1 Tuesday, 15 September 2009
2 [Prosecution Opening Statement]
3 [Open session]
4 [The accused entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 2.20 p.m.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honours. This is case
7 IT-08-91-T, the Prosecutor versus Mico Stanisic and Stojan Zupljanin.
8 JUDGE HALL
9 MS. KORNER: I am, Your Honour. Again, would it be helpful if
10 for the purposes of the note I simply said who was here? I know it's the
11 same as yesterday, but it sometimes makes a difference.
12 JUDGE HALL
14 MS. KORNER: Well, they are as yesterday. Very quickly this time
15 going from my right to left: Mr. Olmsted; Mr. Hannis; myself, Joanna
16 Korner; Ms. Pidwell; and Crispian Smith, case manager.
17 JUDGE HALL
18 And for the Defence.
19 MR. ZECEVIC: Good afternoon, Your Honours. Slobodan Zecevic,
20 Slobodan Cvijetic, Eugene O'Sullivan for the Stanisic Defence.
21 MR. PANTELIC: Good afternoon, Your Honours. I am lead counsel
22 for Mr. Zupljanin, Igor Pantelic. Next to me is my learned friend, legal
23 assistant, lawyer from Florida, Mr. Brent Hicks; next to him is our case
24 manager, Mr. Eric Tully from Ireland. Thank you.
25 JUDGE HALL
1 ourselves to the appearances when new faces appear on each of the teams.
2 MS. KORNER: Certainly, Your Honour. Can I just mention very
3 quickly the question of timing? Would it be suitable to you,
4 Mr. President, and the Court, if I were to conclude my opening by 6.00
5 p.m. and then that would leave one hour for the discussion of Dr. Donia.
6 JUDGE HALL
7 JUDGE HARHOFF: That seems --
8 JUDGE HALL
9 MS. KORNER: Thank you very much. We had reached yesterday the
10 Assembly of the 12th of May.
11 JUDGE HALL
12 MS. KORNER: The Assembly of the 12th of May. We had looked at
13 the minutes, and what I would like to do now is show the Court a video
14 and simply identify for the Court some of the people whose names you will
15 be hearing during the course of this case.
16 [Video-clip played]
17 MS. KORNER: If one looks at it at the moment you see the cameras
18 just panning along. The gentleman in the middle with the camouflage
19 uniform is General Talic, who was the -- who was then commander of the
20 5th Krajina Corps of the JNA, but shortly to become commander of the 1st
21 Krajina Corps of the newly formed Republika Srpska army.
22 For the information of all those of you who may not know that,
23 General Talic was originally on trial here with Radoslav Brdjanin but
24 died in the middle of the trial. Next to him you can see General Mladic.
25 [Video-clip played]
1 MS. KORNER: Momcilo Krajisnik, whose trial has just -- and
2 appeal has just finished. Not able, I'm afraid, to identify who that is
3 at the moment.
4 Sorry, the gentleman to the -- looking at him to the right of
5 General Talic was Lieutenant-Colonel Milorad Sajic, who you would have
6 seen on some of the documents relating to the ARK Crisis Staff. I don't
7 think that needs any explanation.
8 And sitting next to Radovan Karadzic in the camouflage uniform
9 again was Colonel -- then-Colonel Subotic. And I'm afraid we don't know
10 who the lady is -- or at least not in the quick inquiries I was able to
12 That is, we believe -- let me just get that right, Koljevic.
13 Subotic again. Again, can't assist with him.
14 Radoslav Vukic, Dr. Vukic, also a member of the ARK Crisis Staff.
15 This meeting, of course, was held in Banja Luka, and there with his
16 finger to his lips, Radoslav Brdjanin. And I think that's all we need to
17 identify. Thank you very much.
18 The following day -- oh, and I'm open to any corrections from any
19 Defence counsel if I've misidentified anybody.
20 The following day in Banja Luka a parade of the Banja Luka
21 special police was held. This unit had been established by Stojan
22 Zupljanin in April. He'd actually requested armaments and other material
23 from General Kukanjac of the JNA 2nd Military District which covered this
24 area. He was apparently given them. And, in fact, as we will see from
25 documents, possibly not from this opening, so as not to be too long,
1 Stojan Zupljanin actually incorporated into the Banja Luka special police
2 members of the SOS
4 The parade was attended by Mico Stanisic, and it's this unit
5 which came under the command in particular of a man called Ljuban Ecim,
6 which was to commit some of the more serious crimes within the ARK. And
7 we're going to show you a short clip of that parade, noting the armaments
8 that were available to the Banja Luka special police.
9 [Video-clip played]
10 MS. KORNER: It also included units or police officers who came
11 up from other substations. Helicopters. And then, as you can see, the
12 blue uniforms. Sorry, we're speeding it up slightly so that -- just to
13 give you some idea of the numbers of men and equipment available.
14 Perhaps not terribly well-disciplined, judging by the waving to people in
15 the crowd. And the police vehicles. So what we saw there were tanks,
16 APCs, helicopters, men, and arms. I think that will do.
17 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mrs. Korner, I think you announced that we would
18 see the accused Stanisic at the last video or maybe I misunderstood you,
19 but my question goes actually to both videos. Have we seen Mr. Stanisic
20 in any of the two videos that you have shown to us this afternoon?
21 MS. KORNER: Oh, no, no, no, you don't see him in this video. I
22 don't think there is any disagreement though, however, he was there
23 taking the parade, he wasn't actually marching in it, but you just don't
24 happen to see him, and, no, he didn't -- he's not in the 12th of May
25 video. And indeed, when he was interviewed by the Office of the
1 Prosecutor, he denied that he had attended the Assembly of the
2 12th of May, and at present we have no evidence to contradict that from
3 documents or video.
4 JUDGE HARHOFF: Okay. So -- thank you very much.
5 MS. KORNER: But he is -- and as I say - and I'm sure if there is
6 a dispute Mr. Zecevic will let me know - he was present at the parade
7 which took place the day of the 12th of May.
8 Before I move on to the crimes themselves, a brief outline, can I
9 say one or two things about the sources of evidence that Your Honours
10 will hear in this case. Witness evidence comes from the victims of the
11 crimes, first of all, but the vast majority have testified in earlier
12 trials. And accordingly, the Trial Chamber will have very limited
13 opportunity to hear from them. Indeed, many will not be heard from at
14 all in the sense that their evidence simply becomes part of the record
15 through the procedures under Rule 92 bis. Of course the effect is that
16 this tends to shift the emphasis of a trial as the concentration of the
17 evidence that you will hear is on the actions by the accused and their
18 subordinates. And it may appear that the suffering of the victims has
19 been ignored. And simply, we want to say this because we know but the
20 general public may not know that a trial such as this must always be a
21 balancing exercise between the length of a trial and the right of a
22 victim to be heard. And we've no doubt at all that each member of the
23 Trial Chamber will read the evidence and that what happened to the
24 victims will not be forgotten even though this doesn't, as I say, from
25 public perception always seem apparent.
1 Other witness testimony will come from the witnesses to the
2 crimes, who were themselves not a party to those crimes or, indeed, a
3 party to any criminal enterprise, and this includes internationals who
4 were present for some of the events.
5 You will also hear witness evidence from participants in the
6 criminal enterprise. And can I say something about that. Those who fall
7 into the category of participants, who worked in either the MUP or the
8 VRS or the organs of government at either republican or municipal level
9 are necessary for Your Honours to have a proper picture of the events in
10 this case. But they do come - and I say this straight away with a health
11 warning - in many cases they will be reluctant witnesses. They may well
12 have their own agenda for testifying, reasons perhaps to minimise their
13 own involvement or that of others. And it may be - and this is a matter
14 entirely for Your Honours - that you come to the conclusion they are
15 truthful about some matters but not about others. But that of course is
16 a matter for Your Honours to assess, having listened to their evidence.
17 And finally, of course, the evidence will come from documents and
18 from experts in the political and military and police aspects of the case
19 and those who have conducted an analysis of the -- the effects of this
20 criminal enterprise, that is to say if it's not a creed, exhumations, and
21 dispersal of the population.
22 So can I turn now straight away to the actual crimes in the
23 municipalities and the participation by the RS MUP. Three days after the
24 12th of May Assembly, Mico Stanisic issued an order that members of the
25 MUP should be organised into war units. 15th of May, order:
1 "1. Pursuant to the decision of the competent organs ... of the
2 Serbian Republic ..." declaring an imminent threat of war we looked at
3 yesterday. Also, "all authorised officials of the Ministry of the
4 Interior of Serbian Republic ... shall be organised in war units (squads,
5 platoons, companies, battalions, et cetera for the purposes of defending
6 the territory of the Serbian republic.
7 And all we need to look at on the rest of this is the signature
8 and stamp of Mico Stanisic at the bottom.
9 It will be a feature of this case that the police, the MUP --
10 members of the MUP were divided. Those who -- in the towns or the
11 villages keeping order, carrying out -- or should be carrying out their
12 police duties as we understand them, and those who were actually engaged
13 in fighting together with the VRS. When they were engaged in fighting,
14 they came under the command of the military. Otherwise, when dealing
15 with, as I say, what we consider to be normal police procedures they
16 stayed completely within the command of and the orders of the minister of
17 the interior and his subordinates.
18 On the same day, that is to say the 16th of May, Mico Stanisic
19 appointed all his chiefs of the CSBs and he appointed Milenko Karisik as
20 chief of what was called the police detachment, the special police
21 unit -- I'm sorry, it was on the 15th of May. And then on the 16th of
22 May he ordered his chiefs to provide daily reports, and the day after
23 that -- as I say, there was a constant stream of orders coming from Mico
24 Stanisic, he was demanding to know whether an order he had issued on the
25 15th of May had actually been complied with. So it wasn't just that he
1 was issuing orders. He was actually also reminding them that they had to
2 comply. And if we very quickly look at those documents, 16th of May he
3 is sending an order to the security services centre, to the chief
4 personally, and he says here:
5 "In view of the tasks resulting from the order by the minister of
6 the interior ... of the 15th of May ... for the purpose of monitoring
7 combat operations and regular activities of the organs of the interior
8 and in order to collect documentation on the crimes against the Serbian
9 population ..."
10 And again, that's a theme we will see later. The order to
11 investigate - I shall be dealing with it at the very end of what I want
12 to say - was always to investigate crimes committed against Serbs and
13 later on war crimes committed against Serbs, very rarely to investigate
14 crimes generally of the population.
15 And the report goes on:
16 " ... fax reports must be submitted daily to the Ministry of the
17 Interior of Republic [indiscernible] ..."
18 And then the rest of the document shows what the report had to
20 And if we go just quickly to IV -- sorry, back again. There we
21 have it: "War crimes." Roman numeral IV, sorry. It again --
22 "These activities must involve collection of information and
23 documents on war crimes against the Serbs."
24 Then we go to the next document. 17th of May, first paragraph:
25 "Send us reports on the measures taken on the order of the
1 minister number strictly confidential" it gives the number, "of the 15th
2 of May ..."
3 So he doesn't wait two days before sending out a reminder.
4 The seizure of power by the Bosnian Serb leaders in the
5 municipalities that they had targeted to form part of their state,
6 particularly those in the municipalities where the Serbs did not form a
7 majority, in other words, Variant B, followed a similar pattern. And
8 indeed, all these matters which I am about to refer to have been
9 litigated so often that again they are all part of the adjudicated facts.
10 The Serb population, as I mentioned yesterday, was clandestinely calmed
11 and Serb Municipal Assemblies and Crisis Staffs were established.
12 Propaganda was disseminated to make the Serb populace believe that
13 atrocities would be committed against them by non-Serbs. And we've just
14 picked one example. There are many. This was published -- it's called
15 the Informator of the Serbian Democratic Party of Sanski Most. And if
16 you go -- if we go, rather -- I go, you don't -- to the third page it
18 "Dear brother Serbs.
19 "Do you know what our blood-thirsty enemies have been scheming
20 for us?
21 "What they had in mind was to gouge out our eyes, carve us up,
22 hack our bodies to pieces, rape women and girls in front of their
23 dearest, to circumcise, to destroy our religion, to crush us just because
24 we happen to be Serbs.
25 "Don't think anybody's family would have been spared. They had
1 monsters ready and committing to raping Serbian women, and they had
2 developed a system of killing each and every Serb.
3 "Soon we will show everyone their horrible weapons, the
4 Serb-cutters, swords from the middle ages, sledge-hammers, special
5 knives, instruments to gouge out our eyes with, and instruments to carve
6 us up.
7 "A decent man shutters with horror ..."
8 And then they give allegedly an example.
9 Now, to us in the clinical atmosphere of this courtroom it may
10 seem utterly incredible that anybody could believe such total and utter
11 rubbish, but, of course, you're dealing with a population, a rural
12 population for a large part, that was perhaps not quite as sophisticated
13 and was all too ready to believe that this was true. And many of the
14 internationals who were working there, particularly those who were -- had
15 been sent there by the economic -- by the European Community as monitors
16 noted how much the propaganda was being spread and how rumours became
17 fact very, very quickly.
18 Check-points were established manned by Bosnian Serb soldiers, by
19 the MUP, and by so-called paramilitary formations, which was sometimes
20 local Serbs, sometimes people that come from other parts of Bosnia or,
21 indeed, from Serbia, the most famous perhaps being Captain Dragan's men
22 or Arkan's men, the White Eagles, the Wolfs of Vucjak.
23 The importance of the MUP in this plan may be seen by the fact
24 that the assumption of power in the municipalities normally began with
25 the take-over of the SJBs, then the administering of the loyalty oath,
1 and then the dismissal of non-Serb members. Orders for disarmament were
2 issued by the municipal Bosnian Serb or SDS Crisis Staff, and thereafter,
3 depending on the nature of the municipality, the level of violence
4 increased. Non-Serb villages and parts of towns were attacked by the
5 combined forces of the military, the MUP, and again paramilitaries. And
6 the attacks often began with the shelling of the area or village followed
7 by the arrival of armed men in uniform.
8 Those not killed in the attacks or when the forces came in were
9 rounded up, men, women, and children. Unarmed men were summarily
10 executed, some on the spot, some were taken elsewhere. Those who
11 survived were taken to makeshift detention facilities. These included a
12 disused open-cast mine, industrial complexes, football fields, schools,
13 as well as police stations and actual prisons. And the police provided
14 the guards for most or for many, if not all, of these facilities. The
15 conditions therein were generally appalling. Overcrowding, lack of food,
16 lack of water, lack of sanitary facilities, medical attention, if it was
17 there, was limited. All of this was standard. Beatings of inmates by
18 guards and those who were allowed into the detention facility were
19 routine. Some of those beatings were severe enough to cause death. And
20 women who were kept in these facilities, at least in some of them, were
22 Mass killings took place during transport to or from the
23 facilities, and on at least one occasion, if not more, in the facility
24 itself in Keraterm camp in Prijedor the inmates of room 44 -- 4 -- come
25 back to that in a minute -- were all machine-gunned and killed. Looting
1 and destruction of property almost invariably followed on attacks.
2 Religious and cultural destruction took place throughout this period, not
3 confined, in fact, to places where attacks had taken place, but even in
4 places like Banja Luka which was so Serb-controlled that didn't happen.
