1 Monday, 15 February 2010
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.26 p.m.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours -- apologies,
6 good afternoon, Your Honours. Good afternoon everyone in and around the
8 This is case IT-08-91-T, the Prosecutor versus Mico Stanisic and
9 Stojan Zupljanin.
10 JUDGE HALL
11 May we begin in the usual manner by taking the appearances today,
13 MS. KORNER: Good afternoon, Your Honours. Joanna Korner
14 assisted by Crispian Smith for the Prosecution.
15 MR. ZECEVIC: Good afternoon, Your Honours. Slobodan Zecevic,
16 Slobodan Cvijetic, and Eugene O'Sullivan appearing for Stanisic Defence
17 this afternoon. Thank you.
18 MR. PANTELIC: Good afternoon, Your Honours. For
19 Zupljanin Defence, Igor Pantelic and Dragan Krgovic. Thank you.
20 JUDGE HALL
21 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, there are a number of short preliminary
23 First is we asked Your Honours last -- the week before last if we
24 could have an alteration of the dates of the safe conduct. We haven't
25 had that yet. If we don't get it today, we won't get the witness here
1 for the specified period. So if I can point that out.
2 JUDGE HALL
3 the order -- the -- the latest thing is that the form -- it is being
4 formalised, and we will -- it will be issued today.
5 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, in addition, we asked for witness
6 summonses for ST-179 and ST-123; the dates of their testimony are a
7 couple of weeks or so hence. Again, if we don't get those urgently,
8 we're not likely to get the witnesses to court. I don't say today, but
9 for not very much delay.
10 Your Honours, additionally, Your Honours, I believe on the last
11 Friday we sat, asked us to file something today in relation to the site
12 visit. We won't be able to. We considered Your Honours had a fair bit
13 to get on with in any event. But there was a slight misunderstanding.
14 We were going to discuss it with the Defence so we could come to an
15 agreed list of sites. Obviously the Defence were not here last week.
16 They thought we were going to provide a list and then they'd comment on
17 it. Well, we haven't done it. And so I'm afraid that will have to wait
18 for a little bit while we hopefully get together and discuss that this
20 Your Honour, that's the third thing.
21 The fourth thing is in relation to exhumations. We said we would
22 file the database to be added to our 65 ter list. When we get a check,
23 of course, we discovered it was already on our 65 ter list. The various
24 components of this database are 65 ter numbers - I have written them down
25 somewhere - yes, 2517 to 2568. It is our intention purely to produce the
1 database without calling any evidence, and it's a matter for the Defence
2 to say whether they want evidence called from the compilers of the
4 And, Your Honours, I think that concludes all the preliminary
5 matters which I wish to raise.
6 JUDGE HALL
7 [Trial Chamber and Legal Officer confer]
8 JUDGE HALL
9 respect of Ms. Korner's issue about the subpoenas that we still await the
10 responses from the Defence, so the Chamber would need expedited responses
11 in order to go on to the next step. Thank you.
12 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated] ... no objection. I
13 wonder if we could have an oral -- perhaps just an oral indication later
14 today, after the very first break, perhaps.
15 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes, we will provide an oral indication later
16 today. Thank you very much.
17 JUDGE HALL
18 So is the Prosecution ready to proceed with its next witness?
19 MS. KORNER: Yes, Your Honour.
20 [The witness entered court]
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
22 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
23 WITNESS: NEDJO VLASKI
24 [Witness answered through interpreter]
25 JUDGE HALL
1 Good afternoon to you, sir. Would you begin by telling us your
2 name, please.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I am Nedjo Vlaski.
4 JUDGE HALL
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The 27th of May, 1956.
6 JUDGE HALL
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I am a criminologist. I have a
8 degree in criminology.
9 JUDGE HALL
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm a Serb.
11 JUDGE HALL
12 in the region in relation to these matters?
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have never testified before.
14 JUDGE HALL
15 called as a witness in this matter before the Tribunal which has been
16 appointed to deal with crimes that would have occurred in the former
18 have been invited to make a solemn declaration, the effect of which is
19 that your testimony is on oath. The procedure that is followed is fairly
20 standard for courtrooms, in that the side that is calling you - in this
21 case, the Prosecution - would begin by asking you questions. And then
22 the -- counsel for each of the two accused persons would, if they wish,
23 also have questions of you, and the Prosecution would then have a right
24 to re-examine you on matters arising out of your cross-examination. And
25 after that, the Chamber itself may have questions of you.
1 Do you understand what I have just explained?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I have understood everything.
3 JUDGE HALL
4 Prosecution to begin.
5 Examination by Ms. Korner:
6 Q. Mr. Vlaski, can we start by just looking at your dealings with
7 the Prosecution and Defence in this case.
8 Is it right that you were interviewed in Banja Luka in June of
9 last year?
10 A. Yes, the 3rd of June.
11 Q. And you were told that, because of your position you had the
12 right not to answer questions and the right to have a lawyer present; is
13 that right?
14 A. That is correct.
15 Q. And you were prepared to answer the questions and didn't have a
16 lawyer present. Is that right?
17 A. Yes, I very gladly testified.
18 JUDGE HARHOFF: Ms. Korner, could you just explain in which
19 capacity this witness was interviewed.
20 MS. KORNER: He was interviewed as someone who, had this Tribunal
21 been issuing indictments, would have come under the definition of a
22 suspect. Of course, that cannot apply anymore because the Tribunal
23 cannot issue indictments, but people such as Mr. Vlaski are given their
24 rights because of the possibility of prosecution in other places.
25 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you.
1 MS. KORNER:
2 Q. And you had a chance, didn't you, yesterday, to review the -- the
3 recorded interviews; is that right?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And I think what you said about it was that although you might
6 have expressed certain things differently, the interview did record what
7 you wanted to say; is that right?
8 A. Yes, I would have had more to say than that.
9 Q. Right. Again -- yes, that's fair enough, Mr. Vlaski. You were
10 told there were time constraints, as there are today, yes.
11 And I think, this morning, were you able to have a period of time
12 with Mr. Zecevic before coming into court to testify?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. All right, Mr. Vlaski. Can we now move, please, to the various
15 positions that you have held.
16 Did you start working for the MUP of Bosnia and Herzegovina
17 the -- in the 1970s?
18 A. The 1st of June, 1974, to be precise.
19 Q. And, at that stage, were you working in the City Secretariat in
20 the city of Sarajevo
21 A. After completing secondary police school, I was assigned as -- I
22 was assigned to the City Secretariat for the police to general police
24 Q. All right. At a late date, however, did you transfer to the
25 state security division?
1 A. That is correct. From the 1st of June, 1975, I began to work in
2 the State Security Service, at the Republican Secretariat of
4 Q. And in which area of the State Security Service did you work?
5 A. I worked at the state security centre in charge of the Sarajevo
6 area. I worked at the Sarajevo
7 Q. All right. Did you, however, in the 1980s, transfer into -- or
8 did you become inspector for the security of persons and facilities?
9 A. This was just a regular distribution of posts. As one acquired a
10 certain amount of experience and conditions for promotions, I then was
11 given a different position, and I was assigned to duties of a personal
12 and building security.
13 Q. And were you still in that position at the time of the
14 multi-party elections in 1990?
15 A. After this post, where I carried out these tasks and assignments,
16 I was assigned as an inspector at the -- for the combatting of internal
17 enemies, as this was called. These were assignments that had to do with
18 combatting specifically Serbian nationalism.
19 Q. All right. We're going to have a look in a little more detail
20 there what happened to you after the multi-party elections and
21 particularly in 1991.
22 But after the split in the MUP, were you, for at least a short
23 period of time, in 1992, the -- an under-secretary -- assistant
24 under-secretary, I'm sorry, in the National Security Service under
25 Mr. Skipina?
1 A. Before I respond to this question, there is one period that is
2 particularly important for this Tribunal and for this testimony, so I
3 wouldn't wish to skip over that.
4 May I speak?
5 Q. Certainly.
6 A. Before the multi-party elections, I worked at these assignments,
7 counter-nationalist activities, and there was a climate created in
8 Bosnia and Herzegovina already that the police should be depoliticised
9 because change of the political system was expected. It was -- what was
10 being expected was a multi-party system, to this process was proceeding
11 more or less regularly. After the multi-party elections, it was clear
12 that the nationalist parties would win, and all of those patients of
13 ours, or clients, as we used to call them, members from the different
14 ethnic groups that we were covering were now in a position to take over
15 power. This was particularly relevant in the case of Alija Izetbegovic
16 who had been sentenced for Muslim nationalist or fundamentalist
17 activities, depending on how you view these issues. And it was expected
18 that representatives would come from the ranks of other nationalist
19 parties who did have some problems, because of their previous political
21 We were in a position, in the Security Service, to expect those
22 people to come to power precisely because they had been previously
23 prosecuted for their previous activities, especially persons who had
24 taken part in certain activities and were subject to investigations and
25 so on, so we were expecting a certain degree of retaliation and revenge
1 on the part of those people who were about to come to power.
2 As far as the policies of those nationalist parties, they were
3 aimed at implementing those ethnic objectives which prompted them to form
4 political parties in the first place, and represent the interests of the
5 people that they represented. The division of power was effected in such
6 a way that the rule was divided between the SDA, SDS, and the HDZ. And,
7 by inertia, there was a re-alignment among the ranks in certain
8 structures including the police, certain institutions, state organs, and
9 also bodies at lower levels.
10 It was particularly characteristic to note the relationship to
11 the structures of power of those who had been previously processed for
12 their activities, and a characteristic example would be that of
13 Alija Izetbegovic. He did allow for the possibility that the
14 investigators who had conducted investigations against him to be given
15 another chance at a position in these institutions, but probably in
16 somewhat different roles. This was the case also in Croatia with
17 investigators who had been dealing with such matters in Croatia to
18 continue on these duties but to direct them at the -- at their own
19 peoples -- people.
20 So this attitude had an effect and all the institutions in
21 Bosnia and Herzegovina, including those where I had worked. There was
22 publicity given and an image created for certain politicians. They had
23 gained power. And then it was the duty of those people to avenge, in
24 their future work, and work towards their interests and en the interests
25 of the people they represent.
1 This was not the case in the instance of representatives of the
2 Serb people. They felt no need to rely on the support of these
3 structures. At least that a was my impression. I personally worked on
4 the issues of Serb nationalism and clerical nationalism. I would have
5 been the one to deal with these matters. Not even the higher levels of
6 my structures were involved in these political party activities before
7 the elections, because they feared retaliation. Most of the managerial
8 staff who had been involved in the activities availed themselves of the
9 opportunity to retire early, under favourable benefits, and they left
10 their posts. We remained, who were rather inexperienced in view of the
11 newly arisen political situation, and without any political support.
12 Unlike the representatives of the Bosniak and Muslim and Croat people who
13 had absolute political support and an obligation, based on what I was
14 saying earlier on, to repay the debt to these people and to rehabilitate
15 themselves, in a way.
16 Thus, the mandate of setting up the Security Service within the
17 MUP of Bosnia-Herzegovina was given precisely to Munir Alibabic, the
18 investigator who, at one point, investigated Alija Izetbegovic.
19 According to the information we had, we had contacted Izetbegovic at the
20 time when he was serving his sentence in Foca. It was our expectation
21 that this would have an impact on -- in terms of pacifying someone who
22 had already been convicted of nationalism. However, what happened, in
23 fact, was quite unexpected. The investigator in respect of whom managers
24 grew concerned was completely indifferent to the situation. I personally
25 asked him if he was afraid of how the new structures that came to power
1 may react. His response was, I am a professional, and I fear no one.
2 Thereafter, following the elections, the various structures of
3 power came to be manned based on the agreement reached among the various
4 winning political parties. Since Bosnia-Herzegovina operated on the
5 principle of an agreement among the three peoples, and this principle
6 has, in fact, been built in the law and still exists in
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina today, the agreement on the separation of power proved
8 to be difficult.
9 Q. [Previous translation continues] ...
10 A. Can I continue?
11 Q. Mr. Vlaski, can I say this: I'm not proposing to ignore with you
12 the -- the events of 1990 and 1991 and the parliament and the agreements.
13 We have a limited time, as I explained to you this morning.
14 Can I ask what the point is that you want to make in three
15 sentences, if at all possible?
