1 Wednesday, 12 January 2011
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 3.55 p.m.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honours. Good afternoon,
6 everyone in and around the courtroom.
7 This is case IT-08-91-T, the Prosecutor versus Mico Stanisic and
8 Stojan Zupljanin.
9 JUDGE HALL: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
10 Good afternoon to everyone. May we have the appearances, please.
11 MS. KORNER: Good afternoon, Your Honours. Joanna Korner and
12 Crispian Smith for the Prosecution.
13 MR. ZECEVIC: Good afternoon, Your Honours. Slobodan Zecevic,
14 Slobodan Cvijetic Eugene O'Sullivan, and Ms. Tatjana Savic appearing for
15 Stanisic Defence this afternoon. Thank you.
16 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Your Honours.
17 Dragan Krgovic and Aleksandar Aleksic appearing for Zupljanin Defence.
18 JUDGE HALL: Ms. Korner, I don't know if you are about to raise
19 what I was about to, that is, the motion for videolink, the videolink
20 testimony of 008.
21 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, I'm not. And also can I apologise for
22 my slightly casual attitude outside court. I hadn't appreciated, when
23 I was talking to the Legal Officers, that Your Honour was sitting there.
24 So Your Honour may have heard some remarks which I would not have
25 otherwise made, and I think I ought to say that in open court.
1 JUDGE HALL: I'm tempted, Ms. Korner, to let you remain under the
2 illusion that I did hear something, and actually, as I took my seat you
3 were leaving, so -- so you are relieved.
4 MS. KORNER: Ah. Well, I was somewhat appalled when I turned
5 around to see that you were sitting there, if I can put it that way. May
6 I say, it was nothing entirely disrespectful, Your Honour, to anybody.
7 JUDGE HALL: I'm certain that it wasn't.
8 MS. KORNER: No, Your Honours, actually, there is the videolink
9 motion, which -- if Your Honours want to deal with first. But I want to
10 raise the exhumation database, which is the order was to file today. The
12 [Trial Chamber confers]
13 JUDGE HALL: Yes, so what is -- are you reporting on the progress
14 on that, Ms. Korner?
15 MS. KORNER: Well, yes, I mean, unfortunately it's more than
16 reporting on the progress, it's a plea and an application for one more
17 day. It has turned out to be a major task. We've had something between
18 8 to 10 people working on it since the order was given, with - I hope you
19 don't mind - Christmas day off and boxing day. But unfortunately one of
20 the problems was that we needed permission to get access to the ICMP
21 database in order to give the dates that we were asked to give for each
22 of these documents. And we only got that permission yesterday. And so
23 people have been working effectively around the clock. But in order to
24 try and make it entirely accurate, and I underline the word "try," could
25 we have one more day?
1 [Trial Chamber confers]
2 JUDGE HALL: The Chamber will allow until Friday morning. I now
3 recall that this was a matter that was dealt with just before Christmas,
5 MS. KORNER: It was, Your Honours. And then, in fact, we
6 applied -- because of the change in the order, we applied to the
7 Duty Judge for an extension of time which he gave us until today. And
8 thank you very much for Friday morning.
9 Then, Your Honours, you were about to deal with the videolink
11 JUDGE HALL: Yes. The Chamber has before it the motion from the
12 Prosecution to receive the testimony of Witness 008 by videolink. I
13 believe the dates -- the proposal is the 24th and 25th of January. And
14 we would be appreciative if the Defence could respond, we hope, by the
15 close of today.
16 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, as far as Stanisic Defence is
17 concerned, because I haven't consulted with my learned friend from
18 Zupljanin Defence, I can -- I can state our position right away. If it
19 pleases the Court.
20 JUDGE HALL: Yes, Mr. Zecevic.
21 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, understanding the situation and the
22 circumstances, we do not oppose the motion. Thank you.
23 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Krgovic?
24 MR. KRGOVIC: We do the same. So we have no objection to this.
25 JUDGE HALL: Yes, thank you.
1 So -- so the order is as prayed.
2 MS. KORNER: Thank you very much, Your Honours. Can I say, if
3 the witness was perfectly prepared to return, it was his medical
4 condition which -- which made VWS suggest that this was not a good idea.
5 Your Honours, finally, can I return to this witness. And in the
6 light of my past record you won't be surprised at what I have to say.
7 Doing the very best I can this morning and this afternoon, I've been
8 trying to cut down on the documentation that he should look at,
9 Mr. Brown, but it really is going to take me the rest of the afternoon to
10 deal with his original report and at least a further hour, I think, on
11 the Monday morning to deal with the Mladic aspect, and I -- and so I'm
12 asking for the rest of this afternoon in chief and one further hour on
13 Monday morning. I suppose the only thing I can say is he is the only
14 military expert who's dealing with the military documents.
15 [Trial Chamber confers]
16 JUDGE HALL: Yes, Ms. Korner.
17 [Trial Chamber confers]
18 JUDGE HALL: Doing the arithmetic, Ms. Korner, this doesn't --
19 having regard to the five hours that one side has asked for, I can't
20 remember the --
21 MS. KORNER: Two and a half.
22 JUDGE HALL: -- two and a half, this wouldn't present a problem in
23 terms of the witness returning to his other duties, would it?
24 MS. KORNER: No. No, it wouldn't, Your Honour.
25 JUDGE HALL: Yes.
1 MS. KORNER: So -- and it stops me putting in a complaint about
2 the late delivery of the Defence documents, which arrived 24 hours later
3 than they should have. If I can have the extra time because then we
4 won't get to cross-examination today.
5 JUDGE HALL: Yes.
6 MS. KORNER: Thank you very much.
7 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, of course we do not oppose the
8 application of Ms. Korner, and it's true that we are delayed, but
9 I already explained that the delay is caused because of the -- some
10 technical difficulties which we had with the uploading of the documents
11 and the whole mass of the documents which we were dealing with. Thank
13 JUDGE HALL: Yes, we remember you alerted us to that on Monday.
14 [Trial Chamber confers]
15 JUDGE HALL: Yes. Could we have the witness back on the stand,
17 [The witness takes the stand]
18 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Brown, good afternoon to you, sir. Before
19 Ms. Korner continues, I remind you you're still on your oath.
20 Yes, Ms. Korner.
21 WITNESS: EWAN BROWN: [Resumed]
22 Examination by Ms. Korner: [Continued]
23 Q. Mr. Brown, yesterday, and perhaps we should deal with this first,
24 Judge Harhoff asked you if you were in possession of any evidence to show
25 that paramilitary groups were assigned particular tasks by the military,
1 such as mopping up. And you said that you would want to refresh your
2 memory overnight. And I wondered if you are able to help.
3 A. I'm not sure I necessarily saw specific instructions or direct
4 orders to individual paramilitary units using the phrases "mopping up."
5 In my report I do reference two paramilitary groups that I know were
6 subordinated or integrated into the VRS. That being Milankovic's Group
7 which I talked about yesterday which had acted as a volunteer unit in
8 Western Slavonia and later was integrated into the VRS, I believe, and
9 Milankovic himself was given a rank. And he was later sent to Knin, I
10 believe, and died later in 1992.
11 The second group that I reference in my report is a group from
12 Prijedor, Cigo's Group. Which similarly was utilised in Western Slavonia
13 and, I believe, in an open source document as a sort of sabotage group.
14 Sometimes these groups are given names as intervention platoons, sabotage
15 groups, and the like. Cigo's Group was used in Western Slavonia in 1991
16 and was part of the 43rd Motorised Brigade in Prijedor. And, again, in
17 an open source reference purportedly written by Cigo himself, he was
18 involved, as a 43rd Motorised Brigade was as well, was involved in
19 operations in Prijedor in May and June and later in the summer, in 1992.
20 There is also a document written by the Main Staff in July --
21 JUDGE HARHOFF: Hold on a minute, Mr. Brown. In both of the two
22 cases that you have referred to and which we have seen in your report,
23 you just refer to operations, and so my question would be, before you
24 leave these groups, Are you aware of the kind of tasks that these groups
25 performed in those operations?
1 THE WITNESS: Not in detail, sir. I clearly know that the
2 43rd Brigade was involved in operations in Prijedor, and I'm assuming
3 that Cigo's Group was involved in that, in the attacks. But in terms of
4 the details --
5 JUDGE HARHOFF: In what?
6 THE WITNESS: Well, there was an attack on Prijedor and
7 Hambarine, Kozarac in the late May 1992. This is reported by the
8 1st Krajina Corps in their documents, seizing control of the territory.
9 There was a flash-point incident in Hambarine in which some JNA soldiers
10 were attacked. After that there was a large military operation in
11 Kozarac and Hambarine which involved the use of that brigade, amongst
12 others. A large number of civilians were rounded up and sent to
13 detention centres after that, obviously notably in Omarska and Keraterm
14 and Trnopolje. And I'm assuming that Cigo, as part of that brigade, was
15 also involved in that operation.
16 JUDGE HARHOFF: And you can't be more specific?
17 THE WITNESS: I can't be more specific on the role of Cigo within
18 the 43rd Brigade, but I do know the 43rd Brigade was in involved in that
19 operation and congratulated, by the way, by General Talic in an
21 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you.
22 Back to you, Ms. Korner.
23 MS. KORNER: Thank you. In fact, Your Honour, we'll come to the
24 section report that deals with it and have a quick look at the report on
25 the paramilitaries.
1 Q. Mr. Brown, can I go back to where we left off yesterday.
2 We were dealing, yesterday, with the area of responsibility of
3 the corps and their cooperation with the civilian authorities.
4 And if you take your report and if we go to paragraph 1.108,
5 which in English is at page 46. There, you deal with the Crisis Staff
6 relationship with the Crisis Staffs, in the plural, relationships with
7 the military, and you set out there in fairly full detail, but we may as
8 well have a look at the document, the Prijedor decision which was
9 published in the gazette which -- could we -- it's footnote 154; it's tab
10 10 of the documents, and it is 466. And as we discovered yesterday, it's
11 part of the law library.
