1 Tuesday, 26 January 2010
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.09 a.m.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is case number
6 IT-08-91-T. The Prosecutor versus Mico Stanisic and Stojan Zupljanin.
7 JUDGE HALL
8 Prosecution has a preliminary matter to raise. The Chamber itself has a
9 preliminary matter which it wishes to address, but before that I take the
10 appearance, please.
11 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour. For the Office of the
12 Prosecutor I'm Tom Hannis along with Crispian Smith.
13 MR. ZECEVIC: Good morning, Your Honours. Slobodan Zecevic,
14 Slobodan Cvijetic, Eugene O'Sullivan, Tatjana Savic appearing for
15 Stanisic Defence this morning.
16 MR. PANTELIC: Good morning, Your Honours. For Zupljanin
17 Defence, Igor Pantelic and Dragan Krgovic.
18 JUDGE HALL
19 The matter which the Chamber wishes to raise is this, yesterday
20 the -- we were apprised of the proposal of the Prosecution to place in
21 evidence, presumably through the witness at present on the stand, this
22 document which they only recently were able to tender -- to seek to
23 tender in evidence, notwithstanding that they would have been aware of
24 the possibility of this at an earlier stage, and as far as the Chamber is
25 aware, neither the Chamber nor the other side was alerted to this. But
1 be that as it may, there is a procedural difficulty in as much as the
2 Prosecution having closed -- having completed its examination-in-chief of
3 the present witness and documents not merely coming in by migration, as
4 it were. The Chamber suggests that the procedural rules be tweaked, as
5 it were, to invite or to allow the Prosecution to interpose at this stage
6 the -- or interpose is the wrong word. To re-open its
7 examination-in-chief interrupting the cross-examination of Mr. Zecevic
8 which is in process to deal with that document, and then after which
9 Mr. Zecevic, followed by Mr. -- would resume his cross-examination,
10 followed by Mr. Pantelic. Before the Chamber formally so orders, do
11 counsel on either side have a view as to that procedure?
12 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I had been thinking about that and
13 thought that I would probably have to seek leave to re-open if I wanted
14 to show this document to Dr. Nielsen. I also thought about the
15 possibility that perhaps later on the Prosecution would try to introduce
16 this remaining document that we had to get provider permission to use,
17 that we try to do it through a bar table motion or with a later witness.
18 I can do it now as the Court suggests, that might be the most expedient.
19 I'm happy to do that if that's agreeable with the Defence.
20 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, it was our understanding exactly that
21 due to the fact that this document was provided under Rule 70 basis, that
22 is why it came out so late in the proceedings, and it was our
23 understanding that Mr. Hannis will not be using this document with this
24 witness. However, if he intends to use this document with this witness,
25 and direct him through this, then the only applicable solution, I think,
1 would be what Your Honours have suggested, that he re-opens the case and
2 then we continue the cross-examination. We wouldn't have a problem with
3 that. Talking on behalf of Stanisic Defence.
4 JUDGE HALL
5 using it in respect of this witness, but I may be mistaken. Perhaps he
6 can confirm this.
7 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, when we made our original application
8 to add, I think it was 17 documents to use with this witness. This
9 document was on that list until we realised that it was a Rule 70
10 document that we hadn't yet received permission to use in this case.
11 Then we filed an amended application removing that one and seeking leave
12 to admit 16 other documents related to the issue of the Cutileiro plan
13 and discussions and communications about that. So it was originally
14 intended to be part of that whole package, but because we didn't receive
15 it in time and didn't actually have permission until we completed direct
16 exam of Dr. Nielsen, I didn't know what to do other than to seek
17 permission to add it and then try and figure out the best time and way
18 and possible witness to introduce it through.
19 JUDGE HALL
21 MR. HANNIS: Originally, because it seemed to me a logical part
22 of that whole --
23 JUDGE HALL
24 MR. HANNIS: Yes.
25 JUDGE HALL
1 you need?
2 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, five minutes, I would just ask
3 Dr. Nielsen if he had seen this document and how did he see it as fitting
4 in with the other documents in his view of whether or not the proposed
5 separation and creation of a new Serb MUP was part of a Cutileiro plan or
6 something else.
7 JUDGE HALL
8 Mr. Pantelic, do you have a view on this?
9 MR. PANTELIC: Your Honour, we don't have objection to this way,
10 to this proceedings. However, it's not being deal, I think Mr. Hannis
11 will be mindful in terms of timing if he -- Prosecution will take these
12 five or ten minutes, and we are still, I don't know, 15 minutes on,
13 maybe, then tomorrow we could reserve -- we should do our best to finish
14 today, but you know, every minute is counting. Thank you.
15 JUDGE HALL
16 Prosecution may be permitted to re-open its examination-in-chief in order
17 to put this document to the witness who is at present on the stand.
18 Could the usher escort Dr. Nielsen back to the stand, please.
19 MR. PANTELIC: And, Your Honours, during this --
20 JUDGE HALL
22 Yes, Mr. Pantelic.
23 MR. PANTELIC: Sorry, in the meantime, Your Honour, with your
24 permission, I would kindly request the Chamber to allow us the same
25 position in approach with cross-examination like Stanisic Defence because
1 we split certain topics, and Mr. Krgovic will take first part of
2 cross-examination, then I will finish with the other line. Thank you.
3 JUDGE HALL
4 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, the other matter that I wanted to
5 raise, and it seems somewhat --
6 JUDGE HALL
7 be returned, I forgot that you, yourself, had a matter.
8 Yes, Mr. Hannis.
9 MR. HANNIS: I feel a bit ungracious raising it at this time, but
10 it relates to the disclosure of documents to be used and cross-examined
11 by the Zupljanin Defence. Last night at 6.20 I received an e-mail
12 listing some 27 new documents that I had previously not been notified of.
13 The original notification was received on December 14th when Mr. Nielsen
14 started testifying, at that time there was a list of nine documents. On
15 the 16th of December, three additional documents were notified. But now
16 I have 27 new documents, and I just want to issue a complaint about this.
17 You know, it's been a month since he was here, I don't understand why it
18 had to wait until last night at 6.20 to be advised of these 27 new
19 documents. And I note that two of them are listed as still awaiting
20 translation. You will recall that witness Nielsen was delayed from
21 testifying in September until December for the reason that there were
22 hundreds of documents that the Defence said they needed to have
23 translated before they could do his cross-examination. And frankly, I
24 haven't seen that many translated documents used in the cross-examination
25 so far. Thank you.
1 JUDGE HALL
2 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, these documents
3 notified as going to be used for Mr. Nielsen are mainly notes from his
4 report, and I may be using them during cross-examination because they
5 concern certain answers provided by Mr. Nielsen to Mr. Zecevic and
6 Mr. Cvijetic. All these documents that I will be using that are on that
7 list are Prosecutor documents. Ninety-nine per cent of them have already
8 been exhibited in this case. Nielsen in his report mentions them. So
9 the Prosecution is not really taken by surprise nor are they really going
10 to be prejudiced by my use of these documents.
11 I indicated in my initial submission that I will be also using
12 the Prosecution's documents for Mr. Nielsen. Most of my documents are in
13 fact on the Prosecution list. The list of documents the Prosecutor
14 indicated he would be using with Mr. Nielsen, and they are part of his
15 package, so I don't think the Prosecution's objection is really well
17 JUDGE HALL
18 the maybe 1 per cent which Mr. Hannis says have not yet been translated?
19 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, those are documents
20 that were provided to the Prosecution back in December. All the
21 documents I will be using have been translated. This is just part of the
22 wider list and footnotes. I went through them and noted that some have
23 not been translated, and those I will not be using. Because when my
24 case manager was making up this list of documents, I did not know that
25 some of these documents do not have translations, and those I will not be
1 using in my cross-examination today.
2 It's not my habit to use many documents in my examinations,
3 especially not expert witnesses of the Prosecution.
4 JUDGE HALL
5 response to the Prosecution be that Mr. Hannis' apprehensions have no
6 real basis and we can proceed, there should be no difficulties?
7 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] [Microphone not activated] I just
8 received information from my case manager that all the documents on my
9 list are in fact documents referenced in the footnotes of Mr. Nielsen,
10 even that one document which seemed to be a problem.
11 MR. HANNIS: If that's the case, Your Honour, I don't have any
12 problem with that because I certainly need to be familiar with the
13 documents that are in Mr. Nielsen's report. But when I receive a list
14 first thing when I come in, in the morning, and it's not in numerical
15 order, all I have is list of document ID numbers, I don't know what it
16 is, that's and why I raised my complaint.
17 JUDGE HALL
18 stand, please, thank you.
19 [The witness takes the stand]
20 JUDGE HALL
21 still on your oath.
22 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE HALL
24 the Chamber has ruled that the Prosecution be permitted to re-open its
25 examination-in-chief in order to deal with certain documents which they
1 have only recently come to be in a position to put to you. So I would
2 now invite Mr. Hannis to deal with that matter.
3 WITNESS: CHRISTIAN NIELSEN [Resumed]
4 Examination by Mr. Hannis: [Continued]
5 Q. Thank you, Dr. Nielsen, there's just one document I want to ask
6 you about. It's 65 ter number 3464. Your Honours, I'm advised by my
7 case manager it's not in e-court yet, but we can use Sanction to bring it
8 up on the screen for the witness. And this relates to the issue,
9 Dr. Nielsen, that we talked about concerning the Defence position that
10 the separation of the MUP and the creation of a separate Serbian MUP was,
11 according to them, pursuant to an agreement or part of the Cutileiro plan
12 or agreement. You recall that discussion?
13 A. Yes, I recall that discussion.
14 Q. And this document is one letter that we had that was not
15 available to us when you were doing your direct testimony back in
16 December. Waiting to see if we can get it up through Sanction for you.
17 Do you see that on your screen now? It's a document dated the
18 12th of June, 1992, from Mr. Cutileiro to Dr. Karadzic.
19 A. Yes, I see the document now.
20 Q. Do you recall if you had a chance to see that document before you
21 began your testimony?
22 A. I do believe that that is a document that I have seen before
23 testifying, yes.
24 Q. And based on the date of that document, 12 June 1992, and the
25 content, can you tell us what your view is regarding this letter in
1 connection with the claim that the separation and creation of separate
2 Serbian MUP was being done pursuant to the so-called Cutileiro agreement
3 or plan?
4 A. Well, this is one of the documents upon which I base my
5 conclusion that it is erroneous to refer to a Cutileiro plan or
6 agreement. As I stated repeatedly, I regard what Mr. Cutileiro was
7 pursuing as a framework for further negotiations, and I think that
8 Mr. Cutileiro's document or letter of the 12th of June, 1992, which we
9 have in front of us here, confirms precisely that, in the sense that he
10 is telling Mr. or Dr. Karadzic that the only way to bring peace to Bosnia
11 and Herzegovina
12 have been pursued by force are totally unacceptable.
13 He also in the final paragraph alluding to Mr. Karadzic's
14 letters, notes that, "... no promises have been made and that we reached
15 an agreement on the 18th of March on a set of principles. The validity
16 of that agreement, however," - he goes on it to say - "can only be upheld
17 if borders and competences of the contingent units be defined by
18 negotiated consensus and not by force ..."
19 Again that, to me, indicates that what Mr. Cutileiro thought was
20 in place was a framework for negotiations and not a final agreement to
21 divide the country internally.
22 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Dr. Nielsen. I have no further
23 questions, Your Honour, I would tender document 3464 and close my direct
24 examination for the second time. Thank you.
25 JUDGE HALL
1 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P507, Your Honours.
2 JUDGE HALL
3 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you, Your Honours.
4 Cross-examination by Mr. Zecevic: [Continued]
5 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Nielsen, since in view of this supplementary
6 examination-in-chief, we have not learned anything new with respect to
7 your views already expressed by you, I'm going to pick up where I left
8 off yesterday.
9 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Can you please look at P160. Can
10 the witness please be given the binders with documents. That's number 10
11 in your binder. Can we please have page 21.
12 Q. You have reviewed this document, sir. It is a summary of a
13 meeting of senior officials held in Belgrade
14 and you have made several references to this document in your report; is
15 that correct?
16 A. That is correct, sir.
17 Q. On page 20 in B/C/S and 21 in the English, we have the
18 conclusions adopted at this meeting of the 11th of July.
19 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Can we please have page 20 in B/C/S
20 and page 21 in English in e-court.
21 Q. Sir, you can see -- please, page 20.
22 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] When I opened e-court yesterday, I
23 noticed that it was page 20 in the Serbian version. I have just been
24 told that it's actually 23. I apologise. The English page is okay.
25 Q. You can see conclusion number 1. And in this conclusion the
1 second sentence begins by saying:
2 "In doing so, complete constitutionality legality must be
3 ensured, as well as independence without the influence of individual
4 groups, [indiscernible], or parties." Can you see that portion of this
6 A. Yes, I can see that.
7 Q. You will agree with me that it is obvious that the Ministry of
8 the Interior and the minister in particular had a problem with certain
9 number of outside influences coming from individuals, groups factions in
10 the territory, and that is why they have highlighted this as a problem?
11 A. That was indeed one of the major topics of discussion at that
13 Q. Thank you.
14 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Can we please look at page 27. I
15 suppose that's page 30 in B/C/S and 27 in English. I'm talking about
16 item 14.
