1 Monday, 31 May 2010
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours.
6 This is case IT-08-91-T, the Prosecutor versus Mico Stanisic and
7 Stojan Zupljanin.
8 JUDGE HALL: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
9 Good morning to everyone. May we have the appearances, please.
10 MR. OLMSTED: Good morning, Your Honours. Matthew Olmsted,
11 Joanna Korner, and Crispian Smith for the Prosecution.
12 MR. ZECEVIC: Good morning, Your Honours. Slobodan Zecevic,
13 Slobodan Cvijetic, Eugene O'Sullivan, Ms. Tatjana Savic, and
14 Dominic Kennedy appearing for Stanisic Defence this morning.
15 MR. PANTELIC: Good morning, Your Honours. For Zupljanin
16 Defence, Igor Pantelic, Dragan Krgovic, and Jason Antley. Thank you.
17 JUDGE HALL: Thank you.
18 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, before the witness comes in, can I just
19 make one inquiry. I think I know the answer, but I just want to confirm
20 it. Mr. Riedlmayer will be testifying, as I understand it, as an expert
21 under the provisions of Rule 94 and so his reports will be the evidence
22 rather than previous testimony which would be under 92 ter?
23 JUDGE HALL: Yes.
24 MS. KORNER: The reason I'm asking is we made a slight error on
25 the documents we submitted. Because we, for some reason, we have a
1 slight - I don't know quite what the word is - but brain-storm.
2 [Trial Chamber confers]
3 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, that's right, isn't it? Yes, thank
4 you very much. Because we'll have to resubmit the package because we put
5 in, I don't know, as I say, I think we had a brain-storm slightly and we
6 put in his previous testimony, but it will his reports.
7 JUDGE HALL: Thank you.
8 Could the usher please escort the witness back to the stand.
9 [The witness takes the stand]
10 JUDGE HALL: Good morning to you, Mr. Radulovic. Before
11 Mr. Zecevic resumes his cross-examination, I remind you you're still on
12 your oath.
13 WITNESS: PREDRAG RADULOVIC [Resumed]
14 [Witness answered through interpreter]
15 JUDGE HALL: Yes, Mr. Zecevic.
16 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, I have no further questions for this
17 witness, except I would like to tender the documents as per list which I
18 submitted on -- on Friday. I see that there was no reaction, so I
19 assumed that there is no objection from the Office of the Prosecutor.
20 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Olmsted.
21 MR. ZECEVIC: I believe the list has been forwarded to Registry
22 as well. Yes.
23 JUDGE HALL: Thank you.
24 Mr. Olmsted.
25 MR. OLMSTED: Yes, we did receive a list of 31 documents. We
1 don't object to them. We question the relevancy of a number of them, but
2 I think that will be for the Trial Chamber to determine on its own.
3 JUDGE HALL: Thank you.
4 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
5 JUDGE HALL: Yes, Mr. Zecevic. The -- in -- within the -- within
6 the course of this morning's first session we would be able to tell what
7 you the numbers are, but that's a process that's going to take a little
8 while. But the -- but they're all in.
9 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you very much.
10 JUDGE HALL: It's a matter of assigning numbers to them.
11 MR. ZECEVIC: I appreciate. Thank you very much.
12 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours.
13 Cross-examination by Mr. Krgovic:
14 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Radulovic.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you especially for calling
16 me Comrade Radulovic.
17 JUDGE HALL: Why won't my mic turn off?
18 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
19 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Krgovic, give me a moment, please. We have a
20 slight technical problem here. I can't get my mic off.
21 [Trial Chamber confers]
22 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]
23 MR. ZECEVIC: [Microphone not activated] ... the witness's
24 microphone is off as well.
25 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] It seems there's a technical
1 problem of some sort with the mics.
2 Q. Just in order to check out, can you hear me?
3 A. Yes, I can hear you very well.
4 Q. Comrade Radulovic, in answering the Prosecutor's questions, you
5 mentioned some people and said, as far as I understood you, that the word
6 "gentleman" was used very frequently even for those people who could not
7 possibly be understood to be gentlemen. But I will, when I ask you
8 questions about these people, I will just use the word "person" for them
9 so -- to -- as -- so as to avoid using other terminology.
10 A. I agree, because I'm very selective in using that particular
12 Q. Very well. Comrade Radulovic, I will begin my cross-examination
13 with trying to establish a context of your work and the group Milos
14 the circumstances surrounding its establishment.
15 You said that this was in June, the 28th of June, 1992?
16 A. It was the 28th of July, 1991, when the group was formed as the
17 Milos Group.
18 Q. The establishment of the this group, Milos, actually came at a
19 time when the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was breaking up,
21 and at the beginning of the breakup of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia
22 and Herzegovina
23 A. Yes, that's correct.
24 Q. The entire area of the Banja Luka region, where Milos Group
25 operated, and especially the border area towards Croatia, saw the
1 worsening of the security situation and serious breaches and violations
2 of the constitutional and legal order of the Republic of Bosnia
4 A. Yes, that's correct. If you allow me, I would just like that add
5 a sentence to what I've said. The violations -- or, rather, the
6 break-down in the ethnic relations had occurred earlier, so if you only
7 confine this to 1991 then you're only right in part, because all these
8 things had happened post-festum, as it were. Everything had already
9 fallen apart. And the only thing that was left was the breaking up of
10 whatever shards and bits and pieces had been left unbroken.
11 Q. I agree with what you've said. But because of the time-frame of
12 the indictment in which is 1992, I wanted to go back to certain events in
13 1991 because they were -- they reflect on the indictment period. And,
14 therefore, I will focus my question to the period from mid-1991 up until
15 the end of 1992, mid-1991, because that was the time when the Milos Group
16 had been formed.
17 At this point in time, in 1991, war was on in the territory of --
18 of Croatia
19 the Banja Luka CSB and the border areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina
21 A. Correct.
22 Q. The border areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina were being shelled by
23 the Croatian side. There was a strong presence of the ZNGs and the
24 Croatian Defence Council and Croatian armed forces in that area; correct?
25 A. Correct. I apologise, I will try to follow the cursor so as not
1 to barge in on your questions.
2 Q. The Milos Group, in its activities, as far as I understood, this
3 group, at this point in time, was active primarily on monitoring these
4 events and collecting intelligence, gathering intelligence, in order to
5 be able to assess the possible implications of the war in Croatia
6 the Bosnia and Herzegovina and Banja Luka
7 they tried to identify certain security issues and problems which
8 affected security; correct?
9 A. Yes. But I have to stress that a lot of information was missing
10 at the time.
11 I apologise, but if I can just expand on this, there was
12 insufficient information on Sijekovac, Kupres, many events from early
13 1992 when the war started, and this was characteristic specifically for
14 this region, where conflicts broke out between Serbs an armed units of
15 the HOS and the HDZ. And I mention these two towns because they are
16 characteristic of these events, but there are other places where the same
17 was happening.
18 Q. And as a result of wartime -- of war operations in Croatia
19 combat in the border area towards Bosnia and Herzegovina, there was a
20 large influx of refugees from Croatia
21 surrounding areas?
22 A. That's right. I don't know how important it is for you, but
23 since the war broke out in Croatia
24 coming over into the Banja Luka area. Some of them remained there, most
25 of them, while others moved on to other areas in Republika Srpska and
2 JUDGE HALL: [Previous translation continues] ... when we have a
3 moment, may we interrupt to have the Registry assign those exhibit
5 MR. KRGOVIC: Yes.
6 JUDGE HALL: Could we do it now?
7 MR. KRGOVIC: Yeah, can you do it now.
8 JUDGE HALL: Yes. Thank you.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, the 30 tendered documents will
10 become Exhibits 1D287 through 1D317. And additionally the Defence
11 tenders 1D279 and 1D282 which were MFI'd during the last session. Thank
13 MR. KRGOVIC:
14 Q. Mr. Radulovic, this fact and the arrival of the expelled people
15 from -- into that area actually exacerbated the situation, both the
16 security and the economic situation, in the Banja Luka area; correct?
17 A. If you want my opinion, I can tell you that that is correct.
18 Q. When I say "expelled people," I am actually referring to Serb
19 refugees. I'm repeating this for the sake of the transcript.
20 A. Well, that is what I understood you to mean.
21 Q. With these refugees, a number of people were coming back from the
22 battlefields, from the front lines in Croatia, into this area which was
23 under the control of your CSB. So I am referring here to the -- to the
24 members of HOS and ZNG who had fought in Croatia. Also, I'm referring to
25 a number of Serbian people who -- who reported when they were called up
1 and went to fight in Croatia
2 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not hear the last portion
3 of the question.
4 MR. KRGOVIC:
5 Q. Could you please clarify? I didn't quite understand.
6 A. Well, in addition to the refugees who came and who exacerbated
7 the security situation --
8 JUDGE HALL: [Previous translation continues] ...
9 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. In other words, the refugees who arrived in Croatia, and I am
11 hear actually mentioning two different issues, and I'm not necessarily
12 implying that they are related, but in the Banja Luka area there were
13 members of the armed forces of the Republic of Croatia
14 their appearance and who hail from Bosnia-Herzegovina.
15 A. Correct. Now I understood what you meant by your question.
17 Q. And then we see that all three ethnic groups in Bosnia and
19 organising and trying to arm themselves. And at one point in time in
20 Banja Luka there was a large number of armed people in the Banja Luka
21 area. Some of them organised in various units. Correct?
22 A. Yes. But I would just like to add that I myself took part in an
23 investigation where we conducted interviews with an influential person
24 from the SDA who admitted to us that the SDA leadership had purchased
25 5.000 rifles, automatic rifles, from Slovenia. After the interview with
1 this person, this same individual reported publicly what he had said, and
2 he also sent it to the media. And as for him, he was supposed to be
3 processed further or prosecuted, but I'm not sure how that whole thing
4 ended and whether there was a final judgement by a court. But I do
5 remember that figure very clearly, 5.000 rifles, which Slovenia had
6 because they had left behind -- they had been left behind by the
7 Yugoslav People's Army in their depots in Slovenia.
8 Of course, I do not wish to reiterate here the well-known facts
9 about how the Croatian side armed itself, and I wouldn't wish any part of
10 my statement or testimony to be understood as my attempt to give credit
11 to myself for something that Mr. Aco Vasiljevic did. He was the general
12 of the Yugoslav Army who conducted this operation at the time.
13 But I would like to say that our Gradiska source, through his
14 connections who were operating in the border area, the border with
16 event. I would especially like to point this out, and I hope this will
17 not cause him any problems, because he was the first to learn that fact,
18 or, rather, our -- one of our reservists at the SDB and an active-duty
19 member of the SDB, Drago Sobot, they were the first ones who actually
20 obtained that information, that intelligence.
21 Q. Comrade Radulovic, in parallel with these processes conducted by
22 the SDB, also the leadership of the HDZ and the SDA, were involved in the
23 process of establishing the independent Bosnia-Herzegovina dominated by
24 Muslims and Croats, to the detriment of the Serbian nation, right?
25 A. Mr. Krgovic, is there a difference between the period then and
1 the period nowadays? It's an identical situation.
