110111ED

Page 18630

1 But it looks as if your testimony will go well into tomorrow and probably

2 into next week as well, because we will start late tomorrow. I think

3 we're resuming at 3.00 tomorrow afternoon, if I'm ... 3.00 or 3.15

4 tomorrow afternoon. And then Thursday and Friday, are days in which the

5 Chamber will not be sitting due to the Orthodox New Year's celebration.

6 And we will then resume on Monday with your testimony. So that's the

7 plan as it looks at this moment.

8 Before I turn over the floor to Ms. Korner, I need to remind you

9 that you have to tell the truth and that also there is a severe penalty

10 for providing false or incomplete information to the Chamber.

11 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

12 JUDGE HARHOFF: Do you have any questions to put before we begin?

13 THE WITNESS: No, I don't, sir, thank you.

14 JUDGE HARHOFF: Very well then. Let's get on with it. I give

15 the floor to Ms. Korner.

16 MS. KORNER: Thank you, Your Honours.

17 Examination by Ms. Korner:

18 Q. Mr. Brown, can we, first of all, deal with your rather more

19 extended resume, to this extent. Did you produce an updated resume or CV

20 for the purposes of this case?

21 A. Yes, I did, Ms. Korner.

22 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, can I ask that that be exhibited and

23 marked under seal. Sorry, it's got the number 10635.

24 JUDGE HALL: So admitted and marked.

25 MS. KORNER: Thank you very much, Your Honours.

Page 18631

1 Q. Now, Mr. Brown, just -- sorry.

2 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit 1776, under seal,

3 Your Honours.

4 MS. KORNER: Thank you.

5 Q. Now, Mr. Brown, just to put the documents that we're going to be

6 dealing with in context, first of all, you produced the main report

7 headed "Military Developments in the Bosanska Krajina 1992" in

8 July of 2002, is that right, originally for the purposes of the Brdjanin

9 case?

10 A. Yes, that is correct, Ms. Korner.

11 Q. And, indeed, at that stage I'm not sure whether General Talic was

12 still alive or not but I believe he was, just.

13 Subsequently, did you make a statement in July of 2009 when you

14 were asked to look at documents that you hadn't seen before, some of

15 which were relevant to the themes which you had dealt with in your

16 original report?

17 A. That is correct, yes, I did.

18 Q. And, finally, were you asked to look at the material that had

19 been recovered from General Mladic, either his home or elsewhere, and, in

20 particular, what's become known as the Mladic diaries, or more properly,

21 work books?

22 A. Yes, that is correct also.

23 Q. And did you produce a short statement detailing those entries in

24 those work books which, in your view, were relevant to the matters you've

25 discussed in your report?

Page 18632

1 A. Yes, I did.

2 Q. Now, what I want to do, please, in the time that we have, is go

3 through some of the areas of this report and have a look at some of the

4 themes and some of the documents which are relevant.

5 You've divided the report, first of all, after your summary, into

6 the political/military developments in respect of the 5th Corps of the

7 JNA, which then became the 1st Krajina Corps of the Bosnian Serb army;

8 then the military operations; and, finally, the roles, responsibilities,

9 and authorities of the commander of the 5th Corps, or 1st Krajina Corps.

10 Can I just ask you this: In preparing your report and coming to

11 the conclusions that you did, what was the -- the documentation that you

12 looked at? In a general term; not, obviously, specifically each and

13 every one.

14 A. When I first arrived at the ICTY for the Office of the Prosecutor

15 in 1998, I was made aware that a series of documents had been seized or

16 recovered that related to -- were a component of the archive of the

17 1st Krajina Corps, the VRS 1st Krajina Corps. That material was already

18 in the possession of the ICTY Office of the Prosecutor when I arrived.

19 My then-line manager, analytical team boss, asked me to look at

20 this material which up until then had not been fully analysed. And I

21 started to do that over a protracted period of time. I had other tasks,

22 but that was one of the tasks I was set. In fact, it became my key task.

23 And so the material I predominantly used for the production of this

24 report was material from that collection. It became known as the

25 1st Krajina Corps, or 1 KK collection, in the Office of the Prosecutor.

Page 18633

1 It wasn't the only documents that I used in the report, though, but it

2 provided the bulk of the materials.

3 I did use a number of additional documents, some police documents

4 which related, I believe, related to areas that I was looking at and

5 reflected similar issues that were relevant in the 1 Krajina Corps

6 collection. Used a small number of political documents and, I believe, a

7 very small number of open source or video-related material. But the

8 overwhelming bulk of the material came from this collection, from the

9 archive of the 1st Krajina Corps.

10 Q. In general terms, the documents that came from the headquarters

11 of the 1st Krajina Corps in Banja Luka, did that show reports to the

12 Main Staff or orders by General Talic, or whoever preceded him, to his

13 subordinate officers, or was it a mixture?

14 A. It was a mixture of documents. Although, I would add, I believe

15 that many of the documents were reports up the chain. So in the case of

16 the JNA documents, the 2nd Military District; and when the 5th Corps

17 became the 1st Krajina Corps, to the Main Staff of the VRS. There were a

18 lot of daily combat reports. The VRS, in particular, often reported

19 twice a day, very rare -- occasionally three times a day. So there was a

20 significant number of documents that were reports from the corps to the

21 Main Staff. However, there were also documents relating to the internal

22 workings of the corps, documents to subordinate units, logistic reports,

23 and occasionally some documents that went externally from the corps.

24 [Trial Chamber confers]

25 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

Page 18634

1 JUDGE HARHOFF: Sorry.

2 MS. KORNER: Yes.

3 Q. Yes, thank you. All right. Can we turn directly, please, to

4 your report, and I think you've a got a copy with you. And can we look,

5 please, just at the first section that -- on political and military

6 developments at page 12.

7 MS. KORNER: Oh, yes, well I -- yeah. For the moment, I don't

8 need it.

9 Q. You set out there, first of all - and I don't propose to go

10 through anything in particular there - the -- the general developments

11 between January and April of 1992 and then --

12 MR. ZECEVIC: Sorry, could we have the relevant part on the ...

13 MS. KORNER: Do you want it on the screen?

14 MR. ZECEVIC: For the benefit of our clients, I think.

15 MS. KORNER: Yes, I'm sorry, I'm -- Your Honours, I'm

16 summarizing. And when I come -- perhaps I can put it this way: When I

17 come to a specific matter that I want to ask about, we'll have it up on

18 the screen. But otherwise it's just going to be a question of the screen

19 trying to catch up with what I'm doing.

20 Q. At page 15 you dealt with the 5th Corps. And, now, can I just

21 ask you something about the 5th Corps and as it became the

22 1st Krajina ...

23 Within the JNA, how big was the 5th Corps in comparison with the

24 other corps?

25 A. I would -- I would have to be a bit hesitant to answer that

Page 18635

1 question.

2 Q. Right.

3 A. I can tell you what subsequently happened with the VRS. The

4 problem in relation to the 5th Corps was -- especially into 1992, was

5 that a number of corpses of the JNA began to fragment.

6 JUDGE HARHOFF: [Microphone not activated]

7 We were just concerned about whether the two accused would have a

8 paper copy of the -- of your report so as to enable them to follow.

9 Is the Defence able to clarify?

10 MR. ZECEVIC: I believe they have, but -- I mean, the problem is

11 Ms. Korner is summarizing, so I guess they would not -- because I can't

12 find the relevant part that she's referring to. And then if -- if

13 Ms. Korner intends to do that in the future, then perhaps she can give

14 also the indication of the number in Serbian for the benefit of the

15 client.

16 JUDGE HARHOFF: That it true. But as Ms. Korner explained - hold

17 on a minute. As Ms. Korner explained, at this point where she is just

18 rapidly going through the main features of the report, it would -- it

19 would take considerable time to have it brought up on the screen each and

20 every time. So when we come to the point where we have to digest the

21 report in detail, at that point I think it's -- it's required to have the

22 text put up in the screen both in B/C/S and in English. But if the

23 accused would have a paper copy so that they could follow as Ms. Korner

24 is quickly running through it, it might be helpful to them. And that was

25 what we were concerned about.

Page 18636

1 MR. ZECEVIC: I understand, Your Honours. I didn't -- I didn't

2 object to Ms. Korner's explanation, and I -- I appreciate the way that

3 she intends to deal with the -- with the matter, and I wasn't complaining

4 about that at all. And as for the clients, we will provide them with a

5 copy if they don't have that at the moment.

6 Thank you.

7 JUDGE HALL: Thank you.

8 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, and, no, I can't give page numbers in

9 B/C/S, I'm afraid. The one thing I certainly didn't do was mark-up the

10 B/C/S copy, so I'm afraid that the English-speaking counsel will have to

11 indicate if -- what page it is in B/C/S.

12 JUDGE HALL: Anyway, it's the time for the first break, so we

13 would -- if this is a convenient point, with the interruption.

14 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated] ... certainly,

15 Your Honours.

16 JUDGE HALL: And we would resume in 20 minutes.

17 [The witness stands down]

18 --- Recess taken at 3.44 p.m.

19 --- On resuming at 4.09 p.m.

20 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, just while the witness is coming back

21 into court, can I just ask that the document that you admitted from our

22 motion, 3708, be assigned an exhibit number, which is what was the

23 request in our motion. So document from the motion, the Skrbic document.

24 And you said you granted our motion with respect to Rule 65 ter number

25 3708, so could it be assigned an exhibit number, please.

Page 18637

1 [Trial Chamber confers]

2 [Trial Chamber and Legal Officer confer]

3 JUDGE HALL: Yes, thank you. So admitted and marked.

4 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit 1777, Your Honours.

5 [Trial Chamber confers]

6 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, if I understood

7 correctly then, the Prosecutor's application was to have a bar table

8 motion --

9 MS. KORNER: [Previous translation continues]

10 [Overlapping speakers] ... the application at the end of the motion - I'm

11 sorry, Mr. Krgovic - was admitted into evidence proposed 65 ter

12 Exhibit 3708 through the bar table, in other words, not as the part of

13 the bar table motion, and order the Registry to assign a trial -- an

14 exhibit number. And that motion was granted. It's not on our bar table

15 motion that we filed, the big one.

16 I hope that explains it to Mr. Krgovic's satisfaction.

17 [The witness takes the stand]

18 JUDGE HALL: And Mr. Krgovic may take comfort from the fact that

19 I was similarly confused. So thank you.

20 MS. KORNER:

21 Q. Yes, Mr. Brown, I'm sorry about that.

22 All right. I want to deal with, effectively, that part of your

23 report that we can see which begins at paragraph 1.15 - I think the

24 paragraph numbers are the same in the translation - where you talk about

25 the 5th Corps between January and April of 1992. And you refer to a

Page 18638

1 document in respect of your sentence at the end of that paragraph, which

2 is on page 16 in English, which was the withdrawal from Western Slavonia

3 in the Croatian conflict, and you state that:

4 "Some units were tasked with securing full control of the

5 territory, preventing inter-ethnic conflicts, and establishing links with

6 the municipal authorities, TO staff, et cetera."

7 And can we look, please -- this is a document that's already been

8 exhibited - it's referred to in your footnote 14 - at document

9 number 2 -- sorry. It's tab 2 of our list; it's P60.3.