17 Q. I asked you yesterday about deportation, and it's been dealt with
18 in the last paragraph. You can see that here as one of the problems that
19 is being discussed at this meeting of the 11th of July is the resolution
20 of the problem of residents of certain villages moving out who are not
21 within the jurisdiction of the MUP, but there is a desire to attribute
22 this to the MUP. You would agree with me that that was also one of the
23 problems that was very seriously discussed at this 11th of July meeting;
24 is that right?
25 A. I would certainly agree that that was a major topic of
1 discussion. I would agree that not only in this document, but also in
2 numerous other documents that I quote in my report, the MUP complains -
3 and this goes back to Judge Harhoff's question of yesterday - the MUP
4 complains that the army is without any selection criteria rounding up
5 large numbers of especially Bosnian Muslims and that MUP uses the term
6 "dumping" them in facilities which the MUP is then forced to guard or
7 take care of, and indeed Mr. Zupljanin mentions this at this meeting.
8 It's also reflected a week later in the instructions that are issued by
9 the minister pursuant to this meeting.
10 Q. You will certainly agree with me, but thank you for this
11 exhaustive answer, you will agree with me that it is obvious that these
12 two facts that we have just discussed, that is the influence from certain
13 individuals and the situation on the ground which involved the bringing
14 in of a large number of Muslims and exerting pressure on the MUP to
15 provide securities for such collection centres, and the moving out of
16 people were problems, and that the MUP had a kind of negative attitude
17 towards this, actually, they were criticizing this kind of conduct?
18 A. I, again, agree with you that this is one of the major problems
19 that is faced by the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the summer of 1992.
20 It is a problem that is frequently discussed. It is one of the reasons
21 why already in July 1992 the RS Ministry of Internal Affairs is trying to
22 transfer responsibility of detention facilities such as Omarska to the
23 army. As I said, to get out of the business of running or being
24 responsible for detention facilities.
25 I would also note that it is of course the case that there are
1 detention facilities established in the RS at this point which were
2 established originally as police facilities and not by the army.
3 Q. Sir, yesterday you discussed this with my friend and you
4 confirmed that Omarska, Keraterm, and the like had been set up pursuant
5 to a decision issued by the Crisis Staff; is that right? You said that
6 the fact was that a member of the police, Mr. Simo Drljaca, was a member
7 of the Crisis Staff. Do you remember that response of yours?
8 A. Yes, Mr. Simo Drljaca as a chief of the public security station
9 of Prijedor municipality was a member of the Prijedor Crisis Staff, and
10 he implemented not only that decision of the Crisis Staff but regularly
11 implemented decisions of the Prijedor Crisis Staff, just as did his
12 police colleagues at other Crisis Staffs in the country or in -- excuse
13 me, in Republika Srpska in the summer of 1992.
14 Q. Well, that happened because that was done by the Crisis Staffs;
15 is that right?
16 A. I'm not sure that I understand your question. Are you saying
17 that people such as Mr. Drljaca made those decisions or implemented those
18 decisions because they were themselves appointed by the Crisis Staffs?
19 Q. Yes, Mr. Simo Drljaca was appointed by the Crisis Staff and so
20 was Mr. Vrucinic as well as a large number of individuals who were chiefs
21 of public security stations; is that right?
22 A. Certainly it is the case that a large number of police officials
23 at the municipal level were appointed by the Crisis Staffs. However, the
24 Crisis Staffs also in many cases confirmed the existing SRBiH MUP
25 appointments of police officials, and most of the police officials who
1 were appointed by the Crisis Staffs were later confirmed by RS MUP as
2 employees of that ministry.
3 Q. Yes, in 1993 and 1994 and onwards. Sir, isn't it true that in
4 the instruction on the work of Crisis Staffs issued by the government of
5 Republika Srpska - that's Exhibit P70, we don't need it on our screens -
6 it is explicitly stated, and you have quoted this in paragraph 205 of
7 your report, that "the command of the army and the police will remain in
8 the hands of professional organs rather than the Crisis Staffs." Do you
9 remember that?
10 A. Yeah, this is the case, and it is also the case that the role of
11 Crisis Staffs is one of the most frequently discussed topics at meetings
12 of the RS MUP in the course of 1992.
13 Q. You certainly know that on the 23rd of May, that P270 requested
14 for the Crisis Staffs to be disbanded and abolished, are you aware of
15 that? I apologise for the transcript, it's P217. That's minutes of the
16 meeting of the government session.
17 A. I'm not personally aware of that. I would defer to my
18 colleague's report on the Crisis Staffs on that point.
19 Q. Can you please look at this document, it's number 17 in your
21 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Exhibit P217.
22 Q. Item 4 reads, the minutes of the meetings of the government of
23 the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina
24 concluded to undertake measures to abolish Crisis Staffs." Can you see
1 A. I see that, that is what the document says. We both know that
2 the Crisis Staffs, nevertheless, continued to exist for quite some time
3 after that date.
4 Q. I agree with you. However, already on the 24th of May, there was
5 an attempt to set up War Presidency and then on the 31st of May, Karadzic
6 again ordered War Presidency to be set up, and then the Serbian
7 Democratic Party on the 31st of May insisted on the Crisis Staffs to be
8 abolished, and then on the 10th of June Karadzic came up with a new
9 proposal or, rather, an order to establish war commissioner offices. Is
10 this how this process concerning Crisis Staff developed?
11 A. I believe that what you just summarised is reflected in the
12 report of my colleague, Ms. Hanson, and also the report of
13 Patrick Treanor.
14 Q. The fact is also that in the September amendments to the
15 constitution, abolished the Crisis Staffs; is that right?
16 A. I don't doubt that. That would be accurately reflecting the
17 trend in the summer of 1992, which is to centralise power and to abolish
18 decision-making, or restrict decision-making, rather, at the municipal
19 and regional levels.
20 Q. Thank you.
21 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Just for reference, that the
22 amendment to the constitutions are Exhibit 1794 according to 65 ter.
23 Q. Now, a slight digression, in paragraph 212 and your footnote 255,
24 we discussed yesterday the statements made by politicians and what kind
25 of influence it had and what kind of weight they carry with regard to
1 other documents. In paragraph 212 and the footnote 255, you quote a
2 letter sent to the media written by Mr. Mico Stanisic in April 1992. Do
3 you remember that?
4 A. Yes, I remember that.
5 Q. In this letter, he speaks about -- and this is what you cite in
6 your report, about over 4.000 active-duty policemen and several tens of
7 thousands of reserve police officers who were keeping under control about
8 70 per cent of the territory. This is what the letter states; is that
10 A. I don't have the letter in front of me, but, yes, that's how I've
11 quoted it. Yes.
12 Q. And you have quoted this letter of his; however, at the same time
13 several times in your report you cited 279 65 ter document. It's 28 in
14 your binder.
15 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Can we please have it in e-court.
16 275 [as interpreted] according to 65 ter.
17 THE INTERPRETER: Could the counsel please repeat page numbers.
18 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Zecevic, the interpreter is asking if you
19 could repeat the page numbers.
20 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] I apologise. I was away from the
21 microphone. It's page 6 in B/C/S and page 8 in English.
22 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Zecevic, number 28 in your binder is not 275
23 of the 65 ter list but is 279 of the 65 ter list.
24 MR. ZECEVIC: I said 279, Your Honours.
25 JUDGE DELVOIE: Okay. In the record it's -- in the transcript
1 it's 275.
2 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm so sorry.
3 Q. [Interpretation] Sir, you remember quoting this document several
4 times in your report; is that right?
5 A. Yes, in fact, I have an entire section of the report about that
7 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Obviously in the Serbian version
8 for some reason I have the wrong page. But since I don't have much time,
9 the English pages -- good, now I'm been told that this is page number 10
10 in B/C/S.
11 Q. Mr. Nielsen, in the original document it's page 6, the last
12 paragraph, and in e-court it's the second paragraph from the top which
14 "By the beginning of April, 12.000" --
15 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] No, the English page was good,
16 please, we had problem with the page in B/C/S. Can we please have page 8
17 in English, second paragraph from the top. We don't need anything else.
18 Leave it as it is.
19 Q. It reads here that, in the final annual report of the MUP, that:
20 "By the beginning of April, there were under 10.000 reserve
21 police officers and almost 3.000 active duty policemen which makes a
22 total of 12.600."
23 Can you see that?
24 A. Yes, I can see that.
25 Q. This is apparently in contradiction with what Mr. Stanisic
1 mentioned in his letter to the media, which he wrote as a politician.
2 There's a huge difference. He mentions several tens of thousands,
3 whereas in this official document, we have the figure which is below
5 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, I object. That's misleading. The
6 statement by Mr. Stanisic was on the 18th of April. The report is
7 referring to the beginning of April.
8 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Well, Mr. Hannis, even if we are
9 talking about early April or the first half of April, if you think that
10 in three days alone you can recruit many tens of thousands, then
11 obviously we have a problem.
12 Can the witness answer my question.
13 THE WITNESS: I have it to admit that I'm a bit surprised that
14 you are characterising Mr. Stanisic as a politician, when I understand
15 that you are in fact trying to portray him as a professional police
16 officer. The fact of the matter is that he said what he said on the 18th
17 of April, 1992. If it is the case that he is exaggerating compared to
18 what is in the RS MUP 1992 annual report, then I certainly accept that
19 point. I would point out that in paragraph 212, I do not comment at all
20 on Mr. Stanisic's statement. I just say that that is what he stated.
21 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. I'm extremely grateful to you. All I'm asking is why in your
23 paragraph 212 you did not provide any comment on these facts that I have
24 just put to you, unlike what Mr. Stanisic quoted in his letter to the
25 media, in this annual report we have completely different data. That was
1 my question.
2 A. On the contrary, it is I who am extremely grateful to you. I
3 look forward to incorporating that more subtle point in the next version
4 of this report.
5 Q. Thank you very much.
6 Mr. Nielsen, when you speak about Special Police units, primarily
7 the Special Police brigade, isn't it true that this kind of formation as
8 an anti-terrorist unit existed in the MUP of the Socialist Republic
10 A. That is correct, and I state so in my report. There was one unit
11 that existed in the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
12 Q. And this Special Police brigade commanded by Mr. Karisik was
13 referenced by you in a document which is 1861, 65 ter, and that's number
14 30 in your binder. That is, in fact, a list relating to this unit from
15 May 1992, and it is stated that it numbers 170 men.
16 A. Yes, I remember that. For purposes of clarity, we should just be
17 very precise and note that Mr. Karisik was the commander of the RS MUP
18 Special Police brigade and not the SRBiH MUP unit to which we previously
20 Q. Thank you. In item 220 of your report, you say that this
21 Special Police brigade of the RS MUP established its detachments in the
22 territory attached to CSBs in September 1992.
23 A. What I wrote is that in the course of the late summer of 1992, in
24 the autumn of 1992, certain "Special Police units" that were swarming all
25 over the RS, also at the CSB
1 intent to centralise Internal Affairs and consolidate control of the
2 remaining special units under the charge of Mr. Karisik and the
3 Special Brigade of the police.
4 Q. Mr. Nielsen, you will agree with me that at the time, i.e., from
5 April until the end of summer 1992, it was fashionable, as it were, for
6 everyone in every municipality to set up special detachment, intervention
7 detachments and things like that, and this was mainly done by the
8 Crisis Staffs; is that right?
9 A. I agree with you that it was the case. As I've stated
10 previously, that virtually any person with a bit of weaponry, a few
11 buddies, and surplus of testosterone was forming special units during the
12 summer of 1992.
13 Q. Thank you very much. You are aware that, for example, in
14 Trebinje there was a Special Police unit formed back in October 1991 when
15 neither the MUP of Republika Srpska or nor Republika Srpska itself
16 existed. This unit was headed by Alija Delimustafic. This unit actually
17 didn't have a proper structure. They just gathered together, as you've
18 just described, those were armed individuals, they proclaimed themselves
19 to be Special Police units, and then they would go on to carry out
20 looting and plunder.
21 A. Well, I'm certainly aware of the existence of Special Police
22 units formed in the autumn of 1991 in the Trebinje east Herzegovina area.
23 However, I'm not aware that any such unit was headed by
24 Alija Delimustafic.
25 Q. I said that it was created that at the time when the MUP minister
1 of the SR B&H was Alija Delimustafic, and that is when neither the MUP
2 nor Republika Srpska itself existed at that time.
3 A. That is correct. And I believe that unit to which you are
4 referring is in fact dealt with in the RS MUP draft annual report where
5 it is noted that that unit was formed without the awareness of the
6 officials in Sarajevo
7 THE INTERPRETER: Counsel, please wait for the interpretation.
8 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] [Overlapping speakers] ...
9 27th July, 1992, and that's 65 ter 307 in your binder 37. An order from
10 Mr. Mico Stanisic dated 27 July. It's your number 37. Paras 4 and 5.
11 Q. He orders that all special units established during the war in
13 Army of Republika Srpska along with all their members, and he says as the
14 process of replenishing police units was under way, that's the Karisik
15 brigade, all individuals who meet certain criteria may apply to be
16 admitted into the platoons of this Special Brigade; is that right?