2 By using the percentage of the majority nation, they want to give
3 advantage to the two minority nations and establish a country whose major
4 goal will be to fulfil the objectives of the SDA. This is what the
5 current political leadership led by Haris Silajdzic, Zlatko Lagumdzija,
6 and others, is trying to do under a different guise, so to speak, under a
7 different decorum. This is a problem described by Ivo Andric who
8 depicted it with great accuracy and beauty in his book called, in
9 Serbian, Prokleta Avlija.
10 Q. Such policies by Muslim and Croats' parties had their unavoidable
11 effect on the MUP of the then-Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the unity of
12 MUP was disturbed. The Muslim and Croat side started outvoting the
13 Serbian personnel there. Isn't that right?
14 A. I stated my opinion concerning this on the first day of my
15 evidence; that's correct. But I think that it should be well-known to
16 Mr. Mico Stanisic in what way were the Muslims within MUP of
17 Republika Srpska armed. They used illegal channels to do that via a
18 company from Macedonia
19 weaponry to conduct a street war. To be fully precise, they purchased
20 hecklers, short and long-barrels, the so-called 3s and 5s, and they also
21 purchased other equipment. Mostly for street combat and sabotage
23 Q. Comrade Radulovic, I have to correct you. When discussing how
24 the unity of MUP was disturbed, you said the MUP of Republika Srpska, but
25 you meant the MUP of Bosnia and Herzegovina
1 A. Of course. Of course, I meant the MUP of Bosnia and Herzegovina
2 Q. And you were referring to the employees of MUP who were Muslims.
3 A. Yes. Predominantly Muslims, although there were some Croatians
4 as well.
5 Q. And the system of reporting and communications was also disturbed
6 because the Muslims employees used the ethnic lines for sending their
7 reports so that the reports from the Banja Luka CSB, which were supposed
8 to follow the usual channels, did not follow them. Rather, the Serbian
9 employees were skipped over in that reporting system.
10 A. Mr. Krgovic, it is very difficult for me to give answers to
11 everything that you are referring to. God, if I may invoke God, did not
12 give me the talent whereby I could use few words to say a lot. But I
13 have to tell you that this parallel structure is something that we felt
14 back in 1988 and then onwards. And by your leave, there's no need for me
15 to be afraid. I can point a finger at the people from the Banja Luka
16 centre who are Muslims and Croats who maintained their contacts with
18 And whatever they did, they did exclusively - and I repeat, exclusively -
19 in the interest of their nation, of their ethnic group, and their
20 national political parties.
21 I don't know to what extent I need to tell you this. The
22 Republic of Croatia
23 which it organised or attempted to organise the Croats living outside of
25 political analyst, I'm telling you this from the angle of my work at the
1 time and the information I collected. Therefore, there is no background
2 whatsoever to what I'm going to tell you now. I did not use opinions of
3 any other authors. What I'm telling you, I'm telling you on the basis of
4 what I did as an operative, which, unfortunately, wasn't put forward
5 here, because, allegedly, the explanation given was that nobody was
6 interested in that period of time.
7 On the other hand, I as a human being have great difficulty
8 speaking of consequences without mentioning the causes, and this is why I
9 already voiced my objection, saying that this does not reflect my style
10 of work.
11 Now, to be more specific, in 1988, the Ministry of the Interior
12 of the Republic of Croatia
13 rather, some members of the parliament of Croatia at the time, adopted a
14 plan, asking that check-points be established and routes in Bosnia
16 would be admitted into schools for national defence which they could
17 complete in an accelerated manner so that they could take up leading
18 positions in the Ministry of the Interior of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as
19 well as in other organs.
20 This was done in order to establish the pyramid principle by way
21 of which intelligence centres and check-points would be established for
22 certain regions. So, for example, for the area from Bosanski Brod via
23 Derventa to Doboj to Maglaj, ending in Zepca and Zavidovici, this was a
24 channel used by operatives. I know exactly the person who was in charge
25 of this. His name was Marko Lukic. He was a commander of the
1 Special Detachment of the Republic of Croatia
2 was in combat near the Plitvice lake. We who hail from that area know
3 when this combat took place at the Plitvice lake. This man was involved
4 in a traffic accident. He is still alive nowadays, but he had an
5 accident in his BMW. And without going into all the details, he managed
6 to establish this connection via his brother, Stipe Lukic, who worked for
7 the national defence in Doboj.
8 And to everybody's great surprise, a rather young operative, such
9 as Stipe Lukic, managed to recruit and engage many other people, even
10 reactivate some. Some persons who were considered legendary in the
11 intelligence world, such as Ivan Curko via his brother, Marko Lukic, he
12 went to Zagreb
13 national security -- or whatever it was called at the time, I'm not quite
14 familiar with their terminology.
15 The same channels existed in other areas, such as Krajina and
16 some other regions. The same method of establishing information hubs was
17 used by the Bosniak side. I know exactly who were key Bosniak figures in
18 Banja Luka when it comes to collecting intelligence and creating
19 paramilitary formations.
20 Now, since this is a very broad topic, let me summarise. It came
21 as no surprise to us long-term operatives. Those who worked in the
22 State Security Service could observe all of this. This was observed by
23 the Milos Group and by myself as an individual before the Milos Group was
24 established. However, what lacked was the courage. Had we done it in
25 time, had we acted in time, there would have been no war.
1 Q. Comrade Radulovic, I will show you now a report by the
2 Milos Group which is of a later date but speaks of the same topic.
3 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we see 2D02-1611.
4 MR. PANTELIC: And, Your Honours, while we are waiting for
5 document, just a small correction to the transcript. It's at page 10,
6 line 8, when this witness spoke about the book of well-known author,
7 Ivo Andric, Noble Prize author. He said that -- I mean, in transcript
8 it's "Prokleta Avlija" in B/C/S, but the proper translation should be the
9 "Damn Yard."
10 MR. KRGOVIC: I apologise. I went too fast in giving the number.
12 MR. OLMSTED: Apologies, could you give us the tab number as
14 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] That's tab 66 of the
15 Stanisic Defence.
16 Q. You spoke of the name of the people, saying that you knew the
17 names of the people who had organised this in Banja Luka. This is your
18 report, isn't it?
19 A. Yes. This is a short report of ours. The information we have
20 about this phenomenon is much broader, much greater.
21 Q. And those who conducted this illegal activity of arming the SDA
22 and who conducted this anti-state activity according to the standards of
23 your service are precisely these persons: Jahic Bajazid occupied the
24 position of the chief of public security in the Banja Luka centre, right?
25 A. Yes, correct.
1 Q. And while he held this position, since he was not a professional
2 policeman and he had previously been the president of the executive board
3 of the SDA, he directly communicated by a parallel structures with
4 Avdo Hebib and Bosniak members in Banja Luka, right?
5 A. Well, yes, Mr. Krgovic. I'm grateful to you for summarising this
6 and asking me just to confirm or deny this. The situation, however, was
7 much more mixed up than could be gleaned from this dispatch. You have to
8 bear in mind that dispatches sometimes had to be rather brief and no
9 explanations were given that could fully clarify just how well connected
10 and structured and effective this group was.
11 I don't know if you can gain the appropriate impression from this
12 report. But, at any rate, what is stated here is correct.
13 Q. Except for what we see here in this note, there is also some
14 mention of a different situation?
15 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] My colleague Mr. Zecevic suggests
16 that there was some unclarities in relation to these people, at least as
17 far as the translation was concerned.
18 Q. Now, you're talking about an organisation an organised formation
19 or a group of Muslims who were arming themselves and structuring in a
20 military fashion?
21 A. That's correct. In a way, these were the most important such
22 people in the area of Banja Luka. Among them you can find some extremely
23 rich people who owned millions upon millions and who used their own money
24 to support this supply of armaments and formation of units for a large
25 number of military formations, but each of the formation was a small
1 unit. I don't know whether you understood me correctly.
2 Q. So small mobile groups in order to be more difficult to discover
3 but then linked up to form big formations.
4 A. That's correct.
5 Q. What we see here mentioned as a situation is a Serbian state
6 security locating Mr. Becirevic who lived in Banja Luka and who provided
7 them with information about the issue. And as far as I know - and I
8 would like to ask you to assist me with this - the Milos Group took part
9 in the interview with this Becirevic person and took a statement from him
10 in relation to the arming of this group?
11 A. Yes, that's correct. This gentleman confirmed all that we knew
12 based on our operative work, but we didn't know the exact numbers, we
13 didn't know through which channels they obtained weapons, what's the
14 value of it. These were little details we couldn't find out without
15 interviewing him and some other people he pointed out to us.
16 Q. During your conversation or interview of this person, you were
17 not forcing him, you were treating him fair. He gave you the information
18 voluntarily. He even accepted to work with the service, and he asked to
19 be placed somewhere else and become a source for you?
20 A. We are entering issues that of intelligence nature, so if we
21 could ...
22 MR. KRGOVIC: Can we move into a private session now.
23 JUDGE HARHOFF: We didn't hear him ask for private session. Was
24 that the idea?
25 MR. KRGOVIC: I have asked for it, but it didn't enter the
1 transcript because the witness told us that we are reaching information
2 that he wouldn't want to say publicly.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It does not involve persons but
4 methods of work.
5 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, I understood it like that.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
7 JUDGE HALL: Yes, so we move into private session.
8 [Private session]
11 Page 11051 redacted. Private session.
19 [Open session]
20 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.
21 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this
22 document and receive a number for it.
23 JUDGE HARHOFF: Before you do so, Mr. Krgovic, could you
24 enlighten us as to who was this message sent to? If you read the
25 dispatch, it seems to be a reply to an Official Note. Who was the
1 recipient of this dispatch?
2 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. You've heard the question put to you by the honourable judge.
4 Based on this, I think it was sent to the Serbian RDB?
5 A. Yes, that's correct. You understood me. I thought it was
6 obvious. But, yes, I can confirm that.
7 MR. PANTELIC: I do apologise. Your Honour, maybe it's a
8 mistake. It's page 19, line 19, it's "Official Note," not
9 "unofficial note." That's the part of the document.
10 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Just another correction for the transcript, when mention of
12 Serbian security is concerned, in the transcript it says RDB, and you
13 mean the Republic of Serbia
14 A. That's right.
15 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Radulovic, do you know whether this dispatch
16 was also brought to the attention of the MUP of Republika Srpska?
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, they were informed about that.
18 This went through regular mail, Your Honours. The first person who was
19 informed about this was Vojin Bera, who was chief of number 1 -- of 01 in
20 the state security of the Banja Luka centre. And this can be confirmed
21 by the fact that this very report was found in their archives.
22 JUDGE HARHOFF: I'm just curious to know because I'm not sure
23 that I have fully understood the implications of your parallel providing
24 information to Serbia
25 dispatch, it would seem that you were in a dialogue with the Serbian RDB
1 about events happening in -- in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as late as in
2 June 1992.
3 I'm not sure I fully understand the reasons why you had this
4 communication with the Serbian authorities and -- and what the
5 implications of it were, in terms of the Serbian authorities'
6 communications with the authorities of the Republika Srpska.
