1 Monday, 18 July 2011
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.18 p.m.
5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Good afternoon to everybody in the courtroom.
6 Welcome back.
7 Mr. McCloskey, I see you on your feet.
8 MR. McCLOSKEY: Good afternoon, Mr. President, Your Honours,
9 everyone. Yes we're ready to go. I just wanted to let you know a couple
10 of things. We have had a status change for three documents that I think
11 you'll want on the record, which is P2304, and that is from confidential
12 to public; and P2337, from public to confidential; and P2298, from public
13 to confidential. That had to do with Witness PW-057.
14 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much. We will look into the
15 matter and come back to that. Thank you.
16 MR. McCLOSKEY: And, Mr. President, I was -- as you know, I am
17 about an hour and a half beyond actually what I'd estimated, and beyond
18 what I had taken on direct with Mr. Butler in the Popovic case which is
19 how I based my estimate, and, interestingly, Butler and I used 232
20 documents in the Popovic case, and I had reduced it to 190 in this case,
21 so I think the basic explanation is we went much faster in the last case
22 because most everyone was bilingual and represented by counsel. So we're
23 absolutely fine with the pace, as I think everyone is, and we'll try to
24 keep to that, but I think that's basically the reason. We may be talking
25 more this trial but I don't think too much more. So that is the --
1 that's the basis of -- of the -- I think the -- the estimate.
2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I'm not too concerned about the length of the
3 examination-in-chief. On the other hand, and it affects the whole trial,
4 and, of course, the accused will have additional time for his
5 cross-examination. Just one correction: You said at the beginning that
6 you are about one hour and a half beyond your estimation. In fact, it's
7 more than 2 hours and a half, I was told by the Registry.
8 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes. Thank you for that. I'm an hour and a half
9 past what I had gone in the Popovic case, and I thought it was around the
10 same for this case, but it's even longer, so ...
11 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you, that was my misunderstanding.
12 The witness should be brought in, please.
13 Mr. Gajic.
14 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I wish everyone good
15 afternoon. And I would just like to ask Mr. McCloskey to explain further
16 P2298, where he mentioned that the status of this document should be
17 changed from public to confidential.
18 I see that this document is a map, and I don't really understand
19 why the status has to be changed.
20 [The witness entered court]
21 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
22 MR. McCLOSKEY: The -- the initials of the witness are on the --
23 on the map, as far as I'm -- been told.
24 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you. We can come back to that matter
1 Now we should deal with the witness, I think.
2 Mr. Butler, welcome back to the courtroom.
3 THE WITNESS: Good afternoon, sir.
4 JUDGE FLUEGGE: We -- I have to remind you that the affirmation
5 to tell the truth still applies today.
6 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey is continuing his
9 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
10 WITNESS: RICHARD BUTLER [Resumed]
11 Examination by Mr. McCloskey: [Continued]
12 Q. And good afternoon, Mr. Butler.
13 A. Good afternoon, sir.
14 Q. We continue with the chronology of documents and intercepts. I
15 will skip ahead a bit because some of the documents in the order you
16 either already discussed or are in evidence. But let's go to 65 ter 889.
17 That should be 141 in the -- in the tab.
18 And as we'll see, this is an intercept synopsis that we obtained
19 from the Croatian government, and it's dated 13th July 1995 at 1125
20 hours. And we can see here, I won't read it all out, it talks about
21 Colonel Ljubisa Beara of the Main Staff, that he sent to Kasaba four
22 buses, two trucks, one trailer-truck, for transportation of captured
23 Muslims. Talks about sending to Batkovic. And "a selection will be made
24 between the war criminals or just soldiers."
25 What is your analysis of this document, of this intercept?
1 A. Well, sir, in this particular context, just operating from the
2 summary that we have, the particular intercept operators summarised the
3 conversation relating to Colonel Beara in orders that they believe that
4 he has given to send vehicles to bring people to the camp at Batkovica.
5 Q. Would this be consistent with what was going on, on the 13th of
6 July? Are you aware of any evidence that on the 13th of July anyone was
7 sent to -- any of the Muslim able-bodied men were actually sent to
9 A. The presence of Colonel Beara and vehicles going to Kasaba to
10 pick up Muslims is consistent. However, I'm not aware of any evidence
11 that was produced throughout the course of the investigation that
12 indicates that any prisoners were sent from the Srebrenica area to
13 Batkovica that early. It is one of the issues that I am aware the
14 investigation did look at and came up with no evidence to suggest that.
15 MR. McCLOSKEY: I'd offer this intercept into evidence.
16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received.
17 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, 65 ter document 889 shall be
18 assigned exhibit number P2537. Thank you.
19 MR. McCLOSKEY: And if we could go to the next document, P842.
20 Q. This is an intercept between X and Y at 1602 hours --
21 THE REGISTRAR: This confidential document should not be
22 broadcast. Thank you.
23 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you.
24 Q. And it talks about an extension down at Kasaba. X then goes on
25 to say:
1 "Where Malinic unit is. They said that there are 1500 gathered
2 at the stadium."
3 Can you remind us who you believe Malinic is and what this is a
4 reference to?
5 A. Malinic is it Major Zoran Malinic, who is the commander of the
6 military police battalion of the 65th Protection Regiment. The 1500
7 individuals that they are talking about in this context and at this time
8 would be those captured Bosnian Muslims who were attempting to cross the
9 road between Konjevic Polje and Nova Kasaba who were being captured by
10 the VRS in that area and who were being held on the football pitch there.
11 Q. And to remind us of the -- P125, the document that came out under
12 the name of Lieutenant-Colonel Savcic, in that document we'll recall that
13 it begins by stating that there are over 1.000 members of the former
14 28th Division of the so-called BiH Army captured in the area of Dusanovo
15 Kasaba. Prisoners are under the control of the military police battalion
16 of the 65th Protection Regiment. Is this intercept consistent with that?
17 The numbers are a little different.
18 A. Yes, sir, other than the numbers, the general description of the
19 situation is accurate.
20 Q. All right. And P125 has a date delivered -- or excuse me, a time
21 delivered at 1510 hours. This is 1602 hours. Would an increase from
22 over 1.000 to 1500, would that be consistent with the events as you
23 learned of them?
24 A. Yes, sir. The investigation has detailed that prisoners were
25 being captured all through the day and, in fact, even through the
1 subsequent days. Although there are no known survivors on -- after the
2 13th that I'm aware. So the fact that the numbers would be increasing is
3 certainly consistent with what I understand is happening in that area.
4 Q. All right. And let's now go to P413A. And I -- you've discussed
5 this already in your earlier testimony so I won't go along, I won't go
6 into detail.
7 But we just note here that a few lines down the page, it says:
8 "At each point there are roughly 1500 to 2.000."
9 And this intercept is at 1730 hours today. Is that consistent or
10 inconsistent with the previous document, two documents you just spoke of?
11 A. It's consistent, sir. They're all related.
12 Q. All right. Let's go to the next document, P1570A, which is an
14 And can you relate this intercept to any other intercept that you
15 have already spoken about? If you recall.
16 A. Yes, sir. I believe late last week, Thursday, I discussed an
17 intercept between General Krstic and Ljubisa Borovcanin that occurred at
18 roughly 2030 hours on 13 July 1995. Here, at 1945 hours, prior to that,
19 this is a particular intercept where a correspondent is calling from
20 General Krstic looking for Ljubisa and, of course, the phrase "who has
21 gone to Bratunac." And they're talking about one bus from Janja and
22 other parts of the Janja Detachment which -- in Doboj which leads me
23 again to the conclusion that Ljubisa in this context is Ljubisa
24 Borovcanin because these are all locations where MUP forces are coming
1 Q. And is this consistent or inconsistent with the -- a conversation
2 between Borovcanin and Krstic that you just referred to?
3 A. Yes, sir, this dove-tails right into that. This is
4 General Krstic saying he wants to talk to Borovcanin and roughly 45
5 minutes later, Borovcanin calls back, you know, as requested.
6 Q. At 1945 hours where do you believe General Krstic was located?
7 A. I believe he was located in Vlasenica, given the fact that, at
8 approximately 2000 hours, he is given command of the Drina Corps there by
9 General Mladic. So 15 minutes prior to when that ceremony or event
10 occurs he is at the Drina Corps hours in Vlasenica.
11 Q. All right. Let's go to P1601, which is from the Drina Corps
12 command, 13 July. It's the regular combat report to the Main Staff. We
13 see in the situation of the zone of responsibility notation that in
14 Konjevic Polje and also in Nova Kasaba reception of Muslim civilians and
15 soldiers whose surrender is being carried out, taken in an organised
17 What -- can you relate this comment to anything you've been
18 talking about?
19 A. This particular comment refers to the thousands of Bosnian Muslim
20 men, able-bodied men, who are being detained -- captured and then
21 detained at various locations; Nova Kasaba, Konjevic Polje and further
22 towards Bratunac, on 13 July.
23 Q. We don't see a reference to prisoners detained at Kravica or the
24 nearby Sandici field. Do you see any reference about that in there?
25 A. Not specifically, sir.
1 Q. And by 1945 hours, had the Kravica warehouse massacre already
2 been going on for some time? I think you've testified about that
4 A. Yes, sir. My understanding is that the massacre began at
5 approximately 1700 hours.
6 Q. So if we can go to page 3 in the English. And it's the -- it
7 should be the next page -- sorry, page 3 in the B/C/S as well. And we
8 can see a document signed and -- under the name of
9 Commander Major-General Radislav Krstic. And we see that some unit - I
10 can't tell from the stamp - had received this document at 1945 hours.
11 How does this part of this document fit into your evaluation
12 about where Krstic was and whether or not he was commander?
13 A. Well, sir, it's consistent in so much as we know that on the 13th
14 July at approximately 2000 hours he went from being the Chief of Staff to
15 the commander of the Drina Corps, so the signature block is functionally
16 correct as it should be if he were the commander. Whomever received this
17 document, whether it's the Drina Corps com centre or it's for another
18 unit, 15 or 20 minutes earlier from where I would believe, or at least
19 where I understand that the change of command took place at 2000, so I
20 don't see it as generally inconsistent.
21 Q. Okay. Now let's go to P1562.
22 THE REGISTRAR: This is confidential and should not be broadcast.
23 Thank you.
24 MR. McCLOSKEY:
25 Q. We see here, we have an intercept, between Deronjic and X, who is
1 described as Karadzic's intermediary. And it says in parentheses that
2 that intermediary and Karadzic are sitting in the same room.
3 Who do you believe this Deronjic is in this intercept?
4 A. I believe that the investigation has established that this is
5 Miroslav Deronjic, who, at this time, is President Karadzic's designated
6 civilian commissioner for the Srebrenica municipality.
7 Q. All right. And as far as you know, has this intermediary ever
8 been identified?
9 A. Not to my knowledge, sir.
10 Q. All right. So the intermediary says:
11 "I'm waiting for a call to President Karadzic. Is he there?"
12 And B says:
14 Which, let me go back to the beginning, that it says Badem. Can
15 you remind us what you believe Badem means, what this B would be? Or,
16 sorry, what is Badem?
17 A. Badem is the telephonic code-name for the Bratunac Brigade
19 Q. And where in your analysis do you think Deronjic is when he is
20 speaking on this conversation?
21 A. He would be at the Bratunac Brigade headquarters.
22 Q. Okay. Basically it says:
23 Badem says:
24 "Hello. I have Deronjic on the line."
25 The intermediary, known as X, says:
1 "Deronjic, speak up."
2 Deronjic says:
3 "Hello, yes. I can hear you."
4 And X, the intermediary says:
5 "Deronjic, the president is asking how many thousands."
6 What do you think in this context the president is asking about?
7 A. The only thing that numbered thousands at that juncture would be
8 the numbers of Bosnian Muslim men being detained on 13 July 1995.
9 Q. And by 8.10, 2010 hours, can you remind us, were there men
10 actually staying in Bratunac town?
11 A. Yes, sir. By that time, men had been placed in an old hangar
12 facility. They were in the Vuk Karadzic school and in a number of buses
13 and trucks, parked in front of other facilities to include Vuk Karadzic
14 because there was no more room.
15 Q. And then Deronjic says, in response to how many thousands,
16 Deronjic says:
17 "About 2 for the time being."
18 Is 2.000 men consistent or in consistent with your knowledge of
19 the investigation?