17 A. That is correct, and I cite that document in the report for that
19 Q. Thank you.
20 Let's move to a new subject. The question of reporting, you deal
21 with it in paragraph 236 and onwards. I must tell you that I found ten
22 documents, orders and intercessions by the Ministry of the Interior
23 beginning with 18 April, all the way up to October 1992, expressing
24 frustration over the problem of deficits in reporting. Do you agree,
25 having seen all this documentation, that there was a huge problem with
1 reporting within the MUP, lack of reports by Security Services Centre and
2 police stations?
3 A. I agree with you that communication was one of the major
4 structural hurdles that RS MUP faced particularly in the summer of 1992.
5 That is reflected not only in the draft annual report, it is reflected
6 amply in the minister's comments in the 11 July 1992 meeting, and in
7 fact, in the very fact that they were meeting in Belgrade because it was
8 the only place they claimed that they could in fact meet at that time.
9 Q. Thank you so much. I'd like you to go back to 65 ter 279, the
10 one we just mentioned some time ago, the annual progress report. English
11 page 28.
12 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] I'm told by my colleagues that the
13 answer of Mr. Nielsen is written into my previous question. I suppose
14 his answer begins with the word "I agree" at 21, 18.
15 Will this be enough to correct the transcript or shall I ask the
16 witness to repeat?
17 Q. Sir, I asked you to go back to document 65 ter 279, and that's
18 your -- it's in your binder. It's page 28, and in English it's page 23.
19 It says there that on the average in all lines of work in the seat of the
20 MUP, 15 dispatches were sent and 16 were received. That's the third
21 paragraph on that page. In English it's the second paragraph from the
22 top. "On average, 15 dispatches a day were sent..." et cetera.
23 A. Yes, I see that passage.
24 Q. You will agree with me that bearing in mind that there were five
25 Security Services Centres, CSBs, and by the nature of things each CSB
1 delivered its daily report at least once a day, and the CSBs also
2 provided a daily report along the national security line, each CSB on
3 average sent three dispatches or telegrams a day to the MUP?
4 A. I am quite sure that your arithmetic skills are better than mine.
5 I would just note that helpfully the colleagues in RS MUP did the
6 computations for us, and that still adds up to over 4.000 dispatches
7 going in each direction over a nine-month period.
8 Q. I know, but that's precisely why I am presenting this to you.
9 Two out of three every day are daily reports, so on all other issues only
10 one report a day was sent by a CSB
11 matters, all the other lines of work. I'm talking about average values,
12 of course.
13 A. I certainly understand your point. I would just note that the
14 daily reports which you seem to be marginalising in your comments often
15 contained, and indeed were supposed to on the minister's instructions,
16 contain all of the critical information that the ministry needed to do
17 its work on a daily basis. So I would not minimise the significance that
18 they were receiving such reports.
19 I would also note as an analyst that when we say one dispatch,
20 that could be one sentence, it could also be a much larger dispatch. So
21 it's very difficult to generalise here. My impression, certainly as an
22 analyst given the mountains of documentation I had to hike through, is
23 that there was a quite substantial amount of information exchange and
24 communication going on during this period.
25 Q. When you were talking about these daily reports, have you ever
1 compared the contents of these daily reports that arrived from the ground
2 covering events and developments that were ongoing or had just happened
3 on that territory, have you ever made that comparison?
4 A. Yes, I have in some cases, for the sake of my own curiosity, made
5 such a comparison. And I'm sure, like the minister, and as is reflected
6 in the minister's admonishments to his subordinates, one can often be
7 dismayed by the sparseness of the information provided.
8 Q. Thank you. Regarding discipline, Mr. Nielsen, you discuss it in
9 paragraph 227 of your report. Yesterday, my colleague mentioned 1D54,
10 the rules on disciplinary responsibility adopted by Minister Stanisic.
11 And you said, if I remember correctly, you had not reviewed these rules?
12 A. I believe that I said that I was familiar with the document, but
13 that I had not reviewed the rules in detail in comparison to the earlier
14 SRBiH rules on disciplinary responsibility.
15 Q. So we cannot really discuss it, but if I tell you that this
16 document, the rules adopted in the summer of 1992 on disciplinary
17 responsibility shortened the dead-line for starting disciplinary
18 proceedings and doubled the statute of limitations and simplified the
19 procedure for establishing disciplinary responsibility making it speedier
20 and more efficient, would you, from your expert point of view, consider
21 that an adequate step by the Ministry of the Interior?
22 A. I don't think that I would like to comment on what I would
23 consider adequate or inadequate. I would certainly agree provisionally,
24 as I did already yesterday in answer to your colleague's question, that
25 it does seem that they are streamlining the rules on disciplinary
1 procedures, statutes of limitations and such. From my point of view, the
2 major innovation or the most interesting innovation seems to be point
3 number 1 in the 23rd July confidential order which I cite in paragraph
4 227 of my report, and that is, the move to transfer those employees of
5 MUP who have committed criminal acts, except political and verbal
6 misdemeanours, and to put them at the disposal of the VRS.
7 Q. But, sir, you are certainly aware since you quote from these
8 documents, that the document does not say that they are amnestied from
9 their criminal or disciplinary responsibility?
10 A. I am aware that the document in question does not offer an
11 amnesty from criminal or disciplinary responsibility. And I know that
12 this issue has been discussed previously in this trial. I would just
13 note, and I give one very specific case, that of the deaths at
14 Koricanska Stijena in August 1992 where the RS MUP's own investigation is
15 effectively terminated merely because the officers suspected in
16 participating in the killings at Koricanska Stijena are currently
17 subordinated to the VRS and are involved in combat activities. That is
18 the response that is given back up to the minister of Internal Affairs.
19 Q. Sir, I'm sure that the Zupljanin Defence will discuss the matter
20 of Koricanska Stijena with you. However, the fact is that the criminal
21 report about that event was filed to the competent prosecutor's Office
22 and competent court. Do you know that?
23 A. I recall from other cases at this court that that is the case,
24 and that those police officers who were already in August and September
25 1992 suspected in participating in those activities were not in fact
1 prosecuted until much, much later.
2 Q. Sir, the gist is this: The competent authorities did everything
3 that they were duty-bound by the law to do at the time, and they filed a
4 criminal report against an unidentified perpetrator long before they
5 realised that there was police involvement in the event. Do you know
7 A. Well, I am, again, aware that a criminal report was filed. My
8 account based on the available RS MUP documentation is to be found in
9 paragraphs 327 and 328, but, yes, I am aware that such a report was
10 filed. I note that on 14th September, 1992, Simo Drljaca, and I'm
11 quoting here from page 327 of my report "... responded that an
12 investigation could not be carried out because the officers who had
13 participated in the convoy on 21 August were currently deployed on the
14 battle-field." So that is what I meant by my earlier statement.
15 Q. As I said, you will probably discuss that with the
16 Zupljanin Defence.
17 The fact is that before the document you quote from, a criminal
18 report had already been filed to the prosecutor and the court, whereas
19 the police continued with their investigation trying to identify the
20 people involved.
21 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] However, the time that the Defence
22 team of Mr. Zupljanin generously granted me has expired. I have no
23 further questions for this witness.
24 Thank you, Witness.
25 JUDGE HALL
1 cross-examination, there is a question which the Chamber in the person of
2 Judge Harhoff has of Dr. Nielsen.
3 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you. And the reason I put this question to
4 Mr. Nielsen at this point is to allow you, Mr. Zecevic, before we go on
5 for the break, to use the answers that Mr. Nielsen is going to provide to
6 my questions if you so wish.
7 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you very much, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE HARHOFF: And the question that I have for you,
9 Mr. Nielsen, are two.
10 Namely, first, there seem to be a duplicity in the answers that
11 you gave to Mr. Zecevic regarding the information that was provided to
12 the ministry from the institutions below. Namely, in your first answer
13 in which you said that the flow of communication was poor, it was a big
14 problem, it was discussed at every meeting throughout the summer and the
15 early fall of 1992. And you ended up by saying that, well, maybe it was
16 poor, the information, but certainly a substantial flow of information
17 was in fact provided to the ministry from the institutions below it.
18 First of all, of course, the CSBs.
19 My second question is put to you as an expert on the MUP, namely,
20 what was the system of digesting information in the MUP at the time? My
21 question is really, the daily bulletins that came from various bodies in
22 the field, so to say, and sent to the MUP, how were they treated and how
23 were they synchronised and synthesized up through the ministry levels to
24 the minister's desk? Do you know how this worked, and can you tell us?
25 THE WITNESS: Thank you for your questions, Your Honour. The
1 duplicity that you observe in the answers, as you put it, is in fact a
2 duplicity that I'm reflecting as an analyst because it's present in the
3 MUP's own documentation. It is not the -- the problems concerning
4 information are not unique in this respect. There are a number of other
5 problems that they discuss again and again and again, and clearly
6 consider to be among the most substantial obstacles that they face. But
7 where you see that on a day-to-day basis, they manage to get by, they
8 manage to get the information that they need, they manage to get the job
9 done, as it were, I would note that the daily bulletins that came from
10 these various subordinate bodies in the field are only, as we discussed
11 earlier, one type of information that is sent to the RS MUP. There is a
12 very, very substantial amount of documentation. If you look at the
13 collections that the Office of the Prosecutor for Prijedor, for
14 Banja Luka, you can see on a daily basis things that start at the village
15 level in the Prijedor area being reported up to the municipality, the SJB
16 public security station level. Being reported on to the regional level
17 in Banja Luka, and then being reported up to the ministry in Pale or
18 Bijeljina as was the case, and the other way around.
19 And of course, we see that things are being delivered by courier.
20 We see that innovations are being made, such as at one point the need to
21 bounce radio signals from eastern Herzegovina
22 and then back into Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to be able to communicate.
23 But through various ingenious and creative methods such as these and the
24 sheer weight and amount of documentation that we have been able to find
25 for the period from April 1992 until the end of 1992, I, as an analyst,
2 times extremely difficult, but there was regularly ongoing communication
3 because quick fixes and work-arounds were found to remedy a difficult
4 situation on the ground.
5 In response to your second question, without going into too much
6 detail with specific respect to the daily bulletins, a lot of it was, as
7 one can see, cut-and-paste work, so the -- once the reports start coming
8 in the second half of April 1992, you can see a report that is being sent
9 from Prijedor to Banja Luka, reporting on some incident or something
10 that's relevant for the security in that operational area. The exact
11 same sentence, literally verbatim, is cut and pasted into the report that
12 the CSB
13 and that again, that exact same sentence, is then cut and pasted into the
14 daily bulletin of the ministry itself, which the ministry was providing
15 and had been asked to provide to the Presidency of the republic and to
16 the government, and in some case, as I note in my report, this would also
17 be sent to Belgrade
18 what was ongoing.
19 These reports, these daily bulletins as well as other
20 information, was then collated, there was a specific analytical
21 department within the MUP that was responsible and that exists to this
22 day in the RS MUP, an analytical department which was responsible for
23 collating, storing, and preserving these reports and producing the types
24 of quarterly, semi-annual, and annual report that I also cite in my
1 That kind of analytical informational department is present in
2 the ministry itself. It's also present at the municipal and the regional
3 level, and that's reflected in the rule book on internal organisation.
4 So this is why we also at the municipal and regional level are getting
5 quarterly and annual or, rather, in 1992 nine-month reports. So there is
6 an ongoing collation of information, and there are responsible officials
7 in the ministry whose job it is to make sure that long-term trends in,
8 for example, crime are spotted and are directed to the attention of the
9 appropriate officials in the ministry.
10 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Just two questions, Your Honour.
11 If I may ask my two questions and then take the break.
12 JUDGE HALL
13 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
14 Further Cross-examination by Mr. Zecevic:
15 Q. When you were looking at these daily reports submitted by the MUP
16 to the Presidency and on, didn't you notice that in a great number of
17 them there is a note, no reports available from two CSBs each day?
18 A. Almost certainly there are periods of two, even five days where,
19 for example, Doboj would not be able to put a report through.
20 Q. You know that there had been cases when some CSBs were not in
21 contact with the ministry for two or three weeks on end?
22 A. I know that there are periods in which some CSBs were, for
23 example, without electricity. And that is the cases in which, as I know,
24 previous witnesses have said who worked in the ministry work-arounds were
25 found through couriers, for example.
1 Q. I know, but some areas were not accessible, even to couriers, and
2 if anything is sent by courier, it can arrive ten days later.
3 Just one more thing, since war is raging throughout the
4 territory, the ministry from a territory of one CSB covering ten police
5 stations receives one report per day. In your view does that really
6 reflect the level of information available to the ministry in terms of
7 its inadequacy?
8 A. Well, I'm not certain if -- which -- indeed if you are referring
9 to a specific CSB
10 measuring stick is really if one goes through the analytical work of
11 assembling in a database, as I have done all the dispatches going one way
12 and going the other way, you see very considerable and regular traffic,
13 and the bottom line is that if we take as the measuring stick this
14 important 11 July 1992
15 ministry in which they are discussing all the most pertinent problems, we
16 certainly see that in the middle of a raging war, as you put it, they are
17 aware of all the most considerable problems confronting the ministry
18 without the RS.
19 Q. One last question. That meeting of the collegium on the
20 11th July is the first meeting of the collegium?
21 A. No, that is not correct because Mr. Zupljanin refers accurately,
22 It's been a long time since we've seen each other in Sarajevo, he says.
23 Q. Well, I suppose he is referring to the time before the war, and
24 that's why he says it's been a long time.