12 If we look very quickly at this, Article 2 of the document says
13 that it's been -- "Prijedor Municipal Crisis Staff has been established
14 to coordinate the functions of the authority, the Defence of the
15 municipal territory," and so on and so forth.
16 MS. KORNER: If we go to Article 6, please, next page in English
17 and also in B/C/S.
18 Q. The Crisis Staff shall, in particular, coordinate the work and
19 activities of all components of All People's Defence, consider
20 mobilisation, deal with issues of supply requirements, and the like.
21 MS. KORNER: And then finally, at Article 9, which is on the last
22 page of the document. And it's the same page in B/C/S actually. Thank
24 Q. The Crisis Staff shall, at all times, cooperate with the army of
25 the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and so on and so forth.
1 And I think that you note in your paragraph that although you saw
2 documents where the Crisis Staff appeared to be actually giving
3 instructions to the military, by and large it seems to have been a
4 relationship of cooperation; is that right?
5 A. Yes. I think there are similar documents in a number of other
6 municipalities. Kljuc is one; Kotor Varos is another; Prijedor,
7 obviously. And this coordination function not only seems to be
8 articulated in this document but I would argue also occurred.
9 I would also just note that there is a -- the collection of
10 information in the municipalities is referenced in Article 12. So it's
11 not just this coordination and leaving the municipality in isolation;
12 there is also a reporting process. So the collection of information
13 on -- in the municipality and reporting that through a chain.
14 But I think Sanski Most was one most where they may have been
15 slightly more forceful. And did I see one or two references where the
16 military were instructed or given some more forceful instructions to do
17 various issues. But this seems to be a common feature in a number of the
18 municipalities that I have seen documents from.
19 Q. Yes, thank you. And we've already looked at the Kljuc document,
20 which says much the same thing. Yes, thank you very much.
21 You then -- continuing with your report. You point out that it
22 would appear that lower-level officers, or lowish-level officers, who
23 were, for example, brigade commanders became either members of the local
24 Crisis Staff or ex-officio members; is that correct?
25 A. Yes. And I know in Prijedor, for example, Vladimir Arsic or
1 Zeljaja were local commanders there. I've seen a document in Kotor Varos
2 where Commander Bosko Peulic, who was the 122nd Brigade - actually, he
3 was also OPS group Vlasic which is a wider zone, one of the zones
4 I mentioned yesterday - he briefed or was present in some Crisis Staff
5 meetings. I've also seen references, I believe, in Kljuc municipality
6 where military commanders and not necessarily named commanders but
7 military commanders were briefed or had been present.
8 Q. Then moving through, if we look, please, you dealt with and
9 I think we touched on that yesterday, the relationship between the
10 1st Krajina Corps and the ARK regional Crisis Staff. And moving to
11 paragraph 1.116, page 51, we see there that apparently relationships
12 weren't very good because they wanted mandatory attendance, the
13 ARK Crisis Staff, of General Talic or someone designated by him. And
14 then in paragraph 117 -- 1.117, you note that reports dealing with the
15 overall situation, the 1st Krajina Corps were under control.
16 If we look, please, at the documents, please, that you reference,
17 or two of the documents you reference, first one is at tab 21 and is 689.
18 It's already -- I'm sorry, it's already an exhibit,
19 Defence Exhibit 2D0001. All right.
20 Dated the 8th of June, just to note that under "combat readiness"
21 it states that the front line is stable throughout the zone and some
22 units are continuing to mop up and search the areas of Prijedor and
23 Kljuc. But then situation on the ground, the situation on the ground is
24 under control, and the cooperation with the CJB, the public security
25 centre, the police stations, and authorities has been fully established.
1 MS. KORNER: And then if we look, please -- well, I suppose, yes,
2 if we go over the page to paragraph 8 of this report.
3 Q. By the 8th of June, General Talic is reporting that we are fully
4 controlling the territory and successfully holding our current positions.
5 And then if we look, please, at the next document, which is a
6 report a couple of weeks later, 23rd of June, at tab 25. The number is
7 3703. And if we look there, please, at paragraph 3, situation on the
8 ground, sabotage keeps reoccurring, but throughout the entire territory
9 of our area of responsibility, the organs of the civil authorities and
10 the army have established control and prevent the activity of terrorists.
11 From seeing those two documents, is that a theme that reoccurs,
12 that there is control pretty quickly and that it's been exerted through
13 cooperation of the police and the civil authorities?
14 A. Yes. I think there were some sporadic incidents even after this
15 date; for example, in Kotor Varos there were some operations not long
16 after this 23rd of June, and there were some references through the
17 documents into the summer of small groups that were being dealt with.
18 But in terms of establishing control, the authorities and the military
19 seemed to have established control very quickly, bearing in mind the army
20 was established in the middle of May and here is, within weeks, there has
21 clearly been operations prior to this in Prijedor, Sanski Most, Kljuc,
22 and the likes, but they are stating in this, and the previous document,
23 that they have got the situation under control, although I would say that
24 there are still a small number of flash points that do occur around
1 Q. Yes.
2 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, may that last document, 370 - what did
3 I say it was? - 3, yes, could that be admitted and marked, please?
4 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P1785, Your Honours.
6 MS. KORNER:
7 Q. You then carry on in the report for a number of paragraphs, and
8 I want to move on to a further topic, to point out that although there
9 were hiccups in this relationship between the military and the civilian,
10 it -- that there were attempts to rectify problems which arose. And you
11 deal with that in paragraph 1.122.
12 A. Yes. I wouldn't be under any illusion that it was - I think
13 I used the phrase "seamless" in the report. It wasn't appear to be -- or
14 didn't appear to be a seamless relationship at times. The military do
15 make references to the need to establish better cooperation between the
16 organs. So there are times when the relationship clearly would appear to
17 be strained, but there are references that they are trying to improve
18 that by holding meetings or discussions. But overall it would seem that
19 they control the territory very quickly.
20 Q. Yes. Then I don't want to go -- as I say, the report speaks for
21 itself and you reference the documents.
22 You then deal, at paragraph 1.127, page 55 through until the end
23 of this section, with the removal of Muslims and Croats from the
24 military. Again, I don't propose to highlight any particular part of it.
25 You'd mentioned Colonel Hasotic and dealt with it in brief, and you
1 referenced the documents.
2 So can we move now, please, to the military operations section
3 which starts at page 60 of the English. And you set out in the first few
4 paragraphs what you call the general characteristics; is that correct?
5 A. Yes, that's correct, Ms. Korner.
6 Q. And you state that the combat actions, in paragraph 2.2,
7 undertaken by the corps can be divided into two distinct but overlapping
8 categories. The first were a series of operations designed to seize
9 control of and secure territory claimed by the Serbs and which would
10 assist in the establishment of the borders of the Serbian state, and you
11 say the second category of operation - this is paragraph 2.3 on the next
12 page - consisted of large-scale, formal military operations.
13 Now, we're going to look at it in a bit more detail, but can you
14 perhaps outline to the Court what the essential differences were between
15 these two kinds of combat actions; and secondly, whether the police -- or
16 in what category the police would have been used?
17 A. There are a number of notable differences. In relation to the
18 first one, which is operations to secure control of territory, they
19 tended to be at municipal level, using brigade, TO, and police units,
20 often discussions in Crisis Staffs. They weren't necessarily linked,
21 i.e., a brigade, one brigade, in this next municipality, although there
22 sometimes was the movement of some units from one area into another
23 municipality, but they seemed to be a little bit more localised, usually
24 around a brigade or TO level. And they were over very quickly,
25 generally, the operations. They were often categorised as operations to
1 disarm the population or disarm groups. They often involved, for
2 example, in Prijedor, and I believe in Kljuc as well, deadlines for the
3 surrender of weapons, and then operations often joint or with the
4 involvement of the police to take control of territory. And as I say,
5 they generally were over very quickly, within a few days, although there
6 might have been continual action over a week, a few weeks, later on,
7 renegade groups. And they invariably involved the rounding up or taking
8 into custody of numbers of prisoners.
9 The second type of operation - and, really, I'm only referring to
10 Operation Corridor and Operation Vrbas, for the corps - were very much
11 longer in terms of time. They involved large numbers of troops, multiple
12 brigades. And they were directed from -- with clear avenues and axes,
13 from Main Staff directives. And, if you like, they were more akin to
14 large military operations to seize -- in the case of the corridor, to
15 seize the corridor area and link the 1st Krajina Corps with the
16 East Bosna Corps. And in the case of the Vrbas operation, which was a
17 smaller operation than the corridor operation, but to seize the territory
18 around Jajce.
19 In the second type of operation, I do know that there were police
20 involvement, or there was police involvement, in Operation Corridor,
21 albeit, you know, at a relatively small level, as a formed police unit.
22 And there was also, I believe, an RSK/MUP unit, so a police contingent
23 from the RSK were also involved. And that operation took some
24 considerable time. It was relatively successful very quickly, although
25 the operation continued through the summer and into the autumn, in order
1 to expand the corridor. And they achieved the goal very quickly, but
2 they continued to conduct operations to expand the corridor and take
3 control all the way up to the river.
4 Q. Right. All right. We're going to look at it in a little bit of
5 detail, but can I just ask you this: The military unit that took part in
6 the attack on Kozarac and Hambarine was, I think, was it, the
7 43rd Motorised Brigade?
8 A. That's correct, yes.
9 Q. Yeah. Looking for a moment at issues of command and control, in
10 order for that unit to have been involved in that attack, would the
11 authority have lain with the commander of the unit, Colonel Arsic, or
12 would he have had to seek permission from his superiors?
