1 Monday, 16 November 2009
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.06 a.m.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is case number
6 IT-08-91-T, the Prosecutor versus Mico Stanisic and Stojan Zupljanin.
7 JUDGE HALL: Good morning. May I begin in the usual manner, by
8 calling for the appearances, please.
9 MR. DI FAZIO: Good morning, Your Honours. My name is Di Fazio,
10 I appear for the Prosecution this morning, together with my colleague and
11 case manager in this case, Mr. Crispian Smith.
12 JUDGE HALL: Thank you.
13 MR. ZECEVIC: Good morning, Your Honours. Slobodan Zecevic,
14 Eugene O'Sullivan, and Slobodan Cvijetic appearing for Stanisic Defence.
15 Thank you.
16 MR. PANTELIC: Good morning, Your Honours. For Zupljanin
17 Defence, Igor Pantelic, Dragan Krgovic, Eric Tully, and
18 Ms. Katarina Danicic, case manager.
19 JUDGE HALL: Thank you.
20 Yes, may we have the witness returned to the stand, please.
21 MR. DI FAZIO: As the witness comes in, perhaps I can let the
22 usher -- court staff know that I'll be using 65 ter 78 to start with.
23 [The witness takes the stand]
24 JUDGE HALL: Good morning to you, sir. I would remind you that
25 you're still on your oath.
1 Yes, Mr. Di Fazio.
2 MR. DI FAZIO: Thank you, Your Honours.
3 Can the witness be shown 65 ter 78, please.
4 WITNESS: DRAGAN MAJKIC [Resumed]
5 [Witness answered through interpreter]
6 Examination by Mr. Di Fazio: [Continued]
7 Q. Mr. Majkic, on Friday we were discussing -- I was asking you
8 about the events in April of 1992 concerning the division -- or rather,
9 the creation of Serb police stations, and this document touches upon that
10 issue. As you can see, it's dated 10th of April, 1992, and it goes to
11 the chief of the CSB department and all chiefs. And attention to various
12 chiefs of a number of municipalities. Sanski Most is not mentioned
13 there, but it is later. And if you look at --
14 MR. DI FAZIO: And Your Honours, please, this is the first
15 paragraph on the 2nd page, and it appears on the second page of the
16 document, the words beginning "tim povodom" Could you just have a look at
17 that paragraph, please.
18 Q. Now, that document describes a meeting of the SR BH collegium.
19 And it talks about an enlarged CSB advisory counsel being held in Banja
20 Luka CSB on the 7th of April where the security situation was analysed.
21 And then in the next paragraph it goes on to say that in addition to
22 members of the CSB collegium, the chiefs of various municipalities,
23 Banja Luka, Bosanska Gradiska, and so on, including Sanski Most attended
24 this meeting. Did you attend any meeting on the 7th of April, that is
25 the meeting that this document refers to?
1 A. I remember quite clearly a meeting held on the 6th of April, but
2 I can't believe that was even on the 7th in Banja Luka, I just can't
3 believe that, as it says here. I really don't remember bing there on the
5 Q. Very well. The document then goes on to state that a number of
6 conclusions had been adopted unanimously. And that various public
7 security stations are to come under the auspices, under the control,
8 under CSB Banja Luka. And number 11 --
9 MR. DI FAZIO: Which, if Your Honours please, is on the third
10 page of the document. And in the B/C/S it's on the third page in.
11 Q. You can see the Serb municipality of Sanski Most is to become
12 part of that --
13 MR. PANTELIC: Excuse me, Mr. Di Fazio, could you take a look on
14 the page second, line 18 and 19. There is no answer here so maybe you
15 can clarify that. Because maybe there was some problem with the
16 transcript. Your question started with "could you just have a look ..."
17 and then there is no answer. He answers something, and then there is
18 another question of yours. It's line 18 and 19.
19 MR. DI FAZIO: There's some problem with the transcript, but it's
20 been rectified, I believe, I'm told by the recorder. Yes. I'll just
21 continue. I think if there is any problem, we can return to it.
22 Does Your Honour -- my question I think was did you attend that
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said that I was there on the 6th
25 of April, and I'm almost certain that I wasn't there on the 7th. I know
1 that I was there for one day only, and I'm sure I wasn't on the 7th
2 there. I would have remembered something if I were there.
3 MR. DI FAZIO:
4 Q. Very well. I understand your position. Is there -- I hope that
5 suits Mr. Pantelic's concerns, takes care of Mr. Pantelic's concerns.
6 Yes. Anyway, the document then goes on to say that the
7 Banja Luka services centre is going to be organised in various ways, and
8 it's going to be joined by various public security stations. And number
9 11 on the list is Serbian municipality of Sanski Most. Do you have any
10 knowledge of that procedure being made known to you, that being known to
11 you sometime in early April of 1992?
12 A. Well, in the Municipal Assembly of Sanski Most there was an
13 extensive debate about attaching Sanski Most to the Autonomous Region of
14 Krajina, but I know that it was never adopted by the Assembly. So it
15 seems to me that this is impossible. As far as I remember, until 10th of
16 April the Serbian municipality of Sanski Most hadn't been declared or
17 proclaimed. Therefore, I don't know who did this. It didn't happen
18 either in this joint parliament, or that any number of the Serbian
19 deputies got together and adopted such a decision. I really don't
20 remember any such thing taking place.
21 Q. Thank you. The Paragraph 3 of the English which is contained on
22 page 3 and which appears at -- also page 3 of the B/C/S says that
23 employees have to sign the solemn declaration - that's the interpretation
24 I have - the solemn declaration identical to the solemn declaration from
25 the previous law. And there's a dead-line of 15th of April, 1992. Was
1 that dead-line -- any such dead-line, any such dead-line, made known to
2 you by Mr. Zupljanin at any time or by any document?
3 A. Last Friday on several occasions I answered this question
4 pursuant to Mr. Zupljanin's order not to take anything in Sanski Most, so
5 it was not up to me to do anything. But rather, this gentleman was
6 afraid that someone else might try to do something and he wanted me to
7 know that this shouldn't happen. That is why he told me about Kljuc,
8 Bosanski Novi, and Prijedor, that we should stay together even for a year
9 if necessary without doing anything, regardless of what was going on in
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Therefore, there was no need for me to abide by what
11 is written here.
12 Q. Thank you. And can you look now at paragraph 17.
13 MR. DI FAZIO: If Your Honours please, that's the page 5 of the
14 English, paragraph 17, and it appears on the very last page of the B/C/S
15 version of the document.
16 Q. Paragraph 17 says that all authorised employees who don't sign
17 the solemn declaration and aren't going to return to the service have to
18 hand in their weapons. Were you tasked with any such -- did you receive
19 any such instruction?
20 A. I couldn't have received any such instruction. On the 6th of
21 April meeting when Mr. Zupljanin distributed these berets and these
22 copies of solemn declaration, he said something to the effect that these
23 solemn declarations, wherever that was to be put into practice -- but he
24 didn't think that should have been done the police, it was up to
25 Municipal Assemblies to declare themselves a Serbian municipality. And
1 then within that context, as we went along the police should get in line
2 with this kind of commitment of a municipality. So he -- something about
3 these solemn declaration for the employees who wished to remain, they
4 should sign them. I don't remember his saying that anyone who refuses to
5 sign should be laid off.
6 Q. All right. Thank you for that. But my question is more
7 confined. My question is simply this: Paragraph 17 says that authorised
8 employees - that's police - who don't sign the solemn declaration have to
9 hand in their weapons. Now, did you receive any instruction that
10 policemen who didn't sign the solemn declaration had to hand in their
11 weapons at Sanski Most police station?
12 A. I personally didn't receive any instruction. On this 6th of
13 April joint meeting, I heard that and everybody else who was present.
14 But Mr. Zupljanin said that you in Sanski Most should refrain from that
15 because it doesn't apply to you. Therefore, I had no obligation in that
17 It is true that I took these berets and solemn declaration, put them into
18 the boot of my car and locked it there, and that's how it happened.
19 Q. Fine. We've heard that evidence and no problem in understanding
20 that. That's okay. It's just, what I'm asking about is the handing in
21 of weapons by those police officers who don't sign the solemn
22 declaration. That's all. It's very focused. Not berets, not oaths, but
23 the handing in of weapons. Now, did you receive any instruction that
24 those who did not sign -- those policemen who didn't sign had to hand in
25 their guns and weapons?
1 A. I don't remember receiving that, and I never did that. When we
2 split up, all the Muslims and Croats left the station with all their
3 small weapons and rifles. Nobody asked them to do anything of the sort.
4 So the very act of separation on the 17th of April ...
5 Q. And you would agree, wouldn't you, that the effect of that, if it
6 were -- if it existed and if it were to be carried out would be to disarm
7 Muslim and Croat police?
8 MR. PANTELIC: Objection, leading question.
9 MR. DI FAZIO: Well, I'll withdraw it.
10 If Your Honours please, I seek to tender the document into
11 evidence. And without going into the arguments that we've spoken about
12 in recent days, if you're not with me, then I would ask at least that it
13 be marked for identification, but my primary application is to put it
14 into evidence as a full exhibit.
15 JUDGE HALL: Well, as I appreciate the witness's answers, it
16 seems to me that it should be marked for identification because he's
17 distanced himself from the contents of this document in large part.
18 MR. DI FAZIO: Yes, yes, of course. It does of course contain
19 considerably relevant material, and it's signed -- or not physically,
20 doesn't have a handwritten signature, but it is a document authored on
21 the face of it by one of the accused, Mr. Zupljanin. And it deals with
22 all of the arrangements that were leading up to the division of the
23 police and the creation of the Serb police in mid-April, at least, in
24 Sanski Most. And the witness has spoken about all of those matters
25 including instructions and -- that he received from Mr. Zupljanin. Plus
1 that, some of the procedures mentioned in the document marry up with some
2 of his evidence.
3 So for that reason and given the fact that it's highly relevant
4 and probative value, I would seek to tender it, but that's as far as I
5 can take it.
6 [Trial Chamber confers]
7 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Majkic, can I ask you, do you recall having
8 received this document?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I don't.
10 JUDGE HARHOFF: So it was sent by Mr. Zupljanin, as I understand
11 it, to all the chiefs of the SJBs, but it never reached you; is that
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said that I don't recall this
14 kind of document. I don't remember it at all. And particularly, I
15 wasn't at -- because I wasn't at the meeting when this was decided.
16 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The 7th of April.
18 JUDGE HALL: The document is marked for identification.
19 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P355, marked for identification,
20 Your Honours.
21 MR. DI FAZIO: Thank you, Your Honours.
22 Q. Just one last question on the document. The type face, the way
23 the document looks, the setting out of the document with headings, the
24 way the distribution list is written, and generally the format of the
25 document, does that accord with police documents that were being produced
1 in 1992, the sort of documents you saw day-to-day basis in carrying out
2 your duties?
3 JUDGE HALL: If I may relieve you of your anxiety, Mr. Di Fazio,
4 the Chamber bearing in mind the distinction between a document which is
5 admissible as opposed to admitted, the Chamber has no difficulty what
6 order in terms of the admissibility of this document. So I think I
7 understand why you're asking that question, but it probably isn't
9 MR. DI FAZIO: Yes. Very well. Thank you, Your Honour.
10 Q. Okay. Thank you, I've finished with the document. I want to ask
11 you now about another topic altogether, the arrival of the 6th Krajina
12 Brigade. You touched upon this topic last Friday. You said that the
13 army arrived in Sanski Most, and I think it was on or about the day of
14 your meeting on the 6th of April. Do I understand correctly?
15 A. That was on the night between the 6th and 7th of April, during
16 the night.
17 Q. Thanks. And very briefly, how -- what sort of strength was this
18 army unit at? How many men was it at -- did it contain?
19 A. It was a complete 6th Krajina Brigade, made up of all the Serbian
20 soldiers who responded to the call-up, including a number of Croats and
21 Muslims. Many Muslims didn't respond to the call-up, therefore that was
22 a sort of rump brigade, particularly due to the reason to a large number
23 of Muslim and Croats not having responded to it. As far as I remember,
24 it's numbered about 3.000 troops, but I don't know the exact number. I
25 never saw them in one place all together.
1 Q. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. 3.000. Thanks. That's what
2 I wanted to know.
3 And did you meet with the commander of that brigade?
4 A. I met up with him as soon as they arrived. I think he came to
5 have coffee with me the next morning. He went to see me and the
6 commander and tell us that he was there, and when I went to Palanka on an
7 errand, I also went there to see where the command was based. I think it
8 was in Palanka. That's where the brigade was. I found Basara there as
9 well, we had a coffee together, we had a conversation, and then I
11 Q. Basara was the commander, was he?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. And what was the conversation about?
14 A. The situation in general. I don't remember any details. I came
15 to greet him. He offered me a cup of coffee. We had one together, and
16 then it was me, actually, who sent a letter to him and the brigade, the
17 6th Brigade should return to Sanski Most. And on that occasion when we
18 met up again he told me, "I am here to prevent a conflict in
19 Sanski Most." And we talked about other things, of course, but I
20 remember him repeating that that's why he was there with his brigade.
21 Q. Was he there also to assist police in maintaining order and
22 ensuring that conflict did not break out?
23 A. We did not see each other again until - what was it? - the 17th
24 of April when he came at 8.30 in the morning. Before that we did not
25 have any other contacts. On the 17th, though, he came early in the
1 morning to my office.
2 Q. I'll repeat the question. Was he there also to assist police in
3 maintaining order and ensuring that conflict did not break out?
4 A. I suppose so. If he had received an assignment to come and
5 prevent inter-ethnic conflict, then that would have implied cooperation
6 between the army and the police, each acting within their own purview.
7 Q. Thanks. And in fact you had written to him in mid-March, seeking
8 the return of the army to Sanski Most. That's what you testified on
9 Friday. What did you explain in your letter in mid-March that you wanted
10 the army to do when they returned?
11 A. Well, seeing how inter-ethnic tensions grew worse almost every
12 day and since Mr. Zupljanin had told me before that nothing should be
13 done in Sanski Most as in other municipalities, I, realising that
14 inter-ethnic conflict may break out, got the idea that I should invite
15 the brigade to come and help out. Nobody, I suppose, would be so willing
16 to incite a conflict if the brigade was there.