7 Can you clarify this, if you know?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I will do my best to clarify this.
9 As an operative, I wasn't all that much interested in
10 relationships between political institutions and organs, the authorities
11 of Republika Srpska and Serbia
12 the state security of Serbia
13 The first reason was something that's identical to the reason why
14 Bosniaks from Banja Luka were linked up with Sarajevo or Zagreb
15 because I understood that the question of the Serbian People cannot be
16 resolved partially only at the Banja Luka level or only at the
17 Bosnia-Herzegovina level, but only as an issue to be dealt at the level
18 of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia or what remains of
19 this country. So I wanted, for the people in the country that I see as
20 my home country, to know what are the risks and what comes out from the
21 intentions of these entities or autonomous provinces and so forth.
22 That was one motive.
23 The other motive was the issue of not-yet-defined relationship
24 with the JNA because we had rather poor communication between us and
25 them, meaning intelligence they gathered they should send to us so that
1 we would know how to organise ourselves. And also, for us, for our
2 parts, to take information that we have that are not related only to
3 Banja Luka so that such information would be submitted to the centre, to
4 the base, so that the base or the home would be able to use such relevant
6 And the third reason or motive, although I could enumerate more
7 motives, but the third was that there were many of us in the
8 State Security Service who could not part ways so easily and forget about
9 the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia and the services that
10 existed at the federal level.
11 And, Your Honours, I would really like you to understand that our
12 linking up with the state security was for the purpose of preventing
13 crimes, of all crimes against any potential victims. To be honest with
14 you, I am proud to say that thanks to the service, the
15 State Security Service, we managed to save many people and prevented them
16 from disappearing from the face of the earth. Well, that would be all.
17 I don't know whether you've understood me.
18 JUDGE HARHOFF: Maybe I did. Thank you, Mr. Radulovic.
19 You made reference to what you called the "question of the
20 Serbian People."
21 And I understood from your answer to me that the question of the
22 Serbian People would require that you exchanged information with the
23 Serbian intelligence authorities, with the Serbian SDB. And I also
24 understood from your answer that, in fact, you did receive valuable
25 information from the Serbian side which would enable you to provide a
1 clearer picture and an overview of the situation.
2 And then you went on to say that you did all of this in order
3 to -- to prevent crimes from being committed, yet you were also aware
4 that, in fact, crimes were committed; on both sides, yes.
5 So did it ever occur to you that, as much as you thought that
6 your activity would prevent crimes from happening, they might also, on
7 the other hand, actually promote the commission of crimes?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I never doubted for a
9 moment that you would understand me correctly, and you have understood me
10 well, in terms of everything that I have said. But as for whether we
11 were able to actually assess whether there would be omissions, of course.
12 Of course, we were aware that there would be omissions and that some
13 things may occur.
14 But, you know, if you save a single human life, as the Israelis
15 would put it, then you have saved the whole world. And that is what
16 guided us. We wanted to save those that we could within our limitations.
17 But, of course, I did not at any moment imagine that I was a
18 Messiah or some kind of saviour. But, of course, was wasn't able nor
19 were my superiors able to keep everything under control.
20 JUDGE HARHOFF: [Previous translation continues] ... to you,
21 Mr. Krgovic.
22 JUDGE DELVOIE: Just one moment, please. Mr. Radulovic, a small
23 detail. Can you give us the first name of Mr. -- what was his name
24 again? Sorry. Becirevic.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I really cannot recall at this
1 point. I can't remember his first name now as I sit here.
2 But I'm sure you can find that in your information.
3 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
4 JUDGE HALL: [Previous translation continues] ... admitted and
6 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you. Exhibit -- this will be Exhibit 2D84,
7 Your Honours.
8 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, responding to
9 Judge Delvoie's question, I will look up the first name in one of the
10 earlier statements. And then after the break maybe we can show the
11 document to the witness so that he can authentic it. I didn't want to go
12 in such detail, but we will show him the statement.
13 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
14 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. I will now show you another document that is related to what you
16 were telling us about.
17 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we now please see 1D03-3395
18 in e-court. In Stanisic's tab, that's under tab 56.
19 Could we have the second page of this document, please, shown to
20 the witness.
21 MR. OLMSTED: Do we have an English translation of this document?
22 MR. KRGOVIC: I think we have.
23 [Defence counsel confer]
24 MR. KRGOVIC: I'm not sure, but I check.
25 Q. Anyway, I ask witness to -- I will ask witness to see the report
1 and the -- in the [indiscernible] the signature and the date.
2 A. This is a report by the Milos Group dated 3 June 1992.
3 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we now go back to page 1,
5 MR. OLMSTED: I'm sorry, before we ask any questions about this
6 document, the Prosecution raises the same objection as it did last
7 Friday, which is until we have an English translation, it's not
8 appropriate for a witness to be cross-examined about the document.
9 Neither the Trial Chamber nor the Prosecution can confirm what the
10 witness is saying is consistent with the document that we're looking at.
11 And, therefore, we'd ask that we get a translation before any
12 questions are asked about the document.
13 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Krgovic, I would have thought that this would
14 have --
15 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I do not intend do put
16 any questions to the witness related to this document. I will only ask
17 him about the events underlying this document. And when we do get a
18 translation, I will have it uploaded.
19 In other words, I will not use this document when I put my
20 questions to the witness.
21 JUDGE HALL: So what's the point of putting it up?
22 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I wasn't aware that
23 there was no translation uploaded. I was informed that we did have a
24 translation but it hasn't been uploaded yet. So it's really a technical
1 Therefore, I suggest that I just ask the witness about the event
2 itself and nothing to do with the document itself.
3 JUDGE HALL: Yes.
4 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Mr. Radulovic, you must be aware that in Simici, in Banja Luka
6 municipality, Simici village, Banja Luka municipality, there was a
7 Croatian unit which had -- which was well-armed and organised as a
8 military unit; correct?
9 A. Yes. But it was not a military unit; it was a paramilitary unit.
10 Q. At this time, in other words, in July 1992, had you a list of
11 names of those individuals who were armed and the weapons that they had;
13 A. Yes. But this is not the only list. And this is not the only
14 area where there were armed units.
15 I would like to remind you, because you remind me -- you keep
16 reminding me all the time of things, so let me remind you that in 1989 we
17 learned that in the Cazin Krajina, in the Cazin district, in the
18 Velika Kladusa area, there was an armed Bosniak unit which numbered
19 approximately, according to what we learned, which numbered -- or was
20 company-strong. And that they were organised as a military unit,
21 following military rules, and now, if I tell you that we were able to
22 confirm this information -- or, rather, that this is corroborated in a
23 book that was published in Velika Kladusa after the war, it was published
24 by the chairman of the Executive Board, or Executive Council of
25 Velika Kladusa during the war and one of the closest associates of a
1 well-known politician from that area. And this man said in his book, in
2 this memoire of his, he provided a photograph of one of those units and
3 dated it as having been taken in 1989.
4 Now, this information that we had from this period was, as we
5 see, confirmed some ten years after the fact, and it is even more tragic
6 that no one at all paid any attention to this bit of information that we
8 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I believe this would
9 be a good time for a break. And in the meantime, we will have the
10 document translated -- or, rather, the translation of the document
12 So if could I just get a MFI number, please.
13 JUDGE HALL: Yes, Madam Registrar.
14 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 2D85, marked for identification,
15 Your Honours.
16 JUDGE HALL: So we take the break now.
17 [The witness stands down]
18 --- Recess taken at 10.25 a.m.
19 --- On resuming at 10.50 a.m.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, just to correct the transcript. On
21 page 7, line 8 of today's transcript, 30 documents are assigned numbers
22 1D287 to 1D316; and document P75, MFI'd on 7th October, 2009, will become
23 exhibit now.
24 JUDGE HALL: Thank you.
25 [The witness takes the stand]
1 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Comrade Radulovic, we were dealing with a document.
3 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] And, Your Honours, in the meantime,
4 I was told that this document -- or, rather, its translation is now in
5 e-court. So I would like to ask for the 1D03-3395 to be uploaded.
6 That's D285 [sic].
7 I apologise, Your Honours. I won't be needing this document
8 then. We'll deal with it at the very end when I have an official
9 confirmation that it's been entered into the e-court system.
10 Can we please have 1D03-2061.
11 MR. OLMSTED: And if you could just provide us with a tab number.
12 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] This document is the last document
13 on our list. I think it was added -- it's 41.
14 Q. What we have here is a statement by Dzemo Becirevic, a statement
15 to the SNB sector in Banja Luka. And it's related to a political linking
16 up of SDA in Banja Luka and procurement of weapons, all related to his
17 escape from Banja Luka.
18 On page 1, as well as on page 2, he discusses the issues related
19 to the organisation of the party.
20 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we please have page 2 of the
21 document, where he is stating the following.
22 Page 2, please. In the B/C/S version as well, please.
23 Can we have the last paragraph zoomed in. I think ... in the
24 English version, it's the first paragraph; in the B/C/S version, it's the
25 last on the page.
1 Q. It says that from the nine sub-branches, five military formations
2 were established in the sub-branches with a Muslim majority?
3 In the second sentence, we can read that each of the military
4 formations numbered around a hundred men armed with automatic rifles, and
5 a sub-branch president was simultaneously the commander of the military
7 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we please have page 3 in the
8 B/C/S, and in the English version, it's still the first paragraph related
9 to the settlement of Novoselija.
10 Here it is stated:
11 "I know that the president of the Novoselija sub-branch
12 Bajazid Jahic was the chief of the Banja Luka SJB and that he personally
13 brought the weapons from Sarajevo
14 presidents of the five sub branches with a Muslim majority."
15 Mr. Radulovic, the information contained in this statement, is
16 this what you referred to when you said that you can elaborate on this
17 issue? Is this exactly what you had in mind?
18 A. Yes. Thank you. This, what you've presented, is much more
19 credible than any statements I may make about it. But, yes, that is
20 exactly it.
21 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Krgovic, I didn't see the date of this
22 document. Can you remind us?
23 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, we can see it on
24 page 1: 22nd September, 1992. On the first page of the document.
25 JUDGE DELVOIE: And is this a report of the Milos Group?
1 JUDGE HARHOFF: No, it is [Microphone not activated]
2 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] No, Your Honours.
3 Q. Let me show you the last page of the document. This is a record
4 of a statement given by Dzemo Becirevic.
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. It was taken by the National Security Service, Banja Luka.
7 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we please have the last page of
8 the document? Yes, thank you.
9 Q. In accordance with the rules of the time, we can see on the
10 left-hand side who provided the statement. Next to it is the recording
11 clerk. And then we have initials of the persons taking the statement.
12 A. Yes, that's correct.
13 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have the first page
14 of the document back on the screen.
15 Q. It shows the circumstances under which the statement was taken.
16 The statement starts with the words:
17 "I gave the first statement before the SNB inspectors on
18 20 September 1992
19 them the real truth regarding the political and military organisation of
20 the SDA party in Banja Luka and the circumstances of the purchase and
21 smuggling of weapons and my flight from Banja Luka."