13 A. I would imagine he had to seek permission from his superiors. It
14 may not necessarily be, You are to attack this place at this time. It
15 may be of something of a more general nature: You are to secure
16 territory, or you are to establish control, or you are to ... so the
17 actual, specific nature of the instruction may be more general. And it
18 tends to be more general the further you go up, I have to say. But I
19 know that General Talic was aware of the operation, and I know that he
20 congratulated the operation and that he passed on the success of
21 controlling Prijedor up to the Main Staff.
22 Q. All right. And from your overall reading of, I think, thousands
23 of documents to do with this particular area and General Talic, can you
24 give us some idea of what kind of commander General Talic was? In other
25 words, was he somebody who was a hands-on or who would let his
1 subordinates just carry on and do what they wanted?
2 A. Well, I never met General Talic, and I can't tell you what he
3 would be like as an individual. I can only --
4 Q. Yeah, I'm looking at --
5 A. -- explain from the documents. General Talic was someone who had
6 been in operations for sometime. He had been serving in Croatia, he was
7 a career JNA officer, and he had been involved in basically operations
8 from late November 1991. And that continued all the way through till,
9 well, the end of the Bosnian war in 1995; he remained the corps commander
10 there. From what I see, he has a very effective and very functioning
12 The corps does not seem to check pace or stall when there is the
13 transition between the VRS and the JNA, or the JNA and the VRS. There
14 are still the same reports going up to his superior headquarters. And
15 the detailed reports that his -- he and his staff produce are what
16 I would expect to see in a very competent, functioning corps
17 headquarters. And, as I say, the operations that he does conduct, his
18 forces conduct quickly, and he is successful.
19 For example, the operation in corridor, I think the instruction
20 is given out in early June, and it's only within a matter of weeks that
21 he's already pulled together all the forces, and they are rather
22 significant, of his corps to go to that area to conduct the operation,
23 and he's successful. So I think he's a good commander whose staff are
24 aware of what is happening in his corps.
25 Q. Okay. And you said he certainly knew about, for example, the
1 attack on Hambarine and Kozarac. Did he report that to the Main Staff of
2 the VRS?
3 A. Yes, he did, in his regular combat reports.
4 Q. All right. And is that a feature that -- of his reporting, that
5 he reports these kind of incidents and attacks to the VRS Main Staff?
6 A. Yes. It is. And it wasn't available to me at the time I wrote
7 this report but I did see a reference, I believe - I can't remember where
8 it is or the date - but I do remember seeing a reference in the Mladic
9 diary, not long after Prijedor, that he mentions to Mladic, because it's
10 in the diary, that Prijedor is now under control - I forget the exact
11 wording and language. And I don't know if that's a telephone call or
12 whether it's a brief in present, a personal briefing. But it would seem
13 that that was known.
14 Q. Yes. Well, we are going to deal with that. I think we'll see
15 it's at the beginning -- in fact, the beginning of June sometime.
16 All right. Can we just then, please, look at a few examples of
17 matters you've dealt with in your report. If we go, please, to paragraph
18 2.4, you highlight there the common features of the -- what you call the
19 municipality level operations. And you say that the -- after the
20 issuance of deadlines for handing over of weapons and all personnel, the
21 shelling, attacking, destruction of villages, cooperation with the TO and
22 the police force -- and police units - sorry - and then the movement into
23 camps. Is that right?
24 A. Yes. I think that is -- appears to be a common feature in a
25 number the municipalities that I was able to get documentation on.
1 Q. You then discuss, between paragraphs 2.6 and 2.9, the responses
2 to incidents and the roadblocks and the like. And I don't think I need
3 to go into that in any further detail than you've dealt with in your
5 Then you go, at page 64, paragraph 2.10, into the deadlines for
6 the handing over of weapons. And I think it is worth looking at a couple
7 of examples.
8 In the Krajina area, it appears to begin really, effectively,
9 with Defence Minister Subotic's declaration of an imminent threat of war
10 in April. Then on the 4th of May, the National Defence counsel of the
11 Autonomous Region of Krajina, which references that instruction, calls
12 for the setting of a -- sets a deadline for surrender of weapons. And
13 you've set that out. Is that correct?
14 A. Yes. I think it seems to be a natural follow on, that they
15 reference his document. And I'm assuming they take the phrase "take all
16 necessary measures" they take that bit as being -- allowing them to set
17 this deadline to have weapons -- surrender of weapons.
18 Q. All right. And then you note, if we just summarise the next few
19 paragraphs, what the ARK Crisis Staff did, the extension of deadlines,
20 the CSB adopting it and saying, as you set out at the bottom of paragraph
21 2.15, that they will consistently carry out the decision on the disarming
22 of paramilitary units.
23 However, if we just look for a moment at two documents that you
24 reference in paragraph 2.17 which shows, if you like, the convergence
25 between the military and the CSB. Could we look first of all, please, at
1 document which is already exhibited, P561. Which is at tab 7.
2 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm terribly sorry, I just have one clarification,
3 if we can have. 17:20. Ms. Korner, you said: "... what the
4 ARK Crisis Staff did, the extension of deadlines, the CSB adopting it and
5 saying ..." however the 2.15 basically, in my understanding, is quoting
6 the decision of the ARK Crisis Staff, not the CSB.
7 MS. KORNER: You're quite right. Yes, I accept that correction.
8 That's exactly what they're doing. In fact, it's another document where
9 the CSB say they are going to carry it out.
10 Q. Here we see, dated the 14th of May, the order from
11 Stojan Zupljanin to the chiefs of all public security stations, and
12 others, and also copying it, apparently, to the minister of the interior,
13 the Ministry of the Interior, for information:
14 "In keeping with the decision of the Autonomous Region of
15 Bosnia and Krajina regarding the surrender of illegally owned weapons and
16 ammunition, public security stations must undertake the following," and
17 then it's effectively making plans for the surrender or seizure of these
18 illegally owned weapons and providing for the results.
19 And then if we look now, please, at the document which is at
20 binder -- at divider 8, and it's 0 -- I'm sorry, 884 is the
21 65 ter number.
22 The combat report of the following day, if we look at
23 paragraph 3, it appears that the military has been made aware, the last
24 three lines:
25 "Since the deadline for handing over illegally owned weapons has
1 expired, the Banja Luka Ministry of the Interior organs are making
2 appropriate preparations to take away the weapons, and people fear
3 possible inter-ethnic conflicts."
4 Does that show a pretty close knowledge of what each organ, if
5 you like, is doing?
6 A. Yes. I mean, I think it's important enough for the corps to send
7 that up to the -- its higher formation. So it's obviously of some
8 importance to them, and they obviously are very aware of it. I might
9 also just draw your attention to the line before that said: "There have
10 been no armed conflicts in this territory, but the situation is extremely
11 tense." There were some minor incidents, I believe in early May, but
12 I think, you know, this is a tense time. Talic is saying there is no
13 conflicts yet. But it's clear that they are aware of this deadline and
14 they are aware that the police have issued this instruction.
15 Q. Yes. Thank you.
16 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, may that be admitted and marked,
18 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P1786, Your Honours.
20 MS. KORNER:
21 Q. You then reference, in the next paragraph, 2.18 of your report,
22 that the Krajina Corps were issuing and acting on deadlines for handing
23 over of weapons and carried out operations themselves. And you reference
24 those; Sanski Most, Kljuc, Prnjavor, Kotor Varos.
25 And then you give the example, in paragraph 2.19, of the Prijedor
1 municipality, and I don't think we need to look particularly at any of
2 the documentation there.
3 Can we move, then, please, next to the cooperation with the
4 Territorial Defence, which starts at paragraph 2.22. And I think to a
5 large extent we can deal with that in summary form because I think you
6 more or less dealt with that when we looked at the combat readiness
7 report. The territorial units, and you deal with this at some length, in
8 fact were, as it were, transposed within the VRS, the 1st Krajina Corps
9 area, into light infantry units; is that right?
10 A. Yes. That was expected from the 16th Assembly Session. And
11 General Talic's documents also indicated that that was to happen. And
12 eventually, although it took a little period, that the
13 Territorial Defence units were invariably renamed light infantry
15 Q. And as you point out in paragraph 2.33, on the 17th of June -
16 that's in the middle - Talic proposed to the Main Staff the establishment
17 of a formal command structure called the group of light brigades command,
18 and the -- this command was formed from Banja Luka and commanded by
19 somebody called Colonel Petar Spasojevic; is that right?
20 A. Yes, there had been a Territorial Defence command in Banja Luka.
21 And I think probably what General Talic did was just to utilise that TO,
22 existing TO headquarters, and rename it Banja Luka whatever I've written
23 here, the Banja Luka -- the brigade command, and it consisted actually of
24 light brigades in and around the Banja Luka area, a number of them.
25 Q. Right. And if we go to paragraph 2.35, and there is just one
1 document I'm going to ask you to look at there, you point out well if we
2 look at the previous paragraph -- by April, when we looked at the combat
3 readiness report, the 1st Krajina Corps had in fact formed
4 24 light infantry brigades, each of them averaging about 1200 troops; is
5 that right?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And you then give the areas.
8 And in paragraph 2.35, you reference the Kotor Varos Light
9 Infantry Brigade being actively involved in most of the military
10 operations, together with others, including the MUP.
11 And can we look, please, now at document which has got the number
12 10636, tab 34.
13 Is this an order emanating from the light infantry brigade of
14 Kotor Varos?
15 A. Yes, it is. There weren't too many of this type of documents
16 that I saw in the collection that we had, because this is actually a
17 subordinate formations order, in this case the Kotor Varos Light Brigade,
18 down to one of its own subordinate formations, in this case I think it's
19 the mortar platoon. So this is the mortar platoon's copy of the
20 Kotor Varos Light Brigade's commander's order for operations around this
21 period in Kotor Varos. I'm not sure why it was in the collection, but
22 it's one of the -- one of the subordinate unit orders.
