101117IT

Page 17394

1 the 19th having been previously fixed as a dies non juridicus, it is from

2 the Chamber's point of view impossible to reverse that. So counsel

3 should bear in mind that we have available today and tomorrow, and in

4 terms of the OTP's schedule of witnesses, and we alerted before we took

5 the bench, that the continued examination-in-chief of the witness who is

6 now on the stand is likely to occupy the whole of today. Counsel for the

7 OTP would -- should advise themselves accordingly and so adjust their

8 witnesses list.

9 [The witness takes the stand]

10 JUDGE HALL: Good morning to you, sir. Before Mr. Olmsted

11 resumes his examination-in-chief of you, I remind you you're still on

12 your oath.

13 WITNESS: MEVLUDIN SEJMENOVIC [Resumed]

14 [Witness answered through interpreter]

15 MR. OLMSTED: Thank you, Your Honour.

16 Examination by Mr. Olmsted: [Continued]

17 Q. Good morning, Mr. Sejmenovic.

18 A. Good morning.

19 Q. I want to begin today by clarifying just a few matters that

20 were -- that we questioned you about last Friday.

21 First of all, last Friday when I asked you whether the non-Serb

22 population in Prijedor was attempting to obtain weapons prior to the

23 takeover, you told us that some people strove to come by weapons for

24 their personal safety but this was done in an uninstitutional manner.

25 Can you clarify for us what you meant by "uninstitutional

Page 17395

1 manner"?

2 A. Your Honour, before I answer the question, I would like to note

3 that I still owe you the last answer before the recess we had, and the

4 question was that I should briefly describe the atmosphere that reigned

5 in the days preceding the takeover, so if I may in a couple of sentences,

6 I would like do that. I think it would be helpful to all in the

7 courtroom to hear that.

8 Q. I think it would. Let me clarify this particular matter and then

9 we can move right to that because that's actually within the area of my

10 next questions for you.

11 So just to -- focussing on this pre-takeover period, what you

12 meant by uninstitutional manner, which some non-Serbs were obtaining

13 arms?

14 A. The atmosphere I'm referring to was such that the non-Serb

15 population were in a highly insecure situation. Given that, and in view

16 of the fact that they saw that the official authorities did nothing to

17 remedy the situation, they tried to protect themselves. They were left

18 to their own devices. We knew that the army was arming the Serbian

19 population. The non-Serb population of whatever ethnicity was not

20 receiving weapons from anyone. Under the circumstances, some individuals

21 tried to obtain weapons or purchase weapons for themselves either through

22 arms smell smuggling or from members of the reserve force. We did not

23 have any reliable information on this, however. Those were only

24 assumptions that we had.

25 Q. Were these persons, these non-Serb persons who were seeking to

Page 17396

1 obtain arms, were they getting them from Serbs in the area?

2 A. I heard information to the effect that certain individuals had

3 purchased weapons from Serbs, members of the reserve force, or soldiers

4 who returned home and that they were able to purchase weapons from them.

5 Q. And can you tell us what kinds of weapons they were able to

6 obtain through these means?

7 A. I learnt this information as unverified, and it wasn't from first

8 knowledge -- first-hand knowledge. Apparently, a lad from Omarska sold

9 weapons to a lad in Kozarac. I heard stores to the effect that this

10 young man was able to buy weapons from the Serbs in Omarska.

11 Q. Yes, my question is: What kind of arms? Were these any kind of

12 heavy arms or weapons, any artillery or were these just basic weapons?

13 A. No. As far as I remember, it was an automatic rifle that was the

14 case in this instance -- situation, or semi-automatic; I'm not sure

15 anymore.

16 Q. All right. Now I want to move to the atmosphere prior to the

17 takeover. Did you want to supplement what you had told us yesterday? Or

18 on Friday, in fact.

19 A. Yes, I wanted to answer the question but we had to adjourn so I

20 was unable to. It may be helpful to the Chamber.

21 I'm referring to the month of April, i.e., the period preceding

22 the takeover. At the time, Serb forces would appear in Prijedor in

23 several formations. Prijedor was milling with reservist, members of the

24 5th Kozara Brigade. It was through the Prijedor and the villages

25 surrounding Prijedor that regular soldiers of the JNA would pass. One

Page 17397

1 could also see members of the Matic's police in Prijedor from the

2 neighbouring Croatia or, rather, the Serbian Krajina, SRK. At the time,

3 a war was waged in Croatia where in these autonomous provinces

4 independence was claimed. There had already been casualties in several

5 towns. And the scenario was always the same. The army or the police

6 would barge in and cause a massacre. I remember one in Bijeljina, in

7 Zvornik, and I think there was another one in Brcko as well. Around

8 Prijedor, the SDS had taken power in most of the municipalities around

9 Prijedor, a coup was carried out in Sanski Most, they took over power,

10 and a neighbourhood in Sanski Most was torched by artillery fire. This

11 was the pervasive atmosphere in mid-April 1992.

12 At the same time, the Republican Staff of Territorial Defence

13 issued an order that the country should be defended and that the

14 population should be defended. At the municipal level in Prijedor, we

15 were unable to carry out the order because the structures arriving from

16 the SDS stone walled and obstructed these efforts.

17 In mid-April, reenforcements arrived to all the various forces I

18 mentioned around Prijedor and around non-Serb territories. We were still

19 operating within institutions but were unable to exercise in the

20 territory of Prijedor municipality and implement the orders arriving from

21 the republican level.

22 There was a possibility for some initiative at the local level

23 and there was also the pressure brought to bear upon us because of the

24 general situation that existed in the area, pressure from the population.

25 There were also tensions where -- in the areas where Serb populated areas

Page 17398

1 bordered with non-Serb populated ones. I also said that overnight

2 certain white flags or markings would be placed on houses and these were

3 Serb houses in -- on -- in the outlying but -- areas close to the

4 boundary. All this pointed to the fact that the Serbs wanted to engage

5 in actions. If you went through a village which was a non-Serb village,

6 pure non-Serb village, during the night, you would see people take --

7 standing guard in front of their houses. So there wasn't a system in

8 place. What they were attempting to do was to comply with the

9 instructions from the republican authorities, and the municipality was

10 supposed to take care of the population's security and to take measures

11 and precautions to possibly protect the population.

12 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm -- I'm sorry for the intervention in the

13 transcript, 6, line 6; page 6, line 6, I believe the -- the witness

14 mentioned Territorial Defence and it was recorded as municipality.

15 Perhaps municipality Territorial Defence. Maybe you clarify

16 that.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. The Territorial Defence at

18 the level of the municipality of Prijedor.

19 MR. OLMSTED:

20 Q. Last Friday one of the things that you mentioned that you

21 observed in the days leading up to the takeover of the municipality was

22 that women, children, and elderly left their homes during the night and

23 only returned in the morning.

24 What were the ethnicities of these people who would leave during

25 the night?

Page 17399

1 A. They were solely Serbs from the Serb villages bordering with

2 non-Serb villages. The Serbian population was leaving and they would be

3 mostly the elderly, women, and children. They would leave their homes

4 during the night and then come back in the morning. And, of course,

5 people would inquire of them in the morning as to what had happened the

6 previous night. But they would always deny everything. They would say,

7 No, we didn't leave. You are must have -- you must be mistaken, and so

8 on and so forth.

9 Q. Can you explain to us why this phenomenon of people leaving

10 during the night and coming back the next morning was related -- or how

11 you perceive it as being related to the eventually takeover of Prijedor?

12 A. At that point in time before the takeover, as these things were

13 happening, we were quite clear on the fact that the army was getting

14 ready for actions and that that was the reason why they were pulling the

15 Serbian population out of the area, in order to enable them to carry out

16 their actions. And it was only logical to conclude this. However, in

17 the mornings, nothing would really happen. People would come back to

18 their homes, and this is what would happen, once, twice, and we realised

19 that these must have been drills in the event of an actual attack that

20 they should be ready.

21 There were no indications. There wasn't a single reason for any

22 Serbian village to be evacuated in that area.

23 Q. You testified last Friday that you heard public announcements

24 that the non-Serbs were getting ready to attack Prijedor and this was

25 even published in an Official Gazette.

Page 17400

1 Who issued these announcements?

2 A. It was the SDS that published it, or, rather, the public

3 controlling the SDS. It was a component part of a campaign that had long

4 been in the making and been implemented. The SDS created an atmosphere

5 of fear among the Serbian population through their representatives. The

6 SDS took control of all the TV installations in the area, and broadcast

7 its own programme solely, the news from the battle-field in Croatia, the

8 news from Belgrade, their own newscasts, and the news programme was

9 designed deliberately with a view to promoting or implementing a

10 political propaganda which wanted to instill fear with the Serbian

11 population and to simply carry out a propaganda among them.

12 Q. And just to be clear, were there any plans by the non-Serbs to

13 attack either Prijedor town or any part of the municipality at any time

14 prior to the takeover of the municipality?

15 A. Your Honours, at no point in time from anyone person, either

16 civilian or a member of the Territorial Defence, did I ever hear or -- of

17 or see any sort of plan, any mention of it or even any mention of a

18 possibility for a Serbian area or a Serbian home or a Serbian individual

19 to be attacked. The SDA policy, as well as that of all the other parties

20 outside of the Serbian block, outside of the SDS, was to do all in one's

21 power to dispel such unfounded fears. Various peace initiatives were

22 launched, such as ones to set up joint movements, civic fora, joint

23 patrol, mixed military formations which would be composed of the army

24 from the 5th Kozara Brigade, the police, the Territorial Defence in

25 Kozarac, and wherever the army and the SDS agreed, such mixed army units

Page 17401

1 would be set up. But the Serbs refused all of it. Individuals of Serb

2 ethnicity who were committed to peace and civilised life were at risk

3 from the SDS and slowly moved out or withdrew from such civic

4 associations or organisations.

5 Q. Did either the SDS or HDZ leadership in Prijedor receive any

6 instructions from their republican Main Boards to establish Crisis Staffs

7 in Prijedor or separate government institutions?

8 A. The SDS did receive such orders, because it had already

9 established a parallel state by that time.

10 Q. I'm sorry, it was a slip of my tongue. The SDA or the HDZ, did

11 the non-Serb political parties receive any such instructions from their

12 Main Boards.

13 A. No. They had not received any instructions about divisions. The

14 SDA and the HDZ and many of the civic parties of the opposition were

15 operating at the time and had an intention to operate within the bounds

16 of the law, the constitution and institutions that were legitimately

17 elected. What the SDA or non-Serb politicians weren't able to carry out

18 were some of the orders arriving from the state level. They were unable

19 to prevent the SDS from cutting off the financial ties between Prijedor

20 and the rest of the state, because the functionary within the SDK was one

21 who co-operated with the SDS and syphoned off the financial -- the flow

22 of payments from -- from Sarajevo to Banja Luka, to the autonomous

23 province that had, by that time, already been set up there. The

24 mobilisation of territorial staff -- Defence, that is, could also not be

25 carried out although we had received an order from the republican level

Page 17402

1 to do so.

2 Q. In fact, that was my next question. Prior to the takeover, had

3 the TO units in the non-Serb areas of Prijedor been mobilised? And I

4 believe that you have just answered that they could not have been -- you

5 were unable to carry out any instructions to that regard.

6 A. No, they could not have been mobilised because the centre for

7 mobilisation, that is to say the main command in the municipality was in

8 the city of Prijedor. Of course, in that command there were people from

9 the SDS as well, and the order to mobilise the Territorial Defence could

10 not have been implemented in the way it should have been.

11 Q. I want to move now to the takeover itself.

12 Did you go to Prijedor town on the morning after the takeover?

13 A. Yes. I went to Prijedor that morning normally to the meeting

14 that had been agreed, not knowing that what is going on, and at the first

15 stop of the bus, when army troops came onto the bus starting to check

16 papers of the passengers, I realised something out of the ordinary was

17 happening and I saw at the bus-stop sandbags and machine-gun emplacement.

18 The soldiers were checking the IDs of the passengers on the bus. They

19 looked at my ID and returned it to me without a word. They didn't say

20 anything to me or to the other passengers.

21 The bus continued on to Prijedor, and at all the following major

22 intersections we could see soldiers and machine-gun emplacements. And

23 just before the main bus terminal, the railway station at the main

24 intersection in Prijedor near the SUP building outside the town hall, it

25 was the same.

Page 17403

1 Q. And did you also see police guarding these facilities?

2 A. Yes, yes. It was a mixed composition. There were soldiers,

3 police, and military police. Military police wore military uniforms with

4 white belts. So it was a mixed force that carried out this takeover,

5 this military putsch.

6 Q. Now when arrived in town, where did you go?

7 A. When I arrived in town, I went, first, to the party headquarters,

8 because that's where I had planned to go, and there I found some members

9 of the party standing outside. They were trying to get in, but they

10 couldn't because the lock had been changed. A cleaning lady came out and

11 told us, There's nothing for us to do there. She would call the police

12 if we continued trying to get in, so we left, and we set out towards the

13 municipality building.