17 Q. Thank you. Did you report to Mr. Zupljanin, your regional chief,
18 that you had taken this step of inviting army formations, groups --
19 brigade, I should say, into your municipality?
20 A. I really can't remember whether I informed him or not. If I had
21 not, I certainly should have, but I don't remember whether I did. I
22 should have -- I must have sent at least a letter to him saying that the
23 6th Krajina Brigade was in Sanski Most.
24 Q. And would you agree with me that that is -- that sort of
25 information, the request and invitation to bring in armed formations into
1 the municipality is precisely the sort of thing --
2 MR. PANTELIC: Leading again. Objection.
3 JUDGE HALL: You must have anticipated that objection,
4 Mr. Di Fazio.
5 MR. DI FAZIO: I'll move on. Thanks.
6 Q. In the meeting where you actually met up with Mr. Basara and you
7 were discussing matters upon his -- when he first arrived, did you and he
8 discuss specifically how the army might help the police, what exactly
9 they might do?
10 A. At our first meeting, Colonel Basara dropped by just briefly. We
11 just had a coffee together and he said, "I'm here to prevent conflict in
12 Sanski Most," and that's -- that was all. We did not talk about it
13 anymore. It was quite enough for me that he was just there. I was quite
14 reassured and certain that nothing was going to happen in Sanski Most.
15 Q. The army was based -- the 6th Krajina Brigade was based at a
16 place called -- was it Lusci Palanka?
17 A. That's where the command was, and the brigade probably had its
18 own wartime deployment in the surrounding villages. You couldn't see
19 them. They were located and based on the surrounding hills and camps --
20 Q. All right. Thanks.
21 A. [Previous translation continues]... only the commander was in
22 Lusci Palanka.
23 Q. And how far away from the police station is Lusci Palanka?
24 A. Around 25 kilometres.
25 Q. Did you work out any procedures that you and Basara would follow
1 in the event that you had to call upon him for assistance in maintaining
2 law and order?
3 A. I can't remember talking or planning at all. In fact, I remember
4 we didn't. He said, "I'm here to prevent inter-ethnic conflict if it
5 arises," and for me that was a guarantee that nothing would happen. If
6 anything had happened in the meantime, of course we would have met again
7 and agreed what to do, each in our own jurisdiction.
8 Q. Thank you. I want to ask you now about -- move on past the 6th
9 of April. In the days immediately following the 6th of April and leading
10 up to the 13th of April, did you hear anything more about the activities
11 of the SOS in Sanski Most?
12 A. No. It was completely quiet in Sanski Most, at least those few
13 days between the arrival of the brigade until the 14th. It was
14 absolutely quiet in Sanski Most, as far as I remember. There were no
15 incidents or anything.
16 Q. Did you speak to Mr. Rasula in between the 6th and the 13th of
18 A. I don't recall that I did.
19 Q. Did you see Mr. Zupljanin again?
20 A. If it was the 6th, I can't remember -- I don't think -- I don't
21 think I went to Banja Luka between the 6th and the 13th. Maybe we talked
22 on the phone, but I can't remember.
23 Q. All right. What about on the 14th?
24 A. On the 14th I met up with Mr. Zupljanin in Banja Luka.
25 Q. And how did that come about?
1 A. On the 13th of April, within the police station there was some
2 sort of panic. I was informed that the SOS had asked Rasula for an
3 urgent meeting of the Executive Board of the SDS, where they would come
4 with an ultimatum to take over the police. And that afternoon, since I
5 usually did not attend meetings -- and it was quite strange to me that
6 Rasula was informed about it rather than Vlado Vrkes, who was the
7 president of the SDS. But as soon as I was informed of that meeting, I
8 knew why he was inviting me to come. And then I replied that the next
9 morning I was going to the centre to see Mr. Zupljanin on official
10 business. He said, "Fine," and he knew probably that I was going to see
11 Mr. Zupljanin because of the information that was circulating that day.
12 Q. All right. Who told you? Who informed you that the SOS was
13 going to take over the police?
14 A. Well, I got that information from the police, and everyone talked
15 about it that day with quite a lot of anxiety and fear. I saw in
16 people's eyes that they were frightened.
17 Q. Thank you --
18 A. It was not an easy thing to hear.
19 Q. Thank you. You've testified -- so you had police intelligence
20 that the SOS were going to take over the police, and you've told us that
21 the police thought there were about seven or eight people, and you knew
22 one of the leaders or some of the leaders. Did you take steps to -- in
23 those circumstances to go out and arrest them on that very day, put them
24 in prison and charge them with something?
25 A. I've already said that I believed, and we in the police believed,
1 that there were about seven or eight of them because we never saw them as
2 a group. But we never had any verified information about it. Those were
3 rumours circulating around town and at the police, that it was the SOS.
4 We did not know much about them. We knew that there were about seven or
5 eight people who met frequently. We had no verified official reports,
6 and we did not dare make any estimates or plans, precisely because we
7 didn't know how many of them there were.
8 Q. Okay. Well, thanks for that.
9 Did you consider at least going out and talking to them, sending
10 some police officers out to talk to the seven or eight SOS members about
11 this new intelligence you had, perhaps make some inquiries?
12 A. I said last Friday that those seven or eight we knew about had no
13 criminal records, they did not have even a misdemeanour record. They
14 were not violating law or public order. Even when these crimes of
15 bombing happened, when explosive devices were set, we couldn't catch
16 anyone. And they acted quite normally, like any other citizen. I didn't
17 see any reason to go and interview them. What would I tell any one of
19 Q. Well, perhaps you might have told them something to the effect
20 that the police suspected them of throwing bombs and that they've
21 received information to the effect that they are going to take over the
22 police station, is there any truth in this? Did you consider asking them
24 A. Well, I couldn't talk to them because we had no such reports
25 before the 13th of April. There were no reports that they might attack.
1 They went around town and acted quite normally, like the most peaceful of
2 citizens. We had no reason to believe that they might be responsible for
3 any incidents.
4 Q. All right.
5 A. If we had had such information, then we could have invited them
6 for an interview.
7 Q. Thanks. Thanks. Well, one thing you did do is you went off and
8 spoke to Mr. Zupljanin the following day; do I understand your evidence
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. And what did you tell him?
12 A. Well, I went to see him precisely because I needed to tell him
13 what the SOS was planning and to ask him for advice, what we were
14 supposed to do next.
15 Q. And what advice did you receive?
16 A. Well, first he tried to persuade me that I should talk to them,
17 impress upon them my authority to dissuade them from whatever they might
18 be planning, and I said, "What authority?" I had done my best to catch
19 them at whatever they were doing, and if I failed, then what possible
20 authority would I have in their eyes? On the contrary, any such action
21 might get me killed.
22 Q. Can you just explain to the Trial Chamber why the issue of
23 authority and sufficient authority arose as an issue, because they
24 were -- they were the most peaceful of citizens. Why was it -- why did
25 authority arise as an issue between you and Mr. Zupljanin when discussing
1 what to do?
2 A. Well, Mr. Zupljanin tried to talk me into meeting with them and
3 act as someone who has authority. I said I have no authority as far as
4 they're concerned because I didn't know any of them personally. I knew
5 them only by sight. I had no arguments. And if they were really those
6 SOS members, as we suspected, then there's no reason to believe that I
7 would have any authority. That's one.
8 And second, after what happened in Banja Luka, what the SOS did,
9 and if we know that all these SOS men used to be members of the 6th
10 Krajina Brigade and the 6th Krajina Brigade was already in Sanski Most -
11 and we now know that the 6th Krajina Brigade had been in various theatres
12 of war before - it's quite clear that most of them had been elsewhere, in
13 battle-fields, and they were in Sanski Most only on leave. But only now
14 when the whole brigade was in Sanski Most we were able to see how many of
15 them were actually there, in the brigade. And we realised that it might
16 be the biggest mistake possible to clash with them. And then the third
17 thing is if the army was already there, then the army should take care of
18 it; why me?
19 Q. Are you saying that the SOS membership -- members of the SOS in
20 Sanski Most were also members of the 6th Krajina Brigade? Do I
21 understand you correctly?
22 A. Well, all of them were soldiers of the 6th Krajina Brigade, very
23 few of them were in the TO, the Territorial Defence. Most of them had
24 already been in various battle-fields in Croatia for the past ten months.
25 And if they were involved in such crimes, that means that they were the
1 sort of people who dared to -- we can only suppose what would happen if
2 we risked a big clash with them. People already talked around town,
3 saying that they were some sort of paramilitary organisation. People in
4 town actually knew more than we did.
5 Q. All right. Well, when you went and had the meeting with
6 Mr. Zupljanin following the news that the SOS is going to take over the
7 police station, did you know or have any intelligence or information that
8 the SOS membership was -- basically SOS members were also members of the
9 6th Krajina Brigade? Because your evidence up till now has been that
10 there were seven or eight lads as far as you were concerned. So when did
11 it become clear to you that you weren't dealing with seven or eight local
12 lads, but a group that existed within the 6th Krajina Brigade?
13 A. We did not have any knowledge, any reports, about the way SOS was
14 organised. They acted as the SOS, but they never held out themselves to
15 be the SOS. It's the people who labelled them SOS. None of us in the
16 police had ever received any information from them directly that they
17 were the SOS. They did not identify themselves.
18 Q. All right.
19 A. It was only on the 14th when they asked for a meeting with the
20 SDS did they identify themselves as the SOS.
21 Q. Thank you. Just try and answer the next few questions very
22 briefly, if you would. At the 14th of April meeting with Mr. Zupljanin,
23 did you receive any instruction from Mr. Zupljanin to disarm the SOS in
24 Sanski Most, yes or no?
25 A. I can't answer this with a yes or no. When Mr. Zupljanin
1 realised I don't actually dare to do what he was suggesting - he was
2 quite aware of it, that I didn't dare to - and when after all the talking
3 when he realised I didn't even dare go back to Sanski Most if he made me
4 do that, he said, "I know these people, they're very dangerous.
5 If they really had set their mind to it, they're going to do it. Go
6 back, Majkic, and try to settle things down in a quiet way, without
7 shooting. And at least try to have this thing handled peacefully."
8 Q. Thank you. Could you just explain to the Trial Chamber just one
9 part of your previous answer. You said this:
10 "When Mr. Zupljanin realised that I don't actually dare to do
11 what he was suggesting ..."
12 You went on to say other things. Now, what -- what in a
13 nutshell, in brief, clearly, was Mr. Zupljanin suggesting that you do?
14 What did he want you to do in the face of this situation?
15 A. I'll try to quote him. He said, "Majkic, go, and if there's any
16 way to do it without a shoot-out, do it. If it can't happen without a
17 shoot-out, then try to take care of both," he probably meant Croats and
18 Muslims, "and keep them safe. If you are not able to save everyone, then
19 at least try to minimise the casualties."
20 That's approximately what he said. I'm trying to quote him. And
21 finally he said, "God help us."
22 Q. Okay. But -- and I'll return to my other questions then. He
23 gave you no specific instruction to disarm the SOS?
24 A. How on earth were we supposed to disarm the SOS, a paramilitary
25 unit, when the 6th Krajina Brigade was already there? They had to have
1 the entire security situation under control.
2 Q. Thank you --
3 A. And finally it wasn't even our job.
4 Q. Thank you. Did you or he suggest that you enlist the aid of the
5 6th Krajina Brigade to make sure that these SOS members don't take over
6 the police station or attack this public building in the centre of town,
7 enlist their help?
8 A. On the 14th at 4.00 p.m. at that meeting, just after I had met
9 with Mr. Zupljanin in the centre and came to that other meeting, there
10 were members of the Executive Board of the Serbian Democratic Party,
11 three members of the SOS, and there was the intelligence officer of the
12 6th Krajina Brigade. He was there, he was present. I don't think that
13 the SOS had invited him or the SDS had invited him. Colonel Basara must
14 have sent this intelligence officer, which means that Colonel Basara knew
15 what was going on. The intelligence officer from the brigade was at that
17 Q. I'm going to ask you about the meeting, we'll get into that. But
18 all I'm asking you is a very simple question: On the 14th when you were
19 sitting in the office with Mr. Zupljanin, did you and he before the
20 meeting, before the meeting, before you went back to Sanski Most, there
21 in Banja Luka face-to-face with Mr. Zupljanin, did you and he discuss the
22 possibility of enlisting the aid of the 6th Krajina Brigade to stop this
23 take-over of the police station? Was that raised?
24 A. I already told you the whole story about what he tried to get me
25 to do. When he realised I didn't have the guts, he said, "I know these
1 people. They're very dangerous. If they had set their mind to it,
2 they're going to do it. So go try and handle it peacefully. If it's not
3 possible to handle it peacefully, if there's a shoot-out, try to keep
4 everyone safe. If that is not possible, then try to minimise the
5 casualties." That was our whole conversation.
6 Q. All right. Well, let's turn to the meeting that you've already
7 alluded to. This is a meeting on the 14th, and after the meeting with
8 Mr. Zupljanin - and I don't think there was any dispute that it was at
9 the Orthodox church - about what time did the meeting start? Just give
10 us the time, just the time.
11 A. It wasn't in an Orthodox church, it was in the parish residence,
12 which is next to the Orthodox church. Before and now, this is a school
13 for priests. That's one thing. Secondly, the meeting was convened for
14 1600 hours, and I arrived there at 1730 hours.
15 Q. Thank you. And were any members of the SOS present?
16 A. I already said earlier, the SDS executive committee, three SOS
17 members, and the brigade intelligence officer were at the meeting when I
19 Q. Thank you. Who were the SOS members?
20 A. Those were Dusan Saovic, a.k.a. Njunja; Dusan Modrinic, a.k.a.
21 Medeni; and the third one had the nickname Cirija. I don't know his
22 name, not even to this date.
23 Q. So you arrived late. Did you learn anything that had happened in
24 the time prior to your arrival at the meeting?
