1 Tuesday, 23 August 2011
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Good morning to everybody in the courtroom and to
6 those who are following our procedures.
7 Mr. McCloskey, are you in a position to update us about the
8 matters we discussed yesterday?
9 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Mr. President. Good morning. Good morning,
11 Yes, I would like to be able to announce that today we will file
12 92 quater motions for Witness 192 and Witness 193 and that for witnesses
13 61, 42, 94, and 95 we will be -- are asking that they be withdrawn. And
14 I can file something or just do this orally, however you'd wish.
15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much for that. Is the Defence in
16 a position to indicate when they will be able to respond? Taking into
17 account the short time of the remainder of the Prosecution case, we would
18 be happy if the Defence would be able to respond as soon as possible.
19 Mr. Gajic.
20 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, the Defence will
21 respond as soon as we are physically able to do so.
22 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Whatever that means.
23 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] This means that we will do everything
24 in our power to respond as soon as possible. First, we have to review 92
25 quater requests and will respond shortly thereafter.
1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much. Then in that case we will
2 wait for the motion the Prosecution pursuant to 92 quater in relation to
3 two witnesses.
4 Can I take it that the four witnesses are now withdrawn by your
5 oral submission, Mr. McCloskey?
6 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Mr. President.
7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you. If there are no other matters, we
8 should -- the witness should be brought in, please.
9 Mr. McCloskey.
10 MR. McCLOSKEY: Mr. President, you should all have our list of
11 the remaining witnesses and our estimated times, and I've spoken to
12 Mr. Gajic about that. And we hope to be able to work roughly within
13 those times. Witness Pecanac may be hard to gauge the time that he will
14 take, but the rest don't appear to be very time consuming.
15 [The witness takes the stand]
16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much.
17 Good morning, Mr. Butler. Welcome back to the courtroom.
18 THE WITNESS: Good morning, sir.
19 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Again, I have to remind you that the affirmation
20 to tell the truth still applies.
21 WITNESS: RICHARD BUTLER [Resumed]
22 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir is continuing his cross-examination.
24 Mr. Tolimir, you have the floor.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. May
1 there be peace in this house and may God's will be done in these
2 proceedings today and not mine. Greetings to everyone present.
3 Cross-examination by Mr. Tolimir: [Continued]
4 Q. [Interpretation] And Mr. Butler, too. Mr. Butler, yesterday we
5 discussed the conversation with Mr. Mladic and the threat that sanctions
6 would be imposed if UNPROFOR convoys were subject of attack? This is
7 something that we discussed. Do you remember?
8 A. I remember we had discussions related to this within the context
9 of General Smith's witness statement.
10 Q. That's correct. I'll read the relevant sentence. Smith said
11 that he spoke to Karadzic on the 9th of March.
12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Could you please indicate where we can find it in
13 the statement of Mr. Smith so that we can have it on the screen.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, my apologies,
15 Mr. President. We will find the relevant portion of General Smith.
16 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] Can we show D193, page 13,
17 paragraph 2. That's page 12, penultimate or last paragraph of the page.
18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: You mean page 12 in the English; correct?
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's correct. The last
20 paragraph, which reads:
21 "On the 9th May, I had a further private meeting with
22 Dr. Karadzic. The discussions covered the recent BSA attacks on Sarajevo
23 and the Bosnian Serb sanctions on the UN contingents in the eastern
25 Can we now show 65 ter 724. 7248, my apologies.
1 Thank you, Aleksandar.
2 This is another report about the interview that the OTP had with
3 General Rupert Smith on the 8th of November, 2011. Can we have page 4
4 displayed in both versions, paragraphs 1 through 3. It seems that we are
5 looking after paragraph 5, after all. Let me quote:
6 "I predicted under the thesis that the Serbs would neutralise
7 those enclaves to eliminate the need to place BSA forces.
8 "Then there was the routine denial of convoys. There was the
9 shooting down of two Bosnian helicopters flying one into Gorazde and
10 into Srebrenica.
11 "I thought to myself, what if I was Mladic? What would I do to
12 shift the balance of forces to advantage of the Serbs? I would squeeze
13 the enclaves, make them irrelevant, starve them."
14 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
15 Q. This is my question: In this particular quotation, did
16 General Rupert Smith present his view as to what he would have done had
17 he been in the shoes of the Bosnian Serbs?
18 A. This particular -- this second statement which I believe you're
19 incorrect, it's not dated 2011, I believe it's dated 2002. I am not sure
20 if I've ever read it before, so I don't know the entire context of the
21 statement, but from the passage that you laid out, General Smith is
22 theorising that if he were General Mladic, how he would approach the
23 situation with respect to shifting, again, that balance of power and not
24 necessarily strength but the ability to free up forces to use them in
25 other parts of the country. That shifting, that balance of been -- of
1 forces to the advantage of the Serbs, how he would do it. In his case,
2 he's basically saying that he would deal with the situation in the
3 eastern enclaves. He recognised, as General Mladic did, that they were
4 an intolerable strain on the man power resources of the Army of the
5 Republika Srpska.
6 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. General Smith goes on to say further
8 "I would squeeze the enclaves, make them irrelevant, starve
10 Was this, too, a view that he expressed? Thank you.
11 A. It's -- in the context of his witness statement, it's probably
12 not the most artful phrase that he might have used in describing the
13 situation, but what it says is what it says.
14 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. If these eastern enclaves, which were
15 deep within the territory of Republika Srpska, and if they attacked the
16 territory of the Republika Srpska, is not the Army of Republika Srpska
17 entitled to use measures against them including UNPROFOR forces which
18 failed to enforce the demilitarisation to which measures they would be
19 entitled under the legal provisions arising from the Geneva Conventions
20 that we looked at yesterday?
21 A. As I've indicated before, I've always believed that the VRS had
22 the right to attack the elements of the 28th Infantry Division in both
23 the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves. Those represented legitimate military
24 targets. As for the second part of your question, whether or not they
25 were entitled to use measures against the United Nations protection
1 forces is a thornier question. For good or for bad, the United Nations
2 protection forces did not see themselves as a party to the conflict.
3 I understand that from the Bosnian Serb military perspective,
4 they were viewed as, at least tacitly, aiding the Bosnian Muslim forces
5 in the enclaves, or the enclaves with respect to the eastern enclaves.
6 So, again, there was never any problem conducting military operations
7 against the 28th Infantry Division. They represented a legitimate
8 military target as such. I am always problematic with respect to whether
9 or not anyone is entitled to attack the United Nations forces under those
10 same scenarios.
11 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. A moment ago you said that they aided the
12 Muslim forces, and I mean UNPROFOR. Are not the Bosnian Serbs entitled
13 to restrict the aid arriving for the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
14 especially if the aid happens to be transiting the territory under their
15 control? Thank you.
16 A. What I said specifically was that I understand that from a
17 military perspective the Bosnian Serb side viewed that UNPROFOR was
18 aiding the Bosnian Muslim side. I have no first-hand knowledge whether
19 they were or were no it.
20 As to the second part of your question, the Bosnian Serb side
21 obviously did have the view that since they believed that the UNPROFOR
22 was aiding the Bosnian Muslim side, that by restricting supplies going
23 into the United Nations or for United Nations forces, that that would
24 have a follow-on effect and militarily impact or degradate the ability of
25 the Bosnian Muslim military forces to conduct further operations.
1 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Yesterday and this morning we've been
2 discussing the mandate of the United Nations forces, specifically the
3 Dutch Battalion in the Srebrenica enclave.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now call up D20. It's a
5 report based on the debriefing which was published in 1995. We are
6 interested in page 9, paragraph 23 -- 223, which describes the mandate
7 of the Dutch Battalion in Srebrenica. This is the title: "Debriefing."
8 Can we have page 9, paragraph 2.23. Can we have the next page, please.
9 Thank you. We see there 2.23. You can see it. We are discussing the
10 mandate of the Dutch Battalion as expressed here:
11 "The tasks assigned to DutchBat were as follows, derived from the
12 aforementioned cease-fire and resolutions."
13 Under A:
14 "To monitor compliance with the cease-fire.
15 "B. To disarm the BiH.
16 "C. To support the provision of humanitarian aid."
17 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
18 Q. This is my question: Based on your knowledge and reading of the
19 relevant documents including perhaps this debriefing, is what I just read
20 out the basis for the mandate of the DutchBat that was present in
21 Srebrenica? Thank you.
22 A. In the context of this particular document and laying this
23 situation out, these were the three provisions that came out of the 1995
24 report, so this is what initially that they understood their mission to
1 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us, was any of these tasks completed by
2 the UNPROFOR forces stationed in Srebrenica and Zepa?
3 A. With respect to the three tasks, I believe that task A,
4 monitoring the compliance, and task C, were tasks that were always going
5 to be ongoing, and the Dutch Battalion took measures to do that. I do
6 not believe that by the time we got to the third iteration of
7 Dutch Battalion, DutchBat III, that they were actively involved in task B
8 anymore, which was disarming the BiH forces within the enclave.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let's look at D239 now. It's a
11 report from the sector of intelligence and security of the Main Staff of
12 VRS, dated the 19th of May, 1995. Can we show page 2, please, in
13 Serbian, and page 3 in English. We have it now. Thank you. The
14 relevant part reads:
15 "We have confirmed the information that the 28th Division is
16 undergoing intensive preparations for offensive activities in order to
17 link up with elements of the 23rd Division in the Han Pogled area. As
18 part of offensive preparations from the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves,
19 they have taken possession of important features to secure the corridor
20 linking the enclaves, and they have partially grouped the forces in the
21 western part of the enclaves. They have taken Podravanje, Ljeskovik,
22 Susica, Stublic, Brloznik, Sadilov Cair, Godjenje, Ljubomislje, and
23 Gusinac, which are outside of the so-called demilitarised zone, which is
24 also to create better conditions for offensive activities."
25 So this is document dated 19th May, 1995, which is two months
1 ahead of the VRS operations directed at Srebrenica.
2 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Tell us, should UNPROFOR know that they are leaving the
4 demilitarised zone and taking up positions, as indicated here, which were
5 part of the operation of linking up?
6 A. As you are aware, the UN Dutch Battalion forces did have a number
7 of observation posts around the perimeter of the enclave, along not
8 necessarily the demarcated border because the demarcated border was
9 disputed. I would again remind you that whether they should have known
10 or should not have known, the reality was that once restrictions of
11 movements were put into place by the BiH 28th Infantry Division in March
12 of 1995, and perhaps even as early as February, the actual ability of the
13 Dutch Battalion to monitor all of these types of operations would have
14 been greatly degraded.
15 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. You're probably thinking of this
16 particular document of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now show D142, please.
18 Thank you. We have the document in Serbian and we'll shortly have it in
19 English, I suppose. We are interested in paragraph 3, to summarise what
20 you discussed, and I'm quoting:
21 "The Corps command must agree with the UNPROFOR liaison officer
22 stationed there on the procedure when giving advance notice to the
23 commands of the brigades, battalions, and lines of defence of the BH Army
24 of movement and checks by groups, teams, patrols, and others from the
25 UNPROFOR contingent. UNPROFOR movement has to be channelled and reduced
1 as much as possible in places where they can observe and gather
3 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
4 Q. This is a document issued by the command of the BH Army of the
5 Corps in Tuzla, sent on the 4th of January, 1995, to Srebrenica. You are
6 right on that score. However, this is my question: Because of all this,
7 was UNPROFOR under the supervision of the BH Army in Srebrenica or was it
8 the other way around? Thank you.
9 A. I am not sure I can claim that the UNPROFOR was under the
10 supervision of the BH Army in Srebrenica, but, again, I certainly concede
11 what I've always said on this same issue which is that one these
12 restrictions on movement went into place, the ability of the
13 Dutch Battalion to effectively monitor ABiH military movements and
14 activities within the enclave were greatly restricted.
