X says:
24 "They have."
25 Mladic says:
2 X says:
3 "10 minutes ago."
4 Mladic says:
5 "Good, excellent. Continue to monitor the situation. Don't let
6 small groups of them sneak in. They've all capitulated and surrendered,
7 and we'll evacuate them all, those who want to and those who don't want
9 X says:
10 "I understand, General."
11 Mladic says:
12 "Don't issue any statements, and don't interrupt them over the"
13 something" station. We'll open a corridor towards Kladanj."
14 X can't be heard.
15 Mladic says:
16 "Indeed, let it pass there. Take a patrol of ours to wait on the
17 road and move the mines and obstacles ... leave the territory."
18 Looking at both these intercepts together, what do you make of
20 A. General Mladic has already decided that everyone will be removed
21 from Potocari, regardless of whether they wish to remain or not. In the
22 earlier conversation, the correspondents who were discussing it were
23 still discussing a situation and, clearly, were not yet aware of the
24 final instructions that General Mladic had issued in this regard. It's
25 obviously natural, in not only a military sense, but in any bureaucratic
1 organisational sense, that there is a certain time lag as orders are
2 passed down the chain of command and that all the relevant individuals
3 who will implement those orders become aware of them.
4 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. Let's continue in the chronology and
5 go to 65 ter 67. This is a new sort of document for us, I believe,
6 that -- we see that it's from the Republika Srpska MUP, RDB, the
7 State Security Department, Sarajevo. We see who it's to; the deputy
8 minister, personally. And it's from the head of the RDB, Dragan Kijac.
9 Q. I believe you've mentioned this briefly, but can you tell us what
10 this is, who Kijac is?
11 A. He is the head of the RDB, which is the state security apparatus
12 of the Republika Srpska. It is part of the Ministry of the Interior.
13 Just like the army had an intelligence and security apparatus as part of
14 its structure, the Ministry of the Interior also had an intelligence
15 collection and security apparatus, which is the RDB.
16 Q. Is there any indication that the RDB had agents or officers on
17 the ground in and around Bratunac and Potocari on the 12th of July?
18 A. Yes, sir. I am aware that the investigation has identified
19 several RDB agents in and around Bratunac and Potocari on those dates.
20 Q. And this paragraph notes that:
21 "Representatives of international humanitarian organisations in
22 Srebrenica sent a report to their head offices on 12 July, saying that
23 that the morning humanitarian situation was 'worse than ever.'"
24 And then it says:
25 "According to the report, the population lacked food, medicine
1 and clothing."
2 Then it estimates the number of people around the battalion at
3 30.000, and 8.000 more trying to get there. According to military
4 observers, there is not a single armed soldier of the so-called BH among
5 these people. A proposal by the UNPROFOR to provide 20 buses.
6 What does this indicate the SDB has got their hands on when it
7 says that "the humanitarian organisations sent a report" and "according
8 to that report"?
9 A. It reflects the fact that they obviously have knowledge of what
10 various NGOs or the UN, if the NGOs were reporting through the UN
11 channels, the information that they're reporting up their particular
12 chain of command that somehow the RDB is getting access to that
14 Q. And do you know if it was intercepted, or gotten through an
15 agent, or found, or do you have any idea how they got this?
16 A. No, sir, I don't.
17 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. I'd offer that into evidence.
18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Yes, it will be received.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 67 shall be
20 assigned Exhibit P2526. Thank you.
21 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Gajic.
22 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I would just ask
23 Mr. McCloskey and the witness to slow down a bit, because it takes a
24 while before the interpretation is done or completed. They are about six
25 lines behind the speakers.
1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you for this advice.
2 Mr. McCloskey.
3 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you.
4 If we could go to P1566A. It's another intercept from 12 July,
5 1305 hours now, from Krstic and Sobat [phoen].
6 Q. Can you tell us who you think this Krstic and Sobat is?
7 A. In this particular context, "Krstic" is General Krstic, because
8 as one reads further down the particular intercept, one of the
9 correspondents does address him as "General."
10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey, you called him, the other person,
11 Sobat, but I read "Sobot."
12 MR. McCLOSKEY: I meant to say Sobot. I see it the same way you
13 do. I apologise.
14 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Go ahead, please.
15 MR. McCLOSKEY:
16 Q. Does that name, Sobot, ring a bell?
17 A. Yes, sir, it does.
18 Q. Who?
19 A. He is an officer on the Drina Corps staff who's associated with
20 the logistics or rear services branch.
21 Q. And we see "Krsmanovic." In your view, is that the same
22 Krsmanovic you've already talked about related to buses?
23 A. Yes, sir, it is.
24 Q. And I don't want to go through all of this and who the various
25 folks are, Savo and Kosoric and all, but we see, as we get down, it's
1 talking about a tunnel, and that's where they'll be disembarking, "take
2 care that nothing must happen to them." Can you tell us what it is you
3 think General Krstic is discussing here?
4 A. In this particular intercept, General Krstic is discussing or
5 being put through to various correspondents the route of the convoy,
6 which brigade areas it will be passing through, and ultimately where the
7 individuals will be dropped off, and then make that final I believe it's
8 one- or two-kilometre walk through the tunnel between the territory of
9 Republika Srpska to the BiH. So this particular conversation is related
10 to making arrangements for those actions to occur.
11 Q. Is it related at all, in your view, to that other conversation we
12 heard where -- that we saw, excuse me, where General Mladic said
13 something like, Clear the obstacles?
14 A. Yes, sir.
15 Q. What are the obstacles that would need to be dealt with?
16 A. There were mines and other barriers that had been placed on the
17 road, since there's no traffic that goes back and forth between blinds on
18 that, and this was directions to start taking those barriers down so the
19 people could proceed.
20 Q. And when Krstic says, Take care, nothing must happen to any of
21 them, do you relate that in any way to the -- what we heard from in
22 the -- in General Gvero's document, where he says, Take care of UNPROFOR,
23 there are multiple reasons? Do you -- anything similar or related to
24 these two statements?
25 A. Yes, sir, in the sense that while General Gvero was discussing
1 UNPROFOR, in this particular situation General Krstic is seeking to avoid
2 a situation where, particularly close to the demarcation point where the
3 refugees will be placed -- are basically removed from RS territory, he
4 doesn't want an incident or he doesn't want those civilians harmed where
5 they will then immediately make comments and complaints about being
6 harmed by the RS.
7 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. Let's go to the next document,
8 65 ter 140. This is a document from the Command of the Drina Corps, the
9 Intelligence Department, on 12 July. It's very urgent, for immediate
10 delivery to the Main Staff Sector for Intelligence and Security, the
11 Intelligence Administration, the Drina Corps Bratunac Forward Command
12 Post, and personally to Lieutenant-Colonel Kosoric.
13 Q. You've told us who Kosoric is, and we can read the substance of
14 this, so I don't need to go through it. We've heard things like this
15 before. What, basically, is -- and we see this is in the name of
16 Pavle Golic -- "By authorisation of the chief," and it says
17 "Major Pavle Golic." Remind us who Major Golic is.
18 A. Major Golic is an intelligence officer assigned to the
19 Drina Corps Command.
20 Q. And do we see his name popping up in other intercepts and
21 documents and the Zvornik Brigade duty officer's note-book related to
22 various projects that are going on? I'll say that at this point.
23 A. Yes, sir.
24 Q. All right. And it makes a reference to the Drina Corps duty
25 officer, a Lieutenant-Colonel Jovicic, and then the operations officer,
1 Lieutenant-Colonel Ognjenovic.
2 Now, if we go back to 1994 briefly and recall the commander of
3 the Bratunac Brigade, a Mr. Ognjenovic, is this Ognjenovic anything to do
4 with the commander of the Bratunac Brigade in 1994 that sent that report
5 to his troops about making life unbearable for the Muslims?
6 A. Yes, sir. It is the same person.
7 Q. And are there any documents or intercepts that give us any
8 indication where or what Ognjenovic was doing on these days, 12 or 13
9 July, that you recall?
10 A. Yes, sir. He is performing duties as an operations officer in
11 the Drina Corps Command, Vlasenica.
12 MR. McCLOSKEY: Okay. I would offer this document into evidence.
13 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received.
14 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 140 shall be
15 assigned Exhibit P2527. Thank you.
16 MR. McCLOSKEY: If we could go to 65 ter 231. And we now come to
17 the Bratunac Brigade Command daily combat report of 12 July that talks
18 about the enemy trying to break through in this particular direction that
19 we see, including Jaglici, Bokcin Potok, towards Tuzla. I don't think
20 that bears any comment at this point.
21 Q. And then number 7:
22 "The transport of the Turkish population (Muslim refugees) from
23 the village of Potocari towards Kladanj is in progress. A large number
24 (10.000) of refugees are expecting to be transported from Potocari to
1 And we see a time handwritten on this, "1430 hours."
2 Does this roughly reflect some of what is going on related to the
3 Muslims of Srebrenica?
4 A. Yes, sir. I would just note it's 12 July at 1630 hours, not 1430
6 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you. My eyes and mouth are not in sync,
7 but hopefully we'll get them in sync.
8 I would offer this into evidence.
9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Yes, it will be received.
10 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 231 shall be
11 assigned Exhibit P2528. Thank you.
12 MR. McCLOSKEY: And can we go to 65 ter 1985, hopefully briefly,
13 because we see that this is a Main Staff report to the president from
14 12 July.
15 And if we can go to the Drina Corps section, which is on page 3
16 of both languages.
17 Q. And we can see in one part that the enemy has been attempting to
18 withdraw from the Srebrenica enclave, with women and children, in the
19 direction of Ravni Buljin and Konjevic Polje, but ran into a minefield.
20 Is this an accurate report, as far as you know?
21 A. Yes, sir. That particular passage does reflect the knowledge
22 that the Drina Corps has of the current situation and the knowledge that
23 they're obtaining as a result of taking prisoners and interrogating those
24 prisoners for combat information.
25 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. Let's go to the next page in English.
1 It should still be on page 4 -- page 3 in the B/C/S, page 4 in the
3 Q. And under "The Situation in the Territory," it says:
4 "In the Drina Corps zone of responsibility, the population is
5 being taken from Srebrenica enclave to Kladanj in an organised manner.
6 It is estimated on this day that there are about 10.000 Muslims to be
8 Is that, roughly, a correct statement of the situation as it was
9 known by the Main Staff on that day at, roughly, this time-period? We
10 see it's received at 2.00 a.m. on the next day, the 13th.
11 A. Yes, sir, again in the context of they're accurately reporting
12 the information that is available to them. I believe that as time goes
13 on, it's clear that the number of individuals leaving Potocari is well in
14 excess of 10.000, but at this juncture the people drafting this
15 particular report don't know that yet.
16 MR. McCLOSKEY: And, Mr. President, I believe, as I'm noting,
17 that this document is P1215, and for some reason we gave it a 65 ter
18 number. That's the next one in the binder, I see, so I don't think it
19 needs to be offered into evidence. It already is.