5 Mosques were blown up.
6 In places where this degree of force was not needed for the
7 Bosnian Serbs to seize power, for example, in Banja Luka, the non-Serbs
8 lost their jobs and were subjected to a range of discriminatory measures
9 which were perhaps the most extreme exemplified in a document that was
10 issued by the Celinac Crisis Staff. Celinac was next door to Banja Luka.
11 It was -- and there are other not dissimilar examples in this case. It's
12 dated the 23rd of July, and it's a decision on the status of the
13 non-Serbian population of the Celinac municipality. Article 1:
14 "The execution of combat operations on the territory of Celinac
15 municipality and further afield has given rise to basic reasons for
16 giving the non-Serbian population of Celinac municipality a special
17 status, with clearly expressed rights, obligations, and
19 George Orwell would have been proud of that particular statement,
20 a special status with expressed rights, obligations, and
22 You will see that it names all the people, all of whom were, as
23 you can see from the names, are of Muslim ethnicity. They were -- if you
24 look at the next page.
25 " ... considered as persons who previously acted negatively and
1 compromised themselves in various ways, thereby harming the Serbian
2 people, on account of which they are given a different status from other
3 non-Serbian inhabitants."
4 They have the right to live unhindered to health care, however --
5 and they will be permitted to leave the territory on the condition that
6 their departure is conducted in an organised fashion.
7 Article 5:
8 "Until further notice, the citizens from Article 1 shall be:
9 "Forbidden from moving around ... between 1600 and 0600 hours.
10 "Forbidden from lingering in the street ...
11 "Forbidden from bathing in the rivers ...
12 "Forbidden from travelling without permission ...
13 "Forbidden from owning any kind of fire-arm ..."
14 Well, that was a bit unnecessary because by then all non-Serbs
15 were -- actually been disarmed.
16 "Forbidden from moving or using cars.
17 " ... gathering in groups with more than three men ..."
18 Et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.
19 And then in Article 6:
20 "To turn out in an orderly fashion for work considered by the --
21 for tasks encompassed by work obligation."
22 When the populations, non-Serb populations, were driven to leave,
23 they were forced to sign a document which stated that they were
24 voluntarily signing over their property to the Bosnian Serb state. When
25 they left in buses or trains they were robbed of their valuables before
1 or during transit. And in the end, as planned, either voluntarily or
2 forcibly, hundreds of thousands of non-Serbs left the territory of the
3 Republika Srpska.
4 That's the general picture. What we would like to do now is just
5 concentrate on one particular municipality for a little while just to
6 show it in a little more detail what actually happened, and that
7 municipality is Kotor Varos.
8 In the 1991 census, the population of Kotor Varos was shown to be
9 nearly 37.000 Serb, 38.1 per cent. 30 per cent were Muslim, and 29 per
10 cent Croats. So a slight majority there of Serbs, but not enough. And
11 the split was reflected in the 1990 elections, with the SDS receiving the
12 highest number of votes, but they didn't get a pure majority. So they
13 could be out-voted if the HDZ, the Croat party; and the SDA, the Muslims,
14 banded together. And you can see now a map of Kotor Varos came within
15 the area of Krajina. And photographs there of various places that you're
16 going to hear about. The sawmill, the Catholic church, the SJB building,
17 the medical centre, and the prison.
18 And if we look at a map which shows the breakdown of -- can we
19 make it a bit larger? Is that possible? Yeah.
20 What we've got here is the various villages and what the -- the
21 majority of the inhabitants were. So you've got Serbs in purple, green
22 for Muslim, and Croats in red. And if we -- you see Kotor Varos and the
23 town there. Here about Hanifici, Dabovci in particular, and other
24 places. And Maslovare, I believe, I believe, and again I'm open to
25 contradiction, is where Stojan Zupljanin was born. But certainly he was
1 a native of Kotor Varos and a relative of his, Slobodan Zupljanin, was a
2 captain in the JNA unit, the 122nd Infantry Brigade which covered the
3 area and was to play a part in the events and who you will see in a video
4 which we will show in a moment.
5 Ante Mandic, who was president of the HDZ party in Kotor Varos,
6 became president of the Assembly of the elections; Nedjelko Djekanovic,
7 who was president of the SDS
8 Executive Committee of the Municipal Assembly. The SDS party in
9 Kotor Varos was a party to the founding of the community of Bosnian
10 Krajina municipalities, which I spoke about yesterday.
11 I'm interrupting myself again. It was pointed out to me
12 yesterday that I had used a lot of acronyms during the course of my
13 opening. Can I say there is a full list of most of the major acronyms
14 attached to the pre-trial brief and also in the various expert reports.
15 So that if you lost me yesterday, as you probably did, there is recourse
16 to paper.
17 The SDS
18 19th of December Variant A/B. They established an Assembly. And in
19 February 1992 decided to join the ARK, although they'd already been
20 attending meetings of the precursor. And you'll see on the screens
21 before you the decision, 7th of February:
22 "It is hereby proclaimed that the Serbian municipality of
23 Kotor Varos shall be part of the Autonomous District of Krajina ..."
24 Well, of course there wasn't in February a Serbian municipality
25 of Kotor Varos. There was simply Kotor Varos as part of the Bosnian
2 In March of 1992, incidents of violence began. The most
3 notorious one was that a JNA reservist shot a Muslim, and as a result,
4 roadblocks were established by the inhabitants of Vrbanjci which was one
5 of the most predominantly Muslim villages. And matters deteriorated so
6 that on the 18th of March, the 122nd Brigade, and indeed other units,
7 were deployed to the wider area of Skender Vakuf and Maslovare. In April
8 of 1992, the weapons were removed from the Kotor Varos TO warehouse and
9 taken to Banja Luka. There was -- there were protests about this, but to
10 no avail. And during May, the 5th Krajina Corps, later to become the 1st
11 Krajina Corps - and as I said, commanded by General Talic - began to
12 deploy forces more heavily in the area. And in March and April a group
13 of Serb police from Kotor Varos went to Banja Luka for what was described
14 as special training.
15 On the 9th of June of 1992, Milos sent a report. And you will
16 see there that:
17 "Following our proposals ..."
18 And let us remind ourselves that Milos was a group working for
19 the SNB
20 "... and the proposals of others, the SDS party is due to start
21 an operation soon with the aim of taking over power in the Kotor Varos
22 area and settling ethnic tensions in the Kotor Varos Public Security
23 Station and other organs. Whilst this operation is going on, individuals
24 in possession of unlicensed arms or those they have obtained from the HDZ
25 or the SDA should be handing these arms in. This operation should be
1 carried out in a synchronised manner with the help of the Banja Luka CSB
2 We shall keep abreast of things and keep you informed about everything in
3 good time."
4 And you will recall that when we looked at the order yesterday
5 about uniforms in the police station, they said with the exception of
6 Kotor Varos and Prijedor.
7 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mrs. Korner, to whom was this report sent?
8 MS. KORNER: It was sent to the head of the SNB who by then was
9 already, I believe, Kesic in the Banja Luka CSB. There was also -- and
10 of course he, then, would report to Stojan Zupljanin.
11 On the 11th of June, which by no accident was the first day of
12 Bajram, which is the big Muslim festival, the 122nd Brigade and members
13 of the Special Police Unit from Banja Luka CSB took part in the take-over
14 of the town of Kotor Varos, Vrbanjci and Dabovci. The Muslims there were
15 told to surrender their arms. This included in the take-over, take-over
16 of the SJB which was headed by Savo Tepic who was a Serb who had been
17 appointed in April of 1992. According to a witness, Tepic was receiving
18 daily instructions during this period from Stojan Zupljanin.
19 The same day the SDS
20 existence of its Crisis Staff headed by Djukanovic. Some Muslims managed
21 to leave the town and to warn other villages of what had happened. The
22 deputy commander of the SJB, Mr. Sadikovic, who was a Muslim, in fact got
23 away and organised a small band of resistance fighters in the woods, to
24 no avail. On the 12th of June, the village of Hrvacani was attacked with
25 anti-aircraft weapons, mortars, howitzers, and other weapons, and that
1 was followed by other attacks on other villages throughout June. Only
2 two, really, of the villages, namely Vecici and Sokoline, managed to hold
3 out, amazingly enough, until October. Towards the end of June Krajina
4 Television news filmed some of the action that was taking place in
5 Kotor Varos, and we're now going to see that news.
6 You'll need for this, yes, the earphones. And I need some
7 headphones too.
8 [Video-clip played]
9 MS. KORNER: There's no translation.
11 I believe the interpreters should be able to interpret this
12 because they've got an English transcript.
13 [Video-clip played]
14 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Muslim extremists.
15 "The mop-up operation continued today in the area of Kotor
16 Varos" --
17 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters note that we're not sure
18 whether what we have is exactly what's being shown on the video. We just
19 need to make sure that that is the same text.
20 MS. KORNER: Can you pause?
21 All right. I don't know whether the interpreters' booth can hear
22 me, but they should have and we would like, if that's possible, please,
23 to have an English translation of what is being said.
24 THE INTERPRETER: It is possible but the sentence begins
25 with the --
1 MS. KORNER: My earphones won't work at all so I can't hear what
2 the interpreter's saying.
3 THE INTERPRETER: The first sentence begins and it's the same as
4 the text that we have but then it continues and it's not the same text,
5 and we're unable to simultaneously interpret at the speed that the
6 speaker is speaking. So we just need to make sure we have the exact text
7 in order to be able to translate it or read it into the transcript.
8 MS. KORNER: Thank you very much. I'm sorry about that.
9 Your Honour, what we -- what I think, Your Honour, what we can
10 always do is play it. It's the visual effect and we'll explain who the
11 people speaking are, and then at a later stage when we get to the
12 evidence of Kotor Varos we'll make sure that it's properly -- it's the
13 same translation. I'd simply identify who's -- they're speaking to.
14 THE INTERPRETER: We believe we have found the right part now.
15 [Prosecution counsel confer]
16 MS. KORNER: They're now saying they've finally found it.
17 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mrs. Korner, the interpreters note that they have
18 now found the right transcript, so we may try again.
19 MS. KORNER: Thank you very much.
20 [Video-clip played]
21 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Are under the control of the
22 Croatian and Muslim extremists. The main organisers of resistance in
23 these areas are well-known criminals Muhamed Berbic and Mehmed Sadikovic.
24 They have a large number of wounded in their ranks and their food
25 reserves are dwindling. The former Ustasha stronghold of Vrbanjci is
1 firmly in the hands of the army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and
2 Herzegovina. I would like to take this opportunity to stress that we
3 have encountered exceptional cooperation among these people, but
4 unfortunately, there were two villages where, although we had managed to
5 reach an agreement, units of the Ministry of the Interior of the Serbian
6 Republic of Krajina and members of my unit were fired at and we had to
7 respond accordingly.
8 "Mr. Brdjanin, what are the reasons for your arrival and how
9 would you comment on the recent events in the area of the Kotor Varos
11 "One of the tasks of the president of an autonomous region Crisis
12 Staff is to visit all the front lines. I must admit that most often I
13 went to the corridor on the way to Serbia. The reason for my arrival is
14 simply the fact that every Monday I have to brief all of the Crisis Staff
15 presidents on the political situation in this area. We must cleanse our
16 area which of course includes Kotor Varos and Jajce. The most important
17 battle being fought at the moment, and I was there yesterday, is the
18 advance towards Serbia. To put it simply, we're now convinced, and we
19 see that ourselves, that there can be no negotiations with those who are
20 waging war against us. Those who have taken up arms must be defeated and
21 return the weapons. Total Serbian rule must be established here.
22 "We have asked the political structures also to take all possible
23 measures to avoid any conflict situations which could lead to the
24 destruction of buildings, loss of life, and so on. However, I must tell
25 you that while the other side has accepted at least partially our
1 activities, a number of extremists have rebelled and refused to place
2 themselves under control or to return their weapons. This surprise visit
3 to the Serbian fighters by the Krajina leaders is a sign of a
4 synchronised operation. Apart from their activities regarding the
5 liberation of Serbian territory, the officers and soldiers of the Serbian
6 armed formations are directly involved in the establishment of the
7 corridor to Serbia as one of the greatest operations in the history of
8 the Serbian people.
9 "... of the police special detachment and three from the army of
10 the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while seven members of
11 the police were slightly wounded. As soon as their wounds were treated
12 they returned to the front lines of their own accord in order to help
13 their comrades crush the last remaining enemy stronghold in Kotor Varos.
14 In today's fighting in Vecici, Muslim and Croat extremists were left with
15 30 dead and dozens of wounded. Vecici is surrounded by Serbian forces
16 but in the caves and caverns are hardened extremists from the area of the
17 municipality who do not wish to surrender, though they fully understand
18 that none of them can get out.
19 "The mop-up operation continued today in the area of Kotor Varos.
20 In a lightning operation, the members of the Banja Luka Security Services
21 Centre special detachment of the army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia
22 and Herzegovina captured Bilice, one of the most fortified strongholds of
23 the Croatian extremists. Only one member of the special units and army
24 was wounded in this operation, while the enemy had around 50 dead and a
25 large number of wounded. The mop-up is still underway and there are only
1 three more strongholds of Croat Muslims rebels left. The situation in
2 the town itself is gradually returning to normal. Although movement is
3 still allowed only from 9 to 11 hours, life is slowly returning to the
4 streets of Kotor Varos."
5 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters note again that the right
6 places were not properly marked, so we're not sure whether we have
7 actually read out the exact sections. We apologise.
8 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated]
9 MR. ZECEVIC: I just read the interpreter's note and I believe
10 this wasn't the part which was translated. I believe the context of this
11 second video is completely different from what the interpreters were
12 reading, unfortunately. Thank you.
13 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you, Mr. Zecevic.
14 MS. KORNER: Can I say, Your Honours, we had this checked because
15 there is a break, but it is in fact all Kotor Varos. If there's a
16 dispute, we can deal with the evidence. And there are, as I say, other
17 parts on the take, which we haven't got time to play this afternoon,
18 which show Slobodan, Captain Slobodan Zupljanin, wounded. But I say, we
19 can sort out and we'll double-check that.
20 In fact, we simply wanted to show and there is witness testimony
21 to that effect that particularly in Vecici planes were used and there was
23 JUDGE HARHOFF: The Prosecution's opening statement doesn't form
24 part of the evidence anyway, so let's just move on.
25 MS. KORNER: Yes, certainly.
1 The attacks, as I say, followed the same pattern. After shelling
2 the Bosnian Serb forces entered the villages, then looted and set fire to
3 houses. And those who survived were captured and taken to the detention
5 Killings took place during this period. The most notorious was
6 that which took place at the end of June outside the medical centre in
7 Kotor Varos. A number of Muslim men had been brought there and were
8 beaten by members of Kotor Varos MUP, also by the Special Police from
9 Banja Luka, and by soldiers. Following those beatings, 12 to 15 men were
10 executed and one of the witnesses to this event was able to identify one
11 of the killers as a member of the MUP who he knew.
12 The detention facilities in Kotor Varos included a primary school
13 in Maslovare, the SJB, Kotor Varos prison, Kotor Varos school, and most
14 notoriously the sawmill, and you saw those photographs. More important
15 members of the community were actually taken to the CSB Banja Luka. In
16 all these facilities, the prisoners were subjected to different kinds of
17 ill-treatment, ranging from humiliation, beatings, torture, and in the
18 sawmill where women were detained, many of them were raped. The guards
19 for these facilities were largely members of the MUP.