20 A. Given the number of prisoners taken, or at least being described
21 as taken, it would probably be a little low. One of the factors is that
22 there were a group of men - I'm not sure of the number - who were also
23 held in vehicles in and around the village of Kravica. So like I said, I
24 think 2.000 is a bit low for who was in Bratunac that evening. Plus,
25 also taking into account that at around that same time, the first buses
1 and trucks were going from Bratunac to facilities in the Zvornik Brigade
3 Q. All right. And then it is goes on to say the intermediary says:
4 "Two, Mr. President." Then "(heard in the background)."
5 Deronjic says:
6 "But there will be more during the night."
7 Where would more -- if they're talking about prisoners, where
8 would the more be coming from, in your view?
9 A. Those would be prisoners detained in some of the more outlying
10 locations from Bratunac, which would includes Nova Kasaba.
11 Q. All right. Then Deronjic says:
12 "Do want me to come done there to Cerska?"
13 What do you make of that?
14 A. The investigation has determined that Cerska is the location or
15 nickname that President Karadzic's offices were in the Pale area, so, in
16 this context, Deronjic is asking, if you want me to travel to that
17 location to personally brief you on the situation.
18 Q. And then X the intermediary says:
19 "It's best that you send it by telegram."
20 Deronjic says:
21 "Can you hear me, President?"
22 The intermediary X says:
23 "The President can't hear you, Deronjic.
24 "This is the intermediary."
25 Deronjic says:
1 "I have about 2.000 here by now and then ..." with a note that
2 the teleprinter drowns him out.
3 If Deronjic was speaking in the Bratunac Brigade coms room, would
4 that be consistent with a teleprinter being in the same room, if have you
5 any idea?
6 A. One would think so, yes, sir.
7 Q. Okay. Now the intermediary says:
8 "Deronjic, the president says: All the goods must be placed
9 inside the warehouses before 12.00 tomorrow."
10 Deronjic says:
12 And then, X, the intermediary says:
13 "Deronjic, not in warehouses, but somewhere else. Understood?"
14 What is your analysis of those few lines, all the goods -- the
15 president says: "All the goods must be placed inside the warehouses
16 before 12.00 tomorrow"?
17 A. In this particular context, the people speaking to Deronjic
18 appear to have some awareness that sometime after noon on 1400 or after
19 noon on the 14th of July, I should say, that some observers would
20 potentially coming through Bratunac, and there was a concern that whoever
21 those individuals would be, they did not want any outside observers
22 seeing the Muslim prisoners in facilities in Bratunac. So, again, an
23 order to place them in other facilities and other locations where they
24 cannot be observed by whomever -- you know, the people representing
25 Karadzic are talking about.
1 Q. So by 12.00, let's -- on the 14th, where were the thousands of
2 Bosnian Muslims that had been in Bratunac on the 13th, or in that area?
3 A. By 12.00 on the 14th, the final groups of those prisoners from
4 Bratunac who were in the Orahovac facility at Grabovica were in that gym.
5 At the same time, they were still moving people in the Petkovci, the
6 old -- the school at Petkovci, and also further north in the facility at
7 Rocevic. However, given the sheer number of people who were being
8 captured and stored in that location, they were still moving people out
9 of Bratunac all through the day on the 14th. And perhaps even as early
10 as the early morning hours of the 15th. Some of the last people to
11 arrive in the Pilica area and subsequently there was no room at the
12 school in Pilica and they were actually put in the Pilica dom.
13 Q. Let's go to next to the next one, 65 ter 2984, an intercept which
14 the case will show is from 14 July, 2227 hours. That should be 2984A.
15 Thank you.
16 And I don't want to get into a lot of detail on this, but this
17 shows a General Vilotic and a Jokic, the Palma duty officer. Can you
18 remind us what Palma is and who you think this Jokic is?
19 A. Yes, sir. Palma is the telephonic code-name for the Zvornik
20 Infantry Brigade headquarters, and on the 14th of July, 1995, the duty
21 officer of the brigade was Major Dragan Jokic, who was also the chief of
22 engineering for the brigade.
23 Q. Have you heard of a General Vilotic?
24 A. No, sir. I believe, in this particular context, the
25 correspondent is in fact General Miletic from the Main Staff.
1 Q. How is it you come up with that opinion?
2 A. When -- well, first, I'm not aware of any other general officer
3 named Vilotic in the VRS. And, clearly, the context of this
4 conversation, where it was intercepted and what they're talking about, is
5 off of the army of the Republika Srpska radio telephone network. We did
6 actually even go as far as investigatively of trying to determine if at
7 the same time there was potentially a General Vilotic with the federal
8 republic of Yugoslav army, just to ensure that it wasn't a call coming in
9 from perhaps Belgrade or something of that nature, and the investigation,
10 it failed to turn up anyone named General Vilotic in that particular
12 So given my own knowledge of the communications systems, how it
13 is, you know, occasionally garbled, I believe in this context the
14 operator mistook the name Vilotic and instead it's Miletic.
15 Q. And looking at that first line it says:
16 "Where is Obradovic?"
17 And P says:
18 "In the field."
19 And then as you look down we see references to the chief and
20 where the chief is. What is your opinion -- and we later on see that
21 Jokic says:
22 "Obrenovic is really engaged to the hilt."
23 So what's your view on this first: "Where is Obradovic?" Who do
24 you think that is? Do you know of an Obradovic in the Zvornik Brigade?
25 A. No, sir. And, again, you know, I believe that the intercept
1 operators mistook the name Obrenovic for Obradovic.
2 Q. All right.
3 MR. McCLOSKEY: I'll offer this document into evidence.
4 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 2984A shall be
6 assigned exhibit number P2538. Thank you.
7 MR. McCLOSKEY: And could we go to P18. And it's page 14 in the
8 English, and it's dated -- it's for the dates 14 and 15 July of the
9 B/C/S, I'm sorry, I don't have a page. But if you flip through it, you
10 will see it goes by dates. So if we could just go to 14 in English
11 and ...
12 Yes, that's the -- that's the English. And the -- the Serbian
13 should have a marking pretty clearly. Yes, right on the money. Thank
15 Q. Can you tell us, if you can recall, I didn't stay on the front
16 page very long, what this is?
17 A. This particular document is a log-book that was from the
18 Zvornik -- I'm sorry, the Bratunac military police platoon, and it is
19 their daily log-book where they note where all of the officers are on any
20 particular day and what activity that they are engaged in.
21 Q. So this reference that we see:
22 "The police was engaged in the escort of Muslim refugees."
23 What is your opinion on who the police were and who these Muslim
24 refugees were?
25 A. Yes, sir. The police were the Bratunac Brigade Military Police
1 Platoon. On the 14th and 15th, there were no civilians to my knowledge
2 being escorted out of Bratunac. They'd all been removed by the evening
3 of 13 July, and when I use the phrase "civilians" in this context it's
4 the women, children, and elderly from Potocari. The only people being
5 moved on the 14th and 15th of July are the military-aged men who had been
6 previously detained from Potocari, or who had been captured elsewhere.
7 Q. Okay. Let's go to -- now to P124.
8 Now, this is a document from the command of the
9 1st Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade. Remind us the town associated with
10 that command post?
11 A. Yes, sir, this would be Rogatica.
12 Q. It's dated 14 July, and it's sector for intelligence and
13 security. Drina Corps Command. Drina Corps IKM, personally to Krstic.
14 Command of the 65th Projection Regiment. Entitled: "Situation in Zepa."
15 And from the second -- well, from the first page of the Serbian we can
16 see it's in the name of General Tolimir. It's also noted in the English.
17 And what I want to ask you about is on page 2 of the English, in
18 the middle of the page, it says:
19 "Early this morning, since 0500 hours, in the area of
20 responsibility of the 1st Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade and above the
21 Muslim enclaves of Zepa, Srebrenica, and Gorazde there is an unmanned
22 aerial vehicle whose flight path we can determine only by sound.
23 "It is probably recording the positions and ... movements of
24 units. Radio communication interference is registered. The orders for
25 camouflage measures and organisation of multiple communications
1 systems -- system have been issued."
2 And then it goes on.
3 So can you -- just give us initially how would General Tolimir
4 have come into this information? Just generally, if you don't know
6 A. The tracking of these types of threats would be an event that
7 would be reported up through the various command posts. If
8 General Tolimir is present at the -- one of the command posts, either the
9 main or forward command post of the Rogatica Brigade, he is going to be
10 in a position to hear these reports come in, evaluate their significance,
11 and turn around and issue his own orders as a result of them.
12 Q. From what you know from the investigation, were unmanned aircraft
13 used by any forces in Bosnia around this time-frame?
14 A. Yes, sir. The NATO forces did have access to several UAV
15 platforms that were operating in and around Eastern Bosnia at that time.
16 Q. And, again, from your knowledge of the investigation, what is a
17 UAV platform?
18 A. UAV simply stands for unmanned aerial vehicle. It is a remotely
19 controlled pilotless aircraft. Generally its primary function,
20 particularly back at this time-frame, was to provide aerial
21 reconnaissance of ground targets.
22 Q. And General Tolimir is reporting that, among other places, this
23 craft is flying above the enclave of Srebrenica. If General Tolimir is
24 down in the Rogatica, Zepa, Borike area on the 14th, how is it or why is
25 it in your view he would be concerned receiving information from the
1 Srebrenica area and then passing on information from the Srebrenica area?
2 A. Well, there are two parts to the question, I guess.
3 The first part is he would be -- you know, with respect to his
4 receiving the information, command is -- in his integrated system, he is
5 going to be in a position, just like all of the other units are in this
6 respect, to receive the reports from various units. They're all within
7 the Drina Corps. So his ability to monitor that, even though he is
8 dealing with Zepa and the situations around Srebrenica, is -- is
9 perfectly consistent with what the communications would allow. I mean,
10 that's not a problem.
11 The second part of your question, why would he be concerned, is
12 because at this time this remains, still, an integrated operation. The
13 military forces that are going to be taking place and dealing with Zepa,
14 many of them are coming from or just recently arrived from Srebrenica.
15 So, as a professional intelligence officer in this context, he is going
16 to understand that it's more than just what I have in front of me here at
17 Zepa with respect to being concerned about what information the enemy can
18 gain. What information the enemy can glean over the Srebrenica enclave
19 with respect to where military units are or are not located, would give
20 whoever is doing that observation indications on where they might be in
21 other locations, such as Zepa.
22 Q. Do you recall from the investigation any activity that was going
23 on on the ground around the village of Glogova and the Kravica warehouse
24 on the 14th of July?
25 A. Yes, sir. Beginning the morning of the 14th of July, there
1 were -- or, actually, late evening, the 13th, if I recall correctly, but
2 certainly during the day of the 14th, they were removing bodies from the
3 Kravica warehouse, and they were being brought to the Glogova location
4 where a mass grave had been dug, and the bodies from Kravica were being
5 placed in the mass grave in Glogova.
6 Q. Would you say that receiving this information and then reporting
7 it out to the people addressed here would be part of General Tolimir's
8 position as assistant commander for intelligence and security?
9 A. Yes, sir.
10 Q. And can you tell us what -- what part of his -- his job, what
11 label, if any, this activity that he is doing and reporting on would fit
12 under his job?
13 A. This would be something that would fall on the security side,
14 given the context of trying to deny friendly information or information
15 about VRS military forces and the situation on the ground to potentially
16 hostile intelligence sources, which, given the UAV context, would be
18 Q. All right. Let's go to the next document, which is P00128.
19 We see it's the -- from the same place. Dated 14 July to the
20 Drina Corps Command from General Tolimir. And handwritten it's 1045
21 hours. I won't repeat it all, but it basically appears to be talking
22 about an unmanned aerial vehicle reconnoitring the area and jamming the
23 radio communications.
24 Do you relate this document to the previous document?
25 A. Yes, sir. This is -- it's a supplemental report directly to the
1 Drina Corps on the same situation, essentially.
2 Q. And it talks about it a bit in the paragraphs, and then in the
3 final paragraph, it says:
4 "If spotted, the unmanned aerial vehicle must be destroyed
6 How do you take that as -- as -- that statement? Is that a
7 proposal, an order, a request? What is that in your view, militarily?
8 A. That would be an order, sir.
9 Q. Is that kind of an order consistent with his job as assistant
10 commander for security and intel that's working out of the Zepa area at
11 that time?
12 A. It's not strictly consistent, but it again reflects his knowledge
13 of the broader plan, as well as the guidance that has been given to the
14 Drina Corps air defence forces relating to these types of situations.
15 Again, in the context that I read this, General Tolimir is not going to
16 give an order or a direction that he believes he's not authorised to
18 Q. All right. Let's go to P129.
19 This is another document from Rogatica Brigade,
20 1st Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade. 14 July. To several addressees
21 that I won't repeat.
