1 Wednesday, 26 May 2010
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.08 a.m.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning,
6 everyone in and around the courtroom.
7 This is case number IT-08-91-T, the Prosecutor versus
8 Mico Stanisic and Stojan Zupljanin.
9 JUDGE HALL: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
10 Good morning to everyone.
11 May we have the appearances, please.
12 MR. OLMSTED: Good morning, Your Honours.
13 It's Matthew Olmsted, Joanna Korner, Crispian Smith, and our
14 intern, Tatjana Quast with us today.
15 MR. ZECEVIC: Good morning, Your Honours.
16 Slobodan Zecevic, Slobodan Cvijetic, Eugene O'Sullivan, and
17 Ms. Tatjana Savic appearing for Stanisic Defence. Thank you.
18 MR. PANTELIC: Good morning, Your Honours.
19 For Zupljanin Defence, Igor Pantelic and Dragan Krgovic.
20 JUDGE HALL: Thank you. Before we continue with the
21 examination-in-chief of the --
22 [The witness takes the stand]
23 JUDGE HALL: You may be seated, sir.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
25 JUDGE HALL: Before we continue with the examination-in-chief of
1 Mr. Radulovic, there are two small preliminary matters which the
2 Trial Chamber wishes to raise. One is that on Friday the OTP, and in
3 person Ms. Korner, had invited us to reconsider the ruling that we had
4 given excluding the number of articles written and published by the
5 Witness Traynor, and indicating that -- presumably taking on board the
6 reservations that the Chamber had expressed, indicated that the
7 application would have been modified - that's my choice of words, not
8 necessarily what she had said - limiting it to the articles to which he
9 specifically spoke during his testimony. We think that we are inclined
10 to accede to that application, but for the purpose of clarity, we would
11 need, in the course of today, hopefully, or at the earliest convenience
12 of the OTP, the articles in question. We have the full list that the --
13 with which we had been provided; but we need, in order to rule, to know
14 precisely which articles it is that Ms. Korner had in mind on Friday.
15 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, can I say, I had them actually
16 yesterday, but it didn't seem appropriate to raise them. I can provide
17 the numbers at the first break.
18 JUDGE HALL: Thank you.
19 The second matter is that it would be recalled that yesterday we
20 had given an oral ruling in respect of an application which the OTP had
21 made on the 18th of May dealing with the addition of three items to their
22 65 ter list, and we had given a partial ruling, the Defence not
23 objecting, in respect of two of those items because they dealt with the
24 witness who is presently on the stand. There is a remaining item. The
25 65 ter number would be 3598. And subject to being persuaded to the
1 contrary by the Defence, we would similarly be inclined to admit that --
2 allow the inclusion of that item, although we appreciate that the
3 relevant witness isn't scheduled to appear before July. So if the
4 Defence, and as I said, accepting that, as we indicated yesterday, you
5 can make the argument about time, but that apart, that we would wish to
6 hear from the Defence before we formally rule on the admission -- on the
7 inclusion of this 3598. Thank you.
8 Mr. Radulovic, before Mr. Olmsted continues his
9 examination-in-chief, I remind you you're still on you oath.
10 WITNESS: PREDRAG RADULOVIC [Resumed]
11 [The witness answered through interpreter]
12 JUDGE HALL: Yes, Mr. Olmsted.
13 MR. OLMSTED: Thank you, Your Honour.
14 Can we have on the screen P1373, which was admitted at the end of
15 the session yesterday. And if we could turn to page 2 of the B/C/S and
16 page 3 of the English.
17 Examination by Mr. Olmsted: [Continued]
18 Q. First of all, good morning, Mr. Radulovic.
19 A. Good morning.
20 Q. We took a look at this document at the end of the day yesterday,
21 and I just want to ask you a couple more questions about it.
22 You can see that this is -- as we discussed before, this is a
23 SNB Banja Luka payroll for June 1992. And if you can look at number 12
24 on this list, we see the name "Zdravko Samardzija."
25 MR. OLMSTED: Maybe we can zoom in on number 12 in the B/C/S.
1 Q. Can you see that name there, Mr. Radulovic?
2 A. It's kind of illegible, but I recognise it.
3 Q. Okay.
4 MR. OLMSTED: And if we can turn to the last page of this
5 document, both the English and the B/C/S.
6 Q. We see, on this page -- I'll wait for the B/C/S to come up. We
7 see on this page the first name on the list is Ljuban Ecim.
8 Mr. Radulovic, does this mean that Samardzija and Ecim remained with
9 SNB Banja Luka while they were with the Banja Luka Special Police
11 A. Yes, as far as I know. And, throughout, they were on the list as
12 staff of the SNB. There was a remark that they were temporarily deployed
13 to another unit.
14 Q. How would you describe the relationship -- I'm sorry.
15 THE INTERPRETER: Could the microphone of the accused please be
16 switched off.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know what kind of
18 relationship you mean.
19 MR. OLMSTED:
20 Q. Yes, I'm sorry. I was interrupted with my question.
21 Could you describe the relationship between Mr. Zupljanin and the
22 special police detachment commanders?
23 A. Nothing special. I only know that the special detachment was
24 part of the CSB and, frankly speaking, I know that Ljuban Ecim was much
25 closer to Mr. Nedeljko Kesic than he was to Mr. Stojan Zupljanin, with
1 whom he didn't have such close ties. That is my personal observation,
2 and I believe that the events that ensued after 1992 corroborate that.
3 Q. Could you tell us how closely Mr. Zupljanin followed the
4 activities of the CSB police detachment?
5 A. I really don't know to what extent he followed it, but I believe
6 that the detachment had more contacts and closer ties to the SDB than the
7 SJB, regardless of subordination, the command, and everything else,
8 because the managerial staff -- the commanding staff of that detachment
9 belonged to the SNB, and I believe that is the reason why this detachment
10 was so close to the SNB not only at the level of Banja Luka, but also at
11 the level of the entire republic.
12 Q. Well, was Mr. Zupljanin aware of the activities of the special
13 police detachment, their observations in the field?
14 A. I met Mr. Stojan Zupljanin for the first time in person when I
15 first went to Doboj, because I had received information and I also saw
16 with my own eyes what that detachment was doing in Doboj. After
17 returning from Doboj, I immediately informed Mr. Stojan Zupljanin in
18 person that the members of the SNB, who were treated as a special unit
19 and they were conspicuous because they wore special hats and they were
20 called the hat-bearers, they committed serious crimes, and I suggested to
21 the chief, Mr. Zupljanin --
22 Q. Let me interrupt you there. I apologise, but I want to focus you
23 on my questions today, because we don't have enough time.
24 MR. KRGOVIC: No, no, let him finish.
25 MR. OLMSTED: He's not being responsive to my question. My
1 question is not about crimes of the special police at this point; it's
2 just generally did Mr. Zupljanin follow the operations of the special
3 police detachment when they went out in the field to conduct an
4 operation. Whatever they did in the field is not what I'm asking for
5 right now, but whether he followed the operations, as such.
6 JUDGE HALL: It would be helpful if the witness would confine
7 himself to answering the specific questions that is asked. But inasmuch
8 as this seems to be -- this is not an irrelevant point, and it's a point
9 which Mr. Krgovic apparently is interested in, lest it be -- while it's
10 live, perhaps the witness should be permitted to continue, and then you
11 can return to your question, Mr. -- if it needs to be repeated,
12 Mr. Olmsted.
13 MR. OLMSTED: Well, we will be -- we will be asking questions
14 about this particular incident in Doboj a little bit later, and so I'm
15 just trying to avoid repeating ourselves.
16 JUDGE HALL: Very well.
17 MR. OLMSTED:
18 Q. But at any rate, Mr. Zupljanin [sic], I'm sorry for interrupting
19 you. Can you please finish what you were saying, and then we'll focus
20 back on my question.
21 I'm sorry. Mr. Radulovic, I'm sorry.
22 A. May I? I had the feeling -- that was my first oral report to the
23 chief, Mr. Zupljanin. I had a feeling that he was surprised, that he
24 couldn't believe that the members of the special detachment from
25 Banja Luka were doing that. He said he would check.
1 On the following day, I didn't know what Mr. Zupljanin had done,
2 but on the day after that, in other words, on the third day after the
3 event, I saw that the members of the special detachment were withdrawing
4 from Doboj to Banja Luka, and that withdrawal of theirs was not short
5 because they were taking with them what they had taken or looted in the
6 area of Doboj. As I knew some people who were members of that special
7 detachment, I saw an incredible lot of valuable things that they had
8 looted in Doboj. From that, I drew the conclusion that Stojan Zupljanin
9 had taken some steps to withdraw our detachment from Doboj, considering
10 the fact that local criminals also committed crimes using the presence of
11 this other group as a front, and they attributed their own deeds to them.
12 I don't know whether this will suffice for you, but this was the
13 impression I got; namely, that Stojan Zupljanin, when I first informed
14 him, didn't have true information about the activities of the special
15 detachment in Doboj.
16 Q. Can you tell us approximately when you had this discussion with
17 Mr. Zupljanin about the special police detachment?
18 A. The special police detachment, before my report, had been present
19 in Doboj for about two weeks. I remember well that I received the first
20 information from collaborators from the Doboj area. I learned that
21 crimes were being committed there. I admit that at first I couldn't
22 believe that such crimes were being committed, and when I went to Doboj
23 and saw -- and talked to various collaborators and operative connections,
24 as well as members of the public security and state security, with whom I
25 was on good terms and heard from them what was happening in Doboj, you
1 can believe me that to me this was the first information -- the first
2 unpleasant information that I received that this was done by members of
3 my people and members of the service to which I belonged. Those people
4 were doing that freely, without anybody in Doboj doing anything to
5 prevent them.
6 I must remind you that it was especially difficult for me when I
7 learned in Doboj that the mistreatment and -- or, rather, that even
8 people with whom I had long worked in Doboj such as Karlo Grgic or
9 Professor Dr. Ilija Tipura had been mistreated or killed. Many other
10 people, too, came to harm from these individuals. Some were killed and
11 some died as a consequence of mistreatment. This was why I suggested to
12 the managerial staff of the SJB, among them Mr. Zupljanin, that we must
13 do everything to protect the members of the SJB to -- so that they aren't
14 harmed by these criminals and renegades. And, if it is their wish, to
15 allow them to leave the RS freely with all their valuables, without being
16 searched, without anything being taken away from them, without them being
17 mistreated. And I must say that fortunately it was a common position
18 that every -- or every one of these workers, including the SJB and the
19 SDB, being able to do so. And it was, indeed, done. I don't know what
20 else might interest you.
21 Q. Why don't we take a look at P1337.
22 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Olmsted, I would like you to insist a little
23 bit on your initial question; not the crimes, not Mr. Zupljanin's
24 knowledge about the crimes, but Mr. Zupljanin's place in the chain of
25 command, what -- you know, that you initially wanted to know.
1 MR. OLMSTED: Yes, but since we've opened up this topic of this
2 Doboj incident, I think I'll cover this first and then go back to that,
3 if that's all right.
4 JUDGE DELVOIE: That's okay.
5 MR. OLMSTED: Very good.
6 If we could look at P1337. And perhaps we can just quickly turn
7 to the second page of the B/C/S.
8 Q. Mr. Radulovic, can you confirm that this is one of your reports?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. This report is dated 17 May 1992 and discusses or reports events
11 in Doboj around that time-period. And in the first paragraph - if we can
12 turn to the first page - it reports on crimes committed against the
13 non-Serb population in Doboj and attributes these crimes to special
14 forces from Banja Luka and special forces organised by a man called
16 First of all, is this around the time that you had this
17 discussion with Zupljanin about the activities of the special police
19 A. Yes, approximately. At that time, I can't remember the exact
20 date, but what you're mentioning with regard to this, Bozovic was not a
21 member of the Banja Luka Special Detachment. He was from Belgrade
23 forces members from Doboj to become eligible for members of the special
25 Q. Could you provide us with the first name of Mr. Bozovic?
1 A. Yes. Radoman Bozovic. I know that his roots are in Montenegro
2 I met him two or three times. I informed the man of the activities of
3 those who were using the Red Berets as a front, and I know what his
4 reaction was. At the time, he stepped on an anti-personnel mine, and he
5 was taken away on a stretcher. I know that he beat those who were
6 committing crimes even as he lay there on the stretcher. He was holding
7 an automatic rifle by the barrel, and he threatened them that they would
8 be killed, even. And he said to them, Are you the so-called Serb
9 fighters? You call yourselves Serb heroes and do such things. I must
10 say that because it is true.
11 Q. Thank you for that. But please -- please try to limit your
12 answers to my question, because I think my question was simply whether
13 this report, which is dated 17 May 1992
14 discussion with Mr. Zupljanin, and you've given us substantially more
15 than that. So please try to keep your answers short.
16 You referred to, in this report, the special forces from
17 Banja Luka. Is that the special police detachment from Banja Luka
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And who was leading that detachment at this time?
20 A. I know who was the number-one man in Doboj when I went there. It
21 was Ljuban Ecim. There was also Zdravko Samardzija, and I need not
22 repeat all the names that I have already mentioned here; the entire
23 group, the Kojic brothers, Subara, and so on. They're all identified in
24 my reports with their full names, so I don't need to repeat that.
