110721IT

Page 16948

1 [The witness takes the stand]

2 WITNESS: RICHARD BUTLER [Resumed]

3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Good morning, Mr. Butler. Welcome back again.

4 THE WITNESS: Good morning, sir.

5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Perhaps there's no need for it, but I have to

6 remind you again that the affirmation to tell the truth still applies

7 also for today.

8 Mr. Tolimir, you may continue your cross-examination. You have

9 the floor.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours.

11 May there be peace in this house, and may God's will be done in

12 these proceedings. And I would like to wish a pleasant stay to

13 Mr. Butler here in this courtroom with all of us participants in the

14 proceedings.

15 Cross-examination by Mr. Tolimir: [Continued]

16 Now, could we see P2369 in e-court, please. That's a document of

17 the Bosnia-Herzegovina Republic, the Main Staff of the Supreme Command of

18 the BH Army, and it was drafted on the 9th of November, 1995. And it is

19 entitled "The Basic Guide-Lines for the Mission," and it was submitted to

20 the --

21 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not hear to whom it was

22 submitted.

23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Two matters.

24 Mr. Tolimir, the number of this document in the transcript can't

25 be the right one, and please repeat the end of your introduction:

Page 16949

1 "It is submitted to the ..."

2 And then it stops.

3 Mr. Gajic.

4 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, this is P2369. That is

5 the exhibit that we wanted to pull up.

6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.

7 Mr. Tolimir, you said:

8 "And it is submitted to the ..."

9 And then the transcript stops. Please continue.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I said the basic

11 concept for the mission, and it is sent to the Command of the Operative

12 Group in Srebrenica. And that's where I stopped - thank you - if that's

13 what was missing.

14 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Mr. Butler, we gave you, at your request, this document so that

16 you can study it. Now, can you tell us whether you've been able to read

17 through it, and could you tell the Trial Chamber what this is about?

18 Thank you.

19 A. Yes, sir, and good morning.

20 I have reviewed this document. It is a detailed plan and

21 proposal which discusses a, rather, series of complex and synchronised

22 military attacks by forces of Operation Group 8, the ABiH 2 Corps, and a

23 number of other formations that they were planning to undertake at some

24 future point in Eastern Bosnia. It involved -- as military operations

25 goes, this one had a lot of moving parts, so it did require a good deal

Page 16950

1 of co-ordination between the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of the

2 BH, ABiH 2 Corps, and OG-8 in order to have a chance of succeeding under

3 the circumstances. So this particular document reflects, to a large

4 degree, part of the detailed planning that those three organisations were

5 undertaking in order to realise this operation.

6 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Could you tell us now, please, whether we

7 can see from this plan that the Main Staff -- or, rather, the Staff of

8 the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina was in

9 direct contact with the Srebrenica Operation Group and that it

10 co-ordinated and planned its activities around Srebrenica together with

11 that operations group?

12 A. With respect to this document - and just to make one minor

13 correction: the document is dated 9 November 1994, the transcript said

14 "1995" - it does reflect that at least in this particular case the

15 Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of the BiH were communicating not

16 only to 2 Corps, but also directly to Operations Group 8.

17 Q. Could you tell the Trial Chamber whether Operations Group 8 is,

18 in fact, the 28th Division from Srebrenica? This is necessary from the

19 transcript because this is the first time that we've used this term.

20 A. That is correct, sir. And at some point in early 1995 the

21 organisation known as Operations or Operative Group 8 is redesignated as

22 the 28th Infantry Division.

23 Q. Thank you. Mr. Butler, is this the basic plan for active combat

24 operations of the 28th Division from the demilitarised zone in

25 Srebrenica, the 2nd Corps from Tuzla, and other forces of the 2nd force,

Page 16951

1 including forces from Zepa?

2 A. It is a document that is still a conceptual plan. It is not

3 actually, with respect to the initiation of those combat operations, an

4 implementation order.

5 Q. Thank you. Please take a look at paragraph item 1 of this

6 document, where it says:

7 "The plan is -- the concept is: Liberate through active combat

8 part of the temporarily seized territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the

9 municipalities of Bratunac, Vlasenica, Sekovici, Zvornik, Kalesija, and

10 link them up with the free territories of Zepa and Srebrenica," or,

11 rather, "link the free territories of Zepa and Srebrenica with the free

12 territories of Zvornik, Kalesija, and Sekovici in order to create a

13 permanent free corridor for the supply of the population and logistic

14 support to the units of the BH Army and the basis for further liberation

15 of North-Eastern Bosnia as a whole."

16 So is this the basic concept for future combat actions? Thank

17 you.

18 A. Yes, sir, it was.

19 Q. Thank you. Now, please take a look at the following paragraph,

20 below the one that I've just quoted. It says:

21 "The borders of the corridor," "Corridor Borders." Now we see it

22 in the English version as well. And it says:

23 "The village of Podzeplje (the free territory of Zepa), the

24 village of Barice, Sokolica, from Gorijela [phoen] (trig point 431), the

25 village Brezova Glava, Koprivno, Rogac, Mratinjsko Brdo, Previla,

Page 16952

1 Nova Kasaba, Pobujica [phoen]" --

2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Please slow down.

3 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

4 Q. And so on and so forth. Are all these places of the corridor in

5 the territory that you studied in the Srebrenica and Zepa sectors, and

6 are the axes -- or, rather, the directions that lead to the 2nd Corps, is

7 this the indication of that? Thank you.

8 A. Not having the ability to plot these particular locations on a

9 map, it's kind of abstract. But I do recognise, obviously, a number of

10 villages as being in the territory of the Republika Srpska at that time.

11 Q. Thank you. Now, let's take a look at the right border of the

12 future corridor, or intended corridor. It says:

13 "Brestovik (trig point 1291)," and then another bracket" (Zepa

14 territory), Stublic stream, Krcevine (trig point 806), Pale village,

15 Bijelo Polje village, Bucje, Slapovic, Sarici village, further following

16 the border of the free territory of Srebrenica up to Borici village,

17 Zagoni village, Magasici village, Vladusici village, Tusto Brdo

18 (trig point 664), Ocenovici village, Panjevici village (trig point 665)

19 Drenjak (trig point 771), Graina (trig point 693), Kuslat village,

20 Kostjerovo village, Drinjaca village, the left bank of the Drina up to

21 the fortress ..."

22 Now, having the starting point in Zepa, which is Brestovik,

23 trig point 1291, and knowing the left border of the Drina all the way to

24 the forest, can you now orientate yourself to figure out what the border

25 of the corridor is?

Page 16953

1 And he goes on to then mention:

2 "... Kula, the town of Zvornik, Marcici village,

3 Markovaca (trig point 372), Kolovnik village, Percini, Jardan village,

4 Sapna River upstream to Vrela Strana village (these features are to be

5 connected by a line)."

6 Do you now have a picture of where the corridor is, in view of

7 the fact that it ends at Sapna River and begins at Zepa?

8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.

9 MR. McCLOSKEY: Just one clarification.

10 I believe the document says "Kula Grad," and I don't know if the

11 translation didn't get that, but I just -- Kula Grad and Kula are two

12 very distinct and different places that are important in this case, so I

13 just want to make sure that that is clear. As I see this, it says

14 "Kula Grad Zvornik," and I think the general just said "Kula," but ...

15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, would you agree that we see in the

16 document "Kula Grad Zvornik"? In line 22 of page 7 you are recorded as

17 having said "Kula."

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. Thank you,

19 Mr. McCloskey. It is Kula Grad in Zvornik, and that is why I read out

20 that name, so that the witness could recognise it; the location, I mean.

21 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Now, do you we see now that this area stretches all the way from

23 Zepa to Sapna River, which is in the territory of the BH Federation, and

24 is it, as noted here, the right border that should be drawn up?

25 A. Yes, sir. The document reflects that this is the right-hand

Page 16954

1 border of the proposed corridor or main axis of the attack. And as, you

2 know, both I note and, I presume at this juncture, the Court notes, many

3 of these villages that are mentioned are in the Bratunac and Zvornik

4 municipalities. So this territory is in what is at the time and still is

5 part of the Republika Srpska.

6 Q. Thank you. Now that we've seen the left and the right border of

7 the corridor that is supposed to run from Srebrenica and Zepa towards the

8 area of the Tuzla Corps, can we now -- let's now take a look at item 2,

9 where it says the manner of executing of this task:

10 "Liberate the temporarily seized sector of the corridor,

11 inserting large forces into the depth of the corridor sector, and

12 engaging in offensive operations from the free territories of OG-4, OG-6

13 of the 2nd Corps, and OG-8 Srebrenica."

14 Liberate the temporarily seized corridor along the lines as given

15 in item 1:

16 "Engage the already-prepared logistics support immediately

17 through the 2nd Corps."

18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, these are -- you are reading many

19 technical and geographical terms. This is quite difficult for the

20 interpreters to get everything, and especially for the court reporter.

21 If you want to have it on the record, you should slow down while reading,

22 especially if you are dealing with so many technical and geographical

23 terms.

24 Now your question, please.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. I will do

Page 16955

1 my best to slow down.

2 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Mr. Butler, we discussed many different technical terms here, so

4 now I would like to ask you what OG-4 and OG-6 of the 2nd Corps are and

5 what the OG-8 of Srebrenica is that are supposed to liberate the

6 indicated territory. Thank you.

7 A. I am not familiar exactly which particular units OG-4 and OG-6

8 are. I assume that just like OG-8 becomes the 28th Division of the

9 ABiH 2nd Corps, that OG-4 and OG-6 ultimately become the 24th and

10 26th Division of the 2nd Corps. Again, we've discussed

11 Operations Group 8, which later becomes the 28th Infantry Division.

12 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler, for clarifying this.

13 Now, please take a look at item 3. It says "Engagement of

14 forces," and then 3.1, "OG-8 Srebrenica forces." And then it mentions

15 the 284th Eastern Bosnia Light Infantry Brigade which will be used in

16 order to insert itself into the depth of the corridor, and combat groups

17 of battalion strength.

18 Can you explain to the Trial Chamber what these operations group

19 of Srebrenica forces are, and what is the area of -- what was the role

20 and place of the 284th Eastern Bosnia Light Infantry Brigade in the

21 28th Division of the Srebrenica area? Thank you.

22 A. In this particular context, it was envisioned that the

23 284th Light Infantry Brigade would be the primary offensive force for

24 OG-8 in conducting this activity. As one reads down through the various

25 subcomponents of paragraph 3.1 - this goes to A, B, C, and on the

Page 16956

1 subsequent pages - it lists out in specific detail where various

2 subcomponents of the brigade are expected to attack, what their

3 objectives would be, and what axis they will travel to get to those

4 particular objectives.

5 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. To avoid looking at each group and

6 subgroup, can you just -- you've mentioned them. We can just mention

7 that it says, under 8, "Combat group 1," as part of the

8 284th Eastern Bosnia Light Infantry Brigade, and then it goes on to say

9 the "first subgroup," "second subgroup," "third subgroup." Could you

10 explain to the Trial Chamber what these subgroups of the first combat

11 group are? And they are discussed in paragraph 3.1(A).

12 A. In this particular document, what it talks about in combat

13 groups, it identifies a combat group as an element that is the equivalent

14 of battalion strength. So when one starts talking about subgroups, you

15 are talking about elements below battalion. So, you know, in your first

16 subgrouping you would be talking about company organisations. If you

17 were to further divide that, you would be talking platoon-level

18 organisations.

19 It says -- I should say "platoon." It says "balloon" on the

20 transcript. There you go. Thank you.

