100215IT

Page 6283

1 database without calling any evidence, and it's a matter for the Defence

2 to say whether they want evidence called from the compilers of the

3 database.

4 And, Your Honours, I think that concludes all the preliminary

5 matters which I wish to raise.

6 JUDGE HALL: Thank you, Ms. Korner.

7 [Trial Chamber and Legal Officer confer]

8 JUDGE HALL: The Chamber is reminded in respect of -- that in

9 respect of Ms. Korner's issue about the subpoenas that we still await the

10 responses from the Defence, so the Chamber would need expedited responses

11 in order to go on to the next step. Thank you.

12 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated] ... no objection. I

13 wonder if we could have an oral -- perhaps just an oral indication later

14 today, after the very first break, perhaps.

15 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes, we will provide an oral indication later

16 today. Thank you very much.

17 JUDGE HALL: Thank you.

18 So is the Prosecution ready to proceed with its next witness?

19 MS. KORNER: Yes, Your Honour.

20 [The witness entered court]

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

22 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

23 WITNESS: NEDJO VLASKI

24 [Witness answered through interpreter]

25 JUDGE HALL: Thank you. You may be seated, sir.

Page 6284

1 Good afternoon to you, sir. Would you begin by telling us your

2 name, please.

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I am Nedjo Vlaski.

4 JUDGE HALL: And what is your date of birth?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The 27th of May, 1956.

6 JUDGE HALL: And what is your profession?

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I am a criminologist. I have a

8 degree in criminology.

9 JUDGE HALL: And what is your ethnicity?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm a Serb.

11 JUDGE HALL: Have you testified previously before the Tribunal or

12 in the region in relation to these matters?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have never testified before.

14 JUDGE HALL: Well, the -- you would appreciate that you have been

15 called as a witness in this matter before the Tribunal which has been

16 appointed to deal with crimes that would have occurred in the former

17 Yugoslavia. The first thing that would have happened is that you would

18 have been invited to make a solemn declaration, the effect of which is

19 that your testimony is on oath. The procedure that is followed is fairly

20 standard for courtrooms, in that the side that is calling you - in this

21 case, the Prosecution - would begin by asking you questions. And then

22 the -- counsel for each of the two accused persons would, if they wish,

23 also have questions of you, and the Prosecution would then have a right

24 to re-examine you on matters arising out of your cross-examination. And

25 after that, the Chamber itself may have questions of you.

Page 6285

1 Do you understand what I have just explained?

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I have understood everything.

3 JUDGE HALL: Thank you. And I would invite counsel for the

4 Prosecution to begin.

5 Examination by Ms. Korner:

6 Q. Mr. Vlaski, can we start by just looking at your dealings with

7 the Prosecution and Defence in this case.

8 Is it right that you were interviewed in Banja Luka in June of

9 last year?

10 A. Yes, the 3rd of June.

11 Q. And you were told that, because of your position you had the

12 right not to answer questions and the right to have a lawyer present; is

13 that right?

14 A. That is correct.

15 Q. And you were prepared to answer the questions and didn't have a

16 lawyer present. Is that right?

17 A. Yes, I very gladly testified.

18 JUDGE HARHOFF: Ms. Korner, could you just explain in which

19 capacity this witness was interviewed.

20 MS. KORNER: He was interviewed as someone who, had this Tribunal

21 been issuing indictments, would have come under the definition of a

22 suspect. Of course, that cannot apply anymore because the Tribunal

23 cannot issue indictments, but people such as Mr. Vlaski are given their

24 rights because of the possibility of prosecution in other places.

25 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you.

Page 6286

1 MS. KORNER:

2 Q. And you had a chance, didn't you, yesterday, to review the -- the

3 recorded interviews; is that right?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. And I think what you said about it was that although you might

6 have expressed certain things differently, the interview did record what

7 you wanted to say; is that right?

8 A. Yes, I would have had more to say than that.

9 Q. Right. Again -- yes, that's fair enough, Mr. Vlaski. You were

10 told there were time constraints, as there are today, yes.

11 And I think, this morning, were you able to have a period of time

12 with Mr. Zecevic before coming into court to testify?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. All right, Mr. Vlaski. Can we now move, please, to the various

15 positions that you have held.

16 Did you start working for the MUP of Bosnia and Herzegovina in

17 the -- in the 1970s?

18 A. The 1st of June, 1974, to be precise.

19 Q. And, at that stage, were you working in the City Secretariat in

20 the city of Sarajevo?

21 A. After completing secondary police school, I was assigned as -- I

22 was assigned to the City Secretariat for the police to general police

23 duties.

24 Q. All right. At a late date, however, did you transfer to the

25 state security division?

Page 6287

1 A. That is correct. From the 1st of June, 1975, I began to work in

2 the State Security Service, at the Republican Secretariat of

3 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

4 Q. And in which area of the State Security Service did you work?

5 A. I worked at the state security centre in charge of the Sarajevo

6 area. I worked at the Sarajevo centre.

7 Q. All right. Did you, however, in the 1980s, transfer into -- or

8 did you become inspector for the security of persons and facilities?

9 A. This was just a regular distribution of posts. As one acquired a

10 certain amount of experience and conditions for promotions, I then was

11 given a different position, and I was assigned to duties of a personal

12 and building security.

13 Q. And were you still in that position at the time of the

14 multi-party elections in 1990?

15 A. After this post, where I carried out these tasks and assignments,

16 I was assigned as an inspector at the -- for the combatting of internal

17 enemies, as this was called. These were assignments that had to do with

18 combatting specifically Serbian nationalism.

19 Q. All right. We're going to have a look in a little more detail

20 there what happened to you after the multi-party elections and

21 particularly in 1991.

22 But after the split in the MUP, were you, for at least a short

23 period of time, in 1992, the -- an under-secretary -- assistant

24 under-secretary, I'm sorry, in the National Security Service under

25 Mr. Skipina?

Page 6288

1 A. Before I respond to this question, there is one period that is

2 particularly important for this Tribunal and for this testimony, so I

3 wouldn't wish to skip over that.

4 May I speak?

5 Q. Certainly.

6 A. Before the multi-party elections, I worked at these assignments,

7 counter-nationalist activities, and there was a climate created in

8 Bosnia and Herzegovina already that the police should be depoliticised

9 because change of the political system was expected. It was -- what was

10 being expected was a multi-party system, to this process was proceeding

11 more or less regularly. After the multi-party elections, it was clear

12 that the nationalist parties would win, and all of those patients of

13 ours, or clients, as we used to call them, members from the different

14 ethnic groups that we were covering were now in a position to take over

15 power. This was particularly relevant in the case of Alija Izetbegovic

16 who had been sentenced for Muslim nationalist or fundamentalist

17 activities, depending on how you view these issues. And it was expected

18 that representatives would come from the ranks of other nationalist

19 parties who did have some problems, because of their previous political

20 activity.

21 We were in a position, in the Security Service, to expect those

22 people to come to power precisely because they had been previously

23 prosecuted for their previous activities, especially persons who had

24 taken part in certain activities and were subject to investigations and

25 so on, so we were expecting a certain degree of retaliation and revenge

Page 6289

1 on the part of those people who were about to come to power.

2 As far as the policies of those nationalist parties, they were

3 aimed at implementing those ethnic objectives which prompted them to form

4 political parties in the first place, and represent the interests of the

5 people that they represented. The division of power was effected in such

6 a way that the rule was divided between the SDA, SDS, and the HDZ. And,

7 by inertia, there was a re-alignment among the ranks in certain

8 structures including the police, certain institutions, state organs, and

9 also bodies at lower levels.

10 It was particularly characteristic to note the relationship to

11 the structures of power of those who had been previously processed for

12 their activities, and a characteristic example would be that of

13 Alija Izetbegovic. He did allow for the possibility that the

14 investigators who had conducted investigations against him to be given

15 another chance at a position in these institutions, but probably in

16 somewhat different roles. This was the case also in Croatia with

17 investigators who had been dealing with such matters in Croatia to

18 continue on these duties but to direct them at the -- at their own

19 peoples -- people.

20 So this attitude had an effect and all the institutions in

21 Bosnia and Herzegovina, including those where I had worked. There was

22 publicity given and an image created for certain politicians. They had

23 gained power. And then it was the duty of those people to avenge, in

24 their future work, and work towards their interests and en the interests

25 of the people they represent.

Page 6290

1 This was not the case in the instance of representatives of the

2 Serb people. They felt no need to rely on the support of these

3 structures. At least that a was my impression. I personally worked on

4 the issues of Serb nationalism and clerical nationalism. I would have

5 been the one to deal with these matters. Not even the higher levels of

6 my structures were involved in these political party activities before

7 the elections, because they feared retaliation. Most of the managerial

8 staff who had been involved in the activities availed themselves of the

9 opportunity to retire early, under favourable benefits, and they left

10 their posts. We remained, who were rather inexperienced in view of the

11 newly arisen political situation, and without any political support.

12 Unlike the representatives of the Bosniak and Muslim and Croat people who

13 had absolute political support and an obligation, based on what I was

14 saying earlier on, to repay the debt to these people and to rehabilitate

15 themselves, in a way.

16 Thus, the mandate of setting up the Security Service within the

17 MUP of Bosnia-Herzegovina was given precisely to Munir Alibabic, the

18 investigator who, at one point, investigated Alija Izetbegovic.

19 According to the information we had, we had contacted Izetbegovic at the

20 time when he was serving his sentence in Foca. It was our expectation

21 that this would have an impact on -- in terms of pacifying someone who

22 had already been convicted of nationalism. However, what happened, in

23 fact, was quite unexpected. The investigator in respect of whom managers

24 grew concerned was completely indifferent to the situation. I personally

25 asked him if he was afraid of how the new structures that came to power

Page 6291

1 may react. His response was, I am a professional, and I fear no one.

2 Thereafter, following the elections, the various structures of

3 power came to be manned based on the agreement reached among the various

4 winning political parties. Since Bosnia-Herzegovina operated on the

5 principle of an agreement among the three peoples, and this principle

6 has, in fact, been built in the law and still exists in

7 Bosnia-Herzegovina today, the agreement on the separation of power proved

8 to be difficult.

9 Q. [Previous translation continues] ...

10 A. Can I continue?

11 Q. Mr. Vlaski, can I say this: I'm not proposing to ignore with you

12 the -- the events of 1990 and 1991 and the parliament and the agreements.

13 We have a limited time, as I explained to you this morning.

14 Can I ask what the point is that you want to make in three

15 sentences, if at all possible?

16 A. What I wanted to say is this: Since I am here, in order to tell

17 the truth, and I would like to at least point to the reaction that you

18 have to take in order to ascertain the truth, and what I have been

19 telling you so far is part of the truth. This is what I have been

20 through; it is it a rather painful experience that I wish to draw your

21 attention to. I also have personal reasons to do so. I have gone

22 through a great deal of things at the time, and all of them are relevant

23 to piecing together the puzzle an understanding the situation in

24 Bosnia-Herzegovina. That's why I have been trying to tell this story, if

25 you will allow me to.

Page 6292

1 Q. Can I say this, Mr. Vlaski. At the end of your evidence, as the

2 Presiding Judge has pointed out, I have no doubt, if you want to and you

3 feel that events that haven't been covered properly, you wish to say

4 something about, you will be allowed to do that. For the moment, as I

5 explained to you, there is a limited time available to both myself and to

6 the Defence. We would like to ask you questions about what we consider

7 to be relevant. And as I say, if, at the end, you feel there are other

8 matters that you wish to draw to the Courts's attention, I'm sure you

9 will be allowed to do that.

10 So could we just, please, try and sum up what you've just said at

11 rather great length. Pre the multi-party elections, your service

12 maintained intelligence on the leaders of all the nationalist parties.

13 Is that right?

14 A. Only in respect of those for whom there was information and

15 knowledge which made them interesting from the point of view of security.

16 In other words, there were indications that these people might pose a

17 security threat.

18 Q. All right. And you're saying that after the multi-party

19 elections, it was expected that those of you who had, in fact, engaged in

20 these operations might lose your jobs, but that did not happen. Is that

21 the effect of what you were saying?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. All right. So can we -- as I say, I'm going to come back to what

24 happened to you and to the police -- the MUP in 1990 and 1991. But I

25 just want to move ahead to your position after the split.

Page 6293

1 Could you have a look, please, at, on the screen, 65 ter 10138.5.

2 [Microphone not activated]

3 JUDGE HARHOFF: [Microphone not activated]

4 MS. KORNER: It's 10138.5. It's the Republika Srpska Ministry of

5 Internal Affairs. It's page 5 of the -- of the bundle.

6 Do you think we can possibly turn it so that it is a rectangle.

7 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry. If I'm not mistaken, I believe this

8 document has been exhibited already.