20 So unless I'm wrong, could we go to 65 ter 232.
21 Q. Still on 12 July, a document from the Command of the
22 Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade to the Drina Corps Command; attention,
23 Major Golic. Is that the same Major Golic, in your view, that we talked
24 about last time?
25 A. Yes, sir, it is.
1 Q. And we see some information that is being passed on to
2 Intelligence Officer Golic by a Captain Pecanac. What did you learn
3 about who this Captain Pecanac was at the time?
4 A. My understanding from the investigation, as well as other
5 documents, reflects that Captain Pecanac is an officer of the VRS
6 Main Staff who is affiliated with the Intelligence and Security Sector.
7 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. I would offer that into evidence.
8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received.
9 MR. McCLOSKEY: I'll skip over --
10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: One moment.
11 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 232 shall be
12 assigned Exhibit P2529. Thank you.
13 MR. McCLOSKEY:
14 Q. I'm going to skip the next tab and go to tab 115, which we have
15 seen before. It's P2203. It's the 12 July document from
16 General Tolimir, talking about various intel information and proposing
17 Muslims going through the woods be arrested?
18 And you've talked on that in a previous section. It's just here
19 as a place holder, so I don't think we need to discuss it again.
20 I'll go on to the next document, which is D64. And as the
21 previous document, this is a 12 July document from General Tolimir that
22 you've spoken before, where he talks about intel information and makes
23 proposals about capturing Muslim men. And this is where he notes that
24 it's important to note down the names of all men fit for military service
25 who are being evacuated from the UNPROFOR base in Potocari.
1 It's already been discussed, so if we could go past that now to
2 65 ter 168?
3 And this, as we will be able to see on the screen soon, is from
4 the 1st Milici Light Infantry Brigade, the Security Affairs organ to the
5 Drina Corps Command, the OB department. And it mentions at 1600 hours,
6 in the area of Buljim, the person got away from a group of soldiers
7 heading away from Srebrenica, and it lists the person's name, Ibis Malic,
8 son of Maso, born 1 January 1977, and it provides information.
9 Can you tell us, just briefly, what this is? I don't need --
10 we're familiar with the information now, but just what's the
11 Milici Brigade doing here?
12 A. The Milici Infantry Brigade had defence positions around parts of
13 the former enclave. This is just simply a reflection of a soldier who
14 surrendered to the Milici Brigade, his, you know, interrogation after
15 surrendering, where combat information is obtained from him, and the
16 reporting process by the Milici Brigade to their higher command, the
17 Drina Corps Command.
18 MR. McCLOSKEY: And, Your Honours, I would refer you to the
19 report of Dusan Janc and the ICMP identifications to find out the fate of
20 this particular man. I will get a more specific reference for you.
21 But I would offer this document into evidence.
22 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received.
23 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 168 shall be
24 assigned Exhibit P2530. Thank you.
25 MR. McCLOSKEY: And now, getting over to 13 July in the
1 chronology, could we go to 65 ter 762.
2 Q. And we'll see, as we get to it, that this is another report from
3 Dragomir Vasic of the Zvornik CJB, referring to a meeting with
4 General Mladic that morning, where he says:
5 "We were informed that the VRS was continuing operations towards
6 Zepa ..."
7 And in Vasic's words:
8 "... leaving all other work of the MUP as follows:"
9 Is this what happened, roughly?
10 A. Yes, sir, that is correct. At some point, at a meeting that
11 occurred at the Bratunac Brigade headquarters on the evening of 12 July
12 1995, various members of the Drina Corps and the Main Staff, at the
13 direction of General Mladic, begin to put together a plan that would
14 rapidly move military units from the areas in and around the former
15 enclave and pivot them, as it were, so they could very quickly undertake
16 military operations against the Zepa enclave.
17 Q. And during the day on the 13th, did the VRS really understand, in
18 your view, in your opinion, how many Muslim able-bodied men, especially
19 those from the 28th Division, had made it across the
20 Milici-Konjevic Polje-Kravica road into the woods towards Erdut and on
21 towards Baljkovica?
22 A. No, sir. And if one looks at the reporting coming from
23 Major Obrenovic of the Zvornik Brigade and various intercepts that go
24 between the Zvornik commands, Vlasenica, the Drina Corps, and the
25 Main Staff, even, what does become evident is that the senior military
1 officers in the Drina Corps and on the Main Staff have underestimated the
2 number of men in the column, and of obvious most relevance to the
3 Zvornik Brigade, armed men in the column. So while you have a situation
4 where the Zvornik Brigade is talking about a potential crisis, as they
5 have expectations of a rather large military force approaching it and
6 they have no available reserves left, Major Obrenovic's assessments of
7 those situations are generally considered to be over-statements by other
8 members of the army.
9 In fact, Major Obrenovic's assessments are accurate as to the
10 size and the military threat the column posed, and you see that on the
11 late evening of the 14th and early-morning hours of the 15th, when the
12 Drina Corps is forced to start sending military formations from Zepa back
13 to Zvornik in order to reinforce the combat operations that are occurring
15 Q. All right. And we see number 1 of the tasks that the MUP is
17 "Evacuation of the remaining civilian population from Srebrenica
18 to Kladanj ..."
19 Its estimate is about 15.000 by bus. We see that according to
20 Vasic, petrol is still a problem.
21 And then number 2, it says:
22 "Killing of about 8.000 Muslim soldiers whom we blocked in the
23 woods near Konjevic Polje. Fighting is going on. This job is being done
24 solely by MUP units."
25 And if we look at the Serbian term, it's "likvidacija."
1 What does this statement mean to you? This is a report on
2 13 July. It's not clear exactly what time it went out, and I think we'll
3 all recall the Kravica warehouse, in the later hours of --
4 afternoon/evening hours of 13 July, but what has this meant to you over
5 the years, and has your opinion changed at all?
6 A. Yes, sir. What this particular phrase represents to me is the
7 combat operations against the -- part of the Muslim column, a significant
8 part of the column, that has not been able to cross the road at
9 Konjevic Polje, between Konjevic Polje and Nova Kasaba, and continue on
10 the way to free territory.
11 "Liquidation" is an interesting phrase that's used. And very
12 early on, because of what it potentially means in English, where it does
13 have a sinister connotation, I did engage with various translators and
14 language experts at CLSS to determine if it had the same sinister
15 connotation in the Serbo-Croat language. They informed me that it, in
16 fact, does not. It's just a term that they use to, you know, reflect
17 doing something, you know, completely -- doing it in its complete --
18 entirely. So I've always made the point, when coming across those
19 phrases, particularly when it has to do with individuals were being
20 killed, to point out that in this particular context, they're merely
21 talking along the lines of, you know, combat operations to kill the
22 remaining soldiers. It's not read as liquidating soldiers in a more
23 sinister context.
24 Q. And have you seen the term "liquidating" used when, in fact, they
25 were talking about killing people in a summarily executive way?
1 A. Not that I recall since leaving. I mean, normally the term that
2 they use in that context with the intercepts that I'm aware of is they
3 call that particular phrase "triage."
4 Q. All right. And if we go back on an intercept, I believe it
5 was -- yes, it was the evening of 13 July, where X and Y were talking
6 about a total of 6.000 able-bodied men at three locations in the area.
7 So if we give, roughly, some credence to those 6.000 that would be
8 captured at that point, would those 6.000 be at all related to this
9 reference much earlier in the day of 8.000?
10 A. Yes, sir, it would encompass the column -- the general estimates
11 of the size of the column are, for a variety of reasons, very difficult
12 to estimate, but I believe I've always been consistent that the column's
13 between 10 and 15.000 people. So those numbers, an 8.000 number, a 6.000
14 number, of individuals who are involved at that location on 13 July, even
15 those high numbers would be consistent with my understanding of the size
16 of the column.
17 Q. But by the evening of 13 July, are a lot of those able-bodied men
18 now POWs?
19 A. More than that, sir. By the evening of 13 July, after the
20 Kravica warehouse, approximately a thousand of them are already dead.
21 There are probably another 2.000 who are on buses and trucks, in the
22 custody of the VRS and of the police, in other locations in and around
23 Bratunac, where they're being held on those vehicles or other locations
24 before they get sent to Zvornik.
25 Q. And do those numbers in Bratunac increase as the evening goes on
1 and more people are being brought in?
2 A. Yes, sir. My understanding, based on the ongoing investigation,
3 is that through that particular evening, more vehicles filled with
4 prisoners are being brought in as each hour passes, and there's some
5 manner of difficulty in finding appropriate places to park the vehicles
6 and to properly guard them because they're getting so many of them.
7 MR. McCLOSKEY: I would offer this document into evidence.
8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 762 shall be
10 assigned Exhibit P2531. Thank you.
11 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. If we could go to P2238.
12 Q. We now see a report from the Special Police Brigade on 13 July.
13 We don't really see any time reference in the document, aside from what
14 could be gleaned from the document itself. It's to the
15 Pale Police Staff, the Vogosca Police Staff, and the
16 Special Police Brigade, Janja, and it's from Ljubisa Borovcanin, the
17 deputy commander.
18 So, briefly, before we discuss some of the content, what is this?
19 A. Just as Dragomir Vasic sent reports up detailing the situation,
20 so did Ljubisa Borovcanin. This is a report that Mr. Borovcanin sent to
21 his police superiors, detailing the situation on the ground, as he
22 understood it, as well as what activities that the forces under his
23 command were engaged in.
24 Q. Is this consistent with the similar topics mentioned by
25 Dragomir Vasic when he talked about joint police forces? I think he said
1 joint police forces are moving towards Potocari, something to that
3 A. Yes, sir. This -- this joint police force that moved towards
4 Potocari was part of Mr. Borovcanin's unit.
5 Q. So when Borovcanin says in the course of the day, a MUP force was
6 engaged in the direction of Zuti Most, towards Potocari, what day is he
7 talking about?
8 A. This activity he is describing is the early-morning hours of
9 12 July 1995.
10 Q. And so when he says, There was no strong-armed resistance from
11 the Muslims, so we took control of Potocari by 13 [sic] hours, with the
12 right-hand flank, we took control of the Budak and Milacevici features,
13 was that also 12 July?
14 A. Yes, sir, that is correct.
15 Q. And his comment about:
16 "In Potocari, we sealed off the main UN base, where a throng of
17 between 25.000 and 30.000 civilians had gathered ..."
18 And he now notes that:
19 "... 5 per cent of whom were able-bodied men."
20 So we now have Vasic talks about able-bodied men on his 12th July
21 report, and now we have Borovcanin. Is that the same able-bodied men
22 that they're both talking about?
23 A. Yes, sir.
24 Q. I think their percentages are a bit different? Do you recall
25 Vasic's percentage? If not, don't worry about it, that document is in
2 A. Yes, sir. Vasic says 10 per cent. Borovcanin says 5 per cent.
3 Q. He notes that:
4 "A part of the MUP force was involved in the organisation of the
5 evacuation of civilians from Srebrenica ..."