23 Q. Right. And if we go -- it says [indiscernible] set out the
24 background. He says, I've decided to -- next page, 2 in English, and
25 also in B/C/S -- and he said -- he sets out what is to happen. And then
1 at 5, tasks for subordinate units, and then in we go to 5.2 which we will
2 find on the third page in the English and B/C/S, the 2nd Infantry
3 Company, and then goes on to explain what it's going to do. And then it
5 "With part of your forces, be ready to prevent the flaring up of
6 new trouble spots on the territory of the village of Ravna. Acting in
7 concert with the forces of Kotor Varos SJB, organise checking of unknown
8 individuals and foreigners entering the area."
9 Now, from your examination of the documents, and looking at the
10 overall picture of the municipality operations, what was the role of the
11 police in these operations, in general terms?
12 A. Well, most of the documents I've looked at obviously are military
13 documents, and the ones that I do see referencing police involvement do
14 have this phrase of cooperate or coordinate with the police in the
15 takeover or control of territory. There was obviously an involvement
16 later on in relation to captured personnel, but the documents that I do
17 see that reference it invariably discuss -- discuss coordinating with
18 police or cooperating with police, that includes in the Crisis Staff
19 decisions. There are a couple of references in this document to
20 cooperating with the police, not just in the 2nd Company, but I think the
21 Pioneer's Platoon and elsewhere.
22 Q. If we look at the next one, 5.3, we see that acting in concert
23 with -- to the Pioneer's Platoon, acting in concert, again, with the
24 forces of the Kotor Varos public security station.
25 JUDGE HARHOFF: But, Mr. Brown, what does this mean, in practical
1 terms, to coordinate with the police? Thank you very much. I mean, it's
2 completely open. Could be anything. What does it mean? In practical
4 THE WITNESS: Invariably these orders are not written in
5 isolation. There's usually some kind of discussion that goes with it.
6 Coordinating with the police could involve the tasks that the police have
7 been set in any previous discussion or to be -- to -- or to be
8 implemented by the police, there is to be some coordination. For
9 example, one of the tasks may be to the establishment of check-points.
10 The police may be setting up check-points to secure an area or a road,
11 prior to the attack, using military forces. There may need to be
12 coordination in when that check-point is established, what its tasks are
13 to be, issues of opening fire and coordinating fire, coordinating when
14 the attack is going to happen and when it's expected to finish. So these
15 documents are not -- you know, it's not in isolation. I would imagine
16 there was probably a significant amount of planning that goes into this,
17 and representatives, I would imagine, of neighbouring units as well, not
18 just the police. I think it talks about neighbours. There's a planning
19 component to this, and I would imagine cooperation means the police will
20 have set tasks which will be agreed, the individual will be informed
21 about the nature of this operation, how long it's meant to last. If, for
22 example, there is to be the processing of prisoners, there has to be a
23 coordination of effort in that. And so I would imagine that's -- that
24 type of activity is what they are talking about.
25 JUDGE HARHOFF: And --
1 MS. KORNER: [Overlapping speakers] ... if we go to -- sorry,
2 Your Honour.
3 JUDGE HARHOFF: And how about the legal structure. Were the
4 police officers subordinated to the military, or was it just, as it says
5 here, a mere coordination?
6 THE WITNESS: I would have expected, if there was a direct
7 subordination of police into this light infantry brigade for the conduct
8 of this operation, I would have expected it to be quite specific and
9 explicit in this document. And in the same way that the commander of
10 this brigade outlines the exact tasks for his companies, the
11 Pioneer Platoon, the mortar platoon, the intelligence section, if the
12 police were directly subordinated to him, I would have expected an
13 instruction in there that made it clear about what their tasks were to
14 be, not the more general instruction here that seems to say, we are --
15 you are to ensure you coordinate with the police. If there was a direct
16 subordination, I would have expected one of the paragraphs to read
17 something along the lines of, "Such and such a MUP force is to do the
18 following." But I don't see that in this document. And that would lead
19 me to the impression that the subordination of the police in this
20 operation is not one that the commander directly controls him but there
21 was a police involvement in this operation which requires coordination
22 and which the commander is aware of. And the police clearly are playing
23 a part; I don't know what that part necessarily is from this document,
24 but they are engaged in the operation. But from this, if it had been a
25 direct subordinate, if he was -- the police, to all intents and purposes,
1 were another unit within his brigade that he could task and command,
2 I would have expected in one of those paragraphs for it to be explicitly
3 stated there, and I don't see that.
4 JUDGE HARHOFF: I mean, the picture that you are proposing does
5 seem to become a bit blurred. We spoke yesterday about how the volunteer
6 groups and the paramilitary units were circling around more or less on
7 their own, perhaps with some degree of coordination. And now we also
8 have the police apparently not being directly subordinated to the
9 military but just being required to be ready to undertake some tasks
10 according to the local conditions but nothing more than that really.
11 What is your assessment from a military point of view of these
13 THE WITNESS: I do not see that as being an unusual circumstance,
14 sir. And I can give you examples from my own military service where I've
15 worked with policemen and I have worked in joint operations with
16 policemen but I have not commanded them. When I was a very junior
17 officer serving in Ireland in counter-terrorist tasks, I would routinely
18 have policemen with me. We would have coordination meetings in relation
19 to the tasks that we were set, they would be -- we would be conducting
20 operations with them. But they weren't subordinated to me, they were
21 subordinated to their police chain. And there was agreement about the
22 tasks that they had, and there was agreements that I had.
23 So it's not necessarily something I see as unusual.
24 JUDGE HARHOFF: Well, I'm not suggesting that it is unusual.
25 What the Chamber is trying to do is to get a full picture of how this
1 actually happened in practice. And so there must have been some sort of
2 superior planning or, as you say yourself, agreements on exactly what
3 role each of the participating units would have and who was controlling
4 these activities. So if your answer is that it wasn't the military
5 commander who controlled directly the activities of the involved police
6 units, then it must have been the MUP somehow that instructed its units
7 to do this and that on behalf of the military or with the police -- with
8 the coordination of the army.
9 THE WITNESS: I can only --
10 JUDGE HARHOFF: How did it work out in practice; do you know?
11 THE WITNESS: Well, Your Honour, I can only assume that that is
12 what happened. Because as I said before, if it wasn't that, if it was
13 that the military in essence commanded and the police were directly
14 subordinated, I would expect to see a lot of -- not just in this
15 document, but a lot of other references. And I would --
16 JUDGE HARHOFF: I have understood that.
17 THE WITNESS: And I would expect what happened in practice, if
18 you look at the Crisis Staff decisions, was that that was a group whereby
19 agreement was made about territory to be controlled or operations to be
20 mounted, and it may well have been that that was the forum at the local
21 level where individuals would say, An operation is going to be conducted
22 here, and the involvement in the police will be A, B and C; or we will be
23 able to provide A, B and C support in the following way. And the
24 military would be saying, Well, we are going to be conducting the
25 operation and this is our part of it. I think that is one of the -- at
1 the local levels, that is where these decisions seem to occur. And the
2 Crisis Staff -- for example, if you look at the Kljuc municipality, they
3 are meeting every day with military, police, and civilian leadership
4 figures, talking about what has happened in the past and what is going to
5 happen in the next day. And I think this is a very critical component of
6 exactly how it was decided about what areas were going to be taken under
7 control next.
8 JUDGE HARHOFF: Would the military in Kljuc be subordinated to
9 the decisions made by the Crisis Staff?
10 THE WITNESS: I think the Crisis Staff had this coordinating
11 function. Clearly there was a military chain of command, and it is -- it
12 is General Talic, it's his soldiers that are involved in that. But in
13 Talic saying to his subordinates, You are to secure control of territory,
14 you are to cooperate with the municipal authorities, you are to establish
15 the closest links with the municipal authorities, I think his military
16 commanders are then carrying out that instruction for him through the
17 mechanism of the Crisis Staff and other localised meetings in order to
18 secure that territory. And that gives them the legitimacy to have these
19 operations through their own -- clearly the military have a chain of
20 command, and the military brigade commanders will be issuing orders to
21 their individual brigades, but this cooperative element to me seems to be
22 very present. I don't see this subordination issue of, it's only the
23 military in command and anybody else who's involved is under that --
24 I don't see that. I would expect to see other indicators there --
25 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you.
1 THE WITNESS: -- nor from my own military experience do I -- would
2 I necessarily find it unusual.
3 MS. KORNER:
4 Q. Yes. Can we just, for a moment, then, dealing with what you told
5 Judge Harhoff about your experience in Northern Ireland, look at this
6 part. You said that when you did joint operations, there was a -- you
7 dealt with the military, and the police had their own -- I think I better
8 just get your own -- I'm sorry. I'm summarising rather badly what you
9 said. I'll go back to what you said.
10 Yes. You would have coordination meetings in respect of the
11 tasks, but they were not subordinated to you, they were subordinated to
12 their police chain. Is that right?
13 A. Yes. I mean, there can be different -- different instructions
14 given. Police can be subordinated in certain circumstances to the
15 military, but there has to be certain criteria met. But in my experience
16 that didn't happen.
17 Q. I just want to move one step further on that, as you -- as it's
18 been brought up now. In the event that there is a joint police/military
19 operation going on, first of all, have you seen any indication in any of
20 the documents you've looked at that the military would be the people to
21 deal with any disciplinary or criminal infractions that were committed by
22 the police during the course of a joint operation?
23 A. Maybe if I could step back first, talking about the documents of
24 subordination, if we're talking about that now, there were a couple of
25 documents in which, if the military wanted to have police subordinated to
1 them in combat operations, there would have had to be agreement between
2 the corps and the CSB or SJB, that -- there are a number of documents
3 I think two or three.
4 Q. We will look at them.
5 A. And I know that there was one document which that did happen, in
6 November, where there was a request and it -- and it happened. So as
7 I said, there can be mechanisms where police can be subordinated. And in
8 my own -- even in my own previous military service that could happen. It
9 didn't happen to me. When we worked with operations with the police,
10 there was an agreement in what the police were there to do and the tasks
11 that they were there to do, but I did not -- I did not -- they were not a
12 subordinate unit from me. In relation to discipline -- sorry, your
13 question was related to discipline.