15 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Was it the case then that the Army of
16 Republika Srpska which had its territory in the area where the enclaves
17 are situated, aren't they entitled, in fact, to make sure that UNPROFOR
18 does what it was supposed to do; i.e., disarm the enclaves?
19 A. Again, that is a constant theme within the reporting of the VRS,
20 and particularly the Drina Corps, which is the fact that they do not
21 believe that the UN forces were living up to what they believe was the
22 mandate, and part of that mandate, under the cease-fire agreements, was
23 to disarm the Bosnian Muslim forces or to ensure that they remained
24 disarmed within the enclave. The Dutch Battalion and the UN forces, for
25 their reasons, elected not to force the issue with 1st Operations Group 8
1 and later the 28th Infantry Division. They allowed that status quo to
2 remain, and, as a result, that status quo permitted the
3 28th Infantry Division to conduct operations out of the enclave.
4 Q. Thank you. Does that mean, Mr. Butler, that UNPROFOR forces
5 deployed in Srebrenica failed to fulfill their mandate with regard to the
6 parties to the conflict and that they favoured one of the sides and, in
7 fact, allowed it to organise itself militarily?
8 A. Whether or not they failed to fulfill their mandate again
9 revolves around the question of what the United Nations from top to
10 bottom believed their mandate was with respect to the safe areas. As you
11 can tell even from this document that you have here, from the 2nd Corps
12 command, even the Bosnian Muslim military forces believed that the
13 UNPROFOR forces in the Srebrenica enclave were, in fact, gathering
14 information related to their military operations to their detriment.
15 Both sides perceived that the United Nations forces were not acting
16 impartially within the enclave. The Bosnian Serb side had their position
17 which was that the UNPROFOR was tacitly aiding the Bosnian Muslim
18 military forces: One, overtly by not disarming them; and, two, through
19 the convoy activities and humanitarian resupply which they believed was
20 being siphoned to some degree to support the 28th Infantry Division.
21 The Bosnian Muslims on their side, particularly as you get closer
22 to July of 1995, actually go as far as believing that the United Nations
23 mandate for the safe area should be defined as defending the safe area
24 from the attack by the Bosnian Serb military forces.
25 So in this particular context, the United Nations protection
1 forces were viewed very badly by both sides with respect to what they
2 were supposed to be doing within the Srebrenica enclave.
3 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Please, can you tell me this: If
4 UNPROFOR forces in the enclaves had the mandate to disarm the BH, did
5 they also have the mandate to collect intelligence data about the
6 developments in the enclaves with respect to the procedure of arming, and
7 were they entitled to confiscate such weaponry and put them in a safe
8 depot because according to the agreement, even paramilitary formations
9 were subject to disarming in the enclaves?
10 A. Dealing first with your question on intelligence information, I
11 would suspect that while the UN would never qualify it as collecting
12 intelligence on warring parties, the reality will be that the UN
13 commanders on the ground are going to want to keep and be informed as
14 much as possible about what is happening in the enclave, if for no other
15 reason than to assure the protection and security of the UN forces. So
16 there will be intelligence collection or reconnaissance activities going
17 on by the UN.
18 With respect to the collection of weapons, the UN DutchBat forces
19 there did, in fact, collect weapons, particularly early on in 1993, and
20 they were monitored. The problem that was ongoing was that the
21 United Nations would only monitor the weapons that were turned in by the
22 Bosnian Muslim military side. They would not actively go out and seek to
23 disarm those particular units.
24 So on the one hand, they guarded whatever material that was
25 turned over to them, much of it, as it turns out, was either inoperative
1 or obsolete; but on the other hand, they did not do anything with respect
2 to actively going out and confiscating military equipment or supplies
3 that they might have seen.
4 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. If their main task was to effect the
5 disarming of all forces in the enclave, why were they then concealing
6 their task with regard to gathering intelligence about both the regular
7 military and paramilitary forces inside the enclave?
8 A. I don't believe they were concealing it as such. All parties
9 knew that the United Nations forces, as part of the monitoring the
10 enclave, were going to go out and conduct reconnaissance operations. In
11 fact, when you go back to this document that you have on the screen with
12 respect to the 2nd Corps command, it is precisely because of the fact
13 that the ABiH military forces are aware that the Dutch are doing this
14 that they seek to restrict their movement so they can prevent the Dutch
15 from gaining information on these military units and other such
16 information that they deemed would be vital to keep from the Dutch. So
17 it's not a secret that they are doing it. What I'm trying to get the
18 point across is that I would suspect that the UN would not ever claim
19 that they are actually conducting intelligence operations. I mean, they
20 are to be a neutral party. And in this particular context, I don't
21 believe, you know, doing reconnaissance of an area that they are
22 supposedly protecting or monitoring is going to qualify as intelligence
24 Q. Thank you. Please, did you ever read any kind of document
25 containing information about the relationships between UNPROFOR and the
1 commands of staffs and the 28th Division or any other unit because this
2 is mentioned in this document? Was it allowed for a demilitarised side
3 to have liaison officers to communicate with UNPROFOR in Srebrenica?
4 A. I am aware from the various documents that I've read with respect
5 to Srebrenica, that both sides, not only the Bosnian Muslim side but the
6 Bosnian Serb military side, had protocols in place and officers who were
7 designated to be liaison officers, not only with the Dutch Battalion but
8 with the independent United Nations military observers within Srebrenica.
9 So there was, at least, a mechanism by which not only the UN observers
10 but the Dutch Battalion officers could contact both their counterparts
11 within the VRS as well as their counterparts within the ABiH.
12 Q. Thank you. Were units such as battalion and brigades supposed to
13 exist in Srebrenica, and if the proper demilitarisation had been
14 conducted, would the situation have been any different?
15 A. In answer to your first question, I suppose in the abstract that
16 the 2nd Corps could have decided to keep a military organisational
17 structure for Operations Group 8 and later the 28th Infantry Division and
18 still had them completely disarmed in full compliance with the agreement.
19 I don't know that that would have made much sense to do but they could
20 have done it.
21 The second question, I am not sure that I can answer. It
22 requires a bit of speculation on my part. I don't know whether or not
23 it's known or can be known if -- had the 28th Division been completely
24 disarmed, whether or not history would have happened the way that it did.
25 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Given that UNPROFOR maintained legal
1 contact with a military organisation structure in a demilitarised zone,
2 have you come across any documents confirming that they provided them
3 with humanitarian aid even though they were dealing with a military
5 A. I am not aware of any document specifically from the Dutch
6 component of the United Nations which reflects that UN supplies to the
7 Dutch Battalion were being siphoned off or provided to the ABiH. I am
8 aware that various civilian organisations within the enclave, at times,
9 did make complaints to the Dutch that various other humanitarian goods
10 that were brought in under other UN or international auspices were
11 stolen, siphoned off for military use, or being sold on the black market.
12 So I guess I differentiate between those supplies that are going directly
13 to -- and are manifested to the Dutch Battalion for their use versus a
14 broader pool of supplies that were going in to provide support for the
15 larger civilian population.
16 Q. Thank you.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now please have in e-court
19 In the meantime, I would like to tender into evidence D142.
20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you, the last document, D142 was marked for
21 identification pending future identification. It will now be received as
22 D142 as a Defence document.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now please have D80 in
24 e-court. Thank you. This is a document produced by the Republic of
25 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Federation of BH, and their defence ministry,
1 specifically their defence secretariat of Tuzla, Srebrenica department,
2 submitted on the 5th of June, 1995, to the Tuzla defence secretariat in
3 which they are reporting about the situation and aid arriving in
4 Srebrenica. And it says:
5 "We hereby submit a list of the quantities of food, materiel, and
6 technical equipment and fuel issued to our military units in our area
7 from the month of May 1995."
8 Then it says:
9 "25.900 kilogrammes of flour, 596 kilogrammes of sugar, 1.423
10 litres of cooking oil, 619 kilogrammes of salt, 5.000 kilogrammes of
11 beans, 17.020 of cold cuts, 100 kilogrammes of powder milk, 62
12 kilogrammes of juice, 7.000 [as interpreted] of tins." Then it speaks
13 about, "Carrot, beans, 171 litres of fuel, engine oil, 1 litre.
14 "We wish to note that the above quantities have been separated
15 from the humanitarian aid contingent which arrived in the area through
16 the UNHCR, while some of the food was obtained from the Dutch Battalion.
17 "Till our ultimate victory!
18 "Chief of the Defence sector, Professor Suljo Hasanovic."
19 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
20 Q. My question is: Can one infer from this document that the
21 Dutch Battalion was providing assistance to the Army of
22 Bosnian-Herzegovina as well in the Srebrenica enclave consisting of food
23 supplies, fuel, and other necessities and items listed here?
24 A. Within the context of this document it certainly does claim that
25 they obtained some of the food from the Dutch Battalion. It doesn't
1 specify that they obtained fuel or other such items. And I guess the
2 question that I would have before agreeing to a statement like that, is
3 whether or not the Dutch would ultimately have been aware that the food
4 that they were supplying was actually going to the military versus to
5 civilian needs.
6 So while I accept the fact from this particular document that the
7 28th Infantry Division and the military forces within Srebrenica are
8 getting food from these sources, one of which is the Dutch Battalion, the
9 question that I would have is whether or not the Dutch Battalion
10 personnel were aware that they were supplying food for the ABiH army as
11 opposed to providing food for civilians.
12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: One short remark, on my part. You have read into
13 the transcript the content of this document, Mr. Tolimir, in relation to
14 the 171 litres. You said -- or I heard in the interpretation the word
15 "fuel." In the English translation I see "heating oil" in relation to
16 171 litre. It may be a translation issue. I don't know. Just for the
18 Please -- Mr. Gajic.
19 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, obviously there is a
20 slight mistake in the translation because in the original it says "oil,"
21 "171 litres of oil."
22 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I see the word "nafta."
23 Please continue, Mr. Tolimir.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
25 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
1 Q. In order not to dwell on these issues any longer since we see
2 that there were no activities leading to the disarming, and you said that
4 Now let us look at task C. That is to say, did they provide
5 support in providing humanitarian aid? In other words, can you tell me
6 whether UNPROFOR provided support in providing humanitarian aid and did
7 they, themselves, provide humanitarian supplies? Thank you.
8 A. The UNPROFOR, within the context of the Srebrenica enclave, one,
9 their primary mission was to resupply their own United Nations forces;
10 the second one was to facilitate the movement of supplies by other
11 United Nations or international agencies to the enclaves for the general
12 population. It was not the UNPROFOR's job per se to supply the civilian
13 population within the enclave. It was the UNPROFOR's job to provide
14 security, to monitor the enclave, and create the conditions where other
15 United Nations and international agencies would do that.
16 So I mean, I guess it's a bit of an artificial distinction, but
17 from the United Nations' perspective it's probably an important one.
18 Q. Thank you. Now, please, since you spoke about the role of
19 UNPROFOR in delivering the relief, under the Geneva Conventions did
20 UNPROFOR have any right to check and control the ultimate destination
21 relief and to whom it was distributed?
22 A. I don't know the answer to that question. I am not sure of
23 how -- in enough detail how the process would have worked with respect to
24 what UN -- UN protection force procedures were in place to verify that
25 aid coming in from other United Nations agencies or other international
1 organisations were given strictly to civilians or noncombatants and did
2 not make their way to combatant forces. I just don't know enough about
3 how that process worked and what the protocols were to be able to comment
4 on it.
5 Q. Thank you. Well, were they entitled then to monitor or supervise
6 the distribution of this humanitarian aid to prevent it to going to the
7 places where it is not intended to go, such as smuggling channels, black
8 markets, and things of that sort?
