1 Wednesday, 24 August 2011
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.
5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Good morning to everybody.
6 The witness should be brought in, please.
7 [The witness takes the stand]
8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Good morning, Mr. Butler. Welcome back --
9 THE WITNESS: Morning, sir.
10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: -- for another day of hearing. You know the
11 affirmation to tell the truth still applies today.
12 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
13 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir is continuing his examination.
14 Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I wish
16 peace to this house and for all those present. And may God's will be
17 done in these proceedings and may the outcome be as God wishes and not as
18 I wish.
19 WITNESS: RICHARD BUTLER [Resumed]
20 Cross-examination by Mr. Tolimir: [Continued]
21 Q. [Interpretation] I wish welcome also to Mr. Butler. We are glad
22 to have him here.
23 Yesterday, Mr. Butler, we talked about the abuses and eventually
24 the smuggling in connection with the convoys which were perpetrated by
25 the army in Srebrenica. Please, have you reviewed any document that
1 deals with these issues and the issue of the distribution of humanitarian
2 aid? Thank you.
3 A. The documents that I've reviewed in that respect, many of them
4 which were discussed during my direct examination, some of them we've
5 seen on cross-examination, reflect the view that the Bosnian Serb
6 military and the Republika Srpska government had that UNPROFOR and other
7 United Nations agencies, either wittingly or unwittingly, were providing
8 supplies and military materials to the 28th Division and other
9 Bosnian Muslim units within the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves.
10 It was a perception that the United Nations people were aware of.
11 There had been a number of cases in the past where those issues had been
12 flagged to their attention. I believe there are at least one or two
13 cases where UN forces in and around Sarajevo were actually -- convoys
14 were actually stopped that had war materials in them that should not have
15 been there. So it was a continuing theme within that respect.
16 Now, within the enclaves, as I've testified yesterday, certainly
17 the Republika Srpska and the Army of the Republika Srpska were aware that
18 once those convoys went into the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves, they would
19 be powerless to control who the supplies went to. I mean, obviously the
20 overwhelming predominance of the supplies were civilian materials for the
21 civilian populations, but there was black marketeering, there was clearly
22 diversion to the military forces of some of those supplies, and this was
23 well known by all the parties.
24 Q. Thank you for this clarification. Now, please, concerning the
25 supplies that were being sent to the army, something that you could read
1 about even after the departure of UNPROFOR and the liberation of
2 Srebrenica and Zepa and the exit of the BH Army and the civilian
3 population from Srebrenica?
4 A. Specific to the issue of supplies to the army, and, again, as
5 I've testified, most of the military supplies that were going to the
6 28th Division were either brought in or smuggled overland by soldiers of
7 the 2nd Corps going over known smuggling routes, or in some cases that
8 they were brought in surreptitiously via helicopter flights into the
10 So again, in that respect, as I've noted, the goods that the
11 military could appropriate from the civilian population, food stuffs,
12 cooking oils, things of that nature, they did not bring in themselves.
13 They used the auspices of the UN, essentially, to let the UN handle those
14 civilian supplies and then appropriate them as they needed. But the
15 strictly military technical equipment they had to bring in themselves
16 over known routes - it was a relatively active smuggling regime that was
17 going on over these routes - to allow the 28th Division to slowly bring
18 in ammunition, weapons, things of that nature.
19 Q. Thank you. Can you please tell us who gave them permission to
20 bring that in, or did they do it illegally without anyone checking on
22 A. When you say "that," I'm not exactly clear what you're talking
23 about. Are you referring to who gave permission for the civilian aid or
24 who authorised the transshipment of military supplies?
25 Q. I meant military supplies, because you said that -- it seems that
1 you said that it was permitted, even though it was not permitted.
2 A. The United Nations going into Srebrenica, to my knowledge, never
3 wittingly, or to their knowledge, took military supplies in that were
4 going to be used by the 28th Division in the Srebrenica enclave. Now,
5 the 28th Division itself undertook a programme with their headquarters in
6 2nd Corps in order to smuggle military supplies from the larger
7 Bosnian Muslim territory held by 2 Corps behind the Bosnian Serb military
8 lines in order to get it into the hands of the soldiers in Srebrenica and
9 Zepa. Is that what you're referring to, sir?
10 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Please, have you ever seen any report
11 issued by a senior officer, commanders of UNPROFOR, relating to the
12 illegal bringing in of weapons into Srebrenica, whether it was done
13 illegally or through smuggling channels? Thank you.
14 A. I am aware that particularly during the months of January,
15 February, March of 1995 that many members of the United Nations forces in
16 Eastern Bosnia were picking up on bits of information that had to do with
17 outside military supplies coming into Bosnia, primarily through the Tuzla
18 airport. Many of those supplies going to the 2nd Corps, some of those
19 supplies subsequently making their way to the 28th Division in
20 Srebrenica, and that the United Nations was reporting these
21 outside supply -- military supplies coming in, which they viewed as a
22 violation of the United Nations arm embargo. So if that's the context
23 that you're referring to, I have seen those reports.
24 Q. Thank you. Have you perhaps ever seen a report on the
25 conversation done by Mr. Franken on the 31st of March, 1999? We are
1 going to show you in order to facility your answer.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And for that purpose we need an
3 exhibit, 1D207.
4 JUDGE FLUEGGE: We have on the screen the English and the Dutch
5 version of this document. Is there a B/C/S translation?
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It seems that we do not have a
7 B/C/S translation, but I have a hard copy with me.
8 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Tell me, have you ever seen this report that you are now reading
10 that's an interview with Mr. Franken who had been a deputy commander?
11 A. I know that the OTP has interviewed Major Franken on a number of
12 occasions. However, I am not sure that I've -- this doesn't look like an
13 OTP originated product. I assume from the Dutch copy that I saw that
14 this may be an interview that he did pursuant to the Dutch parliament's
15 own investigation into Srebrenica. So I don't believe I've ever seen
16 this particular document before.
17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, can you help us: Who interview
18 Mr. Franken? We can't see that from the text on the screen.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Thank you,
20 Mr. President. Since the witness hasn't seen item number 1, let's see
21 what it says there. But before that it says that the tape recording
22 failed; the text below is a reconstruction of what was discussed. And
23 then it says, under number one:
24 "The ABiH army smuggled two combat armoured vehicles into the
25 enclave via Sarajevo. This was notified by a Dutch OP. They were never
1 found. Later it became clear that the Ukrainians in Zepa were missing a
2 total of five. Bought or stolen by ABiH?"
3 And then under 2 it says -- no --
4 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Before you continue, please explain what kind of
5 document we have on the screen. Who did this interview with Mr. Franken?
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. This
7 interview was done by NIOD, the institute for investigations, and a copy
8 of that interview was provided to the OTP alongside other documents. If
9 you permit me, I would like to read item number 1 -- or, actually, I have
10 already read it.
11 JUDGE FLUEGGE: The NIOD, the institution of investigations, is a
12 Dutch institution investigating the events in Bosnia; is that correct?
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. That's
14 correct. It's their institute for war documentation.
15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you. Please carry on with your
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
18 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Mr. Butler, after having read item 1, tell me, did you know
20 anything about the fact that even heavy weaponry such as combat
21 armoured vehicles were smuggled into Srebrenica?
22 A. I am not aware that heavy combat vehicles such as BTR armoured
23 personnel carriers were smuggled into Srebrenica.
24 Q. Thank you. Do you trust this report by Mr. Franken?
25 A. It's not a question of whether I trust it or not, I guess.
1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: As we have heard from you, Mr. Tolimir, it's not
2 a report. It's a reconstruction of an interview of NIOD with
3 Witness Franken.
4 Mr. McCloskey.
5 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President. That's all I wanted to
6 point out for the record. But also, NIOD is a historical documentation
7 centre; it's not really an investigative body. But it doesn't really
8 matter, just as long as that's clear.
9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: We have seen some other documents in this trial
10 from NIOD, so we are quite familiar with this institution.
11 Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.
12 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. When Mr. Franken testified here, we asked
14 him, on page 39, 3459, lines 15 to 19, and in the course of his testimony
15 he said that he himself had seen armoured vehicles, two of them, passing
16 through Srebrenica. And after that the Ukrainian unit from Zepa, in its
17 logistical report, says - and this is information we received from the
18 UN - reported the disappearance of five APCs. And then on page 3459,
19 lines 24 and 25, and 3401, he replied that these were vehicles that had
20 never been retrieved or found and that that was true.
21 Now, please, were other members of the UNPROFOR, whose statements
22 you've read, were aware of the fact that the BH Army was acquiring heavy
23 weaponry, APCs, and other pieces of equipment in an illegal way by means
24 of smuggling?
25 A. Again, what I can tell you is that I'm not aware of this issue.
1 Having -- you know, as someone who has gone over, through the years, the
2 documents of the Army of the Republika Srpska related to Srebrenica, I'm
3 not aware of any report where the military units talk about the fact that
4 they have captured two BTR armoured personnel carriers from the ABiH
5 pursuant to the fall of the enclave. So if that fact happened, and those
6 BTRs were ultimately taken over by the Army of the Republika Srpska after
7 they were captured, it was never reported in their -- to their chain of
9 I would also note the fact that with respect to the Ukrainian
10 United Nations detachment in Zepa, I would find that fact rather
11 difficult to believe in light of the very close known association between
12 the local VRS forces at Zepa and the Ukrainian Battalion.
13 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
14 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes. We've reviewed what the general said, the
15 cites regarding his statement that Franken testified that he himself saw
16 armoured personnel carriers go through Srebrenica, and it -- we don't see
17 that. So if the general could actually read the section he's referring
18 to. There is a reference that Franken sees, in a report, that things
19 were missing from Zepa, but we can't see what he's talking about, and I
20 don't recall him saying he saw, you know, stolen personnel carriers going
21 through Srebrenica. I mean, that -- perhaps I've forgotten that, but
22 that sounds very strange to me. So if he can read what he's talking
23 about, I would appreciate it.
24 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much.
25 Mr. Gajic.
1 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I will help everyone
2 with the reference. That's the transcript of the 1st of July. It wasn't
3 Mr. Franken who said that he saw it himself, but it's, rather, on
4 page 3461, lines 8 to 9, said:
5 [In English] "My OP only saw them entering the enclave at the
6 south border. That is just a remark for the question before."
7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I'm very sorry, we didn't receive a full
8 interpretation of what you said.
9 MR. GAJIC: [Microphone not activated] [No interpretation]
10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Perhaps you can -- the best way is to have the
11 relevant part on the screen and then we can check it. Page 3461, lines
12 8 to 9.
13 MR. McCLOSKEY: And, Mr. President, if we could start it at 7.
14 You can see that that's a good place to start this. Line 7.
15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Gajic.
16 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. McCloskey is right. That's
17 what I said, that Mr. Franken didn't say that he saw it himself but that
18 that could be seen from the observation point.
19 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Butler, you see it on the screen. I will
20 read the text into the transcript. Mr. Franken's answer is the
21 following, I quote:
22 "First, you concluded that I saw those vehicles in Srebrenica,
23 which is incorrect. My OP," which means the observation post, "only saw
24 them entering the enclave at the south border. That is just a remark for
25 the question before."
1 I would like to invite you, Mr. Tolimir, to -- if you quote
2 something from the transcript or a statement, you should be very correct
3 if you put that part to the witness. Please carry on.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. This is
5 precisely my problem: That I never received the transcript in my own
6 language and I have to rely on my notes which need not be fully precise
7 because of the speed. So that's probably the reason why I wasn't
8 precise. My apologies to you and the witness.
9 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
10 Q. This is my question:
11 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, you have a team. You have Mr. Gajic
12 and other team members and you have assistance for interpretation and
13 translation. So that this is a question of a good preparation of your
15 Please carry on.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I don't
17 want to go into the reasons why I have difficulties and why I do not use
18 all the facilities that I should.