25 Thank you --
1 A. Not precisely, because there was, in fact, and it's cited in my
2 report, a collegium that did meet in, on, I believe, the 14th of April,
3 in Sarajevo
4 Q. That's the collegium meeting in Drace when none of the
5 representatives of other CSBs were present. I'm asking you about
6 meetings of all CSB
7 happened for the first time on 11th July?
8 A. Yes, with that consideration, I agree.
9 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, no further questions.
10 JUDGE HALL
11 20 minutes.
12 [The witness stands down]
13 --- Recess taken at 10.29 a.m.
14 --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.
15 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, I'm sorry, due to the haste I was
16 cross-examining, I failed to -- I omitted to offer a certain document for
17 admission. It's 65 ter 307, and I was commenting it with the witness and
18 then I moved on. I would ask the Trial Chamber to admit this document as
19 an MFI
20 Mr. Tom Hannis from the Prosecution, due to the fact that there is a
21 certain problem with the English translation of the original document.
22 Therefore I would move the Trial Chamber to admit the document as an MFI
23 pending additional reconsideration by the CLSS on the translation of the
25 JUDGE HALL
1 MR. ZECEVIC: 65 ter 307. Thank you very much.
2 JUDGE HALL
3 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, the document will become
4 Exhibit 1D176, marked for identification.
5 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you very much, Your Honours, I appreciate it.
6 JUDGE HALL
7 the stand, please.
8 [The witness takes the stand]
9 JUDGE HALL
10 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours.
11 Cross-examination by Mr. Krgovic:
12 Q. Good morning, Mr. Nielsen.
13 A. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Krgovic.
14 Q. My name is Dragan Krgovic. I'm on the Stojan Zupljanin Defence
15 team, and I'm going to ask you a number of questions relating either to
16 your report or to your evidence given so far in this case. In order to
17 assist the Chamber since you understand our language, I would kindly ask
18 you for us to pause between questions and answers to avoid overlapping,
19 despite all the warnings coming from the Trial Chamber, I'm not very
20 disciplined in that area, but let us try and make life easier for
22 Mr. Nielsen, as far as I could discern from your CV and from your
23 testimony so far, you have no formal education in the area of police
24 matters; is that right?
25 A. That is correct. My training is as a historian, not as a police
2 Q. And you didn't finish a police academy or any other similar
3 course that deals with police matters; is that right?
4 A. That is correct. I've not taken any professional police
6 Q. And you have never worked in the police; right?
7 A. That is correct. I have had the pleasure of working with the
8 police, but not in the police.
9 Q. And you have never been brought in by the police and you didn't
10 have an opportunity to experience how the police operate, probably people
11 who have frequent contact with the police have more familiarity with
12 their work than ordinary citizens, wouldn't you agree with me?
13 A. Well, I certainly don't have a criminal record, but I do have
14 some experience in how the police operates because I have on a number of
15 occasions executed search warrants together with police officers.
16 Q. What I would like to establish before I ask you a question is the
17 following: You also are neither a legal nor a military expert; is that
19 A. That is absolutely correct.
20 Q. This is crucial because sometimes you use some police terms and
21 some military terms, and when you do so, how shall I put it, you construe
22 them and understand them as an educated person or a person who is well
23 educated. But when you do so, you provide your interpretation of these
24 terms from your own angle; is that right?
25 A. I do primarily look at these terms from the angle of a historian
1 who, as I've noted previously, has extensively worked on police in the
3 or police terms, I look particularly at the way the RS MUP, for example,
4 itself uses those terms, and as you will see in my footnotes, on a number
5 of occasions, I make reference to a Serbian dictionary of police terms.
6 I should note as well, I think this is the appropriate time, that
7 I was on one occasion in 2008 retained by the organisation for security
8 and co-operation in Europe
9 Q. In your report I have noticed in places that you are using the
10 term a "war crime." Would you agree with me on that? Shall I give you a
11 reference, a particular reference?
12 A. I don't think a particular reference is necessary. I quite
13 certainly recall that I did use that term, and my use of that term, as
14 far as I recall, is analogous to my use of the term legal or illegal,
15 that is to say, I'm not myself pretending or purporting to make any legal
16 findings, rather I'm noting that that is the word used in the documents
18 Q. In principle, as I understand your understanding of war crime,
19 this is a crime committed during a state of war or during war; right?
20 A. No, that is not correct. I have certainly an understanding of
21 what the legal definition of a war crime is. Stealing a bicycle in
22 war time is, for example, as you well know, not a war crime, even though
23 it takes place during a state of war or during a war. When I use --
24 again, when I use the term war crime, I do so, for example, in the
25 context of when Minister Stanisic orders an investigation of what he
1 calls war crimes or crimes against humanity.
2 Q. And when a bicycle is stolen during a war by a Muslim or a Croat,
3 would that constitute a war crime?
4 A. Certainly not.
5 Q. One of the indictments issued here is that aiding and abetting
6 the destruction of Muslim houses was qualified as a war crime on the
7 bases that nothing was done to prevent it.
8 A. Well, I am aware of the fact that plunder and looting, for
9 example, is a war crime, and I suppose that the theft of a simple bicycle
10 could be lumped into that category, given a very specific context. But
11 I'm referring to the mere stealing of a bicycle on itself, even though
12 it's war time, does not constitute a war crime.
13 Q. We will go back to this issue. My learned friend Zecevic asked
14 you yesterday about a portion of your report, that's your executive
15 summary, paragraph 11 in B/C/S. I'm particularly interested in one
16 sentence from that portion where you say that the RS MUP was the only
17 armed force that was exclusively under the control of the authorities of
18 Republika Srpska. Have you read this part of this findings of yours? My
19 colleague Zecevic showed you yesterday and definitely in the course of
20 your research you could see that in addition to the RS MUP pertaining to
21 the period up to 12th of May 1992, there also existed the Serbian
22 Territorial Defence; is that right?
23 A. Yes, I am aware of the existence of the Territorial Defence.
24 Q. And it was also exclusively under the control of the authorities
25 of Republika Srpska; right?
1 A. That's a very good question, and the reason, again, that I'm
2 using the term solely under the control of the RS authorities for the
3 RS MUP is precisely because it is my understanding based on the findings
4 of my colleague who is a military expert, that the control of the TOs was
5 very much a disputed topic during this period until the formation of the
6 VRS and that there was an ongoing struggle between certain officials in
7 the JNA and certain officials in the TO and the civilian authorities
8 about who exactly was in control of these. I know that your colleague
9 yesterday referred to the relevant military legislation which shows that
10 the TO was under control of the JNA, and the JNA was certainly not solely
11 under the control of the civilian authorities of the RS at this point.
12 But again on this point, I would most certainly defer ultimately to a
13 military expert.
14 Q. I'm interested in the period up to the 12th of May when
15 Republika Srpska was established. You are talking about control over the
16 TO, and Colonel Basara testified about this issue as well, you probably
17 had an opportunity to see his interview. Later a decision was made to
18 resubordinate it to Army of Republika Srpska. However, in this document,
19 the Territorial Defence, the Serbian Territorial Defence was a
20 significant factor and was to a great extent under the control of the
21 Serbian authorities.
22 When I say the Serbian authorities, I'm referring to Mr. Subotic
23 and the Ministry of Defence and the Presidency of Republika Srpska.
24 Would you agree with me?
25 A. I agree with your statement that the Serbian Territorial Defence
1 was a significant factor and was to a great extent under the control of
2 the Serbian authorities. My only disagreement with you is whether they
3 were under the sole control of the Serbian authorities, that is the RS
5 Q. So in that respect would you like to amend your report by adding
6 the Serbian TO which to a great extent was also under the control of the
7 Serbian authorities?
8 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, his report says that the RS MUP was the
9 only one that was under the exclusive control of Serb authorities. He
10 has just given his answer that the TO was not under the exclusive
12 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. On the basis of the documents shown to you by Mr. Zecevic and the
14 ones that you have reviewed, did you find a single document, and I'm
15 speaking about the period from April, and that is the 16th of April when
16 the TO was formed, until the 12th May, 1992, have you found a single
17 document testifying to the contrary that the TO was not under the control
18 of the authorities of Republika Srpska? Actually, I put it to you that
19 you didn't find any such document because you haven't -- otherwise you
20 would have included it in your report.
21 A. Well, in fact, there are such indications in the intercepts that
22 I've quoted in which you can see that the RS's civilian leadership, for
23 example, is complaining about the fact that not all of the TO is doing
24 precisely what the RS leadership might wish it to be doing, but
25 ultimately, again, and I think this is the main point, I would certainly
1 defer to the military expert on this issue. It is my understanding, and
2 part of my conclusion in paragraph E11 is based on that, from his own
3 report that there were disputes regarding the control of the TO during
4 this period.
5 I'm not disputing at all, I reiterate, I do not dispute that the
6 Serbian civilian authorities had very extensive control of the TO during
7 this period. I am disputing only and only disagreeing with you whether
8 they had sole control of the TO during this period.
9 Q. And when you speak about these disputes, that was, in fact, a
10 conflict to the effect that the Serbian TO was not obeying Subotic but
11 rather the local officials and Crisis Staffs, and that they were acting
12 in accordance with their instructions and orders?
13 A. That was certainly one form of concern. There's also concern
14 expressed frequently by the RS leadership during this period that the TO
15 is, to some extent, under the control of what they called "komunjara,"
16 old school communist cadres in the JNA.
17 Q. You are certainly aware, I'm talking about the Banja Luka Krajina
18 and all the other municipalities mentioned in the indictment and referred
19 to my client, such as Sanski Most, Banja Luka, Donji Vakuf, Teslic,
20 Kljuc, Prijedor, that the Serbian TO did exist?
21 A. Well, I'm aware that a TO existed in all of those municipalities
22 and that in many cases it adopted the monicker Serbian TO during this
24 Q. And that in all of these municipalities, and let me remind you of
25 the testimony given by the police station commander in Sanski Most, and
1 the documents from the Sanski Most Crisis Staff which show that the
2 control over the Serbian TO goes along the line Crisis Staff, the Serbian
3 TO, and then upwards towards the level of the republic?
4 MR. HANNIS: If we are going to have a reference to the testimony
5 of a witness, can we have a page reference, please.
6 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] I was speaking in general terms
7 because it was mentioned at least 50 times and many documents were shown
8 to that effect. I'm just asking the witness whether he is generally
9 aware of this.
10 Q. That was my general question because I understood that you read
11 certain witness statements and other documents, therefore, I concluded
12 that you are aware of that without going into any specifics. I just
13 wanted to ask you whether you agree with me or not.
14 MR. HANNIS: Can we clarify the question. It means is the
15 witness generally aware of the specific situation in Sanski Most?
16 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] I'm talking about these specific
17 municipalities in general.
18 MR. HANNIS: Well, the question was referring specifically to the
19 Sanski Most witness and Sanski Most. Now if he is expanding it to
20 Donji Vakuf, Teslic, Kljuc, Prijedor, and Banja Luka, I think he needs to
21 lay some more foundation.
22 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] I'm only asking the witness whether
23 he was aware of that, he agreed with me that the situation was as
24 described, and just as a reminder, I mentioned Sanski Most.
25 Q. Sir, can you answer my question.
1 A. Well, I am aware that testimony on that point has been heard
2 before this Chamber. I don't want to comment on the testimony of other
4 Q. But in the course of your research, you would agree with me that
5 TO existed in all those municipalities and that it was under the control
6 of the local Crisis Staff, or rather, subject to co-ordination?
7 A. I am aware from the expert report of my colleague on
8 Crisis Staffs that the Crisis Staffs were quite involved in the work of
9 the TOs during this period.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Krgovic, before we move on to something
12 else -- and I don't know if you are indeed moving on to something else,
13 but that's the way it looked to me. But before we do so, I would like to
14 solicit from the witness some indication of how did this work out in
15 practice. You say that the TOs were partly, and perhaps even mostly,
16 under the control of the Crisis Staffs and the local political
17 authorities, and yet they were also to some extent under the control of
18 the JNA. How did -- what was the practical way in which this could
19 function? I mean, it sounds very complicated to have two such different
20 organs both being in control of the same body. So how, what sort of
21 co-ordination was in place in order to secure reasonable control over the
22 TOs? Can you clarify.
23 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I -- with respect I'm not certain that
24 I'm very well placed to answer your question. I base my knowledge of
25 that subject on my reading of the expert reports of my colleagues
1 Ewan Brown and Dorothea Hanson who have written respectively on the TOs
2 and the Crisis Staffs, and as well on the MUP documents where I see a
3 veritable tug of war going on during this period. I note that on direct
4 examination we even saw one example of Mr. Stanisic issuing an order to
5 the TO. So this is a period, up until the formation of the VRS, is a
6 period in which everyone, Crisis Staffs, civilian leadership, police,
7 military, are sticking their fingers, as it were, into the work of the
8 TO. And it's only clarified, as counsel has noted, with later decisions
9 and legislation passed by the RS.
10 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you.
11 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Let me conclude, Mr. Nielsen, when you spoke about the
13 Serbian MUP as the only force that was under control, since you are not a
14 military expert, you didn't deal very much with the Serbian TO, the
15 control of it, and its functioning; is that right?
16 A. That's correct, and that's why my report only on a few occasions
17 alludes to the TO.