25 Q. And you mentioned Bozovic. And you said his first name was,
1 I think, Radomir. Was it Radomir or Radojica?
2 A. Radojica, well, where I'm from, names are frequently changed,
3 such as Radoman into Radovan. I'm not quite sure, but he may have been
4 either Radomir or Radojica Bozovic.
5 Q. And just to further clarify, you mentioned the Red Berets. Was
6 that the name of the group that was under him?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And you describe, in this report, a number of crimes committed
9 against the non-Serb population, and then earlier in your testimony you
10 mentioned the mistreatment and killing of some, I believe, former police
11 officers who were non-Serbs. Can you tell us what other crimes they were
12 committing against non-Serbs in Doboj around this time?
13 A. I don't know how to say that in a nutshell. All kinds of crime;
14 rape, mistreatment, murder, looting, anything. If I give you an example,
15 I think it will do.
16 At the entrance to the CSB, I was stopped by an old, experienced
17 police officer by the name of Mile Bosnjak. He was like in a trance. He
18 recognised me because I had worked in Doboj before, and he used to call
19 every employee of his service whom he met in civilian clothes "Boss." So
20 he told me, Boss, I'll kill myself. And I said, What's happening? I
21 thought he was pulling my leg. And then he told me about an experience
22 of his. The members of these paramilitary units, or whatever you may
23 choose to call them, four of them raped a 13-year-old girl in front of
24 her mother in one of the residential high-rise buildings in Doboj. At
25 the time, my daughters were about that age, and, of course, I was unable
1 to control myself, being very emotional, and I asked who had done it.
2 And he told me, among others, that the hat-bearers were doing that
3 together with the local criminals.
4 Having learned that Karlo Grgic had been killed, a man I knew, a
5 professional -- he was the commander of the police station in Doboj, then
6 Ilija Tipura, he was a doctor of legal science and a professor, and he
7 was also chief of the CSB before the war, so knowing who had been killed,
8 of the people I knew, and who had been mistreated -- among others, they
9 even mistreated the family that looked after my children while I lived in
10 Doboj. And it wasn't merely mental harassment, but also physical
11 mistreatment by locking them up in some private or semi-private detention
12 rooms or prisons or whatever. So whatever was -- whoever was found on
13 the street and recognised as being non-Serbian was taken away and
14 mistreated horribly.
15 On the same day, I met Andrija Bjelosevic, and I wanted to know
16 what the problem was. Andrija Bjelosevic was the chief of the service in
17 Doboj, and I remember that in his office I met my earlier chief of the
18 inter-municipal SUP, Milan Maric. It was a convenient moment because
19 Milan Maric was one of the professionals with the greatest experience in
21 Bjelosevic to put an end to it, and he told me, literally, I can do
22 nothing about it. Because they are local groups - if you want, I can
23 mention who it was - local criminals who are stronger than the SJB and
24 the SDB because they enjoy the support of political circles. And I said,
25 Who? And he said, Drago Paravac. And I went to Drago Paravac right away
1 because his office was in the building across the street from the SUP.
2 And I met a man whom I had known before, and I said -- I think at the
3 time he was president of the Executive Committee of Doboj. I told him --
4 well, I didn't call him sir because I rarely say sir to anybody, and I
5 asked, What's happening in Doboj? And it was -- he told me, But what?
6 What's the problem? As if it was a theatre performance. And I said,
7 Man, come on, can't you see that crimes are being committed? They are
8 bringing in Croats and Bosniaks on buses. Because there was a detention
9 facility, a prison of sorts. They are being beaten up and mistreated.
10 And he told me, So what? And I said, Man, but can't you understand what
11 this is about? And he was looking at me as if I were from outer space or
12 something, as if I were talking about irrelevant things, about trifles.
13 JUDGE HALL: If I might interrupt. There are two observations
14 that I would make. One is that I think you're going a little too quickly
15 for the interpreters, so you need to slow down a bit.
16 But, secondly, we appreciate that you are a witness to certain
17 events, and it is in the context of your -- what you would have observed
18 that you have been asked to attend as a witness. But the -- in order for
19 a trial before this Tribunal or, indeed, any tribunal anywhere in the
20 world to move forward in a way that the decision-makers, in this case the
21 Judges, at the end of the day can do their work, it is not the best way
22 to have a witness just give a narrative.
23 The reason why counsel on either side are present is that
24 understanding what the charges are with which the Trial Chamber is
25 concerned, that is, what is specified in the indictment, counsel for the
1 Prosecution, on the one hand, and for the Defence, on the other, would
2 have, in terms of the questions which they intend to ask, a sort of road
3 map as to where to lead, so that not -- whereas the questions that
4 counsel asks, you are expected to answer out of the context of what you
5 observed. It is not an invitation for you to continue a narrative, if
6 you understand what I'm saying.
7 So, in other words, one of the difficulties that we are
8 experiencing is that when counsel asks a question, we expect that the
9 answer that the witness would give would relate to that question, so that
10 we, as the Judges, can follow where counsel is leading us. And the same
11 thing would arise when we hear from -- when counsel from the other side
12 asks you questions. So bearing that in mind, if you would listen to the
13 question that counsel asks and only answer that question, then it would
14 be of benefit to all of us, yourself included.
15 Do you understand?
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand you and I respect you,
17 but I understood the question of the Prosecutor to mean that he wanted to
18 know what crimes were committed in Doboj. I didn't know how else to
19 describe it, other than to give them a picture of what was happening.
20 JUDGE HALL: Yes, Mr. Olmsted, please continue.
21 MR. OLMSTED:
22 Q. You mentioned hat-bearers. Who were the hat-bearers? Just
23 remind us who they were.
24 A. For the umpteenth time, the hat-bearers were members of the
25 special police detachment from Banja Luka. I can tell you that in Doboj
1 they were in a platoon, which means that there were about 30 men.
2 Q. And you also mentioned two individuals, Karlo Grgic and
3 Ilija Tipura. Can you tell us what their ethnicities were?
4 A. Both of them were Croats.
5 Q. Now, you've described for us a number of crimes occurring in
6 Doboj in this month of May. Did you inform -- when you had this
7 conversation with Mr. Zupljanin, did you inform him about all these
8 different types of crimes that the special police detachment and other
9 units in Doboj were committing?
10 A. I informed them in general terms about the crimes, about the
11 crimes that were being committed, and I told them that unfortunately
12 members of the special police detachment from Banja Luka participated in
13 those crimes as well. And two or three days later, the members of the
14 special detachment were withdrawn, were pulled out from Doboj.
15 Q. To your knowledge, were any measures taken to discipline or
16 criminally charge the special police detachment members for any of the
17 crimes they committed in Doboj?
18 A. I'm not aware.
19 MR. OLMSTED: Let's take a quick look at 65 ter 10187.
20 Q. Can you tell us -- I was just reminded by my colleague that in
21 your witness statement you mentioned that they were pulled out -- the
22 special police detachment was pulled out in June of 1992. Is that
24 A. In the beginning -- in the beginning of June or in late May. I
25 can't be more specific than that as to the date, but at around that time,
2 Q. Now, is this one of your reports? Wait, hold on a second. Yes,
3 it is.
4 A. It is.
5 [Prosecution counsel confer]
6 MR. OLMSTED: We have a technical problem here. We have the
7 wrong B/C/S version on the screen. It doesn't match the English
8 translation. So I'm going to come back to this issue.
9 Q. Mr. Radulovic, you mentioned that it was Mr. Zupljanin who
10 withdrew the special police detachment from Doboj at the end of May or
11 beginning of June. Does this mean that Mr. Zupljanin was the ultimate
12 commander of the special police detachment, at least during this
14 MR. KRGOVIC: Objection. It's leading.
15 MR. OLMSTED:
16 Q. Well, then, can you elaborate further on Mr. Zupljanin's powers
17 over this special police detachment?
18 A. Yes, I can. Let me just say that after I informed them verbally,
19 the special detachment was withdrawn from Doboj, and I understood that
20 the special detachment had been withdrawn on the order of
21 Stojan Zupljanin. That was my understanding. And I think that he did
22 have certain powers -- or, rather, among other things, he was also
23 authorised to command that unit. Now, whether he did it directly or
24 whether via his subordinates, right now I simply don't know that, and at
25 the time it wasn't really something that I would inquire about. What was
1 important was that people were withdrawn.
2 Q. Where else, other than Doboj, did the special police detachment
3 conduct operations in 1992, let's say between April and September 1992?
4 A. Among other things, I know that for a while some of them were
5 stationed in Kotor Varos. They behaved the same or similarly to how they
6 behaved in Doboj. I know that everybody had problems with them. And it
7 was the leadership of Kotor Varos that had the most problems with them
8 because they imposed themselves as the lords. They subjugated everything
9 to themselves, and they refused to co-ordinate and co-operate with any
10 organs or authorities in the Kotor Varos area at the local level. They
11 committed crimes. Now, if you're interested in what kind of crimes,
12 I can tell you that, too, because I wrote about that. And naturally they
13 went to other areas very frequently, such as Prijedor, Kljuc.
14 And please don't ask me to speak about Kljuc, since I will appear
15 as Defence witness [as interpreted] in the Kljuc case, and it wouldn't be
16 proper and it could also be unlawful for me to testify about Kljuc here.
17 So please don't put any questions about Kljuc to me, but you can ask me
18 about Prijedor and about their activities there in Kotor Varos and so on.
19 As for their participation in operations at the front-line, I
20 don't know much about that. I don't know anything specific that might be
21 of interest.
22 MR. OLMSTED: Thank you.
23 Mr. Pantelic.
24 MR. PANTELIC: Yes. I think that we have here in
25 transcript - it's page 17 -- it's page 17, line 4 - in response there is
1 a word "Defence witness." It is not what witness actually said. So
2 please, Mr. Olmsted, clarify that with him, in which capacity he is
3 mentioned -- acting, and he's mentioning this case before a Sarajevo
5 MR. OLMSTED:
6 Q. Mr. Radulovic, just for clarification for the record, we have it,
7 in the English transcript, that you said you were a Defence witness in
8 the Kljuc case. Are you, in fact, a Defence counsel in the Kljuc case?
9 A. I'm Defence counsel in that case, one of Defence counsel in that
10 case before the BH Court
11 MR. PANTELIC: And I do apologise. And could we have a name of
12 the client and function of the client, so just for the record?
13 MR. OLMSTED: I don't think that's relevant to this case.
14 JUDGE HALL: I agree.
15 MR. OLMSTED:
16 Q. Mr. Radulovic, you've mentioned that the
17 special police detachment were in Kotor Varos, Prijedor, and you
18 mentioned Kljuc. We won't talk about that. But was this after they had
19 conducted this operation in Doboj, so after May of 1992?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. And to your knowledge and based on your intelligence information,
22 was Mr. Zupljanin aware of the operations that his detachment were
23 conducting in these other municipalities, Kotor Varos, Kljuc, and
25 A. Given that it was you who put to me various dispatches and
1 information notes that I wrote at the time, one can see from those
2 documents that I informed my immediate superior, Vojin Bera, and I also
3 informed orally Nedeljko Kesic. Now, as to whether those information
4 notes and dispatches ever reached Stojan Zupljanin, I truly don't know
5 that. I had occasion once, or maybe more than once - two or three
6 times - to talk to Mr. Zupljanin about what was going on in the Prijedor
7 and Kotor Varos area, and among other things I mentioned the activities
8 of the members of the special detachment of the SJB, or whatever they
9 were called. So I did inform him. And I know, on the basis of contacts
10 with him, that he also expressed certain concern in relation to their
11 behaviour in Kotor Varos and in Prijedor.
12 I remember - I don't know if he still remembers - that he used to
13 tell me that he received similar information from local leadership; first
14 of all, the chief in Kotor Varos. And I know that there was a worker of
15 ours who worked there, Zdravko Pejic. He was from the State Security
16 Service. And based on what I know, he also sent information about crimes
17 committed by members of the special detachment in Kotor Varos.
18 Q. And let me just clarify. The special police detachment was in
19 Kotor Varos after its operations in Doboj?
20 A. Correct.
21 MR. OLMSTED: Let's take look at 2D72. And if we can turn to
22 page 20 of the B/C/S and page 23 of the English.
23 Q. What we have before us is an official ID that's of the
24 special police detachment, and it's for an individual by the name of
25 Miroslav Dragojevic. Have you ever seen this kind of identification card
2 A. Naturally, hundreds of times.
3 Q. Is this the identification card that the special police
4 detachment members would carry?
5 A. They were supposed to have it on them always when on assignment.
6 Q. And whose signature appears on this card?
7 A. I can see that it's a signature of Zupljanin, which corroborates
8 something I have said earlier; namely, that according to what I know, the
9 special police detachment was subordinated to the chief of the security
10 services of Banja Luka.
11 MR. OLMSTED: If we can turn to the next page in the B/C/S and
12 stay where we are in the English.
13 Q. This is the back of the card, and it authorises the special
14 police member to enter other people's apartments and premises, stay
15 there, and perform searches without an order from the relevant organ.
16 Mr. Radulovic, did the special police conduct searches of
17 non-Serb apartments and premises without court orders in 1992?