10 This is an order dated the 1st of April, 1992, to the

11 10th Partisan Division. The order is to pull out that brigade, or

12 division, from combat in the Draskenic village.

13 And was that in Croatia?

14 A. Yes, Ms. Korner. This unit had been operating in

15 Western Slavonia as part of the 5th Corps in Western Slavonia, and it was

16 ordered back to Bosnia.

17 Q. Then it says it's ordered back to Bosnia to go to Sanski Most.

18 "To deploy the unit in the Sanski Most Kamengrad village with the

19 following tasks: achieving full control of the territory, preventing

20 inter-ethnic conflict, setting up roadblocks, and securing features of

21 special importance, establish full cooperation with the organs of

22 government in Sanski Most municipality, and collaboration with the TO,

23 Territorial Defence, and police units."

24 Now, this is an early document. How does that fit in with your

25 assessment of -- of the cooperation of -- that existed between the army

Page 18639

1 and other aspects of, I suppose, defence?

2 A. I -- in reviewing the documents, I saw a number of references

3 that cooperation with municipal authorities, legal authorities on the

4 ground, police, it was a component in -- in a lot of documents in the

5 1 Krajina Corps. And it was also a feature in Western Slavonia, I have

6 to say. So I don't think it was necessarily something new. When the

7 5th Corps was in Western Slavonia, it clearly cooperated with TO units

8 and government organisations there, and this is -- although it's an early

9 document, I saw this type of language reflected in a large number of

10 documents or a number of documents in the Krajina Corps throughout the

11 spring and summer of 1992.

12 Q. All right. Now, your report, in fact, devoted a whole section to

13 Western Slavonia. It begins at paragraph 1.19. And you deal with, in

14 paragraph 1.20, how it deployed the 5th Corps in the Autumn of 1991 to

15 Western Slavonia. And then at 1.23 you cover what you have

16 just - 1.23 - dealt with, which is on page 18, the cooperation with and

17 the utilisation of the Serb TO.

18 Now, the question of that cooperation, did that also cover

19 provision of arms? Because you deal with that at the top of page 19.

20 A. In relation to Western Slavonia, there were a small number of

21 documents that the 5th Corps was providing weapons to the

22 Territorial Defence in Western Slavonia, including, I think, one

23 document, or at least one reference, that weapons were being provided

24 after the UN agreement in Croatia, which -- I'd have to read the UN

25 agreement in detail, but I believe indicated that the area was to be, in

Page 18640

1 essence, demilitarised, and only police with side-arms were allowed to be

2 used.

3 So I did some small number of documents that the provision of

4 weapons by the 5th Corps to the TO in Slavonia occurred.

5 Q. Right. Now, was that to all TOs?

6 A. No. I believe it was only to the Western Slavonia TO. It wasn't

7 TOs -- Croatian TOs or others, it was to Serbian TOs in Western Slavonia.

8 Q. All right. Now, did it also, in fact, in Western Slavonia, did

9 the 5th Corps deal with what were called volunteers or paramilitaries?

10 And if you look at your paragraph 1.25.

11 A. Yes. There were references in a small number of documents to the

12 integration or use of volunteers, and in particular highlight

13 Veljko Milankovic, paramilitary commander, in Western Slavonia. They

14 were integrated into the corps and used in operations there. Some of the

15 volunteers, I believe, came from Serbia.

16 Q. All right. And just jumping ahead for a moment because you will

17 see later how you cover the question of paramilitaries. Was the use

18 of -- of Milankovic in Western Slavonia echoed later on in their dealings

19 with the paramilitary formations in Bosnia?

20 A. Are you talking specifically about Milankovic or more generally

21 about paramilitary?

22 Q. More generally.

23 A. I think when the VRS was established it became acutely aware of a

24 problem relating to paramilitaries. I do deal with that in the report.

25 And I believe that General Talic issued some instructions relating to

Page 18641

1 paramilitary groups. I don't think he was particularly happy with the

2 fact that paramilitary groups were operating outside his command. He

3 instructed units of his command appropriately to, in essence, bring these

4 paramilitary groups under the command of the army or disband them. And I

5 do know, at least the Milankovic case, he was integrated into the VRS,

6 given a rank. At one stage, and I believe later, in 1992 - I would have

7 to go through the document again - was instructed by Talic to go and

8 conduct operations, and I believe he was later killed in 1992 in combat

9 operations.

10 There were clearly problems with paramilitaries, recognised by

11 the VRS. And they instructed that these groups were to be integrated and

12 put under unified command.

13 Q. All right. Then, moving through, you then dealt with, from

14 page 21, paragraph 1.29, the 5th Corps, between April and May. And can

15 we come, please, straight away, to the 16th Session of the Assembly of

16 the Serbian People on the 12th of May dealt with in your report at

17 page 24, paragraph 1.38.

18 MS. KORNER: And can we have up, please, the document itself,

19 which is P754. Oh, and it's at tab - sorry, I should have said - 6.

20 Your Honours, I'm really sorry, I -- oh, no, of course, yeah.

21 Sorry, I thought I had lost it. I have to find it again. I've just got

22 it in the wrong place.

23 Yes. Now, Mr. Brown, can we first of all deal with this

24 generally. How important, in your view, from the point of view of the

25 development of the Bosnian Serb army, the VRS, and the -- their, if you

Page 18642

1 like, cooperation with political and other civilian authorities, was this

2 Assembly?

3 A. I believe in the report itself I argue that this is quite an

4 important meeting, and, in fact, a particularly important meeting. I

5 would indicate that this is not, by any way, a stand-alone meeting. But

6 in relation to the 16th Assembly, it establishes the VRS. Its decisions

7 are passed in relation to the establishment of the army, the position of

8 Mladic as its commander. And, I believe, in the discussions about the

9 strategic goals, it gives a political back-drop to what the VRS are

10 expected to be achieving in the coming weeks and months as a military.

11 It outlines six strategic goals. Karadzic outlines those goals.

12 And if we go through those goals individually: Placing the separation

13 from the other two national communities in Bosnia as the most important

14 strategic goal --

15 Q. Yes, just pause for a moment, if would you, Mr. Brown. Perhaps

16 we better just turn up that part.

17 MS. KORNER: Can we look, please, at -- in the English, page 13,

18 possibly -- actually, I suppose it could be 14. And in the B/C/S, at

19 page 7.

20 JUDGE HARHOFF: What are you referring to, Ms. Korner? Page

21 numbers or paragraph numbers or ...

22 MS. KORNER: Sorry?

23 JUDGE HARHOFF: To what exactly are you referring -- [Overlapping

24 speakers] ...

25 MS. KORNER: [Overlapping speakers] ... I'm referring to the

Page 18643

1 12th of May Assembly. And the page numbers I've given are the page

2 numbers at the bottom, in each case.

3 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thanks.

4 MS. KORNER: So it's page 7 in -- sorry. It's page 13 in

5 English; and I believe it begins at the bottom of page 7 in the B/C/S.

6 JUDGE HARHOFF: Of which document?

7 MS. KORNER: [Overlapping speakers] ... no, it doesn't.

8 Sorry?

9 JUDGE HARHOFF: Of which document?

10 MS. KORNER: 12th of May Assembly, Your Honour.

11 [Trial Chamber confers]

12 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

13 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you.

14 MS. KORNER: Actually, no, that's not the right page. Oh, yes,

15 it is, yep. If I'm right, it's the beginning. Right.

16 Q. The strategic goals. The first such goal: Separation from the

17 other two national communities, separation of states. Separation from

18 those who are enemies and have used every opportunity, especially in this

19 century, to attack us.

20 Right. Second is the establishment of the corridor between

21 Semberija and Krajina.

22 MS. KORNER: And we need to go to the next page, please, in B/C/S

23 for this.

24 Q. Third strategic goal: The corridor in the Drina value -- Drina

25 valley.

Page 18644

1 Fourth strategic goal: The establishment of the border on the

2 Una -- Una, sorry, and Neretva rivers.

3 Fifth strategic goal: Division of the city of Sarajevo.

4 And sixth - for which we need go over the page in English - is

5 access of the Serbian republic to the sea.

6 Now how did those goals, as set out, link up with the military

7 operations, Mr. Brown? I think you effectively deal with that in

8 paragraph 1.41.

9 A. Well, I would argue that those strategic goals were reflected in

10 military documents. They were reflected in a number of military

11 directives that were sent by the Main Staff not long after this Assembly

12 session. They were reflected, in terms of commentary, down the line

13 through Talic's instructions and reports; and, in particular, for

14 example, second strategic goal, which is a corridor link through

15 Semberija, basically linking the Krajina with Semberija, General Talic,

16 within weeks of this Assembly session, launched a very large military

17 operation to achieve that strategic goal, which his corps did do through

18 the summer of 1992.

19 There are -- some of the goals were not achieved. For example,

20 access to the sea was one. And there was some problems in the

21 Neretva river. But through a number of VRS Main Staff directives I would

22 argue that it's clear that these were not just political hot air or

23 rhetoric that had no great meaning; actually they were seen and reflected

24 in the operations that were conducted by the military through the year.

25 I would also add that I don't believe that the 16th Assembly and

Page 18645

1 the goals announced there were the start point. I believe there are --

2 were references through other Assembly sessions prior to that, indicating

3 that the objectives of the Serbs, for example, were to separate Sarajevo,

4 divide Sarajevo into a Muslim and Serb part, or to divide Sarajevo, or to

5 have a corridor link. And in some of the previous Assembly sessions in

6 1992, late 1991, I think you can see echos of those goals.

7 But the 16th Assembly Session for me is one that crystalises

8 that. So it states what the objectives are. But also the decisions that

9 are passed at that Assembly establish the army. Establish the command;

10 place Mladic as the head of the army; discuss issues of integrating the

11 TO into the army to form a unified command, and one army rather than a

12 separate TO and a VRS; and that there is to be a functioning chain of

13 command.

14 So I believe this Assembly session is very important. And, if

15 you like, crystalising the next stage in what the Serbs, the Bosnian

16 Serbs, were going to be doing through May, June, into the summer, and

17 later into 1992.

18 Q. Now, you make the comment that the language used was in many

19 senses inflammatory, combative, and derogatory. This is at

20 paragraph 1.44.

21 If we just look at a couple of examples of what some of the other

22 delegates said.

23 MS. KORNER: First of all, at page 32, Mr. Kozic, and -- that's

24 in English. And in B/C/S, that is at -- I've got it all marked up. I've

25 just got to search where the markings are.

Page 18646

1 Yes, I think that's at page 14 in the B/C/S. Actually, no ...

2 sorry, not page 14. Page 23. My fault. Yep.

3 Q. Mr. Kozic, who is talking about it, says:

4 "I have asked for the floor because of the following suggestion:

5 The enemy, Ustashas and Mujahedin, must be defeated by whatever means are

6 necessary, and only after that can we negotiate."

7 Was that one of the comments that you had in mind?

8 A. Yes. And there are -- I think when you read the Assembly session

9 in its entirety there are a number of references. The tone of the

10 Assembly session doesn't seem to be one that's somewhat calm. Even

11 Mladic, for example, indicates that; he talks about heads of

12 fundamentalism and Muslim and Croat hoards. And language like that is --

13 is -- is present in this Assembly session.