9 A. Again, sir, I don't know if that was a specific mission mandate
10 of the United Nations protection forces or whether that remained a task
11 that the actual agencies providing the aid would be responsible for.
12 Q. Thank you. Please, do you know what the difference is between an
13 UNPROFOR convoy and a humanitarian aid convoy? Can you explain that to
14 that Trial Chamber?
15 A. My understanding was that while all convoys were generally
16 escorted by UNPROFOR, and as evidenced by the documents that I think I
17 discussed during the Prosecution case, you could see two separate classes
18 of convoys that would be moving via the roads. One set of convoys was
19 specifically limited to the supply and provisioning of the designated
20 United Nations military forces in the enclaves or in other areas of
21 Bosnia. And the other set of convoys were those by other United Nations
22 aid agencies or other humanitarian organisations that would be going into
23 the enclaves for their own purposes. So those are the two general
24 categories of convoys that I am aware of.
25 Q. Thank you. Do you know from which type of convoys was it
1 possible to extract certain quantities of fuel oil to be used by the Army
2 of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the enclaves?
3 A. I would presume that both. For example, in one of the documents
4 that was discussed related to an UNPROFOR convoy, the Bosnian Serb
5 military showed concern about wanting to verify the exact amount of fuel
6 in each military vehicle because of their concern that they would be
7 travelling into the enclaves with far more fuel than they actually needed
8 to complete one rotation in and out of the enclave. And the concern was,
9 you know, ABiH military forces would then just siphon off the extra fuel.
10 It would just come right out of the military fuel tanks.
11 In the case of the other UN convoys, one, the same method would
12 apply as well as other more overt situations where fuel and other things
13 would be improperly manifested so that it would show a lesser amount on
14 the manifest document that was actually carried. Those were both
15 concerns that the Bosnian military had with respect to a means of getting
16 fuel into the enclaves.
17 Q. Are you referring to ABiH army when you said the Bosnian army?
18 Thank you.
19 A. I guess I am referring to both. As you're aware, certainly
20 within the context of the VRS at Srebrenica, the Bosnian Muslim military
21 was perceived as getting fuel from UN sources and by their own documents
22 in the Zepa enclave, the Bosnian Serb military was obtaining fuel from
23 the Ukrainian Detachment there that was also operating under
24 United Nations auspices. So I guess within the context of fuel, both
25 parties were surreptitiously obtaining fuel from United Nations sources.
1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Judge Mindua has a question.
2 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Yes. I did understand the
3 difference between the two types of convoys, but I would like to know all
4 those convoys from humanitarian convoys had they to be escorted by
5 UNPROFOR elements or not?
6 THE WITNESS: Generally speaking, the convoys originate from
7 Sarajevo, and those areas did pick up a UN escort. I am not sure whether
8 or not humanitarian convoys, and many did originate from Belgrade to the
9 eastern enclaves, whether they actually had a United Nations escort or
10 whether they were allowed to travel independently. So I don't know the
11 answer to the second part of the question with respect to convoys coming
12 out of Serbia.
13 JUDGE MINDUA: [No interpretation]
14 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. Thank
16 you, Judge Mindua.
17 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Now, Mr. Butler, you have moved on to black marketeering.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at D607 and see what
20 the UNPROFOR deputy commander in Srebrenica has to say about it,
21 Mr. Robert Franken, who was also chief of logistics. It's P607. P607.
22 Thank you. That's Mr. Franken's statement. We need page 2 in Serbian,
23 paragraph -- paragraphs 3 and 4; and page 1, paragraphs 3 and 4 in
24 English. He says:
25 "In that period of time, the Serbs suggested to the Muslims that
1 they should trade with the Muslims based on the prices that existed on
2 the black market in the enclave. When I say 'trade,' I mean trade with
3 all -- all [indiscernible] except for the weapons. After several rounds
4 of negotiations, the civilian authorities of the enclave gave their
5 approval for the goods to be supplied by the Serbs to the enclave. We
6 insisted that the goods be sold in the enclave for roughly the market
7 price and that DutchBat should claim no commercial role in this."
8 This next paragraph:
9 "This fitted well with our idea of bringing the relations between
10 the warring parties back to normal. Rumors spread that the initiative
11 was not viewed well by the groups that controlled the black market. The
12 trade was put a stop to by the military leadership. It was said by the
13 local military leadership that the prohibition had come from the top of
14 the military leadership, although such things worked well in Gorazde, and
15 I presume that the initiative to boycott the trade had really come from
16 the military leadership of the enclave."
17 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
18 Q. This is my question: Did you come across any documents relating
19 to the two parties trading, and can you tell us why did the Srebrenica
20 military leadership accommodate the requests coming from individuals
21 involved in the black market?
22 A. I did come across documents as well as statements from various
23 individuals which did discuss the proposals to kind of normalise trade in
24 and out of the enclaves. My understanding is not only for their purposes
25 the Bosnian Muslim side did not agree to that, and I suspect that black
1 marketeering would be a motive. There are a number of reports that
2 members of the 28th Infantry Division in general, and Naser Oric in
3 particular, were making a very good living with respect to black market
4 operations in the enclave.
5 From the Bosnian Serb side, the idea of normalising trade with
6 the civilians with -- inside the enclave kind of ran counter to their
7 idea of creating the conditions necessary to force the people out of the
8 enclave. So while I take it that the local civilians on both sides of
9 the enclave would be in support of this proposal, I understand that the
10 military leadership on both sides was not eager to engage in a more
11 normalising of commercial and trade relationships.
12 Q. Mr. Butler, I do understand that you were looking at the two
13 sides in parallel, but you see that the document states that this system
14 was in place in Gorazde and that they applied market prices. Was it the
15 case that the market prices would not be agreeable to the black market
16 operators, or, in fact, to the leadership of the VRS and the ABiH? We
17 looked at the document which arrived from the Ministry of Defence of
18 Srebrenica. What Franken says here, he is speaking as UNPROFOR deputy
19 commander and chief of logistics, and he's referring to market prices.
20 Should a parallel be drawn in every answer or should the document
21 be rightly consulted for a proper answer?
22 A. No. What I mean in this particular case - and to be clear - from
23 the ABiH side, their military leadership was accused of being the people
24 who controlled the black market economy within the enclave. Their
25 reasons were not broader than economic as to why they did not see a
1 normalisation of trade activities. The military leadership of the VRS
2 didn't view this in the context of black market or making themselves
3 richer in the way that the ABiH military leadership in the enclave did.
4 They were looking at it as more of a policy issue of not necessarily
5 trading with the members of the enclave because in making their lives
6 potentially easier, they were running counter to their own policy of
7 wanting to create the conditions to leave. Both sides shared the motive
8 of not wanting to see trade normalised but for entirely different
10 Q. Thank you. And did you, yourself, come across a document
11 originating from the Serb side which discusses this issue? Can you refer
12 to a document that you reviewed?
13 A. It's been a number of years, but I seem to recall there was at
14 least one document. I don't know whether it was authored by
15 Momir Nikolic or he was just part of the conversation where the issue was
16 discussed -- or he was aware the issue was discussed relating to
17 normalising trade and that the local community in Bratunac -- the
18 civilian leadership in Bratunac was not necessarily opposed to that
19 because they believed that by trading with the civilians in the enclave,
20 they could actually get supplies and goods from them that they could not
21 obtain from Serbia due to the embargo, particularly fuel. And as part of
22 those discussions, the military leadership indicated that they were not
23 prepared to permit that. So I'm aware of at least one document, like I
24 said, it's been few years, where those issues are discussed.
25 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. My request of you was to refer us to any
1 document which indicates that the Serb position was, as indicated by
2 Mr. Franken here -- and if you could do so at any point during your
4 Now, let's go back to the issue at hand which is the control of
5 convoys by UNPROFOR, and I'm referring to humanitarian aid convoys. Can
6 you tell us -- or, rather, let me put it differently: Who was it who had
7 the right to control UNPROFOR humanitarian aid convoys and humanitarian
8 aid convoys organised by various international organisations? I mean,
9 who within the UN had the right to control these convoys to make sure
10 that they did not include weapons? Thank you.
11 A. Again, referring to my previous answer on that, I am not aware
12 under every circumstance who was responsible for ensuring that every
13 single convoy was properly manifested and that weapons were not being put
14 in. I assume that for those UNPROFOR convoys that were going to resupply
15 their own units that those responsibilities would be taken by the
16 UNPROFOR forces that were organising the convoys.
17 With respect to the other humanitarian aid convoys, I don't know
18 whether or not those organisations were themselves responsible for
19 insuring that weapons did not get into those convoys, or whether or not
20 they had to submit their vehicles and manifests for inspection by
21 UNPROFOR before those requests were consolidated and sent to the
22 Republika Srpska for approval.
23 Q. Thank you.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let us now look at document P10111
25 [as interpreted] in e-court.
1 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Before it appears, can you tell us this: Did UNPROFOR control
3 UNHCR convoys as they emerged in the enclave? Thank you.
4 A. I don't know, again, the actual specifics of whether or not they
5 were controlled by UNPROFOR, whether they were merely escorted by the
6 UNPROFOR, or how much or how little control that the UN protection forces
7 exerted over the actual UN convoys. I just don't know the detail of
9 Q. Thank you. On our screens we have the Agreement on Complete
10 Cessation of Hostilities. Under 3 the agreement reads -- I'm sorry,
11 Article 5:
12 "Full freedom of movement with appropriate procedures shall exist
13 for UNPROFOR and other official international agencies, in particular
14 UNHCR, in order to complement this agreement, to monitor human rights and
15 to deliver humanitarian aid, including medical supplies and evacuations.
16 The parties commit themselves to full respect for the safety and security
17 of UNPROFOR and related personnel. UNPROFOR shall continue to prevent
18 any abuse of freedom of movement by its personnel or convoys which might
19 be of military benefit to either party."
20 The article I've read out deals with a number of issues, but we
21 were only interested in the abuse of convoys. So my question is: Who
22 has it within their authority to monitor the abuse of convoys of
23 humanitarian aid organised by either UNPROFOR or other international
25 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Just for the record, this document is P1011 and
1 not P10111.
2 Now your answer, please.
3 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. And again maybe it's a matter of
4 translation, but when I read the last sentence it says:
5 "The UNPROFOR shall continue to prevent any abuse of freedom of
6 movement by its personnels or convoys which might be of military benefit
7 to either party."
8 I take that that the UNPROFOR is responsible for the conduct of
9 its convoys and personnel. I don't know if I'd link that to the first
10 sentence which is that the UNPROFOR would also ensure that UNHCR
11 personnel and convoys also did not conduct the same. It may be the case.
12 I just -- I don't know and I don't think it's clear from this particular
14 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Thank you. Does this mean that UNPROFOR was able not to prevent
16 the abuse of UNHCR convoys or its own convoys if they happen to find that
17 mines and explosives are being smuggled in them?
18 A. Again, sir, I don't know enough of how that process worked to be
19 able to give you or the Court an answer as to whether or not there was a
20 regime available that the UNPROFOR actually inspected other agency
21 convoys to ensure that that was not happening, or whether those other
22 international agencies were expected to police themselves.
23 I have to assume that if the UNPROFOR became aware of a UNHCR or
24 other international convoy that was carrying prescribed military
25 equipment instead of carrying humanitarian or civilian goods that they
1 would not have let that travel, but I don't know that they viewed that as
2 their job that they were going to inspect each and every convoy.