14 Q. Disciplinary, yes. First of all, simply arising because we're
15 dealing with it at this stage, in respect of the VRS documents that you
16 looked at and in -- specifically in relation to the 1st Krajina Corps,
17 did you see any evidence in those documents of the military dealing with
18 infractions, whether disciplinary or criminal offences, committed by the
19 police, in other words going through the military disciplinary
20 proceedings rather than the police?
21 A. No, I didn't.
22 Q. In your own personal military experience, if there was a joint
23 operation going on and the police committed a disciplinary offence during
24 the course of that operation, who would deal with that, the police or the
25 military chain of command?
1 A. In my experience, the -- it would be the police commander,
2 I mean, I, as a grand commander, would be expected to make a report to my
3 superior command about an incident, but it would not be the
4 responsibility of my superior commander to charge a policeman. My
5 commander would be expected to pass on the details of that to the
6 policemen's chain of command.
7 Q. All right.
8 A. It wasn't my commander or I or anyone else may be held
9 accountable for not doing that and not passing that on, but I was not in
10 a position -- I was a junior officer, I have to say, but I know my
11 commanding officer would not have the power to charge a policeman in
12 my -- in my experience.
13 JUDGE HARHOFF: Even if that policeman was under your authority?
14 THE WITNESS: If he had been -- if there had been agreement and
15 direct subordination had been agreed, and there are mechanisms at the
16 extreme end when policemen can be placed under the command of military
17 personnel, and he was subject to the army law, I would suspect he
18 probably could, although I'm not a legal expert, I'm not a lawyer. But
19 from my experience and the operations that I did, if a policeman had
20 conducted himself in a manner that required some disciplinary process,
21 I was expected to report that through my chain of command. But it was
22 not, I believe, my commander's responsibility to charge him.
23 MS. KORNER:
24 Q. All right. Can we conclude with the document that we were
25 looking at. If we go to paragraph 11. And I think that reinforce --
1 you may see that reinforces the point you make; there's no direct order
3 A. Sorry, is it paragraph 11 of the --
4 Q. Eleven of the same document we're looking at, at 34.
5 A. Yes. And I think there's a reference to neighbours; that
6 probably means neighbouring units.
7 Q. All right. Yeah, if we look at that, it says, For security
8 support, in all units be ready with part of your forces to break up and
9 destroy infiltrated sabotage terrorist groups and other enemy special
10 forces acting in concert with neighbours and the police forces on the
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. And then, Take prisoners of war to the brigade command where they
14 would be interrogated and then to a prison camp. And we will come to
15 that later.
16 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, I'm just checking whether this is an
17 exhibit; no it's not. Could that be exhibited and marked, please.
18 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P1787, Your Honours.
20 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, could I -- I'm not quite clear,
21 because of when we started, what time the break is going to be.
22 JUDGE HALL: Well, I think we could push it to the normal time
23 of 5.20.
24 MS. KORNER: 5.20. Right.
25 Q. Yes, so can I now move, then, because it's the only document from
1 that set, to your section where you actually go into some detail on the
2 cooperation between the military and the police, which starts at
3 paragraph 2.39 on page 75.
4 Now, you point out that it was, in fact, a significant feature in
5 many of the combat actions that took place in the Krajina during 1992,
6 and you further point out that General Talic and Stojan Zupljanin were
7 two of the most prominent figures because of their positions; is that
9 A. Yes, it would seem so.
10 Q. And then you list a number of different, as it were, requests,
11 instructions, and information that went between them. And perhaps we can
12 just look at a couple of examples of that.
13 MS. KORNER: Could we have a look, please, at document 3705,
14 tab 27.
15 Q. And there is a request or a document of 30th of June addressed to
16 the Main Staff, which says that the CSB has approached the army with a
17 request for 200 pieces of 7.62 millimetre or M-56 automatic rifles, and
18 they are recommending that it be issued, particularly as the units are
19 less interested in them apparently.
20 MS. KORNER: And, yes, I'm not sure [indiscernible] --
21 Your Honours, could that be exhibited and marked, please. Admitted and
22 marked, please.
23 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
24 MS. KORNER: Thank you.
25 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P1788, Your Honours.
1 MS. KORNER:
2 Q. And then, later on, this appears to have been a request, is that
3 right, simply for arming police as police, as opposed to anything to do
4 with military?
5 A. Yes. It would seem to be that maybe the police have just made a
6 request, bearing in mind the size of the corps and maybe the equipment
7 that they had, that they need to be armed, maybe in the conduct of their
9 Q. All right. Much later on, it appears that there was a more
10 formalised meeting or request. If we look, please, at document
11 number 56, which is -- it's already been exhibited. Yes, P1668.
12 This is dated the 21st of November, 1992, from General Talic to
13 Zupljanin or his assistant, and, is this right, he's asking for police
14 units with the strength of at least two battalions, and more if possible?
15 A. Yes. I think, reading the document, there is obviously -- as
16 I said, the operations in the corridor, although they were successful
17 they wanted -- it continued, actually, through the year. And obviously,
18 I think, in this case he's requesting for additional support for
19 operations in that area, and he's making a request to the CSB for this.
20 Q. Does the word "request" have any significance in the sense of the
21 relationship between the army and the CSB?
22 A. Could I just read the document quickly?
23 Q. Yes, of course.
24 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, I'm reminded this document was put in
25 under seal, so it ought not to go out on the monitor.
1 THE WITNESS: He's -- having quickly read it, I don't think he's
2 ordering Mr. Zupljanin, he's asking him for the help. He asks, well,
3 quite forcefully, I think, and he's obviously got a requirement that the
4 corridor maybe is threatened and that obviously that that was a very
5 important area, but he's not ordering him, he's making a request or a --
6 or he's asking him.
7 MS. KORNER:
8 Q. All right. We'll see later -- sorry, I was just listening. I've
9 got the B/C/S on so I try not to talk over the English.
10 We'll see later that there is an earlier document in July where
11 General Talic appears to give an order to the police. What does that
12 suggest about the relationship between the police and the army, or Talic
13 and Zupljanin?
14 A. Which instruction is that, Ms. Korner?
15 Q. Right, well, we'll look at it. It's -- I think you reference it
16 in your report.
17 A. Oh, yes, yes.
18 Q. Jump ahead.
19 MS. KORNER: Sorry, Your Honours, I jumped ahead of myself and
20 now I'm --
21 Q. Yes. If you look at paragraph 2.50.
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. You refer to a document which regrettably is not on our
24 65 ter list and so is not in, but -- on the 1st of July he passed an
25 order to units of the corps noting that with the aim of improving the
1 organisation and conduct of operations during combat activities, all
2 police forces were to be placed under the command of the local military
3 commander who shall be -- decide how they are to be used.
4 A. This was the only reference I could see in the military documents
5 about the placing of police under the command. There were the two
6 documents prior to this which made reference, I think it's on the
7 19th of May -- there were earlier documents saying that if there was --
8 if the police were to be used or the military wanted to use the police,
9 there had to be an agreement, had to be a request to the CSB. This
10 document is the only one that I ever saw -- or this reference, actually,
11 is the only one I ever saw with that explicit language. And I don't
12 believe that this seemed to have occurred because, well, this document
13 you've just referenced, the one in September -- or, sorry, the one in
15 Q. November.
16 A. He's making a request again. He's not saying the police are mine
17 and I can use them as I want.
18 I'm not sure why he put this single reference in on that day. It
19 could have been because of the activities of the CSB special unit in
20 Kotor Varos which occurred around that period and which became known
21 about and maybe it was a response to that. But even -- even with that
22 instruction - and it is a slightly ambiguous line, I think, in the
23 document - I did not see commands having police units under their --
24 under their command and them deciding how it's going -- they are going to
25 be used after this instruction which is in July sometime.
1 Q. Yes. Well, in fact I think we can see, if we look, please, at
2 the next document, which was a Defence document. It's at tab 57.
3 2D00119. We see there the document from the CSB which says, at
4 paragraph 1:
5 "In accordance with the order from the Minister of the Interior
6 of the Republika Srpska and on the basis of the dispatch from the
7 commander of the 1st Krajina Corps, Strictly Confidential 709192," which
8 is what that one was, the previous document, "and the consent of the
9 Ministry of the Interior, set up a brigade."
10 So ...
11 A. Yes, it would seem that he accepted the request and it was -- it
12 was implemented.
13 Q. Yes. Yes, thank you.
14 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, that's probably, then, an appropriate
15 moment for the break.
16 JUDGE HALL: Yes. So we rise, to resume in 20 minutes.
17 [The witness stands down]
18 --- Recess taken at 5.21 p.m.
19 --- On resuming at 5.54 p.m.
20 JUDGE HALL: While we wait for the witness to take the stand, it
21 has been brought to my attention that the order that the Chamber made in
22 respect of the application to receive the evidence by videolink didn't
23 fully appear on the transcript. And while it isn't necessary for the
24 Registry's purpose for us to formally issue a written decision, it is
25 apparently necessary for me to repeat that the order has been granted as
2 MS. KORNER: Yes, thank you.
3 JUDGE HALL: Thanks.
4 JUDGE HARHOFF: And also, before the witness is being brought
5 back to the stand, the Chamber has a request to make to the Prosecution
6 in respect of the motion for admission of evidence of ST-020 pursuant to
7 Rule 92 quater. And the issue is that in the motion, the Prosecution
8 added two annexes, two medical declarations, one of which was filed only
9 in B/C/S and the other only in the English translation, without the B/C/S
10 original. And the request that the Chamber would wish to make to the
11 Prosecution is that if those documents are available in the other
12 language, so to say, then could the Prosecution please provide them to
13 the Chamber immediately.
14 MS. KORNER: Yes, certainly, Your Honours.
15 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you.