16 A. What I wanted to say is this: Since I am here, in order to tell
17 the truth, and I would like to at least point to the reaction that you
18 have to take in order to ascertain the truth, and what I have been
19 telling you so far is part of the truth. This is what I have been
20 through; it is it a rather painful experience that I wish to draw your
21 attention to. I also have personal reasons to do so. I have gone
22 through a great deal of things at the time, and all of them are relevant
23 to piecing together the puzzle an understanding the situation in
24 Bosnia-Herzegovina. That's why I have been trying to tell this story, if
25 you will allow me to.
1 Q. Can I say this, Mr. Vlaski. At the end of your evidence, as the
2 Presiding Judge has pointed out, I have no doubt, if you want to and you
3 feel that events that haven't been covered properly, you wish to say
4 something about, you will be allowed to do that. For the moment, as I
5 explained to you, there is a limited time available to both myself and to
6 the Defence. We would like to ask you questions about what we consider
7 to be relevant. And as I say, if, at the end, you feel there are other
8 matters that you wish to draw to the Courts's attention, I'm sure you
9 will be allowed to do that.
10 So could we just, please, try and sum up what you've just said at
11 rather great length. Pre the multi-party elections, your service
12 maintained intelligence on the leaders of all the nationalist parties.
13 Is that right?
14 A. Only in respect of those for whom there was information and
15 knowledge which made them interesting from the point of view of security.
16 In other words, there were indications that these people might pose a
17 security threat.
18 Q. All right. And you're saying that after the multi-party
19 elections, it was expected that those of you who had, in fact, engaged in
20 these operations might lose your jobs, but that did not happen. Is that
21 the effect of what you were saying?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. All right. So can we -- as I say, I'm going to come back to what
24 happened to you and to the police -- the MUP in 1990 and 1991. But I
25 just want to move ahead to your position after the split.
1 Could you have a look, please, at, on the screen, 65 ter 10138.5.
2 [Microphone not activated]
3 JUDGE HARHOFF: [Microphone not activated]
4 MS. KORNER: It's 10138.5. It's the Republika Srpska Ministry of
5 Internal Affairs. It's page 5 of the -- of the bundle.
6 Do you think we can possibly turn it so that it is a rectangle.
7 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry. If I'm not mistaken, I believe this
8 document has been exhibited already.
9 MS. KORNER: Oh, P876, sorry. But anyhow, we've got -- it's on
10 the -- it's the one on the screen.
11 MR. ZECEVIC: No, no, no. I'm not just objecting, just for the
12 sake of the transcript, because, I mean, I think it is easier if we call
13 it by exhibit number now.
14 MS. KORNER: Could we possibly get it up the right way around.
15 [Microphone not activated] ... I gather --
16 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
17 MS. KORNER: I gather there is a technical problem again and the
18 thing can't be turned the right way up. We can give Mr. Vlaski a hard
19 copy, but I don't know that the defendants have it or the accused have
21 Can we move it so that we can see to the right-hand side of the
22 page as we look at it. Thank you.
23 Q. Mr. Vlaski, we can see there the under-secretary for the SNB,
24 that's the State Security Service, as it became called, was, first of
25 all, shown is Mr. Skipina. And then he was replaced by Dragan Kijac.
1 And I think you agree that that's correct, isn't it?
2 Can you see, Mr. Vlaski? It's not very easy.
3 A. I can see it on my screen, but the time-line is somewhat
4 illogical to me. We have skipped from one stage to a stage -- the causes
5 of which need to be explained, and we skipped them.
6 Q. No, Mr. Vlaski, I've just told you. I'm going to go back to all
7 the matters that we discussed in Banja Luka that happened in 1991. I
8 merely want to deal with some of the personalities later on. Do you
9 understand that?
10 A. Very well. I can answer the questions. But, as I say, it was --
11 in 1992, Banja Luka.
12 Q. I'm not -- yes, all right. Can we just look at, please, for a
13 moment, these -- the names here, and then we're going to go back to 1991
14 and 1992.
15 Is it right that after the split in the MUP, Skipina became the
16 head of the SNB
17 Dragan Kijac?
18 You have to say yes, I'm afraid, otherwise it's not recorded.
19 A. Yes, that's right.
20 Q. All right. You're then shown, together with Mr. Goran Radovic,
21 as an assistant under-secretary. Now for, I appreciate a short period,
22 but was that right, was that your appointment?
23 A. I was nominated. However, for some other objective reasons, I
24 was not in a position to perform the duty at all because I was in a
25 hospital undergoing a treatment.
1 Q. All right. Mr. Radovic, first of all, was he somebody that you
2 knew and had worked with before?
3 A. But, of course. Goran Radovic worked in the Sarajevo state
4 security centre. He was a junior colleague. He worked there until 1991
5 when, following the multi-party elections, which was the most sensitive
6 period when new divisions emerged, he became the Deputy Chief of this
7 particular division in the State Security Service.
8 Q. All right. Underneath you shown on this diagram is a gentleman
9 named Dragan Devedlaka. Again, was he somebody you knew?
10 A. Of course. He, too, worked in the State Security Service before
11 the war that's to say. He was an inspector. Later on, in the period of
12 the divisions and commotion within the State Security Service and the
13 Ministry of the Interior, he became the deputy under-secretary for state
15 Q. Okay. All right. I'm not so concerned with the others, but can
16 I look at the top now for a moment.
17 Mico Stanisic, did you know him?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. When did you first get to know him?
20 A. As early as during our schooling in the secondary police school
21 we met, since Mico was the first generation to have been trained in this
22 particular schooling centre. I was the second generation. I was a year
23 younger. We met at the time but were not close. Or, rather, I knew of
24 him. Perhaps he didn't know of me. I was his junior.
25 Later on, we did not work on -- on positions that would have
1 anything to do one with another, and so we didn't have a professional
2 relationship. And it was only after the war that we resumed any sort of
4 Q. All right. By 1992, therefore, or 1991, rather, how long had you
5 known Mico Stanisic for, roughly?
6 A. As of 1991, which was the crucial year for the resolution of the
7 situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, because -- or, rather, in the absence of
8 an agreement between the three political parties surrounding the division
9 of posts, including those in the State Security Service, that's where the
10 problem lay, because our professional colleagues and partners would not
11 agree to a partnership being set up.
12 Q. Mr. Vlaski, I am seriously going to come back to 1991. My
13 question was simply this: How long, by 1991, had you known
14 Mico Stanisic.
15 A. Before 1991, as I said, I didn't have occasion to meet with him,
16 because Mr. Stanisic was not charged with policing work, and we didn't
17 have an opportunity to be in touch.
18 Q. Okay. Tell me, what year were you in the secondary police school
19 when Mico Stanisic was there?
20 A. That would have been 1971, 1972, or 1973. We could have spent
21 two years in the same facility attending school since he is my senior by
22 one year.
23 Q. And, finally, on this diagram and then we'll go back to 1991,
24 Momcilo Mandic, did you also know him?
25 A. The same applies to him as applied to Mr. Stanisic, because he
1 attended the same school. I had occasion to hear of him, but they were
2 my senior schoolmates, and we were not in touch at the time.
3 Subsequently I would hear of him, and we would come across each other,
5 Q. All right. Now, thank you very much.
6 MS. KORNER: We don't need that diagram anymore.
7 Q. Let's go back to what happened after the multi-party elections.
8 First, did you join any political party?
9 A. No. It was the political and social system of the time which
10 required all of us, at least those of us employed on security activities,
11 to be members of the League of Communists. Following change and the
12 dissolution of the League of Communists, we received instructions to the
13 effect that the police was supposed to undergo a depoliticising process.
14 After that, I have never become involved in the work of any political
15 party, and I do not believe that I will ever.
16 Q. Now, as far as you were concerned, you told us already in the
17 speech you made at the beginning of this afternoon's session, that
18 Mr. Alibabic was appointed to, in fact, the MUP and the State Security.
19 Is that right?
20 A. Yes. It was precisely Alija Izetbegovic who gave him the chance
21 to create the security sector in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In addition to
22 others, of course; he didn't do it on his own. But he was one of the
23 professionals who was privy to how the work was done, the methods of
24 work, and so on.
25 Q. And were you then appointed to a different position by
1 Mr. Alibabic?
2 A. Precisely, because there was this need to maintain equality among
3 the ethnic groups, and this was under the constitution, the laws, and the
4 rules that were in force at the time. The posts, the various positions,
5 had to be divided among them, and this should have been done even before
6 the multi-party elections. I said that my senior colleagues who were
7 eligible to retire, in fact, had already retired by that time and left
8 the sector. There were many vacancies. And in my specific case, I don't
9 know about the other ones, the proposals were given by Munir Alibabic,
10 who was the chief of the State Security Service of Sarajevo, that I be
11 appointed the chief of the 5th Administration which was tasked with
12 providing security of persons and facilities of such interest in
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina. I was handed down a decision to this effect.
14 Q. Thank you. Now, at that time, was Mico Stanisic already the
15 secretary to the Sarajevo SUP
16 A. Not at the time, no. This was a very difficult period during
17 which agreements had to be reached about how certain vital posts within
18 the state security sector were to be divided. If we know that
19 Alija Izetbegovic wanted to take over power and, as a representative of
20 the majority people, he wanted to take up the key positions within the
21 minister of police, the foreign ministry, the Presidency, and he also
22 wanted to take over certain lower level positions which carried a certain
23 weight. This was an objective that they wanted to achieve at any cost.
24 The Serb cadres were in an inferior position because the Serbs
25 simply did not understand what the state was like at the time. They took
1 over the Ministry of Agriculture the Ministry of Finance where they found
2 the treasury empty. The Croats were given the Ministry of Defence and
3 other important positions, and this reflected itself on all the future
4 relations within Bosnia-Herzegovina.
5 These institutions were the forum where a certain influence could
6 have been excerpted in the decision-making process.
7 Q. [Microphone not activated] ... for a moment. You're in the
8 Sarajevo SUP
9 the interior, Dr. Zepinic?
10 A. Yes. It was pursuant to the inter-party agreement that he was
11 appointed there, because it was -- this particular position was accorded
12 to a representative of the Serb people, and he was appointed to the post.
13 Q. And Mr. Delimustafic was the minister?
14 A. Yes. He was nominated by the Party of Democratic Action for that
15 position. Even though there were certain things in his background that
16 would -- that should have precluded him from taking that position, but
17 the -- this was a political decision.
18 Q. And who nominated Dr. Zepinic as the minister of the interior?
19 Deputy Minister, I'm sorry.
20 A. The representatives of the Serb people nominated him, and he came
21 from the ranks of the Ministry of Interior to take up this position. He
22 had the requisite knowledge and professional background to perform the
23 duty. That was the assessment made at the time.
24 Q. And, finally on this, was Branko Kvesic, a Croat, the
25 under-secretary for state security?
1 A. Yes, that policy of appointing cadres was a consequence of a
2 certain amounts of lobbying. There were a number of candidates for that
3 position. I know for a fact that one of the candidates was a friend of
4 mine, Jozo Leutar; however, some circles from the Catholic church
5 influenced the party leadership, and he was elected as the
6 under-secretary of the State Security Service.
7 Q. Right. Now, I'm sorry, Mr. Vlaski, again I'm going have to
8 explain to you. Time is limited. If could you just literally answer the
9 questions as simply as possible. Because the simple question was: Was
10 Mr. Kresic, a Croat, appointed.
11 Whilst you were working in Sarajevo during 1991, was Mr. -- were
12 Mr. Radovic and Mr. Devedlaka also working in Sarajevo?
13 A. Yes, they worked in Sarajevo
14 State Security Service's centre as an inspector, and Devedlaka worked in
15 my administration, when I was the chief, as an inspector in the
16 5th Administration for the security of persons and facilities at that
17 time. Later there will be some shifts which were a consequence of some
18 other relationships.
19 Q. All right. Now, I want to deal with this, please, really
20 shortly, Mr. Vlaski, until we move to September -- July to
21 September of 1991.
22 Were there arguments within the MUP about the allocation of posts
23 between the three nationalist parties?