25 A. No, I couldn't have learned of that. At the time I arrived I saw
1 this ultimatum that was put forth by the SOS and I had the information
2 about that from the day before, and I realised that they were discussing
3 this ultimatum because I see that the people from the SDS Executive Board
4 were very worried. I saw that on their faces. I assume that they were
5 even more afraid of the SOS than the others.
6 Q. Was there any discussion about a Crisis Staff?
7 A. When they accepted this initiative, or rather, when they
8 discussed it, since Mr. Rasula knew that I had seen Zupljanin, he asked
9 me what Zupljanin had to say. Although I never told him why I met with
10 Mr. Zupljanin, I responded by saying that Mr. Zupljanin wanted this to be
11 done in a peaceful way if possible. I didn't say anything other than
12 that, and that is when some of them said that a Crisis Staff needs to be
13 set up and this Njunja, as a kind of SOS leader, said, "We have a
14 proposal for the Crisis Staff as well." So not only did they come with a
15 proposal for the ultimatum, they also came with a proposal for the Crisis
16 Staff and then he read this proposal. Once the Crisis Staff was set up,
17 the Executive Board of the SDA [as interpreted] decided to start
18 negotiations with the SDS -- SDA and the HDZ about a peaceful split, and
19 this is what happened in the days afterwards.
20 Q. Thanks. There's just one aspect of your answer that I'd like you
21 to clarify for the Trial Chamber. Rasula asks you what happened between
22 you and Zupljanin. You responded by saying that Mr. Zupljanin wanted
23 this to be done in a peaceful way. What? What was to be done?
24 A. Given that these men came with an ultimatum, they had to accept
25 this ultimatum, but they were nevertheless waiting for me to come and see
1 what news I had. And when I said that Mr. Zupljanin --
2 Q. Mr. Majkic --
3 A. [Previous translation continued] ... asked for this to be done by
4 -- in peaceful way if possible --
5 Q. Mr. Majkic, my question is simple. There's no need -- it's very
6 simple. It's only this, it's only this. You said that Mr. Zupljanin
7 wanted this to be done in a peaceful way if possible. What did he want
8 to be done in a peaceful way?
9 A. I said that Mr. Zupljanin wanted them to do it in a peaceful way,
10 the thing that they had planned. I was never thinking about how and
11 what. When they said that they intended to take over the public security
12 station - and despite all our discussions and thinking - he did ask me to
13 have it done in a peaceful way. How? The only peaceful way is through
14 negotiations. What I said was sufficient for the SDS to decide to enter
15 the negotiations with the SDA and HDZ about division of power and
16 peaceful separation.
17 Q. Thanks. We'll get on to the SDS and SDA later, but just focus on
18 the meeting now at the parish building.
19 MR. DI FAZIO: Well, in fact, perhaps what I'll do is just ask
20 that the witness be shown P60.13, which is the diary that we've looked at
22 Q. And I want to ask you about entries that appear at page 13 of the
23 English, and that in the B/C/S are exactly 16 pages into the document, so
24 it's 16 pages in. It's a handwritten document.
25 MR. DI FAZIO: If Your Honours just give me a moment. I've got
1 to make sure that I've got the right portion of the B/C/S.
2 [Prosecution counsel confer]
3 MR. DI FAZIO: On the B/C/S I think it carries the date
4 26 November in print at the top. I think that's the correct part in the
5 B/C/S, which I think -- page 32. I'm told it's page 32.
6 Q. Now, I think you can see it there -- I hope you can. I'm
7 referring to an entry dated the 14th of April, 1992, and heading above
8 that says:
9 "Course of action in taking over power and establishing the
10 Serbian municipality of Sanski Most."
11 Can you see that?
12 A. I can't see that in the B/C/S version.
13 Q. I think it might be --
14 A. Yes, yes, now I see it.
15 Q. Got it?
16 A. "Course of action of taking over power ..." --
17 Q. Thanks --
18 A. [Previous translation continues] ... "and establishing Serbian
19 municipality of Sanski Most."
20 Q. Thanks. I apologise for that delay. Right.
21 Now I want to ask you about that entry. It says -- it refers to
22 a radical mode of attaining objectives being undertaken. Do you know
23 what reference that might be to -- to what that might be referring?
24 A. I can't read this. If you can read it out for me, then I'll try
25 to answer your question.
1 Q. All right. It says:
2 "Following extensive and continuous inter-party agreements based
3 on the principles, based on electorally agreed on regulations, and on
4 basis of electoral results dictated by political events in Yugoslavia and
5 Bosnia, a radical mode of attaining objectives has been
6 undertaken ..."
7 Have you any idea what that radical -- what those objectives
8 might be?
9 A. I really can't answer that. You should ask the author of this.
10 I really don't know what kind of answer I can give you. I have no answer
11 at all.
12 Q. All right. Can we go down to point 4, and I think we can see it
13 there on the B/C/S in front of our screens. Point 4 in the B/C/S. It
15 "The Crisis Staff consisting of the following members shall be in
16 charge of all actions ..."
17 Thank you. All right. Now, you can see all of the names, some
18 of them you've mentioned. And you're mentioned there. Were you on the
19 crisis --
20 A. I see that, yes.
21 Q. Okay. Simple question: Were you on the Crisis Staff? Can you
22 account for that entry?
23 A. Well, when the SOS suggested -- rather, Njunja suggested and read
24 their proposal about establishing a Crisis Staff, this proposal, apart
25 from Rasula and Vrkes and myself, it included also Dr. Nikolic. But
1 Rasula and Vrkes were not in the SOS proposal. So when they read their
2 proposal, there were eight of us excluding Vrkes and Rasula. After that
3 I immediately got up and said that I -- and offered some explanation why
4 I wouldn't like to be on it. The same happened with Dr. Nikolic. He
5 gave some kind of explanation, and it was immediately accepted by the
6 SOS. After that, Vlado Vrkes, as the SDS president, got up and proposed
7 that he and Rasula should become part of the Crisis Staff based on their
8 posts and positions. The SOS accepted that, and then the executive
9 committee of the SDS party took a decision to adopt this proposal. That
10 is how the Crisis Staff was established, without me, and the last one,
11 not Nikolic Zvonko, but his name was actually Nikolic Viko.
12 Probably Mr. Rasula had some instructions from the top, that is
13 to say from Mr. Karadzic, about who should be on the Crisis Staff and
14 that should have included the chief of police. I didn't know that, and
15 that is why I proposed that I should be excused. I think that Rasula
16 knew that, and that is why he put me on the list. That could probably be
17 found in some SDS records. That's the only explanation of how my name
18 got there.
19 Q. Okay. Thanks for explaining that.
20 You mentioned that Vlado Vrkes and Boro -- sorry, not you. The
21 document mentioned Vlado Vrkes and Boro Savanovic are there to conduct
22 negotiations with the SDA from 10.00 to 1.30.
23 Do you know what negotiations they were tasked with?
24 A. I don't think it was Vrkes and Savanovic. I think that Rasula,
25 Savanovic, and a third member - I'm not quite sure - were tasked with
1 this assignment. But it was Savanovic and the other one who met with the
2 SDA and HDZ. The very following day, they decided to split in a peaceful
3 way because they had been informed about what happened on our side the
4 day before, and I think the dead-line was --
5 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: The witness is kindly asked
6 to slow down, please.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The dead-line was the 17th of
8 April, noon. And I think that after that they started dividing the
9 villages and everything else.
10 MR. DI FAZIO:
11 Q. All right. Negotiations are mentioned there to last until about
12 half past 1.00 in the afternoon, and then it describes a process that is
13 to start at 2.00 in the afternoon. And that is measures taken in
14 relation to the building and public -- police employees. It says that
15 entrances and stairwells and so on shall be secured by reliable men. The
16 6th Krajina Brigade is going to lend a hand by providing a platoon of
17 reservists. Full alert of the 6th Krajina Brigade. And the building is
18 to be secured from within by the national defence secretariat, and the
19 Crisis Staff is to have a liaison man, namely Braco Papric. Do you
20 recall all of those plans being discussed?
21 A. I didn't attend these negotiations at all. The Wednesday 15 --
22 14th and Thursday the 15th, the commander and I went to the municipal
23 building where these negotiations were taking place to see how they
24 progressed. The second or the first day we arrived, we were told that
25 there was an agreement but there was some outstanding matters. So I
1 don't know what they actually agreed, and I don't know if the 6th Krajina
2 Brigade was mentioned in these negotiations at all.
3 Q. Thanks. I'm not talking about the next day or negotiations.
4 We'll get on to that in due course, and you can tell us about that. I'm
5 just talking about the meeting there in the parish house next to the
6 Orthodox church. This document says at that meeting, that various
7 measures were planned. Negotiations lasting until 1.30, and then at 2.00
8 in the afternoon a session of the public service employees begins at 2.00
9 and various matters are to be taken care of, entrances and stairwells and
10 the warehouse secured, et cetera. You can see them written there. Were
11 those measures discussed at the meeting, while you were present anyway?
12 A. Well, you have to tell me exactly what meeting you're referring
13 to, what is written here --
14 Q. The meeting on the 14th are -- when you came back, having met
15 Mr. Zupljanin earlier that day, and you went to the parish house where
16 the SOS were and the 6th Krajina intelligence guy was and SDS Executive
17 Board, that meeting.
18 A. As far as I remember - and I remember very well - when I came
19 there an usher asked me what had Zupljanin said, and I responded as I
20 did. The Crisis Staff was set up on the spot and the SDS and its
21 executive committee decided to establish a commission to conduct
22 negotiations, and that is where the meeting ended. Whether this -- these
23 things happened in the one and a half hours that it last before I
24 arrived, I don't know. When I arrived -- and this second part of the
25 meeting that I attended ended very quickly with all these decisions
1 taking place.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 MR. DI FAZIO: Your Honours, do you propose to take a break
4 shortly? Because this might be a good moment to.
5 JUDGE HALL: [Microphone not activated]
6 Are you saying that your next line is going to take longer than
7 five minutes?
8 MR. DI FAZIO: No, but I can continue if you wish. I'm not quite
9 sure what time you would like to take the break.
10 JUDGE HALL: 10.25 is the usual.
11 MR. DI FAZIO: Okay. All right.
12 Can we go to the English page 15 of the document. That's an
13 entry dated after the 17th of April. I'm not entirely sure where it is
14 in the B/C/S.
15 Q. But I'll read it out to you and -- anyway, I'll read it out to
16 you. It's an entry saying:
17 "Responsibilities and implementation of agreed actions from
18 17 April 1992.
19 "Carry out separation of the police forces by 1200 hours.
20 Dragan Majkic in charge."
21 Were you tasked with any particular responsibility relating to
22 separation of police forces?
23 A. On the 15th and the 16th, negotiations took place. At about 2.00
24 or 2.30 on the 16th when the commander -- I arrived at the building and
25 asked them if they had made any agreements, they told us, yes, but there
1 was some unresolved things. Then we went home. In the evening at around
2 2300 hours, after I'd gone to bed, the telephone rang and somebody called
3 me from the Crisis Staff to come to a house that was a couple of hundred
4 metres from the police station and that I had been summoned by the Crisis
5 Staff. I went there, and I saw that all members of the Crisis Staff were
6 there. I didn't want to interrupt what they were discussing.
7 I just sat down and listened to what they were talking about. They were
8 planning to attack the police building. I suddenly interrupted them and
9 said, "Excuse me, what is this that you are planning?" I think that it
10 was Vrkes who chaired this meeting, judging by the way where he was
11 sitting. He said that, "We have to attack the police building." I asked
12 him, "How can you do that? Because at any moment I always have 20 people
13 outside and 20 people, fully armed people, inside the building." And he
14 said, "We have to." And I said, "Why?" He said, "The negotiations had
15 failed. Once we agreed everything else, the only outstanding, unresolved
16 issue, was the police building. We offered them to move to the Sip
17 building and that we retain the present building. However, they refused
18 that, but they insist of having the police building for them, one floor
19 should belong to them, and the other to us. And since this failed, I
20 said we have to attack."
21 On that Thursday I already had the information that the Muslim
22 and Croat policemen who already had collected all their personal stuff
23 and took them home were saying openly because -- saying openly that they
24 were not coming back because everybody knew that the division was to take
25 place the following day. I told Vrkes, "Please don't attack. There's no
1 need for that. I will agree with the commander for a split in order to
2 avoid this." He was very happy that I suggested that because he,
3 himself, was completely frightened. He was pallid, just like everybody
4 else. I looked at them while they were discussing this, but I just saw
5 that they were frozen with fear. They were just relieved to hear what I
6 wanted to suggest.
7 They immediately accepted my proposal not to launch an attack at
8 5.00 a.m. the next morning and to allow me to agree with the police to
9 split in a peaceful way, and that is where this meeting ended.
10 Q. What precisely was terrifying the Crisis Staff?
11 A. Well, it's not an easy thing to enter into a conflict and attack
12 police at that. When I asked them who's going to attack with them they
13 said, "SOS." I told them I had 20 people fully armed outside the
14 building and 20 fully armed people inside the building. How do you think
15 you can do that? But he said and his voice was shivering, he said, "We
16 must do that." And I said that, "Let me settle this with the commander."
17 And Vrkes told Majkic, "If you manage to pull this through, I will be in
18 debt to you for the rest of my life. And it's on my -- I'll take you to
19 a restaurant, my treat."
20 Q. So presumably the Crisis Staff was looking for any solution to
21 avoid an armed attack and jumped at your offer to negotiate; I understand
23 A. As I said, it was really something out of the heaven. They were
24 relieved immediately and they were not in such a bad mood as they had
25 been when I arrived.
1 Q. Thank you. And perhaps one last question before I leave this
2 topic, and then I imagine the break. Presumably the Crisis Staff, then,
3 and not the SOS, was in a position to decide if and when an attack would
4 take place, because they delayed it once you made your offer; correct?
5 A. There was no one from the SOS at that meeting. That was the
6 Crisis Staff. I'm talking about the meeting in the evening, the Crisis
7 Staff and no one else.
8 Q. Thanks. But from what you've told us, it's clear, isn't it, that
9 the SOS -- sorry, the S -- the Crisis Staff was the body calling the
10 shots on when the attack should take place, from what you've said?