18 Q. And from that I deduce that your report in this part where you
19 say that the Serbian MUP was the only organisation under the control of
20 the RS should be taken with a certain reservation, and --
21 MR. HANNIS: I object to the form of the question. He needs to
22 include the term "exclusive" or "sole" control of the RS.
23 MR. KRGOVIC: I did. It's not in the transcript.
24 Q. [Interpretation] So you heard this, when you were writing your
25 report you didn't take into consideration the position of the TO, and its
1 place within this hierarchy, you didn't analyse the Serbian TO in that
3 A. I repeat that this is a conclusion that I base on my reading of
4 police and civilian documentation, particularly the discussions in the
5 RS Assembly at the time. And to the extent that this -- that you
6 disagree with my conclusion, I think it's most appropriate to put that
7 question to the military expert to whom I would at any point defer.
8 Again, I'm not disagreeing at all that there was extensive
9 civilian control of the Serbian TO at this point. I am making a very
10 narrow point here, which is just that, as far as I can see, the RS MUP --
11 and based on the apparently controversial statements of Mrs. Plavsic and
12 other politicians, they treat the RS MUP as the only organisation under
13 their exclusive control during this period.
14 Q. Further in the next paragraph, 13, there is another conclusion,
15 the last sentence:
16 "Towards the end of June 1992 in the MUP of Republika Srpska
17 there were only six non-Serbs working."
18 That's your conclusion, and you refer to paragraphs from 192 to
19 207. In these paragraphs you referred to a few documents on the basis of
20 which you made this conclusion. Have you had the opportunity to look
21 also at other documents mentioning different numbers as to the non-Serb
22 employees in MUP? Without, however, including them into your report,
23 without mentioning them?
24 A. I'm very grateful for that question. The specific number of six
25 non-Serbs is taken from a specific RS MUP document which I cite in that
1 passage in which I believe five of the six were actually working in
2 Kalinovik of all places. But it is correct that having had time to
3 review all of the documents that I cite in my own report, I have since
4 finishing this report encountered a couple of other passages which
5 suggest, in contradiction of this RS MUP document, that there may have
6 been as many as, I forget the exact number, I'm sure you can give it to
7 me, as many as 140 or -- it's a number in the low hundreds were allegedly
8 still working in the ministry at that time. And those numbers would
9 certainly tend to contradict the RS MUP document which mentions only six
11 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Like my colleague, I prepared a
12 binder of documents, and I would like to ask the usher for assistance.
13 Could we call P160 in the meantime. In your binder it's document
14 number 3. In B/C/S it's page 5. In English it's 8.
15 Q. It's a speech by Mr. Zupljanin in the Serbian. It's the fourth
16 paragraph from the top. In English third paragraph from the top.
17 Mr. Zupljanin says there are about 8.500 active duty and reserve
18 members in the region at the moment including 142 members of other
19 ethnicities. I apologise to the interpreters for speaking too fast.
20 This is that much-talked-about meeting on the 11th of July in Belgrade
21 Do you agree that it's mentioned in the report that Mr. Zupljanin indeed
22 said this?
23 A. Yes, I agree, and that was the approximately 140 number that I
24 thought you were going to mention, so.
25 Q. So that we don't have to take Stojan Zupljanin at his word, let's
1 look at 2D02-0503, and in your binder it's number 2. We received this
2 document officially from the Banja Luka CSB this last autumn, and it is a
3 list of employees and payroll dated October 1992. Only the first page
4 and the last page have been translated, as is the custom with our
5 translation service, and the names have not been translated.
6 However, my assistant underlined all the names of non-Serbs who
7 were employed in the MUP in October 1992. Therefore, I will ask to you
8 look at the B/C/S version, and you will find a lot of Muslim and Croat
9 names. And I assume if you see names like Anto or Muhamed or Selem, you
10 recall be able to identify them as people of Croat or Muslim ethnicity.
11 So please look at the underlined names. Those that are marked,
12 could you confirm that they are Muslims or Croats.
13 A. Well, I can confirm that many of the highlighted names in the
14 B/C/S document are Croat or Muslim. I cannot say that all of them are
15 because, as you know, you cannot always make that determination solely
16 based on a name.
17 Q. Then on the basis of this document, would you be prepared to
18 correct your report in the place where it says that only six non-Serbs
19 were employed in the MUP at that time?
20 A. Well, I'm certainly again grateful to you for this opportunity.
21 As you know, the October 1992 pay lists are not ones that I've seen
22 previously. But I agree with you that Mr. Zupljanin's statement with
23 the, I think, 142 non-Serbs which, you know, theoretically could include
24 Hungarians and Ukrainians as well as Muslims and Croats is valid. So I
25 think that again that paragraph of the executive summary should be
1 modified accordingly. I do want to underline, and this is very
2 important, that the statement about six, only six non-Serbs being in
3 RS MUP at the end of June 1992 is directly quoted from an RS MUP
4 document. So that is obviously an open question why they were so off on
5 their own count.
6 Q. Most likely the minister was misinformed like you were as to the
7 number of non-Serbs. That speaks a little about the accuracy of the
8 reports that reach the minister from lower levels. But this was not a
9 question, just my comment.
10 Earlier today my colleague Mr. Zecevic --
11 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Excuse me, could we get an exhibit
12 number for this last document.
13 JUDGE HALL
14 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit 2D34, Your Honours.
15 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. My colleague, Mr. Zecevic, asked you about the event at
17 Koricanska Stijena, and you discussed it with him a little, but I will go
18 a little deeper. Since you worked at one time in the Office of the
19 Prosecutor and you are familiar with procedures from your work, you are
20 familiar with the police procedure of detecting and investigating and
21 prosecuting. I mean, as a person who has had access to documents like
22 this and to people who deal with this matter?
23 A. Yes, one attains familiarity with such procedures from looking at
24 these documents and the relevant laws and regulations, that's correct.
25 Q. Then you might agree with me that the first thing to do when
1 bodies are found and on-site investigation is carried out, the
2 appropriate service identifies the bodies and then the site, the
3 crime scene is secured?
4 A. I agree.
5 Q. After that an on-site investigation is carried out by the
6 prosecutor and the investigating judge in order to continue with the
8 A. It is you who is the expert here, so yes, I agree and I am guided
9 by your knowledge.
10 Q. And then after these first steps have been taken, a criminal
11 complaint is filed so that the prosecutor's office can get involved, and
12 then under the leadership of the prosecutor and the investigating judge,
13 perpetrators are identified as well as the circumstances under which the
14 crime was committed, and then the whole criminal procedure continues from
16 A. I agree.
17 Q. The investigating judge and the prosecutor after receiving the
18 criminal complaint issue instructions to the police as to what steps to
19 take and how to gather information and evidence on the case, and they
20 practically lead the case.
21 Just a little correction: The investigating judge and the
22 prosecutor, I said.
23 A. I agree.
24 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we show the witness
1 Q. Mr. Nielsen, that's a criminal report that you don't have in the
2 binder. I'll hand it to you now with the help of the usher. I believe
3 you have seen this document before.
4 A. I'm not sure that I've seen this particular document before.
5 Q. Could you just scan it, please. It's a criminal complaint filed
6 to the prosecutor's office by the Security Services Centre signed,
7 Stojan Zupljanin.
8 A. That is correct.
9 Q. And if you look at this criminal complaint bearing mind the
10 standard procedure prevailing in Republika Srpska at the time, you will
11 agree that this whole procedure has been fully observed?
12 A. This does seem to conform to the procedure that you described,
14 Q. And there is no doubt that these criminal charges referred to
15 here are charges of a war crime?
16 A. Again with the caveat that I'm not a lawyer, I see that the
17 charge here is murder.
18 Q. We are not talking about the qualification. The criminal charges
19 are of murder, but the perpetrator hasn't been identified yet, and the
20 bodies have not been identified yet. It's practically a criminal
21 complaint for a war crime regardless of what it's called here.
22 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, that's argumentative. The document
23 speaks for itself. It says murder under a particular provision of
24 Criminal Code; it doesn't say war crime. This witness has said he is not
25 a lawyer, not a legal expert.
1 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] I'll try this another way.
2 Q. Do you know that my client Stojan Zupljanin, among other things,
3 is charged with this incident, Koricanska Stijena, and this Prosecution
4 calls it a war crime?
5 MR. HANNIS: Yes, because we are operating under a different
7 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, but my question was only
8 whether this crime concerning which my client filed criminal charges is
9 the same incident as described in the indictment against my client, that
10 was the point of my question, just the yes or no.
11 JUDGE HALL
12 question? If so, he may answer the question.
13 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I cannot answer that with a yes or no.
14 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Are you aware that this incident at Koricanska Stijena is
16 included in the indictment against my client?
17 A. Yes, I am ware that that incident is named in the indictment.
18 Q. And that he is charged with failure to take appropriate steps or
19 to file a criminal complaint, that that is the charge against my client?
20 MR. HANNIS: He is not charged with failing to file a complaint.
21 He is charged with failing to take adequate measures against the
22 perpetrators. And again, these are legal submissions and things for
23 Your Honours to decide, not something for this witness.
24 JUDGE HALL
25 witness, I'm not sure that I follow your -- where you are going,
1 Mr. Krgovic, with this line of questions. This is addition to
2 Mr. Hannis's point about the submissions and arguments which the document
3 in question may form the basis of at an appropriate stage. How can -- as
4 I said, I'm not sure how this witness can assist by addressing the point
5 you are making on this document.
6 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, this expert, police
7 expert in his paragraph 353 says that the Security Services Centre failed
8 to file reports or a criminal complaint against anyone but one suspect in
9 war crimes and that there are no mention -- references to war crimes in
10 the relevant period of the indictment. And that's why I believe it's
11 relevant, because he deals with it in his report. And if you look at
12 this report and admit it into evidence, the Trial Chamber will have his
13 report before them including this statement that the CSB or the national
14 security centre did not start a single case to prosecute war crimes.
15 Therefore, I'm trying to establish what this expert understands to
16 constitute a war crime, and I want to put specific examples before him.
17 And the Court, and this is already a legal submission, is bound
18 by the factual description of the Prosecutor, not that provided by a
19 policeman. You have heard about this from witness Delic.
20 And the Court in deliberating back in our system is not bound by
21 anything but the factual description. That was the point of my question.
22 Because at the beginning when I established that when the witness
23 mentions war crimes, he speaks of war crimes not as an expert but as a
24 regular person, and that is why I want to show some more documents to
25 this witness regarding his finding in paragraph 353.
1 MR. HANNIS: Well, Your Honour, then my objection is the question
2 should be more directed specifically to what is in 353 and where it came
3 from. This criminal complaint is for murder, and all it says is that
4 unknown perpetrators were involved and there are a hundred bodies in the
5 bottom of the canyon. At this point in time, that's not identified as a
6 war crime. That could be 100 bodies in the bottom of the canyon as a
7 result of some combat activity in the area possibly. But the CSB, the
8 police, had the opportunity to identify certain crimes as war crimes and
9 file them as such because apparently they did file one such crime, but
10 this one was not one of those, as least not in this document.
11 JUDGE HALL
12 this is to allow Mr. Krgovic to proceed. Clearly there is room for
13 disputation here. But I think I understand the basis on which
14 Mr. Krgovic is asking this question. And if I appear to be tentative,
15 it's because I am, because I heard what he has it to say, and I think I
16 follow him.
17 So please proceed, Mr. Krgovic.
18 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Mr. Nielsen, on the first page of this document you will see a
20 reference to a convoy of refugees who were going from Prijedor and
21 Sanski Most towards Travnik. Do you agree with me? You nodded, but it
22 was not recorded.
23 A. I agree that that is what the document says.
24 Q. And on page 2 of this document it is said that the employees of
25 the CSB
1 the perpetrators; correct?
2 A. Again, I agree that that is what the document says.
3 Q. In your report you mentioned several dispatches following this
4 event, and this happened on the 8th of September, 1992. In your report,
5 you mentioned a letter that my client Stojan Zupljanin sent to Prijedor
6 to find out who was in the escort of this convoy. Do you remember
7 mentioning this? The page -- that page is missing in my copy of the
8 report. Do you remember that? You answered a question by Mr. Zecevic
9 about this.
10 A. Yes, I remember that. Stojan Zupljanin, as I state in my report,
11 asked for information about the killings on several occasions in orders
12 to Simo Drljaca.
13 Q. And as you said today to Mr. Zecevic, the response came that
14 these persons were now involved in combat activities and they were not
16 A. Yes, that's correct. It should be noted that it was at that
17 point in time, that is to say, in the second half of August 1992, clear
18 to both Mr. Drljaca and to Mr. Zupljanin that these unknown perpetrators
19 were employees of the RS MUP.
20 Q. Are you aware that based on this criminal complaint and based on
21 the evidence gathered at the time, the prosecution was started after the
22 war against the perpetrators and they were tried in Banja Luka or
24 A. Yes, I mentioned that I am aware of the fact that many years
25 later, there were arrests and trials of those who were alleged to have
1 participated in these killings.
2 Q. And speaking of criminal complaints and the taking of measures,
3 are you aware that the normal practice in the MUP of Republika Srpska,
4 specifically in Banja Luka, in view of the specific circumstances of war,
5 the practice was that professional members of the MUP would do their job
6 and produce certain documents that could serve as a basis for Prosecution
7 later on when the right conditions are created with no statute of
8 limitations or fear thereof because the crimes concerned were grave?