21 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler, for the correction.

22 Please, let us look under "A, Combat Group 1," where it says:

23 "Elements of the 284th East Bosnia Light Brigade, the former

24 6th Detachment, Kamenica, upon the decision of the commander, go to

25 Snagovo and connect these points by a line in an irregular circle.

Page 16957

1 Divide this group into four subgroups. Send them along the axis, and

2 take control of the features as follows:"

3 And then he mentions what facilities will be taken by what

4 groups.

5 Please tell us, does this mean that the 284th Brigade is hereby

6 divided into several combat groups and that only the first combat group

7 is composed of its 4th Detachment? And is the 4th Detachment supposed to

8 advance to Snagovo and Djafin Kamen? Those lines are known to the

9 Trial Chamber from some previous testimonies.

10 A. First, what I would note is that it's not the only combat group.

11 If one looks through this order, there are a total of four combat groups

12 that are identified and tasks provided to them. But in this particular

13 context, I mean, these are the orders for the first combat group, and it

14 is envisioned under this plan that this particular combat group at some

15 point would depart from the former enclave, would make their way to these

16 various locations, and would occupy them.

17 Q. Thank you. Please, since we have just looked at the first combat

18 group, could you please look at B and tell us whether the second combat

19 group and the third combat group and the fourth combat group are also

20 from the 284th Brigade, and does this mean that the entire brigade was

21 supposed to infiltrate and advance to the borders of the corridor which

22 is specified in the basic concept or the basic plan?

23 A. Yes, sir. It does appear from this particular document that most

24 of the combat forces are coming from the 284th Brigade, and one of the

25 key items is, and as noted by General Tolimir, was that it's not

Page 16958

1 envisioned that this is going to be an assault. What this envisions is a

2 plan to, unit by unit, infiltrate these particular groups and subgroups

3 out of the enclave and that they were going to occupy these various

4 terrain features and locations, but they were going to seek to do so in a

5 manner that would not alert the VRS that they were undertaking this

6 operation.

7 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. After the infiltration of the brigade

8 within the corridor and within the boundaries that we mention, in

9 paragraph 3.2 on page 8 it says:

10 "The other forces of the OG Srebrenica ..."

11 We can see it now on the screen. It says here:

12 "The strength and units participating will be decided by the OG-8

13 commander. Organise and carry out the following tasks:"

14 And now we can see six tasks. For example, let us read out the

15 second task and even the first task:

16 "Organise stronger forces according to your decision, from the

17 free area of the villages of Bljeceva village ... organise an attack

18 along the Bljeceva village, Blazijevici village (trig point 532),

19 Radukici village, Magasici village axis, and destroy the Chetniks in the

20 sector of the Magasici village and along the axis of the attack.

21 Organise co-ordination with the inserted forces."

22 My question is this: After the insertion of the

23 284th Light Brigade and after they took the facilities that we mentioned,

24 was it envisioned that the OG-8 Srebrenica carried out attacks and link

25 up with the inserted forces? Thank you.

Page 16959

1 A. Yes, sir. In this context, once the infiltrated forces were in

2 position, it was envisioned that the remaining units of OG-8 would then

3 attack the VRS positions outside of the enclave, working their way to

4 link up with these units. And I would also note that, presumably as part

5 of this exact same operation and at the same time, you would have the

6 forces of OG-4 and OG-6 conducting offensive operations. Again, a rather

7 complex operation with an enormous amount of moving parts. But I suspect

8 that if the ABiH were able to pull this off, it would have made for a

9 very interesting few days for the Drina Corps trying to figure out just

10 what was going on.

11 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Since you have just mentioned OGs 4 and 6

12 and since you said that they were also supposed to carry out attacks, can

13 you tell us whether those OGs were in the territory under the control of

14 the BH Army and whether they were supposed to carry out attacks from the

15 front-line and launch an attack against the Serb forces that were

16 defending themselves from the BiH Army? Thank you.

17 A. Yes, sir. That, in fact, would be the case.

18 Q. Thank you. We're not going to read out all the six tasks. We're

19 just going to read the second task because of the names of the places

20 that the Trial Chamber is already familiar with and because of the

21 activities that ensued.

22 Paragraph 2 reads:

23 "Organise stronger forces (according to your decision) from the

24 free area of the villages of the Jaglici, Susnjari, and

25 Kojsina (trig point 516) to carry out an attack along the

Page 16960

1 Jaglici village-Lupoglav (trig point 676 [as interpreted])-

2 Ravna Gora-Djermani village general axis, and proceed with an attack

3 along the following three axes:"

4 And I will stop quoting from the document at this point. I will

5 just say that under bullet point 2 on one of those axes there is also a

6 reference to Kravica village.

7 My question is this: Was the 28th Division starting to break

8 through from this position, from Jaglici village and Susnjari village,

9 and was it advancing in the direction of Lupoglav while it was trying to

10 break through from the enclave? Did you encounter this in your

11 documents? Thank you.

12 A. Yes, sir. In fact, these are well-defined routes by which

13 supplies did go in and out of the enclave, and, logically, they were the

14 paths that the 28th Division, or the column, as it were, in July 1995

15 took as it was leaving the Srebrenica -- the then fallen enclave and

16 attempting to make their way into ABiH territory.

17 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler, for your explanation. Please, under 3.2,

18 there are 10 tasks covering 10 axes and 10 parts of the 28th Division. I

19 don't have enough time to read all that. Let's just look at 3.3,

20 referring to the Zepa forces, unless you have something else to add about

21 Srebrenica. I will gladly give you the floor to do that.

22 A. No, sir. I mean, the -- the tasks here in this document are

23 relatively straightforward with respect to 1 through 10, so I don't have

24 anything to add at this juncture, sir.

25 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. And now we will just outline some of the

Page 16961

1 things from bullet point 3.3, entitled "Zepa forces." We can now see it

2 in English, 3.3, "Zepa forces," where it says in the first sentence:

3 "The strength and the unit to participate are decided by the

4 commander of the 1st Zepa Brigade. Organise and carry out the following

5 tasks:"

6 Does it show from this that Zepa was also involved in the

7 operation as part of the forces of the 28th Division, or the OG, as they

8 call it in here? OG-8 Srebrenica, to be more precise.

9 A. Yes, sir. This document does lay out a role for the Zepa Brigade

10 to participate and co-ordinate their combat operations with OG-8.

11 Q. Thank you. And now we are going to read from paragraph 2 of

12 Chapter 3.3.

13 Can it be shown, because I would like to read a very typical and

14 recognisable paragraph 2, where it says, and I read:

15 "Engage a certain strength (as decided by the 1st Zepa Brigade

16 commander) from the free area, from the Radava sector, along the

17 Radava-Oglavci-Jazavicija Rupa-Karaula-Podravno village-Rupovo Brdo

18 village axis, attack the Chetniks, disperse them on the axis of attack

19 (if there are any), and co-ordinate with OG-8 Srebrenica forces in order

20 to destroy the Chetniks in the sector of Rupovo Brdo village. Agree this

21 co-ordinated action personally."

22 My question is this: Do you perhaps know that forces from

23 Srebrenica and Zepa on the 26th of June, before those forces were finally

24 engaged, forayed along this axis and into the sectors which are outlined

25 in here? Are you familiar with that?

Page 16962

1 A. Yes, sir. In fact, I believe that one of the documents that I

2 talked about during questioning by the Prosecutor was a document from the

3 Zepa Brigade which may very well have, in fact, discussed this particular

4 operation and the results of that operation.

5 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I kindly ask the e-court to show

7 D62. Let's see if we are talking about the same document. And let us

8 see if the activities evolved in keeping with the plan of Bosnia and

9 Herzegovina. I would kindly ask the e-court to display D62. Thank you.

10 I would like to thank the e-court.

11 We can see the document issued by the Republic of Bosnia and

12 Herzegovina, the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It has "Strictly

13 Confidential," there's a number. The document was issued in Zepa on the

14 28th of June, 1995. The operative time was 1315 hours. This was sent to

15 the 2nd Corps Command, to the 28th Division Command in Srebrenica, as you

16 can see.

17 And now could we please look at the signature -- or, rather,

18 whose name is indicated on the document. Can we show that for the

19 benefit of the witness. Thank you.

20 You can see that here at the end it says "Commander,

21 Colonel Avdo Palic."

22 Can we go back to the first page. Thank you.

23 I would like to read just one part of the combat report which was

24 sent to the 2nd Corps Command and the 28th Division Command in

25 Srebrenica. I'm quoting from the first paragraph, where it says:

Page 16963

1 "Based on the order of the deputy commander of the 28th Division,

2 Srebrenica, Major Ramiz Becirovic, Strictly Confidential number," so and

3 so, "dated 20 June, 1995, on measures to be taken for the execution of

4 sabotage actions aimed at inflicting losses upon the aggressor in terms

5 of troops and equipment, and, in general, at turning Chetnik forces away

6 from Sarajevo."

7 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

8 Q. My question: Did the commander of the Zepa Brigade write that he

9 carried out the insertion of his groups in keeping with the orders

10 received from the 28th Division in the demilitarised zone of Srebrenica?

11 Thank you.

12 A. Yes, sir. The brigade command at Zepa did author this combat

13 report to, one, reflect what he did once he received the orders, as well

14 as discuss issues relating to their results.

15 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. And now can we look at the second

16 paragraph:

17 "Upon receipt of the orders given me by brigade commanders

18 Major Zulfo Tursunovic and Major Ibrahim Mandzic, and by the assistant

19 for intelligence in the division, Captain Ekrem Salihovic, I reviewed the

20 overall situation with respect to this kind of combat action, and based

21 on earlier instructions issued to the Chief of Staff,

22 Major Ramo Cardakovic, by the Chief of General Staff,

23 Brigadier General Enver Hadzihasanovic, I decided, together with

24 Tursunovic and Mandzic, to proceed as follows:"

25 My question, based on the second paragraph, is this: Do you know

Page 16964

1 who Zulfo Tursunovic and Ibrahim Mandzic are? Does the name of

2 Ekrem Salihovic ring a bell? What I'm asking you is whether you have

3 ever come across their names in any of the documents you reviewed.

4 A. The names sound familiar. And where I would have come across

5 these names, for the most part, would have been either in

6 28th Infantry Division documents that I reviewed or in VRS documents

7 where they are identifying individuals whom are in positions of authority

8 within the 28th Infantry Division.

9 Q. Thank you. Does it transpire from the second paragraph of the

10 combat report sent by Avdo Palic that the members of the 28th Division

11 from Srebrenica, Zulfo Tursunovic, Ibrahim Mandzic, and Ekrem Salihovic,

12 acted in concert with Ibrahim Mandzic; in other words, did they follow

13 Mandzic's orders? Thank you.

14 JUDGE FLUEGGE: There should, I take it, be a mistake.

15 Ibrahim Mandzic can't follow orders of Ibrahim Mandzic. Perhaps you

16 misspoke or it is an interpretation issue.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I will

18 repeat my question.

19 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Major Zulfo Tursunovic -- Mr. Butler, Major Zulfo Tursunovic,

21 Ibrahim Mandzic, and Captain Ekrem Salihovic acted in concert with

22 Avdo Palic, and did they work out the plan of attack which is mentioned

23 in here in paragraph 3? It says that they had set up nine different

24 groups and sent them out to carry out different tasks. Thank you.