22 And if we see on the bottom of the Serbian, it's -- it's, again,
23 from General Tolimir. It is entitled: "Placing the UNPROFOR check-points
24 under control."
25 And could we go to page 2 of the English. Just leading up to
1 page 2 it says:
2 "For the time being, we have taken full control over the
3 check-point number 2 at Boksanica where the command of the UNPROFOR
4 forces is located. We have wire connection with it. The check-point
5 will remain functioning as it is not blocked -- as if it is not blocked
6 and surrounded by our forces. We plan to direct the work of the other UN
7 check-points through this check-point. We have instructed the UNPROFOR
8 command to issue instructions to their check-points not to open fire on
9 VRS units and instead -- and to instead simulate the action by shooting
10 in the air if forced to do so by the Muslims."
11 What's going on here, in your view, that General Tolimir is
12 reporting on?
13 A. At some juncture of time, the VRS had approached the
14 Ukrainian Detachment related to Zepa and had effectively co-opted them to
15 assist the VRS by providing information and not resisting VRS military
16 moves into the Zepa enclave.
17 Q. Do you know clearly one way or another whether this co-option
18 you're talking about was by force or by plan or some other means?
19 A. I don't know the answer to that. No, sir.
20 Q. All right. Let's go to P480.
21 Another Rogatica Brigade document from the 14th. In the name of
22 General Tolimir. Personally to General Miletic. Is this the same
23 Miletic you were talk being earlier in your discussion about Vilotic?
24 A. Yes, sir.
25 Q. And it is entitled: "Protection of Secret Military Information,"
1 known as TVP.
2 And in here, we see that General Tolimir is saying it's necessary
3 to incorporate the Main Staff of the VRS in the work-plan of the
4 Drina Corps. And he is talking, I won't repeat it all, about getting
5 these radios.
6 Can you explain why General Tolimir in his position, if he is in
7 the Rogatica area, would be dealing with this subject matter?
8 A. General Tolimir is seeking to effectively align the Main Staff,
9 at least their knowledge of what the Drina Corps is doing, as well as the
10 subordinate brigades related to Zepa, and wants to be able to monitor the
11 Drina Corps communications network that was established for the Zepa
12 operation. Clearly he doesn't have the appropriate equipment to do that.
13 One would think that as a general he can just tell the Rogatica Brigade
14 to give up their equipment. In fact, he can't. The brigade commander
15 needs that particular equipment in order to effectively command his
16 brigade. He doesn't have the right to just take that type of equipment
17 away from him. So his obvious logical process here is that he is going
18 to go back to his headquarters, the Main Staff, and request that they
19 send down the appropriate equipment so he has his own set to be able to
20 listen to these communications functions.
21 It is, again, as I've said before, a process of integrated
22 command. General Tolimir, for him to give effective orders as to what is
23 going on and what actions need to take place from his perspective on the
24 Main Staff, needs to have a detailed knowledge of what subordinate
25 formations are doing, what they're involved in, and what orders they've
1 received. Otherwise, the risk again is that General Tolimir is giving
2 orders that are contrary to -- or -- or, actually, will damage the
3 situation on the ground because he doesn't have a complete and accurate
4 picture of what needs to happen.
5 So this is all part of, you know, a completely integrated command
6 and control system.
7 Q. In your view, would he need to know about what his subordinates,
8 Beara and Jankovic and other security officers, are doing up in the
9 Zvornik and Bratunac area at the same time?
10 A. Yes, sir, he would.
11 Q. And just briefly, why?
12 A. First off, he is still responsible for them and their activities.
13 He is their direct superior.
14 Second, they are carrying out the commander's orders [realtime
15 transcript read in error "offices"], and, in fact, so is he.
16 So for him to effectively do that, to know what orders to issue,
17 and perhaps as importantly, what orders not to issue, he has to be aware
18 of what the plan is, as well as what other people's roles in the plan
20 Q. Well, you've concluded that let's say Beara, Jankovic, Popovic
21 are carrying out the commander's, Mladic's orders, but how can you
22 conclude that he is? How do you know he is not just dealing with Zepa
23 and hiding or ignoring the murders that are going on, on the 14th, 15th,
24 and 16th of July by his -- under the organisation of his people, Beara,
25 Jankovic and others?
1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
3 May God's peace reign in this house and may God's will be done in
4 these proceedings.
5 Could Mr. McCloskey give us the exact reference, showing what it
6 is that I'm hiding or covering up when he talks about murders and
8 Or perhaps he could tell us that all these things are just his
9 assumptions, his evaluations, and his opinions. Thank you.
10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Before you get the floor, Mr. McCloskey, in page
11 22, line 16, I read, I:
12 "Second, they are carrying out the commander's officers, and so
13 in fact so is he."
14 Just going to disappear from the screen.
15 Were you really, sir, talking about the commander's officers, or
16 what was your answer?
17 THE WITNESS: No, sir, that should be the "commander's orders."
18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you for this clarification.
19 Mr. McCloskey.
20 MR. McCLOSKEY: My question was not that General Tolimir was
21 hiding. My question was: How do you know when you say General Tolimir
22 is following the commander's orders that he was not just ignoring those
23 orders or not doing anything, or -- and in fact, hiding from them. How
24 do you know that. Why do you conclude he is following the commander's
25 orders, how do you know he wasn't avoiding them or ignoring them. That
1 was the question.
2 I don't mean to suggest General Tolimir is hiding. That may have
3 been a bad choice of words. More ignoring or avoiding.
4 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you for this clarification.
5 Mr. Butler, are you able to respond?
6 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
7 As I discussed earlier, I believe it was last week, the
8 underlying foundation, when I look at the roles and activities of various
9 individuals, is on the basis of the fact that, as professional military
10 officers - and in the context of all of the people that we're discussing
11 they are - they're going to perform their duties in an efficient and
12 diligent manner.
13 As I also said, even in the context of an unlawful act, like the
14 massacre of thousands of prisoners, being that it was a military
15 organisation that they were going to do so in the military manner in
16 which they had been trained. And, in fact, the information that has been
17 developed through the years of investigation substantiates that, to a
18 large degree, all of the military processes related to collecting the
19 prisoners, transporting the prisoners, moving the prisoner, the execution
20 of the prisoners, the resources needed for that, the burial of the
21 prisoners, and even the reburial of the prisoners, was accomplished in a
22 large degree by soldiers and officers, many of whom are actually
23 cataloguing their participation in various aspects of this broader
24 massacre, because fuel and ammunition and other things had to be
25 accounted for.
1 So when the situation occurs as the question has come up from
2 Mr. McCloskey, how would I conclude that, I look at it from the
3 perspective of General Tolimir's role within the army and the diligent
4 and responsible function of his duties. The fact that his subordinates
5 are heavily engaged in this particular criminal aspect dealing with
6 Srebrenica, they're doing so in a synchronised manner and that
7 General Tolimir's responsibility as their first immediate superior is to
8 know what they're doing and what orders that they are carrying out. It
9 would be a completely irregular situation to have, where a particular
10 officer's subordinates are engaged in activities, military or unlawful,
11 on the basis of an order from somebody else and that the officer who
12 directly supervises their activities and directs their activities,
13 then-General Tolimir would be ignorant of that situation.
14 The last part of Mr. McCloskey's question, the wilful ignorance
15 issue, I guess in the abstract it would be possible that even though all
16 of the mechanisms for command existed and that as noted by the volume of
17 information that I've discussed so far relating to who was talking to who
18 about what, you know, it is conceivable in the abstract that
19 General Tolimir could have elected to remain wilfully ignorant of what
20 was going on for whatever reason. Other individuals who have been before
21 previous Trial Chamber have made the same argument. That, of course,
22 becomes an area outside of my particular expertise. It's just all I can
23 say about that, is that, he obviously had all of the necessary
24 communications means to be informed as to what was going on, why it was
25 going, and whose orders. And if he were diligently exercising his
1 responsibilities as the assistant commander for intelligence and security
2 on the Main Staff, I guess I would find it staggering, frankly, that he
3 wouldn't know and have no idea of the scope and scale of the massacres
4 that were occurring.
5 MR. McCLOSKEY:
6 Q. That's the point of knowledge. Can you remind us what his
7 responsibility would be, if any, regarding the -- once he is -- knows
8 that his subordinate, Beara, Jankovic, and others are carrying out this
9 material, what would his responsibility be in monitoring, working with,
10 overseeing, directing these people in their tasks, if any?
11 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. President, thank you.
13 These are -- this is just speculation. Could Mr. McCloskey
14 please give a reference as to where he finds that General Tolimir knew of
15 these events and what he was describing as his knowledge.
16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
17 MR. McCLOSKEY: I can provide him a short outline. If you'd
18 like. It's evidence in this case.
19 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, if you look at the transcript,
20 Mr. McCloskey decided to use another formulation. He said:
21 "Can you remind us what his responsibility would be, if any,
22 regarding -- the" and then he reformulated, "... knows that the
23 subordinate, Beara, Jankovic, and others are carrying out this material,
24 what his responsibility be in monitoring," and so on.
25 This is slightly different wording of the question.
1 Mr. McCloskey.
2 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes Mr. President. This is, of course, as you've
3 pointed out in the form of a hypothetical. And it's up to the Court to
4 determine the issues, as Mr. Butler is -- has I think just said. So the
5 best way to ask this question, in my view, is the way I did it.
6 Hypothetically, if the General knows about his subordinates doing these
7 things, what would be his normal duties and responsibilities regarding
8 them and their work. It's a hypothetical and not a conclusion.
9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: You should carry on.
10 MR. McCLOSKEY:
11 Q. Mr. Butler, can you answer that hypothetical?
12 A. Yes, sir. I guess in two different scenarios.
13 It would depend on what his normal duty in that sense would be.
14 If he were conducting his duty completely within the framework of his
15 responsibilities as the assistant commander of intelligence and security,
16 and in accordance with the laws of the Republika Srpska and the relevant
17 regulations on the application of the laws of war within the army, then
18 once he were to receive knowledge that his subordinates were
19 participating in this crime he would have duties to have them arrested,
20 presumably, or, otherwise, relieved from that their posts and undertake
21 an investigation because law enforcement in that context is a function of
22 the intelligence and security branch. It's the military police.
23 If normal is to facilitate the commander's orders, then his
24 knowledge of what his subordinates were doing would be important. So
25 again he knew what orders he might need to give in order to facilitate
1 that work, as well as what orders not to give so it did not interfere.
2 So in this particular situation, I mean, he -- he has two hypothetical
3 tracks that he could go down. One hypothetical track is based on gaining
4 knowledge of the crimes that are occurring and doing his duty within the
5 context of the laws and regulations; and the other one is the
6 hypothetical track of finding out about the crimes and doing his duty to
7 fully implement his commander's orders and to make his subordinates
8 available, as required, and to give any other orders necessary in order
9 to ensure they complete their work in the most effective and efficient
10 means possible.
11 Q. So if - again, with a hypothetical - if General Tolimir becomes
12 aware that his subordinates are involved in criminal conduct and allows
13 them to continue in that criminal conduct, is he in fact making his
14 people available to Mladic, as you've said?
15 A. Not -- not only as I've said in this context, but as outlined in
16 the SFRY regulations on the laws of war and their applicability. It
17 talks about the situation where, as a superior officer, you gain
18 knowledge of a war crime occurring and if you fail to take measures to
19 prevent it or to mitigate the damages from it, if you have the ability to
20 do so, you incur at least in that context a legal responsibility for the
21 actions. That's not inconsistent with most other aspects of command.
22 When a commander or superior recognises his subordinates are
23 engaged in any activity, if he fails to stop that activity, not even
24 supposing it's unlawful or not I mean, but not giving any orders to those
25 particular subordinates, the subordinates are free to interpret that the
1 actions that they are involved in, they are doing in compliance with the
2 wishes of the superior.
3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Judge Nyambe has a question.
4 JUDGE NYAMBE: All right. I just wanted an explanation. Just
5 now you have stated that:
6 "When a commander or superior recognises his subordinates are
7 engaged in any activity, if he fails to stop that activity, not even
8 supposing it's unlawful, or not, I mean, but not giving any orders to
9 those particular subordinate, the subordinates are free to interpret that
10 the actions that they are involved in, they are doing in," I suppose, "in
11 compliance with the wishes of the superior."
12 Does that apply even to an activity that is unlawful, which they
13 must know as subordinates that it is unlawful. Are they entitled to
14 assume that it is okay for them to do that with the wishes of the
15 superior? Thank you.