9 A. I assume that that is the logical corollary to what Mr. Zecevic
10 referred to and Mr. Cvijetic referred to as the dropping of the statute
11 of limitations for crimes committed by police officers.
12 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Since I'm not going to deal with
13 this criminal report any longer, can we please have an exhibit number.
14 JUDGE HALL
15 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit 2D35, Your Honours.
16 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we please call up Exhibit 280
17 65 ter.
18 And it's number 7 in your binder, Mr. Nielsen.
19 Q. Can you please look at page 1. That's an analysis of the work of
20 the public security station of Banja Luka in 1992, that's Banja Luka CSB.
21 Can you please look at the signature on the last page. This is a report
22 submitted by inspectors, and you reviewed this document when drafting
23 your report; is that right?
24 A. That is correct, sir.
25 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we now please have page 5 in
1 B/C/S and page 6 in English. In B/C/S it's the first paragraph from the
2 top, and in English it's the second paragraph from the top.
3 Q. This is precisely what I spoke about, and you agree with me that
4 the practice was such that we have a description here of the procedure
5 applicable in investigating crimes. Would you agree with me that this is
6 what it says in this report, that this was a widespread practice in the
7 area covered by the Security Services Centre of Banja Luka; is that
9 A. I agree that this document paints a portrait of what crimes were
10 taking place in the operational area of SJB Banja Luka during this period
11 and that it also discusses what was done to combat such crime. Excuse
12 me, CSB
13 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we please have an exhibit
14 number for this document.
15 JUDGE HALL
16 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit 2D36, Your Honours.
17 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Mr. Nielsen --
19 MR. KRGOVIC: Is this a convenient time for the break, Your
21 JUDGE HALL
22 little late, if you have one or two questions to run it for another five
23 minutes, we can take the break then.
24 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Mr. Nielsen, you will agree with me, and by reading your report,
1 I noticed a number of problems that affected the work of MUP of
2 Republika Srpska in 1992, including the Banja Luka CSB. And I'm going to
3 enumerate these problems and ask you whether you would agree with that or
4 not, but generally speaking there were quite a few problems that
5 disrupted the work of the MUP during the war.
6 First of all, let's begin with the first specific problem which
7 was the lack of professional personnel as a result of the separation of
8 MUP into the Muslim and Serb portions, and that a number of Muslim
9 members of the MUP ceased to work there by either joining the Muslim MUP
10 or simply by resigning; is that correct?
11 A. That certainly was one of the problems faced. I don't think I
12 would in it's entirety agree with your characterisation of why the Muslim
13 members of the MUP ceased to work there. But certainly the fact that the
15 and Croat employees meant a deficit that was, to some extent, remedied by
16 an influx of Serbs, police officers from Croatia where they had been
18 Q. Among those peoples who were admitted into MUP, this was done
19 indiscriminately without any vetting procedure?
20 A. As I note in my report, for the ministry as a whole and certainly
21 also in the area of CSB
22 statement made by Mr. Stanisic, the unfortunate fact was that the
23 ministry as a whole was quite indiscriminate in admitting people into
24 employment in 1992 without appropriate vetting procedures.
25 Q. The next problem that considerably made the functioning of the
1 MUP difficult refers to this Rump Banja Luka CSB which means that police
2 units were often taken by the army, resubordinated to the army, and used
3 for combat operations instead of for carrying out regular police work; is
4 that right?
5 A. All reports of the RS MUP throughout 1992 including on the
6 territory of CSB
7 police by it's extensive involvement in combat activity which left
8 logically comparatively little time and resources for traditional police
10 Q. In addition to the participation of the organs, the courts and
11 other organs, particularly with reference to public law and order, the
12 misdemeanour courts were virtually non-functioning, therefore, the
13 commission of misdemeanours most often committed by conscript could not
14 have been properly sanctioned by misdemeanour courts. I'm referring to
15 this same document, page 3 in B/C/S, where it speaks about public law and
16 order. It specifically speaks about law and order, and I'm going to read
17 it out to you.
18 THE INTERPRETER: Could the counsel please indicate which
19 paragraph he is reading.
20 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Krgovic, the interpreters are asking you to
21 identify which paragraph you are reading out from.
22 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] That is page 3 in B/C/S, second
23 paragraph entitled "Public Law and Order."
24 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you.
25 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. "Often under the influence of alcohol and with the usage of
2 fire-arms, they disturb public law and order and thereby jeopardise the
3 safety of citizens, and frequently they oppose as a group or individually
4 anyone who tries to stop them. Since these are conscripts, members of
5 the OUP are very often reluctant to undertake any measures or are very
6 slow or inefficient, and which is even worse, they express solidarity
7 with the perpetrators which has devastating effects on the public law and
9 JUDGE HALL
10 you had formulated the question.
11 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] No, I haven't.
12 Q. Would you agree that this picture portrayed in this report and
13 you, yourself, partly mentioned it in your report is a true portrayal of
14 the situation prevalent on the ground at the time?
15 A. I agree that this is an accurate portrayal of the situation on
16 the ground. It's a portrayal which goes again and again in numerous
17 RS MUP reports. And just to wrap up on a previous point, when you talk
18 about the military involvement on the territory of the police, on the
19 territory of CSB
20 1992 annual report states that the CSB Banja Luka had by far the most
21 extensive combat involvement of any CSB
22 JUDGE HALL
23 [The witness stands down]
24 --- Recess taken at 12.12 p.m.
25 --- On resuming at 12.35 p.m.
1 [The witness takes the stand]
2 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Before I begin with the witness, I
3 was rather hastily putting my question, 56, line 13, I said that security
4 organs were very slow and inefficient. I was reading this very quickly,
5 and that changed the whole meaning of my question.
6 Q. But I guess Mr. Nielsen, you understood what I wanted to say in
7 light of this recent correction that I've made?
8 A. I agree with you, and we see that in the document that we were
9 looking at that in the opinion of the -- of CSB Banja Luka, the military
10 organs were ineffective.
11 Q. And if you look at the next paragraph that deals with crime
12 rates, this more or less repeats your answer given to Mr. Cvijetic, that
13 is to say, it describes who are mainly the perpetrators of these crimes,
14 that these are actually members of the military, and there is a
15 description of how they are being processed.
16 A. According to this report, certainly military conscripts are a
17 major source of crime. Other groups that are frequently mentioned are of
18 course members of paramilitary groups and just the general rise in
19 criminality because of a very bad security situation.
20 Q. Mr. Nielsen, you would agree with me if I say that these issues
21 mentioned in this report were mentioned for the first time at the meeting
22 of the 11th of July held in Belgrade
23 A. That may have been the first time that those issues were
24 mentioned at that high a level of the ministry. However, documents from
25 April, May, and June, and the first half of July show that the officials
1 in the police were permanently concerned about the deteriorating security
2 situation, in particular about the enormous explosion in criminal
4 Q. In his speech delivered on the 11th of July, Stojan Zupljanin was
5 the first person to raise these issues. To that end, could you please
6 look at P160. Page 5 in B/C/S and page -- actually, pages 7 to 8. It
7 starts on page 7 and then goes on, on page 8 in English.
8 Would you agree with me that Mr. Zupljanin speaks here about the
9 work of the army and Crisis Staffs and says that they are collecting
10 Muslim population and placing them in the camps and then the MUP is
11 requested to provide security, and this is the first time that someone
12 without any pressure from the international community highlighted the
13 problem of the conditions in these detention centres, and proposed -- and
14 initiated this problem to be resolved; isn't that right?
15 A. As an analyst, it's my job to be very specific, so yes, I agree
16 with you that Mr. Zupljanin speaks about the issues that you mentioned,
17 and that is reflected in the document we have in front of us. As to
18 whether that is indeed the first time that someone, as you say, without
19 any pressure from the international community highlighted this problem,
20 that is a finding that I'm unable to concur with because I don't have the
21 information that would lead me to such a conclusion. He certainly does
22 highlight the issue though.
23 Q. And in preparing your report, you haven't found any proof that he
24 [as interpreted] was done under the pressure of the international
25 community and that that problem had already been in the public domain? I
1 am talking about the Banja Luka Krajina, specifically.
2 A. I do not have any information to suggest -- that suggests that
3 Mr. Zupljanin was making his comments under duress or pressure of any
5 Q. In one of the following paragraphs, it's the fourth one from the
6 bottom, he speaks about the army and says that the army is -- are asking
7 for resubordination of the entire force. And then he tackles other
8 subjects as well, and you said that these issues stretch throughout the
9 whole period, but the gist of my question was that all these issues were
10 for the for the first time raised by Mr. Zupljanin, and in order to avoid
11 the influence of the local authorities who are actually paying the
12 police, try to interfere into the chain of command over the MUP. You
13 would agree with me that this is the essence of the objections concerning
14 the system of financing the MUP?
15 A. I agree that the financing of the MUP by Crisis Staffs and other
16 local authorities was a major issue during this period. I don't know if
17 it was Mr. Zupljanin or another participant at this meeting, but someone
18 at had meeting certainly said that he who pays the piper chooses the
19 tune, and that was one reason why MUP needed to be financed at the
20 ministerial and state budget level and not at the local level.
21 I would point out that Mr. Zupljanin's statements are somewhat at
22 odds with his instructions in June 1992 to his own subordinates that they
23 should very faithfully follow the instructions of the local and regional
24 Crisis Staffs.
25 Q. In paragraph 2 it says that the function -- the system of
1 functioning has been broken up.
2 A. As I noted previously, communications issues were -- and
3 difficulties with communications were certainly discussed at this
4 meeting, including by Mr. Zupljanin, that is correct.
5 Q. Concerning your previous answer when you mentioned a letter and
6 the execution of police tasks, have you found any document? And I'm
7 talking about later period July, he sent a letter to the police stations,
8 instructed them not to carry out the orders of local authorities that
9 refer to the security of detention centres and other tasks of that
11 A. As I've stated several is times, it is generally the case that
12 after June 1992 there is a major policy change in MUP regarding whether
13 or not to take orders from Crisis Staffs. And as we see at this meeting
14 and in the conclusions that follow out from this meeting, and
15 Mr. Zupljanin emulates this in his own orders, the trend after June 1992
16 is to centralise decision-making within the organs of Internal Affairs
17 and to tell the Crisis Staffs that they are no longer to give orders or
18 otherwise interfere with the work of the police.
19 Q. That was primarily for the reason of many police stations being
20 under the influence of their local Crisis Staff and their environment
21 that they didn't follow MUP instructions, but rather followed the
22 instructions of the Crisis Staff who were on many occasions in
23 contravention with the instructions received from the MUP; is that
25 A. It is definitely the case that the minister as well as
1 Mr. Zupljanin wished to prevent situations which had been occurring in
2 which the Crisis Staffs had been ordering the police do things that they
3 should not be doing according to, for example, the Law on Internal
4 Affairs. So that this is, again, after June 1992, part of a concerted
5 effort to rectify that situation.
6 Q. And later on you could see and you mentioned it in your analysis
7 concerning the proposals put forth by Mr. Zupljanin, certain concrete
8 measures and steps were taken in order to implement them; is that right?
9 A. That is correct. As I've noted previously, this meeting of the
10 11th of July resulted in a very specific document issued, I believe, on
11 the 17th of July in which various organisations within MUP were
12 specifically tasked to implement the conclusions of this meeting, and of
13 course, Mr. Zupljanin participated in such implementation.
14 Q. One of the problems that I noticed that you mentioned, but not so
15 emphatically, was that certain public security stations did not obey the
16 orders, or let's say guide-lines and instructions received either from
17 the centre of the securities because the structure and the organisation
18 of the MUP was somewhat different from the one of the army. Although,
19 you are not an expert in this particular field, one often uses terms
20 control, co-operation, harmonisation, et cetera, which in war time can
21 only make the functioning of the MUP difficult, the usage of such terms
22 and such approach in operation.
23 A. I think that one of the problems that contributes to this
24 situation at the level of the municipal public security stations is that
25 for the period until the 11 July meeting, they are being told certainly
1 in the northwestern Bosnia
2 top police official that they are to heed and implement instructions,
3 orders, that are issued to them by the Crisis Staffs at the municipal and
4 regional level. Whereas after the 11th of July, they are told that they
5 should only receive orders and implement instructions that are coming
6 through the police organs.
7 So this was a situation that was changing, and it was certainly a
8 situation that was in contradiction of the way in which they had been
9 operating from the beginning of April until the end of June.
10 Q. Because the situation was out of control, and that was one of the
11 conclusions of the 11th of July meeting, that is to place all police
12 forces under centralised control and to bring some order into the
13 functioning of the MUP.
14 A. When one says that something is out of control, that seems to me
15 to suggest that no one was in control. What I'm saying is, rather, that
16 for the period from early April until the end of June, it was in many
17 cases the Crisis Staffs that were in control. And I remind the Court
18 again that police officers were members of these Crisis Staffs. The
19 problem that accumulated was that the Crisis Staffs in many cases were
20 asking the police to do certain tasks without first consulting with the
21 Ministry of Internal Affairs, and in some cases, as I said, they were
22 tasking them to do things that were outside the jurisdiction of the
24 In line with what I call re-centralisation or centralisation of
25 Internal Affairs in the RS, after June 1992 this situation had to be
1 remedied and everyone in the ministry seemed to agree about that.