25 A. Yes, sir. I mean, I agree with your assertion, in the second

Page 16965

1 paragraph, that Palic is working in concert with the other brigade

2 commanders. I take the phrase "upon receipt of the orders given to me by

3 brigade commanders" not to mean that Palic is somehow subordinate to

4 them, but I take it more on a linguistic -- he has got a copy of the

5 orders that they have given their particular units, and in reviewing them

6 with the chief of intelligence, he is now putting together his own plan

7 so they can, in fact, come up with a co-ordinated operation.

8 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. But were you able to observe that in this

9 first paragraph of the document it says:

10 "Based on the order of the deputy commander of the

11 28th Division ..."

12 So does that mean that the 28th Division is a superior command to

13 the Zepa Brigade, where they sent these officers in order for the tasks

14 to be carried out? Thank you.

15 A. Yes, sir. Clearly, in this context, and again to be clear, I'm

16 not saying that Major Becirovic does not exercise control or command over

17 the Brigade Commander Palic, but I just want to be clear that, you know,

18 certainly he takes his orders from the 28th Infantry Division. But in

19 the context of the second paragraph, it reads that he was provided the

20 orders of the brigade commanders of the other two units in order for him

21 to co-ordinate his activities with those units and ensure that they were

22 operating in co-operation with each other.

23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Gajic.

24 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, perhaps because of the

25 differences between the Serbian and English language there has been a

Page 16966

1 misunderstanding, and I would appreciate it if the interpreters did not

2 just read the text out from the screen, but, rather, to interpret what I

3 say. In other words, "after I received the order which was handed in to

4 me," in other words, this means that it was given by one person to

5 another person, from hand to hand.

6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.

7 Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

9 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Mr. Butler, thank you for your previous answer.

11 Now, I don't want to read out the rest, but you probably noticed

12 that in the third paragraph of this document that begins with the word:

13 "Form a number of sabotage groups ..." and then it lists out nine groups

14 below, and under number 1, as you can see, it says "Han Kram," among

15 other things in brackets, and then so on and so forth. Now, the

16 bracketed place names were actually features. Can we see that in

17 paragraph 6, it says that "Crna Rijeka" group, and then "(monument),"

18 does this show that these sabotage operations were carried out against

19 certain features of the VRS Army outside of the territory of

20 demilitarised zone of Zepa and Srebrenica? Thank you.

21 JUDGE FLUEGGE: You were referring to paragraph 6, but I see this

22 term in the line starting with the words "Group 5."

23 Mr. Butler.

24 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

25 And to answer the general's question: I recognise that a number

Page 16967

1 of these particular features, and again just off the top of my head, fall

2 outside the established boundaries of the enclaves. So in this context,

3 these sabotage groups are leaving the enclaves to conduct raids that

4 would be deep within the territory of the VRS.

5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I think we should stay with the previous page in

6 English. Thank you.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

8 Mr. Butler just answered my question, and now I would need the

9 next page in the English version for my next question, and we can stay on

10 the same page in the Serbian language because the text is right before

11 me.

12 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Now, please take a look at paragraph 2 in the English version,

14 which is paragraph 3 below the numbers in the Serbian. And I'm just

15 reading the first sentence, and I quote:

16 "All DIV groups had the task of attacking at the same time of

17 day, at two-hour intervals, with a view to stretching Chetnik forces ..."

18 This report clearly says that all these groups, 1 through 9,

19 actually engaged and acted at the same time in this two-hour interval.

20 Is that what it says there? Thank you.

21 A. In fact, what the paragraph -- the paragraph notes that that was

22 the plan, that they were all going to carry out the actual combat part of

23 these missions within the same time. However, I think if you go to the

24 last two or three sentences of that paragraph, it does indicate that a

25 number of the combat groups, for different reasons, were not able to

Page 16968

1 undertake the combat actions and made a -- made a decision to withdraw.

2 So, in fact, it appears from this document that only about half of the

3 units actually managed to implement the plan.

4 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. However, can you see, in the last

5 paragraph in Serbian, which is the third paragraph in English, where it

6 says:

7 "About 40 Chetniks were killed and dozens were wounded. A

8 significant quantity of infantry weapons were seized ..."?

9 And then it lists what weapons. It says 5.000 rounds and other

10 military equipment. One aggressor soldier in the sector of Vrani Kamen

11 was captured, likely wounded in the chest. His name is Velimir Mrdjan.

12 My question is this: Can we see that the effect of these

13 sabotage groups was tremendous and that these were far -- that these were

14 higher losses than Zepa had throughout the rest of the war, according to

15 their reports? Are these enormous losses in two hours of fighting,

16 losses that were inflicted by this -- by a number of these sabotage

17 reconnaissance groups?

18 A. If this report is accurate with respect to the number of killed

19 and wounded, it would be a significant combat loss. Forty killed and

20 dozens wounded would represent a significant adverse impact to the unit

21 that fell into this particular ambush or loss. Where -- when I

22 recognised this and saw this, it's -- for me, at this juncture in time,

23 it's hard to confirm whether these were, in fact, the actual losses

24 incurred, because what I don't have possession of is the corresponding

25 VRS documents which would reflect, presumably, what their actual

Page 16969

1 casualties were during that operation.

2 I can't -- I can't tell from this particular passage alone even

3 what military unit of the VRS would have been garrisoned there, so I just

4 don't have an ability at this point to confirm that the losses that are

5 being reported by the ABiH in this document are, in fact, accurate, and

6 what the VRS is reporting in their combat reports.

7 I presume it can be a fact that is relatively easy to verify if

8 the Office of the Prosecutor has the corresponding combat reports for

9 whatever unit was attacked. But, you know, setting that issue aside, if

10 the report is accurate, it would represent a significant combat loss to

11 whatever unit was attacked.

12 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Now, are you aware that during the

13 demilitarisation of Zepa this same soldier, whose name is mentioned here

14 as having been captured, in other words, Velimir Mrdjan, was exchanged in

15 1997 and that he was in a position to begin with the evacuation, and then

16 the VRS demanded that all the captured prisoners be released, and that

17 this column was headed by this same soldier, Velimir Mrdjan? Would that

18 confirm or corroborate the validity of this report if you were shown that

19 other document?

20 A. The first answer that I have is, no, I'm not aware of that

21 particular situation. It certainly would confirm the validity of the

22 fact that this particular individual was captured. But, again, as you

23 are aware, General, reports of damage and casualties that military units

24 inflicted on other military units historically tend to be exaggerated in

25 the heat of battle.

Page 16970

1 So I'm not doubting that the incident occurred. What I'm saying

2 is that I think that the number of dead and wounded that are being

3 initially reported by Zepa seems higher than one might normally expect in

4 a combat operation like this, and that there is a chance that the

5 Zepa Infantry Brigade, either deliberately or inadvertently, exaggerated

6 the numbers.

7 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. I understand what you're saying. But

8 would you tell me, please, did the Zepa Brigade, which was in a

9 demilitarised zone, was it entitled, did it have the right, to carry out

10 combat operations against civilians? And I can tell you that we've heard

11 witnesses here who testified to the liberation of this soldier,

12 Velimir Mrdjan, and I also have to tell you that I have no reason to

13 conceal anything here or exaggerate, and that the losses were even higher

14 than shown here. Thank you.

15 A. No, sir. And to be clear, I'm certainly -- I hope it's not an

16 issue of translation. I'm not saying that you are potentially

17 exaggerating this. The point that I am saying is that in combat

18 environments there -- it is normal that the initial reports, particularly

19 relating to casualties that one unit inflicts on another unit, tend to be

20 inaccurate. I would recall back to the Kravica 1993, where, you know,

21 the initial reports of casualties suffered by the Serbs, as the situation

22 became clearer, those numbers went down to some degree. So it's simply a

23 situation of the initial reports are often inaccurate, and as time goes

24 by, more accurate reporting becomes available. I'm not implying that you

25 would be exaggerating the situation.

Page 16971

1 The second question is -- as I've testified with respect to

2 questions asked by the Prosecutor, it is never legitimate to make

3 civilians the object of a military attack, at least under the provisions

4 of International Law.

5 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. But does it make sense to you, if

6 Han Pijesak was the place where the Main Staff was, and Crna Rijeka, and

7 if this was deep in the territory, and if the Zepa area was

8 demilitarised, was it logical that greater losses could be inflicted to

9 civilians and to the army which does not expect such raids deep on their

10 own territory? Would that make sense to you?

11 A. It would certainly make sense that raids conducted by surprise

12 against military forces that are not or have no advance notice of these

13 raids would generate a number of casualties. Surprise, as you're aware,

14 is something that is highly desired when planning military operations

15 because it gives you a significant advantage on the battle-field.

16 So in the sense of, you know, a raid conducted deep in enemy

17 territory against troops who might not be alerted to such a possibility,

18 it would make sense that they would incur a significant number of

19 casualties.

20 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Now, if an attack was conducted by a

21 demilitarised zone, for instance, in your country, against a civilian

22 population, would that demilitarised area lose its status as a

23 demilitarised area or would such attacks be tolerated? Thank you.

24 A. I'm not, again, an expert in International Law, but it is my

25 understanding that if one side or one opposing force militarises a

Page 16972

1 particular protected or civilian area, that, depending on the

2 circumstances, it would lose various protections under International Law.

3 Whether a UN-declared demilitarised area has or does not have weight as

4 protected under International Law is a question best left for a different

5 type of expert.

6 Q. Thank you for your answer. Can you now just tell us: How is it

7 possible that something could both have and not have the status of a

8 demilitarised area at the same time?

9 A. Well, to throw out a hypothetical situation: A hospital, by

10 virtue of it being a medical facility, would be protected and

11 consequently is supposed to be demilitarised. If a situation arose that

12 the adversarial military forces occupied that facility for a military

13 reason, perhaps because where the hospital is located and it gave them a

14 tactical military advantage, it would lose its protected status and

15 become a legitimate military target because it was now being used for

16 military purposes and not humanitarian purposes. Having said that, once

17 the military that are occupying that particular facility leave and it

18 again resumes a humanitarian and medical purpose, it resumes its status

19 as a protected facility.

20 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Now, do you know that we've heard the

21 commander of the units that were attacked in the area of the Main Staff

22 in Crna Rijeka testified here, and that from that day of the attack all

23 the way up to the 28th of August he was engaged in carrying out the

24 operations towards --

25 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not hear what place.

Page 16973

1 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

2 Q. ... Han, in Zepa, and he remained there throughout the

3 operations, and was it a justified action by this commander to return his

4 forces to the demilitarised zone?

5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.

6 MR. McCLOSKEY: There's more than one commander at the

7 Crna Rijeka. If the general could help us with -- I think I know who

8 he's talking about, but it would help Mr. Butler to know who, in

9 particular, he's talking about in this question.

10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It would assist the Chamber as well. Whom are

11 you referring to, Mr. Tolimir?

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. McCloskey.

13 I'm referring to General Savcic, who testified here, and his

14 units were attacked.

15 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

16 Q. And what I would like to ask Mr. Butler is: Have you read his

17 testimony and the documents and the transcript during your preparation

18 for your expertise here? Did you read all of this? And I'm referring to

19 Mr. Savcic's testimony and transcript and so on. Thank you.

20 A. I don't believe that I read General Savcic's testimony related to

21 this specific set of proceedings. I am generally familiar with

22 General Savcic, who's testified in a number of previous proceedings, and

23 I'm familiar with it there. So it will probably be hit or miss with

24 respect to any new material that General Savcic might have discussed that

25 I'm not aware of.

Page 16974

1 And if you can repeat the second half of your question because it

2 is just -- it's just running off the screen and I wasn't sure that I

3 understood what you were looking for the first time.