19 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
20 Q. I would like to put the following question to Mr. Butler: What
21 you have just heard, does it confirm or change the position that you've
22 just expressed about the APCs? Thank you. The APCs, that is, which were
23 smuggled into Srebrenica.
24 A. No, sir, it does not. Simply put: Again, my knowledge of this
25 situation is based off of the military documents that I've read that
1 cover the periods, obviously, before and after the fall of the enclave,
2 primarily from the perspective of the Army of the Republika Srpska. I'm
3 not aware of any military documents that reflect that units of the VRS
4 took custody of these two vehicles or that they were captured by them
5 after the fall of the enclave. I don't -- I hold open the possibility,
6 obviously, that it occurred as Major Franken said, that his OP had
7 reported this. But that fact and that fact that those vehicles had been
8 captured by the VRS subsequent has never been reported.
9 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. I never said that the VRS seized the
10 vehicles or captured them, and that's not the point. The point is, how
11 were the vehicles smuggled into Srebrenica to begin with? How were they
12 smuggled past the observation posts that observed them, and how this was
13 not stopped?
14 Let's now look at item 6 of the interview with Franken, the
15 interview conducted by NIOD in 1999. He says, and I am quoting:
16 "Weapons were regularly smuggled from Zepa straight through the
17 Serbian lines, and local BSA commanders were richly rewarded for this.
18 Occasionally, a BH army smuggling team ran into an ambush and several
19 Muslim fighters were shot. But after this, the smuggling carried on as
20 normal. Horses were sometimes used for this."
21 And I will read item 7, which states:
22 "Weapons were also regularly brought into the enclave from
24 Was the VRS, therefore, rightly concerned about this and should
25 not the VRS have taken all possible measures to make sure that no
1 weapons, ammunition, nor equipment arrived or reached the enclave, i.e.,
2 a demilitarised zone? Thank you.
3 A. I agree that not only was the VRS aware of the fact that weapons
4 were being smuggled into Srebrenica, but that they were -- it was proper
5 for them to be concerned and take the necessary measures to prevent these
6 weapons from being smuggled in.
7 I -- going back to point 6 on this, Major Franken's contention
8 that local VRS commanders were complicit in this somehow, I'm not sure
9 that I'm aware of that fact, at least from the VRS documents. I suspect
10 that the intelligence and security branches of the VRS would have been
11 very involved in that particular process, had they gained any awareness
12 that local Bosnian Serb military commanders were somehow facilitating,
13 for profit purposes, the supplies of weapons, ammunitions, into the
15 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. When reviewing the document 65 ter 05170,
16 you spoke of the various restrictions imposed on UNPROFOR convoys that
17 wanted to bring in supplies. Tell us, was the population in any way
18 affected, adversely, by the restrictions that the VRS may have applied in
19 respect of UNPROFOR convoys?
20 A. While it's difficult to quantify, I believe that there was some
21 impact with respect to the restrictions on the UNPROFOR convoys,
22 particularly related to medical care and certain other food stuffs. It's
23 well documented by the Dutch Battalion that - as well as their own
24 logistics - they would often provide excess medical or food stuffs
25 supplies to the population, particularly segments of that population that
1 were sick or that needed extra care. So in effect by restricting the
2 supplies going into the UNPROFOR forces as part of the VRS campaign, it
3 had, whether by design or not, it had an impact on the civilian
4 populations in the Srebrenica enclave.
5 Q. Are you aware of a case involving a fatality among the civilian
6 population because of the shortage of medical supplies that the VRS may
7 have prevented from entering into the enclave on an UNPROFOR convoy?
8 A. I can't speak beyond generalities on this issue only because the
9 actual day-to-day activities of the Dutch Battalion in the enclave, how
10 they related to the civilian population, was not a focus of my analysis.
11 I just didn't deal with that issue. My knowledge of that is based, in
12 part, off of my own hearing of various members of the Dutch Battalion
13 testify in certain situations here, so, again, I can't speak to that
15 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. In other words, you don't have a document
16 that you may have reviewed and which could be referenced here for the
17 Trial Chamber and which you would have used in expressing your basic view
18 that this practice affected the civilian population?
19 A. The basic document that I used in reference in my narrative with
20 respect to the Dutch Battalion was the 1995 report that the Dutch
21 themselves did after Srebrenica, as well as the United Nations report
22 which also discusses aspects of the Dutch activities in the enclaves.
23 That's the basis of my particular knowledge. I did not, because it
24 wasn't necessary for what I was doing, I did not go through the daily
25 activity reports of the Dutch Battalions -- or Battalion in Srebrenica to
1 review what actions they did or did not take relevant to the civilian
2 population there. And I was not part of the NIOD process as well, so I
3 have no knowledge of what information they may or may not have come up
4 with in that respect as well.
5 Q. Thank you. Is my understanding correct, then: This was on the
6 basis of what you heard and not based on documents that you could speak
7 to as an expert? Thank you.
8 A. It is based on my understanding of those two reports. It is not
9 based upon -- as well as what testimony I've heard, it is not based upon
10 my own independent analysis.
11 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Tell me, did you find in these documents
12 information about a medical organisation existing in Srebrenica which
13 provided this sort of care for the population? Thank you.
14 A. The -- I believe the outside organisation you're referring to is
15 the team from the medicine without frontiers organisation; is that
17 Q. Thank you. I didn't want you to guess what it is that I was
18 thinking of. I just wanted to know what it is that you know.
19 A. My apologies. But I am aware that there was an independent
20 medical organisation, the medicine without frontiers organisation, that
21 did have a medical team inside of Srebrenica.
22 Q. Thank you. Rather than looking at the document produced by this
23 team, let's look at paragraph 26 of the document we have before us so
24 that we could leave it once we are finished with it. There we have
25 paragraph 26, and I quote:
1 "The local situation for the population was, indeed, not great,
2 but after the capture of the enclave, it turned out that there were huge
3 food stocks there. The ABiH even dumped two lorries full of ammunition
4 in the river."
5 Paragraph 27:
6 "The bombardments were, indeed, no small thing," and when I
7 say -- I mean shooting and small arms fire, "but there was never any
8 deliberate targeted shooting at DB III soldiers. Always right next to
9 them. The ABiH did always try to get the DutchBat into a fight, and
10 there were continuous attempts to maneuver the soldiers into a position
11 in which the DutchBat would attract the fire of the Bosnian Serb army,"
12 et cetera.
13 Based on the two paragraphs I've read, tell us, the statement
14 made by Mr. Franken, to the effect that there were huge food stocks
15 there, indicates that the situation in terms of food supplies was not
16 disastrous in the enclave? Because he's talking about the situation as
17 found after the population left the enclave.
18 A. It is what Major Franken says. I mean, this is the report
19 derived from an interview with them. I don't know that to be a fact one
20 way or another. My analysis of the Srebrenica enclave did not include a
21 total of food accounting that was captured in the enclave. My knowledge
22 of it is based off of the VRS reports afterwards, and I'm not aware of
23 VRS reporting that they are taking into custody these vast quantities of
24 food. Whether they went into VRS custody, whether they went into
25 civilian custody by the civilian commissioner of Srebrenica, I don't
1 know. So I'm not in a position to comment one way or another on the
2 issue of food and what was found after the fall of the enclave.
3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: One remark for the transcript. Page 14, line 25,
4 through the next line, the words, I quote:
5 "And when I say -- I mean shooting and small arms fire ..."
6 These words are not part of the document but added by
7 Mr. Tolimir. Just to have a clear record.
8 Please continue.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I did
10 add this to clarify and I did not specify that I was doing that. I was
11 just specifying what the word "pucanje," "shooting," means in Serbian.
12 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Mr. Butler, do you know anything about the delivery of American
14 weapons into the enclave? Did you come across such documents or do you
15 have any sort of knowledge about it?
16 A. I have no direct knowledge of it. I am aware, from reading the
17 United Nations report related to Srebrenica, that there was
18 United Nations reporting on flights go in Tuzla airport where arms were
19 coming in. And certainly there was speculation that the United States
20 had at least some role in those flights. But I don't know anything more
21 than what is printed in the United Nations report related to that.
22 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Let us now look at paragraph 41 of
23 Franken's statement. Let's see what he has to say about it. He was the
24 deputy commander of DutchBat in Srebrenica. I quote:
25 "Franken is certain that there were American weapons deliveries
1 to the ABiH army. These weapons were delivered in Tuzla and transported
2 further from there."
3 This is my question: Were UNPROFOR members also aware of the
4 fact that there were American weapons come from Tuzla and from Tuzla to
5 Srebrenica, as indicated by Mr. Franken in this report of his? Thank
7 A. With respect to the knowledge of the UNPROFOR members, as
8 evidenced by the United Nations report on that subject, a number of them
9 were aware, and I believe one of the documents that you showed me
10 yesterday that was authored by Mr. Akashi, in fact, noted also in that
11 document that they were aware that there were weapon resupply flights
12 coming into Tuzla. So clearly the UNPROFOR members had a contemporaneous
13 knowledge of that event occurring. I am not aware based on my analysis
14 of military documents, relating particularly from the VRS, that any US
15 weaponry was captured there. Frankly speaking, it would be -- I would be
16 surprised to find that that would be the case. Given that all of the
17 combatants were fighting with weapons that were related to the former
18 Warsaw Pact forces in the former Yugoslavia, putting weapon systems that
19 cannot be adequately supplied in an isolated part of the battle-field
20 doesn't make a lot of sense. It makes more sense that if the Americans
21 were providing them weapons, they would be providing them weapons that
22 they may have obtained from non-United States or non-NATO forces, because
23 once you've provided them with these weapons, they could resupply
24 themselves from captured ammunition stocks.
25 So, again, I hold open the possibility, and it's well reported,
1 that there were supply flights going into Tuzla, but I'm not aware of any
2 American weapons being found in Srebrenica after the conflict -- or
3 after, you know, captured by the VRS afterwards, and reported as such.
4 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. You will see that even the Main Staff
5 protested about this issue with the UN headquarters in Zagreb.
6 THE INTERPRETER: Can Mr. Tolimir please --
7 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] D196, yes, that's the number. Can
8 we have D196.
9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, are you tendering the document
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. Yes, I
12 would like it to be admitted with your leave.
13 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be received.
14 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 1D207 shall be
15 assigned Exhibit D305. Thank you.
16 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] We already have the next document
17 on our screens. It's a document by the VRS Main Staff, dated the
18 24th of February, 1995, entitled:
19 "Protest to the UNPROFOR Command in Zagreb, to
20 General de Lapresle and to the UNPROFOR command in Sarajevo, to
21 General Smith in person.
22 "At about 2010 hours on the 23rd of February, 1995, another
23 transport plane landed on the auxiliary runway at Tuzla airport, loaded
24 with weapons and military equipment and escorted by two NATO fighter
25 aircraft, which protected it during its flight and while it was being
2 "Unfortunately, this has happened on a number of occasions
3 recently, right in front of the eyes and the ears of NATO and UNPROFOR
4 forces, in the air and at Tuzla airport itself, who are doing nothing to
5 prevent the violation of the relevant Security Council resolution
6 prohibiting imports of weapons and military equipment."
7 This is my question: Mr. Butler, did you come across several
8 documents and protests of the sort which cautioned about the fact that
9 the resolution was being violated by NATO armed forces, the very same
10 forces which provided security to the air-space above Bosnia-Herzegovina?
11 Thank you.
12 A. Yes, sir, I have seen United Nations documents which relate that,
13 as we've discussed, that were happening at the time these violations were
14 occurring, and I've read a number of witness interviews by United Nations
15 observers who reported these same instances and discussed them. So I am
16 very familiar with the events and allegations related to these particular
17 violations of the cease-fire -- not cease-fire, but of the no-fly zone,
18 as well as the arms embargo.
19 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Was the VRS then left with any other
20 methods of control other than the methods of checks at check-points of
21 the cargo that would possibly slip without proper notification? Was
22 there any other method that they could have applied?