14 There were non-Serbs standing outside, employees of the

15 municipality who had worked there as recently as the day before but were

16 unable to get in, were not allowed, and the president of the

17 municipality, Muhamed Cehajic, was there. He was also standing at the

18 reception desk not being allowed to get in.

19 Q. Can you tell us, at this point in time who were the main SDA

20 leaders in Prijedor? Obviously we don't want a complete list, but if

21 could you just give us the main SDA leaders.

22 A. You mean SDS or SDA?

23 Q. SDA.

24 A. Well the president was Mirzad Mujadzic, vice-president;

25 Camil Pezo; then myself. I can't remember the third vice-president. The

Page 17404

1 Executive Board included Sefer Krkic, Ilijaz Music, Muhamed Cehajic,

2 Becir Mehdunjanin, Ilijaz Memic, I believe was also on the

3 Executive Board. Rufad Suljanovic, Dr. Rufad Suljanovic was also on the

4 Executive Board. I could actually give you all the names, if given a few

5 minutes.

6 Q. That's fine. That will do. Were members of the SDA leadership

7 who held government positions allowed to return to their positions, their

8 jobs in the weeks or months that followed the takeover?

9 A. No one at no time, although they tried to make inquiries by

10 telephone, none of them were allowed to return. What happened the next

11 day, happened in companies and enterprises. Managers of non-Serb

12 ethnicity were refused access to their workplaces. Senior staff in

13 public -- publicly owned companies were also refused access to their

14 workplaces and even ordinary workers were not allowed to go back to work.

15 In some enterprises they were exceptions, I know, for instance, about the

16 service in charge of railway maintenance. There was a non-Serb or a few

17 non-Serbs who were allowed to go on working. As for banks and major

18 companies, major businesses, all non-Serbs who had occupied posts of any

19 importance were refused access and Serbs took over their works -- the

20 workplaces.

21 Q. So if I understand you correctly, it wasn't simply members of the

22 SDA who were denied the opportunity to return to their jobs, it was all

23 non-Serbs except for the exceptions that you gave?

24 A. Right, right.

25 Q. Can you tell us what happened to the members of the SDA

Page 17405

1 leadership in the aftermath of the takeover?

2 A. After the takeover, the SDA leadership never managed to convene

3 again in full composition. There were one or two attempts but they were

4 never able to meet again, all of them. The first thing we did was

5 approach SDS, suggesting that we talk about the situation and discuss the

6 moves they had made.

7 Q. And I want to move on to that in a second.

8 Did the members of the SDA leadership, did they survive the

9 conflict, did they survive 1992?

10 A. Three men survived from the leadership. And 90 to 95 per cent of

11 municipal and local officials were killed.

12 Q. What happened to the non-Serb police officers in Prijedor, after

13 the takeover?

14 A. On that day, policemen turned up for work. Some were turned back

15 without any explanation, but I heard that some others were offered a

16 statement of loyalty to sign. I'm not aware that anyone actually signed

17 it. In fact, I heard that some did but I didn't know these men. But

18 it's quite certain that within a few days even those who were prepared to

19 sign that statement, were no longer working in the police.

20 MR. OLMSTED: Let's look at 65 ter 2418. This is tab number 1.

21 Q. This a decision on the termination of employment. It's dated 16

22 October 1992.

23 Have you seen this document before?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. And without going into any details, who showed it to you?

Page 17406

1 A. I received that document from the man who is named here.

2 Q. As the reason for the decision, it states that the Prijedor

3 Crisis Staff ordered all work organisations to terminate the employment

4 of all employee who is had participated in the armed rebellion around are

5 currently in one of the refugee camps, Omarska or Keraterm.

6 Did you spend any time in Omarska camp?

7 A. Yes, I did.

8 Q. Would you classify it as a refugee camp?

9 A. Absolutely not. It was a concentration camp by any standard.

10 Q. Were only non-Serbs detained at Omarska and Keraterm fired from

11 their jobs in state-owned enterprises?

12 A. No. Everyone was fired, regardless of whether they had been in

13 Omarska or Keraterm, even women were laid off. Dismissals from work had

14 nothing to do with Keraterm and Omarska, and that started happening even

15 before these camps were established.

16 MR. OLMSTED: May this be admitted into evidence, Your Honours.

17 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.

18 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P01715, Your Honours.

19 MR. OLMSTED: I now want to move to events after the takeover.

20 Q. Were any travel restrictions imposed on the non-Serb population

21 in Prijedor municipality, after the takeover?

22 A. Yes. It's not that restrictions were imposed but travel was no

23 longer possible. It was prohibited.

24 Q. Where were you living -- or where were you spending most of your

25 time after the takeover?

Page 17407

1 A. In Trnopolje, in my birth place, my place of residence, and I

2 went occasionally to Kozarac and came back.

3 Q. Other than travelling to Kozarac and that area, the non-Serb area

4 around Kozarac, were you able to travel around the municipality freely;

5 for instance, going into Prijedor town or other locations?

6 A. Not freely. Free travel was possible just the first few days

7 after the takeover. Later on, it was no longer possible because public

8 transport was cancelled and it was based in Prijedor, so there was no

9 more public transport. And travelling in your own car meant that you

10 would be stopped and your papers would be checked at several

11 check-points, and we had also heard that some people had been stopped at

12 these check-points, their cars taken away, and they had to walk back

13 home. That meant practically that it was a total blockade. Several days

14 after the takeover, you were not able to go to Prijedor by any means at

15 all.

16 Q. And who was manning these check-points?

17 A. The police and reservists.

18 Q. And during this time-period, did you hear about any crimes

19 committed against non-Serbs at these check-points?

20 A. Yes. There were cases at the check-point on the way to Omarska.

21 People were beaten up, their cars taken away. There was also an incident

22 at the entry point to Prijedor, but I don't know the details. The person

23 was probably beaten up as well.

24 Q. And during this period between the takeover and the attack on

25 Kozarac, were non-Serbs in Kozarac allowed to move out of the

Page 17408

1 municipality?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Does that include women, children, and elderly?

4 A. That includes everyone. Some people tried, but women and

5 children were turned back.

6 Q. And did you ever seek an explanation for why they weren't allowed

7 to leave the municipality?

8 A. When they stopped people going to Banja Luka the first time, we

9 still had some communication from them. The official explanation was the

10 one that could be heard even earlier in the form of propaganda. Namely,

11 that we were preparing to go to war against Serbs and that we were trying

12 to send our women and children away from Prijedor municipality. However,

13 at the same time, we could see that Serb women and children were being

14 allowed to leave Prijedor. However, no discussion was possible. Their

15 accusations were final. What used to be propaganda turned into an

16 official position that was later published in newspapers and other media.

17 Q. Were non-Serb children allowed to attend school after the

18 takeover?

19 A. No. No, secondary schools were based only in Prijedor. From the

20 moment the road from Prijedor to Kozarac was blocked and when there was

21 no more public transport available, non-Serb children from Kozarac were

22 no longer able to attend secondary school.

23 Q. What happened to the electricity and telephone service in Kozarac

24 after the takeover?

25 A. After the takeover, we continued to have electricity and

Page 17409

1 telephone service for a while and then both were cut off. Several days

2 before the attack, they cut off both.

3 Q. Can you explain to us how you know that it was cut off as opposed

4 to simply malfunctioning?

5 A. Kozarac had no electricity. Kamicani and Jakupovici did not have

6 electricity either, all those settlements. However, Petrov Gaj and

7 Omarska and Serb hamlets adjacent to Trnopolje had electricity. If I can

8 remember well, there were two non-Serb houses on the boundary that had

9 electricity and one of the houses had a working telephone. All the rest

10 had no power and no telephone. Now, looking towards the west, across

11 from Ribnjak and Tomasica village, they had electricity throughout, the

12 town of Prijedor as well. You could see that very clearly every evening,

13 every night.

14 MR. OLMSTED: Let's bring up 65 ter 10580. This is tab 22.

15 Q. And while we're bringing that up, what JNA unit did you serve in

16 during your compulsory military service after secondary school?

17 A. I was in an artillery unit. It was a 105-millimetre Howitzer

18 unit; that's how we called it. We called it Howitzer 105. Those were

19 medium-calibre guns, you can call them.

20 MR. OLMSTED: If we can zoom in just a little bit more. And then

21 scroll -- oh, not that much. That's too much as well. Just a little

22 bit, not ... and if we could actually scroll up towards the top. There

23 you go. There you go.

24 Q. Sir, in the first half of May, was any artillery positioned

25 around Kozarac?

Page 17410

1 A. Well, there was artillery even in April, before the takeover at

2 certain positions around Kozarac. As best I can remember, I'll explain

3 where they were.

4 The guns were here.

5 Q. Wait, let's --

6 A. Cannons were here --

7 Q. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. Let's skip the image right and then, yes,

8 I would like you to mark with an X where you saw various artillery

9 positions around Kozarac.

10 A. Artillery positions were here. And somewhere here too. Then in

11 this area. A position also at Benkovac overlooking Kozarac, I can't see

12 Benkovac. Here, I think. And then in the area of the quarry and the

13 mine there were some positions, in Orlovci, somewhere here. At the

14 airport at Urije, I suppose it's here. Around here. I'm not quite sure.

15 Again, at Gornja Puharska, it's either here or here.

16 Q. And who -- who put this artillery at these various locations

17 around Kozarac?

18 A. Well, officially, there was the Yugoslavia People's Army, the

19 Yugoslav army, although members of the 5th Kozara Brigade were seen

20 there. People who were coming back from the theatre of war in Croatia

21 returning to their homes were observed in some of these locations after

22 their return.

23 Q. Can you describe for us the kinds of artillery that were

24 positioned around Kozarac. You mentioned you were with a Howitzer unit

25 in a JNA. Were any of those placed around Kozarac?

Page 17411

1 A. Even before these incidents we knew that multi-barrel

2 rocket-launchers were at the Urije airport. Large-calibre cannons were

3 in Urije and in Gornja Puharska. There was artillery in Gorazde. At

4 Benkovci there were regular Yugoslavia army troops and they had several

5 large-calibre batteries. We knew that as well. At the quarry, we

6 supposed there were some because soldiers had been seen hauling something

7 and setting something up. And later when they started to use the

8 artillery, we realised it was a smaller calibre. And when the attack

9 happened, those who had seen artillery fire while serving in the army

10 were aware what it looked like when shells were fired from Howitzers of

11 155 millimetres, the devastation is huge. And with these guns you can

12 hear both the explosion and later, 15, 20 seconds later, depending on the

13 distance, you can also hear the sounds of fire, the firing. Prijedor was

14 shelled with heavy artillery from Benkovac and Omarska and that's it for

15 the heavy artillery. With smaller-calibre artillery from Orlovic,

16 Donji Gorazde and the quarry. The artillery from Tomasica that I'm

17 showing near this fish pond was never used. It fired only twice.

18 Q. And we're going into in the attack on Kozarac in a little bit. I

19 did have one clarification for your last answer. You said Prijedor was

20 shelled with heavy artillery. Did you mean Prijedor or were you

21 referring to Kozarac area?

22 A. Maybe I was speaking too fast for interpreters. Kozarac was

23 shelled with heavy artillery from Prijedor, from the area of Urije or

24 Gornja Puharska.

25 So, the shells were coming from this direction, this direction,

Page 17412

1 and this direction. That's heavy artillery. And lighter artillery and

2 mortars were firing from this direction and this direction and somewhere

3 from this area which I did not mark.

4 Q. And I want to talk about this period of April and early May, when

5 these artillery positions were established around Kozarac. Were you able

6 to observe in which directions these weapons were faced?

7 A. Well, I did not go to any of these places. We knew that because

8 we heard from people who had been there and told us, either people from

9 the party or the municipal structures. We knew some of the reservists

10 who were part of these units, and when they deserted, they told us about

11 it. They told us of the positions. Also, villagers from neighbouring

12 villages saw these positions and told us from the municipality. But when

13 the shelling began, I'll mark the position where I was when the shelling

14 began.

15 MR. OLMSTED: And just for the record, he just drew a circle as

16 to where he was when the shelling began.

17 Q. Let me focus you on my question though. You've now mentioned

18 these artillery positions were established in late April -- in April and

19 early May. Were you able to determine in which direction, say, the

20 Howitzers were facing? Were they facing away from Kozarac or towards it?

21 A. They were facing towards Kozarac.

22 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Aleksic is on his feet.

23 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I apologise for

24 interrupting, but in his previous answer the witness said I personally

25 didn't go to any of these locations. How can he then know which

Page 17413

1 direction the guns were facing?

2 MR. OLMSTED: Perhaps the witness can --

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, as responsible

4 people, we were in constant contact with people who came and informed us

5 either because they were afraid and wanted to have answers for what was

6 happening. As for the artillery, everybody said that the artillery guns

7 were facing Kozarac expect for one battery in Urije which wasn't facing

8 in this direction. It was facing at an angle of 90 degrees in this

9 direction, so sort of towards town.

