Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 18660

 1                           Wednesday, 1 February 2012

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Good morning to everybody in and around the

 6     courtroom.  Before the witness will be brought in, I would like to deal

 7     with one matter left over from yesterday.

 8             We discussed the document D341.  This document we postponed a

 9     decision about admission into evidence.  We decided, in the meantime, to

10     mark it for identification pending translation of the entire document.

11     Only 15 pages are translated yet, and therefore it will be received after

12     translation of the whole document.

13             The witness should be brought in, please.

14                           [The witness takes the stand]

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Good morning, Mr. Skrbic.  Welcome back to the

16     courtroom.  I have to remind you that the affirmation to tell the truth

17     still applies today.

18             Mr. Tolimir is continuing his examination-in-chief.

19             But before you start, Mr. Tolimir, can you give us an estimation,

20     any indication how many hours you will need today so that we can plan the

21     cross-examination and the length of the testimony of Mr. Skrbic?

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Greetings to everyone present.  May

23     the Lord bring peace upon this courtroom, and may the outcome of this

24     trial be decided by providence and not according to my wishes.

25             According to the estimate that the Defence team has made, we

Page 18661

 1     believe that we are going to conclude the direct examination of today's

 2     witness, Mr. Skrbic.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.  That means you will

 4     conclude today.  Thank you.

 5             We have to aware that, according to the estimation of the

 6     Prosecution, the testimony of Mr. Skrbic will go into the next week.

 7             Mr. Tolimir, please continue.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

 9                           WITNESS:  PETAR SKRBIC [Resumed]

10                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

11                           Examination by Mr. Tolimir: [Continued]

12        Q.   [Interpretation] Greetings to Mr. Skrbic, and I would like him to

13     have a pleasant stay among us.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please have in e-court

15     1D111, the one that we saw yesterday on our screens.  I apologise.  It

16     should be 1D1111, four 1s.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

18             Mr. McCloskey.

19             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And good morning, Mr. President and Your Honours,

20     everyone.  There is certainly a chance I can finish in one day.  I

21     certainly hope to, so I just want -- there is a chance I can, so I will

22     try to, in fact.  But, you know, sometimes I tend to talk, but we hope

23     we'll get done in a day.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much for this encouragement of the

25     Chamber.  That is appreciated.

Page 18662

 1             Mr. Tolimir.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  Thank

 3     you, Mr. McCloskey.

 4             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Mr. Witness, yesterday we saw this document but since you didn't

 6     have your glasses, I am going to repeat one question that I put to you

 7     yesterday.  Did you amend in any way whatsoever those notes after you had

 8     compiled them?  Did you remove or delete any portions or add any portions

 9     to it?  Thank you.

10        A.   No, I didn't change anything.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Mr. Skrbic, please, can you tell us where did you

12     keep this document from the moment you created it until the moment you

13     handed it over to Mr. Aleksandar Gajic, the Defence legal advisor?  Thank

14     you.

15        A.   Mr. Tolimir, initially it was on a floppy disk, and then I copied

16     it to my laptop computer and this is where I kept it.

17        Q.   Thank you.  You kept it just like any other electronic file or

18     did you provide some specific protection for it?  In other words, my

19     question is:  How did you manage to save it from being destroyed?

20        A.   Unfortunately, I have lost a lot of files.  I didn't save this

21     document as a special document, and I didn't attach any special

22     importance to it.  It was among other documents that I kept with its own

23     annotation, and I think I explained that to the Trial Chamber.  The

24     letter O indicated that this was beyond my scope of responsibility but,

25     rather, within the scope of responsibility that were not part of my

Page 18663

 1     purview.  Therefore, I did not keep it as a particular important

 2     document.

 3        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Skrbic.  Now, let us look at the first entry,

 4     dated 18th March, 1995, and I am going to read:

 5             "Izetbegovic managed in America to have humanitarian aid provided

 6     by air-drops, but he will actually receive weapons.  The Muslims are

 7     planning offensive operations from Bjelasnica towards Gorazde in order to

 8     link up the enclave with Sarajevo.  All the preparations at the

 9     1st Muslim Corps have been finalised and they have 10.000 troops

10     allocated for that operation."

11             Now, Mr. Skrbic, can you please comment this note and what is its

12     significance?  Thank you.

13        A.   That was one among the first pieces of information that indicated

14     that preparations were underway for large-scale operations directed

15     against the Army of Republika Srpska.  That is probably the reason why I

16     became interested in following this kind of information.  That was the

17     route which indicated that preparations would start against Army of

18     Republika Srpska by the BH Army.

19             And this first sentence, which speaks about air-drops,

20     humanitarian air-drops that will, in fact, supply weapons, was

21     subsequently confirmed as true in practice.  As I said yesterday, it was

22     also confirmed by a diplomat from the Ukraine when he spoke to

23     General Mladic.  After that, I don't know which year it was in, but a few

24     helicopters crashed that were carrying weapons for Zepa.

25        Q.   Mr. Skrbic, can you please look at the second entry dated the

Page 18664

 1     19th of March, 1995, and I would like you to focus on paragraph 3, and I

 2     am going to read it.

 3             "The Muslims are moving and regrouping nearly on all lines of

 4     contact.  The soldiers finished school during the war and have been

 5     promoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonels.  They established a

 6     professional brigade in Tesanj, and in Bugojno they are starting

 7     producing electric fuses for mines."

 8             Can you tell us the meaning of what you say here, "moving and

 9     regrouping"?

10        A.   When you have moving and regrouping in a war, every officer in

11     the army realises that large-scale operations were in offing, and it's up

12     to them to estimate whether these movements and these regrouping were on

13     a large-scale, and if that is the case, then it would entail large-scale

14     combat operations.  Due to that, every army in the world is watching and

15     monitoring the movement and the regrouping of their enemies.

16        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Skrbic.  Let us now look at entry dated

17     21st January, 1995.  Can you please tell us, since the first one is dated

18     the 18th of March and we have now this date, can you tell us is that

19     maybe a mistake that you made in the date?

20        A.   No, this was not intentionally written.  I think that's an error.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us what the correct date would be?

22        A.   It should read the 21st of March, 1995, which is confirmed by

23     paragraph 3 in chapter 03, which reads:  "On the 20th of March, 1995, in

24     the early morning hours ..." and so on and so forth.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Let us now take a look at the second paragraph of

Page 18665

 1     this entry which reads, and I quote:

 2             "In the forthcoming offensive, America is going to provide

 3     intelligence reports to the Muslims.  They are going to engage unmanned

 4     aircraft to take off from the island of Brac.  The training of the

 5     Muslims in Zelina and Varazdin is being carried out from mercenaries from

 6     Austria and Germany that had come from the Foreign Legion.  Via Slovenia,

 7     the Muslims are being sent to Bosnia in order to cut off the corridor

 8     near Orasje."

 9             My question is:  Can you please comment on this note.  Do you

10     know anything about these unmanned aircraft as a means of collecting

11     intelligence?  Thank you.

12        A.   Your Honour, this information turned out to be true.  Since I,

13     myself, saw the flights by unmanned aircraft, will you allow me to

14     describe that briefly for your benefit?

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  This was part of the question.  Please carry on.

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I experienced this in the western

17     part of Republika Srpska during the attack launched by the Croatian army

18     launched against the Army of Republika Srpska.  Similar things occurred

19     throughout the territory of Republika Srpska.  At about 5.00 in the

20     morning, there would be artillery preparations.  They would shell the

21     settlements and units of the VRS.  This would be done from 5.00 to 10.00

22     in the morning, and then at 10.00, a drone would fly over the area to

23     carry out reconnaissance and to take photographs.  Some of these drones

24     were targeted by the air defence of Republika Srpska.  In some other

25     parts of the Republika Srpska, some of the drones were hit.  But the one

Page 18666

 1     I was looking at was not hit.  When the drone returned from where it had

 2     taken off, at around 1400 hours artillery fire would be opened again, and

 3     then around 1500 hours or just before night fell, aircraft would take

 4     off.  On one occasion I could recognise fighter planes above

 5     Mrkonjic Grad.

 6             As someone from the anti-aircraft defence, I could recognise

 7     these planes to be NATO pact planes.  I could recognise MIGs that the

 8     Croatian army also had in their possession, as well as the JNA.

 9     Sometimes they would target the relay stations on Kozara.  I won't go

10     into that, but unfortunately they would also target columns of refugees.

11     In this manner, the drones carried out reconnaissance throughout the

12     territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the information gathered was

13     provided to the Croatian army and to the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

14             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Thank you.  We will now have a look at the last paragraph on

16     page 1 of this document, dated the 21st of March.

17             "The Muslims have bought 15 surface-to-surface missiles which

18     were taken over into Croatia via Hungary in humanitarian aid convoys.

19     Croatia retained five of the missiles."

20             My question is as follows:  At the time when you made this entry,

21     did you have any information of trafficking in weapons by using

22     humanitarian aid convoys, and do you know anything about the routes via

23     which Muslims managed to obtain weapons?  Thank you.

24        A.   With regard to the process of bringing weapons as a whole for the

25     needs of the ABiH, well, we were familiar with that, but with regard to

Page 18667

 1     this particular case, I found out about it from an intelligence report.

 2     Not this one.

 3             Mr. Tolimir, every entry here is something I can tell you about

 4     in relation to the general situation and the general way in which weapons

 5     were brought in.  So perhaps I couldn't remember all the rifles, every

 6     rifle, every piece of weapons that were brought in, but there were some

 7     Luna missiles that were brought in from Hungary.  There were multiple

 8     rocket-launchers that were brought in and other equipment as well,

 9     including ammunition.  And this was the general process followed by the

10     ABiH when it came to obtaining weapons from abroad.

11             I had information according to which in Maribor, in Slovenia, the

12     police accidentally found 150.000 rifles.  They then took those rifles to

13     Bosnia and Herzegovina via Croatia, but they would always keep some for

14     themselves.  They would always retain 30 per cent of these weapons,

15     regardless of what kind of weapons they were.

16        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Skrbic.  Given your military speciality, what is a

17     surface-to-surface missile?  What does that mean?

18        A.   Your Honours, a surface-to-surface missile has a large warhead on

19     the missile and it uses solid fuel in its engine.  It is launched from

20     the surface and targets troops or facilities on land.  Anti-aircraft

21     missiles, on the other hand, have a different type of warhead because

22     these warheads fragment in the air without directly hitting the plane.

23     When a plane is hit by these fragments, it is then destroyed.

24             But in these cases there are also two types of missiles used for

25     different purposes.  There are missiles that are used for anti-aircraft

Page 18668

 1     defence of troops, that's a so-called anti-aircraft troop defence

 2     missile, and the anti-aircraft missiles that are used to defend the

 3     territory.

 4        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Skrbic.  Let's now have a look at the note on

 5     page 2, paragraph 3, where it says the following.  You can see it.  It's

 6     on this page, second line:

 7             "Muslims are fortifying themselves in the vicinity of Gorazde,

 8     around Gorazde, because they are expecting an attack on the enclave after

 9     the attack of the Muslim army in the direction of Trnovo."

10             My question is as follows:  Where is Trnovo, which part of the

11     territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina or the Republika Srpska, and how far

12     is it from Gorazde?

13        A.   Trnovo is a place closer to Sarajevo than Gorazde, but I don't

14     know how far it is from Gorazde exactly.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Is the territory of the municipality of Trnovo -- or

16     the territory of the municipality of Trnovo and of Gorazde, are they --

17     do they border on each other?