3 Q. Thank you. But was it possible for UNPROFOR to find anything out
4 if they did not conduct checks? And what sort of method was employed by
5 UNPROFOR in respect of the convoys they escorted?
6 A. Again, from the UNPROFOR side, their particular convoys, as
7 evidenced by the manifests that we have, they were required in a great
8 amount of detail to lay out the entire cargos and personnel manifests of
9 each convoy going into the enclaves, submit them to the Republika Srpska
10 and the Main Staff for approval, and they understood that at some point
11 those convoys were also going to be subject to inspection, and that if
12 there was excess equipment or fuel or equipment that was not properly
13 manifested that the convoy could be turned around or those possessions
15 I don't know how that process worked with the other aid agencies,
16 whether or not they had as sophisticated an apparatus to verify what was
17 going into those vehicles or not, and I don't know what the inspection
18 regime would have been until it got into the Republika Srpska. Now,
19 obviously, just with the UNPROFOR convoys, the humanitarian convoys from
20 other agencies had to manifest their equipment and were also subject to
21 inspection by the VRS at various check-points. And as we know from
22 various documents, in cases where equipment was identified that was not
23 properly manifested or wasn't manifested at all, the VRS confiscated that
25 Q. Tell us, please, as a military analyst, the inspection of
1 humanitarian convoys and UNPROFOR convoys at check-points, was it not one
2 of the methods of preventing abuse? Thanks.
3 A. Correct, sir. The Bosnian Serb military saw the ability to
4 inspect these various convoys at various places as an important means by
5 which they could assure themselves that prescribed military equipment or
6 other dual-use type of supplies or supplies that were not -- or that were
7 being sent in excess of what the perceived civilian needs were could be
8 controlled. So they were very much involved in that process because they
9 saw it as an important way to control the amount of supplies that went
10 into the eastern enclaves.
11 Q. Thank you. A moment ago, we quoted Article 5 of the Cessation of
12 Hostilities Agreement. As a military analyst, do you find it acceptable
13 that this should be the basis for an agreement between UNPROFOR and the
14 VRS? Because it does provide in great detail the freedom of movement to
15 be accorded to UNPROFOR convoys. In other words, is it the basis for the
16 freedom of movement of convoys?
17 A. This particular agreement does lay out the principles relating to
18 freedom of movement. And, again, with the fact that the expectation is
19 that, you know, all parties would allow for the freedom of movement on
20 the one hand, and on the other hand that with respect to the UNPROFOR and
21 the other aid agencies, that they would not allow their offices to be
22 used for military purposes by either one of the warring parties.
23 Q. Thank you.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now call up document D77 in
25 e-court. It's an agreement which was signed on behalf of UNPROFOR by
1 General Brinkman and on behalf of the VRS, General Zdravko Tolimir. We
2 see here item 1 which reads:
3 "These principles define the appropriate procedures regarding
4 freedom of movement, as stated in paragraph 5 of the Agreement on
5 Complete Cessation of Hostilities, signed on the 31st of December, 1994.
6 These principles specifically refer to UNPROFOR movements on Serb held
8 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
9 Q. This is my question: Is this first item completely based on
10 Article 5 of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, is that the case?
11 And you did look at the other agreement.
12 A. Yes, sir, I mean, and I believe that's explicitly laid out in
13 paragraph 1.
14 Q. Thank you. Let's move on to paragraph 2 which relates to the
15 obligation of mutual reporting, that is to say, the obligation of
16 UNPROFOR to notify issues to the Main Staff. So we're dealing with
17 notification in A; we're dealing with movement in B; and in C, with the
18 approval for movement which is to be given by the Main Staff.
19 Did the Main Staff, in fact, grant approval to UNPROFOR vehicles
20 to transit the territory under their control?
21 A. Yes, sir. As we've noted from the documents during the
22 Prosecution case, there were various lists of convoy movements projected,
23 many were approved, some were disapproved, many others had their cargos
24 modified but they were given subsequent approval. So within that
25 context, the process did work.
1 Q. Thank you. You can see that under 3 the agreement envisages
2 control, and it reads:
3 "Convoys may be checked only once by a Serbian Army check-point,"
4 or "for an army. This regards both the incoming and outgoing convoy
5 movement. The inspection of the convoy will last as short as possible.
6 If goods not stated on the notification are found, a more detailed check
7 will be made.
8 "Goods not mentioned on the notification will be allowed to
9 return on their convoy to their starting points. Goods which are not
10 notified and for which transport is forbidden will be taken into secure
12 And the reference here is to mines and explosives:
13 "A joint control by the warring parties," that's to say the two
14 armies and UNPROFOR, on the other hand, "will discuss the final decision
15 regarding these goods. A list of forbidden goods will be handed over to
16 UNPROFOR by the Serbian army HQ, Main Staff."
17 Tell us, was the Army of Republika Srpska entitled to fully
18 inspect convoys both the humanitarian convoys and United Nations convoys?
19 Is this not regulated herein?
20 A. Again, from the part of this document I can see, what they are
21 discussing here is the UNPROFOR convoys. I don't know how limited this
22 particular document is. I mean, one of the things that strikes me is
23 that it talks about there being a separate agreement, even within the
24 United Nations framework, between this document which is covering the
25 UNPROFOR and a subset of the UN forces which is the United Nations
1 military observers.
2 So again, I take that this document deals specifically with the
3 UNPROFOR. I don't know if its provisions broadly extend to all UN
5 As to your second question, yes, as discussed, it sets up a
6 framework by which the Army of Republika Srpska will have an opportunity
7 to inspect convoys going in and out in order to ensure that there is no
8 abuse of the process and that the convoys are carrying only their
9 manifested cargo.
10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I think it's time for the break. Mr. Tolimir,
11 before we break, I would just like to note that you have read, especially
12 paragraph 3, into the record, but not literally, especially in relation
13 to this abbreviation "SA." We see in the first line "SA check-point,"
14 and later on, second part of paragraph 3, "A joint SA UNPROFOR
16 Your interpretation of that was of the word "warring party."
17 That might be right, that can be wrong. At the end in the last line we
19 "UNPROFOR by the Serbian army HQ."
20 SA could be an abbreviation for Serbian army which is, in the
21 context of our discussion, quite strange. I just put it on the record to
22 make sure that we all check the real meaning of SA.
23 We have to adjourn now and we will resume at five minutes past
25 [The witness stands down]
1 --- Recess taken at 10.34 a.m.
2 [The witness takes the stand]
3 --- On resuming at 11.08 a.m.
4 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Yes, Mr. Tolimir. Or, I see Mr. McCloskey on his
6 Mr. McCloskey.
7 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, thank you, Mr. President. I was just
8 informed -- well, in the last session via e-mail that literally as I was
9 standing withdrawing those four witnesses, one of the witnesses finally
10 contacted our person and said that they would be available any time. And
11 that is Witness number 95, PW-29, and we have been able to schedule that
12 witness September 12th. It's a 92 ter witness. It should be very short,
13 but an important witness. So if I could move the Court to withdraw my
14 previous withdrawal and place that witness back on the witness list, and
15 we'll put him in the schedule as we're confirming with him right now, I
16 would appreciate that. I apologise. It's just one of those things.
17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Is there any concern by the Defence?
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. We have
19 no objection to this witness appearing in the court.
20 [Trial Chamber confers]
21 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey, your withdrawal of the withdrawal
22 is accepted. You may call the witness.
23 Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
25 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Mr. Butler, since before the break we were looking at the
2 Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities and we quoted Article 5
3 therein, do I need to show the document again to you or can you answer my
4 question now? Was the Agreement on Complete Cessation of Hostilities
5 stipulate the forming of a central joint submission in order to oversee
6 the implementation of the agreement and was that carried out in practice?
7 A. I believe, as the document has come up, paragraph 2 of that
8 agreement calls for the creation of a central joint commission. Taking
9 that on to the following document, that appears to be at least with
10 respect to -- at least -- I'm sorry.
11 JUDGE FLUEGGE: We need the previous page in B/C/S, please.
12 Mr. Gajic.
13 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, Mr. Tolimir is not
14 receiving the translation into B/C/S; therefore, he did not hear the
15 answer provided by Mr. Butler.
16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Butler, could you be so kind to repeat your
18 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. The document that is currently up on the
19 screen, paragraph 2, calls for the establishment of joint commissions. I
20 believe the following document is the attempt to implement that with at
21 least respect to the Bosnian Serb military and the UNPROFOR.
22 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please now see this
25 document, D250, which speaks about the forming of a joint central
1 commission as well as regional commissions. Thank you. Let's see how
2 and at whose initiative the agreement was drafted, the agreement that was
3 signed. Here we see a document produced by the Main Staff dated the 5th
4 of January, 1995. It is addressed from the meeting of the central state
5 commission to the addressees as listed herein, and on the last page we
6 can see that the document was signed by General Tolimir.
7 Now, please, I am interested in item 5 of this agreement which
8 reads that:
9 "UNPROFOR will prepare a draft of an agreement to be agreed by
10 the signed."
11 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters note that the item read by
12 Mr. Tolimir does not correspond to item 5.
13 THE ACCUSED: [No interpretation]
14 THE INTERPRETER: Can Mr. Tolimir please repeat the question.
15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, please repeat your question. The
16 interpreters didn't interpret it.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Mr. Butler, in this item 5 that I have just quoted, does it
20 specify the manner in which the agreement had been concluded on freedom
21 of movement, concluded on the 31st of January, 1995, between
22 General Brinkman, the representative of UNPROFOR, and General Tolimir,
23 the representative of the VRS?
24 A. If I'm looking at the same paragraph 5, it -- all it specifically
25 says is that the UNPROFOR will prepare a draft agreement on complete
1 freedom of movement which will be agreed bilaterally with the parties.
2 Q. Thank you. That's correct. And I would like to hear your
3 opinion because this is a report from a meeting by a joint commission
4 which says, under 5, that it was agreed for UNPROFOR to prepare a draft
5 agreement on freedom of movement to be agreed bilaterally. Was this
6 agreement agreed bilaterally between Brinkman and Tolimir? Thank you.
7 A. I am not sure that I accept your proposition that this is merely
8 a report of a meeting. There are other portions of the document which
9 you appear to have added a considerable amount of commentary with respect
10 to what you believe that various negotiating positions would be, as well
11 as what the position of the VRS should be or would be in response. I
12 take it that at some juncture the agreement was signed, but I don't --
13 like I said, I mean, just looking at spots of this document rather than
14 having the entire document, it's very difficult for me to conclude
15 exactly what it is in its entirety and what it means.
16 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. I was not asking you about the contents
17 of the whole document. I was specifically asking you about item 5,
18 whether it specifically determines the manner in which this agreement on
19 complete freedom of movement of UNPROFOR was to be achieved. Does it say
20 who is to prepare the draft of this document? And I am talking about
21 item 5?
22 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
23 MR. McCLOSKEY: The nature of that question requires Mr. Butler
24 to be able to understand the document, and it does no good for the
25 witness to just repeat what is said in the paragraph. So if the General
1 wants a serious evaluation I would allow him to let Mr. Butler review the
3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I would suggest that we go back to the other
4 document, to the agreement itself, to see if this item 5 of this document
5 is from the content reflected in the agreement itself. Can we go back
6 to -- I suggest that you call for that document again, D77.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 77.
8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Yes, indeed, I said D77. To which part of this
9 agreement do you refer, Mr. Tolimir? That would be helpful for the
10 witness to answer your question.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I made reference to the
12 manner in which an agreement was reached between UNPROFOR and the VRS
13 concerning the territory of the VRS, and for that purpose I proposed the
14 previous document in order to see what was the role of UNPROFOR.
15 On several occasions there was discussion before about the fact
16 that the VRS was said to have imposed this and that checks -- what I
17 wanted to prove was that it was something that was requested or required
18 by the UNPROFOR. I could show the witness the whole document, however, I
19 cannot quote it in its entirety. I can only quote specific items. For
20 example, item 1 --
21 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Let me interrupt you. This was not my intention.
22 You put a question to the witness:
23 "Does it say who it was to prepare the draft of this document?"