4 Q. Thank you. Now I will rephrase my question to make it clearer.

5 Do you know that General Savcic testified between -- or, rather,

6 from the 26th of June up until the 26th of July, he was tasked with

7 repelling the attack from Zepa and Srebrenica, an attack against the

8 Main Staff, and that he was engaged in the Operation Zepa? Thank you.

9 A. Again, I am aware from the documents that particularly with

10 respect to operations related to the Zepa enclave, that units of the

11 65th Protection Regiment did, in fact, play a major role. With respect

12 to Srebrenica, as I've testified before, at least one of his units, the

13 Military Police Battalion of the 65th Protection Regiment, you know, also

14 played a role in at least the issues relating to not the actual attack on

15 Srebrenica, but prisoners.

16 So in the context of the date range that you have given me, while

17 I don't have specific visibility from the 26th of June to the

18 10th of July when orders are being issued specific to Zepa, I would

19 certainly not disagree with you by saying that the 65th would have still

20 been involved in at least defensive operations around Veliki Zep and

21 other facilities that they were charged to protect during that period.

22 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. The time has come for our first break. I

23 suggest that you should read Mr. Savcic's testimony and the transcript of

24 that testimony, and after that I will invite you to tell me whether his

25 engagement was justified when he put up resistance against the attack of

Page 16975

1 the forces that had attacked him from the demilitarised zone. Thank you.

2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.

3 MR. McCLOSKEY: I would have no objection for Mr. Butler to be

4 able to review General Savcic's testimony at the break. But I think

5 Mr. Butler must need a break, like the rest of us, after all this

6 testimony, and to be doing that kind of work on the break I don't think

7 is realistic. But the large break, I think that would be another matter.

8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I was worrying all the time, especially the task

9 you have to carry out during night-time to read through the document we

10 have dealt with just in the last couple of minutes.

11 Mr. Gajic.

12 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I believe there has

13 been a misunderstanding. Mr. Tolimir has just recommended to Mr. Butler

14 to read something, not to read it at the break, certainly not. He just

15 recommended Mr. Butler that he should perhaps read it over the summer

16 break, for example.

17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much for this clarification.

18 We must have our break now, and we'll come back at 11.00.

19 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

20 --- On resuming at 11.02 a.m.

21 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Gajic.

22 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, just briefly: On

23 page 14, line 20, instead of "trig point 676," it should be "675."

24 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.

25 Mr. McCloskey, is this an appropriate time to deal with the

Page 16976

1 translation issue?

2 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Mr. President.

3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Go ahead, please.

4 MR. McCLOSKEY: These are all P numbers: The first, 847C, then

5 199, then P770, P1569B, P1678, P1960, P2076A, P2116, P2231, P2351, P2361,

6 P2442, P2443 and, finally, P2448.

7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much. These are now received in

8 evidence.

9 Mr. Tolimir, please carry on with your cross-examination and try

10 to focus on matters related to the indictment.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

12 We can now see the document D62 still in front of us on the

13 screen. I would like to go to the second page. Can this be displayed.

14 Thank you.

15 We're still waiting for the second page in Serbian.

16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It is on the screen now.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

18 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

19 Q. We now see the second page and the second paragraph, where

20 Mr. Palic, the commander of the Zepa Brigade, says:

21 "Our losses are as follows: Two killed, one seriously wounded,

22 and five lightly wounded."

23 Does this show that this report is, indeed, authentic and

24 credible?

25 A. Again, sir, I don't question the authenticity of the report or

Page 16977

1 the credibility of the information that Avdo Palic is passing up his

2 particular chain of command to his superiors. My only issue was that I

3 hold open the possibility that the reports that Commander Palic was

4 receiving from his soldiers as to how many killed or wounded they thought

5 they inflicted on the enemy may be higher than had actually occurred and

6 are certainly higher in numbers than I'm used to seeing for a combat

7 action of this type of nature.

8 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Please look at the third paragraph on the

9 same page, which says, and I quote:

10 "In view of the state of affairs in this brigade's zone of

11 responsibility, we shall do our best to follow consistently the order of

12 the commander of the 2nd Corps, Strictly Confidential 02/1-604/95, which

13 is appropriate and realistic in our circumstances, as well as consistent

14 with the agreement reached at the command post in the Main Staff ..."

15 My question is this: Does this part of Avdo Palic's report show

16 that they had received an order on carrying out combat operations, and

17 that they had visited the command post of the Main Staff of the BiH,

18 where they had received their tasks verbally, which is confirmed by the

19 combat document that they then issued on the said date?

20 A. I agree with your assertion that the military operations that

21 occurred and future military operations envisioned are doing so on the

22 basis of Strictly Confidential Order 02/1-604/95.

23 I'm not sure that I agree with your assertion that members of the

24 brigade at Zepa personally met with individuals or had personally visited

25 the command post of the Supreme Command of the BiH Army. I suspect that

Page 16978

1 there may be a translation issue in your question that just is being

2 mistranslated.

3 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Could you please look at the English

4 version and look at the fourth paragraph that we see in Serbian. In

5 English, it's the penultimate paragraph, and can you look at the fourth

6 line from the bottom, where it says this is consistent with the agreement

7 reached at the command post in the Main Staff. Does this sentence in the

8 report show, does it prove, that somebody, indeed, presented themselves

9 at the command post of the Main Staff? Thank you.

10 A. Yes, sir, I agree with that. It is my contention that the person

11 who would have presented himself or group that would have presented

12 themselves at the Main Staff are more likely to have come from the

13 Command of the 2nd Corps, speaking on behalf of the officers and

14 commander in Zepa, as opposed to those particular officers in Zepa

15 travelling to the Command of the ABiH Supreme Command.

16 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Did you read Ramiz Becirovic's statement?

17 And he was the command of the 28th Division, he was a deputy chief of

18 staff during the breakthrough. Did you read it? And did you see that

19 certain officers from the 28th Division did, indeed, present themselves

20 at the command post?

21 A. Yes, sir. I am aware, not only from Mr. Becirovic, but from a

22 number of other documents and sources, that sometime in May or June,

23 maybe even as early as April, the commander of the 28th Division,

24 Naser Oric, as well as a number of his officers, left Srebrenica and the

25 28th Division and were moved to Tuzla and were outside the enclave. So,

Page 16979

1 again, I take your point that it is entirely possible that members of the

2 28th Division did personally represent Avdo Palic. My position is

3 that -- and what I'm trying to, apparently not so clearly, state is that

4 I don't think it's likely that Avdo Palic or members of his brigade staff

5 personally attended that meeting.

6 Q. Thank you. That's your opinion. However, in this report that he

7 sent to his subordinates, who knew whether they had been there or not,

8 why does he say, and I quote:

9 "... as well as consistent with the agreement reached at the

10 command post of the Main Staff"?

11 Thank you.

12 A. I take that that Colonel Palic is obviously aware of the meetings

13 that took place and that -- the decisions that were reached. It would be

14 natural, even if he was not personally present, that those discussions

15 and the decisions reached would be transmitted to him, as they would

16 impact his unit.

17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, I don't think that this report was

18 sent to the subordinates of Avdo Palic, but to his superiors, if I'm not

19 mistaken.

20 Please carry on.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I may

22 have misspoken.

23 Avdo Palic wrote this to his superiors, and he says "consistent

24 with the agreement at the command post," which means that both him and

25 his addressees are aware of the fact that the operation had been

Page 16980

1 discussed and agreed at the command post where the details of the

2 operation had also been agreed. Thank you.

3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Please carry on.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

5 Perhaps we could also look at D52 to show that activities were

6 being carried out in keeping with the November 1994 plan that the

7 Main Staff sent to the 28th Division.

8 Once again, could we please see D52.

9 Yes, we see it.

10 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Now, this is also a document issued by the Army of Bosnia and

12 Herzegovina, by the 2nd Corps Command. It was sent from Tuzla on the

13 8th of July, 1995. It was sent under the title "Information on Combat

14 Results of the Units and Commands of the 28th Ground Army Division of the

15 2nd Corps of the BiH Army."

16 Was this report, indeed, sent by the 2nd Corps to its units, and

17 was it sent in order to inform them about the successes of the

18 28th Division?

19 A. Yes, sir, that is correct.

20 Q. Thank you. Let us look at the two bullet points under this first

21 paragraph. The first bullet point reads:

22 "Sixty Chetniks were liquidated, and according to unconfirmed

23 reports, the aggressor suffered even greater losses and had many wounded:

24 "Sixteen automatic rifles, three M-72 light machine-guns,

25 one M-53 light machine-gun, one carbine, two radio stations, three

Page 16981

1 pistols, 5.000 bullets, and dozens of head of cattle and small livestock

2 were seized, and one van was destroyed."

3 My question: Did the corps command at that point have access to

4 all information, and did it convey that information to all the other

5 members of the military to tell them what successes had been achieved by

6 the 28th Division?

7 A. The answer to your first question, I mean, certainly the

8 2nd Corps had access to the information it was receiving from the

9 28th Division reporting on the successes of its various activities. I

10 take from the title of this particular document and the fact that it's

11 to -- or from the deputy commander for morale - it's very difficult to

12 tell on the translation - that one of the purposes of this particular

13 document was precisely so that various morale officers could relay this

14 information, after removing any secret material from it, to the broader

15 soldiers and officers of the 2nd Corps in effort to inspire them to seek

16 to emulate the same type of military accomplishments that the soldiers of

17 the 28th Infantry Division were doing.

18 Q. Thank you.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we scroll up to show the

20 signature block and also to whom the document was sent. Can the document

21 be scrolled up a little. Thank you.

22 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

23 Q. You can see that the document was sent to -- we don't see it now.

24 We can see it in Serbian; that it was sent to all divisions - now we have

25 it in English as well - to the commanders of all divisions, to all

Page 16982

1 logistics units, to garrison commanders, to an air force brigade, and

2 this was signed personally by the commander of the 2nd Corps,

3 Brigadier Sead Delic. You can now see who he sent the document to. That

4 was sent by electronic mail, so we cannot see the signature, but his name

5 is typed up.

6 Please, based on everything that you have seen, meaning that the

7 commander refers to written and verbal orders and that operations are

8 carried out from Zepa and Srebrenica and in other parts of the

9 demilitarised zones, would you say that what General Savcic testified

10 about here is justified, and that was that they engaged in combat in

11 order to defend themselves, to prevent further forays, and to actually

12 return the forces that had forayed from Srebrenica and Zepa back to the

13 demilitarised zones? Thank you.

14 A. Well, sir, setting aside for the moment General Savcic's

15 testimony here, what I would say is what I believe I've been very

16 consistent about in the numerous times I've testified before this

17 Tribunal in other cases, as well as in this one, which is that the

18 28th Infantry Division was never demobilised or demilitarised. It did

19 conduct active military operations through the period of the end of

20 June 1995. And that from my point of view and my opinion, that VRS

21 military operations directed against the 28th Infantry Division were a

22 justified military act. I think I've been relatively consistent with

23 that position through the years.

24 So, again, while I don't know what General Savcic did or did not

25 specifically say, I certainly wouldn't dispute an assertion that he

Page 16983

1 believed that, you know, the military operations that he was conducting

2 against soldiers from the 28th Infantry Division would be legitimate. I

3 mean, I agree that they would be.

4 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, after having received this answer,

5 I think, again, we see that there is no dispute about the conduct and the

6 acts of the ABiH in relation to this conflict. I would like to invite

7 you more to focus on the charges against you in the indictment and not so

8 much about combat activities. This is not in contest, I take it.

