1 Tuesday, 16 February 2010
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.18 p.m.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honours. Good afternoon
6 everyone in and around the courtroom. This is case IT-08-91-T, the
7 Prosecutor versus Mico Stanisic and Stojan Zupljanin.
8 JUDGE HALL
9 Good afternoon to everyone. May I have the appearances, please.
10 MS. KORNER: Good afternoon, Your Honours. Joanna Korner,
11 assisted by Crispian Smith, Case Manager.
12 MR. ZECEVIC: Good afternoon, Your Honours. Slobodan Zecevic and
13 Eugene O'Sullivan appearing for Stanisic Defence this afternoon.
14 Thank you.
15 MR. PANTELIC: Good afternoon, Your Honours. For
16 Zupljanin Defence, Igor Pantelic and Dragan Krgovic. Thank you.
17 JUDGE HALL
18 And if there are no preliminary matters to concern us, could the
19 Usher please escort the witness back to the stand. Thank you.
20 MR. ZECEVIC: May the record show that Mr. Cvijetic has joined
21 us, in Stanisic Defence. Thank you.
22 [Trial Chamber confers]
23 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
24 [The witness takes the stand]
25 JUDGE HALL
1 Ms. Korner to continue her examination-in-chief, I remind you you're
2 still on your oath. You are may take your seat. Thank you.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
4 WITNESS: NEDJO VLASKI [Resumed]
5 [Witness answered through interpreter]
6 Examination by Ms. Korner: [Continued]
7 Q. Mr. Vlaski, we were looking at the barricade incident yesterday,
8 beginning of March. I would like you to have a look, please, at a
9 newsreel footage, please.
10 [Video-clip played]
11 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Armed and masked people are
12 blocking traffic. In the city, around 20 barricades have been put up.
13 The shooting lasted the whole night, particularly in the municipality of
14 Novo Sarajevo. Behind the barricades made of transport vehicles, there
15 are civilians armed from head to foot who told foreign companies that the
16 reason for barricades was the murder which took place in Bascarsija the
17 day before. Ten minutes before midnight
18 information by our journalist who noticed stopping of trolley-buses and
19 putting up of the barricade at the beginning of Mice Sokolovica Street
20 Police patrol returned in front of the pointed barrels. People were
21 killed during last night fire-fight. Now it only has been confirmed that
22 Pandurevic and two more citizens were killed on the barricades. Foreign
23 agencies said that there had been six people killed.
24 "In the morning, traffic was blocked in the city, schools didn't
25 work. They didn't even let ...
1 "On behalf of Crisis Staff, Rajko Dukic, chairperson of SDS
2 executive committee, spoke about the reasons to put up barricades,
3 demands by Serb people and activities of the Crisis Staff:
4 "A lot happened over the last couple of days what incited,
5 provoked Serbian people who unfortunately have chosen the only possible
6 option and that is to take to the barricades, and one can easily say, to
7 bring attention to something that would be normal in a democratic and
8 civilised society, and that because of one's independence, identity, and
9 sovereignty, nobody has the right to deprive somebody else of that same
10 right. The Serbian people did not expect that in addition there
11 would -- their flag would be shot at, which is what unfortunately
12 happened yesterday at 1600 hours, so to speak, in the centre of Sarajevo
13 "The demands of the Serbian people from Sarajevo and the whole
14 territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina have been manifested through the
15 Crisis Staff under the conditions that have certainly be pointed out.
16 According to the communiqué of the information service of the
17 BiH Presidency, the demands of the Serbian people were only partially
18 met. The Crisis Staff ..."
19 Q. Mr. Vlaski, who are the people flanking Rajko Dukic?
20 A. I don't see anybody applauding Mr. Dukic. I can see that this is
21 a press conference.
22 Q. No, flanking, on either side. Like the Judges.
23 A. That's a different matter. They were the participants in the
24 conference, together Mr. Rajko Dukic, the person who spoke of this
25 unfortunate incident. To his right is Mr. Todor Dutina and
1 Velibor Ostojic, the minister of information, to his left. He was on the
2 government of what was still, at the time, the Socialist Republic
3 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Mr. Dukic was the president of the executive board
4 of the Serbian Democratic Party.
5 Q. And who was Mr. Dutina?
6 A. I don't recall what his official title at the time was. I know
7 that he was a representative there. But what his actual position was, I
8 don't remember.
9 Q. All right. Yes, we can stop the video, thank you.
10 I have just got a couple of other things to ask you, Mr. Vlaski.
11 First is to look at a document -- firstly, you listened to an intercept
12 yesterday. This is one of the ones that is on our 65 ter list.
13 MS. KORNER: Could we have up, please, 1056.
14 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, Your Honours, we lost the LiveNote.
15 MS. KORNER: Oh, so we did.
16 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
17 MS. KORNER: It's back again.
18 All right. Could we have up on the screen, please, 65 ter 1056.
19 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, it's not back again on our side.
20 JUDGE HARHOFF: We're also blank. [Microphone not activated]
21 MS. KORNER: Do Your Honours want me to continue? I don't
22 whether ... all right.
23 Your Honours, before we look at this one, can I -- I'm not clear
24 what the situation was. You allowed me to use this video. Am I allowed
25 to exhibit it? It wasn't on the 65 ter list. No, this is one -- you
1 gave me permission to use this because it was open source material. But
2 I'm just asking whether I can exhibit it, because I'd like to exhibit it.
3 [Trial Chamber confers]
4 JUDGE HALL
5 MS. KORNER: So Your Honours would like an application in writing
6 to add this to our 65 ter list?
7 JUDGE HALL
8 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P980 marked for identification,
9 Your Honours.
10 MS. KORNER: All right.
11 Q. Now, first of all, sir, you listened to this intercept, is that
12 right, which is said to between Stojan Zupljanin and Mico Stanisic?
13 A. That's right.
14 Q. Were you able to recognise the voices?
15 A. I was.
16 Q. As those of Mr. Zupljanin and Mr. Stanisic?
17 A. Right.
18 Q. This was on the 2nd of March of 1992, and the conversation refers
19 to the barricades.
20 MS. KORNER: If we look, please, at the second page in English,
21 and I think it's the second page -- yes, it's the second page also in
23 Q. Stojan Zupljanin says:
24 "We're a listening a bit to how things are going over there."
25 And Mico Stanisic says:
1 "Well, you can hear."
2 "We are following and listening," as they say, "and waiting for
3 further instructions."
4 Now you said the barricades were a spontaneous incident in
6 why, because you were with Mico Stanisic in the Holiday Inn during this
7 period, Stojan Zupljanin was saying, We're waiting for further
9 A. It was logical, since the security situation was so complex. I
10 said earlier on that it was a political assassination and that's one of
11 the gravest qualifications of crime which calls for an appropriate
12 reaction on the part of the authority, and it wasn't forthcoming. The
13 police didn't show the willingness to do its job, and the barricades were
14 a response to a political assassination. The barricades had not been
15 organised before the murder took place but afterwards, and it had
16 occurred as a spontaneous event.
17 It is difficult in moments such as these when such a large
18 overbearing incident happens to ease the tensions that had come to the
19 fore in the country anyway. An adequate reaction on the part of the
20 Ministry of the Interior and the authorities in general to launch an
21 investigation to identify the perpetrators and punish them, such a formal
22 intervention, especially of the Presidency, was not forthcoming.
23 MR. ZECEVIC: [Previous translation continues] ... I'm sorry, I
24 didn't want to interrupt the witness. But we are facing a lot of
25 problems now without the LiveNote because we cannot follow what -- I
1 mean ... we need to watch the document at the same time and ... the
3 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
4 JUDGE HALL
5 for this -- for the technical problem to be corrected. So in the
6 interests of the Defence who is particularly handicapped, perhaps we
7 should rise.
8 --- Break taken at 2.33 p.m.
9 [The witness stands down]
10 --- On resuming at 2.47 p.m.
11 [The witness takes the stand]
12 MS. KORNER:
13 Q. Now, Mr. Vlaski, I would like you to concentrate, please, on the
14 question and not make a speech.
15 The question I asked you is why, if this is a spontaneous
16 outbreak in Sarajevo
17 back to the intercept - We're waiting for further instructions. And then
18 Mico Stanisic says, Be ready and we'll be in touch. Zupljanin: For the
19 most part, everything is ready on our side. Stanisic: Yes, we are
20 waiting for a sign. If a total blockade is needed, all the rest, it will
21 be done.
22 Now, if this is a spontaneous outbreak in Sarajevo, why is
23 Stojan Zupljanin in Banja Luka awaiting instructions from Mico Stanisic
24 to set up a blockade in Banja Luka?
25 A. The answer is only logical. An organised response had to match
1 an organised incident. If somebody organises a political assassination
2 and if this is done by the criminal underworld which is in collusion with
3 the political leadership, then such a murder can happen anywhere in the
4 country. This wasn't a murder as the result of a -- a brawl in a cafe.
5 This was a wedding party which was sporting a Serb flag, and they were
6 the object of the attack, and so there was message behind that. Action
7 will always provoke a reaction.
8 Q. This is about the fourth or fifth time you have described this as
9 a political assassination. You had a chance to listen to your interview
10 in Banja Luka. Do you agree this is the first time in this court that
11 you have described this killing as a political assassination?
12 A. At the time, we didn't speak about this incident in specific
13 terms. It has all -- it bears all of the hallmarks of a political
14 assassination, and I have a degree -- I hold a degree in criminology and
15 I know what I'm talking about and I can give you a definition of a
16 political assassination.
17 Q. Thank you very much. The only question was: Do you agree -- you
18 never mentioned the words "political assassination" in the interview in
19 Banja Luka when this very incident was discussed. And the answer to
20 that, you've already said, is yes.
21 You yourself, you told this Court, were skiing at the time that
22 the murder of the wedding guest took place. How, therefore, by the
23 following day did you know this was a political assassination?
24 A. It -- it was evidently a political assassination. We had
25 intelligence to the effect that the party of democratic action had
1 mobilised criminal structures in the city of Sarajevo. Every criminal
2 structure was in control of a specific neighbourhood in the city of
4 structure had control under which quarter of the town and was headed by
5 which criminal individual. We had intelligence to the effect that there
6 was disagreement within the MUP as to why criminal structures were being
7 involved in certain activities. This was a conflict between Mr. Alibabic
8 and Dautbasic about whether the criminals should be involved into this or
9 not. Mr. Alibabic was a professional and was opposed to this, and Mr.
10 Dautbasic said that if need be, he would even forge an alliance with the
11 devil himself.
12 Q. You told us you went skiing, you got the phone call when you
13 returned on the Sunday afternoon, and you went straight over to the
14 premises of, first of all, the Deputies Club in the Assembly and then to
15 the Holiday Inn. How, by that stage, did you acquire all this
16 information about this being a political killing?
17 A. It was only too clear. The policeman who was right on the spot
18 when the murder took place, he identified the murderer and the murderer
19 was not apprehended by the police at all. In other words, the police was
20 aware of his identity and was protecting the murderer and that's where
21 the problem lay. Had the police reacted in a professional way, right on
22 the spot, this response would not have ensued. Had we received
23 information about the apprehension of the perpetrator, the events would
24 have taken a different course that's for sure.
25 MR. PANTELIC: I'm sorry, it's line 8 -- sorry, it's page 8,
1 line 19, in transcript we have a following sentence: Mr. Alibabic was
2 and if need be he would even forge alliance with the devil himself.
3 I believe that this witness didn't say this particular sentence,
4 and I would kindly ask my learned friend to clarify this.
5 MS. KORNER: What, that Mr. Alibabic would forge an alliance with
6 the Devil himself; is that what you say he didn't say? Anyhow,
7 Mr. Vlaski speaks some English so perhaps he could tell us.
8 A. No, I didn't say that Mr. Alibabic did that, but Mr. Dautbasic
9 did. Mr. Alibabic was a professional, and he was opposed to such an
10 alliance with the criminals. And it Mr. Dautbasic who said that he would
11 forge an alliance even with the devil himself, let alone with criminals.
12 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, I was under the impression -- I was
13 under the impression, before we leave the intercept, that it already had
14 been made an exhibit, but through Mr. Zepinic. But I'm told not. So, in
15 which case, can I have it made an exhibit now.
16 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, I think we took the -- there is a
17 ruling under which conditions the intercept can be -- can be admitted.
18 This is not the case.
19 The witness was not a party, he was not -- he was not present at
20 the time, nor was he -- was he privy to the contents of this particular
22 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, as I --
23 JUDGE HALL
24 basis are you seeking to have this admitted, Ms. Korner?