22 From this, Mr. Radulovic, we can see that the operatives who were
23 taking the statement treated him fairly, which was something that you
24 that told us about already, that there was no coercion involved.
25 A. I personally interviewed Mr. Becirevic. That was this incident
1 when he was kidnapped from us and other people signed.
2 Q. I have shown you several pages of the document. If you want, I
3 can even give you a copy of a document so that can you go through it and
4 tell me whether everything is correct.
5 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, instead of going
6 through it via e-court, maybe this would be ...
7 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Radulovic, you just mentioned that you
8 personally interviewed Mr. Becirevic.
9 Did your interview with him form the basis of Becirevic's
10 statement, which we now have in front of us; or did you interview him
11 long before his statement was given?
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The interview lasted several hours.
13 After having heard him, we started taking the official statement. That
14 was the modus operandi. Then, and today as well, according to the law, a
15 statement was taken from him. He was warned about everything as
16 prescribed by the law, and this is his personal statement. In other
17 words, neither I or the operatives who conducted interview put any
18 constructions of ours and incorporated it into the statement. No, this
19 is his statement. This statement, in this form, in this style, was
20 something that was also recorded for a camera.
21 JUDGE HARHOFF: Let me put my question to you in a different way
23 Do you recall when in September of 1992 you interviewed
24 Mr. Becirevic?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm certain it was on the
1 22nd of September, 1992, but I do not exclude the possibility, namely, I
2 told you that we've had several conversations. Before you reach the
3 stage of a statement, before you've opened him up, before you've conduced
4 him to give you a statement to -- before you make sure that he understood
5 that your intentions are good, which is something that experienced
6 operatives know how to do; so, in short, I may have had conversations
7 with him prior to this and maybe even after the taking of the statement.
8 But the statement was taken on the 22nd of September, 1992, as you can
9 see in this document, in the record.
10 Your Honour, it is stated here that it was taken as defined by
11 Article 151 of the ZKP, but my colleagues would know that the practice at
12 the time, it was not required to record all the things the client or
13 party was warned about. You can see at the end of the statement recorded
14 that the person who gave the statement read his statement and that by
15 signing it he confirms its accuracy. That's how things were done then;
16 that's how things are done now.
17 JUDGE HARHOFF: Do you -- thank you. Do you recall who were
18 present during the interview with Mr. Becirevic, apart from yourself?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. I stated that
20 lieutenant-colonel -- or, rather, at the time he was Major Bogdanic; then
21 my colleague, Goran Sajinovic. Occasionally present was a person who
22 operated the camera; I can't remember his name. And then occasionally
23 some of the people from our operative branch would enter the room, and
24 some of the military security employees as well. But I can't remember
25 who because that was a long time ago.
1 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you.
2 MR. KRGOVIC: Can I have an exhibit number for this document.
3 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked as ...
4 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit 2D86, Your Honours.
5 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Comrade Radulovic, I would like to ask you to take a look at
7 another document related to the activities of the Milos Group.
8 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] It's 1D00-3294.
9 JUDGE DELVOIE: Can we have a tab number, please.
10 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] 53 in the Stanisic Defence
12 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
13 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Mr. Radulovic, for the purpose of illustrating your activities,
15 this is why I'm presenting this document to you. And I would like you to
16 take a look at page 3 of this document.
17 This is a report by Milos
18 A. Yes.
19 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Let us go back to the previous
20 page -- or, rather, the first page; I apologise.
21 Q. What we see here is a partial list of members of Patriotic League
22 from the area of Prijedor. Only one company -- or, rather, only one
23 platoon. You knew about more, but this is just one segment of your work
24 presented here.
25 Can you confirm that this is accurate?
1 A. Yes. This is just a partial view of one military unit. We
2 received our information from a rather large number of associates. And
3 according to rules of the service, these -- the information contained in
4 here is absolutely accurate.
5 I know that we also had information concerning the fact that the
6 wider area of Prijedor, Trnopolje, Kozarac, and Omarska, there were about
7 1200 members of the Bosniak people bearing arms. For all of these people
8 who were armed, we had lists similar to this one. We also had
9 description of what kind of weapons they had. We also had a list which
10 showed that they had artillery pieces, which I understand you will know
11 is not something used in civilian purpose.
12 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Could I have a number for this
13 document, please.
14 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Your Honour, just one observation. The previous
15 document which was given 2D86 was previously MFI'd as 2D85 before the
17 THE REGISTRAR: No.
18 MR. O'SULLIVAN: No? Well, if I'm mistaken, I apologise.
19 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
20 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. O'Sullivan, 2D85 was the Milos report of
21 3rd June; whereas 2D86 was the statement by Becirevic dated the
22 22nd of September. So they're two different documents.
23 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, it is two different documents;
24 I can confirm this for the Registrar.
25 JUDGE HALL: [Microphone not activated] ... admitted and marked.
1 Well, Mr. Olmsted.
2 MR. OLMSTED: Yes, Your Honour, I just wanted to note that I
3 think this document was tendered through Mr. Zecevic as amongst his
4 31 documents, so I think it has already been given an exhibit number.
5 Oh, I'm wrong. I have the wrong list then.
6 JUDGE HARHOFF: But, Mr. Krgovic, apart from this, I have a
7 question about the relevance of this document. It shows that the Muslims
8 were arming themselves and -- and I think there's no question about this.
9 This is not contested by the Prosecution, and it's well established
10 already in the evidence we have.
11 So why would you wish to put yet another document in to show
13 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Well, this is why:
14 We want to show that not only did they have weapons, but they
15 were also organised as a military unit. That is our first argument.
16 As a result, a conflict broke out. They attacked the Army of the
17 TO of the Republika Srpska, and then there was -- there were some
18 prisoners taken, war prisoners, who had been captured at Kozarac and
19 handed over to Omarska which was a military camp, or camp of prisoners of
20 war, and they had the status of prisoners of war.
21 JUDGE HARHOFF: The information from the Registrar seems to
22 exhaust my concerns because it appears that this document is already in
23 evidence as 1D200, if I'm correctly informed.
24 THE REGISTRAR: 312, Your Honour.
25 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Krgovic, please move on.
1 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Comrade Radulovic, we have exhausted all these documents, and I
3 will no longer refer to them. I might occasionally have to refresh your
4 memory to help you recall a fact.
5 But, generally speaking, the picture that we can get from your
6 reports is that in the Banja Luka area, and especially in some areas of
7 the Banja Luka district, there were a number of paramilitary units, both
8 on the Bosniak Muslim side and the Croat side; correct?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. In fact, the intelligence work of Milos, as part of state
11 security, or, rather, the National Security Service, was to gather -- or
12 consisted in gathering intelligence information on such groups, as well
13 as some events that were of security -- of security concern for -- of the
14 security of Republika Srpska; correct?
15 A. Correct. But I would like to add that we also gathered
16 intelligence that were also of relevance for Republika Srpska and not for
17 Banja Luka alone.
18 Q. And in some cases, which involves state security matters, you
19 also interviewed certain individuals so that your work actually included
20 more than just gathering intelligence.
21 A. Of course. Whenever we assessed that that was necessary because
22 of the circumstances and also when we assessed that it was on us to do
24 Q. This brings me to the next topic, which is the scope of work of
25 the State Security Service and the various methods used by these two
1 different services, the public security service and the State Security
2 Service, because these are two quite distinct areas of work.
3 Could you please assist and describe this better? Perhaps my
4 wording was not -- was a bit clumsy. Perhaps can you make the
5 distinction between the two services. But what I'm trying to say is that
6 the State Security Service has a special method of work as well as a
7 special area of work.
8 A. Well, to put it in brief, what we did was intelligence and
9 counter-intelligence. Everything else was logistics, logistical support,
10 as it were. And there is another distinction: The so-called border
11 area -- or, rather, external security operations as well as internal. So
12 when we say external - and I'm talking about the former Yugoslavia - this
13 referred to the territory outside of the Yugoslavia. We were most
14 concerned with groups, ethnic groups, abroad -- extremist ethnic groups
15 abroad, coming from this area; but we were also interested in other
16 intelligence that other intelligence services would also like to obtain
17 in the former -- in the former Yugoslavia
18 Republika Srpska. So that this wide scope of our operation -- because,
19 for instance, in addition what you have seen here, I was also involved in
20 special activities relating to members of transcendental meditation,
21 members of the Adventist Church
22 on, Rotary Club et cetera, and so forth.
23 So my activity and my involvement was multi-faceted, and it is
24 from that time that I actually had made a lot of acquaintances and
25 contacts. So I had contacts with members of military security and
1 members of State Security Services in each and every republic of the
2 former Yugoslavia
3 documents at the CSB at Doboj but me. And also, I was also interested,
4 in a way, in the theoretical aspects of those groups, and I still have
5 some of those documents in my private possession.
6 Q. On the other hand, the public security service has another field
7 of operation, and when we speak of crimes, it would be the crime service
8 that would actually discover and fight crime. That was not part of your
9 work, correct, that was public security?
10 A. Yes. Well, as for the methodology, I -- well, let me wait for
12 Q. You may go on. Please complete your sentence.
13 A. Well, I'm waiting for the interpreter to finish.
14 As for the method of work of the State Security Service, it is by
15 it's very nature conspiratorial or secret; and in the one-time
16 Law on Criminal Procedure, it was exempt from that law. In other words,
17 there was a law -- there was a -- an Article in the Law on Criminal
18 Procedure which provided for our freedom to conduct certain activities
19 which no other service in the former Yugoslavia was allowed to do.
20 I apologise, Mr. Krgovic, but I cannot really discuss the details
21 in open session because this would encroach on security interests of the
22 present services because they adopted the -- an identical method of work,
23 and I wouldn't want to be misconstrued by someone in the area where I
24 have to go back to.
25 Q. I will not dwell on the details of the method of work. We also
1 have people in the public gallery, so we don't want to go into closed
2 session now. I will return to that a little later. But I'm just trying
3 to show that there is a clear distinction in the spheres of work of the
4 public and the State Security Services. Correct?
5 A. Absolutely. You know, for a while, I also worked for the public
6 security service.
7 Q. When you send a report, a Milos report, the information contained
8 therein are treated as intelligence information -- or, rather, evidence
9 of certain events or a certain -- certain facts; correct?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. And your Milos
12 indicia that a certain event had occur, and you will agree with me that
13 the difference between indicia and evidence or proof, there is a long way
14 to cover in order to check the facts and confirm them, and, of course,
15 also, collecting proof for that?
16 A. I will try to use the technical terms here.
17 We are now talking about underlying information. When you have a
18 number of indirect facts or indicia and they actually coincide, then they
19 can become proof. So by properly drawing conclusions, they become
20 evidence. Once you check the original information, they are no longer
21 hypothesis; they become postulates. And as a colleague, you will know
22 that postulates are irrefutable facts, and some of this information
23 actually had the quality of proof -- or, rather, postulates and not just
24 indirect proof or indicia.
25 Q. When I asked on page 38, line 19 -- or, rather, 20 to 23, I was
1 referring to indicia. I have to make a correction in the transcript
2 because I think the two -- we understand each other, but I'm afraid the
3 interpreters did not understand us.