11 MR. PANTELIC: Objection. It's -- first of all, I think it's
12 time for a break, and then after that my learned friend can rephrase the
13 question because it's two-fold, multi-fold, it's loaded. It's unclear,
14 the question.
15 MR. DI FAZIO: Well, I was trying to clarify evidence that
16 occurred earlier -- that came earlier this morning concerning the
17 influence of the SOS on this body. And now we've had some evidence from
18 the witness to the effect that the Crisis Staff is deciding on times for
19 the attack, an attack in which the SOS is to participate. Now, it's
20 those two pieces of evidence that I'm trying to get a further
21 understanding of. That's why I asked that question. I want to know who
22 it was.
23 JUDGE HALL: Perhaps we could return to this after the break
24 because it struck me that the objection would not have been as
25 Mr. Pantelic articulated it, but that it was having regard to the
1 testimony of the witness up to this point. It's the type -- it's really
2 a conclusion that you're asking the witness to give. But as I said, we
3 can think about it during the break.
4 MR. DI FAZIO: Thank you, Your Honours.
5 JUDGE HALL: 20 minutes.
6 --- Recess taken at 10.28 a.m.
7 [The witness stands down]
8 --- On resuming at 10.51 a.m.
9 MR. DI FAZIO: If Your Honours please, just before the witness
10 comes in, there's just one matter I very briefly want to raise with you
11 and that's this: I seek your leave or permission to use another document
12 today that I haven't included on my list. And I'm mindful of the
13 comments on Friday and -- so I'm not doing this in a cavalier fashion. I
14 want to use 65 ter 603. It's a Crisis Staff document from the 24th of
15 April. It -- I thought it had been on my original list, but I've checked
16 and unfortunately it wasn't. I've spoken to the Defence and I gather
17 that there's no particular objection to that. I would intend to use it
18 briefly and spend a minute or two on it at the end of my
19 examination-in-chief and I can make hard copies and have them brought
20 here into court to lessen any inconvenience that might occur to you
21 because of my failure to put it on the list. So that's what I'd like to
22 do if there is no -- if the Trial Chamber's content with that, then
23 that's what I'll do.
24 [Trial Chamber confers]
25 JUDGE HALL: Is there any objection?
1 MR. ZECEVIC: No objection from Stanisic Defence.
2 JUDGE HALL: And it was on the 65 ter list?
3 MR. DI FAZIO: [Microphone not activated]
4 JUDGE HALL: [Microphone not activated]
5 MR. DI FAZIO: Oh, yes, it's one of our 65 ter exhibits, but I
6 hadn't included it on my list of documents I intended to use.
7 [The witness takes the stand]
8 MR. ZECEVIC: It's just the late notice that they are going to
9 use, so we don't have any objection.
10 JUDGE HALL: Yes.
11 MR. PANTELIC: For Zupljanin, also we don't have any objection.
12 MR. DI FAZIO: And I'm not going to dwell on the document at all,
13 but would Your Honours like hard copies? I can get hard copies brought
14 to you, if you like.
15 JUDGE HARHOFF: [Microphone not activated] Yes.
16 MR. DI FAZIO: All right. Thank you.
17 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Di Fazio, I did promise to return to
18 Mr. Pantelic's objection when we resumed, and it seems to me, as I said
19 at the break, that having regard to what the witness has testified to,
20 isn't the question asking him for a conclusion which is properly the
21 province of the Chamber, unless of course your question is in the context
22 of some action that he subsequently took consequent upon his own personal
23 conclusions of the events of the 14th of April?
24 MR. DI FAZIO: Yes, yes, I take Your Honour's point. There will
25 be further evidence about the SOS, but none in the sense of it, as far as
1 I'm aware, dictating what this particular witness did. So I don't need
2 to pursue the question any further.
3 Q. Thanks. We were talking about Thursday night, the 16th of April,
4 and you talked about this meeting. Was -- just final clarification on
5 the meeting. Was every member of the Crisis Staff present from what you
6 can recall?
7 A. Yes. I think they were all there. To the best of my
8 recollection, they were there.
9 Q. Thanks. And I might have asked you this before but I just want
10 to be absolutely clear, there were no SOS members present at the meeting?
11 A. No.
12 Q. Now the following day, that's the 17th, did you go to the police
14 A. Well, that morning I came to work at the usual time, 7.30 or 7.00
16 Q. All right. Did you discuss anything with Enver Burnic, the man
17 who was your commander of police?
18 A. When I came to work, first I looked through the reports to see
19 what had happened the previous 24 hours, reports that the duty officer
20 put on my desk, and then I invited him to talk. When he came, I informed
21 him about everything and I told him, "Commander, just so that we don't
22 provide any provocation for a conflict, as some people seem to expect, I
23 give you approval that you, Croat and Muslim policemen, take leave until
24 Monday morning to force the SDS to accept what Mr. Vrkes had told me
25 about, that proposal that Sip building be given to them as a location for
1 their bodies. I will put pressure on the SDS to clean out the building
2 until Monday morning, the beginning of working hours, so that you can
3 resume work normally on Monday there. And in the event that the SDS
4 fails to vacate the Sip building, then on Monday you come here to work
5 normally, business as usual."
6 The commander liked the proposal. He accepted it willingly. He
7 seemed happy. And then suddenly he jumped from the chair and said, "I
8 have to call the SDA to ask them." I told him, "Enver, don't," because I
9 thought the SDA would not accept it. It was just a hunch. So I told
10 him, "Don't do that, please. Let's do as we agreed. I hope it's for the
11 best." But then he told me, "I really have to call the SDA." He went to
12 his office, he called, came back, and said, "The SDA ordered me not to
13 leave this building." I told him very frankly, "I told you not to call
14 them because now you have to do as they say."
15 So we went on talking and then at 8.30 Colonel Basara came into
16 the office, and as soon as he sat down he said, "I came here to prevent
17 an inter-ethnic conflict. I will not have any inter-ethnic conflict here
18 in town."
19 So we went on talking and we were happy that he joined our effort
20 to prevent the conflict, and for a full three hours he kept sitting in my
21 office and we kept talking until 11.30. Around 11.00, the duty officer
22 from downstairs called me and there was a Muslim officer on duty that
23 day. That policeman asked me whether to go home now or to wait for -- to
24 wait until 12.00. And I told him, "Whatever you decide. It's up to
25 you." I don't actually know what they decided.
1 At that time there was only Enver Burnic and that policeman in
2 the duty room. They were the only Muslims there. Enver left the police
3 building around 11.30, and by that time the SOS were already deployed
4 around the police building. I don't know how he could have failed to see
5 them as he was leaving the police building. He must have seen them and
6 he should have intervened. Did he ever wonder what they were doing
7 there? I can't answer for him of course.
8 But then the commander and I stayed in my office and kept
9 talking, and then at about five to 12.00 two policemen came to my office
10 and told us, "The police downstairs are demanding a meeting. The
11 employees are demanding a meeting." I looked at him uncomprehendingly
12 and said, "Which employees?" And he said, "Everyone, Serbs, Muslims,
13 Croats." It seemed quite illogical to me if at 11.00 there were only the
14 commander and that other Muslim in the duty room. What employees? But
15 anyway we went down and it was true, everyone was in the hall. So I
16 addressed these people and told them all the same things that I told the
17 commander. I put forward my proposal, and everyone accepted it gladly,
18 just as the commander had, they all agreed. But for some reason, they
19 did not dare to leave the building; why, I don't know.
20 So we were stuck. People began telling jokes. I know the
21 commander always had his passport in his breast pocket, and as soon as
22 his banter started, he took it out and said, "I'm always ready to run."
23 At exactly 3.00, Rasula came through the door and pointed at his
24 watch, looking at me. And he tells me, "Majkic, the separation was
25 planned for 3.00." And I said, "We were just talking about that." And
1 he says, "What is there to talk about? You were supposed to be separated
2 by noon. All those who want to stay in this building and work had to
3 sign this declaration. Those who won't have to leave."
4 Then Zikrija Bahtic got up --
5 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter does not understand this.
6 Could the witness slow down and repeat.
7 MR. DI FAZIO:
8 Q. Slow down. Slow down. Slow down. The interpreters can't hear
10 A. When Rasula said that a separation had been agreed, then this
11 Zikrija Bahtic got up and said, "Is that so, President?" And Rasula
12 said, "That's what we agreed." And at that, everyone got to their feet
13 and left.
14 Q. Thank you. Did you see a gentleman named Tomo Delic that day?
15 A. As soon as they were gone, Delic who was alone or with someone, I
16 think he was with someone, came into the room and said, "Don't even think
17 of any -- putting up any opposition. We'll put the Serbian flag on the
18 police building." And I told him, half jokingly, "You are the only one
19 who dare do such a thing." And that's what they did.
20 Q. Thanks. Was a member of the executive board, SDS Executive
22 A. I think he was a member of the Executive Board because he was
23 always present at those meetings. I can't remember all 25 of them.
24 Q. Thanks --
25 A. But I think he was a member of the Executive Board.
1 Q. Thank you. Did you do anything in respect of the berets and the
2 declaration, the oaths, or declarations, or whatever they were
3 concerning -- that you'd been given?
4 A. After the Croat and Muslim policemen left, we remained on our
5 own. I went to my office and everyone followed me. I thought at the
6 moment that the separation had taken place, and all those berets that
7 were still in the boot in my car, I had one policeman fetch them together
8 with the solemn declarations. And that policeman brought them. And then
9 we proceeded to sign these solemn declarations, and everyone who signed
10 got this beret with insignia on it --
11 Q. Thank you --
12 A. [Previous translation continues] ... two Croats were left at that
13 time --
14 Q. Thanks. How did you know to distribute the declarations and the
15 berets at that point?
16 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, Mr. Di Fazio, I wouldn't like to
17 interfere, but I believe the witness wanted to say something else, and he
18 was cut in the middle of a sentence.
19 MR. DI FAZIO: I'm sorry. I didn't mean to cut him off, but I am
20 conscious of time. And -- but --
21 MR. ZECEVIC: I understand.
22 MR. DI FAZIO: I'll make sure that the witness --
23 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you.
24 MR. DI FAZIO: -- fulfils his answer.
25 Q. I cut you off. You were talking about the solemn declarations
1 and everyone who signed the beret -- and everybody who signed got a beret
2 with insignia. Did you want to say anything more about that particular
4 A. I was about to say this: As I was to distribute these berets,
5 the policemen said, "Vlado Lopar," one of the two Croats who remained,
6 "wants to be the first to sign." And I said, "No problem." So this
7 Vlado Lopar signed the solemn declaration and received a beret, and then
8 they all followed, one by one. All those who remained in the building,
9 in other words, signed.
10 Q. Thanks. Can you just tell the Trial Chamber what it was that
11 triggered you at that point to go and get the berets and the
13 A. Well, at that moment I was aware that the separation had
14 happened. There was an inter-party agreement between SDS on one hand and
15 the HDZ and the SDA on the other hand. They had all agreed on this
16 dead-line, 12.00.
17 Q. Thank you.
18 A. Whichever way, it did happen. Mr. Rasula was practically in
20 Q. Thank you. Witness, we want to --
21 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I'm not -- there is an
22 intervention in transcript. 39, line 13, I believe the witness gave
23 the -- "they had all agreed on this dead-line," and he gave the date as
24 well and the time.
25 MR. DI FAZIO:
1 Q. What was the date of the dead-line for the separation?
2 A. 17 April, 12.00.
3 Q. Thank you. Can I ask you now, Witness, we're going to move to
4 another topic, to keep your answers as brief as you can. We've got
5 limited time, and we need to try and wrap this up.
6 How far away -- just give us a short answer. How far away is the
7 municipality building from the police station?
8 A. Around 300 metres.
9 Q. Thank you. Direct your mind to Saturday, 18 April 1992. Did
10 anything happen in relation to that building?
11 A. On that day, Friday, the 17th -- in fact, in the small hours on
12 the Saturday after, around 1.00 a.m., Muslim and Croat policemen headed
13 by the HDZ and SDA respectively went into the municipal building and took
14 it over. They made their base there and said it was their building now,
15 and that's where they would locate their bodies.
16 Q. During that day, the Saturday, did you go to the building?
17 A. That morning the police called me up and informed me of what had
18 happened. I had just come to work and I was waiting -- in fact, I don't
19 know what I was waiting for, but these people from the Crisis Staff also
20 came. And they were going to the municipal building to negotiate with
21 those HDZ and SDA people. And that Saturday, once or twice I stopped by
22 this large office where many policemen were sitting. I sat down with
23 them, had a drink, we talked, and we were waiting for the outcome of
24 these negotiations. By that time the Crisis Staff was leading the whole
25 thing and the HDZ or -- and the SDA. In fact, I'm not sure whether the
1 SDS was negotiating with the Croats and Muslims or the Crisis Staff. In
2 any case, I was sitting there in the room of the policemen.
3 Q. Thank you. Did these negotiations continue over the Saturday and
4 into the Sunday? Just answer yes or no.
5 A. Saturday and Sunday the negotiations lasted.
6 Q. Thank you. Turn your mind now to the events of Sunday night,
7 Sunday, 19 of April, please. On that night did you see Mr. Rasula?
8 A. Around 8.00, Mr. Rasula came to my office and Boro Savanovic from
9 the Crisis Staff and Mirko Vrucinic, the three of them came to my office.
10 Mr. Rasula sat down in my chair, and there was a discussion about these
11 negotiations, that they had talked, that they had failed to agree. I
12 don't remember the details. Anyway, that's what the discussion was
13 about. It lasted until about 9.00 p.m., and then at 9.00 p.m. Rasula
14 took the -- picked up the receiver and said, "Now I'm going to give them
15 an ultimatum that they have to leave the building until" --
16 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter missed the hour.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "Until 10.00." The SDA president
18 took the call and Rasula told him, "If you don't vacate the building by
19 10.00, we will take the building over." And he hung up. Around 10.00
20 Mirko Vrucinic went to the municipal building to see what was going on.
21 At 20 to 10.00 the telephone rang. Mr. Rasula picked up the phone and
22 somebody informed him that SDA and HDZ members had left the building, but
23 the police remained inside. Hearing that conversation, I intervened with
24 Mr. Rasula immediately and warned him that the police was probably not
25 informed of the ultimatum; they were not aware of it. I picked up the
1 phone. I called the police room and Commander Burnic answered. I asked
2 him, "Enver, do you know about the ultimatum?" He said, "What
3 ultimatum?" I told him, "At 10.00 the building will be attacked.