14 Q. Yes. We'll look at Mladic in a moment. But can we now look,

15 please, at a speech that comes shortly after that by a

16 Professor Milojevic, which is at page 33, English, and 24 in B/C/S.

17 Now, he says, in the second paragraph of that statement:

18 "I would like to suggest there will be no doubt that will be the

19 first option of war ..." and so on and so forth.

20 And then in the fourth sentence in English:

21 Which applies that -- "Which implies that we would have to have a

22 map of our own, a border agreed between the political and military

23 leadership of our republic, one thoroughly assessed and, I might add,

24 kept a secret. Divulge it to no one. But each and every general must

25 know this border. And the political leadership should keep this map as a

Page 18647

1 political potential," sorry, "negotiating chip."

2 And then further down, the sentence beginning:

3 "If it is a state border, it intrinsically implies moving a

4 contingent of population. Within the present option, we do not have

5 the [sic] solution."

6 Now, was that a speech of significance, in your view, Mr. Brown?

7 A. Yes. I think it's a comment that -- there are other references

8 in the document, but I think it's a comment worthy of note, that in

9 essence the strategic goals appear to me to be saying, Here's the

10 territory that we want to control, and that will be ours.

11 And there are references in -- from various delegates and

12 speech -- delegates and representatives, saying this will involve the

13 resettlement of people. And sometimes in these documents it's what's not

14 there that may also speak volumes, because I don't really see many people

15 rebutting that and saying, We must not do that, except with the

16 possibility, somewhat oddly enough, of Mladic who seems to raise a note

17 of caution about what is being discussed or prepared.

18 Q. Yeah. And let's just look briefly, then, look at what Mladic had

19 to say during this speech. His speech begins at page 35, and it's a

20 very, very lengthy speech.

21 MS. KORNER: If we look at, first of all, page 36 in English, and

22 it's, I believe, page 27 in the B/C/S.

23 Q. In the middle of second paragraph, he says:

24 "As for defining the goal, it would be very useful to determine

25 and to define the territory of the Serbian republic of Bosnia and

Page 18648

1 Herzegovina."

2 And then further down that same paragraph:

3 "If we have taken something in this war that was not ours, we

4 need to keep hold of it so that in political negotiations we can get

5 those things that were ours and we cannot get it in any other way."

6 What do you understand him to be saying at that stage?

7 A. Well, I think it's -- my reading of this is that the

8 16th Assembly Session is outlining the areas that they want - this

9 Bosnian Serb leadership, that is - want to control. And when he says

10 "not ours," I assume what he means here is possibly territory or

11 municipalities that are not necessarily Serb but that they should concur

12 them or take control of them so that they can somehow trade later, maybe

13 in a political solution or some other agreement, that territory away.

14 And later, in the summer of 1992, the Krajina Corps's zone, for

15 example, they took control of Jajce. And Jajce is not, I believe, a

16 predominantly Serb municipality. It had other values because of -- it

17 had a hydro-electric plant and other areas. But some of the corridor

18 municipalities, for example, were predominantly Croat. But I think what

19 he's saying here is that we must be prepared to take the territories,

20 even though they're not ours in terms of ethnicity or traditionally Serb,

21 so that we can organise and deal with the trade of territory later.

22 Q. All right.

23 MS. KORNER: And then if we go to the next page in English, but

24 it's still the same page in B/C/S, we see, at the top, he is saying:

25 "People and peoples are not pawns nor are they keys in one's

Page 18649

1 pocket that can be shifted from here to there."

2 Is it a quote like that that you had in mind when you were saying

3 he's sounding a note of caution about things?

4 A. Yes. I think there are one or two references in this speech from

5 Mladic that -- and I think I've referenced them in my report. That's one

6 of them. And there are two other ones which seem to indicate that he has

7 an idea of what this is -- this is discussing. This is discussing the

8 movement of people or the forcible removal of people and this might not

9 be an easy thing to do.

10 I would also draw your attention to a quote that he says later

11 on, when he says: What we are discussing here should be kept as our

12 guarded secret. And I think from my reading of this, this Assembly

13 session, he has an understanding of what is going to happen or what is

14 likely to happen, and he warns, in a way, that people are going to be

15 expelled and that -- and moved. I think it's -- it's -- it sits in stark

16 contrast to some of the comments from the delegates who are actually

17 talking about resettlement.

18 Q. Yep. Well, yeah, in fact, that was the next part of the speech I

19 was going to look at.

20 MS. KORNER: If we go to the -- please, the next page. 38 in

21 English, and it's 27 in B/C/S -- 28 in B/C/S as well.

22 Q. If we look at the middle. And, as I say, this is an exceedingly

23 lengthy, apparently unbroken speech by General Mladic. In the middle of

24 the page:

25 "Please let us not only put our minds into what we are doing" -

Page 18650

1 it's about ten lines down - "but let us also think thoroughly about it

2 and let us be cautious about when to keep mum. The thing we are doing

3 needs to be guarded as our deepest secret. And what our representatives

4 appearing in the media at political talks and negotiations are going to

5 say, and they do need to present our goals in a way that will sound

6 appealing to the ears of those we want to win over to our side, without

7 being detrimental to our Serbian people. Our people must know how to

8 read between the lines."

9 And, I mean, in fact, that echos, does it not, Mr. Brown, what

10 Mr. Kozic said a few minutes ago about keeping things a secret?

11 A. Yes, it does, Ms. Korner.

12 Q. Yeah. All right. And just, as I suppose as a contrast, if we

13 look, finally, on General Mladic's speech, at the next page in English,

14 page 39. And it's page 29 in B/C/S.

15 At the top, he refers to a Colonel Hasotic. And he said:

16 "I've explained to you just now, but I will have to do it here

17 before the Assembly. I brought Colonel Vukelic with me this morning, who

18 is from these parts ... shared the same school bench ever since high

19 school. However, it is better to have, here, this Hasotic, who was here

20 amongst us, than to have him take the place of the [indiscernible] Karic

21 or to have him in the trenches fighting against us."

22 Now, first of all, do you know who Hasotic was, Colonel Hasotic?

23 A. Yes, I do, Ms. Korner. He was a JNA officer. Prior to taking

24 his position in the VRS, as head of the VRS, Mladic was commander of the

25 9th Corps in Knin. And Hasotic was one of his staff officers and he was

Page 18651

1 a Muslim officer.

2 Q. Did -- jumping ahead for a moment, did Muslim officers like

3 Colonel Hasotic and Colonel Selak remain in the corps once it was

4 reconstituted as the 1st Krajina Corps of the Bosnian Serb army?

5 A. No. There may have one or two at lower levels. There may have

6 been some in some of the units. But certainly in the staff there were

7 the removals of non-Serb officers, I believe sometime in June 1992. Most

8 of them were sent on leave or sent to have their status resolved in

9 Belgrade, and I believe Hasotic was one of them.

10 Q. All right.

11 A. I also just like to add, I think: What Mladic may be saying here

12 is that there might be other good reasons not to have non-Serbs -- I

13 think he's looking at it from a military perspective. He's saying, If we

14 get rid of all these people - in particular his staff officers - these

15 are the very people who are going to be potentially fighting us. So he

16 might be throwing that in as another reason, not necessarily because he

17 has obvious sympathies there, but I think it's from a military

18 perspective he's saying, We need to be weary.

19 Q. And he goes on shortly, within a few lines further on:

20 "Therefore we cannot cleanse nor can we have a sieve to sift so

21 that only Serbs would stay or that the Serbs would fall through and the

22 rest leave. Well, that is -- that will not -- I do not know how

23 Mr. Krajisnik and Mr. Karadzic would explain this to the world. People,

24 that would be genocide."

25 So was that, in your view, a continuation of this theme about

Page 18652

1 what to do about the non-Serbs?

2 A. It would appear to be, yes.

3 Q. All right. And then further down the paragraph, he seems to

4 switch slightly, because the language he uses, as I think you pointed

5 out, becomes a bit more descriptive. He says -- he's talking about the

6 Muslims living peacefully above Kalinovik, and then the military hospital

7 under blockade, so the Muslims are under blockade, there is nowhere they

8 can go. One of the reasons is because of the head of the Dragan

9 fundamentalist lies beneath our hammer.

10 And, again, is that the language you were thinking about?

11 A. Yes, I think that's quite derogatory language.

12 MS. KORNER: And then, finally, and this is the final part of the

13 speech, could we go to page 45 in English. And in B/C/S it is page 33.

14 Q. He says, at the top there:

15 "The enemy has attacked us with all its might from all

16 directions" - it's about five lines down - "and it's a common enemy

17 regardless whether it is the Muslim hordes or Croatian hordes. It is our

18 common enemy. What is important now is either to throw both of them out,

19 employing political and other moves, or to organisation ourselves and to

20 throw out one by force of arms and we will be able to deal somehow with

21 the other."

22 And how does that particular utterance by Mladic fit in to what

23 subsequently happened, Mr. Brown, as far as you're concerned?

24 A. Well, there clearly was a significant use of the VRS in

25 operations immediately -- actually, prior to this Assembly session.

Page 18653

1 There was already operations going on. But certainly in the weeks and

2 days and months after that, there was significant operations.

3 So --

4 Q. Right. All right. That's all I want to ask you about the

5 session itself.

6 Now, going back to your report, you make the point, at

7 paragraph 1.53, that these strategic goals were not simply rarified

8 statements. And is that exemplified by one of the documents that you

9 looked at?

10 MS. KORNER: Sorry. Can I, just for a moment -- yes, can we look

11 at, I think it's 58.

12 I just want to check, sorry, Your Honours, one document.

13 Q. Yeah, you make the point that these goals were disseminated, in

14 fact, to the lower levels.

15 MS. KORNER: And can we look now, please, at the mobilization

16 order, 21st of May, tab 11, which is document number 10505.

17 Q. Now, this is the general mobilisation order issued by

18 General Talic, although I think if we look at the last page we'll see it

19 was signed on his behalf by somebody else.

20 And if we look at the terms of this general mobilisation order,

21 first of all, it's page -- second page in English but still on this front

22 page of the B/C/S:

23 "Immediately establish direct contact with municipal, military,

24 and territorial organs on the ground, offering expert and materiel

25 support for the mobilisation process."

Page 18654

1 That's item 1.

2 Item 5 -- well, before I actually move on to this slightly

3 different topic, how does that fit in with the general themes that you

4 observed through your analysis of these documents?

5 A. Well, I think this is an important document. It comes not long

6 after the Assembly session and the establishment of the army. It calls

7 for mobilisation. There had actually been calls prior to this for

8 mobilisation, and there had been mobilisation of the Serbian TO in

9 April and calls for mobilisation in early May. But this is a

10 mobilisation instruction based on the Presidency. So the Presidency have

11 called for this, Talic has passed it down the chain, and it's of note

12 that his first instruction is to establish direct contact with municipal

13 and military organs on the ground. It's -- he places it as his first

14 task for those who have been mobilised.