25 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, as I understand it, on the
1 2nd of March -- Mr. Zecevic, you know, Mr. Zecevic, it's polite to sit
2 down if somebody else is standing up.
3 Yes, my understanding is this conversation took place on the
4 2nd of March at the time when this witness and Mr. Stanisic are at the
5 Holiday Inn together, or in the same place. In addition to that, he's
6 able to speak as to the contents and he's able to recognise the voices.
7 Can I say, I can't think of any more criteria for making a
8 document admissible.
9 JUDGE HALL
10 that where a person -- although a witness might purport to identify the
11 voices on a transcript -- on an intercept, if he was -- if he -- was
12 himself not a party to the exchange, or was present, was otherwise
13 present, then it is not admissible by -- through that witness. It may be
14 admissible otherwise. Do I understand you to be saying that the
15 testimony of this witness is that he was, in fact, present?
16 MS. KORNER: That he was there in the Holiday Inn with
17 Mico Stanisic. He gave evidence yesterday. I don't know whether he can
18 say he was actually present at the time of the call. I -- probably not.
19 [Trial Chamber confers]
20 JUDGE HALL
21 has made -- [French on English Channel]
22 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated]
23 [French on English Channel]
24 MS. KORNER: Can we have English. Could we have English, please.
25 I didn't -- I'm afraid because the French was going on while Your Honour
1 was talking, I didn't catch what Your Honour said. Was the ruling that
2 it was admitted or not admitted?
3 JUDGE HALL
4 MS. KORNER: All right. Thank you.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P981 marked for identification,
6 Your Honours.
7 MS. KORNER:
8 Q. I want you, finally, to look, please, at a letter that you were
9 shown in interview, which is -- is -- is 65 ter number 3370.
10 It's dated 10th of October -- I'll just wait for the English to
11 come up.
12 It's dated 10th of October, 1994. And it's addressed to the
13 Government of the Republika Srpska, to Mr. Brdjanin.
14 Did you know Mr. Brdjanin?
15 A. I had the opportunity to meet him, as a deputy in the
16 Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, after the first multi-party
18 Q. All right. And the letter is signed by Mr. Kesic. Did you know
20 A. Of course.
21 Q. All right. And, effectively, what it is, is it's asking for an
22 apartment to be allocated to you. But it's the middle paragraph I want
23 to ask you about.
24 He was amongst the first people in the former state security of
25 the former Bosnia
1 in order to oppose the Croatian-Muslim coalition, as it's put.
2 Is that an accurate description of your activities during the
3 course of 1991 and early 1992?
4 A. I can say that I was in that group of desperate people who were
5 working in an institution that was called the MUP of the
6 Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and who were completely
7 marginalised and who had a need to self-organise for reasons which were
8 then later verified and recognised by international agreements.
9 Q. Now can you answer my question, please. Is that description an
10 accurate one?
11 A. Well, I was that -- deserving that, in 1994, I was forced to
12 temporarily resolve my housing issue. Had I really been deserving,
13 somebody would have adequately dealt with that matter before that. But
14 in 1994, at the end of the war practically, I was seeking a temporary
15 solution for my housing problem.
16 Q. No. I'll ask for the third time, please, Mr. Vlaski. Mr. Kesic
17 describes you as one of the -- among the first people in the former state
18 security to organise Serbian personnel in order to oppose what is
19 described as the Croatian-Muslim coalition.
20 Were you one of the first people to organise the Serbs within the
21 MUP against the non-Serb members?
22 A. We did not organise against other members of the MUP. We
23 organised ourselves in order to protect, as I said, our personal and
24 professional interests, as well as the interests of the people that we
25 represented. Yes, and I was in that group.
1 Q. Thank you.
2 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, may that be admitted and marked,
4 JUDGE HALL
5 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P982, Your Honours.
6 MS. KORNER:
7 Q. You told the Court yesterday, in one of your many speeches, about
8 the Muslims and Croats - and this is at page 6350 of the transcript:
9 "That the SDA and the HDZ in the MUP played with me,
10 humiliated me."
11 Is that what you feel about what happened to you in the MUP
12 during 1991 and early 1992?
13 A. The best illustration for that would be my appointment and the
14 issuing of the decision and the abolishment of that post. I mean, that
15 was only just me, but that was the fate of many others. But I had the
16 misfortune, let's say, to experience what I did experience, not for some
17 personal problems that I had with those people, but because of
18 nationalist and political reasons.
19 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... [Microphone not activated]
20 MR. ZECEVIC: I believe I heard Ms. Korner said, No further
21 questions, but ...
22 MS. KORNER: I did. [Microphone not activated]
23 MR. ZECEVIC: It was not recorded in the transcript. That's why
24 I wanted to know.
25 JUDGE HARHOFF: [Microphone not activated]
1 JUDGE HALL
2 MR. ZECEVIC: May I?
3 JUDGE HALL
4 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you very much.
5 Cross-examination by Mr. Zecevic:
6 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Vlaski.
7 I'm going to put a couple of questions to you. But, first of
8 all, I have to ask you, because you and me are speaking the same
9 language, to make a pause so that the interpreters would have time to
11 I'm going to show you, yesterday, during the day, you talked
12 about the situation in the MUP of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and
14 going to show you document 1D114. This is an inter-party agreement
15 within the coalition of the HDZ, SDA, and the SDS, from January 1991.
16 MR. ZECEVIC: [Previous translation continues] ... please give to
17 the witness a binder of the documents in order to facilitate for the
18 witness only, if there is no objection from my learned colleague.
19 Q. [Interpretation] You have it on the screen, but I can also give
20 you a hard copy.
21 You can see that the heading of the document states in
22 handwriting, January 1991. And then, in item 2, we have a list of the
23 leading posts in the Ministry of the Interior. Do you see that?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. And you can see, under B, deputy of the minister. And then on
1 the one hand it says SDS
2 assistant to the minister for crime fighting SDS. And then we have
3 Momcilo Mandic. Do you see that?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And that corresponds to the situation in the MUP after 1991, in
6 the MUP of the Socialist Republic
7 A. Yes, it corresponds for the most part. There are elements here
8 which were not verified until later. I'm talking about some personnel
10 Q. I asked you deliberately only about these first two. Mr. Zepinic
11 and Momcilo Mandic. Do you agree that they really performed those
12 duties, as stated here on this list?
13 A. Yes, they did perform those duties.
14 Q. Under letter L, there is the assistant -- or the deputy for the
15 under-secretary for the State Security Service, then it says that the
16 post belongs to the SDS
17 If I understood your testimony correctly from yesterday and
18 today, precisely that is the post that you were supposed to be appointed
19 to and were appointed to but then that post, after your appointment, was
20 deleted from the classification of posts in the Ministry of
21 Internal Affairs of the Socialist Republic
22 A. That is correct.
23 Q. Thank you.
24 A. Can I give an explanation?
25 Q. Yes, of course, but I'm just asking you to go slowly, please.
1 Go ahead.
2 A. Mr. Zepinic was appointed deputy minister from the ranks of the
3 Serbian people, and he was nominated by the Serbian Democratic Party
4 which won a share of the power after the multi-party elections.
5 Mr. Zepinic was a member of the Ministry of the Interior, and he
6 was among the professionals, according to his experience as well as his
7 education. Mr. Momcilo Mandic did finish police schools. He worked in
8 the judiciary after that -- in the police and then in the judiciary, and
9 he was dealing with the issues of crime. So because of his professional
10 qualifications, he was elected or appointed as assistant minister as
11 opposed to the person from the ranks of the SDA, who was a man, who was
12 highly educated but performed work which had nothing to do with the
13 police. He had worked in our health centre in the process of recruiting
14 staff into the police forces.
15 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please be asked to repeat his
16 last sentence.
17 JUDGE HALL
18 sentence, please.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't want to analyse any
20 further. I could provide a broader analysis for each of the posts in the
21 Ministry of the Interior. I said about the assistant minister for
22 uniformed police, from the ranks the SDA, a person was appointed for that
23 post, of a high education, but without any experience or any expertise
24 for the duties that such a post would imply.
25 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. I would just kindly ask you for the name of that assistant from
2 the SDA.
3 A. Avdo Hebib.
4 Q. Thank you. The organisational structure of the MUP of the
5 Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was customary in those
6 areas, and it had two parts: Public security and state security. Isn't
7 that right?
8 A. Yes, that's right.
9 Q. State security, where you worked, was headed by the
10 under-secretary for state security. I am talking about the MUP of the
11 Socialist Republic
12 A. Yes, that is correct.
13 Q. And that post, the under-secretary for state security, was
14 assigned, pursuant to this coalition agreement, to the HDZ, and
15 Mr. Branko Kvesic came to that post.
16 A. Yes, Mr. Kvesic assumed that post.
17 Q. You were the chief of the 5th Administration in the
18 State Security Service; is that correct?
19 A. Yes. This is a lower ranking organisational unit that is part of
20 the state security organisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
21 Q. You were supposed to be given a decision as deputy -- as --
22 deputy under-secretary for state security, and you were supposed to be
23 the assistant to Branko Kvesic and the main operative in the
24 State Security Service. Is that correct?
25 A. Yes, that is correct. May I just give a slightly more detailed
1 explanation for this organisational structure?
2 Q. Yes, you can, but please be concise.
3 A. This coalition agreement, as we can see, followed the multi-party
4 elections, and it was supposed to be the parameter for the distribution
5 of the key positions in the institutions of the Socialist Republic
6 of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which it still was at the time. The
7 under-secretary for state security was appointed to Branko Kvesic, who
8 was a representative of the HDZ, and represented the Croatian people.
9 Pursuant to the agreement, the deputy under-secretary for state security
10 should have been assigned to a representative of the Serbian people, and
11 that person was supposed to be nominated by the Serbian Democratic Party.
12 This post was not filled for half a year, and that was a
13 deliberate action by the coalition partners who tried in all possible
14 ways to obstruct this particular appointment. The reasons for such
15 conduct could be seen in the fact that the existing rules on
16 classification of posts, according to the laws in effect at the time, the
17 deputy under-secretary is actually the most important position in state
18 security. The person assigned to that post is responsible for the work
19 of the operative force in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
20 No operative measure, wire-tapping or any other kind of action,
21 could be carried out without the knowledge of that particular person.
22 Precisely this fact speaks to the scale of obstruction that was being
23 carried out in relation to this service. There was no person who was
24 professionally in charge of this particular aspect of the work. This was
25 given to the internal agreement of representatives of the Bosniak Muslim
1 people and the Croatian people for as long as they shared common
3 The representatives of the Serbian people were given the sole
4 important post in that service, and that is the security for persons and
5 facilities. This was a very difficult job because it's very easy to make
6 mistakes in that work, whereas, that person had no influence in the
7 shaping and performance of the most sensitive duties from the area of
8 state security.
9 Q. If I understood you correctly and to summarize, you, as you have
10 told us several times till now, never actually assumed those duties as
11 deputy under-secretary for state security, even though that should have
12 happened. And, in essence, on the basis of what you have told us, the
13 Muslims, primarily, and the Croats, practically controlled the
14 State Security Service of the Socialist Republic
15 Bosnia and Herzegovina almost entirely at that time?
16 A. At that time, the absolute control of the work and all the
17 activities of that service was in the hands of the Muslims. I'm talking
18 about the top leadership, because it was up to them would be done and
19 what would be accorded significance. Serbian representatives did not
20 have any influence at all in that area. They were even bypassed in some
21 purely banal matters.
22 Q. Thank you. We have a document here, 1D118. This is a document
23 from March 1992. It's information about the abuses, illegalities, and
24 manipulation by the SDS
25 of the Socialist Republic
1 exhibit in this case, since, I, in our conversation yesterday --
2 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated]
3 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] I'm sorry? Madam Korner, you said
4 something? I'm sorry.
5 MS. KORNER: Yes, I asked for a number. [Microphone not
7 MR. ZECEVIC: It's 1D118.
8 Q. [Interpretation] Yesterday, when I showed you that, you told me
9 that this information was something that you were not familiar with, and
10 that is why I'm not going to present the entire document to you. I'm
11 going to read some of the characteristic excerpts so that you could
12 confirm whether you agree with them or not.
13 On page 1, it says:
14 "Since the multi-party elections until today, the personnel
15 policies in the State Security Service of the MUP of the
16 Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was conducted by
17 Hilmo Selimovic, Asim Dautbasic, Alibabic --
18 MS. KORNER: Can I please have the bit that you're reading out on
19 the screen. Thank you.
20 MR. ZECEVIC: This is page 1. It's the first -- it's the
21 first -- the second paragraph.
22 "The personnel police of the BiH MUP ..."