20 The Banja Luka Special Police, in particular three of its
21 members, Ljuban Ecim, Slobodan Dubocanin, whose name you saw on one of
22 those Crisis Staff things, and a man called Zdravko Samardzija, were
23 prominent in the crimes that were committed in Kotor Varos. The Crisis
24 Staff was fully aware of what was happening, as indeed was
25 Stojan Zupljanin. And General Talic also knew because he was receiving
1 daily combat reports. The Crisis Staff held virtually daily, if not
2 sometimes twice-daily, meetings in a building which was a matter of yards
3 from the SJB and they could hear the screams of some of the detainees.
4 The minutes of those meetings record their knowledge, again in a somewhat
5 anodyne fashion.
6 If we look at just a few examples, they kept very -- or we
7 managed to recover a large number of minutes from Kotor Varos. On the
8 21st of June you will see that they had a meeting. And Savo, who is
9 Savo Tepic:
10 "Highlighted the problem of a lack of personnel for special
11 training of the police."
12 It was concluded that he should invite Ljuban, that's Ljuban
13 Ecim, or Zdravko, that's Samardzija, to the next Crisis Staff meeting and
14 he was then given the task of briefing Stojan Z, we say Stojan Zupljanin,
15 "on problems we are experiencing and scheduling a meeting, attendance at
16 which should be ensured by the following persons Brdjanin, Peulic, and
17 other competent people."
18 Two days later -- three days later, the 24th of June,
19 Inspector Pejic informed the Crisis Staff about the work of the security
20 service and the results of the questioning of the persons who had been
21 brought in. He suggested that a session of the Crisis Staff be devoted
22 to the problem of detained persons. After a discussion of the work of
23 the security station, it was concluded that the Crisis Staff has no right
24 to interfere in the professional work of the police and army, and that no
25 one wishes or requires it to take upon itself security and the creation
1 of conditions for full security on the territory of Kotor Varos
2 municipality ..."
3 And again, it goes back to what I was saying yesterday, that they
4 accepted that there were the lines of -- the chains of authority within
5 the police and army with which they couldn't interfere, although
6 obviously they were going to make suggestions.
7 Next 26th of June, two days later. There you will see that
8 Lieutenant-Colonel Peulic, the VRS commander, was presenting his report.
9 "Savo Tepic informed the Crisis Staff of recent developments in
10 the public security station, and said it was his impression that many
11 members of the special unit were acting without authorisation ..."
12 That's to put it mildly.
13 "... but no one dared criticise them because of the threats that
14 they make ..."
15 And then:
16 "Dr. Gajanin informed the Crisis Staff of the situation as
17 regards casualties and reported on what had been done on the premises of
18 the health centre by members of the special unit, which he had tried to
19 prevent, but was driven away at gunpoint. Nedjo Djekanovic," that's
20 Andjelko Djekanovic, the Crisis Staff president, "said that last night he
21 had told Dubocanin about everything going on at the health centre and in
22 the town and had been assured by him that it would be prevented."
23 In other words, there was clear knowledge, reporting of the
24 crimes that were taking place.
25 "He also said that all these questions had to be cleared up and
1 information provided on the behaviour of the members of the special unit
2 at the meeting with Stojan Zupljanin, the chief of the CSB, scheduled for
3 tomorrow. Zarko Mikic said that the Crisis Staff had discussed the
4 behaviour of the members of the special unit on several occasions and
5 shown itself unable to influence them and he asked
6 Lieutenant-Colonel Peulic to help solve this problem ..."
7 "At the end of this item, the President said that what had been
8 done yesterday must not happen again and that this kind of behaviour by
9 members of the special unit and individuals on our side must be dealt
10 with and they must be put under control."
11 And I don't actually think we need to -- this was simply an
12 example of the use of language, but I don't think we need to -- given the
13 time. If we move to the next Crisis Staff meeting, 29th of June, item 2:
14 "In the health centre, six people have been recorded as killed
15 and 19 wounded."
16 That was very short of the true figure.
17 "With regard to the activities of the Crisis Staff members, the
18 following conclusions:
19 "All those willing to move out of Kotor Varos are to make a
20 statement at the lower court leaving their immovable property to the
21 social and political community ..."
22 And then going down further:
23 "Detainees are to be held at the warehouse Pilana," which is
25 "And Mr. Gavric is to take part in the Crisis Staff and take
1 responsibility for organising population resettlement."
2 So we've got everything in this one, we've got the killings,
3 moving out, and the detention facilities.
4 Has the next one got up? Yeah.
5 And then on Friday, the 28th of August, and we'll be looking at
6 some slightly different ones later, there is a report from
7 Captain Zupljanin and then in the middle of that paragraph Chief Sepic
8 [sic], it's one line further up. That's it.
9 Chief Tepic reported about visiting the branch and whatever, and
10 insisted that the names of police officers who had been engaged in
11 unauthorised dealings and then:
12 "He informed the War Presidency that on the basis of the
13 instructions of the CSB
14 be released from prison ..."
15 That relates to two matters. First, throughout August, as you
16 will hear during the evidence, the republican-level government was
17 making -- producing reports designed to look at the detention centres in
18 order to deal with the international outcry over these detention centres.
19 And all police authorities were ordered to report on numbers of the
20 prisoners and the like. But the second thing is this, it shows that
21 Stojan Zupljanin, at the CSB
22 prisoners, even in Kotor Varos.
23 Yeah. And then I think finally on this little group, this is a
24 1st Krajina Corps document. They also engaged in regular reporting, and
25 under item 4, "Situation on the ground," it talks about the
1 20th Light Infantry Brigade, which is the one that covered Kotor Varos,
2 is stressing that there is resentment among the population because of the
3 attack on the Muslim village of Koricani.
4 "The same command has detected an Ustasha group consisting of
5 about 30 Ustashas in the Bilice village near Kotor Varos and is
6 undertaking measures to destroy them. The Banja Luka CSB Security
7 Services Centre special detachment located in the Kotor Varos area has
8 still not joined the 22nd Light Brigade and is causing serious problems
9 on the ground."
10 Everybody -- it was a public scandal the behaviour of the special
11 police from Banja Luka.
12 In fact, so notorious had the special police become that
13 Stojan Zupljanin had been requested that they be withdrawn, but in fact,
14 as will be seen, they were still operating at the end of August. It may
15 be that we can skip some of these because it should move backwards.
16 Yes, I think we -- can we put that one, 14th of July? It's going
17 slightly backwards again, but 14th of July, Kotor Varos again, and in
18 item 1, the War Presidency concluded it was not satisfied with the
19 results achieved so far and the current military and security situation.
20 It was further concluded that General Talic and Stojan Zupljanin have to
21 be contacted urgently in order to inform them of our dissatisfaction.
22 Item 2:
23 "Activities relating to moving out the population failed to meet
24 expectations. This task must be dealt with in a much more organised
25 fashion; an agency has to be established to handle these matters."
1 24th of July, still on the subject of what is called
2 re-settlement of population and what we say was in fact the forced
3 expulsion of non-Serbs. Remember we heard Mr. Gavric in one of the other
4 meetings. He was to compile and forward to the Presidency a detailed
5 report on the re-settlement of the population, number of convoys, number
6 of persons, profile of those who moved out, who did the transporting, and
7 so on and so forth.
8 On the 28th of July, again the Crisis Staff was aware that
9 through the report from the chief of the SJB, who was also aware, that:
10 "... confiscating the money of individuals who are moving out, it
11 was established that this was being done without anyone's order, i.e., in
12 an unauthorised manner and this can have a negative effect on the
13 operation and reputation of all of us. It was decided that the money
14 confiscated in this manner will be used to help the families of soldiers
15 killed and other essential costs of the municipality."
16 Some people might have thought that perhaps the money should be
17 returned to those from whom it had been stolen.
18 And then the 28th of July, this is a Krajina report, and it shows
19 the, as it were, the -- the authorities working as of one mind.
20 "In the city of Banja Luka and other large towns there is an
21 increased demand for, and organisation of, the departure of Croatian and
22 Muslim population. We consider that the municipal and regional
23 authorities should work much harder at this."
24 And then on the 21st of August the War Presidency:
25 " ... President Djekanovic pointed out matters and problems to be
1 solved, to the effect that pressure and provocation by certain members of
2 the special forces unit directed against the Muslim and Croat families in
3 order to compel them to leave should be stopped; that the question of
4 what to do with several families from Gornji Cepak who cannot stay here
5 but are still in Cepak should be dealt with and that the killing of the
6 Orsulic couple should be investigated."
7 Now, the special police was supposed to have been withdrawn back
8 in July. They were still operating in August, and then I think that
9 will -- perhaps we can just look at the 19th of August which is attached
10 to the back of 745. And item 2:
11 "Slobodan Zupljanin and Mane Tepic briefed the War Presidency,
12 the situation of the ground military ..."
13 "Zupljanin also informed the Presidency about the results of the
14 meeting with General Talic ... corps commander and what had been agreed
15 with him."
16 So they were getting full reports all the way through.
17 The forced transfer or deportation of the non-Serb population was
18 overseen by the municipal authorities, but they recorded all their
19 actions as being carried out on orders. First of all, can we look at an
20 example of the doc -- sort of document that somebody leaving was supposed
21 to sign. All of that information. And going down to the next two --
22 yes -- no, above that. Yeah.
23 "I hereby declare ... I'm voluntarily leaving Kotor Varos" --
24 "I wish to move away ..." et cetera, et cetera.
25 " ... And I leave behind my land in Kotor and my destroyed
1 house ..."
2 And then he says he will not fight against the ensuance of the
3 Serbian republic.
4 And then can we look at the last paragraph.
5 "This statement is done in three identical copies, one of which
6 will be sent to the Crisis Staff, one to the population re-settlement
7 agency ..."
8 And you will recall that they were saying agency should be set
9 up. One indeed was set up.
10 " ... and one to the Autonomous Region of Krajina."
11 And then finally in October 1992 the War Presidency in
12 Kotor Varos lasted longer than almost anywhere else because the residents
13 of Vecici held out so long. And you will see that he, Nedjeljko
14 Djekanovic, talked about the weapons surrender. This was all to do with
15 Vecici. And then he said:
16 "As for the action of surrendering weapons and movings of people
17 from the territory of Kotor Varos, he pointed out that the drive and all
18 activities had been conducted on the orders of the Government and the
19 Presidency of the Republika Srpska ..."
20 By 1994 when the Banja Luka conducted a survey of the
21 populations, they showed the -- what it was in 1991, the figures which I
22 gave you earlier, and you will see that there'd been an increase in
23 Serbs. Now, these are approximate figures, admittedly, and Muslims had
24 gone from 11.000, just over 11.000, to just under 2. And Croats from
25 10.000 to under a thousand.
1 And as far as the cultural property is concerned, the evidence
2 will show that most, if not all, Roman Catholic churches and mosques in
3 the Kotor Varos municipality were destroyed in 1992.
4 The film that you saw and, as I said, it was the village of
5 Vecici that held out until the end of October. On the 2nd of November,
6 and you heard the commentator talking about the fact they knew that they
7 were surrounded and couldn't escape. On the 2nd of November a group of
8 about 200 men tried to escape while the women and children surrendered.
9 They were ambushed and about 150 were captured. Others were killed there
10 and then, and they were taken to a school in Grabovica together with the
11 women and children who'd surrendered. And the latter, the women and
12 children, were taken away on buses provided by the Crisis Staff. The men
13 were then executed by members of the military. No members of the police,
14 I hasten to add, were involved in that killing. And accordingly, that's
15 why it's not charged in this indictment, but nonetheless, it's part of
16 the general picture of what happened in this municipality. The killings
17 were recorded by the VRS in the -- their daily combat report of the 4th
18 of November, and the Crisis Staff minutes record that Mr. Djekanovic, the
19 president, went to the school on the 5th of November to assist in, as
20 described, cleansing.
21 Can I -- having looked in a little detail now at Kotor Varos, can
22 I then turn to other examples that you're going to hear about in this
23 case of the major killings. In Prijedor the take-over and the subsequent
24 attacks followed much the same pattern as Kotor Varos, they actually
25 happened earlier. The names of the villages have become infamous,
1 Kozarac in particular. Large numbers of civilians were killed during and
2 after the attacks. In 1996 -- thank you -- in 1996 members of the Office
3 of the Prosecutor -- I think it's 1996, is it -- yes -- were allowed in
4 for the first time with cameras. And I'm just going to show you a very
5 brief shot of what Kozarac looked like in 1996. And there's no sound --
6 I'm so sorry. There's no sound to this. It's just some ...
7 [Video-clip played]
8 JUDGE HARHOFF: Who took the footage?
9 MS. KORNER: Investigators from the Office of the Prosecutor.
10 Slow down. Yeah. Any houses remaining standing, we heard from the
11 evidence, were nearly all owned by Serbs. Okay. Speed that up. Kozarac
12 was shelled before the troops went in.
13 Okay. Let's fast-forward to the remains of the mosque.
14 And what you see there is the minaret, I believe. The cultural
15 expert will be better -- and of one of the mosques in Kozarac. There
16 are -- there is film taken by news reporters at the time, but this is
17 perhaps the clearest.
18 The two major killings associated with the municipality was the
19 massacre -- and it was room 3, and I ought to have known that, of
20 Keraterm camp which was a disused ceramics factory on the outskirts of
21 Prijedor. The guards were members of Prijedor SJB. They assisted in or
22 they allowed men who were armed with automatic weapons into the building
23 and, as I said, opened fire on the detainees who came from the Brdo area
24 of Prijedor municipality which had been recently, as it were, cleansed,
25 and more than a hundred people were killed. The bodies have never been
1 recovered. And in August of 1992, trucks and buses which were taking
2 Muslim men, women, and children from the Prijedor area were being
3 escorted by members of the Prijedor police so-called intervention
4 platoon, which was another form of special police. The convoy was
5 stopped. The men were separated by the police. They were driven to a
6 mountainous area in Skender Vakuf called Mount Vlasic, Koricanske
7 Stijene. The other men were taken out to the edge of a cliff and shot.
8 Only 200 -- out of 200 men only a handful survived. It was one of the
9 most notorious events of the whole war and in the end of what I have to
10 say we will look at something that happened.
11 We just thought you might like to have a look at some photographs
12 of what this place looks like, taken very recently, in fact, in June --
13 taken earlier. All right. Taken at some stage. It's just to show you
14 what it looks like. There's the road and it is, you may think, amazing
15 that anybody was able to survive.
16 That's Prijedor.
17 In Kljuc, the attacks on the Muslim villages also resulted in two
18 major killings. On June the 1st Muslim men had been detained in a school
19 in Velagici. It was guarded by Bosnian Serb police and the army.
20 Shortly before midnight the detainees were ordered to line up in front of
21 the school, and two Serb soldiers opened fire killing at least 77. On
22 the 10th of July special police and soldiers rounded up the inhabitants
23 of the Biljani area, and again confined them in a school. The men,
24 between 150 and 200 were killed, some at the school, some in a nearby
25 house, and some -- and others elsewhere.