23 A. Well, sir, I believe that the VRS applied both the methods that
24 were available to it, militarily speaking. The first one was the
25 inspection regime that was in place to ensure that the United Nations was
1 not overtly carrying armed materials into the enclaves, which they did.
2 And the second one was the creation of military positions and ambushes
3 along the known smuggling routes to try and interdict, to the degree that
4 they could, the smuggling of weapons and arms into the enclave.
5 And I would note that not only was it smuggling on the ground,
6 but on a number of occasions the ABiH sought to smuggle in weapons via
7 helicopter. And at least on one occasion that I'm aware of, the VRS was
8 successful in shooting down a helicopter resupply flight.
9 Now, with respect to the second avenue, the reality on the ground
10 was that, just as I have discussed on a number of occasions, the VRS
11 never had the adequate military manpower to completely seal off the
12 enclave so weapons and supplies could not be smuggled in, but they were
13 aware that the smuggling was occurring and that they were taking steps to
14 combat it as much as they could.
15 Q. Thank you.
16 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] Let us look at D197.
17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, the document we just saw on the
18 screen, D196, was marked for identification pending translation. I was
19 told that a translation is now available. Are you tendering the document
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. Yes, we
22 are, with your leave.
23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will now be Exhibit D196, and I would
24 appreciate if, from time to time, the Defence could update us with the
25 completion of translations.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
2 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] We now see D197. It's a document
3 issued by the Embassy of Bosnia and Herzegovina, its military economic
4 mission in Zagreb, which was sent to their office in Bihac, in the area
5 of the 5th Corps of the BH Army, intended to -- personally for the corps
7 Q. In the letter they detail the items sent in the last dispatch, or
8 shipment. The items mentioned are, without exception, mines and
9 explosives. Is it possible for you to draw a conclusion as to how it was
10 possible for these mines and explosives to reach the Bihac area, having
11 travelled from Zagreb? Thank you.
12 A. No, sir, it's not. The conflict that occurred in the far western
13 portion of Bosnia and Bihac is not an area that I've put any study into.
14 Q. Thank you. Can you please look at this document, and just above
15 the stamp you can see the last sentence. Now I hope you can see it.
16 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] Actually, we need the next page in
17 English, and we can retain the current page in the Serbian. Thank you.
18 Q. You see, they just typed the license plate number of the truck
19 that delivered this ordinance, UNHCR, and it was signed by
20 Mr. Hajrudin Osmanagic, the military attache. Thank you.
21 So can you see that this delivery came via the UNHCR?
22 A. I have no way of knowing whether that's true or not, whether it
23 came under the auspices of the UNHCR or whether it was just a vehicle
24 with UNHCR markings that was stolen or however it was done. I mean, I
25 just don't know. I am not familiar with the area with respect to the
1 military campaigns that were fought there, so I have no basis by which to
2 offer an opinion as to how weapons were or were not being smuggled into
3 the Bihac enclaves.
4 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I note for the record that I only see a date in
5 the stamp, which seems to be the 29th of May, 1993, although I'm not sure
6 if that is really correct. Could the stamp please be enlarged. It is
7 possible that the English translation is correct with the date of
8 29th of May, 1993, although the original is not very clear. It could be
9 1983, although at that time there was no embassy -- no BiH embassy in
11 Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. But on
13 the first page one can see, under the heading "-93," which indicates the
14 year of 1993, which is the time of war. And during the war there was a
15 military mission of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Zagreb, and also one can
16 see in the stamp that the date is the 29th of May, 1993.
17 I showed this document in order to demonstrate that it was the
18 UNHCR who was also smuggling weapons and ammunitions in their vehicles,
19 and Mr. Butler already commented on this.
20 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] Can we now take a look at 1D198.
21 In view of the fact that the time and the place is in dispute, whether
22 this was during or before the war, in this document, again, we can see
23 that it's clearly dated the 19th of May, 1993, and the sender is the
24 Embassy of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
25 THE REGISTRAR: [Previous translation continued] ... one
1 correction for the transcript: The accused requested Exhibit D198.
2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Please, please wait for the end of the
3 translation and then give us the number, Mr. Registrar.
4 Once more, please.
5 THE REGISTRAR: The requested exhibit was D198. Thank you.
6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
8 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Mr. Butler, you can see this exhibit which says that the
10 5th Corps of the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, strictly
11 confidential number 01/1-1690-2, 19th May, 1993, logistical report on
12 receipt of shipment of ubs through UNHCR, and below it is listed what was
13 carried by the UNHCR from Zagreb and delivered to the 5th Corps,
14 including 50.000 rounds of ammunition; then 20.000 rounds of
15 7.62 millimetre; 12.000 of detonating caps; nitroglycerin gun powder, and
16 so on and so forth. And finally Hexogen-explosive and rocket fuel.
17 This was also shipped from Zagreb to Bihac. My question is: Was
18 the UNHCR also used for the transportation and smuggling of weapons and
19 ammunition for the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina?
20 A. Just to clarify this document, the weapons that you list off are
21 not those that were actually delivered. Those are subsequent to a future
22 request. They're requesting those amounts of ammunition. However, if
23 you go into the body of the first paragraph again, it does particularly
24 note that through the particular channel that they are receiving these
25 supplies, albeit through some mechanism of the UNHCR, they recognise that
1 the maximum secrecy is necessary in order to protect the way that these
2 supplies are being received.
3 Again, whether large portions of the UNHCR are complicit in this
4 or whether, you know, individual members of the UNHCR have been bribed or
5 have been coopted to participate in this process is not clear from this
6 document. But, I mean, so we're not in dispute. Certainly, the VRS by
7 1995 had more than adequate reason in their mind to believe that military
8 supplies could be smuggled in via those routes. Which leads me back to
9 my earlier conclusion that the VRS is justified -- or was justified at
10 the time in instituting an inspections regime to make sure that the
11 smuggling of military supplies in humanitarian goods was not happening.
12 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. It's correct. One can see that from what
13 was written by the 5th Corps commander to the embassy in Zagreb.
14 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] Can we now see D199. Thank you.
15 Q. We can see this document on our screens. It's another document
16 issued by the Embassy of the Republic of BH in Croatia. And it speaks
17 about the delivery of 70 tons of D-2 fuel. The haulier, as stated in the
18 fourth row, is UNHCR, or the entity carrying out the transportation.
19 My question is as follows -- or maybe first it would be better if
20 you read the document and then I can pose a question. Or maybe I can
21 read paragraph 3:
22 "Should the UNHCR distribute the diesel to other institutions as
23 humanitarian aid, since they do not know where the diesel comes from,
24 these institutions must issue a specific quantity of diesel to the
25 5th Corps in accordance with the needs of the 5th Corps, and the rest
1 must be reimbursed as agreed with the 5th Corps command.
2 "The 5th Corps command shall send me a report on this matter."
3 This was also signed by Osmanovic [as interpreted], and the date
4 is -- I'm sorry, military attache Osmanagic, and it's dated the
5 13th of May, 1993.
6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Just a correction: It was not signed by
7 Mr. Osmanagic, but signed by another person for the military attache
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President, for this
10 correction. It is correct. It was signed by Ibrahim Hadzic, the
11 representative of this office.
12 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Mr. Butler, can one deduce from this document that the UNHCR is
14 supplying fuel by stating the civilians as recipient but in fact
15 providing it to the army? Have you come across any similar documents
16 when you studied the papers relating to Srebrenica?
17 A. With respect to your second question first: I have not, with
18 respect to Srebrenica, come across any document which would reflect
19 something this overt as was occurring in Bihac. I would also -- I'm not
20 sure what to conclude from the particular document also, other than the
21 fact that while I concur the UNHCR is part of the fuel distribution
22 process, at least the second and third lines of that last paragraph
23 reflect the fact that members of the UNHCR themselves don't know where
24 the fuel is coming from and who the final originator is supposed to be,
25 and it's actually holding open the possibility that they may
1 inadvertently deliver parts of that fuel to humanitarian organisations
2 since they don't know that it's destined for military aid.
3 So, again, whether or not the entire UNHCR apparatus in
4 Western Bosnia was complicit in this organisation or whether select
5 members or parts of it were, obviously from these documents it lays out a
6 situation where the ABiH and the government -- or through the embassy in
7 Zagreb had created a pipeline to use a UN agency as a means of supplying
8 aid to their forces in Bihac.
9 Now, again, I agree with your -- you know, what I've said earlier
10 on this. Certainly by 1995 the VRS would have had enough information
11 about these various schemes that they had more than adequate grounds to
12 institute an inspection regime.
13 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. If there were no troops in Srebrenica and
14 if there were no tanks that required this fuel, would you agree, then,
15 that the VRS was capable of precisely estimating the quantity of fuel
16 required by the population and to stop any surplus amounts that might be
17 used by the army, because the VRS knew exactly what quantity of fuel was
18 needed by the civilian population and what quantities were needed by a
19 military unit, for example?
20 A. I would agree that based on the VRS's understanding of what the
21 ABiH had in the enclave, that they certainly did believe that they had an
22 ability to accurately calculate what fuel would be required going into
23 the enclave. They should have had -- you know, setting aside the fact
24 that the ABiH would have been trying to deceive the VRS as to their true
25 strength, the VRS should have had an accurate picture of the materials
1 that the UNPROFOR, as well as the various civilian agencies in the
2 Srebrenica enclave, possessed, to include diesel/electric generators,
3 things of that nature. Not necessarily vehicles, but obviously machinery
4 that's important for the civilian population that runs on that type of
6 So, yes, the VRS should have been able to accurately assess,
7 based on the information that they had at the time, what the normal fuel
8 accountability should be.
9 Q. Thank you. If the VRS had a criteria, for example, a battalion
10 needed this and this quantity of fuel for their vehicles, was it possible
11 for them to know the quantity needed by an UNPROFOR battalion and could
12 they assume that some of the quantities were shipped elsewhere and stored
14 A. The VRS could and did assume a number of things related to that.
15 The -- the VRS would have had an ability to seek to estimate the monthly
16 fuel usage of the UNPROFOR and to calculate, in their mind, how much fuel
17 would be needed. The UNPROFOR DutchBat, as far as I'm aware, provided
18 their actual fuel usage to the UNPROFOR headquarters. They did not --
19 that information was not available to the VRS. So the first thing that
20 you will have is a gap between the VRS calculations of fuel being used by
21 the Dutch Battalion and the Dutch Battalion's actual fuel usage.
22 The other factor that I suspect would play in there is that,
23 particularly within the military, all military units, to include those in
24 peacekeeping forces, would like to establish and maintain a reserve of
25 fuel and other important technical items in the event of a supply
1 disruption so they were not immediately impacted.
2 While I suspect that the Dutch Battalion would liked to have
3 created this reserve of fuel, it would not be uncalled for for the VRS to
4 look at the creation of a fuel reserve by the Dutch as something that
5 could be used by the ABiH potentially.
6 So there is a lot of different ways that the VRS's calculations
7 of the fuel that the Dutch would use or should be using versus the actual
8 Dutch fuel consumption as well as their -- the Dutch requirements to put
9 together a fuel reserve in case of disruption, and why the two parties
10 would not be able to agree on how much fuel was actually being used
11 versus what was needed.
12 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Do you know that or whether UNPROFOR of
13 Srebrenica provided fuel for the buses that transported the civilian
14 populations from Srebrenica to Tuzla in accordance with the agreement on
15 the evacuation? Colonel Karremans from UNPROFOR himself proposed that
16 UNPROFOR provide fuel for those purposes.
17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
18 MR. McCLOSKEY: Just to -- there is no facts in the record, and I
19 think it was just a mistake, that the general knows that the -- the buses
20 did not go from Srebrenica to Tuzla. They went, and I'm sure as he'll
21 agree, to the Luka area right at the confrontation line, a good ways from
23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. McCloskey. That's
25 correct. The buses couldn't go to Tuzla, but they did reach the border
1 of that area, where it was decided that they would be offloaded from the
2 buses and that the population would proceed on foot across the separation
3 line until they were received in the BH territory.