9 Please carry on.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

11 Since the beginning of the day I have been looking at documents

12 which prove the attempts by Muslims and their Supreme Command to link up

13 Srebrenica and Zepa with the 2nd Corps in Tuzla and to link up the two

14 enclaves with each other, and I've also looked at documents which have

15 already been received by the Trial Chamber and which demonstrate that

16 that was, indeed, the case. And I'm now trying to proffer proof to show

17 why all the directives were issued, why all the tasks have been given and

18 assigned. Thank you.

19 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I just would like to remind you that this trial

20 is not about a war. This trial is about certain criminal acts you are

21 charged with. This is the background of my intervention and my guidance

22 I tried to give you in order to make sure that you will use your time for

23 cross-examination in the best way for your defence.

24 Please carry on.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

Page 16984

1 I'll do my best. However, I have to answer all the questions or

2 all the issues that were raised by the Prosecutor during the

3 examination-in-chief of this witness.

4 Please, let us go back to the order issued on the 11th,

5 bearing number D300, and that was sent by Enver Hadzihasanovic on the

6 9th of November, 1994.

7 I misspoke. Aleksandar has just corrected me. Let's go back to

8 P2369, and D300 is Directive 6. Thank you very much. I apologise to the

9 e-court.

10 This is a document which was sent by General Enver Hadzihasanovic

11 on the 9th of November, 1994. We were on paragraph 3.3, page 9. We had

12 covered paragraph 2 in Chapter 3.3, and that dealt with sabotage

13 operations that were being carried out in keeping with the order.

14 And now can we go on to look at the same page again, page 10 in

15 this document. Thank you.

16 We can now see that below the title "Zepa forces" it says "The

17 forces of the 2nd Corps of the BiH Army."

18 We have to go to the following page in English, and there we can

19 see tasks being issued under A to OG-6 Zivinice forces. There is a

20 reference to attacks from the territory of the BiH Army towards the

21 demilitarised zones of Zepa and Srebrenica, as well as of activities

22 aimed at linking up the two enclaves and their linking with the

23 2nd Corps.

24 Now let's look at page 11 -- or, rather, page 10, page 10, where

25 it says they are carrying out an attack, the beginning of page 10, where

Page 16985

1 it says Zivinice forces are carrying out attacks, and "insert armed

2 forces in the following zone." I skip the names of the places. And they

3 are tasked of acting in concert with inserted forces.

4 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

5 Q. My question is this: In this paragraph, the units of the

6 2nd Corps which bordered on the Republika Srpska, were they given a task

7 to act in concert with the forces of the 28th Division during the

8 breakthrough and during the operation that had been planned previously

9 for the 28th Division? Thank you.

10 A. In this particular document, which is dated November 1994, it

11 lists out specific tasks for OG-6 and OG-4 which, as General Tolimir

12 notes, would be along the border -- or along the confrontation lines

13 between ABiH 2 Corps and the VRS. It was envisioned in this plan that

14 all of the military operations would be synchronised and co-ordinated

15 with each other in order to have the maximum adverse impact on the VRS

16 when this operation was undertaken.

17 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Now please take a look at some three

18 lines or four lines below the "OG-4 Kalesija forces." We have before us

19 the Zivinice forces.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In English, that should be on

21 page 11, please.

22 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Now, we see those four lines above "OG Kalesija." We see that it

24 says their task, and that's the task of the OG-6, and it reads as

25 follow -- and OG-6, that's the operations group in Zivinice. The task is

Page 16986

1 as follows:

2 "On the axis of attack, disperse and destroy the Chetnik forces

3 and secure the corridor along the right-hand side border of the zone of

4 attack. Link up the forces of OG-6 Srebrenica at this specified line and

5 prevent Chetnik intervention from the direction of Sekovici towards

6 Seliste village and the Borogovo feature (trig point 923)."

7 Now my question: Are these forces that had contact on the

8 territory that had -- these forces that had come from the territory on

9 the 2nd Corps of the BH Army, was it their task to link up with the

10 28th Division forces, as indicated here under "OG-8 Srebrenica"?

11 A. Yes, sir. If and when this plan was implemented or to be

12 implemented, their task was to link up with those forces of OG-8.

13 Q. Thank you. Now, was this the basic conceptual plan for the

14 entire operation to link up the enclaves and to link up the forces within

15 the enclaves with the 2nd Corps? Thank you.

16 A. Yes, sir. If we read this document in its entirety, I believe

17 you are correct that it does lay out the basic conceptual plan to achieve

18 that link-up.

19 Q. Thank you.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now see the next page,

21 please. We can leave Kalesija aside.

22 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Would you take a look at 4.3, that paragraph. That's under the

24 "General Notes and Tasks," which is Chapter 4. Thank you.

25 "The plan of operation," and I quote, "for time and place of the

Page 16987

1 execution of tasks will be worked out separately and delivered to you

2 subsequently."

3 And my question: Does this suggest that this operation was,

4 indeed, planned, and that the planning was in its final phases of its

5 implementation, and this is something that the units would be informed

6 of? Is that correct?

7 A. I agree with your assertion that it was planned, in the sense

8 that the basic concept existed. When you read this document, it goes

9 into probably even more detail than a basic concept. But, clearly, my

10 reading of paragraph 4.3 is that there are still other issues,

11 particularly when you read this in context with other statements in the

12 document, that have yet to be worked out, either planned or implemented,

13 that have to be achieved before this entire operation can move forward.

14 And, again, the last line being that, We're identifying those various

15 components that have to be done before we can move forward and we will be

16 alerting you to what our orders and decisions are in a future time.

17 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler, for your answer. You are perhaps

18 referring to paragraph 4.5, which reads, and I quote:

19 "An important and basic precondition to carry out this operation

20 is your supply with the minimum quantity of ammunition and UBS," or

21 combat supplies.

22 Did you mean that?

23 A. In part, yes, sir. As you would obviously know, sending forces

24 out from the OG-8 and, later, 28th Infantry Division without adequate

25 amounts of ammunition and other material -- military materials in order

Page 16988

1 to accomplish these tasks would certainly result in a significant defeat

2 for those forces. So one of the preconditions before this could be

3 executed was that ammunition and other military materials would have to

4 be infiltrated into the enclave and stockpiled in sufficient quantities

5 to allow for these types of operations to take place.

6 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Now let's take a look at 4.7, which is

7 where what you've just mentioned is specified, and I quote:

8 "Apart from the task of bringing in the ammunition and war

9 materiel, immediately embark upon the organisation of reconnaissance in

10 the depth of the enemy and the features which are to be seized, and the

11 insertion of men who will later participate in the tasks. Report on the

12 results of the work regularly and promptly."

13 Is that what you have in mind?

14 A. Again, in part. I mean, obviously the task of bringing in

15 ammunition. But specific to paragraph 4.7, it notes that another

16 precondition, as it were, is that the OG-8 will need to send out small

17 reconnaissance teams to essentially observe and scout the terrain

18 objectives that they plan to seize at a later date. Knowing, first of

19 all, how to get to that terrain and what all the geographic and terrain

20 issues that have to be dealt with, as well as what VRS military

21 dispositions would be or might be around those particular objectives,

22 would be a vital element of information that would have to be known by

23 OG-8 if they were going to have any chance of success in this military

24 operation.

25 Q. Thank you. Can you agree with me if I say that the main issue

Page 16989

1 here is obtaining ammunition and lethal assets, and everything else is a

2 question of training and equipment -- or, rather, provisions of the army

3 and the units that are to be used for insertions and raids? Is that

4 correct or not?

5 A. Well, if I read this -- these points, and I think it goes all the

6 way to point 14, in their entirety, there are three or four basic themes

7 that are laid out here as significant concerns to the General Staff, or

8 the Supreme Command in this case, of the ABiH. One, obviously, is

9 whether or not they would be able to supply the requisite military

10 technical equipment, ammunition, and other military supplies in order to

11 undertake the operation, which, again, given the context of OG-8 being

12 located many kilometres behind enemy lines, was no easy feat.

13 The second one was ensuring that there was available military

14 manpower and soldiers to accomplish the task that had been directed. And

15 so, again, I take General Tolimir's point. It's not just men with guns;

16 there is an implied training requirement.

17 The third issue is, you know, a thorough reconnaissance of the

18 battle-field to include the objectives so that the OG-8 military forces

19 would know where they're going and what they should expect when they get

20 to their objectives.

21 And the last one is the issue of security, which hasn't been

22 discussed yet, but it is a key theme throughout this operations order

23 because it was recognised that with a plan of this complexity, if the VRS

24 were to learn of this plan, particularly at the early stages of the plan,

25 that they could relatively quickly either preclude or prevent the plan

Page 16990

1 from occurring by attacking the forces in the enclave, which would, in

2 effect, cause much of the plan to collapse. So they were very concerned

3 about not only accomplishing all of these things ready to undertake the

4 plan, but to do so in a way that would minimise the risk of the enemy

5 discovering what was being planned and later to be implemented.

6 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Now, in the course of your research, did

7 you come across documents that speak to or about the main command trying

8 to provide the right conditions in order to enable this operation of the

9 28th Division?

10 A. I did not look specifically at ABiH military documents related to

11 the attempts to logistically supply the 28th Infantry Division. However,

12 again referring to the United Nations report related to the fall of

13 Srebrenica, there is some discussion in that particular report where it

14 talks about the UN's awareness of efforts by the ABiH and, specifically,

15 2 Corps to smuggle military supplies and ammunition into the enclaves

16 during the period the first six months of 1995.

17 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now see D67 in e-court,

19 please.

20 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

21 Q. I'd like to show you this document, and then I have some

22 questions.

23 We see here that this is a report from the

24 Intelligence Administration, Sarajevo, Counter-Electronic Warfare

25 Department, Communications and Electronic Counter-Measures Section, dated

Page 16991

1 the 13th of July, 1995, in which the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina --

2 rather, its Army General Staff, forwards, via the commander of the

3 1st Corps, to the president of the Presidency of the Republic of

4 Bosnia-Herzegovina this interim report after the fall of Srebrenica, in

5 which they report on what they had done so far for the enclave, and it

6 reads as follows:

7 "Dear Mr. President.

8 "In view of the situation of our enclaves during the preceding

9 period, the Army General Staff has undertaken a series of military

10 activities and procedures to organise the members of the army in the

11 enclaves and prepare them for possible developments, primarily the

12 defence of the existing free territory and a planned engagement and

13 preparations for future joint operations and planned operations."

14 My question would be this: Do we see here that the commander of

15 the army is pointing out to the president of the state that he's planning

16 planned operations for the defence of the enclaves and with the members

17 of the army in the enclaves? Now we'll see later on who this document

18 was signed by. Thank you.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we just show the signature

20 page, please, by e-court. And then go back to the first page.

21 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.

22 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Mr. President.

23 If the general is, which it appears he is, planning on asking

24 Mr. Butler detailed questions about this, I am told it's a

25 four-page document, and I think it would only be fair to let Mr. Butler

Page 16992

1 review this document before questions are posed.

2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I think it depends on the question Mr. Tolimir is

3 putting to the witness. We will see.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I thank Mr. McCloskey and

5 Mr. Butler, as well as the Trial Chamber. We saw the signature page. We

6 saw who it was who signed this document.

7 Can we now have the first page again, please, in e-court.

8 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

9 Q. And, witness, sir, could you please tell us whether we see from

10 this document that Delic had informed Izetbegovic that he was preparing

11 the enclaves for future joint operations? Thank you.