23 Have you found that, Ms. Korner?
24 MS. KORNER: Yes. Thank you very much.
25 MR. ZECEVIC: You're welcome.
1 Q. [Interpretation] The personnel policy of the BiH, has been run by
2 Hilmo Selimovic, Asim Dautbasic, Munir Alibabic, and Branko Kvesic.
3 Do you agree with that?
4 A. Yes, that is the most tragedy aspect because they are at the head
5 of the SDS
6 interpret the policies of the SDS
7 Q. Thank you. A little bit lower on that page, we're looking at the
8 fourth paragraph from the top, discusses this case of yours. And it
10 "When drawing up the new structure and systematisation of the SDB
11 in March 1991, Asim Dautbasic, Munir Alibabic, and Branko Kvesic pushed
12 through two insignificant assistant places instead of the place of the
13 SDB deputy under-secretary, which belonged to the SDS, according to the
14 inter-party agreement."
15 Isn't this correct?
16 A. Yes, it's correct. Because they did what they wanted, because
17 nobody could have any influence over what they would write in the rules,
18 that draft rules that then they would submit to the government for
20 Q. In the next paragraph, sometimes -- somewhere in the middle of
21 that paragraph it states -- I think this is the third or fourth sentence
22 after that paragraph, it says that Asim Dautbasic practically, from the
23 level of the State Security Service of the MUP of the Socialist Republic
24 of Bosnia-Herzegovina, along with the agreement of the under-secretary,
25 completely took over the coordination of the work of the service,
1 creating such channels of the flow of information where the SDS cadres
2 were bypassed so that the information from the bottom to the top and the
3 leadership of the SDA and the HDZ went exclusively by way of these two
5 Is this correct?
6 A. Yes. In such relations, there was no need for us even to come to
7 work. They could have sent our salaries to us at home. We could have
8 been out there skiing or sitting at home because we were not even needed.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Let's go to the next page. We're
11 talking about page 2 in the e-court as well.
12 Q. The second paragraph from the top says:
13 "With a view to enforcing discipline among certain cadres, Serb
14 staff, various methods were applied, failure to issue rulings as
15 prescribed in the new rules of procedures on the internal organisation of
16 the SDB, withholding parts of completed rulings until the person was
17 transferred to another less significant post, and, outside the SDB,
18 attempts of classic recruitment, taking statements, et cetera."
19 Were you familiar with this?
20 A. This was a concept which was previously planned and which had the
21 objective of bringing the Serb staff into an unfavorable position. This
22 was the SDA strategy, and Alija Izetbegovic wanted the Serbs to reduce
23 them to a minority. And a way to that was to clear the state security of
24 any Serb staff.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 The following paragraph is paragraph number 5 on a the page. And
2 you say that focus in the work of the service is placed almost
3 exclusively on the operative inquiries of the activities within the SDS
4 from the lowest organisational units to the higher levels of leadership.
5 Do you agree with that?
6 A. I fully agree. Precisely this sentence, this piece of
7 information, prompted the press release which the -- the incumbents of
8 the state security leadership only inform, addressing the public at
9 large, and distancing themselves from such activities of the state organs
10 and from such manipulations as performed by the MUP and the
11 State Security Service.
12 Q. The last paragraph on this page states that as of the month of
13 May 1991, the telephone line in the Deputies Club of the SDS had been
14 wire-tapped and so on and so forth. And, on the following page, mention
15 is made of some secret intercepting points that had been set up.
16 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] This is page 3 in e-court,
17 paragraph 1.
18 Q. Can you see that, and can you tell us anything about it?
19 A. I can recount the entire story surrounding such practice, since I
20 was one of the persons who had extensive experience in such activities
21 because I had been working on precisely such duties for a long time.
22 Q. First of all, speak slowly, and be very concise. Give us only
23 the key points. Thank you. Go ahead.
24 A. The legislation in force regulated the application of operative
25 and technical measures and means. They were defined by the law in very
1 precise terms as well as with the rules governing the work of the
2 State Security Service. However, the rules and laws were one matter, and
3 the practice was another altogether. It was in quite an unlawful way
4 that representatives of the leadership were eavesdropped on, the members
5 of parliament who were duly elected, including us, I'm sure of that.
6 Every individual who showed or exhibited any sort of activity
7 aimed at safeguarding the interests of either the profession, the law, or
8 national interests was the subject of the activities of this structure,
9 which misused the means it had in order to meet the requests issued to
10 them by their leaders.
11 A vertical system was established from the assistant leader of
12 state security, Mr. Dautbasic, all the way down to the lowest level of
13 operatives who applied various operative means and measures. The matter
14 was so dramatic that members of the Party for Democratic Action were
15 directly involved in such unlawful activities. Representatives of the
16 party intercepted communications from specific sights which were placed
17 outside of state security facilities, namely in private homes and various
18 buildings. We have documents to prove that.
19 These same representatives of the party, having obtained, through
20 unlawful means, various information, forwarded to Mr. Munir Alibabic
21 these -- the same information once or twice a week. This was documented
22 in the log-book, registering the movement of different persons. This was
23 in the MUP building, where Mr. Alibabic was the minister. The public
24 security forces, that's to say the police, were duty-bound to register
25 every individual who entered the building, as well as the person they
1 were visiting.
2 In this particular book, we found information to the effect that
3 three members of the Party of Democratic Action would enter the building,
4 in the context that I'm speaking of, and bring in material. The purpose
5 behind this was for the material to be processed and then forwarded to
6 the political leadership and, in part, to the media.
7 We have proof that on a weekly basis Mr. Senad Abdic, editor of
8 "Slobodna Bosna" paper, came there routinely. They published this sort
9 of information in order to justify the activities taken by the party
10 leadership in relation to the Serb staff.
11 Q. Let me interrupt you here and put several questions to in
12 relation to what you just told us.
13 If my understanding of what you said is correct, and please tell
14 me if it's not, the wire-tapping measures, the interception measures,
15 which the State Security Service was authorised to carry out under the
16 law and in keeping with specific procedure, in the course of 1991 and
17 1992, were, in actual fact, privatised in the service of the -- of a
18 political party, namely, the SDA.
19 Just tell me if I'm right or not.
20 A. Yes, it is fully privatised in the service of the SDA, and, in
21 part, the HDZ as well. Insofar as it was needed by the Croats or,
22 alternatively, by the Bosniaks.
23 Q. Moreover, if my understanding is correct, these eavesdropping
24 measures, which were applied from, as you put it, the certain sites that
25 had been set up ad hoc, were not applied by technicians who were employed
1 by the State Security Service but, rather, by certain individuals who
2 were members of the Party of Democratic Action. Is that right?
3 A. No, that's not right. Expertise is required to apply these
4 measures, as well as a series of conditions that needed to be met. In
5 order for such an operation to be conducted, there had to be coordinated
6 activity from a number of individuals, from telecommunications operators,
7 and so on and so forth. Let me not go into explaining the techniques
8 behind the work because it -- they will take us too far. The gist of the
9 matter is that in the application of these measures SDA members were
10 involved, and they were the ones producing the end product.
11 Q. The SDA staff who yielded the end product worked together with
12 Munir Alibabic, whom they visited once or twice weekly, at least, at the
13 very least, in his office. That's what you told us, right?
14 A. Yes. Certain representatives of the Serb people were involved in
15 this as well, who were performing their regular official duties. They
16 also had some involvement in these unlawful activities, and they informed
17 us of them. They were afraid of doing anything, however, because they
18 were afraid for their own fate.
19 Q. You also said that Mr. Munir Alibabic, who created these
20 documents together with his SDA colleagues, forwarded the -- some of
21 these documents to the media, which was in violation of the regulations
22 that were in force at the time.
23 A. There were certain rules in place in relation to the media. In
24 order for certain information to reach the media, it had to go through
25 the analysis department first, which would decide whether the material
1 was apt to be publicised or whether it should only be forward to the
2 leadership staff. However, here it was Dautbasic, Alibabic, and Kvesic
3 who decided which of the information needed to be published in the media,
4 such as "Slobodna Bosna," or any other media that suited them.
5 MR. ZECEVIC: [Previous translation continues] ...
6 JUDGE HALL
7 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you very much.
8 JUDGE HALL
9 [The witness stands down]
10 --- Recess taken at 3.42 p.m.
11 --- On resuming at 4.18 p.m.
12 JUDGE HALL
13 doing other work in the interim.
14 Yes, please continue, Mr. Zecevic.
15 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm waiting for the witness, Your Honours.
16 JUDGE HALL
17 [The witness takes the stand]
18 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Mr. Vlaski, before the break, we were just about to discuss
20 "Slobodna Bosna" and the media in general. But let me put one other
21 question before we move to that topic.
22 The SDA activists, who, together with Mr. Alibabic, were involved
23 in these, as you call them, unlawful intercepting activities, can you
24 tell me, were they individuals called Behman, Arnautovic, Skalonja, and
25 Osman? Do you recall that?
1 A. I do remember that very well, because I had occasion to see the
2 names of these individuals in the book registering visitors entering the
3 MUP building in Sarajevo
4 I also had occasion to see them later on, on the MUP payroll,
5 when this became common knowledge, and their presence in the MUP was
6 legalised by them being -- becoming employees of the MUP.
7 Q. Thank you. Let us go back to the media.
8 You said that Messrs. Alibabic, Dautbasic, and Kvesic decided
9 independently which information would be provided to the media. Can you
10 tell us what media was involved? Was it "Muslimanski Glas,"
11 "Slobodna Bosna," and "Hercegovacki Tjednik" and similar papers?
12 A. Yes, these two as well as others; the dailies, such as the
14 Q. When you say "involved," they were used for the purposes of a
15 propaganda war, was it not?
16 A. Yes. It was part of the political, military, and media
17 preparations for the takeover of power in Bosnia by the HDZ/SDA coalition
18 and to the detriment of the Serb people. The representatives of this
19 particular policy believed that they ought to be the masters in
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina. It seems that for Bosnia-Herzegovina the
21 relationship between the master and the servant was a historical
22 category, and they believed that it was time for them to become masters.
23 Q. Thank you. If my understanding of your testimony is correct,
24 this discussion of ours, concerning 1D118, shows that you substantially
25 or -- agree with what is contained in the document. Is that right?
1 A. I could discuss this particular document for days and corroborate
2 what is stated there with various statements and documents because there
3 is no better proof than this one to show how far Mr. Kvesic, who was at
4 the head of the State Security Service, privatised the service. When he
5 no longer felt that he needed to remain in Sarajevo, he brought along
6 with him documentation concerning the service, and this was an
7 illustration of his unlawful and unprofessional conduct.
8 Q. Thank you.
9 A. If I may add, it was precisely because of such actions that were
10 taken that certain individuals committed suicide, because of what had
11 been published about them in the book.
12 Q. Thank you. Mr. Vlaski, do you know that the Party of
13 Democratic Action, in the course of 1991, sent young men to be trained in
14 the Croatian MUP?
15 A. Yes, of course. And I personally saw documents dispatching these
16 men to the training centre in Zagreb
17 Q. I will show you 1D123. This is a document issued by the SDA.
18 The document is dated 11 July 1991. It is instructions for
19 candidates, and it is addressed to the Ministry of the Interior of the
20 Republic of Croatia
21 Let me put one question to you before we start discussing the
23 You will see that on the right-hand side, in the heading, it says
24 SDA - Party for Democratic Action - Sarajevo, Marsala Tita Street
25 Do you remember if this was, indeed, the correct address of the head
1 office of the SDA in Sarajevo
2 A. Yes, that was precisely their address.
3 Q. The document shows that the SDA recommended that certain
4 candidates be admitted to the centre in the Republic of Croatia
5 Reference is made to some sort of a mutual agreement. What is crucial,
6 however, is that the Party of Democratic Action, as a political party,
7 should be sending their members to such a training course for reserve
8 policemen; whilst, at the same time, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there existed
9 a school where policeman could undergo training. Is that right?
10 A. That's right. This is the best illustration of such unlawful
11 conduct. Any state, if it wants to state that it's ruled by law, then it
12 cannot have this sort of cooperation with a neighbouring state, in this
13 case, the Republic of Croatia
14 It is out of the ordinary and unlawful that one should organise training
15 in this way. But this reflects the situation in which we had to operate.
16 And it sounds somehow comical that I should even call it a state. It's a
17 caricature of a state.