6 And can that be seen from the video of 12 July and 13 July?
7 A. Yes, sir. The videos do show that the various bus convoys are
8 escorted by MUP forces, either Republika Srpska police or other MUP
10 Q. All right. Then he talks about how the able-bodied Muslim men
11 set off through Konjevic Polje towards Tuzla, and that he urgently
12 dispatched forces with hardware to seal off the Kravica-Konjevic Polje
14 We need to go over to the next page in English.
15 Did the investigation, and Petrovic video, and other information
16 bear out this statement?
17 A. Yes, sir, it did.
18 Q. Now he talks about the night between 12 and 13 July, that the
19 armed Muslim group launched an attack in the direction of Konjevic Polje,
20 and that combat lasted several hours and continued through the day. So
21 what day is he now talking about?
22 A. At this juncture, he's now talking about the 13th of July.
23 Q. And he notes that the enemy sustained a loss of 200 soldiers who
24 were killed, and he notes that:
25 "... we captured or had surrendered to us around 1500 Muslim
3 "This number increases by the hour."
4 Now, you have discussed the document of 13 July in the name of
5 Savcic, where, according to that document, General Tolimir issues a
6 proposal, and there's a discussion of over 1.000 -- or there's a mention
7 of over 1.000 prisoners in the Kasaba area. Is Borovcanin -- are his
8 units in the Kasaba area at all?
9 A. No, sir, they are not.
10 Q. Can you tell us where his guys are, where they're getting these
11 1500 Muslims in relation to Kasaba?
12 A. The police forces under Borovcanin's command are essentially
13 staged, literally, in a very long series of lines along the road from the
14 town of Konjevic Polje, back towards Bratunac, to the Sandici Meadow and
15 actually a little bit further towards Kravica in that regard. So the
16 prisoners that he's talking about, because of the territory that he
17 controls, are different from the prisoners that are being accounted for
18 at Nova Kasaba.
19 Q. And he notes that:
20 "The number increases by the hour."
21 And then he says:
22 "According to all indications, the number of Muslim soldiers who
23 did not manage to break through is on the rise and is approximately
24 between 5.000 and 6.000, which means that we have intense combat ahead of
1 So we had just heard that -- I think from Vasic that they were
2 fighting 8.000. Is this 5.000 and 6.000 that he's talking about the same
3 group that Vasic is talking about, or is this a group that's already gone
4 past the road and is on their way towards Zvornik, or some other group?
5 A. No, sir. I believe this is the same group that Vasic was talking
6 about. When one compares the reports of Vasic and Borovcanin, it's clear
7 that they have a pretty common view of what the battle-field situation
8 looks like at that particular time.
9 Q. Yes. And something just I wanted to clear up. I asked you about
10 the previous document, where Vasic makes this reference to liquidating
11 8.000 people, and I asked you, Had your view of that changed over the
12 years? And I recall that you said, Yes, sir. But when you said, Yes,
13 sir, did that mean your -- what did that mean, when you said, Yes, sir,
14 just so we can clear that up?
15 A. I said, Yes, sir, as my predicate to answering the question. I
16 did not mean that my opinion of that had changed over the years.
17 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. I didn't think it had, so I thought I
18 better clear that up.
19 And I would offer this document into evidence.
20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I think it's in evidence. It's P2238.
21 MR. McCLOSKEY: Absolutely correct.
22 And the next document is a more lengthy report, so I think this
23 is the -- and it is the time to break.
24 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Indeed. We must have our first break now, and we
25 will resume at 11.00.
1 --- Recess taken at 10.29 a.m.
2 --- On resuming at 11.02 a.m.
3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Yes, Mr. McCloskey, please continue.
4 MR. McCLOSKEY: Could we now go to 120 tab, and it's P1335.
5 Q. And as we're waiting, I'll note that this is from the
6 Republika Srpska Ministry of Interior, Special Police Brigade Bijeljina.
7 It's got a date of 5 September 1995 up in the left corner, and it's
9 "Report on the Combat Engagement of the Special Police Brigade
10 and Other Police Forces in Operation Srebrenica 95 in the Period from
11 11 July to 21 July 1995."
12 If we can go to the last page. I don't think we really need to.
13 It's page 5 of the B/C/S, 6 of the English. It says:
14 "Report submitted by: Ljubisa Borovcanin."
15 So, Mr. Butler, I know you've had a chance to review this report.
16 What is this report, briefly?
17 A. In September 1995, Mr. Borovcanin is tasked to write a report
18 pertaining to the activities that both he and the units under his
19 direction took related to Srebrenica. This particular document is his
20 report of that situation and the activities that he undertook.
21 Q. All right. And let's start with it should be page 1 in the
22 English translation - I believe it's page 2 of the B/C/S - where he
23 starts getting into the detail. I want to ask you about a few of these
24 things. It says -- begins:
25 "By order 64/95 issued by the deputy minister of the interior on
1 10 July 1995, I was sent with some MUP forces to participate in the
2 Srebrenica operation ..."
3 And then it goes on and it lists the forces.
4 Have we seen this order he's referring to?
5 A. Yes, sir. That is the order by acting Minister Kovac.
6 Q. All right. And we see, as we go down the page, he describes the
7 units that the order entailed, and then he starts describing, in the
8 first paragraph, during the night of 10/11, he came to Jahorina, and
9 starts describing his dealings with people. And can you remind us where
10 he was coming from?
11 A. At this point in time, he and the police units he was commanding
12 were engaged at the Trnovo battle-front.
13 Q. And we see he notes at the bottom of this page that Spaso Skoro,
14 assistant commander for the Special Police Brigade, took over command of
15 the police forces in Trnovo. Was -- how did that relate to Borovcanin?
16 A. Once Borovcanin, who was commanding those forces, was ordered to
17 a different assignment, there was a requirement to designate somebody
18 else to command the remaining police forces at Trnovo. That would be
20 Q. All right. And we see on this first page that he basically
21 describes the units that were in the order, and he does mention the
22 Serbian MUP. As you go through this document and he talks about the
23 various units that came with him and what they are up to, do you ever see
24 him report again about anything to do with the Serbian MUP?
25 A. No, sir.
1 Q. So what would that indicate to you whether or not they are came
2 with him?
3 A. That indicates to me that they did not accompany him.
4 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. Let's go to page 2 in the English.
5 It should be still page 2 in the B/C/S.
6 Q. He talks about arriving in Bratunac at 1200 hours on the 11th.
7 He became acquainted with the situation on the front at Srebrenica town,
8 in the direction of Pribicevac. Then he says:
9 "From the observer post in Pribicevac, I contacted
10 General Mladic, who personally commanded over the operation."
11 Is that information consistent with what you had learned about
12 the location of General Mladic on this date?
13 A. Yes, sir. Pribicevac was the forward command post that the
14 Drina Corps was using for this particular operation, and at some point
15 General Mladic did personally arrive at Pribicevac for the -- at this
16 particular juncture, it would be the last half -- or the last part of the
17 operation, which would include the actual capture of the town of
19 Q. All right. And it says:
20 "On receipt of combat papers, he ordered me to that same day with
21 all available manpower and equipment from the direction of Zuti Most to
22 Potocari and Milacevici, which was an unrealistic task in view of the
23 fact that the envisaged police forces had still not arrived in this area
24 or could not be used."
25 Now, going back to the issue of whether or not Borovcanin was
1 under the command of the army at this period, does this statement in his
2 report give you any indication on that issue?
3 A. Yes, sir. I believe it's not unambiguous at all that Borovcanin
4 believes he's under the command of the army and is taking orders from, in
5 fact, General Mladic, the commander of the army.
6 Q. But we will recall his 10 July order that said he was to, I
7 believe, make himself available to General Krstic. Does this change your
8 analysis, or how would you incorporate that?
9 A. No, sir. General Krstic is the chief of staff of the
10 Drina Corps. And at the time the order was written, he was the man --
11 the senior army person directing military operations. When
12 General Mladic, as the commander of the army, shows up, by default he is
13 now the senior army officer, and it would be completely customary for
14 Borovcanin to report to General Mladic in this sense.
15 Q. And what about his statement, saying that Mladic's order was
16 unrealistic because his forces -- Borovcanin's envisaged forces had not
17 arrived or could not be used?
18 A. Again, General Mladic gave him an order of what he wanted to
19 occur. Borovcanin, in this statement, appears to have made the reply
20 that regardless of what he may have told General Mladic, he didn't feel
21 that he had the ability to accomplish that mission, simply because the
22 available forces hadn't arrived in the area yet. He -- in this sense, he
23 obviously went ahead in order to receive his orders. As one notes
24 further in time, as those forces become available, he does undertake this
25 mission, or the mission is modified by General Mladic in the coming
2 Q. Remind us what that mission is that he actually did eventually
4 A. Beginning the morning of 12 July 1995, those particular MUP
5 forces do begin to advance towards -- from the Yellow Bridge area to
6 Potocari, so he's following General Mladic's order. He's just having to
7 wait until he assembles his forces to do so.
8 Q. And then he describes this MUP company from the training centre
9 who you described yesterday. I think you said they had also been
10 referred to as the deserter unit, led by Dusko Jevic and
11 Mendeljev Djuric. Can you tell us briefly about those two folks and
12 whether or not there's other evidence that they were in the area and
13 involved, just very briefly.
14 A. Yes, sir. These were the previously-discussed individuals who
15 were undergoing police training at the Jahorina Training Centre.
16 Initially, one company of these police recruits was put together to
17 accompany the forces designated in the 10 July order from Minister Kovac.
18 As it turns out, they were later joined, I believe on the 12th of July,
19 by a second company from the Jahorina Training Centre.
20 Q. And remind us, where did Dusko Jevic, as assistant commander, and
21 Mendeljev Djuric, company commander, fit into this, as he notes here?
22 A. Dusko Jevic at this time is in charge of the training centre.
23 Mendeljev Djuric is one of the designated deserter company commanders.
24 The name Nedjo Ikonic will also come up. He is another one of the -- he
25 is the 2nd Company commander.
1 Q. Do you remember the shortened name for Mendeljev Djuric?
2 A. Yes, sir. He's referred to as Mane.
3 Q. And do you remember the name of Dragomir Vasic's deputy for the
4 Zvornik CSB?
5 A. He's the same name, Mane Djuric.
6 Q. Is it the same person?
7 A. No, sir, it is not.
8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Could you please pause between question and
9 answer and the next question.
10 MR. McCLOSKEY: Okay.
11 Q. And we see that he is ordering the 1st Company of the Zvornik PJP
12 to gather. Do you remember the nickname of Dusko Jevic, as learned by
13 the investigation and, actually, acknowledged by Dusko Jevic?
14 A. Yes, sir. His nickname is Stalin.
15 Q. All right. I won't go through all of this. But in that
16 paragraph, it's talking about the 1st Company, and he also makes
17 reference to clearing a passage through the minefield, and that there was
18 a team of pioneers from the Bratunac Brigade to clear the passage through
19 the minefield; is that all correct, as far as you know?
20 A. Yes, sir.
21 Q. And then he makes reference that:
22 "At about 2000 hours, negotiations began between Mladic and a
23 representative of UNPROFOR and the Srebrenica Muslims."