24 That was your question put to the witness. It would be helpful
25 for the witness to know to which part of the agreement you are referring,
1 to understand item 5 of your letter.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I am talking about
3 the whole agreement proposed to the VRS to be signed regarding the
4 freedom of movement of UNPROFOR throughout the whole territory of
5 Republika Srpska, and I am talking about the manner in which it was
6 constructed, and I demonstrated that by quoting item 5.
7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Are you able to answer this specific question in
8 relation to item 5 of the document signed by Mr. Tolimir, D250,
9 Mr. Butler?
10 THE WITNESS: I believe, if I am correct, what General Tolimir is
11 referring to is that in paragraph 5 of that document it states that the
12 UNPROFOR will draft the principles for the agreement of movement, and
13 then what we are now looking at on the screen is, in fact, the
14 manifestation of that draft. I take it -- I hope that's what
15 General Tolimir was referring to.
16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
18 Can we go back to D254. Thank you.
19 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I think this is the wrong number. We saw D250;
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I said that we should go back to
22 D254 before we go to the one that we have on the screens. All right.
23 Now we have it and we have item 5. Now let us look at the first page of
24 this document --
25 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, just to clarify so that we have a
1 clear record. This is D250 which we have on the screen with item 5. If
2 you want to have on the screen another document, you should not say
3 "let's go back" to that document, because we didn't have it on the screen
5 Mr. Gajic.
6 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] You're right, Mr. President. We
7 hadn't had D254 before. It was just a minor administrative error, so we
8 are seeking to look at 254.
9 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Mr. Butler, here we see a document made by the Main Staff of the
11 VRS, the sector for intelligence and security affairs. It was produced
12 on the 12th of February, 1995. It was sent to all the commands, and it
13 speaks about the movement of UNPROFOR around the territory of
14 Republika Srpska. In paragraph 1, it says:
15 "Through the regional joint commissions UNPROFOR representatives
16 are constantly bringing up the issue of greater freedom of movement for
17 UNPROFOR across the front line, with the aim of getting authorisation to
18 cross the front line and move within the territory of Republika Srpska on
19 the lower regional levels while not having to notify the Main Staff and
20 not to having to wait for authorisation by the Main Staff of the VRS
21 before doing so.
22 "This kind of approach indicates that UNPROFOR wanted to avoid
23 the obligation undertaken by them in the agreement signed on the
24 principles of freedom of movement signed on the 31st of January, 1995,
25 between the UNPROFOR command and General Tolimir, and the text of that
1 agreement is attach hereto."
2 Now, what comes next is the agreement that we already looked at.
3 Now, let's move to this portion where you say that I was making
4 some comments.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So we need page 2 where we see --
6 we need page 2. Thank you. Can I have page 2 in e-court, please. In
7 English, it's page 3. And can we scroll down the text in the Serbian
8 because I would like to read the last sentence on page 2. Thank you.
9 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
10 Q. "UNPROFOR representatives during -- concluding the agreement,
11 insisted that their goods not be seized, that is possibly not listed in
12 the notification due to an administrative error, and they conceded that
13 under such circumstances they would return the whole convoy to its points
14 of departure. We agreed as -- with that as can be seen from the
15 agreement, but we emphasised that the items that were not listed in the
16 manifest and whose transportation is forbidden would be confiscated and
17 kept in our depots until a conclusion reached about what to do with them
18 by the joint commission."
19 My question is: These joint military commissions, were they
20 authorised to inspect the routes and the checks and the arrival of
21 UNPROFOR convoys that had previously been notified to the Main Staff?
22 A. If I understand this particular document correctly with the last
23 one, it was not the joint military commissions themselves which conducted
24 the inspections, it was the joint military commission that created the
25 framework agreement. The actual inspection of the materials would be
1 left to each individual party. So, you know, in that context it was not
2 like there was a joint United Nations Republika Srpska military
3 check-point which cleared each convoy -- or physically inspected each
4 convoy. The military commission created the framework as to how it would
5 be done, but, you know, the UN was left to manifest the convoy, the VRS
6 Main Staff approve the convoy, and it would be inspected by a VRS
7 check-point at an agreed upon location.
8 Q. Please, after reading this item in the last question which says
9 that the final decision -- pending final decision, the goods would be
10 kept in our depots; that is to say, the pending decision to be taken by
11 the joint commission. So does that mean that these joint commissions had
12 to be notified about any cargos that had been seized and stored in
13 depots? Thank you.
14 A. The way that this particular document lays that out goes into,
15 first, laying out that there will be lists that will be made as to what
16 cargos -- or the transport of cargos that are prohibited. The third
17 paragraph from the end notes a request from General Tolimir to
18 subordinated formations requesting that they forward a draft list of the
19 cargos that they think need to be banned, and that once this is done they
20 will actually public the full list.
21 The last part of the process will be: Should cargos be pulled
22 off of convoys? This document does call for them to be put into a depot
23 and maintained in that depot until such a point in time as a joint
24 decision has been made as to what the status of the cargo is. So this
25 document kind of lays out an ongoing process in light of the fact that it
1 lays out a broader process on here's how this cargo will be handled, but
2 acknowledges in the very next paragraph that at the point in time that
3 this document is written there is not a list yet of what that prescribed
4 cargo is.
5 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Can you please answer me this: Who is to
6 take the decision relating to the items confiscated at check-points and
7 toward in depots? Was that decision to be taken by the joint military
8 commission or somebody else? And I'm referring to the decision that you
9 talked about.
10 A. I believe from the contents of the document that the decision to
11 actually remove cargo from a convoy and place it in a depot would be made
12 by the party that was inspecting the convoy. The ultimate disposition of
13 that cargo once it got to the depot as to whether or not it would be
14 brought back to United Nations custody or whether it would be allowed to
15 continue on to the enclave or its destination, or a third option that it
16 remains in the depot, would presumably be made by that joint military
18 Q. Thank you. Were then members of the joint military commission
19 who were supposed to decide on this required to be informed about all the
20 items that were banned, seized, confiscated, stored, et cetera? Did the
21 members of the joint military commission have to know about this?
22 A. I would expect that at some point after the publication of this
23 document that once a list was established by the VRS and once cargo was
24 being -- one, that list would have obviously been passed to the joint
25 military commissions so all parties would know what cargo could not
1 travel through. And then to the next step in instances where such cargo
2 was confiscated, in order to come to a conclusion as to what to do with
3 that cargo, one would think that members of the joint commission would
4 have to be informed of its seizure, the circumstances of its seizure, and
5 the fact that the cargo was, in fact, part of the list of banned cargo.
6 Q. Thank you. If General Tolimir was a member of this joint
7 commission and a signatory to this agreement, was it necessary for him to
8 be informed about the documents that indicated that parts of convoys were
9 banned, seized, or in any other way hampered with? Was it necessary for
10 him to be informed fully about that and sign any kind of documents in
11 that respect?
12 A. While you could have taken a personal interest in this, it would
13 also have been appropriate for you to delegate the responsibility for
14 implementing this to another member of the Main Staff. It could have
15 been within the security branch or intelligence branch or it could have
16 even been with the approval of General Milovanovic or General Mladic,
17 another member of the Main Staff who might have been more suited to the
18 role. So I don't believe that you would have had to personally do this,
19 but it could have been delegated.
20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Butler, I think this was not the question.
21 Mr. Tolimir asked you:
22 "If Mr. Tolimir was a member of this joint commission, should he
23 be notified about this specific cargo which was seized?"
24 THE WITNESS: If he were the functioning member, he would have to
25 be notified, yes.
1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Indeed, that was the question.
2 Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
4 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
5 Q. My question is: Does this agreement signed by Tolimir and
6 Brinkman on freedom of movement of UNPROFOR regulate the movement of
7 convoys belonging to other humanitarian organisations? Thank you.
8 A. I am not sure. I believe that if you go back to the agreement it
9 did specifically make a differential between the UNPROFOR and the UNMO
10 convoys. So, again, I am not sure from the parts of the agreement that
11 we've reviewed whether or not that agreement covered the entirety of
12 other humanitarian organisation convoys.
13 Q. Thank you. Let us please look at the last paragraph of the
14 document, just above the signature block. It reads:
15 "These freedom of movement principles refer only to convoys and
16 single UNPROFOR vehicles and not to convoys of international humanitarian
17 organisations. Regarding convoys of international humanitarian
18 organisations, they should implement the procedure and checks agreed upon
19 so far."
20 So, therefore, my question: The agreement signed by Tolimir and
21 Brinkman, did it refer only to individual UNPROFOR convoys? I mean,
22 convoys and individual UNPROFOR vehicles. Thank you.
23 A. Yes, sir, I take it from this last paragraph that the
24 interpretation of the VRS and of General Tolimir was that this particular
25 agreement was limited only to UNPROFOR.
1 Q. Thank you. As a military analyst who has been able to read the
2 agreement in the course of your testimony today, so is it only my
3 interpretation that this agreement relates to UNPROFOR alone? You are of
4 a different opinion? Thank you.
5 A. No, sir. I believe that you're speaking on behalf of the VRS
6 when you're making this interpretation of what this agreement covers. I
7 don't believe it's just singularly your interpretation.
8 Q. Thank you. And did UNPROFOR interpret the agreement as written
9 in the various items that it contains?
10 A. I can't speak to the context by which UNPROFOR believed the
11 agreement, whereas what it covered or what it did not. I mean, all I can
12 tell you, again, going back to the agreement, was that as a context of
13 the agreement the UNPROFOR covered their convoy movements and it
14 specified out that the UNMOs would be separate. If there is a
15 separate -- or if there is a third or fourth page in the basic agreement
16 that notes that you -- the international convoys were covered, that's one
17 thing. If it's not, I would assume that they are not covered there.
18 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Let's go back to D77 in order for you to
19 see what we are discussing. Thank you. Have a look at the document
20 which relates to the freedom of movement principles. It was issued by
21 the Main Staff of the BH command in Sarajevo. You can see that there is
22 their letterhead. It speaks of the aims -- the aim, under 1;
23 notification, 2; control, under 3, and the way it is to be exerted; under
24 4, the notification of roots.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we go to the next page please.
1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
2 MR. McCLOSKEY: I would ask in this situation that these
3 documents be printed out, these multipage documents be printed out, and
4 Mr. Butler have a chance to review them. I can't follow what is going on
5 here. This electronic way of going from one page to the next, to the
6 next and back, Mr. Butler is trying but -- and then being quizzed on the
7 last paragraph of one document.
8 If he wants a serious evaluation or analysis of this document, I
9 would ask that it be printed out, to have him allowed to have two
10 different documents printed out for him so he can do some sort of
11 reasonable analysis. This is completely confusing. I don't know what he
12 is being asked about, where he is going from, which document. This
13 computer, unfortunately, doesn't make this very easy.
14 And I know Mr. Butler is trying, but he cannot be expected to be
15 able to answer questions clearly in this kind of a format.
16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I see that Mr. Registrar already printed it out,
17 the agreement. It should be handed over to the witness if everybody
18 agrees with this procedure. I don't see any objection.
19 Yes, please hand it over to Mr. Butler. This is the agreement
20 itself, D77.
21 Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. We'll
23 give Mr. Butler a chance to review the agreement, and we'll ask him to
24 tell us if it relates to UNPROFOR convoys and vehicles alone or to others
25 as well.
1 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
2 Q. It's a simple question: Who does the agreement apply to?
3 A. Based on the absence of any language in this particular agreement
4 relating to other humanitarian convoys, I take it that the agreement
5 specifically deals with the issue of the UNPROFOR convoys.
6 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now show 65 ter 5717. Thank
8 you. It has appeared. It's a VRS Main Staff document, dated the 21st of
9 August -- or, rather, 31st of August. Apologies. Thank you, Aleksandar.
10 The 31st of August. It is signed by deputy commander
11 Lieutenant-Colonel Milovanovic, and it is titled: "Order Regarding
12 Movement of Humanitarian Aid Across Separation Lines."
13 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
14 Q. I will quote from paragraph 1 and then we can discuss it. It
16 "You know that the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska no
17 longer has any jurisdiction or responsibility concerning approval of
18 entry and movement of teams and convoys of organisations through the
19 territory of Republika Srpska.