18        A.   Your Honours, in the pre-war situation, given the pre-war

19     divisions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, these municipalities were not the

20     same -- or, rather, they were the same.  But in the post-war situation,

21     well, I don't know how these things were organised.

22        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Skrbic.  Could you tell us whether you know

23     Gorazde had the same status of a protected and demilitarised zone, as was

24     the case for Srebrenica and Zepa?  Thank you.

25        A.   Yes, it was a protected zone.  General Michael Rose - and this is

Page 18669

 1     something I found out through hearsay - warned General Mladic that

 2     Gorazde should not be attacked, even though General Rose admitted that

 3     there were attacks from other enclaves launched against the Army of

 4     Republika Srpska.  And other places were also attacked in the direction

 5     of Trnovo, as stated in this document here.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Mr. Skrbic, let's please have a look at the

 7     entry 0.4, dated the 22nd of March, 1995.  I am interested in

 8     paragraphs 3, 4, and 5.  As there is no translation, I'll read it out.

 9     And I quote:

10             "NATO is preparing a special corps with about 40.000 men, the

11     purpose of which will be to evacuate UNPROFOR forces when the conflict

12     escalates, as expected, because the Muslims have already been forced to

13     do that.  The Muslims in the enclaves are blocking UNPROFOR forces with

14     the purpose of trying to force them to withdraw."

15             Third paragraph.

16             "Schools and nurseries are being closed in Tuzla, which is a

17     reliable indicator that the Muslims offensive is quite certain."

18             My question is as follows:  Do you know anything about a plan to

19     evacuate the UNPROFOR forces as stated here?

20        A.   Well, there was a general tendency.  We became aware of it

21     through information from UNPROFOR itself.  Lieutenant-Colonel Dudnjik

22     spoke about this at the meeting in Vlasenica.  He said that UNPROFOR had

23     no choice but to withdraw from the entire territory to make it possible

24     to use the air force on the battle-field.  They didn't say to use force

25     against the VRS.  That wasn't stated, but when the air force was used, it

Page 18670

 1     was always against the VRS.  So the members of UNPROFOR themselves were

 2     afraid.  They feared for their security.  They were afraid of all the

 3     sides in the party.

 4             Your Honours, I know that even in Tuzla the ABiH members blocked

 5     UNPROFOR forces in Bihac.  When I was in the 2nd Krajina Corps, a major

 6     from the French army, who was an UNPROFOR member, complained to us about

 7     an inappropriate relationship that the Muslim army in Bihac had towards

 8     them.  Colonel Vojisavljevic [phoen] from the 2nd Krajina Corps was also

 9     present, and he didn't know how to help them.

10        Q.   Thank you.  My question is as follows:  The entries I have just

11     quoted, do they concern all the enclaves in the territory of Bosnia and

12     Herzegovina?  Is that what is shown by the entries you made?  Thank you.

13        A.   Yes.  These entries concern all the enclaves.

14             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise to the interpreters.

16             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   In the following paragraph, paragraph 5, entry 04, it says:

18             "Schools and nurseries are being closed in Tuzla, and this is a

19     reliable indicator that the Muslim offensive is quite certain."

20             My question is:  Why is closing schools and nurseries a reliable

21     indicator that the Muslim offensive is quite certain?  Could you answer

22     that question.

23        A.   Your Honours, in the course of the war Tuzla was under the

24     control of the ABiH.  Given that the population could see that they were

25     preparing an attack as part of a general offensive, it's quite logical to

Page 18671

 1     expect that the VRS army will respond, and that is the reason for which

 2     the schools were being closed in Tuzla.

 3        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Skrbic.  Could we now please see the last

 4     paragraph of entry 0.5, 0.5.  That's the following entry, the next entry.

 5     Thank you.  I quote:

 6             "In agreement with UNPROFOR representatives, the Muslims want to

 7     protect the enclaves and to have UN forces on their side.  They want to

 8     amend their mandate and carry out a spring offensive without encountering

 9     any obstacles."

10             Mr. Skrbic, do you know which offensive is being referred to

11     here?  Thank you.  Which spring offensive is being referred to here?

12        A.   This offensive was planned as early as the beginning of January.

13     I say this with some reservations.  I didn't examine the documents.  I

14     don't know when it was planned, and I haven't seen documents from the

15     ABiH, from the Muslim side.  But given certain events on the ground, it

16     was possible to see that this offensive had already been launched

17     because, in April, there was intense fighting in the direction of Trnovo

18     and Vlasic and other places, and there was fighting from the direction of

19     Bihac as well, but they gave up because of the bad conditions.  So the

20     contents of this report were, in fact, confirmed by events on the ground.

21        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Skrbic.  What enclaves does this refer to in the

22     RS?  I am talking about this entry.  Thank you.

23        A.   Mr. Tolimir, I must say that there were no enclaves in the RS.

24        Q.   Thank you.  But were there Muslim enclaves in the territory of

25     the RS that were given the status of protected zones?  Thank you.

Page 18672

 1        A.   Now I understand.  Those were enclaves in the east of Bosnia and

 2     Herzegovina or in the present-day Republika Srpska.  They were Srebrenica

 3     and Zepa.

 4        Q.   Thank you.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please see page 3 of these

 6     notes.  I am interested in entry 0.6.  I would like to focus on

 7     paragraphs 2 and 3.

 8             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   I quote paragraph 2, and the date is 24 March 1995:

10             "The Muslims are preparing an attack on Brcko, Teslic, and

11     Trnovo.  The Muslims have not reorganised their army for such an

12     extensive task and yet will carry out offensive actions in a synchronised

13     manner.

14             "In Gorazde, the Muslims are forcing UNPROFOR to withdraw because

15     they have the intention to attack Serbian positions from there, too."

16             These were paragraphs 2 and 3 of the entry dated 24 March 1995.

17             Here is my question:  Mr. Skrbic, please explain to the

18     Trial Chamber in which parts of the Republika Srpska Brcko, Teslic, and

19     Trnovo are?  Is it one region or are they located in different regions?

20     Thank you.

21        A.   Your Honours, Brcko is in the north-eastern part of Bosnia and

22     Herzegovina.  It is on the river Sava, on the right bank.  Teslic is some

23     100 or 120 kilometres from Brcko towards the central part of Bosnia and

24     Herzegovina.  And Trnovo is quite a different place altogether.  It's to

25     the north-west of Sarajevo, not far from the city.  All these places are

Page 18673

 1     in different locations so that this information that attacks on these

 2     places are being prepared is a reliable indicator of an imminent general

 3     offensive.

 4        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Skrbic.  Let us deal with entry 0.7 now.  I am

 5     interested in paragraph 1, and the date is 25 March 1995.  I quote:

 6             "The Muslim offensive is meant to be a means of pressurising

 7     Western diplomacy to open talks about the acceptance of the plan of the

 8     contact group and the legalisation of the results of the Muslim army

 9     achieved during the cessation of hostilities as well as preventing

10     Serbian responses, especially against the enclaves."

11             Here is my question.  What does this phrase mean:  "The

12     legalisation of the results of the Muslim army achieved during the

13     cessation of hostilities"?  Thank you.

14        A.   In the entire territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Muslims

15     were taking significant portions of territory.  The results overall were

16     not overwhelming, but they wanted their successes to be legalised.

17     However, not these results to be used as a means of pressurising the

18     contact group but, instead, to exert pressure on foreign diplomacy which

19     in turn would influence the contact group.  But the plans of the contact

20     group were not favorable for the Republika Srpska.

21             So there was an agreement reached, eventually, to keep the

22     territories controlled by the three parties, the VRS, the BH Army, and

23     the HVO, as they were.  That would have been acceptable for the RS, but

24     the contact group changed that thoroughly.  That's why there had to be

25     pressure exerted on the contact group and the VRS, and I talked about

Page 18674

 1     that yesterday when I paraphrased the words of General Wesley Clark.

 2        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Skrbic.  Let us look at entry 0.8, which is on

 3     page 4 of your document.  We can see that this entry is dated

 4     26 March 1995.  I quote:

 5             "Muslims are pressurising UNPROFOR to bring about a change of its

 6     mandate in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina.  They are probing the reactions

 7     with regard to the protection of the enclaves, and they got assurances by

 8     NATO that the enclaves will be protected by the air force.  The

 9     preparations for an attack on Teslic are nearing their end.  The Muslims

10     are pressurising the HVO to support them with artillery which they will

11     probably accept.  And when they use up the artillery, then the Muslims

12     will attack them."  Remark by PS.

13             What do these initials PS stand for?  I mentioned them at the end

14     of my quote.  Thank you.

15        A.   PS are the initials of Petar Skrbic; in other words, me.  This

16     kind of making remarks is part of the scholarly procedure, so when you

17     enter a comment of your own you must clearly mark it as such.

18        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Skrbic.  Here is my question:  Did you have any

19     other information about the assurances that NATO gave the Muslims to the

20     effect that they would protect the enclaves by the air force?  Thank you.

21        A.   Your Honours, let me first inform you, because this is reliable

22     information, that in 1993, in Brussels, it was agreed that the NATO

23     air force units would be used, but it was not defined against whom they

24     would be used.  Initially, this agreement was neutral.  They wanted to

25     protect UNPROFOR in the territory of the whole former SFRY.

Page 18675

 1             Later that changed.  NATO was always saying that they were

 2     protecting UNPROFOR and the enclaves, but in late 1995, they totally

 3     sided with the Croatian and Muslim armies in their air-strikes.  The book

 4     written by Mr. Richard Holbrooke clearly shows how the mandate was

 5     changed, the mandate of the NATO forces.  Since in 1995, according to his

 6     own words, he was asking President Clinton daily to bomb Serbian

 7     positions, and I am going to paraphrase one of his sentences.  He was

 8     saying, Mr. President, there is no talking with them.  They must be hit.

 9     And he was always sending such messages to the president that there is no

10     other solution, that air-strikes against the Serbian positions must be

11     carried out.

12             In his book "Modern Warfare," Mr. Wesley Clark wrote about the

13     bombing of the FRY.  Yesterday, I couldn't answer Mr. Tolimir's question

14     because he asked me where did they go in 1996.  I don't know about

15     Leighton Smith even today, but I know that Wesley Clark became the

16     commander of NATO forces.  And in his book "Modern Warfare," Clark wrote,

17     among others, about the bombing of the RS.

18             Your Honours, NATO once threatened the Muslims to bomb them, but

19     that never happened.  They threatened because of the provocations from

20     the enclaves directed against the VRS.  So we can conclude from that that

21     the positions of the VRS, the territory and the population of the RS were

22     the only ones to be bombed by NATO air force.  Nobody else.  Not even --

23     there weren't even collateral -- there wasn't even collateral damage on

24     anybody else's part.

25        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Skrbic.  Let us now look at paragraph 6 of this

Page 18676

 1     entry, dated 26 March 1995.  I quote:

 2             "The Muslims are illegally moving out because they think that the

 3     offensive against the VRS began with insufficient preparations and that

 4     the VRS will respond."

 5             Since this is not translated, please explain to us what

 6     illegal -- what this phrase means, "illegally moving out."  To which

 7     enclaves does this apply?  Thank you.

 8        A.   Your Honours, in a number of towns and in some territories in the

 9     RS, Muslims lived during the war normally.  I cannot list them all but

10     I'll give you some examples, Sanski Most, Mrkonjic Grad, Brcko, and some

11     other places which I cannot remember now.  They lived normally there so

12     that this process of moving out has been labeled illegal because nobody

13     forced those Muslims to move away.  And, Your Honours, nobody is so

14     susceptible to the effects of war than the population.  They sometimes

15     know more about it than military officers, and they react in an almost

16     natural way when they are afraid, irrespective of the combat

17     activities -- or their nature, I mean.  When there is armed conflict, the

18     population is afraid and, logically, flees.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Now let us look at the last paragraph on page 5.