24 A. There were no arguments. There was a situation at the
25 professional level of a certain trust and confidence, because up to a
1 little bit before that, we had ideal relationships. This was before the
2 elections. And there was no need for us to disagree, because we
3 considered our jobs as our professional duties. So once we, however, saw
4 that there were certain tendencies backed by certain political concepts
5 and ideas which were being carried out by our institutions and behind the
6 backs of us professionals, we became frustrated and then this created
8 In the beginning, there was no open opposition. There was a kind
9 of security/intelligence game that was present. But people in these
10 conditions are linked by common problems, not common interests. We had
11 no other interest other than the interest in preserving our personal
12 dignity and professional dignity. And then it was our duty to protect
13 the interests of the people that we represented, because that was how the
14 system had been set up. This system was not set up like that before, but
15 new relationships created it, and then we, in the MUP, the police, and
16 the security centre, were experienced not as professionals but were
17 thought of as Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. We would -- we could have been
18 the best professionals ever; however, that would not have made any
19 difference, because the system had began to become deformed from the
20 inside. And it was deformed by those who created and influenced these
21 decisions. Lower levels had no influence on decision making; this was
22 excerpted only by the higher levels of leadership.
23 Q. Let's have a look, please. We can trace what happened to you
24 through some of the intercepts which you have had a chance to listen to.
25 MS. KORNER: Could we have, please, up on the screen,
1 65 ter 1029.
2 Now, Your Honours, Mr. Vlaski's listened to all the
3 intercepts -- oh, it is P7 -- P719. Sorry, it has already been
4 exhibited -- has listened to all the intercepts. We've provided his
5 voice recognition on these intercepts. He is not on them -- I mean, he's
6 not speaking personally. He can assist us to the content. And so I'm
7 going to ask him whether he recognises the voices but without playing
8 them again, as I did with the last witness. And then ask for those,
9 which he's not a party, whether they can maybe MFI those which are not
10 already exhibited.
11 Q. I think you listened to this conversation and you were able to
12 identify -- to recognise the voice of Mr. Karadzic; is that correct?
13 A. That is correct.
14 Q. And can you just briefly, before we look at the part that relates
15 to you, tell us, firstly, when did you first meet Dr. Karadzic?
16 A. This was after the elections. By the nature of my duties when I
17 was the chief of the 5th Administration for the security of persons and
18 facilitates, it was my job to provide security for state officials. And
19 when the political situation became more complex, then we had to provide
20 security for party leaders and even for leading members of the clergy.
21 And that is why I had the need to meet and introduce myself to people for
22 whom we were supposed to provide security. And I know Mr. Karadzic from
23 the time that I was working in the service. And you already know the
24 reason why. And this applies not only to him but to many others.
25 Q. Yeah. All right.
1 MS. KORNER: Now, if we look, please, at the second page in
2 English and -- I don't have the B/C/S. I would think it would be the
3 second page in B/C/S as well. Yeah. Yeah. Thank you.
4 Q. Mr. Karadzic is seeking information, and the other speaker who
5 you weren't able to recognise, but we say is Mr. Mandic, is telling him
6 about a meeting that happened at Simovic. And Mr. Karadzic says:
7 "And was Vlaski" -- "was Vlaski appointed there last week?"
8 Now, this is the 17th of June. Would it have been about then
9 that you had been appointed to the Sarajevo
10 A. I have to explain this situation to you like this, because it is
11 not so -- from this conversation you cannot really understand it like
13 I was replaced as chief of the administration for the security of
14 persons and facilities, and it was a position that was -- two-way
15 position that in the leadership hierarchy was meaningless, in the
16 national security sector under the pretext that the rules on internal
17 classifications of posts had been changed. A Bosniak, a Muslim, was
18 appointed in my place, and I was not given another assignment. I didn't
19 have a job anymore. And this small irrelevant position in the hierarchy
20 bothered somebody because it was occupied by somebody who was a member of
21 the Serbian people. From the professional point of view, it was
22 irrelevant, which ethnic group was given that particular job.
23 The entire leadership structure in the national security station
24 was divided by the SDA and the HDZ. As for this appointment, on the
25 17th of June, this is a consequence of the fact that the existing rules
1 on the classification of posts provided the -- that the deputy --
2 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please repeat what he said.
3 The interpreters are unable to follow.
4 MS. KORNER: Right.
5 Q. Sorry, Mr. Vlaski, you have to repeat that last part because the
6 interpreters didn't catch it. You said:
7 "As for this appointment, on the 17th of June, this is a
8 consequence of the fact that the existing rules on the classification of
9 posts ..."
10 What did you say after that?
11 A. According to the -- those rules, according to the classification
12 of posts, the post of Deputy Chief of the Public Security Service is
13 specified and, according to the agreement between the parties, should
14 have been assigned to a member of the Serb ethnic group. After certain
15 consultations - and I was unassigned, I was replaced from my previous
16 post - I was proposed for this other post. And Minister Delimustafic
17 signed that decision on appointment.
18 Q. All right. Let's move on, then, please, to August --
19 MS. KORNER: Sorry. Just a moment, Your Honours. Forgive me,
20 I'm just ...
21 Yes, this is 65 ter 10269, please. I don't think this one is
23 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honour -- Your Honours, we have a objection to
24 a number of these documents. I was waiting because we were not sure if
25 the other -- the Prosecution actually intended to -- to exhibit these
2 Namely, there is six documents which have been disclosed on the
3 12th of February, on Friday, to us, for the very first time. And these
4 documents, another three documents, including the one which Ms. Korner
5 just called right now, are the exhibits -- or the -- the documents which
6 are disclosed after the filing of the -- the pre-trial brief, so they are
7 not on the 65 ter list.
8 Now, I -- I know that the guide-line 15 requires the party to
9 seek leave to use the material which has not -- which has not been timely
10 noticed as the -- as the guide-line says. Now, apart from that, I
11 believe the documents which have been disclosed just on last Friday for
12 the very first time is -- is something which definitely, I think,
13 that -- that the Office of the Prosecutor cannot show good cause for
14 such -- such untimely disclosure of these documents. And -- and by this,
15 Your Honours, we believe a certain prejudice to the accused is -- is
17 I -- I can -- I can go on -- I have the arguments for this, but I
18 don't -- I just --
19 JUDGE HARHOFF: [Microphone not activated]
20 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes, I wanted to be as short as possible. Thank
21 you very much.
22 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, I would have thought it would have been
23 appropriate to raise this before the witness came into court and I began
24 my examination. But having said that, all of the intercepts are in a
25 database which are all on EDS
1 interview with Mr. Vlaski, which came after the filing of the pre-trial
2 brief. As it happens, it's only when you're doing a double-check to see
3 whether they are on the 65 ter list that you see that they're not, or
4 whatever. But I cannot see how the Defence can be said to be prejudice,
5 because every single one of these intercepts is available on EDS.
6 JUDGE HARHOFF: But they would have to be notified about their
8 MS. KORNER: They were -- yes, true. They were notified of their
9 use in the disclosure. But, I mean, as I say, no objection was taken to
11 I mean, it's not that I've suddenly produced them today for use.
12 They were notified when we gave notification on Friday of the documents
13 that were going to be used. And they were given copies, so they didn't
14 have to look through the EDS
15 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, this is a principal question.
16 There -- we established -- or actually, Your Honours established the
17 guide-lines. The guide-line number 6 says that this should be done by --
18 properly by a written motion in advance.
19 Now, we -- we are now facing the situation as -- as -- as -- the
20 Office of the Prosecutor is obviously understanding the situation as
21 introducing the documents after the witness is -- after the witnesses
22 pass. We have the motion which we are now responding to, pending one of
23 the motions.
24 So the -- the -- the documents are offered to -- for exhibits
25 post festum, after the witnesses leave the courtroom, instead of doing it
1 in advance. I think that's the only proper way how it should be done.
2 And it has to be in a written motion because the guide-line says so.
3 Thank you.
4 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, all I can say is I appreciate what
5 Your Honours said, and we're having them marked for identification. If
6 absolutely required, we will apply to add them to the 65 ter list in a
7 separate motion.
8 But what is happening here is these are all documents about which
9 the -- the witness can speak. And his name is mentioned. That's where
10 they are all relevant. Whether they are entered into evidence as
11 exhibits is another matter. All I'm asking is that he can deal with
12 them. And not that -- we're not taking the Defence by surprise. One --
13 maybe one exception - I'm not sure there was an objection to this -
14 there was an article in "Oslobodjenje," which we didn't find until last
15 week sometime, although that's open source.
16 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, there's six documents, including two
17 videotapes, which have not been disclosed to us before Friday, never. I
18 think that's -- speaks for itself.
19 [Prosecution counsel confer]
20 [Trial Chamber confers]
21 [Trial Chamber and Legal Officer confer]
22 JUDGE HARHOFF: Counsels on both sides, we have had a look at the
23 procedural guide-lines, and it appears that the Prosecution is required,
24 first of all, to ensure that all documents that it intends to use are
25 included in the 65 ter list; and, secondly, that documents which the
1 Prosecution intends to use with the witness are notified to the
2 Defence 72 hours in advance. And I think there is a rule also in the
3 provision that says that prior to weekends it has to be on Thursday.
4 So we do acknowledge that the Prosecution is out of time.
5 However, you were notified on Friday that these six documents would be
6 used, and you were given a copy. So I'm not sure that much prejudice has
7 been caused, at least not in relation to this first document.
8 What bothers the Bench is, rather, that at least this first
9 document seems to have very little relevance. And this links up with the
10 requirements that when the Prosecution has not sought introduction of a
11 document on to its 65 ter list then it has to do so by doing two things.
12 First of all, it has to show good cause and also it has to show that the
13 document is relevant. And I'm not sure, at least I do not understand the
14 immediate relevance of this transcript that we have in front of us.
15 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated]
16 JUDGE HALL
17 MS. KORNER: As -- Your Honours, it happens -- so happens that
18 one doesn't matter because it's already an exhibit. This is it not the
19 one that's being objected to. This is -- Your Honour, this is -- I'm
20 going to show the -- the -- through the series of intercepts, what
21 happened to Mr. Vlaski. This is the first that shows him being
22 appointed. It also -- you know -- I mean, I'm not going to make a speech
23 about why it's relevant. But, in fact, it's already -- this one's an
24 exhibit. It's the next one that was about to come up that Mr. Zecevic is
25 objecting to.
1 MR. ZECEVIC: I don't have anything to add, Your Honours. And I
2 completely agree with the analysis that the Chamber has -- has just
3 stated, that I just -- we are really concerned with -- with the --
4 with -- with this, because ...
5 JUDGE HARHOFF: I must add that this is the one issue that has
6 taken up most of our time when discussing procedural matters. And I --
7 it's beginning to become a nuisance to the Court that we have to go
8 through this far too often. And I must remind the Prosecution of its
9 obligation to ensure that documents are provided according to the
10 procedural guide-lines that we have set up. I'm sorry. We cannot go on
11 like this, because we lose so much time.
12 So that's the general instruction that the Chamber wishes to hand
13 down at the moment; namely, please observe what we have set in place in
15 Now, in the concrete matter of the six documents, the Chamber is
16 unable to assess the good cause that the Prosecution may have, and we are
17 also unable to assess the relevance of the documents. And so, for these
18 reasons, we are unable to determine whether any prejudice has been made
19 to the Defence. We are prepared to allow the Prosecution to use these
20 documents with the witness, provided that we come to the conclusion that
21 the Defence does not suffer any prejudice. But we have to see the
22 documents before we can make any final determination of it.
23 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated] ... that mean
24 Your Honours want to --
25 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
1 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, all those documents, the list and the
2 documents, are all with Your Honours. Do Your Honours want to look at
3 them before we carry on? Because I'm going through the whole -- I'm
4 getting it through now, I say in terms, I think it's about five or six,
5 if not more, intercepts to show what happened. Some of which are on our
6 65 ter list, others which are not.
7 [Trial Chamber and Legal Officer confer]
8 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
9 [Trial Chamber confers]
10 JUDGE HARHOFF: Ms. Korner, the Legal Officer reminds me that the
11 document that is currently on the screen, namely, the intercept in which
12 Dr. Karadzic is speaking to Mr. Mandic, has not been exhibited.
13 MS. KORNER: Well, my information, Your Honour, I don't know
14 who's right, but my information is it is exhibited.
15 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
16 JUDGE HARHOFF: I think we'll take the break now.
17 --- Recess taken at 3.47 p.m.
18 [The witness stands down]
19 --- On resuming at 4.29 p.m.
20 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, if -- if I may, before the witness is
21 ushered in.
22 There are two things, Your Honours. Regarding the request by the
23 Trial Chamber to state our position in relation to Witnesses ST-179 and
24 ST-123, we do not object for subpoena of these two witnesses.
25 And one additional thing: I was notified by my assistants that
1 1D176 document which was MFI
2 the translation was received and now I move that -- and it is updated in
3 e-court, that particular number, and I move the Court to lift the MFI now
4 and properly exhibit it as 1D176.