16 [The witness takes the stand]
17 MS. KORNER:
18 Q. Mr. Brown, we were looking at the general issue, as discussed in
19 your report, of cooperation between the military and police. And if we
20 look at paragraph 2.41 of your report, you reference some documents where
21 there are examples of that cooperation. And I think we can just look at
22 those, please. The first is the document at -- which is P432.13 at
23 tab 14. This is 29th of May regular combat report to the Main Staff.
24 And we see, at paragraph 2, combat disposition of the units:
25 "Units of the 1st Krajina Corps are holding positions taken
1 earlier, and the front line has not moved. Cooperation with the MUP in
2 mopping up the terrain and confiscating weapons from illegal formations
3 in the area of Prijedor, Sanski Most, and Kljuc continues."
4 An, again, going back to the questions Judge Harhoff --
5 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, Your Honours, there appears that two
6 terms are used for the -- for the one word in Serbian. In all the cases
7 in these reports and the reports that we saw before, the word is -- in
8 Serbian, is "sadejstvo" and it is -- it is translated sometimes as
9 "acting in concert" and sometimes, as Ms. Korner just rightly said now,
11 Now, maybe in order that we have -- this is one of the important
12 issues, I believe, in this case, and maybe with the help of the
13 interpreters can we really opt for one interpretation in English of
14 the -- of the word, in Serbian, "sadejstvo"? That is my suggestion in
15 order that we have a clear situation further on in the case. Thank you.
16 MS. KORNER: Well --
17 [Trial Chamber confers]
18 MS. KORNER: Sorry, if I look at the B/C/S version in
19 paragraph 2, it's -- which word do you say is the "cooperation"? Because
20 it -- it doesn't -- cooperation is the first word in the English
21 translation, which is not the word I think you said.
22 MR. ZECEVIC: The word "sadejstvo" is the second word -- or the
23 third word in the second --
24 MS. KORNER: Yes, I can see that now.
25 MR. ZECEVIC: -- in the sentence of this, under 2.
1 MS. KORNER: Well, then what's the first -- actually, I can't ask
2 you this.
3 MR. ZECEVIC: The first sentence is -- it is continued --
4 "continuance of the coordination" or "continuance of acting in concert."
5 MS. KORNER: Well, Your Honour, this is all a bit difficult, and
6 the trouble is it's -- we've been going through this for -- now for
7 nearly 18 months, I think, without this issue being arisen. I'm not sure
8 whether the interpreters can resolve the issue for us. I mean, why -- do
9 the interpreters in the booth, are they any better than the interpreters
10 in CLSS or whoever did these documents?
11 MR. ZECEVIC: I wasn't really --
12 JUDGE HARHOFF: Is the issue such that it can be determined once
13 and for all?
14 MR. ZECEVIC: I believe it is, Your Honours. Just that we use --
15 because the Serbian word is one word, and it's used throughout. The
16 whole -- every each and every document has the very same word, and this
17 is -- this is specifically a military term, and it has its explanation in
18 Serbian language. Therefore, my suggestion is that we use only one term
19 in English, corresponding to the fact that it's one term in Serbian.
20 Whichever -- I'm not insisting whichever -- whichever word or words in
21 English would be appropriate, I'm asking for help. And in order that we
22 clarify the situation, that it is this precise Serbian word that is used,
23 when we used, for example, "acting in concert," it means "sadejstvo,"
24 because "coordination" is the other word and can be used for some other
1 JUDGE HARHOFF: I understand. But my question to you was really
2 whether the Serbian word, even if the word is the same but used in a
3 different context, would have a different meaning. So my question to you
4 was: Is the Serbian word of such a nature that it can only be correctly
5 translated with one, and only one, English word that then would have to
6 be applied every time from now on?
7 MR. ZECEVIC: Well, Your Honours, as far as my knowledge goes,
8 this is a very specific military term. And usually it is used only in
9 the military documents to explain a certain action of the -- of the
10 military units.
11 JUDGE HARHOFF: May I suggest, Mr. Zecevic, that you put a
12 request to CLSS to have this issue settled once and for all. Meaning
13 that when this issue is used in a military context, what is then the
14 correct English translation.
15 MR. ZECEVIC: I will, Your Honours. Thank you very much.
16 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thanks.
17 MS. KORNER:
18 Q. Right. Mr. Brown, what I was asking you about this document was,
19 in the light of Judge Harhoff's requests, whether it's -- is any light
20 shone on the role of the police by this, as to what they were doing?
21 A. Well, I take it at face value what the document says, that they
22 have conducted operations in cooperation with the police. If -- it
23 doesn't say police units under my command have conducted A, B and C, or
24 subordinated units to the 43rd Brigade have done A, B ... it says they
25 have been working in cooperation.
1 Q. All right.
2 A. Maybe I'll also draw your attention, if I can, to the --
3 reinforcing the issue that the territory was controlled quite quickly in
4 paragraph 1, bearing in mind this is the 29th of May, so I think the
5 attacks in Prijedor were the previous day or even the day before that,
7 There are some weak resistance to confiscation of weapons in the
8 wider area of Prijedor, Sanski Most, and Kljuc. The armed formations
9 have been broken up, but some components from individual squads are still
10 resisting. So ...
11 Q. Yes. In fact, the -- Mr. Brown, you've got a remarkable recall,
12 but the attack on Prijedor took place, in fact, the day after this, on
13 the 30th of May.
14 A. Oh, was that -- okay. Well, I think there was some activity
15 prior to that, though, wasn't there.
16 Q. Yes. All right. And then the other document I'd like us to look
17 at, please - I think that one is an exhibit, isn't it, yes - is the
18 document at tab 21, which is -- 2D001 -- we did. I think we've already
19 looked at that, so I'm not sure we need to look at that one again.
20 Yes. It just says -- yes, the cooperation [indiscernible].
21 All right. You then, again, pick the example of Prijedor as a
22 demonstration, if we look at paragraph 2.43, of the cooperation that took
23 place. And it's worth having a look at this for a number of themes,
24 I think. The document is P672, tab 45. This is the report that was, in
25 fact, supplied -- it was the commission investigating the so-called
1 reception centres but it mentions other things, and if we look at the
2 last page, it's dated the 18th of August. If we look at the last page.
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Well, all right. I was waiting for it to come up on the screen.
5 MS. KORNER: Can we have a look, please -- no. Sorry. It's not
6 the same. I'm looking at a different -- sorry, yes, I see there seems to
7 be -- I think it's --
8 [Prosecution counsel confer]
9 MS. KORNER: I'm so sorry, Your Honour, I've got the same
10 document in both, at 45 and 46, but they are supposed to be different
12 MR. ZECEVIC: They are different documents.
13 MS. KORNER: Yeah.
14 [Prosecution counsel confer]
15 MR. ZECEVIC: 46 is the --
16 MS. KORNER: 45. It's the CSB Banja Luka report.
17 [Prosecution counsel confer]
18 MS. KORNER: Which is Exhibit P602. Thank you.
19 Q. Right. Hopefully we now have the right one.
20 Yes. And that's the commission.
21 MS. KORNER: Can we go -- rather than worrying about when the
22 date is, could we go, on this point, first of all, to page 5 in English
23 and page 7 in B/C/S.
24 Q. Now, this is the role of Prijedor SJB. And if we look at the
25 second paragraph, it says:
1 "After the outbreak of the armed conflict, at the request of the
2 army, and as a result of the situation they found themselves in,
3 employees of Prijedor SJB took part directly in the armed conflicts,
4 during which 11 employees lost their lives.
5 "Together with members of military units, employees of the police
6 are searching the field, mopping up the remaining covert groups according
7 to plan and under the direct command of the appropriate senior officers.
8 At the same time, they are gathering operative information about the work
9 of the adversary, bringing in persons, et cetera, suspected of armed
10 rebellion," and then, again, "in collaboration with members of the
11 military police, working in joint patrols, mixed check-points,"
12 et cetera, et cetera.
13 Now as a description of what the police were doing, Mr. Brown, is
14 this one that is a recurring description?
15 A. Yes. And I think it would seem to echo what -- the earlier
16 document you showed from Talic about operations in Prijedor as a
17 cooperative component here.
18 Q. Right. Now, simply because I don't want to go back to this
19 document, can we go back to the previous page in English, page 4, and
20 in -- it's page 6 in -- yes, page 6 in B/C/S, the resettlement of
21 citizens. We see that according to the operational findings of SJB
22 Prijedor, about 4 to 5.000 persons mainly of Muslim ethnicity left the
23 municipality before the armed conflict.
24 And then in the next paragraph: From the beginning of the armed
25 conflict, in the municipality of Prijedor, until the
1 16th of August, 1992, according to data that have been insufficiently
2 checked out, about 20.000 people, citizens, left the municipality, mainly
3 of Muslim and Croatian but also of Serbian ethnicity. And I think you
4 reference that part later on when you're dealing with the evidence of
5 the, as it were, the removal of the non-Serb population; is that right?
6 A. Yes, I believe. I don't know if I referenced that specific
7 quote, but probably this document.
8 Q. And I think we'll find you do.
9 And then -- and the same -- on that same aspect, if we go forward
10 again, please, to page 7 in English, the resettlement of citizens from
11 Sanski Most, and that is on page 10 in B/C/S. Again, the report shows
12 that about 3.000 persons have moved away from the municipality since the
13 beginning of the armed conflicts. And up to the 16th of August, about
14 12.000 had applied, mainly of Muslim but partially of Croatian ethnicity,
15 applied to Sanski Most to unregister.