9 MS. KORNER: Oh, P876, sorry. But anyhow, we've got -- it's on

10 the -- it's the one on the screen.

11 MR. ZECEVIC: No, no, no. I'm not just objecting, just for the

12 sake of the transcript, because, I mean, I think it is easier if we call

13 it by exhibit number now.

14 MS. KORNER: Could we possibly get it up the right way around.

15 [Microphone not activated] ... I gather --

16 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

17 MS. KORNER: I gather there is a technical problem again and the

18 thing can't be turned the right way up. We can give Mr. Vlaski a hard

19 copy, but I don't know that the defendants have it or the accused have

20 it.

21 Can we move it so that we can see to the right-hand side of the

22 page as we look at it. Thank you.

23 Q. Mr. Vlaski, we can see there the under-secretary for the SNB,

24 that's the State Security Service, as it became called, was, first of

25 all, shown is Mr. Skipina. And then he was replaced by Dragan Kijac.

Page 6294

1 And I think you agree that that's correct, isn't it?

2 Can you see, Mr. Vlaski? It's not very easy.

3 A. I can see it on my screen, but the time-line is somewhat

4 illogical to me. We have skipped from one stage to a stage -- the causes

5 of which need to be explained, and we skipped them.

6 Q. No, Mr. Vlaski, I've just told you. I'm going to go back to all

7 the matters that we discussed in Banja Luka that happened in 1991. I

8 merely want to deal with some of the personalities later on. Do you

9 understand that?

10 A. Very well. I can answer the questions. But, as I say, it was --

11 in 1992, Banja Luka.

12 Q. I'm not -- yes, all right. Can we just look at, please, for a

13 moment, these -- the names here, and then we're going to go back to 1991

14 and 1992.

15 Is it right that after the split in the MUP, Skipina became the

16 head of the SNB, of the under-secretary of the SNB, later replaced by

17 Dragan Kijac?

18 You have to say yes, I'm afraid, otherwise it's not recorded.

19 A. Yes, that's right.

20 Q. All right. You're then shown, together with Mr. Goran Radovic,

21 as an assistant under-secretary. Now for, I appreciate a short period,

22 but was that right, was that your appointment?

23 A. I was nominated. However, for some other objective reasons, I

24 was not in a position to perform the duty at all because I was in a

25 hospital undergoing a treatment.

Page 6295

1 Q. All right. Mr. Radovic, first of all, was he somebody that you

2 knew and had worked with before?

3 A. But, of course. Goran Radovic worked in the Sarajevo state

4 security centre. He was a junior colleague. He worked there until 1991

5 when, following the multi-party elections, which was the most sensitive

6 period when new divisions emerged, he became the Deputy Chief of this

7 particular division in the State Security Service.

8 Q. All right. Underneath you shown on this diagram is a gentleman

9 named Dragan Devedlaka. Again, was he somebody you knew?

10 A. Of course. He, too, worked in the State Security Service before

11 the war that's to say. He was an inspector. Later on, in the period of

12 the divisions and commotion within the State Security Service and the

13 Ministry of the Interior, he became the deputy under-secretary for state

14 security.

15 Q. Okay. All right. I'm not so concerned with the others, but can

16 I look at the top now for a moment.

17 Mico Stanisic, did you know him?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. When did you first get to know him?

20 A. As early as during our schooling in the secondary police school

21 we met, since Mico was the first generation to have been trained in this

22 particular schooling centre. I was the second generation. I was a year

23 younger. We met at the time but were not close. Or, rather, I knew of

24 him. Perhaps he didn't know of me. I was his junior.

25 Later on, we did not work on -- on positions that would have

Page 6296

1 anything to do one with another, and so we didn't have a professional

2 relationship. And it was only after the war that we resumed any sort of

3 relationship.

4 Q. All right. By 1992, therefore, or 1991, rather, how long had you

5 known Mico Stanisic for, roughly?

6 A. As of 1991, which was the crucial year for the resolution of the

7 situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, because -- or, rather, in the absence of

8 an agreement between the three political parties surrounding the division

9 of posts, including those in the State Security Service, that's where the

10 problem lay, because our professional colleagues and partners would not

11 agree to a partnership being set up.

12 Q. Mr. Vlaski, I am seriously going to come back to 1991. My

13 question was simply this: How long, by 1991, had you known

14 Mico Stanisic.

15 A. Before 1991, as I said, I didn't have occasion to meet with him,

16 because Mr. Stanisic was not charged with policing work, and we didn't

17 have an opportunity to be in touch.

18 Q. Okay. Tell me, what year were you in the secondary police school

19 when Mico Stanisic was there?

20 A. That would have been 1971, 1972, or 1973. We could have spent

21 two years in the same facility attending school since he is my senior by

22 one year.

23 Q. And, finally, on this diagram and then we'll go back to 1991,

24 Momcilo Mandic, did you also know him?

25 A. The same applies to him as applied to Mr. Stanisic, because he

Page 6297

1 attended the same school. I had occasion to hear of him, but they were

2 my senior schoolmates, and we were not in touch at the time.

3 Subsequently I would hear of him, and we would come across each other,

4 informally.

5 Q. All right. Now, thank you very much.

6 MS. KORNER: We don't need that diagram anymore.

7 Q. Let's go back to what happened after the multi-party elections.

8 First, did you join any political party?

9 A. No. It was the political and social system of the time which

10 required all of us, at least those of us employed on security activities,

11 to be members of the League of Communists. Following change and the

12 dissolution of the League of Communists, we received instructions to the

13 effect that the police was supposed to undergo a depoliticising process.

14 After that, I have never become involved in the work of any political

15 party, and I do not believe that I will ever.

16 Q. Now, as far as you were concerned, you told us already in the

17 speech you made at the beginning of this afternoon's session, that

18 Mr. Alibabic was appointed to, in fact, the MUP and the State Security.

19 Is that right?

20 A. Yes. It was precisely Alija Izetbegovic who gave him the chance

21 to create the security sector in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In addition to

22 others, of course; he didn't do it on his own. But he was one of the

23 professionals who was privy to how the work was done, the methods of

24 work, and so on.

25 Q. And were you then appointed to a different position by

Page 6298

1 Mr. Alibabic?

2 A. Precisely, because there was this need to maintain equality among

3 the ethnic groups, and this was under the constitution, the laws, and the

4 rules that were in force at the time. The posts, the various positions,

5 had to be divided among them, and this should have been done even before

6 the multi-party elections. I said that my senior colleagues who were

7 eligible to retire, in fact, had already retired by that time and left

8 the sector. There were many vacancies. And in my specific case, I don't

9 know about the other ones, the proposals were given by Munir Alibabic,

10 who was the chief of the State Security Service of Sarajevo, that I be

11 appointed the chief of the 5th Administration which was tasked with

12 providing security of persons and facilities of such interest in

13 Bosnia-Herzegovina. I was handed down a decision to this effect.

14 Q. Thank you. Now, at that time, was Mico Stanisic already the

15 secretary to the Sarajevo SUP?

16 A. Not at the time, no. This was a very difficult period during

17 which agreements had to be reached about how certain vital posts within

18 the state security sector were to be divided. If we know that

19 Alija Izetbegovic wanted to take over power and, as a representative of

20 the majority people, he wanted to take up the key positions within the

21 minister of police, the foreign ministry, the Presidency, and he also

22 wanted to take over certain lower level positions which carried a certain

23 weight. This was an objective that they wanted to achieve at any cost.

24 The Serb cadres were in an inferior position because the Serbs

25 simply did not understand what the state was like at the time. They took

Page 6299

1 over the Ministry of Agriculture the Ministry of Finance where they found

2 the treasury empty. The Croats were given the Ministry of Defence and

3 other important positions, and this reflected itself on all the future

4 relations within Bosnia-Herzegovina.

5 These institutions were the forum where a certain influence could

6 have been excerpted in the decision-making process.

7 Q. [Microphone not activated] ... for a moment. You're in the

8 Sarajevo SUP as -- in the 5th Administration; was the deputy minister of

9 the interior, Dr. Zepinic?

10 A. Yes. It was pursuant to the inter-party agreement that he was

11 appointed there, because it was -- this particular position was accorded

12 to a representative of the Serb people, and he was appointed to the post.

13 Q. And Mr. Delimustafic was the minister?

14 A. Yes. He was nominated by the Party of Democratic Action for that

15 position. Even though there were certain things in his background that

16 would -- that should have precluded him from taking that position, but

17 the -- this was a political decision.

18 Q. And who nominated Dr. Zepinic as the minister of the interior?

19 Deputy Minister, I'm sorry.

20 A. The representatives of the Serb people nominated him, and he came

21 from the ranks of the Ministry of Interior to take up this position. He

22 had the requisite knowledge and professional background to perform the

23 duty. That was the assessment made at the time.

24 Q. And, finally on this, was Branko Kvesic, a Croat, the

25 under-secretary for state security?

Page 6300

1 A. Yes, that policy of appointing cadres was a consequence of a

2 certain amounts of lobbying. There were a number of candidates for that

3 position. I know for a fact that one of the candidates was a friend of

4 mine, Jozo Leutar; however, some circles from the Catholic church

5 influenced the party leadership, and he was elected as the

6 under-secretary of the State Security Service.

7 Q. Right. Now, I'm sorry, Mr. Vlaski, again I'm going have to

8 explain to you. Time is limited. If could you just literally answer the

9 questions as simply as possible. Because the simple question was: Was

10 Mr. Kresic, a Croat, appointed.

11 Whilst you were working in Sarajevo during 1991, was Mr. -- were

12 Mr. Radovic and Mr. Devedlaka also working in Sarajevo?

13 A. Yes, they worked in Sarajevo. Radovic worked at the

14 State Security Service's centre as an inspector, and Devedlaka worked in

15 my administration, when I was the chief, as an inspector in the

16 5th Administration for the security of persons and facilities at that

17 time. Later there will be some shifts which were a consequence of some

18 other relationships.

19 Q. All right. Now, I want to deal with this, please, really

20 shortly, Mr. Vlaski, until we move to September -- July to

21 September of 1991.

22 Were there arguments within the MUP about the allocation of posts

23 between the three nationalist parties?

24 A. There were no arguments. There was a situation at the

25 professional level of a certain trust and confidence, because up to a

Page 6301

1 little bit before that, we had ideal relationships. This was before the

2 elections. And there was no need for us to disagree, because we

3 considered our jobs as our professional duties. So once we, however, saw

4 that there were certain tendencies backed by certain political concepts

5 and ideas which were being carried out by our institutions and behind the

6 backs of us professionals, we became frustrated and then this created

7 tensions.

8 In the beginning, there was no open opposition. There was a kind

9 of security/intelligence game that was present. But people in these

10 conditions are linked by common problems, not common interests. We had

11 no other interest other than the interest in preserving our personal

12 dignity and professional dignity. And then it was our duty to protect

13 the interests of the people that we represented, because that was how the

14 system had been set up. This system was not set up like that before, but

15 new relationships created it, and then we, in the MUP, the police, and

16 the security centre, were experienced not as professionals but were

17 thought of as Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. We would -- we could have been

18 the best professionals ever; however, that would not have made any

19 difference, because the system had began to become deformed from the

20 inside. And it was deformed by those who created and influenced these

21 decisions. Lower levels had no influence on decision making; this was

22 excerpted only by the higher levels of leadership.

23 Q. Let's have a look, please. We can trace what happened to you

24 through some of the intercepts which you have had a chance to listen to.

25 MS. KORNER: Could we have, please, up on the screen,

Page 6302

1 65 ter 1029.

2 Now, Your Honours, Mr. Vlaski's listened to all the

3 intercepts -- oh, it is P7 -- P719. Sorry, it has already been

4 exhibited -- has listened to all the intercepts. We've provided his

5 voice recognition on these intercepts. He is not on them -- I mean, he's

6 not speaking personally. He can assist us to the content. And so I'm

7 going to ask him whether he recognises the voices but without playing

8 them again, as I did with the last witness. And then ask for those,

9 which he's not a party, whether they can maybe MFI those which are not

10 already exhibited.

11 Q. I think you listened to this conversation and you were able to

12 identify -- to recognise the voice of Mr. Karadzic; is that correct?

13 A. That is correct.

14 Q. And can you just briefly, before we look at the part that relates

15 to you, tell us, firstly, when did you first meet Dr. Karadzic?

16 A. This was after the elections. By the nature of my duties when I

17 was the chief of the 5th Administration for the security of persons and

18 facilitates, it was my job to provide security for state officials. And

19 when the political situation became more complex, then we had to provide

20 security for party leaders and even for leading members of the clergy.