4 So when I talked about indicia, I was actually talking about
5 indirect evidence. For your -- so let us go back to the way you work.
6 So when you get -- receive certain information at the centre, 01 receives
7 them at the service, based on that information, the analysts should
8 actually review all those facts and put them together to provide an
9 analysis and a foundation which then you would have to check, and then it
10 would also relate them to other indicia or other facts, and this then
11 serves as a foundation for an analysis of an event or an incident or a
12 situation, a specific situation. Correct?
13 A. Yes. Yes, but, in fact, Milos Group had an obstacle to overcome,
14 and that obstacle was called Vojin Bera, who had turned into both an
15 analyst and an authorised official who assessed the value of information
16 received based on the source and not based on the very substance of the
17 intelligence gathered.
18 If we were -- if we, for instance, provided an information
19 report, a written information on Kotor Varos, for instance, his duty was
20 to forward it to the chief of national security of Kotor Varos - and
21 the same was true for all municipalities - and then those people on the
22 ground would have to complete this picture by collecting additional
23 information, which we had just indicated, as you said, and then they were
24 supposed to get back to us so that -- so there was supposed to be
25 feedback so that it can be determined whether these were just indicia or
2 Now, he took it upon himself to keep the information for himself.
3 Very frequently, he would not forward it to his superiors. And, which is
4 worse, he had a great influence on the then-chief of National Security
5 Service, Nedeljko Kesic, who trusted him completely, believing that he
6 was an experienced operative of the State Security Service; and Kesic, in
7 fact, was an inexperienced official of the State Security Service. And
8 this is where the ghost was put back in the machine or the lid was put
9 back on Pandora's box, and so a lot of the information that we collected
10 never went further; they remained with Bera or with Kesic, but it was
11 accompanied by Bera's assessment or evaluation of that information. And
12 this is why I find myself in a position today to be reminded of various
13 reports, information reports, that had been drafted before the events in
14 Sijekovac, Teslic, and many others. Whereas, had that information been
15 evaluated properly, probably many of the tragic events would never have
17 Now, please understand me. I'm not referring here only to the
18 misfortunes that befell the Serbian People. I'm primarily referring to
19 the nature of that information, the confidential nature of that
20 information; and in this, this also explains the belated reaction to what
21 happened in Trnopolje, in Koricanske Stene, in many other places where
22 the largest number of people who died or were killed were innocent
23 people. And this is why I'm in a situation, where, to this day, I
24 believe that because of this -- the improper conduct of my immediate
25 superior, many people found their deaths, although they were innocent.
1 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] 41, 8, what's missing in the
2 transcript is Keraterm and Omarska.
3 Q. There's another additional problem related to your work, was your
4 pro-Yugoslav orientation and affiliation, namely, you did not hide your
5 views when you were looking for associates among the Croats and Muslims;
6 you used this -- had you to use this to establish a connection. Is that
8 A. Partially. I always clearly stated who I was, what I was. None
9 of you have ever visited my office where I'm a lawyer, but in any of my
10 offices one would have found a picture of Josip Broz Tito, or his bust,
11 and other paraphernalia managed to collect related to
12 Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, national liberation
13 struggle, and so forth.
14 And let me correct you just in one segment. Namely, you said
15 that I was doing that to gain trust of Bosniaks. Well, that's not true.
16 Among those of the Bosniak people who were of the same views, or of the
17 Croat people who were of the same views, they understood that we had same
18 views all together.
19 Q. You may have misunderstood me. What I wanted to say was that
20 this view of your, this position of yours, pro-Yugoslav character
21 position, helped you establish better contacts with members of Bosniak
22 and Croat ethnic groups who trusted you then?
23 A. Who trust me still today. My friendships established before are
24 still ongoing.
25 Q. Of course, this position of yours was something that caused some
1 of the employees of your service to view you as a traitor, as an enemy to
2 the Serbian People. They had resistance in regard to trusting you.
3 Am I correct? Or let me summarise that. I'll show you a
4 document --
5 A. I can answer.
6 Q. No, I'll show you a document where you make some statements of
7 this nature.
8 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] It's 1D03-3403, please.
9 JUDGE DELVOIE: Tab number, please.
10 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] I apologise, 63; Stanisic tab.
11 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I can see it.
13 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. This is your report, Milos Group report?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. What I wanted to say -- I may have summarised the document not
17 clearly. What you said here is that you have problems in communication
18 with your colleagues who do not understand you and cause problems in your
20 A. I will try and provide you brief answers from now on.
21 Yes, your conclusion is correct and it's accurate, what you can
22 see here in the document.
23 Q. And that was one of the reasons why people mistrusted you. You
24 say here that for the purpose of protecting ourselves and to create
25 better conditions for our work, I would like to ask you to ask our
1 colleagues to view us different and not as potential traitors and enemies
2 of the Serbian People.
3 A. Yes, that's correct. We've had lots of problems. We were
4 occasionally brought in. Criminal reports were submitted in relation to
5 some of our members.
6 Q. This is --
7 A. I apologise. But there is just one sentence I would like to add,
8 with your permission.
9 It is very difficult to find yourself in a situation, either
10 during wartime or in peacetimes, where you discuss certain events and
11 trends that you condemn as a person that were committed by members of
12 your people because one is not forgiven for something like that, yet I
13 believe that all my actions and my testimony today and in the previous
14 days is something that's in the interests of the Serbian People. And as
15 an old proverb says, one must divide chaff from wheat, separate chaff
16 from wheat, instead of putting everything into one basket.
17 Q. And, in conclusion, consequence of this -- of this element, your
18 hard work in gathering information was not something that was treated in
19 an appropriate manner nor were your warnings an information analysed in a
20 proper way or forwarded.
21 A. That's correct.
22 Q. I used the word Strakhanovian. This is something that we used in
23 our terminology in socialist times, meaning hard work.
24 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have an number for
25 this document, Your Honours.
1 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked as ...
2 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 2D87, Your Honours.
3 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Comrade Radulovic, let me ask you about a specific set of events
5 in Teslic. You discussed this, but only briefly, during the direct
6 examination, and I would just like to elaborate this in certain elements,
7 to go through this operation you were at the head of. And then I'll also
8 show you a few documents.
9 MR. KRGOVIC: Just one more correction: The word I used was
10 Strakhanov-like; that's 44:8.
11 Mr. Radulovic wouldn't know about that. Strakhanov-like is
12 something that had to do with the Russian miners. Strakhanov, who was a
13 world champion in terms of how much coal he managed to dig out. So when
14 one uses this term "Strakhanov-like work," it means hard work, massive
16 A. Mr. Krgovic, thank you. But I would have preferred had you used
17 Alija Sirotanovic because his shovel was bigger than the Russian guy's.
18 Q. That's because we, from Montenegro
19 Russians than --
20 A. Yeah, that's why you are where you are now.
21 Q. I will start with my questions concerning Teslic by asking you
22 about a meeting that was organised in the CSB building in the office of
23 Mr. Zupljanin.
24 During the direct examination, you told us who took part. And I
25 would just like to go back to two of the participants. One is
1 president of the Court from Teslic, Mr. Kovacevic, and the public
2 prosecutor, Mr. Peric.
3 As I understood it, these people were invited to the meeting for
4 several reasons. I will give you two, and you can correct me if I'm
5 wrong. First reason was for them to confirm, together with Mr. Perisic,
6 the information about the events in Teslic?
7 A. Yes, that's correct.
8 Q. The second reason: It was necessary, after the arrest that was
9 agreed at the time, and after the conducting of pre-investigation
10 process, it was necessary to -- to order a detention for the group of
11 people in Teslic, and only a court could have done that?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Their very presence at the meeting had that precise purpose,
14 namely, to avoid something that was happening up until that point, namely
15 that the police arrest some of the paramilitaries who would immediately
16 then be released and even threaten those who had arrested them.
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. I mentioned "those who were to be arrested." I mentioned
19 military, paramilitary, para-police groups, because there were people,
20 especially in the early stages of war, when people were undefined in
21 their membership, as far as -- in which group they were?
22 A. That's correct.
23 Q. You were assured by those present at the meeting that once the
24 evidence was gathered, which was a task for your group, that they would
25 order detention for the members of the group and that, furthermore, their
1 arrest will finally be something that will be brought before courts.
2 A. That's correct. Maybe I can assist you here.
3 Before setting off for Teslic, we were aware that everything will
4 be done completely in accordance with the law in regard to documenting
5 all the crimes committed by the group. I was authorised, I was promised
6 assistance, which enabled me to take inspectors, experienced inspectors,
7 for the service who would help me do this completely in accordance with
8 the law.
9 In other words, this investigation was done in full keeping with
10 the law, with full respect of their rights -- I mean, the rights of the
11 detained, and it included interviewing all surviving witnesses as well as
12 members of families of those who were killed or tortured. And we
13 collected all material evidence so that the criminal report -- and
14 believe me, I had written I don't know how many criminal reports, but
15 this criminal report had more evidence supporting it than dozens of
16 indictments I'm coming across nowadays before the courts in Bosnia
18 Q. If you want, we can go to private session, but could you please
19 tell us the names of the people who went with you?
20 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Maybe it would be better to go to
21 private session. Mices are still at large.
22 JUDGE HALL: Yes, we would move into private session.
23 [Private session]
11 Page 11081 redacted. Private session.
9 [Open session]
10 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.
11 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Comrade Radulovic, before you got the assignment from
13 Stojan Zupljanin, you said that he seldom gave you any orders or anything
14 of the sort, but when it was discussed that somebody needed to go to
15 Teslic, he directly, as you said, ordered you to go to Teslic and arrest
16 and file criminal charges against the people who had committed the crimes
17 in Teslic?
18 A. Yes, that's correct, as far as I can remember, but just a second
20 That's precisely how it was. As far as can I remember, that was
21 the first and only time that Mr. Zupljanin issued an order to me. In all
22 our contacts up until that time, and after that time, Stojan Zupljanin
23 did that in a diplomatic form. He wasn't a person issuing orders. And
24 if I have a grudge against him, if I have something that I want to blame
25 him for, then it's precisely that, that he wasn't a person issuing
2 Q. And in order for that operation to be carried out, in order for
3 you to have legitimacy, you were appointed chief of the public security
4 station in Teslic?
5 A. Correct.
6 Q. And that was done before you set out to Teslic. You were
7 appointed prior to that?
8 A. On the same day. Or, rather, the day before; the day before the
10 Q. And, at the same time, it was said that you would remain there
11 for some time, until you put things at the station under control and
12 until you ensured that there was that satisfactory level of work at the
13 police station in Teslic.
14 A. Correct.
15 Q. And the Teslic operation was completed successfully. The persons
16 who had committed crimes were arrested. And as the arrest was in
17 progress, and there was an exchange of fire between your group and the
18 criminals, there were some casualties; and, as far as I could understand,
19 one of your men was killed and one person on the side of the Mice Group?
20 A. Correct.
21 Q. And, naturally, given the power and the brutality and level of
22 organisation of this group, you and the men that had set out from
23 Banja Luka established contact with the local military units, not at the
24 level of the command of Bilanovic, but at a lower level.