10 MR. OLMSTED: May this be admitted into evidence, Your Honours.

11 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I object to this

12 document. What assistance does it have? The witness didn't see any of

13 these locations, he didn't see whether there was any action from these

14 locations, nor does very any personal knowledge. He said, I heard from

15 some people, but he didn't say the source. And we don't see how this map

16 could assist the Chamber.

17 He doesn't have any knowledge of actions nor does he have

18 personal knowledge. He is merely talking about something that heard from

19 others. This is not even hearsay. It's -- who knows who he heard it

20 from.

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Allow me, Your Honours, I'm trying

22 to economise with time so I may be speaking too quickly.

23 We had a few reservists who left the 5th Kozara Brigade. There

24 was a lieutenant or second lieutenant who had been at some of these

25 locations and he told me us about what he saw there. He gave us some

Page 17414

1 additional information which I didn't talk about because I wasn't asked.

2 That's one of the things that I'm talking about.

3 The second is that shells can't just fall out of the sky. They

4 come from certain directions and they hit certain locations. And you

5 know exactly whether the whistling sound is above your head or whether it

6 is coming from the opposite direction. Those who had served in the army

7 and had some training knew very well that it wasn't difficult to

8 establish where artillery shells were coming from. Only very exceptional

9 geographic circumstances is a -- difficult to establish when, for example

10 you're in the hills and the sound reverberates, so it's difficult to

11 orient yourself.

12 MR. OLMSTED: Your Honours, I think he --

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And one other very important thing.

14 We didn't get the information for any of these places from only one

15 person. The head of the municipality and the party was visited by people

16 on several occasions. Ten people had come from Gornja Puharska to

17 complain about these guns. And I can't have any doubt if people come to

18 complain every single day.

19 JUDGE HALL: It seems to me, Mr. Krgovic, that, if anything,

20 the -- an argument could be made about weight, but I see no reason why

21 the document shouldn't be admitted based on this witness's testimony.

22 Admitted and marked.

23 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P01716, Your Honours.

24 MR. OLMSTED:

25 Q. Sir, I think you mentioned this in response to one of my prior

Page 17415

1 questions, but did you and the other members of the SDA leadership

2 attempt to meet with the SDS leadership in Prijedor following the

3 takeover?

4 A. Yes, we did. There was several attempts and several meetings

5 were held. The police, after the takeover of power, called the police in

6 Kozarac so I know there were some contacts there, and I know that a team

7 from the police went to negotiate. I know that a delegation went to a

8 meeting to Banja Luka to meet with Kupresanin and Zupljanin, and I know

9 that another delegation went to the SUP in Prijedor to the police, one

10 went to the barracks and this was more or less unsuccessful. The SDA

11 tried, at the level of the SDS party which was in control of everything,

12 to set up a meeting and we managed to convince the SDS to hold this

13 meeting. The meeting was held in Prijedor and I was personally there at

14 the meeting.

15 Q. I'm going ask you about that meeting, but before I do, you

16 mentioned this meeting in Prijedor with Kupresanin and Zupljanin. Was

17 that Stojan Zupljanin, the CSB chief at the time?

18 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, had this is the first

19 time that the Prosecutor has mentioned this. We were not informed about

20 this. The witness didn't talk about this at all, nor did the Prosecutor

21 inform us about this. I would like this to be stricken from the record

22 and not to be -- and I would like the Prosecutor not to be allowed to go

23 along this line. This is not professional behaviour. The Prosecutor

24 never informed us about this and they didn't supply with us a proofing

25 note that would contain this information.

Page 17416

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours --

2 MR. OLMSTED: Before you answer, sir, just a moment.

3 Your Honours, this is the first I heard about this too and that's

4 why it is not in any proofing notes but he has now given an answer.

5 He's mentioned someone by the name of Zupljanin and I think it is now my

6 right to ask him which Zupljanin it was.

7 JUDGE HALL: Yes, we'll have to see where this goes, the witness

8 having volunteered that information. We will see where it goes because

9 it may very well in result in counsel for Zupljanin being given time to

10 deal with this in their cross-examination. But as I said, the witness

11 has volunteered it, so let's proceed.

12 MR. OLMSTED:

13 Q. Sir, can you tell us which Zupljanin you were referring to who

14 attended this meeting with members of the Kozarac police?

15 MR. KRGOVIC: It is misleading. The witness never mentioned a

16 meeting in Kozarac. What is going with you?

17 MR. OLMSTED: No, I didn't say there was a meeting in Kozarac.

18 I'm reading from the record. Let's let the witness then explain to

19 clarify that.

20 Q. Sir, you mentioned there was a meeting in which Zupljanin and

21 Kupresanin attended or participated in. First of all, can you tell us

22 which Zupljanin you meant by that?

23 A. That was the chief of police, that Zupljanin.

24 If I can provide some details because some of the parties are

25 contesting this. Let me explain how this meeting happened.

Page 17417

1 Vojislav Kupresanin was the president of the autonomous region of

2 Krajina and he had a brother. His brother's wife was Hamdo Balic's

3 sister, who was from Kozarac. And along that personal line Hamdo Balic

4 from Kozarac, the brother-in-law of Kupresanin, was asked for -- and told

5 for Kupresanin to ask Zupljanin to meet with a delegation from Kozarac

6 which would explain that we were not armed, that we had no bad intentions

7 towards the Serbs, that they were prepared to solve issues together and

8 then this delegation went to Banja Luka. Becir Mehdunjanin led the

9 delegation, and I think Hamdo Balic was also there, who was Kupresanin's

10 brother-in-law. In a way he was his brother-in-law.

11 Q. And can you tell us approximately when this meeting took place?

12 A. Some time between the 15th and 20th of May, I think. It was the

13 second part of May, not later than the 20th of May. I'm not completely

14 sure.

15 Another piece of information. Dusan Tadic from Kozarac was also

16 supposed to be a member of this delegation, together with some other

17 Serbs. Dusan Tadic is the person whose case was heard before this

18 Tribunal. This delegation went to Banja Luka and had some talks but

19 there were no positive results. The explanations provided by the

20 delegation were not recognised.

21 Q. I want to move on to the meeting that you attended with other

22 members of the SDA leadership with the SDS leadership.

23 First of all, can you tell us when that meeting occurred?

24 A. That meeting occurred sometime in mid-May.

25 Q. And --

Page 17418

1 A. I was never sure of the exact date because lots of things were

2 happening at the time.

3 Q. And can you explain to us why you and the other members of the

4 SDA leadership wanted to have this meeting with the SDS leadership?

5 A. There were several reasons. First, we were under complete

6 blockade. Normal life was completely interrupted. People were terribly

7 afraid. They were locked up in that area. We were afraid of an attack.

8 We were not preparing any sort of an attack. We didn't even have any

9 defence prepared. We wanted to talk to the SDS about the situation. We

10 wanted to offer some solutions out of this situation. Everything that

11 the SDS mentioned as reasons for a military coup we wanted to convince

12 them that these reasons didn't exist.

13 Q. And where did this meeting take place?

14 A. On the premises of the SDS in Prijedor.

15 Q. And other than yourself, who from the SDA leadership was present

16 at this meeting?

17 A. I was there; Becir Medunjanin was there; Mustafa Tadzic, from

18 Kozarac; Islam Bahonjic; Professor Ilijaz Music; Meho Tursic.

19 Q. Who from the SDS leadership was present at this meeting?

20 A. On behalf of the SDS, it was President Simo Miskovic; Dragan or

21 Dusan Kurnoga; Slobodan Kuruzovic; some security officials from military

22 security and also from public security; Commander Arsic, he was a

23 lieutenant-colonel, or colonel; and Major Zeljaja, who was the garrison

24 commander in Prijedor and Arsic was the commander of the 5th Kozara --

25 Q. Can you now tell us briefly what happened at this meeting with

Page 17419

1 the SDS leadership and representatives from the military and public

2 security?

3 A. After a few jokes made by the SDS and the officers, I must tell

4 you first that Simo Miskovic, the president of the SDS, refused to start

5 the meeting until the officers were there, and the meeting started only

6 after the officers had arrived. Professor Music spoke first, I believe.

7 He talked about the difficult situation. He said that people needed to

8 be reinstated in their jobs, something to that effect. However, then the

9 officers took over. Simo Miskovic hardly said anything. Arsic, Zeljaja,

10 and some of the security officers were the ones who talked, as did

11 Kuruzovic. They talked about war. They said we didn't know what war was.

12 They recommended that we all got in a vehicle and they could drive us to

13 the front so we could finally see what war meant.

14 Zeljaja then took over. And he gave an ultimatum, saying that

15 the weapons needed to be surrendered. It was an impossible ultimatum.

16 Beco said that we weren't armed in a way that they thought we were armed.

17 They said they knew exactly how many weapons we had. And they mentioned

18 certain numbers. Arsic or Zeljaja gave us one number, then somebody from

19 the security gave another figure. Somebody said there were 10- to 11.000

20 barrels in Prijedor, 5- to 7.000 in Kozarac, and either way, they wanted

21 these thousands of weapons to be surrendered. They said that

22 conversation could continue only after that.

23 Q. How many weapons did the non-Serb population have at that period

24 of time?

25 A. Very, very few. In a military sense, nothing. As far as

Page 17420

1 infantry weapons are concerned, there might have been a few dozen pieces.

2 But there were quite a few hunting rifles, because during peacetime, a

3 lot of the people were hunters. There were quite a few personal pistol,

4 personal weapons, rifles from the Turkish era and some improvised devices

5 that look like a rifle. However, when you put it all together it

6 wouldn't have been more than a thousand pieces.

7 Q. Did you and the other members of the SDA delegation explain this

8 to the members of the Serb delegation at this meeting.

9 A. Beco gave this explanation, Bahonjic was also explaining things.

10 However, they interrupted us in our explanations and at one point Zeljaja

11 was very aggressive in saying, We know exactly how many weapons you have.

12 If Kozarac doesn't return - I can't remember whether said 5- or 7.000

13 pieces - I will flatten Kozarac with the ground. Serbian police must be

14 in Kozarac and the Serbian flag must be in Kozarac. Run your weapons,

15 and when the Serbian police and Serbian flag are in Kozarac, we will sit

16 down and talk. Beco of course said, People is it clear to you that we do

17 not have those weapons? And he said, Well, that's your problem.

18 Q. During this meeting, how did the members of the Serb delegation

19 refer to the Kozarac TO and the Kozarac police? Did they use any

20 particular names to refer to them?

21 A. Zeljaja, the man I talked about, and Arsic, they talked about the

22 Green Berets. They said, We know how Green Berets there, how many

23 weapons there are, and so on. He was using only that term, Green Berets,

24 or the Muslim army.

25 Q. Were there any Green Berets in Kozarac?

Page 17421

1 A. No, there weren't. There weren't any Green Berets. There wasn't

2 any army. It was the -- an attempt to create the Territorial Defence, so

3 to speak.

4 Q. And how did the meeting end that day?

5 A. It ended with this ultimatum, the threat; namely that we had to

6 return these thousands of pieces of weapons than the Serbian army or the

7 Serbian police had to take over Kozarac and the Serbian flag had to fly

8 over Kozarac. A key problem was that at the very same moment we knew

9 that there was no theoretical chance for us to meet this ultimatum

10 because we didn't have that number of weapons, and if we returned fewer

11 weapons than in the ultimatum, that would have meant that we failed to

12 meet the conditions.

13 Q. After this meeting, did you and the other SDA leaders convey what

14 happened in this meeting to the community leaders in the Kozarac and the

15 surrounding non-Serb areas?

16 A. Yes, we did. We informed them. People were given the

17 information in the atmosphere that I already described. There was no way

18 out, and we were given an impossible ultimatum. We told this to the

19 people. We discussed it. And the people saw only one single problem

20 with this, which was how to protect the lives of the people.

21 There wasn't anything positive that we could say about the

22 conduct of the Serbs. There were these types of ultimatums. However, we

23 knew that there were not even minimal guarantees provided by those who

24 had issued the ultimatum.

25 MR. OLMSTED: Your Honours, I see it's almost time for a break.

Page 17422

1 Perhaps it's a good time.

2 JUDGE HALL: Yes. Yes, we would resume in 20 minutes.

3 [The witness stands down]

4 --- Recess taken at 10.24 a.m.

5 --- On resuming at 10.46 a.m.

6 [The witness takes the stand]

7 JUDGE HALL: Yes, Mr. Olmsted.

8 MR. OLMSTED: Thank you, Your Honour.

9 Q. Prior to the break, we were talking about a meeting that you

10 attended with the community leaders in Kozarac following this meeting you

11 had with the SDS leadership and members of the military and police in

12 Prijedor.

13 Can you tell us what actions the leadership in Kozarac decided to

14 take at this point in time, having learned what went down at this

15 meeting?

16 A. The leadership continued to try to keep in touch and to try and

17 talk to the SDS leadership and the valid municipal structures again.