16 THE WITNESS: Under the SFRY, later adopted the RS law, legally
17 you're correct. They are not permitted to assume that. In a practical
18 sense of command, however, what happens frequently is that subordinates
19 will often take their queues from a superior. One particular
20 hypothetical situation might be that a group of soldiers would take a
21 prisoner and shoot that particular prisoner. They would then look down
22 the road, be aware that their commander has witnessed that act. The
23 question is what happens next. If the commander takes immediate action,
24 the lesson that the subordinates draw is that that type of conduct will
25 not be condoned. If the officer, once he becomes aware of that act,
1 turns and walks away, the practical reality for the subordinates is that
2 they understand that that type of behaviour will be condoned by the
3 command and that they're free to continue on to do it without fear of
5 So I do take your point, ma'am. Obviously there is a legal
6 responsibility not to engage in this. But certainly, from a practical
7 command point, soldiers might not -- at the lower levels certainly might
8 not have that same appreciation as officers should.
9 JUDGE NYAMBE: Thank you.
10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey, it's time for the last question
11 before the break.
12 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, just one more document quickly I think we
13 can get to quickly. It's 65 ter 2204.
14 Q. It's a document, this time under the name of General Mladic,
15 dated 14 July. And it -- it speaks about the request of the Dutch
16 Battalion to move out of the area.
17 Mr. Butler, is this roughly consistent with what you know
18 eventually occurred; DutchBat leaving the area under the authority of
19 General Mladic?
20 A. Yes, sir, it is.
21 MR. McCLOSKEY: I'd offer this into evidence, Mr. President, and
22 then a good time to break.
23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 2204 shall be
25 assigned exhibit number P2539. Thank you.
1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much.
2 We must have the first break now, and we will resume quarter
3 past 4.00.
4 --- Recess taken at 3.45 p.m.
5 --- On resuming at 4.18 p.m.
6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Yes, Mr. McCloskey. Please carry on.
7 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
8 Q. I would like to now go out of order slightly and go back to
9 P1459. This is the duty officer notebook of the Zvornik Brigade.
10 Mr. Butler it will be up on the screen, only I -- given some of what you
11 were just saying I want to go through a few of the days --
12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Where can we find it in the binder?
13 MR. McCLOSKEY: There's a couple of pages here and there,
14 Mr. President, but -- so I would say it's not in the binder, because I'm
15 just going to decide if I'm -- to keep it all together, I'm going to try
16 to keep it with the related subject matter.
17 So if we could start at page 41 in the English. It should be 40
18 in the B/C/S. And it's the Prosecution's position, as you will see from
19 this so-called teacher's edition, that this is the 14th of July. We need
20 to get the B/C/S which should be able to be up at the same time. Oh,
21 thank you.
22 Q. And what I want to you ask about Mr. Butler is this bottom
23 section, 14 July. Prosecution's position is that it's -- Dragan Jokic is
24 the duty officer on the 14th of July, and you've just testified about
25 that. Do you stay with that?
1 A. Yes, sir. It is my understanding that he is the duty officer on
2 the 14th of July.
3 Q. And this reference, "Colonel Salapura called, Drago and Beara are
4 to report to Golic."
5 And can you briefly tell us who you think these people, what unit
6 they belong to?
7 A. Colonel Salapura is a subordinate of General Tolimir. He is the
8 chief of the intelligence administration. Drago, in this case, I believe
9 it's Drago Nikolic, the security officer for the
10 Zvornik Infantry Brigade. And Beara, again, is a direct subordinate of
11 General Tolimir. He is the chief of the security administration. Golic
12 is Major Pavle Golic who is an intelligence officer with the Drina Corps.
13 Q. And can you tell us from your review, for several years here, is
14 Salapura a name, a common name? Do you see any other Salapuras involved
15 in these events in any way?
16 A. I can't answer if it is a common name in Serbian naming context.
17 But with respect to the VRS, I'm only aware of one Colonel Salapura.
18 Q. All right. Now let's go to page 45 in the English, and page 44.
19 I won't ask you what's going on on the 14th in the Zvornik area. That's
20 part of the record.
21 Here we see, if we're still on the 14th, and at 1500 hours it
23 "Colonel Beara is coming in order to Orahovac, Petkovci, Rocevic,
25 Is that -- that Colonel Beara, who is he, in your view here, in
1 this context?
2 A. Same officer we previously discussed, the chief the security
4 Q. And what do you take this to be a reference to, what I just read?
5 A. Given the locations are all - Orahovac, Petkovci, Rocevic,
6 Pilica - are all known schools where prisoners were detained prior to
7 their execution, this is -- Colonel Beara is coming in the
8 Zvornik Brigade area with the intent of either visiting or dealing with
9 the issues related to those locations.
10 Q. All right. Now let's go to page 55 in the English, 54 in the
11 B/C/S. We're still on 14 July.
12 This reference, Beara to call 155. What do you make of this?
13 A. I'm aware from the investigation that 155 is the main phone
14 number at the Main Staff, Panorama. So in this particular context, Beara
15 is calling 155, or calling the Main Staff.
16 Q. Well, tell us how this would work. We see this again, it's
17 Dragan Jokic. So if this is a note from Dragan Jokic, what can we glean
18 from how Jokic ended up writing this, if anything?
19 A. Well, sir, one of the functions of the duty officer, because he's
20 performing his duty in the duty operations centre, and because that has
21 to be by the phone, for his -- you know, for his tour -- duty officer, he
22 is usually the person that all incoming and outgoing issues for the unit
23 go through. In this context, either Dragan Jokic personally or the
24 assistant whose helping him during the performance of his duty is taking
25 phone messages or other orders that have come in from outside the
1 brigade, it's customary that they write them down so they don't forget
2 them and pass them on.
3 The military switchboard only goes as far as with respect to the
4 radio telephone to the Zvornik headquarters. If a call or if an order
5 comes in for not only Beara but any other officer who is around there,
6 they're going to have find an alternate means to get the word to him. So
7 again they're -- that's why they write things down so these issues aren't
9 Q. All right. Let's go to the next page, number 57. In English,
10 56. And we see written in large letters on the left-hand side in the
11 Serbian. We still need the Serbian. Thank you.
12 Dragan Jokic is still noted as the duty officer. And it says:
13 "From Beara, Drago to report, Mane Djukici [phoen]."
14 And then it is says in very large print:
15 "0900 Beara is coming."
16 Who do you think these folks are?
17 A. Beara is the same officer we discussed, Colonel Ljubisa Beara.
18 Drago, Drago Nikolic. I -- there are a -- Mane is, I know, a very common
19 name, so I don't want to speculate on that particular one. And, of
20 course, the notation at 0900 Beara is coming, given the context of this
21 is the third or fourth page of the 14th of July, I'm reading this to
22 assume that this is a notation that Beara is coming tomorrow, in that
23 context, the 15th of July, at 0900 hours.
24 Q. All right. Let's go to 74 in the B/C/S, and I hope 75 in the
25 English. It's ERN 761 in the English, the last -- yes, that's correct in
1 the English.
2 We see at the top of the page:
3 "Drago and Lieutenant-Colonel Popovic are to report to Major
4 Golic early in the morning?"
5 Are these the same people that you've been talking about?
6 A. Yes, sir, they are.
7 Q. And looking down the page, we see under requests - and we know
8 it's the position of the Prosecution that this is Drago Nikolic as duty
9 officer - for the 1st Battalion, can you tell us, we see 50 litres of oil
10 for transport of troops to Kula.
11 Do you know where Kula is?
12 A. Yes, sir. That's the actual village that the school is
13 located -- we call it the Pilica school. It's actually physically
14 located in the village of Kula.
15 Q. And also 20 litres of gasoline. Has the investigation revealed
16 any -- any troops around that school where Muslims were held?
17 A. Yes, sir. I am aware that members of, in part, the 1st Battalion
18 were at that location guarding the prisoners around the school.
19 Q. All right. Now let's go to 85 in English. 84 in the B/C/S.
20 We're now on -- clearly on 16 July. That last communication
21 notation -- oh, I'm sorry.
22 Can we go to page 79 in the English and page 78 in the B/C/S.
23 And we see that Milorad Trbic is the duty officer. Can you
24 remind us who he is?
25 A. Milorad Trbic is the assistant chief of security. He worked for
1 Drago Nikolic in the Zvornik Brigade.
2 Q. And we see this entry:
3 "0855 Golic asked Popovic to call him."
4 And who do you think that is, Golic and Popovic?
5 A. Major Golic from the Drina Corps; and Lieutenant-Colonel Popovic
6 from the Drina Corps.
7 Q. And why do you say that, as I think Golic and Popovic are
8 relatively common names?
9 A. In my context of trying to identify through the years all of the
10 officers and all of the individuals involved in the crimes, we do run
11 into these. I mean, I obviously hold open the possibility that there are
12 dozens, if not hundreds, of soldiers from the Drina Corps with the last
13 name of Popovic. The issue then becomes, given the context of what we're
14 talking about, as well as, you know, the rank of the individuals -- I
15 mean, the reality is that all of those other Popovics aren't going to
16 have access to military telephones and wouldn't be calling the
17 Zvornik Infantry Brigade. So the most logical people to presume these
18 conversations are involved with are going to be the officers who are
19 directing the issues related to the Drina Corps. Again, whether they're
20 lawful or not.
21 So that's why I take this as Major Golic and
22 Lieutenant-Colonel Popovic calling the duty officer, as opposed to
23 Private Golic and Private Popovic.
24 Q. So as this note says Golic -- we can glean from the note that
25 Golic has called and said, and I quote:
1 "That he can forget what he asked for and what he wrote about.
2 He knows what he is supposed to do according to the agreed procedure ..."
3 Do you know the specifics of what they're talking about? For
4 example, do you know what he wrote about, that Golic is now saying he can
5 forget about what he wrote about? Do you have any idea what it was that
6 Popovic wrote about?
7 A. I'm not sure I recall or I ever knew what Popovic might have
8 written back on 15 July. I don't know if I've ever seen an order from
9 Popovic in that context.
10 Q. And this comment:
11 "He knows what he's supposed to do according to the agreed
12 procedure. Boss, from Panorama, 01."
13 What is this boss, remind us what Panorama 01 would be?
14 A. Panorama is the telephonic code-name for the Main Staff. What
15 officers would frequently do in order to give a clue to the people who
16 they were talking to on the phone who was actually the person giving the
17 order or something of that nature, was that if they wanted it -- people
18 to understand that it was from the commander, it would be 01. So if you
19 have a call from the Zvornik Brigade in -- you know, you want to talk to
20 Zlatar -- or, I'm sorry, you want to talk to Palma 01, everyone
21 understands that you're looking for the brigade commander. Panorama 01
22 [Realtime transcript read in error "Palma"] is the commander of the
23 Main Staff, which would be General Mladic.
24 Q. And this agreed procedure glossed from -- agreed procedure from
25 General Mladic, what procedure would Golic, Popovic, Mladic have to do
1 with on the 16 July, in your view? If any.
2 A. If one extrapolates the conversations and the issues that we
3 talked about previously on the 17th and the 18th, the particular
4 intercept where the two correspondents are talking about what the
5 procedure was and in detail what happens to those males who are between
6 the 16 to 60 military age group, this is another reference to the agreed
7 procedure. The fact that the boss is giving directly these orders, if
8 one goes back in time to intercepts that occur on the 15th, Colonel Beara
9 makes it clear in his discussions with General Zivanovic and shortly
10 thereafter, General Krstic, about these -- you know, the orders coming
11 from the boss personally on this.
12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Butler you spoke about the extension of the
13 commander. Could you please repeat the code-name of this extension.
14 THE WITNESS: It is -- the suffix that they use is 01. So, for
15 example, if you're talking about over these radio telephones what the
16 normal military discussion was, was if you wanted to talk to the brigade
17 commander of the Zvornik Brigade, you would want to speak to Palma 01,
18 and it was generally understood that that was the commander. Zlatar 01
19 is the commander of the Drina Corps. Panorama 01 is generally understood
20 by everyone to be the commander of the Main Staff. It is just a military
21 slang terminology people would use.
22 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I understand. Palma 01 is referring to whom?
23 THE WITNESS: Palma in this case is the telephonic code-name of
24 the Zvornik Infantry Brigade.
25 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I ask this question only because of the record.
1 On page 37, line 12, which has just disappeared from the screen, you are
2 recorded to having said if you want to talk to Palma 01, everyone
3 understands that the Main Staff, which would be General Mladic.
4 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. Somehow that didn't get transcribed
5 correctly or I misspoke. I apologise.
6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: No, you didn't misspeak. You said Panorama 01, I
7 think. I just wanted to correct the transcript.