1 In Bosanski Samac, on the 17th of May, 18 detainees in a
2 warehouse which were guarded by police were killed by members of a
3 paramilitary group. The police ordered the other detainees to load the
4 bodies on to a truck, then took them to an area where the survivors were
5 forced by the police to bury the bodies.
6 In Gacko in August, Bosnian Serb police and soldiers took
7 detainees from the SJB building to a bridge at Kotlina and nine were shot
8 and killed.
9 In Zvornik on about the 30th of May, Muslim detainees from the
10 village of Kostijerevo were being detained in a school building. The men
11 were beaten, tortured, and then executed in groups of ten. 88 men were
13 On the 1st of June, 750 Muslim men were taken to a technical
14 school which was guarded by the police. Men suffocated in a hangar. 160
15 of those who survived were taken out and killed. The remainder were
16 transferred on the 5th of June to a cinema hall, and groups were taken
17 from there to a slaughter-house on three different occasions and killed.
18 In Visegrad, the Lukics, Milan and Sredoje, the trial of who has
19 just finished, were the most active proponents of the cleansing
20 operation. Their group was originally part of the reserve police force.
21 In June Milan Lukic executed five non-Serb men on the banks of the river
22 Drina, and a week later, having confined more than 60 civilians,
23 including women, in a house they doused it with inflammable liquid and
24 setting it on fire, causing the death of most.
25 In Brcko although the killings were not on the sort of massive
1 scale that I've just been describing, they were widespread and extremely
2 scandalous. One of the most notorious killers was a member of the MUP.
3 In fact, he was put in charge of a detention camp there called Goran
4 Jelisic, and the photographs of what he did have become almost as
5 infamous as those way back in the Vietnam war when we show the police
6 captain shooting somebody.
7 What we see here is Jelisic is the man in short sleeves holding
8 the gun, and we see there is another armed man behind him. He fires the
9 gun at the Muslim, and again. And we see the death of the men.
10 Your Honours, it's probably time, I think, for a break. I've --
11 I'm coming on to detention facilities, and I will complete certainly my
12 opening before 6.00.
13 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mrs. Korner, the Chamber discussed yesterday how
14 to organise the hearings in the future. And for the information of both
15 parties and the accused and the Registry and the interpreters, we suggest
16 the following time schedule for the future. We will have three sessions
17 in each hearing. The first is to last 85 minutes. Then we will have a
18 20-minute break. And then another session of 80 minutes only, and then
19 another 20-minutes' break. And then there should remain exactly 80
20 minutes for the last session. So we will divide the sessions so as to
21 have the longest first, which is five minutes longer than the two others,
22 85 minutes, and then 20-minute breaks twice in between. So that's going
23 to be the schedule for the future. Thanks.
24 So we'll meet in 20 minutes from now.
25 --- Recess taken at 3.45 p.m.
1 --- On resuming at 4.10 p.m.
2 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, just before I move on to --
3 JUDGE HALL
4 MS. KORNER: Oh, certainly.
5 JUDGE HALL
6 There is an administrative matter which I would wish to address
7 briefly. We learned just before we came in that, for reasons which are
8 unimportant, the accused were unable to have their snack in the break.
9 So if -- we will resume with Ms. Korner continuing her opening, but if
10 the accused -- if either of the accused have any discomfort as a result
11 of this, I invite them either directly or through their counsel to
12 indicate it to the Chamber and we will make the necessary adjustments if
14 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, may I check with my client?
15 JUDGE HALL
16 MR. ZECEVIC: Just one minute. Thank you very much.
17 [Stanisic Defence counsel and accused confer]
18 MR. ZECEVIC: I was advised that it's okay that we continue.
19 Thank you very much.
20 JUDGE HALL
21 MR. ZECEVIC: My both accused.
22 JUDGE HALL
23 MS. KORNER: Yes, Your Honour. I was about to say during the
24 course of the break, I've been inviting the Defence to obviously correct
25 me if I'm saying anything that's to their certain knowledge not agreed or
1 incorrect. But Mr. Zecevic approached me about the question of
2 Goran Jelisic and his membership of the police. I understand that will
3 be a matter of dispute. I was referred to the Jelisic judgement which we
4 pulled up very quickly and it says he was given police duties. But in
5 any event I wouldn't like Your Honours -- as Judge Harhoff just pointed
6 out, what I say is not evidence, and Your Honours will undoubtedly listen
7 to the evidence, but Mr. Zecevic drew that to my attention.
8 Can I turn, then, to the broad outline of the detention
9 facilities that you will hear about in this case. Again, this is just
10 examples. All of the detention facilities which are charged in this
11 indictment had some kind of police presence there. Some were entirely
12 police detention centres; others, such as Manjaca, was largely the
13 province of the army, the VRS, but contained an element of guards from
14 the MUP. And we have a diagram which we'll quickly show you where the
15 names and where these -- of the detention camps in the municipalities
16 which are going to be dealt with in this indictment.
17 As with the killings, the most notorious detention facilities
18 were those in the Prijedor region, namely Omarska, Keraterm, and
19 Trnopolje. Omarska was established on the 31st of May by the direct
20 order of Simo Drljaca. The commander of Omarska was a man named
21 Zeljko Mejakic, who came from the Omarska sub-police station.
22 If one looks quickly at the documents setting up the camp, dated
23 the 31st of May of 1992:
24 "The industrial compound of the 'Omarska' mine-strip shall serve
25 as a provisional collection centre for persons captured in combat or
1 detained on the grounds of the Security Services' operational
3 That of course gave it a semblance of legitimacy. Could we go
4 over to paragraph 6 on the next page. Okay. Don't worry. We -- through
5 my mistake, we haven't got that in, but I'll just say that the security
6 was to be provided by the Omarska police station. They had to report, as
7 you will hear, every 24 hours or immediately when circumstances allow no
8 delay. The author, Simo Drljaca, prohibited the giving of any
9 information whatsoever concerning the function of this collection centre.
10 All official documents shall be kept at the collection centre and may be
11 taken out or destroyed only with the permission of the chief of the
12 Prijedor Public Security Station. And then the last page -- don't worry,
13 that's my fault. Last page.
14 All right. Rather than -- don't worry. It's signed by
15 Simo Drljaca and copies went to the -- among other people the security
16 services centre in Banja Luka. Ah, there we are.
17 Simo Drljaca, a man of considerable notoriety, in particular
18 because when an attempt was made to arrest him by SFOR way, way back, in
19 1996, he was shot. The camp Omarska held thousands of Muslim and Croat
20 civilians, including women. The prisoners were regularly beaten and
21 tortured, some during interrogations which were carried out by members of
22 the MUP. People died from the beatings carried out not only by guards
23 but by people they allowed to enter the camp. Women were raped. As I've
24 said earlier, the conditions were atrocious, overcrowding, lack of food
25 and water and sanitary facilities, with very limited medical care. The
1 camp was actually visited in July by the Banja Luka authorities which
2 included both Stojan Zupljanin and Radoslav Brdjanin. Radoslav Brdjanin
3 described to a reporter what he found in his visit as an example of a job
4 well done. That was his overall visit to Prijedor.
5 Keraterm, which was actually established a few days earlier,
6 reflected the same types of crimes. Trnopolje was in a slightly
7 different category, in that it contained, apart from people who'd been
8 detained, dispossessed families who'd been sent there or taken there.
9 Eventually when Omarska and Keraterm were closed at the beginning of
10 August, the inmates were transferred to Trnopolje, which remained open
11 until November and the detainees who'd not been killed or transported out
12 of the country were then transported to Batkovic camp in Bijeljina, and
13 that in itself, because they were also transported to that same camp from
14 other camps in other areas of Bosnia, is a demonstration that this was a
15 carefully conceived and worked-out enterprise.
16 However, also in Trnopolje there were beatings which led to death
17 and women were raped.
18 It was these camps, in particular Omarska and Trnopolje, that
19 were visited at the beginning of August by international reporters. And
20 the film that they produced not only led to the closure of these camps,
21 but as I mentioned earlier, provided the outside world with the first
22 real evidence of what was happening in that part of Bosnia. And I think
23 it's worth just playing, although it's been seen over and over again, the
24 particular film. It was filmed by ITN and the reporter was a woman named
25 Penny Marshall.
1 [Video-clip played]
2 "[Voiceover] These are the Muslim prisoners of Omarska. In small
3 groups, under heavy Serbian guard, they are ushered into the canteen for
4 their single meal of the day. Most have been here for two months. They
5 say they don't know why but they were rounded up from their homes. They
6 were too frightened to talk about the way they have been treated and the
7 conditions in which they have been kept. Conditions which have been
8 hidden from the world, as the Serbs have denied access here to the United
9 Nations and to the International Red Cross. Their prison is an old
10 mining complex outside Banja Luka in northern Bosnia. In an office above
11 the canteen, the camp commandant and a spokeswoman for the local" --
12 MS. KORNER: Just to point out that the person you're seeing in
13 the uniform is, in fact, Simo Drljaca
14 [Video-clip played]
15 "[Voiceover] Serbian authorities said they had two and a half
16 thousand of what they called internees who were being interrogated as
17 possible Muslim fighters.
18 "No, this is not a camp. This is a centre, a target centre,
19 Omarska and Trnopolje, both [indiscernible] centres not camps.
20 "The prisoners were being brought to the canteen from a large
21 industrial building in the centre of the mining complex. It too was
22 under heavy guard and we asked to be allowed to look inside. But in
23 spite of promises of openness from the Serb Bosnian leader Dr. Karadzic,
24 we were told we could see no more.
25 "Why are you not fulfilling Dr. Karadzic's promise to us?
1 "He -- he promised us something else and said, You can do this
2 and this and that, and not that.
3 "Our armed escort made it clear. Our visit was over.
4 "We're now being asked to leave this camp having seen nothing
5 more than the canteen. We have been told that Dr. Karadzic's promise,
6 while good to us, does not carry any weight here.
7 "As we were moved on, soldiers told us the army did not control
8 the camp, which they said was run by the local authorities and militia.
9 "We had asked to be taken to a second camp at Trnopolje, in the
10 same area, to which several hundred prisoners from Omarska had that day
11 been transferred and which has also been at the centre of allegations of
12 atrocities. Conditions at this camp were appalling. In 100-degree heat,
13 hundreds of men were forced to eat and sleep outside in the field, behind
14 barbed wire. Their meager rations consist of a small hunk of bread and a
15 bowl of soup every day. Here too they said they had been rounded, whole
16 villages emptied of their men, and they were afraid.
17 "Can you tell me anything about the conditions in which you are
18 being kept here or is it difficult?
19 "I'm not sure that I'm allowed about that. You know, I'm -- can
20 you understand me?
21 "Have people here been beaten?
22 "Here? No. Here, no. Not here.
24 "I rather wouldn't talk about that. I'm sure ...
25 "Can you tell us anything about the conditions that you are being
1 kept in and the treatment of the people you were with?
2 "Well, that was hard time, how can I say but ...
3 "We heard stories of people being beaten and people disappearing.
4 Was that -- did that happen?
5 "Well, I can't say much about that.
6 "We just came here.
7 "From another camp?
8 "From another camp and we didn't know what the condition here.
9 We accept a little bit more -- better.
10 "What were you --
11 "Like a prison.
12 "What was it like before?
13 "It was terrible.
14 "One of the prisoners asked us to check on him in several days'
15 time to see that he hadn't been punished for speaking to us, and away
16 from the camera there were allegations of routine beatings and
17 executions. Several prisoners told us of retaliatory killings. One
18 instance in which they claimed 150 of their fellow prisoners had been
19 killed following the death of ten Serbian soldiers in a Muslim village.
20 We were told people had been beaten to death, and we were asked to
21 smuggle a film out of the camp. The pictures show severe injuries,
22 apparently as a result of beatings.
23 "In the makeshift medical centre there were cases of scabies,
24 malnutrition and diarrhea. Local doctors said they were chronically
25 short of medicine and drugs. Among them was a Muslim doctor. We asked
1 him whether there had been any cases of beatings.
3 "On one side of the camp were refugees who were here simply
4 because they have nowhere else to go, their homes having been destroyed.
5 They have been told they can go as soon as they have a guarantee of a
6 home outside Serb-controlled Bosnia. In Banja Luka prisoners' wives have
7 been queuing for days for news of their men and to register as refugees,
8 because they too have nowhere to go. On the roads to Banja Luka, Muslim
9 villages lie empty and deserted. Homes destroyed.
10 "If there is eventually freedom for the men in the detention
11 centres, it's unlikely to be in Serb-controlled Bosnia.
12 "Ian Williams, ITN
13 "And Ian Williams joins us now live.
14 "Ian, you were clearly supervised as you went" --
15 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated]
16 There is other video evidence as part of the exhibits in this
17 case which shows more pictures of the camps. The evidence shows also
18 that the doctor who you saw there was the person who asked the reporters
19 to smuggle the film out of the beaten boy that you saw.
20 Manjaca camp was just outside Banja Luka. It was, in fact,
21 originally a military training-ground and it operated from May until
22 December. As I said, it was operated largely by the VRS military police
23 under the command of a retired then brought back colonel called Popovic.
24 But members of the MUP secured the camp's perimeter and indeed conducted
25 the interrogations of people who were held there. Again, conditions in
1 that camp were appalling and people died because of the beatings. Most
2 famously a Muslim called Omer Filipovic who came from Kljuc. Many of the
3 people rounded up from Kljuc and Sanski Most in particular ended up in
4 Manjaca, and again, Manjaca camp was actually visited at the time by
5 Lord Ashdown. And indeed, an earlier -- also one of the prisons in
6 Sarajevo Kula.
7 And I'm afraid the quality of the sound in this video is very
8 bad. Again, it's a newsreel. I believe CNN, because I think the
9 reporter is Christiane Amanpour.
10 [Video-clip played]
11 "... has been a prison for the last 20 years and it is not on the
12 list of detention centres that outside observers have requested to see,
13 yet this is where the first international observer has been brought. He
14 is Paddy Ashdown, leader of Britain's Liberal Democrat party. He was
15 invited by the president of Bosnian Serbs, Radovan Karadzic, under great
16 pressure since reports of Serbian concentration camps made world
17 headlines. Karadzic made a great show of standing aside while Ashdown
18 interviewed these prisoners.
19 "There's never been any concern about the way this particular
20 camp is run, but I do want to suspend my judgement until I see some of
21 the other camps.
22 "And Karadzic chose this moment to make his first so-called
23 unilateral gesture of goodwill releasing just ten prisoners, those who
24 are over 60 or in poor health. Smiling he handed out release papers as
25 though he were handing out awards and he brought tears of joy to those
1 who were being freed.
2 "The Serbs say they hold a maximum of 8.250 prisoners, not the
3 58.000 that the opposition claims. They say they would like to get rid
4 of all of them, but, say the Serbs, they have had no reciprocal gestures
5 from the Muslims or the Croats.
6 "We release people who are not likely to be mobilised again. If
7 we release all of those people without exchange they will be mobilised
8 immediately and they will fight against us. It would be unreasonable.
9 "The Serbs say all the people here are fighters. The prisoners
10 say they are not.
11 "I have no weapons. I didn't shoot.
12 "This man is blind in one eye. He says he couldn't fight even if
13 he wanted to. They all say they've been taken as bargain [indiscernible]
14 for prisoners from the other side, and they don't expect to be released
15 any time soon.