20 "This approval is issued by the co-ordinating body for
21 humanitarian aid and the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Social Welfare."
22 This is my question: While reviewing the documents as part of
23 your preparations, did you contemplate what the competence was of the
24 Main Staff and what the competence was of other bodies, such as the
25 co-ordinating body for humanitarian aid?
1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
2 MR. McCLOSKEY: Mr. President, this is a three-page document in
3 English. We heard that it was from some lieutenant-colonel. Could
4 Mr. Butler be at least allowed to see the whole page -- the whole
5 document if he is going to be asked about it and see who it is from?
6 Because it is hard for me to imagine that this is from a
7 lieutenant-colonel, but perhaps it is. I can't see the last page.
8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Indeed it would be --
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. McCloskey. This is
10 not --
11 JUDGE FLUEGGE: -- helpful for the witness to see the whole
12 document. If you put such a broad question about the whole content of
13 this document to the witness, then the witness should have the
14 possibility to look at it.
15 Mr. McCloskey.
16 MR. McCLOSKEY: And of course, we do see it is from
17 Lieutenant-General Milovanovic. So just if we could have the whole
18 document so he can do it, because otherwise between the translations and
19 the piecemeal approach it's going to be very difficult.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. McCloskey and
21 Mr. President. As I was announcing the document, I said that it was sent
22 by a deputy commander, Lieutenant-General Manojlo Milovanovic. Perhaps
23 the witness did hear it or perhaps it wasn't interpreted. And then I
24 quoted from paragraph 1.
25 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Because of the discussions we've had, I would like to repeat my
2 question. Did the VRS Main Staff give approval for the movement of
3 humanitarian convoys or was it only competent to issue such approvals for
4 UNPROFOR convoys?
5 A. Again, this kind of illustrates exactly why I would like to look
6 at the whole document. If you look at that paragraph or that page in
7 isolation, you can make that assertion. If you look at the last page
8 where we looked at the signature, there looked like an order from
9 General Milovanovic that part of it looked like they were specifically
10 issuing orders that were not in compliance with that, and there is a
11 middle page that I haven't even seen. So context matters, and to be able
12 to make an assessment as to, you know, based on one line of a three-page
13 document that this is the way it was, when I'm looking at the third page
14 of the document and it appears they are trying to subvert that, it kind
15 of seems like to be a bit of a pointless exercise.
16 Q. Thank you.
17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, you should take that comment of
18 Mr. Butler into account and try to rephrase your questions or give the
19 witness the opportunity to look through the entire document, otherwise
20 it's not helpful for your Defence.
21 Please carry on. One moment, please.
22 [Trial Chamber confers]
23 [Trial Chamber and Legal Officer confer]
24 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, please carry on your examination and
25 take into consideration the best way to get a good answer from this
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
3 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Mr. Butler, what was the authority of this co-ordinating body for
5 humanitarian aid at the time this document was written on the 1st
6 [as interpreted] of August, 1994?
7 A. I am not sure of the specific responsibilities for the
8 co-ordinating body for humanitarian aid. It was not an issue that I
9 looked very deeply into.
10 Q. Thank you. On the 21st [as interpreted] of August, 1994, as
11 General Milovanovic states in the introductory part of its order, the
12 approval would be given by the co-ordinating body for humanitarian aid in
13 the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Social Welfare. Was this body indeed
14 authorised to give approvals?
15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: You were interpreted to having said "21st of
16 August, 1994." The document is from the 31st of August, 1994. I don't
17 see a reference to another date in the document as we see it on the
18 screen. Could you [Overlapping speakers] ...
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I sometimes do not
20 articulate clearly what I say, so the interpreters may have misheard what
21 I said. The date is the 31st of August, 1994.
22 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.
23 Mr. Butler, do you recall the question?
24 THE WITNESS: No, sir, I can answer it. As noted in the
25 paragraph on the first page, it specifically notes that the approval is
1 now issued by the co-ordinating body. So I take it from
2 General Milovanovic's authorship of this document that they are the
3 accepted authority to issue approvals.
4 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Thank you. As we can see in item 3 where the obligations of the
6 Army of Republika Srpska are listed, can you tell us did the VRS have the
7 right to control and inspect such convoys moving along the territory
8 under the control of the VRS? It's paragraph 3, I misspoke when I said
9 item 3.
10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: You are referring to paragraph 3 of the first
11 page; is that correct?
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. That's
14 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, you're correct that paragraph 3
15 specifically states that the Army of Republika Srpska has the obligation
16 to check teams and convoys of humanitarian organisations.
17 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Thank you. You are now able to see the preamble to the order.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at page 2 so that
20 Mr. Butler may have a chance to look through the entire document as
21 requested by the Prosecutor. Thank you.
22 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, your question, please.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
24 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Mr. Butler, having examined the document, can you tell us does it
1 clearly transpire from the document that all the information concerning
2 the humanitarian convoys, the VRS should be conveyed to the VRS through
3 the notification sent to them from the co-ordinating body for
4 humanitarian aid and the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Social Welfare?
5 A. What the document specifically notes in paragraph 1 of the order
6 is that regardless of the circumstances, that military forces are not to
7 permit convoys to go into territory under the control of Muslim or
8 Croatian forces if the crossing has not been announced in writing by the
9 Main Staff of the VRS.
10 So I take that to mean that even if the humanitarian
11 co-ordinating body -- if such a convoy has the authority of the
12 co-ordinating humanitarian body, unless there is also confirmation of
13 that issued by the army that the army is not to allow these convoys to
15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I would like to put a question to the witness at
16 this point in time to understand the discussion more clearly.
17 I take it that this is an order of the deputy commander of the
18 Main Staff of the VRS to subordinate units.
19 Mr. Butler, can you help us, is this exactly in accordance with
20 an agreement between the VRS and UNPROFOR? Have you any idea about that,
21 the connection --
22 THE WITNESS: I don't.
23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: -- between this ... [Overlapping speakers]
24 THE WITNESS: I don't believe they are connected. This
25 particular document, I belive, refers strictly to other humanitarian
1 convoys that were run by either other UN agencies or other international
2 agencies. I don't believe that this particular document -- and it's
3 tough to tell because this is August 1994 and the agreement we are
4 talking about is dated January 1995. But I believe that these protocols
5 are dealing strictly with humanitarian goods that would be more under the
6 purview of control of civilian organs of the RS as opposed to the
7 UNPROFOR which would be more under the purview of control of the VRS.
8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Is my understanding correct that this document is
9 an internal order from the Main Staff of the VRS to subordinate units in
10 the VRS?
11 THE WITNESS: Correct, sir.
12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we go back to page
14 1 of the document in e-court to paragraph 4. I would like to quote it
15 for the witness.
16 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Have a look at this. I did ask you if the notifications were the
18 source of information for the Army of Republika Srpska and for the
19 check-points conducting these checks. Thank you.
20 A. I'm sorry, I don't understand what you are asking with respect to
21 this question.
22 Q. Did the VRS receive information about humanitarian convoys from
23 the co-ordinating body in order to be able to check the cargo the convoys
24 carried and if it was indeed the cargo that had been approved?
25 A. Yes, sir. In the context of this document, page 1, I mean, it
1 notes that they are receiving information, as you said in paragraph 4.
2 And it also notes that in the following paragraph that they acknowledge
3 that the information that they are receiving is often incomplete and they
4 are doing the best that they can in order to receive the additional
5 information that they believe that they and the corps need in order to
6 allow these things to pass.
7 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In order for us to move to another
9 document, I would like first to tender this document into evidence and
10 then I would seek another document to be shown to the witness.
11 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received.
12 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter 5717 shall be assigned
13 Exhibit D303. Thank you.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have in e-court P689.
15 As we can see this is an Official Gazette. We need page 2 in the Serbian
16 and keep page 1 in English, please. This is about in -- as it says in
17 Article 1, that a decision was taken to set up a state committee for
18 co-operation with United Nations and international humanitarian
19 organisations. And then in Article 3, it is said:
20 "Decisions and orders from the committee's jurisdiction are
21 obligatory for all state organs of Republika Srpska."
22 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Based on this, my question is as follows: Did you know that
24 there was a commission existing in Republika Srpska, a state committee
25 for co-operation with the United Nations and international humanitarian
1 organisations and that its decisions were binding for everyone, including
2 the Army of Republika Srpska? Did you see anything to that effect in the
3 documents that you reviewed and studied?
4 A. Could I ask you to go to page 2 in the English language of this
5 please, for a second? The next page. The next page down, please, also.
6 Third. Okay.
7 I guess where I am confused is -- and that's why I wanted to
8 check the actual date of the decree, was that we are discussing from the
9 prior document something in 31 August of 1994, and we're referring now to
10 a decree published on 15 March 1995, and I am not sure if they are even
11 related or not. I mean, I understand generally your question, Was there
12 an organ to do that? Yes, there was. But I am not sure that this
13 particular document which is published five -- six months after the
14 August document that you referred to relates to it, or relates to maybe a
15 prior iteration of that organ. So I am not sure where you are getting at
16 with the question.
17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: May we please see the top of the page in B/C/S.
18 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Thank you. Maybe if we read Article 6 that would be helpful for
20 Mr. Butler because he wants to understand the whole document. Let's see
21 what Article 6 of this decision says, and I quote:
22 "Permits for the movement of convoys and employees of the
23 United Nations and humanitarian organisations on the territory of
24 Republika Srpska shall be issued by the co-ordinating body for
25 humanitarian operations, pursuant to this committee's decisions."
1 Now we can take a look at the decision taken by the committee
2 with respect to the co-ordinating body, and I would like to hear whether
3 there was a link between the co-ordinating body and this committee.
4 A. I am not sure. I go to Article 11 where it specifically notes
6 "On the day of the publication on this decision, the decision on
7 forming a state committee for co-operation with the UNPROFOR and all
8 previously adopted enactments relating to the work of the committee shall
9 become null and void if they are contrary to this decision."
10 So I gather the answer to the question is if the Republika Srpska
11 authorities did not consider the work of that commission or committee to
12 be contrary to this decree, they would be related, and if they did
13 consider the work to be contrary, they would not be related. And I don't
14 know the answer to that question one way or another.
15 Q. Thank you. My question is: Did all the state organs have an
16 obligation to co-ordinate their work with regard to international
17 humanitarian organisations in compliance with this decision? Thank you.
18 A. I don't know that I have the ability to answer that question. I
19 did not study the workings of the state organs with respect to this
20 particular regulation or document and how they worked with the UN.
21 That's outside my area of expertise.
22 Q. Thank you. Since you dealt with the issue of convoys, and you
23 said that in examination-in-chief, did you study all the laws and bylaws
24 that pertain to this area and governed the movement of international
25 organisations and their convoy across the territory of Republika Srpska?
1 A. No, sir. What I had studied was the practical application of the
2 process whereby which the United Nations protection forces would submit
3 convoy clearances to the Main Staff and the decision-making process of
4 the Main Staff in granting the clearance for the convoy to move or making
5 changes in the manifest or denying permission for the convoy to travel.
6 That was the focus of my review of that material. It was not to
7 encompass all of the other legal and diplomatic ramifications beyond
9 Q. Thank you. Since you answered several questions in
10 examination-in-chief about humanitarian convoys and the approvals and
11 denials of their passage, my question is: The decisions and orders
12 issued by this commission or committee, did they apply to everyone in
13 Republika Srpska that had anything to do with humanitarian convoys and
14 humanitarian organisations? Thank you. As a jurist, I would like you to
15 answer this question.