8 Thank you.
9 Mr. McCloskey.
10 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
11 Q. And we also see that this message referred to above conveyed to
12 Popovic at 0910. And the bottom of the page:
13 "Beara to call Panorama 155 at 0930 hours."
14 You've mentioned the Main Staff switchboard 155 in your view.
15 Where in particular, or who was picking up on that line, as far as you
16 knew, during this time-period?
17 A. My understanding is the 155 line rings in the operation centre of
18 the Main Staff.
19 Q. And do you recall who you see on intercepts or on other documents
20 that are speaking from the Main Staff? Any high-ranking officers on
21 these days?
22 A. The most logical person who would be the senior-ranking officer
23 there would be General Miletic, the chief of operations for the
24 Main Staff. Other generals would be in and out of there, but that's
25 General Miletic's primary duty position.
1 Q. All right.
2 A. Or duty location, would probably be a better description of it.
3 Q. Let's go to page 85 in English in the same document. We're still
4 on 16 July. 84, B/C/S.
5 Trbic is still the duty officer. And it says:
6 "At 1400 hours, Popovic requested a bus with a fuel [sic] tank
7 and 500 litres D2. Zlatar duty officer and Golic informed."
8 What does your analysis bear, if anything, about Popovic
9 requesting a bus with a fuel tank and 500 litres of D2. First of all,
10 tell us what D2 is?
11 A. D2 is diesel fuel.
12 Q. And how do you interpret this line?
13 A. Well, don't have to interpret it much, in so much as there is
14 actually significant corroborating documentation as well as intercepts,
15 which discusses an entire episode of Colonel Popovic requesting fuel
16 related to the job that he had to do and that there was an entire process
17 that went on related to what procedures had to be followed so that the
18 fuel could be appropriately signed over to Colonel Popovic, could be
19 brought out to him, the fuel would be consumed, and then he'd sign for
20 the remainder of the fuel that went back. There are intercepts which
21 talk about that process to various members of the Drina Corps rear
22 services staff, as well as documents from the Zvornik Brigade, from their
23 rear service, which reflect the actual withdrawal or disbursement of the
24 fuel and the various officers who had to sign off on that. I think, as I
25 discussed earlier, in this particular context, the use of the fuel and
1 for what -- we're aware it was being used with, is obviously unlawful
2 connected to the mass execution and burial thereafter, but the process is
3 occurring along the same military manner that it would be if it were fuel
4 going for any other variety of reasons.
5 Q. We'll get to the documents and intercepts you mention as we go
6 through the chronology. But do you recall the location that this fuel
7 was taken to to be used by Popovic?
8 A. Yes, sir. It's Pilica.
9 Q. And what, in your opinion, was this fuel being used for by
10 Popovic at Pilica on 16 July?
11 A. My understanding is that they needed it for the buses that were
12 taking people from the school at Pilica and taking them to the location
13 in which they were executed in Branjevo.
14 Q. All right. And then this other line underneath that is:
15 "Zlatar duty officer and Golic informed."
16 We again hear from Golic. Which Golic do you think that is in
17 this context?
18 A. Major Golic from the Drina Corps, sir.
19 Q. And the Zlatar duty officer?
20 A. I think, on 16 July, if I recall correctly, the Zlatar duty
21 officer is Colonel Cerovic.
22 Q. We'll check. I think there's a document related to that to see
23 if that's true.
24 A. That would be Cerovic, with a C, for the transcript.
25 Q. All right. That was just the -- I wanted to get us back to the
1 work being done by some of the people involved here.
2 And so now if we could go back to the chronology, and I thank
3 everyone for bearing with me, could we go to P373B. And we now see,
4 we're on the -- we're on the 14th July. We have an intercept.
5 MR. McCLOSKEY: Shouldn't be broadcast.
6 Before we go to this, could we go to 65 ter 111.
7 Q. And I'm not sure it's in the binders. I couldn't find it, but it
8 will come up on the screen. It was on the list, though. I may have
9 skipped over it by accident.
10 Now, Mr. Butler, if you could take a look at this noting it's
11 from the Drina Corps on the 13th July, received by someone at 20 hours --
12 or 2000 hours. What is this, and how does it fit into your analysis,
14 A. Yes, sir. As an important component obviously of the military
15 aspect of command, everybody in all of the relevant military units has to
16 be made aware when there is a significant change in command of a military
17 formation. Everyone has to be on the same sheet of paper as to who the
18 commander is.
19 This is a particular document signed by
20 Lieutenant-Colonel Jovicic to -- from the Drina Corps Command to all of
21 the relevant units of the Drina Corps informing them that
22 General Zivanovic has been relieved of command of the Drina Corps and is
23 being reassigned to new duties, that General Krstic is assuming the post
24 as corps commander, and that, to replace him, Colonel Svetozar Andric,
25 who at that time is the commander of the 1st Birac Brigade, is now taking
1 General Krstic's place as the corps Chief of Staff.
2 So this is the formal notification so all of the subordinate
3 formations are aware of this development.
4 MR. McCLOSKEY: Okay. I would offer that into evidence,
5 Mr. President.
6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Yes, it will be received.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 111 shall be
8 assigned Exhibit P2540. Thank you.
9 MR. McCLOSKEY:
10 Q. Now let's go back to P373B, an intercept from 14 July not to be
11 broadcast. But we can see that it's -- the participants are
12 General Zivanovic, at Zlatar, which you've told us is the code-name for
13 the Drina Corps Command. And Major Jokic, the Palma duty officer.
14 And we can see this, as consistent with your testimony that Jokic
15 was the duty officer that day. And we see that General Zivanovic is
16 passing on information to Jokic but he is saying: Take this as an order.
17 Then -- and says:
18 "Surround the location."
19 How do you interpret General Zivanovic from the Drina Corps
20 Command issuing an order to Major Jokic when we have just seen him being
21 replaced as corps commander the night before?
22 A. Yes, sir. If I recall, General Krstic's Defence counsel asked me
23 that same question.
24 This is the second of two intercepts related to this particular
25 issue. There's a previous intercept where Obrenovic and the
1 Zvornik Brigade is seeking to find the corps commander. They're
2 unsuccessful in doing that. At some point in this context,
3 General Zivanovic, who is still in Vlasenica at the Drina Corps Command,
4 and who, on the 14th, is now realizing that there is a significant
5 adverse military situation developing at -- or in the zone of the
6 Zvornik Infantry Brigade, does reach out through the Zvornik Brigade duty
7 officer and informs him of the situation and what he ought to do. And in
8 this context, he gives an order, as a general. Tells Jokic to tell
9 Obrenovic to take this as an order.
10 It is, perhaps, one of the few orders which, in reality,
11 General Zivanovic might not be authorised to give; but, having said that,
12 he is still a general in the Army of the Republika Srpska. He has
13 recognised a situation that could have a potentially significant adverse
14 impact, and he is taking steps to deal with it. The fact that he does
15 this order in this context is -- is somewhat extraordinary, but, as a
16 general who has an awareness of what's going on and who knows all of the
17 people involved, he -- he gives that order, and for all anybody knows
18 because I don't think we've ever been able to confirm or deny this one
19 way or another, he could even be passing on the order of General Krstic.
20 So it is an outlier in the context of the normal course of how
21 orders are given and why. Obrenovic obviously is engaged in this and
22 takes this as an order, as it's passed down. But I don't -- for the
23 context that we've discussed before, this doesn't offset the fact that on
24 the 14th of July General Krstic is not the corps commander and
25 General Zivanovic has somehow reassumed command.
1 Q. And can you very briefly tell us what is this emergency that has
2 got General Zivanovic involved in issuing an order. Just very briefly.
3 I think you have referred to it already, but ...
4 A. Yes, sir. As I've discussed, the -- during the -- primarily the
5 evening of the 12th and through the day of the 13th, the
6 Zvornik Infantry Brigade as well as the MUP units in and around
7 Nova Kasaba, Konjevic Polje, as reflected by Dragomir Vasic's reports,
8 and Borovcanin's, recognise that the armed head of the column could
9 number as high as 3.000 to 4.000 soldiers. Other evidence that I've
10 discussed reflects the fact that the senior levels of the Drina command
11 on those days believe those numbers are wildly exaggerated, that the
12 military threat is nowhere as significant as Obrenovic has been stating
13 it has been.
14 What this particular intercept and the response of
15 General Zivanovic is, is a recognition that Obrenovic has in fact been
16 very accurate with his estimates of the size of the column and
17 consequently the military threat that it poses to not only the Zvornik
18 Infantry Brigade by the actual town of Zvornik.
19 So at this point in time, you begin to see a series of intercepts
20 reflecting how that knowledge of the military situation being worse than
21 everybody anticipated in Zvornik being passed around and the measures
22 that various command-level elements to include the Drina Corps will be
23 taking over the subsequent hours to combat that threat.
24 Q. Now, let's go a little later in the evening to 2102 hours. It is
25 P16A. It's the next document in the tab.
1 This is 14 July from the other intercept records in the case in
2 evidence. And we see that it's between Palma duty officer, Major Jokic,
3 and Badem, X and Y, and we see early on someone is asking to talk to
5 Badem again is who, or what?
6 A. Badem is the telephonic code-name for the Bratunac Infantry
8 Q. So we see this. I won't read it all out. The Palma duty officer
9 who we know is Jokic wants -- says:
10 "Beara is needed urgently. Somebody needs him. The higher house
11 urgently needs him ..."
12 And then it says:
13 "But he has to call me."
14 Then as we look down the intercept, we see that Jokic and BE
15 actually start speaking to each other and that Jokic says:
16 "We were together, Colonel, sir, number 155 called you and asked
17 you to call him urgently."
18 So can you tell from this where Jokic is calling from and where
19 he is calling to, looking for Beara?
20 A. Jokic is calling from his duty location, which is the
21 Zvornik Brigade, where he is the duty officer that day, and he's calling,
22 if he's calling through Badem, he is calling to the Bratunac Infantry
23 Brigade, where he finds Beara.
24 Q. And the "higher house"? What do you think that is a reference
25 to? It's mentioned I see at least twice in this intercept.
1 A. It depends on whose reference -- I mean, in the case of Palma,
2 the higher house or the next level of command would be the Drina Corps.
3 In the case of Beara, it would be the Main Staff.
4 Q. Well, this line in the middle that says -- where Jokic says:
5 "Number 155, that's, I mean, the higher house, you go ahead and
6 call them, you have, so I don't speak like this."
7 What's Jokic says?
8 A. Well, I mean, again, putting it in context of how he is speaking,
9 Jokic, like most other officers, are aware that their telephonic
10 conversations can be monitored by the enemy. So he is attempting to
11 speak cryptically. But he is, as we know, 155 is the number for the
12 Main Staff operations centre. So what he is trying to do in this context
13 is relay to Colonel Beara that he needs to call back to the Main Staff
14 operations centre.
15 Q. And then Beara says something, or BE says something according to
16 this that we only have ... for. And Jokic says:
19 "We have huge problems over here."
20 Then BE, we can't hear anything from BE, or they couldn't. And
21 then Jokic says:
22 "There are big problems, well, with the people -- I mean, with
23 the parcel."
24 And he goes on to say Drago is nowhere around and then he
25 reiterates to call the higher house, 155.
1 What does your analysis reveal Jokic is referring to when he says
2 "We have huge problems, big problems, well, with the people -- I mean,
3 the parcel"?
4 A. As is evident in other intercepts, parcels was what they would
5 euphemistically call people or, in this particular context, prisoners.
6 Again, not wanting to mention the phrase prisoners over a potentially
7 unsecure line that could be intercepted.
8 Q. And have you -- and has -- seen any particular problems that
9 Jokic may be referring to at this time in the evening? Any idea what he
10 is talking about?
11 A. At this point in time on the 14th, you have a situation where
12 they are still just finishing up, they're actually still executing
13 prisoners at the Orahovac killing fields. They haven't quite started at
14 Petkovci yet. They're still prisoners up to other locations. But, in
15 context, you have the military column which has now broken through the
16 first line of defence on the late evening of the 13th and is pushing
17 actually relatively close to Orahovac and further on.
18 So it's a mixed conversation where Jokic is trying to deal with
19 issues and explain problems with the prisoners and, at the same time,
20 they have a worse -- worsening military situation with respect to actual
21 combat activities.
22 Q. Was there any indication in the public testimony of
23 Dragan Obrenovic in the Blagojevic case that Jokic informed him of any
24 problems with the prisoners at some point? If you recall.