24 So this would be 2000 hours. What day is he talking about here?
25 A. 11 July 1995, sir.
1 Q. So what do you think he's referring to?
2 A. There were two meetings on the 11th of July. The first one was
3 strictly between General Mladic, the VRS, and representatives of the
4 Dutch Battalion, which took place at approximately 2000 hours. The
5 second meeting, which took place at 2200 hours, included a
6 representative -- a civilian representative of the Bosnian Muslims in
7 Potocari. So since he is talking about Srebrenica Muslims, I take it
8 he's talking about the second meeting that occurred on 11 July 1995.
9 Q. And then he says:
10 "General Mladic ordered me to launch an attack in the early hours
11 of the following morning."
12 Is this a reference to what Mladic said at Pribicevac, or do you
13 think that it's something later that Mladic has said to him, or can you
14 tell from this?
15 A. I take this to read that sometime after receiving his initial
16 orders at Pribicevac, he met with General Mladic again later at the
17 Hotel Fontana, I presume, and General Mladic modified the original order
18 and then told Borovcanin that the attack that his forces needed to
19 undertake, you know, could take place in the morning.
20 Q. All right. And then we see that he describes one of these units,
21 the 2nd Special Police Detachment that arrived around 0300 hours. That
22 would have been on the 12th. And that was one of the -- was that one of
23 the units referenced in the original 10 July order?
24 A. Yes, sir. It is a somewhat complicated military activity to
25 withdraw a unit that's engaged in combat operations, reorganise them, and
1 then send them to a different location on the battle-field. You just
2 can't leave a gap in the line. Somebody has to fill that position. So
3 the fact that it would take a number of hours in order to accomplish
4 this, and then make the unit available to be sent to Srebrenica, is not
6 Q. All right. And then he describes what happens in the
7 early-morning hours and going through the minefield, and that a member of
8 the Bratunac Brigade set off a mine and died. And then he mentions the
9 first task was to take control of the UN check-point on Zuti Most, and
10 that was completed without any incidents, and that the Dutch members did
11 not react. Is that consistent with a similar comment he made in that
12 just brief report we saw on the 12th and 13th by this same author?
13 A. Yes, sir, it is.
14 Q. All right. Then he describes the estimate of the number of
16 And if we go to the next page in English, he talks about this --
17 the next page in B/C/S as well. He talks about the civilians being
18 transported to Kladanj in an organised way, that it was organised by the
19 army, and that the MUP forces had a supportive role, such as regulating
20 traffic and maintaining public law and order.
21 Then later on, they received information from State Security that
22 12- to 15.000 able-bodied, mostly armed Muslims were moving from
23 Srebrenica towards Konjevic Polje, Cerska and Tuzla. Is that the group
24 that you've just given your own estimate, based on your experience, was
25 between 10- and 15.000 moving in that direction?
1 A. Yes, sir, that is correct.
2 Q. Okay. And then he tells us he's received an order from
3 General Mladic to send half of his men and available technical equipment
4 to that axis so as to block the area and fight the aforementioned
5 formations. Can you describe to us where, from the evidence, the videos,
6 the documents, Borovcanin took his units?
7 A. Those particular units moved up to the Bratunac-Konjevic Polje
8 road, and as video footage of -- the Petrovic video shows, the bulk of
9 his forces, including a tank and several anti-aircraft vehicles, are in
10 and around the area we refer to as the Sandici Meadow.
11 Q. And we see that he says the 2nd Special Police Detachment and the
12 1st Company of the Zvornik PJP, with two tanks, a BOV, a Praga -- and a
13 Praga. The translation describes what a Praga is. It's a self-propelled
14 anti-aircraft gun. Can you tell us what a BOV is, in your view, and what
15 a Praga is?
16 A. Those are self-propelled -- they're basically self-propelled
17 crew-serve weapons. The Praga is an anti-aircraft gun. I think the BOV
18 in this particular context that they are referring to is also -- has an
19 anti-aircraft gun mounted on it, if I recall the Petrovic video
21 Q. All right. And then in this, he talks a bit about the deployment
22 along the road there, and then he says:
23 "It's estimated that 3- to 4.000 enemy soldiers managed to pass
24 along this segment towards Cerska and further to Sapna and Crni Vrh."
25 You, of course, now have been able to view material after the
1 fact. Who are these estimated 3- to 4.000 people that he's talking
3 A. More importantly than me, Mr. Borovcanin has had two months to
4 review materials after the operation occurred as well, so he is aware
5 that these 3- to 4.000 soldiers represent the bulk of the armed members
6 of the column that were able to successfully cross the road during the
7 evening hours of the 11th and 12th of July. As, I believe, the evidence
8 has borne out certainly in earlier trials, the military leaders in the
9 column made the decision to place as many of the armed soldiers as they
10 could at the -- or towards the front of the column in anticipation of the
11 fact that that would be where the heaviest combat would be.
12 Q. And does -- that 3- to 4.000 number that made it through and
13 headed up in that direction, is that consistent with what you've learned
14 about what Obrenovic was reporting and any other indications from your
15 time in the case?
16 A. Yes, sir. It is consistent with the numbers that Obrenovic and
17 other members believed were the forces that were approaching the Zvornik
19 Q. All right. Now we get to 13 July, which should be page 3 in the
20 B/C/S. It's got a very short section, we see, relative to the other
21 days -- to the previous day - excuse me - where he says that the
22 situation was getting more complex because of the advance of the Muslim
23 formation who had managed to break through, so they engaged other forces.
24 I think you've made a reference to that. Traffic was stopped along that
1 Then the next paragraph is:
2 "Forces of the Army of Republika Srpska mostly regrouped in order
3 to go to Zepa."
4 Was that correct? Was that what they were doing -- the VRS was
5 doing on the 13th?
6 A. Yes, sir, that is correct.
7 Q. And it says:
8 "One member of the Skelani Platoon of the 2nd Police Detachment
9 was killed in the fighting with the enemy."
10 Are you aware of one member of the Skelani Platoon of the
11 Special Police Detachment being killed along that road between
12 Konjevic Polje and Kravica?
13 A. Yes, sir. He was killed at Kravica.
14 Q. Do you remember his name at this point?
15 A. No, sir, I do not.
16 Q. Okay. And what do you recall the circumstances, just very
17 briefly, of his killing? You say "Kravica." Where?
18 A. He was -- according to the information derived from the
19 investigation, as well as other information pertaining in medical records
20 or military medical records, he was killed in the town of Kravica. There
21 was no combat in the town of Kravica, but as the evidence of the
22 investigation has noted, he was killed in conjunction with the Kravica
23 warehouse massacre which occurred approximately 1700 hours that day. The
24 information that the investigation is aware of is that he, reportedly,
25 was killed by Muslim soldiers seeking to escape the warehouse.
1 Q. All right. There's quite a bit of material in the record on
2 that, so I think we'll just leave that where it is.
3 In his regular -- or his 13 July report that referenced the 12th
4 and 13 July, he particularly had mentioned that on the 13th of July,
5 around 1500 Muslim soldiers had been captured or surrendered to his
6 forces, and that the number increases by the hour. We don't see any
7 reference to that in this 13 July portion. Do we see any reference to
8 all those surrendered or captured men along that road anywhere in this
10 A. No, sir. By September 1995, I suspect that that's an
11 inconvenient fact, and, as such, it was omitted.
12 Q. What do you mean by that?
13 A. By September of 1995, the news of the involvement of the Army of
14 the Republika Srpska, and in this context the MUP units of the
15 Republika Srpska serving with the army at Srebrenica, and their
16 association with the massacres had become public. It had started
17 becoming public as early as August of 1995. So for individuals who were
18 involved in that, it wouldn't make much sense for them to create official
19 documents reflecting their association or knowledge of prisoners whom
20 they knew to be dead. And, in fact, not just dead, murdered, in the case
21 of the Kravica warehouse, murdered by forces under his command.
22 Q. All right. We see, as we continue on page 3 of both languages, a
23 brief comment on the 14th. We've got to go to the next page in B/C/S to
24 catch the 14th - thank you - where he talks about new problems arising,
25 that Zvornik threatened by these Muslim forces from Cerska. Then he
1 talks about the 15th, gives a description of his units and what they're
2 doing, and then again refers to the enemy forces were estimated at 3500
3 to 4.000 men moving towards Nezuk, was coming behind the soldiers of the
4 Zvornik Brigade along the axis toward Baljkovica. Are these 3500 to
5 4.000 the same men he's referred to that made it over the road?
6 A. Yes, sir, they are.
7 Q. Then he talks about fighting throughout the day on the 15th along
8 all the aforementioned axes, and considerable losses were inflicted on
9 the enemy. He says:
10 "All the units remained on the lines reached during the night."
11 Then he says:
12 "The blockade of the area was organised by the Zvornik Brigade."
13 And he says:
14 "We did not 'like' the basic idea because the latest
15 developments, the artillery of the Zvornik Brigade was relocated in a
16 hurry, so that it was still not operational."
17 What's he talking about, if you -- in your opinion?
18 A. Well, sir, there's a bit of a back story to this particular
20 Sometime during the late evening hours of the 14th of July and
21 the early morning hours of the 15th of July, 1995, Borovcanin and the
22 police forces under his command are ordered to leave the area where they
23 are on the road between Bratunac and Konjevic Polje and deploy into the
24 area of Zvornik, the Zvornik Brigade in order to deal with, as he says,
25 the military threat. At the same time this is occurring, units of the
1 Zvornik Infantry Brigade who are deployed at Zepa, under the command of
2 Lieutenant-Colonel Pandurevic, are also being ordered back to Zvornik
3 because of the growing military threat.
4 At approximately noon on the 15th of July, at the headquarters of
5 the Zvornik Brigade, there was a meeting of the relevant military and
6 police commanders. Colonel Pandurevic, Major Obrenovic, Mr. Borovcanin,
7 was part of that meeting. Dragomir Vasic was part of that meeting. I
8 believe the commander of the 2nd Sekovici Detachment was also part of
9 that meeting. It was a quick council of war, if you will, where
10 Colonel Pandurevic was updated on the situation that was -- the military
11 situation in his brigade, and where they determined what acts and actions
12 they would take in order to counter that particular situation.
13 From my awareness of previous testimony of Mr. Vasic and
14 statement of Mr. Borovcanin, the police's position was not that they
15 should engage in a military battle against a force that vastly
16 outnumbered even their assembled forces at this point, but that they were
17 advocating that perhaps the Zvornik Brigade should allow the armed head
18 of the column to safely pass between the lines and reach ABiH territory.
19 At that particular meeting, at least according to the recollections of
20 these individuals and Major Obrenovic, Colonel Pandurevic rejected that
21 proposal and, instead, made a determined effort to seek to militarily
22 engage and defeat the column.
23 So where he's talking about, We did not like that basic idea,
24 this is Borovcanin now, two months later, expressing the fact that the
25 police leadership at that meeting did not agree with Colonel Pandurevic's
1 plan, although they were obligated to carry it out. And, in fact, they
2 did so to the best their ability.