16 All right. Then, staying with your paragraph 2.45, you also
17 reference the document - I hope this is the right document - which is
18 P689; it's your footnote. And it's at tab 61. And if we go to page 4
19 very quickly, there we can see that you've already pointed out the
20 military involvement in these operations in Prijedor. Here we can see
21 confirmed that the combat operations which they say commenced on the
22 22nd of May employees of this station actively participated in these
23 operations, primarily members of both active and reserve forces of the
24 police; combat activities were at their most intense in the areas of
25 Kozarac, and so on and so forth.
1 And we can see that.
2 And I think that's -- you then deal with Sanski Most in your --
3 sorry, in your report, going back to 2.45, and in -- yes, and also you
4 make the point at the end of that paragraph that they were assisting in
5 the establishment of the detention centres, took over the security of
6 these centres from the army, and carried out interrogations and
7 processing of prisoners. And you reference one of a number of those
9 And I'm just wondering if it's worth having a look at 2.47. No,
10 I don't think it is.
11 Then can we deal, can we move to where you do deal with the
12 resubordination, which is at paragraph 2.49. You say -- and, again, we
13 come to the question of what this word is, but for the most part the
14 operations involving the police and the military were carried out in
15 cooperation with each other; there were occasions when police units were
16 directly integrated or subordinated to the VRS.
17 You make the point there that there are fewer examples of direct
18 integration of police units than for cooperative or joint operations, but
19 you then give some examples of where that happened.
20 And then in paragraph -- sorry, can I -- yes, I see, yes, can we
21 have -- in the next paragraph you then give some examples of the
22 correspondence between the army and the police about this, and I think we
23 ought to look at that.
24 Can we start with the document which is P376, at tab 12.
25 Now, this is quite early on, 28th of May, and it's a document
1 issued by Stojan Zupljanin to all SJBs - and this appears to be the one
2 that went to Prijedor - the corps command, and the chief of corps
3 security. And it talks about the activity, armed conflicts and military
4 activity have spread. And then in paragraph 2:
5 With regard to this matter and bearing in mind the fact that
6 further uncontrolled activity could have major undesirable consequences,
7 et cetera, all armed action and police activity is hereby forbidden
8 without a prior decision and consent of this CSB and the relevant corps
9 command of the armed forces of the Serbian Republic.
10 From your study of the documents, were you able to see,
11 Mr. Brown, why this order was issued?
12 A. I don't know specifically why -- why it was -- why the police
13 have issued this.
14 Q. All right.
15 A. I can't say from my -- the military documents particularly.
16 Q. All right. And then if we look --
17 A. I don't see those documents, by the way, as a -- when we're
18 talking about the issue of subordination, I don't necessarily read it in
19 relation to that. I read this more along the lines of both the police
20 and the military wanting to ensure control of their units when combat
21 actions are occurring so that in order -- I mean, it talks about
22 coordinated and organised activity. They want to ensure that operations
23 are coordinated, and I think what they are saying is if there is units
24 doing -- you know, conducting operations on their own or firing of -- it
25 can cause problems in coordinating their general structure. So I don't
1 necessarily see this as a subordination issue, subordinating police;
2 I see it as a control issue.
3 Q. Right. Well, on that note, let's look at the next document,
4 please, that you reference, which is 65 ter 3704, at tab 24.
5 This is approximately three weeks later, 19th of June, order on
6 the use of the police in armed combat operation, signed by General Talic:
7 "Since there are various ways of using the police force in armed
8 combat operations, I issue the following. In the zone of responsibility,
9 the police carry out tasks falling under the competence of the
10 Ministry of the Interior and they are fully responsible for maintaining
11 the law and order, preventing crime, and ensuring the successful
12 functioning of units on the front.
13 "The police may be used in direct combat operations on the front
14 only exceptionally when it is necessary to hold and strengthen the front
15 until the arrival of military units. In other cases, it's necessary to
16 inform the chief of security services centre and receive his approval."
17 So what was General Talic, as far as you can ascertain from your
18 knowledge, dealing with here?
19 A. Well, I think he's saying that there are exceptional
20 circumstances where the police can be used in combat operations. I would
21 read this potentially from -- in -- through the optics of the corridor
22 operations and, if you like, front lines where soldiers are holding
23 positions. And maybe more akin to what happened in that instruction you
24 showed earlier where a battalion was asked to be formed and raised in
25 order to stabilise the front or hold the front. And if there is that
1 requirement, then the CSB has to approve that.
2 Q. Right. So here they are saying the police can carry out tasks
3 falling under the competence of the Minister of the Interior.
4 General Talic appears to be drawing a distinction between the police
5 tasks and the military tasks here?
6 A. Yes, he would seem to -- I mean, that would seem reasonable, yes.
7 Q. All right.
8 MS. KORNER: Yes, Your Honours, may that be admitted and marked,
10 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
11 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P1789, Your Honours.
12 MS. KORNER:
13 Q. Then other similar documents or documents that -- dealt with that
15 Document number 40, I've already dealt with the two from
17 Yes. And then I think you reference there, as I said earlier,
18 the 1st of July instruction, and that's the end of paragraph 2.50.
19 A. Yes, I think I dealt with that one.
20 Q. We dealt with that one, yeah.
21 Then again, summarising, as quickly as we can, the remainder of
22 this report, I think you also showed that there was cooperation -- on the
23 remainder of this part of the report, in the processing of prisoners,
24 transfer between detention facilities.
25 And we ought to look, perhaps, at one more document, and that is
1 document at tab 52, which is P1094.
2 This is rather like, I think, the last document that -- or the
3 one before the last that we looked at. This is on the 18th of September,
4 from Stojan Zupljanin, addressed to all SJBs and, again, to the command
5 of the 1st Krajina Corps, the 2nd Krajina Corps. And it talks in
6 paragraph -- the last paragraph on the first page in English, and I think
7 it's over the page in B/C/S, if we go to the next page in B/C/S:
8 At the same time, we draw to the attention of the SJB chiefs the
9 fact that members of the active and reserve police forces may be engaged
10 in combat activities according to the principle of resubordination to a
11 superior army command only in the event that combat activities are taking
12 place on the territory covered by the designated SJBs and with the
13 approval of the chief of the CSB.
14 Again, anything to show why Zupljanin was writing this in
15 September? It's similar to the one he wrote way back in June.
16 A. I would only speculate that the requests for combat operations in
17 the corridor, that the police were trying to minimise that type of
18 activity and that there had been these requests to send formed police
19 units or units up to the front line, and maybe they felt that really was
20 an army task that they shouldn't be conducting, that there was enough
21 work in their own municipalities, as highlighted in one of the middle
22 paragraphs, and that he was saying that really we should only be involved
23 in combat operations if it's in our own area.
24 Q. Yes.
25 A. And maybe it was to do with not wanting to release policemen up
1 to the -- up to the front line to, in essence, act as soldiers in
2 defending the corridor.
3 Q. Right. Yes. All right. And as I said, I don't think I need to
4 draw the Court's attention to any other documents within this section.
5 Can we turn briefly to paramilitaries because we have dealt quite
6 a lot with that in your previous answers. Starting at paragraph 2.57 of
7 your report. And as you've already, I think, explained to the Court, the
8 involvement of paramilitaries was a complex one. I think that's the
9 second sentence in paragraph 2.57.
10 And let us look at the report you've already referred to in your
11 answers to Judge Harhoff. The document is already an exhibit, and it's
12 P591, tab 36.
13 This report was produced by, as he was then, Colonel Tolimir; is
14 that right?
15 A. Yes, that's correct.
16 Q. In August of, as we can see, well, it's dated the 28th of July,
17 but if one looks at the end, it appears to have gone out on the
18 13th of August. And he gives a long preamble as to what the
19 characteristics of paramilitaries are.
20 And then if we go, please, to the fourth page in English and the
21 same in the B/C/S, he is listing some of the groups. And if we look at
22 the fourth one on that page, there is a group with 13 members, headed by
23 somebody called Zeljko Skrbic, which is active, and it says, on the
24 instructions of somebody from the Jajce SJB, the said group armed and
25 equipped itself with state-of-the-art supplies from a second engine fuel
1 depot, then they turned outlaws, attempt to eliminate the command staff
2 of the depot and take it over. To avoid punishment, Skrbic formally
3 joined the 30th Krajina Division.
4 Now, how does this fit in with your survey of the
5 1st Krajina Corps dealings with paramilitary organisations?
6 A. Well, I think this document, and others, indicated that they
7 wanted to ensure that these units were brought under control and to be --
8 they were to be placed under the control of the army, and this would seem
9 to be an example that they were, or at least this unit was anyway. But
10 it seemed to be more that the issue of paramilitaries -- I mean, that
11 they were -- there was a clear awareness. This is quite a detailed
12 document. There was an awareness of what the paramilitaries were doing
13 and also how many were with operating and some of the groups that were
14 there, but that really -- instead of -- instead of suppressing them
15 fiercely, based on what they had done and what they were continuing to do
16 in all their guises, they wanted to bring them in to the VRS. And that
17 seemed to be more important and they seemed to be acceptable as long as
18 they were within the VRS or under the control of the Serb authorities.
19 Q. Yeah. Yes. Because they go on to list -- or he -- sorry, he
20 goes on to list groups active in the area of Prijedor, including this
21 group headed by, I think you've mentioned already, Cigo's Group headed by
22 this man called Radanovic. Then we see Veljko Milankovic from Prnjavor
23 and is recently formally under the command of the 1KK; the Serbian
24 Defence forces, Nenad Stevandic, who's a member of the -- well, it
25 doesn't say that here but, anyway, there is a connection between SJB and
1 SNB. And over in the next page, please, we see that a Special Police
2 unit, under the command of a certain Kujundzic, has been established in
3 the village of Stanari in the municipality of Doboj and consists of about
4 80 men who are mainly involved in setting up check-points which they use
5 for their criminal activities.
6 Now, that report was the 28th of July. And I think you
7 reference, in your report, at paragraph 2.63, that Major Talic -- sorry,
8 General Talic issued his own instruction which we can see, please, as
9 P593, tab 38.
10 And the -- he refers to the assessment in the first paragraph,
11 two days before, and then he orders:
12 Offer all paramilitary formations and their leaders ... if they
13 do honestly intend to serve the rightful struggle for survival of the
14 Serbian people an opportunity -- and we need to go over to the next page,
15 please -- to join the regular army.