21 And that is why I had the need to meet and introduce myself to people for

22 whom we were supposed to provide security. And I know Mr. Karadzic from

23 the time that I was working in the service. And you already know the

24 reason why. And this applies not only to him but to many others.

25 Q. Yeah. All right.

Page 6303

1 MS. KORNER: Now, if we look, please, at the second page in

2 English and -- I don't have the B/C/S. I would think it would be the

3 second page in B/C/S as well. Yeah. Yeah. Thank you.

4 Q. Mr. Karadzic is seeking information, and the other speaker who

5 you weren't able to recognise, but we say is Mr. Mandic, is telling him

6 about a meeting that happened at Simovic. And Mr. Karadzic says:

7 "And was Vlaski" -- "was Vlaski appointed there last week?"

8 Now, this is the 17th of June. Would it have been about then

9 that you had been appointed to the Sarajevo position?

10 A. I have to explain this situation to you like this, because it is

11 not so -- from this conversation you cannot really understand it like

12 that.

13 I was replaced as chief of the administration for the security of

14 persons and facilities, and it was a position that was -- two-way

15 position that in the leadership hierarchy was meaningless, in the

16 national security sector under the pretext that the rules on internal

17 classifications of posts had been changed. A Bosniak, a Muslim, was

18 appointed in my place, and I was not given another assignment. I didn't

19 have a job anymore. And this small irrelevant position in the hierarchy

20 bothered somebody because it was occupied by somebody who was a member of

21 the Serbian people. From the professional point of view, it was

22 irrelevant, which ethnic group was given that particular job.

23 The entire leadership structure in the national security station

24 was divided by the SDA and the HDZ. As for this appointment, on the

25 17th of June, this is a consequence of the fact that the existing rules

Page 6304

1 on the classification of posts provided the -- that the deputy --

2 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please repeat what he said.

3 The interpreters are unable to follow.

4 MS. KORNER: Right.

5 Q. Sorry, Mr. Vlaski, you have to repeat that last part because the

6 interpreters didn't catch it. You said:

7 "As for this appointment, on the 17th of June, this is a

8 consequence of the fact that the existing rules on the classification of

9 posts ..."

10 What did you say after that?

11 A. According to the -- those rules, according to the classification

12 of posts, the post of Deputy Chief of the Public Security Service is

13 specified and, according to the agreement between the parties, should

14 have been assigned to a member of the Serb ethnic group. After certain

15 consultations - and I was unassigned, I was replaced from my previous

16 post - I was proposed for this other post. And Minister Delimustafic

17 signed that decision on appointment.

18 Q. All right. Let's move on, then, please, to August --

19 MS. KORNER: Sorry. Just a moment, Your Honours. Forgive me,

20 I'm just ...

21 Yes, this is 65 ter 10269, please. I don't think this one is

22 exhibited.

23 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honour -- Your Honours, we have a objection to

24 a number of these documents. I was waiting because we were not sure if

25 the other -- the Prosecution actually intended to -- to exhibit these

Page 6305

1 documents.

2 Namely, there is six documents which have been disclosed on the

3 12th of February, on Friday, to us, for the very first time. And these

4 documents, another three documents, including the one which Ms. Korner

5 just called right now, are the exhibits -- or the -- the documents which

6 are disclosed after the filing of the -- the pre-trial brief, so they are

7 not on the 65 ter list.

8 Now, I -- I know that the guide-line 15 requires the party to

9 seek leave to use the material which has not -- which has not been timely

10 noticed as the -- as the guide-line says. Now, apart from that, I

11 believe the documents which have been disclosed just on last Friday for

12 the very first time is -- is something which definitely, I think,

13 that -- that the Office of the Prosecutor cannot show good cause for

14 such -- such untimely disclosure of these documents. And -- and by this,

15 Your Honours, we believe a certain prejudice to the accused is -- is

16 created.

17 I -- I can -- I can go on -- I have the arguments for this, but I

18 don't -- I just --

19 JUDGE HARHOFF: [Microphone not activated]

20 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes, I wanted to be as short as possible. Thank

21 you very much.

22 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, I would have thought it would have been

23 appropriate to raise this before the witness came into court and I began

24 my examination. But having said that, all of the intercepts are in a

25 database which are all on EDS. Some of these intercepts were used in

Page 6306

1 interview with Mr. Vlaski, which came after the filing of the pre-trial

2 brief. As it happens, it's only when you're doing a double-check to see

3 whether they are on the 65 ter list that you see that they're not, or

4 whatever. But I cannot see how the Defence can be said to be prejudice,

5 because every single one of these intercepts is available on EDS.

6 JUDGE HARHOFF: But they would have to be notified about their

7 use.

8 MS. KORNER: They were -- yes, true. They were notified of their

9 use in the disclosure. But, I mean, as I say, no objection was taken to

10 this.

11 I mean, it's not that I've suddenly produced them today for use.

12 They were notified when we gave notification on Friday of the documents

13 that were going to be used. And they were given copies, so they didn't

14 have to look through the EDS.

15 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, this is a principal question.

16 There -- we established -- or actually, Your Honours established the

17 guide-lines. The guide-line number 6 says that this should be done by --

18 properly by a written motion in advance.

19 Now, we -- we are now facing the situation as -- as -- as -- the

20 Office of the Prosecutor is obviously understanding the situation as

21 introducing the documents after the witness is -- after the witnesses

22 pass. We have the motion which we are now responding to, pending one of

23 the motions.

24 So the -- the -- the documents are offered to -- for exhibits

25 post festum, after the witnesses leave the courtroom, instead of doing it

Page 6307

1 in advance. I think that's the only proper way how it should be done.

2 And it has to be in a written motion because the guide-line says so.

3 Thank you.

4 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, all I can say is I appreciate what

5 Your Honours said, and we're having them marked for identification. If

6 absolutely required, we will apply to add them to the 65 ter list in a

7 separate motion.

8 But what is happening here is these are all documents about which

9 the -- the witness can speak. And his name is mentioned. That's where

10 they are all relevant. Whether they are entered into evidence as

11 exhibits is another matter. All I'm asking is that he can deal with

12 them. And not that -- we're not taking the Defence by surprise. One --

13 maybe one exception - I'm not sure there was an objection to this -

14 there was an article in "Oslobodjenje," which we didn't find until last

15 week sometime, although that's open source.

16 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, there's six documents, including two

17 videotapes, which have not been disclosed to us before Friday, never. I

18 think that's -- speaks for itself.

19 [Prosecution counsel confer]

20 [Trial Chamber confers]

21 [Trial Chamber and Legal Officer confer]

22 JUDGE HARHOFF: Counsels on both sides, we have had a look at the

23 procedural guide-lines, and it appears that the Prosecution is required,

24 first of all, to ensure that all documents that it intends to use are

25 included in the 65 ter list; and, secondly, that documents which the

Page 6308

1 Prosecution intends to use with the witness are notified to the

2 Defence 72 hours in advance. And I think there is a rule also in the

3 provision that says that prior to weekends it has to be on Thursday.

4 So we do acknowledge that the Prosecution is out of time.

5 However, you were notified on Friday that these six documents would be

6 used, and you were given a copy. So I'm not sure that much prejudice has

7 been caused, at least not in relation to this first document.

8 What bothers the Bench is, rather, that at least this first

9 document seems to have very little relevance. And this links up with the

10 requirements that when the Prosecution has not sought introduction of a

11 document on to its 65 ter list then it has to do so by doing two things.

12 First of all, it has to show good cause and also it has to show that the

13 document is relevant. And I'm not sure, at least I do not understand the

14 immediate relevance of this transcript that we have in front of us.

15 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated]

16 JUDGE HALL: The intercept, sorry.

17 MS. KORNER: As -- Your Honours, it happens -- so happens that

18 one doesn't matter because it's already an exhibit. This is it not the

19 one that's being objected to. This is -- Your Honour, this is -- I'm

20 going to show the -- the -- through the series of intercepts, what

21 happened to Mr. Vlaski. This is the first that shows him being

22 appointed. It also -- you know -- I mean, I'm not going to make a speech

23 about why it's relevant. But, in fact, it's already -- this one's an

24 exhibit. It's the next one that was about to come up that Mr. Zecevic is

25 objecting to.

Page 6309

1 MR. ZECEVIC: I don't have anything to add, Your Honours. And I

2 completely agree with the analysis that the Chamber has -- has just

3 stated, that I just -- we are really concerned with -- with the --

4 with -- with this, because ...

5 JUDGE HARHOFF: I must add that this is the one issue that has

6 taken up most of our time when discussing procedural matters. And I --

7 it's beginning to become a nuisance to the Court that we have to go

8 through this far too often. And I must remind the Prosecution of its

9 obligation to ensure that documents are provided according to the

10 procedural guide-lines that we have set up. I'm sorry. We cannot go on

11 like this, because we lose so much time.

12 So that's the general instruction that the Chamber wishes to hand

13 down at the moment; namely, please observe what we have set in place in

14 terms of use of documents and notification of the Defence.

15 Now, in the concrete matter of the six documents, the Chamber is

16 unable to assess the good cause that the Prosecution may have, and we are

17 also unable to assess the relevance of the documents. And so, for these

18 reasons, we are unable to determine whether any prejudice has been made

19 to the Defence. We are prepared to allow the Prosecution to use these

20 documents with the witness, provided that we come to the conclusion that

21 the Defence does not suffer any prejudice. But we have to see the

22 documents before we can make any final determination of it.

23 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated] ... that mean

24 Your Honours want to --

25 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

Page 6310

1 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, all those documents, the list and the

2 documents, are all with Your Honours. Do Your Honours want to look at

3 them before we carry on? Because I'm going through the whole -- I'm

4 getting it through now, I say in terms, I think it's about five or six,

5 if not more, intercepts to show what happened. Some of which are on our

6 65 ter list, others which are not.

7 [Trial Chamber and Legal Officer confer]

8 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

9 [Trial Chamber confers]

10 JUDGE HARHOFF: Ms. Korner, the Legal Officer reminds me that the

11 document that is currently on the screen, namely, the intercept in which

12 Dr. Karadzic is speaking to Mr. Mandic, has not been exhibited.

13 MS. KORNER: Well, my information, Your Honour, I don't know

14 who's right, but my information is it is exhibited.

15 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

16 JUDGE HARHOFF: I think we'll take the break now.

17 --- Recess taken at 3.47 p.m.

18 [The witness stands down]

19 --- On resuming at 4.29 p.m.

20 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, if -- if I may, before the witness is

21 ushered in.

22 There are two things, Your Honours. Regarding the request by the

23 Trial Chamber to state our position in relation to Witnesses ST-179 and

24 ST-123, we do not object for subpoena of these two witnesses.

25 And one additional thing: I was notified by my assistants that

Page 6311

1 1D176 document which was MFI'd pending translation, I was informed that

2 the translation was received and now I move that -- and it is updated in

3 e-court, that particular number, and I move the Court to lift the MFI now

4 and properly exhibit it as 1D176.

5 Thank you very much.

6 MR. PANTELIC: Just for the record, Your Honour,

7 Zupljanin Defence take no position with regard to the issue. Thank you.

8 JUDGE HALL: Thank you, counsel.

9 [The witness takes the stand]

10 JUDGE HARHOFF: The Chamber has deliberated on the objection

11 raised by the Defence before the break, and we have reached the following

12 conclusion, and I will explain afterwards why we have come to this

13 conclusion.

14 The documents presented Friday afternoon by the Prosecution

15 included a list of documents to be used with the current witness. In

16 this list, nine documents appeared to have been proposed for use,

17 although these nine documents had not been previously included in the

18 65 ter list.

19 The general rule that the Chamber has laid down in the procedural

20 guide-lines is that no documents can be used or can be introduced into

21 evidence unless it has been included in the 65 ter list; or, if it has

22 not, then, unless the moving party has shown good cause for the delay and

23 also has shown that the document is relevant.

24 In the present case, the Chamber has not been given any

25 explanation as to why the nine documents have not previously been

Page 6312

1 included in the 65 ter list, nor have we been given any indication of

2 their relevance. And the determination of the Chamber is, therefore,

3 that a distinction could be made between those documents among the nine

4 new documents that have already been released to the public domain, and

5 those of the nine documents that have previously been MFI'd by virtue of

6 their being introduced through other witnesses can be used today with

7 this witness, whereas, the remaining three documents cannot.

8 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated] ... which three? Sorry,

9 Your Honour, which three documents are those? Which those three

10 documents are those, may I ask?

11 JUDGE HARHOFF: Document 25, 26, and 28 have been already

12 released into the public domain. They are articles and TV clips. And

13 then as for the intercepts, we've been told that three of them have

14 already been MFI'd. So that's three intercepts and three public domain

15 documents, altogether six documents that can be used today with this

16 witness, and the remaining three documents out of the nine cannot.