4 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
5 Q. But I'm asking you, do you know if United Nations provided fuel
6 for the buses to transport the populations into the Muslim territory from
7 the territory of Republika Srpska in compliance with the signed agreement
8 and that this instruction was issued personally by Colonel Karremans?
9 A. My knowledge is that they did not. From the review of documents
10 that I have done related to the buses and truck transports, the fuel that
11 was used in those vehicles primarily came from civilian commercial stocks
12 that were at the Vihor Transportation Company in Bratunac. Now, the UN
13 did send down a tanker with fuel and several days later it reached there,
14 and what happened was that that fuel that in fact went to Vihor was used
15 to restock that supply there.
16 So potentially three or four days afterwards, the fuel was
17 reimbursed. But the fuel that primarily filled up the buses and the
18 trucks through the various days of the 12th and 13th originated from
19 existing fuel supplies at the Vihor Transportation Company.
20 Q. Thank you. Do you know --
21 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Tolimir please repeat the name of the
23 MR. TOLIMIR: [No interpretation]
24 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, could you please repeat the whole
25 question, and especially the name of the battalion. The interpreters
1 didn't catch it.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
3 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Mr. Butler, do you know what happened with the reserves of fuel
5 at the Dutch compound in Potocari; to whom was it distributed; or was it
6 used to fill the tanks of the buses that were transporting the Muslim
7 population from Srebrenica after the signing of the agreements?
8 A. Again, sir, I don't know what did or did not happen with respect
9 to the fuel reserves of the Dutch Battalion. I do know that the Office
10 of the Prosecutor is in possession of particularly detailed lists of
11 civilian buses that were filled up at the Vihor commercial plant -- or
12 commercial transportation company in Bratunac that were used as part of
13 the movement of the civilians out of Srebrenica.
14 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
15 MR. McCLOSKEY: And if the general has evidence that there were
16 fuel reserves of DutchBat, as he's built into that question, I think it
17 would be appropriate for him to reference us to what he is talking about.
18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I asked
20 Mr. Butler if he knew what happened with the fuel reserves of the
21 DutchBat and he gave the answer that he gave. It is up to me to put
22 questions, not to provide proof and evidence.
23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
24 MR. McCLOSKEY: The objection would be that his question assumed
25 a fact not in evidence. And that is a standard objection. And I don't
1 generally go technical on that, but if he's going to assume something
2 like that, he is -- it's incumbent upon him to either ask about that, was
3 there reserves, or establish that there were reserves. Given the answer
4 that Mr. Butler gave, it's not necessarily objectionable, but Mr. Butler
5 said he was not aware of that, so that's why that's an appropriate
6 objection, in my view.
7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, your question was if Mr. Butler knew
8 what happened with the fuel reserves of the DutchBat. It would be more
9 appropriate to ask Mr. Butler if he knows anything about fuel reserves,
10 and then the next question could be to ask if he knows anything about
11 what happened to these reserves.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. Thank
13 you, Mr. McCloskey. My question was about the reserves. Since I did not
14 get an answer, we are going to show a video-clip of the discussion
15 between Mr. Mladic and Mr. Karremans, and in this video clip
16 Mr. Karremans is offering to provide fuel. So --
17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: We may do that, but after the break. We must
18 have our first break now, and we will resume at 11.00.
19 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.
20 --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.
21 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, please go ahead.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
23 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Mr. Butler, we were able to see that there were many
25 possibilities for smuggling weapons, ammunition, fuel, et cetera. Let us
1 now look into the rights of the party which let's these items pass
2 through, the rights arriving from the Geneva convention.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D1004, this is the
4 4th Geneva Convention, relative to the protection of civilian persons in
5 times of war. We are interested in Article 23 which is at page 8 in
6 English and 5 in Serbian. My apologies, the other way around, page 8 in
7 Serbian and 5 in English. Thank you, Aleksandar.
8 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Let me read the article, Article 23:
10 "Each High Contracting Party shall allow the free passage of all
11 consignments of medical and hospital stores and objects necessary for
12 religious worship intended only for civilians of another High Contracting
13 Party, even if the latter is its adversary. It shall likewise permit the
14 free passage of all consignments of essential food stuffs, clothing and
15 tonics intended for children under 15, expectant mothers, and maternity
17 "The obligation of a High Contracting Party to allow the free
18 passage of the consignments indicated in the proceeding paragraph is
19 subject to the condition that this Party is satisfied that there are no
20 serious reasons for fearing."
21 Under a:
22 "That the consignments may be diverted, used for different
23 purposes, and not -- so that the consignments might be used for purposes
24 other than the ones they intended for.
25 "b. That the control may not be effective; or
1 "c. That a definite advantage may accrue to the military efforts
2 or economy of the enemy through the substitution of the above-mentioned
3 consignments for goods which would otherwise be provided or produced by
4 the enemy or through the release of such material, services, or
5 facilities as would otherwise be required for the production of such
7 "The power which allows the passage of the consignments indicated
8 in the first paragraph of this Article may make such permission
9 conditional on the distribution to the persons benefitted, thereby being
10 made under the local supervision of the Protecting Powers.
11 "Such consignments shall be forwarded as rapidly as possible and
12 the power which permits their free passage shall have the right to
13 prescribe the technical arrangements under which such passage is
15 My question: In view of the provisions of Article 23, the VRS,
16 as a party which has allowed the humanitarian aid to transit the
17 territory under its control on its way to Srebrenica, was it entitled to
18 exercise full control, including the control of the distribution of the
19 humanitarian aid, with a view to ensuring that it not be abused? Thank
21 A. They were, as specified here, and my understanding, again, is
22 that the -- if one assumes that the United Nations functions as the
23 protecting power in Bosnia and that the High Contracting Parties are, in
24 fact, the warring parties, the Republika Srpska can and did use the
25 offices of the protecting power to manage the distribution of those
1 civilian supplies. So I believe that both, as a matter of law, in fact,
2 what happened in Bosnia, with respect to the humanitarian supplies,
3 happened in compliance with this.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 Let us now look at paragraph b of this particular article, "that
6 the control may not be effective." This is one of the conditions based
7 on which it may not be permitted. Are the conditions, a, "that the
8 consignments may be used for different purposes, other purposes," and, c,
9 "that the enemy may use them for military purposes."
10 So please, if these three conditions were not met based on the
11 indications arising from situations, did the VRS have the right to deny
12 passage of humanitarian aid? Thank you.
13 A. Again, I would note that I'm not an international law specialist,
14 so I don't want to provide anything that gets couched as legal advice,
15 but certainly within the confines of these articles the VRS - not
16 necessarily the army but certainly at the political level, the government
17 of the Republika Srpska - could have seen fit to terminate the
18 arrangements by which the United Nations protection forces acted as a
19 protecting power.
20 Now, I suspect that you're going to have an interesting legal
21 discussion with the rights, as specified in the Geneva Conventions,
22 between High Contracting Parties to conduct conflict, versus the legal
23 obligations of those same High Contracting Parties to follow the
24 obligations and resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and
25 how they're binding and under what circumstance, and that is something
1 that is well above my head to comment on.
2 So while I take your point as to what Article 23 says in its
3 face, I would just remind you and the Court that there were other factors
4 in play with respect to the United Nations and Security Council
5 resolutions seeking to be implemented along the same lines.
6 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. The VRS across which territory these
7 convoys travelled, did it have reason to doubt that some of the aid would
8 end up in the hands of the BH Army, given the fact that a military unit
9 was stationed in Srebrenica?
10 A. No, sir. As I've indicated from my review of the VRS documents,
11 they believe that they had adequate information available to them that
12 established the basis that some of the aid that was being given to
13 civilians was being diverted for military purposes. I mean, the VRS was
14 very clear about that.
15 Q. Thank you. Yesterday we saw documents indicating that some of
16 the humanitarian aid was set aside for the military. We saw it yesterday
17 in the report D80 drawn up by a municipality president. It was indicated
18 that this was done on a monthly basis.
19 This is my question: The percentage of aid which was set aside
20 for the military, be it 20 or 30 per cent - let's leave that
21 aside - could it have been withheld by the VRS given the fact that it was
22 aware of this aid being shipped every month?
23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
24 MR. McCLOSKEY: Could Mr. Butler be allowed to see the document
25 that this question appears to be based on? I mean, it -- the question
1 appears, on its face, to be based on a document and then there are
2 percentages that are actually mentioned, so I would ask that we be able
3 to see that.
4 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Let's have D80 on the screen, please.
5 THE WITNESS: To answer your first assertion: I'm not sure that
6 this document alone makes the case that humanitarian aid was set aside
7 for the military. I -- it reflects the fact that the military is
8 acquiring the supplies. Whether it's being set aside deliberately or
9 whether it's been appropriated without the approval of civilian organs or
10 because the civilian organs are powerless to stop it is an open question,
11 but it is coming off civilian supplies.
12 Answering your second question - and agreed, I have no way of
13 knowing what the percentage could or is - could the VRS have been aware
14 of these factors and have then sought to decrement the supplies coming in
15 accordingly, I have no idea if the VRS could have been aware of this
16 specific information and diversions. My reading of the VRS documents
17 does not reflect that they had this specific level of awareness of the
18 supplies being diverted. They had a general knowledge that they were
19 being but certainly nothing to this level of specificity.
20 Whether or not they could have consequently decremented that is,
21 quite frankly, more a political decision than a military one. The --
22 politically, VRS could have made an argument that the supplies, if they
23 could provide a percentage, should be decremented by that such to ensure
24 that they did not follow into military hands, and, of course, I expect
25 the United Nations humanitarian organisations would have significantly
1 pushed back against that assertion, because of the impact that it would
2 have had against the civilian population.
3 I would also note that as a practical aspect it would have
4 probably not been an effective measure for them to take, because, as both
5 you and I are aware, in a military environment most often our needs come
6 first, before the civilian population. Which means that in order to
7 maintain the military capacities of fighting forces, it's not like the
8 military would go without the military supplies that they felt that they
9 needed. What would in fact happen is that they would continue to take
10 those supplies from the civilian population and that it would, in fact,
11 simply function to increase the hardships that the civilian population
12 was operating under.
13 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. This was a document you saw yesterday.
14 Below the heading it says, To the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
15 5 June 1995.
16 Now I will show you a different document, on the basis of which
17 you will be able to make an accurate calculation of the percentage of aid
18 set aside for the military.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look D213 in e-court. We
20 can see the document now.
21 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
22 Q. In the Serbian version we can see that all the months were
23 covered in terms of aid reaching the enclave. Captain Slavko Novakovic
24 signed it. He was charged with humanitarian aid in the Drina Corps. The
25 heading does state the Drina Corps command. This is a document which
1 relates to 1994, and one can use it to conclude that the situation was
2 more or less the same in 1993, because the size of the population did not
3 vary much between the two years. I will show you another list for 1995
4 for the months for which calculations were made.
5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Before we move to another document, I would like
6 to see the full heading of this document in English.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] There, it says: "The Command of the
8 Drina Corps," and there's nothing else there. The items missing from the
9 English translation are numbers. They didn't copy them.
10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I wanted to see the full headline. Now I see it,
11 the description, what kind of list it is. And it's related to 1994.
12 Thank you. Please go ahead.
13 Mr. McCloskey.
14 MR. McCLOSKEY: I just also see that the B/C/S goes up to 38,
15 this goes to 25, so there must be more to this. If we could get at some
16 idea of how much there is on this list. Does it go on and on, is there
17 more text, or is it just a few more numbers?
18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: We see here the last item is number 52.
19 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you.
20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.
21 Please go ahead, Mr. Tolimir.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. We can provide the
23 originals for the Trial Chamber to look at, and then you can get the
24 clear picture of the document in the originals.