16 "Christiane Amanpour at Kula prison, outside Sarajevo.
17 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "The conditions in which --"
18 "[Voiceover]... Paddy Ashdown had broken his holiday and
19 travelled for three days over a thousand miles to get to Manjaca camp.
20 What he saw was a shed which in better days might have housed animals now
21 home to more than 600 men. Here the prisoners live, eat and sleep 24
22 hours a day. Most of these men just arrived three days ago from the camp
23 at Omarska. Their faces still haunted by memories they did not dare
24 relate in the presence of their guard. For five minutes, Paddy Ashdown
25 was allowed to speak privately to the men. However grim their conditions
1 here, they told him, things were much better than the place they'd just
2 come from. The camp commandant had promised Mr. Ashdown total freedom to
3 see anything he wanted. In the event he was told that wasn't possible.
4 "Even during Mr. Ashdown's visit time was limited to a mere
5 half-hour and access was limited to only a few prisoners.
6 "As he left he said however bleak things seem to be, this camp
7 did appear to be properly run.
8 "Clearly I have had access to those prisoners without the guards
9 present. I [indiscernible] them, and I find them deeply moving. They
10 have had an appalling time in Omarska where they've come from. I think
11 it's a tremendous improvement on the part of the press that have exposed
12 that, and they've probably just saved very many prisoners' lives. But
13 every prisoner I've spoke to here without the guards present have told me
14 conditions are not what you'd want them to be but they're a hell of a lot
15 better than they had been before.
16 "With the visiting politician gone, what these men have suffered
17 in the past remains largely unspoken.
18 "Caroline [indiscernible], Manjaca prison camp in Bosnia.
19 "[Indiscernible] -- camp in Serbian-held northern Bosnia.
20 Authorities say they hold 3500 prisoners here, including about a thousand
21 from the --"
22 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated]
23 Thanks. I think we're just repeating the same clip,
24 Your Honours. Your Honours will hear from people in one form or another,
25 whether in writing or whatever, from those incarcerated in Manjaca and
1 contrary to what Lord Ashdown, as he later became, thought conditions
2 were considerably worse than it would appear.
3 Some of the prisoners who were transported to Manjaca from the
4 other detention facilities, including Betonirka in Sanski Most and
5 Omarska, died during the transport through the conditions of that
6 transport. In fact, that prompted a remarkably honest report from one of
7 the VR officers -- VRS officers who were stationed in Manjaca. And if
8 you look now at that report dated the 7th of August. Prisoners of war,
9 military secret, strictly classified, and it's addressed to the
10 1st Krajina Corps command, the security and intelligence department. If
11 you go to the second paragraph:
12 "We received the prisoners of war from 'Omarska' camp. The
13 reception has been organised but not followed since no paperwork. A
14 total of eight prisoners died during the transport from Omarska to
15 Manjaca, three of which have most probably been killed because they had
16 visible traces of violence. We did not receive prisoners and we insisted
17 that they are driven back to Omarska for proper burial there. However,
18 it is very probable that the dead have been loaded off and thrown
19 somewhere in the forest on the Manjaca-Banja Luka strip.
20 "The behaviour of people who participated in securing the
21 transportation of the prisoners is very incorrect, inhuman, and bullying.
22 So when the security organ warned them not to kill a half-dead prisoner
23 they told him, 'Should you act like that, you'll get what he got.'
24 "Indeed it is obvious that the world public is not complaining
25 without arguments, because it is us who provide those arguments. I am
1 requesting the organs of the 1st Krajina Corps command to take care on
2 their own level and in their sphere of competence for similar scenes
3 never to happen again.
4 "Manjaca camp is now full and has no room for a single prisoner.
5 We are reminding that the investigating inspector's explanation was that
6 all prisoners who have been brought from 'Omarska' are 'serious
7 extremists,' and that he didn't provide a single fact in explanation of
8 that fact. During the reception, we have found people who weren't even
9 fit to hold a rifle in their hands, nonetheless to run or to shoot. We
10 also found minors, born in 1977, who didn't even have a weapon or
11 participated in the combat, not even being water carriers to the enemy.
12 All of this is indicative of thoughtless conduct of the organ in Prijedor
13 and the superficial work of the organs of the police and the SUP. This
14 is the reason why we are requesting you urgently give us the official
15 records of the interviews with the prisoners."
16 And last paragraph:
17 "Considering that there are minors, individuals older than 60,
18 and sick individuals among the newly arrived prisoners (from Omarska),
19 there is a need to make lists and ... after we process them to suggest
20 they're released with the mediation of the Red Cross."
21 We suggest that that corroborates what the evidence shows that
22 there was just whole-scale round-up of people who were not Serb going on
23 and had nothing whatsoever to do with combat activities.
24 As a result of the international furore which attended the
25 revelation of these detention facilities, Karadzic issued an order about
1 the treatment of prisoners and this prompted Stojan Zupljanin to send an
2 order to SJB chiefs. And you see that on the -- well, first of all, it's
3 Karadzic's order, first of all, that's coming up on the screen. We'll
4 just go to the next page. Signed Karadzic. And then same -- same day,
5 Stojan Zupljanin to the chiefs. Necessary for all public security
6 stations transporting prisoners of war to Manjaca to start assembling
7 personal files for each prisoner of war individually. Again, in
8 parenthesis, one might have thought that someone might have done that
10 "To ensure expeditious execution of this task, on the
11 20th of August, operatives should be sent to Manjaca with the documents
12 collected so far ... number -- in consideration of the numbers of
13 prisoners, Sanski Most, Prijedor, Kljuc ... should each send a team of
14 operatives ..." and they must report.
15 In Vlasenica, turning to a different area, the most notorious
16 camp was Susica under the command of Dragan Nikolic, a member of the
17 special police. Detainees were beaten, robbed, tortured, and killed.
18 Female detainees were raped. Again, some prisoners were transferred to
19 Batkovic. On the 30th of September, Karadzic made a speech at a funeral
20 of some VRS people being killed, and it seems to be particularly
21 inflammatory, and that night members of the MUP at the Susica camp
22 executed the detainees that remained. Again, that is not part of the
23 indictment, but it is part of the general picture of what happened in
25 Every single municipality had its share of detention facilities,
1 and in each the pattern of beatings, killings, and inhuman conditions
2 were repeated. In Pale where the Bosnian Serbs had an overwhelming
3 majority and was indeed the seat of the Republika Srpska government and
4 for a period the MUP was based there, indeed so Mico Stanisic was there,
5 detained -- the MUP detained and beat non-Serbs from the SJB -- in the
6 SJB building and a gym in the old cultural centre.
7 So that's a brief survey of the detention facilities that figure
8 in this case. A word about paramilitaries and the RS MUP.
9 The relationship between the RS MUP and the paramilitary
10 formations which operated during this period could really be described as
11 love/hate, the same between the VRS and the paramilitary formations.
12 There was cooperation between these paramilitaries and the authorities
13 when it was useful to them. But once they wanted to establish law and
14 order in the territories that they were -- had brought under Bosnian Serb
15 control, then these paramilitaries became a nuisance or a lot worse, and
16 particularly when they started to attack property and persons of Bosnian
17 Serbs. In the original seizures of power, paramilitary formations worked
18 side by side with the RS MUP and the VRS. And this was particularly
19 marked in Sanski Most, in Bosanski Samac, in Visegrad, Donji Vakuf, and
20 in Zvornik. Arkan's men figured particularly in Zvornik.
21 However, quite often thereafter the paramilitaries remained in
22 the area even after they'd -- the areas had come under Serb -- Bosnian
23 and Serb control, and they committed crimes and therefore became an
24 embarrassment to the authorities. In Zvornik, a group calling themselves
25 the Yellow Wasps were heavily engaged in the torture and death of inmates
1 in detention facilities. They were allowed in by members of the MUP
2 who'd been guarding those facilities. No action, however, was taken
3 against them until they started to cause problems to the SJB in Zvornik.
4 And in -- there is a report, a very, very lengthy report put in by the
5 chief on the activities of the Zvornik public security station over the
6 three months July to September 1992. Paragraph 2:
7 " ... the station opposite -- until July 30th this year," that's
8 when action was taken against the Yellow Wasps, "this station operated in
9 very difficult circumstances and was unable to operate ... because of
10 large and small paramilitary groups which operated on the territory of
11 the Serbian municipality of Zvornik, rendering the activities of the
12 station, as well as other state organs impossible ...
13 "They created a psychosis of fear," et cetera, "and uncertainty
14 among the citizens in the city, which made it possible for goods of
15 various quantities and value to be taken out of the municipality," and
16 there's a list of those goods.
17 "Because of all this, in order to improve the overall security
18 situation and find a role and a place for the station in accordance with
19 the law, a special MUP unit," that was special police "was engaged, which
20 at the end of July dispersed the paramilitary groups and enabled the
21 station to assume its role as defined by the law."
22 And incidentally while we're on that going a bit further down,
23 although it's not on the same topic:
24 "A string of measures and activities were undertaken in order to
25 resolve -- solve the issue of collection centres of which there are
1 two ... about 180 people in them. The municipal organs, military organs,
3 but it still remains unresolved ..."
4 And I think that's all we need. As I say, it's a very lengthy
6 Once again -- in Teslic, and again, I'm just giving a couple of
7 examples really, a group called the Mice went into the area in June 1992.
8 They actually were carrying identification -- identity cards from both
9 the military and the police. One of the leaders of this group
10 Milan Savic was a high-ranking officer in the CSB Doboj. They appear to
11 have been sent there to encourage the Teslic authorities to speed up the
12 process, and they took it upon themselves to arrest and detain and then
13 beat up and finally kill non-Serbs. This they were allowed to do without
14 any hindrance from the authorities in Teslic or without the Teslic
15 authorities seeking any help until the Serb population began to complain.
16 As a result, the Teslic authorities went to Banja Luka and they applied
17 to Stojan Zupljanin for assistance in getting rid of the group.
18 Stojan Zupljanin sent a member of the SNB in Banja Luka, a man called
19 Predrag Radulovic. He took a force of men with him and arrested members
20 of the group. They were originally detained in Banja Luka prison, but
21 they were then ordered to be transferred to Doboj prison where they were
22 promptly released. And one of the matters I'll deal with in a moment or
23 two is the failure to really deal properly with anybody that was
25 And the events in Teslic were really rather pithily summed up by
1 the Prosecutor from Teslic in his report to the Municipal Assembly in
2 September of 1992. If we come down to the second section manifest forms
3 of crime the part that begins:
4 "The public Prosecutor's office received crime reports against
5 112 persons during the report period. All crime reports were dealt with
6 in a timely fashion. Investigations were requested against 81
7 persons ..."
8 And so on and so forth. Again, this is an issue I'll return to,
9 but there's no doubt at all that the criminal justice system can't have
10 been working perfectly through this period but it was certainly working.
11 If we go over the page, you'll see the numbers at the top and then of the
12 paragraph just below the chart:
13 "Of the persons reported, 85 were Muslims, 27 were Serbs, and no
14 crime reports against Croats. The Muslims were reported for armed
15 rebellion and the illegal possession of weapons or explosives, while the
16 Serbs were reported for all other criminal acts."
17 And we can see what they were, aggravated larceny, five for
18 murder, and then illegal deprivation of freedom.
19 "All the Serbs reported were members of the Serbian army
20 formation or reserve policemen."
21 Actual crime situation.
22 "Recorded crime is a fraction ... most criminal acts remain
23 undiscovered, and many crimes are tolerated by the authorities for
24 various reasons. The Prosecutor's office has knowledge of the day-to-day
25 looting of property, houses, business premises being set on fire and
1 destroyed, armed robbery and murder being committed for base motives,
2 socially owned flats and private houses being occupied unlawfully,
3 stealing of forest timber, and other forms of wilful act. There is no
4 criminal prosecution for most of these acts.
5 In ten days alone there were three murders for base motives and
6 several cases of arson and armed robbery. In only one case were the
7 perpetrators arrested and criminal proceedings initiated against them.
8 The perpetrators of the other two murders have not been arrested to the
9 present day. The public Prosecutor, president of the court personally
10 demanded the command of the Teslic Serbian brigade arrest one accomplice
11 on suspicion of murder. It is inexplicable why these people have not
12 been arrested."
13 Go over the page, top paragraph.
14 "The destruction of religious buildings is a war crime against
15 civilians because of the way and circumstances in which it was
16 perpetrated. The Serbian people will carry a heavy burden of historical
17 responsibility until the perpetrators of these and similar criminal acts
18 are brought to justice."
19 And the job of whom was it to bring these people to justice? The
21 Over the course of the last session -- a day and a bit or
22 whatever one calls it, I've dealt with a quite a number of parts of the
23 evidence and documents that we say shows evidence of the participation in
24 the joint criminal enterprise by both accused. Both Mico Stanisic and
25 Stojan Zupljanin were men of great authority, not only by virtue of the
1 positions which they held but also through the nature of their
2 personalities. The RS MUP, like the VRS, was a strongly hierarchical
3 organisation. We've already seen that Stojan Zupljanin was writing that
4 his word was law. And Mico Stanisic made his position no less clear in
5 an interview that he gave to Javnost on the 30th of October of 1992. You
6 see the date at the top, and then: "Rule of law established."
7 And then we have the reporter asking him -- pointing -- asking
8 him about the appointment to these -- to the position. And in the answer
9 about halfway down through the answer -- sorry, I should have said the
10 question is:
11 "Bearing in mind specific wartime circumstances to what extent
12 are you satisfied with the activities of the organs of the internal
13 affairs of the Republika Srpska?"
14 And he says:
15 "We are among the first organs which were set up in quite an
16 organised manner as part of the executive power in the territory of our
17 state. Notwithstanding all organisational difficulties, I want to point
18 out that I am really satisfied with the way the interior ministry is
19 functioning and that I am satisfied with the level of our organisation,
20 especially with the dedication and determination of all the members of
21 our service to make their utmost contribution to the cause which the ...
22 Serbian people are fighting for."
23 He was asked about the tactical equipment. And on the next
24 page -- yes. He was asked:
25 "Are there any problems of coordination between the organs of the
1 Ministry of the Interior in different areas ... namely, is the
2 functioning of the service in these war times utterly centralised?
3 "Fortunately," replied Mr. Stanisic, "the Ministry of the
4 Interior indeed functions as a centralised organ and we do not sense any
5 autonomous or secessionist tendencies amongst the members or our
6 service." That must be it. "Every briefing that I hold is attended by
7 my assistants, assistant secretaries, chiefs of security services centres
8 from all the areas. It has not happened yet that we had a briefing which
9 was not attended by all the staff members regardless of the location
10 where the briefing took place. "Also," this is the part that we wish to
11 stress, "it has not happened yet that anyone in the whole territory of
12 Republika Srpska ever refused to carry out any of my orders issued, of
13 course, in accordance with the law."
14 I would like to -- I think the next bit -- if we go down the page
15 a bit.
16 "I think that nowadays we are the only ministry some members of
17 which have been expelled from our ranks - not because they did anything
18 against the Serbian interest but because they committed individual acts
19 succumbing to base instincts which really does not befit a member of our
21 "How many such cases are there?