12 A. Well, yes, sir. I mean, I have seen this document before. It

13 turns out in my previous testimony in the Perisic case there was a rather

14 spirited discussion about helicopter flights into the Srebrenica enclave,

15 so I am familiar with this particular document.

16 Again, in this context, as issues are coming up on the

17 13th of July, 1995, and questions are being raised, this is a report to

18 the highest levels of the BiH government, where the military justifies,

19 to some degree, the support that they have given to the enclave, and lays

20 out in some specific detail all of the activities that they undertook in

21 order to get supplies into the enclave. Clearly, in the context that

22 General Tolimir has raised, the language does imply that this was not

23 just routine supplies, so to speak; that there was at least some -- you

24 know, there was not only, I guess, you know, the primary defence of the

25 existing free territory, so I guess in some sense it is routine resupply,

Page 16993

1 but also discusses preparations for future operations.

2 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. And now would you take a look, please,

3 below the first paragraph. It says:

4 "Specifically, the following has been done for Srebrenica and

5 Zepa:"

6 And then bullet point 1:

7 "To start with, lethal assets and MTS/materiel and technical

8 equipment were brought in on foot in fairly small quantities."

9 And then the second bullet point:

10 "Seventeen helicopter flights were carried out, in each of which

11 a helicopter was hit."

12 And now can we see the page following a number of bullet points

13 there and see the last bullet point where the table begins. It says:

14 "The attached table shows exactly what MTS was delivered to

15 Srebrenica and Zepa."

16 And then it gives a breakdown of that materiel in a table.

17 Now, the question is this: Did the Main Staff of the BH ensure,

18 via these helicopter flights, that the enclaves in Srebrenica and Zepa

19 received sufficient equipment and supplies in order to carry out attacks?

20 A. Well, sir, either -- I mean, ultimately, just like in the context

21 of the VRS, it was the Main Staff that was undertaking those activities

22 through corps and other subordinate formations. In this manner, the

23 ABiH Supreme Command undertook, either directly or through 2nd Corps,

24 operations to try and get ammunitions and other military technical

25 supplies to Srebrenica and Zepa. The fact that military operations were

Page 16994

1 carried out to the degree that they were, you know, would reflect that,

2 at least in hindsight, they were getting enough ammunition and enough

3 supplies to conduct the operations that they did conduct. The unknown

4 question is whether or not they ever received an adequate amount of

5 materiel and supplies to reach the threshold to conduct the large-scale

6 operation that was envisioned down the road.

7 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Now please take a look at this table, and

8 will you see, under number 1, it says Zepa receives 173.600 rounds, where

9 Srebrenica receives 354.658; in total, 469.228 [as interpreted] rounds.

10 And then in the following rows we see 7.62-millimetre rounds - that's

11 number 2 - three 7.9 millimetres, 9.400 pieces. 4, we see that 7.9

12 rounds are mentioned -- or, rather, that's number 3. Number 4 is

13 "rifle-launched grenade." Cumulative contact-fuse grenades. And then

14 five contact-fuse rifle-launch grenades, and six hand-grenade, seven RPG,

15 et cetera, et cetera. You know what RPGs is. Perhaps you can explain it

16 to the Trial Chamber, where it says "390." So what is RPG-7 rocket?

17 A. As noted under asset seven, it's translated as

18 "rocket-propelled grenade." RPG-7 is the traditional Soviet military

19 model, which is ubiquitously copied by everyone of a hand-held

20 rocket-grenade launcher. It fires the RPG-7 rockets. So what this

21 reflects is a number of rocket-launchers as well as extra rockets for

22 them. It's a hand-held device. It's, again, pretty common within most

23 light military forces.

24 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Could you please tell us whether you know

25 from the documents when the ammunition and weapons were air-dropped. Do

Page 16995

1 you know when Muslims started doing that in 1995 and for how long that

2 whole operation lasted? Thank you.

3 A. My knowledge of that is based off of the information in the

4 United Nations report. And if I recall correctly, I think those types of

5 resupply operations began sometime in the early part of 1995. I don't

6 think I could be much more specific than that. It's been a number of

7 years since I've dealt with that particular issue. I would again

8 refer -- if it is an issue -- a question that, in fact, needs to be dealt

9 with, I would refer the Court to that particular United Nations report,

10 where it is laid out in some detail.

11 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Thank you for referring us to the

12 document.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And now can we have in e-court, on

14 the right-hand side where the Serbian -- where the Serbian document is

15 now, can we see 65 ter 420 in English. I have the Serbian hard copy, so

16 I can read from it.

17 And now we can see the document. I would kindly ask for the

18 table to remain on the left-hand side.

19 This is a document issued by the 28th Division, the Command of

20 the OG-8 Srebrenica, dated 15 November 1994. The title of the document

21 is "The Main Plan for the Execution of Task/Opinion," sent to the Staff

22 of the Supreme Command and Enver Hadzihasanovic in Kakanj.

23 Can we go to the last page to see who signed the document.

24 THE INTERPRETER: Could the accused please be instructed to slow

25 down. Thank you.

Page 16996

1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, two issues.

2 E-court didn't understand your instruction correctly. You wanted

3 to have D67 in English on the left-hand side of the screen, and

4 especially the table; is that correct?

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That is correct, Mr. President. If

6 that is possible, fine. If not, we'll go back to it later. Thank you.

7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I just want to understand what your instructions

8 are.

9 You wanted to have on the left-hand side D67 in English; is that

10 correct? And what did you want to have on the right-hand side? Is that

11 the document we have now on the screen, also in English, if I understood

12 you correctly, because you have the English -- the B/C/S version in front

13 of you? Is that correct?

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. But on the right-hand side we

15 have a Serbian version, whereas I would like to have the English version

16 of the document, for the benefit of the Trial Chamber, on the right-hand

17 side.

18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much. And this is 65 ter 420 in

19 English, please, if that is possible.

20 You wanted to have on the left-hand side D67. Now we have it on

21 the right-hand side, D67. And on the other side of the screen we wanted

22 to do have 65 ter 402, both in English.

23 I think we have it now. Again, now this is identical.

24 There we are. I think we have it now on the screen.

25 Mr. Tolimir, please carry -- [Overlapping speakers]

Page 16997

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Please carry -- [Overlapping speakers]

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please --

4 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I have not finished. Just a moment.

5 The interpreters asked you to slow down while reading.

6 Now continue, please.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

8 Could the document on the right-hand side, which is in English,

9 be brought back to page 1. We need to read just one sentence from that

10 page. Thank you, thank you.

11 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

12 Q. I'm reading the first sentence:

13 "I have received and carefully studied your basic plan to execute

14 the task. I wish to set out my views and suggestions in this respect.

15 "Item 1 - plan acceptable.

16 "Item 2 - acceptable.

17 "Item 3 - engagement of forces ..."

18 And so on and so forth. And now he says, and I will not go on

19 reading, he provides his opinion about the deployment of combat groups.

20 And finally at the end of the document where you can see the signature we

21 would like to look at the last paragraph on the last page in Chapter 12,

22 under the title "General Remarks."

23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Look at the screen, at the transcript. You see

24 you are reading too fast. The interpreters can't follow. You want to

25 have everything on the screen -- on the transcript, and, therefore, you

Page 16998

1 should slow down.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

3 I apologise to the Trial Chamber and to the interpreters.

4 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

5 Q. Let's now look at what Mr. Oric says about what he needs for the

6 execution of the task. The following quantities of ammunition have to be

7 brought in to carry out the task. In the left-hand-side table, we can

8 see that he received 354.000 rounds, and he requested only 173.000, so

9 he's received three times more. He also asks for 55.000 other types of

10 rounds, and we see that he has 7.62, 24.000, and Zepa has 4.360. And

11 then further on he says that he needs 150 hand-held or rifle-launched

12 grenades, and he also has contact-fuse rifle-launched grenades, and so on

13 and so forth.

14 My question is this: Was Mr. Oric supplied by air with all the

15 necessary ammunition and weapons that he had requested for the operation?

16 Thank you.

17 A. I don't know that I can answer that, because the one outstanding

18 bit of information that's needed would be the answer of, well, you know,

19 consumption. In abstract, 469.000 rounds of ammunition delivered sounds

20 like a lot and would be sufficient to stockpile for an operation of this

21 nature. One has to take in account that these supplies are being

22 consumed in other military operations or in defence of the enclave from

23 VRS attacks. So from these two documents, you know, the one part of the

24 equation that's missing in order to determine whether or not he was able

25 to successfully stockpile what he needed for the operation is a view of

Page 16999

1 what the 28th Division was consuming as part of their normal military

2 requirements.

3 So, I mean, if they're consuming 600.000 rounds during the same

4 period and have only been resupplied to a 469.000-rounds level, then the

5 answer is, no, he wasn't receiving the necessary supplies. If they only

6 used 100.000 rounds, then the answer might be, yes, he received three

7 times as many -- or three times as much ammunition as he thought he

8 needed. But without facts and figures relating to the consumption of the

9 military units, at the same time it can be misleading to answer the

10 question whether or not resupply was adequate.

11 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Please, before the operation started, was

12 the demilitarised zone supposed to carry out any operations? Were they

13 supposed to use ammunition once it was demilitarised? Could we then, in

14 that case, talk about whether any ammunition was spent or not spent?

15 What I mean is -- mean to say is that it should have been demilitarised

16 and weapons should have been seized from them.

17 A. Again, in abstract, I agree. If -- if the zone was demilitarised

18 as envisioned, your ammunition consumption numbers would be zero. We

19 know, though, that that was not the case.

20 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. You're a military analyst and a

21 researcher. Could you tell us whether the commander who has received a

22 task should stockpile for an operation, in view of the fact that he

23 received his stocks by air, under the control of the UNPROFOR, who were

24 in a position to control every helicopter sound in the air? Thank you.

25 A. Well, getting to your first question, a commander who envisions

Page 17000

1 on conducting military operations will obviously take the prudent and

2 necessary steps to stockpile not only ammunition, but what other military

3 supplies he believes he will need in order to conduct that operation. Of

4 course, he has to do so in context of the other military requirements

5 that he has at the time. So what he knows he needs to do and what may be

6 practicable under the circumstances could be different.

7 I don't know that I can answer the second question with respect

8 to the UNPROFOR having control of the air and things of that nature. I

9 mean, that's a -- I don't know that that has to be answered. It's

10 simply, yes, they did resupply not only over land, but by helicopter

11 resupply flights that have been documented, so, I mean, the answer is,

12 yes, they were getting resupplied. And, yes, a prudent commander would

13 stockpile his supplies.

14 Q. Thank you.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] D53 is the following document I

16 would like to call up. Thank you.

17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, you have used 65 ter 420. Are you

18 tendering it?

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, of course. Thank you,

20 Mr. President, for reminding me to do that.

21 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received.

22 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 420 shall be

23 assigned Exhibit D302. Thank you.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

25 Can we now look at D53. Thank you.

Page 17001

1 Thank you, Aleksandar.

2 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Do you see an order here? This order was issued by the BiH Army

4 on the 17th of June, and there is a reference to active combat

5 operations. And I'm going to read just the first paragraph:

6 "Pursuant to a verbal order issued --"

7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Just a moment, please. Could the -- yes, thank

8 you. I was asking for enlargement of the B/C/S version. Thank you.