25 A. Correct. We didn't trust Dejan Bilanovic because we knew from
1 before that he had been in contact with the Mice Group.
2 Q. And naturally you also had the political support of the local
3 authorities of Mr. Perisic and the entire municipal leadership in Teslic.
4 More or less. I know, I know. I have expanded the question. But let me
5 narrow it down.
6 Mr. Perisic and the people around him?
7 A. Yes, you stated correctly. Because not everybody supported me.
8 Shall I tell you who didn't?
9 Q. Please do.
10 A. One of the current politicians in power today, Stojicic.
11 Shall I tell you who else didn't? The priest, Savo Knezevic. I
12 didn't see him, I didn't perceive him as a politician, but at the time he
13 was the main figure.
14 Shall I give you more names?
15 Q. Well, I'm interested in people who supported you.
16 A. Fortunately it was the majority. The majority of the Serbs who
17 supported me. And as for these two, whose names I gave you, I don't
18 consider them to be great Serbs, at any rate.
19 Q. And you also received assurances that the local police station,
20 where Mr. Markocevic was, also wouldn't stand in your way, nor would they
21 put themselves on the side of the Mice Group?
22 A. Those who could have caused trouble for us, we managed to win
23 them over, to bring them over to our side. Had we not done that, there
24 would have been ... I have no idea what would have been.
25 May I add a sentence?
1 Q. Please go ahead.
2 A. In that operation, the biggest problem arose when all of the
3 soldiers from front lines, citizens of Teslic, and all civil population
4 of Teslic wanted to join this operation. We didn't want to have the
5 front lines emptied from soldiers, and we knew that the more people
6 participated, the greater there were chances for casualties. That was an
7 assessment I made as a reserve officer from the Bileca school, and I was
8 top of my year while I was at that school, just so you know.
9 Therefore, I wanted to have a operation that would involve as few
10 people as possible from the ratio was 1:3. In areas where there were ten
11 of them, we would send 30 of ours. And so on.
12 As for the rest who wanted to participate, we put them in reserve
13 forces. We made sure they were not in the front. It may look comical to
14 you now, but in just one location, in the Kardijal Hotel, at the
15 Vrucica Banja, we found 1200 casings from machine-gun bullets that had
16 been fired at us when we surrounded them at the hotel. You can just
17 imagine there were perhaps some 20 of them there, just so you don't think
18 that all they had was slingshots.
19 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Krgovic, it's time for the break, so if we
20 could -- if this is a convenient point.
21 Before we rise, the -- we received a motion from the
22 Office of the Prosecutor on the 27th of May in relation to a witness who
23 is scheduled to attend within the next three weeks. It -- the -- the
24 application for that witness would be heard by videolink. It appears to
25 be a matter without controversy, and we are inviting an expedited
1 response from the Defence.
2 20 minutes.
3 [The witness stands down]
4 --- Recess taken at 12.08 p.m.
5 --- On resuming at 12.32 p.m.
6 [Trial Chamber confers]
7 JUDGE HALL: The document that had been previously marked for
8 identification, Mr. Olmsted, I take it you've seen the English
10 JUDGE HARHOFF: Of 2D85. 1D03-3395, Exhibit 2D85.
11 [Prosecution counsel confer]
12 MR. OLMSTED: Yes, we have the English translation.
13 JUDGE HALL: And you have no reservations about the application
14 to exhibit it, having read it?
15 [Prosecution counsel confer]
16 [The witness takes the stand]
17 JUDGE HALL: I thought it was a rhetorical question, but
18 apparently it isn't.
19 MR. OLMSTED: Sorry, Your Honours, I just have -- too many
20 numbers that I can't remember the document. But I have been reminded of
21 it, and we have no objection.
22 JUDGE HALL: So we lift the MFI marking on it.
23 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Let's continue.
24 Q. Since we finally have the translation of this document, the
25 document we discussed, let me show you briefly 1D -- 2D85; I apologise.
1 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] 2D85.
2 Q. That's the document you already saw. It has the description of a
3 number of persons.
4 All right. We have the English version now too. It says that
5 the persons listed below have weapons which were made available to
6 protect the interests, and names of the HDZ?
7 A. Yes, yes, correct.
8 Q. All right. We made a digression, but let us go back to Teslic
9 now and the answers you provided to us.
10 You said that you managed to ensure the unity and consent of all
11 relevant authorities in Teslic municipality, civilian and military, and
12 you had the consent of the corps and a direct order from the Banja Luka
13 CSB to carry out that operation, right?
14 A. Yes.
15 JUDGE HARHOFF: I am wondering if there is any urgent need to
16 elicit yet more information on the Mice operation. I think it has been
17 cleared and -- and we've heard a lot of it so far. So unless you are
18 able to convince me that there is a compelling need to proceed into this
19 question, I suggest that you move on to something else.
20 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] No, Your Honours, I just need a few
21 more pieces of information, not really details.
22 Q. And to conclude, so had you not been able to ensure this kind of
23 a support at the local level from the Crisis Staff, military authorities,
24 and so on, and the judiciary, this operation of yours -- it is not
25 certain how it would have been carried out, and it could have produced
1 many casualties, and its outcome could have been uncertain?
2 A. Yes, you're absolutely right. First of all, I could not have
3 embarked upon that operation had there not been an order, had not the
4 Banja Luka CSB stood firmly behind it.
5 As for everything else, all the additional support, that was the
6 prerequisite for us getting involved in that operation.
7 Q. You must know that in certain municipalities in the territory
8 under the jurisdiction of the CSB, certain Crisis Staffs and certain SJBs
9 were absolutely beyond the control of the CSB due to political reasons?
10 A. Yes, that's the right reason, and I can enumerate additional --
11 or, rather, I can enumerate some examples. The most prominent one being
12 Prijedor and Simo Drljaca, which represented a strong-hold that neither
13 the Banja Luka CSB nor the entire republic, as far as I know, could do
14 anything about.
15 Why do I say "as far as I know"? Because, at the time, we tried
16 first via military security and then later on via the Tajfun to insist
17 on the removal the Simo Drljaca. Don't ask me how we wanted to move him,
18 but we wanted to move him. And our request was not granted. They had no
19 understanding for our request. Everybody kept saying that he had a
20 support of local political organs so that any operation along the lines
21 of the one carried out in Teslic could have resulted in serious
22 bloodshed. And its outcome would have been completely uncertain, bearing
23 in mind that, at the time, Simo Drljaca had full support of the entire
24 army and police in that area.
25 Also, do not underestimate the fact that the strongest military
1 units in Republika Srpska came from that area.
2 I don't know whether you need additional information. I can
3 certainly tell you that. There were some other SJBs that were also
4 prominent in this sense. The Prnjavor station tried to act in a similar
5 way, as did Kotor Varos station for a while. But there were certainly
6 very strong pressures at the local level exerted so that it wasn't
7 possible to communicate with people in a civilised manner.
8 Q. And to follow up, for the sake of transcript, when you said that
9 Simo Drljaca had support of the army and police in that area, you were
10 referring to Prijedor?
11 A. Yes, yes, I was referring to the local level.
12 Q. And when this operation was completed and when the criminal
13 reports were filed and these people arrested and turned over to
14 authorities, to your surprise, if I may say so, two or three days later,
15 some of these people were released, Slobodan Karagic and some of his men,
16 and this was done on the basis of an order from the basic court in
18 A. Correct.
19 Q. And before that, had you threats coming from that group.
20 A. Yes, yes. But let me explain how come he and his group were
21 released first.
22 He came just one day before the operation, and this fact was
23 established. Since it was also established who had killed one of our men
24 at the Kardijal Hotel, we knew exactly who killed him and how, then it
25 was a position of both the prosecution and the court, and I also
1 acquiesced in that, that there was no evidence whatsoever that some of
2 these people had committed a serious crime that would justify pre-trial
3 detention. So everybody who had arrived Teslic on the eve of the
4 operation was released.
5 Q. And this man, Karagic, actually sued you after the war, but if I
6 understood the list that you showed us --
7 A. There were three cases in court against me in Teslic. One
8 pursuant to an indictment submitted by the district prosecutor. He --
9 his name was Djuric. And then when he actually annulled the crime -- the
10 criminal report submitted against me by the CSB in Doboj, this was
11 followed by a private suit initiated by Slobodan Karagic and
12 Stojan Djuric.
13 These proceedings were also completed or ended, and the court,
14 pursuant to the criminal report submitted by Slobodan Karagic, decided
15 not to conduct the proceedings, or, in other words, it remained
17 And as for Stojan Djuric, prior to his death, and he fell
18 seriously ill - he had cancer - so prior to his death, he actually
19 revoked his criminal report against me before a court -- or in court, and
20 he addressed the court on that occasion, apologising to me, to me
21 personally. I accepted his apology because I knew -- I knew that the
22 outcome of his disease was very predictable and that he only had days to
24 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, Your Honours, if I may be of assistance.
25 Page 56, line 17, it's a private criminal complaint. "Privatni
1 crimnial tuzba" in Serbian. Thank you.
2 JUDGE HALL: Thank you.
3 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. As for the rest of the group --
5 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we see document 1D03-1381.
6 JUDGE DELVOIE: Tab number, please.
7 MR. KRGOVIC: Tab number 19.
8 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
9 MR. KRGOVIC: In Zupljanin register.
10 [Interpretation] 1081; my apologies. In other words, 2D03-1081.
11 There seems to be a problem with this document, so I will move on
12 to something else.
13 Perhaps we can have the document placed on the ELMO. Oh, all
14 right, now we have it.
15 No, I'm sorry, that's not the right document.
16 JUDGE DELVOIE: It seems to be the one that you asked for
17 Mr. Krgovic, isn't it? 21st of July, 1992.
18 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] No, it is the 22nd of July, but I
19 can't -- the 21st of July --
20 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction.
21 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] But I can't see it here on our
22 screens. 2D03-1081.
23 [Defence counsel confer]
24 MR. KRGOVIC: Can I put on the ELMO the B/C/S version and the
25 participant can follow.
1 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated]
2 MR. KRGOVIC: No English. It was ...
3 It was English, but it's disappeared somehow.
4 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated]
5 MR. KRGOVIC: Yeah, yeah, that's it. It's English version.
6 So can I put the B/C/S version on the ELMO for the benefit of the
8 MR. OLMSTED: Your Honour, I note that it is on Sanction right
9 now. Yeah, okay, there you go.
10 MR. KRGOVIC: Yeah.
11 Q. [Interpretation] Would you please take a look at this document.
12 This is a ruling of the lower court in Teslic, dated the
13 21st of July, 1992, whereby detention of a large number of members of the
14 Mice Group is cancelled. Correct?
15 A. Yes.
16 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] May I have the second page of this
17 document, please.
18 Q. This was signed by investigating judge Nenad Kovacevic.
19 A. Yes. At the time, he was the president of the lower court in
21 Q. Please take a look at the second paragraph, reading:
22 "The investigating judge, in his letter number 1492/92 of
23 20 July 1992
24 custody individuals named in the disposition herein."
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. The prosecutor was?