20     Thank you.  Yes, here it is.  It's entry 0.11, dated 1 April 1995.  I

21     quote:

22             "The NATO air forces in Italy are preparing for offensive

23     actions, but no higher level of alert has been declared for their units.

24     Some transport equipment has been transported to Split, allegedly in

25     order to pull out UNPROFOR."

Page 18677

 1             The last words are on the following page.  Thank you.

 2             Mr. Skrbic, please explain to us, what does this mean,

 3     "preparation for offensive actions without a higher level of alert being

 4     declared"?  Thank you.

 5        A.   Yes, I can explain.  That was my speciality for a long time,

 6     anti-aircraft defence.  In all countries, when you declare a higher level

 7     of alert, then all personnel, pilots, and engineers must be at the

 8     airfield.  And there are three levels of combat readiness.  Level three

 9     is when the planes are armed, the pilots are at the airfield, but they

10     are still in the barracks, to put it that way.  Level two means that the

11     pilots have to be on the apron but do not board the planes yet.  And

12     level one means when the pilots must be in the cockpits, the planes are

13     armed, and only waiting for the signal to take off.

14             So this information means that none of these three levels was

15     ordered, but they are -- but readiness is heightened anyway.  However,

16     these three higher levels have not been declared.

17             Did you ask about anything else?

18        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Skrbic.  That will suffice with regard to my

19     question.  Let us now look at the entry dated the 2nd of April, 1995.

20     Thank you.  This is enough.  Since we don't have a translation I am going

21     to quote the first two paragraphs.  Quote:

22             "NATO aircraft are preventing flights by the Muslim and

23     Croatian --"

24             I'm sorry, I made a mistake and it should read as follows:

25             "NATO aircraft are not preventing flights by Muslim and Croatian

Page 18678

 1     helicopters."

 2             The next paragraph:

 3             "UNPROFOR is exploring the intentions of the Serbs towards the

 4     enclaves.  Only in that area do they wish to exert pressure to have the

 5     cessation of hostilities honoured."

 6             Can you tell us which particular areas are they talking about

 7     when they speak about the cessation of hostilities?  Was it the whole of

 8     Bosnia or which specific areas did you have in mind?  Can you explain

 9     that to us.

10        A.   In the area of Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde.  I'm

11     sorry, in Bihac as well.

12        Q.   Thank you.  My next question is:  Was UNPROFOR or NATO, for that

13     matter, obliged to prevent all flights over Bosnia and Herzegovina and

14     any hostilities that were in breach of the agreement on the cessation of

15     hostilities?  Thank you.

16        A.   Your Honours, I would like to remind you, because I am very well

17     informed and knowledgeable about this area thanks to my research, that

18     the UN Assembly - I don't know what number it was - but it adopted a

19     resolution which was called "No-fly zone," which pertained to the

20     air-space above the entire Bosnia and Herzegovina.  In other words, as

21     from that year and throughout the war, no one except NATO aircraft was

22     allowed to fly in that air-space.  I saw it with my own eyes that they

23     projected and ejected infrared protection, which is actually anti-missile

24     defence because a rocket always follows a stronger infrared beam.

25             This information testifies to the fact that they were acting

Page 18679

 1     partially, that some sides were prevented from flying, some sides were

 2     not.  The reaction and the speed of NATO actions was not equal to

 3     everyone.  According to this resolution, these flights should have been

 4     forbidden and it was up to NATO to do that.

 5        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Skrbic.  Let's move now to page 7 so that we can

 6     take a look at the next entry.  It's at the very top of the page, and I

 7     quote:

 8             "The Croats are mobilising new soldiers across Slavonia and

 9     rotating units towards Grahovo and Glamoc.  They are using enormous

10     resources in order to clear up the roads."

11             My question is:  Do you have any personal knowledge about this?

12     Thank you.  I am talking about the activities of the Croatian army.

13        A.   Yes, I do.  I was particularly interested in following the events

14     involving Glamoc because that was my birthplace.  Later on it turned out

15     that this information was completely true.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Now, please, let's look at entry 0.13, paragraph 7.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please scroll up --

18     actually, scroll down so that we can see the bottom of the page.  Thank

19     you.

20             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Now, look at the fifth paragraph from the bottom, which reads:

22             "Forcible mobilisations among Muslims in nearly all major towns.

23     They are calling up even those hadn't been called up before."

24             My question is:  What does "forcible mobilisation" mean and what

25     does it indicate?

Page 18680

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  This is the fourth paragraph from the bottom, not

 2     the fifth.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, since we already

 5     discussed various types of mobilisation in my testimony, I would just

 6     like to focus on the term "forcible mobilisation."  Since in the

 7     territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina controlled by their army general

 8     mobilisation was declared, and just like in Republika Srpska this was

 9     pretty exhausting for the population for the federation.  The conscripts

10     were reluctant to respond to the call up.  Forcible means that physical

11     force and not only physical force was used, but also they were threatened

12     with weapons should they fail to respond.  So it was no longer an issue

13     of responding voluntarily.  They had to respond.  And when I say "they,"

14     I am talking about the Muslims, because here we are talking specifically

15     about this ethnic group.

16        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Skrbic.  Can we now have page 8 of this document,

17     paragraphs 2 and 3.  Now, let's look at paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 on this

18     page, and I quote:

19             "They are offloading equipment from the US army ships.  They are

20     being transported to the NDH," which is an abbreviation for the

21     independent state of Croatia, "purportedly for the intention of pulling

22     out UNPROFOR."

23             Next paragraph.

24             "The Muslims are being supplied by US aircraft via Dubrave

25     airfield and the costs are covered by Libya, Iran, and Kuwait.  Through

Page 18681

 1     offensive operations Muslims are endeavouring to take control of Teslic,

 2     Doboj, and Vozuca, and then together with the Croats they would advance

 3     towards Posavina."

 4             Mr. Skrbic, can you tell us what do -- does this information that

 5     you recorded here suggest?

 6        A.   Mr. Tolimir, there are three kinds of events described here.

 7     First of all, the pulling out of UNPROFOR from Croatia.  That never

 8     materialised, but it is true that they indeed offloaded equipment about

 9     which I spoke yesterday when I said that I found shell casings with NATO

10     marks on it near Mrkonjic Grad, and they had been used on the positions

11     held by the Croatian army whilst attacking Republika Srpska.

12             Now, the second paragraph deals with the financing.  The costs of

13     this operation involving the landing of aircraft on Dubrave airfield or,

14     rather, the fact that they landed there was not difficult to notice.  We

15     noticed that there were at least 30 sorties, and one could only assume

16     that they were carrying military equipment because such a huge number of

17     sorties are never used when you are carrying humanitarian aid.  These

18     costs were covered by these three countries that I already mentioned, and

19     I would like to add that Saudi Arabia extensively financed the Muslim

20     army.

21             And paragraph 3, speaking about the taking control of Teslic,

22     Doboj, and Vozuca, pertained to the information about joint offensive

23     operations with the Croats in general.

24        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Skrbic.  When you commented the first paragraph,

25     you said that UNPROFOR was not actually pulled out because it says here

Page 18682

 1     "purportedly."  Can you explain what you meant by the word "purportedly"?

 2     In the Serbian the word is "navodno"?  Does that indicate an intention or

 3     an excuse?

 4        A.   Your Honours, the word "navodno" in the Serbian language means

 5     that it's not true.  That this was not intended for the pullout operation

 6     of UNPROFOR.  I would like to draw your attention to the inverted commas

 7     that we have in the word "pulling-out," which really indicates a big

 8     question mark over the whole operation.  Actually, a true and real

 9     terminology is not being used and that's only to be expected.  Nobody is

10     going to say openly that this was used to bomb the Serb army and the Serb

11     positions.  That's why the word "allegedly" or "purportedly," "navodno,"

12     was used.

13        Q.   Can we now look at 0.15, your entry 0.15.  It's dated the

14     7th of April, 1995.  I am going to read paragraph 2.  Second, third, and

15     fourth, and fifth:

16             "The West estimates that the Muslims have not had any significant

17     successes in the most recent offensive and they are still incapable of

18     defeating the Serbs."

19             The next paragraph:

20             "They are preparing their public for air-strikes because they

21     claim that the Serbs are attacking safe havens, and they are causing

22     incidents involving UNPROFOR.  The Muslim population is anxious because

23     they are anticipating an attack towards Vozuca and Teslic.  The losses

24     incurred on Majevica they are trying to play down by launching a

25     propaganda about the Serb attacks on the protected areas.  They are

Page 18683

 1     preparing their population for attacks on Trebava and Gradacac."

 2             Mr. Skrbic, can you please explain what this is all about and

 3     what were the consequences of this kind of estimate that the West had

 4     made about the Muslims incapability to defeat the Serbs?

 5        A.   The Western estimates about the balance of power were confirmed

 6     by Admiral Leighton Smith, General Clark, and General Walker at the

 7     meetings that you, Mr. Tolimir, attended yourself.  This balance of power

 8     had not been achieved.  Before that time, as we all saw, they were

 9     providing support to the Muslims in all shape and form.  But in view of

10     the amount of the assistance that they received, the Muslims failed to

11     achieve a proportionate level of success.  That's why the West assessed

12     that they should launch a -- stronger attacks on the Serbs.

13             But, Your Honours, it is common knowledge that the West said at

14     that time, "We don't have reason, as yet, to engage major air force.  You

15     Muslims have to give us some substantial reason that we can use as a

16     justification for the use of aircraft."  So this was reflected on what

17     the Muslims did in the enclave by provoking UNPROFOR, blocking UNPROFOR,

18     attacking during a cease-fire, et cetera.  It was extensively discussed

19     in the public that the US President Clinton had told President

20     Alija Izetbegovic: "Until you reach the number of casualties of 5.000,

21     the air force will not be used against the Serbs."

22        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Skrbic.  Please now have a look at the third

23     paragraph, where it says:

24             "They are preparing the public from strikes from the air."

25             Please, could you tell us who is preparing the public for strikes

Page 18684

 1     from the air?  I'm referring to this entry that you made here.  Thank

 2     you.

 3        A.   All countries that are NATO pact members are preparing the

 4     public, the international public.  It's necessary to create a

 5     situation -- it's necessary to show that using NATO air-strikes is

 6     justified.  So they had to show what the Serbs were doing.  They had to

 7     show that they were doing certain things that they shouldn't be doing.

 8     They wouldn't withdraw the artillery from Sarajevo.  They had to show

 9     that they wouldn't listen, that they were attacking enclaves.  But they

10     were provoked from the enclaves.  In fact, the Muslims would launch an

11     attack, and then they would say that this was the Serbs' fault.  So

12     that's the sense in which they were preparing public opinion for

13     air-strikes carried out by NATO.

14             Forces for rapid intervention were prepared.  They were located

15     in Split.  So the purpose was for the public to believe that, in fact, it

16     really was necessary to bomb the Serbs.  So this was the propaganda that

17     was at stake, the preparation of the -- so that the public would be able

18     to accept such action.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see page 9 of Mr. Skrbic's

20     notes now.  Could we see what was entered on the 17th of April, 1995 --

21     rather, the 10th of April, 1995.

22             THE INTERPRETER:  Correction.

23             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   We can see that entry, and I'll read out the first sentence:

25             "The NATO pact air force is carrying out intensive reconnaissance

Page 18685

 1     of the protected zones.  They are gathering information on Serbian

 2     facilities in case these areas should be bombed."