4 Collect your men and leave the building." He said, "Fine," and hung up.
5 At ten to 10.00 the telephone rang again. Rasula answered and somebody
6 told him that the commander and another three men left the building, got
7 into one police car that they had taken, and two other men who had driven
8 their own cars to work also left. The others were still in the building.
9 At 10.00, when shooting started, those who were still inside the
10 building were probably frightened because the SOS was already on the
11 other side of the building. They did not dare escape that way, so they
12 jumped through the window and ran in the opposite direction. That way at
13 10.00 there was no one left in the building, just the guard. There was
14 not much shooting. I don't think any bullets actually hit the building.
15 Most of the shooting was in the air. The guard was crouching in a
16 corner, terrified.
17 Then Rasula got another call around 10.30 and somebody told him,
18 "President, here I am, I'm sitting in your office." So it was all over.
19 I went home around 11.00.
20 Q. Thanks. And was a Zolja rocket-propelled grenade weapon used?
21 A. Well, first of all, one Zolja was heard. An SOS man did not want
22 to shoot at the building. He was shooting at a tree next to the
23 entrance. He did that on purpose. He didn't want to shoot at the
24 building because they probably knew there was no one inside.
25 Q. Okay. So essentially there was -- I'll withdraw that question.
1 MR. DI FAZIO: I want to show the witness a document, please,
2 it's 65 ter 597.
3 Q. Okay. Well, we can see it's a Crisis Staff document. It's dated
4 20 April 1992, and it's gone to the chief of Public Security Service in
5 Banja Luka and a Serbian newspaper agency. Who was the chief of Public
6 Security Service Banja Luka at that time?
7 A. Zupljanin.
8 Q. Thanks. And it's an announcement, and it says - and I'm looking
9 at the third paragraph - that:
10 "The Crisis Staff of the Serbian municipality of Sanski Most is
11 of the opinion that force had to be used during the liberation of the
12 Sanski Most Municipal Assembly building from armed formations of the
13 extreme faction of the SDA leadership. Long and exhausting talks simply
14 failed to bear fruit."
15 Now, do you recall any such announcement being made by the
16 Crisis Staff?
17 A. I don't remember this being proclaimed, but it probably was. It
18 could have been in the newspapers, on the radio, but I wasn't aware of
20 Q. Thank you. And --
21 MR. DI FAZIO: Yes, I seek to tender the document into evidence,
22 if Your Honours please.
23 [Trial Chamber confers]
24 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
25 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P356, Your Honours.
1 MR. DI FAZIO: Okay.
2 Can the witness be shown 65 ter 602.
3 Q. Witness, I'd like to get through this document as swiftly as we
4 can because we're -- got time constraints. So I'd just like to ask you
5 to answer a few questions about this document and be as brief as you can.
6 It's dated 22nd of April, 1992, and it's got -- it's apparently signed by
7 the Crisis Staff. And I think if we look at the bottom of the B/C/S you
8 can see a stamp there, Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia and
9 Herzegovina, Sanski Most Municipal Board.
10 Now, the document, firstly -- some of the names here you've
11 already spoken about, and we know some of their names, Ned Rasula,
12 Vrucinic, Vrkes, Savanovic. There's a man there named Mile Gutes, and
13 paragraph 3 concerns his assignment at Sanski Most Serbian radio station.
14 All I want to know is very simple thing, I don't want a big long
15 explanation, all I want to know is do you know of a gentleman actually
16 named Mile Gutes, and was he in some way connected with radio in Sanski
17 Most? That's all I want to know, nothing more.
18 A. Well, he was the husband of one of our employees who worked on
19 ID cards, and at that time I had heard that he was enlisted to become the
20 director of the radio station because he was a Muslim.
21 Q. Right. Thank you --
22 A. Even if he was in that position, I think he didn't stay there for
24 Q. Thank you. One other name that we may not have mentioned to the
25 Trial Chamber thus far is in paragraph 5. Vrucinic is mentioned again
1 and then Mladen Lukic. Who was Mladen Lukic?
2 A. Well, he was a member of the Crisis Staff, a lawyer by
3 profession. He worked for the utility company in charge of general
4 affairs there.
5 Q. Thanks. Go to paragraph 6.
6 "The Crisis Staff of the Serbian municipality of Sanski Most
7 adopts a conclusion that the Serbian defence forces are to be placed at
8 the disposal of the commander of the Serbian Territorial Defence and
9 engaged as a special unit ..."
10 Is that a reference to the SOS, the Serbian defence forces?
11 A. It says clearly Serbian defence forces, therefore SOS -- but it's
12 not clear to me how come that all of a sudden a paramilitary unit is
13 attached to the Territorial Defence because all of them were fighters
14 with the 6th Krajina Brigade. I don't know how this decision was taken.
15 Maybe Colonel Basara wanted to get rid of them, but I find this decision
16 rather odd. But yes, at that time they were attached to the Serbian
17 Territorial Defence.
18 Q. Okay. So on the face of it, on the face of it, this document
19 would indicate that the Crisis Staff was able to exert control over the
21 A. Well, probably they decided to put them under their control,
22 because before that they were not under the control, and with decision
23 they were put under the control and they ceased to be paramilitary unit,
24 if they were one, and to become part of regular forces.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 MR. DI FAZIO: If Your Honours please, I seek to tender that
2 document into evidence. In support of my application, he's made -- the
3 witness has given esoteric information that tends to bolster the
4 authenticity of the document. The evidence relating to Gutes, his some
5 somewhat particular occupation. It's got a stamp on it as well. And the
6 characters are all men that he has discussed and spoken about.
7 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
8 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P357, Your Honours.
9 MR. DI FAZIO: Thanks.
10 Q. Let's move along swiftly.
11 The following day, Monday, that's Monday, the 20th of April, did
12 you go to Banja Luka?
13 A. No. I don't know whether I went to Banja Luka on the second or
14 the third day to see Mr. Zupljanin, but I doubt it was on the second day.
15 So it would be a few days after these events that I went to see him.
16 Q. Thank you. Whenever it was, whether it was the -- Monday or the
17 second or third day, what did you discuss with him?
18 A. I simply went there to inform him about everything that had taken
19 place and how it all went. I know that he was very glad that it was
20 finished in a peaceful way. He was very satisfied that it went
21 peacefully without shooting.
22 Q. And he was satisfied with what in particular, the taking over of
23 the police station and the municipality building or just one or both?
24 A. I don't know what he was satisfied with, but as I say, that it
25 went without any shooting except for a few shots fired around the
1 municipality building. He was happy to see that no one was injured or
2 hurt. He was extremely happy that there were no casualties incurred.
3 Q. Did he give you any instructions?
4 A. I don't recall him giving me any instructions. I simply informed
5 him that the entire territory of the municipality was covered by the
6 active-duty police force; that the situation was very quiet and there
7 were no problems; and that I had erected certain check-points, were only
8 meant to check vehicles not citizens. Therefore, the police work as such
9 went as usual, only with reinforced numbers. And all through to May I
10 don't recall any incident or any problem arising or any complaints coming
11 from the citizens to me. So everything was under control and people went
12 to work normally. I'm not sure only about that first Monday after the
13 event, but the day after, when we saw that the situation was back to
14 normal, everybody came to work, the employees, the supervisors, and
15 everything else. It all lasted until the 1st of May.
16 Q. Thank you. I want to ask you now about the period of time
17 between Monday, the 20th -- yes, Monday, the 20th, and Thursday, the 30th
18 of April, 1992, that period of time. You told us already that you
19 started to carry out your police work. In that time, did a gentleman
20 named Simo Drljaca visit the police in Sanski Most?
21 A. I know that it happened five or six days later or three or four
22 days later. Anyway, the Crisis Staff called me to attend a meeting in
23 that period. When I arrived there, I saw representatives from Prijedor,
24 one of them was Simo Drljaca. I don't remember who the other one was.
25 And Vinko Kondic from Kljuc, the chief from Kljuc, had come accompanied
1 by somebody from the SDS. So there were about four or five new faces on
2 the Crisis Staff.
3 The meeting --
4 Q. Can I just interrupt you. Could you just explain to the
5 Trial Chamber what occupation and position Simo Drljaca and Vinko Kondic
7 A. Vinko Kondic was the chief of the Kljuc SJB, and Simo Drljaca was
8 in Prijedor, he was a lawyer not working for the police. That's all I
10 Q. Okay. And what did -- okay, please, go on and explain to the
11 Trial Chamber what these men were here for -- were there for, and in
12 particular what Drljaca was there for.
13 A. They came there simply to see the model of how we took over
14 power, in order to apply the same model in their municipality. So after
15 this lengthy explanation, they went away without comprehending at all how
16 we did it, and I noticed they were really not happy with that, how was it
17 possible for them not to do what we did, because they didn't understand a
18 thing. And that is why later on in Prijedor during the take over of
19 power, a lot of policemen got killed.
20 Q. So they weren't very pleased with your model of taking over and
21 they went on -- they had their own, as events later bore out?
22 A. Well, they were not displeased with our model. They only
23 couldn't understand how we managed to reach this outcome. It was
24 impossible for them to do that, not in a million years. They probably
25 wanted to apply the same model, having seen that there were no
1 casualties, and they wanted to do it the same way; but it was impossible
2 under their circumstances, in their situation. That's as much as I can
3 tell you.
4 Q. Okay. Thanks.
5 Boro Savanovic is a relative of yours, is he not?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Okay. And we're still focusing on those ten days, 20 to 30 of
8 April. During that period of time did he give you any information about
9 your -- security of your position as police chief?
10 A. In the course of those ten or so days, I had no idea that the
11 Crisis Staff was meeting, except for the meeting attended by people from
12 Prijedor and Kljuc. However, Boro Savanovic and Nemanja Tripkovic would
13 come to see me every evening and try to persuade me to resign. However,
14 I didn't want to accept that. I had some arguments with them, some
15 light-hearted arguments, I have to say, and then on the evening of the
16 29th, when they came again to try to persuade me, and I again told them
17 that I didn't want to withdraw, Boro Savanovic, a relative of mine, told
18 me, "Man, if you don't resign, they're going to kill you." Then I
19 realised how serious it was, and then on the following day when they
20 called me to the Crisis Staff I told them that I was willing to resign.
21 Q. Thank you.
22 MR. DI FAZIO: Can the witness be shown 65 ter 2366. Yes, 2366.
23 Q. Okay. So another Crisis Staff document. This one is indeed
24 dated 29 April, and -- I only want to direct your attention to two
25 paragraphs in particular. First, paragraph 5. And it says:
1 "In connection with appointing the chief of the public security
2 station and the functioning of the Sanski Most STO, Nedeljko Rasula and
3 Nedjo Anicic are instructed to visit Banja Luka."
4 Do you know anything about that?
5 A. I don't.
6 Q. And paragraph 4 above says:
7 "That a sharp statement to be issued on punishment in connection
8 with the disarming of paramilitary formations in Sanski Most ..." and
9 that your relative Savanovic was in charge of this. Do you know anything
10 about that?
11 A. I don't remember. I wasn't at that meeting. I know nothing
12 about these decisions. I didn't even know before the 30th of April that
13 the Crisis Staff was meeting occasionally. Therefore, I cannot comment
14 on that.
15 Q. Thank you.
16 MR. DI FAZIO: And can we just scroll down on the B/C/S version
17 and perhaps look to the next page of the B/C/S version and the page after
18 that, please. Thank you.
19 Q. This document has got a stamp there. Do you recognise that
21 A. Well, that resembles a stamp of the Serbian Democratic Party, at
22 least the coat of arms that I see in the middle. Around that, it's a bit
23 blurred. I cannot read it.
24 Q. Thank you.
25 MR. DI FAZIO: I seek to tender that document into evidence.
1 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and --
2 MR. KRGOVIC: Your Honour, objection, because -- I turn to
4 [Interpretation] The witness did not identify a single portion of
5 this document, nor did he admit to knowing anything about these
6 meeting -- about these decisions. And he also knew nothing about the
7 meetings taking place, therefore there is no nexus between what is said
8 in the document and the testimony given by this witness.
9 [Trial Chamber confers]
10 JUDGE HALL: Yes, the document is marked for identification.
11 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P358, marked for identification,
12 Your Honours.
13 MR. DI FAZIO: Thank you.
14 Can the witness be shown 65 ter 1846, 1846. All right.
15 Q. All right. This document is ...
16 [Prosecution counsel confer]
17 MR. DI FAZIO: Would Your Honours just bear with me for one
18 moment, please.
19 Thanks. While we're waiting for any problems to be sorted out in
20 relation to that document, I can move on to 606, 65 ter 606. Okay.
21 Q. Again, on the face of it a Crisis Staff document. This one's
22 dated 30th of April, conclusions of the Crisis Staff. And the one that
23 concerns you is paragraph 2. And it says that:
24 "The Crisis Staff ... hereby appoints and certifies that
25 Mirko Vrucinic is going to start his job as acting chief of the public
1 security station ... from the 1st of May ... at 9.00 ..." and that they
2 undertake to find a position for you. Does that correspond with what, in
3 fact, happened? Did, in fact, Vrucinic start as acting chief of public
4 security station on the 1st of May?
5 A. This Crisis Staff meeting that I was invited to attend was
6 precisely for the purpose of informing me that Vrucinic was to become
7 chief, and I was offered the position of the chief for national defence.
8 However, I told them I didn't want to leave the police force. And then
9 during all these wrangling and during my explaining to them that this was
10 not the way to dismiss them, they didn't want to listen to reason. They
11 just wanted to dismiss me. I at least asked them to send a telegram to
12 Zupljanin so that he knows, and then they refused to do that. They even
13 refused to call him by phone. They just said, "Please get up and Mirko
14 will sit in your chair." They offered me different positions, but I
15 refused them. So there was a kind of stalemate. They simply didn't know
16 what to do with me. I, myself, knew, but I didn't want to accept that.