18 A. I don't know of a single case where there was a court order, and
19 I know of a lot of cases where searches were conducted, where people's
20 apartments were entered without any sort of a court order. As for this
21 authorisation, it stems from the old Law on Criminal Procedure. This
22 authorisation was given to members of certain services, including the
23 public and State Security Service, and they were entitled to use it under
24 certain circumstances. I had a similar authorisation during the 20 years
25 of service, so throughout that time I was entitled to do that. I worked
1 for 25 years in the State Security Service, and I never used this
2 authorisation to enter a premises without a court order and search them.
3 I'm just saying this to illustrate how lightly members of the
4 special detachment within the CSB treated this authorisation. Of course,
5 it was quite easy to pull out your ID, enter somebody's apartment who was
6 fighting for his very life, trying to save his family, and nobody really
7 cared whether what they were doing was lawful, unlawful.
8 Q. And what were the --
9 JUDGE HALL: I don't know if you're finished with this, but I
10 have a question of the witness.
11 I see that the phrase is -- appears twice on the back of the card
12 "provided for by law." And if I understand the witness's answer to your
13 last question -- the counsel's last question, it was that this was the
14 old law. And my question is whether this quote/unquote "old law" had
15 ever been repealed or whether it was still in force?
16 Do you understand my question, sir?
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, certainly. That's my
18 profession; that's from my professional field. We did not change the Law
19 on Criminal Procedure once the war broke out and once Republika Srpska
20 was established. Rather, in 1993, at one of the Assembly sessions of
21 Republika Srpska, we adopted the decision declaring that the Law on
22 Criminal Procedure of the former SFRY was still in force. So it was a
23 uniform law that was in place. We simply adopted a decision extending
24 its validity. And it wasn't until sometime in 2000 that the Law on
25 Criminal Procedure was changed, and those were initially mostly cosmetic
1 changes. And sometime later there were also some substantive changes in
2 order to harmonise that Law on Criminal Procedure with some crimes and in
3 order to have it encompass the situation as it existed before the
5 I hope I was clear. I think that all of this was done in 1993.
6 JUDGE HALL: Thank you.
7 Yes, Mr. Olmsted, you may continue.
8 MR. OLMSTED: Thank you, Your Honour.
9 Q. Just to go back to these searches of apartments that the
10 special police detachment were conducting in 1992, when they conducted
11 these searches, did they take anything from the apartments? And if so,
12 what did they take?
13 A. Whatever they considered to be valuable and that they could
14 profit from. So it wasn't just valuables, jewellery, cars, paintings and
15 so on, but everything else; TV sets, VCRs, whatever they could get, even
16 bed linen.
17 Let me just give you an illustration. In the territory of
18 Teslic, they expropriated 147 cars that had a value above average in a
19 month's time, so that was just one example, not to mention other goods
20 worth millions. They looted whatever they could; shops, warehouses. It
21 was really something they took advantage of. Some people who had nothing
22 just before that became wealthy overnight.
23 Q. I want to move to another topic now. Did you know about a red
24 kombi --
25 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I'm a bit confused,
1 because I think that a leading question preceded this answer. When the
2 witness spoke about searches, he spoke about searches in general, not
3 just searches conducted by the special unit, especially when it comes to
4 Teslic and all of these instances of lootings and so on. I had to
5 explain, because this question and this answer put together don't make
7 MR. OLMSTED: I think that's a matter for cross-examination.
8 I think the witness perfectly understood the question, and it was
9 directed particularly at the special police detachment.
10 JUDGE HALL: I was going to suggest the same thing. Mr. Krgovic,
11 to the extent that you have a concern, it's a note that you would make
12 for when you cross-examine the witness.
13 MR. OLMSTED:
14 Q. Mr. Radulovic, did you know about a red "kombi" group operating
15 in Banja Luka the beginning of April 1992?
16 A. I think that every resident of Banja Luka knew of that. The red
17 kombi or red van was actually a hearse, in translation. This was the
18 most awful thing that happened in Banja Luka, a civilised town. Whenever
19 people saw this red van, they would start running away. And whoever had
20 this red van stopped in front of their house could officially announce a
21 period of mourning. These were the people who acted with ill intentions
22 in relation to everybody. People were beaten, harassed. All kinds of
23 things were done by this group which was recognisable because of this red
24 van. I regret that the colour was red. It is my colour. I wish it were
25 of another colour.
1 Q. Who were the members of this red kombi group targeting?
2 A. For a while -- or, rather, initially, mostly affluent, respected
3 citizens of Bosniak ethnicity. And later on, when they stole everything
4 they could from them and deported them or did graver things, then it was
5 the turn of those who were Serbs and who in any way opposed their
6 activities. I know of cases where they mistreated Serbs, stole from
8 Q. How long did this group operate in Banja Luka for?
9 A. For a long time. I think that the methodology of work of that
10 group was consistent with the methodology of work of the Chetniks. They
11 operated in "trojkas," in groups of three, and they spread fear among
12 people. They intimidated them so that people would make a decision
13 quicker and easier to leave Banja Luka or so that people would withdraw
14 from public spaces or streets whenever they saw the red kombi so as there
15 would be no witnesses to what they did.
16 Your Honours, by your leave, just one more sentence, just one
18 I know that what I'm saying is something that can cause grave
19 consequences to me because members of the red kombi group walk freely in
20 Banja Luka nowadays, but I am not uncomfortable speaking about this
21 because these people do not really belong to my nation. They -- this is
22 a deviant behaviour, and they were never called to responsibility for
23 what they had done.
24 Q. Was this red kombi group functioning throughout 1992, from April
25 through to the end of December 1992?
1 A. They were active, as far as I remember, throughout 1992.
2 Q. And can you tell us, Who were the members of this group?
3 A. I cannot remember all of them. I do remember one or maybe two of
4 them. One was called Predrag Boziroda. Boziroda.
5 Q. That's fine. Were there police officers in this group?
6 A. He was also a policeman.
7 Q. Were the other members also police officers?
8 A. As far as I know, none of the people who were in this red kombi
9 group were people who were outside of the police force, with one
10 limitation. There is a possibility that some of them or one of them may
11 have had an ID by the SNB, the National Security Service, because the
12 times were difficult and it could happen that some people would have IDs
13 of the State Security Service without even knowing what this service was.
14 They somehow got it from somebody else. There is a possibility, yes, but
15 mostly they were linked up or linked to the CSB in Banja Luka.
16 Q. And from where did this group operate from? What was their
17 headquarters or their base?
18 A. In the building -- or, rather, let me put it like this: In
19 the -- on the premises that belonged to the CSB, that's where they were
20 located, in the official -- in the official premises, and then they would
21 launch into their actions from the premises that belonged to the CSB. I
22 don't know whether they always took off from the same place or did they
23 use various locations that were part of the CSB. I don't know anything
24 about that. My guess is that it wasn't so. This was simply a criminal
25 group that did what they did for personal gain, and only for personal
1 gain. They were trying to instill fear among the citizens, primarily
2 those of non-Serb ethnicity, yet such activities of theirs were not
3 condoned by the Serbs either. Everyone was afraid of them. One wouldn't
4 dare mention a red kombi or red van in Banja Luka. I don't know whether
5 you can understand that, whether you can understand the feeling. It's
6 just as if somebody would come to a doctor saying, I'm feeling that I
7 have a cold, and then he hears, Oh, no, you actually have cancer, you
8 have about 24 more hours to live. That kind of feeling.
9 Q. Did you have any discussions about this red kombi group with
10 Mr. Zupljanin?
11 A. No, and I can tell you why. Because I talked about the issue
12 with my colleague, Zivko Bojic, with Mr. Vlado Tutus. I also talked
13 about it with people from the military security service. And I remember
14 that Mr. Zivko Bojic told me about Stojan Zupljanin being informed about
15 it and even told me that some kind of arrangement was made to neutralise
16 such groups, including the red van, red kombi. I don't know what was
17 done about it. I am not aware of any specific measures being taken about
18 this group of people. That's all I know about the red van. They
19 committed all sorts of crimes.
20 Q. Let me stop you there. Mr. Radulovic, I know we're going into a
21 lot of detail about events there that occurred a long time ago, and we're
22 doing it in a limited amount of time. Would it assist you to answer the
23 question I asked you if you took a look at your written statement
24 briefly, and particularly paragraph 95?
25 MR. KRGOVIC: No, Your Honour, I object. I strongly, vigorously
1 object to that. Ask a direct question, not to use the statement.
2 Your Honour, the position of the Defence is this statement is a
3 compilation and consists of only the Prosecution case against the
4 accused, not the real statement. That's the reason we object to tender
5 this as evidence like the 92 ter statement, so that's it.
6 MR. OLMSTED: Your Honours, I'm not asking him to read out loud
7 anything from his prior statement. I'm just seeking clarification
8 because what he's saying -- there is some inconsistency, and I want to
9 just clarify that. If he reads it and that's all he wants to say about
10 it, that's fine. I'm not going to put in the record his statement.
11 JUDGE HALL: What Mr. -- I appreciate the practical difficulty
12 that you have, Mr. Olmsted, but, as always, counsel must take its witness
13 as he find him. And Mr. Krgovic is more than technically correct. So
14 ask the question and see what answer you elicit. And the witness,
15 himself, was not asked -- it's unusual, let me put it that way, for
16 counsel to invite a witness to refresh his memory from a document, rather
17 than it actually coming from the witness.
18 MR. OLMSTED: Yes, but this is -- I'm sorry, Your Honour. This
19 is a written statement that he signed, he reviewed very carefully. It's
20 compiled from his various interviews, so it contains a lot more detail.
21 And since we're asking very specific questions regarding conversations he
22 had with certain individuals, I think it just will assist him if he
23 reviews it, and then I can ask him again the question I wanted to ask
25 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Krgovic has seen the statement?
1 MR. OLMSTED: Yes, they've had it for months.
2 JUDGE HALL: Yes, Mr. Krgovic.
3 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honours.
4 The problem with the statement is the following: It is a
5 compilation of interviews taken out of the context. And on the occasion
6 of proofing, when we were proofing this witness, he told us that about
7 30 per cent of it was true and correct and that there were bits missing
8 that need to be elaborated, and this is what he's doing now. He's now
9 elaborating on some of the issues, and this is why I opposed -- and this
10 is why we opposed for the statement to be entered into the evidence. And
11 so we asked for him to testify based on his memories.
12 JUDGE HALL: There is no application for it to be entered into
13 evidence, and I propose, as a practical solution, inasmuch as the
14 statement is available to you and you may make use of it in
15 cross-examination, Mr. Olmsted, you may show him a portion of the
16 statement for him to refresh his memory so that we can move on with this.
17 One of the reasons why I think this should be permitted is I bear in mind
18 that we're dealing with events that would have occurred a long time ago,
19 when the purpose of a trial is not to -- is not a test in memory; it's a
20 question in finding the truth. So if -- Mr. Olmsted, if you could
21 identify the relevant portion. It is not going to be put in evidence,
22 indeed that is not your application, and no doubt Mr. Krgovic would flag
23 it and address it in cross-examination.
24 MR. OLMSTED: Thank you, Your Honour.
25 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, just another comment,
2 This is a statement from the 12th of -- month of December 2009,
3 so it's not some previous materials that have been compiled. All the
4 discussions, all the interviews, took place in 2009.
5 JUDGE HALL: All of those conditions are not lost upon the
6 Trial Chamber, Mr. Krgovic. We appreciate everything that you would have
7 said. And as I indicated earlier, technically speaking, you're correct.
8 Indeed, it is so obvious you probably don't have to argue it. But, as I
9 said, to try to arrive at a practical way of dealing with the immediate
11 MR. OLMSTED:
12 Q. Mr. Radulovic, could you please turn to paragraph 95 of your
13 written statement. And it's page --
14 A. Yes, yes, I found it.
15 Q. Can you please take your time and read that paragraph. It's not
16 very long.
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. You agree with what's written in that paragraph?
19 A. Yes, completely. I stated yesterday, when I spoke about the
20 members of SOS who were -- or the term was translated as
21 "special police detachment," but my first informations were those that I
22 received from Mane Popovic, and my reaction was to go to
23 Mr. Stojan Zupljanin and to tell him -- and tell him that people with
24 such a pedigree, with such a history, with such a record, should not be
25 accepted as members of either public or state security, exactly what you
1 can see in the statement. And then Zupljanin responded, among the men,
2 the men that we discussed at the time, were also the people who were
3 within the red kombi or red van group. Since I knew Mr. -- well, rather
4 not a mister, but Predrag Boziroda, and since I knew about some of his
5 activities in this group, red van, I found it illogical to see such
6 people as members -- as regular members of public or state security.
7 That's what I said yesterday as well. And now, since we have this
8 especially stressed in this part, while I was giving this statement I
9 believe I may have stated that it includes members of the red van group,
10 and that's correct. That's the same thing in a nutshell.
11 So the statement wasn't clear enough. And this is where I agree
12 with the Defence lawyer. It is a compilation. It's a compilation based
13 on several reports I drafted. You can see that in the footnote as well.
14 Q. Okay, thank you. And when you brought to Mr. Zupljanin's
15 attention the activities of the SOS as well as the members of the
16 red kombi group, what was his response?
17 A. I've just told you now. Radule, he told me, these are Serbian
19 Q. All right.
20 Between the 1st of April and 31st of December, 1992, where was
21 your office located?