3 Q. All right. And in his report, we now come to the 16th, where he
4 describes fierce fighting with the Muslim forces in the area of
5 Krizevici, Tisova Kosa and Baljkovica. And just briefly, did that
6 include Muslim forces from the 28th Division coming from the direction of
7 Srebrenica as well as Muslim forces from the 2nd Corps from the direction
8 of Nezuk?
9 A. Yes, sir, that is correct.
10 Q. He describes the Muslim forces capturing three 57-millimetre
11 self-propelled guns of the VRS and firing upon the VRS forces. Then he
12 describes that the VRS had about 40 killed and more than 80 wounded, that
13 1 member of the 1st Company of the Zvornik PJP was killed and 5 members
14 wounded, and that at about 1500 hours, the bulk of the enemy column,
15 about 2500 soldiers, managed to break through to Nezuk.
16 We need to go to the next page in the B/C/S.
17 But then as he goes on in the English, which is page 5 in the
18 English, if it's the correct translation, he goes back in time and says:
19 "At 1300 hours, the commander of the Zvornik Brigade,
20 Vinko Pandurevic, and the commander of the Muslim side, Semso Muminovic,
21 agreed to open a one-kilometre-wide corridor in the area of Parlog and
22 Baljkovica to allow Muslim soldiers to get out."
23 That this truce would be in force for 48 hours, et cetera, as we
24 read through it.
25 So how do you take this? Do you -- from your knowledge of the
1 reports on this, do you know where large amounts of soldiers -- Muslim
2 soldiers able to break through before this corridor was opened up, or is
3 this a reference to people getting through after the corridor was opened
4 up, but if you know from the -- of course, from the documents,
6 A. To a large degree, Borovcanin's description of the ferocity of
7 the combat is accurate, and as well as the members of the army killed and
8 wounded. My understanding, based on my analysis of the other military
9 documents, is not that they were able to break through prior to the
10 cease-fire and the agreement made between Pandurevic and Semso Muminovic.
11 My understanding of the combat situation was that until and up to the
12 point that Colonel Pandurevic agreed to that, the column still had not
13 successfully broken through the VRS lines. So in this particular
14 context, my view has been that Colonel Pandurevic, in making a
15 calculation as to the casualties that his particular unit was incurring
16 against the column, and the reasonable expectation that he would be able
17 to still prevent the column from achieving its mission, he made the
18 decision, and one that was not authorised by his superiors, to allow the
19 column to pass through his lines and go to ABiH territory.
20 Colonel Pandurevic, for his part, attributes a different motive to his
21 reason as to letting the column go.
22 Q. Well, what do you believe -- or what, in your view, did
23 Pandurevic say regarding his motive for letting the column go, and in
24 what context did he say it? What are you basing that on?
25 A. Well, sir, Colonel Pandurevic, now General Pandurevic, did
1 testify on his behalf during the Popovic trial, and his position was that
2 he allowed this column to pass through, and his decision on the 16th was
3 strictly a humanitarian gesture and had nothing to do with the scope and
4 scale of combat activities that had occurred on the 15th and the 16th.
5 It is, from my perspective, difficult to square that in light of the fact
6 that less than 24 hours prior to the decision to let the column go,
7 Colonel Pandurevic was vetoing advice by police and other individuals
8 that they should let the column go in the first place. In context, he
9 believed that he could make a fight out of it and inflict significant
10 casualties on the enemy. He did. But, in turn, the enemy inflicted
11 significant casualties, in both manpower and materiel, to his brigade.
12 And only when faced with that situation on the afternoon of 16 July, did
13 he unilaterally make the decision to allow the remainder of the armed
14 column to pass safely through his lines.
15 Q. Okay. Can you put this in a little context for us? Can you tell
16 us, and just very briefly: What was going on, as well as this fight with
17 the column, in the area of the Zvornik Brigade on the 14th, the 15th and
18 16th, you know, as charged in the indictment? I don't mean for you to be
19 giving evidence on that. The Court has seen plenty of evidence. But can
20 you remind us: As charged in the indictment, what is going on on the
21 14th, the 15th and the 16th, in terms of non-combat activity and the
22 involvement or non-involvement of Zvornik -- excuse me, and the
23 involvement of Zvornik Brigade troops?
24 A. Yes, sir. As it's laid out, not only is the Zvornik Brigade,
25 during this period starting on the evening of the 13th of July, beginning
1 to engage in combat activities against the armed column, but starting the
2 evening of the 13th July, the first convoy loads of buses and trucks,
3 filled with men from the Bratunac area and those who had been captured,
4 start arriving in the zone of the Zvornik Brigade and are starting to
5 fill up schools in Orahovac, Petkovci, Rocevic and Pilica. So in this
6 particular context, not only is the Zvornik Brigade having to deal with a
7 significantly adverse military situation that is developing in its zone,
8 it is also having to deal with obligations related to guarding and later
9 participating in various aspects of the executions of thousands of
10 Bosnian Muslim prisoners that were in the brigade zone. It created, from
11 a military perspective, a situation where the Zvornik Military Brigade
12 had completely exhausted its reserves and abilities. They were -- to use
13 a phrase, they were flat-out committed. They had no reserves or nothing
15 Q. All right. To finish up this report - I think we're still on
16 page 5 of the English - as we review briefly the rest of these dates, we
17 get down to the 20th of July, the final entries, where he talks about the
18 various people that commanded the units that he was working with;
19 Dusko Jevic, Mane Djuric -- and when he says "Mane Djuric" there, which
20 one do you think he means?
21 A. He is referring to his subordinate, Mendeljev Djuric, sir.
22 Q. All right. And Nedjo Ikonic, Milos Stupar, and if we go to
23 page 6 in the English, Rado Cuturic, and the others. Do you recall
24 anything happening to Rado Cuturic on the 13th of July?
25 A. Yes, sir. Also at the Kravica warehouse, at the same time that
1 the first soldier was killed, he was injured and later taken to the
2 Bratunac Medical Centre, where he received treatment.
3 Q. Do you remember how he was injured or what part of him was
4 injured, if --
5 A. If I recall correctly, he received a burn on his hand or arm.
6 Q. And did Mr. Borovcanin tell the investigation how that happened?
7 A. Again, if I recall correctly, Mr. Borovcanin stated that he was
8 injured in this way when he grabbed the rifle barrel of a weapon that a
9 Bosnian Muslim prisoner had obtained while attempting to depart from the
10 Kravica warehouse.
11 Q. All right. And that document is already in evidence, so -- now,
12 that got us a bit out of our chronology because it went all the way
13 through the 20th, so we need to, unfortunately, go back to catch our
14 chronology, which was still on the 13th of July. And if we could do that
15 by getting to P1560B, an intercept.
16 And this is an intercept dated 13 July 1995, at 2040 hours, and
17 it's identified --
18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It should not be broadcast because it's
20 MR. McCLOSKEY:
21 Q. It has been identified as being from General Krstic, and X, who
22 they put in parentheses, is "Borovcanin from the specials."
23 Who do you think this "Borovcanin from the specials" would be?
24 A. This is Ljubisa Borovcanin, sir.
25 Q. And we see the conversation between Krstic -- I won't read it
2 Borovcanin says:
3 "Hello, this is Borovcanin, General. How are you?"
4 And Krstic says:
5 "Well, where are you, fuck it?"
6 Borovcanin says:
7 "I'm here at the command post."
8 Where would that be, in your view, if you could tell, on the
9 evening of 13 July at 24 [sic] hours? Where would Borovcanin's command
10 post be, in your view, if you have any knowledge?
11 A. Well, sir, given the fact that this conversation is intercepted
12 over the military telecommunications network, the command post that he
13 would be referring to would be the actual -- or former IKM and, in fact,
14 the headquarters of the Bratunac Infantry Brigade in Bratunac.
15 Q. Okay. Well, you say the military network. Could he be at the
16 police command or the police station in Bratunac?
17 A. My understanding from the investigation, as well as from the
18 statements by Mr. Borovcanin, was that he was in and around Bratunac and,
19 at one point, at the police station. However, the fact that he's on the
20 military communications network, which I do not believe the police
21 station in Bratunac has access to - they have their own police
22 network - and the fact that it's Krstic calling, you know, is what I use
23 to base my assessment that at this point in time that this conversation
24 is occurring, Borovcanin is at the headquarters of the Bratunac Brigade
25 and not at the civilian police station.
1 Q. How do we know that the Bosnian Muslims are not intercepting
2 radio or telephone communications from the police station?
3 A. Well, sir, most of the police communications in that respect
4 tended to go over already-established land lines of the PTT, which would
5 make them more difficult for them to intercept. My knowledge of the
6 intercept project and the various networks related to it reflect the fact
7 that the PTT was a separate network from the military telecommunications
8 network, and these intercepts that we're discussing at some juncture
9 passed over the military network and thus made them liable for
11 Q. Okay. We see this brief conversation.
12 Krstic says:
13 "How's it going?"
14 Borovcanin says:
15 "It's going well."
16 Krstic says:
17 "Don't tell me you have problems."
18 Borovcanin says:
19 "I don't, I don't."
20 What is this, militarily, if anything, besides two friends
21 chatting, or what do you make of this?
22 A. I make of this General Krstic, who at this time has just become
23 the commander of the Drina Corps, speaking with Borovcanin and getting a
24 situation report from Borovcanin as to what has been occurring and
25 whether or not his forces are having any issues.
1 Q. Where do you put the Kravica warehouse massacre, in terms of 2040
2 hours on this day?
3 A. My understanding, again based on the investigation, is that the
4 massacre began at 1700 hours and continued in spurts, or in pulses, so to
5 speak, for an hour or two afterwards. This conversation occurs after
6 most of the people in the Kravica warehouse are dead.
7 Q. So do you incorporate that, if that's the case, would it be
8 consistent, and if Borovcanin knew about that, since we know from the
9 case that he was there with Petrovic, do you -- what do you make of him
10 telling Krstic it's going well and that he doesn't have any problems, if
12 A. Well, sir, I mean, not only to infer these issues, you have to
13 understand what Borovcanin was dealing with, you also have to note what
14 General Krstic, himself, was personally aware of. And in that respect, I
15 am aware that, you know, as part of the earlier investigation and as
16 noted in testimony during the Krstic trial, that during the late
17 afternoon hours, General Krstic, himself, did travel the road
18 Bratunac-Konjevic Polje-Nova Kasaba-Milici in order to get to his
19 headquarters at Vlasenica, first to begin the planning for the Zepa
20 operation and, second, that's where he received his promotion to the
21 commander of the Drina Corps. So General Krstic had a first-hand
22 knowledge of the situation not only militarily along that road, but was
23 aware by sight of the thousands of prisoners who were being taken. So in
24 this context, and given that General Krstic is aware of that situation,
25 that's how I read this particular intercept. He's aware that prisoners
1 are being captured, that there is a plan to kill those prisoners, and
2 he's discussing this issue with Borovcanin, both the military aspects of
3 the security of the road as well as the killing of the prisoners.
4 Q. Well, we don't see any discussion about any killing going on
5 here, so how do you -- how do you make that statement?
6 A. With very few exceptions, you don't see references to the killing
7 in documents or intercepts. It, again, goes back to the context of
8 General Krstic being aware of General Mladic's order related to the fate
9 of the prisoners.