5 Thank you very much.
6 MR. PANTELIC: Just for the record, Your Honour,
7 Zupljanin Defence take no position with regard to the issue. Thank you.
8 JUDGE HALL
9 [The witness takes the stand]
10 JUDGE HARHOFF: The Chamber has deliberated on the objection
11 raised by the Defence before the break, and we have reached the following
12 conclusion, and I will explain afterwards why we have come to this
14 The documents presented Friday afternoon by the Prosecution
15 included a list of documents to be used with the current witness. In
16 this list, nine documents appeared to have been proposed for use,
17 although these nine documents had not been previously included in the
18 65 ter list.
19 The general rule that the Chamber has laid down in the procedural
20 guide-lines is that no documents can be used or can be introduced into
21 evidence unless it has been included in the 65 ter list; or, if it has
22 not, then, unless the moving party has shown good cause for the delay and
23 also has shown that the document is relevant.
24 In the present case, the Chamber has not been given any
25 explanation as to why the nine documents have not previously been
1 included in the 65 ter list, nor have we been given any indication of
2 their relevance. And the determination of the Chamber is, therefore,
3 that a distinction could be made between those documents among the nine
4 new documents that have already been released to the public domain, and
5 those of the nine documents that have previously been MFI'd by virtue of
6 their being introduced through other witnesses can be used today with
7 this witness, whereas, the remaining three documents cannot.
8 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated] ... which three? Sorry,
9 Your Honour, which three documents are those? Which those three
10 documents are those, may I ask?
11 JUDGE HARHOFF: Document 25, 26, and 28 have been already
12 released into the public domain. They are articles and TV clips. And
13 then as for the intercepts, we've been told that three of them have
14 already been MFI
15 documents, altogether six documents that can be used today with this
16 witness, and the remaining three documents out of the nine cannot.
17 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, yes, I'm just asking which of the three
18 that can't, rather, than telling me which I can. Because at the moment I
19 can't work out which ones Your Honours are referring to. I'm so sorry.
20 JUDGE HARHOFF: We do not, at the moment, have a final updated
21 list of which of the intercepts that have been MFI'd. This is why I'm
22 speaking in -- in -- in some misty terms.
23 MS. KORNER: Well, you see, Your Honour, none of the ones -- can
24 I tell Your Honours which the intercepts are. The first is 10266, 10267,
25 10269, which you can forget about because I can see that it is going take
1 some time. 10270, they're all ones that have not been MFI'd.
2 JUDGE HARHOFF: That is clear. But three of them have been MFI'd
3 as far as we are told. So one of them is not.
4 MS. KORNER: No. Well, in that case, that surprises me, because
5 when we checked, we didn't think they had been.
6 [Trial Chamber confers]
7 JUDGE HARHOFF: Yeah. Couldn't Mr. Smith ...
8 MS. KORNER: That's right -- we don't think -- no, no the
9 Case Manager did a check. I heard Your Honours' remark. And we don't
10 think any of the ones that are in -- if you have looked at the list on
11 the screen, you'll see they're written in red, yes. I don't see them in
12 black and white. But none of those have been MFI'd.
13 Can I -- I don't think I -- I don't want to waste time while the
14 witness is sitting here again. But can I explain. They're part of a
15 series of intercepts, all of which deal with Mr. Vlaski's position, all
16 of which he has listened to. And some went on to our list but others
17 didn't, and it was only when we were checking the intercept lists that we
18 realised they weren't in there. But it shows a -- the progression, if
19 you like, from the 16th of September to the 19th, and it's relevant to
20 Mr. Karadzic's reaction. You have looked at some of those. This shows
21 the progression through. And that's -- that's the only reason we're
22 putting it in, because it's clearly quite important. It starts with
23 Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Zepinic, moves through Mrs. Plavsic and whatever,
24 and that's why we think it's important.
25 But if Your Honours say I can't, then I'm not going argue at all.
1 But none of those have been MFI
2 JUDGE HARHOFF: So they cannot be used?
3 MS. KORNER: Right. Can I just -- the reason being, because of
4 the late disclosure or the late notification. Or just -- you can't use
6 JUDGE HARHOFF: You can't use them because you did not move to
7 have them admitted into your 65 ter list. And this was particularly
8 detrimental to the Defence because in all the other cases which we have
9 dealt with, we have been dealing with 92 ter witnesses; whereas, today
10 we're dealing with a viva voce witness. Now in the 92 ter instances, the
11 Defence has been given a 92 ter package way in advance which would have
12 enabled the Defence to prepare itself for the cross-examination of those
13 92 ter witnesses. But, today, this is a viva voce witness, and the
14 Defence is being taken by surprise by virtue of your late disclosure and
15 by virtue of the fact that you didn't apply or didn't move to have them
16 included in your 65 ter list. And then comes on top of it the issue of
18 MS. KORNER: But, Your Honour, that's -- as it were, the
19 objection wasn't taken. Either we weren't notified in advance, and
20 they've had this since Friday. And you didn't ask me to explain the
21 relevance. And I can explain the relevance by showing them to you.
22 If you don't look at them, whether or not they're admitted as
23 exhibits and whether Mr. Vlaski [sic], you cannot see the progression of
24 what happened. That's the problem.
25 [Trial Chamber confers]
1 JUDGE HALL
2 suggesting or intending to imply that the -- in this case, Office of the
3 Prosecutor, is deliberately trying to sabotage the way that the
4 guide-lines were intended to move the trial along. It's only that at the
5 end of the day we come to -- we come down the side the fact that the
6 guide-lines are there and there are consequences. As Judge Harhoff says,
7 the lack of notice, the lack of effective notice, to the Defence and
8 the -- and the Chamber has -- has this -- has these consequences.
9 So, therefore, that is why the distinction was made in the ruling
10 that has been -- that has been given, between the public domain documents
11 where the same technical objection could have been taken, but,
12 effectively, the Chamber has waved that, and the documents which have
13 been otherwise MFI
14 And I think we should -- we have to move on.
15 MS. KORNER: Right. Your Honour -- all right. I apologise.
16 But, I simply cannot see why, because the video cassette is in public,
17 the video is of a news reel or was in a newspaper, we gave exactly the
18 same notice to the Defence that we were intending to use them that --
19 that the distinction is drawn like this.
20 JUDGE DELVOIE: Ms. Korner, the distinction drawn in your favour.
21 We could have ruled out all those documents because of no -- no motion
22 has been filed to have them on the 65 ter list. So simply -- so simply
23 as that.
24 We said we still can take those two -- three or four in, because,
25 well, the damage is -- is less for the Defence because they are in the
1 public domain, because they already have been discussed, and MFI'd. But
2 that's only -- only for -- for this time, you know. Next time, documents
3 will go out if they are not on the 65 ter list or if there is not a
4 prior -- a motion to have them on the 65 ter list prior to -- for the use
5 in court and tendering the documents, even for identification.
6 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, all right. I -- Mr. Vlaski is in
7 here. But, Your Honours, there simply has not been a single policy being
8 followed throughout this case. And filing of motions in and I
9 respectively say in our judgement, just merely adds to the ever growing
10 pile -- I mean, if that's what Your Honours' ruling is, I'm not -- not
11 seeking to, at this stage, take it any further.
12 Q. All right. Mr. Vlaski, I'm sorry about all this. I'm afraid
13 we're going to have to start moving fairly quickly through your evidence.
14 MS. KORNER: We should have up on the screen now, please, an
15 intercept which is on, which is already an exhibit, P902.
16 Q. Mr. Vlaski, this is a intercept I think you listened to. And
17 were you able to identify, recognise, both the voices of Mr. Karadzic and
18 Mr. Zepinic?
19 I'm afraid you have to say yes or no. Oh, you're not getting
21 A. [In English] Translate.
22 Q. Okay. On the screen, you can see the transcript of one of the
23 tapes you've listened to. You were able to recognise, I believe, both
24 the voices of Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Zepinic. Is that right?
25 A. [Interpretation] That's right.
1 MS. KORNER: And if we look, please, at the second page in
2 English and the third -- second page in B/C/S. Sorry, the third page in
3 B/C/S, I beg your pardon.
4 Q. Karadzic is talking --
5 MS. KORNER: No, this is completely different.
6 Your Honours, I'm sorry.
7 Can we go back -- I'm so sorry. Can we go back, please, to the
8 first page in English. Can we go back to the first page in English,
9 please. Yup, it's different.
10 I'm sorry, Your Honour. What I have been -- what I have got in
11 my binder is different, but this is ...
12 Q. Mr. Vlaski, Mr. Zepinic is telling Mr. Karadzic that he got drunk
13 with you that night and he goes -- Mr. Zepinic says to Mr. Karadzic that
14 he found out about the decision on the replacement of Nedjo Vlaski on
16 Now, this is the 16th of September. Can you tell us, please,
17 what had happened to you at that time?
18 A. Apparently, my case was interesting at the time, as it is now.
19 And let me clarify what this was all about.
20 Because of the position to which I was supposed to be appointed
21 to, in view of that position, you can clearly see the situation in MUP
22 and the personnel policy run within it. It also -- it is also indicative
23 of the relations between the various political parties and between the
24 various appointed officials in the ministry.
25 Let me clarify. I received, from Mr. Delimustafic, a decision to
1 the post of the Deputy Chief of the State Security Service. However, I
2 was unable to take over the duties that I was supposed to take over,
3 pursuant to this decision, because the head of that same security
4 service, Mr. Kvesic, the one that I was supposed to be a deputy to,
5 placed obstacles in the way of this. This must have been deliberate,
6 because otherwise such an act of arbitrariness and self-will is difficult
7 to explain. This was the dimension to my case because within the
8 hierarchy under the rules the entire operative work of the security
9 sector of the State Security Service in Bosnia-Herzegovina would be
10 controlled from this particular post that I was supposed to take over.
11 And that is why somebody objected to the fact that the Serbs should have
12 someone occupying this post.
13 Therefore, I was obstructed in an attempt to take up the new
14 position. Alongside this, there was legal obstruction taking place, the
15 aim of which was to eliminate this post from the official classification
16 of jobs. Those who were behind this attempt made a new version of the
17 rules overnight and sent it to the government of the -- of
18 Bosnia-Herzegovina for their approval. In other words, the rules were
19 changed on my account, so that the post to which I was appointed was
20 simply deleted with -- physically with a white varnish, and they tasked
21 the minister with providing a written explanation that would account for
22 such deletion. The minister signed an explanation, which stated that the
23 process of rationalising leadership posts was taking place.
24 However, it was only my post that was abolished in the new
25 version of the rules. By the logic of things, the lower post should have
1 been abolished as well. What was important to them was to -- to
2 discontinue the chain within the hierarchy of posts occupied by Serbs.
3 The initiative thus formulated was easily carried by the government,
4 because it was the HDZ/SDA coalition which had the majority votes in the
6 So the government basically abolished the post of the
7 Deputy Chief of the security sector. Consequently, the division
8 appointing me to this post was null and void. In this way, the Serbs
9 lost yet another position, in addition to the position that I had held
10 earlier on. Therefore, we could not wield any sort of influence on the
11 work of the service, save for several insignificant posts that we still
12 held. In this way, we were humiliated, demoted in an unlawful way. But
13 there was no way to reverse the process.
14 Q. All right. So, this is what Mr. Zepinic is telling Dr. Karadzic.
15 MS. KORNER: Can we go, please, in this intercept to the third
16 page in B/C/S, and I'm -- I need to see the English. Try the third page,
17 please. Yes.
18 Q. We see there that Karadzic is getting quite cross about it, and
19 we've had a look at this intercept before. And then he says:
20 "Please let Vlaski get in touch with me and tell him not to
22 Now, did you get in touch with Dr. Karadzic?
23 A. I did not, because I realised it would have been pointless.
24 The position of Mr. Karadzic, who did not get into state
25 institutions, he was the only one who remained only a political figure as
1 a president of the political party, unlike Izetbegovic and others, who
2 got positions in the government. His position at the time was a marginal
3 one. He had no power, unlike others who had absolute power on the
4 government. And you can see what sort of power he has, or absence
5 thereof, here because he says to the deputy police minister who, in his
6 turn, again, didn't have that much power because he was answerable to the
7 police minister, to use his offices to do this and that.
8 Again, he was appealing to the deputy minister who depended on
9 the kindness and mercy of the minister for favours but was otherwise
10 under no obligation to do what he was asked.