22 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Olmsted, before you go to another topic, do
23 we have a Milos
24 MR. OLMSTED: The Prosecution's not in possession of one, but
25 I can ask Mr. Radulovic if he ever wrote one.
1 Q. Mr. Radulovic, did you ever write a report on the activities of
2 the red kombi group?
3 A. Yes, I did. I remember well a comment I wrote in this report or
4 a comment that Mr. Nedeljko Kesic put in this report of mine saying that
5 this is something we shouldn't be dealing with; in other words, we
6 shouldn't be dealing with gathering information relating to criminal
7 activities by members of CSB, members of this group, the red van group.
8 I remember this well. I believe it may be part of the materials that you
9 have. I managed to find it among the documents that were handed over to
11 MR. OLMSTED: Does that answer your question, Your Honour?
12 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
13 MR. OLMSTED: Before I move on to the next topic, maybe we should
14 take the break.
15 JUDGE HALL: Yes. We'll return in 20 minutes.
16 [The witness stands down]
17 --- Recess taken at 10.25 a.m.
18 --- On resuming at 10.55 a.m.
19 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, just before the witness comes in, I
20 said to Your Honours after the break I'd give you the numbers, and I said
21 to Mr. Dygeus that I'll give him the sheet of paper afterwards.
22 The documents referred to by Mr. Traynor were as follows: 65 ter
23 10358.03, 65 ter 3379, 65 ter 3378, 65 ter 3375, 65 ter 10358.07, and
24 65 ter 3373. Those are the six articles.
25 Your Honours, while I'm on my feet, can I just also mention that
1 next week Mr. Riedlmayer, the expert, if he's an expert, to do with
2 religious destruction is being called; we haven't yet had a ruling from
3 Your Honours on that, so if you would consider that.
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 [Trial Chamber and Legal Officer confer]
6 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Olmsted, before you continue, you would have
7 been alerted by the Court Officer, whom I thank, because, as I told her,
8 she would -- by speaking with you directly she would identify the problem
9 better than I would be able to at this point, that in terms of the
10 earlier question, the interpreters may not have -- what we would have
11 gotten would not have been what the witness intended to convey, and
12 you've been invited to ask the question again for the record. And I
13 assume it's been -- it's 21 -- the answer appears at page 29, line 3. I
14 believe you have that information, Mr. Olmsted. So before you continue,
15 perhaps you could deal with that issue.
16 MR. OLMSTED: Thank you, Your Honour.
17 And before I do, I was notified that the document we showed the
18 witness when we were -- testifying about Doboj, P1337, that was only
19 marked for identification previously in this trial, and so we would move
20 to admit it, now that he identified it. It is the document pertaining --
21 it is the document I showed him pertaining to Doboj and the activities of
22 the special police.
23 JUDGE HALL: So it's now -- we lift the MFI status, and it's a
24 full exhibit.
25 MR. OLMSTED: Thank you.
1 Q. Mr. --
2 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm really sorry. Is that the document dated
3 17th of May? Thank you very much. I'm sorry.
4 MR. OLMSTED:
5 Q. Mr. Radulovic, before we took the break, you were looking at
6 paragraph 95 of your written statement. And perhaps you could just turn
7 back to that. There was an issue with regard to the translation of what
8 you testified about that paragraph, and so I'm going to ask my question
9 again. And if you could just briefly repeat again what you told us.
10 And my question was: After you've read this paragraph, does that
11 refresh your recollection with regard to a conversation that you had with
12 Mr. Zupljanin about the red kombi group?
13 A. With your permission, I said that after having heard that, among
14 others, members of and individuals from this group will be received into
15 the active duties of the service, and I've heard about that from Mane,
16 that these people will be allowed to enter this group. And I went to
17 Stojan Zupljanin and told him that I believed they shouldn't be allowed
18 to become members of active service because their history is not the kind
19 of history that an employee of the public or state security should look
20 like, and I also said what the reaction was of Mr. Zupljanin.
21 What I'd like to stress is that during that conversation - it was
22 a conversation; it wasn't a written communication - that I told him what
23 they had done before, what crimes they've committed. I'm not sure --
24 what is it that you're asking me to do? I can now elaborate and talk
25 about all of these actions that they were responsible for, but this had
1 to do with my relationship and my contacts with Stojan Zupljanin, which
2 also included discussions about the red kombi group.
3 And could you please correct name "Bodiroga." It turns out I
4 said "Bodiroga," but it's Predrag "Boziroda."
5 Q. Thank you. And I'll just repeat that the only reason we're
6 asking you this question again is because there may have been a mistake
7 in the translation, the English translation, so we apologise for having
8 asked the question again.
9 Just one further confirmation. Will you confirm that Zupljanin's
10 response to you was, Well, Dule, these are Serb heroes?
11 A. That's correct. I can confirm that. That's what he said.
12 Q. Thank you, and I think that clarifies the record.
13 I want to move on to another topic.
14 Between 1 April and 31 December 1992
15 located physically?
16 A. It was located on the premises of the CSB in Banja Luka, in the
17 so-called central building, fourth floor. I think the number of my
18 office was 49, or maybe 149, one of the two. But it was on the fourth
19 floor, and that was the top floor of the building. There is no fifth
20 floor. Milos Group had three offices. I was sitting alone in one of the
21 offices, and then the remaining colleagues were seated two per office.
22 Q. During this time-period, were you aware whether non-Serbs were
23 brought to the CSB building and interrogated?
24 A. I have seen very little of it with my own eyes. I've heard of
25 some of these events, but mainly because I spent very little time in
1 Banja Luka. The activities of the Milos Group was almost invariably in
2 the areas outside of Banja Luka. We would come to Banja Luka either late
3 in the day or occasionally we would be away from Banja Luka for several
4 days. And realistically speaking, I did not focus nor did I focus my
5 colleagues to monitor what's going on in the CSB centre because I
6 believed there were others who would be able to notice, observe, possible
7 illegal activities or actions that do not confirm with police work,
8 regular police work. But I did see on occasions that people were brought
9 in and mistreated, and I can give you specific examples. But I do not
10 know who was in charge of interrogation of these people and who was in
11 charge of the investigation.
12 Q. Thank you for that answer. But I think one of the problems here
13 is that you have to understand that when you answer a question, I have to
14 listen to the interpretation, and there is a delay. Just because there's
15 a delay doesn't mean that I just want you to continue with your answer.
16 Just wait after you've answered the question and let me ask another
18 But you did mention that you observed some illegal activities
19 during the interrogations of non-Serbs at the CSB building. Could you
20 please provide us what you observed?
21 A. I observed that people I knew from the town were being brought to
22 the central building of the CSB, handcuffed, obviously beaten. I could
23 not connect these people with any possible illegal activities, and it in
24 a way all seemed rather surprising to me. Also, some members of Bosniak
25 and Croat people came to my offices in Banja Luka, when I was there,
1 complaining about certain events, certain trends, harassments. They even
2 pointed out to issues related to the disappearance of their nearest and
3 dearest, people who were taken in custody by the so-called members of
4 public or security services. I can't remember his name now, but the
5 owner of the first shopping mall in Banja Luka came to me to tell me that
6 some of our employees took into custody his wife and his mother-in-law.
7 I got interested in the issue, tried to resolve the situation. However,
8 neither the wife nor the mother-in-law were ever found. They're still
9 missing. Therefore, there are grounds to believe that they were killed
10 exclusively because of the huge wealth the family had prior to the war.
11 Q. What were the ethnicity of the wife and the mother-in-law?
12 A. Bosniaks.
13 Q. When you had the opportunity to observe these non-Serbs being
14 brought to the CSB building, can you tell us, do you recall who was
15 actually bringing them in on those occasions that you actually observed?
16 A. I really cannot give you specific names, but these were mainly
17 people who joined the service later, at a later stage. When I say
18 "service," I mean either public or state security, people of whom I do
19 not know that they were members of the special police detachment -- or,
20 rather, I really -- I actually do know that they were a member of the
21 detachment, but I don't know what their names are. I was an employee of
22 the State Security Service. I know the structure well and the
23 individuals -- the staffs of both public and -- of the State Security
24 Service, but the public security service people, I knew only those that I
25 was familiar with privately. Professionally speaking, I knew very little
1 about the staff of the public security service. I knew quite a few of --
2 a very small number of them by the name.
3 Q. And can you tell us, What happened to these non-Serbs during
4 their interrogation at the CSB building?
5 A. I cannot, because I didn't take part in those interrogations,
6 especially not during that period. But I know that in 1993 I had an
7 argument with the chief, Nedeljko Kesic, because some Bosniaks had been
8 brought in and mistreated by their interrogators. Predrag Ceranic was in
9 charge of that, who was his then-deputy. People were literally beaten
10 up, and everything -- all their property had been looted. The members
11 that I have mentioned here took part in that activity. They were under
12 the command and under the authority of Ljuban Ecim and
13 Zdravko Samardzija. This went on for a couple of days.
14 I said that it was unnecessary because I had had information
15 about those people from 1990 or 1991. They were members of the SDA,
16 which was a legal political party, the Party of Democratic Action, and
17 they were collected for days and mistreated and beaten because allegedly
18 the service had security-relevant information about their hostile
19 activities. I know that because I spoke to Predrag Ceranic and
20 Nedeljko Kesic on several occasions about that, and I insisted that these
21 people should not be mistreated. In 1992, I know that our former
22 employees of the SJB were also brought in for interrogation. I can
23 relate what they went through, what kind of mistreatment, but I didn't
24 witness that.
25 Q. These former colleagues from the SJB, were they non-Serbs?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And focusing on 1992, in 1992 what information did you have about
3 any mistreatment of these former colleagues of yours or any other none
4 Serbs at the CSB building?
5 A. I have already said that I wasn't much involved, but I know of a
6 case when one of the former chiefs of the security service - he was
7 either chief or deputy chief - he had to unload coal for the CSB, which
8 didn't make sense because only recently the man was a colleague, an
9 active serviceman. I saw that as a humiliation for him. I think that
10 his name was Ibrabegovic [phoen] or something, I'm not sure, but
11 something similar. We pointed that out, too, because I saw that as
12 something that I had already observed in Doboj.
13 Q. Okay. Thank you for that example.
14 This information you received about the mistreatment of non-Serbs
15 at the CSB building, did you communicate that to Mr. Zupljanin and
16 Mr. Kesic in 1992?
17 A. To Mr. Kesic, yes. And I said that my contacts with
18 Mr. Stojan Zupljanin were rare and only under certain circumstances, when
19 it was really required. Otherwise, I was not in contact with
20 Mr. Zupljanin; certainly not daily, maybe not even weekly. I forwarded
21 such information through Bera [Realtime transcript read in error "Beara"]
22 to Mr. Kesic, but I related much information to Mr. Kesic directly about
23 these cases.
24 Q. This mistreatment of non-Serbs at the CSB building, was it
25 done --
1 MR. ZECEVIC: Sorry. Just 38, 1, I believe the witness said
2 "Bera," not "Beara." It might be --
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's "Bera."
4 MR. OLMSTED:
5 Q. This mistreatment of non-Serbs at the CSB building in 1992, was
6 its frequency and where it occurred open enough that it could be observed
7 by pretty much anyone, or was this something done very secretly?
8 MR. KRGOVIC: It's calling for speculation. If you look at the
9 previous witness, he wasn't there most of that time, so --
10 MR. OLMSTED: Well, he did observe a few instances himself.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I cannot say how frequent, exactly,
12 that was and who was in a position to see that. I know from experience
13 that I observed some things and my colleagues didn't, although I had been
14 there only for 15 minutes and they had been there for 15 days.
15 MR. OLMSTED:
16 Q. Did you ever visit Manjaca Camp in 1992?
17 A. Only once.
18 Q. And can you tell us approximately when that was, what month?
19 A. It was in 1992. It could have been in July or August. I know
20 that it was summertime, and I know why I went there.
21 Q. And what did you observe about the conditions at the camp?
22 A. Well, briefly, it was horrible. There were no conditions for
23 biological survival, no hygiene at all. The food was extremely bad.
24 There was a huge number of people on a very small -- in a very small
25 space. Most of them had gone through physical mistreatment. What else
1 should I say? There was a group there that would physically mistreat
2 every prisoner when they were brought there, and many prisoners died in
3 Manjaca of the consequences of these beatings. When I say "many," I must
4 say that even two or three is many, to my mind, but certainly a much
5 greater number must have died for these reasons. And many were maimed.
6 I don't want to go into the mental consequences, but the physical
7 consequences certainly were grave.
8 Q. You mentioned that they were prisoners. Was this an open camp or
9 was it a detention facility?
10 A. It was a detention facility. And when I say that, I mean any
11 facility with a fence around it and guards and from which nobody can
12 leave without permission or an order of the ones guarding them.
13 Q. This information that you observed or learned about Manjaca Camp
14 and the treatment of the detainees there, did you provide this
15 information to Mr. Kesic and Mr. Zupljanin?
16 A. I did inform Mr. Kesic, and he said that this wasn't our concern,
17 that it was under the authority of the VRS. Frankly speaking, he told me
18 not to meddle. That's roughly it. But it wasn't only once. We spoke
19 about it on several occasions. Unfortunately, he didn't accept any of my
20 suggestions. He never granted any of my requests.