18 There were attempts to contact them in Banja Luka and from what was done

19 in the field, it was clear that the threats were serious, so attempts

20 were made to increase the security of the population.

21 There were attempts to organise the Territorial Defence in a way

22 that would reduce tensions and reduce fear among the population.

23 However, there were attempts during the entire time not to cause any

24 provocations, not to provoke the SDS structures and the powers that it

25 had.

Page 17423

1 Q. [Microphone not activated] It was on. I don't know why it didn't

2 work that time. You mentioned that there were attempts to organise the

3 TO in the Kozarac area. Can you tell us what attempts were made? What

4 was the first thing that the people of Kozarac tried to do?

5 A. The people from Kozarac, at the time that it became clear that it

6 was impossible to answer an ultimatum of that type, the only thing that

7 remained was to take all measures in order to protect the lives of the

8 civilians and of the population. The only structure that existed and for

9 which there were orders on the republican level, were the remains of the

10 TO located in the Kozarac area and in a small area outside of Prijedor in

11 the area of Hambarine, Rizvanovici and Ljubija. These were the only

12 territories where some indirect structures of Bosnia-Herzegovina existed

13 at the time. The conclusion was that the TO had to expand and be

14 organised in a way to protect the population from being massacred, should

15 that ever happen.

16 Q. And you've said that the decision was made to try to expand the

17 TO. What was the first step in that process?

18 A. In an establishment sense, in peacetime conditions, the TO had a

19 minimal number of men. It was necessary to expand this, in order to be

20 able to achieve at least minimal protection and to organise the people

21 who were able to obtain any sort of weapons, in order to protect the

22 population. The only legal way was to expand the TO in an establishment

23 sense, and this was done during those days; however, not through

24 mobilisation but through volunteering. People weren't ordered to join.

25 People reported on their own, or they asked to join the

Page 17424

1 Territorial Defence because they were not able to sit at home afraid and

2 in the uncertainty without any organisation that that would serve to

3 protect their homes.

4 Based on the records that we had, lists were very soon put

5 together, and since we didn't know what number of people we had, and we

6 had no vital information in relation to the defence, people were told to

7 put themselves on the list, as well as the weapons that they had, if they

8 had any, and then various formations were put together from this pool of

9 people, based on the structure of the TO, with the Main Staff in Kozarac

10 and with regional staffs in the various local communities, or at -- or at

11 even lower levels if the local communities were large.

12 And let me just say this: This was only an attempt because we

13 didn't manage to put together a list of all those people who volunteered

14 to join the TO.

15 Q. Did you --

16 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Olmsted, if I might interrupt briefly. You're

17 probably aware of this, as is the Chamber, but the -- when we take the

18 usual break at 12.05, would you have left only seven minutes of your

19 total allotted time.

20 MR. OLMSTED: Thank you, Your Honour.

21 Q. Just to clarify, you mentioned these lists of volunteers were

22 created. Did you sign the list?

23 A. I did sign the list and everybody from my village signed, or at

24 least the majority did. And I must say that people of other ethnicities

25 also signed this list.

Page 17425

1 Q. Did you own a weapon at that time?

2 A. I did not.

3 Q. Now, you mentioned that this was merely an attempt to expand the

4 TO. Were the non-Serbs in Kozarac area, in the end, able to really

5 organise a defence before the Serbs attacked that area?

6 A. They were not. The time was very short, and we failed to

7 complete the organisation which could have been effective. It was broken

8 up practically within a few hours.

9 Q. Can you explain why you weren't able to mobilise in that

10 time-period. Obviously it a limited time-period of a week or two. But

11 what other barriers were there with regard to mobilising the TO.

12 A. We were completely isolated. Communication was very poor or

13 impossible. There were no communications devices. There were no

14 weapons. You would be able to defend half of a village and then there

15 would be an open area of several kilometres completely unprotected and

16 then again a few rifles in a part of a village. There weren't enough

17 weapons, there weren't enough professionals who would be able to do this.

18 There were only two or three officers for the 20.000 or so people. There

19 wasn't enough time. There wasn't any fuel. We simply didn't have the

20 available resources to do this, not even in a longer period of time, let

21 alone such a short period of time.

22 Q. By the time of the Serb attack on Kozarac, at maximum, how many

23 men had been mobilised into the Kozarac TO?

24 A. I don't know the exact number of people. There might have been

25 2- or 3.000. But the vast majority of them were unarmed, including

Page 17426

1 people who had very old style pistols and personal weapons, the maximum

2 number of people who were armed in the TO would have been about a

3 thousand for the entire area.

4 Q. And that is for the entire Kozarac area, including Trnopolje? Or

5 which areas are you covering with that?

6 A. I think the entire area of Kozarac, all the local communities,

7 this entire non-Serb area.

8 Q. Were any plans made to attack Prijedor town or any of the Serb

9 areas in the municipality during this period of mobilisation?

10 A. No.

11 Q. Were any plans made to attack any Serb military, VRS, or TO units

12 in the Prijedor area during this period?

13 A. No.

14 MR. OLMSTED: May we look at P653.

15 Q. What you have before you is a dispatch from SJB Prijedor to

16 CSB Banja Luka dated 18 May 1992. We see that listed in this -- and we

17 need to zoom out a little bit. Listed in this dispatch are a number of

18 local communes. Can you tell us what are the ethnicities or the ethnic

19 majorities of these communities listed here, just generally?

20 A. It is the non-Serb ethnicity who are in a majority, so in

21 Rizvanovici, Hambarine, and Biscani, mostly there were Bosniaks. In

22 Carakovo as -- too. Now the areas of Kozarac and Kozarusa was inhabited

23 mostly by the Bosniak population, though some local communes had mixed

24 population, but all in all this was non-Serb population.

25 Q. Now we see in the first paragraph it is written that -- or refers

Page 17427

1 to paramilitary units present in these local communes.

2 Can you tell us other than the -- first of all, were there any

3 non-Serb paramilitary units in the Kozarac area?

4 A. Absolutely not. There was only the Territorial Defence and

5 nothing else. And there was the police, with its reserve force. That

6 was it. However, the Serb authorities referred to all of them as

7 paramilitaries in relation to their own structure, the para state

8 structure that they set up.

9 Q. Now, for Kozarac and Kozarusa, the report states that there this

10 is a unit the size of a company with rifles and mortars.

11 Can you tell us how big is a company?

12 A. I wasn't in the infantry, but a company can number several

13 hundred men, at the most.

14 Q. And was this an accurate estimation of the size of the TO units

15 in the Kozarac area before the attack on Kozarac?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Now your previous answer --

18 A. Excuse me. Let me just add that, so far as the weapons are

19 concerned, this isn't accurate. If hunting rifles and such-like are

20 meant under weapons, then it's true. As far as I know, there were no

21 mortars.

22 Q. Now in your prior answer you mentioned -- that prior to the

23 attack on Kozarac, you mentioned the number of 2.000 -- I think you

24 mentioned about 1.000 persons. A company is less than a thousand

25 persons. Can you explain the discrepancy? What were you referring to

Page 17428

1 when you said that a thousand people were in the TO?

2 A. There were quite a few people without weapons. There were very

3 many of those who had pistols. A significant number of people had

4 old-fashioned pistols or makeshift contraptions. So if we added all of

5 these together, pistols, and old-fashioned pistol, whatever could be used

6 for combat, and if we add all the people together, and some of them were

7 unusable in war, then we could have a thousand people. But as for the

8 proper infantry weapons, there were a few of those.

9 But if I can make an observation. This document, dated the 14th

10 of May, does not tally in any of its elements with what they were telling

11 us at the meeting where we were issued with an ultimatum. From what I

12 can see, there is an official document. The people who were members of

13 this structure are asked that we should give back 5- to 7.000 rifles.

14 Evidently, they knew what the situation was like when it came to the

15 number of weapons, but they deliberately placed before us impossible

16 requests.

17 Q. And I want to make sure we understand you properly on this issue.

18 If I understand you correctly, in the Kozarac area, there may

19 have been somewhere around a thousand weapons. However, for the Kozarac

20 TO itself, there was only units about the size of a company which is, I

21 think you said, several hundred people at most that had been mobilised by

22 the time of the attack?

23 A. The Territorial Defence was attempted to be put together based on

24 the list of volunteers who signed their names on that list. There was no

25 time to take it a step further from that list. What we knew, based on

Page 17429

1 these lists, was that when we factored in all these makeshift contraption

2 old-fashioned pistols, M48 rifles, automatic or semi-automatic rifles,

3 when we put all these together we couldn't have more than a thousand men.

4 As for the conventional formation of a unit with automatic

5 weapons I don't think we had more than a -- several hundred of those.

6 However, in the documents you have before the Tribunal, you can easily

7 find out what the numbers were.

8 MR. OLMSTED: Let's look at 1D312.

9 Q. This is an intelligence report dated 3 June 1992. In the first

10 part, it lists members of a -- four squads that purportedly made up the

11 Trnopolje platoon of the Patriotic League. Was the Patriotic League in

12 the Trnopolje-Kozarac area at this time, prior to the attack on Kozarac?

13 A. No, no. Some of the people mentioned in these lists were members

14 of the Territorial Defence. Some of them were; others were not.

15 Q. Are there any minors or elderly listed here?

16 A. No. Well, Suad Sivac was a minor and he is listed as having an

17 automatic rifle, and I know for a fact that he did not have a weapon

18 because he is my friend's brother.

19 Q. It mentions in this report a Kozarac Crisis Staff. Was a

20 Crisis Staff ever established in Kozarac?

21 A. No, it wasn't. Some referred to the TO Staff as the

22 Crisis Staff. It was a term that was widely used to refer to all these

23 structures in that period of time. But in proper legal terms, a

24 Crisis Staff was never set up, one that would have a stamp, powers, and

25 order issuing authority.

Page 17430

1 Q. During the three-week -- well, first of all, I think you have

2 already mentioned that after the takeover the meeting was --

3 A. Excuse me, one other thing I would like to observe. There are

4 people listed here as having weapons who did not have them at all.

5 Huso Trnjanin, the friend of mine and a neighbour, didn't have any

6 weapons. And he was about to come of age. And he is listed here as

7 having had an automatic rifle.

8 Q. I think you mentioned this, but after the takeover, who

9 controlled the media in Prijedor?

10 A. For the most part, even before the takeover, it was the SDS that

11 controlled the media. The main television outlets were held by the SDS

12 months before the takeover. As for the local media, after the takeover,

13 they were taken by the SDS and were under their exclusive control. All

14 the non-Serb employees were prohibited from working at "Kozarski Vjesnik"

15 and other such media.

16 Q. In the three-week period between the takeover the Prijedor and

17 the attack on Kozarac, how were members of the SDA and HDZ leadership

18 portrayed through the media in Prijedor?

19 A. Before the takeover, they started referring to us as extremists.

20 They referred to the Territorial Defence as the Patriotic League at

21 first, and later as the Ustasha forces, as the Muslim Mujahedin forces,

22 as the Muslim army, regardless of the fact that there were people of

23 other ethnicities in them as well. At the point when they took over the

24 power by force, they referred to us as the Ustasha, as the Ustasha

25 Mujahedin forces. They referred to the politicians as the

Page 17431

1 fundamentalists, the extremists, et cetera. These were all manner of

2 derogatory terms from the vocabulary of the propaganda that had been

3 employed previously.

4 Q. Prior to the attack on Kozarac, were there any serious acts of

5 violence against the non-Serb population in this area?

6 A. No, no. There were speculations or accusations from the Serbian

7 authorities that somebody had killed a Serb policeman in an area of

8 Prijedor. It was alleged that this individual fled to the area inhabited

9 by the Bosniaks. However, details were never shed light on by the

10 police. Still the allegations remained that it was the Muslims who had

11 done it.

12 Q. I think you misunderstood my question. Prior to the attack on

13 Kozarac, was there any incidents of violence against the non-Serb

14 population? Were there any shelling incidents or such before the attack

15 on Kozarac?

16 A. No. No, never.

17 Q. Now, on what date was Kozarac attacked?

18 A. Kozarac was attacked, I believe, on the 24th of May. I think it

19 was the 24th of May.

20 Q. In the days prior to the attack on Kozarac, were there any

21 ultimatums issued to the people of Kozarac?

22 A. There were several ultimatums of sorts. After the meeting I

23 attended, I know that another team went to Prijedor to negotiate the

24 modalities of surrender. They went there twice. Shortly before the

25 attack when they went there, they never returned. We learnt at later

Page 17432

1 date that they had been liquidated. After this, there were no more

2 contacts, and a day or two later, an attack followed.

3 Q. This delegation that went to Prijedor to negotiate, who was a

4 member of that delegation?

5 A. The delegation was led by the chief of police in Kozarac, that's

6 to say of the regular police. His name was Osman. We referred to him as

7 Osmo. I don't remember his surname. We all knew him as Osmo. He was

8 the Kozarac police commander.

9 Q. And at this -- this delegation, at this point what were they

10 prepared to do? What were they prepared to offer the Serb authorities?