11 Q. No. Mr. Vlaski, I'm really sorry, but it was a simple question:
12 Did you get in touch with Dr. Karadzic as he tells Dr. Zepinic you should
14 A. I said right away that I didn't, because he didn't have any
15 influence to excerpt. And I didn't think that I -- that anything would
16 come out of it, save for me meeting up with Mr. Karadzic.
17 Q. All right. Let's look at the influence that he may or may not
18 have had, according to you.
19 Then he ends up by saying, Mr. Karadzic, on that page:
20 "Please find Vlaski and let him write a complaint on the
21 decision. He should hand it to you personally, and you should act
22 according to it."
23 Did you write a complaint about the decision?
24 A. That would have been absurd to address any sort of letter to
25 individuals who are disrespectful of the law and to expect them to take
1 my letter or complaint into consideration in any way.
2 Q. So you neither wrote to Mr. Delimustafic nor to Dr. Zepinic nor
3 to anybody else. Is that the situation?
4 A. Of course I didn't. It wasn't my personal problem; it was the
5 problem of the institution run by individuals who were either incompetent
6 to do the job or were under the influence of others.
7 Q. Right. When you were listening to intercepts yesterday, did you
8 listen to one where Biljana Plavsic was also talking to Dr. Karadzic
9 about you?
10 A. I heard the intercept.
11 Q. All right. Did you also know Biljana Plavsic?
12 A. For the same reasons that I knew all the other officials in the
13 government, I was under the obligation to take care of their security.
14 So I knew and had occasion to meet Madam Plavsic as well.
15 Q. Right. And once you were in Belgrade
16 Vila Bosanka later on in 1992, did you see a great deal of
17 Biljana Plavsic?
18 A. No. As she came out of Sarajevo
19 the last one to leave her flat in the area of Jahorina, it was only later
20 on that she went to Belgrade
21 attend to in the Presidency of the Serb Republic
22 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... in Belgrade and you were in
24 A. Not on a regular basis, but I did have the opportunity to see her
25 from time to time.
1 Q. All right did. You recognise her voice when you heard it on the
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. And, indeed, did she tell you -- did she tell Mr. Karadzic that
5 the complaint was that you had been replaced by a Muslim?
6 A. She complained, and that is just an indication of the
7 powerlessness of the top bearers of state authority of the
8 representatives of the Serbian people, because Biljana Plavsic was the
9 president of the Council for the Protection of the Constitutional Order,
10 a person who was a figure at the head of a state body which was in charge
11 of monitoring and directing the work of state security. In that body and
12 in the Presidency, because of the manner of decision-making, she had no
13 influence in those functions and could not have an influence on anything.
14 So her protest and her dissatisfaction about my case and many other
15 matters and acts and relationship towards her as an organ of authority
16 shown in the Presidency and in the party which had placed her in this
17 position. This was just a reflection of the powerlessness of officials
18 to carry out their duties pursuant to the law because of conduct,
19 obstructionism, which were impossible to react to in any other way, other
20 than just plain dissatisfaction.
21 Q. Right. So it's your view that none of the Serb people in
22 authority, even in the Presidency, had any power or influence at all. Is
23 that -- is that what you're saying and have been saying throughout this
25 A. Absolutely, that was the main reason why everything had been
1 placed into question, because a constitutional people and their legally
2 elected representatives did not have the opportunity to carry out the
3 most basic duties, pursuant to the regulations, the constitution, and the
4 laws. If anyone needed to privatise Bosnia and Herzegovina and -- and
5 exclude arbitrarily one people, then that would have been the way to
6 do it.
7 Q. Right. Thank you. Now, I think you also listened, and this is
8 all the same day, to a conversation between Karadzic and Koljevic, all
9 the 17th of September. And, again, was Karadzic speaking to Koljevic, on
10 the intercept you listened to, about your case?
11 A. Yes. It was also a question of my case because Koljevic was one
12 of the members of the Presidency of the Bosnia-Herzegovina, representing
13 the Serb people, and he, just like professor Plavsic, were academically
14 educated, cultivated people and were not used to the method of work that
15 was prevalent in the Presidency and probably were not used to the
16 attitude towards them by representatives who had arrived there according
17 to God knows what criteria and positions previously held. So my problem
18 was just mentioned as something to be noted in order to have one more
19 reason why they would need to request a political response to such a
20 situation or to seek a political response to such a situation.
21 Q. All right.
22 MS. KORNER: Can we have up intercept, same day, all these
23 intercepts, 17th of September, P903, MFI'd.
24 Q. Now, this is a conversation - we can all see
25 17th September - between Mr. Dr. Karadzic and Mr. Simovic. Can [sic] you
1 listen to that? Were you able to recognise both voices?
2 A. Of course. Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Simovic both. I know
3 Mr. Simovic too, because we worked together on the same duties in the
4 security service in Sarajevo
5 Q. Now, I want to you look, please, at what Mr. Karadzic says in the
6 middle of the page where he is speaking to Mr. Simovic.
7 "Would you please tell Zepinic that tomorrow we are withdrawing
8 all of our ministers and all of our officials in the MUP. We are
9 discontinuing the complete partnership and going into opposition because
10 Zepinic is allowing maltreatment and removal from office of our men.
11 Vlaski was removed from his office and it is over. Tonight at 8.00, I am
12 going to break up with Izetbegovic. I am withdrawing everything. SDS
13 party into opposition."
14 And so on and so forth.
15 You said that Mr. Karadzic had no power to effect what happened
16 to you. As far as you were concerned, did he have the power to withdraw
17 the SDS
18 A. You can see that this is an emotional reaction by a man who
19 doesn't have a response to these nasty things that were done not only to
20 me but towards political colleagues and to my people to whom I belong by
21 birth. So I experienced this fate. And Mr. Karadzic's reaction is just
22 a consequence of an emotional state and the fact that an end must be put
23 to such a position. So what would be the point of him being at the head
24 of the party, which placed him in power, if he could not implement this
25 power in any way? You do not respond to power with a telephone call. He
1 couldn't tell Mr. Zepinic in a telephone call that he was going to do
2 this and that. There has to be some sort of an assessment before
3 embarking on such an activity.
4 So I would say that this was an emotional reaction by a figure
5 that was in -- in power.
6 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... right. It may be emotional.
7 All I asked you, Mr. Vlaski, was whether Mr. -- Dr. Karadzic had the
8 power to walk out of the Assembly, taking the SDS with him.
9 A. At the time, the conditions were not there nor was the point of
10 tolerance so low for such an act to ensue. This act ensued later, and
11 this was done because there was no other way out, other than what was
12 discussed, and for which he had the support of the other representatives
13 of the Serbian people in the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and then
14 as things appeared, then in the other institutions of power in
15 Bosnia and Herzegovina, all those representatives who participated in
16 power. They all sought the protection of the party which had one -- its
17 share of the votes in the election, in order to be able to implement
18 their share of power.
19 Q. Yes. All right.
20 MS. KORNER: Can we just look, please, at the bottom of the page
21 in -- no, second page in English and second page, also, in B/C/S.
22 Q. And what he's going on to say at the top:
23 "Vlaski was the straw that broke the camel's back. I'm going to
24 phone Hebib to tell him this, and you tell Zepinic that it is over." And
25 then to resign.
1 Did you listen, in fact, also to an intercept where Karadzic did
2 ring Mr. Hebib about what was happening to you?
3 A. I did, yes.
4 Q. In fact, the following day -- no, the same day, I'm sorry, on the
6 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry. I believe it was ruled by the
7 Trial Chamber. I don't think that Ms. Korner is going to use this
9 MS. KORNER: I'm not.
10 MR. ZECEVIC: Oh okay. I am sorry.
11 MS. KORNER: I'm not. I'm not using the documents that I have
12 been ruled that I can't use. I'm dealing with the contents thereof.
13 MR. ZECEVIC: The document has been ruled out, and she wants --
14 Ms. Korner wants to use the contents of the document so ...
15 MS. KORNER: You told me I can't put the documents in as exhibits
16 or indeed even introduce them. Can I -- with the greatest of respect, I
17 can certainly ask this witness what he heard and listened to this morning
18 or yesterday.
19 If Your Honours are ruling that I can't even ask him that, then
20 that's a different matter entirely. Then I will seek to argue this much
21 more fully.
22 [Trial Chamber confers]
23 JUDGE HALL
24 shouldn't use the word difficulty, but I can't think of any other word,
25 and we fully understand the objection that is taken by the Defence, in
1 that the course that you are following strongly suggests that,
2 notwithstanding the ruling that the Chamber has given in terms of the
3 admissibility of these documents, that you are nevertheless going to
4 effectively get the contents in.
5 However, we do appreciate the relevance of your seeking to elicit
6 from the witness what he did and why he did it. So we would rule that if
7 you concentrate on what he did and why he did it, then that would -- even
8 if that brings you very close to that line, that you may proceed down
9 that road.
10 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated]
11 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
12 MS. KORNER: That we will be filing an application to add these
13 documents to our 65 ter list. By that stage, the witness will have gone.
14 He can also recognise - and I underline that again - and it may well we
15 can get these intercepts even without adding to the 65 ter list the other
16 evidence we are going to call. But I won't be able to get that evidence
18 All -- however, I take the point. Your Honours, what I'm
19 prepared to do is say he listened to intercepts, was able to recognise
20 the voices, and what he did as a result of it. Well, I see Your Honour
21 Judge Delvoie shaking his head. But, Your Honour, that's the problem.
22 [Trial Chamber confers]
23 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm --
24 JUDGE DELVOIE: [Microphone not activated] I refer now to what the
25 witness did back in 1991?
1 MS. KORNER: No. I'm talking to what -- he listened to all the
2 intercepts yesterday.
3 JUDGE DELVOIE: Yes, but isn't the ruling that the intercepts are
5 MS. KORNER: No, Your Honour. The ruling is the intercepts are
6 out until such time as I call evidence about their quality. But I was
7 told the ruling was I could ask about recognition of voices. That was
8 absolutely clear.
9 Your Honours, we can go back and find it. That was Your Honours'
10 ruling. I specifically asked that -- Your Honours, regardless of whether
11 I get the intercepts admitted -- I know Mr. Zecevic is waiting to say
12 something, but regardless -- we're now being completely side tracked.
13 Regardless of whether the intercepts are admitted at this stage as
14 exhibits if the party to it is not the one giving evidence, I was
15 specifically told I could ask someone who was aware of the contents and
16 who had knowledge of the speakers whether they recognised the voices.
17 And that -- I know Your Honours don't seem to feel at the moment that's
18 important. My respectful suggestion is it may well turn out to be
20 JUDGE DELVOIE: Are we talking now about previously MFI'd
22 MS. KORNER: No. We're talking about the intercepts which you
23 have ruled I cannot have in at the moment but which he has listened to
24 and which we're going to apply to put in. But he won't be here to give
25 the evidence that he is able to give.
1 JUDGE HALL
2 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, Your Honours. It's -- again, we're
3 coming back to the position -- the founding position when I -- when I
4 first made the objection. It's all about the notice. We are not on
5 notice about these documents. That's why the Trial Chamber ruled.
6 Now Ms. Korner is - I'm sorry to say this - but trying to open a
7 side door to, I don't know, introduce these documents again. I don't
8 think -- I'm sorry, but I don't think that's -- that's proper. The
9 ruling has been given, and we should at least honour that.
10 Thank you.
11 JUDGE HARHOFF: Ms. Korner, I think Judge Delvoie put it very
12 clearly: The ruling is that these documents cannot be used today with
13 this witness, including your being prevented from showing it to him.
14 Now, I must say that, just as one of the three Judges on the
15 Bench, I'm -- I'm not quite certain that I understand just why and how
16 this is important and relevant, as you claim it is. So my suggestion is
17 that you address the issue of the various attempts made by each of the
18 three political groupings in Sarajevo
19 the administration directly with the witness, and you will have to do
20 that without using these documents.
21 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated] ... Your Honour, we
22 really are -- and I --
23 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
24 MS. KORNER: I am slightly concerned, and I -- but I don't think
25 it's proper for me to make a speech at this stage, and particularly in
1 front of the witness, about why this is relevant. And it's nothing
2 to -- or very little to do with what is described as the resting control
3 over the SUP
4 but it's -- it's not that exactly.
5 I don't think it's right to make speeches at this stage about why
6 we say it's relevant.