17 So we just sat there staring at each other. When I realised that they
18 didn't know what to do, I told them to tell me to take a five-day annual
19 leave, during which time Vrucinic would find an appropriate position
20 within the public security station that was corresponding to my
21 qualifications. Finally they accepted that, and I decided to resign and
22 I left the meeting. Therefore, I only stayed there while this item was
23 on the agenda, and after it has finished I left.
24 Q. Thank you.
25 MR. DI FAZIO: I seek to tender that document into evidence.
1 JUDGE HALL: [Microphone not activated]
2 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the President.
3 JUDGE HALL: Sorry.
4 I suppose inasmuch as he was present for part of this, he is
5 saying, that this is slightly a different category from the --
6 MR. DI FAZIO: It is, at least to that extent, and it has got --
7 his evidence accords with paragraph 2 from that basis.
8 JUDGE HALL: Admitted.
9 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P359, Your Honours.
10 MR. DI FAZIO: And could I just quickly show the witness 2741,
11 65 ter 2741.
12 Q. Okay. It's really the first page that I'm interested in, first
13 and last page. So on this page, the first page of this document, which
14 is entitled: "Job specification and employment overview in Sanski Most
15 SJB on 13 May 1992," the first page shows that Mirko Vrucinic is chief
16 from the 4th of May, 1992. Again, without reading out anything just cast
17 your eye down the page, look at those names of those police there,
18 typists, finance, maintenance people, were they all police working in
19 Sanski Most at the time? We know about Vrucinic. I'm talking about the
21 A. Yes, they were all the employees working at the police station at
22 the time, at least those on this page.
23 Q. Okay. Thanks. And just go to the very last page, it's the last
24 page on both documents, English and B/C/S. Perhaps the second-to-the --
25 perhaps the second-to-last page of the B/C/S. Yes, I think that's
1 better. It says -- well, first of all, do you recognise those names as
2 employees of the SJB?
3 A. Yes, I do.
4 Q. Thank you. And we don't need to dwell on this. I can simply
5 lead you through this. On the last page your name appears, it says
6 unassigned and 4th of May, 1992, previously chief, all of that is true.
7 You were in the police and you were previously the chief of police?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 MR. DI FAZIO: I tender the document.
11 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
12 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P360.
13 MR. DI FAZIO: Okay.
14 Q. Now turn your mind to the period of time after all of these
15 events that you've been talking about, after you were dismissed from your
16 position as police chief. Firstly, do you know of a place in Sanski Most
17 called Betonirka garages?
18 A. Well, Betonirka garages, that was actually company making
19 concrete products. It was close to the public security station, not more
20 than 50 metres. Those were the garages belonging to this company. I
21 suppose you are referring to them, they were close to the road.
22 Q. Yes. Thanks. And do you know of a place called Krings Hall in
23 Sanski Most?
24 A. I do. That was a company established before the war. It was a
25 German company and it was in operation before the war. That's why it was
1 called Krings Hall.
2 Q. And do you know of a sports hall in Sanski Most?
3 A. Yes, I do. It's a town sports hall in Sanski Most.
4 Q. In the months after the end of April, were prisoners taken there,
5 to those places?
6 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] I'm sorry, Your Honours. Both my
7 and Mr. Pantelic's LiveNotes are not working, therefore we are not in a
8 position to follow both the transcript and the witness's testimony.
9 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
10 JUDGE HALL: I understand it's a technical problem which is
11 affecting everyone, and they're trying to sort it out now.
12 MR. DI FAZIO: I'm sorry, I misunderstood. I didn't realise.
13 Q. Okay. Sports hall, Krings Hall, and Betonirka. Were those
14 places used to detain prisoners in the months after your dismissal?
15 A. I was not going to work. I only went once a week. As for the
16 Betonirka building, I never went there. I did hear that there were
17 prisoners there. As for the Krings Hall, on the way towards
18 Lusci Palanka, when I was passing by in my car, I could see people inside
19 the hall. I saw a few reservists and soldiers standing guard. I went to
20 the sports hall once to intercede for one young man to get him out of
21 there. I went on that occasion with Nemanja Tripkovic, who was kind of
22 in charge of that hall, humanitarian sort of thing. So when I went to
23 get that young man out, I saw the place. I don't know anything about
24 Betonirka; I never went there.
25 Q. Thanks. What was the ethnicity of the people in those three
1 locations? The prisoners I'm talking about.
2 A. Muslims and Croats -- I mean probably. You know, who else?
3 Q. Right. Thank you. And you said that you interceded on one
4 occasion for a young man. What was the young man's ethnicity?
5 A. Muslim.
6 Q. And were you successful in getting him out?
7 A. He was released a few days later I think -- in fact, I don't
8 think, I know. But, look, those people were from Mahala. There was a
9 sort of skirmish on the 4th. People left the Mahala, there was no one
10 there anymore. People dispersed around town, everybody found
11 accommodation somewhere, and then the army rounded them up around town,
12 put them into the hall, and then they were transported via Bosanska Krupa
13 towards Cazin and Bihac. So I interceded that time for a young man from
14 Mahala. His mother was friends with my wife --
15 Q. Okay. Thanks.
16 A. [Previous translation continues] ... and that was the connection.
17 Q. Thanks. Do you have any recollection who was --
18 MR. ZECEVIC: Again, the witness was cut in the middle of his
19 answer, Your Honours. I believe he should be -- I understand the
20 concerns my friend is having with the time, but I still believe that the
21 witness should be allowed to answer in full. It's --
22 MR. DI FAZIO: No, I understand --
23 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you.
24 JUDGE HALL: It struck me that the witness was interrupted
25 because he was going off into peripheral information which isn't
1 particularly helpful.
2 MR. DI FAZIO: That's precisely what I was doing. I didn't want
3 to get into the relationship between the mother and the boy, and so on.
4 It just wasn't germane to any of these issues.
5 Q. Were prisoners also taken to the police station?
6 A. At the police station, statements were taken from them -- I mean,
7 as far as I know. I would come once a week only for about a half an hour
8 or an hour. Statements were taken from these people, and if nobody had
9 a -- someone had a record, then they were kept and detained in those
10 facilities. And if you did not have any record, then they were released.
11 Q. What ethnicity were these people?
12 A. Muslims and Croats. I don't know if there were any Serbs among
13 them. That's what I heard from the people in criminal investigations.
14 Q. Was there any problem with accommodating these prisoners at the
15 police station?
16 A. There was a remand facility adjoining the building of the police
17 station, and that's where I heard all the leading people from the SDA and
18 the HDZ and even some policemen were detained.
19 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, Your Honours. 57 -- page 57, line 3 and
20 4, it's entered into the transcript that somebody who had a record then
21 they were kept and detained in those facilities. I don't think that the
22 witness had said exactly that. Maybe my friend can re-address. Thank
24 MR. DI FAZIO: Thank you.
25 Q. You mentioned earlier, just a moment ago, that -- in answer to
1 the question of whether prisoners were taken to the police station, that
2 you would go there about once a week for an hour and a half, statements
3 were taken from the police -- from these people, and if somebody had a
4 record then they were kept and detained in those facilities. Is that
5 what you said, or has it been misunderstood?
6 A. Well, when they were giving statements, if the investigators
7 found them responsible, liable, for some sort of offence they were kept;
8 others who were found to be clean were released. This was done not only
9 by the police station, the public security station, but also the military
10 police who were based at the police station. I believe that in fact it
11 was the military police who was, in that matter, senior. On the
12 occasions when I stopped by, I heard from the men working in the criminal
13 investigations department that those who were found to be guilty of
14 something were kept, while the others were allowed to go home.
15 Q. Okay. So military police and police were working together
16 insofar as these prisoners were concerned?
17 MR. KRGOVIC: I mean, objection, Your Honour. It's a leading
18 question. The witness didn't say -- said [indiscernible] the senior was
19 the military police. He didn't say they were working together.
20 MR. DI FAZIO: Okay. Perhaps I'll withdraw the question.
21 Q. Let me ask you this: Were the military police interrogating
22 prisoners as were the police?
23 A. Well, I would see them. I saw even some of our own agents who
24 had been retired. They were ex-investigators who were now mobilised by
25 the military police for this work. I saw one such person who was
1 conducting questioning upstairs in one room. He was taking statements
2 for these prisoners at the public security station. The investigators
3 were only helping the military police. The military police was in
4 charge, as far as I can remember my conversations with the investigators
5 from the criminal investigation service.
6 Q. Were police involved in arresting prisoners and feeding them into
7 these detention -- or these places, the police station, sports hall,
8 Krings Hall, and Betonirka?
9 A. I was never able to see any policemen going around and rounding
10 up people, but I did see military police getting out of their cars,
11 walking up to houses and taking people out. I saw the military police
12 doing that. Whether anyone from our police station did the same work, I
13 don't know. I would just drop by once a week to see if a job was found
14 for me, some suitable position, the man would tell me, "No," and I would
15 go home.
16 Q. Where did you see the police -- military police rounding up
18 A. Around town, around villages. The village next to me was a
19 Muslim village. I saw a couple of times military police vehicles, four
20 or five military policemen getting out and going up to a house and taking
21 someone out. I saw that more than once.
22 Q. All right. Do you have any --
23 A. I saw Muslims being detained, arrested.
24 Q. Thanks. Do you have any recollection of the police cells
25 becoming full and that triggering the use of Krings Hall, Betonirka? Do
1 you have any recollection of that?
2 A. Of course that was the reason, when this remand facility by the
3 police station was full you couldn't put any more people inside. They
4 probably decided that it was only able to hold up -- to hold a certain
5 number of people, and after that number was reached, first they used
6 Betonirka, and then they involved the Krings Hall as well when Betonirka
7 was full.
8 Q. Thank you. Now I'd like to finish up with that document that I
9 referred to earlier --
10 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Di Fazio, it's time for the break.
11 MR. DI FAZIO: Oh -- well, I can indicate -- I think we need to
12 address you about that. I can indicate I've got one minor topic to
13 finish, and that's it.
14 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, may I just raise the question of what
15 happens tomorrow. It's clear that this witness will go into tomorrow. I
16 understand he's expressed some disquiet, not surprisingly, about the
17 length of time he's been here. This came from VWS. So what we're going
18 to suggest is that this witness, in fact, his cross-examination is
19 completed before we start the videolink. We should still start the
20 videolink tomorrow, but just not at 9.00. I think it would be somewhat
21 unfortunate because the next witness is likely to take a long time -- or
22 certainly longer than this witness.
23 JUDGE HARHOFF: How much time did the Defence ask for?
24 JUDGE DELVOIE: They asked for five hours in total, so we can't
25 do that tomorrow.
1 JUDGE HARHOFF: All together five hours, Ms. Korner.
2 JUDGE DELVOIE: So tomorrow, if you want to do it tomorrow, then
3 tomorrow is gone.
4 MS. KORNER: Yes, well, then I think that will have to be --
5 Your Honour, I think there's a certain undesirability in any event of our
6 interposing a witness who is going to deal with much of the same events,
7 although at a later stage. If tomorrow's witness on videolink is
8 certainly going to take, I think the best part of three days with
9 cross-examination, that means that this gentleman would have to wait
10 until Friday, and I think that's highly undesirable. I think it's better
11 that we complete cross-examination of him and then start the next witness
12 thereafter. And if that means having to start him on Wednesday rather
13 than tomorrow, then so be it. I understand we've got an extended sitting
14 for Thursday in any event.
15 [Trial Chamber and Legal Officer confer]
16 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mrs. Korner.
17 MS. KORNER: Yes.
18 JUDGE HARHOFF: Apparently there's a difficulty in having the
19 video line established for Friday.
20 MS. KORNER: Right.
21 JUDGE HARHOFF: And I regret the outcome of this because we
22 actually put this to your colleagues on Friday when we adjourned, asking
23 the Prosecution if they were really sure that --
24 MS. KORNER: I know it was -- Your Honour, I'm sorry, that was a
25 mistake. Because -- and indeed it wasn't -- we understood he was happy
1 to remain. The information -- and perhaps you can ask him now, because
2 the information we've got from VWS is that he's deeply unhappy about
3 remaining for -- until Friday, which would effectively be when he was
4 crossed -- sorry, when he was cross-examined.
5 [Trial Chamber and Legal Officer confer]
6 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, I know it's -- I'm sorry it's created
7 such difficulty. In fact, the message from VWS came this morning to us.
8 Up till then we'd understood he didn't mind staying. The difficulty is
9 we can't really send him away and bring him back again. I mean, he'll be
10 in -- because he's part heard in examination, and he can't talk to
11 anybody, and that's going to be impossible.
12 JUDGE HALL: Excuse me, sir, the -- I suppose you would have
13 heard what has passed between the Bench and counsel, and the -- there are
14 a number of decisions which we have to make, one of them being -- well,
15 some of those decisions being contingent on your -- I shouldn't say
16 availability because you are already in this matter as a witness, but we
17 are keenly aware of the inconvenience which merely being here as a
18 witness causes and the aggravation of that inconvenience if, as we
19 considered on -- when we rose on Friday and up to today, that your -- the
20 completion of your testimony would be interrupted to accommodate another
21 witness who's testifying by videolink. But the question I have to ask is
22 what is your -- if you have to be stood down after tomorrow's sitting
23 until Friday, what do you have to say about that? Could we hear directly
24 from you, please.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, if that can be avoided; if it
1 can't ...
2 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, may I suggest, is it possible to have
3 an -- is it possible to have an extended sitting tomorrow? Is that --
4 it's not, because we understood that the court might be available.
5 JUDGE HARHOFF: [Microphone not activated]
6 [Trial Chamber confers]
7 JUDGE HALL: Could we return to this after the break.
8 --- Recess taken at 12.13 p.m.
9 [The witness stands down]
10 --- On resuming at 12.44 p.m.
11 JUDGE HALL: Despite the extended break and the discussions which
12 would have occupied our time, we are not in a position to give a
13 definitive answer or ruling on the matter of how we proceed with the rest
14 of the week. But the -- we hope to be in a position to do so at the end
15 of today, and you would be advised in the usual manner.