2 Q. However, the situation did not improve significantly. Therefore,
3 I would like you to look at document 266 from 65 ter list. It's a minute
4 of the meeting of an extended collegium of the minister of the interior.
5 It's your number 5.
6 You have mentioned this document in your report.
7 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Can you please move, or, rather,
8 turn to page 4 in the Serbian version and page 5.
9 Q. Can you look at the fifth paragraph from the top below this
10 encircled one. It says that from -- within the remit of the work
11 organisation and internal organisation of units and the job description
12 of employees, such formulations such as co-ordination and dovetailing,
13 et cetera, should be removed and emphasis should be laid on direct
14 command and control role of superior officer as well as the
15 responsibility of each employee for the tasks that he or she is supposed
16 to carry out. This is basically what I asked you about a minute ago.
17 That is to say, to chuck out all these terms that lower units used as an
18 excuse to avoid the implementation of the instructions received from the
19 superior organs; is that right?
20 A. I agree that this reflects this ongoing struggle to stream-line
21 and make more consistent the way in which the ministry functioned. As
22 with, for example, the ministry's protracted struggle with paramilitary
23 organisations, so it was with the Crisis Staffs. This was a procedure
24 which was often going two steps back, one step forward, but was moving in
25 the direction that you highlight.
1 Q. In 1992, you would agree that it was very difficult, or rather
2 difficult for the MUP to operate and carry out its general duties as
3 provided by the law?
4 A. I agree that the way in which you just characterised the
5 situation conforms with the way the RS MUP characterises the overall
6 situation in which it operated in 1992 in all its analytical summary
7 reports including the draft 1992 annual report.
8 Q. Mr. Nielsen, in your report you described the functioning of the
9 national security service, and it relates to a number of reports that you
10 refer to. You said that from April 1992 until the end of that year, the
11 security sector at the CSB
12 And that in the relevant annual report for 1992, there is not a single
13 mention of any war crimes committed against non-Serbian population.
14 You would agree with me that regardless of these two documents,
15 there is evidence that the state security service was very much involved
16 in detecting crimes against the Muslims; is that right? If you look at
17 other documents that are not strictly related to this specific paragraph.
18 A. I want to make it very clear that the statement in paragraph 353,
19 which you allude to, is purely a statement about what the SNB, the
20 national security service was doing with respect to war crimes, and not a
21 statement about what CSB
22 only one part, was doing.
23 This is just a finding that comes straight out of the document
24 that I cite in footnote 532. I agree with you that the SNB in the course
25 of 1992 did look into war crimes on a regular basis, including on several
1 occasions war crimes, alleged war crimes committed against the Muslims
2 and Croats. And I note that I have cited a number of reports, mostly
3 from early 1993, in which the national security service in the Banja Luka
4 and Prijedor areas among other things catalogue the destruction of
5 mosques and Catholic churches in northwestern Bosnia.
6 Q. Would you kindly look at 2D27. It's number 1 in your binder. I
7 don't know, Mr. Nielsen, if you had occasion to see this document before.
8 The B/C/S copy is a bit illegible. There is a translation in the
9 attachment. But first of all tell me, did you see this before?
10 A. I believe I have seen this before, I note that it's from Teslic
11 municipality. This may have been, although my memory is vague on this
12 point, among the documents related to the group popularly referred to as
13 the Mice.
14 Q. Precisely. And this is a criminal complaint against several
15 persons, I believe there are sixteen of them, plus their leader, who is
16 on the run, and they are reported for widespread looting and plunder
17 against Muslims and Croats, that's on page 3 in B/C/S; illegal arrests,
18 that's on page 4 in B/C/S; and page 5, keeping large numbers of Muslims
19 and Croats in inhumane conditions, beatings, illegal arrests, and finally
20 the killing of a number of persons of Muslim and Croat ethnicity by this
21 group on the premises of the public security station and some other
22 locations. This is my summary, but I see that you are following because
23 you read very fast.
24 It's all in the attachments, I don't have them, but all these
25 statements are indicated there. It's a very voluminous and detailed
1 criminal report, if you will agree with me.
2 A. I agree with that, yes.
3 Q. Look at the B/C/S version, please and the signature. We can't
4 see it in the English, but the name is Predrag Radulovic. It's only in
5 the B/C/S.
6 A. On the last page of the document?
7 Q. Yes. Sorry, the last but one. It's enlarged on the screen in
8 front of you. Predrag Radulovic was a member of the state security
9 service; correct? And you will find him in those reports about the Milos
10 group. He signed those dispatches. Do you remember?
11 A. Yes, I recall long discussions about Mr. Radulovic and his
12 association with the group that called itself Milos.
13 Q. And he was a member of the state security service, later national
14 security service?
15 A. Well, until about 1994 when he then, I believe, offered his
16 services to the Serbian state security services in Belgrade.
17 Q. This concerns an event from July 1992 when he was a member of the
18 state security service; correct?
19 A. I believe that is correct, yes.
20 Q. Would you then modify your findings in paragraph 353 where you
21 said that the state security service, later national security service,
22 never filed a single criminal complaint concerning a war crime? Would
23 you -- perhaps not modified, but supplemented, I'm sorry if I misspoke.
24 You don't need to modify it, but perhaps supplement your report to say
25 that at least one criminal report against a number of persons was filed
1 concerning a war crime?
2 A. Well, I note that in at least the English version of
3 paragraph 353 which I wrote, I stated that "from April 1992 until the end
4 of that year, the SNB
5 only one individual for suspected war crimes." Now --
6 Q. There are at least 16 of them?
7 A. That is certainly correct. Where I would perhaps take issue with
8 your characterization or the need to rewrite or amend my finding is
9 whether these people in this document are actually charged with war
10 crimes, just as we discussed earlier, the one for Koricanska Stijena
11 where it says murder, I don't see the word war crime. Again, let me be
12 very clear that the finding, if that's what you want to call it, that the
14 their finding not mine. I'm just quoting it from their document.
15 Q. Precisely for that reason I asked my first question, if you
16 remember, what exactly you understand war crime to mean. I did not mean
17 to offend you, I just wanted to find out to what extent we agree on the
18 terms, although the Prosecutor objected and I could not continue. That
19 was the point anyway. Basically this is a war crime, that's the whole
21 A. Well, sir, in testifying here, and again hyper-conscious of the
22 fact that I'm not a lawyer as yourself, I'm not making any findings at
23 any point in time and do not wish to make any findings about whether any
24 act constitutes a war crime or not. I may have my own opinions about
25 that. I'll keep those to myself. But at any rate, I'm trying to
1 adequately and accurately tell the Court what these documents say. So
2 when they say war crime or when they say illegal, then I quote that. I
3 make no finding about whether that was actually case. I do find again,
4 as we note, we are dealing with professional police officers unlike
5 myself, and I assume that they have some idea about what was legal and
6 illegal and what constituted a war crime.
7 Q. Yes, and since you are not qualified properly for police terms,
8 you quote them in the documents as you find them without interpreting
9 them and going deeper into their meaning.
10 A. That is correct, because ultimately this is a report about what
11 the police did and how they perceived their own work, and I'm very glad
12 that you raised that point because in December I was asked about
13 so-called loyalty oaths. Your colleagues told me and instructed me
14 hopefully that that was not an official term being used. But if you see
15 the police documents themselves, the police themselves use that term,
16 statements of loyalty, even though it apparently has no legal
18 Q. And you will agree with me that this event and these incidents in
19 Krstici are part of the indictment against my client?
20 A. I have not read the indictment for quite some time, but if you
21 say that is in the indictment, I'll take your word for it.
22 Q. Basically we agreed on this passage that -- I understood you were
23 saying that -- are saying that when SNB did not prosecute a war crime,
24 when you say that, you don't mean that the SNB did nothing to collect
25 evidence or did not take any steps et cetera, and in that sense you would
1 modify this particular passage in your report?
2 MR. HANNIS: Well, Your Honour, that assumes a fact I think is
3 not in evidence yet. He is referring to paragraph 353 of Mr. Nielsen's
4 report where cites from April 1992 until the end of the year, the SNB
5 sector at CSB
6 hasn't established that this document that appears to have the signature
7 of Predrag Radulovic was from the SNB sector at CSB Banja Luka. You may
8 recall some evidence that we've had already, and I'm sure you'll hear
9 more, that there was a dispute about whether Teslic pertained to
10 Doboj CSB
11 document says the signature, Predrag Radulovic's signature is "on behalf
12 of," and then it says, "illegible." So we don't know if it's on behalf
13 of CSB
14 established that fact yet to warrant asking this question.
15 MR. KRGOVIC: Your Honour, my learned friend is wrong, we did ask
16 to the witness, the protected witness which I cross-examined him and it's
17 related, he confirmed that Predrag Radulovic was member of SNB
18 Banja Luka, if you remember. And he spoke with Mr. Radulovic during the
19 inspection of the -- and if we can go to the private session, I can tell
20 the name of this witness, just to remind the Prosecution if it's
21 necessary. But if Mr. Nielsen agree with me that -- oh, he is under the
22 oath, I mean, Mr. Nielsen. So, he signed the undertaking, so I think I
23 can do that in front of him.
24 JUDGE HALL
25 MR. HANNIS: Yes, I do, Your Honour, because no matter what that
1 answer is it doesn't change the fact that the source of Mr. Nielsen's
2 statement is a report from CSB
3 somebody in CSB
4 of the SNB
5 he was working on behalf of CSB
6 Mr. Nielsen's statement inaccurate.
7 MR. KRGOVIC: Is that dispute, that Mr. Radulovic didn't work in
9 MR. HANNIS: I don't know where all Mr. Radulovic worked, and on
10 -- in what position he was doing this. I seem to recall seeing some
11 document where he was acting as SJB chief for Teslic for a brief period
12 of time. So I don't know on whose behalf and in what capacity he is
13 writing this document at this time. I don't think that's been
15 MR. KRGOVIC: If you look in the appendix of your indictment you
16 can find the position of Mr. Radulovic very clear within the organisation
17 of the SNB
18 JUDGE DELVOIE: It's in the prosecutor's chart that he is SNB
19 Banja Luka Milos group. Isn't that enough, Mr. Hannis?
20 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I think you'll need to hear some
21 further testimony about what Mr. Radulovic was during at certain periods
22 of time to determine whether or not when this criminal report was filed
23 whether it was filed on behalf of SNB Banja Luka or on behalf of some
24 other organisation, such as headquarters or SNB in Doboj, because
25 Mr. Nielsen's report is referring to a report from CSB Banja Luka. And
1 whoever wrote the report in CSB
2 Mr. Radulovic as part of the SNB
3 front of them when they wrote their report.
4 MR. KRGOVIC: Mr. Nielsen, just answer my first question, if he
5 is aware where Mr. Radulovic is working, if he confirmed he was in SNB
6 until 1994. I mean, so he has knowledge about it. So I can't see any
7 sense of this objection. If you look at two pages before, I clearly
8 asked Mr. Nielsen what was the position of Mr. Radulovic on this period,
9 relevant period of time, I mean, July 1992. And he clearly said, yes, he
10 was working in SNB
11 JUDGE HALL
12 in all these details, the question --
13 MR. KRGOVIC: Yeah, we are wasting time.
14 JUDGE HALL
15 question is originally phrased by you before Mr. Hannis intervened, would
16 the witness -- as I understand your question is whether the witness would
17 modify his answer in the light of this document.
18 MR. KRGOVIC: Yeah.
19 JUDGE HALL
20 answer so let's deal with that and move on.
21 MR. HANNIS: Just to indicate, Your Honour, it was my
22 understanding that Mr. Radulovic was temporarily appointed as chief of
23 the SJB Teslic I think at the time this criminal report was charged. And
24 therefore he is issuing the report on behalf of the SJB and not the SNB
25 in Banja Luka.
1 JUDGE HALL
2 question, Mr. Hannis, it seems to me that the identity of the individual
3 is less important than the -- than what the document purports to say and
4 whether the witness would modify his answer in light of the contents of
5 the document. Isn't that the question, Mr. Krgovic?
6 MR. KRGOVIC: Yes.
7 THE WITNESS: Looking at the document which you've provided to
8 me, it is the case that it's a criminal complaint for things that, as you
9 state, some may construe as war crimes. It is issued by, if you look at
10 the letterhead, the public security station in Teslic and signed by
11 Mr. Radulovic. It does not mention in the document, as far as I can see,
12 the national security service, even though I do not contest that
13 Mr. Radulovic was at that time also an employee of the SNB. But
14 ultimately, it does not really modify my one sentence in paragraph 353
15 because all I'm saying is a simple case of an analyst saying, This is
16 what that document says, period. Now, the authors of that document might
17 be wrong, but that should be put to the authors of that document.
18 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Which brings me to another thing. When you made that conclusion,
20 you did not look at other documents than the two you mentioned; correct?
21 A. Well, in the context of discussions of the RS MUP's interest in
22 prosecuting individuals for war crimes, I, as an analyst, thought that it
23 was salient to quote the Banja Luka SNB sector's report on its own work
24 for 1992 which includes that sentence.
25 Q. Mr. Nielsen, among other things, your report deals with Manjaca.
1 You will agree with me that Manjaca was a military camp under the
2 exclusive jurisdiction of the VRS?