21 Q. And did you also speak to Mr. Zupljanin about Manjaca Camp?
22 A. I don't remember having spoken to Zupljanin about these things.
23 Q. Perhaps to refresh your recollection, you could look at
24 paragraph 170 of your written statement and just read it to yourself and
25 see if that refreshes your recollection. If it doesn't, that's fine.
1 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, this is a
2 cross-examination. If this is how it is supposed to continue, showing
3 the witness a statement every now and then --
4 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the Judge, please.
5 JUDGE HALL: How many times -- the ruling that I gave earlier
6 was, I thought, exceptional. How many times is this exercise going to be
8 MR. OLMSTED: Perhaps could we talk about this without the
9 witness listening in.
10 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Radulovic, could you please remove your
12 Mr. Olmsted, my concern is that we're dealing with a question of
13 the proper application of the Rules.
14 MR. OLMSTED: Yes, Your Honour.
15 This is, of course -- this testimony is not a memory test. He's
16 testifying about a whole bunch of events that occurred in 1992. We've
17 only even touched on some of them. And obviously we have limited time,
18 and we're trying to get out the evidence at quickly as possible.
19 We're not asserting that the witness is being untruthful.
20 I think he's trying to give the truth. But because of -- this so much
21 information, in addition because he is here as a Serb testifying against
22 Serbs, and he's also here with his boss -- his former boss, it's a
23 difficult situation for him, and we just want the truth to come out and
24 have him an opportunity to refresh his memory with regard to the certain
25 things he says in his statement, not bringing that statement into the
1 record at all. And this is merely to speed up the process, so I'm not
2 asking him tons of questions about these issues. I don't know -- I can't
3 say how often I'll have to use it, but I'm trying to use it only in
4 particular instances.
5 JUDGE HALL: When I asked how often you would have to use it,
6 that was really a rhetorical question. The thing is the Chamber has
7 ruled on the use of these statements as matters which may be exhibited,
8 and we are -- it would be inconsistent with what we would have previously
9 ruled to allow you to go down the path which you seem now intent on
11 MR. OLMSTED: Well --
12 JUDGE HALL: I would have thought that one of the skills of
13 counsel is being faced with, as I said earlier, you take your witness as
14 you find him, to phrase your questions in order to get the information
15 that you seek. The Chamber has ruled on the broad question of the
16 admissibility of these statements.
17 MR. OLMSTED: And certainly under the guide-lines, Your Honour,
18 you have the power to determine the means and circumstances in which a
19 witness's memory can be refreshed. Here he says he doesn't recall
20 something, and I can't speak for every jurisdiction, but the jurisdiction
21 I come from, you certainly can refresh a witness's memory from his prior
22 statements or basically anything, and --
23 JUDGE HALL: Well, I was about to say I'm not sure the Rules are
24 that wide, but the rules with which I'm familiar is that one of the
25 conditions precedent for a witness to refresh his memory is that the
1 document must be virtually contemporaneous. And one of the
2 deficiencies - for want of a better word - in this case is that -- and
3 this was at the heart of Mr. Krgovic's earlier observation, is that we're
4 dealing with a recent compilation. So, in other words, there's a
5 remoteness to the events with which -- about which a witness is
6 testifying and the refreshing-memory document, which is a cause of
8 [Prosecution counsel confer]
9 MR. OLMSTED: Your Honour, you're correct that the statement was
10 made not in -- back in 1992, but it was made in conditions where it was
11 extensive interviewing going on. He had the opportunity to review a
12 large number of documents and really think and spend time reflecting on
13 these events, and the situation, of course, is very much different in the
14 courtroom, where he is subject to pressure, nervousness of testifying
15 here, the fact that he's testifying in open session. Some of the things
16 he says are quite powerful. And so in those circumstances all we're
17 seeking to do is to refresh his memory regarding a prior statement he
19 I don't want to ask leading questions, and that's what I'm trying
20 to avoid. And by refreshing his memory, then asking my question again,
21 which is not leading, it's perhaps going to speed up the whole process.
22 And that's really all we're trying to achieve here.
23 JUDGE HALL: Of course, efficiency is merely one aspect. Another
24 overriding aspect of our trial is conduct and fairness, is more
1 May we have a moment, please.
2 [Trial Chamber confers]
3 JUDGE HALL: Again, we take a practical approach to this. And as
4 with the last -- the last time this arose, the witness may read the
5 relevant portion of his statement, and then you may ask your question,
6 Mr. Olmsted.
7 MR. OLMSTED: Thank you, Your Honour.
8 Q. Mr. Radulovic, I apologise for that. We just had to argue a very
9 procedural matter, and now we can get back on to our topic.
10 If you could please take a look at paragraph 170, and if you
11 could just read that short paragraph completely to yourself.
12 A. I've read it.
13 Q. And my question to you is: Does that refresh your recollection
14 regarding a conversation you had with Stojan Zupljanin about
15 Manjaca Camp?
16 A. There's nothing special. I can only repeat that in 1992 there
17 had been too many conversations, especially between me and Kesic. Well,
18 I also spoke about many events to Mr. Stojan Zupljanin too, but I'm not
19 sure that I orally informed Mr. Zupljanin of the conditions at Manjaca.
20 I don't remember. Although I saw what I stated and what I signed, but
21 part of the statement refers to my report number 238. And if that is
22 contained in my report, then that is much more credible than what I may
23 or may not remember after such a long time.
24 Q. Did you ever discuss with Mr. Zupljanin under whose jurisdiction
25 Manjaca Camp fell?
1 A. No. Let me tell you, when I wrote that report about Manjaca and
2 when I informed Kesic of the events there, I know that Kesic said to me
3 then that it was not our concern, that I shouldn't meddle, that it's
4 under the authority of the army; simply speaking, that we should steer
5 clear of it. I considered it the duty of our service to inform of such
6 things because I considered our service the most important link between
7 politics and the situation on the ground, some sort of connecting tissue.
8 I was at Manjaca, but I was also at Gradiska and Omarska, and I
9 considered all that intolerable. That cannot be in the interests of the
10 Serbian people, and it cannot be the objective of the Serbian people to
11 keep persons in such camps who are innocent, who were simply taken there
12 because they have names of a certain type or because they belonged to a
13 certain religious or ethnic group. I didn't write that because it was my
14 wish to go outside of the scope of the interests of the service. It was
15 my opinion that the service had to register such things and inform those
16 above us, inform the politicians.
17 And being here, I can add we noticed that information about these
18 things wasn't being passed on, so we tried to get this information to the
19 political leadership through military security. There was a man in
20 military security at the time, and later he would become the leader of
21 the Typhoons. We tried to forward such information through him.
22 Q. Thank you, Mr. Radulovic. And, again, I just have to keep on
23 reminding you - I apologise for this - but please try to keep your
24 answers short.
25 You mentioned Mr. Kesic and you were reporting this information
1 regarding Manjaca Camp as well as other matters affecting public
2 security --
3 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Olmsted.
4 MR. OLMSTED: Yes.
5 JUDGE DELVOIE: May I just intervene for a moment.
6 The witness referred to one of his reports, and if it's correct
7 in the transcript, it would be report number 238. Can we establish a
8 link with one of the reports on your list? Is it or isn't it?
9 MR. OLMSTED: Unfortunately, Your Honour, we don't have all his
10 reports, and it's not on our list.
11 JUDGE DELVOIE: It's not on your list.
12 MR. OLMSTED: We don't have that report.
13 JUDGE DELVOIE: Okay, thank you.
14 MR. OLMSTED:
15 Q. As I was saying, you were reporting this information regarding
16 Manjaca Camp and, in fact, other matters affecting public security to
17 Mr. Kesic. Did he have an obligation to report those matters then on to
18 Stojan Zupljanin as well as to the RS MUP?
19 A. Yes.
20 MR. OLMSTED: Let's take a look at P411.18. I'll just make sure
21 that I said it right. It's P411.18. Yes, this is the document.
22 Q. Mr. Radulovic, is this one of your reports?
23 A. Yes, it's mine, or, rather, a report of my group.
24 Q. It states that the TO, Serbian police, and volunteers took all
25 key installations in Sanski Most, and almost all extreme members of the
1 SDA fled the municipality.
2 When you wrote "Serbian police," who were you referring to?
3 A. If you mean those who fled, they were the leaders of the SDA
4 party, reputable Bosniaks from the area, and Croats.
5 Q. Thank you for that answer, but let me re-ask my question.
6 You write in here that the "Serbian police," among others, "took
7 all key installations in Sanski Most." Do you see that?
8 A. Yes, I can see it, and it's true. I don't know what there is to
9 comment. It is true. The Serb forces took all significant facilities at
10 Sanski Most and established, well, let's call it Serb rule in
11 Sanski Most.
12 Q. And the only thing I'm seeking clarification at this point is:
13 You say "Serbian police," and that's a general term. And could you be
14 more specific as to who you mean by "Serbian police"? Was it the SJB
15 members? Was it the CSB? Who were the Serbian police?
16 A. I didn't say "Serbian police," meaning police from Serbia
17 meant active and reserve policemen from the Sanski Most Police Station,
18 TO members, and various volunteers who appeared grouped in various
19 groups, unlike specialists who called themselves some sort of Chetniks.
20 So it was a complex situation. Whoever had weapons belonged to a group
21 that they thought they should belong to, except for organised forces that
22 belonged to the Territorial Defence, Serbian police.
23 It was a mixed-up situation in Sanski Most. There were different
24 kinds of mistreatments on various grounds, so whoever was in the position
25 to leave Sanski Most safely and were of a different ethnicity, that is to
1 say, they were Croats or Bosniaks, did so because they were scared, they
2 didn't want to test their luck, and they left. Those who remained were
3 those who were not able to leave.
4 Q. You mentioned volunteers, and this document we're looking at also
5 mentions volunteers. Could you tell us whether that -- you're referring
6 to the SOS or S-O-S in Sanski Most?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Now, according to your intelligence information, was there any
9 organised armed resistance in Sanski Most by the non-Serb population
10 either during this take-over or following it?
11 A. I had no information about any specifically-organised resistance
12 movement, but there were instances of Croats and Bosniaks in that area
13 attempting to organise themselves and organising some sorts of groups and
14 so on. It wasn't typical for Sanski Most. It was more typical for other
15 areas such as Prijedor, Kljuc, and some other places.
16 Q. So in your assessment, did the non-Serbs who remained in
17 Sanski Most - and you've just mentioned these were non-Serbs who really
18 didn't have the means to leave the municipality - did they pose any
19 threat to Serb control over that municipality?
20 A. I can't say anything specifically about that. I did not make any
21 assessments or evaluations. But if I were to use my work experience and
22 the information I had coming from that area, I don't think that they were
23 a significant safety and security risk for the Serbian authorities in
24 that area.
25 MR. OLMSTED: Let's take a look at 2D21.
1 Q. And can you confirm whether this is one of your reports?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Now, this report is -- the previous report we looked at was dated
4 24 April 1992
5 dated 7 March 1992
6 a few thousand long-barrelled rifles. Can you tell us what happened
7 between early March and the time of the take-over in the middle of April
8 that prevented the non-Serbs from mounting a significant armed resistance
9 against the Serb forces?
10 A. Yes, I can explain. Before the take-over of power, almost all
11 members of Bosniak units had withdrawn to the Bihac area.
12 Q. Thank you.
13 MR. OLMSTED: Can we please take a look at 65 ter 2840.
14 Q. And, Mr. Radulovic, can you confirm whether this is one of your
16 A. Yes.
17 MR. OLMSTED: Unless Your Honours have any questions regarding
18 this document, I'm just going to seek to tender it.
19 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
20 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P1374, Your Honours.
21 MR. OLMSTED: Can we please look at P693. And if we could turn
22 just quickly to the page number 2 of this document. Oh, actually, no,
23 leave it there. Leave it there.
24 Q. We see at the top it says "Radulovic, Sajinovic, Stjepanovic,"
25 and it's dated 16 October 1992
1 Sir, is this one of your reports?
2 A. Yes, it is.
3 MR. OLMSTED: If we could take a look at the second page of the
4 B/C/S. I think it's the bottom of the page of the English.
5 Q. It states here:
6 "Around 20.000 Muslims have moved out of this region, and the
7 remaining 10.000 or so wish to do the same. Muslims have been moving out
8 of this region mostly because of its uncertain future and lack of
9 security. This uncertainty is due to the wilful behaviour of individuals
10 and groups who abuse citizens of Muslim background and exert pressure on
12 To your knowledge, did the Sanski Most SJB take any measures in
13 1992 to stop this abuse of non-Serb population in Sanski Most?
14 A. Very few or insignificant.
15 MR. OLMSTED: May we take a look at 65 ter 410.
16 Q. Mr. Radulovic, can you confirm whether this is one of your
18 A. It is.
19 Q. It states that:
20 "In the early-morning hours ... the most important buildings in
21 Prijedor were occupied, and all roads leading to the town were blocked by
22 armed formations of the Serbian people."
23 Can you tell us which armed formations of the Serbian people
24 you're referring to?
25 A. Well, there were a number of groups established on a voluntary
1 basis, comprising volunteers. I can't call them either parapolice or
2 paramilitary. At the time, we used to denote them as armed formations of
3 the Serbian people. I know that some of them were under the control of
4 the army, some of them were not, not of the police either, and that's
5 what I could tell you in a nutshell.