18 Q. Do you know that these candidates who were sent to attend
19 training in the Republic of Croatia
20 activities of the Croatian MUP and the ZNG against the JNA and Serbs in
22 A. Well, quite clearly, in order for such agreement to exist as is
23 referred to herein, there would first would have to exist an agreement
24 between the Republic of Croatia
25 Again, in this instances, as well as in other situations, the Serbs were
1 bypassed. They should have, at the very least, been informed about it,
2 and, of course, under the existing rules and regulations, they should
3 have been consulted. What was happening here was the cooperation between
4 the political leadership in Croatia
5 SDA in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
6 This goes to show that the SDA party was using this channel to
7 create an armed force of its own. This was a way for it to create its
8 own army, through the Ministry of the Interior, which later proved to be
10 Suffice it to say, that the very way in which they obtained the
11 candidates is telling. They used the records in the possession of the
12 Ministry of Defence where qualities of these candidates were listed for
13 specific military disciplines. Sefer Halilovic prepared a military
14 concept for the creation of an armed force, and it was following that
15 particular concept that these candidates were sent to the
16 Republic of Croatia
17 Q. Thank you. Let me now show you another document by the SDA --
18 MS. KORNER: I don't believe there was an answer to the question
19 that was asked by Defence counsel. Namely, whether the candidates who
20 were sent to attend the training in the Republic of Croatia
21 part in the armed activities of the Croatian MUP and the ZNG against the
22 JNA and Serbs.
23 There was no answer to that question, at all.
24 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you very much, Ms. Korner.
25 Q. [Interpretation] Would you kindly answer this question? Yes,
1 Ms. Korner is right. Your response was quite long so I even missed it.
2 A. Well, I think this is something that was happening in a different
3 state. I don't know for what sort of purposes they used them over there.
4 It was a bit difficult for us to know, so I'm unable to answer that
5 question correctly.
6 Q. All right. Very well. Thank you.
7 I would now like to show you document 1D00-4681. This is a
8 document by the SDA of the 8th of July, 1991, and it bears the heading:
9 The List of Candidates for the Training of Special Forces in the MUP of
10 the Republic of Croatia
11 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] I have the information, but I'm not
12 sure whether this is P424 in this case file, MFI.
13 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, I didn't say this last time, but I'm
14 going say it this time. Before we go any further with these documents,
15 two things: Firstly, has the witness ever seen it before? Second,
16 please may I be told where exactly these documents come from.
17 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, first of all, I have
18 to show the document to the witness in order to be able to put questions
19 to him. Secondly, on the 2nd of February of this year, in relation to a
20 piece of correspondence by Ms. Korner, I informed Ms. Korner in writing
21 about the sources of all the documents of Mr. Stanisic's Defence. I
22 listed six sources from where all the documents that we have and that we
23 are presenting in the proceedings are from. I can list those documents
24 again. And this specific document came from the MUP of Republika Srpska,
25 from the team for the investigation of war crimes from Banja Luka
1 don't know if this is sufficient.
2 I was hoping that this document and my letter of the
3 2nd of February would be sufficient so that we would have no more need to
4 go into the sources of the documents and discuss that particular matter.
5 MS. KORNER: Can I explain?
6 It is absolutely right. Your Honour will recall I raised this
7 before in respect of some of these documents.
8 One of the documents in particular, which was presented by
9 Mr. Cvijetic, apparently came from a web site maintained by an accused in
10 this Tribunal, namely -- I've forgotten what his name is now.
11 MR. ZECEVIC: General Praljak.
12 MS. KORNER: Thank you very much.
13 Without any attribution whatsoever as to where these documents
14 actually come from. That's my concern. It's no good, as I say, simply
15 saying, Our documents come from these six sources.
16 There will be an objection to any document which comes off a web
17 site for which there is no attribution to where these documents come
18 from, and particularly a web site maintained by an accused in this
20 Secondly, my concern is this: Not the general sources, but where
21 each individual document about which we raise a query comes from. And
22 I've now had a response in relation to this one. I have nothing further
23 to say.
24 Do I take it the previous document that you showed this witness
25 is also from the MUP?
1 MR. ZECEVIC: That is correct. And it has already been exhibited
2 in this case.
3 MS. KORNER: No.
4 MR. ZECEVIC: Without the objection from you. Yes, the previous
5 document is 1D123, and it has been exhibited already.
6 MS. KORNER: Well, I'm --
7 MR. ZECEVIC: Without any objection from the Office of the
9 MS. KORNER: Yes. Well, I think we may be taking some -- more
10 interest into where these documents emanate from. However, the point
11 still is, is has this witness - and I appreciate until he has seen it, he
12 can't give the answer - but has he actually seen this document before?
13 He wasn't asked in the previous case whether he had seen that document
14 before. In the previous -- the previous document.
15 JUDGE HALL
16 Ms. Korner, each item will be dealt with it as it arises on an
17 item-by-item basis.
18 MS. KORNER: Yes, I agree. And, Your Honour, at the moment, I'm
19 still waiting to hear whether the witness saw the previous document he
20 was shown -- had seen before, I'm sorry.
21 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm not exhibiting this -- this particular -- this
22 previous document I'm not exhibiting with this witness because it's
23 already exhibited by another witness. Therefore, I don't see any reason
24 why should I ask the witness if he has seen the particular document?
25 The witness knows about the fact that the SDA was sending
1 candidates to -- to -- to -- MUP of Croatia for -- for the training.
2 That is all that I wanted to elicit from the witness on that particular
4 MS. KORNER: Well, in that case, what is the point of showing him
5 a document without asking him whether he has seen it? You're inviting
6 him to comment. You could have asked the question, with the greatest of
7 respect, without showing a document whether -- which he, may I say, I
8 should be very surprised if he has seen before.
9 JUDGE HALL
10 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Mr. Vlaski, you have a document in front of you. It's a list of
12 the candidates for training as special forces in the Republic of the
14 You've looked at the document. First, can you please tell me
15 whether you had the opportunity to see this document before?
16 A. This one specifically, no. But I did see a similar document on
17 the same topic, which we even published in a piece of information
18 material, in English, which we drafted in 1992, in Belgrade, with the
19 Jugo Istok, South East agency. There is a copy done on the -- or an
20 issue done on the topic of media manipulation; I gave that to the
21 representatives of the OTP. Unfortunately, I didn't have copies of that
22 publication with the documents that were included in that. The
23 publication is called "The Chronicles of Anticipated Death," and they
24 were sent to -- this issue was sent to many addresses in the course of
1 Q. When you say you gave that publication to the OTP, can you tell
2 me, when did you give it to them?
3 A. I didn't give them that one. We did three different publication
4 in that period on different topics. One was on military, political, and
5 media preparation, and, in that context, the first publication published
6 a document on this same topic. The second publication, which I did give
7 to the Prosecution, had to do with the media manipulation coming from the
8 west, and it documents exactly the facts which were deliberately
9 manipulated for purposes of media manipulation, in that publication.
10 Q. When you say it's a similar document, do you think that it's a
11 similar document by format, or does it also refer to the same topic or
12 that it is a list of candidates for training in special forces in special
13 forces in the Republic of Croatia
14 A. Yes, that document which we put in that publication does also
15 deal with the same topic of sending special forces for training to
17 Q. Can you look at the last page of this document, please.
18 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] That is page 14, I think, in the
19 e-court. Actually, it's 14 in the Serbian and perhaps already page 2 in
20 the English. Because it's just a question of names. Yes, exactly.
21 Q. You can see that this document which lists a total of 463 persons
22 of Muslim ethnicity is signed by Rasim Muharemovic from the SDA Sarajevo.
23 There is a signature and a stamp. Do you know who Rasim Muharemovic was?
24 A. That was a person who was in charge of security issues in the SDA
1 Q. So this gentleman, Muharemovic, was, let's say, the chief of
2 security of the Party of Democratic Action?
3 A. Not security in the sense that he is doing protection work, but
4 he is organising security within the party.
5 Q. Since you had the opportunity now to look at this document, can
6 you please tell me whether, by its contents, it's similar to the document
7 which you included in that publication or not?
8 A. Yes, it's a similar document.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this
11 document as an MFI
12 MS. KORNER: It already is ... [Microphone not activated]
13 MR. ZECEVIC: But, Your Honours, I'm -- I was just -- it's P424.
14 So then the Prosecution actually tendered this document?
15 MS. KORNER: No, no, you did. [Microphone not activated]
16 MR. ZECEVIC: But it's P424.
17 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated]
18 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, I'm really confused. It's P424 then it
19 was tendered by the Prosecution and now Ms. Korner is -- is objecting for
20 me using this document. I'm not -- I'm really -- I'm really confused.
21 JUDGE HALL
22 to this specific document.
23 MR. ZECEVIC: Can we have it then, if there is no objection, can
24 we have it exhibited without the MFI
25 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated] ... been a mistake. It
1 was put to --
2 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
3 MS. KORNER: I -- there seems -- I think there has been a mistake
4 in the tendering -- I -- because I recall Mr. Draganovic was asked by the
5 Defence about this. They asked for it to be -- it's not on our document
6 list. You can tell. It's a Defence document. It couldn't have been put
7 in by us. So there must be a mistake in the numbering.
8 MR. ZECEVIC: Okay. I accept, and I will not lose any more time.
9 MS. KORNER: And, indeed, I think it was marked for
10 identification because we raised the self-same objection to it at the
11 time it was sought to put it in, through Mr. Draganovic.
12 MR. ZECEVIC: P424, MFI
13 [Trial Chamber and Legal Officer confer]
14 JUDGE HALL
15 by Mr. Zecevic. And it has somehow been incorrectly indicated as a
16 Prosecution document.
17 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes. I'm -- I'm -- I was reminded, just for the
18 sake of -- of clarity on this, I was reminded by my colleague
19 Mr. Cvijetic that the document was MFI'd not because there was an
20 objection by the Prosecution when the document was offered to be
21 tendered, but because the witness said that it -- it -- it is a forgery
22 because the address of the SDA was not -- was not correct.
23 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated]
24 MR. ZECEVIC: Yeah, okay. Okay.
25 Well, now that the address, I believe is -- is -- is resolved,
1 maybe we can re-address the issue again.
2 [Trial Chamber confers]
3 JUDGE HALL
4 marked as an exhibit.
5 MS. KORNER: No. I'm so sorry -- [Microphone not activated]
6 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you very much.
7 MS. KORNER: I maintain the objection. [Microphone not
9 This witness has never seen the document before. He says he has
10 seen similar documents. I'm maintaining the objection. And particularly
11 in the light of the evidence of Mr. -- I'm asking that a witness be
12 called to give the provenance of this document.
13 JUDGE HALL
14 the answer this witness gave earlier that he had not seen this particular
15 document --
16 MS. KORNER: Yes.
17 JUDGE HALL
18 the correct -- on the acceptance of the address, which is just one --
19 MS. KORNER: Yes.
20 JUDGE HALL
21 different issue.
22 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, I'm -- I'm saying that I'm going to
23 object to the admission of these documents until I hear from a witness
24 about where these documents come from.
25 [Trial Chamber and Legal Officer confer]
1 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
2 JUDGE HALL
3 that this may be exhibited, and it must remain as an MFI document marked
4 for identification for the time being. Because, as Ms. Korner has
5 correctly reminded us, this witness, although he accepts the correctness
6 of the address, has never seen the document.
7 MR. ZECEVIC: I understand, Your Honours. I was just -- just
8 notified by -- by my assistants that it was actually Mr. Di Fazio, who
9 asked the document to be MFI
10 JUDGE HALL
11 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you very much.
12 MS. KORNER: I'm sorry, Your Honour. Let's not get this
13 confused. It was a mistake to list it as Defence [sic] document. We
14 weren't asking for it to be admitted; we were asking for it to be marked
15 so if we wanted to go back to it, we knew what it was. It's still a --
16 it's still a Defence document. It's should have never been marked an as
17 a Prosecution document. And that's where the confusion has arisen.
18 JUDGE HALL
19 MR. ZECEVIC: I understand, Your Honours. I would just -- I
20 would just like to clarify one thing. Maybe it's not the proper time
21 now, but we will have to readdress that, because my understanding of
22 Ms. Korner is that she will object to all the documents, admission of the
23 documents by the Defence until she hears from the witness about where
24 these documents come from.
25 If there is -- if that is the standard, Your Honour, then the
1 Defence will do the same. And I don't think it will bring us to anything
2 reasonable, considering the -- the due process of law and the -- and the
3 normal -- normal procedure in this courtroom.
4 JUDGE HALL
5 the -- Ms. Korner's position, that isn't remarkable, is it? We always
6 have to be satisfied as to the provenance of exhibits so that the --
7 there's no way -- there is no general anticipatory order that that --
8 that can be made, even with the understanding of counsel. We have to
9 deal with these on an item-by-item basis, as I said earlier.
10 So we'll see.
11 MR. ZECEVIC: I agree, Your Honours, but I was just -- just
12 surprised by the comment.