17 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, yes, I'm just asking which of the three

18 that can't, rather, than telling me which I can. Because at the moment I

19 can't work out which ones Your Honours are referring to. I'm so sorry.

20 JUDGE HARHOFF: We do not, at the moment, have a final updated

21 list of which of the intercepts that have been MFI'd. This is why I'm

22 speaking in -- in -- in some misty terms.

23 MS. KORNER: Well, you see, Your Honour, none of the ones -- can

24 I tell Your Honours which the intercepts are. The first is 10266, 10267,

25 10269, which you can forget about because I can see that it is going take

Page 6313

1 some time. 10270, they're all ones that have not been MFI'd.

2 JUDGE HARHOFF: That is clear. But three of them have been MFI'd

3 as far as we are told. So one of them is not.

4 MS. KORNER: No. Well, in that case, that surprises me, because

5 when we checked, we didn't think they had been.

6 [Trial Chamber confers]

7 JUDGE HARHOFF: Yeah. Couldn't Mr. Smith ...

8 MS. KORNER: That's right -- we don't think -- no, no the

9 Case Manager did a check. I heard Your Honours' remark. And we don't

10 think any of the ones that are in -- if you have looked at the list on

11 the screen, you'll see they're written in red, yes. I don't see them in

12 black and white. But none of those have been MFI'd.

13 Can I -- I don't think I -- I don't want to waste time while the

14 witness is sitting here again. But can I explain. They're part of a

15 series of intercepts, all of which deal with Mr. Vlaski's position, all

16 of which he has listened to. And some went on to our list but others

17 didn't, and it was only when we were checking the intercept lists that we

18 realised they weren't in there. But it shows a -- the progression, if

19 you like, from the 16th of September to the 19th, and it's relevant to

20 Mr. Karadzic's reaction. You have looked at some of those. This shows

21 the progression through. And that's -- that's the only reason we're

22 putting it in, because it's clearly quite important. It starts with

23 Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Zepinic, moves through Mrs. Plavsic and whatever,

24 and that's why we think it's important.

25 But if Your Honours say I can't, then I'm not going argue at all.

Page 6314

1 But none of those have been MFI'd.

2 JUDGE HARHOFF: So they cannot be used?

3 MS. KORNER: Right. Can I just -- the reason being, because of

4 the late disclosure or the late notification. Or just -- you can't use

5 them.

6 JUDGE HARHOFF: You can't use them because you did not move to

7 have them admitted into your 65 ter list. And this was particularly

8 detrimental to the Defence because in all the other cases which we have

9 dealt with, we have been dealing with 92 ter witnesses; whereas, today

10 we're dealing with a viva voce witness. Now in the 92 ter instances, the

11 Defence has been given a 92 ter package way in advance which would have

12 enabled the Defence to prepare itself for the cross-examination of those

13 92 ter witnesses. But, today, this is a viva voce witness, and the

14 Defence is being taken by surprise by virtue of your late disclosure and

15 by virtue of the fact that you didn't apply or didn't move to have them

16 included in your 65 ter list. And then comes on top of it the issue of

17 relevance.

18 MS. KORNER: But, Your Honour, that's -- as it were, the

19 objection wasn't taken. Either we weren't notified in advance, and

20 they've had this since Friday. And you didn't ask me to explain the

21 relevance. And I can explain the relevance by showing them to you.

22 If you don't look at them, whether or not they're admitted as

23 exhibits and whether Mr. Vlaski [sic], you cannot see the progression of

24 what happened. That's the problem.

25 [Trial Chamber confers]

Page 6315

1 JUDGE HALL: Ms. Korner, the Chamber, of course, is not

2 suggesting or intending to imply that the -- in this case, Office of the

3 Prosecutor, is deliberately trying to sabotage the way that the

4 guide-lines were intended to move the trial along. It's only that at the

5 end of the day we come to -- we come down the side the fact that the

6 guide-lines are there and there are consequences. As Judge Harhoff says,

7 the lack of notice, the lack of effective notice, to the Defence and

8 the -- and the Chamber has -- has this -- has these consequences.

9 So, therefore, that is why the distinction was made in the ruling

10 that has been -- that has been given, between the public domain documents

11 where the same technical objection could have been taken, but,

12 effectively, the Chamber has waved that, and the documents which have

13 been otherwise MFI'd when we draw the line between those and the others.

14 And I think we should -- we have to move on.

15 MS. KORNER: Right. Your Honour -- all right. I apologise.

16 But, I simply cannot see why, because the video cassette is in public,

17 the video is of a news reel or was in a newspaper, we gave exactly the

18 same notice to the Defence that we were intending to use them that --

19 that the distinction is drawn like this.

20 JUDGE DELVOIE: Ms. Korner, the distinction drawn in your favour.

21 We could have ruled out all those documents because of no -- no motion

22 has been filed to have them on the 65 ter list. So simply -- so simply

23 as that.

24 We said we still can take those two -- three or four in, because,

25 well, the damage is -- is less for the Defence because they are in the

Page 6316

1 public domain, because they already have been discussed, and MFI'd. But

2 that's only -- only for -- for this time, you know. Next time, documents

3 will go out if they are not on the 65 ter list or if there is not a

4 prior -- a motion to have them on the 65 ter list prior to -- for the use

5 in court and tendering the documents, even for identification.

6 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, all right. I -- Mr. Vlaski is in

7 here. But, Your Honours, there simply has not been a single policy being

8 followed throughout this case. And filing of motions in and I

9 respectively say in our judgement, just merely adds to the ever growing

10 pile -- I mean, if that's what Your Honours' ruling is, I'm not -- not

11 seeking to, at this stage, take it any further.

12 Q. All right. Mr. Vlaski, I'm sorry about all this. I'm afraid

13 we're going to have to start moving fairly quickly through your evidence.

14 MS. KORNER: We should have up on the screen now, please, an

15 intercept which is on, which is already an exhibit, P902.

16 Q. Mr. Vlaski, this is a intercept I think you listened to. And

17 were you able to identify, recognise, both the voices of Mr. Karadzic and

18 Mr. Zepinic?

19 I'm afraid you have to say yes or no. Oh, you're not getting

20 interpretation.

21 A. [In English] Translate.

22 Q. Okay. On the screen, you can see the transcript of one of the

23 tapes you've listened to. You were able to recognise, I believe, both

24 the voices of Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Zepinic. Is that right?

25 A. [Interpretation] That's right.

Page 6317

1 MS. KORNER: And if we look, please, at the second page in

2 English and the third -- second page in B/C/S. Sorry, the third page in

3 B/C/S, I beg your pardon.

4 Q. Karadzic is talking --

5 MS. KORNER: No, this is completely different.

6 Your Honours, I'm sorry.

7 Can we go back -- I'm so sorry. Can we go back, please, to the

8 first page in English. Can we go back to the first page in English,

9 please. Yup, it's different.

10 I'm sorry, Your Honour. What I have been -- what I have got in

11 my binder is different, but this is ...

12 Q. Mr. Vlaski, Mr. Zepinic is telling Mr. Karadzic that he got drunk

13 with you that night and he goes -- Mr. Zepinic says to Mr. Karadzic that

14 he found out about the decision on the replacement of Nedjo Vlaski on

15 Friday.

16 Now, this is the 16th of September. Can you tell us, please,

17 what had happened to you at that time?

18 A. Apparently, my case was interesting at the time, as it is now.

19 And let me clarify what this was all about.

20 Because of the position to which I was supposed to be appointed

21 to, in view of that position, you can clearly see the situation in MUP

22 and the personnel policy run within it. It also -- it is also indicative

23 of the relations between the various political parties and between the

24 various appointed officials in the ministry.

25 Let me clarify. I received, from Mr. Delimustafic, a decision to

Page 6318

1 the post of the Deputy Chief of the State Security Service. However, I

2 was unable to take over the duties that I was supposed to take over,

3 pursuant to this decision, because the head of that same security

4 service, Mr. Kvesic, the one that I was supposed to be a deputy to,

5 placed obstacles in the way of this. This must have been deliberate,

6 because otherwise such an act of arbitrariness and self-will is difficult

7 to explain. This was the dimension to my case because within the

8 hierarchy under the rules the entire operative work of the security

9 sector of the State Security Service in Bosnia-Herzegovina would be

10 controlled from this particular post that I was supposed to take over.

11 And that is why somebody objected to the fact that the Serbs should have

12 someone occupying this post.

13 Therefore, I was obstructed in an attempt to take up the new

14 position. Alongside this, there was legal obstruction taking place, the

15 aim of which was to eliminate this post from the official classification

16 of jobs. Those who were behind this attempt made a new version of the

17 rules overnight and sent it to the government of the -- of

18 Bosnia-Herzegovina for their approval. In other words, the rules were

19 changed on my account, so that the post to which I was appointed was

20 simply deleted with -- physically with a white varnish, and they tasked

21 the minister with providing a written explanation that would account for

22 such deletion. The minister signed an explanation, which stated that the

23 process of rationalising leadership posts was taking place.

24 However, it was only my post that was abolished in the new

25 version of the rules. By the logic of things, the lower post should have

Page 6319

1 been abolished as well. What was important to them was to -- to

2 discontinue the chain within the hierarchy of posts occupied by Serbs.

3 The initiative thus formulated was easily carried by the government,

4 because it was the HDZ/SDA coalition which had the majority votes in the

5 government.

6 So the government basically abolished the post of the

7 Deputy Chief of the security sector. Consequently, the division

8 appointing me to this post was null and void. In this way, the Serbs

9 lost yet another position, in addition to the position that I had held

10 earlier on. Therefore, we could not wield any sort of influence on the

11 work of the service, save for several insignificant posts that we still

12 held. In this way, we were humiliated, demoted in an unlawful way. But

13 there was no way to reverse the process.

14 Q. All right. So, this is what Mr. Zepinic is telling Dr. Karadzic.

15 MS. KORNER: Can we go, please, in this intercept to the third

16 page in B/C/S, and I'm -- I need to see the English. Try the third page,

17 please. Yes.

18 Q. We see there that Karadzic is getting quite cross about it, and

19 we've had a look at this intercept before. And then he says:

20 "Please let Vlaski get in touch with me and tell him not to

21 leave."

22 Now, did you get in touch with Dr. Karadzic?

23 A. I did not, because I realised it would have been pointless.

24 The position of Mr. Karadzic, who did not get into state

25 institutions, he was the only one who remained only a political figure as

Page 6320

1 a president of the political party, unlike Izetbegovic and others, who

2 got positions in the government. His position at the time was a marginal

3 one. He had no power, unlike others who had absolute power on the

4 government. And you can see what sort of power he has, or absence

5 thereof, here because he says to the deputy police minister who, in his

6 turn, again, didn't have that much power because he was answerable to the

7 police minister, to use his offices to do this and that.

8 Again, he was appealing to the deputy minister who depended on

9 the kindness and mercy of the minister for favours but was otherwise

10 under no obligation to do what he was asked.

11 Q. No. Mr. Vlaski, I'm really sorry, but it was a simple question:

12 Did you get in touch with Dr. Karadzic as he tells Dr. Zepinic you should

13 do?

14 A. I said right away that I didn't, because he didn't have any

15 influence to excerpt. And I didn't think that I -- that anything would

16 come out of it, save for me meeting up with Mr. Karadzic.

17 Q. All right. Let's look at the influence that he may or may not

18 have had, according to you.

19 Then he ends up by saying, Mr. Karadzic, on that page:

20 "Please find Vlaski and let him write a complaint on the

21 decision. He should hand it to you personally, and you should act

22 according to it."

23 Did you write a complaint about the decision?

24 A. That would have been absurd to address any sort of letter to

25 individuals who are disrespectful of the law and to expect them to take

Page 6321

1 my letter or complaint into consideration in any way.

2 Q. So you neither wrote to Mr. Delimustafic nor to Dr. Zepinic nor

3 to anybody else. Is that the situation?

4 A. Of course I didn't. It wasn't my personal problem; it was the

5 problem of the institution run by individuals who were either incompetent

6 to do the job or were under the influence of others.

7 Q. Right. When you were listening to intercepts yesterday, did you

8 listen to one where Biljana Plavsic was also talking to Dr. Karadzic

9 about you?

10 A. I heard the intercept.

11 Q. All right. Did you also know Biljana Plavsic?

12 A. For the same reasons that I knew all the other officials in the

13 government, I was under the obligation to take care of their security.

14 So I knew and had occasion to meet Madam Plavsic as well.

15 Q. Right. And once you were in Belgrade dealing with the

16 Vila Bosanka later on in 1992, did you see a great deal of

17 Biljana Plavsic?

18 A. No. As she came out of Sarajevo in the month of May and she was

19 the last one to leave her flat in the area of Jahorina, it was only later

20 on that she went to Belgrade because she had certain obligations to

21 attend to in the Presidency of the Serb Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina.