10 Q. All right. Let's go on to the next document, which is an area
11 that is a subject of the indictment which we have referred to, in the
12 Prosecution, as the Milici patients and their situation. Have you
13 reviewed documents and materials associated with the Milici -- what we
14 call the Milici patients?
15 A. Yes, sir, I have.
16 Q. And can you give us a very brief outline of what you've learned
17 from the documents and other materials about the -- tell us -- what I
18 mean -- what am I referring to when I say Milici patients?
19 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I think are you referring to P1542A.
20 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, A. That's correct. I haven't gotten to
21 that yet, but that's what we're getting to.
22 Q. If Mr. Butler could give us the broader picture of what he's
23 learned from the documents, the intercepts, and then we'll go through
24 some of them.
25 A. Yes, sir. From my review of the documents, and, again, while I
1 was part of the investigation team, there was evidence collected that
2 reflected that on the evening of the 12th and through the 13th of July
3 1995, a number of Bosnian Muslim soldiers or military-aged men, who were
4 captured by the VRS and the affiliated police forces, were wounded and in
5 need of medical attention. A number of these individuals - I believe the
6 number is approximately 13 or 14 - were sent to the medical facility in
7 Milici, where they were treated by the doctors at that facility. Those
8 patients, because very rapidly it taxed out the ability of the medical
9 facility to care for them, were ultimately -- or were first transferred
10 from the Medical Centre in Milici to the Medical Centre in Zvornik. They
11 were subsequently transferred from the Medical Centre in Zvornik to the
12 Zvornik Infantry Brigade, where they were then kept in that particular
13 brigade's infirmary.
14 At some point after they were transferred to the Zvornik Brigade
15 Command and kept in the infirmary there, they disappeared and are
16 currently missing.
17 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. Let me first go to 65 ter 1316 and
18 come back to the intercept we were looking at. But 1316, that's under
19 tab 123.
20 Q. And this is a document that we see dated 24 July, and the
21 Republika Srpska War Hospital Milici, to the Drina Corps Command, to
22 General Krstic personally, entitled "Medical Support for Operation
23 Srebrenica 95," and it's from the War Hospital director,
24 Dr. Radomir Davidovic, neurosurgeon.
25 Is this a document you've had a chance to review?
1 A. Yes, sir, I have.
2 MR. McCLOSKEY: And if we could just go to page 2 of the English,
3 and it's probably the page 2 of the B/C/S as well. It's right near the
4 bottom of the page, where the signature name is. In fact, it may be the
5 next page in the B/C/S. Yes, I think -- well, I think we have to go one
6 more page. Yeah, I think that's where this would be.
7 Q. I just want to note -- I mean, we see, generally, as we look
8 through this, it talks about medical support, and then very near the end
9 he says:
10 "Eighteen wounded enemy have undergone surgery and have been
11 transferred to the hospital in Zvornik on the orders of the Main Staff."
12 What do you think that is a reference to, given your knowledge of
13 the investigation?
14 A. That is a reference to wounded prisoners who were being treated
15 at the Milici facility and then were subsequently transferred to Zvornik.
16 MR. McCLOSKEY: And I would offer this document into evidence.
17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received.
18 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 1316 shall be
19 assigned Exhibit P2532. Thank you.
20 MR. McCLOSKEY: I'm going back to P1542A, this very short
21 intercept between X and Y at 1236 hours, and this is on 13 July, from our
22 intercept records.
23 Q. We see X saying --
24 THE REGISTRAR: This is a confidential document. Thank you.
25 MR. McCLOSKEY:
1 Q. -- "Don't send me any more Muslims to Milici because the hospital
2 is overcrowded. Send them to Zvornik."
3 And it says:
4 "All right. Professor Davidovic is down there, and he's been
5 sending them."
6 This other document we just saw was in the name of
7 Dr. Radomir Davidovic, neurosurgeon. Can you connect this intercept and
8 that other document?
9 A. Yes, sir. I believe the Professor Davidovic that they are
10 talking about is, in fact, Dr. Davidovic.
11 Q. All right. And just one line I forgot to ask you about. When
12 Dr. Davidovic says that 18 soldiers have been transferred to Zvornik, he
13 says "on orders of the Main Staff," what do you make of that? How is it
14 that the Main Staff is involved in 18 wounded Muslim soldiers?
15 A. In the context of military operations, the Main Staff monitors
16 all aspects of what's going on. As noted in Dr. Davidovic's reports, you
17 know, there are a number of wounded soldiers coming in -- a fairly good
18 number of wounded soldiers during the period coming in, and it's not --
19 not only is it not unreasonable; it would be a duty of at least medical
20 members of the Main Staff and other organisation to be monitoring what is
21 happening at the military medical facilities and ensuring that those
22 facilities continue to have the capability to treat wounded and injured
24 At some point, Milici becomes overcrowded, and a decision is made
25 by somebody at the Main Staff that in order to alleviate that
1 overcrowding, the wounded prisoners will be sent from Milici to Zvornik,
2 where, presumably, they had ample space at that time to deal with them.
3 Q. Now, these 18 people -- wounded people that come to the
4 Milici Hospital, are they coming from the same or a different area of
5 captured prisoners than those over 1.000 prisoners that are mentioned in
6 the Savcic memo, where, according to that memo, Savcic is saying that
7 Tolimir is making proposals and talking about the over 1.000 prisoners
8 located around Kasaba?
9 A. At this juncture, I don't recall. I do know that the
10 investigation has spoken with the doctor. It's been a number of years,
11 so I don't recall what he said exactly as to where the prisoners came
13 Q. What is the general area? Is the general area around
14 Milici Hospital associated with the general area around Kasaba to
15 Konjevic Polje, for example? Just help remind us of the geography.
16 A. Well, yes, sir. I mean, from Milici, if you continue eastward
17 along the highway, the next town of consequence is Nova Kasaba, and then
18 beyond that is Konjevic Polje. So they are geographically linked by the
20 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. Let's go now to 65 ter 1318.
21 Q. And do you recall, sir, whether the invest -- and not to be
22 broadcast, please.
23 Sir, were you aware from the investigation whether or not any of
24 those Milici patients that we've been talking about were -- were there
25 any records that those patients were -- provided to the investigation by
1 the Milici Hospital?
2 A. Yes, sir. I'm aware that at some juncture as part of the
3 investigation, OTP investigators did go to the Milici Hospital and were
4 able to obtain records which reflect the intake of the wounded
5 Bosnian Muslims as well as medical records relating to the care that they
7 Q. And looking at this exhibit, are these, to your knowledge,
8 records relating to those patients?
9 A. Yes, sir, they are.
10 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. I would offer this document into
12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 1318 shall be
14 assigned Exhibit P2533, admitted under seal. Thank you.
15 MR. McCLOSKEY: And staying with this same topic for a bit, can
16 we go to 65 ter 326.
17 Q. And we'll see that this is an interim combat report from the
18 Zvornik Brigade, dated 22 July, in the name of Vinko Pandurevic. To your
19 knowledge, is Pandurevic back to the Zvornik Brigade now on the
20 22nd of July?
21 A. Yes, sir. Colonel Pandurevic arrives back in the brigade zone
22 approximately noon on 15 July, and he remains there at least during this
24 Q. All right. And I just want to ask you about this line in
25 paragraph 3:
1 "We request from the corps command that the Exchange Commission
2 start work as soon as possible."
3 And especially this line:
4 "We also require instructions as to what to do with the
5 prisoners, where to put them, and to whom we should hand them over."
6 What do you make of this last line about asking for instructions,
7 what to do with the prisoners, that we see that he's referring to some
8 prisoners taken on the 22nd of July in this document?
9 A. Well, sir, as the investigation has borne out, the
10 Zvornik Infantry Brigade has been taking prisoners daily as a result of
11 its combat with the column. And with the exception of one prisoner, who
12 happened to be a high-ranking communications official with the
13 28th Infantry Division, those prisoners are never accounted for and are
14 presumed to have been killed shortly after capture at some juncture.
15 Those types of prisoner accountings are not included in the daily combat
16 reports of the Zvornik Infantry Brigade during the period. This combat
17 report on the 22nd of July is the first written report from the
18 Zvornik Brigade where they are talking about prisoners that they have
19 killed -- or not prisoners that they have killed -- enemies that they
20 have killed, i.e., liquidated, again using that phrase, as well as
21 soldiers who are being captured, and only at this date, the 22nd of July,
22 is the Zvornik Brigade requesting the Drina Corps Command provide
23 guidance as to what to do with prisoners that they're capturing.
24 Q. So what? What's your point? Pardon the bluntness.
25 A. The point is: By the 22nd of July, the commander of the
1 Zvornik Brigade understands that, We're not killing prisoners as we
2 capture them anymore, and that, Since we're not doing that, I need
3 instructions as to what I'm supposed to do with the prisoners that I am
4 capturing. That is how I take this particular issue and the point behind
6 Q. Okay. On a related point, since you've mentioned this, can you
7 tell the Chamber -- and I believe this document's in evidence and they've
8 seen it, but I don't need it up right now. Do you recall an 18 July
9 report that Vinko Pandurevic sends to the Drina Corps, where he talks
10 about Muslims coming to his area?
11 A. Yes, sir.
12 Q. Can you tell us your recollection of what he says and what you
13 make of that, since I think it's relate to do what you've just said?
14 A. In that particular report, that interim combat report of 18 July
15 1995, Colonel Pandurevic is sending to the Drina Corps a rather detailed
16 discussion as to not only the issues related to combat that his unit has
17 just undergone and the casualties that his unit has taken, not only in
18 the Srebrenica battle, but in the previous months of combat, as well as
19 raises the issue that, you know, in spite of everything else related to
20 combat, his brigade had to deal with the -- I believe the number he uses
21 is 2- or 3.000 prisoners that somebody made a decision to put in his
22 brigade area. There's a rather complex back-story related to this
23 interim combat report that I don't know that I need to go into, but
24 these -- Colonel Pandurevic, again, his awareness of the prisoners, that
25 they were brought into his zone, and what happened to them.
1 Q. All right. Let me get back on point to the Milici patients, if
2 we could.
3 I'd offer that last document, 65 ter 326, into evidence. It
4 refers to the question about what to do with prisoners.
5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I would like to put one question to the witness
6 in relation to this document.
7 I see Pandurevic, in his report, mentions 23 Muslim soldiers
8 captured, and then, in addition to that, the unit from Osmaci captured 17
9 Muslims along its own line. You were discussing the capturing of these
10 prisoners, and you were referring to these altogether 40 captured Muslim
11 soldiers; is that correct?
12 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, sir. I don't understand the question.
13 JUDGE FLUEGGE: If you -- I would like to refer you to the second
14 paragraph under item 1 of this document. I see there 10 enemy soldiers
15 were liquidated, while 23 Muslim soldiers were captured. And then the
16 next sentence, there's an indication that 17 Muslims were captured along
17 its own line. All together, 40, I take it. And you were discussing this
18 document, and you were especially referring to these 40 soldiers,
19 captured soldiers; is that correct?