11 A. The last time they went, they did so in order to discuss the

12 modalities of the arms surrender. They wanted the police to come visit

13 and see for themselves what the quantities of weapons involved were.

14 That was the basic reason why they went to Prijedor.

15 The previous discussions in Banja Luka and discussions with the

16 SDS failed, and this was the only thing that was left to be done. The

17 last-ditch chance to prevent an attack. But they did not succeed. They

18 simply never returned from this meeting.

19 Q. So, at that stage, the Kozarac TO was prepared to surrender any

20 weapons they had. Is that what you're telling us?

21 A. Yes. The last-but-one time when Osman and the Bahonjic led this

22 delegation, I don't know what the substance of their discussions back

23 there was but when they returned they told us that we simply will to meet

24 their demands. They gave their proposal that they should come and visit

25 these areas and see for themselves. They had hoped that the proposal

Page 17433

1 would be accepted. We don't know what they discussed subsequently. We

2 only know that they were liquidated.

3 Q. Now, at what time on May 24th did the attack on Kozarac begin?

4 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Olmsted, I would like to clarify something.

5 At 39, line -- no at 40; 40, line 2, the witness seemed to have

6 said when I read the record that the delegation, "They simply never

7 returned from this meeting." And that's in clear contradiction with what

8 he says a few lines after that.

9 Could you please clarify whether the witness meant -- really

10 meant this?

11 MR. OLMSTED: Yes, Your Honour.

12 Q. Sir, you've mentioned that a delegation went to Prijedor to

13 negotiate the arms surrender and that they were liquidated. You also

14 mentioned that a delegation returned to Kozarac and told you that -- that

15 the Serbs refused to discuss it and that they -- they demanded that their

16 demands be met.

17 Can you kindly explain that contradiction for the Trial Chamber?

18 A. Your Honours, I first wanted to describe for you the time-line

19 and then the two delegations.

20 Both delegations, on both occasions, were led by the police chief

21 Osmo. When Osmo went with Bahonjic and some others to Prijedor for the

22 first time, they had their meeting, they had their discussion and then

23 returned. They had consultations locally, and then a day or two later

24 they went there again to negotiate the modalities of surrender, and it

25 was after that second visit that they never returned. But it's always

Page 17434

1 the time group of people.

2 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Witness, you say after the second meeting

3 they never returned.

4 Mr. Olmsted said something about liquidation, were they -- was

5 that what was happening -- happened to them?

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We were not sure that they had been

7 liquidated. We didn't have any information. We presumed that they were

8 detained or put in prison. They did not return to Kozarac and we didn't

9 have any contact with them. It was only later on that we found out that

10 they had been liquidated. The remains of some of them have not been

11 uncovered to this day.

12 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.

13 MR. OLMSTED:

14 Q. Sir, at what time on the 24th of May did the attack on Kozarac

15 begin?

16 A. On the 24th of May, the attack began at around noon. At 11.00, I

17 think, I set out for Kozarac. There was short lull in the shelling,

18 which resumed after noon and it was an all-out shelling from all

19 directions. At that point, I was about to enter Kozarac. I was there

20 for about a half an hour and went back to Trnopolje.

21 Q. If I understand your last answer, did the shelling begin before

22 11.00 a.m.? Because you said there was a lull in the shelling. Can you

23 explain that a little further.

24 A. The shelling started at about 11.00 in the morning. We could

25 hear shells landing on Kozarac. Then there was a pause of perhaps half

Page 17435

1 an hour or an hour, I can't be sure, which was followed by fierce

2 unrelenting shelling from all directions on Kozarac and the villages

3 beyond Kozarac. The area across from the road, across from Kozarac, was

4 not shelled. I was, by that time, very close to the area that was hit by

5 shells. I was there for half an hour and then went back to Trnopolje

6 because I could not reach the TO staff in Kozarac.

7 Q. Before the shelling begin, did the Serb authorities in Prijedor

8 or the military issue -- or, first of all, did they allow the non-Serb

9 women, children and elderly to leave Kozarac before the shelling began?

10 A. No. No. As the first shells impacted, there were victims in the

11 yards and on the roads. Later on, people started fleeing, and as they

12 did so, many perished under artillery fire. Actually, there was chaos,

13 people fleeing in all sorts of directions and crossing their paths, one

14 another's path, and the shelling of Kozarac lasted for two days and two

15 nights, with some short interruptions.

16 Q. Did the non-Serb population, either the Kozarac TO or the

17 population in general, offer any resistance to the shelling? Did they

18 fire shells back or do anything?

19 A. None. They didn't have anything to resist with. They didn't

20 have infantry weapons, let alone artillery. Not even trenches had been

21 dug to protect people from artillery fire.

22 Q. And where did you go after the shelling ended? You said the

23 shelling lasted for two days and two nights. Where did you go after the

24 shelling ended?

25 A. When the shelling ended, the population started fleeing from

Page 17436

1 Trnopolje because the infantry troops were on their way from Prijedor to

2 Trnopolje and killing people on their way. The population was fleeing in

3 the direction of Kozarac. I followed them.

4 On the second night I was in the village of Suhi Brod, on the

5 Trnopolje-Kozarac road, quite close to the vantage point from which I was

6 able to observe shelling two days earlier. In the evening hours of that

7 second day, the mass torching of non-Serb areas began from the direction

8 of Prijedor. In a very short span of time, along the length of several

9 kilometres, several villages and hamlets were set on fire. Houses in the

10 village of Mujkanovici, Kozarusa, and the suburbs of Kozarac were on

11 fire.

12 Q. And who way torching these villages, these non-Serb villages?

13 A. The Serb infantry advancing from Prijedor. They followed

14 artillery and killed off the elderly who weren't fast and able to flee.

15 They set houses on fire even where inhabits were still in the homes. We

16 had eye-witnesses who fled that area and we know for a fact that the

17 infantry that was advancing killed Asim Melkic, an elderly person who was

18 unable to walk fast. They would first hurl hand-grenades into those

19 houses where they presumed there was still people and then they would

20 hurl special sort of bombs that were able to set houses on fire. So the

21 two villages were on fire in a very brief period of time.

22 Q. You mentioned you saw the infantry there. Did you see any member

23 of the civilian police participating in these operations in these

24 non-Serb villages?

25 A. I did. In the following days during their operations of ethnic

Page 17437

1 cleansing, there were several formations that were part of these groups,

2 including soldiers in blue, and I mean dark blue uniforms; there were

3 soldiers wearing conventional military uniforms; there were those who --

4 who had only parts of uniform and the rest were civilian clothes. There

5 was a blue APC which I was able to see from quite close-up. It wasn't in

6 the olive-drab colour. It was purple-blue in colour and I could see

7 soldiers wearing different insignia. I don't know which units they

8 belonged to establishment-wise. I can only tell you the sort of uniform

9 I saw them wearing.

10 Q. How many of these operations following the shelling of the

11 Kozarac area did you personally witness? You were around the Kozarac

12 area during this time-period. Which ones did you actually see for

13 yourself?

14 A. Since I was at a boundary where three villages coming together, I

15 was able to saw [as interpreted] from quite close-up the ethnic cleansing

16 as it was taking place and I was able to observe it on three occasions.

17 Naturally, I was hidden. I was hidden in a way that I could possibly be.

18 The scenario was more or less identical. They would encircle the area

19 from three sides, from an intersection from meadows and then fire would

20 be opened from all directions, all at once. People would start fleeing.

21 They would kill individuals, one or two individuals per village or hamlet

22 normally. Then they would then advance whilst shooting. They would

23 gather the population normally next to one of the larger houses. Next,

24 they would take the men to the vehicles that were already standing ready

25 on the road. In the situations where they didn't have vehicles, they

Page 17438

1 would escort them either toward Kozarac or toward Trnopolje on foot. In

2 all these three instances, things happened the same way. There would

3 always be a couple of dead bodies left behind. During the night, one or

4 two houses would be set on fire, and then the remaining women and

5 children frightful -- frightful, had to pack their belongings and leave

6 the area in droves.

7 Q. Can you name the three villages that you personally witnessed

8 these operations being conducted?

9 A. Sivci, Gornji Sivci, Mujkanovici, and Dergici [phoen] and part of

10 Suvi Brod or Ornici, and another hamlet I can't remember right now,

11 Muranovici, I think.

12 Q. And you mentioned that after they encircled these villages and

13 opened fired on them, they were rounding up the men. Were the non-Serb

14 villagers in these locations offering any kind of resistance to their

15 arrest or to these attacks?

16 A. No. No. No one anywhere in the area where I was. Because in

17 the days before, after the ultimatum, people gathered the arms that they

18 had and they turned them over at the municipality building in Trnopolje

19 where the Serb police and the army had already entered.

20 I know one of our neighbours was collecting the weapons, Redzo

21 together with a man from Sivci village whose name I don't know. And

22 already on the second day after the shelling of Kozarac, the weapons had

23 been turned over. These were purely columns of refugees. There was no

24 resistance but still the cleansing continued. Villages were emptied and

25 people ran away.

Page 17439

1 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Olmsted, just one minute, please.

2 Mr. Witness, you said you were observing things from a place

3 where you were hiding. Did you see all this happening in this -- in

4 these different hamlets from the same hiding place? Were able to see all

5 that from one hiding place?

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I was moving around

7 within an area, within a diameter of, say, 300 metres. Within those 300

8 metres, there was the boundary between three villages. There was an old

9 barn some 10 metres from the road from --

10 [French interpretation on English Channel]

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] [Previous translation

12 continues] ... so I had not-- had time to -- farther away.

13 The second time I tried to run. Soldiers on APCs had already

14 come and I managed to run just a bit further away into the berry bushes

15 next to the road, and I watched through the berries people being led,

16 captured.

17 And the third time I watched from the house of Dzemal Sivac. As

18 this operation of theirs had begun, I had not time to run away. I lay on

19 the roof of the house and watched. I saw the Mujkanovici village being

20 surrounded and when they took away 17 men, first these men were gathered

21 outside one of the houses and then they were led along the roads that I

22 was watching. They all passed by that house and I even heard what the

23 soldiers were ordering them to do. They ordered them to sing some songs.

24 They beat some of the men. But all of them with their arms raised were

25 taken away in the direction of Kozarac.

Page 17440

1 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you, sir.

2 MR. OLMSTED:

3 Q. You mentioned soldiers. Did the police also -- the civilian

4 police also participate in these arrests of these non-Serb men in these

5 villages?

6 A. In one case that I watched all of them were wearing regular army

7 uniforms.

8 In another case, it was a mixed group, a few police uniforms and

9 about ten soldiers. So ten soldiers and perhaps only two police

10 uniforms.

11 There were also two or three Martic's policemen from the Serbian

12 Krajina in Croatia. The rest were wearing regular army uniforms.

13 And the third incident I mentioned, apart from the uniforms I

14 already described, there were two men who were wearing only parts of

15 military uniform. One was wearing jeans, if I remember well, with an

16 army shirt. And the other one was wearing trainers, not army boots. And

17 I was so close that I could even hear them talking to each other.

18 Q. You mentioned that during the operations non-Serb homes were

19 torched, set on fire. Were any Serb homes destroyed during these

20 operations?

21 A. No, no, by no means. Not a single one.

22 Those Serb houses which were inside non-Serb territory had been

23 given instructions to mark their houses in white paint with a large

24 letter S, and that was a sign to the soldiers who were involved in this

25 operation that I described to pass that house by, to leave it alone.

Page 17441

1 Q. And during these operations, what happened to non-Serb movable

2 property, their possessions that they had in their houses?

3 A. After the expulsion of women and children and the last

4 stragglers, the next day began the looting. In fact, at first, I thought

5 those were robberies, but two days into it, I realised it was systematic.

6 Teams arrived carrying out only one type of property, such as a team

7 taking away household appliances. Then another team would arrive taking

8 different sorts of items, televisions, VCRs, technical equipment. Then

9 other teams came, taking away woodwork, chandeliers, whatever was of good

10 quality. But they all stored it in one and the same place. And then

11 trucks would arrive and take it in the direction of Kozarac.

12 So this plundering was selective. And only when that was

13 finished, individual looters would come and take what remained in the

14 houses, or they would come with carts and take it all away.

15 Q. What happened to your own home in Trnopolje during this period?

16 A. My house was not torched. It was rifled and plundered, yes. It

17 was ransacked, but it was not torched.

18 In the very centre of Trnopolje, the army did not torch or

19 plunder houses. In the very centre, within a diameter of about 500

20 metres houses were left intact, but the population was expelled, and very

21 soon afterwards, some Serbs took over these houses.

22 Q. And can you tell us, you said you personally observed three of

23 these probations but you were in the community for quite some time. How

24 long did these cleansing operations last?

25 A. At least a month.

Page 17442

1 Q. And by the end of these operations, how many non-Serbs remained

2 in the Kozarac area?