22 "Such cases are rare, but significant /sic/ for us. We want a
23 ministry without a single member who would disregard the legal norms of
24 Republika Srpska." We say that was deliberate disinformation being given
25 to the people.
1 Have you got the next page?
2 We just -- there's one part of the next page perhaps we might
3 look at. Page 3, sorry, that's it.
4 At the bottom the question was: "Some are inclined to accuse the
5 special units of the Ministry of the Interior of abuse of power when
6 performing their duties in Bijeljina."
7 Then there is a bit about:
8 "We are determined to protect our constitutional order ..." et
10 "Anyone who decides to disturb the above-mentioned has to be
11 aware that we are categorically going to use all available legal measures
12 to prevent and defeat such attempts. It is not true that the special
13 unit abused power in Bijeljina."
14 Again, the evidence will show that that also was not true.
15 Both of the accused were what is generally known as hands-on
16 leaders. We've already seen footage of Stojan Zupljanin in the field at
17 Kotor Varos, footage of Mico Stanisic with his men, Special Police, on
18 their training exercises. There are other film clips of Stanisic,
19 particularly one in October 1992, where he's interviewed clearly, as it
20 were, on the field of battle.
21 Mico Stanisic attended sessions of the government in which policy
22 was discussed and he himself participated in the discussions. And if we
23 just look at one example. These are the minutes of the 41st Session held
24 on the 22nd of July. We see there attending Mico Stanisic. The agenda
25 begins there. We see over the page everything. And then in particular,
1 can I draw Your Honours' attention to 7 and 8:
2 "Proposal for appointing a president to the Central Commission
3 for the Exchange of War Prisoners.
4 "Agreement on the conditions and way of exchanging war
6 As you will hear during the evidence that central commission was
7 another device for expelling the non-Serbs.
8 If we go down further on, on the same page, Mico Stanisic is
9 raising a question on why the minister of foreign affairs, Mr. Buha,
10 isn't present. Over the page, Momcilo Mandic was also there and he's
11 proposing that that Mico Stanisic be appointed a member of the
12 commission. And then Mico Stanisic speaks again further down the page,
13 all to do with the -- this commission. And I don't think that -- as I
14 say, the full document, you -- it's matters of policy outside the strict
15 area of the Ministry of the Interior.
16 It also appeared to other members of the government that
17 Mico Stanisic had a particularly close relationship with Radovan Karadzic
18 and also Momcilo Krajisnik, and he therefore bypassed the normal chain of
19 command in the government in that Mico Stanisic should have gone to the
20 prime minister of the government. And there -- that impression may have
21 been gained by people around them. He was also filmed going to places
22 with them. In fact, Branko Djeric, the prime minister, publicly
23 complained about Mico Stanisic's avoidance of the normal chain of command
24 in the Bosnian Serb Assembly on the 23rd of November. And if we go to
25 page 17, this is a long speech by Mr. Djeric. It began two pages
1 earlier. And he says -- no, we go to the next -- yeah.
2 "For example, when it comes to the justice system, when it comes
3 to the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Internal Affairs" -- the
4 minister of justice was Mandic, "they are not even in the government.
5 They never come to the government sessions, only to the president of the
6 republic or the president of the Assembly. Neither of them has ever
7 stood up in front of the people or on television and said: 'We are
8 responsible for their work,' which would release the prime minister from
9 the responsibility."
10 I think this was -- taken as a whole it was a complaint that he
11 getting blamed for things that he really ought not to have got blamed
12 for. And Stanisic responded, starting at page 19, long speech again, and
13 then on the last part he said in the paragraph, page 21, yes. I can let
14 you know, that's the one.
15 "I can let you know about our financial affairs," blah, blah,
16 blah, "you know, "he said, "that the police have built this country from
17 the beginning, along with the people, defending them and providing space
18 for the government to make law regulations and to turn this country into
19 a legal state. I am always ready to present to you all that we have done
20 during the period. There were no regulations ..."
21 Well, that certainly wasn't true. We have already seen that
22 there was regulation after regulation and order being issued.
23 "... the intentions were good, but if there were any mistakes we
24 are ready to discuss them and to answer for them. Therefore, I do not
25 agree that anyone can say, call someone to be Radovan's man, and based on
1 that to claim he is no good." And this was a remarkable admission.
2 "We had to also take criminals and crooks, because you know that
3 no intellectual took the rifle in his hand and went to fight for his
4 country. We had good intentions. If I was wrong, I accept this ..."
5 That of course is part of the case for the Prosecution, that
6 knowingly and deliberately that the police used, took into their ranks,
7 people who they knew were criminals and were likely to commit criminal
8 offences and did nothing about it.
9 Mico Stanisic, as we've seen already, issued orders to the CSB
10 chiefs he appointed and to the RS MUP generally. As we've already seen,
11 he required prompt action and reporting thereof. We've looked at some
12 examples, but another example of a major order was the one issued on the
13 27th of July, which included the disbandment of the CSB Special Units and
14 the creation of one single Special Police unit. This was issued on the
15 27th of July, and item number 4:
16 "All Special Units formed during the war period on the
17 territories of the Security Services Centres are to be immediately
18 disassembled and put at the disposal of the army of the Serbian
19 Republic ..."
20 So they're not to be arrested, they're not to be prosecuted,
21 they're to be put at the disposal of the army of the Serbian Republic.
22 And that was echoed in a later order that we'll see in a moment.
23 Apart from issuing written orders, Mico Stanisic held regular
24 meetings, as he himself said, with his CSB chiefs and other high-ranking
25 members of the RS MUP. On July the 11th in, in fact, Belgrade, although
1 it says -- the brief analysis is headed Sarajevo, the meeting took place
2 in Belgrade. And if we just look at the first page and you'll see it
3 says at the top this was a meeting held in Belgrade. And if we look at
4 the people who were there, it's virtually the same that we saw in the
5 11th of February meeting, as I say, all of who by this stage got high
6 positions and with others. But we see Stanisic, Kljajic, and we see what
7 positions they received there. Slobodan Skipina, Under-Secretary of
8 State Security Service. Assistant ministers Vlasko Kusmuk, Planojevic,
9 Njegus -- go down a bit further -- see some of the names. If we go down
10 to the middle we see Stojan Zupljanin. You see there Goran -- yeah, from
11 here. A bit further up.
12 Jusurovic [sic], Goran Radovic, Stojan Zupljanin, Nedeljko Kesic,
13 and so on and so forth. It's a very long document and we'll look at it
14 when we reach that evidence. In fact, he also sent a report of that
15 meeting, this is just to show the communication and cooperation between
16 the -- him and other people involved in this enterprise. He sent a
17 report on the 17th of July to Radovan Karadzic. You'll see -- no, can we
18 just go -- sorry, I just want to go to the front page. Can we move a
19 bit -- yeah.
20 President of the -- to the president of the Presidency, who was
21 Radovan Karadzic, and the prime minister. Report on some aspects of the
22 work done to date and the tasks ahead. It was in fact a report of July
23 and [indiscernible] so it's a long report.
24 He also sent out, even during the course of the conflict,
25 inspectors to the various CSBs and SJBs. In June he received a report on
1 Brcko, Zvornik, and Bijeljina. And in August he was sent a full report
2 on the activities of the Yellow Wasps in Zvornik. And if we look, first
3 of all, at April -- there's an earlier one. It's not working at the
4 moment. 17th of June, that's an earlier one -- although -- sorry, can we
5 just go back to that for the moment. I beg your pardon. This is an
6 earlier one. But it's actually quite interesting because it's
7 21st of April, so -- but it says under Zvornik -- Zvornik really was one
8 of the worst municipalities for violence and the like.
9 "... the town is under Serbian militia reserve and the -- and
10 reserve TO. The town is being cleaned ..."
11 This is 21st of April. And the 17th of June -- yeah. This is
12 the -- a report on the inspection, what was found at Brcko, Zvornik, and
13 partially at Bijeljina. Now, if we go to the second page, this is purely
14 on the basis of his knowledge:
15 "Considering that a large number of crimes were also committed by
16 members of the Brcko Public Security Station, it was agreed that they
17 should continue gathering intelligence and other information ..."
18 Next page, middle paragraph, a lot of information about
19 Captain Dragan and Goran Jelisic and if we get to the bottom, certain
20 Goran Jelisic -- why are we suddenly going to blue?
21 "Goran Jelisic had committed crimes of rape and murder of
22 innocent Muslims. The same as bragging around Brcko and Bijeljina about
23 his evil doings. The police employees in direct contact with him are in
24 fear of him pulling a weapon at them because he is, as they say,
25 unpredictable, and it is enough for a policeman to look at him the wrong
1 way for a conflict to break out."
2 MR. ZECEVIC: Sorry. I just have one intervention in the
3 transcript. It's page 60, line 15, I believe the document says and my
4 colleague says "certain Goran Jelisic committed rape and murder
5 of innocent Muslims." Thank you very much.
6 MS. KORNER: Yes, I said "certain."
7 If one looks a bit more on this report -- all right, let's not
8 bother. We'll deal with this report when we come to the evidence.
9 Just -- it's that document.
10 This is the 4th of August, 1992.
11 "We are hereby submitting as an attachment a report on the
12 activities of the MUP to detect the criminal activities of the Yellow
13 Wasps ..."
14 And then the next document is the actual report. As I say, it
15 was only at the end of July and effectively it was because the
16 Yellow Wasps had attacked a car. It's not altogether at the moment clear
17 from the evidence whether it was a car that Stanisic himself was in or
18 Velibor Ostojic and that then brought the wrath of the authorities down
19 on this particular group. So that is a, as it were, a quick look at
20 the -- some of the -- I mean only some of the evidence that shows
21 Mico Stanisic's knowledge and involvement.
22 As far as Stojan Zupljanin is concerned, we've already seen that
23 he complied with the orders given to him by Mico Stanisic, but he was
24 also ideologically committed to the goals of the Bosnian Serb SDS
25 leadership from the early days. If you recall, yesterday we looked at
1 the letter he wrote to Mrs. Plavsic complaining about the paper being
2 changed to green.
3 As we said, Banja Luka was Serb controlled, strategically
4 important, and contained the headquarters of one of the biggest corps in
5 the VRS. That enabled Stojan Zupljanin to liaise directly with
6 General Talic in respect of joint operations. Moreover, he also had
7 direct contact with Radovan Karadzic from 1991. That cannot be said of
8 many of the chiefs of the CSBs. If we look at the screen this was
9 7th of August, 1991. Again, it's an intercept of a conversation between
10 Karadzic and Zupljanin and in -- Karadzic says he -- when he comes in and
11 he says Zupljanin here. He doesn't have to say, By the way, I'm
12 Stojan Zupljanin, and I'm chief of the CSB, or whatever. It's straight
13 Zupljanin here. Most of the conversation seems to concern some
14 businessmen from Zagreb and some shady dealings, but at page 3:
15 "I'm sending you my regards from Banja Luka," he says.
16 "Keep on fighting and following your course."
17 And Karadzic says: "Thank you very much.
18 "So that you know in that these last moves and the tactics that
19 you've been developing, I think they're extremely good and just keep on
21 And then Karadzic says: "I hope the people will realise what's
22 better for them so they can see for themselves."
23 And then there's conversation about Alija Izetbegovic. And then
24 over the page, Zupljanin, in the middle page, says:
25 "What good that would do us, no way. Here, I've been listening
1 to the news tonight, and Alija's trying some things but our guess is
2 that, in a way, this is the beginning of his end."
3 Karadzic said:
4 "Yes, I believe he'll lose a lot among his people, and that
5 hawk's nest of his.
7 "He wants to isolate himself," says Karadzic. At 10 per cent of
8 Serbs holding entire Croatia by the throat over there, what could
9 35 per cent do here? Yes, absolutely, and fight along a peaceful course,
10 for we really have no interest in that.
11 In May, and I think we have looked at that, he gave instructions,
12 we looked at some documents to the SJBs about the disarmament policy,
13 there may be one more, dated the 14th of May, to the chiefs of all public
14 security stations, et cetera, et cetera.
15 "In keeping with the ... autonomous region of Bosnian Krajina
16 regarding the surrender of illegally owned weapons ... public security
17 stations must undertake the following ..."
18 And he sets out what they have to do. And on the last part --
19 no, sorry -- "Measures."
20 "Measures activities in the event of possible resistance
21 particularly of the people against whom the planned activities are being
23 And then 6 and 7:
24 "Plans for the seizure of illegally owned weapons, ammunition,
25 and explosive devices must immediately be sent to the Banja Luka Security
1 Services Centre for verification.
2 "Reports on the results of the planned activities must be sent to
3 the Banja Luka Security Services Centre ..."
4 I think that this demonstrates yet again the -- as I say, the
5 rigidly hierarchical and controlled nature of this particular force.
6 In fact, the VRS were rather worried about what they -- the CSBs
7 and SJBs intended to do. If you just look at a report for -- virtually I
8 think it's the same -- the day after. We look at situation on the
9 ground, the last few lines, "since," "since the dead-line ..." Yeah, in
10 that paragraph. Thanks.
11 "Since the dead-line for handing over illegally owned weapons has
12 expired and the Banja Luka MUP organs are making appropriate preparations
13 to take away the weapons, people fear possible interethnic conflicts."
14 He forwarded orders he received from Mico Stanisic to the SJBs,
15 and there's quite an interesting one here. Again, 15th of May, sent from
16 the Banja Luka services centre to all SJBs, to the chief, and it says:
17 "We received the communication ... from the Serbian Republic of
18 the BH MUP ..." and this is to do with individual cases and people
19 committing crimes. Last paragraph:
20 "Employees who do not fulfill the conditions prescribed for
21 police reserves are to return their equipment to the police stations and
22 to be placed at the disposal of the Serbian Territorial Defence."
23 As far as the Special Police are concerned, their behaviour, it's
24 quite clear from the evidence we've looked at, particularly in
25 Kotor Varos, that Stojan Zupljanin knew what they were doing. But on the
1 13th of June, even Prijedor police station, even Simo Drljaca was
2 prompted to send a report to the chief of the security services about the
3 special unit. With respect to the deployment of Banja Luka Security
4 Services Special Unit, the following can be stated, and then there is a
5 long paragraph about everything that they had done, arbitrarily
6 arresting, interrogating, abusing the prisoners, stealing the jewellery,
7 scandalised the police officers there, and so on and so forth. And then
8 it says:
9 "The help that we received from the Special Unit of the
10 Banja Luka Security Services during the attack on Prijedor was valuable
11 but after the joint action of the army, the Special Unit and our police,
12 I received many complaints about the conduct of the Special Unit and
13 their looting during mopping-up operations."
14 [Trial Chamber confers]
15 MS. KORNER: I'm sorry, I didn't realise that 85 minutes had
16 passed, Your Honour.
17 Can I say, I'm very nearly concluded, Your Honours. I don't know
18 whether that helps.
19 JUDGE HALL
20 about to wrap up, having regard to what you had indicated earlier about
21 being ready to begin your response to the questions posed by the Chamber
22 to you yesterday when we resume at 6.00.