2 A. Mr. Branko Peric.
3 Q. And that was the information that you had, that they were
4 released from custody?
5 A. Correct. But only for the group that was released from custody
6 before they were all released.
7 Q. Very well. I will show you the other documents as well.
8 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] But could we now go back to page 1
9 of this document, please.
10 Q. You can see here on the right-hand side it says: "At 1000 hours"
11 and that -- or "at 1510," and then this is a sort of para -- signature or
12 some initials. Correct?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. This would suggest that this was received somewhere?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Now I would like to show you another document related to this
18 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we tender this document,
19 Your Honours.
20 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
21 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit 2D88, Your Honours.
22 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we now have P1313, a
23 Prosecution Exhibit.
24 Q. This is a log-book of the -- from the detention unit in Doboj,
25 the custody log-book. I will now you show you the page indicated
1 ERN 155935.
2 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] I apologise, 0415-5935.
3 I believe it's page 21 in e-court.
4 I think it's the next page; I apologise. 22. The next page.
5 We should have on the screens number 143. In the left-hand
6 column, 143. Page 5935, the last digits of the ERN number.
7 Q. So let's take a look at the first column. Let's see which
8 individuals this relates to.
9 MR. KRGOVIC: The second part of this page, please, the left
10 portion, as it were.
11 [Trial Chamber confers]
12 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] I'm sorry, it's the left-hand page
13 of this log-book, not of this page, because the page is of a larger
14 format. We only see the right-hand side of that page. Now could we see
15 the left-hand side of that same page.
16 So I would like to see the first half of this page marked in
17 e-court as -- maybe -- it could be 5934. Maybe you can try that number.
18 I apologise for the this, but, yes, right.
19 Q. Now, please take look. Can you see the names here. So we have
20 under number 143, Pijunovic Miroslav. And then we have Slobodan Tekic,
21 Dobrivoje Culibrk, Stojan Djuric, Slavko Spasovic; all of these men are
22 mens of the Mice Group?
23 A. Yes.
24 MR. KRGOVIC: Let's go back to the previous page.
25 Q. So we see the last two names are Sljivic and Sljuka?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. They were released from custody in Teslic; correct?
3 A. Yes.
4 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we go back to the page we had
5 before, 5935.
6 Q. Now you can see that according to this log-book where it says
7 "date of release," they were released on the 24th of July, 1992
8 That is the same time that we saw where the ruling was received at the
9 district court in Doboj.
10 Can you see it in the third column, the last box at the bottom,
11 the last two?
12 A. Yes, I can. The 24th of July, 1992, at 1510.
13 Q. And they were released pursuant to the Teslic lower court ruling,
14 K 35/92. That's what we saw -- that's the document we saw a moment
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Thank you. I just wanted to show the connection between this
18 ruling, that note, and --
19 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Krgovic, I think we've been there before,
20 haven't we?
21 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] No, we haven't, Your Honour.
22 Namely, one of our witnesses mentioned that these people were released
23 from detention, and that's why I'm showing this. That they were released
24 before the document reached the county prison in Doboj. And what I'm
25 trying to show is what we can see in the upper right corner of this
1 document, and we can also see it's the same handwriting as the one we
2 found in the book.
3 That was the purpose why I wanted to show this document to the
4 witness, to present the entire release procedure.
5 But we'll move to a different topic now.
6 Q. Sir, after you submitted a criminal report, after the persons
7 were handed over to the investigative judge, the proceeding went on
8 according to the law from that point on; is that correct?
9 A. Yes. One could say so.
10 Q. And all the further activities, investigation, and everything
11 else was under their jurisdiction. Am I right in saying that? All the
12 investigative activities were, according to the law, under their
14 A. Well, that's how it was before, and that's how it is still today.
15 Q. You are probably familiar with the fact that part of this
16 process, there is one investigative step, namely, it was necessary to
17 obtain forensic evidence as well and that the relevant organs issued an
18 order to that effect?
19 A. I know of all that. I don't know how to explain it differently.
20 That was under their jurisdiction. You do know that the Ministry of
21 Interior, according to the law, cannot order exhumations, cannot order
22 any forensic expertise. Even if they have an expert, forensic expert,
23 among their ranks, they cannot launch into such an expertise without
24 receiving an order from either a investigative judge or the prosecutor.
25 Q. And when you addressed Mr. Zupljanin in relation to the
1 investigative steps that are under the jurisdiction of the prosecutor,
2 was for the purpose of him to try and maybe speed up the process through
3 his influence, to use his clout to ask the judicial organs to provide the
4 necessary resources?
5 A. Yes, that's correct.
6 Let me explain why we needed -- why we asked for the process to
7 be speeded up.
8 We had two locations, two mass graves. In one grave, there was
9 20; in the other, 28 bodies.
10 Q. You told us about it yesterday.
11 A. Yes. And that's why we asked for it. Namely, we didn't want
12 something to happen, something that had occurred on other -- in other
13 cases earlier, namely, that remains should be removed. We wanted to have
14 this exhumation and a post-mortem to be conducted, knowing that the
15 remains of persons killed -- for them to be something that can be
16 recognised by their closest relatives but also to almost everything in
17 Teslic because Teslic is a small town and people know each other.
18 Q. Yes. But unrelated to this, after prosecutor had suggested, the
19 investigative judge actually started the process which then took its
21 A. That's correct.
22 Q. And you do remember that at the same time, simultaneously, a
23 proper avalanche of accusations came that you did not abide by the
24 procedure that was reported by the CSB Doboj; there were some
25 privately-filed complaints by individuals involved. It all came
1 immediately after. Do you remember those events?
2 A. Yes, of course, I do remember. Sorry to say that. It's a
3 notorious fact. I gave my statement before the relevant organs in
4 Teslic, before the court in Teslic, and I saw there that they have this
5 in their records. In other words, for me to reiterate that would be a
6 waste of time, of your time.
7 Q. No, I didn't mean it like that. I wanted to lay the foundation
8 for my next question.
9 When you discussed with Mr. Zupljanin this issue, when he told
10 you, Radule, don't you get involved with that. Let the court deal with
11 it. You have enough problems as it is. That was the essence of what he
12 was trying to tell you, wasn't it?
13 A. Well, I remember now, and let me repeat this: I did not have
14 frequent conversations with Stojan Zupljanin; I can only remember the
15 events about which we talked. I told that to the Prosecutor, and I'm
16 telling you this again. I did not have direct contact about various
17 information with Stojan Zupljanin. And in relation to my conversation
18 with Stojan in Teslic, I believe that this was a conversation that was by
19 the book, a conversation between a superior and subordinate officer.
20 My arrival at SUP on the next day, at 9.00 a.m., showed me that
21 he was very much interested in making sure that the persons who
22 perpetrated the crimes were arrested and charges brought against them.
23 His first question was how many people were killed. I thought he had
24 asked me about my group. And when I responded by saying one was killed
25 among them and one among us, I remember Mr. Stevilovic then saying,
1 Congratulations; that's fine. Because, as a soldier, his assessment
2 before the start of the operation was that there will be a lot of
3 casualties among us and that we have to be prepared for that.
4 The view was, so to speak, that only children should not be sent
5 into this operation, namely, people who don't have brothers, for
6 instance, or siblings. And also not to send those who have small
7 children, because we assumed that there would be many more casualties.
8 To be fully honest, what we had in mind was casualties among our ranks.
9 Nobody was thinking about how many casualties would there be among them.
10 Q. And Stojan Zupljanin and Stevilovic congratulated you on the
11 success of the operation? That's what they said?
12 A. Yes, that's how I understood them.
13 Lest I forget, one of the reasons why I left Teslic rather soon
14 was because of a suggestion that came from Belgrade as well, saying, You
15 should not be dealing with public security service issues; you are
16 educated to be a state security personnel and to collect intelligence.
17 They already had information that somebody is getting ready to
18 kill me and that the person closest to the preparations for my killing
19 were people by the name of Predrag Rakocevic [phoen] and Marinko Dukic.
20 It was only 1998 that I had an opportunity to have a discussion with them
21 openly about all the aspects of the events past, and I still remember
22 Marinko Dukic telling me from a man I hated most to -- during the period
23 between 1992 and today, I realised that same man was my best friend. I
24 remember that well. And Marinko Dukic is a very straightforward person.
25 Predrag Markocevic [phoen] said the same thing. And at about that time I
1 managed to clear up matters also with Andrija Bjelosevic in relation to
2 all the events that were unclear to him. So one cannot say that all the
3 traces we left behind were bad.
4 After a while, through conversation, clarification of issues, we
5 would come to a conclusion that a huge number of people who had initially
6 seen us as enemies, traitors, and so forth, finally accepted us as
7 professionals, human beings, and true members of our nation.
8 I apologise for this discourse which was rather long, but that's
9 how things were.
10 Q. Following this, you handed over the public security station to
11 the people who were appointed, and then you left the area and re-joined
12 the State Security Service, continued your work as a part of the
13 Milos Group?
14 A. That's correct.
15 Q. There was a misunderstanding that occurred a bit earlier, and I
16 would like to ask you to clarify this for me.
17 We were talking about -- about the Milos Group members.
18 MR. KRGOVIC: Can we move to the private session now.
19 JUDGE HALL: Yes.
20 [Private session]
19 [Open session]
20 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.
21 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. I think it may have been the day before yesterday in responding
23 to the questions by the Prosecutor who showed you a document concerning a
24 unit from Teslic that was part of the VRS which was not within the
25 hierarchy. We asked -- you asked for them to be -- to join the public
1 security station in order to put them under control and help this public
2 security station in their fight against self-proclaimed groups and
3 para-formations and their criminal activities. Mainly because this group
4 was an experienced group of fighters. According to you, they could have
5 been incorporated with -- into the police force, and you believed they
6 would be a positive force in resolving more complex problems?
7 A. That's correct. It was a smaller company headed by
8 Lieutenant Jocic.
9 Q. The idea was to put them under control because the risk was that
10 they might become a paramilitary formation on their own and become a
11 security problem?
12 A. That's correct. They took part in the arrest of the Mices. Up
13 until that point, there was no reason to treat them as perpetrators of
14 crimes of any sort, especially not of war crimes. And I believe that a
15 high-quality unit like that with good training should be signed on
16 because my intention was, in the capacity of the chief of the public
17 security station, to make sure that we, the public security station, will
18 take care of another two or three groups, primarily a group of rebels
19 from Blatnica, who were also committing crimes at the time, as well as
20 with a certain Bubic, from the area of the village of Pribinic, who, for
21 a while, was some kind of a warden or commander of some detention unit,
22 unorganised detention unit. I don't know whose interests he was working
23 for, but we prevented him from continuing with his activities.
24 There were also other smaller groups present in Teslic, again,
25 involved in committing crimes against non-Serb population, and we had
1 plans of taking care of that, making them -- putting them under control.
2 We prepared reports about it.
3 Q. We have seen the reports. We'll -- instead of going deeper into
4 that, let me show you a document.
5 The Prosecutor showed you a document --
6 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Krgovic, excuse me. Before we leave this
7 issue, I was -- I was interested in exploring a bit Mr. Radulovic's
8 comment that the Mice weren't really arrested for reasons of war crimes
9 but, rather, for the commission of civilian crimes.