6 Q. Do you have information that the police from the SJB Prijedor
7 participated in the take-over of Prijedor?
8 A. Yes. If I may add, we, as the Milos Group, were concerned. You
9 keep referring to me, personally. All of the reports are a product of
10 collective work of all of us who were members of the Milos Group.
11 What I'm trying to say, that during this period of time in
12 Prijedor we were concerned by the fact that individuals committed various
13 mistreatment and crimes, victimising non-Serbs. We were concerned by
14 such phenomena, as a result of which we informed the SDB and our
15 superiors, believing that together with SJB and together with the
16 military security, they should do something about reintroducing
17 discipline and law and order and put those armed formations under control
18 in order to protect citizens, regardless of what ethnicities they were.
19 I never made distinctions on the basis of what ethnicity they were.
20 Q. And what response did you receive to that? Did you receive --
21 were any actions taken to stop these crimes?
22 A. Well, after this report, there came a period of a very difficult
23 situation in Prijedor when nobody was safe, least of all Bosniaks and
25 Briefly - and this is a very long story, but I'll tell you this
1 briefly - it wasn't until a commission came from Banja Luka that the
2 number of crimes significantly decreased, as well as instances of
3 mistreatment of non-Serbs, but it wasn't until much later that this
5 Q. And are you -- in that last statement that you're referring to,
6 are you talking about the camps in Prijedor, or are you talking about
7 crime in general in Prijedor? Just to clarify.
8 A. I was referring to everything, the crimes that were committed not
9 only in Prijedor, but in the wider area of Prijedor municipality, such as
10 Hodzeni [phoen], Brisevo, Hambarine, Kozarac, Trnopolje. I was also
11 referring to what was happening in Omarska, Keraterm, to what was
12 happening within the police station in Prijedor. I simply meant not only
13 the ordinary crimes committed but also what we believed fell into the
14 category of war crimes and crimes against the civilian population.
15 Q. This commission, was this in 1992 or is it later in 1993?
16 A. No, this happened in 1992. I remember well; I was in Prijedor
17 for work. I don't know to what extent it is important for all of you
18 here, to give you the reasons for my presence, but, at any rate, that was
19 my first physical presence in Prijedor, and I saw something that I
20 couldn't believe was happening. I visited the camp in Keraterm and the
21 one in Omarska, and I saw something I could not comprehend; the attitude
22 of the guards and of personnel who were guarding the detainees. The
23 conditions were unbearable in a very small space, in closed space. There
24 were too many detainees who were taken out for questioning and brought
25 back all bloody and beaten up, and that was the condition they had been
1 in when taken to questioning. That first experience I had with that
2 caused me to first go to the SDB team, headed by Vojin Bera.
3 Q. We're going to talk about your visit to Omarska and Keraterm in
4 detain in a little bit, but I really want to try to address some
5 preliminary matters before we go to that. So please follow my questions.
6 But just to clarify, I want to get down this commission you've
7 mentioned. This commission, was that after you visited the camps? Is
8 this a commission that was formed to visit the camps? Is that correct?
9 A. Yes, that's correct.
10 MR. OLMSTED: All right. Can we tender this document into
11 evidence, Your Honours?
12 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
13 MR. OLMSTED: And can we -- sorry.
14 THE REGISTRAR: Sorry. Exhibit P1375, Your Honours.
15 MR. OLMSTED: And can we take a look at 65 ter 10191.
16 Q. Sir, what you have before you is a report dated 7 September 1992.
17 Is this one of your -- not your, but your team's Milos reports?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Just take a look at the first few sentences, and can you tell us
20 what the purpose of this report was, what were you trying to report?
21 A. I think that the report is self-explanatory, but I will tell you
22 that we attempted, by way of this report, to put on notice the leadership
23 of our service, that this is something that the highest political and
24 military echelons in Republika Srpska should be made aware of so that
25 there would be an end to crimes and mistreatment in Prijedor
2 I have to tell you that the citizens of Serb ethnicity took these
3 crimes in Prijedor with great difficulty. I was present when operatives
4 of the public security turned to me for advice as to what to do; should
5 they leave the service, should they flee Republika Srpska; because they
6 refused to be associated in any way with such kind of work in
7 commissions, investigations team, in public security, military security,
8 and so, due to the attitude that the guards had vis-à-vis detainees who
9 were brought in for questioning. That's all.
10 Q. You indicate in this report that Prijedor buildings are still
11 being unnecessarily destroyed and non-Serbs are forcibly expelled and
12 even killed. Was this the first report you submitted concerning such
13 crimes against the non-Serb population in Prijedor?
14 A. No.
15 Q. By the time of this report, which is 7 September 1992, was the
16 non-Serb population that was remaining in Prijedor posing any threat to
17 Serb control of that municipality?
18 A. Before this date and after this date, no. It did not represent a
19 danger either before this date or after this date. After an operation
20 that was conducted in relation to combat activities in Hambarine and
21 Kozarac, following that time, Bosniaks represented no danger whatsoever
22 when it came to military or any other activities in the territory of
23 Prijedor. This operation took place much before this date, the
24 7th of September, 1992.
25 Q. And we will address those attacks on Hambarine and Kozarac in
1 just a minute. But according to your intelligence information, who was
2 committing these crimes against the remaining non-Serb population?
3 A. There were a number of groups committing crimes, and there were
4 members of police involved in those instances where Croats or Bosniaks
5 were mistreated, both active and reserve policemen of the police station
6 in Prijedor. Simo Drljaca gave his consent directly for such activities.
7 Q. You also mention in this report mass graves locations. Which
8 mass graves are you referring to?
9 A. Mass graves in Rudnik, Ljubija, and Tomasica area.
10 Q. And who was buried at these locations, these mass graves?
11 A. Unfortunately, it was mostly the innocent civilian victims who
12 were buried, of Bosniak and Croat ethnicity, most likely. In Hambarine
13 it was Bosniaks. In Brisevo, mostly Croats. And as for the victims of
14 Donja Ljubija area, it was the Bosniaks. And then the wider area of
15 Kozarac -- you have to understand that 20.000 Bosniaks lived in Kozarac,
16 some Croats, and some belonging to a group called "Others," minorities of
17 Czech or Polish origin.
18 Q. So if I understand your answer, these mass graves contained
19 non-Serb victims of the attacks on Kozarac, Hambarine, Brisevo, as well
20 as other villages in that area?
21 A. Yes, correct.
22 Q. Did you write any reports about these mass graves that provided
23 more detailed information than you provided in this report up your chain
24 of command about these graves?
25 A. Yes, I gave more detailed reports. And as for the events in
1 Prijedor, if I analyse everything I wrote, I think that my most detailed
2 reports were about the events in Prijedor. I talked more to Kesic and
3 Vojin Bera about these events than about the events in Teslic and Doboj
4 because I believed that the consequences of such behaviour of
5 individuals, including members of the state and public security, were
7 In 1992, as I wrote this report, I qualified this, Your Honours,
8 as a case of genocide. And I don't know why now, after 17 or 18 years
9 have passed, I would give a different qualification to it.
10 MR. OLMSTED: Your Honours, perhaps this is an appropriate time
11 for a break.
12 I'm sorry, can I ask one -- well, I can ask it after the break,
14 [The witness stands down]
15 --- Recess taken at 12.06 p.m.
16 --- On resuming at 12.34 p.m.
17 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Pantelic, we have been alerted to your -- for
18 the matter you wish to raise. Would it suffice if we were to release the
19 witness about five minutes -- excuse the witness about five minutes
21 MR. PANTELIC: Absolutely, Your Honour, yes. Thank you.
22 JUDGE HALL: Yes.
23 [The witness takes the stand]
24 MR. OLMSTED:
25 Q. Mr. Radulovic, in early summer of 1992, was there an attack by
1 Serb forces on the village of Brisevo
2 something about that.
3 A. Yes, I did.
4 Q. Can you tell us which Serb forces participated in that attack?
5 A. At the time, I had information according to which these were
6 members of armed formations who had arrived from the area of Sanski Most.
7 I cannot tell you exactly what the name of the unit or their command was,
8 but these were armed formations from the area of Sanski Most.
9 Q. Do you recall, were they VRS forces or were they paramilitary?
10 A. VRS.
11 Q. And according to your intelligence information, was there any
12 armed resistance by the Croat population in Brisevo?
13 A. Not in Brisevo.
14 Q. Well, can you tell us what happened to the civilian population in
15 Brisevo during the attack?
16 A. They suffered as victims. There were even casualties among
17 children below the age of seven. I couldn't give you a number of the
18 victims, but, in any case, a very large number of victims for a village
19 in a very small area, in total.
20 Q. After the attack, what remained of the village?
21 A. I don't think anything remained there; only traces of what was
22 burned, destroyed. And victims, the bodies, were removed.
23 Q. Did you have the opportunity to actually visit Brisevo sometime
24 after the attack and witness what the village looked like, yourself?
25 A. No, not directly, not in the village itself, but I did have an
1 opportunity to see the village from a vantage point. I spent a lot of
2 time in the area of Ljubija, Gornja Ljubija, Prijedor, Brisevo,
3 Niska Rijeka. My wife hails from that area.
4 Q. This information about what happened to the non-Serb population
5 during the attack on Brisevo, where did you obtain this intelligence
7 A. Primarily from employees of the public security service who were
8 working from the station department of the Ljubija Police Station.
9 Q. Around this same time-period as the Brisevo attack, was there
10 also an attack by Serb forces on the village of Hambarine
11 A. I think the village of Hambarine
12 The conditions were different. The Hambarine village, there was a group
13 of Bosniaks who had military organisation, were armed.
14 Q. Can you tell us which Serb forces participated in the attack of
15 that village?
16 A. I cannot -- I'm not familiar with insignia on uniforms, but there
17 were volunteers, members of the police special detachment, together with
18 the police from Prijedor, reserve police from Prijedor. At the time of
19 the operations in the area of Hambarine, I was present there for a
20 shorter period, for one day, so I even was an eye-witness to some of
21 these combat operations. And I would like to ask -- when I'm saying "me,
22 personally," I still refer to the whole group, the Milos Group. Very
23 seldom I went out without the entire group being together.
24 Q. You mentioned in your last answer the special police. Was that
25 the special police of the CSB Banja Luka?
1 A. Yes, yes.
2 Q. Since you were there, where was the detachment positioned during
3 the attack?
4 A. I cannot tell you that, but I encountered some of the special
5 detachment members - we were passing each other - because between me --
6 or, rather, the Milos Group and the members of the special detachment,
7 there was certain tension, one could feel it between us, and it was
8 possible at any point that there would be an armed conflict, even,
9 between us. And since they were stronger, our assessment was to try to
10 and avoid such contacts because they might lead to direct armed
11 conflicts. We were, in comparison to them, humane human beings; whereas
12 they would stop at nothing. They didn't have any dignity. And we had to
13 bear in mind that it wouldn't necessarily only be us but also our
14 families who they could target. There were some threats issued as well.
15 You can imagine what kind of situation it was.
16 Q. What triggered the attack on Hambarine? Was there a particular
17 event that triggered it?
18 A. To put it as short as possible, on an occasion some members of
19 the Territorial Defence came to a check-point which was set up by the
20 Bosniaks from Hambarine. I think one was killed of the
21 Territorial Defence members and one was seriously wounded. And that
22 started this series of armed conflicts. And then that, furthermore, led
23 to the eruption of this cleansing or mopping-up of terrain.
24 MR. KRGOVIC: [Previous translation continues]... members of TO
25 was killed and one was wounded. In transcript, it says one was killed,
1 one was wounded.
2 MR. OLMSTED: Are you suggesting that that's not what he said?
3 Q. Mr. Radulovic, in your last answer, at the check-point, did you
4 say that it was one TO member who was killed and one who was seriously
6 A. As far as I remember the events, and as far as I remember what
7 I've just said, there were two killed and one was seriously wounded.
8 Q. Thank you.
9 Was the Bosniak population in Hambarine able to offer any
10 meaningful resistance to this attack?
11 A. I cannot give you an evaluation of that. I had information that
12 they are organised in a way, in a military manner, but I didn't have
13 specific, exact information about how many armed men are there, what kind
14 of armaments they have, what kind of logistics; as opposed to the
15 situation in Kozarac about which I had much more detailed information and
16 more reliable. So I cannot give you an opinion about whether they
17 believed they actually could put up some kind of more meaningful
18 resistance. I guess they would have known best about these things. But
19 I do believe it would have been illogical for them to start all that,
20 because Ljubija, Gornja, was behind them, which was under the control of
21 the Serbian forces; Prijedor was under Serbian authority; so they only
22 had one way out of the encirclement, and that is towards Kozarac. So if
23 they had a reasonable commander, I'd say he would not allow them to
24 initiate any kind of armed conflicts.
25 Q. After the attack on Hambarine, what remained of the village? Was
1 it seriously damaged?
2 A. Yes. And if I may say, we had a repetition of what we've seen
3 before; namely, whatever wasn't destroyed during the armed conflict
4 itself would be destroyed immediately after the operations. After the
5 searches had been conducted, after everything had been stolen, everything
6 would be destroyed.