16 But in terms of where we are now, Mr. Di Fazio, could we safely
17 assume that by the end of today's session you would have completed your
18 examination-in-chief of this witness?
19 MR. DI FAZIO: Yes, we can. In fact, we can assume that I'll --
20 all things going well, I'll finish it in the next five minutes.
21 JUDGE HALL: Thank you.
22 MS. KORNER: If Your Honours will excuse me then, I mean that's
23 only the reason I came into court, was to alert you to the problem. So
24 I'll wait for your ruling obviously on how we proceed.
25 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you. The difficulty is, as you will
1 appreciate, that we don't know as of yet whether we can have the
2 videolink established also for Friday. If we can, then I think we should
3 finish this witness; if we can't, then it would make no sense to only
4 start the video conference on Wednesday and then go on for Wednesday and
5 Thursday and then have to excuse the witness and resume next week with
6 the video conference. That's the issue.
7 [The witness takes the stand]
8 MS. KORNER: Yes, Your Honours, what we had unofficially worked
9 out between us was that we thought even with cross-examination of
10 Mr. Majkic that the videolink would in any event start tomorrow. We've
11 had informal discussions between counsel. But as I say, I'll leave it,
12 and if necessary, then clearly we will have to reduce -- in order to
13 finish with an extended sitting on Thursday, we do have to reduce how
14 long we take in chief as well as cross.
15 JUDGE HARHOFF: That's another option. The third option is to
16 all together postpone the video conference until the next week again, and
17 then have the two remaining witnesses that you have planned for this
18 week, but I mean --
19 MS. KORNER: Yes, Your Honour, I can't remember who --
20 JUDGE HARHOFF: 113 and 121.
21 MS. KORNER: Right. Your Honour, I think that -- we're still
22 awaiting the result of the service of the summons on the witness. We
23 don't know yet what's happened there. He's due next week, so we've got a
24 sort of packed week, as it were, already. Yeah. So let's --
25 Your Honours, we'll wait and see what happens with this. Thank you very
2 MR. DI FAZIO: Your Honours, I think hard copies of 65 ter 603
3 have been now distributed, that's the extra document that I added that I
4 wanted to raise that had not been on my list. And can the witness please
5 be shown the electronic version on the screen.
6 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Di Fazio, at a certain moment you were
7 announcing another document, if my memory is good, it's 118 and
8 something -- but it wasn't at first sight on our -- on our list. Are you
9 not bothering anymore --
10 MR. DI FAZIO: I've looked at that. I don't think -- I think the
11 other documents that I referred to later covered the point the point --
12 [overlapping speakers]
13 JUDGE DELVOIE: Okay. Okay.
14 MR. DI FAZIO: So I think it's probably going to be superfluous,
15 and we can just avoid it. Thanks.
16 Q. Now, Mr. Majkic, again on the face of it, a Crisis Staff document
17 dated 24 April 1992, and the first paragraph is the main point that I
18 want to ask you about. Essentially it's this: The Crisis Staff has
19 decided that there's going to be a curfew and that the curfew starts from
20 the 24th of April, and that the chief of public security station is
21 charged with implementing the decision. Are you aware of any such
23 JUDGE HALL: Yes, Mr. Cvijetic.
24 MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] I'm not sure, but I believe that
25 on the screen in the Serbian version we are looking at the previous
1 document, the one from before, not the current English document.
2 MR. DI FAZIO: I can't tell -- oh, yes, I can, because -- well,
3 it's the same date.
4 JUDGE HARHOFF: [Microphone not activated]
5 MR. DI FAZIO: 603 is the document that I'm interested in and
6 the ...
7 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Di Fazio --
8 MR. DI FAZIO: Oh, I see, the English is incorrect as well. I'm
9 sorry. I apologise for that. I was looking at the one I have in front
10 of me on the left-hand. I'm sorry, Your Honours, I didn't bother to
11 check whether we had the correct one actually on the screen. Yes.
12 Thank you. I appreciate that.
13 Q. Okay. Again, I won't go -- I won't bother repeating everything
14 I've said. You can see it's 24th of April. Paragraph 1 deals with a
15 curfew. And apparently the chief of public security has got to implement
16 the curfew. Do you know anything about a curfew being imposed on the
17 24th of April?
18 A. It could be that someone from the Crisis Staff told me they had
19 decided to impose a curfew probably. I tried to remember whether a
20 curfew was in place at that time. I think it was someone from the
21 Crisis Staff told me at one point they were about to impose a curfew.
22 Q. Thank you. And in addition to being told that the Crisis Staff
23 was about to impose a curfew, can you tell the Trial Chamber if indeed a
24 curfew was imposed, even if you don't know the date?
25 A. Well, I'm trying to say I can't remember at all. I've been
1 trying over the past few days to remember, but it's just not coming back
2 to me. I don't know if there was a curfew or if someone told me, or
3 perhaps it was announced on the radio and in the newspapers as a decision
4 of the Crisis Staff. I really can't remember.
5 Q. Thank you.
6 MR. DI FAZIO: Well, if Your Honours please, bearing in mind the
7 accumulation of those several comments: can remember someone approaching
8 him, talking to him; it might have been mentioned on the radio; and that
9 it was imposed, I would then seek on the basis of all of that to tender
10 the document.
11 JUDGE HALL: Yes, admitted and marked, Mr. Di Fazio.
12 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P361, Your Honours.
13 MR. DI FAZIO:
14 Q. Mr. Majkic, thank you very much for answering my questions.
15 MR. DI FAZIO: If Your Honours please, I have no further
17 JUDGE HALL: Cross-examination.
18 MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, the Defence of
19 Mr. Stanisic will also cross-examine. We just changed the sequence
20 because Mr. Zupljanin's Defence has more questions and asked for more
21 time. Therefore, only if Mr. Pantelic has not covered certain topics
22 relevant to us, I will question the witness additionally, and I might
23 need less time.
24 JUDGE HALL: [Previous translation continues]...
25 MR. PANTELIC: [Microphone not activated]
1 Cross-examination by Mr. Pantelic:
2 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Majkic. My name is
3 Igor Pantelic. I am appearing here for Mr. Zupljanin.
4 A. Nice to meet you.
5 Q. We've already seen each other, it was last week at a meeting
6 organised by the Victims and Witnesses service. We went through a couple
7 of documents and we are going to do so again to clarify certain points
8 that the Prosecutor has questioned you about. One more thing, answer --
9 after each answer, please - and after each question - pause for about
10 five seconds so that both can be interpreted properly.
11 Mr. Majkic, if I remember well, you were appointed as chief of
12 the public security station of Sanski Most sometime in July, more
13 precisely on the 9th of July, 1991?
14 A. Right.
15 Q. And from that time until the 30th of April, 1992, you were chief
16 of the Sanski Most public security station, and as such you attended the
17 so-called expanded meetings of the collegium of the security services
18 centre in Banja Luka at regular intervals?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. At those meetings at the CSB Banja Luka, there were discussions
21 about the state of affairs in and the work of individual police stations
22 within the CSB Banja Luka?
23 A. Not individual police stations, but all police stations were
24 represented at the meetings that took place once a month and were
25 convened by Mr. Zupljanin.
1 Q. And in that whole period while you were chief of the police
2 station in Sanski Most, you had occasion to get to know Mr. Zupljanin.
3 Could you give the Trial Chamber your personal view of Mr. Zupljanin and
4 his professional work as much as you were able to learn about it in that
5 relatively short time.
6 A. Myself, I can say that Mr. Zupljanin, in regard to us who worked
7 in police stations and for most of the citizenry, was an example of a
8 good person and a good policeman. We all appreciated him and held him in
9 high esteem. Whenever any of us had a work-related or even a
10 non-work-related problem, we knew that we could address Mr. Zupljanin
11 personally, come to see him, call him on the phone, and he was always
12 helpful and forthcoming towards everyone. And that's precisely what we
13 respected him for.
14 Q. To your knowledge, did Mr. Zupljanin treat equally all three
15 ethnic communities, given that in the police in that area there were
16 members of all three ethnicities in high positions?
17 A. Whenever I was in contact with him, never ever did I notice any
18 hint of his being biassed on an ethnic principles, and that is why I
19 liked him as a person because for him ethnicity was in the last place.
20 He must more appreciated professionalism and everything else. So he
21 treated all the chiefs, the Serbs, the Muslims, and others, equally.
22 Q. Therefore, we can conclude that Mr. Zupljanin was in his work,
23 insofar as you were able to see, always tolerant towards all his
24 co-workers regardless of their ethnicity?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Now, Mr. Majkic, we have to address a topic, an area, that has
2 been imposed on us primarily by the Prosecution because they have certain
3 theory on that, and we are going to waste time on this, but what can we
4 do? That's our job. The Prosecution submits that Republika Srpska and
5 all its organs, including the police, are a totally illegal structure,
6 and that is why we have been spending so much time discussing this issue.
7 Now, what I want to ask you is this: Do you agree with me that Bosnia
8 and Herzegovina had been designed as a republic, made up of three
9 constituent peoples: Serbs, Muslims, and Croats. Is that correct?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. And in Bosnia and Herzegovina as such, it was always important to
12 provide the protection of the interests of each constituent people; is
13 that right?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Sometime towards the end of 1991, more precisely in October, the
16 Serbian people were out-voted in the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina
17 when the deputies of Serbian ethnicity walked out. Do you remember that?
18 A. Yes, I do.
19 Q. Bearing in mind the grave situation that prevailed in the former
20 Yugoslavia which threatened to spillover into Bosnia-Herzegovina, the
21 international community made an effort in order to try and solve these
22 tensions in a certain manner; is that right?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. One of the solutions proffered was in February 1992, where the
25 so-called Cutileiro's Plan was adopted which envisaged the formation of
1 three ethnic entities in Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that correct?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. You may not know this, but I'm going to tell you and then you can
4 agree or disagree with this and that is: According to this plan, each
5 ethnicity or entity was to have its own police force. Is that right?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Now, let us move to the present. At the moment there are two
8 entities existing in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Republika Srpska and the
9 Muslim/Croat Federation.
10 A. Only Federation. It's not called the Muslim/Croat Federation.
11 Q. All right. To all intents and purposes, this Federation is
12 actually made up of the Muslim and the Croat peoples?
13 A. Including some Serbian returnees.
14 Q. On the other hand, the other entity is Republika Srpska; right?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Each of these entities nowadays has its own police force; right?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Do you know what kind of emblem is worn by the police officers in
19 the Federation, what do they have on their caps and on their armbands?
20 A. On their caps they have a metal star which has a coat of arms in
21 it with three fields. One is chequered part, the other one is
22 fleur-de-lis, and the third one is the emblem of the international
23 community, and they have the same patches on their sleeves.
24 Q. The chequered flag is the symbol of the Croatian people in
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that right?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. The fleur-de-lis is the symbol of the Muslim people in the
3 Federation; right?
4 A. Yes.
5 JUDGE HARHOFF: Where are we heading with this, Mr. Pantelic.
6 MR. PANTELIC: We are heading, Your Honour, to the issue which
7 was raised by the Prosecution in its theory regarding the symbols of the
8 police uniforms in Republika Srpska.
9 My next question will conclude this issue, simply because it is
10 indisputable fact that in 1992 all three parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina
11 got their own flags, symbols, coat of arms, et cetera, like in
12 Republika Srpska with three-coloured flag, in Muslim/Croat Federation the
13 respective -- their respective symbols. So simply, to show that at least
14 it was not -- there is not any discriminatory intent from the Serbian
15 part to introduce relevant symbols on uniforms, simply as that. Because
16 obviously OTP is dealing with this issue, trying to create this sort of
17 discriminatory intent on the part of Serbian authorities. So I will just
18 clarify this issue and conclude this topic, with your permission of
19 course, Your Honour.
20 JUDGE HARHOFF: I'm not convinced that this is entirely relevant,
21 but if you can round it up quickly, then please do so.
22 MR. PANTELIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE HARHOFF: I mean, be aware of the constraints of time on
25 MR. PANTELIC: Thank you.
1 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Majkic, let us conclude. In 1992 as well,
2 practically all the three warring parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina had their
3 own police emblems. The Serbs had their tri-colour, the Muslims had the
4 fleur-de-lis, and the Croatian police had the chequered flag; is that
6 A. Yes. I know about the Serbian police for sure, but as for the
7 others you're probably right.
8 Q. In your statement you mentioned that while you were the SJB chief
9 in Sanski Most, that that was more of a function of a coordinator for
10 various departments within the station.
11 A. We were not officials. We were management, so to speak, and our
12 duty was to coordinate the work of all constituent part of the police,
13 that is the police, the administrative service, the communications
14 centre, et cetera. So our role was simply to coordinate their work.
15 Q. And the same principle was applied at the level of the CSB;
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Tell me this, Mr. Majkic: Your commander at the Sanski Most
19 station had a direct operative connection with the Banja Luka CSB, with
20 the official who was in charge of public security. You can tell me what
21 his title was.
22 A. Bajazid Jahic was head of the public security sector. In other
23 words, he was in charge of all the authorised officials, both the CID and
24 the police. And he had a job title of the deputy chief of the centre.
25 Q. He was a Muslim and he was in the Banja Luka CSB; right?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. The commander of your station practically had a vertical
3 operative connection with Bajazid Jahic; is that right?
4 A. Yes, as well as the head of the CID.
5 MR. DI FAZIO: If Your Honours please, I'm not objecting at all
6 in terms of this -- the content, the topic. But it's not clear to me and
7 it should be clear, I submit, what precisely a vertical operative
8 connection is. Is Mr. Pantelic talking about subordination within the
9 police force; if so, that should be made clear. And if the implication
10 is that there was no subordination between the head of the --
11 MR. PANTELIC: I will clarify that --
12 MR. DI FAZIO: Just let me finish. We've also got to be clear
13 that there is -- if the suggestion is being made that the commander at
14 the Sanski Most police station did not have any subordinate relation with
15 this witness, if that's the implication, then that also should be clear,
16 so that you can understand that evidence and you can understand exactly
17 what a vertical operative connection is.