25 JUDGE FLUEGGE: The document is already in evidence and we have
1 it on the screen. That is quite sufficient. I just wanted to see the
2 full description of the document in English. Go ahead, please.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Microphone not activated]
4 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Your microphone is off.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The first list related to Zepa.
7 Can we look at 1D704, which is the shipment of the humanitarian aid for
8 the enclave of Srebrenica in 1994. Thank you.
9 Yet again the translation includes only -- oh, there is no
10 translation at all.
11 Can we see both pages. The table relates to the entire year,
12 medical supplies, medication, and it was signed by
13 Captain Slavko Novakovic, who drafted the document and was charged with
14 these issues within the Drina Corps.
15 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
16 Q. This is my question: Based on the two documents about the needs
17 of the civilian population in Zepa and Srebrenica in 1994, could the VRS
18 make an assessment of the required quantities of food stuffs and other
19 necessities in the enclaves?
20 A. I take it, from an abstract perspective, that any professional
21 logistician - and certainly there were some on the VRS Main Staff -- or
22 VRS Main Staff and Drina Corps Main Staff - could have made a general
23 assessment as to how much general civilian and humanitarian supplies a
24 set civilian population might have required under the circumstances.
25 The -- there are obviously a lot of variables involved. Knowing
1 the number of the civilian populations, having accurate figures with
2 respect to the ages and medical requirements of various segments of that
3 population are going to be important. I don't know that the VRS
4 specifically had those numbers. But I suspect that you could make a
5 ballpark, as we say in America, estimate as to what the supplies -- what
6 a basic civilian population might need.
7 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can these documents be admitted
9 into evidence, please, and we will then present a different document
10 relating to the same issues but from the perspective of the Muslim side.
11 Thank you.
12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: The document D213 is already in evidence. For
13 the second one, 1D704, we don't have an English translation; therefore,
14 it will be marked for identification pending translation.
15 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 1D704 shall be
16 assigned Exhibit D306 marked for identification pending translation.
17 Thank you.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
19 Can we now look at D212 in e-court.
20 Q. Let us see how these humanitarian needs were viewed by the Muslim
21 side. Thank you. We have the document now. It was sent to -- it was
22 sent from Sarajevo on the 27 of February, 1995, to the Zepa municipality,
23 the president of the municipality.
24 And it reads:
25 "Dear sir.
1 "We have received a UNHCR report on humanitarian aid deliveries
2 to Zepa for the period between the 1st of December, 1994, and the
3 15th of February, 1995. The report shows that on average 85 per cent of
4 the aid was successfully delivered, which is satisfactory. This is the
5 breakdown of the articles delivered".
6 And we have quantities in tonnes. Listed are leguminous plants,
7 meet, fish, cheese, rice/flour ... milk, oil, salt, sugar, and there are
8 various columns listing various figures. And the last column reads
9 percentage achieved. You can tell that in five cases, five articles,
10 let's start from the bottom, salt, 120 per cent was the percentage
11 achieved in -- against the needs expressed. Then we have rice/flour,
12 meat, et cetera.
13 Let's read through to the end of the document:
14 "In the days ahead, a relatively good supply of sugar is expected
15 since large quantities have arrived in Belgrade.
16 "It can be concluded from the above data that the UNHCR is
17 providing a relatively good supply of goods to Zepa, and we continuously
18 monitor this and maintain permanent contact with them.
19 "Yours faithfully.
20 "Dr. Hasan Muratovic.
22 This is a minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
23 This is my question: Wasn't even the minister -- a minister of
24 Bosnia-Herzegovina happy with the distribution of the humanitarian aid by
25 the UNHCR in the course of -- sorry, not -- 1995 -- or, rather, from
1 December to February 1995?
2 A. Yes, sir, this document reflects that from the period
3 1 December 1994 through 15 February 1995 that it is their view that the
4 aid delivered was satisfactory.
5 Q. Thank you. Did you, as an analyst find any documents testifying
6 and confirming that the aid received by Zepa across the territory
7 Republika Srpska was sufficient?
8 A. I did not review documents with respect to aid going into the
9 Zepa enclave per se to determine whether or not the aid going into the
10 Zepa enclave was sufficient.
11 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Was this being monitored by
12 Minister Muratovic and did he express his satisfaction in this document
13 by claiming that the deliveries supplied to Zepa are at a satisfactory
15 A. Yes, sir, as I've indicated in my prior answer, between the set
16 period Dr. Muratovic was satisfied with the aid coming in.
17 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please, can we look at another
19 document in e-court, which is D209.
20 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Since this document covers the period from December 1994 until
22 February 1995, let us look at the situation in March and April of 1995.
23 It pertains to Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde.
24 We see here that this document was produced by the Drina Corps on
25 the 3rd of May, 1995. This is a breakdown of humanitarian aid to the
1 Muslims enclaves for March and April 1995. We have various columns. In
2 the first one is the description of goods; the next one indicates the
3 quantity in tonnes, and it relates to the months of March and April and
4 the enclaves of Srebrenica, Gorazde, and Zepa.
5 Now, please, if we look at the quantities. Let's take just one
6 example of one of the staple items, such as flour or beans, which is
7 under number 2. Did you ever analyse whether these quantities were
8 enough to meet the needs of the Srebrenica, Gorazde, and Zepa enclaves?
9 A. No, sir. As I indicated before, I am not a professional
10 logistician, and as a result I have no -- I do not have the professional
11 background in order to make those kinds of -- the analysis, let alone
12 judgements, behind them. So with respect to analysing whether these
13 delivered amounts would be sufficient for whatever the population, I just
14 have no basis to make those calls.
15 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Could a logistics person be able to
16 decide whether 32 tonnes of flour --
17 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: 300 tonnes of flour.
18 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
19 Q. -- would be enough to feed three -- 35.000 people?
20 A. I would like to believe that there are people on UNHCR staff as
21 well as other professional logistical organisations who can make those
22 calculations. I assume there are, I just -- I don't know.
23 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Have you ever found a document in which
24 it says that the enclaves were suffering from shortages of flour and
25 other staple foods as well as baby formulas, medical supplies, hygiene
1 items, and things of that nature? Do you have any reference in that
3 A. No, sir, I don't. I did not review UNHCR documents related to
4 supplies going into Srebrenica. The best people to ask that question to
5 would obviously be those UN officials as well as the Dutch Battalion
6 people who were there who were making their own independent observations.
7 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Let me show you another document from
8 1994 sent to the Drina Corps. It relates to potentially contentious
9 issues with regard to the distribution of UNHCR humanitarian aid.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at 1D852. Thank you.
11 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
12 Q. We have the document, but I've just been told that there is no
13 English translation. I'm going to read it out. It is stated in the
15 "Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska, confidential number
16 10/14-29, 16th January, 1994.
17 "Assessment of the order of the president of the RS."
18 Then there is a reference to this order. And then it goes on to
19 say, I quote:
20 "Pursuant to the order issued by Dr. Radovan Karadzic, president
21 of RS, item 3, confidential number," this and this, "shall be amended to
22 read as follows:
23 'All contentious issues that might arise with representatives of
24 UNPROFOR and military observes shall exclusively be resolved through
25 Corps commands and the Main Staff of the VRS. As for international
1 humanitarian issues, these issues shall be resolved through the
2 government co-ordinating body for humanitarian aid.'
3 "Signed, Commander Lieutenant General Ratko Mladic."
4 My question is: From this stamp can we see who the sender of
5 this telegram is, and does this confirm that this is an authentic
6 document dated the 16th of January?
7 MR. McCLOSKEY: Excuse me, Mr. President.
8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
9 MR. McCLOSKEY: Ms. Stewart was able to find an English
10 translation of this document, just so everyone knows that. I'm not sure
11 how we can use it. One sec.
12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It is a Defence document. Perhaps it could be
13 uploaded as well.
14 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I was told by Mr. Registrar: If Ms. Stewart
16 would send this translation to the Registrar, it could be uploaded and
17 displayed on the screen together with the B/C/S original.
18 There we have it on the screen thanks to the OTP.
19 Mr. Tolimir, please continue.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Microphone not activated]
21 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am grateful to Mr. McCloskey and
23 his team.
24 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Mr. Butler, now you can see the English version of this document.
1 Now, based on this document can one draw a conclusion that the president
2 of Republika Srpska, Radovan Karadzic, and the commander of the
3 Main Staff, Ratko Mladic, resolved all the issues through the organs
4 responsible for monitoring and analysing the delivery of humanitarian aid
5 to the enclaves? Thank you.
6 A. I am not sure, off of a solitary document, I can draw a
7 conclusion. What this document appears to be is part of the ongoing
8 process. This document - and at this point I don't have the English
9 translation yet up on my screen - I --
10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: The Court Usher will assist you to get it on the
12 Do you have it now?
13 THE WITNESS: What this document appears to be is a response to
14 the president of Republika Srpska who has issued an order regulating
15 these contacts and disputes, and this appears to be General Mladic is
16 responding to that order, essentially making an amendment to that order
17 back to the president with his recommendation of what the text should
18 read in that particular item.
19 Without having the base item to go behind and looking at it in
20 its entire context, I can't answer your question whether I can conclude
21 whether all of these issues are solved or regulated or whatever. I mean,
22 this is just one fragmentary piece.
23 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. I understood from your answer that it was
25 Mladic who was amending something and sending it to Karadzic. Couldn't
1 it be the other way around? I think that Mr. Karadzic is instructing
2 Mr. Mladic how to solve the problems.
3 A. Again, without seeing the base document and understanding the
4 genesis behind it, it's difficult to say exactly what this is. I'm only
5 operating off of this one particular document. Again, what it appears to
6 me to be is that there is -- has been published by the president of the
7 Republika Srpska some definitive guidance on these issues in that base
8 document, which is 01 [sic] 128/94 and that president -- or that
9 General Mladic is looking for having at least one of those particular
10 issues amended.
11 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, can you help me: This document,
12 signed by Ratko Mladic, to whom was it sent? I can't see an addressee of
13 this document.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] He is sending this to all the units
15 so as to inform them about the amended procedure for solving the dispute
16 with UNPROFOR and humanitarian organisations, and he is passing on the
17 solution as provided by President Karadzic. Although it's not stated,
18 but when you have a document of this kind, that means that it's being
19 sent to all the units.
20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you for this assessment. Please carry on.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
22 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Mr. Butler, have you found any document saying that the
24 population was leaving the enclaves and that the humanitarian aid that
25 was taken in early 1994 as a criterion for the needs to be met in the
1 course of 1995, did it reach the population?
2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
3 MR. McCLOSKEY: Could that be broken down? I mean, "is there any
4 document that they were leaving the enclave." I mean, there are so many
5 documents about them leaving the enclave. I'm sure the general has
6 something more specific in mind. But if he could be more specific, it
7 would be helpful.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. McCloskey. I will
9 call up a document produced by the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Which
10 is D144.
11 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, are you tendering 1D852?
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Thank you for reminding
13 me. We do tender it.
14 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Due to the help by the Prosecution, there is a
15 translation. I hope that the parties and the Registry will be able to
16 connect the translation with the original B/C/S document and then it will
17 be received as a document in evidence.
18 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 1D852 shall be
19 assigned Exhibit D307 marked for identification pending translation.
20 Thank you.
21 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I think we have a translation.
22 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I take it the parties will communicate about the
24 uploading of this document. It is not in e-court yet. It should be --
25 it is the duty of the Defence, in co-operation with the Prosecution.
1 Please carry on.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
3 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
4 Q. This is a document that I asked for. Can you look at line 13
5 from the top, which begins with the words:
6 "All the individuals complaining about the shortage of food and
7 for that reason intend to leave these areas. We have found possibilities
8 for providing assistance in this regard. However, in the summer months
9 it is as if some unknown wave flows through the people, suddenly creating
10 a euphoria, that the best solution is to leave for Tuzla. This literally
11 causes waves throughout the entire area, and the majority of people are
12 then ready to leave. Such has been the case in recent days.