7 Q. And what happened to the civilian population in Hambarine?
8 A. Some of the civilians got killed, and some were expelled or maybe
9 driven away from the area, if you prefer it that way.
10 Q. Let's move to Kozarac. Can you --
11 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Olmsted, can I ask, Did the witness write a
12 report on Hambarine? And if so, do we have it?
13 MR. OLMSTED: I'll answer the second question first. We don't
14 have reports on the crimes that were committed in Hambarine or Brisevo, I
15 don't believe. Otherwise, we'd be showing it to the witness. But I'll
16 ask him the first part of the question.
17 Q. Mr. Radulovic, we've talked about Brisevo and Hambarine so far,
18 and we're going to talk about Kozarac next. Did you write reports on
19 what you learned about what happened to the civilian populations in these
20 villages in 1992?
21 A. I know for a fact that we did write reports because our practice
22 was to put into writing whatever information we gathered. So the fact
23 that we haven't -- that you haven't found these reports, well, I don't
24 know anything about that. But the vault that I had or the strong box
25 that I had in my office, and that remained in Banja Luka, there was 2.750
1 pages of documentation. You presented to me only about 1200 pages, which
2 means that about 1250 pages are missing that were drafted by the
3 Milos Group, and that more than half of the reports submitted by us is
4 missing. You must understand that I did not keep my private archives
5 where all these documents would be stored, but I know for a fact that we
6 reported about events in Hambarine, in Ljubija, in Kozarac. I have seen
7 some of the documents. They were shown to me by you. You can put
8 questions about those.
9 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you, Mr. Radulovic.
10 Mr. Olmsted, could you, at any convenient moment, check whether
11 document 10190 could concern Hambarine, not necessarily now at this
13 MR. OLMSTED: Yes, Your Honour, it does, but it's not on our
14 exhibit list, and that's why I didn't show him -- it's about the
15 check-point incident, and I figured that he got that -- we got that out
16 sufficiently without the document.
17 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
18 MR. OLMSTED:
19 Q. Let's talk about Kozarac. Now, what Serb forces participated in
20 the attack of that village?
21 A. The same: members of the VRS, active, reserve, and conscript
22 elements; then police, active and reserve; paramilitary formations. I do
23 not have information concerning participation of the police special
24 detachment from the CSB Banja Luka.
25 Q. And I think we have already evidence that the attack on Kozarac
1 was essentially around the same time as the attack on Hambarine. Is it
2 fair to say that the attack on Kozarac was triggered by the same event as
3 the attack on Hambarine?
4 A. Yes. A casualty was an active captain of the VRS, as well as one
5 soldier, and I think that one soldier was seriously wounded. Exactly the
6 same kind of incident; barricades, there was shooting. But that route --
7 that road used to be blocked for a period of time, the road between
8 Banja Luka and Prijedor, which was a serious problem because a big part
9 of the territory was cut off. One had to travel using roundabout ways,
10 bad roads between Prijedor and Banja Luka and back.
11 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm terribly sorry. A part of the answer was not
12 recorded. I believe the witness mentioned that there was a barricade
13 there. Maybe you can clarify that with the witness, Mr. Olmsted.
14 MR. OLMSTED:
15 Q. Did you -- Mr. Radulovic, in your last answer did you refer to a
17 A. Yes, I did refer to a barricade. It was on the road from
18 Banja Luka to Prijedor, and there was another one on the way back. So on
19 the entrances to the village, there were barricades with armed people,
20 members of Bosniak ethnicity in the area. And not only in that area, in
21 the wider area of Kozarac they set up a defence circle with armed
22 formations guarding the entrances into the village against the Serbian
23 policemen and Serbian forces. It was organised -- well organised. They
24 had squads, companies, and so on; namely, establishment strength was a
25 brigade strength. They had primarily infantry arms but also some
1 artillery pieces. These were called Charlies. I don't know how many
2 pieces they had. I also don't know how many other artillery pieces they
3 had, but I do know that they were rather well armed.
4 Q. Thank you. But, again, my question was just about the
5 barricades, and you provided much more information. And I appreciate
6 your efforts to provide as much information as possible, but please just
7 focus on the question again.
8 What happened to the civilian Bosniak population after this
9 attack on Kozarac? What happened to them?
10 A. Almost all of them ended up in collection centres such as
11 Trnopolje or in camps such as Keraterm and Omarska. Why am I making this
12 distinction between a collection centre and a camp? Let me explain.
13 Trnopolje was a place where they treated people less harsh than in
14 Keraterm or Omarska.
15 Q. And I'll ask the same question as I asked about the other
16 villages. What was left of the Bosniak houses and mosques and other
17 premises in the village of Kozarac
18 A. Almost nothing remained. There used to be five mosques there,
19 and all five of them were destroyed. There is seven mosques there, newly
20 built, and the village was completely reconstructed, except for something
21 that is, of course, most difficult to reconstruct; namely, there aren't
22 many of the people who used to live there before the war. Many of them
23 met tragic death. A lot of people know about that.
24 MR. OLMSTED: Let's take a look at 65 ter 433.
25 Q. Can you confirm this is one of your team's reports?
1 A. Yes, yes.
2 Q. And it's dated 28 May 1992
3 on Kozarac the Serb forces lost, it reports, only five men, while the
4 non-Serbs lost several hundred.
5 Was that, in fact, the case?
6 A. That's what's stated in our report. We had such information at
7 the time. Whether anything changed at least in relation to casualties on
8 the Serb side or whether any other changes, this is the information we
9 had at least in May, and what's in it is what we knew.
10 Q. The report also states that a huge number of persons have been
11 arrested and some have surrendered, and it talks about problems providing
12 them shelter or a place to be, and includes women, children, and old
13 people. Are these people people that ended up in the camps that you just
14 told us about a minute ago?
15 A. Most of them ended up in the so-called Collection Centre
16 Trnopolje, and those who were of better health or those who were
17 able-bodied men who could be members of the army, who looked more fit,
18 they were imprisoned in Keraterm and Omarska. I don't know whether
19 you're familiar with that. This Omarska location and the very location
20 where these people were incarcerated was a location that belonged to the
21 Ljubija Mine. The building there where they were housed belonged to the
22 Ljubija Mine complex.
23 Q. Mr. Radulovic, obviously you were horrified about this
24 information you received about the crimes committed in these villages
25 during the attacks. Do you recall that you discussed this information
1 with Mr. Zupljanin two or three months later?
2 A. I discussed the events in Prijedor with Mr. Zupljanin. On how
3 many occasions, I don't know, but I can tell you that we had quite a few
4 discussions in relation to the events in Prijedor. I even remember that
5 we proposed for Simo Drljaca to be removed in one way or the other. We
6 assessed that he was crazy, that he was a maniac. I can say whatever I
7 want about him because he's dead now, but I can say that I pulled out my
8 Hekler pistol and pointed at him, put it in his mouth, actually wanting
9 to kill him after I've seen what had been done there, and it was just my
10 humanity that prevented me from doing that. He didn't know who I was, so
11 he was startled by it all, and I didn't know who he was. So this vicious
12 circle was broken only when the commander of the police station,
13 Dusan Jankovic, showed up, who in 1984 was a member of my team when we
14 provided security for the Olympic Games, who told me that I must quickly
15 get out of Prijedor because Simo Drljaca would not forgive and forget and
16 he would kill me as well as all the members of my group.
17 MR. OLMSTED: May we tender this document into evidence?
18 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
19 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P1376, Your Honours.
20 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Olmsted, can I put one question to the
22 About the statement that on the Serb side there was a loss of
23 five men, and ten having been wounded, whereas it is estimated that enemy
24 losses amount to several hundred men, speaking of enemy losses, does this
25 refer to armed men, or is it a total number of casualties within the
1 civilian population.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, we were talking about
3 total numbers, referring to total numbers. We didn't have even an
4 opportunity to try and determine which of the casualties were members of
5 armed formations and which civilians.
6 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
7 MR. OLMSTED: Let's take a look at 65 ter 1151. This is a report
8 dated 30 May 1992
9 Q. Can you confirm whether this is a report by your team?
10 A. Yes, it is.
11 Q. It states there is a lack of professionalism on the part of the
12 Prijedor SJB and TO commanding personnel and states that the problem of
13 detained and captured persons of Muslim background is still present.
14 What do you mean by "lack of professionalism" on the part of the
15 Prijedor SJB leadership?
16 A. Well, you see, when you have such total confusion, lack of
17 organisation; when there's not proper accommodation available to people
18 who were taken into custody for some reason or another; when one doesn't
19 know what the interrogations are about; when there were -- when there are
20 no preceding operational activities aimed at determining whether a person
21 was a member of enemy formations, of Green Berets; when the teams aren't
22 organised in a way to have members who know how to deal with issues
23 professionally and fairly. And I also believe that simply their approach
24 was not professional, not competent, with the exception of some employees
25 either of the state or public security services, who did somehow manage
1 to keep up the reputation of, let's say, not only Republika Srpska, but
2 the Serbian people as well.
3 Q. Based on your intelligence information that was available to you,
4 were these non-Serbs that were detained by the police of any security
6 A. If you mean the security interest, I really didn't see any
7 special significance in locking these people up, or I didn't see that
8 this was in our interest. I did observe many elderly people, women, and
9 children in some locations. I will never accept that this may have been
10 the interest of my people. This was, instead, the interest of criminals
11 and crooks or profiteers, people who didn't think that there would be a
13 MR. OLMSTED: May this be tendered into evidence?
14 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
15 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P137 --
16 MR. KRGOVIC: This document isn't on the 65 ter list.
17 MR. OLMSTED: Yes, it is. It's 65 ter 1151.
18 JUDGE HALL: Was the number given?
19 THE REGISTRAR: This would be Exhibit P1377, Your Honours.
20 MR. OLMSTED: We confirm that it certainly was on our
21 65 ter exhibit list.
22 Q. Mr. Radulovic, you mentioned a while ago that you visited Omarska
23 and Keraterm camps yourself in 1992, and I want to talk about that. But
24 before we do: Before you visited the camps, had your intelligence team
25 received any information about what was going on at Omarska and Keraterm
1 before you went there?
2 A. We had some information. Our most important goal was to check
3 who, of the collaborators of the SDB, I mean, the pre-war collaborators,
4 and our operational connections, was in those camps. We could not
5 believe that people were kept under such conditions and that such
6 measures were being applied to them. We were especially horrified by the
7 scenes that we saw, and I mean the Milos Group, that in the so-called
8 triages - which -- that's a term they used - active servicemen of the SDB
9 and the SJB took part. And I know many of them as experienced and
10 ethical people, and I couldn't understand why they were there. If they
11 were unable to resist, they could have walked out, escaped. I would
12 never have consented to taking part in what they did. And when I learned
13 that the number-one man behind all these triages, investigations, and so
14 on was Vojin Bera, it became clear to me that anything was possible,
15 because he was a classic sycophant, and this is why the accused,
16 Mr. Zupljanin, never got true information, or at least not before we
17 passed it on to him, before we informed him.
18 Q. Well, this information that you received before you came to
19 Omarska and Keraterm about abuses of the detainees there, did you write
20 reports on that information?
21 A. Yes. Just briefly, I believe that we sent a dispatch to
22 Nedeljko Kesic. And at the time, Vojin Bera was not in Banja Luka so we
23 handed it directly to Kesic, and I believe that it was one of the reasons
24 why we went. I told you what the most important reason was, but we also
25 went there to check what was going on. And, yes, I almost forgot,
1 Mr. Marko Lazovic from the SDB of Serbia called me up and told me that he
2 had some information about something happening in Prijedor and that he
3 suspected that crimes were being committed. And speaking as a colleague,
4 he said to me, Starisa [as interpreted], go there and check there as soon
5 as possible and find out what's really happening. I went there, among
6 others, also to inform the SDB of Serbia because I saw that they were
7 interested. I wrote the report when I came back, which is a longer
8 report. I don't know whether you saw it. And then I was called to come
9 to Belgrade
10 Q. And we'll get more into that in a minute.
11 You mentioned that there were these triages at Omarska and
12 Keraterm, and you mentioned that they consisted of someone from the SDB
13 and someone from public security. Who was the third party in this
15 A. And military security, please, members of the military security
16 too. I said I was horrified because I had seen members of the state
17 security and public security, but I failed to add that among those who
18 conducted the investigations, there were also people from military
19 security. All these three structures were together and under the direct
20 command, if you will, or acted upon the orders of Vojin Bera. He was
21 charged of these triages, checkups, investigations, and all that for --
22 he was -- he headed or issued order to all these three teams.
23 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Olmsted, the interpreter didn't catch the
24 third security service that was involved, and I think that's important to
25 have on the record. 69, 8.
1 MR. OLMSTED:
2 Q. I apologise, Mr. Radulovic, but just so the record is clear, can
3 you just very simply tell us who were the three persons involved in these
4 triages, where did they come from, in each of these triages?
5 A. I didn't speak about three persons; I spoke about three security
6 services. Those present were members of public security - I believe
7 about a dozen; then there were staff of national security - I believe
8 about 14 of them, with a detachment of national security from Prijedor;
9 and there were also members of military security. In all, there were --
10 all right.