25 A. It's been a lot of years, sir. I don't think I recall anymore.
1 I'm sorry.
2 Q. All right. Fair enough.
3 A. It's been a while since I've read that testimony.
4 Q. Fair enough. Let's go to the next document, 65 ter 2996A. A
5 one-line intercept that you've -- believed talked about many times over
6 the years.
7 We're now on the 15th of -- of July, according to this intercept.
8 And it says:
9 "Colonel Beara was looking for General Zivanovic, but he was not
10 there. He said he was to call him at extension 139."
11 What's -- what's going on here?
12 A. It is a summary of a conversation where Colonel Beara is calling
13 from a location looking for General Zivanovic, not reaching him
14 immediately, and leaving a message that Zivanovic was to call him or
15 could reach him - him being Colonel Beara - at extension 139.
16 Q. Do you recall what extension 139 is?
17 A. Yes, sir. Extension 139 is the phone line for the phone in
18 Drago Nikolic's office in the Zvornik Brigade.
19 Q. All right.
20 MR. McCLOSKEY: I offer that into evidence.
21 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received.
22 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 2996A shall be
23 assigned Exhibit P2541. Thank you.
24 MR. McCLOSKEY: Just skip over the next one. It's another
25 version of that. So let's go to 65 ter 2997B.
1 Q. This is, again, 15 July 1995, at 0954 hours, just two minutes
2 after that last little one-line synopsis, and the participants are
3 General Zivanovic and Colonel Ljubo Beara, according to the intercept
4 operators. I won't read all of it. We see that there are some initial
5 hellos and some comments. And then Beara noted as B says:
6 "Okay then. Listen Bro."
7 Zivanovic says:
9 B says:
10 "You know that day? I informed the commander about it. Furtula
11 didn't send Lukic's intervention platoon."
12 And Lukic is waiting at Blagojevic. Sorry, Zivanovic says:
13 "And Lukic is waiting at Blagojevic."
14 And then Beara says:
15 "Lukic is here with me and his driver and we urged them on that."
16 Can you tell us, based on your review of this entire intercept
17 and the other information, what do you believe he is talking about and
18 who are these people, the commander, for one; Furtula, for the other;
19 Lukic and his intervention platoon, another? Who are these guys? What's
20 he talking about in your view?
21 A. Furtula is Major Radomir Furtula is the commander of the
22 Visegrad Light Infantry Brigade. In this context Lukic has been
23 identified by the investigation as Milan Lukic, and they're talking about
24 instructions that his particular platoon was supposed to be sent up on
25 the commander's orders. Again, in this context, I take the commander to
1 be General Mladic.
2 Q. And we haven't heard much about the Visegrad Brigade. What corps
3 do they belong to?
4 A. The Visegrad Brigade is also part of the Drina Corps Command. Or
5 part of the Drina Corps, more accurately.
6 Q. Do you remember its formalised name?
7 A. Yes, sir. It should be the 5th Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade.
8 Q. All right. And Zivanovic says:
9 "And Lukic is waiting at Blagojevic."
10 What Blagojevic do you think he would mean in this context?
11 A. Blagojevic being the commander of the
12 Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade. He is trying to say that Lukic is
13 supposedly waiting at the Bratunac Brigade headquarters or somewhere in
14 Bratunac where he can be reached.
15 Q. And Beara says:
16 "Lukic is here with me and his driver and we urged them on that."
17 And where do you think based on the context of these intercepts
18 Beara is at this point?
19 A. Going back to the previous intercept, if he's asked for
20 General Zivanovic to call him at 139, and General Zivanovic has called
21 him there, then, at the time of this intercept, Colonel Beara is sitting
22 in Drago Nikolic's office at the Zvornik Brigade headquarters. It's the
23 Standard facility.
24 Q. And then Beara continues:
25 "And yesterday Furtula sent one soldier without an arm and
1 another one that Lukic knows as a drunkard."
2 And then he says:
3 "Fuck him."
4 Zivanovic says:
6 Beara says:
7 "Instead of a platoon."
8 Zivanovic says:
9 "Oh dear."
10 Beara says:
11 "Simply, he doesn't give a damn about the commander's
12 orders [sic]. Well, now that platoon has 60 men."
13 Who do you think Beara is referring to when he says "commanders"
15 A. Yes, sir. I believe, again in this context, the commander he is
16 referring to is General Ratko Mladic.
17 Q. Then Zivanovic says something we can't hear.
18 Beara says:
19 "Have him send at least half."
20 Zivanovic says:
21 "Yes, yes."
22 Beara says:
23 "Say again?"
25 "To send them immediately.
2 And then Zivanovic says:
3 "I can't order that anymore."
4 What do you take Zivanovic's comment about "I can't order that
5 anymore" to refer to; and do you have an opinion on why he is saying
7 A. Yes, sir. What Zivanovic is doing is, in this case, informing or
8 reminding Colonel Beara that since he is no longer the commander of the
9 Drina Corps, he has no authority or right to issue commands to
10 subordinate brigade commanders, or -- because they're not his
11 subordinates anymore, in that nature.
12 So he's just saying I'm no longer empowered to make orders like
13 that, and when you look at the next line he is basically giving Beara a
14 phone extension to call.
15 Q. And who do you believe that phone extension is? We see 385.
16 A. 385 is the phone extension associated with the Drina Corps
17 commander. Not only in Vlasenica, but when the Drina Corps commander is
18 in a different location, for example, at a forward command post, if
19 they're going to be there for a few days, they will actually trunk --
20 electronically trunk that line so it rings out wherever the corps
21 commander is located. You call 385, you're going to get whomever the
22 corps commander is.
23 Q. And we'll get to this in a minute, but is there another intercept
24 right after this between Beara and Krstic?
25 A. Yes, sir.
1 Q. All right. Explain, if you will, how it is a colonel like Beara,
2 who you say the evidence indicates is at the Zvornik Brigade, how is it
3 that he is calling up and asking General Zivanovic for troops? He is a
4 colonel, he is from the Main Staff, he is the chief of security. Can you
5 explain how, in your view, this works in the military, the appropriate
6 military context?
7 A. Yes, sir. As I've frequently noted, officers performing their
8 duties are going to give the orders that they're lawfully entitled to
9 give. In many cases, they will be supplemental orders to a broader order
10 that they have received. In this manner, you have Colonel Beara having a
11 discussion with General Zivanovic. From this particular intercept, it's
12 clear that both of them understand what the commander's orders were and
13 that various units of the Drina Corps were supposed to send, in this
14 case, at least one intervention unit, in furtherance of the commander's
15 orders. And, in this case, the commander being General Mladic.
16 So it's not improper for Colonel Beara to call General Zivanovic,
17 particularly since, in this conversation, Colonel Beara is -- is unaware
18 that General Zivanovic, for whatever -- you know, at this point can't
19 give orders like that anymore. It's -- it's not improper for
20 Colonel Beara to call General Zivanovic to remind him of what
21 General Mladic's orders were in this issue and to ask General Zivanovic
22 to give the necessary orders to his brigade commander to ensure that
23 General Mladic's orders are carried out as he gave them.
24 That is an appropriate role for what a staff officer would do in
25 furtherance of ensuring his commander's orders are fully carried out.
1 Q. Why couldn't, under these rules, Beara, as a colonel, just order
2 the troops from the Zvornik Brigade?
3 A. Because General -- or because Colonel Beara does not have the
4 right to command those soldiers from the Zvornik Brigade. That right is
5 vested solely in the brigade commander. Or, at this point in time, the
6 brigade deputy commander. The fact that Colonel Beara is following the
7 boss's orders does not give him unlimited authority to command soldiers
8 from other units. He has to exercise proper command and staff channels
9 and relationships. Colonel Beara is within his rights to relay to
10 Colonel Zivanovic that General Mladic's orders are not being followed and
11 that General Zivanovic should give the orders necessary to ensure that
12 General Mladic's orders are complied with.
13 But Colonel Beara does not, in and of himself, possess the
14 authority to bypass General Zivanovic or, as you'll see in the next
15 intercept, General Krstic, and directly contact or phone down to the
16 5th Podrinje Unit and order Major Furtula to send that platoon
18 MR. McCLOSKEY: I'd offer this intercept into evidence.
19 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Yes, it will be received.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 2997B shall be
21 assigned Exhibit P2542. Thank you.
22 MR. McCLOSKEY: So now if we could go to P506B. It's the same
23 date, 15 July. The time is now 10.00, about five or six minutes after
24 the last one. Bless you. The participants are noted.
25 Colonel Ljubo Beara and -- bless you. Colonel Ljubo Beara and
1 General Krstic.
2 Q. And we see Beara saying:
3 "General, Furtula didn't carry out the boss's order."
4 Who do you think the boss is in this context?
5 A. Since we're talking about the exact same context of the last
6 intercept, the boss is General Mladic.
7 Q. Krstic says:
8 "Listen, he ordered him to lead out a tank, not a train."
9 Beara says:
10 "But I need 30 men, just like it was ordered."
11 Then Krstic says:
12 "Take from Nastic or Blagojevic."
13 Who do you believe Krstic is referring to when he says Nastic or
15 A. Blagojevic is the commander of the
16 Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade. Nastic is the commander of the
17 Milici Light Infantry Brigade. So what he is telling Beara to do is he
18 is authorising Beara to contact those two units and have them pull --
19 have them send the people as requested.
20 Q. Krstic doesn't suggest Pandurevic or Obrenovic. Any reason why
21 he wouldn't have in that situation?
22 A. By this time, 1000 hours on 15 July, General Krstic is now well
23 aware of the dire military situation in the Zvornik municipality, and, in
24 fact, has already sent back Colonel Pandurevic and the two battalions
25 worth of soldiers -- or the two tactical groups worth of soldiers from
1 Zepa to return back to Zvornik so they can militarily deal with the
3 So clearly, knowing that -- General Krstic is not -- knowing
4 what's happening in Zvornik, he is not going to suggest that troops be
5 taken from the combat line in Zvornik. He is basically saying take them
6 from units that are less militarily involved right now and, you know,
7 basically identifying the Bratunac Brigade or the Milici Brigade as
8 possible sources of those troops.
9 Q. After suggesting Nastic and Blagojevic, Krstic goes on so say:
10 "I can't pull anything out of here for you."
11 Where is Krstic at the time; and what is he doing?
12 A. At the time of this intercept, General Krstic is at the IKM, I
13 believe, it's pronounced Krivace, and is engaged in the military
14 operations related to Zepa. So, again this is an example of what I mean,
15 how they've run extension 385 out to the forward command post so it can
16 reach General Krstic.
17 Q. Would that IKM be Krivace?
18 A. Yes, sir, that's a more accurate pronunciation of it.
19 Q. All right. And then Beara says:
20 "But I don't have any here. I need them today and I'll give them
21 back tonight. Krle, you have to understand, I can't explain it to you,
22 like this."
23 What's this term, "Krle"?
24 A. Krle was a nickname that various senior officers had for
25 General Krstic.
1 Q. And when he says "I can't explain it to you like this," what's
2 your view of what that mean, if anything?
3 A. Well, sir, he's -- as the chief of Main Staff, the security
4 administration, he probably knows better than anyone else the
5 vulnerabilities of the telephone system to potential compromise and is
6 making it clear, I can't really go into the details of the conversation.
7 Q. And Krstic says:
8 "I'll disturb everything on his axis if I pull them out, and a
9 lot depends on him."
10 What does that mean?
11 A. The Visegrad Brigade was involved in the Zepa operation, coming
12 in from a separate angle from the main attack. Part of the military
13 operation for these units was to draw forces away or keep forces pinned
14 down so the main forces attacking from the north would find less
15 resistance in this context, basically what General Krstic is telling
16 Beara is that, I can't weaken that particular axis of the attack.
17 Q. And then Beara says:
18 "I can't resolve anything without ..." and that should read 15 to
19 30 men.
20 That's a misprint in the English translation.
21 And Boban Indjic is how it is spelled in the B/C/S, not Djindjic.
22 Do you know who this Boban Indjic was at the time?
23 A. Yes, sir. He's a member of the Visegrad Brigade. And actually
24 at this time he is a subordinate to Milan Lukic.
25 Q. Do you recall an intercept on the 13th that had something to do
1 with a unit with -- from Visegrad coming up to the Srebrenica area?
2 A. Yes, sir, I do. If I recall correctly, the intercept notes that
3 they were on their way but due to a mechanical problem the bus carrying
4 them broke down, so they could not complete the journey.
5 Q. All right. And I believe that's in evidence, but I will check on
6 that intercept. All right. So Beara says:
7 "I can't resolve anything without 15, 30 men, and Boban Indjic."