13 MS. KORNER: I wanted to -- I want to make my position absolutely
15 MR. ZECEVIC: May I continue, please.
16 MS. KORNER: All right. I just want to make this very clear.
17 There are certain classes of documents such as those that are taken off a
18 web site from an accused that will be an automatic objection. Other
19 documents, as Your Honours say, we will deal with -- on a case-by-case
21 MR. ZECEVIC: But I have stated that this is not the document --
22 these are not the documents which come from the web site.
23 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated]
24 MR. ZECEVIC: And even if they come from the web site, this is a
25 public domain. The Internet is a public domain, Ms. Korner, and
1 therefore --
2 JUDGE HALL
3 Mr. Zecevic, that because the internet is in a public domain that a
4 document would migrate into the court, if that's the only source.
5 But let's see what happens as we go.
6 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you, Your Honours, I understand.
7 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Vlaski, I apologise for the fact that we are
8 losing time. Can we look at 1D124. It's a document of the Ministry of
9 Interior of the Republic of Croatia
10 31st of July, 1991 is the date. Subject: Attendees of the training
11 course and instructions for those who have left the training course.
12 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] 1D124.
13 Q. Have you ever seen the document before or such a document before?
14 A. No. I haven't had the opportunity of seeing this sort of
16 Q. Very well.
17 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Can the document be -- can the
18 witness be shown 1D00-4704, which is the document dated the
19 8th of August, 1991.
20 Q. It was also issued about the MUP of Croatia and lists the
21 attendees of the sixth course for individuals training to be policemen.
22 Page 1 is related to the 1st Battalion, which -- the members of which are
23 listed in the alphabetical order.
24 Do you -- can you see the document?
25 A. Yes, I can.
1 Q. Have you ever seen this document before?
2 A. No, not this particular one. But, as I said earlier, I did see
3 the lists that were sent to Croatia
4 issued in Croatia
5 seen it before.
6 Q. Very well. Tell me, Mr. Vlaski, these young Muslims who
7 attended -- or who went to the MUP of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
8 you do know that on their return to the BH they largely joined the
9 reserve force of the MUP of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
10 A. Yes. It's correct that the SDA leadership, through the MUP
11 reserve force, built up its own armed force which was supposed to acquire
12 legitimacy by virtue of the fact that it was part of an institution
13 which, by its very definition, was an armed forces. And this was a
14 method, the simplest way of creating a powerful armed force through the
15 police reserve force.
16 Q. You must be aware of the fact that the Ministry of the Interior
17 of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina was illegally arming the
18 Party of Democratic Action?
19 A. We had information to that effect, and this was more or less
20 known to the public at large, which channels were used for arming.
21 Q. I have a certain number of receipts here, reflecting the
22 hand-over of weapons and equipment. This is 1D00-6944. The receipts are
23 mostly -- refer to the months of February and March 1992, and they
24 reflect the hand-over of weapons and equipment.
25 Have you ever seen these documents before?
1 A. Since we had Serb individuals as members of the MUP who worked in
2 certain organisational units which had to do with financial records of
3 the MUP, we received a great deal of information from these individuals,
4 both about the hand-over of weapons and the invoices that were paid in
6 behind all of it was Minister Delimustafic, Bruno Stoic, who was the
7 assistant minister and head of finances in MUP. Based on the information
8 thus obtained, we launched information to the media - some of the
9 information was published in the Belgrade
10 read in Bosnia-Herzegovina - but they were known to the public at large.
11 Now, as for these receipts, specifically, we had a fair amount of
12 information about them because our colleagues who were employed on these
13 posts, in warehouses, and in certain departments were aware of these
14 activities. They even knew of the vehicles used to transport the goods,
15 though I can't tell you exactly where the documentation based on which we
16 were aware of these activities ended up, what became of it.
17 Q. Thank you very much.
18 MS. KORNER: Yes, well, he still hasn't answered the question.
19 Can we have an answer, please.
20 Has he ever seen the receipts before was your question. We then
21 got this speech which doesn't answer the question.
22 MR. ZECEVIC: It was my understanding that he hasn't seen them,
23 and that is why I didn't offer it for --
24 But I can ask the question.
25 Q. [Interpretation] Did you see the receipts that I've just shown
1 you ever before? Have you ever seen them before?
2 A. I can't recall specific documents. It would really be too much
3 of an expectation to expect me to remember receipt numbers so-and-so. I
4 was aware of some of them; I did see some of them. But receipt
5 number 115, well, almost 20 years later, I can hardly be expected to
6 remember this.
7 Q. Well, that was my understanding of your answer, but since my
8 learned friend insisted that I repeat the question --
9 A. Had I worked in a warehouse where such receipts were issued, I
10 would probably recall them.
11 Q. Thank you, Mr. Vlaski.
12 It was because of the nature of your work that you were informed
13 of the secret meeting of the SDA in the police hall which was held on the
14 26th of May, 1991. Is that right?
15 A. Yes. Because, at the time, I was the chief of the administration
16 for the security of individuals, and these individuals included
17 Mr. Izetbegovic, who participated in the meeting.
18 Q. At the meeting, a decision was taken, among others, on the
19 setting up of the National Defence Council of the party. Is that right?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. At the meeting held on 26th May, 1991, a decision was taken on
22 the establishment of the Green Berets and the Patriotic League, as
23 paramilitary formations, and on their arming. Is that right?
24 A. It was not taken in that particular format, but a political
25 decision was made to take that general course. These organisations or
1 formations were not publicly announced at such meetings, not to everyone.
2 Q. The Council for National Defence of the SDA - and we saw, a
3 moment ago, the name Muharemovic, who was the chief of security of the
4 SDA and who authored certain documents - was in fact part of the plan for
5 an armed conflict with a view to separating Bosnia-Herzegovina from
7 A. The SDA political leadership did not accept the constitution of
8 the BH in the way in which it was laid down. For any decision of this
9 sort, whereby certain formations which were not provided for by the
10 constitution were set up, since, under the BH constitution, only the JNA
11 was envisaged and the MUP was envisaged as an armed force as well,
12 however, it was under the wing of the party that certain preparations
13 were made for one such activity to be legitimised, whilst taking control
14 of all the leverages of power.
15 Q. Under the existing rules and regulations, this was an illegal
16 armed rebellion to all intents and purposes?
17 A. I would not call it an illegal rebellion; I would call it illegal
18 preparations. Mr. Izetbegovic was a lawfully elected state official
19 because he was the elected member of the Presidency as a representative
20 of the Bosnian people. So as -- having such a role, he, however, acted
21 as an illegal structure in the Presidency because he was involved in
22 unlawful activities aimed at setting up illegal paramilitary formations.
23 Q. Thank you. Can I show you 1D00-4743 now, which is a SDA
24 document, signed by Mr. Hasan Cengic. It bears the date of the
25 13th June 1991
1 The document says that -- or notifies the fact that the Council
2 for National Defence was set up. Now officially established as you
3 confirmed to us. This was discussed on the 26th of May.
4 A. Yes, it was on that date that a political decision was taken to
5 set up that formation. It was on that -- at that SDA meeting that a
6 political decision was taken as to what needed to be done. Because the
7 meeting was attended by representatives of the SDA not only of
8 Bosnia-Herzegovina but also of Sandzak, Kosovo, Croatia, Vienna
9 were also some foreign emissaries there whose identity we were unable to
10 uncover. It was too difficult a task.
11 Q. In other words, a political decision to set up the Council for
12 National Defence was taken on the 26th of May. And as we can see from
13 this document, on the 11th of June, the decision was -- the political
14 decision, that is, was implemented. Is that right?
15 A. This is the logical sequence from a political decision to the
16 operational implementation of the decision. At that time, in the month
17 of June, no elements existed for such an activity to be undertaken. In
18 other words, there was a plan behind all of this. And what the goal of
19 the plan was became clear afterwards.
20 If I may add another thing: In order to implement this decision
21 already in the month of June, illegal organisations such as
22 "Slobodna Bosna" was set up, which was led by Zjakic from Stari Grad
23 municipality, and Patriotic League which was coordinated by
24 Sefer Halilovic, as an active JNA officer.
25 Q. Tell me, sir, have you ever seen the document before?
1 A. Not this one, no. But it was a -- a matter that was of common
2 knowledge at the time. It was a public matter in the public domain. It
3 had already been published by the newspapers at the time.
4 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Can this document please be
5 exhibited, unless there are objections from the Prosecution.
6 MS. KORNER: Yes, there are. Can I firstly be told where this
7 comes from. Secondly it says:
8 "On that occasion, a declaration was adopted. And we attach it
10 Can we have the declaration, please.
11 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] The document comes from the same
12 source as the previous one, namely, the MUP of the Republika Srpska, team
13 for investigations into war crimes of Banja Luka. We don't have that
14 declaration which is one of the documents that were appended to this
16 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, I -- again, it is not a document he has
17 seen. It's a part document. We haven't got the other part. The
18 relevance is obviously what the declaration is. I'm afraid we object.
19 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, to me, the fact that
20 this document confirms that on Monday, 11th of June, the Council for
21 National Defence of the SDA was set up illustrates its relevance, nothing
22 else. A declaration about this is ...
23 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, the suggestion which is being made and
24 accepted with alacrity put by the witness is that this was part and
25 parcel of some kind of plan to do something. I'm not quite clear what.
1 But, therefore, it seems to me that it's important that we see the whole
2 document for what it is. In any event, as I have already said, this
3 document is not admissible through this witness because he has never seen
4 it before.
5 JUDGE HALL
6 application, Mr. Zecevic. The -- I suppose it could be marked for
7 identification at this stage, but I will not accept it through this
9 MR. ZECEVIC: I appreciate that, Your Honours.
10 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 1D180 marked for identification, Your
12 [Trial Chamber confers]
13 [Defence counsel confer]
14 MR. ZECEVIC: May I continue, Your Honours?
15 JUDGE HALL
16 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you very much.
17 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Vlaski, you are aware that those who were
18 defending in the war or those whose wartime service was recognised as of
19 the 18th of September, 1991
20 A. Yes. This was published in the "Official Gazette" of the
21 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I don't know the exact date. And I
22 don't recall. But, anyway, the authorities at that time issued this
23 information on the -- in the "Official Gazette."
24 Q. I'm now going to show you that document. This is 1D03-1032.
25 We still don't have a translation of this document. These are
1 just two articles that are relevant.
2 So I suggest that we just comment on them with the witness,
3 because I assume that he referred to or meant that that was this
4 document, when he said that it was published in the "Official Gazette."
5 This is the law of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina
6 government for 2004, with the subheading the Law on the Rights of
7 Defenders and members of their families.
8 In Article 1, regulates the conditions, the manner, and the
9 procedure in order to achieve the rights for war. Disabled veterans,
10 members of their families, the members of Sehid [phoen] families, members
11 of the families of those killed, who died, or are missing. The families
12 of those killed, died, the missing defenders and demobilised defenders,
13 persons that are responsible and awarded merits for their work in the
14 defenders and liberation war, as well as other questions from the
15 protection of defenders and wounded war veterans.
16 THE INTERPRETER: The counsel is asked to repeat a part of his
18 MR. ZECEVIC: [No interpretation]
19 Q. [Interpretation] My question was as follows: Did you have this
20 regulation in mind that I just read to you when you said that you read,
21 in the "Official Gazette," this information that the term served in the
22 war is being recognised as of the 18th of September, 1991?
23 A. Yes, that was published. That date was published in the
24 "Official Gazette" that I saw, and I see the same date in this law.
25 I really didn't have any need to monitor the legislature of
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1994 because the facts that relate to this period
2 are familiar from "Official Gazettes" published before, precisely for
3 reasons that included in that law were also persons who represented the
4 organisation of the Green Berets which was mostly formed from criminals,
5 from Sarajevo
6 Q. You can see here, in Article 2, that defenders are considered to
7 be members of the army, the Croatian Defence Council, and the police or
8 the authorised organs of internal affairs who participated in the defence
9 of Bosnia-Herzegovina from the 18th of December [as interpreted], 1991.
10 And then, at the end of that paragraph, it says, As well as persons who
11 participated in the preparation for defence and in the defence of Bosnia
12 and Herzegovina
13 were engaged by the authorised organs.
14 When it says here that that also refers to persons who were
15 engaged in the period before the 18th of September, does that actually
16 refer to the categories of persons that you mentioned before?
17 Can you please also wait before you begin answering.
18 A. Yes, that particular "Official Gazette" that I mentioned,
19 provided for the possibility of these categories of persons be covered
20 and have that status before the 18th of September. These are these
21 categories of illegal formations which were formed as of June or
22 practically May and which already did go through preparations and
23 internal organisation and which already had their names and weaponry.