11 Q. And these triages, did they only function in the camps in
12 Prijedor, or were they in other municipalities in the region?
13 A. I'm saying that the detainees at Keraterm and Omarska - and I'm
14 sure of what I'm saying - had gone through investigative -- the
15 investigative procedure. And if you ask me about other areas, I can tell
16 you that it was just the same in Gradiska. People were called in for
17 interviews. And those people were detainees in those camps. And the
18 situation was the same in other areas also.
19 Q. What about Sanski Most? Were these triages working in the
20 detention facilities in Sanski Most?
21 A. Yes, I know that. I wasn't there personally, I didn't see it
22 with my own eyes, but I was very close with one of the most important
23 people in the SJB in the area of Sanski Most, and I'm still on good terms
24 with him today. He complained to me about the way these interviews were
25 conducted, how these people were being processed, and he told me about
1 the same thing that I told you about the investigations conducted in and
2 around Prijedor.
3 Q. Now I want to turn to your visit to Omarska and Keraterm camps.
4 Can you tell us how soon after these camps were established that you
5 actually visited them?
6 A. I couldn't say. I don't have that information. I think that
7 some 20 days or maybe a month elapsed. I'm a bit lost in time, though,
8 because it's been a long time, but I remember well what I saw with my own
9 eyes at Keraterm and Omarska.
10 Q. And did you visit both those camps the same day?
11 A. Yes. In the morning hours, I was at Keraterm; and in the
12 afternoon, I was at Omarska. The distance is about 15 kilometres.
13 Q. Since you visited Keraterm Camp first, let's talk about that one
14 first. What did you observe about the conditions for the detainees at
15 that camp? You mentioned that they were crowded, very crowded, but what
16 else did you observe when you visited it?
17 A. Well, there was a huge hall. By the way, Keraterm was a factory
18 of ceramic tiles for the construction industry. It was impossible to
19 count the people in that hall. Whether they -- there would have been 800
20 or a thousand, I really can't tell, but people were crammed together like
21 sardines. They couldn't even sit, let alone lie down. And I know that
22 it was sunny and hot. People couldn't get water. And you couldn't even
23 think of hygiene or sanitation. And individuals were taken from that
24 hall to another building, which was the office building of Keraterm, for
25 interviews, for interrogation, and most everybody who was taken from one
1 building to another was beaten on the way and mistreated physically. The
2 first information about this mistreatment I received from SJB staff, who
3 complained to me that you cannot simply have those who are bringing in
4 the detainees refrain from beating them and mistreating them, so they
5 were -- they were brought in for interviewing bloody, and they returned
6 even bloodier. Although these people belonged to the same people as me,
7 I cannot consider them as such. To me, they are just criminals. I have
8 a universal view of crime and criminals. To me, a criminal is a
9 criminal, irrespective of his ethnicity, whether he is a Serb, Croat, or
10 a Bosniak. To me it's a universal category, which is hostile to me and
11 hostile to my ideology and my people.
12 Q. Did you see any women, elderly, or children at the camp when you
13 visited that day?
14 A. At Keraterm, I saw a very small number of females, but I couldn't
15 see much because I was unable to access all parts of the space where they
16 were kept. I watched or looked in through a door, and I saw those
17 standing closest, so I couldn't tell whether at the other end there were
18 women or children, but I did see a certain number of women.
19 Q. Do you recall who you saw guarding the camp when you visited?
20 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Olmsted, I'm a little bit confused here. Are
21 we talking about Omarska, or Keraterm, or both?
22 MR. OLMSTED: We're just talking about Keraterm. We'll move to
23 Omarska next.
24 JUDGE DELVOIE: Okay, thank you.
25 MR. OLMSTED:
1 Q. At Keraterm, who was guarding the camp?
2 A. I understood this to be about Keraterm. Whatever I said -- I
3 have said so far is about Keraterm.
4 I can't give you their names, but they were reserve police
5 officers and active-duty police officers. I cannot say that there were
6 no soldiers among them, but I did recognise some public security staff
7 because I could tell by the uniform whether someone was a reserve SJB man
8 or an active-duty SJB man or, alternatively, a military man. At
9 Keraterm, I did not see any members of military units among the guards,
10 all the time referring to Keraterm.
11 Q. And now let's move to Omarska Camp. After you visited Keraterm,
12 you said that you went to Omarska Camp. When you arrived at Omarska,
13 again, I think you mentioned previously that you observed the conditions
14 were very crowded there for the detainees. What else did you observe
15 about the conditions at that camp when you visited it?
16 A. What I saw at Keraterm was horrible, but what I saw at Omarska
17 was much more horrible. At the administrative building at Omarska, the
18 administrative building of the mine, I met a lot of my colleagues from
19 the SNB and SJB, and I saw that there were members of the military
20 security there as well whom I didn't know from before. Since I wanted to
21 collect as much information as possible about what was going on at
22 Omarska and Keraterm, I went up to a room which is above the cafeteria,
23 and then from a window there I looked at the back side of that building.
24 There was a yard there covered with grass, and in two or three places I
25 saw silhouettes, people whom I couldn't recognise, and I probably would
1 not have been able to recognise them had I known them from before. So I
2 asked, What is going on? Who made these people lie here in the sun and
3 torture them thus? And then an experienced worker of the SNB told me,
4 using my nickname, Pile, are you pretending to be crazy or are you blind?
5 And since that person used to be my superior, chief of the SNB who
6 retired in the meantime, I asked him, Well, what's the problem? And he
7 said to me, Well, these are dead men. I said, What do you mean, dead
8 men? He said, Well, they were shot from the roof. There is a
9 competition between different armed formations as to where are they going
10 to hit these people, and they bet on beer.
11 So that was the -- that was how much human life was worth there.
12 So me being me, I started cursing, using all the curses that came to my
13 mind. Of course, I didn't see Vojin Bera there, because he mostly was
14 never present where he was supposed to be present and never knew what he
15 was supposed to know. He's simply that kind of a person, a narcissistic
16 person. Upon seeing that, I went back to Banja Luka, and I remember --
17 Q. Before we move on to your return to Banja Luka, let's get back to
18 Omarska Camp and what you observed them, and then we'll move on to that
20 Where you observed these bodies on the second floor, was that the
21 room where these triages were conducting interrogations?
22 A. Yes. In those premises where I was up on that floor, the people
23 who were brought there were people who were under investigation. There
24 was an operative procedure in place against them, and people were
25 questioned there.
1 Q. And the former SNB chief who you spoke with, can you give us his
3 A. Given what he's like as a person, and also given that he himself
4 was hurt by everything that was going on at Keraterm and Omarska, I would
5 kindly like to ask the Court to give that name, if absolutely necessary,
6 in a private session because I would rather not utter it publicly.
7 JUDGE HALL: Yes.
8 [Private session]
11 Page 10866 redacted. Private session.
22 [Open session]
23 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.
24 MR. OLMSTED:
25 Q. When you were at Omarska Camp, did you have the opportunity to
1 observe who was guarding the camp?
2 A. At Omarska, I saw at the gates members of the public security
3 service; but to tell you the truth, it's a rather large perimeter. And
4 then inside I saw numerous members of military formations of the
5 Army of Republika Srpska. I can't tell you whether they also had a role
6 in securing the camp. I really wouldn't be able to tell you because the
7 perimeter is rather large.
8 Q. Do you recall seeing any women, elderly, or children at the camp
9 that day?
10 A. At the Omarska Camp, I did not have occasion to see them. I saw
11 them at Trnopolje. At Trnopolje, I saw many children, women, the
13 Q. And you visited Trnopolje Camp that day as well?
14 A. Yes. Mr. Prosecutor, I said already what was the reason for me
15 going to those places, to the collection centre. As I have said to you,
16 I wanted to establish which of our collaborators, who had been our
17 collaborators before the conflict broke out, were located there in order
18 to allow them to get in touch with their relatives and to also have a
19 choice in deciding where would they go, et cetera. It was my duty to be
21 Q. Now let's talk about your return to Banja Luka that day. When
22 you returned to Banja Luka, what happened? Did you meet with your
24 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Olmsted, is this going to be a very short
1 MR. OLMSTED: I was looking at this clock, but you're right, the
2 one on the computer is different, and so, yes, we should stop here.
3 JUDGE HALL: Thank you.
4 Mr. Radulovic, your testimony is -- you're completed day 2 of
5 your testimony. We are not going to rise immediately. We have a
6 procedural matter we wish to deal with. So the usher will escort you
7 from the courtroom. We will reconvene tomorrow in a different courtroom.
8 And you would remember the cautions I gave you yesterday. Thank you.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
10 [The witness stands down]
11 JUDGE HALL: And before I hear from Mr. Pantelic, I should alert
12 you, Mr. Olmsted, that you have used five hours and forty minutes, so you
13 would have, if my arithmetic is correct, two hours and twenty minutes
15 MR. OLMSTED: Can I address that after -- that issue just
16 briefly? We can do Mr. Pantelic first, and then I can just raise a
17 couple issues with regard to this witness.
18 JUDGE HALL: Yes, Mr. Pantelic.
19 MR. PANTELIC: Your Honours, thank you, being grateful for this
21 Your Honours, my learned friend Ms. Korner made a submission last
22 Friday, May 21st. Her submission is on page 10697, line 17, with regard
23 to Traynor's -- Mr. Traynor's articles issue. And she mentioned that I
24 made a submission on May 18th, and the page -- transcript page is 10454,
25 saying that, in fact, I was not objecting to the OTP's position regarding
1 the admission of articles. Unfortunately, as usual, our friends from
2 Prosecution -- maybe it's a lack of professional diligence or I don't
3 know what, they are -- they are trying to misinterpret the situation. In
4 fact, I said, on page 10454, line 22, that I'm ready and I will not
5 object to the admission of Mr. Traynor's article, but only the article in
6 which he was mentioning events where Serbs were victims.
7 Yes, I must admit that it was, to some extent, in ironic way,
8 because obviously Mr. Traynor did not make any particular article with
9 regard to the Serb victims and atrocities against Serbs. So having that
10 in mind, I think that I could have an, at least, apology from Ms. Korner
11 for this misinterpretation of my submission because it was really not
12 only out of context, but it was completely fabricated, sort of say,
13 because transcript is very clear.
14 With regard to Mr. Traynor's article, I want to put on the record
15 that position of Zupljanin Defence is the following: Our understanding
16 is that actually newspaper articles are a form of a creation by
17 journalists of certain events. This is a creative work, and it is
18 nothing to do with hearsay issue. In particular case, Mr. Traynor was
19 very welcome to give his testimony before this Trial Chamber, to testify
20 about his own personal impressions or facts that he was eye-witness or
21 fact witness, and nothing to do with the principle of hearsay through
22 newspaper articles, because we all know how an article can be created and
23 what is the nature of that newspaper article. This is a creative work;
24 this is art to some extent. And that's why we strongly object to the
25 admission of these four proposed articles in relation to my client,
1 Mr. Zupljanin, and these 65 ter numbers are 3378, 3375, 10358.07, and
3 When reading these four articles, actually, we can conclude how
4 level of interpretation and, I would say, a creative approach was made,
5 not to mention the titles and the headlines in these articles. So I have
6 impression that you already ruled in terms of issue of reconsideration,
7 Your Honours, but --
8 JUDGE HALL: Provisionally.
9 MR. PANTELIC: Yes, but, I mean, that's my impression. I'm just
10 waiting for your final ruling. But this is a very serious and, from our
11 point of view, fundamental issue in relation to the legal aspects of this
12 particular case, and we are very in favour to ask for the certification
13 if your ruling will be that these four particular articles in relation to
14 Mr. Zupljanin - I'm not speaking on behalf of Stanisic Defence in this
15 particular case - that we could ask for the certification. Because, as I
16 said, my -- my approach to this particular issue is that I don't want to
17 create in this particular trial an overall library of articles and
18 materials. We have to be focused - this is a criminal trial - to facts,
19 to eye-witnesses, et cetera. Otherwise, as I said, on one article like
20 this, we could tomorrow, on the same basis, find three or four and five,
21 and where is the end of this story? Just that, Your Honours.
22 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Pantelic, this is taking a little longer than we
23 had thought. And, incidentally, according to the transcript at line 21
24 of the previous page, I'm recorded as saying "Mr. Pantelic." What I said
25 was "provisionally." In other words, we provisionally ruled on the
1 matter, but obviously we're going to have to take this up tomorrow.
2 So it's past time for the adjournment now, and we would be --
3 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, can I just mention, I'm not proposing
4 to dignify this with a response at the moment. You'll recall last week
5 Mr. O'Sullivan, without any prior notice, got up and made a legal
6 submission. I then asked Your Honour to make an order that if legal
7 submissions are going to be made, we be notified in response, and your
8 response was that you couldn't imagine that that wasn't something that
9 most counsel would do. I was unaware, until Your Honours mentioned it,
10 that Mr. Pantelic was going to raise anything. In spite my request for
11 information via e-mail, I got no answer until 30 seconds ago.
12 Your Honours, I'm now having, unfortunately, to ask that when the
13 Defence are going to making submissions, they notify us in advance. And
14 that's all I want to say.
15 JUDGE HALL: So we resume tomorrow morning at Courtroom II
16 at 9.00. Thank you.
17 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, that was a request for a ruling at some
19 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.49 p.m.
20 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 27th day
21 of May, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.