 3             My question is as follows:  Did you have any information about

 4     these events referred to in this entry, or were you perhaps an

 5     eye-witness and how was this information gathered?

 6        A.   Mr. Tolimir, carrying out reconnaissance from the air -- carrying

 7     out reconnaissance of not only protected areas but the entire territory

 8     of Bosnia-Herzegovina was something that was done on a daily basis and it

 9     was done continually.  It was done by drones and particularly by aircraft

10     that were involved in reconnaissance.  As I am an officer from that

11     domain, I assume that reconnaissance was also carried out from AWACS

12     reconnaissance planes.  This was electronic surveillance.  I couldn't see

13     this myself, naturally, but there is such a manner of carrying out

14     reconnaissance as well.

15             As far as protected zones are concerned, Your Honours, I can

16     claim with much certainty that NATO has photographs that show what was

17     going on in the protected zones, and this involves movements of the

18     Serbian and the Muslim forces.  They had such daily information, and on

19     each photograph you have information that shows when the photograph was

20     taken, at what time, and which territory was photographed or which

21     stretch of territory was photographed.

22        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Skrbic.  Could you please tell us what preparing

23     for bombing involves?

24        A.   Mr. Tolimir, this question requires a lengthy answer, but I will

25     try to be brief, Your Honours.  Apart from preparing the public to accept

Page 18686

 1     such action, when the army receives an order to bomb a certain area they

 2     have to receive information telling them which targets and which

 3     locations to target.  They have to be told what sort of bombs to use

 4     because they have bombs of various weights and calibres.

 5             Then you have to know what the situation is in the territory.

 6     You have to know whether the UNPROFOR forces in the territory are

 7     protected, whether they are safe.  And there is -- there are other things

 8     that have to be done before the bombing starts.  And once you start

 9     bombing, you can't stop it.  It's a military and a technical process that

10     isn't easily stopped.  I am referring to process of bombing itself.  You

11     can call back planes, but once the planes start bombing, this can't be

12     stopped.

13        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Skrbic.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I think it would be

15     better to have a break now rather than move on to my next series of

16     questions.  Thank you.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Indeed, we should have our first break now, and

18     we will resume at 11.00.

19                           --- Recess taken at 10.28 a.m.

20                           [The witness stands down]

21                           [The witness takes the stand]

22                           --- On resuming at 11.02 a.m.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, you have up to now used more than

24     seven hours for your examination-in-chief, and I note that you have dealt

25     extensively with the war notebook of the witness, for the time

Page 18687

 1     18th of March until 10th of April.  If you are continuing at this pace,

 2     it will take much time.  And I have no idea about your intentions how to

 3     go ahead, but you should be aware of the time you use with this specific

 4     document.  But now you have the floor again, and please proceed.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.  We'll

 6     conclude with this matter today, and I'll bear in mind what you have

 7     said.  Thank you.

 8             Could we please see page 10 now.  I am interested in the entries

 9     made on the 13th of April, 1995.  And I quote ... could we please see the

10     following page?  I made a mistake.  The next page.

11             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Mr. Skrbic, let's have a look at the third paragraph on this

13     page.  It says:

14             "The Muslims are massing their troops in the direction of

15     Han Pijesak and Vlasenica and Sekovici.  They are focussing their action

16     on Vlasic in the direction of Galici."

17             The following line:

18             "The 16th Division is preparing to launch an attack on the Nis

19     plateau.  They are intensifying attacks from enclaves, from protected

20     zones."

21             My question is as follows:  What does the massing of forces in a

22     certain area or on a certain axis indicate, in fact?  Thank you.

23        A.   Massing forces in a given area in the direction of a given axis

24     is a reliable indicator of preparations that are underway for combat

25     operations.

Page 18688

 1        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Skrbic.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now please see P2369,

 3     which is a Prosecution exhibit.  Thank you.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, may I ask you about your intentions

 5     in relation to the document 1D1111?

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We'll go back to it after we have

 7     had a look at this document.  Thank you.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.  Please go ahead.

 9             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Here we can see that there is a document from the Republic of

11     Bosnia and Herzegovina.  It's from their Supreme Command Staff of the

12     armed forces of the RBH.  The date, the 9th of November, 1994.  It's a

13     basic plan for the execution of the task.  That is the title of this

14     document.  Have a look at item 1, at that paragraph.  I'll read it out:

15             "The plan is:  Liberate in active combat action parts of the

16     temporarily seized territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the municipality of

17     Bratunac, Vlasenica, Sekovici, Zvornik, and Kalesija, and link the free

18     territories of Zepa and Srebrenica with the free territories of Zvornik,

19     Kalesija and Zivinice, in order to create a permanent free corridor for

20     the supply of the population and logistics support to the units of the

21     Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and a basis for the further liberation of

22     North-Eastern Bosnia as a whole."

23             My question is as follows:  In your entries in the previous

24     document mention was made of mass -- of the massing of Muslim forces in

25     the direction of Han Pijesak, Vlasenica, and Sekovici.  In that entry

Page 18689

 1     that we had a look at a minute ago is there information that indicates

 2     that the plan was carried out, the one mentioned in the document, and

 3     does it confirm what is mentioned in this document?

 4        A.   Well, these two documents, if we compare them, they are

 5     completely compatible with each other.  In this ABiH document, half of

 6     the territory is even more extended.  It includes Kalesija as well.  I

 7     won't repeat the names of all the places, but it concerns the entire

 8     Podrinje area, from the south right up to Bijeljina, as far as Bijeljina,

 9     and this confirms the intention that was referred to in my notes.  The

10     intention to launch an offensive.

11             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

12             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Thank you.  Please tell us if the Main Staff of the VRS knew of

14     the BH Army preparations and of their intention to link the territories

15     of the enclaves Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde with the territory

16     controlled by the 2nd Corps of the BH Army?

17        A.   Yes, the Main Staff was aware of that.  And I am certain that

18     such information can be found in the intelligence from which -- or,

19     rather, based on which I made my notes, too.

20        Q.   Thank you.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now again see 1D1111.

22     These are General Skrbic's notes.  Thank you.

23             We can see them.  Let us go to page 12, paragraph 3.  Thank you.

24             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Let us now focus on the third paragraph from the top.  I quote:

Page 18690

 1             "In all sections of the front line, the Muslims are resting their

 2     units, mobilising new ones, and preparing for new offensive actions to

 3     make up for their failure so far, especially in the Stolice (Majevica)

 4     area."

 5             If we skip one paragraph now and focus on the fifth paragraph on

 6     this page, it reads:

 7             "They are launching activities from Sarajevo and from the

 8     enclaves to provoke the Serbs and bring about air-strikes of NATO

 9     forces."

10             How did the Muslims try to bring about NATO air-strikes against

11     VRS positions, as far as you know?  Thank you.

12        A.   The Muslims -- or, rather, I apologise, the members of the

13     BH Army who were Muslims were very clear about NATO's unwillingness to

14     act if they don't have a justification for that.  And the justification

15     for air-strikes would be actions taken by the VRS, and these actions can

16     be brought about by provocations from the enclaves to which the VRS would

17     have responded.

18             It is clear from what is stated here that cease-fires are

19     useless.  When either side ceases fire, there are no NATO air-strikes.

20     But when the Muslims launch military actions from protected zones, that

21     was a breach of the mandate of UNPROFOR, and then the public and NATO had

22     an excuse to intervene if the Serbs respond to such provocations.  That

23     is why they always tried to present these provocations in such a manner

24     as to give NATO a pretext for acting.

25        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Skrbic.  Please take a look at your entry marked

Page 18691

 1     0.23, dated 16 April 1995.  We can see it right on our screens.  I am

 2     interested in the first paragraph, which reads, I quote:

 3             "The West openly advocates the continuation of the war in the

 4     former Bosnia and Herzegovina and sides with the Muslims who they

 5     consider not yet capable enough to be a full match for the Serbs.  Until

 6     the Muslims become one, the war will continue and the West will insist on

 7     political means.  It is in their interest for the contact group to fade

 8     away as soon as they make sure that AVNOJ borders are recognised."

 9             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the accused please repeat the part of his

10     question after the quotation.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, please repeat your question after

12     the quotation.  The interpreters didn't catch it.  It was too fast.  Once

13     again, please.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

15             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Mr. Skrbic, can you explain this part of the text about the

17     Muslims who are not yet up to the Serbs in terms of military strength?

18     Why does it say that they are not yet a full match for the Serbs?  Thank

19     you.

20        A.   The information available was also about the process described in

21     this paragraph.  The facts concerning these processes - and I'm not

22     referring to single event but a process - were corroborated by

23     General Clark and Admiral Leighton Smith in their statements.  Let me

24     remind you that General Clark said that the balance of forces had not yet

25     been achieved, that the Serbs had the upper hand.  But he warned the VRS

Page 18692

 1     and General Mladic not to fool themselves, that the balance will be

 2     brought about, and that then, the Serbian army will be in an inferior

 3     position.  And that was also confirmed by Admiral Leighton Smith.  I

 4     don't need to repeat that.

 5        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Skrbic.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please see page 13 of

 7     General Skrbic's notes.  I mean entry 0.25.  The date of that entry is

 8     5 May 1995.

 9             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   I quote.  The first paragraph reads:

11             "NATO is preparing sophisticated support to the withdrawal of

12     UN forces.  Two American vessels with German and American soldiers are in

13     the Adriatic.

14             "The Croats are moving planes from Pleso airfield to Pula and

15     Split.  They are preparing to achieve radical objectives."

16             And the next sentence:

17             "About 2.000 Serbs were killed in Western Slavonia."

18             Mr. Skrbic, please explain what this is about and which events

19     are referred to in this entry?

20        A.   Mr. Tolimir, the first sentence states that NATO is preparing

21     support.  It is not difficult to learn about movements of vessels by

22     using electronic means and other means.  These vessels were in the

23     Adriatic.

24             The second sentence is also true.  In the air force and

25     anti-aircraft defence of the VRS, there were pilots who used to fly their

Page 18693

 1     planes from Pleso airfield, which is right outside of Zagreb, and they

 2     were also trained at Pula airfield, which was a military airfield, and at

 3     Split airfield, which is a combined civilian and military airfield.  So

 4     plane movements were also easy to observe.

 5             In Western Slavonia it is stated that about 2.000 Serbs were

 6     killed.  That's an estimate.  The exact number is something I cannot

 7     confirm now.

 8        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Skrbic.  Let us go to page 14 now, entry 0.27.  I

 9     am interested in paragraph 6, and I quote:

10             "One Muslim helicopter was shot down and fell in the Zepa area."

11             Here is my question:  Do you know why helicopters flew to and

12     from Zepa in spite of the ban on flights?  Thank you.

13        A.   Mr. Tolimir, we can only speculate about the reasons for their

14     flights, but the question arises, Your Honours, how come they were

15     allowed to fly when there was a no-fly zone in force, that was declared

16     pursuant to a resolution.  That is the question.

17             What that helicopter which was shot down was transporting?  Well,

18     most probably weapons.

19        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Skrbic.  Could we please go to page 16 now,

20     entries 0.31.  Thank you.  We now see the entry dated 11 May 1995.  I am

21     quoting from the first paragraph:

22             "America and Germany are trying to turn UNPROFOR into a tool for

23     support to the Croats and Muslims.  An obvious proof of that is the

24     fact -- is Western Slavonia where they want to legalise what the Croats

25     took by aggression.  They are trying to bring about legal air-strikes

Page 18694

 1     carried out by NATO around Sarajevo."