3 A. As far as I know, no one remained.

4 MR. OLMSTED: Let's look at 65 ter 476. This is tab 2.

5 And if we can turn to page 2 of the B/C/S.

6 Q. We see this is a dispatch from SJB Prijedor to CSB Banja Luka

7 dated 5 July 1992.

8 If you look first at item number 2 it states that:

9 "According to the disarmament plan, the search was supposed to

10 start on 22 May 1992?"

11 Were you aware that two days before the attack on Kozarac the

12 Bosnian Serb police had intended to enter Kozarac and search for weapons?

13 A. No, we didn't know that. I saw that for the first time when this

14 paper was shown to me.

15 Q. If we look at item number 3, it provides as a reason for the

16 start of the war in Kozarac, as it says:

17 "... was the blockade of the Prijedor-Banja Luka main road as

18 well as the attack on the military column during negotiations on the

19 unconditional returns of weapons belonging to paramilitary formations."

20 You already mentioned there was a couple last-ditch efforts to --

21 by a non-Serb delegation to surrender the TO weapons. At the same time

22 did the Kozarac TO mount an attack on the VRS column along this

23 Prijedor-Banja Luka road?

24 A. Your Honours, to be quite honest, I don't believe it. I don't

25 know believe it for two reasons.

Page 17443

1 Sometime before this, the Serb army put up a tank at the entrance

2 to Kozarac. No one even tried to come near those soldiers in the tank

3 crew, let alone hurt them. I heard that there were some forces from

4 Jakupovici but they were coming in shooting and the orders were not to

5 shoot except in self-defence. I don't think anyone opened fire at the

6 Serbs without being fired at first. And another thing, that road had

7 been blocked for a long time before by the Serb army and when these

8 combat operations of theirs started people probably had to defend

9 themselves. What exactly happened there, I don't know. I wasn't there.

10 But we had at that point no more co-ordination for me to be able to find

11 out the details. I only heard on the Serb radio that the army had been

12 attacked in Jakupovici and that because of that, the army was taking

13 action.

14 Q. This item further states that the fighting started with an

15 artillery attack and then members of the army and police embarked on

16 mopping up the terrain.

17 Are these the cleansing operations that you described for us a

18 moment ago?

19 A. I think so.

20 Q. And then it states that in the course of these operations,

21 citizens collected weapons themselves and handed them over to the army

22 and police.

23 I think you mentioned that you witnesses this in at least one

24 village. So the non-Serb population was co-operating with the army and

25 the police during these operations?

Page 17444

1 A. Your Honours, it was not one village. That happened in Hadzici

2 in Sivci in Kenjari village, in Trnopolje. That was the pattern in a

3 large number of villages.

4 I was present during one such collection of weapons in Sivci

5 village.

6 Q. Now item number 7 lists the number of weapons collected and

7 seized as of the date of this July dispatch. And I have added them up

8 myself, and I arrived at a total of about one thousand weapons seized not

9 only in Kozarac but Hambarine and other non-Serb areas in Prijedor.

10 So that is, would you agree, consistent with your estimate that

11 there was less than a thousand weapons or around a thousand weapons at

12 most in the Kozarac area in the possession of the non-Serbs?

13 A. Yes, Your Honours. That is consistent with my estimate.

14 Q. Did anyone from the Prijedor SJB confirm to you that they knew

15 that the citizens of Kozarac did not have many weapons?

16 A. Yes. The inspector in Omarska confirmed it by the name of

17 Dragan Radakovic. He is the one who interrogated me in Omarska camp. In

18 fact, that is the first thing he said when I came in to be questioned.

19 He said verbatim, listen, Sejmenovic, we're not interested in weapons, we

20 know you didn't have weapons. There was a very small amount, negligible.

21 We're interested in Sarajevo. We're interested in SDA policy, the

22 government, et cetera.

23 MR. OLMSTED: May this be admitted into evidence, Your Honours.

24 [Trial Chamber confers]

25 JUDGE HALL: On what basis, Mr. Olmsted?

Page 17445

1 MR. OLMSTED: Your Honours, we just went through a number of the

2 items and this witness could confirm certain information and clarify and

3 contradict other information in it. Therefore, I think since he has been

4 able to speak about it - there is probably no objection on authenticity

5 grounds - we move to admitted it at this time.

6 JUDGE HALL: Yes, Mr. Aleksic.

7 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I do not mean to

8 object immediately to the admission of this document, but it is precisely

9 as you said. We have the evidence of this witness, second-hand hearsay

10 in some cases. At the time when this document was drafted, he was in

11 hiding. He had nothing to do with the writing of the document. He

12 doesn't know to whom it was sent, nor had he seen it before proofing. We

13 have thus his evidence on one of the facts mentioned here.

14 [Trial Chamber confers]

15 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.

16 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P01717, Your Honours.

17 MR. OLMSTED: I now want to show you a video that you had an

18 opportunity to review during proofing. It's 65 ter 3598. And it's an

19 ABC "Nightline" programme. And if we can go to 5 minutes and 40 seconds.

20 [Video-clip played]

21 "Dave Marish: ... we visited the ethnically cleansed Kozarac in

22 northern Bosnia last week. We were closely supervised by the local Serb

23 militia, restricted to just a few blocks of the town" --

24 MR. OLMSTED: Pause right here, about 5 minutes and 53 seconds.

25 Q. First of all, do you recognise this village that is depicted in

Page 17446

1 this footage?

2 A. This is one house that you see just as you come into Kozarac from

3 the road to Banja Luka. It's at the first intersection.

4 Q. Do you recall, is this a non-Serb house or a Serb house?

5 A. There were no Serb houses there. Only Bosniaks live there. I

6 think it's either in this house or the -- the house next to this one that

7 the Lovic family lived. In any case, in this case there was no Serb

8 population.

9 MR. OLMSTED: Can we continue with the video.

10 [Video-clip played]

11 "Dave Marish: ... home to about 15.000 Muslim men, women and

12 children. Today there are no Muslims there, none, and none of their

13 X-marked homes is intact. Other homes in Kozarac" --

14 MR. OLMSTED: Pause at 6 minutes and 8 seconds.

15 Q. First of all, the houses that we looked at before, the ones that

16 appear to be damaged, were those non-Serb houses as well?

17 A. They were not. Some houses that were torched later were either

18 Serb houses or houses that the soldiers appropriated. With Serb houses,

19 the rule was that they would mark them. This Mirko Djurdjevic may be the

20 name of the soldier who took over the house, or it was originally owned

21 by a Serb, Mirko Djurdjevic. It's one of the two.

22 Q. I want to clarify your last answer. It says here in the

23 transcript that Serb houses were torched. Were any Serb houses torched

24 in Kozarac?

25 A. No, no. There were a few non-Serb houses but were not torched.

Page 17447

1 Q. Again, the record says:

2 "There were a few non-Serb houses but they were not torched."

3 Do you mean there are were a few Serb houses that were not

4 torched? Because your answer is confusing based on what you said

5 earlier?

6 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry. This is exactly what the witness said.

7 It was properly interpreted.

8 MR. OLMSTED: Then I just need the witness to explain that a

9 little bit better.

10 Q. Your answer was that:

11 "There were a few non-Serb houses," so Bosniak or Croat houses,

12 "that were not torched."

13 I see, I misread your answer.

14 So you're saying there were a few non-Serb houses that were

15 preserved, that they weren't actually destroyed?

16 A. Your Honour, maybe there is a confusion in interpretation.

17 When the infantry came into Kozarac, they torched almost all the

18 houses. When they came to a house that they knew was owned by a Serb,

19 they spared it. They didn't set it on fire. So Serb houses were not set

20 on fire. Some of the army troops that came into Kozarac included

21 residents of Kozarac, Serbs, so they preserved some houses in the centre,

22 mainly Serb houses. Or, they appropriated them. And they also did not

23 allow some non-Serb houses to be torched because they wanted to take

24 these houses for themselves.

25 Q. Thank you for that clarification. I think it was my confusion.

Page 17448

1 If we can continue a little bit further.

2 [Video-clip played]

3 "Dave Marish: ... have been marked to survive. This one with

4 the colours of the Serbian flag. This --"

5 MR. OLMSTED:

6 Q. We just paused at 6 minutes and 14 seconds, but just a moment

7 before we saw a house with the Serbian flag painted on it. And here we

8 are, we have it in front of us at 6 minutes, 11 seconds. Why would

9 someone paint a Serbian flag on a house?

10 A. This is a house where a Serbian family lives, or a Serb, at this

11 moment in any case, and then that Serb would either put up a Serbian flag

12 or write on the house, This is Serbian, because, at the time, non-Serb

13 houses were being torched and looted to protect himself from the torching

14 and looting, this owner wrote on the house that it was Serbian or put up

15 the flag and/or would also put a board with his Serbian name on it.

16 Q. Can we continue with the footage then.

17 [Video-clip played]

18 "David Marish: ... with the colours of the Serbian flag. This

19 one says: 'This is Serbian!' They stand undamaged like the remaining

20 Serb" --

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's correct.

22 [Video-clip played]

23 "David Marish: -- residents of Kozarac surrounded in silence,

24 deadly silence."

25 MR. OLMSTED: All right. Can we stop it there.

Page 17449

1 Your Honours, may this be admitted into evidence.

2 MR. ZECEVIC: Sorry, can we have the indication of the date when

3 this was filmed, if it's known?

4 MR. OLMSTED: Yes. It was filmed late in 1992, was when it was

5 filmed. I think in the transcript there's reference that this footage

6 was a few months after -- after the attack on Kozarac.

7 MR. ZECEVIC: Well, if it's late in 1992 how would the answer --

8 how would the -- this witness be able to comment on this?

9 MR. OLMSTED: Well, he just commented on it. He was describing

10 the destruction in Kozarac. We saw some of the destruction in this

11 video. We saw the painting of a flag on a Serb -- a house that was

12 occupied by a Serb so it would not be destroyed, and, in fact, was not

13 destroyed. So it corroborates his evidence as to what was happening in

14 Kozarac during the attack, after the attack.

15 MR. ZECEVIC: Well, if you're -- Mr. Olmsted, with all due

16 respect, if you are trying to -- to rephrase the -- what the -- what the

17 newspaper person or the journalist was saying, we heard that. Now,

18 the -- the witness cannot only confirm what we saw here. He wasn't

19 there. He doesn't know -- he knows one -- I believe one house he only

20 recognised it.

21 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Zecevic, I thought I heard the journalist

22 saying at the very beginning of the footage that we saw that he and his

23 team visited Kozarac a few days after the attack. But maybe you could

24 hear it again.

25 MR. ZECEVIC: That is precisely why I asked when this was filmed.

Page 17450

1 Because it -- it might be significant. Thank you.

2 MR. OLMSTED: Yes, we can go back -- why don't we go back to the

3 beginning. It's at 5 minutes and 40 seconds and play it from there.

4 [Video-clip played]

5 "Dave Marish: ... area dominated by two cities, Prijedor and

6 Banja Luka and a once thriving Muslim town called Kozarac. We visited

7 the ethnically cleansed Kozarac in northern Bosnia last week. We were

8 closely supervised by the local Serb militia, restricted to just a few

9 blocks of the town, once home to about 15.000 Muslim men, woman and

10 children. Today there are no Muslim there, none, and none of their

11 X-marked homes is in tact. Other homes in Kozarac have been marked to

12 survive. This one with the colours of the Serbian flag. This one says

13 'This is Serbia!' They stand undamaged like the remaining Serb residents

14 of Kozarac surrounded in silence, deadly silence.

15 "Where are all the ..."

16 MR. OLMSTED: Your Honour, I believe in the transcript which

17 covers the entire ABC "Nightline" programme, Ted Koppel states at the

18 beginning that the footage was -- I believe I will have to look for the

19 reference, it was a few months after the attack actually occurred. But I

20 can simply clarify this matter with this witness as to whether he saw

21 this kind of damage in Kozarac itself and whether it was during that

22 time-period that this damage occurred, if that's the objection by the

23 Defence as to what -- what this witness particularly knew had happened in

24 Kozarac.

25 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Olmsted, in your list of documents, the video

Page 17451

1 is dated November 1992.

2 MR. OLMSTED: And that would be consistent with what I was

3 assuming. I have to -- I would have to read through the entire

4 transcript to confirm that, but I think that is my recollection as well.

5 Q. But let me ask you, sir, before we break: You were in -- in the

6 area of Kozarac. You saw this footage. Was this level of damage to the

7 non-Serb property what you witnessed yourself in Kozarac and the

8 surrounding areas, after the -- after the shelling that took place at the

9 end of May?

10 MR. ZECEVIC: Well, I'm sorry, I think this is leading. We would

11 need an open question for this witness, if we are to satisfy the

12 requirement properly.

13 MR. OLMSTED: I'll rephrase, Your Honours.

14 Q. How did what you saw on this video compare to the damage that you

15 saw in Kozarac and the surrounding areas during and after the shelling in

16 May and June 1992?

17 A. Your Honours, I really want to be of assistance. Houses were

18 marked like this and we saw it practically the day after the ethnic

19 cleansing. The army walked through and some -- it would leave marks

20 behind. The Serbs would receive information that they needed to mark

21 their houses, and they did so.