22 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... in Belgrade and you were in

23 Belgrade, did you see her on a regular basis?

24 A. Not on a regular basis, but I did have the opportunity to see her

25 from time to time.

Page 6322

1 Q. All right did. You recognise her voice when you heard it on the

2 intercept?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And, indeed, did she tell you -- did she tell Mr. Karadzic that

5 the complaint was that you had been replaced by a Muslim?

6 A. She complained, and that is just an indication of the

7 powerlessness of the top bearers of state authority of the

8 representatives of the Serbian people, because Biljana Plavsic was the

9 president of the Council for the Protection of the Constitutional Order,

10 a person who was a figure at the head of a state body which was in charge

11 of monitoring and directing the work of state security. In that body and

12 in the Presidency, because of the manner of decision-making, she had no

13 influence in those functions and could not have an influence on anything.

14 So her protest and her dissatisfaction about my case and many other

15 matters and acts and relationship towards her as an organ of authority

16 shown in the Presidency and in the party which had placed her in this

17 position. This was just a reflection of the powerlessness of officials

18 to carry out their duties pursuant to the law because of conduct,

19 obstructionism, which were impossible to react to in any other way, other

20 than just plain dissatisfaction.

21 Q. Right. So it's your view that none of the Serb people in

22 authority, even in the Presidency, had any power or influence at all. Is

23 that -- is that what you're saying and have been saying throughout this

24 afternoon?

25 A. Absolutely, that was the main reason why everything had been

Page 6323

1 placed into question, because a constitutional people and their legally

2 elected representatives did not have the opportunity to carry out the

3 most basic duties, pursuant to the regulations, the constitution, and the

4 laws. If anyone needed to privatise Bosnia and Herzegovina and -- and

5 exclude arbitrarily one people, then that would have been the way to

6 do it.

7 Q. Right. Thank you. Now, I think you also listened, and this is

8 all the same day, to a conversation between Karadzic and Koljevic, all

9 the 17th of September. And, again, was Karadzic speaking to Koljevic, on

10 the intercept you listened to, about your case?

11 A. Yes. It was also a question of my case because Koljevic was one

12 of the members of the Presidency of the Bosnia-Herzegovina, representing

13 the Serb people, and he, just like professor Plavsic, were academically

14 educated, cultivated people and were not used to the method of work that

15 was prevalent in the Presidency and probably were not used to the

16 attitude towards them by representatives who had arrived there according

17 to God knows what criteria and positions previously held. So my problem

18 was just mentioned as something to be noted in order to have one more

19 reason why they would need to request a political response to such a

20 situation or to seek a political response to such a situation.

21 Q. All right.

22 MS. KORNER: Can we have up intercept, same day, all these

23 intercepts, 17th of September, P903, MFI'd.

24 Q. Now, this is a conversation - we can all see

25 17th September - between Mr. Dr. Karadzic and Mr. Simovic. Can [sic] you

Page 6324

1 listen to that? Were you able to recognise both voices?

2 A. Of course. Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Simovic both. I know

3 Mr. Simovic too, because we worked together on the same duties in the

4 security service in Sarajevo, so I did recognise his voice.

5 Q. Now, I want to you look, please, at what Mr. Karadzic says in the

6 middle of the page where he is speaking to Mr. Simovic.

7 "Would you please tell Zepinic that tomorrow we are withdrawing

8 all of our ministers and all of our officials in the MUP. We are

9 discontinuing the complete partnership and going into opposition because

10 Zepinic is allowing maltreatment and removal from office of our men.

11 Vlaski was removed from his office and it is over. Tonight at 8.00, I am

12 going to break up with Izetbegovic. I am withdrawing everything. SDS

13 party into opposition."

14 And so on and so forth.

15 You said that Mr. Karadzic had no power to effect what happened

16 to you. As far as you were concerned, did he have the power to withdraw

17 the SDS, though, from the Assembly?

18 A. You can see that this is an emotional reaction by a man who

19 doesn't have a response to these nasty things that were done not only to

20 me but towards political colleagues and to my people to whom I belong by

21 birth. So I experienced this fate. And Mr. Karadzic's reaction is just

22 a consequence of an emotional state and the fact that an end must be put

23 to such a position. So what would be the point of him being at the head

24 of the party, which placed him in power, if he could not implement this

25 power in any way? You do not respond to power with a telephone call. He

Page 6325

1 couldn't tell Mr. Zepinic in a telephone call that he was going to do

2 this and that. There has to be some sort of an assessment before

3 embarking on such an activity.

4 So I would say that this was an emotional reaction by a figure

5 that was in -- in power.

6 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... right. It may be emotional.

7 All I asked you, Mr. Vlaski, was whether Mr. -- Dr. Karadzic had the

8 power to walk out of the Assembly, taking the SDS with him.

9 A. At the time, the conditions were not there nor was the point of

10 tolerance so low for such an act to ensue. This act ensued later, and

11 this was done because there was no other way out, other than what was

12 discussed, and for which he had the support of the other representatives

13 of the Serbian people in the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and then

14 as things appeared, then in the other institutions of power in

15 Bosnia and Herzegovina, all those representatives who participated in

16 power. They all sought the protection of the party which had one -- its

17 share of the votes in the election, in order to be able to implement

18 their share of power.

19 Q. Yes. All right.

20 MS. KORNER: Can we just look, please, at the bottom of the page

21 in -- no, second page in English and second page, also, in B/C/S.

22 Q. And what he's going on to say at the top:

23 "Vlaski was the straw that broke the camel's back. I'm going to

24 phone Hebib to tell him this, and you tell Zepinic that it is over." And

25 then to resign.

Page 6326

1 Did you listen, in fact, also to an intercept where Karadzic did

2 ring Mr. Hebib about what was happening to you?

3 A. I did, yes.

4 Q. In fact, the following day -- no, the same day, I'm sorry, on the

5 17th?

6 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry. I believe it was ruled by the

7 Trial Chamber. I don't think that Ms. Korner is going to use this

8 document.

9 MS. KORNER: I'm not.

10 MR. ZECEVIC: Oh okay. I am sorry.

11 MS. KORNER: I'm not. I'm not using the documents that I have

12 been ruled that I can't use. I'm dealing with the contents thereof.

13 MR. ZECEVIC: The document has been ruled out, and she wants --

14 Ms. Korner wants to use the contents of the document so ...

15 MS. KORNER: You told me I can't put the documents in as exhibits

16 or indeed even introduce them. Can I -- with the greatest of respect, I

17 can certainly ask this witness what he heard and listened to this morning

18 or yesterday.

19 If Your Honours are ruling that I can't even ask him that, then

20 that's a different matter entirely. Then I will seek to argue this much

21 more fully.

22 [Trial Chamber confers]

23 JUDGE HALL: Ms. Korner, we think we appreciate your -- I

24 shouldn't use the word difficulty, but I can't think of any other word,

25 and we fully understand the objection that is taken by the Defence, in

Page 6327

1 that the course that you are following strongly suggests that,

2 notwithstanding the ruling that the Chamber has given in terms of the

3 admissibility of these documents, that you are nevertheless going to

4 effectively get the contents in.

5 However, we do appreciate the relevance of your seeking to elicit

6 from the witness what he did and why he did it. So we would rule that if

7 you concentrate on what he did and why he did it, then that would -- even

8 if that brings you very close to that line, that you may proceed down

9 that road.

10 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated]

11 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

12 MS. KORNER: That we will be filing an application to add these

13 documents to our 65 ter list. By that stage, the witness will have gone.

14 He can also recognise - and I underline that again - and it may well we

15 can get these intercepts even without adding to the 65 ter list the other

16 evidence we are going to call. But I won't be able to get that evidence

17 in.

18 All -- however, I take the point. Your Honours, what I'm

19 prepared to do is say he listened to intercepts, was able to recognise

20 the voices, and what he did as a result of it. Well, I see Your Honour

21 Judge Delvoie shaking his head. But, Your Honour, that's the problem.

22 [Trial Chamber confers]

23 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm --

24 JUDGE DELVOIE: [Microphone not activated] I refer now to what the

25 witness did back in 1991?

Page 6328

1 MS. KORNER: No. I'm talking to what -- he listened to all the

2 intercepts yesterday.

3 JUDGE DELVOIE: Yes, but isn't the ruling that the intercepts are

4 out?

5 MS. KORNER: No, Your Honour. The ruling is the intercepts are

6 out until such time as I call evidence about their quality. But I was

7 told the ruling was I could ask about recognition of voices. That was

8 absolutely clear.

9 Your Honours, we can go back and find it. That was Your Honours'

10 ruling. I specifically asked that -- Your Honours, regardless of whether

11 I get the intercepts admitted -- I know Mr. Zecevic is waiting to say

12 something, but regardless -- we're now being completely side tracked.

13 Regardless of whether the intercepts are admitted at this stage as

14 exhibits if the party to it is not the one giving evidence, I was

15 specifically told I could ask someone who was aware of the contents and

16 who had knowledge of the speakers whether they recognised the voices.

17 And that -- I know Your Honours don't seem to feel at the moment that's

18 important. My respectful suggestion is it may well turn out to be

19 important.

20 JUDGE DELVOIE: Are we talking now about previously MFI'd

21 intercepts?

22 MS. KORNER: No. We're talking about the intercepts which you

23 have ruled I cannot have in at the moment but which he has listened to

24 and which we're going to apply to put in. But he won't be here to give

25 the evidence that he is able to give.

Page 6329

1 JUDGE HALL: Yes, Mr. Zecevic.

2 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, Your Honours. It's -- again, we're

3 coming back to the position -- the founding position when I -- when I

4 first made the objection. It's all about the notice. We are not on

5 notice about these documents. That's why the Trial Chamber ruled.

6 Now Ms. Korner is - I'm sorry to say this - but trying to open a

7 side door to, I don't know, introduce these documents again. I don't

8 think -- I'm sorry, but I don't think that's -- that's proper. The

9 ruling has been given, and we should at least honour that.

10 Thank you.

11 JUDGE HARHOFF: Ms. Korner, I think Judge Delvoie put it very

12 clearly: The ruling is that these documents cannot be used today with

13 this witness, including your being prevented from showing it to him.

14 Now, I must say that, just as one of the three Judges on the

15 Bench, I'm -- I'm not quite certain that I understand just why and how

16 this is important and relevant, as you claim it is. So my suggestion is

17 that you address the issue of the various attempts made by each of the

18 three political groupings in Sarajevo at the time to seize control over

19 the administration directly with the witness, and you will have to do

20 that without using these documents.

21 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated] ... Your Honour, we

22 really are -- and I --

23 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

24 MS. KORNER: I am slightly concerned, and I -- but I don't think

25 it's proper for me to make a speech at this stage, and particularly in

Page 6330

1 front of the witness, about why this is relevant. And it's nothing

2 to -- or very little to do with what is described as the resting control

3 over the SUP in Sarajevo. This is, I appreciate, the witness is saying,

4 but it's -- it's not that exactly.

5 I don't think it's right to make speeches at this stage about why

6 we say it's relevant.

7 JUDGE HARHOFF: Certainly it is for the witnesses to testify and

8 not the counsels. But I think what you have just said explains the

9 problem very well, because if this is not all about the power struggle in

10 those days in 1992 over the control over the state administration, then I

11 don't -- really don't know what it is about then. So ...

12 There is a major --

13 MS. KORNER: Your Honours -- [Overlapping speakers] ...

14 JUDGE HARHOFF: There is a major problem of understanding where

15 we are going.

16 MS. KORNER: Well, Your Honour, I'm perfectly - I think the

17 witness ought to leave - but I'm perfectly prepared to explain that. I

18 mean, I don't, as I say, I don't think it's proper for the Prosecution to

19 make speeches in the middle of trial any more than we have objected to

20 the Defence making speeches. But if it's not clear to Your Honours, then

21 I think I ought to -- then I ought to say.

22 JUDGE HARHOFF: Couldn't you put the questions to the witness

23 that will exemplify and bring out the evidence that you wish?

24 MS. KORNER: I can certainly put questions to him. Yes, but...

25 right.

Page 6331

1 JUDGE DELVOIE: Ms. Korner, the speech you -- you're not willing

2 to make is, if I understand it well, about relevance.

3 MS. KORNER: Yes.

4 JUDGE DELVOIE: But I think that what happens due to the fact

5 that we consider that the 65 ter list rule is not applied correctly is

6 not about relevance. So the speech about relevance, even if you made it,

7 would not be relevant, if I may say so.