7 JUDGE HARHOFF: Certainly it is for the witnesses to testify and
8 not the counsels. But I think what you have just said explains the
9 problem very well, because if this is not all about the power struggle in
10 those days in 1992 over the control over the state administration, then I
11 don't -- really don't know what it is about then. So ...
12 There is a major --
13 MS. KORNER: Your Honours -- [Overlapping speakers] ...
14 JUDGE HARHOFF: There is a major problem of understanding where
15 we are going.
16 MS. KORNER: Well, Your Honour, I'm perfectly - I think the
17 witness ought to leave - but I'm perfectly prepared to explain that. I
18 mean, I don't, as I say, I don't think it's proper for the Prosecution to
19 make speeches in the middle of trial any more than we have objected to
20 the Defence making speeches. But if it's not clear to Your Honours, then
21 I think I ought to -- then I ought to say.
22 JUDGE HARHOFF: Couldn't you put the questions to the witness
23 that will exemplify and bring out the evidence that you wish?
24 MS. KORNER: I can certainly put questions to him. Yes, but...
1 JUDGE DELVOIE: Ms. Korner, the speech you -- you're not willing
2 to make is, if I understand it well, about relevance.
3 MS. KORNER: Yes.
4 JUDGE DELVOIE: But I think that what happens due to the fact
5 that we consider that the 65 ter list rule is not applied correctly is
6 not about relevance. So the speech about relevance, even if you made it,
7 would not be relevant, if I may say so.
8 MS. KORNER: Now, I think we're somewhat -- we're now -- I'm so
9 sorry, Your Honour, but I think we're at cross purposes.
10 But, in any event, I think the best thing is I proceed as -- as
11 His Honour Judge Harhoff has said with questions to the witness leaving
12 out any reference to the intercepts which you have ruled out.
13 But can I make it absolutely clear, Your Honours, there will be
14 an application to put it on the 65 ter list. There will be an
15 application that these are authentic, genuine intercepts. And this
16 witness is in the best position, because of his knowledge of the
17 participates and what they're talking about, to authentic those
19 And that's -- I just want to make that absolutely clear.
20 Right. Can we move on, please, then --
21 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry. Just one comment, Your Honours.
22 Your Honours, the guide-line says that the application has to be
23 made in advance, in written form. So if the Prosecution thinks this
24 witness will be able to give them this data which is important for their
25 case, they should have filed the application as according to the
2 I don't think that it would be proper that we -- that the witness
3 leaves and then only afterwards, post-facto, the Prosecution files the
4 application. I don't think that's proper.
5 Thank you very much.
6 JUDGE HARHOFF: If I may respond. You are absolutely right,
7 Mr. Zecevic. But that is a matter of admission into evidence.
8 At the moment, we're dealing with this witness, who has to
9 provide us with evidence about the events that took place at the relevant
10 time in 1992.
11 So let's get on with that, and then we can always return to the
12 issue of whether or not these and other intercepts can be admitted into
14 MR. ZECEVIC: I understand. Thank you.
15 JUDGE HARHOFF: And notwithstanding the extended break that we
16 had earlier, it is time for the break.
17 [Trial Chamber confers]
18 JUDGE DELVOIE: Before we rise, on the 22nd of January, 2010
19 Trial Chamber issued an order for safe conduct for Witness ST-186,
20 stating that as the witness is scheduled to travel between
21 6 and 12 February 2010, any change of date will be communicated to the
22 witness and the state authorities by the Registrar of the Tribunal, and
23 any notice of such change shall form part of and have the same binding
24 force and effect as this order for safe conduct.
25 During hearing of the 3rd of February, 2010, the Prosecution
1 informed the Trial Chamber that, following amendments in this schedule,
2 ST-187 is required to be in The Hague
3 13th of March, 2010, instead. The Trial Chamber requests the Registry to
4 make the necessary arrangements to implement the order for safe conduct
5 for ST-187 accordingly.
6 JUDGE HALL
7 [The witness stands down]
8 --- Recess taken at 5.27 p.m.
9 --- On resuming at 5.51 p.m.
10 [The witness takes the stand]
11 JUDGE HALL
12 MS. KORNER: Sorry.
13 Q. Mr. Vlaski, were you aware, at the time, that the Serb
14 leadership, Bosnian Serb leadership, or the SDS leadership, was taking
15 such an interest in your fate?
16 A. On listening to the intercepts, I concluded that perhaps they
17 were attributed to much of a historic importance, and I'm referring to
18 the situation I was in.
19 The fact of the matter is that the problems did escalate and
20 warrant a reaction on the part of the political structures.
21 Q. You heard the learned Judge describe this as a struggle for the
22 control of the MUP. What was the importance of who was controlling the
23 MUP in Bosnia
24 A. The struggle for the control of the MUP was won right at the
25 start by the party which had been given the possibility by the election
1 results to be allocated posts in the MUP. The significance of the MUP in
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina, regardless of how one might view it as a state, was
3 enormous because the MUP was the only armed force at the time. The
4 political parties, which were contemplating the creation of the state and
5 government, were capable of gauging its significance. Evidently the SDS
6 did not have that ability to gauge its importance when it was getting
7 into this discussion with its other coalition partners as to the
8 allocation of posts.
9 The consequence of such an approach on the part of the SDS is
10 illustrated by my case and by other cases where some other forces were in
11 control and at play which used unlawful means.
12 Q. All right. But you say at the time, when the allocation of posts
13 was going on, the SDS
15 At this stage, however, when you have heard and seen that from
16 Karadzic through to the members of the Presidency there was a lot of
17 discussion and threats going on. By that stage, were the SDS leadership
18 aware of the importance of the MUP?
19 A. It did become aware, but that -- it was far too late. It was
20 water under the bridge. They wanted to change matters at the eleventh
21 hour, at the time when they were already losing three to nil.
22 They did not take control of vital post in the institutions.
23 They did not take measures to make sure, at least, that -- or, rather, to
24 make sure that unlawful actions did not take place.
25 The upshot was that one individual who was at the head of the
1 institution, such as state security, the chief of the
2 State Security Service, embodied all the three branches of powers,
3 because once -- one, for instance, the individual at the head of the
4 Bihac state security was an MP, he was a member of the parliament, and,
5 at the same time, he was the chief of the service which was part of the
6 executive branch. By virtue of his position as an MP, he should have
7 been the one to control the legality of the work of the service which he
9 So they were individuals holding posts that were of very great
10 importance, and they held all these various posts in the different
11 branches of government which allowed them to carry their activities
13 Q. All right. It was a simple question and doesn't require that
14 length of answer. Your view is that the SDS realised too late the
15 important of the MUP?
16 A. Correct.
17 Q. All right. Let's deal -- let's go back to what you were doing
18 then, please.
19 I think it's right that, in early 1992, were you assigned to the
20 administration for intelligence and counter-intelligence in -- in
22 A. This occurred after the ploy where my post of the deputy head was
24 Another similar situation occurred to me shortly thereafter when
25 I was replaced from the position of the chief of the administration for
1 the security of persons and facilities; that was once. And then again
2 from the position of the chief of service. At that point, I didn't have
3 a position to hold, and so they assigned me to the post of an inspector
4 to the administration you mentioned, the administration for intelligence
5 and counter-intelligence. And I held the post of an inspector there.
6 Q. Thank you. During the course of your activities there, did you
7 take trips to Belgrade
8 A. I was in Belgrade
9 specific dates. I didn't go there very often. But for various, both
10 personal and professional reasons, I -- I would go there. So I would go
11 there because I had relatives there and also because of the situation
12 concerning the Serb representation in the Government of
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina that I had to go there.
14 Q. Right. When you went there, did you go from time to time with
15 Dragan Devedlaka?
16 A. Yes. We went there together on several occasions.
17 Q. Did you have meetings there with the predecessor to
18 Jovica Stanisic as head of state security, a gentleman named
19 Zoran Janackovic?
20 A. Before coming across Mr. Zoran Janackovic, we had
21 Mr. Radmilo Bogdanovic as our contact. He was the minister of the MUP in
23 As for Mr. Janackovic, we had a meeting with him later; the goal
24 being to simply brief one another on the situations in the respective
1 Q. You said "... because of the situation concerning the Serb" -- I
2 don't think you said "reputation" -- because of the "situation."
3 Because of the situation concerning the Serb situation in the
5 What was the concern?
6 A. There was several reasons, or concerns. Firstly, the staffing
7 policy, which was detrimental to the Serb people, and various
8 manipulations and ploys on the part of the colleagues who enjoyed the
9 political sponsorship and support of the parties of the SDA and HDZ, as
10 well as the general state of security in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina had, by that time, been getting into an ever deeper
12 crisis. Those of us in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I mean the Serb
13 personnel, felt helpless. The Serb policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina lost any
14 power it may have had.
15 Q. All right.
16 A. Serbia
17 Q. Right. Did you ask them for any assistance in terms of arms or
19 A. This wasn't our job, and we didn't have any discussions on this
20 issue. The Serbs were engaged in the Yugoslav People's Army, which were,
21 in the view of others, pro-Serbian because most of its members were
22 Serbs, and they didn't need weapons.
23 Q. Can I move now, please, to the meeting of the 11th of February in
24 Banja Luka which you attended.
25 MS. KORNER: And the number of which is ... yes. It's -- for
1 some reason it's Defence Exhibit 1D135.
2 Now, you had a chance to read it both when you were interviewed
3 in Banja Luka and again two days ago. But I think, as you told us in
4 Banja Luka, you remember this meeting as though it were yesterday. Is
5 that right?
6 A. Well, I do remember it. Unfortunately, we hadn't had such
7 meetings until February of 1992. Had we had an opportunity to meet up
8 earlier on, matters would have been better.
9 We met for the first time at that point, and there were several
10 among those who were in attendance who I didn't know from before. I
11 think more than half of them were unknown to me.
12 Q. All right. This was a meeting, was it, that was open only to
13 Serb police officers?
14 A. Well, no. There were some individuals who weren't Serbs. They
15 came from mixed marriages. Though, let's put it that way, they were
16 loyal to the Serb leadership.
17 Q. All right. Which ones came from mixed marriages?
18 A. I think Mr. Nenad Radovic, and I'm not sure about Igor Velasevic.
19 Q. Who asked to you come to the meeting, or how did you find out
20 about the meeting?
21 A. As for the circle of individuals whom I was more often in touch
22 with, they were mostly colleagues from state security who held positions
23 in the structure: Dragan Devedlaka, Mr. Goran Radovic, then Goran Zugic.
24 Yes, Dragan Devedlaka, I mentioned him already.
25 So this was the circle of people working for state security, and
1 that's why we were more often in touch. And I learned about this meeting
2 from them.
3 Q. Did they tell you, either Radovic or Devedlaka, who had asked
4 them to attend the meeting?
5 A. I don't remember. The atmosphere at that point was that the
6 people who attended the meeting were brought together by common problems
7 all of us were faced with. This was an attempt to do something, and that
8 was one of the goals of this meeting. We found that out only when we
9 arrived in Banja Luka
10 Q. All right. Why was the meeting held in Banja Luka?
11 A. I don't think there was a particular reason behind it. At least
12 that was my impression. And I didn't organise the meeting.
13 In my view, the meeting could have held [as interpreted]
14 anywhere, at any of the locations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. When you look
15 at the composition of the people who gathered there and if you consider
16 the security aspect, I think this could have been the case. But probably
17 because of the logistics and accommodation facilities and some other
18 reasons perhaps, it was suggested that it be held in Banja Luka.
19 Q. It may well have been. But given that Sarajevo was where the
20 seat of government was, why not in Sarajevo
21 A. The location is not of decisive importance for a meeting to be
23 Banja Luka was characterised by a more normal, as it were,
24 situation, when it came to the MUP institution. And I'm referring to the
25 Banja Luka Security Centre which proved much simpler because the MUP
1 staff in Banja Luka were much more loyal. And I'm referring to
2 Mr. Zupljanin, who was the head of the centre.
3 This must have decided the matter. It was a centre which covered
4 a vast area and was characterised by a more positive, favourable
5 political and security situation. Otherwise, it could have been held in
7 any other aspects than the atmosphere that I referred to.
8 Q. Yes. Loyal to whom?
9 "... the ... staff in Banja Luka were much more loyal. And I'm
10 referring to Mr. Zupljanin ..."