9 Please carry on.

10 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

11 Q. "Pursuant to a verbal order issued by the commander of the

12 General Staff of the BiH Army, Army General Rasim Delic, and on the

13 occasion of the great successes achieved by units of the BiH Army in the

14 general area around Sarajevo and Gorazde, as well as on the basis of

15 intelligence that the command of the aggressor forces of

16 the Protection Regiment in Han Pijesak is holding part of its units in

17 reserve to intervene in the event of an attack by our forces from Zepa, I

18 hereby issue the following order:

19 "Execute all preparations in the Command of the

20 28th Land/Army Division to execute offensive combat operations with a

21 view to liberating the territory of BiH Army, over-extending the

22 aggressor forces and inflicting losses on them, co-ordinating action with

23 the BiH Army forces carrying out operations in the general area of

24 Sarajevo."

25 And the second bullet point reads:

Page 17002

1 "Plan realistic tasks which will assure certain success, on the

2 basis of an accurate assessment and the potential of our forces in

3 Srebrenica and Zepa."

4 My question to you is this: The person who drafted this

5 document, who was issuing the order, as well as the person who received

6 the order, should both have the realistic view or should they have both

7 made a realistic assessment of their military capabilities for the

8 execution of this task? Thank you.

9 A. If I read your question correctly, sir, what you're asking is

10 that as an order is passed down from the higher levels through

11 intermediate levels to the command that's required to execute it, is

12 there a process by which the various commands evaluate orders that are

13 received and make determinations as to whether or not they can fully

14 carry them out, or partially carry them out, or carry them out only to a

15 limited degree. I mean, that is a normal command function. Is that the

16 question that you're asking, sir?

17 Q. This is what I asked you: The person who issued the order to

18 execute the task and the person who was supposed to execute it, did they

19 both have to have in mind realistic assessments of the consumption of

20 materiel, lethal assets, and other resources necessary for the execution

21 of the task? Thank you.

22 A. Yes, sir. In that sense, both the intervening individual -- or

23 intermediate individual, in this case General Budakovic, as well as the

24 individuals who received this order would be expected to tailor the tasks

25 to what is realistically possible. So in order to do that, they would

Page 17003

1 know whether or not they had all of the necessary equipment, supplies,

2 materiel, and manpower to accomplish that task. It doesn't make any

3 military sense to plan to execute a task that you know that you can't

4 accomplish because you're lacking in other components of military

5 ammunition or supplies.

6 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Did you notice, in the first paragraph of

7 this order, that a reference is made to offensive operations, with a view

8 to liberating the territory? And when we're talking about these

9 assessments, did they also take into account the task to liberate the

10 entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina? In other words, was there an

11 opinion that the commander -- commanders of the BiH Army were capable of

12 ultimately doing that? Thank you.

13 A. This -- this particular order is far more limited than I would

14 take your question to mean. This order is simply, and quite cleverly,

15 actually, a reflection of the fact that the Bosnian and Herzegovina

16 military has learned that the 65th Protection Regiment has still managed

17 to maintain a considerable amount of reserve forces which could,

18 conceivably, be employed in the Sarajevo area, and, in fact, the

19 65th Protection Regiment was, throughout the course of the war, deployed

20 in many various areas of the Republika Srpska because it represented a

21 mobile and powerful reserve force. And so based on this information,

22 this reads to me like the 2nd Corps and their 28th -- and the

23 28th Infantry Division are being directed to put together a military

24 attack out of Srebrenica or Zepa, the primary purpose to ensure that the

25 65th Protection Regiment is held in place there or is engaged in that

Page 17004

1 particular location and that their reserves are then exhausted or

2 over-extended. And, therefore, it would not be available to be

3 redeployed to the Sarajevo and Gorazde battle-front area which, in the

4 words of the BiH Army at this juncture, was the critical battle that was

5 going on.

6 I don't take this particular document to read in such a

7 wide-sweeping manner as you suggested that, you know, this is their

8 expectation, that they're going to be able to liberate all of the

9 territory of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

10 Q. Thank you. Please read paragraph 1 once again, where it says,

11 and I read again:

12 "Execute all preparations in the Command of the

13 28th Land/Army Division to execute offensive combat operations with a

14 view to liberating the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and

15 Herzegovina ..."

16 This was signed by Brigadier Sulejman Budakovic. Does it mean

17 that he has in mind the liberation of the entire territory of Bosnia and

18 Herzegovina and all those tasks that have to be executed during offensive

19 operations? Thank you.

20 A. No, sir. I take this simply as view of liberating the territory

21 of BH to the extent that they are already doing in the wider area around

22 Sarajevo and Gorazde. Obviously a war aim of the Army of Bosnia and

23 Herzegovina was going to be to liberate all of their territory of all the

24 territory that they considered occupied, but I just -- in this particular

25 singular document, I just don't read as much into it as you do, sir.

Page 17005

1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, I think it's time for the second

2 break.

3 We have to adjourn, and resume at 1.00.

4 --- Recess taken at 12.29 p.m.

5 --- On resuming at 1.03 p.m.

6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Yes, Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

8 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

9 Q. Mr. Butler, I asked you whether the chief of staff of the

10 2nd Corps, Brigade General Budakovic, was referring to an oral order and

11 ordered the preparations, that they be made for combat operations. So

12 was he actually relying on Delic's order when he issued his order?

13 A. It appears, in part, as you look at the preamble on that first

14 paragraph, it says, one: "Pursuant to a verbal order ..." and, of

15 course, it also refers back to an earlier document. But looking at this

16 in its entirety, I would say that, again, this order was written in the

17 context of receiving a verbal order from Delic, who wanted various

18 supporting actions done to ensure that the ABiH military forces around

19 Sarajevo and Gorazde could continue to enjoy success.

20 Q. Thank you. And could that be the oral order that was issued to

21 the chiefs of staffs of command that was issued to -- in the Command of

22 the 28th Land/Army Division?

23 A. I'm not sure I understand your question. Are you asking that

24 this particular document, and as it was set out by General Budakovic, was

25 this document based, in large degree, to the oral order?

Page 17006

1 Q. Thank you. My question was whether Budakovic was talking about

2 the oral order from Delic that should be known not only to him, but also

3 to those who sent the document; in other words, members of the

4 Command of the 28th Division. And how could he refer to the order if

5 they were not -- if they didn't have information on what it contained?

6 A. Yes, sir. I mean, I agree with your assertion that this is the

7 order that Budakovic sent to the Command of the 28th Division. It was,

8 to a large degree, it appears, based on a verbal order. And I also agree

9 that given the document reference in question, that it does presuppose

10 that the Command of the 28th Division in Srebrenica has a working

11 knowledge of that particular document as well as the general situation.

12 Q. Thank you. Now let's see whether the Command of the

13 28th Division could have been informed of the oral order of the

14 commander.

15 Could we now see document D1, 1D1.

16 [Defence counsel confers]

17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: You should switch off your microphone during your

18 private discussion.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

20 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

21 Q. We see here a statement from the Chief of Staff of the

22 28th Division where he speaks about his being at the command post in

23 Kakanj with the Chief of Staff and the commander, because that was their

24 command post, the BH Army command post, in April 1995. And maybe that is

25 when he received the oral order, because there was no other way he could

Page 17007

1 receive it.

2 Now, let's take a look at page 5 in Serbian and 7 in English.

3 Now we see in Serbian, in paragraph 4, which reads, and that's

4 the second paragraph in English --

5 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: That is not the second

6 paragraph.

7 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

8 Q. "Towards the end of April, we flew out of Zepa in a

9 helicopter" --

10 My error. I was asking for the English page.

11 So:

12 "In late April 1995, we flew by helicopter from Zepa and arrived

13 in Zenica. We were part of a delegation sent from Srebrenica, headed by

14 Commander Naser Oric ..."

15 And so on and so forth. He goes on to name all the others who

16 were there. They had a task, and so on and so forth.

17 Now, does this suggest that it was possible for him to have had a

18 contact, oral contact, with the Chief of Staff, including the order to

19 begin combat operations and try a break-out from Srebrenica towards the

20 2nd Corps in Tuzla?

21 A. I guess where I'm -- I'm having difficulty following the track on

22 this is the document that we just discussed, you know, how that relates

23 to this particular date and time. I mean, can we go back to that

24 original document? I mean, I just want to, in my own mind, go back to

25 the date of the document that you were referencing earlier and then try

Page 17008

1 and compare it to this particular oral order, or a written order, I mean.

2 Q. Thank you. Do you recall the document that was published on the

3 11th of November, 1994, relating to the break-out operation and the

4 linking up of enclaves? Do you remember that document?

5 A. Yes, sir.

6 Q. Thank you. Now, do you see that this document speaks of

7 April 1995, in other words, a period following that period from that

8 document?

9 And now if you look at the seventh line below the line containing

10 the words "April 1995," where it says:

11 "Commander Oric and I were supposed to go back together, but

12 after a discussion with the commander of the General Staff, Oric received

13 permission to stay on in Tuzla for a while and to return to Srebrenica

14 after the training of officers, around the 10th of May, of officers who

15 had come for training earlier."

16 Now, can we see from this that there was oral communication

17 between the Chief of Staff of the 28th Division with the commander of the

18 General Staff, and that they were there from April 1995 until the

19 10th of May, 1995, when Naser Oric stayed behind?

20 A. Let me see if I can cut right to what I believe you are driving

21 to.

22 If I understood the text of the various questions correctly, are

23 you asking me that do I believe that in this period of April/May 1995 the

24 activities that you are discussing here are, in fact, the verbal order to

25 implement this particular plan that we've discussed, 02-1/1394-1, dated

Page 17009

1 9 November 1994? Is that the question that you're asking?

2 Q. Thank you. My question to you is in line with what you've just

3 said. Now, was Commander Delic, the commander of the

4 Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, did he have oral communication with the

5 commander and Chief of Staff of the 28th Division, as stated here by

6 Ramiz Becirovic in his statement, in other words, from late April into

7 May? Thank you.

8 A. He could have communicated with him in a variety of ways. As you

9 know, the -- not only could they have done oral communications, but there

10 was the ability to do written communications or enciphered computer

11 communications, so I would not limit contacts just to oral

12 communications. Clearly, if the individual was out of the enclave, that

13 did increase or would increase the ability to communicate in person, let

14 alone orally over the telephone.

15 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. I pointed out a meeting that they had

16 where they had direct contact, and this is something that Becirovic

17 talked about. And then I said that it was not possible to have any

18 further contact unless there was communication or visits. Here, he

19 described a visit, and then it also says:

20 "... pursuant to an oral order from the BiH commander, carry out

21 preparations for combat operations in order to liberate the territory of

22 the BH Army."

23 That's how this letter or order began.

24 Now, my question to you is: Could Delic issue this oral order,

25 about when the operation was to begin and the plan implemented, could he

Page 17010

1 have done that earlier because they were there for training and

2 preparations?

3 A. The -- just to qualify one point. As I noted, I do not read that

4 order in the same way that you did, that it qualifies as a full-blown

5 liberation-of-the-territory order. Having said that, having --

6 General Delic could have clearly issued the order, either orally or in

7 writing, at any time that he deemed that the conditions were met to begin

8 the final preparations for the plan that we've talked about for

9 9 November 1994. Having all of the relevant commanders physically

10 present, or many of them present in Tuzla, would have had an opportunity

11 to do that, if, in fact, he chose to do it there.

12 As a military practice, having the subordinate commanders and key

13 principals around and physically being able to brief them on the order

14 helps to ensure that everyone understands what the tasks are and what is

15 expected of them. So, you know, while the order may have been given at

16 that point in time, if I agreed to your time-line and assertion, the

17 actual final preparations for the operation would clearly not have

18 started occurring until such time that all of those relevant individuals

19 who were in Tuzla were brought back into the enclave so they could

20 undertake the preparations.

21 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler.