8 MS. KORNER: Now, I think we're somewhat -- we're now -- I'm so

9 sorry, Your Honour, but I think we're at cross purposes.

10 But, in any event, I think the best thing is I proceed as -- as

11 His Honour Judge Harhoff has said with questions to the witness leaving

12 out any reference to the intercepts which you have ruled out.

13 But can I make it absolutely clear, Your Honours, there will be

14 an application to put it on the 65 ter list. There will be an

15 application that these are authentic, genuine intercepts. And this

16 witness is in the best position, because of his knowledge of the

17 participates and what they're talking about, to authentic those

18 intercepts.

19 And that's -- I just want to make that absolutely clear.

20 Right. Can we move on, please, then --

21 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry. Just one comment, Your Honours.

22 Your Honours, the guide-line says that the application has to be

23 made in advance, in written form. So if the Prosecution thinks this

24 witness will be able to give them this data which is important for their

25 case, they should have filed the application as according to the

Page 6332

1 guide-lines.

2 I don't think that it would be proper that we -- that the witness

3 leaves and then only afterwards, post-facto, the Prosecution files the

4 application. I don't think that's proper.

5 Thank you very much.

6 JUDGE HARHOFF: If I may respond. You are absolutely right,

7 Mr. Zecevic. But that is a matter of admission into evidence.

8 At the moment, we're dealing with this witness, who has to

9 provide us with evidence about the events that took place at the relevant

10 time in 1992.

11 So let's get on with that, and then we can always return to the

12 issue of whether or not these and other intercepts can be admitted into

13 evidence.

14 MR. ZECEVIC: I understand. Thank you.

15 JUDGE HARHOFF: And notwithstanding the extended break that we

16 had earlier, it is time for the break.

17 [Trial Chamber confers]

18 JUDGE DELVOIE: Before we rise, on the 22nd of January, 2010, the

19 Trial Chamber issued an order for safe conduct for Witness ST-186,

20 stating that as the witness is scheduled to travel between

21 6 and 12 February 2010, any change of date will be communicated to the

22 witness and the state authorities by the Registrar of the Tribunal, and

23 any notice of such change shall form part of and have the same binding

24 force and effect as this order for safe conduct.

25 During hearing of the 3rd of February, 2010, the Prosecution

Page 6333

1 informed the Trial Chamber that, following amendments in this schedule,

2 ST-187 is required to be in The Hague between the 6th and the

3 13th of March, 2010, instead. The Trial Chamber requests the Registry to

4 make the necessary arrangements to implement the order for safe conduct

5 for ST-187 accordingly.

6 JUDGE HALL: 20 minutes.

7 [The witness stands down]

8 --- Recess taken at 5.27 p.m.

9 --- On resuming at 5.51 p.m.

10 [The witness takes the stand]

11 JUDGE HALL: Please proceed, Ms. Korner.

12 MS. KORNER: Sorry.

13 Q. Mr. Vlaski, were you aware, at the time, that the Serb

14 leadership, Bosnian Serb leadership, or the SDS leadership, was taking

15 such an interest in your fate?

16 A. On listening to the intercepts, I concluded that perhaps they

17 were attributed to much of a historic importance, and I'm referring to

18 the situation I was in.

19 The fact of the matter is that the problems did escalate and

20 warrant a reaction on the part of the political structures.

21 Q. You heard the learned Judge describe this as a struggle for the

22 control of the MUP. What was the importance of who was controlling the

23 MUP in Bosnia at this stage, in 1991 and 1992?

24 A. The struggle for the control of the MUP was won right at the

25 start by the party which had been given the possibility by the election

Page 6334

1 results to be allocated posts in the MUP. The significance of the MUP in

2 Bosnia-Herzegovina, regardless of how one might view it as a state, was

3 enormous because the MUP was the only armed force at the time. The

4 political parties, which were contemplating the creation of the state and

5 government, were capable of gauging its significance. Evidently the SDS

6 did not have that ability to gauge its importance when it was getting

7 into this discussion with its other coalition partners as to the

8 allocation of posts.

9 The consequence of such an approach on the part of the SDS is

10 illustrated by my case and by other cases where some other forces were in

11 control and at play which used unlawful means.

12 Q. All right. But you say at the time, when the allocation of posts

13 was going on, the SDS didn't appreciate the importance the MUP, in your

14 view.

15 At this stage, however, when you have heard and seen that from

16 Karadzic through to the members of the Presidency there was a lot of

17 discussion and threats going on. By that stage, were the SDS leadership

18 aware of the importance of the MUP?

19 A. It did become aware, but that -- it was far too late. It was

20 water under the bridge. They wanted to change matters at the eleventh

21 hour, at the time when they were already losing three to nil.

22 They did not take control of vital post in the institutions.

23 They did not take measures to make sure, at least, that -- or, rather, to

24 make sure that unlawful actions did not take place.

25 The upshot was that one individual who was at the head of the

Page 6335

1 institution, such as state security, the chief of the

2 State Security Service, embodied all the three branches of powers,

3 because once -- one, for instance, the individual at the head of the

4 Bihac state security was an MP, he was a member of the parliament, and,

5 at the same time, he was the chief of the service which was part of the

6 executive branch. By virtue of his position as an MP, he should have

7 been the one to control the legality of the work of the service which he

8 headed.

9 So they were individuals holding posts that were of very great

10 importance, and they held all these various posts in the different

11 branches of government which allowed them to carry their activities

12 wilfully.

13 Q. All right. It was a simple question and doesn't require that

14 length of answer. Your view is that the SDS realised too late the

15 important of the MUP?

16 A. Correct.

17 Q. All right. Let's deal -- let's go back to what you were doing

18 then, please.

19 I think it's right that, in early 1992, were you assigned to the

20 administration for intelligence and counter-intelligence in -- in

21 Sarajevo?

22 A. This occurred after the ploy where my post of the deputy head was

23 abolished.

24 Another similar situation occurred to me shortly thereafter when

25 I was replaced from the position of the chief of the administration for

Page 6336

1 the security of persons and facilities; that was once. And then again

2 from the position of the chief of service. At that point, I didn't have

3 a position to hold, and so they assigned me to the post of an inspector

4 to the administration you mentioned, the administration for intelligence

5 and counter-intelligence. And I held the post of an inspector there.

6 Q. Thank you. During the course of your activities there, did you

7 take trips to Belgrade?

8 A. I was in Belgrade previously as well. I don't recall the

9 specific dates. I didn't go there very often. But for various, both

10 personal and professional reasons, I -- I would go there. So I would go

11 there because I had relatives there and also because of the situation

12 concerning the Serb representation in the Government of

13 Bosnia-Herzegovina that I had to go there.

14 Q. Right. When you went there, did you go from time to time with

15 Dragan Devedlaka?

16 A. Yes. We went there together on several occasions.

17 Q. Did you have meetings there with the predecessor to

18 Jovica Stanisic as head of state security, a gentleman named

19 Zoran Janackovic?

20 A. Before coming across Mr. Zoran Janackovic, we had

21 Mr. Radmilo Bogdanovic as our contact. He was the minister of the MUP in

22 Serbia.

23 As for Mr. Janackovic, we had a meeting with him later; the goal

24 being to simply brief one another on the situations in the respective

25 countries.

Page 6337

1 Q. You said "... because of the situation concerning the Serb" -- I

2 don't think you said "reputation" -- because of the "situation."

3 Because of the situation concerning the Serb situation in the

4 government.

5 What was the concern?

6 A. There was several reasons, or concerns. Firstly, the staffing

7 policy, which was detrimental to the Serb people, and various

8 manipulations and ploys on the part of the colleagues who enjoyed the

9 political sponsorship and support of the parties of the SDA and HDZ, as

10 well as the general state of security in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

11 Bosnia-Herzegovina had, by that time, been getting into an ever deeper

12 crisis. Those of us in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I mean the Serb

13 personnel, felt helpless. The Serb policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina lost any

14 power it may have had.

15 Q. All right.

16 A. Serbia was preoccupied with its own problems.

17 Q. Right. Did you ask them for any assistance in terms of arms or

18 equipment?

19 A. This wasn't our job, and we didn't have any discussions on this

20 issue. The Serbs were engaged in the Yugoslav People's Army, which were,

21 in the view of others, pro-Serbian because most of its members were

22 Serbs, and they didn't need weapons.

23 Q. Can I move now, please, to the meeting of the 11th of February in

24 Banja Luka which you attended.

25 MS. KORNER: And the number of which is ... yes. It's -- for

Page 6338

1 some reason it's Defence Exhibit 1D135.

2 Now, you had a chance to read it both when you were interviewed

3 in Banja Luka and again two days ago. But I think, as you told us in

4 Banja Luka, you remember this meeting as though it were yesterday. Is

5 that right?

6 A. Well, I do remember it. Unfortunately, we hadn't had such

7 meetings until February of 1992. Had we had an opportunity to meet up

8 earlier on, matters would have been better.

9 We met for the first time at that point, and there were several

10 among those who were in attendance who I didn't know from before. I

11 think more than half of them were unknown to me.

12 Q. All right. This was a meeting, was it, that was open only to

13 Serb police officers?

14 A. Well, no. There were some individuals who weren't Serbs. They

15 came from mixed marriages. Though, let's put it that way, they were

16 loyal to the Serb leadership.

17 Q. All right. Which ones came from mixed marriages?

18 A. I think Mr. Nenad Radovic, and I'm not sure about Igor Velasevic.

19 Q. Who asked to you come to the meeting, or how did you find out

20 about the meeting?

21 A. As for the circle of individuals whom I was more often in touch

22 with, they were mostly colleagues from state security who held positions

23 in the structure: Dragan Devedlaka, Mr. Goran Radovic, then Goran Zugic.

24 Yes, Dragan Devedlaka, I mentioned him already.

25 So this was the circle of people working for state security, and

Page 6339

1 that's why we were more often in touch. And I learned about this meeting

2 from them.

3 Q. Did they tell you, either Radovic or Devedlaka, who had asked

4 them to attend the meeting?

5 A. I don't remember. The atmosphere at that point was that the

6 people who attended the meeting were brought together by common problems

7 all of us were faced with. This was an attempt to do something, and that

8 was one of the goals of this meeting. We found that out only when we

9 arrived in Banja Luka.

10 Q. All right. Why was the meeting held in Banja Luka?

11 A. I don't think there was a particular reason behind it. At least

12 that was my impression. And I didn't organise the meeting.

13 In my view, the meeting could have held [as interpreted]

14 anywhere, at any of the locations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. When you look

15 at the composition of the people who gathered there and if you consider

16 the security aspect, I think this could have been the case. But probably

17 because of the logistics and accommodation facilities and some other

18 reasons perhaps, it was suggested that it be held in Banja Luka.

19 Q. It may well have been. But given that Sarajevo was where the

20 seat of government was, why not in Sarajevo as opposed to Banja Luka?

21 A. The location is not of decisive importance for a meeting to be

22 held.

23 Banja Luka was characterised by a more normal, as it were,

24 situation, when it came to the MUP institution. And I'm referring to the

25 Banja Luka Security Centre which proved much simpler because the MUP

Page 6340

1 staff in Banja Luka were much more loyal. And I'm referring to

2 Mr. Zupljanin, who was the head of the centre.

3 This must have decided the matter. It was a centre which covered

4 a vast area and was characterised by a more positive, favourable

5 political and security situation. Otherwise, it could have been held in

6 Sarajevo, Pale, Sokolac, anywhere, it could not have been relevant for

7 any other aspects than the atmosphere that I referred to.

8 Q. Yes. Loyal to whom?

9 "... the ... staff in Banja Luka were much more loyal. And I'm

10 referring to Mr. Zupljanin ..."

11 Loyal to whom?

12 A. The law and its implementation.

13 If you have a leader, a leader at the -- one of the top

14 positions, such a leader should have the highest responsibility. If you

15 have an individual who is not responsible higher up than those who are

16 lower up [as interpreted] are left to their own devices and can conduct

17 themselves as they wish. We had instances of unlawfulness in Sarajevo,

18 in the very head office and all the way down to field officers, various

19 commanders of stations, et cetera. And, of course, this wasn't something

20 that allowed for loyalty. It was the professionals themselves who

21 directed the way in which all the subordinates would comport themselves.

22 Q. Tell me something, Mr. Vlaski, what was the ethnic composition in

23 Banja Luka?

24 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, Your Honours, a part of the answer of

25 the witness didn't -- wasn't recorded.

Page 6341

1 JUDGE HARHOFF: [Microphone not activated]

2 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes, Your Honours, the last part. He was -- he was

3 referring to the chain of command, something. I don't want to actually

4 influence the witness in this respect.

5 JUDGE HALL: Ms. Korner, could you ask the witness to repeat

6 his -- the last part of his answer to your last question, please. Last

7 but one questions -- well, your last question, sorry.