 2             Let us go to page 19 now.  I am interested in entry 0.32.  I

 3     apologise, actually it's 0.35.  Thank you.  The date is 15 May 1995, and

 4     in paragraph one you wrote:

 5             "The American General Dzon Sauel [phoen] is inspecting

 6     Croatian-Muslim regiment in order to create a joint federation army.  He

 7     is engaged in talks with the Muslim and the Croatian political

 8     leaderships.  Turkish representatives are on a similar task."

 9             At the time, did you have either information indicating the

10     creation of a Muslim-Croatian coalition?

11        A.   Mr. Tolimir, Your Honours, the Croatian president,

12     Mr. Franjo Tudjman, and the president of the Federation of

13     Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, met in Washington in 1992, and

14     agreed to establish a joint military committee.  Later, in 1995,

15     Minister Haris Silajdzic [Realtime transcript read in error "Horace"],

16     and I think that his counterpart was Boban, also went to Washington to

17     reach a specific agreement about an alliance of their armies.  They did

18     not establish a military committee, but they initiated processes that

19     enabled them to act jointly in an offensive on Republika Srpska.

20             The 5th Corps of the Muslim army in Bihac assisted the Croatian

21     army in the offensive against the Republic of Serbian Krajina.  That is

22     Lika and Kordun.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Let us go to page 20 in this document.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  May I interrupt you for a moment.  Before we go

25     to the other page, I just want to clarify one matter.

Page 18695

 1             Sir, you said:

 2             "Later, in 1995, Minister Horace," and there is something

 3     missing, "with his counterpart Boban went to Washington."

 4             Can you repeat the name of this minister, please?

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, the minister's name

 6     is Haris, H-a-r-i-s, Silajdzic.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Judge Mindua has a question.

 8             JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Yes, Witness Skrbic, on page 35 of

 9     the transcript, line 2, Minister Boban, which country was he from before

10     1995?  I was sure he was a minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, you should switch off your

12     microphone when you are talking to your legal advisor.

13             Mr. Skrbic.

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, Minister Boban - I

15     assume his name was Mate Boban - he was a representative of the Croats in

16     the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  He wasn't from Croatia.  As

17     for who participated from Croatia, I can't remember that.

18             JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] That's exactly the reason for

19     which I put that question to you because you mentioned President

20     Alija Izetbegovic from Bosnia and Herzegovina and President

21     Franjo Tudjman from Croatia, and you made a parallel between the two.  I

22     thought you were going to do the same with regard to minister -- with the

23     Croatian minister and the minister from Bosnia and Herzegovina.  But,

24     very well, you have told us which side he was from.  Thank you.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.

Page 18696

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

 2             Can we please now see page 20, entry 0.36, paragraph 5 in

 3     Mr. Skrbic's notes.  Thank you.

 4             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   "Units of the 2nd Muslim Corps continue reconnaissance and

 6     sabotage actions against Sekovici, Vlasenica, and Han Pijesak."

 7             My question is as follows:  Can you tell us whether this

 8     information can be seen as an indicator of Muslim plans for linking up

 9     territories in Eastern Bosnia with the main territory controlled by the

10     ABH?

11        A.   Yes, this information provides quite reliable indicators of their

12     intentions to link up the enclaves.

13        Q.   Does that then also involve the enclaves of Zepa and Srebrenica?

14     And I'm sorry that I didn't point this out to you when I initially asked

15     the question.

16        A.   Mr. Tolimir, not only Zepa and Srebrenica, but also Gorazde.

17        Q.   Thank you.

18                           [Trial Chamber and Legal Officer confer]

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would kindly ask Trial Chamber to

20     allow me to tender 1D1111 to be admitted into evidence.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, how many pages does this document

22     encompass?

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  This

24     document has 22 pages.

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

Page 18697

 1             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes, Mr. President.  Prior to our taking a

 2     position on this document, I think there is some more information we --

 3     it would be appreciated whether or not this is a partial document that

 4     was taken out of a larger document.  For example, I believe it stops in

 5     May of 1995.  So if it's -- if there is June and July and it's part of a

 6     bigger document, I think it should come in with the bigger document.  If

 7     it -- all it is is what it is, then that's the situation, then I would

 8     know that.  But I can't tell if this has been pulled out of a bigger

 9     document or it is what it is, and I think it's incumbent upon anyone

10     offering a document such as this that we received a day or two ago just

11     to let us know so I can make a position on that.

12             I could also give my position after cross-examination as well,

13     and I could ask him about it.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, can you give us some more

15     information about that or ask the witness about the full context and the

16     background of the document.  We have heard something about it, but is it

17     the complete document or is it a partial document of a bigger one?

18     Please clarify that with the witness.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

20             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Mr. Skrbic, is that the whole document that you drafted based

22     on -- is it the document in its entirety, as we see it?

23        A.   Your Honours, this kind of context and this kind of information

24     constitutes a complete document.  You see that the last date was the

25     25th of May.  Otherwise, I was engaged in other matters after that date.

Page 18698

 1     I was on the front.  I didn't have my computer with me.  I wasn't taking

 2     any notes, et cetera.

 3             Now, concerning this specific topic and these matters, there are

 4     no other documents that are relevant.

 5        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Skrbic.  My next question is:  If anyone doubts

 6     the authenticity of that document, is it possible for them to look at the

 7     document that created the foundation for it and could they see these

 8     entries that you highlighted?

 9        A.   Mr. Tolimir, this is a compilation.  In some instances that was

10     rewritten verbatim, some are not, but basically the substance of

11     information was consistent with either written or oral intelligence

12     reports received by the Main Staff and General Mladic.

13        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Skrbic.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey.

15             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I have no objection to this -- admissibility of

16     this document.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.  I would first like to see the first

18     page and then the last page of this document.  I take it that there is no

19     cover page, and the first entry is dated the 18th of March, 1995.

20             And now let's go to the last page, please.  Can we go back to the

21     penultimate page.  There we can see the last entry is from the

22     22nd of May, 1995.  It's number 0.42.  The text itself is on the next

23     page.

24             The document will be marked for identification, pending

25     translation.

Page 18699

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter document 1D1111 shall be

 2     assigned Exhibit D350, marked for identification pending translation.

 3     Thank you.

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

 5             Mr. Tolimir, please proceed.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  Can we

 7     please now have in e-court -- no, I'm sorry.  On yesterday's page of the

 8     transcript 18655, lines 17 and 18, there is a record which I am going now

 9     to quote.

10             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   "I attended the meetings of collegium or meetings of Main Staff

12     commanders of the Army of Republika Srpska ..."

13             We have here the word "commanders" in plural in the record.  Can

14     you tell us when collegium meetings were held of the Main Staff, how many

15     commanders were present?  Thank you.

16        A.   Eight commanders, Mr. Tolimir.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Can you please tell us which specific commanders you

18     have in mind, commanders of which units?

19        A.   Those were commander of the Main Staff of the VRS and corps

20     commanders.  The 1st and the 2nd Krajina Corps, the Eastern Bosnia Corps,

21     the Drina Corps, the Herzegovina Corps, the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, and

22     the commander of air force and anti-aircraft defence.  Occasionally in

23     attendance was the commander of the Guards Brigade, and I did not include

24     him in this number.

25        Q.   Mr. Skrbic, speaking about the collegium of the commander of the

Page 18700

 1     Main Staff, can you tell us whether there were any discussions at these

 2     meetings relating to POWs and the treatment of prisoners of war?

 3        A.   Yes, there were debates of that nature.

 4             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Please repeat your --

 6             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   If you recall, can you tell us what was being discussed?  Can you

 8     please tell us, if you remember, what was being discussed?

 9        A.   Your Honours, I'm sorry I have to mention my name as well, but

10     General Tolimir, General Gvero, and myself particularly insisted in those

11     meetings not only to adhere to the general attitude towards POWs, but

12     that orders should be issued -- specific orders should be issued to each

13     and every unit on how to treat the prisoners of war and to impart on them

14     the precise stipulations from the international humanitarian law.  I

15     remember that clearly.

16             Some documents of that nature were, indeed, written, and I saw

17     them when I testified here before.  However, I don't know how many of

18     them were drafted, and I cannot tell you the exact number at the moment.

19        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Skrbic.  My next question is:  Do you have any

20     knowledge whether -- Zdravko Tolimir, from late July 1995 until

21     November 1995, where he was in that period?

22        A.   I have partial [as interpreted] knowledge about that.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Stop.  You are overlapping again.  We want to

24     have everything on the record, and therefore please pause between

25     question and answer.

Page 18701

 1             Your answer is recorded as, "I have partial knowledge."  Is that

 2     all of what you said, or was there something more?

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I said that I have

 4     reliable knowledge.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

 6             Please continue, Mr. Tolimir.

 7             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Skrbic.  Can you describe for us the circumstances

 9     that the VRS found themselves towards the end of July 1995?  Or, more

10     specifically, what kind of problems did they encounter, because you made

11     an indication to this effect in one of your previous answers?

12        A.   Your Honours, we saw from the analysis of the information

13     contained in my notes what was happening on the front line.  However,

14     when Glamoc, Grahovo, Knin, and other places were occupied by the

15     Croatian army and due to intensive NATO air-strikes in that area, all the

16     generals from the Main Staff of the VRS went to that particular section

17     of the front but at different times.

18             General Djukic and General Tolimir left in late July 1995.  I was

19     busy, so I left later in August.  I don't know exactly when

20     General Mladic arrived, but he came there at approximately that time as

21     well, and General Milovanovic was already there.  And we never went

22     anywhere from there until the end of the war.

23             Initially, we were billeted at the Kula forward command post

24     above Mrkonjic Grad, and then because of fire coming from the Croatian

25     Muslim army, we relocated our command post in Baraci where we stayed only

Page 18702

 1     for two days, and then we have to relocate the forward command post of

 2     the Main Staff of the VRS to Banja Luka.

 3             Your Honours, in Banja Luka we held several meetings of the

 4     collegium of the Main Staff, and we had a number of meetings with the

 5     president of the republic.  General Tolimir attended almost all of these

 6     meetings.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Let me put a question in relation to these

 8     meetings to you.  You mentioned four assistant commanders, if I

 9     understood you correctly; General Gvero, General Djukic, General Tolimir,

10     and yourself.  Can I take from that that all assistant commanders were

11     formally member of this collegium of commanders?

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, not only formally, all

13     the assistants were, in fact, members of the collegium of the Main Staff.

14     All assistant commanders.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

16             Mr. Tolimir.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

18             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   My next question is:  During NATO air-strikes and artillery fire

20     coming from rapid reaction forces, were only VRS targets hit and whether

21     there were some civilian casualties as well?

22        A.   Not only military facilities such as relay stations were

23     targeted.  Civilian facilities, inhabited places were also targeted.

24     Your Honours, I was in Baraci, a village, when that village was bombed.

25     And then columns of refugees were also targeted.  I know for sure that in

Page 18703

 1     the vicinity of Petrovac, a Croatian MIG-21 targeted a column of

 2     refugees.  I believe there is a video recording of that event.

 3             I am also an eye-witness to NATO aircraft targeting a column of

 4     refugees in Mrkonjic Grad.  Your Honours, I arrived three hours after

 5     that strike, and there was blood that had been spilt on the road.  There

 6     were horses that had remained half alive there and they were suffering.

 7     I had to leave that sight, that terrible sight rapidly.  And then several

 8     seconds after that, a few NATO planes with these -- they had these

 9     distinctive wings so I could recognise them, these planes targeted a

10     relay station on Kula.  When I arrived there and asked

11     General Milovanovic about what had happened, he said they had killed two

12     of our soldiers.  General Tolimir said that the rapid intervention force

13     artillery had opened fire and the Croatian artillery had open fire.  They

14     used heavy artillery, multiple rocket-launchers, and mortars.