15 He also makes note, in paragraph 6, that those who are mobilised

16 are to have the goals of our struggle briefed to them. So it doesn't

17 specifically reference the six strategic goals, but it does indicate that

18 those who are being mobilised are to be made of why they are being

19 mobilised and what the struggle is about.

20 Q. All right. Which goes on from the point you're making in your

21 report.

22 The -- before you move on to the next page in English, but

23 item 5:

24 "When conscripts are enlisted into the units, perform security

25 checks on each individual, taking care that provocateurs and fifth

Page 18655

1 columnists are not admitted."

2 I think fifth columnists, it may be fairly obvious what's meant

3 by that. But what about provocateurs? Are you able to assess what he

4 was referring to there?

5 A. I don't think I'd like to make a guess on what he means by that.

6 He could be talking about, say, Muslims or Croats who might come in and

7 become problematic. He could be talking about Serbian paramilitaries.

8 But I'm not sure I'd like to make a comment on what that is.

9 Q. All right. Okay. Moving then, please, to paragraph 8.

10 MS. KORNER: Next page in English, and it's the second page in

11 B/C/S.

12 Q. "Until the units receive combat tasks, engage them in the

13 following tasks."

14 And item -- the 4th task:

15 "Establish the closest possible cooperation with the people and

16 legal authorities within their zones of responsibility."

17 So is that developing, effectively, from his first instruction?

18 A. Yes. I think it reinforces what he said in paragraph 1.

19 Q. All right.

20 A. And I would argue that in a number of cases from the

21 documentation that's exactly what happened.

22 I'd also like, maybe, to draw your attention to paragraph 11,

23 which relates to paramilitaries. It says:

24 "Do not allow the presence of paramilitary formations or other

25 special organisations within the zone of responsibility. Disperse

Page 18656

1 individuals [sic] among various units as volunteers, and if they refuse,

2 break them up. Or, if necessary, destroy them."

3 Maybe there'll be an issue that will come up later, but I -- this

4 is, for me, one of Talic's -- a constant thread or a regular thread that

5 comes through his documents, that he -- he's unhappy with paramilitaries

6 working outside his chain of command and that -- yet that he's happy to

7 have them in, in his units.

8 Q. All right. And why do you think it is that he's unhappy about

9 them working outside of his chain of command?

10 A. Well, I can't say for sure, because, you know, it was not

11 necessarily documentation that shows his thoughts on the matter, but he

12 was a professional military man. And I think senior officers want to be

13 in command. And I think having organisations outside his military

14 command, either conducting operations separately to what he was doing or

15 doing other things, may not have sat well with him. And he wanted to

16 have them inside. It may also be a reflection on what was articulated at

17 the 16th Assembly Session, which -- where they've have the units -- what

18 they called a unity of command. The VRS was to have, like any army, was

19 to have a proper chain of command. So I think he, as a military man,

20 wanted to have them in his formations rather than outside.

21 Q. All right. And then one further small point on this document.

22 MS. KORNER: If we go to the next page in English, please, and

23 it's the last page -- it's page 3 in B/C/S and page 4 in English.

24 Q. We see there -- well, there we can see the stamp, and it's got

25 the word "Zar." So someone signed, apparently, on General Talic's

Page 18657

1 behalf. But underneath that is the distribution list.

2 Now, was that common on military documents, that there'd be a

3 list of the people to whom this was going?

4 A. Yes, that's right, Ms. Korner. In many of them, not all of them,

5 but many of the documents had a distribution list.

6 Q. All right. I know it's difficult, and if you can't answer that

7 question, say so. But did -- have you ever seen a document which shows

8 one of these orders or directions from General Talic going to the police?

9 A. I have seen one or two documents which were specifically directed

10 to the police, i.e., it was a letter or a report to them. I can't

11 remember if I've seen any document, if you like, a more routine document

12 that has a distribution of the police at the bottom.

13 There were one or two which were related to police issues or

14 cooperation issues or the provision of equipment to the police which

15 clearly went in the address block to the police, but in terms of the more

16 routine military instructions, I don't remember. If there are there,

17 they are probably very small number.

18 Q. All right. Although, of course, as we can see from that,

19 obviously the military police was a different matter. They came under

20 [indiscernible] command.

21 All right. Can we a look -- now there's one example of, as you

22 say, the goals or the directions which emerged from the

23 12th of May Assembly being disseminated. Can we look at much, much later

24 document, please, which you looked at more recently, and that's at

25 tab 58 --

Page 18658

1 MS. KORNER: Oh, Your Honours, in fact, this one hasn't yet been

2 made an exhibit. So could that be, please, admitted and marked.

3 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.

4 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P1778, Your Honours.

5 MS. KORNER: Now can we have up on the screen, please,

6 65 ter 1611, please; tab 58.

7 Q. Now, this document is much, much later in time, obviously.

8 24th of November, 1992. And it's addressed to the Zvornik Light Infantry

9 Brigade command. And it says:

10 "Pursuant to the directive of the Main Staff ... strictly

11 confidential number ... and assessment of the situation, I have

12 decided ..."

13 How does that fit in with your observations and conclusions on

14 the dissemination of instructions?

15 A. Well, I think it's - I hope - quite self-evident, that the

16 Drina Corps is passing to a subordinate brigade an instruction that it's

17 received from the Main Staff and would seem to show a functioning chain

18 of command. And the directive in question, I believe, has similar

19 language in paragraph 1. And maybe more generally, although this is an

20 area, I do hasten to add, Your Honours, that I'm not necessarily as

21 detailed with in terms of knowledge of documents from the Krajina area;

22 this all relates to operations in the Drina valley. And, of course, the

23 Drina valley was one of the strategic goals of the Bosnian Serbs. To get

24 control of the Drina valley and to eliminate the border between the FRY,

25 or Serbia, and the SRBiH. That was a stated strategic goal. And this

Page 18659

1 appears to be related to attempting to secure control of that area

2 through the use of directives from the Main Staff down to the corps and

3 then down onto a brigade of a lower level. And obviously in paragraph 1

4 it makes reference to forcing the Muslim local population to abandon

5 areas within that area.

6 Q. Right. We'll have a look at the directive in a moment. But if

7 we continue to say with this document, as you say, it was the Drina

8 valley. If we go over -- well, first of all, we can see it deals with

9 Visegrad and -- under paragraph 1. And then tasks for the units, the

10 task to the Zvornik Light Brigade in 2.1.

11 MS. KORNER: And over the page, please, in English and also in

12 B/C/S.

13 Q. To Bratunac. And then further down he talks about the

14 intelligence support and engineers support. And then (c), morale and

15 psychological preparations.

16 "Before initiating any kind of operation, inform the unit members

17 about the important aim of that operation and underline that the outcome

18 of minor actions and of the whole operations of crucial importance ..."

19 MS. KORNER: And can we go to the next page, please, in English.

20 And I hope I'm on the right page in B/C/S. Yes, I am.

21 "... importance for the realisation of the aim of the

22 Serbian People, namely the creation and establishment of a Serbian state

23 in these areas."

24 And how does that fit in with the earlier documents that we saw

25 about mobilization?

Page 18660

1 A. Well, I think it's quite similar to some of the other directives

2 or areas, that even at the lower level the military are informing their

3 subordinates of the importance of the territory that they are to gain

4 control of. And, again, I say that this is an area that links to a

5 strategic goal of a -- getting control of the Drina valley. And it would

6 seem that they are placing an importance on informing, at the lower

7 level, the importance of that particular area and the importance of that

8 operation.

9 Q. Yes.

10 A. It's not a rarified statement that's held at a political level

11 that doesn't have any clear meaning. It would appear that the commander

12 of the Drina Corps is making sure that the soldiers who are going to

13 execute this particular operation know why it has a higher meaning or a

14 higher strategical importance.

15 Q. All right. And then if we look --

16 MS. KORNER: Oh, yes, I'm sorry. Yes, Your Honours. May that

17 now be admitted and marked, please.

18 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.

19 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P1779, Your Honours.

20 MS. KORNER:

21 Q. And then if we look very quickly at Directive 4 which you in fact

22 deal with in a number of places in your report, which has got the 65 ter

23 number 1609.

24 It's not in -- it's going to come up on the screen, Mr. Brown.

25 Sorry it's not in the bundle, because it was a late addition.

Page 18661

1 You reference it, in fact, at your footnote number 80 in this

2 particular section dealing with it. It sets out what has happened.

3 If we can look at the second page in English, and it's also, I

4 believe, the second page in B/C/S. Yeah.

5 "Most of the tasks have been carried out in full. And among the

6 most significant, we would stress the following. The 1st Krajina Corps

7 has preserved and expanded the borders of the Republika Srpska; smashed

8 enemy groups in Central Bosnia, Bosanska Posavina; liberated

9 Bosanski Brod, Jajce, and other settlements in its area of

10 responsibility; protected the Serbian people; and preserved the corridor

11 through Posavina."

12 And then if we look at the following tasks which he's decided

13 should take place. At page 3 in English and also, I think, page 3 in the

14 B/C/S.

15 "I have decided the following. The main forces of VRS army of

16 the Republika Srpska are to stabilise the Defence on the lines reached,

17 cleanse the free territory of Republika Srpska of the remaining enemy and

18 paramilitary formations, drive the regular Croatian army force out of our

19 territory, while the auxiliary forces are to crush the Muslim forces in

20 the Drina valley."

21 So, again, that's referring back to one of the strategic goals.

22 And then the aims of the operations are as follows.

23 MS. KORNER: And if we go to the next page in English, please.

24 THE WITNESS: And maybe just also on that particular page --

25 MS. KORNER: Yeah.

Page 18662

1 THE WITNESS: -- not related to the Drina valley, but it makes

2 mention that they haven't managed to achieve their goal in the Neretva

3 river, and that was a goal. And they also ask or say that they need to

4 expand the Posavina corridor so that even though they've secured the

5 corridor, they want to expand on it.

6 MS. KORNER: Yes, sorry. Can we just go back.

7 Q. You're quite right. I should have drawn your attention to that,

8 to the previous page. Yep.

9 The following tasks from Directive 3 have not been carried out.

10 And there we see, as you say, the Herzegovina corps has filed to reach

11 the left bank of the Neretva river security access to the sea.

12 And then, finally, on this document, two other matters.

13 MS. KORNER: So can we go, please, to page 4 in English. These

14 are the aims of the operation.

15 Q. "Launch offensive operations to crush the HVO and the Muslims in

16 the territory of Republika Srpska, force them into unconditionally

17 surrendering their weapons or destroy them?"

18 MS. KORNER: And then over the page, again, to (d), what the

19 Drina Corps is supposed to be doing. And I think, I'm sorry, we need to

20 go, probably, to the next page in B/C/S. Yes, it needs to be -- sorry,

21 yes, it's page -- in the B/C/S, it is 0087-6282 at the top. Yes, thank

22 you.

23 Q. "(d) The Drina Corps, from its present position, its main forces

24 shall persistently defend Visegrad, the dam, Zvornik, and the corridor,

25 while the rest of its forces, in the wider Podrinje region shall exhaust

Page 18663

1 the enemy, inflict the heaviest possible losses on him, force him to

2 leave Birac, Zepa, and Gorazde areas, together with the Muslim

3 population."