16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: The witness answered this question already. He
17 said he didn't study all the internal regulation and beyond this area of
18 his investigation. Please carry on.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
20 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Mr. Butler, do you think that in order to analyse humanitarian
22 convoys, it is essential to be familiar with the legal provisions
23 pertaining to a specific territory that you are studying?
24 A. In the context of what I was asked to do by the Office of the
25 Prosecutor, the legal underpinnings and the diplomatic underpinnings of
1 convoy movements, in my mind, were not necessary to know. What I was
2 asked to do was to look at particular convoy documents with the first
3 goal of making a determination as to whether or not the VRS Main Staff
4 was actively involved in the process of reviewing them and clearing them,
5 which my assessment is that they were; and secondly, were the convoys
6 that were not being cleared or was the materials that were being not
7 manifested or being reduced, did they coincide with the stated policy of
8 the VRS and the Republika Srpska with respect to Directive 7 and 7(1).
9 For me to do that, I don't believe it's necessary for me to understand
10 the legal and political aspects of negotiations between the
11 Republika Srpska and the United Nations as to what laws are in effect
12 covering convoy clearance and how the Republika Srpska civilian organs
13 somehow interface with the Republika Srpska military organs.
14 Q. Mr. Butler, I quoted Article 3 to you on the forming of this
15 state committee and I am going to repeat it:
16 "The decisions and orders from the purview of the committee are
17 binding for all the state organs of Republika Srpska."
18 So if this committee gave its approval for a convoy to cross the
19 territory of Republika Srpska, was that binding for the Army of
20 Republika Srpska as one of its organs? Thank you.
21 A. The article says what it says. The decision and order from the
22 committee's jurisdiction are obligatory on all state organs. The armed
23 forces of the Republika Srpska would qualify as a state organ in this
24 context. So in theory, what should have happened is if the committee
25 improved in its entirety a particular convoy movement or a particular
1 manifest by virtue of this document, the Main Staff would not have had
2 the authority to modify manifests or to deny convoys that were cleared by
4 Q. Thank you. I also quoted Article 6, which speaks about the
5 issuance of approvals for the movement of humanitarian convoys and UN and
6 international organisations personnel through Republika Srpska is within
7 the remit of the co-ordinating body. My question is: When we talk about
8 issuing permits for the movement of convoys through Republika Srpska, was
9 it something that the Main Staff was to be consulted or was it
10 exclusively within the purview of the co-ordinating body mentioned
12 A. As a practical matter, the Main Staff would have had to have been
13 consulted in this process because, ultimately speaking, the Main Staff
14 and the military controlled access to the enclaves. They were -- as
15 noted before, the enclaves had a significant military character. So the
16 Main Staff, as the military arm of the Republika Srpska, has to be
17 involved in this process very closely.
18 Q. Thank you. My question is as follows: In that case, did the
19 state committee notify the Main Staff about what they approved or not
20 approved because they were controlling the territory where the convoys
21 travelled and whether they were crossing the lines into another
23 A. As evidenced by that 31 August 1994 document, they had to have
24 co-ordinated that with the Main Staff because that document already lays
25 out circumstances where convoys which had been cleared by various
1 co-ordinating bodies, but not cleared by the Main Staff, were showing up
2 at various parts of the battle-field. So there had to have been a
3 process established; whereas, after a decision made by a civilian body on
4 a humanitarian convoy was made, that ultimately that was co-ordinated
5 with the military organs of the state because only the military organs of
6 the state could ultimately ensure that the convoy could be cleared to
7 pass through the territory and into the enclave.
8 Q. Thank you. In that case, was the Army of Republika Srpska
9 supposed to tell the committee whether it was safe or not safe for a
10 certain convoy to go down the specified route for which the committee
11 gave its approval?
12 A. I take it that would be one purpose. One of the things that the
13 committee would have to tell the army -- or that the army would be
14 expected to tell the committee as to what routes that the convoy could
15 take and at what times they would be cleared to be on those routes.
16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, I think it's time for our second
17 break. We adjourn and resume at 1.00.
18 --- Recess taken at 12.30 p.m.
19 [The witness stands down]
20 [The witness takes the stand]
21 --- On resuming at 1.03 p.m.
22 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Yes, Mr. Tolimir. Please continue.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
24 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Mr. Butler, can you tell me when you were reviewing the documents
1 relating to the convoys, did you come across any document testifying to
2 the fact that the Main Staff failed to act in accordance with the
3 decisions of the state committee and that it acted contrary to its
4 decisions when it came to humanitarian convoys?
5 A. I don't recall that I did off the top of my head. The general
6 process, as I understand it, was the committee would -- once they
7 approved a convoy, would then pass the material on to the Main Staff
8 where they would ultimately clear the convoy for travel. There may have
9 been cases where that has occurred, but I don't recall any off the top of
10 my head.
11 Q. Thank you. Are we talking about a permission or about an
12 approval, and was the Main Staff obliged to abide by the decision taken
13 by the committee regarding the passage of a convoy?
14 A. I think it's on a more technical basis. For example, along the
15 lines of a convoy that may have been approved for a certain date did not
16 travel or was not permitted to travel because they were entering into the
17 Republika Srpska at a different check-point than had been cleared
18 previously by the Main Staff. I know there were a number of cases like
19 that. I don't believe it was the Main Staff itself overruling permission
20 for convoys that had already been previously approved by the commission.
21 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Can you tell the Trial Chamber what the
22 difference is between the permission for movement across Republika Srpska
23 and the approval for movement across front lines?
24 A. I think you -- in your question you've kind of laid out the
25 differential. One process involved the actual approval of a convoy and
1 its manifest. The second process revolved around gaining the necessary
2 permission to cross the front lines or to enter the Republika Srpska at
3 certain territories, most of which was controlled by the army; therefore,
4 the VRS's involvement in that process, even with civilian United Nations
5 agency convoys, was vital because as evidenced by the 31 October 1994
6 document -- I'm sorry, August 1994 document, they had to be appropriately
7 cleared because you couldn't have a situation where United Nations
8 convoys found themselves in a battle-field environment and nobody was
9 aware that they were coming or that they were in the place that they were
10 supposed to be.
11 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Did you have an opportunity to look at
12 documents in which the secure conditions are provided for a convoy and
13 where solutions are provided for some extraordinary situations that
14 involved a degree of danger, if such situations occurred?
15 A. I am aware, generally, that particularly with respect to convoys
16 around Sarajevo, that that was a factor. I did not examine that
17 particular issue closely given the fact that my primary focus was on
18 convoys going into the eastern enclaves. So I -- and particularly
19 Srebrenica and Zepa. So I agree in context. There were cases where the
20 VRS refused to allow various convoys to pass because of claims of combat
21 activity that was ongoing. But that was often not the issue with
22 Srebrenica and Zepa. Those routes to those enclaves did not have
23 constant combat in them.
24 Q. Thank you.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have D186, please. It's
1 a document of the Main Staff dated the 12th of March, 1995, and it speaks
2 about the prevention of plunder and looting because such things were
3 happening. I am not going to read the whole document, only the first
4 sentence from the introductory part. And it says:
5 "The National Assembly of Republika Srpska and the highest organs
6 of authority in Republika Srpska have verified the mandate of UNPROFOR in
7 Republika Srpska. Since UNPROFOR is on a peace mission to Republika
8 Srpska, (despite the fact that we - the Army of Republika Srpska and its
9 Main Staff - as well other institutions in Republika Srpska have many
10 objections to the biassed behaviour of UNPROFOR members, and there are
11 regular discussions of this at the meetings held with the representatives
12 of UNPROFOR) ..." And so on and so forth.
13 And then it goes on to say at the end -- so in this introductory
14 part it says that:
15 "Regardless of the problems that we are facing, UNPROFOR is
16 afforded legitimacy when it comes to its passing through the territory of
17 Republika Srpska."
18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: What is your question, Mr. Tolimir?
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My question was whether this
20 indicates that legitimacy is being afforded to UNPROFOR in the territory
21 of Republika Srpska by invoking the authorities that granted them
22 approval for deployment.
23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
24 MR. McCLOSKEY: Can we at least see who has written this
1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Let's go to the last page in both versions.
2 Signed by Colonel-General Ratko Mladic.
3 Mr. Butler.
4 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. In this context, it reflects the fact
5 that while the Main Staff has issues with the UNPROFOR, the political
6 powers of the state have affirmed the UNPROFOR's mission to be there and
7 that they are to be accorded the respects and authorities that they are
8 supposed to have under their mandate. So he acknowledges, you know -- on
9 behalf of the army, you know, he acknowledges the status of the UNPROFOR
10 in that respect.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Microphone not activated]
12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Your microphone.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have page 1 of the document
14 back on our screens so that I can put my question to the witness.
15 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Does paragraph 2, if you've read it, make reference to robbery
17 being committed against members of UNPROFOR in the territory of Republika
18 Srpska? In fact, that's how the paragraph starts:
19 "There have been cases of UNPROFOR members being robbed in the
20 past ..."
21 A. Yes, sir, and, in fact, if you read that with the first paragraph
22 on the second page, it lays out the proposition that there are not only
23 individual acts of criminality perpetrated against the UNPROFOR but also
24 groups of individuals who are doing that, and that because of the
25 perception that the UNPROFOR is not neutral, that authorities within the
1 army are not taking -- either not taking those reports seriously or not
2 moving forward seriously to suppress banditry against the UNPROFOR
3 because I think the phrase was people who are robbing UNPROFOR are
4 actually true patriots. So it does lay out in the second paragraph the
5 problems that they are having with these criminal bands.
6 Q. Thank you. Does not the order issuing authority condemn the sort
7 of conduct you've referred to in paragraph 2?
8 A. Yes, sir. I mean, in the context it lays it out. I don't know
9 if he specifically in that paragraph, you know, General Mladic condemns
10 his actions, but certainly that's the point that is made that, you know,
11 the military will not tolerate this behaviour. It's made in both
12 paragraph 2 and paragraph 3. I would guess the top paragraph of the
13 second page.
14 Q. Thank you. We'll read paragraph 3 as well:
15 "This and similar acts of robbery have in an inexplicable and
16 unacceptable way become expressions of 'heroism' and manifestation of
17 'real' patriotism."
18 In other words, he is drawing the attention to these problems.
19 And now I'm moving on to read the order itself.
20 "I hereby order --" thank you. I am unable to read the entire --
21 part 1. Yes, thank you:
22 "Engaging all available forces, corps commanders shall order that
23 searches be conducted and other actions taken in uncovering procedures
24 with the aim of locating the perpetrators of these serious crimes,
25 documenting the crimes, launching criminal proceedings against the
1 perpetrators and returning UNPROFOR property."
2 Does not item 1 of the order express in clear terms that all the
3 envisaged criminal actions be taken against the perpetrators of such
4 acts? Thanks.
5 A. Yes, sir. That -- the first part or paragraph 1 of that order
6 lays out the corps commanders are responsible for dealing with the
7 investigation issues related to locating the perpetrators of these
8 crimes, documenting them, initiating criminal proceedings, and when
9 recovery, obviously, to return the UNPROFOR property.
10 Q. Thank you. Since corps commanders are mentioned here as the
11 relevant structures, is that the case because they are the ones in charge
12 of the entire territory through which UNPROFOR -- or, rather, convoys are
13 supposed to pass?
14 A. In part that is correct. The corps are the military units that
15 ultimately control the territory. They are the geographically based
16 ground forces. I would also direct your attention to paragraph 3 of that
17 order because it's implied as part of the paragraph 3 that the other
18 reason why the corps are involved is because there is at least the
19 inference by the Main Staff that it may well be subordinate military
20 commanders at the corps who are encouraging such acts. And as their
21 commanders, the corps commanders would be expected to take active
22 measures against these individuals.