22 Another important fact, in order to understand this issue, the

23 woman who helped me hide in Gornji Sivac [phoen] told me something that a

24 mobilised soldier, a Ukrainian, had told her; namely, that she need to

25 put the letter S on her house, as well as the soldier across the road, so

Page 17452

1 that when the army passed through they would leave her house alone. And

2 this was really what happened. There was a large letter S on the house

3 across the road. The wife of Dzemal Sivac also put a large S on her

4 house, and the houses around were torched or fire was opened on them.

5 However, the soldiers left her house alone. The same markings happened

6 in other villages, in Trnopolje where I lived, in Trnjani. Similar

7 markings were made by the Serbs who moved into those homes in the recent

8 days. And what I remember is similar to what's on the footage. And what

9 was done here is similar to what was done in Trnopolje.

10 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry -- I'm terribly sorry, I just ... have an

11 intervention, 58, line 8. I believe I heard the witness saying, "The

12 mobilised soldier who was Ukrainian."

13 Can you clarify that?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The place where I was hiding is on

15 the boundary of three villages, and in one of those villages there are

16 some non-Serbian families where Ukrainians lived. Since Trnopolje was

17 very mixed ethnically. And these Ukrainians had received very serious

18 threats that they were either to be mobilised into the Serbian army or

19 they would encounter the same problems as others. And the neighbour of

20 the woman who helped me hide accepted to be mobilised. He took a rifle,

21 he put on the uniform, but he asked not to be included in operations and

22 instead to be allowed to be on duty service around houses, and he did

23 that for a few days until he was told the following, verbatim: You are

24 not loyal. When you kill a few Muslims we will know that you are loyal

25 to us. He was very frightened by this. There was a family in the area

Page 17453

1 that was Bosniak. And I remember that a few times he went out and opened

2 fire on -- in the corn field when he heard a noise, hoping that he would

3 hit somebody who was hiding there.

4 MR. OLMSTED: Your Honours, I think the main point with regard to

5 this video is this witness was able to identify that this is Kozarac --

6 JUDGE HALL: Yes, Mr. Olmsted. My initial hesitation was that I

7 was trying to remind myself as to how we would have dealt with these

8 news -- bits of news footage previously, but clearly the purpose of

9 tendering it is that it is illustrative of the witness's testimony. And

10 the witness's explanation at 58, line 16 through 18, what I remember is

11 similar to what is on footage and what was done there clarifies

12 everything.

13 So the matter -- the footage may be admitted and marked.

14 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P01718, Your Honours.

15 MR. OLMSTED: And, Your Honour, I see it's time for the break.

16 JUDGE HALL: Yes. And you will wind up when we return.

17 [The witness stands down]

18 --- Recess taken at 12.09 p.m.

19 --- On resuming at 12.41 p.m.

20 JUDGE HALL: We have a brief oral ruling which we would deliver

21 while the witness is on his way in.

22 In its oral ruling of the 12th of November, 2010, the

23 Trial Chamber, inter alia, denied the Prosecution's motion to admit the

24 evidence of ST-223, pursuant to Rule 92 bis. The Trial Chamber ordered

25 ST-223 to be called viva voce and granted the Prosecution 45 minutes to

Page 17460

1 that he needed to put on weight because I couldn't appear at the

2 round-table meetings looking like that for the purpose of these political

3 goals so I needed to recover and look good and then appear in public.

4 JUDGE DELVOIE: Did you lose that much weight in seven or nine

5 days?

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I had lost a lot of weight before,

7 because I lived on my own out in nature, and then I was in the Trnopolje

8 camp and finally in the prison in Omarska, so I lost a lot of weight.

9 Although I -- I am of thin constitution, regardless of my weight.

10 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.

11 JUDGE HALL: Yes, Mr. Aleksic.

12 Cross-examination by Mr. Aleksic:

13 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Sejmenovic. My name is

14 Aleksandar Aleksic and I am one of the Defence counsel for Mr. Zupljanin.

15 A. Good afternoon.

16 Q. You testified before this Tribunal in six case, if I have the

17 correct information, in the Tadic, Kovacevic, Sikirica, Stakic, Brdjanin

18 and Krajisnik cases?

19 A. That's correct.

20 Q. In the last case against Mr. Krajisnik, the Defence did not

21 cross-examine you, so only your summary was provided; do you recall that?

22 A. I don't know about that. I didn't know that -- about that in the

23 Krajisnik case.

24 Q. Tell me, in late 1990, elections were held in Bosnia for the

25 Republican Assembly, as well as local elections for the

Page 17461

1 Municipal Assemblies; is that correct?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And as you said in this case, you were elected to the Council of

4 Municipalities as a deputy from Prijedor municipality.

5 A. That's correct, sir.

6 Q. As for the republican elections, will you agree with me that

7 there were seven electoral unit and that SDS won in Banja Luka and Doboj,

8 if you recall?

9 A. It's possible there must have been some margin but what the

10 margin was, I don't recall. And it didn't have the significance that was

11 ascribed to it later.

12 Q. You testified on Friday, I believe, that after the elections

13 local authorities were established in Prijedor. You, as a republican

14 deputy, and you had the right to attend municipal assembly meetings, and

15 you did; however, you did not have the right to vote.

16 A. No, I did not have the right to vote.

17 Q. Since we speak the same language, we need to pause for a second

18 before -- between question and answer.

19 A. I understand.

20 Q. If I understood your early evidence and what you said on Friday,

21 you personally, on behalf of your party, the SDA, did not take part in

22 the negotiations about the divisions and the establishment of the

23 government in Prijedor.

24 A. No, I was not taking part, but I was kept informed.

25 Q. Your party was represented in these negotiations by

Page 17462

1 Dr. Mirza Mujadzic?

2 A. That's correct. And sometimes the negotiations were led by an

3 authorised delegation.

4 Q. You know that on behalf of the SDS, the negotiations were led by

5 Mr. Simo Miskovic, President of the Municipal Board?

6 A. Correct. When there were talks at the level of the president,

7 then Mujadzic would talk to Miskovic.

8 Q. More than once in previous testimony, including Friday in this

9 case, you said these negotiations failed because the SDS would not agree

10 to the appointment of certain SDA candidates to certain positions. They

11 failed because of the intransigent position of the local SDS.

12 A. I must say, Your Honours, it had nothing to do with specific

13 candidates, specific people. It had to do everything with certain

14 departments, certain areas of government.

15 Q. We will come to that.

16 Last Friday, and in testimony before that, you said that in

17 February -- or, rather, on 17 February 1992, there was an extraordinary

18 session of the Assembly of Prijedor, and on Friday, you mentioned what

19 you said previously in Brdjanin, on page 12307; namely, that the initial

20 demand of the SDS at that assembly session with the assembly be disbanded

21 and that early elections for the municipal assembly be called [as

22 interpreted].

23 A. That's correct.

24 Q. Also in Brdjanin, on 12304, you said you couldn't exactly

25 remember who said what, but you knew that there was a record of that

Page 17463

1 assembly session, and that we could check by looking at that transcript.

2 Therefore, could we see, 65 ter D -- sorry, 2D02-2019. And that

3 is tab 26. I have a hard copy for the witness, because this is a long

4 document, 60 pages in B/C/S.

5 And it might be easier for you to follow on paper.

6 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] If I can have the usher's

7 assistance.

8 It's page 3 in e-court, in B/C/S; and in English, that's page 2.

9 Q. You see the session was chaired by the president of the

10 municipality, Mr. Cehajic, and that in addition to the assemblymen, 57 of

11 them, there were you, Mr. Mujadzic and Mr. Simo Miskovic?

12 A. Correct.

13 Q. And you can see lower on the same page the agenda, item 1:

14 "Analysis of the implementation of the conclusions of the

15 Prijedor Municipal Assembly session held on 22 January 1992."

16 A. That's right.

17 Q. In English, that's the same page. But you should turn to the

18 next page. It says in second paragraph:

19 "The first of the conclusions of that session of the 22nd

20 January 1992 was to charge party presidents and the presidents of

21 Deputies Clubs to divide power within ten days, by the 2nd of February,

22 analyse the previous division and inform the municipal assembly at its

23 next session with the participation of all parliamentary parties.

24 Co-ordination is hereby entrusted to the secretary of the

25 Prijedor Municipal Assembly."

Page 17464

1 You probably know that the secretary was Mr. Dusko Baltic, a

2 lawyer by training.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Now turn to page 43 in B/C/S. In English, it's 28.

5 Mr. Baltic speaks halfway down the page -- sorry, towards the

6 bottom of the page. And he goes on for a while.

7 He says:

8 "I would like briefly to inform the assemblymen on the results of

9 talking held at the meeting of party presidents and the presidents of

10 Deputies Clubs. I am aware that the assemblymen are familiar with the

11 issue and how it ended but I would like to make a formal report about the

12 outcome of that meeting.

13 "Following those conclusions we called a meeting on the 30th of

14 January, and it lasted roughly from 9.00 a.m. to 4.00 p.m. Anticipating

15 certain problems, we decided to record it all on tape, and later we

16 transcribed that tape. I'll just briefly say that after that exhausting

17 meeting no agreement was reached on the division of power, although the

18 representatives of the opposition had tried to help in this discussion,

19 and the outcome of all that was a joint proposal, made at the initiative

20 of all those present, insisting that it be made on behalf of all parties,

21 not just one party, to initiate the motion for dissolving the assembly at

22 this assembly session. So that after debate on the motion, this assembly

23 should adopt a conclusion, in fact a decision, to be submitted to the

24 Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina."

25 And then Mr. Cehajic butts in. Because, at this at this point

Page 17465

1 Mr. Popovac, walked out, if you remember.

2 Do you remember that members of the opposition parties, the SDPA,

3 and the liberal party, the former reformists, in other words, were

4 unhappy with the way things were turning out and they walked out of the

5 session?

6 A. Mr. Popovac, whom you just mentioned was a member of the SDA

7 leadership and he walked out at this moment. Whether he returned later,

8 I don't know.

9 Q. So after that, Mr. Dusko Baltic goes on and says -- next page in

10 English, please:

11 "The proposal was that the assembly, after debating this motion,

12 take a decision to be submitted to the Republic Assembly, which should

13 call early elections. The fourth item" --

14 This was accepted unanimously, and the meeting ended with

15 applause. Do you remember these words of Mr. Baltic from that meeting?

16 A. Now I'm reading the transcript, I -- parts of his speech are

17 coming back.

18 Q. He was followed by Mr. Suad Kolonic, a deputy from the SDA;

19 right?

20 A. Right.

21 Q. He says:

22 "As far as I know, we, the assemblymen, declared ourselves at the

23 previous session and gave our consent to representatives of

24 Deputies' Clubs, and parties to divide power. We did not, however,

25 authorise them to bid on our behalf on the dissolution of this assembly.

Page 17466

1 In my view, the conclusions that were adopted at their meeting are not

2 binding upon us in any way and finally, Mr. Secretary, who authorised you

3 to send any messages and wires on behalf of all the members of this

4 assembly."

5 Now, on the issue of who was present at that session of the 30th

6 meeting, in fact that meeting, we can refer to the contribution by

7 Mr. Stakic. That's page 49 in B/C/S. In English, it's 32.

8 Sorry, it must be the next page in B/C/S.

9 It's towards the bottom of the page where Mr. Stakic says:

10 "I would just like to enumerate the participants in this

11 agreement, Dr. Mirza Mujadzic, president of the SDA;

12 Professor Husein Crnkic, president of the SDA Deputies Club;

13 Simo Miskovic, president of the SDS; Dragan Savanovic, the president of

14 the SDS Deputies Club. I was there in my own name and on behalf of the

15 assembly, just as the vice-president of the party, then was Aiz,

16 Dragan Svraka, Cedo Vila, Milena Vokic, Nebojsa Bogunovic, Jozo Maricic,

17 Silvije Saric," et cetera.

18 I'll repeat: Cedo Vila, Milena Vokic, Nebojsa Bogunovic,

19 Jozo Maricic and Silvije Saric.

20 So it follows from this that that meeting was attended also by

21 the authorised representatives of the SDA, the president of the municipal

22 board of the party, Mr. Mujadzic and Mr. Crnkic; right?

23 A. Right.

24 Q. Now, at the end of that meeting, page 55 in B/C/S and 35 in

25 English, Dr. Mujadzic takes the floor again. It's halfway through this

Page 17467

1 paragraph, he is, in fact, responding to Mr. Miskovic, whom we will read

2 a bit later, and he says:

3 "As for the negotiations that Mr. Miskovic described so

4 exhaustively, the first negotiations that this commission conducted,

5 nobody from this party questions the moral or the professional quality of

6 the negotiations and the team. But, again, neither the commission, nor

7 the party presidents have the authority to say the final word in

8 negotiations. It always goes to the Executive Committee and the

9 Main Board."

10 And he goes on:

11 "In this case, in these papers, the material that we are

12 submitting to you now --"

13 Just one digression. Just before he and Mr. Crnkic spoke and on

14 the 17th of January, he offered the SDA proposal to the SDS as to how to

15 divide power, and he says:

16 "In these papers that we are offering to you now, this material

17 had previously been agreed in the Deputies Club and they are the right

18 papers. They are not in dispute in any way. This is a comprehensive

19 offer. Now if you don't accept this, you can make a counteroffer and

20 then we will try to narrow our differences until we find common ground.