4 Again, how does that fit into the overall themes, Mr. Brown?

5 A. Well, I think it's as I said earlier on. This is the directive,

6 and then that the corps - the document that we saw before - that the

7 corps extracts its -- the Drina Corps extracts its component and passes

8 it down to the Zvornik Brigade in relation to operations in the Drina

9 valley, to control that territory and to move Muslims, as it's annotated

10 on that document.

11 Q. All right. Yes, thank you. That's all I ask about that

12 document.

13 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, may that be admitted and marked,

14 please.

15 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.

16 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P1780, Your Honours.

17 MS. KORNER:

18 Q. All right. Going back to your report again, Mr. Brown. From

19 paragraph -- and we've looked at some of the examples that you specified

20 in paragraph 1.53. You say that by -- in paragraph 1.54:

21 "By the summer of 1992, it was clear that the objectives of

22 creating a Serb state were not just political rhetoric but were a driving

23 factor behind the actions of the military."

24 And that's effectively what you've been describing to us now; is

25 that right?

Page 18664

1 A. Yes. I think there are some other documents as well that are

2 referenced. But I would argue that that is the case.

3 Q. Right. There are, in fact, a number of other references to other

4 documents, but because of the time, I'm going to move on. Right.

5 Yes, sorry, I'm doing -- because it's both of us speaking

6 English, I gather what has been happening with the B/C/S witnesses, not

7 leaving a pause.

8 Now, the strategic goals, and finally on this part before we move

9 to the next part of your ... were set out, were they not, very clearly in

10 a report which deals with a number of themes. And we may as well look at

11 that now. The analysis of the combat readiness of the army, which was

12 produced in 1993.

13 MS. KORNER: And it's document 1305, and it's at tab 62.

14 If we look, after the table of contents, effectively, at the

15 beginning of that, it's page 7 in English, control and command. And in

16 B/C/S it's on the -- it's page 8, I think. Yeah. Yes.

17 Q. It talks about what's happened in the VRS and says:

18 "The objective of our operations, battles, and engagement [sic]

19 in the recent period has been to defend the Serbian People against

20 genocide by the Muslim-Ustasha forces ... protect the property and

21 cultural heritage of the Serbian People, and to liberate ... territories

22 which are ours," and so on and so forth.

23 MS. KORNER: In fact, if we then look, please, at the third --

24 sorry, page 10 in English. And in B/C/S, at page 11, I think.

25 Q. Now, it says here:

Page 18665

1 "The control and command function in the framework of the

2 establishment of the Army of Republika Srpska developed in two stages.

3 The first from April -- 1st of April to 15th of June. And the second

4 from that date until today?"

5 Now, the -- the establishment of the VRS took place, did it not,

6 on the 12th of May, the 12th of May Assembly?

7 A. Yes, it did.

8 Q. Right. So when it talks about developed in two stages, what's it

9 referring to there?

10 A. I believe maybe what they're talking about is that once the army

11 was announced at the 16th Assembly Session there was a period where, if

12 you like, the formal structure of exactly what the corps were going to

13 consist of, the units that were going to be subordinated, the

14 Light Infantry Brigades that were going to be created into the TO, took a

15 few weeks or a period to be established. And that probably meant work at

16 the Main Staff level, maybe at the Presidency level. But once that had

17 been agreed and accepted, there -- I think, at least according to this

18 document, there was a formal establishment instruction which was passed

19 out around the 15th of June.

20 Q. Right.

21 A. That doesn't mean to say that I think when this army was

22 established on 12th of May that they were not -- the Main Staff was

23 somehow in a vacuum, because there are -- for example, the mobilisation

24 instruction was passed on the 20th of May by the Presidency, passed down

25 through the Main Staff to General Talic. He instructed that. There are

Page 18666

1 reports going up from General Talic prior to the 15th of May and

2 after the -- 15th of June and after the 12th of May, reports going up to

3 the Main Staff, daily combat reports two or three times a day. There are

4 instructions coming down to the Main Staff.

5 So I think it's a little bit ambiguous, this date. But I think

6 maybe what it meant was that around the middle of June all the pieces

7 were in place in terms of the formal establishment structure of what each

8 corps in the VRS was going to be. But it -- from my perspective, it

9 didn't mean that the VRS was not functioning between it's establishment

10 on the 12th of May and the middle of June. Far from it, actually.

11 JUDGE HARHOFF: Who exactly made this analysis?

12 THE WITNESS: This type of analysis was not unusual in the JNA.

13 And, in fact, I suspect what happened was that the VRS, because there

14 were many of them, were all former JNA officers, that they simply

15 utilised this process. And it was an established process within the JNA

16 to conduct, in essence, a retrospective analysis of how formations had

17 been in a particular period. And I think staff officers at the

18 Main Staff would have contributed components to this. The Main Staff

19 officers would have been heavily involved. And I know that there were

20 reports that went -- for example, the corps were expected to provide an

21 analysis of combat readiness, which, in turn, would assist the staff

22 officers at the Main Staff in compiling this analysis.

23 So, for example, there are logistic issues, issues on tanks,

24 communications, and I would suspect that each staff officer under whose

25 remit that function fell would probably be the person that would provide

Page 18667

1 the material for that analysis. And it would be fused together -- I

2 don't know for a fact, but possibly by someone like the chief of

3 operations, senior staff officer at the Main Staff, or maybe another

4 important senior staff officer.

5 So the information is provided by the subordinate formations, the

6 staff officers in the particular departments within the Main Staff would

7 most likely have provided the material that is relevant to their remits,

8 and it would probably be pulled together by maybe the operations and

9 training department to provide the full report.

10 JUDGE HARHOFF: Do you know if such reports were made regularly?

11 And were they made for purely internal purposes within the army, or were

12 they drawn up for external purposes so as to be presented to the

13 political leadership or others outside the military structure?

14 THE WITNESS: I think this is a type of document, bearing in mind

15 its size, that was once a year or relatively -- a relatively expanded

16 piece. But there is -- in the beginning of this document, it clearly

17 went with a briefing. It didn't just go as an interesting thick document

18 that went in the archive. Because at the beginning of the document it --

19 it's -- it gives an analysis briefing that clearly occurred. And when

20 you look at that, it's not just military figures that are attending this

21 briefing. It includes the political leadership. There are -- all the

22 various departments of the army, I think, are talking about their

23 individual component. And I believe even the minister of interior

24 attended this briefing.

25 So I think in this particular case -- this document was written

Page 18668

1 in 1993, so it is a retrospective document. I think it's April 1993; I

2 have to check the date, but I think it's April 1993. But it's reflecting

3 back on what had happened in 1992, and that was the normal format of this

4 type of report. In the JNA days it would be quite similar. But clearly

5 this one had been accompanied - I'm assuming occurred - because there is

6 a timetable of who is to brief --

7 MS. KORNER: [Overlapping speakers] ... yes, and if we go back --

8 if Your Honours -- yes, can we go back, please, to the page 4 in the

9 English after the contents table, and we'll see that. And in B/C/S it

10 will be at page -- it's at page 3. 5. Sorry. Page 5.

11 JUDGE HARHOFF: But I think -- the important point of my question

12 was to shed some light over the recipients of this information.

13 THE WITNESS: I don't know who -- who were on the distribution.

14 I'd have to check. There is a distribution at the back, potentially.

15 But I don't know. But certainly, bearing in mind this was found in the

16 Krajina Corps archive, it's clearly gone down the military chain. And

17 you'd expect that. It reflects many of the issues that the army is to

18 address. I mean, the purpose of the report is not just to look back and

19 say, This is what happened; it's to address what they need to do in the

20 forthcoming period.

21 So clearly it's gone down. And clearly there's obviously a

22 briefing that involves other people outside the military. But I can't

23 tell you whether this document more widely was disseminated outside the

24 military structure.

25 JUDGE HARHOFF: Because the important thing is to know also

Page 18669

1 whether it was pushed upwards, more particularly to the government.

2 MS. KORNER: It's signed -- yes, sorry, Your Honour, that we can

3 do. It's signed. It's actually signed by Karadzic.

4 If we go, please, to page 157 in English. I believe it's page

5 137 in the B/C/S. When I say "signed," it appears under his signature as

6 supreme commander. It's not actually signed I don't think. It's just

7 typed.

8 English, please, at page 157.

9 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you.

10 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, I have some more questions on this

11 document, but I'm told it's time for the break.

12 JUDGE HALL: Yes.

13 So we would resume in 20 minutes.

14 [The witness stands down]

15 --- Recess taken at 5.26 p.m.

16 --- On resuming at 5.53 p.m.

17 [The witness takes the stand]

18 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, I have had put up on the screen the

19 part that Mr. Brown was referring to about who was present at this

20 briefing on the report.

21 Q. All right, Mr. Brown, I've had put up on the screen the part of

22 that document that you were referring to, which is the briefing session,

23 it would appear. And we can see that at 1330 to 1400 there were speeches

24 by the guest participants in the analysis, the RS prime minister,

25 RS defence minister, and the minister of the interior, who I hasten to

Page 18670

1 add, in April 1993 was not, of course, Mico Stanisic.

2 Ten minutes per speech. I would be very surprised if that was

3 adhered to.

4 MS. KORNER: And then over the page, please, very quickly.

5 Q. In fact it appears there were representatives from other armies

6 there as well.

7 And then finally, at 1610, contribution of the supreme commander

8 of the armed forces of Republika Srpska to the analysis of the combat

9 readiness.

10 And that was, in fact, was it not, Mr. Karadzic, as we saw?

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. Yep. Right. Can we then go back to the part that was dealing

13 with. I think we've dealt with the dates that were shown about the

14 starting. And as you deal with in your report, in fact, we can see from

15 other documents that you reference that there were -- the Main Staff was

16 issuing instructions and orders before its formal date of the

17 15th of June.

18 MS. KORNER: The next -- oh, sorry. Page 11. Back to page 11 in

19 English. And page 11 also in B/C/S.

20 Q. In the second paragraph, it says how big the army was by

21 April of 1993. "The Army of Republika Srpska currently numbers 222.727

22 persons..."

23 Are you able to comment at all on that, Mr. Brown?

24 A. No. I mean, I think it's at face value. That the size of the

25 military. And the 1st Krajina Corps, I think, was around about 70.000 at

Page 18671

1 that time. So it was one of the biggest, in fact, it was not -- it was

2 the biggest by some significant way, by that time.

3 Q. Right.

4 MS. KORNER: Then if we go next, please, to page 13 in English,

5 and where they're talking about infantry units. And it's page 13 also in

6 B/C/S.

7 Q. Now, you deal -- in fact, you reference this part of the report

8 later on when you're dealing with other matters. Really the cooperation

9 with the Territorial Defence units. But we may as well deal with this as

10 one whole.

11 "The infantry units which through some self-organisation grew on

12 a massive scale out of the Territorial Defence and other units were used

13 only at the beginning of the war according to the decisions of

14 Crisis Staffs and similar authorative bodies. Amongst the infantry

15 units, there were also units which represented various political

16 structures, which were sometimes in opposition to the overall objectives

17 of our war. Some of them developed into paramilitary formations. These

18 units mainly executed missions in the territories of their own

19 municipalities or even smaller areas. Initially the units elected their

20 own commanders. And the targets of actions were chosen collectively.