11 Loyal to whom?
12 A. The law and its implementation.
13 If you have a leader, a leader at the -- one of the top
14 positions, such a leader should have the highest responsibility. If you
15 have an individual who is not responsible higher up than those who are
16 lower up [as interpreted] are left to their own devices and can conduct
17 themselves as they wish. We had instances of unlawfulness in Sarajevo
18 in the very head office and all the way down to field officers, various
19 commanders of stations, et cetera. And, of course, this wasn't something
20 that allowed for loyalty. It was the professionals themselves who
21 directed the way in which all the subordinates would comport themselves.
22 Q. Tell me something, Mr. Vlaski, what was the ethnic composition in
23 Banja Luka?
24 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, Your Honours, a part of the answer of
25 the witness didn't -- wasn't recorded.
1 JUDGE HARHOFF: [Microphone not activated]
2 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes, Your Honours, the last part. He was -- he was
3 referring to the chain of command, something. I don't want to actually
4 influence the witness in this respect.
5 JUDGE HALL
6 his -- the last part of his answer to your last question, please. Last
7 but one questions -- well, your last question, sorry.
8 MS. KORNER:
9 Q. Mr. Vlaski, can you repeat your answer. Not -- please don't
10 repeat your answer.
11 The last -- the last sentence of your answer.
12 A. I think that the problem lay in the relationship along the chain
13 of command in the police which should follow subordination; where the
14 chain of command did not function in a lawful way, anarchy ensued. In
15 other words, everyone did what they felt was due and interpreted the law
16 in their own way and would not incur any responsibility or consequences
17 because they enjoy political protection at the post that they held.
18 Q. All right. Can we go back to the question that I asked next.
19 What was the ethnic composition in --
20 MR. KRGOVIC: Ms. Korner, the last sentence, he said, It wasn't
21 case in Banja Luka is not recorded, so I must suggest ...
22 MS. KORNER: Sorry. What wasn't?
23 Q. Look, can we leave this whole topic. Can we get to this. Is --
24 what was the ethnic composition, please, Mr. Vlaski, in Banja Luka
25 A. I don't have and cannot recall the demographic data for
1 Banja Luka. I can tell you what the level -- what the situation at the
2 level of Banja Luka was when it came to the division of power.
3 As for Banja Luka itself, I am not in a position to give you a
4 specific answer, a precise answer. Are we referring to Banja Luka
5 proper, the Banja Luka region, the Krajina? Demographics differ, and I
6 don't have them.
7 MS. KORNER: Mr. Krgovic, you want to say something.
8 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. The previous
9 answer -- the last sentence that the witness said when he was talking
10 about the way in which the various MUP structures behaved, he said that
11 that was not -- that did not apply to Banja Luka, the unlawfulness of
12 conduct. And that's important. So I would like the witness to kindly
13 repeat that.
14 JUDGE HALL
15 which answer this question was to.
16 Mr. Krgovic, where are we in terms of line numbers, please.
17 MR. KRGOVIC: [Microphone not activated] ... sorry, page 59,
18 line 6. This part is missing.
19 JUDGE HALL
20 probably going to have ask the question again.
21 MS. KORNER: I'm not going to ask the question again,
22 Your Honour.
23 MR. KRGOVIC: I will clarify that in my cross-examination, so
24 that's ...
25 MS. KORNER: Yeah. Right.
1 Q. Before I ask you to refresh your memory from your interview,
2 Mr. Vlaski, in Banja Luka
4 A. As for Banja Luka proper, the Serbs were at a numerical
5 advantage. Let's put it that way. But I don't have the statistics that
6 would indicate the various settlements encompassed by Banja Luka and
7 their ethnic makeup. It is a rather thankless task now to manipulate the
8 various numbers.
9 Q. Did the fact that Banja Luka had a Serb majority and a Serb chief
10 of the CSB
11 MR. KRGOVIC: Objection, leading.
12 MS. KORNER: If I can finish the question.
13 Q. Did the fact that Banja Luka had a Serb majority and a Serb chief
14 of the CSB
16 A. It could have had an impact on that. I'm not stating it did. It
17 just could have, for practical reasons.
18 Q. All right. Mico Stanisic --
19 JUDGE HARHOFF: Ms. Korner.
20 I understand this meeting was a meeting in the RS MUP; is that
21 correct, Mr. Witness? It was an RS MUP meeting on the 11th of February?
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] From the minutes, it follows that
23 the meeting was held in Banja Luka on such and such a date, and those who
24 attended the meeting are listed here.
25 According to the minutes, the meeting did not have an
1 institutional format. I could say it was a meeting of a group, a working
2 meeting of a group of individuals of Serb ethnicity. And this is
3 something that you will see from the discussion as it unfolded and the
5 JUDGE HARHOFF: Very well. Thanks.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And if I may add something.
7 JUDGE HARHOFF: I will give the floor back to Ms. Korner.
8 MS. KORNER:
9 Q. Just so we are absolutely clear, everybody who attended that
10 meeting was a Serb member of the MUP and a relatively high-up Serb member
11 of the MP. Is that right?
12 A. One could interpret it in this way between the lines. But for
13 none of those attendees do we have a title, and nowhere in the discussion
14 was the issue raised of the institutions that they were representing
15 there and who they were speaking -- on whose behalf they were speaking.
16 As I can tell from the minutes, they all spoke on their own personal
18 Q. I'm not suggesting this was an officially called meeting at all,
19 Mr. Vlaski. This was a meeting, as we can see from the minutes, where
20 discussion was held by these individuals but all of whom held relatively
21 high positions. For example, Mr. Stanisic, Mr. Mandic, Mr. Kljajic,
22 Mr. Draskovic.
23 A. That's correct.
24 Q. Thank you. Now, --
25 A. That's correct.
1 Q. First of all, Mr. Zupljanin opened the meeting, as we can see.
2 Do you know why he spoke first? Was it simply because the meeting was in
3 Banja Luka?
4 A. It is only logical and natural that an individual hosting an
5 event for a number of persons should open the meeting, should give some
6 opening remarks. And I think it's the sole reason why he did it.
7 Q. And was the meeting -- where was the meeting actually held in
8 Banja Luka? In the CSB
9 A. You don't have to suggest places to me. It was not held on the
10 premises that were intended for the work of the police or the MUP. It
11 was held on the first floor of the Bosna Hotel, right next to the piano
13 Q. Mico Stanisic spoke second. Do you know why he took apparently a
14 fairly leading role in this meeting?
15 A. It was logical for someone who came from Sarajevo and represented
16 or held a significant position within the MUP of Bosnia-Herzegovina who,
17 in addition to that, had greater responsibility for representing
18 interests to do that. He was, perhaps, in a better position than
19 everyone else to take up that role at this meeting.
20 Q. Now, you've read through the minutes. Are those accurate minutes
21 of the meeting that were taken by Mr. Velasevic?
22 A. I think the discussion went beyond that which is recorded here,
23 although the minutes reflect the state of affairs. There may have been
24 certain formulations that -- well, had audio recording been made of the
25 meeting, then, perhaps, the -- it would be a full reflection of it. But
1 I don't think that the minutes are far from that, far from reflecting
3 Q. So they're, obviously, as you say, a summary of what was said.
4 But as far as that summary goes, an accurate one. Is that right?
5 A. Yes, that's right.
6 Q. Among other things that were said, Mr. Koroman --
7 MS. KORNER: If we go to the third page in English, please, and
8 the third page in B/C/S -- fourth page in B/C/S, sorry.
9 Q. -- said that his opinion was that:
10 "All further discussion is pointless. A list of demands should
11 be made drawn up," as opposed to drown up, "and given to the MUP with a
12 deadline. If they are not met, we must paralyse the whole of SRBH and we
13 can do that."
14 Can you just tell the Judges who Mr. Koroman was?
15 A. Malko Koroman was the official at the head of a police
16 organisational unit in Pale, public security unit.
17 Q. And then Mr. Tutus spoke, and then you spoke:
18 "We must work out how to carry out the decisions from this
19 meeting the only way would be to organise the Serbian MUP and implement
20 all decisions without question."
21 MR. ZECEVIC: For the benefit of the -- of the witness, it's on
22 the next page. His speech is on the next page of this document.
23 MS. KORNER: Oh, sorry. Thank you. Yes, can we go to the next
24 page then. Yup.
25 Q. Was your view, in February of 1992, as you expressed it, that
1 there was really only one thing to do, and that was to organise a
2 separate MUP?
3 A. If I can respond to this question, these discussions and
4 conclusions show that Serbian representatives offered the possibility of
5 making one more effort and to change the situation and the relations in
6 the MUP, because the conclusions from this meeting were supposed to be
7 and were sent to Minister Delimustafic and the Muslim, Bosniak, Croatian
8 representatives who had usurped this institution. What we were left with
9 was to offer them a chance of an agreement; are we going to embark
10 together on setting up a lawful institution, or are we going to go, as
11 the political process was already unfolding, to the development of our
12 own institutions, which was supposed to protect the people we
13 represented, because this could not be done from the institution that
14 already existed. That is why is this meeting occur in the first place.
15 Q. Yes. Could you tell us --
16 MS. KORNER: Let's turn to conclusions, please, which is on the
17 last page of the -- no, sorry. The penultimate page in English. Fourth
18 page and ... it's the following page in B/C/S than this one we're on.
19 Q. Can you tell us where in the conclusions we're able to find the
20 Serbian representatives offering the possibility of making one more
22 A. The first conclusion:
23 "A Serbian collegium is hereby established in the
24 Socialist Republic
25 Not a MUP but Serbian collegium consisting of Serbian personnel
1 at executive positions along all the lines of work within the MUP.
2 Precisely the reason why we were bypassed and humiliated because our
3 representatives did not occupy a single significant function. We were
4 skipped over, ignored. So what else could we do but make a composition
5 that would be able to meet regularly, be part of the MUP entity, and be
6 able to protect the legitimacy and legality in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
7 Second conclusion: The Serbian MUP [as interpreted], or
8 Deputy Minister Momcilo Mandic would manage the Serbian collegium and
9 ensure the implementation of decisions. Because, at that time, he was
10 the only representative in that institution representing the Serbian
12 And then the third conclusion:
13 "The Serbian collegium," again, the collegium is underscored.
14 It's an informal circle, gathered every morning, or twice a week,
15 depending on the situation, and that was the practice in the police where
16 it would then review all the questions, and it says that that Serbian
17 collegium would "carry out all the necessary preparations for the
18 functioning of the Serbian MUP after the promulgation of the Serbian
19 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina."
20 So that is the third conclusion. So it's an alternative. The
21 first or the second -- and if the first and second conclusions were not
22 implemented, then there is nothing to do so.
23 MS. KORNER: I think Mr. Pantelic wants to say something.
24 MR. PANTELIC: I do apologise for everyone in these proceedings.
25 It's just a correction to the transcript. It's page 65, line 12, after
1 the word "second conclusion," witness said the Serbian "member." It's
2 not correct. Said in the LiveNote the Serbian MUP. The right expression
3 was Serbian member.
4 Thank you.
5 JUDGE HALL
6 MS. KORNER: Actually, I can't even -- I can't make sense of
7 anything that's been written there. It says the Serbian collegium would
8 carry out all the necessary preparation for the -- I imagine all that
9 gobbldygook must be "functioning of the Serbian MUP."
10 Q. All right, Mr. Vlaski, this is the whole point, isn't it? If you
11 look at paragraph 3, this wasn't anything, was it? I mean, sorry, to do
12 with, as you put it, the last chance. One and two were set up in order
13 to carry out the preparations necessary for the functioning of the
14 Serbian MUP after the promulgation of the Serbian republic.
15 Can you explain why you say that is an olive branch, if you like,
16 to the BiH MUP?
17 A. May I reply?
18 Q. [Microphone not activated]
19 A. Conclusion number 5 states:
20 "Not a single decision regarding the staffing policies in the
21 SRBH MUP," I underline the SRBH MUP, "will be implemented without the
22 approval of Deputy Minister Momcilo Mandic."
23 This conclusion contradicts these other conclusions, but it's a
24 conclusion. So that means that there still was a possibility to make
25 appointments pursuant to these principles that should have been in effect
1 for an institution of this nature. And that in itself would have placed
2 out of commission these conclusions that were forced by such an attitude
3 towards the Serbian people, generally in Bosnia and Herzegovina and
4 towards us as professionals, and those heading those organs in
5 particular. That was then forced.
6 Q. But if -- forgive me, Mr. Vlaski. If not a single decision
7 regarding staffing policies in the SRBH MUP will be implemented without
8 the approval of Deputy Minister Momcilo Mandic, how is that going to aid
9 cooperation and, as it were, make for a functioning joint MUP?