24 And they were the ones who implemented these actions, which were planned
25 at the political level and carried out at the operational level by these
1 particular formations. This was probably a consequence of some ... one
2 of the consequences of that was the killing of the wedding guest in
4 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Well, if there are no objections, I
5 would like to tender this document to be admitted and marked for
7 JUDGE HALL
8 MR. ZECEVIC: Well, it wasn't anticipated before, but definitely,
9 if our friends from the Prosecution side will -- will accept that, we
10 will -- we will have it as a part of the law library, yes.
11 MS. KORNER: All very sudden. We got it today without a
12 translation. We have never seen it before. I don't know -- that's
13 clearly not the Gazette either. So where is the Gazette?
14 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, we downloaded this from the web site
15 of the -- of the -- of the Government of Federation of
16 Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that is why it is not in a proper form as a
17 Gazette. But this is it the law.
18 JUDGE HALL
19 and I don't know that there's going to be any dispute as to its
20 authenticity - it is simply a mechanical matter of getting it translated,
21 which would happen eventually, I suppose.
22 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you very much. So can it be marked for
23 identification then?
24 JUDGE HALL
25 agreed that the library is a work in progress, and, at the end of
1 exercise, counsel would jointly hand over -- lay over to the Chamber
2 what -- what is in this basket that we call the law library?
3 MR. ZECEVIC: That is correct, Your Honours. But this is
4 something which just popped up like two days ago, and it wasn't -- it
5 wasn't -- it wasn't a part of our understanding with -- with our friends
6 from the -- from the -- from the -- from the Prosecution side. And that
7 is why I'm just raising this issue. We are perfectly willing to add it
8 to the law library, of course.
9 MS. KORNER: I'm not prepared to give an undertaking at this
10 stage without seeing further as to whether we are going to agree or not.
11 MR. ZECEVIC: Okay, I will move on then. Thank you very much.
12 Q. [Interpretation], Mr. Vlaski --
13 JUDGE HALL
14 MR. ZECEVIC: Oh, okay. Thank you very much, Your Honours.
15 [The witness stands down]
16 --- Recess taken at 5.20 p.m.
17 --- On resuming at 5.45 p.m.
18 JUDGE HALL
19 has been brought to my attention during the break that inasmuch as this
20 last document, the Prosecution has reserved its position on that it may
21 or may not eventually make its way into the law library. The safer
22 course would be to have it marked for identification so it doesn't
23 get -- it doesn't stray out there.
24 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you. I appreciate it.
25 JUDGE HALL
1 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 1D181, marked for identification,
2 Your Honours.
3 [The witness takes the stand]
4 MR. ZECEVIC: May I continue, Your Honour?
5 JUDGE HALL
6 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you very much.
7 Q. [Interpretation] A moment ago we were looking at that piece of,
8 legislation, and one of the crucial dates was the
9 18th of September, 1991.
10 If you recall, can you tell me this: Was this not the very same
11 date on which the police reserve force was mobilised, pursuant to an
12 order by Mr. Delimustafic back in 1991?
13 A. Yes. It has to do with this, as well as with what I said
14 earlier, that these paramilitary formations were granted the status of
15 legitimacy under these provisions, and this is by far more important to
16 me than what Delimustafic wrote.
17 Q. But you will agree with me, won't you, that it was on or around
18 that date that the mobilisation of the reserve force of the police was
19 declared in BH, pursuant to an order by the then-minister of the interior
20 of the BH, Mr. Delimustafic?
21 A. Yes, but this is a coincidence.
22 Q. Right. Let us sum up. On 26th of May, 1991, a meeting was held
23 where a political decision was taken that the Council for National
24 Defence was to be set up. Approximately, at the same time, the
25 Green Berets and the Patriotic League were established. In the course of
1 the summer, Muslim youths were sent for training to the MUP of the
2 Republic of Croatia
3 reserve -- police force of the police, and that same force was mobilised
4 sometime in mid-September 1991.
5 Is the time-line more or less correct?
6 A. Yes. But let me only add this: That alongside this process, the
7 arming process took place as well. What were the financial sources?
8 Well, some of it was from the budget and some of it was from the side --
10 Q. If my understanding of what you're saying is correct, in this
11 way, a respectable armed force was created, was it not?
12 A. The indicators point to that precisely. Because the option which
13 existed under the constitution that they should be part of the
14 Territorial Defence and the JNA was not utilised. Rather, the third
15 option of creating a paramilitary force was chosen, and this had to be
16 legitimised through a political action and through the adoption of
17 relevant regulations by the authorities.
18 Q. Throughout that time, you, in the Ministry of the Interior, were
19 confronted with numerous problems, such as the ones you related yesterday
20 and earlier today.
21 If I recall correctly, on the 9th of September, 1991, you came
22 out, or, rather, the leading staff of the Serb ethnicity came out with a
23 press release. Do you recall that?
24 A. Yes. Because our struggle against the windmills was pointless.
25 We invested efforts in favour of professionalism and lawfulness and
1 realised that it all came to nothing. Our attempt, through the political
2 structures - and who else could we have turned to but to the Serb people
3 whom we were part of? We could not seek international protection. We
4 could not expect any sort of fair or at least civilised approach by the
5 Bosniak Muslim leadership of the MUP. Thus, we were compelled, in a way,
6 to let the public know about this. We could only inform them about this,
7 because we could not get any protection from them just as we couldn't get
8 any protection from the SDS
9 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Can we please show you 1D116. This
10 is the press release of the managerial staff of the MUP of
12 Q. You can see the document now. Is this the press release you
13 talked about a moment ago and confirmed its existence?
14 A. Yes. It's a press release issued by the managerial staff of Serb
15 ethnicity of the MUP of BH.
16 Q. And in this press release you pin-pointed some of the most
17 typical cases, including yours, where you were not appointed to the post
18 which you should have been given or which the SDS should have given based
19 on the inter-party agreement. Is that right?
20 A. Yes, my case was among the cases that prompted the issuing of
21 this press release. And there were some others which were even more
23 Q. When you say "more drastic," what exactly are you referring to?
24 A. I'm referring to unlawful conduct, which became the standard
25 practice of a state institution and instead should have been punished.
1 No control could be enforced, because the key positions of control were
2 usurped by the very same individuals who took over the legislative,
3 executive, and judicial functions all at once. I mentioned the case of
4 Mr. Zijo Kadic, who was the chief of a centre, member of the parliament,
5 and a presiding -- or the chief of the State Security Service of
6 Bosnia-Herzegovina. How can a member of the Serb people expect such an
7 individual to take any measure or initiative against the practices that
8 became very prominent? It was quite clear that there was no political
9 will to do that. Not only that, but there was another ulterior motive
10 which dictated precisely what -- that what was done should be done in the
11 way it was done.
12 Q. P902 was shown to you yesterday. This is an intercept involving
13 Mr. Zepinic and Mr. Karadzic, and I think it bears the date of the
14 16th of September. They're having a conversation about the problem which
15 arose concerning your appointment. Do you recall that? That's P902.
16 A. Yes, I do recall that.
17 Q. Yesterday, when my learned friend was showing you --
18 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Can we please have page 4 of P902.
19 And that's page 4 both in the Serbian and English versions. Page 4 in
21 Q. Can you see the document?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. At the bottom of the page, Mr. Vitomir Zepinic says - and in
24 English, it's in the middle of the page. He says:
25 "If Avdo Hebib and Hilmo would remain here, I will not. To be
1 clear, I will not go there. I will form a separate ministry."
2 If my understanding is correct, Mr. Vitomir Zepinic tells
3 Mr. Karadzic that because it is impossible to honour the agreement, he
4 would, as the last resort, form a separate ministry. Is that right?
5 A. Yes. The date is the 16th of September, and these events
6 happened in that very period.
7 Throughout the year, the nine months were characterised by the
8 very policies that I explained. It was a time-limit within which all the
9 vital functions should have been made operational and not just for
10 national security but for these institutions to become operational. But
11 this deliberate obstruction, which completely bypassed the political
12 rules, colleagues, and institutions, led us to a situation where
13 Mr. Vitomir Zepinic, a top notch intellectual, who, to his misfortune,
14 did not have extensive experience with the police or with criminals - he
15 wasn't really skillful at discussing matters with criminals - well, this
16 proved to be his disadvantage, not an advantage.
17 It was a misfortune for us that we had to endure such relations.
18 Whatever the case, those who are in power, once they realise they have
19 power, they do what they will. Those of us who did not have power, had
20 to do the little we could; and we could do basically nothing. This
21 helplessness and desperation that led Vito into a situation where he said
22 that he would create a separate institution, such an intellectual who
23 advocated lawfulness in the face of individuals who only knew the tool of
24 force and -- and the language of force, had to resort to this. I suppose
25 I would be able to tell you enough about these relations to fill a book
1 of memoirs. But the statement he made here best illustrates the edge to
2 which we were pushed.
3 On the other side, the political leadership did not have a
4 political response to the situation. They had been fighting for
5 something for nine months and realised that they could not win the game.
6 They realised that their coalition partners with whom they believed they
7 had come to terms -- with -- about something, these three peoples could
8 only co-exist on the principle, on principle of an agreement among the
9 three peoples. And the agreement was possible only through the mediation
10 of the international community, because there was no goodwill on the part
11 of these two peoples - and I'm referring basically to the political
12 leadership, not to the individuals themselves - they did not have a voice
13 that could be heard. Unfortunately, individuals with a criminal past
14 took up certain positions thanks to certain conditions which prevailed in
15 Bosnia-Herzegovina. They got a chance to do something. And what they
16 did was the very worst.
17 Q. I hope you will agree with me that one of the tactics which was
18 pervasive and particularly prominent in the Ministry of Interior was to
19 postpone and drag the resolution of certain issues that were raised by
20 the Serb side?
21 A. Well, that was a part of the plan. It was not -- it didn't
22 amount to postponing anything. Mr. Izetbegovic, as he came out of
23 prison, already had an idea of how he was going set up a party and take
24 over power. Clearly, the policy was to break up the existing state for
25 the preservation of which, unfortunately, representatives of the Serb
1 people fought. And this was confirmed by the plebescite which was aimed
2 at preserving Yugoslavia
3 now - tailored to fit everyone. We were supposed to catch up with the
4 progressive world. And God knows when we will do it now, because we're
5 still dealing with the same issues we were dealing with back in 1991 and
6 1992. And, for that reason, it was impossible to expect someone who
7 already had a plan prepared -- well, the Serbs didn't have a plan. They
8 clearly made their political view loud and clear and that was that they
9 wanted to preserve Yugoslavia
10 Now, we were supposed to be given a role of a national minority,
11 and this is something that clearly transpires from one of the conclusions
12 of the Badinter Commission. If this was an option that we were going to
13 be given, and if it was clear that Izetbegovic received political and
14 international support to organise a referendum in
15 Bosnia-Herzegovina - which, by the way, was never verified by any of the
16 institutions - this particular act - which was organised in Bosnia
18 counter-constitutional - had never been verified by the BH organs. And
19 by the letter of the law, it was counter-constitutional because the
20 legislation of the BH clearly envisaged a procedure for the verification
21 of the results. Just as the results of the 1991 census in
22 Bosnia and Herzegovina had never been verified.
23 In other words, everything was a travesty in that state because
24 somebody wanted it to be that way.
25 Q. When you say "plan," I assume that if we place the -- the events
1 from September and the whole of 1991 into context, then a part of that
2 would be the declaration on the independence of October, which was
3 adopted by the Assembly in violation of the constitution, the rules of
4 procedure, and other regulations.
5 A. This is just now the speeding up of the political process to buy
6 some time so that things could be completed faster. Along with the
7 political aspect, all the other preparations were continuing to give us
8 some kind of role that we could not accept. Now, I'm talking about the
9 people from my ethnic group because this is where my origin is.
10 Q. You are aware that the European Union, in late 1991 and
11 early 1992, joined the plan to seek a peaceful solution for the situation
12 in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This plan was called the Cutileiro Plan and
13 envisaged a division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into three entities with
14 separate organs, which, at the time, was believed to be the only
15 reasonable and rational solution in order to resolve the situation in
16 Bosnia and Herzegovina. Do you recall that?
17 A. I remember that very well. Every event has left a thick mark on
18 my memory. And such an event is something that I do remember very well.
19 Also because we saw it as a chance. Finally someone did see that there
20 was a problem there that had to be resolved adequately and in a timely
22 However, the plan and the assistance that came from the outside
23 was something that somebody did not need. And after all of this, we can
24 see who did not need this. The Serbs were willing to accept such a
25 solution. The manner and the way in which this agreement would be
1 reached was just a question of good will, how to implement that, but, of
2 course -- I apologise.