8 MS. KORNER:

9 Q. Mr. Vlaski, can you repeat your answer. Not -- please don't

10 repeat your answer.

11 The last -- the last sentence of your answer.

12 A. I think that the problem lay in the relationship along the chain

13 of command in the police which should follow subordination; where the

14 chain of command did not function in a lawful way, anarchy ensued. In

15 other words, everyone did what they felt was due and interpreted the law

16 in their own way and would not incur any responsibility or consequences

17 because they enjoy political protection at the post that they held.

18 Q. All right. Can we go back to the question that I asked next.

19 What was the ethnic composition in --

20 MR. KRGOVIC: Ms. Korner, the last sentence, he said, It wasn't

21 case in Banja Luka is not recorded, so I must suggest ...

22 MS. KORNER: Sorry. What wasn't?

23 Q. Look, can we leave this whole topic. Can we get to this. Is --

24 what was the ethnic composition, please, Mr. Vlaski, in Banja Luka?

25 A. I don't have and cannot recall the demographic data for

Page 6342

1 Banja Luka. I can tell you what the level -- what the situation at the

2 level of Banja Luka was when it came to the division of power.

3 As for Banja Luka itself, I am not in a position to give you a

4 specific answer, a precise answer. Are we referring to Banja Luka

5 proper, the Banja Luka region, the Krajina? Demographics differ, and I

6 don't have them.

7 MS. KORNER: Mr. Krgovic, you want to say something.

8 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. The previous

9 answer -- the last sentence that the witness said when he was talking

10 about the way in which the various MUP structures behaved, he said that

11 that was not -- that did not apply to Banja Luka, the unlawfulness of

12 conduct. And that's important. So I would like the witness to kindly

13 repeat that.

14 JUDGE HALL: Yes. Could you please repeat your -- I'm not sure

15 which answer this question was to.

16 Mr. Krgovic, where are we in terms of line numbers, please.

17 MR. KRGOVIC: [Microphone not activated] ... sorry, page 59,

18 line 6. This part is missing.

19 JUDGE HALL: Ms. Korner, that is so far back that you are

20 probably going to have ask the question again.

21 MS. KORNER: I'm not going to ask the question again,

22 Your Honour.

23 MR. KRGOVIC: I will clarify that in my cross-examination, so

24 that's ...

25 MS. KORNER: Yeah. Right.

Page 6343

1 Q. Before I ask you to refresh your memory from your interview,

2 Mr. Vlaski, in Banja Luka generally, did any one of the nations in -- in

3 Bosnia have a majority?

4 A. As for Banja Luka proper, the Serbs were at a numerical

5 advantage. Let's put it that way. But I don't have the statistics that

6 would indicate the various settlements encompassed by Banja Luka and

7 their ethnic makeup. It is a rather thankless task now to manipulate the

8 various numbers.

9 Q. Did the fact that Banja Luka had a Serb majority and a Serb chief

10 of the CSB have any --

11 MR. KRGOVIC: Objection, leading.

12 MS. KORNER: If I can finish the question.

13 Q. Did the fact that Banja Luka had a Serb majority and a Serb chief

14 of the CSB have anything to do with that being the place for this

15 meeting?

16 A. It could have had an impact on that. I'm not stating it did. It

17 just could have, for practical reasons.

18 Q. All right. Mico Stanisic --

19 JUDGE HARHOFF: Ms. Korner.

20 I understand this meeting was a meeting in the RS MUP; is that

21 correct, Mr. Witness? It was an RS MUP meeting on the 11th of February?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] From the minutes, it follows that

23 the meeting was held in Banja Luka on such and such a date, and those who

24 attended the meeting are listed here.

25 According to the minutes, the meeting did not have an

Page 6344

1 institutional format. I could say it was a meeting of a group, a working

2 meeting of a group of individuals of Serb ethnicity. And this is

3 something that you will see from the discussion as it unfolded and the

4 conclusions.

5 JUDGE HARHOFF: Very well. Thanks.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And if I may add something.

7 JUDGE HARHOFF: I will give the floor back to Ms. Korner.

8 MS. KORNER:

9 Q. Just so we are absolutely clear, everybody who attended that

10 meeting was a Serb member of the MUP and a relatively high-up Serb member

11 of the MP. Is that right?

12 A. One could interpret it in this way between the lines. But for

13 none of those attendees do we have a title, and nowhere in the discussion

14 was the issue raised of the institutions that they were representing

15 there and who they were speaking -- on whose behalf they were speaking.

16 As I can tell from the minutes, they all spoke on their own personal

17 behalf.

18 Q. I'm not suggesting this was an officially called meeting at all,

19 Mr. Vlaski. This was a meeting, as we can see from the minutes, where

20 discussion was held by these individuals but all of whom held relatively

21 high positions. For example, Mr. Stanisic, Mr. Mandic, Mr. Kljajic,

22 Mr. Draskovic.

23 A. That's correct.

24 Q. Thank you. Now, --

25 A. That's correct.

Page 6345

1 Q. First of all, Mr. Zupljanin opened the meeting, as we can see.

2 Do you know why he spoke first? Was it simply because the meeting was in

3 Banja Luka?

4 A. It is only logical and natural that an individual hosting an

5 event for a number of persons should open the meeting, should give some

6 opening remarks. And I think it's the sole reason why he did it.

7 Q. And was the meeting -- where was the meeting actually held in

8 Banja Luka? In the CSB?

9 A. You don't have to suggest places to me. It was not held on the

10 premises that were intended for the work of the police or the MUP. It

11 was held on the first floor of the Bosna Hotel, right next to the piano

12 bar.

13 Q. Mico Stanisic spoke second. Do you know why he took apparently a

14 fairly leading role in this meeting?

15 A. It was logical for someone who came from Sarajevo and represented

16 or held a significant position within the MUP of Bosnia-Herzegovina who,

17 in addition to that, had greater responsibility for representing

18 interests to do that. He was, perhaps, in a better position than

19 everyone else to take up that role at this meeting.

20 Q. Now, you've read through the minutes. Are those accurate minutes

21 of the meeting that were taken by Mr. Velasevic?

22 A. I think the discussion went beyond that which is recorded here,

23 although the minutes reflect the state of affairs. There may have been

24 certain formulations that -- well, had audio recording been made of the

25 meeting, then, perhaps, the -- it would be a full reflection of it. But

Page 6346

1 I don't think that the minutes are far from that, far from reflecting

2 reality.

3 Q. So they're, obviously, as you say, a summary of what was said.

4 But as far as that summary goes, an accurate one. Is that right?

5 A. Yes, that's right.

6 Q. Among other things that were said, Mr. Koroman --

7 MS. KORNER: If we go to the third page in English, please, and

8 the third page in B/C/S -- fourth page in B/C/S, sorry.

9 Q. -- said that his opinion was that:

10 "All further discussion is pointless. A list of demands should

11 be made drawn up," as opposed to drown up, "and given to the MUP with a

12 deadline. If they are not met, we must paralyse the whole of SRBH and we

13 can do that."

14 Can you just tell the Judges who Mr. Koroman was?

15 A. Malko Koroman was the official at the head of a police

16 organisational unit in Pale, public security unit.

17 Q. And then Mr. Tutus spoke, and then you spoke:

18 "We must work out how to carry out the decisions from this

19 meeting the only way would be to organise the Serbian MUP and implement

20 all decisions without question."

21 MR. ZECEVIC: For the benefit of the -- of the witness, it's on

22 the next page. His speech is on the next page of this document.

23 MS. KORNER: Oh, sorry. Thank you. Yes, can we go to the next

24 page then. Yup.

25 Q. Was your view, in February of 1992, as you expressed it, that

Page 6347

1 there was really only one thing to do, and that was to organise a

2 separate MUP?

3 A. If I can respond to this question, these discussions and

4 conclusions show that Serbian representatives offered the possibility of

5 making one more effort and to change the situation and the relations in

6 the MUP, because the conclusions from this meeting were supposed to be

7 and were sent to Minister Delimustafic and the Muslim, Bosniak, Croatian

8 representatives who had usurped this institution. What we were left with

9 was to offer them a chance of an agreement; are we going to embark

10 together on setting up a lawful institution, or are we going to go, as

11 the political process was already unfolding, to the development of our

12 own institutions, which was supposed to protect the people we

13 represented, because this could not be done from the institution that

14 already existed. That is why is this meeting occur in the first place.

15 Q. Yes. Could you tell us --

16 MS. KORNER: Let's turn to conclusions, please, which is on the

17 last page of the -- no, sorry. The penultimate page in English. Fourth

18 page and ... it's the following page in B/C/S than this one we're on.

19 Q. Can you tell us where in the conclusions we're able to find the

20 Serbian representatives offering the possibility of making one more

21 effort.

22 A. The first conclusion:

23 "A Serbian collegium is hereby established in the

24 Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina."

25 Not a MUP but Serbian collegium consisting of Serbian personnel

Page 6348

1 at executive positions along all the lines of work within the MUP.

2 Precisely the reason why we were bypassed and humiliated because our

3 representatives did not occupy a single significant function. We were

4 skipped over, ignored. So what else could we do but make a composition

5 that would be able to meet regularly, be part of the MUP entity, and be

6 able to protect the legitimacy and legality in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

7 Second conclusion: The Serbian MUP [as interpreted], or

8 Deputy Minister Momcilo Mandic would manage the Serbian collegium and

9 ensure the implementation of decisions. Because, at that time, he was

10 the only representative in that institution representing the Serbian

11 people.

12 And then the third conclusion:

13 "The Serbian collegium," again, the collegium is underscored.

14 It's an informal circle, gathered every morning, or twice a week,

15 depending on the situation, and that was the practice in the police where

16 it would then review all the questions, and it says that that Serbian

17 collegium would "carry out all the necessary preparations for the

18 functioning of the Serbian MUP after the promulgation of the Serbian

19 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina."

20 So that is the third conclusion. So it's an alternative. The

21 first or the second -- and if the first and second conclusions were not

22 implemented, then there is nothing to do so.

23 MS. KORNER: I think Mr. Pantelic wants to say something.

24 MR. PANTELIC: I do apologise for everyone in these proceedings.

25 It's just a correction to the transcript. It's page 65, line 12, after

Page 6349

1 the word "second conclusion," witness said the Serbian "member." It's

2 not correct. Said in the LiveNote the Serbian MUP. The right expression

3 was Serbian member.

4 Thank you.

5 JUDGE HALL: Thank you, Mr. Pantelic.

6 MS. KORNER: Actually, I can't even -- I can't make sense of

7 anything that's been written there. It says the Serbian collegium would

8 carry out all the necessary preparation for the -- I imagine all that

9 gobbldygook must be "functioning of the Serbian MUP."

10 Q. All right, Mr. Vlaski, this is the whole point, isn't it? If you

11 look at paragraph 3, this wasn't anything, was it? I mean, sorry, to do

12 with, as you put it, the last chance. One and two were set up in order

13 to carry out the preparations necessary for the functioning of the

14 Serbian MUP after the promulgation of the Serbian republic.

15 Can you explain why you say that is an olive branch, if you like,

16 to the BiH MUP?

17 A. May I reply?

18 Q. [Microphone not activated]

19 A. Conclusion number 5 states:

20 "Not a single decision regarding the staffing policies in the

21 SRBH MUP," I underline the SRBH MUP, "will be implemented without the

22 approval of Deputy Minister Momcilo Mandic."

23 This conclusion contradicts these other conclusions, but it's a

24 conclusion. So that means that there still was a possibility to make

25 appointments pursuant to these principles that should have been in effect

Page 6350

1 for an institution of this nature. And that in itself would have placed

2 out of commission these conclusions that were forced by such an attitude

3 towards the Serbian people, generally in Bosnia and Herzegovina and

4 towards us as professionals, and those heading those organs in

5 particular. That was then forced.

6 Q. But if -- forgive me, Mr. Vlaski. If not a single decision

7 regarding staffing policies in the SRBH MUP will be implemented without

8 the approval of Deputy Minister Momcilo Mandic, how is that going to aid

9 cooperation and, as it were, make for a functioning joint MUP?

10 A. It would help quite a lot, because these are the structures

11 representing the SDA and the HDZ in that MUP made appointments however

12 they wanted. They never asked anybody for anything. They did -- behaved

13 according to their own conscience, which they didn't have. And they did

14 what they wanted, and I am an example of that. They played with me,

15 humiliated me.

16 Q. Conclusion number 16.

17 MS. KORNER: Can we go over, please, to the next page, please, in

18 each.