18 MR. PANTELIC: [Interpretation] Very well. Let us clarify this.
19 Q. In your public security station in Sanski Most, you had a
20 co-worker of yours who was the station commander; right?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. You also had your assistant who was in charge of the criminal
23 investigation service?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Of course you were in charge of other sectors, like
1 administrative ones and such-like, but we are not going to talk about
2 them now. What I am interested in is the following. The head of the CID
3 in Sanski Most had a direct operative relationship with the Banja Luka
4 CSB, but along their line of work, that is, the criminal investigation.
5 A. Yes, with Bajazid Jahic, who was in charge of both the police and
6 the CID.
7 Q. Precisely so. Let's make an example. If there is an operation
8 aimed at breaking up the smuggling ring, the drug smuggling ring, the
9 people from the CSB Banja Luka coordinate, the whole operation with your
10 respective head in your police station, and they carry out what is within
11 their purview?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. When you became chief of the Sanski Most SJB, you and your
14 associate introduced a practice of holding the so-called morning staff
15 meetings in order to see what happened on the previous day and to
16 coordinate your activities?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. You would certainly then be in a position to institute certain
19 proceedings if you were told at these staff meetings that a policeman has
20 abused or violated conduct of -- or duty -- conduct or behaviour. For
21 example, that one of the policemen had beaten up somebody who had been
22 brought into the police station, and you would have a report on that
23 immediately the next morning on your desk.
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. You would then suspend such a police officer and compiled an
1 official report for further measures to be taken. If the circumstances
2 were such that it constituted a criminal offence, then you would report
3 this to the public prosecutor.
4 A. Yes, of course. Any criminal offence should be forwarded to our
5 prosecutor, whether it had -- it was committed by a policeman or by an
6 ordinary citizen.
7 Q. Well, that was exactly my point. If you had any knowledge that
8 there was a breach of authority within your police station, you would
9 take measures within the rules and regulations and the Law on the
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Within your regular report at the collegiums at the Banja Luka
13 CSB, your written reports and statistical analysis, there would be a note
14 saying that, for example, certain members of the SJB Sanski Most were
15 subject to disciplinary or any other proceedings?
16 A. If something of that sort happened in our police station, that
17 would be contained within the relevant daily report. And in addition to
18 that, we in the police would take statements from all other policemen
19 concerning the circumstances, and we would establish whether there was
20 any breach of official duty or not. We would investigate it, and if it
21 has been established that there was an offence committed it would be
22 forwarded to the commission in the centre, and this commission was in
23 charge of conducting disciplinary procedure. If a criminal offence was
24 committed by a police officer, of course the report would go to the
25 public prosecutor, and then it would be up to him to decide how to
1 proceed further.
2 Q. That was exactly my point. Stojan Zupljanin, as the head of the
3 CSB, if he hasn't received any dispatch from you or any report from you
4 that a procedure has been instituted, then he cannot guess about anything
5 going on if he hadn't received this information from the lower instance?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. I have a couple of questions for you about the situation in
8 Sanski Most. Tell me if you agree or not with the following conclusions
9 of mine. One of the conclusions is that there was an intensive political
10 activity in Sanski Most carried out by the SDS, SDA, and the HDZ
11 concerning resolving the situation and the tensions in Sanski Most; is
12 that right?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And members of all these three political parties were in
15 negotiations and trying to agree how to carry out a division along ethnic
16 lines, not only of power but also of territory in Sanski Most?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. So there was no talk about any forcible take-over of power. That
19 was an ongoing negotiating process and looking for agreement on the
20 conditions under which these three ethnic communities in Sanski Most
21 would continue to live?
22 A. Yes.
23 MR. PANTELIC: Could we have -- [Interpretation] Could we please
24 now look at 5355 [as interpreted], MFI.
25 Q. You have reviewed this document with my learned friend, the
1 Prosecutor. This refers to the meeting at the CSB held on the 6th of
2 April. And now in paragraph 1 it says that major problems have arose in
3 B&H and that certain principles that were established at the level of the
4 international community and that the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina is seen
5 as the form of co-existence of these three constituent units.
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Further on in this dispatch it says that Republika Srpska has
8 been established, that its constitution was promulgated, and that the
9 Assembly also adopted the Law on the Internal Affairs of the Serbian
10 Republic of BH; is that right?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. On page 2 of this dispatch it reads that the previous dispatch
13 from the Ministry of the Interior of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and
14 Herzegovina of the 2nd of April actually recommended that the entire
15 transformation be implemented peacefully and without any incidents or
16 excesses. Correct?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. In the spirit of these principles, you, too, in Sanski Most made
19 efforts to divide your work with the other two chiefs?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. However, already in April 1992 we are facing some indisputable
22 facts: One, Republika Srpska is in existence.
23 A. Correct.
24 Q. There is a constitution of Republika Srpska.
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. There is a government of Republika Srpska.
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. And finally, there is a Ministry of the Interior of
4 Republika Srpska.
5 A. Right.
6 Q. Now, in para 8 of this dispatch it is stipulated -- look at
7 para 8.
8 A. I can't see it yet.
9 Q. It's page 4.
10 A. I see it now.
11 Q. In that paragraph, 8, we read, among other things, that a very
12 rigorous test will be held to select candidates for active duty, and
13 priority shall be given to the employees of the former Ministry of the
14 Interior who for any reason whatsoever were forced to change their place
15 of residence.
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Now, I'm putting it to you that a large number of MUP members
18 from the former Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbian members, had been
19 expelled from towns where Muslims and Croats had taken over, and they had
20 all flocked to Republika Srpska. And herein the instructions of the
21 ministry, we see that those people who had been expelled from their towns
22 and their homes, who were professional, who were former policemen, will
23 have priority in the filling of vacancies at the Ministry of the Interior
24 of Republika Srpska.
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. There is also a reference to Serbian policemen expelled from
2 Croatia who would also be eligible for jobs at the Ministry of the
3 Interior of Republika Srpska; correct?
4 A. Yes.
5 MR. PANTELIC: [Interpretation] Could we now get 65 ter 83.
6 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Pantelic.
7 MR. PANTELIC: Yes.
8 JUDGE HALL: Before you move on, this document, I'm reminded, was
9 marked for identification.
10 MR. PANTELIC: Yes.
11 JUDGE HALL: You having used it for your own purposes, do you
12 wish to, as it were, join the Prosecution in asking that it be tendered
13 as an exhibit at this stage?
14 MR. PANTELIC: Yes, I would do that, yes.
15 [Trial Chamber confers]
16 JUDGE HALL: So we would now mark it as an -- enter it and mark
17 it as an exhibit.
18 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 1D78, Your Honours.
19 MR. DI FAZIO: And it doesn't matter much, I suppose,
20 Your Honours, but shouldn't this be a Prosecution exhibit? We originally
21 sought its admission. Now events have -- at that stage marked for
22 identification. Now events have allowed it --
23 JUDGE HALL: Yes, yes, yes.
24 MR. DI FAZIO: P355, yes.
25 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
1 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P362, Your Honours.
2 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, Your Honours, I think Mr. Di Fazio
3 called that this document was already admitted, MFI'd, P355, so therefore
4 he shouldn't -- this document shouldn't have a new number.
5 THE REGISTRAR: I was confused. The counsel is correct. I
7 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you.
8 MR. PANTELIC: [Microphone not activated]
9 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
10 MR. PANTELIC: [Microphone not activated]
11 Sorry. So now this exhibit is P355. Just for the record. My
12 microphone was off.
13 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Majkic, now on your screen you see another
14 dispatch sent by the CSB Banja Luka to all public security stations and
15 also to the MUP of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It
16 refers to a variety of activities in April of 1992, but what is important
17 to me here is the passage that is underlined, namely, that the
18 obligations mentioned in this telegram do not apply to Prijedor and
19 Kotor Varos police stations and that authorised officers at these
20 stations may continue to wear the current insignia, pending the
21 resolution of the political situation in these municipalities. Do you
22 see that?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. I infer from this that Sanski Most and the other municipalities
25 you mentioned in your answers to the Prosecution practically were subject
1 to the same principles as Prijedor and Kotor Varos; right?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Therefore, Zupljanin is not talking about attacks, about violent
4 take-overs, about any kind of violence; on the contrary. He's talking of
5 the need to find a solution in a peaceful and tolerant, civilised way
6 with the agreement between political parties and the communities in the
7 given municipality.
8 A. Correct.
9 MR. PANTELIC: May we have, Your Honour, a number for this
10 exhibit. I would like to tender it because it's -- corresponds to the
11 previous explanations of this witness of the previous municipalities.
12 And now we shall have a more broader picture.
13 [Trial Chamber confers]
14 MR. PANTELIC: If there is no objections from Prosecution's side.
15 MR. DI FAZIO: No, there's no objection, but I just wonder if we
16 could be clear so that I'm -- did this have a 65 ter number?
17 MR. PANTELIC: 65 ter 83.
18 MR. DI FAZIO: Thank you. No objection.
19 JUDGE HALL: So it -- admitted and marked.
20 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit 1D78, Your Honours.
21 MR. PANTELIC: Much obliged, Your Honours.
22 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry --
23 THE REGISTRAR: I do apologise, Your Honour, this is indeed 2D18.
24 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
25 MR. PANTELIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. In your statement given to the Prosecution in 2001 and an annex
2 in 2008 -- or rather, a supplemental statement in 2008, and today as
3 well, you mentioned that you were facing serious risk to your life,
4 serious threats to your life at the time you resigned; is that right?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Can you tell the Trial Chamber if Mr. Zupljanin perhaps had
7 similar problems with his associate Vlado Tutus who was then a police
8 official and member of SDS in Banja Luka? Can you perhaps make a
9 comparison between your own personal situation and the situation of
10 Mr. Zupljanin. Could you tell that in your own words to the
11 Trial Chamber, the problems both you and Mr. Zupljanin were facing.
12 A. That day, on the 30th of April when the Crisis Staff practically
13 replaced me, that evening around 7.00 p.m., I called Mr. Zupljanin at his
14 home and told him how I had been treated at the hands of the
15 Crisis Staff. In that conversation, Zupljanin told me, "Majkic, if
16 you're quite sure that you can win this challenge at the Assembly
17 meeting," which was scheduled for the 4th of May, "if you can win, if you
18 have a chance, go to the Assembly, you have my full support. But if
19 you're not sure, run or they will kill you." He actually said the same
20 thing as my relative, Boro Savanovic. And then Zupljanin continued to
21 say, "I am in a similar plight. Your fellow, this Tutus," happens to be
22 from the same town as I, "is preparing my replacement. I cannot
23 guarantee that I will stay in my position because there is great pressure
24 from certain fractions in the SDS that I be replaced." That was the end
25 of that conversation. I resigned -- I was replaced, rather, whereas he
1 managed to stay in his position, fortunately or unfortunately for him, I
2 don't know anymore.
3 And I know that during those days there was a major fight in the
4 CSB about who will be the chief, Tutus or Zupljanin.
5 Q. [Microphone not activated]
6 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
7 MR. PANTELIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. During that phone call, did Zupljanin mention that he had also
9 received death threats as part of this political play?
10 A. I can't recall. If he had received threats, I don't know why he
11 would have shared it with me. He said, "Only I am in the same situation
12 as you are. I cannot know whether I'm going to stay in my position or
13 not." But if he was really in the same situation as I, then he might
14 have well received threats as well.
15 Q. All right. Tell me now ...
16 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
17 JUDGE HALL: Yes, Mr. Pantelic.
18 MR. PANTELIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
19 Q. [Interpretation] When Mirko Vrucinic replaced you as chief of the
20 police station in Sanski Most and you had occasion to talk to him and
21 consult with him and exchange opinions, tell the Trial Chamber what
22 advice did you give to Mirko Vrucinic for his future work as a
23 professional, and what did he tell you? Tell the Trial Chamber briefly.
24 A. First of all, he mentioned one case, something that happened
25 after the military operation in Hrustovo and Vrhpolje when people left
1 that area and when raids started on those two villages and the looting
2 began. I told Mirko that he had enough policemen to seal off these two
3 villages, to stop the looting, because refugees were coming in every day
4 and they could well use the accommodation available in these villages.
5 Not everyone could be accommodated in town. And indeed, Mirko took my
6 advice. He provided enough men to guard and seal off both villages.
7 Later on I noticed that some policemen tend to take orders from
8 other policemen and do other business around town. I told Vrucinic to
9 disregard those people at the municipality and to listen more to
10 Zupljanin and police officials. There were two or three cases that
11 prompted me to tell him that, and his answer was - I'll try to quote
12 him - he says, "Majkic, you can't mean it about the centre and Zupljanin.
13 The municipal government is the real power. They are the state." And he
14 told me that two or three times, which means that I must have spoken to
15 him two or three times, trying to give him professional advice.
16 JUDGE HALL: [Microphone not activated] Mr. Pantelic.
17 MR. PANTELIC: Yes.
18 JUDGE HALL: [Microphone not activated]
19 MR. PANTELIC: No, it's --
20 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the President, please.
21 MR. PANTELIC: Just one more question, and I'm finished for
23 JUDGE HALL: Yes.
24 Q. [Interpretation] So in conclusion, despite the fact that as a
25 colleague and a professional and a friend you advised Vrucinic to stick
1 to the professional line of command, he refused and he coordinated and
2 cooperated instead with the local mandarins?
3 A. Yes.
4 MR. PANTELIC: Your Honour, I think it's time now for
5 adjournment, I believe it's the time.
6 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Majkic, your testimony is still not at an end
7 because you appreciate you're being cross-examined by Mr. Pantelic.
8 The -- you remember that at the last adjournment I had alerted you to
9 certain procedural matters which we are trying to resolve. I am advised
10 that the current arrangements are that it is expected that your
11 cross-examination would be completed by tomorrow. So we rise now for the
12 day, and I repeat -- I remind you of the warnings about not speaking to
13 anyone outside the Chamber about the case or speaking with the lawyers on
14 either side. But you would return to this chamber at 9.00 tomorrow
15 morning. Thank you.
16 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.46 p.m.,
17 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 17th day of
18 November, 2009, at 9.00 a.m.