13 "Pursuant to the Order of the commander of the
14 28th Army Division ... dated 27th May, 1995, all movement by individuals
15 or groups of people, particularly soldiers, between the Srebrenica and
16 Zepa enclaves is forbidden without prior written permission from the unit
17 commander in the case of members of the armed forces, for which the
18 consent of the division command is also required. Pursuant to the same
19 Order, the commands of all units in the division zone of responsibility
20 are obliged to make use of the intelligence and military security service
21 organs to gather information on all persons intending to leave the safe
22 area for other free territories ..."
23 So in this first paragraph, where the order of the command is
24 being referred to, does it say that people are complaining about the
25 shortage of food and that that was the reason for their intention to
1 leave the areas but that solution has been found to provide assistance?
2 Did the command decide that that was not a sufficient reason for people
3 to leave the area and that they have found a way of getting around this
4 issue by increasing the reserves?
5 A. What it says, sir, is that for all those who complain of a lack
6 of food and for that reason intend to leave these areas, we have found
7 possibilities for providing assistance in this regard. It does not
8 specify, at least the part of the document that I can see, how they were
9 going to deal with that issue and whether or not increasing food reserves
10 are a part of that, assuming food reserves even existed. What it says is
11 what it says. There's not enough to read into what they actually mean
12 behind that particular line, in my opinion.
13 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. But this was written by the 28th Division
14 which is there together with the population; therefore, they are capable
15 of finding a solution and offering assistance in that respect. Is that
16 true or not? Thank you.
17 A. I agree with your assessment that they're there and they are in a
18 position to offer a solution. What I'm just saying is that they don't
19 specify in the lines that you've talked about -- there's no -- there is
20 no details as to what those potential solutions are. It just says that
21 possibilities -- you know, that we have found possibilities for providing
22 assistance in this regard. I mean, I take your assumption that it could
23 mean distributing more food, but it doesn't say that. So, I mean, that's
24 my answer to your question. What it says is what it says. It does not
25 specify what the measures are.
1 Q. Thank you. Mr. Butler, please, could that problem have been
2 solved in any other way other than by giving food to those who are
3 complaining that there was the shortage of food?
4 A. I suspect that from a military disciplinary point of view there
5 were other ways that the issue could have been solved. For example,
6 given the context of this document that people are leaving, in part, with
7 their families or in extended groups, by putting more rigorous measures
8 on the members of the military to keep track of them and potentially even
9 put those in detention who they suspect may flee, that would cause those
10 individuals and their families to remain in the enclave, because they
11 would have no other means of getting out. So there are more harsh
12 measures that could have been put into place beyond the simple aspect of
13 increasing the food supply to certain individuals or groups.
14 Q. Thank you. I'm sorry, Mr. Butler. Maybe we were mistranslated
15 when we quoted this, but this is a report from the 28th Division, saying
16 that all those complaining about the food were taken care of. And the
17 only way that they could have been taken care of was by giving them food.
18 Can we please look at the first paragraph of this document, in
19 view of the answer that you gave us. The document which was sent on the
20 19th of June, 1995, it was sent to the command of the 2nd Corps, and
21 paragraph one states:
22 "The problem of members of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and
23 Herzegovina and civilians leaving the Srebrenica and Zepa safe areas in
24 the direction of Tuzla, Kladanj, and Serb has been present since the
25 first days of demilitarisation of this area."
1 In other words, this was a steady process that did not only take
2 place in 1995.
3 "During this entire period, the military and civilian authorities
4 in Srebrenica have taken a number of measures to prevent such departures,
5 yet all of these measures have not yielded significant practical
7 And he goes on to say that this was due to a shortage of food but
8 that they had been successful in providing food to all those who
9 expressed a shortage of it. He goes on to say:
10 However, in the summer months it seems that suddenly some unknown
11 wave flows through the people, a craving of departures.
12 So this is my question: Were there permanent departures of the
13 civilian population from Srebrenica to Central Bosnia as is stated here?
14 Thank you.
15 A. That question I can definitely answer. As you will note, and as
16 this document notes, the issue of civilian population within the enclave,
17 many of them wanting to leave, was an issue that began from the very
18 beginning of the creation of the enclave. The enclave was, in fact,
19 created in part because people who had been forced out of the Kamenica
20 and Cerska areas by the Bosnian Serb military offensives in early 1993,
21 January, February, March, and had been pushed into Srebrenica, were, in
22 fact, in April of 1993 being put on trucks by the VRS and evacuated out
23 of that town. That evacuation out of the town of Srebrenica in 1993 was
24 stopped by the BiH government, which viewed that as --
25 THE ACCUSED: [No interpretation] [Overlapping speakers] ...
1 THE WITNESS: -- by allowing those people -- by allowing those
2 people to depart, was making themselves complicit in an ethnic cleansing
4 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, please switch off your microphone.
5 Please switch off your microphone, thank you.
6 THE WITNESS: So to that degree it has been well established that
7 a large percentage, and perhaps the majority of the people, who were
8 actually in the Srebrenica enclave were not actually from Srebrenica.
9 They were refugees who had been pushed out of their village and home
10 areas and other parts of Eastern Bosnia. So there was always a desire on
11 their part to leave the Srebrenica enclave.
12 I mean, from a political perspective, there was always a desire
13 by the ABiH government to not allow them to leave the enclave, because if
14 that portion of the civilian population left the enclave, it would
15 presumably directly impact any legitimacy to the argument that they had
16 that those safe areas needed to be maintained.
17 So I agree with General Tolimir's assertion that from the very
18 beginning of the enclave, for a variety of reasons, civilians who were
19 trapped in those enclaves wanted to get to Central Bosnia or out to
21 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. We will be discussing this issue later in
23 some of the questions, but let's complete this issue. Was the problem so
24 comprehensive that even the division commander had to apply restrictive
25 measures in 1995 to prevent the population from moving out of the
2 A. It was an ongoing problem. Much to the same degree that it was
3 always an ongoing problem of manpower for the VRS. The family men -- the
4 males of the families who were trapped in the Srebrenica enclave were, in
5 fact, conscripted into the 28th Infantry Division. If they were to
6 escape with their families, that would obviously have a corresponding
7 negative impact on the material and the military ability of the
8 28th Infantry Division to do what it had to do.
9 It was a classic situation of a military unit operating behind
10 enemy lines but within a friendly population. The military unit depended
11 heavily on that civilian population for a lot of the resources and
12 personnel in order to do that job. And so they recognised as long as
13 they could keep a handle on the civilian population within the enclave,
14 that many of the men would not leave their families and as such would be
15 available for military service.
16 Q. Do you have information to the effect that the army, because it
17 wanted to have its units at full strength, prevented the population from
18 leaving Srebrenica in accordance with the agreement on free movement?
19 A. I have not seen any specific ABiH documents that note that.
20 However, I've -- as part of my own research, I've probably come across
21 enough anecdotal information which would support that conclusion, which
22 is that it was not in the interest of the ABiH government to allow the
23 civilian population to slowly bleed out of the enclave, because of the
24 impact that it would have on the military units within the enclave.
25 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Did you come across information that even
1 the humanitarian aid was --
2 THE INTERPRETER: Can Mr. Tolimir please repeat his question.
3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, the interpreters asked you to repeat
4 your question, please.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
6 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Mr. Butler, as you reviewed various material, did you come to
8 learn that the army in Srebrenica and Zepa compelled the civilians to
9 work for the purposes of the army in order to receive humanitarian aid --
10 in exchange of which work they would receive humanitarian aid?
11 A. When you're -- when you use the phrase "compelled the civilians
12 to work for the purposes of the army," are you referring to -- I mean,
13 just to be clear, are we referring to actual physical labour or are we
14 referring to the idea that the men would have to serve in the military,
15 at least part time, in order to be eligible for humanitarian aid?
16 Q. I don't need the answer merely for the sake of an answer.
17 Perhaps we should look at a document -- or, rather, I will put another
18 question to you and then we will have before us a document which deals
19 with this issue.
20 Here, on page 2, the last paragraph of this document, wasn't this
21 problem in Zepa resolved by the application of restrictive measures and
22 even by the deployment of units to Zepa which were to prevent the
23 population from moving out? Let's look at the last paragraph on this
24 page. Perhaps in your language it's not the last paragraph.
25 "In addition to other measures, I decided to send to Zepa
1 elements of a unit attached to the staff and the commander of the
2 281st Light Mountain Brigade, Major Zulfo Tursunovic, to use his
3 authority to try and bring back some of the individuals who hailed from
4 these areas who we believe left in the direction of Zepa in the last
5 couple of nights with a view to crossing over to the Kladanj area. As
6 appropriate, the members of this unit will, in co-operation with the
7 military police of the 285th Light Mountain Brigade, arrest these
8 individuals and return them to Srebrenica by force.
9 "We believe that the 2nd Corps should, in co-operation with other
10 authorities, take more severe repressive measures against all these
11 individuals, which would be a deterrent to all those who wished to move
12 out of Srebrenica and Zepa."
13 This was signed by Major Ramiz Becirovic. This is my question:
14 In the course of 1995, was it not the case that the problem had become so
15 serious that the army had to prevent individuals from leaving the
16 enclaves? They even had to resort to oppressive measures, and even the
17 involvement of the corps was required to make sure that these people are
18 prevented from fleeing the area?
19 A. Yes, sir. I mean, as this document reflects, the military
20 leadership of the 28th Division recognised the adverse impact that these
21 desertions were having on its military units, much the same way that they
22 impacted the military units of the VRS and other units. And along the
23 same lines, they were engaged in measures to try and apprehend these
24 individuals, even if they had successfully left the enclave, and then
25 return them to their military units, in part, as is noted, as a
2 So that if these people who had thought they had successfully
3 deserted were brought back, in the future other people would recognise
4 that attempts to desert would be futile and that they should just stay
5 and perform their military service.
6 Q. Thank you. Please, can we have your comments as a military
7 expert and military analyst how this reflected itself on the humanitarian
8 needs in the enclaves? Were they greater or smaller as a result of this?
9 A. I'm not sure I understand your question, because I'm not sure I
10 understand how a correlation between military members deserting from the
11 28th Division -- I mean, I'm not sure how it connects to the overall
12 humanitarian situation in Srebrenica. If you could clarify your
13 question, maybe I can assist.
14 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Was the number of beneficiaries of the
15 humanitarian aid reduced with the departure of the people from the
16 enclaves? Thank you.
17 A. Yes, sir. I mean, obviously every mouth that's no longer
18 required to be fed makes it the same amount of supplies go further among
19 the remaining population. If those families were to abandon their
20 residence in Srebrenica, those facilities would then become available to
21 other people who may not have had a place to stay or things of that
22 nature. So, you know, arguably, as people departed the enclave, and if
23 one assumes that the supply remained constant, those people remaining in
24 the enclave could expect to enjoy a slightly higher quality of life, or
25 at least a slight -- not quality of life, certainly a slightly increased
1 ability for food and housing and other services.
2 Q. Were humanitarian organisations aware of this? Did they, due to
3 these departures, reduce the amount of the humanitarian aid they
4 delivered or not?
5 A. I don't know.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 Let us look at D209, a document dating back to 1995, and let's
8 make a comparison of it.
9 Mr. Butler, look at the table relating to Srebrenica and the
10 months of March and April. The figure for March is 305. And in April it
11 had 387 tonnes. So it increased from 305 to 387 tonnes. And then flour,
12 which is in the first row, also increased. So from -- in Gorazde, 362 to
13 531. Zepa, 72 -- from 72 to 77. So that's just the first row. In other
14 words, regardless of the fact that the size of the population was
15 reduced, the needs increased.
16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: What is your question?
17 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
18 Q. My question was this: If we look at the first row in this table,
19 can we conclude that the quantities of humanitarian aid increased despite
20 the fact that the population decreased?