21 And individuals or groups sometimes abandoned the set goals."

22 Now, again, really, what themes do we see, in this part, that you

23 consider to be important?

24 A. Well, I think looking at other documentation it would seem that

25 that first component about the use of Crisis Staffs, the referencing

Page 18672

1 Territorial Defence units that ended up being incorporated into the VRS

2 as light brigade, that would seem to be what happened. There were

3 municipal operations in which localised TO, or former TO, light brigades

4 were used, as well as regular VRS, I have to say. But it would seem to

5 be -- and then what happened is these units were integrated into the VRS.

6 And as the municipalities were brought under control, the operations

7 tended to change, at least in the 1st Krajina Corps, into larger, more

8 set, peace combat operations.

9 For example, the operations in the corridor. Operations in Jajce

10 was one, another one. So I think it would seem to be reasonably

11 reflective of what did happen in the early -- late spring, early summer,

12 municipality attacks with the use of Crisis Staffs at a localised level.

13 And then what happened later in summer were the more set piece, either

14 consolidation of the territory that they had, or larger-set peace combat

15 operations, like occurred in Jajce.

16 Q. All right. And there they refer also to the -- the units which

17 developed into paramilitary formations. Again, is that a theme that we

18 see echoed throughout the documentation that you've looked at, this

19 question of these so-called paramilitary organisations?

20 A. Yes. There were -- I -- I go back. I make no bones that there

21 were references in the documents, the military documents, that there were

22 what they called paramilitary groups outside the VRS that they wanted to

23 bring in under control. I would argue that it would seem, certainly in

24 the municipalities where the documentation is stronger, such as Prijedor,

25 such as Sanski Most, such as Kljuc, that the units from a military

Page 18673

1 perspective, although they were often operating or at least the documents

2 say they were operating with the police and -- you know, with

3 Crisis Staffs, the documents for me show that the units, the military

4 units that were involved in these municipalities were not paramilitary

5 ones. For example, the 43rd Motorised Brigade was not a paramilitary

6 group or unit. It was a formed unit of the 5th Corps that had operated

7 in Sanski -- in Croatia. It was sent back by Talic into Prijedor and

8 then it [indiscernible].

9 The 6th brigade that we saw earlier on that was deployed back

10 from Western Slavonia into Sanski Most was not a paramilitary group. The

11 1st Partisan Brigade operated in parts of Kljuc was not a paramilitary

12 group.

13 So, yes, there are references to paramilitaries and the problem

14 of paramilitaries, but I wouldn't necessarily overplay them that they

15 somehow were the units that were involved in all or many or even most, I

16 have to say, of the actual takeover of municipalities or combat

17 operations that were taken in controlling the territory in that first

18 stage that they talk about.

19 Q. Right.

20 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Brown, speaking as a military expert, would

21 you consider any military advantage for an army leadership to have such

22 paramilitary groups operating more or less on their own? Perhaps as

23 autonomous units that would be or could be controlled or guided on a very

24 superior level so as to say that such groups could be asked to assist in

25 this or that operation but other than that, these groups would be

Page 18674

1 operating on their own, basically.

2 Is there, from a military point of view, any advantage to having

3 such groups; or are they merely a nuisance to the military leadership and

4 the military structures?

5 THE WITNESS: I'm a little bit unclear. Your Honour, are you

6 talking about from my own experience or are you talking about from what I

7 see maybe from the documents relating to the VRS?

8 JUDGE HARHOFF: Sorry for being unclear. I'm talking about your

9 evaluation of the use that these paramilitary groups in Bosnia in 1992

10 could have offered to the army, if any.

11 THE WITNESS: I think, depending on who they are and what their

12 skills are and what they've done before, there could have been a value.

13 JUDGE HARHOFF: Such as?

14 THE WITNESS: Well, for example, if you look at

15 Veljko Milankovic, who clearly had some following in his municipality,

16 who clearly had a desire to fight - I'm assuming because he sent his

17 organisation and himself to Croatia - who continued to fight through 1992

18 until he was killed later in the war, of course they would have had --

19 and it may well have been they gained some experience or knowledge of

20 particular areas. It may well have had some significant previous

21 training. So from a strictly military perspective, there could have been

22 significant value in having them within the military.

23 But I think one of the issues potentially for Talic is that he is

24 a former JNA man. He has been instructed that the Serbian army is to

25 have a unified command and that -- that that should mean that anybody who

Page 18675

1 is in the army or -- or an armed unit, I mean, outside maybe the

2 Ministry of Interior, which also, you know, has an armed component,

3 should be placed under a command.

4 And I think I argue in the report is that, yes, he makes

5 references to, We must disband these groups or break them up, but it

6 strikes me that it's as much an issue of command and control as it is

7 about the unhappiness of what these organisations -- organisations have

8 actually done. He brings Veljko Milankovic into his corps and he gives

9 him a task with the knowledge that this mans has created problems in the

10 past. And I think it's almost -- but -- it is a complicated issue, I

11 have to say, and it is -- it strikes me is that the greater goal of

12 having a unified Serb position and a unified army counts more than the

13 fact that these people are looting, committing crimes, are sometimes

14 disreputable characters, and challenging what they see as the legal

15 authority, i.e., their authority. That seems to be the problem for them.

16 More than the really obvious one, is that, Is this the type of

17 organisation you want to bring into a military organisation?

18 Because I know from my own military perspective there would have

19 been, talking about the British Army here, there is no way that I could

20 see any commander that I have known in my military service come anywhere

21 close to some of these groups that are outlined in some of these reports,

22 let alone, you know, integrate them into their command.

23 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you for this answer. Could I just put a

24 supplementary question: Namely, if you are in possession of any evidence

25 to show that these paramilitary groups were assigned particular tasks by

Page 18676

1 the military, such as mopping-up operations or cleaning up after the

2 takeover, do you have any evidence to support this? Or is that

3 [Overlapping speakers] ...

4 THE WITNESS: [Overlapping speakers] ... I would like to refresh

5 my report and some of the footnotes and maybe get back to you, if I

6 could, tomorrow on that. There are references to paramilitaries

7 operating. I said Milinkovic was one that was integrated into the corps

8 and send off for operations. Whether it was specifically to do cleaning

9 up operations, I would have to look again at the documents, if that's

10 possible.

11 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you.

12 Back to you again, Ms. Korner.

13 MS. KORNER: Yes. Your Honours, this -- the references - it may

14 assist Mr. Brown; we may as well deal with it, if we can, now - at

15 page 20 of the report in English, paragraph 1.26, 1.25, really, because

16 it's Western Slavonia that ...

17 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you. I think we should let the witness

18 come back to this point, if he wishes to expand on his answer --

19 MS. KORNER: Certainly.

20 JUDGE HARHOFF: -- tomorrow.

21 MS. KORNER:

22 Q. Well, Mr. Brown, if, tomorrow morning, after you've had a chance

23 to look through it, you come up with anything, then you can let the Court

24 know.

25 MS. KORNER: Can we go back, please, then, to the -- this combat

Page 18677

1 readiness report. The next paragraph says:

2 "When the army of the Republika Srpska was formed, the units were

3 incorporated into it."

4 If we go over the page, please, in English, and also in B/C/S, to

5 page 14, we see there, in paragraph -- second paragraph on that page:

6 "The [sic] infantry units formed are equipped with weapons

7 received from the former JNA which were distributed by officers, members

8 of the SDS, or other representatives of the Serbian People."

9 Q. Now, again, this theme of the arming, coming from the JNA, from

10 the SDS, and Serbs, is that a theme that had been prevalent -- sorry,

11 prevalent, had been seen in Western Slavonia?

12 A. Yes. I said earlier I think there were some admittedly small

13 number of reference in the documents to the arming of the Serbian TO in

14 Western Slavonia. There were a small number of other JNA documents in

15 the period prior to the establishment of the VRS which would indicate

16 that the JNA were supplying weapons to TOs prior to the -- if you like,

17 the breakup of Bosnia.

18 Q. All right. It then deals with what the arms were. And then

19 says:

20 "Since the Muslims did not have enough weapons or support

21 equipment, no significant support of infantry units in action was

22 necessary, especially not by longer-range or higher range [sic] calibre

23 ordnance. The need for it grew steadily as the war progressed."

24 Again, from your examination and analysis of the documents, is

25 that an accurate description, that the Muslims simply didn't have weapons

Page 18678

1 or support in the way that the VRS did?

2 A. Well, my report didn't go into details on the issues of the

3 Muslim capability. That's not what the report was asked to do. And it

4 was looking specifically at the Krajina Corps documents that gave an

5 indication. However, I would have to say that, in essence, although

6 there was some pull-out of JNA units, to all intents and purposes, the

7 JNA, at least in March -- February, March, April, that was present in

8 Bosnia, became the VRS. Yes, there were individuals who left,

9 non-Bosnian ethnicity. There was the pull-out of some equipment from the

10 JNA. But to all intents and purposes, the JNA became the VRS. And the

11 JNA was a military organisation that had had combat operations in Croatia

12 over a protracted period of time. And I would, as I say, although I

13 haven't looked at, in detail, the issue of the ABiH, I don't think --

14 well, I know they were not -- I believe they were not armed in anything

15 like the way that the VRS was. I don't see the heavy artillery, I don't

16 see tanks, I don't see communications systems, all the things that the

17 JNA had had which used in Croatia. I don't see that with the ABiH at

18 all.

19 Q. And just while we're on this page - and it's purely in case

20 anybody raises any inquiries - they describe the features of an attack at

21 the bottom of it, and they say at number 7, or dot 7:

22 "An attack is usually carried out by special units, so-called

23 intervention, special or assault formations."

24 Do you know what they mean here by "special units"?

25 A. Some -- it's not completely unusual; they may call them different

Page 18679

1 names, but some infantry battalions, in the way that they would have what

2 are called rifle companies or infantry companies, occasionally have a

3 specialist platoon or a specialist reconnaissance platoon. Often it's

4 called "intervention platoon" in the JNA. And these may well be people

5 who are more highly trained, highly trained in reconnaissance issues,

6 maybe certain special weapons skills. And it may be that it's relating

7 to that.

8 Q. And then one more question on a particular item. Two, further

9 on, they talk about the fortification of lines during an attack is not

10 carried out, is that ... and interdictions, very seldom.

11 What does that mean in military parlance?

12 A. Interdiction normally means, if you like, the severance of a line

13 of communication or an ambush on a particular route. It's to -- or to --

14 an attack or maybe even the mining of an area to stop the enemy utilising

15 that route. I don't necessarily think there's anything unusual in that

16 reference.

17 Q. All right. Yep. Can we move on then, please, just to look at a

18 couple of other matters in this report.

19 MS. KORNER: If we go to the assessment of morale at page 45 in

20 English, and I think it's the same in, yes, B/C/S. Or maybe it's not,

21 actually. Just a moment. Sorry, I'm not sure it is. I think I've got

22 the wrong ... that's a later one.