23 Q. Thank you. Does this mean that the Main Staff was able to
24 make -- or give responsibility upon each and every corps commander if an
25 act of robbery was committed in his area of responsibility to confer upon
1 the responsibility to locate the perpetrators?
2 A. If I understand your question correctly, I don't know that it's
3 the Main Staff had to give responsibility. It is my understanding under
4 law that -- Republika Srpska law that existed at the time that the corps
5 commanders themselves already had the authority to do that.
6 But to the next point, General Mladic, as the commander of the
7 army and whom the corps commanders were directly subordinate to, was
8 making it clear personally, and when you look at paragraph 5 that he
9 expected that the corps commanders would actively work to undertake this,
10 these measures, and ensure that acts of robbery were not committed
11 against the UNPROFOR.
12 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Was it based on this that the army had
13 its responsibilities in respect of convoys across the territory that it
14 controlled, across Republika Srpska?
15 A. I guess the answer is in part. I mean, when we go back to the
16 issue of Directive 7 and Directive 7(1) where the issue of restricting UN
17 convoys is discussed, it makes it clear that that is a thought out
18 process of state and military policy. That's one aspect. This is an
19 aspect dealing with individual and collective acts of criminalities.
20 When you lay these two issues together it makes it clear that, you know,
21 while the Army of Republika Srpska was going to engage in some activities
22 as part of its state policy and part of its military programme against
23 the United Nations protection forces, it was not, on the other hand,
24 prepared to accept individual acts of criminality by rogue soldiers or
25 rogue commanders in doing that.
1 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. We will have time to look at what it is
2 that Directive 7 and 7(1) have to say. Yesterday we were able to see
3 that even General Smith received the announcement that -- of the fact
4 that sanctions were going to be imposed in relation to the eastern
5 enclaves. We will have an opportunity to discussion this. Let me ask
6 you in relation to this specific document: Was this the reason why the
7 army was supposed to receive announcements of the time, date, and route
8 of convoys in order to timely redress any possible shortcomings or
9 failures to take proper action in respect of convoys?
10 A. It may have been a reason, but I do not believe it was the
11 primary reason. This is, again, simply put, the army taking actions to
12 ensure that the UNPROFOR was not subject to criminal acts, particularly
13 by members of the VRS. Now, obviously would the fact that the corps are
14 advised as to when these convoys are going through or not, would that
15 help in their crime prevention efforts? Certainly. But having said
16 that, the fact is that the corps already had this information from well
17 before March of 1995, so the fact that they are notifying the corps as to
18 these issues of when these convoys pass and where, while potentially
19 helpful to the crime prevention activities -- was more important for
20 protecting the convoys and assuring their clearances through combat
22 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. That's a different issue. My question
23 had to do with something else, but let's not waste time on this. I'd
24 like to move to a different document. I don't want to waste time.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 1D924 shown in e-court.
1 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Meanwhile, I should tell you that it's an -- it's a coded
3 telegram sent by Akashi to Annan on the 1st of March, 1995, and it's
4 entitled: "Attitude of the Bosnia Government to UNPROFOR."
5 Paragraph 1 on page 1 reads:
6 "The BiH has been increasingly intransigent toward the peace
7 process and to UNPROFOR. Despite their acceptance of the cessation of
8 hostilities agreement on 31st December 1994, and of the accords of
9 several joint commissions held at the various command levels, the BiH has
10 obstructed attempts by the UNPROFOR to improve liaison, observe
11 confrontation lines, and separate forces by refusing to attend regularly
12 the joint commission process. They have applied significant additional
13 restrictions on UNPROFOR movement ..."
14 This is my question: Did you have occasion to see a single
15 document which would speak to the restriction imposed by the BH Army on
16 the movement of UNPROFOR?
17 A. I may have seen individual documents related to that, but given
18 the context of my particular analysis, the issue of movement restrictions
19 by the BiH Army on the UNPROFOR, in any aspect outside of how it impacted
20 the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves would not have been an area that I
21 focussed on.
22 Q. Thank you. Did you perhaps examine the issue from the
23 perspective of the fact that the central state commission is referred to
24 as a central body through which the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement is
25 being implemented as indicated by Mr. Akashi? He refers to the agreement
1 of the 31st of December, 1994, and states that there were additional
2 restrictions imposed on UNPROFOR movement. He also states that they no
3 longer co-operated or worked with the joint commission. Did you have an
4 opportunity to come across something like this?
5 A. Again, sir, while I may have come across it, the focus of my
6 analysis in this area would have been related to the more tactical issue
7 of restrictions of movement placed on the UNPROFOR forces within the
8 enclaves and their impact on the ability of the UN forces within the
9 enclaves to monitor all the activity in those enclaves. Those issues
10 outside the enclaves wouldn't be relevant to me.
11 Q. Thank you. Yesterday we spoke of the restrictions of movement of
12 liaison officers who were instituted as part of those cessation of
13 hostilities agreement, and I'm quoting what Mr. Akashi has to say:
14 "Numerous restrictions were imposed on UNPROFOR. The trend is
15 that such restrictions are imposed at a time when armed activities are
16 planned or when increased pressure is intended to be put on UNPROFOR."
17 The last sentence says that they forced liaison officers to
18 withdraw from Tuzla to Gornji Vakuf. We can see that in paragraph 3.
19 And it was also indicated that those who were in Gornji Vakuf had to be
20 transferred to the territory of Republika Srpska.
21 This is my question: Since all these activities aimed toward
22 restricting the movement of UNPROFOR and the control to be exerted by
23 UNPROFOR over the BH Army were well known to both Annan and Akashi, does
24 this mean that they did receive information from UNPROFOR units on the
25 ground and UNPROFOR commanders about the activities of the BH Army and
1 the violations of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement that they
3 A. If one presumes that the information in this particular document
4 is based on reporting from the ground commanders at the lowest levels in
5 the UNPROFOR, and I believe it is, the notification inherent in this
6 document would confirm what you've said, which is that that information
7 that is occurring -- or those facts that are occurring on the ground are
8 receiving visibility at the highest levels of the United Nations.
9 Q. Thank you. Let us look at paragraph 4 on page 3. Thank you. It
11 "There have also been several indicators which suggest that the
12 BiH is considering an offensive in the near future."
13 Under A:
14 "The refusal of the BiH to accept the BSA liaison officers is
15 referred to."
16 Under B, it reads there are indicators that the BiH is improving
17 its efficiency through reorganisation, rearming training and force
18 standardisation. Mobilisation of large numbers of troops continues in
19 the major centres of Zenica and Tuzla. There has been unusually heavy
20 troop movement and resupply towards the northern regions. Hospitals on
21 the western confrontation line have been warned to expect casualties.
22 This is my question: Did the United Nations precisely identify
23 which was the side that refused to continue complying with the cessation
24 of hostilities agreement and that continued with combat activities on the
25 territory under its control? Thank you.
1 A. This document specifically lays out the notification, many of the
2 issues which we discussed yesterday. When one looks at the date of this
3 document, looks at what happened in context afterwards, it's clear that
4 just like other notifications, you know, at some point even the UN senior
5 leadership became aware that the BiH was intending to break the
6 cease-fire and to resume offensive activities. I think this document is
7 a reflection of that, and given where this document -- who authored it
8 and where it was sent to, it's fair to conclude that that notification
9 went to the highest levels within the United Nations within the
10 department of peacekeeping.
11 Q. Bearing in mind the documents that we saw yesterday about the
12 activation of the armed forces in Zepa and Srebrenica, as a soldier would
13 you consider it justifiable to take steps preparing for combat activities
14 in the territory of an enclave where armed forces were not supposed to
15 exist to begin with? Thank you.
16 A. Justifiable in a sense of the Bosnian government's military
17 objectives, yes. Justifiable in the sense of legal obligations in a
18 cease-fire zone is a different question. As you noted, it was supposedly
19 demilitarised; therefore, if they were properly demilitarised you
20 wouldn't have the situation where in the enclaves those forces are
21 mobilising and preparing for combat activities. As we know, that was not
22 the case. So, again, since this --
23 Q. And was the least that the Army of Republika Srpska could do to
24 prevent the army that UNPROFOR failed to disarm in the demilitarised
25 zones of Zepa and Srebrenica from arming -- from arming -- to prevent
1 them from arming through various restrictions. That's what should stand
2 at the end of my question.
3 A. Now it's clear. Yes, sir, from a military perspective, the idea
4 that the Army Republika Srpska would take steps to ensure that their
5 adversary -- their armed adversary within the enclave was not
6 surreptitiously receiving weapons is something that they would have been
7 actively involved in and were actively involved in.
8 Q. Thank you. Was the Army of Republika Srpska able to have any
9 impact on the distribution of humanitarian aid in the enclaves and
10 prevent the aid from being distributed to the army?
11 A. The Army of Republika Srpska was able to control the flow going
12 into the enclaves by virtue of convoys and inspections. Once a convoy
13 passed through that final check-point and went into the enclave, they
14 obviously had no material ability to affect where in the enclave that
15 material went and whom ultimately consumed it.
16 Q. Thank you. Since the army that had not been disarmed in the
17 enclaves did require some sort of logistics, do you happen to know in
18 what way the BH Army received food supplies and other logistical supplies
19 in Srebrenica and Zepa?
20 A. I think the pattern that has been established is quite clear.
21 Those supplies that were overtly military, such as weapons, grenades,
22 mine, ammunition, were smuggled in over land or, in select case, brought
23 in by helicopter. Those items that were considered to be dual-use, that
24 had both military and civilian applications, such as food, such as fuel,
25 things of that nature, the military within the enclave was content to be
1 able to appropriate from the general supplies that were going to the
2 civilian population.
3 Q. Thank you. The supplies intended for the civilian population
4 that you mentioned in your answer, did they come from the various
5 humanitarian convoys arriving in the enclave, such as UNPROFOR and UNHCR
6 convoys among others?
7 A. Probably to a larger extent from UNHCR convoys, to a lesser
8 extent the UNPROFOR, since it wasn't their specific mandate to provide
9 food to the larger civilian populations. So that is why in the context
10 of those convoys there was attention paid to the amount of materials
11 going in to try and ensure that the amount of materials there were going
12 in were suitable for the civilian population but would not be in such
13 excess that it would be diverted to military use. These are the -- the
14 attention being paid to it was by the Army of Republika Srpska.
15 Q. Thank you.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Since we are at the end of our
17 work-day, I would ask that 1D924 be admitted into evidence. That's the
18 report by Mr. Akashi.
19 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you. I take it there is no B/C/S
20 translation. If you don't insist to receive a translation into B/C/S, it
21 will be -- or, I should ask you if you want to have a translation. Have
22 you contacted a translation unit? Mr. Gajic, what is your position?
23 Otherwise we just receive it as a document.
24 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] I think that the process is underway.
25 The Case Manager is dealing with some issues, and I have taken on,
1 myself, certain others, and I am sure that we will resolve the matter
3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: The document -- I really didn't understand your
4 response. Are you going to receive or request a translation or not? If
5 you don't need a translation, it will be admitted into evidence.
6 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] It would be good to have a
7 translation because we find the document to be very important, and not
8 just the portion shown to Mr. Butler. So we would be insisting on a
9 translation. Can we have the document marked for identification until
10 the translation is received?
11 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be marked for identification pending
12 translation, but it is your responsibility to make sure that a
13 translation will be made.
14 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter 1D924 shall be assigned
15 Exhibit D304 marked for identification pending B/C/S translation. Thank
17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Gajic.
18 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President, and the Defence
19 is aware of that obligation.
20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.
21 We have to adjourn for the day and we will resume tomorrow
22 morning at 9.00 in this courtroom. We adjourn.
23 [The witness stands down]
24 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.47 p.m.,
25 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 24th day
1 of August, 2011, at 9.00 a.m.