15        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Skrbic.  Could you please tell the Trial Chamber

16     whether during that period of time Tolimir exercised a command role?

17     Thank you.

18        A.   No.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Could you tell us whether during that period of time

20     Tolimir stayed at the basic command post in Crna Rijeka or in the area of

21     responsibility of the Drina Corps?  Thank you.

22        A.   No.  As I have said, General Tolimir, towards the end of July,

23     went to the western part of Republika Srpska, and he remained there until

24     the end of the war.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Since you have -- or, rather, could you tell the

Page 18704

 1     Chamber where the forward command post of the Main Staff was located

 2     during that period of time?  Thank you.

 3        A.   Your Honour, I've already provided that information but I will

 4     repeat it for the sake of the transcript with your leave.  The forward

 5     command post of the VRS Main Staff was located at a place called Kula,

 6     above Mrkonjic Grad.  And then for a short period of time it was located

 7     in Baraci, which is in the direction of Glamoc, Livno.  Afterwards, it

 8     was transferred or it relocated to Banja Luka, and we remained there

 9     until the end of the war.

10             All the places that I have mentioned are in the western part of

11     Bosnia and Herzegovina which was also called Krajina before the war.  And

12     for those reasons, you can yourself draw the conclusion that that has

13     nothing to do with Crna Rijeka, which is in Romanija, in the eastern part

14     of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Judge Nyambe has a question.

16             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Yes, my question is directed to General Tolimir.

17     Starting from page 44 in your questions you have been referring to "that

18     period of time" in line 3, and then you refer again in line 6, "during

19     that period of time," again in line 14, "during that period of time."

20     Could you be more specific about exactly what period of time you are

21     talking about, please?

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Judge.  From the end of

23     July until the end of November 1995 is the period of time I have in mind.

24     I was asking the witness about that period of time.  Thank you.

25             JUDGE NYAMBE:  Thank you very much for your answer.

Page 18705

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Please continue, Mr. Tolimir.

 2             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Skrbic, for having agreed to testify in these

 4     proceedings instituted against me at this Tribunal.  Thank you for

 5     everything.  I wish you a safe return home.  May God bless you and may

 6     you live a long life.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I have put a series of

 8     questions to this witness as part of my Defence, and the Defence -- my

 9     Defence case has no need to put any further questions to this witness.

10     Thank you.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

12             Mr. McCloskey, do you want to proceed with your

13     cross-examination?  You have the floor.

14             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes, Mr. President.  I was told they would go the

15     full day, and I know that doesn't happen always, so I have a few

16     questions based on some of the things I just heard, but I do have a

17     binder of materials and other things.  So if I can get through just the

18     few questions, if we could then take an early break and I will try to get

19     myself organised.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, please go ahead.

21                           Cross-examination by Mr. McCloskey:

22        Q.   General, good afternoon.

23        A.   Good afternoon, Mr. McCloskey.

24        Q.   I guess it's been since, I think, 2005, when we first met and I

25     interviewed you about this case.  Do you recall that?

Page 18706

 1        A.   Yes.

 2        Q.   And do you stand by your statements to me in that -- in that

 3     interview?

 4        A.   Mr. McCloskey, I have only changed the date that related to

 5     leaving for the VRS army.  The 17th of December is the correct date, not

 6     the 17th of November.  That is the only thing that I changed, and I

 7     informed the Chamber of the fact.

 8        Q.   Okay.  And you've also told us that you testified for the

 9     Prosecution in the Popovic case.  And do you stand by your testimony in

10     that case?

11        A.   Mr. McCloskey, I downloaded part of the transcript from those

12     proceedings from the internet.  I had access to the Tribunal's web site

13     and that's what I did, but I am not sure I saw the entire transcript.

14     But there is nothing that I would amend in relation to that testimony,

15     either.

16        Q.   Okay.  And you just spoke briefly of what was going on in Knin

17     and Glamoc and Grahovo, your hometown area, in the end of July and

18     August, and I think you know that many Serb civilians left their home

19     area at that time, and it's been the position of the Prosecution that

20     they were driven out and forcibly removed by the Croatian forces.  Do you

21     agree with that, that these Serb civilians were forced to flee from their

22     homes?

23        A.   Yes, Mr. McCloskey.  I fully agree with what you have said.  If

24     you like, I could describe the refugee column for you.  There were

25     hundreds of thousands of people on the road from Bijeljina via Banja Luka

Page 18707

 1     to Petrovac.  That is a distance of 600 kilometres.  The refugees first

 2     started coming from Krajina and then from the western part of

 3     Republika Srpska.  I apologise for going into these details.

 4        Q.   Yes, and I don't want to go into the details either.  I think

 5     there is a good record in the Gotovina case.  But you'll agree with me, I

 6     think, how horrible this was for the civilians.  You, yourself, lost your

 7     home, people were killed, and these people really had no choice but to

 8     flee from this policy that -- and this attack of the Croatians?  The

 9     Croatian government forces, not the Croatian people.  So do you agree

10     with me about that?

11        A.   Yes, yes.  Yes, I fully agree with you.

12        Q.   And when you said earlier that many times in war, populations are

13     the most aware of what's going on, many times -- and many times they just

14     have to flee armed conflict.  And I think I would agree with that, as

15     would the UNHCR.  But you've also now agreed with me that sometimes there

16     is a policy to drive civilians away, that is wrong, as in the case of

17     Croatian forces, correct?

18        A.   Yes.

19        Q.   When all the generals that you've talked about were in the area

20     of the Krajina dealing with this massive threat and, as we now know, the

21     eventual loss of some territory, and there was a threat of air force --

22     or actual use of air force, was General Jovo Maric, the head of the

23     administration for the air force and air defence, with you guys?

24        A.   Yes, but it was called the air force and aircraft defence.  The

25     term "war" wasn't used or "military" wasn't used.

Page 18708

 1        Q.   Okay.  We might have had a little translation issue, but

 2     you've -- you've said that you and General Mladic, General Tolimir, that

 3     you were all there from the end of July through November -- or I think

 4     you said through the end of the war.  Did that apply to General Maric as

 5     well, was he there with you the entire time?

 6        A.   Mr. McCloskey, I am sure that Mr. -- or, rather,

 7     General Jovo Maric left earlier than all of us.  He was with

 8     General Milovanovic a lot earlier, but I cannot remember when he left.

 9     But it was earlier.

10        Q.   Well, was he there in September 1995?

11        A.   Yes.

12        Q.   Yes.  General Milovanovic has told this courtroom that Maric was

13     with him throughout September.  Does that meet your recollection as well?

14        A.   Mr. McCloskey, I am trying to give you a precise answer, so I

15     cannot claim that they were together.  Sometimes I would see

16     General Maric in Drvar and he was on his own, without General

17     Milovanovic.  But on the whole, they would be together.  But I cannot

18     really claim that they were together all the time.

19        Q.   All right.  I didn't mean to try to -- your answer whether they

20     were actually together, but it was whether or not General Maric was with

21     you people.  I know there wasn't a lot of space from the descriptions of

22     where you were billeted and the command -- forward command post there was

23     small, so that was my question:  Was -- Maric was there in September as

24     far as you can recall?

25        A.   My answer is yes.

Page 18709

 1        Q.   And you also just told us that you were at meetings of the

 2     Main Staff where the Geneva Conventions and the treatment of prisoners

 3     were mentioned, and that you and others, including General Tolimir,

 4     supported those conventions.  As far as you know, were over -- were many

 5     thousands of Muslim able-bodied men summarily executed by Bosnian Serb

 6     forces after the fall of Srebrenica?

 7        A.   Your Honours, there is so much information in the media about

 8     this question.  I can't say that I haven't heard over the media various

 9     pieces of information.  Some would increase the number, some would reduce

10     the number, but I heard about this event from the media.  That is what I

11     can claim.

12        Q.   Are you saying you've only heard of the murders from the media?

13        A.   Yes.

14             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Mr. President, it might be a good time.  You see,

15     I've just gotten some binders delivered, and I think if I can study them,

16     I may be able to go through this a little bit more thoroughly or

17     efficiently.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I personally have a small problem with that

19     because I was asked to have a meeting with a visitors group between 12.30

20     and 1.00.  If you are able to at least go ahead for ten more minutes,

21     then we may have a break until 1.00.

22             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I think I can do that.  Yes, Mr. President.  No

23     problem.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

25             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Let me just take a bit of a moment.

Page 18710

 1        Q.   General, you have just gone over with us very carefully these

 2     periods of April, May -- March, April, May, from your notes, and you told

 3     us you didn't go to the Krajina until the end of July.  Where were you

 4     working in July 1995?  And I'll help you a little bit.  You told us you

 5     were there, I believe, July 11th, 12th, 13th, and then you went and saw

 6     President Karadzic on the 14th.  But aside from that period that you've

 7     already talked about -- in fact, let's say from 14 July, what did you do?

 8     Where were you?

 9        A.   From the 14th of July until the 27th of July, I was in

10     Han Pijesak at the rear command post.  On the 27th of July, I went to

11     Belgrade to attend the promotion of a lieutenant-colonel or

12     lieutenant-colonels who had completed military academy in

13     Republika Srpska.  Glamoc fell, that's what I heard.  It was on the

14     28th of July.  On the 29th of July, after this promotion of these

15     second-lieutenants --

16             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction.

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- I returned to Zvornik.  I

18     apologise, am I giving you an answer that is too long?

19             MR. McCLOSKEY:

20        Q.   I think you have got me through the end of July and that's really

21     my question.  So is it fair to say that from -- from May, June, until the

22     end of July you were mostly at your desk in and around Han Pijesak doing

23     your duty as an assistant -- one of the six assistant commanders for

24     General Mladic?

25        A.   Yes, on the whole that was the case, as you, yourself, have said.

Page 18711

 1        Q.   And we've heard about the morning meetings that were held each

 2     day of the senior assistant commanders with -- with the commanders.  Did

 3     you go to those meetings?

 4        A.   General Djukic and myself did not attend those meetings held in

 5     the morning.

 6        Q.   Never?

 7        A.   It's not possible to define "never."  When we have a meeting of

 8     the commanders and when we arrive in Crna Rijeka, well, on such occasions

 9     we also attend the meetings.  But it wasn't our regular duty to attend

10     regular meetings when these daily briefings would be given.

11        Q.   But the afternoon meetings that we heard about from

12     General Milovanovic.  He set out the daily routine for us and normally

13     the people that had to come.  The same thing happens here.  Every

14     morning, 9.00, senior trial attorneys have to get together with the

15     Prosecutor.  Normal.  You had to go to those meetings too, didn't you?

16     One of six assistant commanders for the whole army?

17        A.   I made a distinction with regard to that information from

18     General Milovanovic.  He knew what was happening.  But I'll repeat what I

19     said:  General Djukic and General Petar Skrbic did not attend the regular

20     morning briefings.  We only attended briefings and meetings of commanders

21     when called by the commander of the VRS Main Staff, when asked by that

22     commander to do so.

23        Q.   You did say you went to the going-away party for

24     General Zivanovic at the Jela restaurant which occurred on 20 July there,

25     not far from Han Pijesak.  You also said there was never a mention of

Page 18712

 1     Srebrenica at that -- at that occasion.  Do you recall testifying about

 2     that?

 3        A.   Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

 4        Q.   Well, do you remember seeing that -- part of that celebration

 5     being filmed by the VRS or a cameraman of some sort?