22 Now please answer this question: Was the direct, personal,

23 physical, as it were, contact between Naser Oric, his deputy,

24 Ramiz Becirovic, and the commander of the BH Army, Rasim Delic [Realtime

25 transcript read in error "Naser Oric"] in existence, as it were, on this

Page 17011

1 date, on the 5th of this month, where Ramiz Becirovic mentions here?

2 A. I don't know the answer to that. I mean, I can't go into his

3 statement to verify what is or is not or would not have happened. I just

4 don't know.

5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I note we have a problem in the transcript.

6 In the last question of Mr. Tolimir, there's a reference to

7 "Naser Oric," his "principal." I don't know if he really said

8 "principal" or "deputy," Ramiz Becirovic, and the commander of the

9 BH Army. And we see again the name "Naser Oric." But I think we heard

10 "Rasim Delic." Is that correct, Mr. Tolimir?

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. We will

12 clarify all this by quoting the words of Ramiz Becirovic that can be

13 found in his statement in paragraph 3 -- or, rather, the seventh line of

14 that paragraph. That's the paragraph beginning with the words: "In late

15 April 1995." And the seventh line in that paragraph reads:

16 "Commander Oric and I were supposed to go back. But after a

17 discussion with the commander of the General Staff, Oric received

18 permission to stay on in Tuzla for a while and to return to Srebrenica

19 after the training of officers was completed around the 10th of May,

20 officers who had arrived earlier."

21 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Now, my question is this: Mr. Butler, from this statement of

23 Mr. Becirovic's, can we conclude that there was oral communication

24 between General Delic, Naser Oric, and Ramiz Becirovic in the months of

25 April or May 1995, as described here by Becirovic in his statement, and

Page 17012

1 is it possible that it was at this time that he issued the oral order

2 that was mentioned in document D53 and that I quoted earlier, the

3 document dated 17 June? Thank you. In other words, were they already in

4 the know about the substance of Delic's oral order?

5 A. I don't mean to sound obstinate, but I'm not sure that I can

6 answer that question. This is a statement by a particular individual.

7 I'm not in a position to make conclusions based off of one statement,

8 particularly the conclusions that you're looking for. My answer would be

9 that maybe Mr. Becirovic would be the person that you should be directing

10 that question to.

11 Q. Thank you. I will not insist. You conducted an analysis here,

12 and my question now is very specific. Did Ramiz Becirovic state in his

13 statement that he and Naser Oric had direct contact with Rasim Delic?

14 Thank you.

15 A. I -- again, what it says in this statement, it says in the

16 statement. There's -- there's one particular line:

17 "In the meantime, the commander of the General Staff, Delic,

18 arrived, who enable us to go to Visca by helicopter, and we went to a

19 location in the corps command, where Delic received us."

20 Again, I can verify that it says what it says in the statement,

21 but I can't verify that what is said in the statement actually happened,

22 you know, at least in the context of that particular meeting.

23 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. We will waste no more time on this. Let

24 the Trial Chamber have their own opinion of this.

25 But let's see now document D178. This is an intelligence

Page 17013

1 information or intelligence report.

2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Before this will be brought up, please, I would

3 like to see the first and the last page of the current document, which

4 seems to be D1 or 1D1; I don't know.

5 THE REGISTRAR: This is D1. Thank you.

6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.

7 We have now only the B/C/S version on the screen.

8 Thank you. It's a document from the 11th of August, 1995.

9 And I would like to see the last page with the signature.

10 It says signed by Ramiz Becirovic. Thank you very much.

11 Now the other document, D178, should be brought up.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

14 Q. D178 is on the screen now. It says here, in the title,

15 "Main Staff of the VRS, Intelligence and Security Sector." It says

16 "22nd of June, 1995." And, finally, we will see the stamp, on which the

17 date is the 23rd of June or April 1995.

18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: The document should be enlarged, please.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20 Let's look at the fourth paragraph in this document on page 3.

21 Thank you.

22 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

23 Q. I quote -- I apologise, and I quote from the fourth paragraph:

24 "It has been confirmed that the Muslim forces in Srebrenica,

25 Zepa, and Gorazde are continuing with preparations for offensive

Page 17014

1 operations, and that they are using the Srebrenica-Zepa axis for the

2 manoeuvre of forces and the movement of civilians and goods. They are

3 supplying ammunition and weapons by air. A great deal of the population

4 is expressing fear and the wish to leave the enclave because of the

5 announced escalation of combat operations and the feeling of isolation."

6 Thank you. End of quote.

7 My question is this: Do you see that on the 22nd of April the

8 Main Staff had information that in Srebrenica preparations were ongoing

9 for an offensive aimed at linking up the enclaves and ultimately linking

10 up the enclaves with the forces of the 2nd Corps? Thank you.

11 A. What it says is that the Main Staff had confirmed that the forces

12 in Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde are continuing their preparations for

13 offensive operations. It does not say in this particular passage the

14 second assertion that you've made, and -- that it is that these

15 particular offensive operations are designed to link up with the forces

16 of 2nd Corps.

17 Q. Thank you.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And now can we look at D238.

19 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Since you're an analyst, a soldier, I have asked you to analyse

21 certain data. That's what my questions have all been for.

22 And now let's first look at page 1. The document was issued on

23 the 26th of June, 1995. It is intelligence information by the Main Staff

24 of the Army of Republika Srpska, the Intelligence and Security Sector.

25 And now can we please look at page 2 in Serbian and 3 in English,

Page 17015

1 where it says in the second paragraph, and I quote:

2 "In the zone of responsibility of the 2nd Muslim Corps, an

3 additional mobilisation campaign is underway, including under-age,

4 elderly, and ill military conscripts. In the area of Majevica, Teocak,

5 Kalesija, and Kladanj, the units of the 2nd Muslim Corps have continued

6 their diversionary operations."

7 And so on and so forth.

8 My question is this -- end of quote. My question is this: Based

9 on this intelligence, can you conclude that when a mobilisation campaign

10 is underway, under-age, elderly, and ill military conscripts are being

11 mobilised as part of that campaign, can you conclude, based on that, that

12 that military is preparing for a serious or large-scale military

13 operation? Thank you.

14 A. Yes, sir. In the sense that offensive operations generally

15 require more from the attacking forces in defend -- than in terms of

16 manpower, equipment, and other issues, if the 2nd Muslim Corps, in this

17 context, is preparing for a significant military operation, it would be

18 logical that they would take whatever steps that they believed they could

19 take in order to ensure that, at least in terms of manpower, they had as

20 many soldiers available as they could in that particular context.

21 Now, having said that, if you're mobilising under-aged, elderly,

22 or ill individuals, particularly with respect to under-age or elderly, I

23 mean, you really are looking in a situation where there will have to be

24 some time spent training or re-training them in order to perform even

25 basic military functions. So it differs, in a sense, from, you know,

Page 17016

1 mobilising relatively well-trained reservists who can be put into combat

2 operations in a week or two, versus drafting a recent group of

3 16-year-old kids who were formerly in high school and who have had no

4 military service and expecting them to be available in the same

5 time-frame.

6 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler, for this military analysis. And now can

7 you look at the last paragraph on the same page.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the document in Serbian be

9 scrolled up a little. Thank you. In English, it's 5, page 5, the second

10 paragraph on page 5. Thank you.

11 Thank you, Aleksandar.

12 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

13 Q. I'm going to quote from this paragraph:

14 "On 25/26 June of this year, Muslim forces of the 28th Division

15 started offensive operations from the enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa by

16 infiltrating several sabotage and terrorist groups into our territory.

17 In Srebrenica, they blocked UNPROFOR, accusing them that they had not

18 protected the so-called demilitarised zone. It is not unlikely that

19 parts of UNPROFOR had been disarmed."

20 However, the next sentence reads:

21 "The objective of these operations is to link up our forces and

22 create more favourable conditions for operations by the 24th, 23rd, and

23 26th Divisions from the directions of Kalesija, Zivinice, and Kladanj."

24 My question to you, sir, is this: Does all this point to the

25 fact that the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including its parts in the

Page 17017

1 demilitarised zone, had launched an operation to create a corridor to

2 infiltrate sabotage groups into the territory and that they had started

3 the operation which was planned already in November 1994? Thank you.

4 A. First, can I request a clarification on your question.

5 When you read that particular paragraph to me, the

6 English-language translation that I have said:

7 "The objective of these operations is to tie up our forces and

8 create more favourable conditions ..."

9 What I heard you ask -- or you say is:

10 "The objective of these operations is to link up our forces ..."

11 Is it a -- am I -- is the English translation correct, or ...

12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.

13 MR. McCLOSKEY: Mr. President, I don't have an answer to that.

14 But if I could have just a minute or two at the end just to seek

15 a bit of clarification on a 98 bis issue before we leave.

16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Indeed, we should come to an end. We have only

17 three minutes left, and I would like to say some words as well before we

18 break.

19 I think this is going to be a longer discussion and examination

20 of the witness on this document. Is that correct? And, therefore, you

21 should reserve this kind of questions for the next hearing in August. Is

22 that acceptable for you, Mr. Tolimir?

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

24 Everything is acceptable to me. However, I would really

25 appreciate to receive an answer at least to my last question before we go

Page 17018

1 to the recess. The recess is going to be long, and the witness can be

2 influenced in all sorts of ways, so I would really appreciate an answer

3 before we break up for the summer.

4 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Then you should please say again if -- read this

5 part of the sentence where we see -- which starts with: "The objectives

6 of these operations is to tie up," or "to link up." That was the

7 question. Otherwise, the witness is not able to answer your question.

8 Read this part into the transcript again, please, but only the beginning

9 of the sentence.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11 I am reading that part of the text that you requested. You have

12 it in English:

13 "The objective of these operations is most probably to -- the

14 linking up of our forces and creating more favourable conditions for

15 operations by the 24th, 23rd, and 26th Divisions from the direction of

16 Kalesija, Zivinice and Kladanj."

17 Thank you.

18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It was only the question of "link up" or "tie

19 up." Now we heard for the first time "it is most probably." Did you say

20 that? I don't see it in the English text.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In the English translation it

22 should read "most probably the linking up of our forces." Thank you.

23 This is what the English translation should read.

24 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.

25 Could you comment on that, Mr. Butler?

Page 17019

1 No, we don't have so much more time. Let's hear the answer of

2 Mr. Butler, if he is able to provide us with the answer.

3 THE WITNESS: If I were to take it that the actual phrase is

4 translated as "linking up" versus "tying up," the short answer would be:

5 It's possible. I wouldn't necessarily conclude that, because the problem

6 over this whole course of questions and pieces of evidence was that we

7 have one particular document dated 9 November, and in this particular

8 practice I'm being shown disparate pieces of information, to a degree out

9 of context, in a manner to try and to determine whether or not it

10 supports or doesn't support a specific conclusion. As an analyst, that's

11 a particularly bad practice, because you're going to -- you're going to

12 find what you're looking for in this particular case. Now, if you want

13 it to be this way, you can always make a case that it is.

14 You know, it is possible. And if I were to review all of the

15 relevant material, I might even conclude that General Tolimir would be

16 correct. But I would certainly not be comfortable in doing it off of

17 three or four or five pieces of data and jumping to that particular

18 conclusion.

19 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you for this answer.

20 That should conclude now the interrogation of the witness.

21 I give the floor to Mr. McCloskey.

22 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President.

23 I have been speaking to Mr. Gajic about the 98 bis, and he is

24 unable to tell me whether or not the general has decided to make a 98 bis

25 argument. I would request the Court require them to tell us before the