23 Sorry, it's page 40 in B/C/S.

24 Q. "Factors which influenced the morale of units in the army" - and

25 we'll look at some morale reports later - but "the attitude of the

Page 18680

1 international community to the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis and war,

2 and we see the Serbian People, midway through the paragraph, was

3 subjected to inconceivable demonisation. The unscrupulous information,

4 propaganda war, in almost all of the powerful states of the world, in

5 particular the orchestrated planting of lies about alleged massacres of

6 civilians, bombardment of civilian facilities, POW camps, ethnic

7 cleansing, the raping of women, and other media fabrications serve to

8 project a distorted picture of the national interests of the Serbian

9 people ..."

10 Now, Mr. Brown, from your reading of the documents, was this a

11 position that the JNA was taking throughout, that what was being said

12 about what was happening was propaganda and lies?

13 A. I'm not necessarily saying the JNA, but the VRS.

14 Q. Sorry, the VRS. Yeah.

15 A. The VRS did make such comments that, in essence, there was some

16 external -- there was -- the external actors were misrepresenting and

17 mis-portraying their position. And I think this -- I mean, I guess I

18 read it like most, that what they're trying to say here is that these

19 allegations of massacres or camps were somehow an external propaganda and

20 that, I guess, the inferences is that they're not true.

21 Q. All right.

22 MS. KORNER: And then over the page, please, to the current

23 situation in Republika Srpska, and it's in the next page in B/C/S as

24 well.

25 Q. The first paragraph again talks about the Serbs' problem. But

Page 18681

1 it's the second paragraph I want to look at part of. In the middle of

2 that paragraph, a series of military and political consultations that was

3 held to consider the situation and course of combat operations, the

4 functioning of the political authorities, and problems of cooperation

5 between the civil authorities and the army, the numerous meetings held

6 between unit commands, local authorities, and so on and so forth.

7 Again, when you looked at the documents, is that

8 paragraph reflected in those documents, namely, the meetings and the

9 cooperation that's described here?

10 A. Yes, I think that seems to be the case. And obviously this is a

11 relatively general comment in one line, but do see -- if you ask me do I

12 see examples of municipal meetings with military and civil and police, I

13 do see that. Have I seen requests for cooperation in court? Yes, I do.

14 Have I seen it at the senior level? Well, there are references in, for

15 example, Mladic's diary where he is attending meetings with senior level

16 figures but he's also touring the ground with local and municipal

17 leaders. So if you ask me if I've seen examples that would seem to

18 corroborate that, I would say yes.

19 Q. All right.

20 MS. KORNER: I want to move, please, to where we see the size of

21 the Krajina Corps as a whole. Just find that. Just a moment. Thought I

22 had it marked.

23 Yes, if we come, please, to page -- well, let's start page 69 in

24 English, and it's page 62 in the B/C/S. Then we see -- we've really

25 dealt with this, the organisation of the Army of Republika Srpska and

Page 18682

1 then the forming of the Main Staff. But let's go over the page then,

2 please, two pages. Page 71 in English and 64 in B/C/S.

3 Q. And there we see, do we, that the total size of the

4 1st Krajina Corps on page 71 involves -- was some 72.000 men?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And as you say, rightly, if we look at the size of the other

7 corps, and this is in 1993, it really is virtually three times as large

8 as the next largest, isn't it, which was the ...

9 A. I think the Drina Corps and the Sarajevo corps were quite

10 reasonable in size, but they are still not anything like the size of the

11 1 KK.

12 Q. Just while we're on that, because we've heard a lot of references

13 to various units or the ... can we just briefly deal with, please, what

14 the rough size, obviously it may vary, of the various components that

15 made up the 1st Krajina Corps or generally more than that.

16 First of all, how many men would there be in a brigade, roughly?

17 A. Well, it would vary, depending on what the brigade was. If it

18 was an armoured brigade or an artillery brigade or a light infantry

19 brigade or an infantry brigade, so it did vary. But you could be talking

20 thousands. Maybe 3.000.

21 Q. All right. I don't think the VRS had regiments, did it?

22 A. It did. But they were -- for example, they would have an

23 engineering regiment, so they did use the phrase regiment.

24 Q. Okay. And what sort of the size would they [Overlapping

25 speakers] ...

Page 18683

1 A. Probably around the same size. Maybe slightly smaller than a

2 brigade.

3 Q. All right. A battalion?

4 A. Well, a battalion normally can be about 600 people. And that's

5 kind of similar to what it would be in the British Army. But usually a

6 battalion is maybe around 600.

7 Q. A company.

8 A. I don't know for sure for the VRS, but a company normally is

9 about 100 to 120 men. Maybe a few more but not many more.

10 Q. And then a platoon?

11 A. Those ones are usually about 30 men.

12 Q. And, finally, a squad?

13 A. A squad, I know from the British Army were always impoverished,

14 so we have fewer men than the Americans, but the -- it's usually about

15 eight to 12 men.

16 Q. All right. And then if we just look at, in April 1993, we can

17 see the total number of the VRS at page 73, in English. And --

18 JUDGE HARHOFF: Could I just ask, before leaving the diagram on

19 the screen.

20 Under officers and non-commissioned officers, there are two

21 figures above a line and under a line; what's the difference between the

22 two? Do you know?

23 THE WITNESS: I'm not sure, sir. Whether one relates to active

24 military personnel and one reservists; that could be one of the issues,

25 that the one below the line or, if you like, regular people and the

Page 18684

1 others are reservists. But I'm a little bit unclear myself, sir.

2 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you.

3 MS. KORNER: And if we move, please, to page 73 in English; 65 in

4 B/C/S.

5 Q. We see there the total figure for the VRS in April of 1993 was

6 214.000 men altogether.

7 Yep. Although you do actually reference -- well, actually, while

8 were on the subject, just one other thing, while were on the subject of

9 the ethnicity personnel.

10 MS. KORNER: Can we go to page 80 in English, sorry, and I'm not

11 sure which page it is, actually. It will be page -- yes. It's page 72

12 in B/C/S.

13 Q. Where they refer to the national structure of active officers

14 serving in the VRS: 37 Macedonians, 204 Yugoslavs, and then 33 Muslims,

15 62 Croats, 33 Muslims, and 200.165 Serbs. So it would appear that some

16 Muslims and some Croats did remain with the VRS?

17 A. Yes, outside of military officers. And I think, getting back to

18 your other point, Your Honour, I think the line does mean, I think, if

19 you look at the figures, it says the 1 KK of the 4.054 officers

20 established 2.373, or 59 per cent are filled with officers, of whom 398

21 or 17 per cent are active military officers. So I think that reflects in

22 the figure, the lower figures, active military personnel, i.e.,

23 professional officers. Other ones are reservist, people who've had

24 military service but have been recalled.

25 But, yes, the figure in relation to the ethnicities relates to

Page 18685

1 active personnel, but it would still seem to be relatively small.

2 MS. KORNER: And then, finally, can we look at this report at

3 page 90 in English, and it's page 80 in B/C/S.

4 Q. Paragraph 9:

5 "The intensity and pace of combat operations of the army ...

6 necessary to accommodate increasing numbers of POWs. In the past period

7 we processed about 8.500 prisoners of war, filed criminal reports for

8 various criminal offences against about 1.000 of them. And during the

9 processing of prisoners of war, we pursued a policy of massive

10 persuasion, whose effects will be apparent after a few years."

11 In this context, did you understand what's meant by "massive

12 persuasion"?

13 A. This is under the intelligence and security section so I suspect

14 that what they're trying to do is turn them or use them as informants.

15 And that's what they mean. In the later years, the information they may

16 get may be of valuable to them. Some of them, not eight and a half

17 thousand of them, but I think, bearing in mind this is under the

18 intelligence and security section, it may -- may mean that they're trying

19 to persuade released POWs or POWs to somehow continue to provide

20 information in the coming period.

21 Q. All right. And then under paragraph 10, in the middle of that

22 para they're talking about cooperation, and again this is under

23 intelligence and security.

24 "Our cooperation with the MUP of Republika Srpska and especially

25 with the MUP of the Republic of Serbia and of the Federal Republic of

Page 18686

1 Yugoslavia we consider to be unsatisfactory, that the main cause being,

2 in our opinion, the passivity of the organ mentioned and their reluctance

3 to expand cooperation ..."

4 And it goes on to say at the end of the paragraph that they're

5 going to call for meetings with the intelligence and security affairs.

6 All right. And I think that's really all -- although, as I say,

7 you refer to other parts. That's all that want to ask about that

8 document.

9 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, may that be admitted and marked.

10 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.

11 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P1781, Your Honours.

12 MS. KORNER:

13 Q. Sorry, going back to your report then, Mr. Brown, you -- we

14 stopped at paragraph 1.69, but I think I want to deal with the next part

15 fairly quickly. Formation of the 1st Krajina Corps, effectively you

16 cover that and give the documentation which is relevant.

17 Then you deal, at paragraph 1.77, with mobilisation. And you set

18 out there the background to the mobilisation order that we looked at. Is

19 that correct?

20 A. Yes, that's correct, Ms. Korner.

21 Q. Can we look now, please, if we move through, as I say, you set

22 this up all very clearly in your report, to the area of responsibility of

23 the 1st Krajina Corps, which is paragraph 1.83 at page 39.

24 Now, you set out very clearly the -- where -- which area it

25 covered. The more complicated of the municipalities was Kljuc, if we can

Page 18687

1 summarize that. Is that right?

2 A. Yes. I -- I think in the early part of June there was clearly

3 some discussion between the neighbouring corps, the 2nd Krajina Corps and

4 the 1st Krajina Corps, as to who and how Kljuc should be included and

5 whose area of responsibility it should be in. And I think it was then

6 subsequently passed on to the 2nd Krajina Corps, although there was a

7 period, I think maybe late May and the first few days of June, where

8 Kljuc, the units in Kljuc that were conducting operations in Kljuc, were

9 part of the 1st Krajina Corps. But there was an anomaly as to exactly

10 whose area of responsibility Kljuc fell.

11 Q. I think that's pretty clearly documented and referred to in your

12 report.

13 MS. KORNER: If we can just, so that we can see a pictorial

14 representation of it, the map. Could we have a look, please, at 10639,

15 tab 64.

16 Now, the copy in the bundle is pretty small, so hopefully we can

17 blow up bits of it so it's clear what we're looking at.

18 It has not been translated but I think you'll -- does it -- well,

19 I suppose, actually, we ought to properly get a translation from the

20 interpreters, if we could just -- well, if you could -- no, well,

21 actually, it's quite complicated to get ...

22 Q. Mr. Brown, what does the heading say? That's the simplest.

23 A. I believe it says "Area of Responsibility of the 1st Krajina

24 Corps."

25 Q. Right.

Page 18688

1 And if there's any doubt about it, what it says ...

2 Then can we see, what do the markings that we can see across

3 this?

4 A. The one that I'm a little bit unclear on is the yellow one in the

5 middle, the smallest one. But the -- going from top left: Ops

6 Group Prijedor; Tactical Group 6 is the red one next to it; Tactical

7 Group 3; Tactical Group 1; 5; 4; Ops Group Doboj; I believe this is

8 OG Vlasic, the green one at the bottom; and then I think this is

9 30th Infantry Division. But the one in the middle, I'm a little bit

10 unclear as to what that says.