23 MS. KORNER: Yes.
24 JUDGE HALL
25 MS. KORNER: Oh, yes, I will certainly finish. I was going to
1 say I can finish in the next ten minutes if that's suitable to
2 Your Honours and the interpreters.
3 JUDGE HALL
4 MS. KORNER: Thank you.
5 JUDGE HALL
6 MS. KORNER: Finally on the -- this aspect of what
7 Stojan Zupljanin was aware of, on the 20th of July he sent a report to
8 the minister. And if one looks at the second paragraph, he deals with
9 the army and police arresting a great number of citizens of Muslim and
10 Croat nationality who were, depending on the number of and circumstances
11 on the field sent to various buildings.
12 "According to our information, this situation involves several
13 thousands of mostly military-aged men. They were subject to operational
14 procedures by military services, service for national and public
15 security, which then carried out a selection ... three categories ...
16 first and second ... security interest ... third category made up of
17 adult men on which, so far, the security service doesn't have any
18 information of security interest for us, so they can be treated as
20 Finally, as far as the expulsion -- finally on this topic. As
21 far as expulsion of non-Serbs were concerned, the evidence will show that
22 the RS MUP was instrumental in the providing of buses to transport the
23 non-Serbs guarding the buses and committing crimes and sometimes murder.
24 I want to deal briefly with the failure to investigate or punish.
25 As I've already really referred to throughout this opening, the evidence
1 shows that neither Mico Stanisic nor Stojan Zupljanin did anything less
2 really than pervert the function of a police force to protect lives and
3 property of all persons who came within their jurisdiction. If they
4 can't do that, the object of a police force is to investigate and punish
5 the perpetrators of crimes, particularly those who commit the most
6 serious crimes of murder, serious assaults, and unlawful detention. The
7 Law on Internal Affair, Articles 12 and 15 made it quite clear that that
8 was what they were supposed to be doing, as did the criminal procedure
9 code. As we've seen, the criminal justice system continued to function
10 during this period and the books that are part of this case from the
11 Prosecutor's offices showed that arrests were being carried out and
12 persons were being prosecuted.
13 Paramilitary formations such as the Yellow Wasps who were
14 committing these offences were actually being assisted by police. I'm
15 not going to put the document up, but there is a document dated the
16 11th of July, which is up actually, which shows that they handed over
17 weapons to Vojo Vuckovic, who was a member of the Yellow Wasps.
18 And when orders were given for investigations of war crimes, this
19 was always in respect of war crimes committed against Serbs.
20 Very occasionally, when crimes against non-Serbs were so
21 notorious that an investigation had to be launched, for some reason these
22 investigations were unsuccessful, or if the persons were arrested, the
23 judicial process was so stalled that no one was ever convicted. The
24 Mount Vlasic killings that I've referred to were actually featured on an
25 ABC Nightline programme, and Stojan Zupljanin was interviewed. And I
1 think it might be worth just dealing with that.
2 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mrs. Korner, one last question. The law that you
3 referred to, the Law on Internal Affairs --
4 MS. KORNER: Yes.
5 JUDGE HARHOFF: -- was that an RS law or an old Yugoslav law or
6 where -- who passed it?
7 MS. KORNER: I think I mentioned that yesterday, but they adopted
8 a Law on Internal Affairs in March of 1992, but it was actually virtually
9 wholly the same as the old law that had existed since 1990. What they
10 didn't seem to manage to get to put together was a rule book so they used
11 the old rule book, but the criminal procedure code applied throughout.
12 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thanks.
13 MS. KORNER: This is a very short piece of film so we can just
14 look at that with the earphones.
15 [Video-clip played]
16 "[Voiceover] I saw them dropping hand-grenades and shooting down
17 the hill at the dead bodies. Then I looked up and I saw the people from
18 the bus looking --
19 "Camps in Bosnia. Sites of atrocities. Now the survivors are
21 "[Voiceover]... that the world has to be aware of everything that
22 happened --
23 "The hidden horrors.
24 "[Voiceover] This is ABC News Nightline, reporting from
25 Washington, Ted Koppel.
1 "Perhaps no generation of humans since the beginning of time has
2 had a greater exposure of violence than this generation" --
3 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated]
4 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
5 MS. KORNER: Every now and again -- I'll let Mr. Smith see if he
6 can find the -- the bit.
7 But they were both -- if we can't, we'll play it at a later
8 stage. Both Zupljanin and General Talic were interviewed about the
9 killings at Mount Vlasic. That's it. We found it. Thank you. Can we
10 just go back for a minute.
11 [Video-clip played]
12 "Captured and questioned by investigators from a Bosnian Serbian
13 army. Regional commander General Momir Talic:
14 "[Voiceover] Our investigation showed that no soldiers
16 "Having cleared themselves, General Talic's men turned over both
17 survivors to the police in Banja Luka. But police chief Stojan Zupljanin
18 told me:
19 "[Voiceover] We have no living witnesses who can confirm or deny
20 the incident.
21 "At least Zupljanin admits the incident occurred. He says it's
22 under investigation and he shows us files of evidence. He even let us
23 watch his ballistics expert examine bullets that were found at the scene.
24 He promises:
25 "[Voiceover] The Serbian people will see to it that all the
1 guilty parties are tried in a court of law.
2 "Small consolation for the relatives of the victims. Ms. Veta's
3 husband was last" --
4 MS. KORNER: Pause it there.
5 That investigation, we would submit, was nothing more than show
6 for the foreign press and the internationals. It may not come as a
7 surprise to hear that the evidence will show nobody until this Tribunal
8 some years ago put an indictment out against one of the members of the
9 Special Intervention Platoon Mrdja was any prosecution ever launched in
10 respect the massacre. And very recently, as you no doubt you have seen,
11 there have been trials carrying on at the state court.
12 So what one can say in brief conclusion, Your Honours, what was
13 the end result of these crimes that were committed in 1992 in the
14 municipalities which are reflected in this indictment? Exhumed bodies in
15 these municipalities overall come to some 3.449. Of that, the scheduled
16 incidents amount to 2.825. Some bodies, of course, have never been
17 recovered. Missing overall in these municipalities 4.411 people.
18 Displaced persons from these municipalities run into the hundreds of
20 And so we end where effectively we began yesterday. We suggest
21 that what happened, the pattern of events, can only have come about as a
22 result of a preconceived plan, a joint enterprise, devised and put into
23 execution by those at all levels of the Bosnian Serb leadership. And we
24 are confident that when you've heard all the evidence in this case you
25 will be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the two accused
1 knowingly and fully participated in the criminal enterprise which we
3 JUDGE HALL
4 We would now take the break and you would be prepared to -- do
5 you need to be reminded of the two questions that the Chamber put to you
6 yesterday, Ms. Korner?
7 MS. KORNER: No. I understand -- my understanding is that you
8 would wish me to explain the relevance of what has been described as the
9 Siege of Sarajevo report by Dr. Donia and why we should be allowed to put
10 in exhibits which were not on our original 65 ter list. Have I got that
12 JUDGE HARHOFF: Roughly so. One question also was how the
13 attached or the following 28 documents relate to the Sarajevo report.
14 MS. KORNER: Yes.
15 --- Recess taken at 5.32 p.m.
16 --- On resuming at 5.56 p.m.
17 JUDGE HARHOFF: Yes, Mrs. Korner.
18 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, may I --
19 JUDGE HARHOFF: We were discussing yesterday the issue that had
20 become clear to us just recently, namely, about the relevance of the
21 report prepared -- the late -- the supplemental report prepared by
22 Dr. Donia on the Siege of Sarajevo. And so we wanted you to point out to
23 us which parts exactly of that report are of any relevance to this case
24 and which of the documents that were coming in the wake of this document
25 were actually linked to the document itself. So let's begin by those two
2 MS. KORNER: Yes. Can I start, first of all, Your Honours, with
3 the relevance. It is perhaps a slightly misleading title in the sense
4 that it says, The Bosnian Serb leadership and the Siege of Sarajevo, and
5 it's different from the report that I know Your Honour, Judge Harhoff, is
6 familiar with through having sat on the trial of Dragomir Milosevic.
7 There are three Sarajevo municipalities in this indictment, that
8 is to say Pale, Ilijas, and Vogosca. The report deals with the
9 take-overs in all three, and I'll come to the various parts of the report
10 in a moment, but can I just generally summarise why we say this is
11 important and relevant.
12 This report is a microcosm of the background to the take-overs in
13 these municipalities. It will have the effect, if Your Honours allow it
14 to go in, of stream-lining matters down the road and the effect of
15 dealing with one of the aspects which I know is of concern to Your
16 Honours, namely, that the trial should not last any longer than it must
17 have to. If we do not have this report admitted and the various
18 documents, it will require us to lead further evidence about the
19 take-overs in this municipality to show the pattern of events which I've
20 been referring to throughout my opening.
21 The second matter is this: This report was only completed in --
22 well, end of May/June this year, which is why it was disclosed at a later
23 stage. It was actually disclosed in June to the Defence and given to
24 Your Honours in August. Therefore, Dr. Donia had the opportunity to look
25 at material which wasn't available to him when he did his earlier reports
1 for Krajisnik, for the Brdjanin case, for the Dragomir Milosevic,
2 including a great deal of intercept evidence which only came to light
3 shortly before he did this report. And he is, therefore, able to deal
4 with that.
5 In addition to that, he has referred to a great deal of
6 open-source material such as books and newspaper articles which would not
7 otherwise be before this Court. So having said all that, can I take Your
8 Honours through the report and show you why we say it is relevant.
9 Leaving aside the introduction which merely sets out his
10 methodology, he then deals with Sarajevo and the multi-party elections of
11 1990. Your Honour asked me yesterday about where these municipalities
12 were and the like, and he deals with exactly all of that in that
13 particular paragraph -- chapter, which is chapter 2. He explains
14 particularly the multicultural, multinational make-up of Sarajevo which
15 is important because we say it's one of the reasons why you couldn't say
16 this is going to be Serb territory.
17 He then deals in chapter 3 with regionalisation in general. He's
18 already dealt with that in some other reports and Variant A & B. So to
19 that extent, I agree. That was just probably a repetition of his earlier
20 reports. I don't believe there's anything except that he talks about the
21 SAO Romanija Birac at page 16. Perhaps you might look at that if Your
22 Honours be kind enough. From its inception, the SAO Romanija Birac was
23 to be the Bosnian Serb counterpart to the city government of Sarajevo.
24 So he explains that.
25 Then he deals with Variant A & B. And then can I come -- this is
1 the meat, I suppose. Chapter 4, the SDS political take-over of
2 Sarajevo's suburbs and the three municipalities we're dealing with, I
3 suppose, would count for Sarajevo's suburbs. He talks about Jovan Tintor
4 at page 23, who figures in this case that you're going to hear, and then
5 at page 24 we get directly to one of the municipalities that we're
6 actually dealing with in this case, Pale. And you will see in that
7 paragraph, page 24, SDS
8 or with Malko Koroman, who you've heard about in the opening, who's going
9 to again figure largely. And he has dealt with an article, which
10 otherwise -- if I have -- if we have to try and get this all in and
11 you've already told us some months ago, I think it was, that the report
12 would go in as a document with the -- that we didn't have to separately
13 list all the footnotes on our 65 ter list.
14 And here he's quoting Malko Koroman from an interview in
15 something -- in a magazine called Policajac and deals with what happened.
16 And if we go through, there's a lot about Koroman, and it's all about
17 Pale until page 27, where we deal with Ilijas, also one of our
18 municipalities. And again, because he's got the opportunity and because
19 he's a professional historian, he has looked at sources and material, all
20 of which he's listed which otherwise to get in before you as evidence
21 would require us to double virtually the number of exhibits.
22 He goes on to deal with other municipalities just to give the
23 general picture. And may I say, we will be concentrating on the ones
24 that are particularly relevant to our case or mention the MUP. This is
25 what the case is about.
1 If you go to page 38, "Other Municipalities," second paragraph,
2 under that head, he talks about Vogosca, which is the third of the three
3 Sarajevo municipalities that this case is concerned with.
4 JUDGE HARHOFF: Hold on a minute. In my page 38 I -- in the
5 second paragraph under "Other Municipalities," --
6 MS. KORNER: SDS
7 JUDGE HARHOFF: -- is just mentioned --
8 MS. KORNER: Yeah.
9 JUDGE HARHOFF: -- as it is in the next paragraph -- the last
10 paragraph --
11 MS. KORNER: Yeah, but it's not dealt with as a completely
12 separate head as Pale and Ilijas are, but it's dealt with in this, as it
13 were, collection of "Other Municipalities."
14 Your Honours, we propose, as we said all along and indeed we may
15 have done already, but I'm not sure, to highlight what we say will be the
16 relevant parts. It's not that we're asking you to read through every
17 page of every report, but it is important that we're able to deal with
19 Your Honours, chapter 5 deals with the military preparations, but
20 in general, not specifically, in Sarajevo. It's how the formation of the
21 VRS and the like came about. And again, we accept that it's referred to
22 in the other report that we've put in. But again, he's had access to new
23 documents that were not available to him when he prepared his reports for
24 the Brdjanin case way back, I believe, in 2001 and the -- the Krajisnik
25 case, again which was prepared much earlier. So there are documents in
2 Then chapter 5, "the road to war" --
3 JUDGE HARHOFF: I guess that should be chapter 6 because --
4 MS. KORNER: Should it?
5 JUDGE HARHOFF: -- the previous one was also chapter 5, or is it
6 a separate part of chapter 5?
7 MS. KORNER: Yes, it must be chapter -- no, Your Honour is quite
8 right, it's a separate chapter, so it should 6. I don't think he spotted
9 that when he was doing that. That again sets out the background. Again,
10 some of it is dealt with in his earlier reports. Some he's able to
11 produce new -- a new light from new documents.
12 If you go to page 50, the second paragraph deals with the
13 barricades incident, which I've already talked about in opening, which is
14 clearly part of our case because of the involvement of so many of the RS
15 MUP in it. And he, for example, he deals with -- at 162, footnote 162,
16 Jovan Trifkovic, an SDS
17 that he had manned the barricades of the Vrbanje bridge and for that he's
18 referred to Oslobodjenje -- gee, I must have been told how to say this a
19 hundred times. Anyway, it's the publication Oslobodjenje. Tintor, again
20 someone who we'll hear about because he was the president of the Serb
21 municipality of Vogosca, so he's an important player in this case. This
22 was an interview that he gave, an intercept which does not appear in any
23 other form.
24 Along about the barricades. The top of -- the bottom of page 51,
25 Kukanjac urgently convened another meeting that led to a second agreement
1 to deploy joint patrols of the JNA and local police. And this is an
2 interview with the BBC
3 the 31st in Ilijas, MUP officers of Serb nationality dressed in blue
4 uniforms surrounded the police station and so on. And then we get the
5 attack on the Vrace academy.
6 Chapter 6 but what should be chapter 7, Serb visions of Sarajevo.
7 Again, this is part of the general picture. We say that what happened in
8 Sarajevo with the take-overs, leaving entire -- entirely the Siege of
9 Sarajevo, which we're not concerned in this case -- all of this relates
10 to the take-overs and why they were being done and how the Serbs
11 perceived Sarajevo to fit into their state, Bosnian Serbs, and all of
12 this we say is relevant.