3 Q. Is it not true that Mr. Izetbegovic also agreed to the plan after
4 which he withdrew his signature or his agreement from the document?
5 A. This is a matter that is known. Mr. Izetbegovic was never
6 consistent in his policies. His tactics was to be unpredictable and
7 inconsistent, and it cost the other political structures a lot,
8 particularly the Serb political structures. If you believe the man, then
9 that would, at the same time, be your punishment.
10 Q. Perhaps he was consistent with his plan, as you said?
11 A. Well, that he probably was. But the way in which you need to
12 achieve a plan, you need to have different tactical manoeuvres and an
13 approach. In order to implement this plan, he used all kinds of methods.
14 Q. All right. Yesterday you talked about my -- talked with my
15 learned friend about the meeting of the 11th of February, 1992, in
16 Banja Luka. That was not a secret meeting, was it?
17 A. No, it was in no way a secret meeting. I can absolutely claim
18 that, that it was not a secret meeting of any type.
19 Q. It's a fact that several of those who addressed the meeting
20 talked about the need to submit the conclusions to the then-minister,
21 Mr. Delimustafic, and to give deadlines in order to surmount certain
22 problems. Isn't that right?
23 A. Well, that was our approach; let's reach an agreement. And we
24 did offer the possibility for an agreement. However, trouble forced us
25 to assemble at this meeting. Had there been any kind of plan, we would
1 have managed to meet in this composition during a year or so that had
2 gone by. We would probably have sat down somewhere, organised ourselves,
3 prepared ourselves. We would have done something on some kind of
4 political platform or would have had some other tasks to implement.
5 Trouble forced us to meet on the 11th of February, 1991, for the first
7 What does this mean, for the first time? This means that we did
8 not have -- other than these few colleagues on this list whom I knew
9 personally, these were all the other people that I met for the first
10 time. And this indicates the scale of our trouble, that we didn't even
11 have time to meet each other personally. Whose fault is that? It's the
12 fought of our leadership. I, as the chief of the 5th Administration, was
13 prevented from moving around as an authorised official. In order to
14 prevent me from moving around, Minister Delimustafic, actually the deputy
15 for -- or assistant for finances Bruno Stoic wrote an order stating that
16 no one can go more than 5 kilometres away in any official vehicle without
17 the permission of the minister.
18 So I was humiliated; I had to wait at the secretary of the
19 minister's office for her to write some kind of authorisation so that I
20 could go on a business trip. While my colleagues, Muslims and Croats,
21 could travel distances of 300 or 500 kilometres and didn't have to
22 account for that to anyone. And this is why we met for the first time.
23 And I regret that we met only then for the first time. Had we been
24 meeting more or before, our response would probably have been more
25 effective, and we would have had probably the possibility of having some
1 sort of influence on any situation. But this is what -- how it all
2 worked out.
3 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] can we please show the witness
5 Q. My learned friend put questions to you yesterday about this
6 meeting, and you did give your comments on that, so I don't want to go
7 into that again. But one of the things that was stated was the matter of
8 the arming of the police reserve forces of Serb ethnicity.
9 Isn't it a fact that, in 1991, the police reserves were mostly
10 replenished by Muslims. They were mostly summoned into the reserves?
11 A. Yes, correct. Correct. We, at the Ministry of the Interior,
12 had, as far as I know, about 10.000 members, uniformed policemen. And
13 those who were just employees were not police officers. And we also had
14 a certain number of reserve forces. According to the list, which is
15 taken as the relevant criteria in 1991 - the ratio along the ethnic lines
16 in Bosnia-Herzegovina is known to everyone - so that structure was
17 supposed to correspond to the ethnic structure of those employed in all
18 the institutions. So that structure was supposed to reflect the
19 constitution and the structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina in institutions
20 and some public enterprises as well. It -- the situation with the
21 employees there was supposed to reflect the overall situation in
22 Bosnia and Herzegovina.
23 For example, in western Herzegovina
24 were in a -- in a majority. Then, in some other places, had you Muslims,
25 Bosniaks, who were in a majority. So that, perhaps -- situation was not
1 reflected right there. But precisely for that reason, at the level of
2 the former Yugoslavia
3 prevalent opinion in Bosnia and Herzegovina was that they were also a
4 majority in that segment in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Nobody
5 ever provided specific data about the ethnic structure of the cadres
6 employed there. That organisational unit was under the control of
7 Mr. Hilmo Selimovic, who was mentioned as few times before, who came to
8 the ministry from a post as the director of the brewery.
9 So they were these authentic -- authentic people who were
10 interpreting these lists. And you can imagine the objectivity that they
11 had when they provided their views on the protection of the
12 constitutional order and the actual state of affairs in the government.
13 That didn't even occur to them. They could adjust the data the they
14 wanted to and put the stamps on that, and they were not obliged to report
15 about that to anyone. They didn't have to report to anybody or be
16 responsible to any kind of political structure.
17 So, of course, this is all in the sphere of legend. They
18 couldn't just sack people from the MUP for some frivolous reasons; I
19 mean, it was also a social question, not just a political question. So
20 then they refrained from that sort of revenge, but they used all sorts of
21 more subtle methods of replenishing the staff. And this is why they
22 thought up of this principle of the reserve composition through which
23 they were supposed to create an armed force, a legal armed force which
24 would be part of the ministry forces, which, if needed, could turn into a
25 military force, because those persons who were recruited were of
1 specialties by establishment as drawn up by Sefer Halilovic, representing
2 the Patriotic League, because he had military training. And this is what
3 they coordinated. They had all had coordination at the SDA level, and
4 the National Defence Council, together with cooperation from the HDZ,
5 because they did need an alliance in relation to Serbia. They needed an
6 alliance with Bosnia and Herzegovina, because they were also settling
7 their accounts through Bosnia and Herzegovina to the detriment of
8 Bosnia and Herzegovina.
9 Q. I would like to ask you to be more concise because I think we
10 have lost track of the question here.
11 Was it not a fact that -- to a greet degree, Muslims were mostly
12 called to join the reserve forces of the MUP?
13 A. Yes, that is correct.
14 Q. Isn't it true that in those areas of the public security station
15 where the reserve forces had a Muslim minority -- majority, the MUP would
16 provide for material and equipment to precisely those places; is that
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Isn't it true that in the same way, in the territories of the
20 public security stations, where the Serbs were in a majority in the
21 reserve forces, actually no weapons or materiel or equipment was sent by
22 the MUP?
23 A. It's true that nothing was supplied, but there is another fact
24 which is even worse.
25 Q. Go ahead.
1 A. There's another fact I am aware of. Certain assets were
2 deliberately taken out of the centres where the Serbs had at least some
3 form of influence or clout. This is particularly typical for state
4 security, and this is the sector I'm most familiar with.
5 When all the operative technology, which was by the order of
6 Dautbasic, withdrawn from all the centres and stored in -- at one
7 location in Sarajevo
8 the field to work. The official justification was that they wanted to
9 prevent the equipment from being misused. They stored all the technology
10 and the equipment in the head office and used it for their own purposes
11 as they saw fit, and we discussed that.
12 Q. Yes, you discussed this yesterday.
13 Let me sum up. On the one hand, the public security stations
14 where Serbs were in the majority, materiel and technical equipment,
15 including uniforms, were not supplied; whereas, on the other hand, what
16 little they did have was taken away from them and taken to the Sarajevo
17 head office. Is that right?
18 A. Yes. From the available receipt documentation, you can see that
19 the equipment was taken, through unlawful means and methods, away; and
20 the individuals who were in charge of these facilities didn't have an
21 opportunity of using them anymore.
22 Q. So some of the matters discussed at the meeting by
23 Mr. Andrija Bilosevic, among others, who complained about the fact that
24 did he not have any more weapons. Then there was another individual who
25 said that they didn't have uniforms in sufficient numbers, et cetera,
1 these were, indeed, matters which bothered the heads of public security
2 stations and others who were represented at the meeting, and they did
3 have an actual basis.
4 A. Yes, of course. All these claims had a basis because they were
5 based on the situations that prevailed in the various stations. And
6 there was a need to protect the population.
7 Q. Thank you. Let us, therefore, conclude. The requests put forth
8 at this meeting were not aimed at additional arming of policemen of Serb
9 ethnicity. This was merely a request for all the policemen, regardless
10 of their ethnicity, to be fully equipped, all those who worked within the
11 Ministry of Interior of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Is
12 that right?
13 A. Absolutely. The only logical explanation, and this is a fact, is
14 that this was the sole objective of these requests.
15 Q. It is a fact as well that in the February of 1992, not only did
16 you, as members of the MUP of Bosnia-Herzegovina, of Serb ethnicity, see
17 no other way out of the situation then the formation of the
18 Ministry of the Interior of Republika Srpska. You also enjoyed the
19 support of the European Union which had a plan of division of
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina on the principle of the three entities. Is that not
22 A. We merely followed a line of thinking, a policy, which wanted to
23 solve the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, because neglecting or ignoring
24 the interests of one people would lead to an enormous difficulty for
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina. You cannot run a concern policy whilst completely
1 ignoring the interests of one people. The international negotiations
2 which took place and as far as the Lisbon
3 concerned, they were headed in that same direction. Later on, this plan
4 was, in a modified version of it, brokered by the international community
5 and these were the Dayton Accords. That was the only possible political
7 Now let me answer your question. The MUP leadership consisting
8 of individuals of Serb ethnicity didn't have any other choice because the
9 political tendency was for certain regions of municipalities to be set up
10 through which authority would be established on a regional principle.
11 These were the well-known SAO Krajinas. This was an option which was
12 offered, and this was offered in the discussions concerning the
13 constitutional amendments and the arrangement of the three peoples.
14 Neither the Bosniaks nor the Croats accepted this option because it did
15 not run in -- in their favour.
16 Q. Very well. Now, the last topic that I would like to discuss with
17 you, and this was also the last topic covered with you by Ms. Korner in
18 her direct examination, was the issue of the barricades as of the
19 1st of March, 1992.
20 You repeatedly stated that in your view this was a political
22 Now, was not one of the reasons on which you base this position
23 of yours is the way in which the crime was committed? The wedding guest
24 who was killed was killed in the yard of a church in Sarajevo in front of
25 the very eyes of the wedding party.
1 A. Well, that's the gravity of it all. And that's the message it
2 sent. Had the circumstances not been such, the event would not have led
3 to the subsequent events, if the incident itself didn't have such
5 The murder of that wedding party guest was not committed because
6 of the identity of the wedding guest -- party guest, but, rather, because
7 of the Serb insignia, of the Serb flag. And the message was that they
8 shouldn't be there. And then, by the same token, they shouldn't
9 anywhere. They were not desirable in Bosnia-Herzegovina at all.
10 Now, where would this lead us, the Serbs, as a collective and let
11 alone the individuals themselves? So should an individual merely fall
12 flaunting a flag constitute a target for that very same reason? Should
13 such a gesture have such drastic consequences? Is this what should
14 befall a person who strikes a song or -- was this supposed to be the fate
15 of the Serb people?
16 Q. And particularly the fact that the murder was committed at the
17 threshold of a church; is that right?
18 A. Well, yes. It has a wider dimension if we analyse it from the
19 political point of view. The wedding could take place in a registrar's
20 office without any problems, but, in a church, Serbs, at Bascarsija,
21 should they really be there? Well, the message that was sent was, You
22 came there this once, but that was your last time you were there.
23 Q. Tell me, you confirmed that the perpetrator was identified and
24 arrested and subsequently released. One of the eye-witnesses told us
25 that according to the information he had, the order came directly from --
1 MS. KORNER: Sorry, from where are you quoting? [Microphone not
3 MR. ZECEVIC: Well, I think the position of the Trial Chamber is
4 that we are not allowed to -- to give the name of the witness. We can
5 cite the words of the witness without disclosing the name of the witness.
6 MS. KORNER: No, I'm sorry, Your Honour, I don't agree with that.
7 The rule is you cannot -- you can put propositions to this
8 witness; they should not be preceded by the words "Somebody has told us
10 JUDGE HALL
11 MS. KORNER: [Overlapping speakers] ... the proposition itself.
12 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Do you have information that from interviewing the person
14 arrested, according to that, the information came directly from the
15 office of Mr. Izetbegovic?
16 A. I don't have that particular knowledge, but all the facts, i.e.,
17 actions of the MUP officers involved, indicate that it was not done in a
18 professional manner.
19 The response of the persons authorised was not either
20 professional or in accordance with the law. The individual should have
21 been firstly arrested, and, secondly, detained.