 6        A.   Yes, I remember.

 7        Q.   Have you had a chance to see that film of that party that you

 8     were at?

 9        A.   I haven't had the opportunity of viewing that video recording.

10        Q.   Well, would you be surprised if I told you that the Court has

11     that video recording, that General Mladic spoke about Srebrenica, and

12     that -- the great victory there and -- both for General Zivanovic and

13     General Krstic.  We counted at least four times, and that was just in the

14     speeches, not to mention what the commanders and the officers --

15             MR. McCLOSKEY:  That's P2231.

16        Q.   -- would have said to themselves on such an auspicious day,

17     20 July.  So having that in mind, knowing there is that video out there,

18     do you want to think about that question again?  Do you recall Srebrenica

19     being spoken of by the officers and men at General Zivanovic's party?

20        A.   Mr. McCloskey, on 12 May 2005, I told you that I did not remember

21     whether that was spoken about.  If I could see the video recording, that

22     might jog my memory.  But, Your Honours, am I really obliged to remember

23     everything after 20 years?  That is why what I said, that I didn't

24     remember what is spoken about, is valid.

25        Q.   Yeah, maybe we had a translation issue, because -- and I'll take

Page 18713

 1     a look at the transcript, but I don't remember memory being a part of

 2     your answer, but we'll take a look at that.

 3             But now, as I've reminded you of this, going back in your mind

 4     now, do you remember any discussions about Srebrenica, the events, the

 5     attack, the fall, the prisoners, the successes, the failures, the dead?

 6        A.   As far as I remember, I do not remember that topic.  Whether

 7     there was propaganda talk or political talk, in inverted commas, I

 8     wouldn't want to go into that.  Sometimes commanders boast about things

 9     they never did.

10        Q.   When did you first hear about the attack by VRS forces on the

11     enclave of Srebrenica?

12        A.   I don't recall.

13        Q.   Do you remember what you said in the Popovic case?

14        A.   No, I do not.

15        Q.   I'll get the exact --

16        A.   Can you remind me?

17        Q.   Well, I'll get the exact wording, but my recollection is you said

18     you found out from the media after the war.

19        A.   Yes, that is what I said.

20        Q.   Okay.  So when you said that at the Popovic trial under oath,

21     were you mistaken?  People can make mistakes, even under oath.

22        A.   Of course it's a mistake, Mr. McCloskey.  The media as early as

23     25 July, or whichever date it was in July, reported about it.  I don't

24     mean the media after the war, because the war ended with the

25     Dayton Accord.  That's too along a period for me not to have heard

Page 18714

 1     anything about it.  That would have been very weird indeed.  On RS TV,

 2     but I suppose on Federation TV too, although I didn't watch that, there

 3     was such information.  I didn't have a TV set in my office, though.  I

 4     didn't need one.  I went to the neighbouring office and that is probably

 5     when I heard that information.

 6        Q.   So we are talking about the information about the attack on the

 7     enclave.  Are you saying you heard it from the neighbouring office on the

 8     media or through a military colleague?

 9        A.   In the office next door, I heard it on television.  I did not

10     hear it from a colleague.

11        Q.   Okay.  And so you first heard about the attack on Srebrenica from

12     the media.  You -- never from any military colleague, report -- military

13     meeting or report; is that right?

14        A.   Your Honours, I do not understand this question.

15        Q.   It wasn't very well stated.  Let me try again.  I just want to

16     clarify:  You first heard about the attack on Srebrenica through the

17     media sources?

18        A.   Well, Mr. McCloskey, I heard about the possibility of an attack

19     on the enclaves because of the military actions launched from those

20     enclaves.  And I've already mentioned that.  General Mladic told the

21     Ukrainian representative Alexander Alexandrovich that we wouldn't be able

22     to take those provocations launched by the Muslims from the enclaves.

23     You shouldn't think that I'm obfuscating and pretending I don't

24     understand the question.  There were provocations almost daily.

25             I apologise.  General Mladic spoke to General Rose, too.  He

Page 18715

 1     said, "General, you were in nine countries waging war, but never in

 2     Britain.  I am waging war in my country.  Please don't let the Muslims

 3     from Gorazde shoot at us."

 4             That is why this question is far too broad for me be able to

 5     explain.  Do not place me in such a position.  Please be fair and

 6     don't -- you -- don't attack my credibility.  How could I say that I

 7     haven't heard of the attacks from the enclaves and the response by the

 8     VRS?  That would really be too naive.  But if the Prosecutor is trying to

 9     make me remember details and the circumstances under which I heard them,

10     that is, the exact time and place, well, Your Honours, these are things I

11     really cannot remember.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey --

13             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Could I have one clarifying question?

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, please.

15             MR. McCLOSKEY:

16        Q.   General, my question was not, "When did you hear about the

17     possibility of an attack on Srebrenica?" as you've stated.  My question

18     was very clear.  It was:  Did you first hear about the attack on

19     Srebrenica from the media, which you told me in your interview and you

20     testified under oath.  So it's a very simple question.  And in fairness

21     to you, general, when I interviewed you, you first told me you first

22     heard about it in, I think, July 20th or 26th, so I was wondering why you

23     testified under oath that you heard it afterward.  And now I'm trying to

24     clarify:  The attack, July 6th, that's when it happened, did you first

25     hear about that attack from the media?

Page 18716

 1        A.   I do not remember.  I don't think that the media reported about

 2     it.  At least to the extent I follow the media.  And I didn't even know

 3     that an attack had been launched on the 6th of July.

 4             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you, Mr. President.  I know you've got to

 5     go.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We must have our second break now, and we will

 7     resume at 1.00.

 8                           --- Recess taken at 12.30 p.m.

 9                           [The witness stands down]

10                           [The witness takes the stand]

11                           --- On resuming at 1.02 p.m.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, Mr. McCloskey.  Please continue.

13             MR. McCLOSKEY:

14        Q.   General, I want to go back to my questions about the Jela

15     restaurant and your testimony about that so you can actually see what you

16     said.

17             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And that was from the testimony from page 18624.

18        Q.   And it's in the middle of the page.  And General Tolimir asked

19     you:

20             "Q.  Thank you.  Now, at the farewell reception for

21     General Zivanovic, was there any discussion, did anyone talk about the

22     events in Srebrenica?"

23             And your answer is:

24             "As far as I can recall, there was no mention of it."

25             Now that we have talked, is it fair to say that you do recall

Page 18717

 1     Srebrenica being mentioned?

 2        A.   Mr. McCloskey, I said as far as I remember no, and I stand by

 3     that statement.

 4        Q.   All right.  Let's just go to the transcript of that just to --

 5             MR. McCLOSKEY:  It's P2231.  In the English.  And I --

 6        Q.   It starts off with General Zivanovic saying some things,

 7     General Gvero, and then Mladic gets up and talks for a long time, as he

 8     does.

 9             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And I want to go to page 3 in the English and

10     page 3 in the B/C/S.

11        Q.   And he says:

12             "Thank you, General, and thank all of your fellows for not

13     letting the Serbs disappear."

14             Let's hope that we'll find that.  But before they do, can you

15     tell us what is this concept that he's referring to about Serbs

16     disappearing?

17        A.   That's not a concept.  It was an assessment that the Serbs could

18     re-experience the year 1941 and, as a consequence, disappear not only

19     from that area but beyond.  In 1991 and -- or, actually, since 1991, many

20     Serbs have been killed, especially in the western part but also in the

21     east of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  But I don't need to bother you with the

22     figures.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey, can you help us to find it in the

24     transcript.  I see Ms. Stewart working hard on it.

25             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yeah, we'll just talk about this concept of

Page 18718

 1     disappearing folks for a while, and hopefully we'll find it.  Page 8 in

 2     the English.  Again, I don't seem to have at the e-court pages, and I'll

 3     correct that tonight so I can get that done properly.

 4             Okay.  We can see it up at the top, where it's about five lines

 5     down in the English on the right.

 6             "Thank you, General.  You and your --"

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Please move your microphone further to you, or

 8     use the other one.

 9             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And it's at page 7 in the B/C/S, lower down.

10        Q.   And it says:

11             "Thank you, General, you and your colleagues for not allowing our

12     people to disappear.  It was just the other day, triumphantly and with

13     pride, as a commander, you handed over the duty to the commander of the

14     corps, General Krstic, who, together with you, gave the liberated

15     Srebrenica and Zepa to the Serbian people."

16             And then he goes on.  That's one of a few references that is made

17     to Srebrenica right there in General Mladic's speech.  But I -- I want to

18     go back and ask you about this disappearance.  You mentioned 1941.

19        A.   Yes, what is your question?

20        Q.   And I think we'll agree, very briefly, that you're referring to

21     World War II and the large number of Serbs who were murdered by forces

22     acting with the Nazis or the Nazis themselves; is that right?

23        A.   Yes, they were killed in the Second World War in 1941.  That is

24     correct.  Many of them were killed by Ustashas.

25        Q.   And you're meaning by that Croatian forces of some sort?  I don't

Page 18719

 1     want to get into the details of 1941.

 2        A.   Yes, I meant that type of armed forces that belonged to the

 3     independent state of Croatia which was a fascist entity in the Balkans.

 4     Those units, the Ustashas, also comprised Muslims.  They were also called

 5     Ustashas.

 6        Q.   And when Mladic says this to his assembled corps commanders and

 7     others, did you truly believe that the Muslim forces were coming to

 8     commit genocide on Serbs?

 9        A.   Not only the Muslim forces but the Croatian forces, too.

10        Q.   And this was a common theme, that they are coming to kill us

11     all - the Muslims and the Croats - that was passed not just among the

12     generals but it was passed down to the soldier on the ground, by the

13     morale officers and the commanders, wasn't it?

14        A.   I am not sure that they spoke about that all the time, but it is

15     true that they were indicating a potential danger, especially with regard

16     to the fact that we came to harm several times.  During the

17     First World War, almost the entire Serbian people moved across the

18     mountains, through Albania, and went to Corfu.  And then came the

19     Second World War, so that these are essential, historical elements

20     indicating the existence of a real threat.

21             You don't need to go into moralising our deep historical

22     research.  You only need to be reminded of Bosanska Dubica where

23     thousands of people were killed.  And then there was the camp of

24     Jasenovac where seven hundred thousands Serbs were killed, although that

25     figure has been disputed, but no estimate goes below 500.000.  So there

Page 18720

 1     was a real threat that the Serbian people might disappear.

 2             The Serbian people disappeared from Croatia in 1995.  They

 3     disappeared totally.  They either fled, became refugees, or were killed.

 4     You heard the information that in Western Slavonia about 2.000 people

 5     were killed.  I was not sure that was accurate, so that's why I expressed

 6     my reservations.  But one hundred per cent of the population - and I mean

 7     the Serbian population - were driven out of Croatia.  And that's an event

 8     that corroborates that the possibility of the disappearance of the Serbs

 9     from these areas, including the Republika Srpska, was realistic.

10             Your Honours, I must tell you that even now there is strong

11     pressure to abolish the Republika Srpska.

12        Q.   Do you find a difference between a commander telling his troops,

13     "The enemy is a threat and they are coming to kill you," and the

14     commander telling his troops and his officers, "The enemy is coming to

15     kill you all and coming to commit genocide on you"?

16        A.   Yes, there is a difference.

17        Q.   And it's the position of the Prosecution, general, that that

18     second position, when General Mladic and General Krstic and the other

19     commanders say to their troops and say to their people that "the Croats

20     and the Muslims are coming to commit genocide on you," that that was done

21     for the purpose of to vilify the Muslim people and engender hatred

22     against them.  And that it's this kind of propaganda and politicising war

23     that can lead and does lead and did lead to mass execution.  Do you

24     agree?