10 A. It would help quite a lot, because these are the structures
11 representing the SDA and the HDZ in that MUP made appointments however
12 they wanted. They never asked anybody for anything. They did -- behaved
13 according to their own conscience, which they didn't have. And they did
14 what they wanted, and I am an example of that. They played with me,
15 humiliated me.
16 Q. Conclusion number 16.
17 MS. KORNER: Can we go over, please, to the next page, please, in
19 Q. "Work intensively to train and arm our police personnel."
20 By "our," who did -- what was meant?
21 A. Parallel with this administrative and cadre policy, this other
22 type of policy in the MUP was conducted to the detriment of the Serbian
23 people. A vast imbalance was created in the distribution of the key
24 positions as far as cadre reputation was concerned, as well as a
25 de-balance in the reserve forces of the police in the arming of members
1 of the police, in the procurement and distribution of weapons according
2 to organisational units.
3 The MUP was such that all the key functions were controlled by
4 representatives of the Muslim and the Croatian people. The materiel
5 financial service was under the control of Bruno Soco, and the minister
6 was the responsible person who approved the funds for salaries and the
7 functioning -- actually for the purchase of equipment and weaponry. This
8 weaponry was not sent to the centres where the Serbs held the top
9 positions or where the majority. No, quite the opposite. They were
10 withdrawn if there.
11 This is what happened with the equipment from the state security,
12 which was withdrawn before any of the events, back to the seat in
14 according to the needs of those who were doing it, and these were done by
15 chiefs, or colleagues among the Muslim and Croat people's ranks. This
16 was done in order to create elementary conditions for a reserve police of
17 Serbian ethnicity so that they would be able to carry out their
18 assignments which were primarily quite certain, because of the increasing
19 complexity of this political situation.
20 Q. So the simple answer to my question, "our," was this is to arm
21 the reserve police of Serbian ethnicity. Is that right?
22 A. Yes, that is correct. I don't see anyone else who would have to
23 be armed. Those who wanted to go to the military responded to the
24 call-up and they went to the army, and they had weapons there. I'm
25 thinking of the JNA.
1 Q. Okay. All right. That's all that I want to ask you about that
3 Now, was there any other meetings that you attended after this
4 meeting of the 11th of February that involved only Serb police officers?
5 A. I don't recall such a meeting being organised like this one in
6 Banja Luka
7 but a meeting of the type of a meeting, I do not recall taking place.
8 Q. Any kind of meeting, however informal, that was held in Pale?
9 Did you attend anywhere any such meetings?
10 A. It could happen that I did not, because, like I said, these
11 others were more suitable to be invited to such a thing. I assume that I
12 wasn't invited, but I don't allow the possibility that I didn't attend
13 such a meeting, but I don't know when it was, who could have possibly
14 attended it, or what could have been discussed there.
15 Q. Any meetings that you can recall where Mico Stanisic,
16 Dragan Kijac, Milan Scekic, people like that, attended?
17 A. I don't recall that. I know the people, but I don't remember
18 them ever being in one place. There should have been some sort of reason
19 for that, something that would link me or connect me with those people or
20 that topic that would be the topic of such a meeting.
21 Q. All right. I want to move, please, now, to the barricades
22 incident at the beginning of March in Sarajevo.
23 First, how did you first hear about the barricades being erected
24 in Sarajevo
25 A. I heard on Sunday when I came back from skiing. I went to ski on
1 Bjelasnica, and then, when I returned, I had a telephone call from
3 Mr. Karadzic, and he was the first one who conveyed to me this
4 information, because, at that time, I wasn't really following what was
5 happening in the media, because, outside, I didn't have that possibility
6 of getting to that information.
7 I was informed about that event by telephone.
8 Q. And can you remember which colleague informed you?
9 A. Djordje Kapor.
10 Q. Once you had been informed, where did you go to?
11 A. After speaking with Mr. Kapor, there were calls probably to other
12 members of the MUP, who were still working in the MUP at that time, for
13 us to assemble in the premises of the designates or Deputies Club of the
14 Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Djuro Djakovic Street
15 official premises used by parliamentarians, by deputies of the Serbian
16 Democratic Party in the Bosnian Assembly.
17 Q. Did you go there?
18 A. Yes, I went. And there was a broadcast circle of people there
19 who came because of this unfortunate incident in Sarajevo when the
20 Serbian best man was killed in Bascarsija in the wedding party. And in
21 view of the situation in the town, this required a kind of caution as far
22 as personal, also in terms of the general situation which could arise
23 from something like that. The gravity of the situation required that,
24 other than the reaction that ensued along the political lines by the SDS,
25 there had to be a certain reaction in the security sense by Serbian
1 representatives of that same MUP which was then still a unified, single
3 Q. Can you pause there for a moment, please.
4 You say the gravity of the political -- of the situation required
5 something other than the reaction that ensued along political lines by
6 the SDS
7 Why did this killing of a Serb guest at the wedding require a
8 political reaction by the SDS
9 A. Because the MUP did not wish to carry out a proper investigation
10 into this because this was a classical political killing. It was not
11 just a regular killing of the best man, something that can happen or any
12 kind of killing which can happen in any town in the world. This was a
13 political killing. And behind that killing stood the criminal structure
14 which also had protection in the MUP, and this was something that was
15 generally known.
16 The majority of criminals were issued official identity cards by
17 Minister Delimustafic, and they did not have to meet any regular
18 institutional conditions for that. They would issue ID cards to
19 criminals with criminal records so that they would do the bidding of
20 individuals from the political structure. So this was something that we
21 did not have a response to because the criminals had entered the ranks of
22 the police. Those who fought against these people on the right side of
23 the law were now colleagues with these people, and you could not expect
24 an honest investigation. And this is why this kind of reaction followed.
25 Q. All right. You had as assistant minister, a Serb, Dr. Zepinic.
1 Why couldn't it be left to him to deal with this, as opposed to the SDS?
2 A. He had the opportunity for a year, and this was valuable time
3 lost, and there was nothing that had an effect to change the situation.
4 He was also a professor, a intellectual who happened to fall into a
5 situation where the upper hand was held by criminals. There was nothing
6 much that he could do in such a situation. He could not come down to the
7 level of the criminals with whom he had to deal with.
8 Q. All right. I won't come along and list all the other Serb
9 members in the MUP, but let's look at what happened at the beginning of
11 When you got to the Deputies Club, you said a number of people
12 were there. Who was there from the SDS?
13 A. I didn't analyse that SDS
14 of these people anyway. It was not relevant to me in that sense, who
15 these people were.
16 Q. Well, let's go through the people you did know.
17 Was Dr. Karadzic there?
18 A. No, he was in Belgrade
19 and when the assembling began. He was in Belgrade at that time.
20 Q. All right. Was Velibor Ostojic there?
21 A. I assume so, but I don't recall each individual who was present.
22 Velibor was in the next phase of the development of the situation
23 relating to the killing of this wedding party member. He was included in
24 all the subsequent events because he was the minister for information.
25 Q. Well, I want you to cast your mind back, because you spoke about
1 this during the interview, and tell who was there.
2 Was Dr. Koljevic there?
3 A. I cannot remember. They had a different position. The
4 Presidency had its own area of work. I think perhaps he did drop by, but
5 I really cannot remember.
6 This was a very short time that we spent there. There was an
7 assessment because of the new situation that that particular place was
8 unfavorable from the security point of view, because there was a danger
9 that members of this criminalised structure attacked this Deputies Club
10 once they found out about the meeting, and then the decision was made to
11 go to the Holiday Inn. That was a place, it's a hotel in Sarajevo where
12 the majority of the foreign journalists were staying and the SDS did
13 have - how to put it? - kind of position there because the director of
14 the hotel was a director of Serb nationality and there was some sort of
15 guarantee there that the -- there would be no problems. And that is why
16 the meeting, namely all the activities in relation to this particular
17 event, were then relocated to the Holiday Inn.
18 Q. Right. Well, let's deal who was at the Holiday Inn rather than
19 at the Deputies Club?
20 So let's start again, shall we?
21 Who of the SDS
22 A. Mr. Rajko Dukic was there who was president of the SDS executive
23 board. This is one of the more prominent figures both in the business
24 and political life. And he was there since he had some kind of business
25 arrangement in that hotel in that area, something like that, so he was in
1 the function of the coordinating these activities of the SDS. That was
2 Rajko Dukic.
3 Velibor Ostojic, the minister of information was there, and many
4 others. I really didn't have any ambitions to register them in that sort
5 of sense. And as per their functions, probably there were many people
6 because it was a hotel that anybody could enter who wanted to.
7 Q. Yes, quite. But this was meeting, was it not, which was attended
8 by members of the SDS
9 MUP. Is that correct?
10 A. That is correct, because that is a place where people from the
11 field would come. It was very busy just like a bus or a railway station.
12 It wasn't a meeting where you could start it at 1500 hours an end at 1700
13 hours. The event of such a nature that it was an activity in continuity
14 where people and events followed one another, then coordination occurred
15 in some political and security aspects, and other aspects of this event.
16 In the political sense, this was coordinated by Mr. Dukic who formulated
17 the conclusions; the media aspect was along his line, as much as he
18 could, was done by Mr. Velibor Ostojic. And as far as the security
19 aspect, because the police, by the very nature of their work, had to
20 carry on with the implementation of the regular tasks in the town. This
21 required the police to take up some actions, so this required some sort
22 of coordination of the police forces, including the police forces of
23 Serbian ethnicity.
24 Q. Right.
25 A. Mr. Stanisic was there, Kijac, Momo Mandic, I was there,
1 Devedlaka, Goran Radovic, there were probably some others, but ...
2 Q. All right. Was any attempt made by you or by Mr. Stanisic or by
3 anybody to make any planning to take down these barricades?
4 A. The barricades were organised in some parts of the city of
6 Somewhere there was some coordination along the SDS lines because the
7 party had its own infrastructure in the field and communication with
8 their people in the field, and this was a spontaneous reaction, after the
9 killing of the Serbian best man. This was a cry of the Serbs of Sarajevo
10 that things could not could not go on anymore. Now this was a -- the
11 last drop.
12 There had been a killing, so this was a warning and a call of
13 what we others could expect. So it was normal that it was necessary to
14 seek a political reaction. And you can see that from what was formulated
15 by the SDS
16 barricade, a barricade in itself means a blockade of some area or space
17 in order to prevent something happening that you did not want to happen.
18 This was just done by people. This was done along some sort of
19 coordination of the SDS
21 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... just ask you there to look
22 briefly for the last couple of minutes at one document, which is the
23 interview with Mr. Mandic that took place in Slobodna Bosna,
24 10th of April, and I believe it is it already an exhibit.
25 MS. KORNER: It is Exhibit P735.
1 And can we have, please, in the English the fourth page, and in
2 the B/C/S, it's the - one, two, three - also the fourth page.
3 Q. You've had an opportunity to see this before?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Yes. The -- Mr. Mandic is being asked by the reporter about the
6 barricades being organised by the SDS
7 paragraph he says:
8 "Rajko Dukic headed the committee for the organisation of
9 barricades. I do not wish to hide anything. Dragan Kijac, Mico
10 Stanisic, and myself and some others from the MUP took part in this, and
11 we organised everything so as to avoid bloodshed."
12 First of all, was Dragan Kijac one of the people who you saw at
13 the Holiday Inn?
14 A. Yes, he was.
15 Q. Were you one of the committee for the organisation of the
17 A. I was there, but I wasn't a member of any committee.
18 Q. All right. Thank you.
19 MS. KORNER: That's all, Your Honours, that I ask today, I think.
20 [Trial Chamber confers]
21 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
22 JUDGE HALL
23 required to return tomorrow morning at 2.15 -- tomorrow afternoon at 2.15
24 when we will continue your testimony. Your examination-in-chief still
25 has a -- a little while to go, and after which you would be -- counsel
1 for the accused will be invited to cross-examine you.
2 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
3 JUDGE HALL
4 MS. KORNER: I don't think I'm going to need anything like
5 that -- well, depending on the answers.
6 JUDGE HALL
7 remind you that, having been sworn as a witness, you can't have any
8 communication with counsel from either side. And in such conversations
9 as you may have with persons outside of the courtroom, you can't discuss
10 your testimony.
11 So with that warning, we take the adjournment to tomorrow
12 afternoon at 2.15. Thank you.
13 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.02 p.m.
14 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 16th day of
15 February, 2010, at 2.15 p.m.