22 However, the person was hidden away. Evidently he had the
23 protection of the police. And the evidence from the crime site
24 disappeared. Only 15 years later did the BH judiciary start -- initiate
25 a procedure against the suspect for the murder, but the trial was not
1 completed because the various opposing factions were at logger heads
2 surrounding this issue, and they liquidated the individual.
3 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Zecevic, I didn't hear the witness say that a
4 perpetrator was arrested and subsequently released, and I didn't -- I
5 can't see that in the answer he gave after you put that to him.
6 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, it must -- it must be -- my mind is
7 tricking me. I feel I heard that he said that he was identified,
8 arrested, and then released.
9 JUDGE DELVOIE: Can you -- can you ask him to clarify.
10 MR. ZECEVIC: I understand, Your Honour.
11 Q. [Interpretation] Tell me, sir, can you resolve this
13 A. Yes, I am more familiar with this issue than you are.
14 This was the result of unprofessional conduct. The role of the
15 authorised official is such that they first have to identify the
16 perpetrator. And there was a policeman at the crime scene, and he was
17 supposed to arrest the individual.
18 However, the individual was hidden away and enjoyed protection.
19 So I'm not talking about any sort of arrest taking place. The person who
20 was the participant in the event was protected.
21 MR. ZECEVIC: Was that enough explanation, or should I pursue?
22 JUDGE DELVOIE: [Microphone not activated]
23 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you very much.
24 Q. [Interpretation] Yesterday, during the direct examination, you
25 listed a number of individuals who were present in the Holiday Inn on the
1 day you were there, including Mr. Stanisic.
2 Mr. Stanisic claims that he was away in Mostar on official
3 business on that day and that he returned to Sarajevo only late that
4 evening. Do you allow for the possibility that you may be mistaken, your
5 memory might be playing tricks with you that he was in Sarajevo on that
7 A. Well, nobody asked me which period of time that was, or period of
8 day. I was there in the evening hours myself, and that was when we met.
9 Q. So that was late in the night?
10 A. Yes, I was there late in the night.
11 Q. Thank you.
12 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] I have no further questions.
13 JUDGE HALL
14 Yes, Mr. Krgovic.
15 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, may I just mention that there's just
16 one small matter I want to raise just before we rise today. It's purely
17 administrative, and it shouldn't take more than a minute.
18 JUDGE HALL
19 you could --
20 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, Your Honour.
21 JUDGE HALL
22 LiveNote. If you could break at about 6.55 to allow Ms. Korner to deal
23 with that matter.
24 MR. KRGOVIC: I will do that, Your Honour.
25 Cross-examination by Mr. Krgovic:
1 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Vlaski, good day. I am Mr. Krgovic, and I'm
2 representing Mr. Zupljanin. I'm going to put several questions to you
3 that have to do with your testimony today and yesterday.
4 In response to my colleague, Mr. Zecevic's question, you
5 mentioned certain operative techniques from certain centres where a
6 certain influence was excerpted by Serbs at the centre in Sarajevo
7 well known that the equipment used for wire-tapping was relocated from
8 Banja Luka and transferred to the Sarajevo centre.
9 A. Not only from Banja Luka. It was a decision to pull that out of
10 all the centres. That was it. It was not something that was done
11 selectively. It was a general decision on the relocation of all the
12 equipment to the centre, where control would be taken over by the line
13 along the vertical subordination structure, under the control of these
14 structures, from the ranks of the Muslim and Croatian people.
15 Q. And this meeting on the 11th of February in Banja Luka, the
16 opening by the host, Mr. Stojan Zupljanin, when he spoke about the
17 security and the materiel and financial situation, he also referred to
18 this about these matters, which in the circumstances, making the work of
19 the SUP
20 A. Well, this was a problem -- it was a general problem where some
21 people were more affected by it and some less. It just varied in the
22 details. It depended on the size, the security requirements, the
23 security threat assessment. So these problems were in some places more
24 pronounced and some places less pronounced.
25 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we now look at 1D135, please.
1 Q. This is the document of the minutes that you already had. So can
2 you please look at page 4 in the Serbian version, and that is the place
3 where Mr. Vlado Tutus from the Banja Luka centre --
4 Did you know Mr. Tutus?
5 A. Yes, did.
6 Q. And he says there that, precisely for the reasons that you are
7 talking about, says that the people from Bosanska Krajina have lost their
8 trust in the MUP; the CSB
9 all-terrain vehicle. And that problem did exist because people in the
10 municipal and regional centres felt abandoned and believed that the
11 Serbian cadres in the MUP had to do much more than they were objectively
12 able to. Is that correct?
13 A. Yes. It was an assembly of the desperate, not MUP leadership.
14 Our cry was away of reacting. Mr. Tutus, probably as a policeman of many
15 years standing in a town such as Banja Luka, had enough information about
16 the mood of the people. And it was normal that those people would convey
17 their dissatisfaction. And it was also normal that he, as an authorised
18 person in charge of the security in a town, if he had nothing to defend
19 it with and to carry out his regular duties -- I mean, we can see that he
20 didn't have the adequate vehicles.
21 Well, how can we talk about any kind of work? Were we supposed
22 to get horses like we did in World War II to be able to go from one place
23 to another?
24 Q. And the security problem was particularly pronounced in the
25 Banja Luka area because of proximity of the war in Croatia
1 which were spilling over from Croatia
2 A. At that time, the refugees from Croatia were the first refugees
3 that arrived to Bosnia and Herzegovina from Croatia
4 came to the Krajina area, they came to Banja Luka. And that pressure
5 from Croatia
6 the police because they were the ones who had resolve the numerous
7 problems. And they were most affected by those problems, and they were
8 the ones called upon to deal with them.
9 Q. On the other hand, they were not equipped and didn't have enough
10 people, and they asked for reinforcements in personnel; they asked for
11 professional staff, which would help out. They asked for people from
13 A. They had been thrown out of their jobs in Croatia. They didn't
14 just lose their jobs. So what can a professional do? He is not going to
15 go into some kind of trade that he never did in his life before. He was
16 a policeman, and he was looking for a position in the police.
17 On the other hand, we had the process of the employment of
18 completely incompetent people to the police, even though we had perfectly
19 capable policemen that were available.
20 Q. And that was precisely the problem discussed by Mr. Zupljanin at
21 this meeting. On the one hand, criminals were being employed in the
22 police; and, on the other hand, we had professional who would be able to
23 do the job properly, who were not being taken into service.
24 A. That was the plan. Employing criminals, misusing, deliberately,
25 their abilities in order to implement objectives. That was part of the
1 plan. Serbs could not employ the professionals that were offering
2 themselves from Croatia
3 forces of the police either. They were not being trained; they were not
4 being provided equipment or weapons. And so now we have some question
5 being put here about the arming of these structures. Again, these are
6 legitimate structures that were including the active police. This was a
7 pronounced problem. What kind of a Serbian MUP or a Serbian conspiracy
8 or a Serbian organisation can we be talking about? That is a joke even
9 to mention it in this context. We were powerless there, and we were just
10 speaking rhetorically in this way without any kind of concrete action.
11 Q. If you look at the second page of this document, one of the
12 speakers is Cedo Kljajic and he's referring to the Motorolas which were
13 obtained by MUP funds but were never placed in the MUP warehouses. Was
14 that also part of this plan?
15 A. I am very familiar with this kind of dealing about the obtaining
16 of this equipment because we did inform the public to a considerable
17 degree about that, as for these Motorolas. And not only Motorolas; there
18 were vehicles arriving, all kinds of things coming in. All of that was
19 being directed at these structures. The Motorolas were taken by
20 Mahmutovic whose superior I was for a certain period of time. And this
21 went along that line, the SDA. I think that this, for us, at that time,
22 was not really any kind of strange thing, but we didn't have the
23 mechanisms to react. We didn't have any mechanisms; we didn't have any
25 Q. And what Cedo Kljajic is saying, We Serbs are the only ones who
1 are acting lawfully, as opposed to the SDA and the HDZ. This assertion
2 of his is correct?
3 A. Well, that was our problem because we naively believed that we
4 could do something if acted legally. Until the last day, until the
5 division in the MUP occurred, until this whole process began of the
6 falling apart of Bosnia and Herzegovina, we naively believed that you
7 could preserve. And this Assembly, this meeting of ours, and from the
8 conclusions, it was evident that we were still trying to offer to
9 Alija Delimustafic, as the minister, something. But that was just an
10 illusion. We were trying to give him an opportunity for us to form a
11 kind of Serbian MUP within the MUP so that we could at least be able to
12 collect -- to assemble in a restaurant without having to hide -- to say,
13 Well, we are Serbs; we could listen to each other; we could comfort each
14 other; and then, if we have the opportunity, we could tell each -- you
15 something; and then perhaps we could reach some sort of agreement or tell
16 you at least something.
17 However, the role of the police is not to reach agreements.
18 Their job is to implement the laws. And the principle here, as they
19 imposed on us, was, Well, let's agree whether we're going to follow the
20 law or not. And, of course, they didn't need the laws. They had the
21 political support and that was the way they operated.
22 Q. And when the reserve forces were formed, when members of the
23 Muslim ethnic group were recruited, then they went and they took records
24 from the Defence Ministry, knowing whose specialities were of recruits
25 who was -- were then mobilised. They were recruiting those had had
1 certain specialised military knowledge. Is that correct?
2 A. Yes. That was already the plan drawn up by Sefer Halilovic on
3 the military organisation of the SDA Party. And I am a witness who can
4 affirm that Mr. Sefer Halilovic came to the Presidency to see
5 Alija Izetbegovic, because, at that time, the Presidency was under the
6 authority of my administration, at whose head I was, so we did know who
7 was coming to the Presidency because it was our duty to provide
8 counter-intelligence protection.
9 However you couldn't do this in an institutional way. This was
10 sort of privately-gained information, because this institutionalised work
11 required work along the specific professional line. And the work had to
12 are verified somewhere in order to enter into procedure. And so that
13 pursuant to any kind of information on illegal actions, somebody would
14 then need to take adequate measures because state security was supposed
15 to work on the combatting of organised and illegal activities.
16 As for legal activities, such as the legal activity of a
17 political party, that was not part of the work of a security service,
18 except in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where this was acceptable.
19 Q. Mr. Vlaski, just a correction to the transcript, page 57. You
20 said, I am personally a witness that he came. Isn't that correct?
21 A. Perhaps I misspoke. I was informed about the fact that Mr. Sefer
22 Halilovic came to the Presidency to see Alija Izetbegovic.
23 MR. KRGOVIC: [Previous translation continues] ... to break up my
25 JUDGE HALL
1 Mr. Vlaski, the -- we are about to take the adjournment for the
2 day. Your cross-examination is still not complete, and before the Usher
3 escorts you from the courtroom because the Court is not going to rise
4 immediately, I would remind you of what I said yesterday about not
5 discussing the matter with other persons. Thank you.
6 So we would resume at 2.15 tomorrow in this courtroom. Thank
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
9 [The witness stands down]
10 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, the first thing can I say, we can do
11 in open session; and the second matter, I would like to go into private
12 session for. But it's a question of tomorrow.
13 The next witness is only arriving late tonight. We had a request
14 last week from Mr. Zecevic to be able to interview that witness before he
15 testifies. We suddenly, today, had a request also from Mr. Krgovic who
16 would also like to see this witness, which is not a request we've had
18 This witness, it would seem, is going to finish pretty quickly
19 tomorrow afternoon as I understand from Mr. Krgovic. So we will not be
20 able to go, as a result of these requests and apart from the fact that he
21 has also got to look through documents, we won't be able to call that
22 witness tomorrow. So there will be, I am afraid, a break at the
23 conclusion of this witness.
24 JUDGE HALL
25 to the that in the note that was sent to Ms. Featherstone, when was this,
1 on the 10th? On the 10th.
2 MS. KORNER: Right. I hadn't -- I've obviously missed that one
3 or forgot about it.
4 So just so Your Honours are aware of that.
5 We're now getting requests to see just about every other -- every
6 witness we're calling between now and Easter from both counsel. So can I
7 make it clear: We'll do our best do accommodate them, but, obviously,
8 VWS aren't happy about witnesses being here for a very long time. And
9 really it is incumbent upon the Defence, if they want to interview these
10 witnesses, to make their own arrangements, rather than us having to
11 factor in that when we bring them up here. So I'm just, as it were,
12 putting down a marker, as somebody in my chambers would say.
13 Your Honours, for the second matter, can I just briefly go into
14 private session.
15 JUDGE HALL
16 [Private session]
11 Page 6443 redacted. Private session.
16 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6.58 p.m.
17 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 17th day of
18 February, 2010, at 2.15 p.m.