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. McCloskey, what is your question?

Page 18721

 1             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I asked him if he agreed with the position of the

 2     Prosecution.  I don't mean just to be philosophising.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  No, I didn't hear the question, "Do you agree?"

 4     Thank you.

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, words have a very

 6     precise meaning to me, and if they don't, I cannot interpret them.  It

 7     was interpreted to me that Mr. McCloskey said that the Muslims were

 8     coming.  That is a -- that is an action which takes place at a moment in

 9     time.  The moment -- but that wasn't so.  The Muslims were coming to

10     uproot the Serbs.  However, it never happened that we were told, "The

11     Muslims are coming to kill you."  This instantaneous action, here they

12     are.  No, that never happened.  Apart from that, the analysis of combat

13     readiness from 1992 is a document at the disposal of this Tribunal, too.

14     And it says in that document that genocide against the Serbian people is

15     a possibility.

16             MR. McCLOSKEY:

17        Q.   Yes, and I won't spend too long with this.  General Mladic in

18     that 1992 analysis says several times, as I think others do, that the

19     Serbs are threatened with genocide which is more than uprooting, of

20     course.  It can include uprooting but implies murder.  And so my point

21     is:  Do you agree with me that that is a propaganda statement to rally

22     the troops to hatred, to kill the enemy, and that can lead to mass

23     executions and war crimes?

24        A.   From the point of view of science, propaganda could not be

25     successful if it were not founded at least partly on truth, and probably

Page 18722

 1     an element is also motivating people to fight.  In the Serbian language,

 2     however, there is a difference between uprooting and genocide.  Genocide

 3     is the total destruction of a nation, whereas uprooting is driving them

 4     out of their native area.  In other words, that the people can no longer

 5     be found where they were born, where their home was.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  We'll go to something a little more specific now.  Do

 7     you recall in your interview with me on the 12th of July in 2005 my

 8     question where I ask you:  "Who were Mladic's closest generals?  Who was

 9     he closest to?"  Do you remember your response?

10        A.   Yes, I do, Mr. McCloskey.

11        Q.   And if I asked you that question again, what would your answer

12     be?

13        A.   I think -- or, rather, I don't think but let me put it this way:

14     He most often spoke with General Tolimir.  Then you asked me a follow-up

15     question and I said that he most trusted General Tolimir and that he

16     spent most of the time in private conversations with General Tolimir.

17     Now, if you would be kind enough to confirm whether I am right in what I

18     remember?

19        Q.   You are.  That's pretty much as I see it, and so that ... now

20     were you -- do you recall - and I know this is going back - there was a

21     New Year's Eve celebration in 1996 that a lot of the senior officers got

22     together with -- and their wives and their friends and family and there

23     were speeches given.  Do you remember being present at that event?

24        A.   Yes, I do.  Your Honours, let me explain.  I was asked whether I

25     remember being at this celebration.  The question was not whether I was

Page 18723

 1     there.  I just said that I remember.  But what do I remember?

 2             I'm sorry, Mr. McCloskey.  Maybe the translation is not correct.

 3     And I highly appreciate the interpreters, but I would really like to have

 4     all the words clear, that based on them I can draw proper conclusions on

 5     the basis of which I can give you a proper answer.

 6        Q.   Were you at the 1996 celebration with the other senior generals?

 7        A.   Yes.

 8        Q.   All right.  I am going to play a -- I hope I am going to play, I

 9     am going to try to play a bit of the video.

10             MR. McCLOSKEY:  We're -- sorry, we're not going to be able to do

11     that now.  We are not set up for that and that's my fault.  And I know

12     the Defence has this video.  They have a transcript.  So I just want to

13     read one little section from that, and I'll go slowly.

14        Q.   And just ask you --

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Can you give us the exhibit number of the

16     transcript.

17             MR. McCLOSKEY:  It should be P01029.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

19             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And I have noted that I am going to page 5 in the

20     B/C/S and looks like page 6 on my copy.  Though I can't guarantee that's

21     the same e-court at this point.  It actually is.  So --

22        Q.   General Mladic says --

23             MR. McCLOSKEY:  We'll give it a try on the video.  I think it

24     would be better, especially for the witness.

25             Yes, we can start that first paragraph -- or the middle paragraph

Page 18724

 1     at page 6 at 1.19.12 to 1.22.16.  It in the -- it's in the middle of one

 2     of General Mladic's speeches at the -- at this function.

 3                           [Video-clip played]

 4             MR. McCLOSKEY:  We must have two different timings.  So I'll go

 5     ahead and just read this.

 6        Q.   We'll, if we need to -- general, I apologise for the miscue.  If

 7     you need to see this, we'll have that ready for you tomorrow and get it.

 8     But this is not a very controversial item.  I just want to ask you if you

 9     agree with what General Mladic is saying.  And in the English in the

10     middle of that paragraph he says:

11             "I was able to do so only thanks to all of you, irrespective of

12     when each of you joined the Main Staff, and thanks to the exceptional

13     fighting spirit of our people and our army, those who helped me, most

14     definitely my closest associates.  And now I can tell you only part of

15     it, as a part of it, it can't be told yet.  The most important decisions

16     were taken by a group of five people.  This was the inner core of the

17     Main Staff which, in addition to myself, included General Milovanovic, my

18     deputy and the Chief of Staff, and Generals Djukic, Gvero, and Tolimir.

19     This was the inner core.  The other generals also participated in very

20     difficult and very often in all decision-making, General Jovo Maric,

21     General Tomic, General Grubor at that time, and General Skrbic."

22             What I wanted to ask you about is, as Mladic says "inner core,"

23     to your understanding was there an inner core of the Main Staff?

24        A.   That's what we used the call the inner circle of the collegium of

25     the Main Staff.  There was no formal and official term "inner core."  It

Page 18725

 1     is just a metaphor, and this is what I said, Your Honours, and I also

 2     showed that to you in a chart presented to all of you by the Defence

 3     team.

 4        Q.   So do you agree with Mladic here when he says that the most

 5     important decisions were taken by a group of five people, and then he

 6     lists the five people I mentioned?

 7        A.   Yes, I do.

 8        Q.   All right.

 9             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Can we go to the first page of the -- of this.

10     And in both languages -- I'm sorry.

11        Q.   And in both languages, we see Mladic saying:

12             "Ladies, dear guests, colleagues, officers, and generals,

13     General Gvero has encouraged me to say a few things.  It was long ago in

14     1992, a difficult year, when it was even difficult to look at this area

15     on a map.  Fortunately, there are witnesses.  One of them is my wife and

16     several associates and comrades-in-arms from the Knin Corps.  But I am

17     saddened that the most important among them, General Tolimir, and his

18     wife are not with us tonight.  As you know, he is on assignment, battling

19     the dragons of the world in Vienna on behalf of the Serbian nation."

20             So from what you could see in your experience working as an

21     assistant commander during the war and especially in 1995, in the summer

22     of 1995, could you agree with General Mladic that General Tolimir was so

23     important to him?

24        A.   Your Honours, I cannot tell you what Tolimir meant to

25     General Mladic.  All I can do is to confirm that this is what

Page 18726

 1     General Mladic stated.

 2        Q.   But you did answer me in the interview, and you said what you

 3     said about General Tolimir and General Mladic, and you stand by that.

 4        A.   Yes, Mr. McCloskey.  But there is a distinction there as well,

 5     but I am not willing to try and elaborate on that now.

 6        Q.   Okay, well, we have got to go question by question as you know,

 7     but if you need to explain an answer, you are always free to do so, and

 8     as you know General Tolimir can always ask -- will have chance, if he'd

 9     like to, to ask you questions.

10             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  Let's go to P2520.  And that should

11     be the document from 12 July that you spoke about with General Tolimir.

12        Q.   And we see that, as you've stated, it's from your sector, in your

13     name.  The chart that we had on the screen the other day, there is a

14     transportation unit in the Main Staff, isn't there?

15             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness kindly lower the sound in his

16     headphones because the French booth hears the B/C/S from the witness's

17     headphones very loudly.  Thank you.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  With the assistance of the Court Usher, please.

19             Mr. McCloskey.

20             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.

21        Q.   Was there a transportation unit administration?  I'm sorry, I

22     have forgotten the formal name of it.

23        A.   A transportation unit did not exist as an independent one in the

24     Main Staff.

25        Q.   Was there a transportation unit in the Main Staff?

Page 18727

 1        A.   I answered that question, Your Honours.

 2        Q.   You said something about --

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  No.  No, you didn't answer it.  It was the

 4     question about if there was a transportation unit.  The question was not

 5     if there was an independent transportation unit.  Was there any

 6     transportation unit, was the question.  Please answer it.

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, there was a

 8     transportation service within the logistics sector of the Main Staff of

 9     the VRS.  It was in charge of transportation, but there was no single

10     unit dealing with that, either as a staff unit or as a -- an integral

11     part of the Main Staff.

12             MR. McCLOSKEY:

13        Q.   And, general, that's all I was asking, and thank you for telling

14     us it was within the logistics branch.  And did you know an officer named

15     Kerkez?

16        A.   Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

17        Q.   And who was he and what was his position?

18        A.   He was at the head of the transportation service within the

19     logistics of the VRS Main Staff, and he had the rank of colonel.

20        Q.   And in July 1995, can you remind me what your rank was?

21        A.   Mr. McCloskey, in July 1995 I had the rank of a major-general.

22        Q.   And can you explain to me what -- why are you involved in this

23     request to the Ministry of Defence for vehicles and not the logistics

24     people?  Or are they?

25        A.   Mr. McCloskey, they - and when I say "they," I mean the

Page 18728

 1     logistics - can make use only of the means that the army doesn't have at

 2     its disposal.  Everything else that is beyond the army was within the

 3     charge and the responsibilities of my sector.  Therefore, they were not

 4     entitled to request mobilisation.  It was my sector who had to do it.

 5        Q.   Okay.  So the kind of mobilisation of actual vehicles that you

 6     are requesting here is the kind of mobilisation -- one kind of

 7     mobilisation that is part of your job definition?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   And what I'm getting to is that I know at many times we think of

10     mobilising men for troops, but it obviously includes materiel as well; is

11     that right?

12        A.   That's right.

13        Q.   And I won't go over all of them, but we saw that your request to

14     the ministry was taken rather seriously, was turned into an order by the

15     ministry to their own people, and it was giving very strict follow-up

16     orders on reporting.  And actually one of the documents said that this

17     was really hurting public transport or something to that effect.

18             So my question is:  Your request, was that normal for a request

19     like this to be taken so seriously and acted upon so strictly in

20     conformance with your request?

21        A.   Completely normal.

22        Q.   And did the ministry understand that this wasn't just coming from

23     General Skrbic but that General Skrbic couldn't act like this without the

24     authority of General Mladic?

25        A.   Of course, Mr. McCloskey.

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 1        Q.   All right.

 2             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I see that it's a good time to break, and thank

 3     you, everyone.  I will do my best to try to finish tomorrow, and if --

 4     hopefully give the general some -- the last time in the day for a

 5     possible redirect.  I will reorganise and endeavour to do that, and I'll

 6     have a better estimate in the morning.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much for that.  We have to adjourn

 8     for the day.  We will resume tomorrow morning at 9.00 in this courtroom,

 9     again.

10             And please be reminded, again, that you shouldn't have any

11     contact with the parties during this break.

12             We adjourn.

13                           [The witness stands down]

14                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at

15                           1.45 p.m., to be reconvened on Thursday, the

16                           2nd day of February, 2012, at 9.00 a.m.