20 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. This -- in this document, this is the
21 first time that one sees, in a Zvornik Brigade combat report, a reference
22 to Bosnian Muslims. These -- at this point, these are people who are now
23 trapped behind the line and are being captured by -- the 23 by the
24 Zvornik Brigade and, as you note, Tactical Group Osmaci, not technically
25 part of the Zvornik Brigade, but an adjacent unit, and Colonel Pandurevic
1 is aware of those as well.
2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much.
3 This document will be received as an exhibit.
4 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 326 shall be
5 assigned Exhibit P2534. Thank you.
6 MR. McCLOSKEY: And one last question before the break,
7 Mr. President, that Mr. Butler may or may not be able to help us with.
8 Q. Mr. Butler, there's been evidence in this case that the first
9 group of Srebrenica prisoners arrived at Batkovic from the Bratunac area
10 on 18 July. You may remember that. Do you recall, aside from that 18
11 from Bratunac, what date we first see other Srebrenica prisoners start
12 arriving at Batkovic, but if you can remember?
13 A. As I recall from both documents and the conduct of the
14 investigation, I believe those prisoners don't start arriving in Batkovic
15 until the 24th or 25th of July.
16 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. Well, we've got those records and
17 we'll double-check them.
18 And I think it's time for the break, Mr. President.
19 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Indeed. We will have our second break and resume
20 at 1.00.
21 --- Recess taken at 12.31 p.m.
22 --- On resuming at 1.01 p.m.
23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Please continue, Mr. McCloskey.
24 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you.
25 If we could go to P850B, still on the topic of the -- no
1 broadcast - of prisoners and Milici patients.
2 Q. This should be an a intercept of 23 July, where Pandurevic,
3 Vinko, is mentioned as a participant, and a question mark is for the
4 person that he is talking to.
5 And I just want to ask you, Mr. Butler, I know you've had a
6 chance to review this, but what was see the first question:
7 "How are you?"
8 And Vinko Pandurevic says:
9 "I'm all right, not too bad."
10 Then someone says:
11 "What's new with you?"
12 Pandurevic says:
13 "We are catching Turks still. I have prisoners ..."
14 Now, this is -- as we see, it's a 23 July intercept at 0800
15 hours. Do you relate this comment by Pandurevic of "I have prisoners"
16 with the -- it's the 22 interim combat report that we just went over,
17 where he required instructions on what to do with prisoners?
18 A. Yes, sir, I do.
19 Q. He also says:
20 "I have the wounded, so I don't know what to do with them, where
21 to send them."
22 Do you believe in this he's referring to wounded Serbs, or
23 wounded Muslims, or can you tell ?
24 A. In this context, it's my opinion he's referring to the wounded
25 Muslims. I don't believe he would have any questions or doubts as to
1 what he should be doing if they were his own soldiers who were wounded.
2 There's well-established practices for how those people will be treated
3 and where they will be evacuated to in Belgrade.
4 Q. And from the investigation, are you aware of what wounded Muslims
5 he would have -- had been referring to on this date, 23 July?
6 A. Yes, sir. These would be the wounded Bosnian Muslims who had
7 started in Milici, who were transferred to the Zvornik Medical Centre,
8 and then were subsequently transferred to the Zvornik Brigade Infirmary
9 at the Standard Garrison.
10 MR. McCLOSKEY: Okay. And if we could go to what is marked as
11 P85A, a conversation that happens at -- five minutes later.
12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Is it possible that it is P851?
13 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, that's what I meant to say, Mr. President,
14 851A. We see the same conversation on this English translation, but --
15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It's also confidential. It should not be
17 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes. So if we could go to P851A.
18 Q. Five minutes after this conversation where Pandurevic asks about
19 what to do with the wounded, it says:
20 "The participant '?' in the previous conversation called and
21 asked for Vinko again ..."
22 So who would Vinko be in this conversation?
23 A. That would be Vinko Pandurevic, the commander of the
24 Zvornik Infantry Brigade.
25 Q. And this participant noted as "?," that's the same way the
1 previous person in the conversation was noted as, as well; correct?
2 A. That is correct, sir.
3 Q. So we see:
4 "The participant '?' in the previous conversation called and
5 asked for Vinko again, but Ljubo answered, and '?' told Ljubo to pass on
6 to Vinko."
7 Now, "Ljubo," any idea who Ljubo is?
8 A. Yes, sir.
9 Q. Who do you think Ljubo is? And I think we all understand at this
10 point that Ljubo is a relatively common Serb name.
11 A. I believe that he's referring to a staff officer on the
12 Zvornik Brigade. If I recall correctly, his name is Ljubo Bojanovic.
13 Q. And why do you -- why do you think this is Ljubo Bojanovic?
14 A. He -- his name appears in other aspects of the investigation as
15 the officer who was sent out from the Zvornik Brigade to relieve
16 Drago Nikolic, who was performing functions as the duty officer of the
17 Zvornik Brigade IKM, or forward command post, on the evening of 13 July
18 1995. And in that context, I'm familiar with his name as being a staff
19 officer in the brigade, so he is the only one I'm aware of with the first
20 name of Ljubo.
21 Q. Could you be mixing that up with Mihajlo Galic, on the 13th of
22 July, from the IKM?
23 A. I don't believe so. It's been a while since I've looked at the
24 IKM documents. I know he's not there on the 13th, I know he's there on
25 subsequent days.
1 Q. All right. Well, let's continue on in the intercept.
2 It says -- what "?" says:
3 "What Vinko and I were just talking about, will arrive at your
4 place by 1700 hours. The boss, Lieutenant-Colonel Popovic, will arrive
5 and say what needs to be done regarding the work we talked about."
6 What do you make of that?
7 A. Coupling this with the previous intercept and the role of
8 Lieutenant-Colonel Popovic, I take it that Popovic will be coming up and
9 will have some dealings with the prisoners that are being taken by the
10 Zvornik Brigade, inclusive of the wounded prisoners.
11 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. Now let's go to it should be P1459,
12 and I have page 143.
13 Q. This is an entry from the Zvornik Brigade duty officer note-book
14 for the period 23 July. Had you reviewed the duty officer note-book as
15 part of your analysis?
16 A. Yes, sir. With respect to my past testimonies, that particular
17 document did not come into the possession of the OTP until after the
18 publication of the revised narrative. But I have seen it since then, and
19 I have read it, of course, and testified related to it.
20 MR. McCLOSKEY: And I hope I've got the right numbers.
21 Q. Can you remind us who normally wrote many of the entries in the
22 duty officer note-book?
23 A. Customarily, it was either the duty operations officer or one of
24 his assistants. They were on duty -- they were, essentially, the 24-hour
25 duty operations officers, and they would, and they would note information
1 in the note-book that was important, relevant, passing of messages,
2 things of that nature.
3 Q. And in looking at that short intercept that we just talked about
4 that mentioned Ljubo, that "Ljubo answered," have you seen it where the
5 duty officer on duty at the command answers the telephone, that is noted
6 down by the intercept operators?
7 A. Yes, sir.
8 MR. McCLOSKEY: And this should be page 142 in the B/C/S.
9 Q. And the English document we are looking at now is the version we
10 call the teacher's edition, and it's the position of the Prosecution that
11 the duty officer that day on the 23rd was Ljubo Bojanovic. Would that be
12 consistent with your analysis that the previous intercept, P851A, the
13 Ljubo mentioned would have been Ljubo Bojanovic?
14 A. Yes, sir, it is.
15 Q. All right. And that conversation, as we note, is noted at 0805
16 hours. And now, in the duty officer note-book, we see it as:
17 "0830 hours. Lieutenant-Colonel Cerovic relayed a message for
18 commander that Lieutenant-Colonel Popovic will arrive by 1500 [sic]
20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I think you misspoke. In the English
21 translation, it says "1700 hours."
22 MR. McCLOSKEY: You're absolutely correct, Your Honour. I know
23 it's 5.00, and I put a "5" in there. I apologise about that.
24 Q. 1700 hours, which, of course, is what we saw from the previous
25 intercept. Do you relate this notation at all with the previous two
2 A. Yes, sir. This is the duty officer's notation of the accounting
3 of the previous two phone conversations.
4 Q. Can you tell us who Lieutenant-Colonel Cerovic is?
5 A. Yes, sir. He is the assistant commander of Morale, Religious and
6 Legal Affairs for the Drina Corps.
7 Q. And in your view, would he be any of the people or -- persons
8 from the previous intercept, if you connect these two, like you say, who,
9 if anyone, would he be?
10 A. If you were able to connect all three, he would be the
11 correspondent identified by the question mark.
12 Q. All right. And it says "relayed a message for commander." If
13 Ljubo Bojanovic is a staff officer receiving this at the Zvornik Brigade,
14 who would the reference to "commander" be, in your view?
15 A. It would be his commander, Lieutenant Pandurevic.
16 Q. And Lieutenant Colonel Popovic, in the context of this
17 conversation with Cerovic passing on this message, who would
18 Lieutenant-Colonel or "LTC" Popovic be?
19 A. He is the chief of security for the Drina Corps.
20 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. And let's go now to 65 ter 190.
21 Q. And this is a vehicle log for a Golf from Vlasenica. That's for
22 July 1st through 31st July 1995. And under the box that says "Rank," and
23 "Full name of driver/user," we first see "Dusan Vucic" [sic] and
24 "Lieutenant-Colonel Vujadin Popovic." So can you tell from this front
25 page who whose vehicle this should be on this day and this month?
1 A. Looking at the context of the document, this monthly accounting
2 sheet reflects that this vehicle operates under the direction of the
3 security organ of the Drina Corps.
4 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey, perhaps you misspoke again. I see
5 a different name of the driver, "Dusan Vucetic," and not "Vucic."
6 MR. McCLOSKEY: No, you're absolutely correct. My Serbian lost a
7 syllable there, and it is much easier than I made it sound. So you're
8 correct, "Vucetic." And after 15 years, I have no excuse. I apologise
9 for that.
10 Q. But, Mr. Butler, can we go to the section in this document that
11 is -- covers the use of the vehicle for 23 July, this date that we have
12 been talking about related -- in the last few exhibits. I believe it's
13 the fourth page in the English and the same in the B/C/S.
14 And if we blow that up a little bit. I think we should be fine
15 with the B/C/S because it's in Latin.
16 We note that if we go to the 23rd, we see "Time used from," and
17 it starts out at "0900 hours," that's all it says there, and then "7111,"
18 and then it describes the route "Vlasenica-Zvornik-Vlasenica." Is that
19 consistent with the -- your analysis with regard to
20 Lieutenant-Colonel Popovic going to the Zvornik Brigade to deal with
21 prisoners and wounded?
22 A. Yes, sir. It's evidence that he, in fact, did so.
23 Q. Can you remind us where the headquarters of the Drina Corps is?
24 A. Vlasenica, sir.
25 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. I would offer this document into
2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 190 shall be
4 assigned Exhibit P2535. Thank you.
5 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. Now we are getting back to our
6 chronology, because the Milici patients took us a bit out of that
7 chronology, but let's go back to P2143 -- or on to P2143, back to 13 July
8 1995, a Main Staff report to the president. And if we could go to page 3
9 in the English, page 3 in the B/C/S.