8 Krstic says:
9 "Ljubo, this is not protected."
10 Beara says:
11 "I know, I know."
12 What's going on here?
13 A. Again, now General Krstic is reminding Beara that this particular
14 line is liable to intercept.
15 Q. And then Krstic says:
16 "I will see what I can do but it will disturb a lot. Have a look
17 down there at Nastic and Blagojevic's."
18 I think that's self-explanatory.
19 Beara says:
20 "But I don't have any. If I did, I wouldn't still be asking for
21 the third day."
22 Krstic says:
23 "Again, check with Blagojevic. Take his Red Berets."
24 What are the Red Berets, in your view?
25 A. The Red Berets unit was an intervention platoon, part of the
1 Bratunac Brigade. Normally it was assigned to the 3rd Infantry Battalion
2 but because most of the particular individuals to that unit were younger
3 and fitter soldiers, they were often used in a number of other places
4 during the war.
5 Q. All right. Well, we see what Beara says about that, "they're not
6 there. They took off." I won't repeat it all.
7 Krstic again says:
8 "I will see what I can do."
9 Beara says:
10 "Check it out and have them go to Drago's."
11 In this context, who is Drago and where is Drago's, in your view?
12 A. Drago is Drago Nikolic, the chief of security for the
13 Zvornik Brigade. If Beara is telling them to go to Drago's, they're --
14 what he is basically saying is, Send them to the headquarters of the
15 Zvornik Infantry Brigade, have them report to Drago Nikolic where I
16 happen to be sitting at the moment.
17 Q. Krstic says:
18 "I can't guarantee anything."
19 Beara responds:
20 "Krle, I don't know what to do anymore."
21 Krstic says:
22 "Ljubo, then take those MUP men from up there."
23 What's that a reference to?
24 A. As we've discussed over the last couple of days, there were a
25 number of MUP units who were under military command related to this
1 operation and in this context, General Krstic is throwing out the idea of
2 potentially MUP or police officers being used by Beara for his task.
3 Q. Beara responds:
4 "No, they won't do anything. I talked ..."
5 That's fairly self-explanatory. And then he says there is no
6 other solution but for the 15 to 30 men with Indjic. The thing that was
7 supposed to arrive on the 13th but didn't.
8 Krstic says:
9 "Ljubo, have you to understand me too...," then "you've done
10 fucking all sorts to me.
11 Then Beara says:
12 "I understand, but have you to understand me too, and had ...
13 these men [sic] been done then, we wouldn't be arguing over it now."
14 What do these exchanges mean to you?
15 A. General Krstic is obviously not happy about having to figure out
16 where he's going to find additional people for the task that Beara is
17 undertaking, and Beara is reminding him that, had the people showed up
18 like they were supposed to, we wouldn't be having this conversation
20 Q. So now Krstic says:
21 "Fuck it. Now I'll be the one to blame."
22 Blamed for what, in your view? What is Krstic being worried
23 about being blamed for?
24 A. The fact that given what Colonel Beara is involved in,
25 General Krstic is worried about the fact that he will get blamed because
1 the executions that are supposed to be occurring are taking longer than
2 they're suppose to because individuals who were supposed to be sent
3 haven't been send. Now he is the corps commander. The fact that they
4 weren't sent from the Visegrad Brigade ultimately is his responsibility.
5 Q. And Beara responds:
6 "I don't know what to do. I mean it, Krle. There are still 3500
7 parcels that I have to distribute and I have no solution."
8 What do you take it -- this term "3500 parcels to distribute"
9 means? What are the parcels?
10 A. The parcels in this particular context is the euphemism that they
11 were using for prisoners.
12 Q. And we see this intercept is at 10.00 a.m. on the 15th. Do you
13 remember what prisoners are still alive in the Zvornik Brigade area of
14 responsibility at 10.00 a.m. on the 15th?
15 A. Well, sir, by this time, the prisoners from the Orahovac school
16 and the Petkovci school have already been killed, but there are still
17 prisoners alive in Rocevic and Pilica, as well as the overflow prisoners
18 that are going into the Dom of Kulture.
19 Q. And so in that context, when Beara says this, and this it's
20 this -- "that I have to distribute and I have no solution." What does he
21 mean by, "that I have to distribute and I have no solution"?
22 A. It's, in my opinion, a clear reference to the fact that these
23 prisoners have to die and at the moment he doesn't have the means to
24 undertake executions.
25 Q. Okay. The other version of that intercept which is already in
1 evidence so I won't go there.
2 Let's go to 65 ter 114. We're still in our chronology. And what
3 we have here is a document from a person named Colonel Ignjat Milanovic.
4 I'll remind the Trial Chamber, you have heard General Keserovic
5 talk about this document a bit, but it was a while back.
6 And this is 15 July. It is entitled: "Engagement of Forces in
7 Searching the Terrain in the Direction of Zepa and the
8 1st Zvornik Infantry Brigade."
9 Thank you for getting that handwritten version up for us. I
10 think that they should be in the binder.
11 It's entitled: "Proposal." And the proposal is to authorise and
12 appoint the commander of the 1st Bratunac Brigade to command all the
13 forces searching the terrain.
14 Can you just give us a synopsis briefly of what's going on here
15 and who this Ignjat Milanovic is?
16 A. Colonel Ignjat Milanovic is an officer on the Drina Corps
17 Command. His normal role is that he is the chief of the air and air
18 defence forces for the corps. What this particular document is, is a
19 reflection of a normal and often-exercised practice of the VRS of sending
20 various staff officers to locations in order to gain a clear picture of
21 what's going on and to ensure various orders are being forwarded --
22 sorry, followed and were necessary to make proposals for changes in
23 orders if the circumstances change. In this context, he is replying
24 that, based on the order of the Drina Corps commander, I went to these
25 various locations and acquainted myself with the situation. He is now
1 reporting back to the Drina Corps commander and saying, Here are the
2 things that I of my own authorities have ordered based on what he
3 believes he is authorised to give orders against.
4 And then he makes an additional proposal related to some various
5 command resubordinations, which clearly he doesn't believe he is
6 authorised to undertake, and needs the approval of the Drina Corps
8 So this is a relatively typical role that a staff officer would
9 play in the context of a military operation.
10 Q. And does - one last question - this proposal have anything to do
11 with the column and the Muslims from Srebrenica that you had been talking
12 about, that moved through the area earlier?
13 A. Yes, sir, in the sense that these are the remnants, the back end
14 of the column that had been cut off by the 13th of July and in subsequent
15 days, the 14th and 15th, they're still engaged in operations against
16 them. And what is apparent to Colonel Milanovic under the circumstances
17 is that they're having problems with successfully dealing with the battle
18 because the various military forces that are engaged in it are under
19 independent commands and that he believes that because there's not one
20 overall commander, co-ordinating this situation and directing the
21 activities of the units, that they're not being as successful as they
22 should be in this regard.
23 Q. Does that include MUP units?
24 A. Yes, sir. There, at this point in time, there were still two
25 companies of the Jahorina MUP on the road between Sandici and Konjevic
2 Q. And do you recall their -- their immediate commander?
3 A. Their immediate commander was Ljubisa Borovcanin.
4 Q. And his subordinate commander?
5 A. Well, in this case, it would be Mendelav Djuric and Nedjo
6 Ikonic -- I'm sorry, Dusko Jevic. And then below him would be Mendelav
7 Djuric and Nedjo Ikonic.
8 Q. And what officer was Milanovic proposing take over command of all
9 these units?
10 A. His proposal was that it was the commander of the
11 1st Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade.
12 Q. Who was?
13 A. Colonel Blagojevic.
14 Q. And I would offer that -- that document into evidence.
15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received. But I would like to ask you
16 to repeat one answer. Page 62, lines -- line 16. You have mentioned
17 several names which are not recorded. Could you please repeat them.
18 THE WITNESS: The question was related to the subordinate
19 commanders of Ljubisa Borovcanin, sir?
20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Yes, indeed.
21 THE WITNESS: The next subordinate commander would be Dusko
22 Jevic, and then subordinate to Dusko Jevic were the two actual company
23 commanders, Mendelav Djuric and Nedjo Ikonic. That's I-k-o-n-i-c,
25 MR. McCLOSKEY: I guess we have gone past the break five minutes.
1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Now we have it on the screen. Thank you. It
2 will be received.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 114 shall be
4 assigned exhibit number P2543.
5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much. We must have our next break
6 now, and we will resume 20 minutes past 6.00.
7 --- Recess taken at 5.49 p.m.
8 --- On resuming at 6.23 p.m.
9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: At the outset of today's hearing, you,
10 Mr. McCloskey, indicated a change of status of three documents. The
11 Chamber checked these indications, looked into the details, and I can
12 confirm that P2304 should now be public. Instead of that, P2337 and
13 P2298 should be under seal.
14 Mr. McCloskey, please continue.
15 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
16 Q. Okay. Mr. Butler, let's now go to P2218. We left off with the
17 last document, the proposal by Colonel Milanovic for Colonel Blagojevic
18 to take over command of these units searching this terrain coming out of
19 the enclave area. Now we can see we actually have a document. It's a
20 daily combat report in the name of the commander of the Bratunac Brigade,
21 Blagojevic. From his command to the commander of the Bratunac Brigade,
22 Blagojevic, from his command to the command of the Drina Corps. And
23 while it doesn't say anything specific on that point, we do see in the
24 middle of paragraph 2, we've got the handwritten version, there's also a
25 typed version in the B/C/S, but we see in the middle of paragraph 2 it
2 "During the day the brigade commander visited all units which are
3 blocking the enemy retreat."
4 And it lists all these different units, brigades, the
5 65th Protection Regiment; the Milici Brigade, the 65th Protection
6 Regiment, parts of the MUP, and the 5th Engineering Battalion. And it
7 says he defined their tasks and organised their joint action and
9 What do you make of that, that the brigade commander did this?
10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I would kindly ask you to slow down again.
11 Because some parts of your reading into the record is missing.
12 Mr. Butler.
13 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. In this particular document, it reflects
14 that the proposal made by Colonel Milanovic the day prior has been, to a
15 large degree, accepted by the Drina Corps commander, General Krstic, and
16 subsequently he'd ordered Colonel Blagojevic, the Bratunac Brigade
17 commander, to implement these as far as at least visiting all of the
18 units, defining their tasks, and organising their joint actions and
19 communications. Does not specifically say take command, but clearly
20 Colonel Blagojevic has been given an order to all to synchronise all of
21 the operations of these units.
22 Q. All right. Now, if the next day, the 17th, Colonel Blagojevic
23 was sent off to Zepa at some point, what situation would that create, if
24 these units were -- were still searching the area?
25 A. It would, in effect, be the same situation that was in existence
1 on the 15th, and there would be a requirement for somebody else to take
2 control of synchronising all of these units and integrating their
3 operations against the remnants of the column.
4 Q. All right. Let's go now to P -- it's 126. This is a document we
5 spent some time with, with another witness, but let me ask you a bit
6 about it, Mr. Butler.
7 We see that it's from the Main Staff. 17 July. And we see that
8 it's in the name of Ratko Mladic. And the entitled: "Integrating of
9 Operations to Crush Lagging Muslim Forces." And it's to the Drina Corps
10 command for information and to the Zvornik Brigade, the Bratunac Brigade,
11 the Milici Brigade, and the 67th Communications Regiment.
12 And the first paragraph talks about sending three officers, and
13 it names them, from the Main Staff to assist -- to the Zvornik Brigade,
14 and I'll read it slowly:
15 "To assist in the joining of the VRS and MUP forces, the planning
16 and co-ordination of combat operations to block, crush, and destroy
17 lagging Muslim forces in the wider area of Kamenica and Cerska."
18 Can you tell us, if you recall, who these people were, Colonels
19 Nedjo Trkulja?
20 A. He was the chief of armoured forces for the Main Staff of the
22 Q. Milovan Stankovic.
23 A. He was another intelligence officer with the Main Staff of the
25 Q. Under who?
1 A. In that context, he would be under General Tolimir. Although,
2 more accurately, under Colonel Salapura.
3 Q. And Bogdan Sladojevic?
4 A. He was an officer who had just been reassigned from the federal
5 army, the VJ, to the VRS, and he was on temporary duty at the Main Staff
6 before assuming his job as the chief of operations for the
7 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. He just happened to be there at the time.
8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
10 Please, Mr. President, could you instruct Mr. McCloskey to give
11 us the reference where it shows that that officer was subordinated to me.
12 If they were deployed pursuant to an order issued by somebody else, where
13 does it say that he was subordinated to Tolimir?