19 Q. "Work intensively to train and arm our police personnel."

20 By "our," who did -- what was meant?

21 A. Parallel with this administrative and cadre policy, this other

22 type of policy in the MUP was conducted to the detriment of the Serbian

23 people. A vast imbalance was created in the distribution of the key

24 positions as far as cadre reputation was concerned, as well as a

25 de-balance in the reserve forces of the police in the arming of members

Page 6351

1 of the police, in the procurement and distribution of weapons according

2 to organisational units.

3 The MUP was such that all the key functions were controlled by

4 representatives of the Muslim and the Croatian people. The materiel

5 financial service was under the control of Bruno Soco, and the minister

6 was the responsible person who approved the funds for salaries and the

7 functioning -- actually for the purchase of equipment and weaponry. This

8 weaponry was not sent to the centres where the Serbs held the top

9 positions or where the majority. No, quite the opposite. They were

10 withdrawn if there.

11 This is what happened with the equipment from the state security,

12 which was withdrawn before any of the events, back to the seat in

13 Sarajevo, from where anything could be done. And it could be manipulated

14 according to the needs of those who were doing it, and these were done by

15 chiefs, or colleagues among the Muslim and Croat people's ranks. This

16 was done in order to create elementary conditions for a reserve police of

17 Serbian ethnicity so that they would be able to carry out their

18 assignments which were primarily quite certain, because of the increasing

19 complexity of this political situation.

20 Q. So the simple answer to my question, "our," was this is to arm

21 the reserve police of Serbian ethnicity. Is that right?

22 A. Yes, that is correct. I don't see anyone else who would have to

23 be armed. Those who wanted to go to the military responded to the

24 call-up and they went to the army, and they had weapons there. I'm

25 thinking of the JNA.

Page 6352

1 Q. Okay. All right. That's all that I want to ask you about that

2 meeting.

3 Now, was there any other meetings that you attended after this

4 meeting of the 11th of February that involved only Serb police officers?

5 A. I don't recall such a meeting being organised like this one in

6 Banja Luka. I don't remember. Perhaps there was some contacts or talks,

7 but a meeting of the type of a meeting, I do not recall taking place.

8 Q. Any kind of meeting, however informal, that was held in Pale?

9 Did you attend anywhere any such meetings?

10 A. It could happen that I did not, because, like I said, these

11 others were more suitable to be invited to such a thing. I assume that I

12 wasn't invited, but I don't allow the possibility that I didn't attend

13 such a meeting, but I don't know when it was, who could have possibly

14 attended it, or what could have been discussed there.

15 Q. Any meetings that you can recall where Mico Stanisic,

16 Dragan Kijac, Milan Scekic, people like that, attended?

17 A. I don't recall that. I know the people, but I don't remember

18 them ever being in one place. There should have been some sort of reason

19 for that, something that would link me or connect me with those people or

20 that topic that would be the topic of such a meeting.

21 Q. All right. I want to move, please, now, to the barricades

22 incident at the beginning of March in Sarajevo.

23 First, how did you first hear about the barricades being erected

24 in Sarajevo?

25 A. I heard on Sunday when I came back from skiing. I went to ski on

Page 6353

1 Bjelasnica, and then, when I returned, I had a telephone call from

2 Belgrade from a colleague who was in charge of security from

3 Mr. Karadzic, and he was the first one who conveyed to me this

4 information, because, at that time, I wasn't really following what was

5 happening in the media, because, outside, I didn't have that possibility

6 of getting to that information.

7 I was informed about that event by telephone.

8 Q. And can you remember which colleague informed you?

9 A. Djordje Kapor.

10 Q. Once you had been informed, where did you go to?

11 A. After speaking with Mr. Kapor, there were calls probably to other

12 members of the MUP, who were still working in the MUP at that time, for

13 us to assemble in the premises of the designates or Deputies Club of the

14 Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Djuro Djakovic Street. These are

15 official premises used by parliamentarians, by deputies of the Serbian

16 Democratic Party in the Bosnian Assembly.

17 Q. Did you go there?

18 A. Yes, I went. And there was a broadcast circle of people there

19 who came because of this unfortunate incident in Sarajevo when the

20 Serbian best man was killed in Bascarsija in the wedding party. And in

21 view of the situation in the town, this required a kind of caution as far

22 as personal, also in terms of the general situation which could arise

23 from something like that. The gravity of the situation required that,

24 other than the reaction that ensued along the political lines by the SDS,

25 there had to be a certain reaction in the security sense by Serbian

Page 6354

1 representatives of that same MUP which was then still a unified, single

2 organisation.

3 Q. Can you pause there for a moment, please.

4 You say the gravity of the political -- of the situation required

5 something other than the reaction that ensued along political lines by

6 the SDS.

7 Why did this killing of a Serb guest at the wedding require a

8 political reaction by the SDS, rather than just investigation by the MUP?

9 A. Because the MUP did not wish to carry out a proper investigation

10 into this because this was a classical political killing. It was not

11 just a regular killing of the best man, something that can happen or any

12 kind of killing which can happen in any town in the world. This was a

13 political killing. And behind that killing stood the criminal structure

14 which also had protection in the MUP, and this was something that was

15 generally known.

16 The majority of criminals were issued official identity cards by

17 Minister Delimustafic, and they did not have to meet any regular

18 institutional conditions for that. They would issue ID cards to

19 criminals with criminal records so that they would do the bidding of

20 individuals from the political structure. So this was something that we

21 did not have a response to because the criminals had entered the ranks of

22 the police. Those who fought against these people on the right side of

23 the law were now colleagues with these people, and you could not expect

24 an honest investigation. And this is why this kind of reaction followed.

25 Q. All right. You had as assistant minister, a Serb, Dr. Zepinic.

Page 6355

1 Why couldn't it be left to him to deal with this, as opposed to the SDS?

2 A. He had the opportunity for a year, and this was valuable time

3 lost, and there was nothing that had an effect to change the situation.

4 He was also a professor, a intellectual who happened to fall into a

5 situation where the upper hand was held by criminals. There was nothing

6 much that he could do in such a situation. He could not come down to the

7 level of the criminals with whom he had to deal with.

8 Q. All right. I won't come along and list all the other Serb

9 members in the MUP, but let's look at what happened at the beginning of

10 March.

11 When you got to the Deputies Club, you said a number of people

12 were there. Who was there from the SDS?

13 A. I didn't analyse that SDS composition much. I didn't know most

14 of these people anyway. It was not relevant to me in that sense, who

15 these people were.

16 Q. Well, let's go through the people you did know.

17 Was Dr. Karadzic there?

18 A. No, he was in Belgrade at that time, when this event occurred,

19 and when the assembling began. He was in Belgrade at that time.

20 Q. All right. Was Velibor Ostojic there?

21 A. I assume so, but I don't recall each individual who was present.

22 Velibor was in the next phase of the development of the situation

23 relating to the killing of this wedding party member. He was included in

24 all the subsequent events because he was the minister for information.

25 Q. Well, I want you to cast your mind back, because you spoke about

Page 6356

1 this during the interview, and tell who was there.

2 Was Dr. Koljevic there?

3 A. I cannot remember. They had a different position. The

4 Presidency had its own area of work. I think perhaps he did drop by, but

5 I really cannot remember.

6 This was a very short time that we spent there. There was an

7 assessment because of the new situation that that particular place was

8 unfavorable from the security point of view, because there was a danger

9 that members of this criminalised structure attacked this Deputies Club

10 once they found out about the meeting, and then the decision was made to

11 go to the Holiday Inn. That was a place, it's a hotel in Sarajevo where

12 the majority of the foreign journalists were staying and the SDS did

13 have - how to put it? - kind of position there because the director of

14 the hotel was a director of Serb nationality and there was some sort of

15 guarantee there that the -- there would be no problems. And that is why

16 the meeting, namely all the activities in relation to this particular

17 event, were then relocated to the Holiday Inn.

18 Q. Right. Well, let's deal who was at the Holiday Inn rather than

19 at the Deputies Club?

20 So let's start again, shall we?

21 Who of the SDS was at the Holiday Inn when you all moved there?

22 A. Mr. Rajko Dukic was there who was president of the SDS executive

23 board. This is one of the more prominent figures both in the business

24 and political life. And he was there since he had some kind of business

25 arrangement in that hotel in that area, something like that, so he was in

Page 6357

1 the function of the coordinating these activities of the SDS. That was

2 Rajko Dukic.

3 Velibor Ostojic, the minister of information was there, and many

4 others. I really didn't have any ambitions to register them in that sort

5 of sense. And as per their functions, probably there were many people

6 because it was a hotel that anybody could enter who wanted to.

7 Q. Yes, quite. But this was meeting, was it not, which was attended

8 by members of the SDS according to you and also Serbian members of the

9 MUP. Is that correct?

10 A. That is correct, because that is a place where people from the

11 field would come. It was very busy just like a bus or a railway station.

12 It wasn't a meeting where you could start it at 1500 hours an end at 1700

13 hours. The event of such a nature that it was an activity in continuity

14 where people and events followed one another, then coordination occurred

15 in some political and security aspects, and other aspects of this event.

16 In the political sense, this was coordinated by Mr. Dukic who formulated

17 the conclusions; the media aspect was along his line, as much as he

18 could, was done by Mr. Velibor Ostojic. And as far as the security

19 aspect, because the police, by the very nature of their work, had to

20 carry on with the implementation of the regular tasks in the town. This

21 required the police to take up some actions, so this required some sort

22 of coordination of the police forces, including the police forces of

23 Serbian ethnicity.

24 Q. Right.

25 A. Mr. Stanisic was there, Kijac, Momo Mandic, I was there,

Page 6358

1 Devedlaka, Goran Radovic, there were probably some others, but ...

2 Q. All right. Was any attempt made by you or by Mr. Stanisic or by

3 anybody to make any planning to take down these barricades?

4 A. The barricades were organised in some parts of the city of

5 Sarajevo by members of those local communities on their own initiative.

6 Somewhere there was some coordination along the SDS lines because the

7 party had its own infrastructure in the field and communication with

8 their people in the field, and this was a spontaneous reaction, after the

9 killing of the Serbian best man. This was a cry of the Serbs of Sarajevo

10 that things could not could not go on anymore. Now this was a -- the

11 last drop.

12 There had been a killing, so this was a warning and a call of

13 what we others could expect. So it was normal that it was necessary to

14 seek a political reaction. And you can see that from what was formulated

15 by the SDS, the political reply. Then the security response was the

16 barricade, a barricade in itself means a blockade of some area or space

17 in order to prevent something happening that you did not want to happen.

18 This was just done by people. This was done along some sort of

19 coordination of the SDS. I was not coordinating along that particular

20 line.

21 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... just ask you there to look

22 briefly for the last couple of minutes at one document, which is the

23 interview with Mr. Mandic that took place in Slobodna Bosna,

24 10th of April, and I believe it is it already an exhibit.

25 MS. KORNER: It is Exhibit P735.

Page 6359

1 And can we have, please, in the English the fourth page, and in

2 the B/C/S, it's the - one, two, three - also the fourth page.

3 Q. You've had an opportunity to see this before?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Yes. The -- Mr. Mandic is being asked by the reporter about the

6 barricades being organised by the SDS. And at the bottom of the

7 paragraph he says:

8 "Rajko Dukic headed the committee for the organisation of

9 barricades. I do not wish to hide anything. Dragan Kijac, Mico

10 Stanisic, and myself and some others from the MUP took part in this, and

11 we organised everything so as to avoid bloodshed."

12 First of all, was Dragan Kijac one of the people who you saw at

13 the Holiday Inn?

14 A. Yes, he was.

15 Q. Were you one of the committee for the organisation of the

16 barricades?

17 A. I was there, but I wasn't a member of any committee.

18 Q. All right. Thank you.

19 MS. KORNER: That's all, Your Honours, that I ask today, I think.

20 [Trial Chamber confers]

21 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

22 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Vlaski, your testimony is not at an end. You're

23 required to return tomorrow morning at 2.15 -- tomorrow afternoon at 2.15

24 when we will continue your testimony. Your examination-in-chief still

25 has a -- a little while to go, and after which you would be -- counsel

Page 6360

1 for the accused will be invited to cross-examine you.

2 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

3 JUDGE HALL: Ms. Korner, you have an hour and a half left.

4 MS. KORNER: I don't think I'm going to need anything like

5 that -- well, depending on the answers.

6 JUDGE HALL: So we take the -- sorry, Mr. Vlaski, I am obliged to

7 remind you that, having been sworn as a witness, you can't have any

8 communication with counsel from either side. And in such conversations

9 as you may have with persons outside of the courtroom, you can't discuss

10 your testimony.

11 So with that warning, we take the adjournment to tomorrow

12 afternoon at 2.15. Thank you.

13 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.02 p.m.,

14 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 16th day of

15 February, 2010, at 2.15 p.m.