10 Q. Under the section that says "The Enemy," looking at the part that
11 talks about Srebrenica, it says:
12 "The enemy from the former enclave of Srebrenica is in a state of
13 total disarray, and the troops are surrendering in large numbers to the
14 VRS. A 200- to 300-strong group of soldiers managed to break through the
15 general sector of Mount Udrc, from where they are trying to break through
16 to the territory under Muslim control."
17 So the first part about this, that the enemy in Srebrenica -- the
18 enemy from the former enclave is in total disarray and are surrendering
19 in large numbers to the VRS; is that correct? Anything to add to that?
20 A. No, sir. That's accurate.
21 Q. And you've said who was in control of the area from Nova Kasaba
22 to Konjevic Polje, and you've also said from Konjevic Polje to Kravica
23 was MUP forces, so how would you explain that in this document, that
24 those prisoners surrendering along the Konjevic Polje to the Kravica
25 road? Were there VRS involved in those surrenders as well, do you know?
1 A. Again, the troops at Nova Kasaba and Konjevic Polje were members
2 of the VRS. In this context, while technically they are surrendering to
3 Special Police and not army soldiers, this is, again, a reflection that
4 all of the combat forces there, to include the police forces, are
5 operating under military control.
6 Q. All right. And going down to the situation in the corps, there's
7 a mention of combat groups from other corps units are in the final stages
8 of the preparation aimed at settling the issue of the Zepa enclave. Do
9 you -- is that a correct statement in this report?
10 A. Yes, sir. As the documents and other information sets out at the
11 time, as this is occurring on the 13th, elements of the Zvornik Brigade,
12 the Birac Brigade, and other associated army units are moving from the
13 Srebrenica battle-front area to the Zepa area, where they are going to
14 begin to undertake combat operations there.
15 Q. I note I forgot to ask you about this line in paragraph A, the
16 part that I'd mentioned:
17 "... a 200- to 300-strong group of soldiers managed to break
18 through to the general sector of Mount Udrc."
19 Now, you have just spoken at length, I believe, about the Muslims
20 that broke through, and from the documents from the MUP. Does this 2- to
21 300 group, is that a different group? Is it the same group? Is this
22 correct? What do you make of this reference that's going to the
24 A. I believe this is a manifestation of the situation that I talked
25 about previously, where Major Obrenovic and other lower-level commanders
1 of military and police units view these numbers as far higher, yet senior
2 commanders at the Drina Corps and at the Main Staff are seeing a
3 situation differently and have the numbers listed a lot lower. Just as I
4 talk about in some cases commanders having a common view of the
5 battle-field, this is an example where, you know, they don't have a
6 common view of the battle-field. As it turns out, the Drina Corps and
7 the Main Staff significantly underestimated the number of armed Muslim
8 fighters in the column.
9 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. Let's go now to P626.
10 Q. And this should take us back -- as I recall, Judge Nyambe asked
11 you a question related to your knowledge about the whereabouts of
12 Colonel Jankovic back in -- when you were talking about the 17th/18th of
13 July documents and the MSF workers, it's my recollection, and you made a
14 reference to something in your response to Her Honour.
15 This particular document, what is it, and was that, in your
16 recollection, related to anything that you gave to the Judge in answering
17 her question, or am I mistaken on that?
18 A. Well, sir, this particular document is authored by
19 Colonel Radoslav Jankovic from the Drina Corps forward command post in
20 Bratunac. On the 13th of July, it lays out his knowledge and report back
21 to the Main Staff of the situation regarding the evacuation of the entire
22 Muslim population, the status of wounded prisoners, and lays out what he
23 anticipates will be occurring in the upcoming days, or at least in this
24 case the 14th, and proposals that he has made. He -- from the videotape
25 evidence related to the meetings, he is in Bratunac as early as 13
1 July -- I'm sorry, as early as 11 July 1995. And to my knowledge, again
2 based on documents and investigation, he remains in Bratunac during this
3 entire period, dealing with these respective types of issues.
4 I don't remember the exact details of Her Honour's questions, so
5 I am not sure whether I responded to it or not.
6 Q. Does this --
7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Judge Nyambe has a question.
8 JUDGE NYAMBE: It's not a question. It's just to retrace my own
9 recollection of what was talked about at that point.
10 I think your reference, as I understood it, was a reference to
11 the Secretary-General's report on the fall of Srebrenica, I thought,
12 but ...
13 THE WITNESS: I think in that context, we were talking about air
14 power and things of that nature, so, yeah.
15 MR. McCLOSKEY: My memory is -- we'll check the record and make
16 sure we get that straight, Your Honour, and make that -- maybe
17 Mr. Gajic's memory is better.
18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: He's a young man.
19 Mr. Gajic.
20 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, if I'm not mistaken, and
21 I believe I do recall this well, this was to do with a document which
22 bore the initials of Mr. Jankovic. It was a handwritten document. And
23 there was another identical document that had a typewritten
24 "Momir Nikolic" signature, and I believe that this is document led to the
25 discussion that we are now trying to recall.
1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you for this assistance.
2 Mr. McCloskey.
3 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes. And in that discussion, I recall Mr. Butler
4 saying something along the lines of, Yes, you will -- we will have seen
5 documents from previous days from Colonel Jankovic. So thank you.
6 I think it will be made clear. Thank you very much, Mr. Gajic.
7 Q. Okay. Just one -- one question about this. We see that he is
8 talking about, in the middle of paragraph 1, that there are 54 wounded at
9 the UNPROFOR base, a list of names has been taken from the UNPROFOR, a
10 doctor from the UNPROFOR has stayed in the hospital in Bratunac, at the
11 request of the hospital staff, to make sure that the patients are
12 properly treated. It says:
13 "I intend to send him away tomorrow, under the pretext that his
14 help is not necessary."
15 Do you have any information or any knowledge of what he's talking
16 about here, why he would need a pretext or why he has a pretext to send
17 away a doctor that's looking after patients?
18 A. He would need to invent a pretext to send the doctor away,
19 claiming his help was not necessary, if it is his intention that he does
20 not want Dutch or other international observers to be in a position to
21 see and monitor what is happening with those particular group of wounded
23 Q. As far as you can recall from the investigation, were the -- this
24 group of prisoners eventually transported to Batkovic?
25 A. Yes, sir. With the exception of one of the wounded prisoners who
1 was identified as a suspect in crimes against Serbs and placed in police
2 custody, the remaining prisoners were transported to Batkovica.
3 Q. And do you remember if that one person you talked about survived?
4 A. Yes, sir, he -- in fact, because he was in police custody, he did
6 Q. Do you remember his name?
7 A. It's been some time since I've seen that particular document.
8 No, sir, I don't.
9 Q. Okay. And on that same topic, when we were talking about the
10 local staff for MSF and the UNMO staff - that was the discussion of
11 the -- both in the documents and the intercepts - and they were listed in
12 the intercept, and finally we saw the document that listed their names
13 from the MSF, I failed to ask you: Did the investigation reveal whether
14 those men and some women survived?
15 A. Yes, sir. If I recall correctly, all those individuals were
16 ultimately allowed to depart from the former enclave.
17 MR. McCLOSKEY: Okay, thank you.
18 All right. Could we go to P1225.
19 Q. And we see a document here from the Drina Corps Command at the
20 now forward command post called Krivace, dated 13 July, speaking of some
21 Srebrenica events. And on that first English page and the B/C/S, we see:
22 "Combat readiness at 8.00 a.m." or "800 hours on 14 July."
23 We see the Krivace Command Post and some things, and on the next
24 page in the English, the command post in the village of Podzeplje, and
25 various other tasks and things.
1 What is this? And it's in the name of, excuse me,
2 Major-General Radislav Krstic.
3 A. Just as Krivaja-95 was the name of the detailed operations plan
4 related to Srebrenica, this document is the detailed operations plan
5 relating to what would be VRS military operations against the Zepa
6 enclave. In a near-identical manner to how the army laid out all of its
7 objectives and tasks for individual units for Srebrenica, it does the
8 same thing for Zepa.
9 Q. And we see, on the first page, it appears to be handwritten
10 "Military Secret, Stupcanica-95." What's that?
11 A. That was the designated code-name for the Zepa operation.
12 Q. Does this have anything to do with the order from General Mladic
13 that you will recall us seeing - I believe it was dated 10 July - about
14 getting ready for Zepa?
15 A. Yes, sir. To -- to some degree it is, because it details tasks
16 for some of those units that he had previously given orders to on 10 July
17 in order to prepare or create the circumstances to begin these
18 operations. So in the military planning process, you have General Mladic
19 already thinking about the next objective even before the first objective
20 has been taken. And as the situation dealing with the first objective,
21 Srebrenica, comes to pass, he is already rapidly transitioning the
22 military forces, through his order and through that planning process
23 that's being undertaken at the Main Staff in the Drina Corps, to move on
24 to the next objective in an extremely rapid manner.
25 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. Let's go on to the next document.
1 It's 65 ter 109.
2 Q. And this is, we can see, an order from the Drina Corps, dated
3 13 July, entitled "Search of the Terrain," to various brigades. I won't
4 read it. We see that it's in the name of -- and it says
5 "Commander Major-General Radislav Krstic," and we see a stamp at 13 July,
6 20 [sic] hours, and then below that, "13 July, 2030 hours."
7 At the time of the execution of this document or when it was
8 made, in your view, was General Krstic the chief of staff of the
9 Drina Corps or was he the commander of the Drina Corps?
10 A. At the time this document was created and signed, General Krstic
11 had just been appointed the commander of the Drina Corps, replacing
12 General Zivanovic.
13 Q. And did you, as part of the investigation, learn from any witness
14 or witnesses, or documents, the circumstances or the place upon which
15 General Krstic was made commander of the Drina Corps?
16 A. Yes, sir, I did. As a component of the investigation and trial
17 of General Krstic, one of his primary defences was that he was not the
18 corps commander, so there was a significant priority placed on gathering
19 evidence related to when, where, and how he assumed command. As a result
20 of the evidence obtained, it reflects that General Mladic appointed
21 General Krstic as the commander of the Drina Corps at approximately
22 2000 hours on 13 July 1995 at the corps headquarters in Vlasenica, and,
23 in fact, did so on the signed orders of President Karadzic.
24 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. I see that we've reached the end of
25 the day, and there is a trial after ours, Mr. President.
1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Are you, at this point in time, tendering this
3 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, I should. I still have a question on this
4 topic, but, no, I actually -- yes, I would tender this, please. Thank
5 you for reminding me.
6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 109 shall be
8 assigned Exhibit P2536. Thank you.
9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much.
10 We have to adjourn for the week, and we will resume on Monday,
11 2.15 in the afternoon, in this courtroom.
12 And, again, Mr. Butler, no contact with either party about the
13 content of your testimony during this break.
14 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: We adjourn.
16 [The witness stands down]
17 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.46 p.m.,
18 to be reconvened on Monday, the 18th day of July,
19 2011, at 2.15 p.m.