10 Mr. Radulovic, did I understand you correctly?
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, you didn't, and I apologise --
12 I regret that. They were, first of all, arrested because they had killed
13 a number of persons of non-Serb ethnicity. That was the main reason why
14 they were arrested and why a criminal report was filed.
15 As for other things they did, everything was documented so that
16 their ordinary, if I may say so, crime activity was in the background at
17 the time. It wasn't given the priority.
18 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you.
19 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Now, another report of the Milos Group shown to you by Prosecutor
21 concerns the establishment of the special police detachment. I'll show
22 you the decision of the Assembly of -- of the Serbian Bosnia and
24 So could you now please be shown --
25 THE INTERPRETER: Could the counsel please repeat the number of
1 the document.
2 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. But before I put this to you --
4 JUDGE HARHOFF: Counsel, the interpreters ask you to repeat the
5 number of the document, if you would be good enough. Thanks.
6 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] 2D55.
7 JUDGE DELVOIE: Your document list, Mr. Krgovic, tab number?
8 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honours. Tab 21.
9 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
10 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Within the Milos Group, you did not really focus on the special
12 detachment. It wasn't a particular focus of your attention. It's only
13 if you came across some information on their activities. And you
14 informed about them, in general terms, if it was of security interest for
15 that region, right?
16 A. Yes. Absolutely right.
17 Q. And please look at the second page of this document. The
18 Assembly of Krajina established this detachment. And in the document it
19 says that the detachment will comprise members of active and reserve
20 police force.
21 And then if you go to the next page then we will see what the
22 intention of the Assembly was at the time. And you know how sometimes
23 very good intentions produce evil results. It says here that the unit
24 would be established in order to protect law and order, especially to
25 protect against sabotage activities and so on.
1 And then in paragraph 4 from the top it says how the detachment
2 would be manned. And we can see in this paragraph that, first of all,
3 there would be some active policemen in it who were skilled and who were
4 part of the "posebni" detachment, which existed before the war. And then
5 that out of the candidates that were available they should select those
6 who had already been in similar units in Zagreb and Sarajevo
7 fled from the area as well as persons who already had some experience on
8 the front line.
9 It says here that some candidates have the relevant skills and
10 expertise which would allow them to execute successfully any tasks and
11 that those who were in reserve forces would remain in reserve forces
12 until certain conditions were met, following which they would be
13 transferred into active-force members.
14 I apologise for speeding.
15 So what is important? It's that certain persons who had
16 front-line experience became members of the unit, and, unfortunately,
17 some persons who really did not belong in that units and who did not meet
18 the requirements also became members, right?
19 A. Yes. And, unfortunately, those who had no place in that unit had
20 the main role.
21 MR. PANTELIC: I do apologise, Your Honours. I have a problem
22 with LiveNote, so I would kindly ask the assistance of technical unit.
23 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. And when speaking of this, you said, Yes, there were such
25 instances, and there were some honourable compensations and, yes, there
1 were members who discharged their duties in a honourable and honest way.
2 A. Certainly.
3 Q. In your evidence in-chief, you said that after these events,
4 speaking of Stojan Zupljanin, you said that you had told him, in general
5 terms, about the behaviour of members of that unit - this is page
6 10804 - when you came back from Doboj. And you received information, and
7 you mention some colleagues of yours. And then in speaking of this
8 event, you said that it wasn't really your job to wok on crime
9 investigations. You said that there were some irregularities in the
10 conduct of the members of that unit, saying that cars had been stolen and
11 there was some unlawful activities related to detention and bringing in
12 of persons, right?
13 A. I'm waiting for the interpretation to finish.
14 Mr. Krgovic, as far as I remember -- or to the extent that I
15 remember events which took place 17 years ago, there's no reason why I
16 shouldn't remember what I said four days ago.
17 Q. At the time when you were in Doboj, you said that you didn't know
18 what the circumstances were while they were there, who had sent them
19 there, and how -- how they worked.
20 A. Mr. Krgovic, I conveyed this information, in general terms, to
21 Stojan Zupljanin primarily in order to protect the members of our special
22 detachment from the frequent occasions where they were used to shield
23 local criminals. Everything that local criminals had done was mostly
24 attributed to the members of the special detachment of police from
25 Banja Luka and also partially was also attributed to members of the
1 Red Berets unit. After saying this to Stojan Zupljanin, I proposed that
2 they be withdrawn, and I said explicitly that, based on what I knew, it
3 wasn't done the next day by the day after; namely, members of the special
4 detachment were withdrawn from Doboj to Banja Luka, and they took several
5 days in pulling out because they carried with them the items that they
6 had seized or had stolen from shops, private enterprises, and so on. I
7 saw with my own eyes.
8 I concluded that Mr. Zupljanin accepted that information with due
9 seriousness, giving it serious attention. I don't know whether he
10 verified this with somebody or not, but the information about their
11 withdrawal was provided to him by the Milos Group.
12 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we now see OTP 65 ter 10355,
14 65 ter 10355.
15 Q. This is a list, a payroll list, from Doboj, from the Doboj CSB,
16 their police station. Here we can see that these people were on the
17 payroll in Doboj. It is entitled:
18 "The 9th Company for Special Assignments, Banja Luka
19 And then can you see the list of persons who were members. This
20 is payroll for May. This is a much longer document, and I have shown
21 only the first page. This is the page that I'm interested in. And based
22 on what we can see here, they, as a unit, were detached to the Doboj CSB
23 at the time. They received their salaries there. And they were issued
24 assignments an orders there. It stems from this document, right?
25 A. Yes, that would be my conclusion too.
1 Q. And these are the people that you have mentioned as being there
2 at the time?
3 A. Yes. But I also mentioned other persons.
4 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I seek to tender this
5 document into evidence.
6 JUDGE HALL: Admitted.
7 Mr. Olmsted.
8 For one thing, we don't have an English translation of this.
9 But ... and I guess, apparently, it's so illegible that we can't get an
10 English translation of it. So that's the only problem with it.
11 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Krgovic.
12 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, perhaps we could MFI
13 it at this point. This document was on the OTP list in relation to the
14 witness from Doboj who spoke of the same events, and I was sure there was
15 a translation.
16 Could we perhaps MFI it for the time being until we get a better
17 copy, and then I'll give it to the CLSS.
18 JUDGE HALL: Brief question: How does this payroll list assist?
19 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, this is a payroll
20 list from Doboj for the members of the special unit from Banja Luka
21 which, at the time, was deployed in Doboj and was under the jurisdiction
22 of the Doboj authorities, the CSB and SJB in Doboj.
23 This is why we want this to be tendered into evidence. It bears
24 the stamp of the Doboj Crisis Staff, I think. This is where that unit
25 was active in that capacity.
1 JUDGE HALL: But the assignment of such persons is independent of
2 the specifics of the names on the list, isn't it?
3 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honours. I will get to
4 that. My question will also relate to other members. But when it comes
5 to this company that the previous witness spoke about, he was from the
6 police station in Doboj, there was some talk about payroll, et cetera.
7 And the Prosecutor did not tender that document into evidence at the
8 time. I guess it didn't suit them. So this is why I want it to be
9 admitted now.
10 MR. OLMSTED: Yes, Your Honour, I think I understand your
11 concerns. I don't see -- this document -- it's unclear who the special
12 unit was. It's not clear from the witness's answer whether this is the
13 Banja Luka Special Police Detachment or some other special unit that was
14 created within Doboj. And, therefore, there is a bit of confusion as to
15 its relevance to this case.
16 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] If I may reply. It says clearly
18 "The 9th Company for Special Tasks, Banja Luka."
19 Q. So you will agree with me, won't you, that this refers to that
20 special unit from Banja Luka?
21 A. Mr. Krgovic, no offence - and this pertains to the Prosecutor as
22 well - I know that this document pertains to the members of the special
23 detachment from Banja Luka who had been deployed to Doboj. There's no
24 doubt there whatsoever. I know that this is how they refunded salaries
25 for those who had left their original unit and went to the area of
1 another unit.
2 I recognise some names here. And based on that, I can conclude
3 that they were in the special police detachment from Banja Luka.
4 [Trial Chamber confers]
5 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Krgovic, I'm a bit at a loss as to what it is
6 you wish to show to the Chamber about these members of the Banja Luka
7 special detachment that were apparently replaced and sent to Doboj.
8 What is the Chamber to make of this information?
9 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, the position of the
10 Defence is - and we're trying to prove this on the basis of this
11 document - is that the Assembly of the Autonomous Region of Krajina and
12 the Ministry of Defence made a decision to resubordinate one company from
13 the Banja Luka area and to redeploy them to Doboj where they acted under
14 the command of the authorities of that town in order to defend the town.
15 So they were there, they were active there, their salaries were
16 paid out to them there, and they were granted all the rights that they
17 were entitled to in Doboj. And this is what I'm trying to show. I'm
18 trying to show the link.
19 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Krgovic, this -- this is more or less clear.
20 Why don't you just ask that question to the witness? Or is he not
21 supposed to know?
22 MR. KRGOVIC: [No interpretation] [Microphone not activated]
23 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for Mr. Krgovic.
24 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, the witness has
25 already answered my question. He said that they were deployed there and
1 that they were under their command. But we can go over it again.
2 Q. Based on what you know and based on how they were redeployed --
3 JUDGE HALL: [Previous translation continues] ... we must take the
4 adjournment for the day. So, the --
5 MR. OLMSTED: Can I just make my point quickly on this document.
6 JUDGE HALL: Yes.
7 MR. OLMSTED: Thank you, Your Honour.
8 I mean, it's just still very unclear how this witness is coming
9 to the conclusion that these are members of the Banja Luka Special Police
10 Detachment. It's a very difficult document to read. At the very least,
11 he should provide the names on this list who he leave believes were part
12 of the Banja Luka Special Police Detachment. Otherwise, there's really
13 no need to even go any further with this line of questioning.
14 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I will continue
15 dealing with this, and I will also show to the witness a larger document,
16 the list of the members of the special unit. And when you compare the
17 names there with the names that the witness says he recognised, the
18 conclusion will be clear to you. The document itself says that it is
19 about the members of the 9th Company from Banja Luka.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If I may say something, I have
21 glasses, but the names are legible, although hard to read, but still
22 legible. And I recognise the names, first and last names, of the people
23 whom I knew before the war and concerning whom I knew that during the war
24 they were members of the special detachment. I told you everything now.
25 There is no need for me to read this any further. I don't know all of
1 these young men. That's true, I don't know all of them. But I saw two
2 or three names on this list, and right now I can't tell you that I saw
3 these persons in Doboj. But if it says on the top that this is a
4 payroll, then I don't see why I shouldn't believe that these were members
5 of our special detachment.
6 JUDGE HALL: Anyway, we'll pick up on this tomorrow morning. In
7 the meantime, we'll marked for identification, so we don't lose it in
8 the ...
9 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit 2D89, marked for identification,
10 Your Honours.
11 [The witness stands down]
12 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.51 p.m.
13 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 1st day of
14 June, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.