16 And then item 2: Do not include in the units individuals and
17 groups which have been involved in crimes and looting or who have
18 committed other criminal acts. Disarm and arrest them and bring criminal
19 charges against them in the army courts, regardless of their citizenship.
20 Now, this is end of July. Were there any documents earlier that
21 you saw in relation to any dealings with paramilitaries that show any
22 suggestion that these people should be charged with criminal offences?
23 Or was that the first time?
24 A. You're talking about General Talic issuing an instruction
25 similar --
1 Q. [Overlapping speakers] ... yes, instruction, exactly.
2 A. I believe that was the first time. I could be wrong. But from
3 memory I think that was the only one I remember.
4 Q. All right. And then 3, again, this -- might as well look at the
5 B/C/S word -- well, here it says, in cooperation with the SRBH MUP,
6 disarm and arrest paramilitary formations, et cetera, et cetera.
8 units, groups, and individuals, in the territory. From now on, bring
9 criminal charges against those commanders, competent military territorial
11 Now, it says there that he forbids the existence of any
12 paramilitary units. And I think you go on in your report, however, to
13 point out or to give the full example of what happened to Milankovic and
14 indeed other paramilitary groups.
15 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, I should just note, in passing, that
16 in paragraph 2.67 it appears to read on the 23rd of December, "1992."
17 That should read "1991." It was corrected by Mr. Brown in an addendum.
18 Q. It appears that these -- this paramilitary organisation continued
19 to exist because it was part of the Krajina Corps; is that correct?
20 A. Yes, I mean, I think, at least from the documents I was able to
21 review, I certainly know that those two, Cigo's Group, for example, and
22 also Milankovic's Group, were -- continued to be part of the VRS and
23 clearly were not -- well, it says "do not include individuals or groups,"
24 well, his unit continued to -- Milankovic's unit continued to operate
25 until his death.
1 Q. Right. And indeed ... yes.
2 All right. That's all I want to deal with on paramilitaries.
3 Can we move, then, please, to some of the features of the
4 municipality attacks which you start to deal with at paragraph 2.73. And
5 I think you already indicated earlier that there was a similarity that
6 occurred during these military attacks and operations which have been
7 carried out, and you describe that in paragraph 2.73 and indeed 2.74.
8 You go on to deal with the incidents as against the Serb forces,
9 which preceded, as you put it, some of the municipality attacks. And if
10 we look at one of the documents, dated the 1st of June, which is document
11 at number 17, which is P411.29 -- I think we've looked at that, sorry.
12 Yes, I've got the wrong document. No, I haven't.
13 I asked you earlier about the reporting up of these attacks and
14 the responsibility to taking these attacks. So if we look at this
15 report, 1st of June, from the 1st Krajina Corps, at the bottom of the
16 page - first page in English and second page in -- middle paragraph,
17 second page in B/C/S, I think. The heaviest fighting has taken place --
18 yeah, in the area of Hambarine, Prijedor, Kozarac, troops under the
19 command of the Prijedor area cleared Hambarine and Kozarac and completely
20 destroyed one ZNG unit, which is apparently black shirts, foreign
21 mercenaries, and legionaries, and the troops have arrested more than
22 2.000 Green Berets who are now in Omarska. 135 of them in Stara Gradiska
23 and about 5.000 in the village of Trnopolje.
24 What does this report demonstrate, as far as you're concerned, in
25 the themes that you were looking at in your report?
1 A. Well, I think, again, you know, there is an involvement of the
2 army. There's a large number of people captured as a result very
3 quickly, and they're placed in detention centres very quickly, or at
4 least arrested. And there was references after that of General Talic
5 commending that operation. And, again, it would seem to be one of those
6 quite quick operations. To take that number of people and control that
7 number of people is not an easy logistic issue if they were all
9 Q. Well, I was going to ask about that. According to this, they
10 have arrested 2.000 Green Berets. Does that Green Berets suggest these
11 are supposed to be armed combatants?
12 A. They categorise Green Berets generally as combatants. 2.000 is a
13 lot. 5.000 people in Trnopolje is a lot of people. I'm not sure they
14 can all be combatants. I think I find that very difficult.
15 Q. Yeah. While we are on this report, can we go to the third page,
16 please, in English, and it's the fourth page in B/C/S. It says, at the
17 end: This report shall be thrashed out with the soldiers -- sorry, with
18 all soldiers. Specifying the facts that it presents more credible than
19 those in the mass media.
20 You spoke yesterday of dissemination of the, as it were, the
21 plans, the underlying -- I suppose the word is ideology behind what was
22 happening. Is this -- can this be categorised as an example of that?
23 A. Well, I think it could be certainly seen as a report that
24 indicates that the corps wanted to ensure its soldiers knew what was
25 going on and why. This particular type of report was written by
1 Colonel Vukalic, who was an assistant commander for moral guidance and
2 legal affairs. It was a position, a particular staff position, in the
3 corps. And what this officer would do, and his role really, was to
4 ensure that the troops knew what was happening and that subordinate
5 formations from the corps were made aware. So he would produce usually
6 monthly reports. Sometimes they were more frequently than that. And
7 they were summary documents about what was -- what had happened in the
8 period prior to that. So it's not necessarily a combat report as we've
9 seen before which tended to be daily reports about the situation. This
10 is more of a consorted report that he would produce every so often. And
11 he clearly wants this to be disseminated down the corps and into -- into
12 the units.
13 Q. All right. Finally on this report, although it's on a slightly
14 different topic, but just so, again, we don't have to go back to it, can
15 we go back to the first page. In the third paragraph, starting in the
16 Banja Luka region, Colonel Vukalic then goes on to deal with, again, this
17 question of moving out. And he says that a portion of the Muslims and --
18 Muslim and Croatian population is moving out, the region of
19 Bosnian Krajina has issued a decision to facilitate such departures,
20 providing that the Serbs from Central Bosnia and places with predominant
21 Muslim and Croatian populations are also allowed to move out.
22 Those departing will not be allowed to return.
23 Would part of Colonel Vukalic's job as the morale officer, as it
24 were, be to liaise with the civilian authorities, for example the
25 ARK Crisis Staff?
1 A. I'm not sure that that was his role. The corps did have an
2 officer for civilian affairs which was separate to this, but clearly this
3 is a job that requires to receive information about what's going on, and
4 he clearly knows about this decision, and he's aware that the population
5 is moving out and that they are not going to be allowed to return. And
6 again, on your previous point, that this information should be
7 disseminated down or thrashed out, as he calls it, with soldiers, clearly
8 shows that, you know, that this is an issue that they are to be made
9 aware of, or at least they haven't got any problems with them being made
10 aware that that is the situation.
11 And, again, I keep coming back to the issue of time. This is the
12 1st of June. This is with only weeks from the 16th Assembly Session,
13 weeks from the formation of the army, and already there's references that
14 large numbers of people are moving out or that there are large numbers of
15 people in detention.
16 Q. Right. Yes, thank you. That's all I'm going to ask from that
18 And if I'm looking at your paragraph 2.76, you conclude that
19 the -- these incidents that -- against the Serb forces were low-level
20 ones, even though they resulted in the death of Serb soldiers, and that
21 the response to them, as you say, was often significant, both in terms of
22 manpower and weapons system used.
23 What do you mean by that?
24 A. I mean, I -- I did see in the documents that there were instances
25 where Serbs were attacked, you know, especially in the early part of May,
1 and there were a number of incidents -- the Hambarine check-point
2 incident being one, where Serb soldiers and police, I believe, or
3 military police, were attacked. There was an incident in Kljuc where a
4 bus was attacked carrying JNA soldiers. And incidents resulted in the
5 deaths of Serbs. But they did seem somewhat low-level in terms of
6 casualties, and within days sometimes, within days, you had what appeared
7 to be large-scale military operations, combined operations, sometimes
8 involving tanks - as a reference, I think in the attack on Prijedor, that
9 tanks were used. There are references in the 1 Krajina Corps of massive
10 bombardment and destruction of towns and villages, and it seemed to be
11 that the incidents were -- the unfortunate incidents where soldiers or
12 Serbs were killed did seem somewhat low-level in comparison to what
13 followed, the rounding up of thousands of people and the destruction of a
14 lot of -- a lot of property, which -- some of which is referenced in the
16 Q. You've talked about the use of tanks and the like. Would the
17 brigades that were involved in these attacks have their own tanks or
18 heavy artillery, or would they need to request the use of those?
19 A. Certain brigades of the corps would have had some tank support.
20 I don't know the exact distribution. For example, in the motorised
21 brigade, 43rd Brigade, it may have had its own tank support. There was a
22 tank brigade within the corps. It's its own armoured brigade. And
23 normally when armour is used, it's not used as a brigade on its own; it's
24 usually given in support of other operations. So Talic probably had the
25 option of disseminating out armour to units, and probably some units of
1 his corps also had armour.
2 It was a bit similar in relation to artillery, although artillery
3 comes in many forms. And infantry and Territorial Defence units would
4 have had things like mortars and maybe even small calibre artillery
5 pieces. But there were larger artillery pieces in certain units of the
6 corps. So, in essence, it's a bit of a mix.
7 Q. Yes. Thank you.
8 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, I've reached the end of that section,
9 so perhaps it would be an appropriate moment.
10 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Brown, as indicated to you, your testimony has a
11 ways to go yet. And, again, as we would have indicated, the Court will
12 not be sitting for the rest of this week in observance of the
13 Orthodox New Years, observed according to the Julian calendar. So we
14 would continue your testimony at 9.00. We are scheduled for, in this
15 courtroom, on Monday morning, yes, and I trust that everyone has a safe
17 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.
18 [The witness stands down]
19 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6.58 p.m.,
20 to be reconvened on Monday, the 17th day of
21 January, 2011, at 9.00 a.m.