21 A. I believe that all you can conclude based on this document is
22 that from the month of March and April that, with respect to looking at
23 line 1 as an example, flour, that the amount increased between March and
24 April. I don't believe that - based on this document and one or two
25 others - that anybody can draw a meaningful conclusion as to why the
1 amount increased and, more importantly, that it was directly as a result
2 of a -- or that the population was decreasing at the same time, and by
3 how much.
4 I mean, just looking at the dates between March and April, right
5 offhand one reason that I could possibly attribute to the increased
6 delivery would be the fact that March still falls at the end of winter
7 and April begins the month of spring when the weather is more temperate;
8 that might have allowed for better conditions for convoys to move in. I
9 don't know that that's the case, but it is another explanation.
10 So the practice of taking one or two data points and trying to
11 extrapolate a conclusion out of that in this regard is just not an
12 exercise I'm going to engage in. There are ways to come to these
13 conclusions through proper analysis, but this isn't it.
14 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Did you yourself make any sort of an
15 assessment or analysis of the shipments of humanitarian aid received on a
16 monthly basis in the course of 1995?
17 A. I believe you've asked me that question before, and my answer
18 again remains the same: It was beyond the scope of my analytical work to
19 analyse UN supplies going into the convoys and -- or UNHCR supplies going
20 into the enclaves. I did not do that.
21 Q. Thank you. But in the course of your examination-in-chief, you
22 expressed views and positions about the humanitarian aid being on a
23 steady decrease; whereas, we can see on the basis of this document that
24 it was on the increase. So did you look into the validity of your
25 answers from that perspective?
1 A. The testimony that I made with respect to the
2 examination-in-chief was the result of, one, the fact that I was being --
3 I was reviewing documents which showed that the Main Staff was reviewing
4 convoy orders and, for their reasons, were making reductions in the
5 amount of material supplies that they were allowing UNPROFOR and the
6 United Nations UNHCR organisation to bring into the enclaves. That was
7 the point that I was trying to make. I did not correlate that to the
8 point that you're looking at, is whether or not those actual reductions
9 that was being made by the Main Staff in fact resulted in a net increase
10 or decrease in the amount of supplies going into the Srebrenica enclave
11 or the Zepa enclave.
12 That analysis can be done. It wasn't within my purview to do it.
13 Many of the documents that you're bringing up now were not available to
14 me when I did my initial analysis. So, again, the purpose of my
15 testimony in direct with respect to those convoy documents was to show
16 the Court the involvement of the Main Staff of the Army of the
17 Republika Srpska in that process.
18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Butler, please have a look on the screen
19 again. Mr. Tolimir dealt with item 1, flour. If you have a short look
20 at the other items, do you see an increase or a decrease or a stable
21 amount of food being delivered in the months between March and April?
22 THE WITNESS: Well, again, sir, as soon as you go to item 2, you
23 see an increase. In item 3, looking at the Srebrenica column, you see a
24 decrease. Item 4 remains stable. And this is the point that I'm trying
25 to make: You can't make what's logically known as an ipso facto
1 analytical conclusion, which is an analytical trap, I mean, you can't
2 draw these types of conclusions just like this. I mean, if you're going
3 to do a sustained analysis of what food was reaching the enclaves and
4 what the conditions were, yes, you can do that, but this is why I cannot
5 agree to General Tolimir's conclusion simply off of one or two data
6 points and that they may or may not support a conclusion.
7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much.
8 Mr. McCloskey, I don't see you any longer on your feet.
9 MR. McCLOSKEY: I was -- I can't really make much sense of the
10 B/C/S that's covering the English, and you and Mr. Butler are so, and so
11 I'm not going to -- I won't worry about that. But if we were going to go
12 into that any more, we're just asking if we can see the entire image.
13 But we're fine.
14 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I received the response I was asking for. Thank
16 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you.
17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, some minutes left before the second
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
20 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Mr. Butler, the staple foods -- aren't flour and beans such
22 staple foods, and isn't that the sort of food stuff you would need to
23 consume every day?
24 A. It would be a rough diet if it were just those two, but, yes, I
25 take your point, flour and beans are staple items.
1 Q. And what about powdered milk? Isn't that the criterion based on
2 which one would assess the needs of a population for each of the month?
3 A. Again, without knowing more details as to the overall situation,
4 within the enclave -- and I -- just at this point let's take Srebrenica,
5 you know, without knowing the number of total people that they're trying
6 to supply the existing food stocks and consumption rates, this is kind of
7 the same discussion that we had a number of days ago when you asked me
8 the question about whether or not, if I were to look at a list of
9 ammunition, whether that was enough, and my same answer applies: Enough
10 in context to what? Without knowing what is already on hand and how fast
11 it's being consumed, there's no way to make any kind of informed
12 assessment as to whether or not the supplies that are being received are
13 enough. All you can do is exactly what you're doing here, which is
14 pointing to two specific data points on a month-by-month basis and making
15 a calculation that, you know, between the months of March and April one
16 data point increased and one data point decreased. That tells you
18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, we must have our second break now.
19 I would like to invite you to consider if you could leave to another --
20 move to another matter after the break, because Mr. Butler clearly
21 indicated that he is not an expert on these matters you have put
22 questions to him.
23 We adjourn, and resume at 1.00.
24 --- Recess taken at 12.30 p.m.
25 --- On resuming at 1.03 p.m.
1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Yes, Mr. Tolimir. Please carry on.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
3 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Mr. Butler, let us look at 65 ter document 05179. When I asked
5 you yesterday, on page 16492, about document P162, you gave me more or
6 less this answer, as recorded in the transcript. When I asked you about
7 your position and your understanding about the role of the co-ordinating
8 body mentioned here and its relationship with the Main Staff, you gave
9 your answer in lines 2 to 19 on page 16492. You said that the UN was not
10 the only agency involved in these matters.
11 Now, in order to avoid repetition: At the end of your answer, I
12 asked you about your opinion as to who had control about what was
13 entering the enclave -- actually, that was the Prosecutor who asked you
14 this, and you said that it was the Main Staff who issued specific
15 approvals and permissions on a daily basis.
16 Now, please, let us look now at 65 ter 05178.
17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
18 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, and as the general appears to be asking
19 Mr. Butler about a specific question that I did, and his specific answer,
20 and he paraphrased it, could he -- could we actually go to that, if he
21 intends to do that, so we can see what the question was and what the
22 answer was? It's, I think, a rather important area.
23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Up to now we didn't hear any question from
24 Mr. Tolimir. He referred to a previous part of the examination --
25 THE ACCUSED: [Microphone not activated]
1 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] When document P2162 was shown, on
3 transcript page 16492, lines 12 to 19, the Prosecutor asked:
4 "Can you explain how you understand the role of the co-ordinating
5 body ...?"
6 And I would like to read the answer that you gave, lines 2 to 19.
7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Perhaps it's a waste of time to read that into
8 the transcript again. We have all the transcript in front of us in the
9 English version. The witness can see it and read it again. Perhaps you
10 put a question in relation to that, and then Mr. Butler is in the
11 position to read the relevant part of his previous answer.
12 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
13 Q. In the second answer to Mr. McCloskey about who had the final
14 control, you said that it was the Main Staff who issued definite --
15 definitive orders on a daily basis.
16 Now, my question was: Did you have control in mind or approvals?
17 Because Mr. McCloskey asked you about control and you spoke about
18 approvals. So let us clarify to what your answer exactly refer. Which
19 term should we use, whether it be "control" or "approval"?
20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: And this is in relation to the lines 18, 19, 20,
21 and 21 of page 16492.
22 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. I stand by my answer. My opinion is
23 that on a factual basis ultimately the Main Staff exercised the final
24 control, because the fact is that regardless of any decisions made by the
25 civilian body, it would ultimately have to be the army that would permit
1 the convoys to transit through what were then military areas to get into
2 the enclaves.
3 So while I take General Tolimir's point that ultimately the
4 approval body was the civilian body, the reality on the ground was that
5 the civilian body could approve requests as they saw fit; but ultimately
6 if the Main Staff did not allow the convoy to transit through for a
7 variety of military reasons, the Main Staff was exercising control over
8 that process.
9 I hope that clarifies, sir -- that clarifies the meaning behind
10 my answer.
11 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Butler, I recall that you described that in
12 more detail later on in your examination-in-chief, but could you make a
13 distinction between the word "control," final control, which was used by
14 Mr. McCloskey, and your answer "the final approval." Because now you
15 said you stand by your answer but use the word "control" instead of
16 "approval." Could you please clarify.
17 THE WITNESS: I guess -- I guess to be very -- as clear as I can
18 on it: Again, the civilian agency approves the request from UNHCR. That
19 request then goes to the Main Staff. The Main Staff ultimately controls
20 the access that that convoy is going to have to the enclave, because
21 first it has to also review that material. It has the option of, as we
22 saw in a number of documents, writing down some of the supplies that were
23 going through and potentially sending them back to the civilian
24 commission for them to reconsider that those degradations could take
25 place. It is also responsible, if it approves or concurs with the
1 approval of Republika Srpska civilian commission, ultimately it's the
2 army that's responsible and for ensuring that clearance is delivered so
3 the convoy can go into the territory of the Republika Srpska and be
5 So the Main Staff and the military controls that aspect of the
6 process which will ultimately result in delivery of the convoy and the
7 goods to the enclave. But in the sense of the UN civilian goods, as
8 we've discussed, again, I take General Tolimir's point that, you know, it
9 is a civilian body that is that approval authority. I agree that, in
10 theory, the civilians are going to approve it and the military is just
11 going to follow orders and do that; however, for a variety of reasons the
12 military may seek at points in times to delay those convoys, to reroute
13 those convoys, things of that nature. So, I mean, there's a de jure
14 process and then there's what actually happens on the ground.
15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you, for that.
16 Mr. Tolimir, please go ahead.
17 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Mr. Butler, was it possible for the army to prohibit a convoy to
19 pass through if it had been given an approval to do so by the state
21 A. I would say that from the experience of the documents that I have
22 seen that if the state committee wanted the convoy to go through, and if
23 the military objected to it, that the military could come up with
24 necessary pretexts which might delay that convoy or might, again, push it
25 in time or maybe even deal with the issue of the -- how much cargo was in
1 the convoy. But I would say that at the end of the day, if the civilians
2 approved that convoy going through, the VRS - unless they could actually
3 show sustained combat activity in an area - would ultimately have to
4 accede to that and allow that convoy to pass.
5 Q. Mr. Butler, let us look at 65 ter document 05178. It's a
6 document from the Main Staff of the VRS, dated the 21st of March, 1995.
7 It is addressed to the state committee for co-operation with the UN and
8 international humanitarian organisations to the chairman of the
9 committee, Professor Koljevic, personally. And the document reads as
11 "On the 20th of March, we received a letter from the chief of
12 convoy operation of the UNPROFOR BH command, Lieutenant Leviv [phoen],
13 who, in response to our letter regarding the reduction and
14 rationalisation of the movement of convoys in order to ease the burden on
15 our roads, sent the follow answer: 'That he appreciates the concern on
16 the part of the VRS army concerning the safety of UNPROFOR personnel on
17 the roads and accepts the proposal for the traffic to be reduced as much
18 as possible by establishing fixed schedules for convoys.'
19 "That is why they want to introduce a shuttle bus line for the
20 main company of BH command in order to transport only those UNPROFOR
21 personnel who are going on leave or are on rotation and travelling from
22 Sarajevo to Split and vice versa. The cargo accompanying these convoys
23 would only consist of personal belongings and mail pouches. Depending on
24 the number of passengers, a convoy may be made up of one minibus or one
25 jeep or a bigger bus or a combination thereof. I propose the following
1 days where they would travel:
2 "Tuesday, Sarajevo-Split. And then back on Wednesday.
3 "Saturday, Sarajevo-Split. And then back on Sunday.
4 "The request for these movements shall be submitted to the
5 Main Staff of the VRS through regular procedure through military
6 observers at Pale.