3 A. I agree that Manjaca was a military detention facility.
4 Q. And it was exclusively the corps commander and the army that had
5 responsibility for this detention facility; correct?
6 A. That is my understanding, and it is my understanding based on
7 police documentation that the corps commander on occasion allowed police
8 personnel to interrogate individuals detained in Manjaca together with
9 the military investigative and police authorities.
10 Q. And in the functioning of Manjaca camp, that was the only police
11 role if we set aside the dozen or so policemen who provided security?
12 A. I agree that besides very limited guarding of Manjaca providing
13 security, as you put it, and the interrogation of prisoners at Manjaca by
14 the SNB
15 Manjaca was very limited.
16 Q. And the police had no influence whatsoever of the organisation of
17 the camp, the way it operated, the conditions inside. It was solely
18 within the purview of military authorities; correct?
19 A. To the best of my knowledge, the -- as you state, the conditions
20 and the way in which Manjaca operated was under the control of military
22 Q. On the other hand, the army made efforts to exert influence and
23 to control other detention facilities; right?
24 A. I don't agree with that. From the police's perspective, as we
25 discussed earlier today, the problem was rather that sometimes the army
1 did not show any interest in some of the other detention facilities and
2 left the police to operate them instead.
3 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we show the witness 1D12.
4 That's 65 ter 503.
5 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Krgovic, the previous one and the one before
6 that, the one before that being 65 ter 266, you don't tender them?
7 MR. KRGOVIC: Not at this stage, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
9 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] I am sorry, it's not in your
11 [In English] Usher, can you provide this to the witness. I
12 apologise, I didn't get this because I was concentrating on the question.
13 JUDGE HALL
14 I note that we have 20 minutes left before we rise for the day. You
15 would recall that this witness is only available until tomorrow, and
16 tomorrow is reserved for re-examination by the Prosecution. And I am
17 reminded that you had indicated that Mr. Pantelic also had questions in
18 cross-examination, and I am appreciative of the fact that about
19 30 minutes of today's session at the very beginning was taken up with
20 certain procedural matters, but the -- well, I don't really have a
21 question, but I'm just alerting you to where we are in terms of time, in
22 terms of what the completion of the cross-examination of this witness on
23 behalf of Zupljanin and the fact that tomorrow is reserved for the
25 MR. KRGOVIC: Your Honour, this is my last question, so if I am
1 going to count, I still have one hour to complete this cross-examination,
2 meaning Zupljanin team in total has one hour, if I'm correct, so this is
3 my last question. So Mr. Pantelic will continue, so we'll see how far we
4 come to.
5 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Nielsen, have you had occasion to see this
6 document before?
7 A. I believe I've seen this document because it's cited by Mr. Brown
8 in his report.
9 Q. This document shows that Mr. Talic is ordering Manjaca,
10 Trnopolje, Omarska, and Prijedor that an inspection is pending. He gives
11 them orders what to do in preparation and issues an order basically;
13 A. That is correct.
14 Q. And this is precisely on the issue of army interest and
15 involvement. It is the army here who is seeking to control and to
16 instruct these detention facilities that are not within the system of
17 military detention facilities, but the army is still trying to exert
19 A. Well, whether it's an order or not, what he is doing is he is
20 informing CSB
21 at that point but is rather an SJB. But he is informing the police in
22 Prijedor that he has approved the visit of the international commission,
23 what is the -- the international commission for visiting prisoners
24 detained at detention camps at Manjaca, Trnopolje, Omarska, and Prijedor,
25 and he is informing them that they better get their house in order by the
1 time this commission shows up. That, to me, does not mean that he is
2 asserting exclusive control of those authorities, and the very fact that
3 he sends to the police in Prijedor, shows his knowledge of the fact that
4 the police are involved in running some of those facilities.
5 Q. He is doing that, in fact, pursuant to a verbal order by the
6 commander of the Main Staff who approved this visit. It seems from the
7 document that it was General Mladic who approved this visit to detention
9 A. Yes, that is correct.
10 Q. And in addition to the CSB
11 security organ which, if you are aware of the whole structure, is
12 involved in guarding duties and security in detention facilities?
13 A. Yes, that's correct. The organs of security of the 1st Krajina
14 Corps are among the recipients of this.
15 MR. KRGOVIC: Can I have an exhibit number for this document,
16 Your Honour.
17 JUDGE HALL
18 MR. KRGOVIC: Thank you so much, Mr. Nielsen, I have no further
20 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
21 THE REGISTRAR: This document has already been assigned
22 Exhibit 1D12, Your Honours.
23 MR. KRGOVIC: I didn't know that. Thank you for the correction.
24 Cross-examination by Mr. Pantelic:
25 Q. [No interpretation]
1 A. Good day.
2 Q. [No interpretation]
3 A. Your Danish is impeccable, Mr. Pantelic.
4 Q. Like your Serbian language.
5 Mr. Nielsen, you stated on many occasions during the
6 examination-in-chief and cross-examination and in earlier proceedings
7 that you are not an expert in legal matters; am I correct?
8 A. Yes, and as we say in Danish, I'm now stating that for the 117th
10 Q. And you are not an expert in military issues?
11 A. Ditto.
12 Q. And you are not an expert in political issues?
13 A. Well, that certainly depends on what you mean by political
14 issues. I have written extensively on political matters.
15 Q. You are not a political analyst?
16 A. I have a degree in political science and in international
17 relations, and so political analysis is certainly part of my purview.
18 Q. So I can take that you are an expert for political life in Bosnia
19 and Herzegovina
20 A. Well, for the purposes of that case that's not the way I
21 understand that I'm being proffered as a witness particularly because, as
22 I stated previously, the political landscape and situation in
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina was dealt with in a complimentary report by
24 Mr. Treanor.
25 Q. I take it that you are not an expert for political life in
2 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, he has not been tendered by the
3 Prosecution in this case as a political expert, he is being tendered as a
4 police expert. Many of these questions have already been asked and
6 MR. PANTELIC:
7 Q. And, Mr. Nielsen, you stated that you are not an expert in
8 international public law, I believe?
9 A. That is correct.
10 Q. So you are historian, you have a PhD degree in philosophy; am I
12 A. No, you are wrong, I have a PhD in history, which is called a
13 doctor of philosophy, as are all PhDs.
14 Q. So would you agree me, Mr. Nielsen, that having in mind that all
15 these issues that you just mentioned, that it would be fair to actually
16 extract from your report everything which is related to police matters,
17 to political issues, to military issues, or constitutional law issues; am
18 I correct?
19 MR. HANNIS: Argumentative, Your Honour. That's matter for you
20 to decide.
21 MR. PANTELIC:
22 Q. Mr. Nielsen, in preparing your report, you were actually working
23 on the basis to support Prosecution case; am I correct?
24 A. As I stated at the outset of my testimony --
25 Q. No, no, just give me yes or no answer, please.
1 A. Well, in that case, no, you are incorrect.
2 Q. Mr. Nielsen, can we agree upon the fact that MUP being a part of
3 government, now we are speaking about Republika Srpska, actually is
4 organised in accordance and it's functioning is in accordance with the
5 law on state administration? Am I correct or not?
6 A. Yes, and I responded to that previously.
7 Q. And would you agree with me if I will put to you that the notion
8 of functioning of MUP is actually closer to the verb to direct and not to
9 command like in army structure? In fact, Mr. Nielsen, this is the
10 approach which was taken by many of Trial Chambers within this Tribunal.
11 Would you agree with me or not?
12 A. I'm not sure that I understand your question, quite frankly.
13 Q. I will try to be more precise. We have two meanings of
14 functioning. We have verb "to direct," and we have verb "to command."
15 It's understandable for you?
16 A. Mm-hmm.
17 Q. Verb "to command" is more related to the army than to police; am
18 I correct?
19 A. In normal peacetime circumstances, that would be the case, yes.
20 Q. So in police work, we could say that the function of the police
21 is related to the notion of direction rather than commanding; yes?
22 A. Yes, although I don't think that a police officer who disobeys
23 the commands or instructions of his superior officer will last very long
24 in professional service.
25 Q. We shall come to that. At this point it is quite enough.
1 During your testimony in examination-in-chief, this is transcript
2 page 4749 until page -51, in your answers on Honourable Judge Harhoff
3 questions regarding the role of the police during military operations,
4 you were explaining that actually, I'm quoting, you said beaurocratically
5 speaking, during some combat activities police being subordinated to
6 respective military commander is the fact, but on the other hand this
7 member of police is also in kind of command relation with the MUP. Do
8 you remember that issue that was mentioned?
9 A. Yes, I recall that discussion.
10 Q. Well, I put to you, Dr. Nielsen, that during military operations
11 only military commander in its zone of responsibility of his unit is
12 responsible for command and not police officers or employees of Ministry
13 of Internal Affairs. Do you agree with me or not? Just yes or no
15 A. No, and neither does the defence expert.
16 Q. Okay. Give me the answer on the following situation: If during
17 military operation a member of police unit commit a crime, who is in
18 charge to initiate proceedings against him?
19 A. My understanding is that responsibility rests with the military
20 authorities for that case that you explained.
21 Q. And another issue that I would like to discuss with you is, would
22 you agree with me that the work of CSB
23 communication and sending dispatches and daily reports and weekly reports
24 so that CSB
25 due to the problems that the other regions have with the communications;
1 am I correct or not?
2 A. It is difficult to actually answer that question for the reason
3 that I note in my report that we in this institution, the ICTY, have a
4 surplus of information, documentation from CSB Banja Luka, whereas we
5 have comparatively little from other CSBs. So it's difficult to make
6 that finding.
7 Q. In any case, CSB
8 informed and received -- informed MUP and received direction from MUP; am
9 I correct?
10 A. That is correct. That is what I stated earlier today.
11 Q. And you stated in paragraph 236 of your report that -- actually
12 you are describing the way how this reporting process is going, and then
13 you mentioned in paragraph 237 that Mr. Zupljanin actually in order to
14 comply with this practice, in fact, Mr. Zupljanin reprimanded chiefs of
15 SJB for submitting poor daily reports, that was the fact actually from
16 the documents that you were reviewing. Am I correct?
17 A. Yes, there is an issue between quantity and quality here.
18 Q. Okay. It is not for us to discuss that matter. Now, in the
19 paragraph 186 of your report, you are speaking about the CSB structure,
20 but I'm taking -- I stand corrected, of course, that you -- in this
21 particular paragraph you would use rule book of -- 1992 rule book of MUP;
22 am I correct?
23 A. That is correct.
24 Q. And this rule book was a draft made, I think, in, let's say --
25 where it was made this rule book?
1 A. As we discussed yesterday, the draft, I believe, was finalised in
2 September 1992, and it was adopted, I think, in November.
3 Q. And this particular rule book was related to the state of
4 imminent threat of war and war, state of war; yes?
5 A. That was my understanding, that it was drafted to conform with
6 the operation of MUP in those conditions.
7 Q. Okay. And would you agree with me that in other, I would say,
8 circumstances actually MUP was information so they used former rule
9 books, I believe, from Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina MUP; am I
11 A. I agreed, and I answered that question earlier, that's correct.
12 Q. Yes. And actually in accordance with this previous regulation,
13 the structure of CSB
14 the chief of CSB
15 A. That is correct.
16 Q. And then he got actually a certain department and a certain
17 services, two were most important under him was a chief of sector of
18 national security or state security; am I correct?
19 A. That is correct.
20 Q. And on the other hand, his, I would say, assistant or colleague
21 was chief of sector of public security; am I correct?
22 A. That is also correct.
23 Q. And also chief of CSB
24 I'm speaking about the CSB
1 A. Yes, there were several departments.
2 Q. And then other was department for legal affairs; am I correct?
3 A. You are again correct.
4 Q. And the other one was department for analytical affairs; am I
6 A. That is also correct.
7 Q. And finally, it was the department for connection, transmission,
8 and communications in general; yes? Am I correct?
9 A. Yes, that is correct.
10 JUDGE HALL
11 rise for the day.
12 MR. PANTELIC: Yes, Your Honour, thank you, and tomorrow I have
13 additional time to finish with Mr. Nielsen, I believe. Because in the
14 meantime, I was speaking with my learned friend, Mr. Hannis, in and
15 general, he was keen to allocate certain couple of minutes, if necessary
16 for me, or maybe I'm wrong. You never know with the Prosecution.
17 [Trial Chamber confers]
18 JUDGE HALL
19 MR. HANNIS: "Keen" might be too strong a word for it, but I'm
20 not objecting to him having some additional time because we spent that
21 half-hour at the beginning, I re-opened to do some additional redirect,
22 so I think it's fair to subtract some time from me tomorrow, but I don't
23 know how much time he is asking for, an hour, 45 minutes, or something in
24 that neighbourhood.
25 MS. PIDWELL: I would be comfortable maximum, I do my best, but
1 maximum it will be around 45 minutes, something like that. So I will be
2 along these lines, yes.
3 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Pantelic, if we extract from that 45 minutes,
4 the 10 minutes that you spent on irrelevant questions like you did in the
5 beginning of this, then it will work.
6 MR. PANTELIC: I will do my best, Your Honour, to do my job.
7 JUDGE DELVOIE: Okay. Thanks.
8 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.47 p.m.
9 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 27th day of
10 January, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.