13 Chapter 8, establishing the siege. Now, on the face of it that's
14 where it would stop, but in fact, there is a representative -- sorry,
15 there is a reference at page 63, second paragraph under "contours of the
16 siege," to Trifko Radic, representative of the western Sarajevo
17 municipality of Ilijas where the government -- Bosnian government forces
18 had failed to break through in April could now claim that he and his
19 colleagues had sealed the city.
20 And after that, from the -- really effectively starting on April
21 the 6th, we accept entirely, it's not relevant, and that's where it
22 stops. But all the passages that we've taken Your Honours to now we hope
23 you would see were relevant, and that is why we wish to lead evidence
24 about it. The other municipalities have been litigated very, very, very
25 often, but there are very few adjudicated facts in relation to these --
1 and therefore, we have to cover it in a little more detail than we would
2 other have to, and Dr. Donia's report on this provides the background,
3 refers to the documents that we think will assist this Trial Chamber in
4 understanding what happened, but we do say it's relevant.
5 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thanks.
6 We realise that the evidence included or the -- not the evidence,
7 the information included in his last report is information that is not
8 contained in any of his previous reports. In that sense, it is new
9 material from Donia. But what we're not sure of is whether this
10 information is amply given by other witnesses already or otherwise
11 included in the other documentation that you have included in your 65 ter
13 MS. KORNER: It's not, Your Honour. And I -- the reason is, it's
14 not on our 65 ter list because you said that the reports went in as a
15 whole and we weren't obliged to put it on our 65 ter list. And as I
16 said, we really have to include -- because if you will recall at the
17 meeting that we had, I asked this specific question because we were
18 concerned about that aspect, whether we would have to put these documents
19 that were in the footnotes on our 65 ter and we were told no, we didn't
20 have to. So that's the reason it's not on. As I said already, all these
21 matters he refers to, a lot is what I call open-source material, books,
22 and things which, you know, we don't actually have particularly in-house
23 but he's looked at elsewhere.
24 But, Your Honour, the answer to your question is: No, you won't
25 get this evidence from anything on our 65 ter list -- well, not anything.
1 You will get some of it but not a lot.
2 JUDGE HARHOFF: Right. So the next issue was which of the 28
3 documents actually relate to this report; can you tell us?
4 MS. KORNER: To this report?
5 JUDGE HARHOFF: Yes.
6 MS. KORNER: Not to the earlier reports?
7 JUDGE HARHOFF: No, no, to this one.
8 MS. KORNER: Right. Can I just tell Your Honours this: Of the
9 29 documents, 15 in fact were disclosed prior to July the 31st. I think
10 I need to give you those figures first and then I'll go into this. Three
11 of them are open source. One of them is a different version of a
12 transcript of minutes because minutes quite often come in from different
13 sources of Assembly minutes and been ERN'd under a different number and
14 that's what happened. So, in fact, there are only ten documents out of
15 these which have not been disclosed before -- obviously open source, but
16 there are actually ten actual substantial documents. We went back and
17 did a thorough check when this issue arose.
18 JUDGE HARHOFF: And can you tell us which they are and how they
19 relate to the report?
20 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, I can -- I can tell you which documents
21 that we wish to use with Dr. Donia relate.
22 JUDGE HARHOFF: Let me just see if I can find your -- yes, I have
23 the list.
24 [Prosecution counsel confer]
25 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, document 3394, which is a Glas
1 article --
2 JUDGE HARHOFF: Now, let's be clear. Is that document included
3 in your list of documents which you wish to -- I have 3392, 3393, and
4 3395. So 3394 seems to be missing from this list at least.
5 MS. KORNER: Yes, it does. You're absolutely right, but I think
6 it may be a ...
7 [Trial Chamber and Legal Officer confer]
8 JUDGE HARHOFF: Yes, please go on.
9 MS. KORNER: Can I -- I'll come back to that. 3398, which is
10 over the top of the other side of the document.
11 JUDGE HARHOFF: I have that.
12 MS. KORNER: Which is the party council meeting. 3403, which
13 is -- that's -- it's an article.
14 JUDGE HARHOFF: I have that as well.
15 MS. KORNER: And 4 --
16 JUDGE HARHOFF: Okay.
17 MS. KORNER: -- and 5.
18 JUDGE HARHOFF: Okay.
19 MS. KORNER: -- and 7.
20 JUDGE HARHOFF: Okay.
21 MS. KORNER: I think we see -- and 9, 10, and 11.
22 JUDGE HARHOFF: So we have taken notice of the fact that you have
23 announced that you will use nine documents; is that so, from this list?
24 MS. KORNER: You asked -- you asked -- this is the list that
25 we -- this is the list that we applied to add to the 65 ter list. Of
1 those, nine refer to this new report.
2 JUDGE HARHOFF: Very well. Thank you very much. I have
3 understood now.
4 MS. KORNER: Possibly -- but there seems to be -- may I say that
5 there's a slight -- there seems -- the one I mentioned is on our list of
6 the ones we're going to use but doesn't appear to be here, and that's
7 3394. But if we can't use that, we can't use that. See what I mean?
8 And there's one other.
9 Yeah, and it may be -- I'll tell you what it is. We asked
10 Dr. Donia to reduce the number of documents he thought were relevant
11 because of the time constraints, and it may be that ones that are on his
12 original list he then took out. So it is nine documents. We hope.
13 JUDGE HARHOFF: Very well. Thank you.
14 MS. KORNER: Is there any other matter I can assist with?
15 JUDGE HARHOFF: Not relating to the supplemental motion. I think
16 that is -- sorry, not relating to the Sarajevo report. I think that's
17 clear by now.
18 MS. KORNER: Thank you.
19 JUDGE HARHOFF: But let me turn to the supplemental motion,
20 because this is the motion in which you ask for introduction or admission
21 into evidence of the 29 documents --
22 MS. KORNER: Yes.
23 JUDGE HARHOFF: -- that relate to --
24 MS. KORNER: Dr. Donia generally.
25 JUDGE HARHOFF: -- to Dr. Donia's report.
1 MS. KORNER: Do you want --
2 JUDGE HARHOFF: And as far as I can see, you only applied, was
3 it, a couple of days ago - yesterday in fact - to have these admitted
4 into your 65 ter list.
5 MS. KORNER: Yes, because they were footnotes to his reports. I
6 can give you -- if Your Honour wants them, I can go through every single
7 one of the documents and show you the footnote, and tell you which
8 footnote they refer to. And I refer again to Your Honours' ruling that
9 we didn't have to put them in. But we felt if Dr. Donia was going to
10 refer to them in the limited period that he had to give evidence, to
11 testify, to draw Your Honours' attention to various documents, then
12 properly we ought to apply to add them to the 65 ter.
13 JUDGE HARHOFF: Let me just be clear about the ruling that I gave
14 at the 65 ter meetings. I'm -- I don't have the transcripts here with
15 me, but I'm almost certain that what we said was that you don't have to
16 put all the documents that are mentioned in footnotes in the expert
17 reports onto your 65 ter list unless you intended to have them admitted
18 into evidence, because in that case the Defence needs to be put on
20 MS. KORNER: I agree.
21 JUDGE HARHOFF: So if we can agree that this was what the Chamber
22 ruled at the pre-trial stage.
23 MS. KORNER: Can I put it this way: I don't believe there is a
24 transcript of this meeting because it was a fairly quick meeting which
25 was held with, I believe, Mr. Zecevic and counsel then for Mr. Zupljanin,
1 Mr. Visnjic, by telephone and we discussed the matter then. And I'm not
2 sure - I would have to go back again and check - that it was repeated
3 again. I accept entirely that that was -- if that was what said, that
4 that was the gravamen of Your Honours' ruling.
5 JUDGE HARHOFF: Yes, and I hope the Defence is on that same line
6 because it wouldn't make sense otherwise.
7 MS. KORNER: Yes, quite.
8 MR. ZECEVIC: That is correct. I can concur with Your Honour and
9 Ms. Korner that it was actually at that -- on that particular meeting
10 that we discussed this matter.
11 MS. KORNER: And Your Honours, a Senior Legal Officer was present
12 as well and I believe a transcript has been asked for but we haven't had
13 one yet.
14 JUDGE HARHOFF: Let's not waste any more time on this issue. The
15 heart of the matter is that the Chamber is disturbed by the fact that you
16 only come here only a couple of days before Donia actually appears and
17 asks to have these 29 documents admitted into evidence, because we think
18 that you should actually have known and seen and determined a long time
19 ago that you would wish to use these 29 documents during the
20 examination-in-chief of Dr. Donia. So why on earth are you coming with
21 it in the last minute? It puts the Chamber into difficulty and it
22 certainly puts the Defence into difficulty.
23 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, one of the problems we've had is that
24 until we appeared here -- whenever the Pre-Trial Conference was, we
25 didn't know what sort of time we were being given to call evidence. You
1 may recall that we filed a motion applying that under the ruling made by
2 Lord Bonomy, I believe it was, the experts were not under 94 but would
3 come under a form of 92 bis or whatever. And I think at the Pre-Trial
4 Conference, I think, Your Honour ruled that you just wanted them under
5 Rule 94. And I see there's some nodding going on.
6 Until that stage we didn't know and that's why we didn't produce
7 the list, we didn't know how long we were going to get for Dr. Donia, how
8 his evidence was going in. Now, I absolutely appreciate that we've had a
9 week, more than a week, I'm not sure, as I say, I can't remember when the
10 Pre-Trial Conference was, and that we should have done it than we did it,
11 yes, but we simply got buried in motions and that's, I'm afraid, the only
12 explanation. And all I can say is I'm sorry, but as Your Honours have
13 ruled in any event that cross-examination on the Sarajevo report will not
14 have to take place until later, the other documents are all ones which I
15 have no doubt at all both my learned friends are familiar with.
16 JUDGE HARHOFF: We would see things slightly differently, because
17 if I recall your indications of the time that you would need to examine
18 Dr. Donia, at no point did you indicate that you wanted to have more than
19 three hours. Maybe there was one very early submission from your side
20 where he was on for perhaps four hours, but I'm not sure of this. But it
21 was either three or four hours, and so I think you could have and should
22 have indeed made up your mind much earlier about the documents that you
23 really wished to confront Mr. Donia with when he appears. And you could
24 have done so knowing yourself that you wouldn't spend more than three or
25 maybe four hours with him in your examination-in-chief.
1 MS. KORNER: Your Honours --
2 JUDGE HARHOFF: So that would have been put you easily in a
3 position where you could have made up your mind as to which documents
4 would you wish to use, and so as to notify the Defence and ultimately the
5 Chamber about this.
6 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, I accept the criticism. There's
7 nothing else I can say but that we've selected these documents because we
8 hoped that they would assist the Trial Chamber. The fact that for
9 whatever reasons - and Your Honours say that's -- my explanation is not
10 sufficient - and so I accept the criticism. All I can say is that we
11 would like -- we've been warned by Your Honours about what will happen if
12 we are late. I would like to say it will never happen again, but we will
13 make -- that would possibly be too optimistic, but we will make every
14 effort we can to make sure it doesn't happen again.
15 JUDGE HARHOFF: What we will do now is that we will adjourn for
16 10 or maybe 15 minutes and deliberate on the matter, and we'll be back
17 here in court at quarter to 7.00 and hand down our ruling on these two
19 --- Recess taken at 6.29 p.m.
20 --- On resuming at 6.57 p.m.
21 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you. We have only three and a half minutes
22 left and I don't want to pull the same stunt as we did yesterday, so I'll
23 try to offload the decisions that we have reached in the break. Thank
24 you for waiting.
25 Mrs. Korner, we are of the opinion that only parts of the Donia
1 report are of relevance to this case, and we will therefore identify
2 chapters 4, 5, and what should have been 6 as the parts of the report
3 which we will admit. This means that for your examination-in-chief in
4 relation to this report you will limit yourselves to questions relating
5 to chapter 4, 5, and what should have been 6. And to be clear, I better
6 line out the page numbers. It's from page 23 to and including page 54.
7 So 30 pages out of the report we will allow, and the rest is out.
8 In relation to the documents, the 29 documents, included in your
9 motion of I think it was 14th of August, it follows from the first
10 decision that out of those 29 documents which you have moved to have
11 included, we will allow you to admit those documents that are mentioned
12 in the footnotes of those three chapters. I can't on top of my head tell
13 you which one it is.
14 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated]
15 JUDGE HARHOFF: But I suppose that a small number of the
16 29 documents are mentioned in the footnotes of those three chapters, and
17 those we will allow you to include in your 65 ter list. The remaining
18 documents in that group of 29 cannot be introduced into your witness --
19 into your exhibit list, 65 ter list, at least not through this witness.
20 And finally, I think I have one minute more, regarding the time
21 for Donia tomorrow. It turns out - and we have received this information
22 from the Registry - that Popovic is actually cancelled for tomorrow. So
23 we could begin earlier on in order to make sure that there is enough time
24 for you to complete your examination-in-chief minus the three chapters
25 and for the Defence teams to conclude their cross-examination on the
1 Donia reports except the three chapters.
2 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, just one difficulty with that.
3 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
4 JUDGE HARHOFF: Sorry. No, no. Let me just -- what we propose,
5 and we have 45 seconds left, is that if you wish to begin at 12.15, the
6 Chamber and the Defence team hopefully will remain available to you;
7 otherwise, we begin at 2.15, as scheduled. But if by the end of your
8 proofing with Dr. Donia tomorrow and if you're nervous about the time,
9 then you can pick up the phone and let us know if you wish to begin at
10 12.15 because that will add another 90 minutes to the time that you have
12 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, I'm very grateful. Can I very
13 quickly -- we'll certainly do that. The only difficulty we foresee is
14 that we've got to work out and extract the documents. And the other
15 matter in the ten seconds left, do Your Honours -- would Your Honours
16 like hard copy binders of the documents that he's going to refer to?
17 JUDGE HARHOFF: Not me.
18 [Trial Chamber and Legal Officer confer]
19 JUDGE HARHOFF: I don't know about my colleagues. I don't --
20 MS. KORNER: No.
21 JUDGE HARHOFF: -- I take it from the internet or the e-court
22 system. But my colleagues, would you like to have hard copies provided
23 by the Prosecution?
24 JUDGE HALL
25 time being.
1 JUDGE HARHOFF: Very well.
2 Could you let us know which of the 29 documents appear in those
3 three -- in the footnotes of those three chapters sometime tomorrow
4 before Dr. Donia comes.
5 MS. KORNER: Yes, we can. We will e-mail all parties so that
6 everybody knows.
7 Sorry, one last -- please, one last thing. Would Your Honours
8 make an order formally, which I understand you have to, that the court
9 will sit on Thursday morning rather than Thursday afternoon. We're still
10 appearing on the court list as Thursday afternoon.
11 JUDGE HARHOFF: That order is hereby made.
12 MS. KORNER: Thank you.
13 JUDGE HARHOFF: And one final question. When should -- perhaps
14 we can discuss it tomorrow, but I would like to ask the Defence then to
15 consider how long time do they need to prepare for the cross-examination
16 of the three chapters? You don't have to answer now, but by tomorrow
17 because otherwise we'll spend more time. But please have an answer ready
18 for us by tomorrow.
19 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you. We will, Your Honour.
20 JUDGE HARHOFF: This meeting is adjourned. See you tomorrow.
21 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.03 p.m.,
22 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 16th day of
23 September, 2009, at 2.15 p.m.