11 Q. All right. I hope it doesn't matter too much.

12 MS. KORNER: If we can just -- I don't know whether we can zoom

13 in slightly --

14 Q. Oh, I'm sorry, Mr. Brown, there's one other ... where does this

15 map actually come from? And can you -- it's not dated, but are you able

16 to say, from your knowledge, roughly when it was produced?

17 A. This was a map that was within the 1st Krajina Corps collection.

18 It's rather a large laminated map, I believe, if I remember rightly. So

19 it was within the collection.

20 I believe it is a map that most likely was made in late 1992.

21 And I say that because the area of responsibility would seem to match, if

22 you like, the furthest extent that the corps got after it secured the

23 whole of the corridor area, which is the area to the top right, and also

24 operations in Jajce which were in the Autumn or late summer/Autumn of

25 1992.

Page 18689

1 So it must be at least after those operations. And my assessment

2 is it's most likely to be in late 1992 or maybe even to early 1993. And

3 it would seem to show where the corps had achieved its objectives or

4 achieved its area of responsibility by that period. Although, I have to

5 say I do caveat that with that it is not dated, and, you know, it could

6 be a little bit later than that period.

7 Q. All right. And, I mean, the municipalities it covers --

8 actually, I think one of the documents does have a list, but it's all

9 those going up to -- does that go up to the border with Croatia?

10 A. Yes. Yes, that -- in essence, the river is the top boundary of

11 the corps.

12 Q. Yeah. Yes. Yes, thank you.

13 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, may that be admitted and marked,

14 please.

15 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.

16 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P1782, Your Honours.

17 MS. KORNER:

18 Q. Now in respect of Kljuc, I think you note at -- in paragraph 1.95

19 that military operations and attacks that had occurred there IN late May/

20 early June were carried out by units under Major Talic's command --

21 General Major Talic's command. There was then a meeting, and units were

22 resubordinated to the command of the 2nd Krajina Corps.

23 But I want to look at one document that you reference there,

24 please, in that paragraph.

25 MS. KORNER: Could we have a look, please, at ... it's -- sorry.

Page 18690

1 Where has it gone to? Yes. Document 65 ter 805, at tab 15.

2 Q. Now, this is a document of the 31st of May, 1992. And if one

3 goes to the third page in English and the third page, also, in B/C/S,

4 it's signed by Colonel Galic, then-Colonel Galic. Is that the same Galic

5 who then went on to deal with the siege of Sarajevo?

6 A. Yes, that's correct. He was the 30th Infantry Division or

7 Partisan Division, as it was called in the JNA days, in Mrkonjic Grad

8 area, under Talic, and then a little bit later than that he went to

9 become the corps commander of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.

10 Q. All right. And was this the 30th Partisan Division one of the

11 divisions that came under General Talic's command?

12 A. That's correct, yes.

13 Q. All right.

14 MS. KORNER: Can we go back to the first page, please.

15 Q. This is an order. He says:

16 "Because of the recent situation in the municipality of Kljuc and

17 resumption of the blood-thirsty activities of the Green Berets," and so

18 on and so forth, "I hereby order the Kljuc Defence command shall be

19 mounted in the zone of the municipality of Kljuc."

20 And then he sets out who it should consist of, and it includes in

21 that list the chief of the Kljuc public security station, the president

22 of the municipality of Kljuc with two or three members of the current

23 Crisis Staff, then operatives and clerks. The primary task assigned to

24 the Kljuc defence command shall be the protection of the Serbian People

25 in the grater area of the municipality.

Page 18691

1 Now, first of all, the term "defence command," is that one that

2 crops up regularly in documents.

3 A. No. I have to say I think this is the only time I have seen it

4 in that phrase.

5 Q. All right. And do you -- from your looking at it, these

6 documents, what was the purpose of -- of this, as far as you understand

7 it, in May of 1992?

8 A. I think I put it in line with similar kind of activities that

9 were going on in other municipalities, whereby there was a coordinated

10 effort by municipal actors in order to conduct operations, or take

11 control of territory, or defend territories as it sometimes may be

12 stated, often utilizing members of the civilian authorities or involving

13 members of the civilian authority, the police and the military. If you

14 like, a sort of coordinated effort in that area. And there's a --

15 similar to occurred -- would seem to have occurred in Prijedor, for

16 example, or in Sanski Most, where you had Crisis Staffs with a similar

17 kind of makeup. I would put it along that. Although, I have to say,

18 that the phrasing of "defence command" is one, as I said, that I hadn't

19 necessarily seen before.

20 Q. All right. In most of the documents that we've looked at so far

21 and which we'll look at later, there's cooperation with the other

22 authorities, the civil authorities, the police. Here it appears to be an

23 order.

24 A. Yes, it would seem to be, which, I have to say, is the only one I

25 have seen like that and is somewhat unusual, I suspect. But I haven't

Page 18692

1 seen a similar instruction in the corps documents.

2 Q. All right.

3 MS. KORNER: Yes, Your Honours, could that be -- I don't think

4 that has been admitted so far, has it? No. Your Honours, could that be

5 admitted and marked.

6 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.

7 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P1783, Your Honours.

8 MS. KORNER:

9 Q. In that context, I think it is also worth looking at a document,

10 that comes from the civil side. Can we look, please, at document -- just

11 a moment. The description of our list seems to be a bit odd. 37.

12 Should be -- it should be a report on the work of the Crisis Staff. Can

13 we just -- sorry. Sorry, the description is completely out of kilter of

14 what the document is. But it's 2783, 65 ter number.

15 All right. This is a report on the work of the Crisis Staff

16 (War Presidency) of the Municipal Assembly Kljuc in the period from 15

17 May till today. And it's July of 1992.

18 If we go to the second -- the next page in English and also in

19 the B/C/S, we see there at the penultimate paragraph on that page in

20 English but I think it is actually the next page in the B/C/S. Sorry, we

21 need to go to the next page in the B/C/S. Top paragraph there?

22 "Representatives (Commanders) of the VRS who led and conducted

23 war operations defended the territory against Muslim extremists

24 participated regularly at the meetings of the Crisis Staff and War

25 Presidency at the time of the war conflict and had very good cooperation

Page 18693

1 with the Crisis Staff. All important military and police issues were

2 solved, including Crisis Staff of Municipal Assembly. The period can be

3 characterised as a period of very successful cooperation between the

4 Crisis Staff and military organs and the breaking the Muslim extremists's

5 armed resistance, and the Crisis Staff especially emphasised and

6 recognised the efforts and good job of the 30th Division," so on and so

7 forth.

8 And it goes on to say that: "... after the VRS regular and

9 reserve police forces was the whole Serb population ... broke down Muslim

10 extremists's armed resistance, and the Crisis Staff tried as much as was

11 possible in the war conditions to establish civil authority."

12 Taking those two documents together, Mr. Brown, what do you

13 deduce from that?

14 A. Well, I think, at face value, the documents would appear to

15 indicate that there was a coordinated effort to take control of that

16 municipality involving the military, clearly, but also involving the

17 police and the -- the civil authorities. And that there was coordination

18 or cooperation with the Crisis Staff and the military, and it didn't

19 seem -- at least that's what the documents would seem at face value.

20 Q. And it doesn't appear that in this document there is any

21 reference at all to this -- this one document there, where it talks about

22 "defence commands"?

23 A. No, there's not.

24 Q. Yeah. Yes.

25 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, may that document then, please, be

Page 18694

1 admitted and marked.

2 JUDGE HALL: Yes, admitted and marked.

3 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P1784, Your Honours.

4 MS. KORNER:

5 Q. Yes, you then go on to deal, in your report, please, back to your

6 report, at paragraph 1.101, "Cooperation with Civilian Bodies." And you

7 set out there at paragraph 1.105, and it's a document we have looked at

8 on a number of occasions - so I'm not -- although it is on our list, I'm

9 not going to trouble the Court with that - the Djeric instructions. And

10 you looked at the Prijedor decision of the 20th of May, which referred to

11 those instructions. But, again -- I just want to check that one,

12 actually. I think that's already been exhibited, so ...

13 Oh, yes, that's the one where we've got -- there's two versions

14 of it.

15 MS. KORNER: Yes, Your Honour, one -- yes, it's the document at

16 tab 9. I just want to check that. Yes, it is an exhibit.

17 Your Honour, that version of the document doesn't have a date, as

18 I say, but the gazette version, which is 466, does, which is at tab 10,

19 and, Your Honours, I think, simply, for those purposes, we'd better ask

20 to admit the gazette version as well, so we know exactly what the date

21 is. But, Your Honours, I don't want to go through it again because we --

22 but it has already been gone through and it is an exhibit.

23 JUDGE HALL: Sorry, when you say as well --

24 MS. KORNER: It's tab 10, it's 65 ter 466.

25 The previous document has already been admitted, the version of

Page 18695

1 this document, but it doesn't contain a date. The gazette version does.

2 And so I think just for those purposes, we'd better have the gazette

3 version admitted as well.

4 JUDGE HALL: Yes, so admitted and marked.

5 MS. KORNER: Thank you very much.

6 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, one suggestion, Your Honours. Before we

7 do that - make we can check - I think it's a part of the law library.

8 But I cannot --

9 MS. KORNER: Oh, is it?

10 MR. ZECEVIC: But I cannot be 100 percent sure, and my assistant

11 is not in the court right now.

12 JUDGE HALL: Thanks for that reminder, Mr. Zecevic.

13 MS. KORNER: Well, then, Your Honour, I'm perfectly happy to wait

14 until then.

15 I withdraw that application. It's part -- Mr. Zecevic is quite

16 right; it's part of the law library.

17 Q. And, as I say, I think, Mr. Brown, you deal with a number of

18 other documents that show that in -- in your report. And, again, I don't

19 think we need trouble that -- until we get, please, to paragraph 1.113.

20 This may be the last matter that we deal with this afternoon. Where you

21 reference that, in fact, it was General Mladic who ordered that contacts

22 be established with the president of the Autonomous Region of Krajina and

23 that General Talic was a member of the ARK Crisis Staff.

24 And you reference the document, which I think already has been

25 admitted, which is the telephone numbers - yes, it has - it's P557. Can

Page 18696

1 we just have that up very briefly. We see there the telephone numbers of

2 the Krajina Autonomous Region, what is called the War Staff here.

3 Interestingly enough, though, it has everybody's telephone number

4 but General Talic. Are you able to read anything into that at all?

5 A. I -- I couldn't really comment why it's not there or why it

6 should be there but isn't. I'm not sure I could really speculate.

7 Q. All right. Thank you. In that case, I don't think I need

8 trouble that one. Yes.

9 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, I see the time and that's probably a

10 suitable time to break off.

11 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Brown, whereas you know this quite well, I'm,

12 nevertheless, for the record, obliged to remind you that, having been

13 sworn in as a witness, you cannot have any communications with counsel

14 from either side, and in such conversations that you may have outside of

15 the courtroom, you cannot discuss your testimony.

16 So we take the adjournment, to reconvene tomorrow at 3.15 in the

17 afternoon.

18 [The witness stands down]

19 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.00 p.m.,

20 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 12th day of

21 January, 2011, at 3.15 p.m.