14 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, that was the answer of the witness
15 and not any suggestion of Mr. McCloskey to the witness. Mr. McCloskey
16 just asked who was that person.
17 Please carry on Mr. McCloskey.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But the context was this: Who
19 would that person have been subordinated to? That's what Mr. McCloskey
21 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Yes --
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise to you, but ...
23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, you may deal with that during your
24 cross-examination. It is absolutely correct and there's no criticism if
25 Mr. McCloskey asks who a certain person is subordinated to. That's all.
1 And that is an absolutely correct question.
2 Please carry on, Mr. McCloskey.
3 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
4 Q. Mr. Butler, do you recall upon which document or authority or --
5 you base your opinion regarding the placement of Milovan Stankovic?
6 A. It's been a while. I'd have to research that myself. But to be
7 clear, I'm not implying that in this order that Milovan Stankovic was
8 sent to the Zvornik Brigade on the order of General Tolimir. I'm just
9 noting that Milovan Stankovic is an intelligence officer with the VRS.
10 Q. All right. And this says, number 2:
11 "The team from the VRS ... shall assess the situation on the
12 brigade's front line and in the rear, the available forces, and hear out
13 the proposal and opinion of the commander of the Zvornik Brigade. On
14 this basis, they are to draw up a plan together with the brigade
15 commander to comb the terrain, block, crush, and destroy the straggling
16 parts of the [sic] armed Muslim groups in the wider areas of Kamenica,
17 Cerska, and Udrc."
18 Now, we have jumped a little bit ahead of our chronology because
19 of the second part of this document and the previous documents we've been
20 related to. But can you put these two paragraphs into context? What --
21 what had gone on in the Zvornik Brigade area, in terms of the military
22 situation, and what, in your view, based on your review of the materials,
23 do 1 and 2 have to do with?
24 A. As I previously discussed, the military situation in the
25 Zvornik Brigade, on 16 July 1995, and the combat that was occurring with
1 the column, Colonel Pandurevic made an agreement with the commander of
2 the 28th Infantry -- or not the commander, I'm sorry, with
3 Semso Muminovic to allow the column to pass through the lines and into
4 Bosnian Muslim-held territory. As noted, that was not an act that was
5 authorised by either the Drina Corps Command or the Main Staff, and as
6 word spread that Colonel Pandurevic had made this agreement, there are
7 various documents, intercepts, which reflect that a lot of people were
8 very disturbed by hearing this.
9 The following day, this -- these two paragraphs reflect
10 General Mladic wanting to send and, in fact, he did send these three
11 officers to talk to Pandurevic, and they also spoke to Obrenovic, in
12 order to make an independent evaluation of the situation and later
13 potentially make a recommendation back to General Mladic what, if any,
14 actions might be taken against Colonel Pandurevic for his decision.
15 Q. Are you aware of any negative recommendation or action that was
16 taken against Pandurevic for his decision to open up the corridor?
17 A. No, sir. And, in fact, when I discussed earlier the
18 18 July interim combat report, I had noted that there was a bit of a back
19 story to why Colonel Pandurevic felt a need to lay out a detailed
20 accounting of not only his actions with respect to the most recent combat
21 but the previous burdens that the Zvornik Brigade had been asked to
22 shoulder. That interim report to General Krstic was motivated, to a
23 large degree, by the visits of these three officers, and
24 Colonel Pandurevic's feeling that he needed to really lay out his case
25 and wanted to make it directly to General Krstic.
1 In any event, for whatever reason, General Mladic did not
2 sanction or relieve Colonel Pandurevic for his decision.
3 Q. All right. Now let's take a look at paragraph 3 that speaks:
4 "As of 17 July," and then it lists these forces, the Bratunac Brigade,
5 and I won't list all of them. But are those the same forces that were
6 spoken about by Ignjat Milanovic and in Blagojevic's daily combat report
7 that we've just seen on this same topic?
8 A. Yes, sir.
9 Q. And it talks about discovering and destroying the lagging Muslim
10 groups in this area. And it says:
11 "I hereby appoint Lieutenant-Colonel Keserovic, the officer of
12 the military police of the [sic] Main Staff security administration, as
13 the commander of all the aforementioned forces."
14 And then it gives it various other tasks related to that.
15 And if, in fact, Colonel Blagojevic left the area on the 17th of
16 July, would this order fill in that gap that you spoke of previously?
17 A. Yes, sir.
18 Q. Now let's go to 65 ter 249. This is a document from the command
19 of the Bratunac Brigade on 17 July to the Drina Corps Command. It is in
20 the name of Colonel Blagojevic, and it says:
21 "Among the Muslim prisoners, there are four underage children
22 (aged between 8 and 14) who are being held in a military custody in
23 Bratunac. One of them told the commander of the unit that was searching
24 the area about a large number of Muslim troops committing suicide or
25 killing each other. We propose that this testimony be recorded by
1 cameras of your press centre."
2 Now, this reference to "units searching the area," do you connect
3 this "units searching the area" reference with any -- any of the
4 information set out in the previous document where Keserovic is put in
5 command of the forces regarding the lagging Muslims from Srebrenica?
6 A. Yes, sir. The Bratunac Brigade forces, who were engaged in these
7 activities, would have been under his direction.
8 Q. And can you describe what you recall, if anything, about what --
9 what the forces did that day, on the 17th, that resulted in these
10 prisoners? Just roughly. If you recall.
11 A. I understand from the investigation that a composite unit of the
12 Bratunac Infantry Brigade and the MUP forces of the Jahorina MUP
13 companies, on the 16th and 17th, were conducting sweep operations. And I
14 believe that individuals who participated in this talk about, somewhere,
15 of approximately 180 Bosnian Muslim men from that particular sweep
16 operation being captured. Among them were these four underage, or four
20 A. Yes, sir.
21 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. I would offer this document into
23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Yes. It will be received as an exhibit.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, 65 ter document 249 shall be
25 assigned Exhibit P2544. Thank you.
1 MR. McCLOSKEY:
2 Q. Okay. Getting back to our chronology, which is really on the
3 15th of July. We could go to P13, if we could.
4 And this is the interim combat report from Vinko Pandurevic from
5 the Zvornik Brigade to the Drina Corps Command. It's got a sent/received
6 stamp of 1925 hours.
7 Can you -- before we get into this document, can you set the
8 scene for us? The early evening hours of 15 July. Where was Pandurevic
9 that day, and what is he doing, as far as you know, from the
10 investigation in this early -- at this time that this document was
11 drafted and sent to the Drina Corps.
12 A. Yes, sir. As I've testified earlier, during the early morning
13 hours of the 15th of July, Colonel Pandurevic and the two tactical groups
14 that made up the formations of the Zvornik Infantry Brigade were directed
15 to go from the Zepa battle-front and return to Zvornik, in order to deal
16 with the unfolding military issue they were having. He arrived
17 approximately 11.30, and by 12.00 was meeting with individuals at the
18 Zvornik Brigade and other units that were involved - Major Obrenovic,
19 Mr. Borovcanin, Dragomir Vasic - and discussed how they came together,
20 and that Colonel Pandurevic had laid out a plan by which he wanted to
21 block the column.
22 This document is his interim combat report reflecting, in part,
23 what the situation was in the Zvornik Brigade, what orders he had given,
24 and at the time that he's drafting this, he is at his forward command
25 post where he is co-ordinating the larger defence operations against the
2 Q. And these first three paragraphs that describe the situation, did
3 you find them to be roughly accurate when comparing various other reports
4 and information?
5 A. Yes, sir. I believe this is a -- an accurate recounting of the
6 information that everyone was aware of at the time on 15 July with
7 respect to the battle-field situation.
8 Q. So he -- in that third paragraph, talks about the attack on
9 Memici is still in progress, that all targets deep inside the territory
10 and the suburbs and town of Zvornik have been under artillery fire. Who
11 can hit them with artillery fire at that point?
12 A. That would be artillery fired from the positions of the ABiH
13 2 Corps on the other side of the confrontation line.
14 Q. "All attacks have been repulsed successfully so far. So far,
15 according to information received we have four dead and a dozen or so
17 "With all available forces, we have sealed off the wider area of
18 Crni Vrh and Planinci, and partially the area of Kamenica.
19 "All brigade forces are fully engaged and we have no reserves."
20 Now this next small paragraph I want to ask you about. It says:
21 "An additional burden for us is the large number of prisoners
22 distributed throughout schools in the brigade area, as well as
23 obligations of security and restoration of terrain."
24 MR. McCLOSKEY: And for Your Honours, it says:
25 "... as well as obligations of security and 'asanacija terena,'"
1 which is a term you've heard before which got translated as "restoration
2 of the terrain."
3 Now, this large number of prisoners distributed throughout the
4 schools in the brigade area, by 7.00 p.m., the evening of 15 July, are
5 there any prisoners alive at Orahovac?
6 A. No, sir. Save the four survivors.
7 Q. And Petkovci school?
8 A. No, sir, they are all dead except for the survivors there.
9 Q. And the Rocevic school?
10 A. They were being killed during the day on the 15th. I don't know
11 that we have any survivor accounts which reflect how late that was going
12 on, but by 7.00 p.m. most of them should have been dead already.
13 Q. And the Kula school in Pilica and the cultural centre in Pilica
14 on the evening of 15 July, can you remind us what their status was based
15 on the investigation?
16 A. Yes, sir. The group -- the groups at Pilica and at the Dom of
17 culture were still alive and being detained.
18 Q. So what do you believe that Pandurevic is referring to when he
20 "An additional burden for us is a large number of prisoners
21 distributed throughout the schools in the brigade area, as well as
22 obligations of security and 'asanacija terena'"?
23 A. My opinion is that Colonel Pandurevic understood within the
24 context of what was happening that the requirements to, first, guard the
25 prisoners, deal with their executions, and then to burry the bodies, as
1 well as continuing to guard the prisoners at Pilica and the Dom of
2 culture was having an adverse impact on his ability to deal with the
3 combat situation which was occurring at the same time. The key phrase is
4 that all brigade forces are fully engaged and we have -- he has no
5 reserves. These forces that could have been available had they not been
6 involved in these activity would have potentially given
7 Colonel Pandurevic at least a minimal reserve force, but it was otherwise
8 engaged on what were, you know, the tasks relating to prisoners.
9 Q. And when you say "obligations of security," how is it that you
10 say that this is guarding the prisoners?
11 A. To my knowledge, the actual identities of who was responsible for
12 the executions is still a little unclear. I am aware that members of the
13 4th Infantry Battalion in Orahovac were involved in the executions at
14 that site. I do not know whether or not 6th Battalion members were
15 involved in the executions at Petkovci; although, they were clearly
16 involved in guarding the prisoners at the school.
17 Most of the investigative work related to Rocevic occurred after
18 departed from the ICTY and the Office of the Prosecutor, so I don't know
19 that I'm fully clear on all of the elements that were involved in the
20 executions at Rocevic, although I am aware that some members of
21 potentially the 5th or 2nd Battalion were involved. And while the
22 killings that were done at Branjevo were done by a combination of the
23 10th Sabotage Detachment and later on a group of men who had come up from
25 And then later the final killings at the Dom of cultural which
1 I'm not sure at this date who ultimately was responsible for executing
2 those. But again, with respect to the 1st Battalion, they were engaged
3 in the process of guarding them as well as the process of having to
4 remove the bodies, particularly from the Dom of culture since it was in
5 the middle of the town at Pilica, and bring them to where they would be
6 buried at Branjevo.
7 So again in that particular context it's all a reflection of the
8 numbers of soldiers and units that had some involvement in the whole
9 wider aspect of the crime or multiple crimes in this case. At the same
10 time, there's also a pitched battle going on in other locations of the
11 Zvornik Infantry Brigade.
12 Q. And, Mr. President, it's -- there's a translation issue here.
13 And it's the position of the Prosecution that the term "obligations of
14 security" has to do with securing or guarding the prisoners, that the
15 term related to security branch is a different term, and so it would not
16 be appropriate to view this as obligations of the security branch. I
17 believe Mr. Gajic and General Tolimir will agree with us on that. It's
18 been the subject of agreement for many years. But, of course, I'll wait
19 to hear from them on that.
20 There's a bit more time to discuss this document, Mr. President.
21 We can talk about it tomorrow or finish it tonight, whatever is -- you
23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I think we have to adjourn for today. You may
24 continue tomorrow.
25 We are sitting in the afternoon. Therefore, we resume at 2.15 in
1 the afternoon in this courtroom, number III.
2 We adjourn.
3 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.00 p.m.,
4 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 19th day of July,
5 2011, at 2.15 p.m.