21 I therefore propose that the SDS consider our proposal and their

22 decision, and possibly their counterproposal can then be included as the

23 third item on the next assembly's agenda after the two items that we have

24 proposed which will be analysed by the expert team in co-operation with

25 the executive committee. So the third item could be discussed -- the

Page 17468

1 discussion on the SDA's proposal with a possible SDS counterproposal and

2 the possibility of their further harmonisation."

3 It follows from this, witness, that on that day, the 17th of

4 January, Mr. Mujadzic, from the SDA, or anyone else from the other

5 negotiating teams you mentioned, was not authorised to agree to a

6 specific division of power department by department because it had not

7 been harmonised at the Main Board of the party. Instead, on that day,

8 for the first time, the Municipal Board of the SDA made a formal offer to

9 the SDS on paper, after running this proposal through the Deputies Club,

10 the -- and other authorities of the party. Do you agree?

11 A. No, no I can't agree. You could get that impress though if you

12 are only looking at this. But various offers circulated even before

13 this. This transcript only reflects the moment when the entire political

14 structure of the municipality came to discuss this proposal.

15 This offer that was made to the SDS here had been made before but

16 out of the public eye, outside of the assembly. And this was a moment of

17 confrontation with the public, because the assembly session was broadcast

18 and it was an opportunity for the people to find out what the SDA was

19 offering and what the SDS was refusing.

20 Q. Sir, look at page 27, where Mr. Crnkic takes the floor, the

21 president of the SDA.

22 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] In English, that's at page 18.

23 Q. Mr. Crnkic speaks of the 30 January meeting where he and

24 Mr. Mujadzic agreed that a proposal should be made for early elections

25 and goes on to explain:

Page 17469

1 "After an exhausting debate, we reached an impasse and said, Very

2 well, if there is no other way out, let's have new elections. However,

3 we - I in my capacity as the Deputies Club president, Mirza as the party

4 president, Simo as the SDS president, et cetera - we all have to check

5 our decisions with our boards. It's normal. Whatever we decide must be

6 approved as a proposal by our respective parties, by our respective

7 clubs, by those who brought us here."

8 And then, in the penultimate line, he says:

9 "In this sense, I feel I must intervene here and tell Mr. Svraka

10 what the state of things is; namely, why these conclusions haven't been

11 signed although they have been accepted in principle."

12 A. Perhaps --

13 Q. Mr. Sejmenovic, based on what Mr. Crnkic, the president of the

14 SDA Deputies Club in the municipal assembly, said, he confirms that

15 Mr. Mujadzic and himself agreed on the meeting on the 30 January as to

16 what the proposal to be placed before the assembly should be but that,

17 however, they had not had the authorisation to sign this before all the

18 relevant party bodies have had a chance to look at it. Do you agree?

19 A. Before this particular assembly meeting, there were various

20 interpretations circulating of this particular meeting, depending on the

21 party interpreting the meeting. To the best of my knowledge, at this

22 particular meeting where everyone was present, a definitive decision had

23 not been taken. Rather, it was decided that until -- that unless an

24 agreement is reached with the SDS before the next assembly meeting, then

25 it would be up to the assembly to decide the matter. Those were the

Page 17470

1 interpretations, as far as I know. I also know that following this

2 meeting with the opposition, Simo Miskovic no longer wanted to meet with

3 the SDA leadership in an effort to find a solution. On the other hand,

4 the SDA proposal had not yet been made public and this was an opportunity

5 to rectify that.

6 Your Honours, perhaps it would be helpful if, in addition to the

7 quotation you read from what Mr. Crnkic said, to read another sentence of

8 his that followed, so I'm repeating: Crnkic, the head of the Deputies

9 Club is saying, We are in a very chaotic situation and the dissolution of

10 the assembly would only lead to an ever-greater chaos. Why would we want

11 a chaos that is graver than the one we have right now?

12 Q. Sir, I'm merely telling you and this is something you will be

13 able to see from Mr. Svraka's address on page 26. Mr. Svraka is a deputy

14 for the liberals which is the former party of reformists of

15 Ante Markovic; right?

16 A. No, it was a liberal party and Ante Markovic's reformists were a

17 separate party.

18 Q. At any rate, it was not a national party?

19 A. No. But it was in the opposition at the time.

20 Q. Let me tell you first what happened and what the time-line of

21 events relating to these conclusions was:

22 "First off, it is true that the conclusion was adopted by all the

23 presidents of parties and presidents of Deputies Clubs after several

24 hours of deliberations. There only remained certain reservations in

25 respect of the matters that were signed. So this is the reason why we

Page 17471

1 should place this matter on today's agenda."

2 Two sentences further down, he goes on to say:

3 "I expect Mr. Mujadzic and Mr. Miljkovic," I think this should

4 read Mr. Miskovic, "to take the floor and tell the people in no uncertain

5 terms if they are ready to agree on matters or not. What they said back

6 at that meeting, they were close to tears. Let me tell you once more

7 that we had reached an agreement at a meeting which took place

8 subsequently, that we would forward these conclusions to the president of

9 the assembly. He summoned us later on to see what the state of affairs

10 was and, at this meeting, we agreed that we would be discussing no other

11 matters but this one. In other words, that the only item on the agenda

12 of the meeting of the assembly on the 17th February would be precisely

13 this matter. A firm promise on this was given by presidents of the

14 parties and presidents of the Deputies Clubs. So what they are doing

15 here today is either a lie or a farce. In my view, it is both. If they

16 do have some sort of trust placed in them by their own respective

17 parties, it is their own matter. However, what we saw happen today and

18 the way this meeting or this session unfolded today, what they should do

19 is leave."

20 It follows from Mr. Svraka's speech that the president of the

21 Municipal Board of the SDA and the president of the Deputies Club agreed

22 at this meeting of the 30th January that the only item on the agenda

23 would be the conclusion around which everyone agreed that early elections

24 were to be called.

25 Do you agree?

Page 17472

1 A. Your Honours, firstly, I'd like you to avoid asking me about the

2 details of the meeting because I did not attend it.

3 Q. Pause there, please.

4 Please turn to page 1 of the document.

5 A. You misunderstand me. I am talking about the meeting between the

6 opposition and the ruling parties where power-sharing was discussed. I

7 wasn't present at this meeting. I was, however, present at the session

8 of the municipal assembly, the minutes of which we are reading. Thus,

9 who said what at the meeting between presidents of the parties and

10 Deputies Clubs, both the ruling parties and the opposition, I don't know.

11 I only know what the interpretations of the meeting were given by the

12 party presidents at this session. Whether something was agreed, signed,

13 or not signed at the meeting, I cannot tell, because I wasn't there. But

14 I repeat, there were different interpretations of this particular

15 inter-party agreement.

16 There is another matter which is important for the Chamber. Let

17 me explain to you what the proper was: Regardless of the agreement

18 reached by the parties, there was a parliamentary procedure in place.

19 Members of the assembly were not, under the constitution, or any other

20 law, or enactment, duty-bound to adhere to this agreement. They could

21 reach a new conclusion at this assembly meeting, because the conclusions

22 reached at the earlier meeting were pre-dated.

23 As one of the members of the opposition said at this session,

24 Mr. Mujadzic and Mr. Miskovic, sirs, reach an agreement before us here.

25 Or tell us that you cannot reach agreement.

Page 17473

1 According to this deputy's opinion, there was a certain

2 time-limit that was running within which they would have had to reach an

3 agreement.

4 Q. We will go back to what Mr. Miskovic said later.

5 Mr. Miskovic took the floor immediately before Mr. Mujadzic.

6 A. Which page is that, please?

7 Q. Give me a moment to find it.

8 It starts at page 51, continues on page 52 through 54. And in

9 English ... pages 33 and 34.

10 At the beginning of his address, and let me make a small

11 digression, it was shortly before he took the floor that Mr. Mujadzic

12 handed him the paper with the proposal of how power should be divided;

13 that's to say, half/half.

14 Mr. Miskovic goes on to say:

15 "I said another thing and it's that some things were done in this

16 way or that way on purpose. I think that Aiz noted it well, and when I

17 react the immediately I was going to propose to the SDA to take all the

18 various departments in order for us to solve the problem and see if this

19 will continue to be the underlying reason or if some other reason will

20 crop up."

21 So what follows from this is that Mr. Miskovic was even prepared

22 to go as far as to offer all of the departments to the SDA, thus handing

23 them over the entire responsibility; is that right?

24 A. No, absolutely not. Mr. Simo Miskovic seized the opportunity to

25 discuss power-sharing in public because there was a radio broadcast being

Page 17474

1 made of this assembly. He was being ironical. He was -- he wanted to

2 make a point of saying that they wanted to go as far as even handing all

3 of the power to the SDA, but what happened, in fact, was that he had been

4 refusing any SDA proposals all along and even the 50-50 percentage

5 division was difficult for him to accept. So he wanted Mr. Mujadzic to

6 speak out and that's why he said what he said here, which did not reflect

7 his own opinion. It was merely a propaganda-driven -- in the direction

8 that was favourable for the SDS.

9 Q. Mr. Miskovic goes on to say:

10 "If somebody should be laid the blame on, then they should be

11 putting forth some arguments for it. As I see it, all the discussions

12 that have been held here today and that placing the blame on the SDA. I

13 don't know if I'm right, but it has been said that we had not wanted it,

14 that it was obvious who did not want it, that people know who doesn't

15 want it. Now life saving solution has been found proposed by one party.

16 "But let's take things in their proper order. At the beginning

17 of power-sharing, a blockade ensued and therefore we, the SDS, held an

18 ordinary party assembly session electing a new president, and that's to

19 say, myself and my first step was to get in touch with the president of

20 the SDA with a view to removing the cause of the blockade. Talks on that

21 subject were held in the office of the vice-president of the municipal

22 assembly but without the participation the SDA president who had to go

23 away on a trip. However, there was the president of the Deputies Club

24 and the president of the municipal assembly present, and I asked them if

25 they had been given a mandate by their party to negotiate all the various

Page 17475

1 matters and whether the party was going to stand behind our agreement."

2 "There were various discussions on the matter as to whether this

3 was the case or not, and after several hours of discussions the

4 conclusion was that they did not have the mandate. That's number one.

5 These are the facts.

6 "Secondly, when it was established at last that they had not been

7 authorised, we demanded that both parties elect representatives who would

8 be authorised to engage in negotiations who would have the mandate to

9 engage in power-sharing negotiations and thus automatically to lift the

10 blockade of the assembly and who would be the signatories on behalf of

11 their respective parties. That was done. We received a paper stating

12 that among other things, Sefik Krkic would be leading these negotiations

13 on behalf of the SDA, together with the internal revenue service head,

14 Meho and Peso Camil. Right from the start, we defined the criteria based

15 on which we would divide the power. Once the criteria were established,

16 two and a half hours later, without any problems" --

17 [Trial Chamber confers]

18 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] "In an amicable atmosphere, we

19 managed to agree on the 50 -per cent division."

20 He goes on to say:

21 "We agreed that this should -- that a clean copy should be made

22 of it and that on the following day we would complete the second part

23 which would be much easier.

24 "And then it would be forwarded and thus" --

25 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Aleksic, I'm sorry, but is it really

Page 17476

1 necessary to read all this into the transcript? What's the purpose?

2 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I do believe it

3 necessary, because it relates to this witness's testimony in this case

4 and in other cases. And it responds to the Prosecution case that the SDS

5 obstructed the process of establishing a government and that it did not

6 take part in the work of the various structures and that all contact had

7 been severed, that they did not take part in government, and that all

8 this happened because of the way the SDS conducted itself; whereas, what

9 I'm just reading out now shows that the story was much different, that

10 the SDA representatives would agree to certain matters but this would

11 later on be reneged because apparently they did not have the adequate

12 authorisation and so on.

13 JUDGE DELVOIE: But I suppose you will ask -- you will tendered

14 this document. Do you foresee any objections? Because if -- if you

15 tendered it and we -- [Overlapping speakers] ...

16 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] [Overlapping speakers] ...

17 Your Honour, I have finished with this document. However, in previous

18 cases and on Friday, the witness said that the basic request that the SDS

19 put forth on this assembly session was to call early elections, and I

20 wanted to show that this wasn't a SDS request but a joint request. But

21 I'm finished with this document and I wish to tender it into evidence.

22 JUDGE HALL: Any objections?

23 MR. OLMSTED: No, Your Honour.

24 JUDGE DELVOIE: There's not even a question.

25 JUDGE HALL: [Microphone not activated]