7 "We are forwarding this to you for your information, and we are
8 asking the state committee for co-operation with the UN to adopt a
9 decision regarding the said requests, and we need to have it in writing.
10 "Chief of Staff, Manojlo Milovanovic."
11 I'm sorry for having to read this because we don't have a
13 My question is: Does this document suggest that
14 Lieutenant General Manojlo Milovanovic is asking Professor Koljevic, the
15 chairman of the committee, not to take any decision but, rather, just to
16 implement it? Thank you.
17 A. What I take this document to be is, first of all, a note from
18 Lieutenant General Milovanovic that lays out the issue of UNPROFOR
19 traffic and wanting to standardise it, that they have proposed a solution
20 on how travel will be made in this particular case. And it sounds like,
21 again, from the last two paragraphs, that General Milovanovic is
22 forwarding this proposal up to the civilian leadership for them to
23 ratify, and the presumption being, once the civilian leadership ratifies
24 this formally in writing it will be implemented.
25 Q. Thank you. Have you noticed that this is not the only thing that
1 he is forwarding but that in the last two paragraphs he is seeking a
2 decision to be made on the said requests, and I am going to quote again
3 the last two lines:
4 "We are forwarding the above to you for your information, and we
5 are kindly asking the state committee for co-operation with
6 United Nations to take a decision on the said request, which needs to be
7 sent to the Main Staff of the VRS in writing.
8 "Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Manojlo Milovanovic."
9 So is he asking the state committee to make a decision or not?
10 Thank you.
11 A. Yes, sir. Maybe I wasn't clear with what I said back or there
12 was a translation issue, but I believe that is exactly what is happening.
13 He is making this proposal to the state commission and he is requesting
14 that they make a formal decision on the matter.
15 Q. Thank you. Let us now look at P689, Article 6.
16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tolimir, are you tendering this last
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. Yes, we
19 would like to tender this, and my apologies for not stating that right
21 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It will be marked for identification pending
23 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter document 5178 shall be
24 assigned Exhibit D308 marked for identification pending translation.
25 Thank you.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We need the second page of this
2 Official Gazette in the Serbian version so that we can see what we are
4 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Now, could you please look at Article 6, which reads:
6 "Permits for the movement of convoys and employees of the UN and
7 humanitarian organisations on the territory of Republika Srpska shall be
8 issued by the co-ordinating body for humanitarian operations, pursuant to
9 committee decisions."
10 My question is: Did General Milovanovic strictly abide to all
11 rules and regulations in light of this decision that was published in the
12 Official Gazette?
13 A. It certainly is consistent with the language in Article 6,
14 reflecting, in a practical sense, that the military is going to lay out
15 the option in this particular case and send it up for a final decision by
16 the civilian leadership. So taking the last exhibit in this one in
17 context, General Milovanovic appears to be operating within the framework
18 of the spirit of Article 6.
19 Q. Thank you.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have P2162, please.
21 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
22 Q. While we are waiting, let me tell you that it's a document
23 produced by the Main Staff entitled -- or, actually, sent to subordinate
24 units of Drina Corps, Eastern Bosnia Corps, and Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.
25 The original says 2nd of April, 1995.
1 With respect to this document, you commented this handwritten
2 remark made by Mr. Nikolic, and I'm going to read it:
3 "Not a single convoy or the ICRC team or MSF may enter Srebrenica
4 without my permission and presence.
5 "Signed, Momir Nikolic."
6 Now, my question is: Did Momir Nikolic make this remark and
7 address it to the Main Staff prior to the convoys entering Srebrenica?
8 A. I don't believe that in the context of this document
9 Momir Nikolic is making this remark to the Main Staff. I believe that my
10 testimony related to this is that this document was sent by the
11 Main Staff to the subordinate formations, to include the Drina Corps, and
12 made its way to Captain First Class Nikolic of the Bratunac Brigade who
13 was responsible for the inspection of those vehicles is going into the
14 enclave. And that this notation on the document is for the benefit of
15 the individuals at the yellow bridge and at the Bratunac Brigade
16 headquarters so that they would know that in the event that one of these
17 convoys were to come in and seek to enter the enclave, that they were not
18 authorised to grant permission for that convoy to continue on unless
19 Captain Nikolic was personally present there and gave his authorisation.
20 I believe I've also testified that this is an example of the type
21 of inspection regime that was in place so that the VRS had the ability to
22 inspect these convoys.
23 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Can you please tell me this: Did Nikolic
24 write this because he wanted to obey orders to the letter and exercising
25 conduct control in a proper way, or was his intention to impose some kind
1 of his personal authority?
2 A. No, sir. Your first supposition is what I believe is the correct
3 one. Captain Nikolic wrote these orders because he himself had received
4 orders through the chain of command to ensure the proper inspection and
5 clearance of these convoys at the last possible place that they could be
6 inspected before they entered the enclave.
7 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. The first sentence reads:
8 "We hereby inform you that we agree to the requests of the
9 co-ordinating body for humanitarian aid as follows."
10 And then they are citing the requests.
11 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] Can we move to the next page,
13 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. McCloskey.
14 MR. McCLOSKEY: I would just note - and I know it's difficult for
15 the interpreters to always read the translation, but it says "we --" the
16 official translation says:
17 "We hereby inform you that we consent ..."
18 So "agree"/"consent" is the issue here. So I just wanted to
19 point that out.
20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.
21 Mr. Tolimir.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we please move to the last
23 sentence of this document.
24 Let's see what else General Milovanovic has to say. This is
25 page 3 of the document, and the last.
1 Can it be shown in e-court, please.
2 Q. I'm reading:
3 "Chef d'équipe," or head of team, "will be carrying the cargo
4 manifests as well as the manifests of the individuals being transported,
5 conduct inspection, and ensure a smooth passage."
6 "Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Manojlo Milovanovic."
7 My question is: Does this part of the document speak of any
8 restrictions --
9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I have to interrupt you. The English page
10 doesn't correspond to the B/C/S.
11 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I was told that only the first page of the
13 English version is uploaded into e-court so that that part is not
14 available in English. But you read it into the transcript and you may
15 put, now, your question to Mr. Butler.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
17 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Mr. Butler, did General Milovanovic ask that inspection be
19 strictly carried out as well as that the convoy be allowed unhindered
21 A. It's a two-part process. Yes, he directed that the inspections
22 be carried out; and by noting the fact that, one, he transmitted down
23 what the Main Staff's understanding of the cargo was going to be, and he
24 also indicated that the convoy commander is going to be carrying a copy
25 of the manifest, this way Captain [sic] Milovanovic had a way of not only
1 making sure that the cargo in the vehicle matched the cargo that the
2 convoy commander had on the manifest, but that that cargo also matched
3 what the Main Staff understood was being set down.
4 If all of those conditions are met, then the second prong of that
5 goes into effect, which is: Yes, ones these conditions are satisfied,
6 the expectation is that Captain Momir Nikolic will allow the convoy to
7 pass unhindered.
8 Q. This is my question for you: Was Captain Nikolic able to deny
9 passage to a convoy that had been granted approval by
10 General Milovanovic, a convoy which had a complete cargo manifest?
11 A. If the cargo manifests matched, then Captain Nikolic would not,
12 if he were properly exercising his authority, be able to stop the convoy
13 on that basis. If the cargo manifests did not match or there were some
14 other problem that was identified, I suspect the practical application
15 would be that Captain Nikolic would contact, through the Drina Corps, the
16 Main Staff, he would explain what the discrepancies were as they existed,
17 and he would request instructions from the Main Staff as to what to do
18 with the convoy.
19 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. Since we are running out of time, let us
20 move to a video-clip concerning the ammunition found on a humanitarian
21 convoy at Rogatica.
22 MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation] Which is P212. The transcript is
23 1D234. And it has been distributed to the interpreters. Can it be
24 played, please. P2126. I omitted number 6. Can it be played, please.
25 [Video-clip played]
1 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Representatives of the UNHCR
2 transported --"
3 THE INTERPRETER: Can we note, the interpreters: We have
4 received a transcript, but we don't know where the tape is being played
5 for and cannot read the transcript.
6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: We should stop the video. The interpreters
7 indicated they don't know where the tape is being played for and cannot
8 read the transcript. Can that be checked by the Defence, please.
9 Mr. Gajic.
10 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I am told by the
11 Case Manager that the transcripts of the video "UNHCR Convoy - Rogatica
12 (Zepa)" were distributed to the interpreters.
13 THE INTERPRETER: The interprets note that the portion heard on
14 the footage so far is not reflected in the transcript that we have.
15 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] The video fully reflects the
16 transcript, and nothing has been left out or added.
17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: In that case, I would like to receive the
18 transcript in hard copy to be able to check it.
19 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] We have copies ready and are able to
20 do so.
21 JUDGE FLUEGGE: The only way to resolve this problem is that the
22 video should start exactly where the transcript is beginning. And it
23 should be noted for our transcript, for the record, where the video will
24 start. One moment, please. Don't start.
25 Mr. Gajic, could you please check with your colleague that we
1 really start with where the words can be heard: "Along with food for the
2 people of the Muslim enclave of Zepa ..."
3 And please indicate, for the record, where we start with the
5 Mr. Gajic.
6 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I'm afraid that we
7 will have to start from the beginning because the Case Manager doesn't
8 have the headphones. And the video starts, of course, from 00.00, and we
9 will play the entire video footage. It is short.
10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Go ahead, please, and the interpreters will only
11 be able to interpret that portions we have -- they have available.
12 [Video-clip played]
13 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Along with food for the people of
14 the Muslim enclave of Zepa, the UNHCR representatives were transporting
15 ammunition for Muslim soldiers.
16 "At the Rogatica check-point, a routine inspection of the convoy
17 loaded at the UNHCR -- loaded at the UNHCR warehouse in Pancevo, turned
18 up ammunition of various calibres hidden among the goods, mainly in the
19 flour, and in the cabs of the trucks.
20 "VRS soldier: While inspecting the convoy, in about the fifth
21 sack I checked using a knife, I noticed there was something in the flour.
22 When I carried out a regular inspection, I discovered ammunition.
23 "Without a doubt this sort of conduct represents the severest
24 form of criminal activity and is utterly in contradiction with the
25 mandate and nature of humanitarian missions.
1 "Whether or not they felt caught in the act by the ammunition
2 found in the convoy, the leader and one of the drivers reacted as
4 "Convoy member: I don't know anything about the ammunition found
5 in the flour, and I have nothing to say.
6 "Convoy member: I don't know where the ammunition in the truck
7 came from; I don't know what to say. I cannot say anything really.
8 "Commander of the Army of Republika Srpska,
9 Colonel General Ratko Mladic, sent protests to the UNHCR offices in
10 Zagreb, Belgrade, and Pale, and asked that competent officials there take
11 immediate measures to avoid similar incidents in the future.
12 "General Mladic also informed the UNHCR representatives about the
13 fate of the convoy that was stopped and its personnel. General Mladic's
14 statement said that the goods will be confiscated and appropriate legal
15 measures taken against those responsible.
16 "What else can we say as we watch the images from Rogatica that
17 best testify to the human nature of international humanitarian
19 "Need we remind them that they have always been welcome and safe
20 on the Serbian side in the former Bosnia and Herzegovina?
21 "Need we remind them that the food for the Muslim population
22 arrives in these convoys above all because of the understanding of the
24 "Need we remind them how many times this understanding has been
1 "Should they ask themselves who has the right to transport
2 ammunition and weapons along with food?"
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] With your leave, we will play P2125
4 as well.
5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: You don't get the leave. Look at the clock. We
6 are at the end of today's hearing. Everybody saw what we saw on the
7 screen, and you may play another video tomorrow and then put questions to
8 the witness with respect to these videos.
9 I'm sorry for that, but we have to adjourn for the day. And we
10 will resume tomorrow morning at 9.00 in this courtroom.
11 [The witness stands down]
12 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m.,
13 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 25th day
14 of August, 2011, at 9.00 a.m.