1 Tuesday, 18 January 2011
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning,
6 everyone in and around the courtroom.
7 This is case IT-08-91-T, the Prosecutor versus Mico Stanisic and
8 Stojan Zupljanin.
9 JUDGE HALL: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
10 Good morning to everyone. May we have the appearances, please.
11 MS. KORNER: Joanna Korner and Crispian Smith for the
12 Prosecution. For a moment I had forgotten who I was.
13 JUDGE HARHOFF: As long as you don't forget where you are.
14 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated]
15 MR. ZECEVIC: Good morning, Your Honours. Slobodan Zecevic,
16 Slobodan Cvijetic, Eugene O'Sullivan, and Ms. Tatjana Savic appearing for
17 Stanisic Defence.
18 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours.
19 Dragan Krgovic, Aleksandar Aleksic, and Igor Pantelic appearing for
20 Zupljanin Defence.
21 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Your Honour, you asked us yesterday at the close
22 of business to address you this morning --
23 JUDGE HALL: Yes. [Microphone not activated]
24 MR. O'SULLIVAN: -- in relation to the Prosecution's notice in the
25 particular Exhibits P1755 and P1756, and Your Honours will have seen that
1 in paragraphs 5 through 7 of the Prosecution's notice they acknowledge
2 several discrepancies between those two proposed exhibits. Your Honours
3 will recall, having looked at that submission, that Mr. --
4 General Milovanovic did not review a complete version of P1755. He never
5 reviewed P1756, and I'm referring to out-of-court review. And in court
6 he reviewed only selected pages of P1756. The Prosecution also
7 acknowledges discrepancies in that one document or one version of this
8 document contains documents inserted into the book that are not in the
10 We say that these discrepancies are significant. And I suppose
11 we could ignore the elephant in the room, but I say we shouldn't. There
12 are problems with these documents that we've raised with you in the past,
13 and there is no rational basis on which to decide which of these two is
14 authentic and ought to be admitted.
15 But I'll take that point no further, Your Honour.
16 JUDGE HALL: Thank you, Mr. O'Sullivan.
17 Is there a response?
18 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, obviously we don't agree. Mr. Hannis
19 set out the major difference is the way that the documents were scanned.
20 There is actually no problem with this; if Your Honours want it, the
21 originals can come in to court and can be examined. So it's the
22 originals which are the evidence, in effect. We are simply saying rather
23 than bring them into court and have -- because it will cause problems
24 with other cases, and have them made exhibits in this case, we want the
25 scans. Mr. Hannis explained the difference; the only real difference is
1 the scanning. As it was pointed out by Mr. Hannis, the general in fact
2 in court identified the handwriting.
3 And as I say, Your Honours, I don't know whether this is
4 reopening the whole question of the admissibility of these documents as
5 witnesses [sic]. If so, then obviously, as I say, we can call a great
6 deal of further evidence about it. But Your Honours have accepted it.
7 Mr. Hannis has given the explanation for the differences. And we invite
8 Your Honours to simply admit or, rather, remove the MFI status from the
10 JUDGE HALL: Thank you, Ms. Korner.
11 Well, it occurred to the Chamber, when we first saw Mr. Hannis's
12 report with his candid observations about the apparent discrepancies,
13 that they were matters which, notwithstanding the decision which the
14 Chamber has already made and which it doesn't intend to revisit about the
15 admissibility of these documents, that the -- in fairness, the Defence
16 should have an opportunity to comment on it. And the -- but on a closer
17 inspection, it appears to the Chamber that the discrepancies are not as
18 stark as they may appear at a casual reading. And reminding all the
19 parties that the question of weight of these documents has yet to be
20 determined and will be a factor in the final resolution of this matter,
21 we at this stage order that the MFI status of the documents be removed
22 and they be marked as full exhibits.
23 [Trial Chamber confers]
24 [Trial chamber and Legal Officer confer]
25 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
1 JUDGE HALL: By way of clarification, it is the coloured versions
2 which are being -- in respect of which the MFI status is being removed,
3 and the black and white versions are not admitted.
4 MS. KORNER: Yes.
5 JUDGE HALL: Yes.
6 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, can I just return to something
7 Your Honours just said, saying that it's a question of the weight. We
8 understood the documents were admitted on the basis that Your Honours
9 were satisfied these were authentic. If you're not so satisfied, then
10 you couldn't have admitted them. The weight is a different matter in the
11 sense of how much does it assist Your Honours in deciding --
12 JUDGE HALL: Yes, we aren't saying anything different,
13 Ms. Korner.
14 MS. KORNER: All right. I just was a little concerned when --
15 because you allied it with the question of the -- potentially the --
16 whether these documents were authentic or not because of the
18 JUDGE HALL: I thought that had long been decided.
19 MS. KORNER: Right.
20 JUDGE HALL: And to the extent that we can import the decision in
21 Seselj as to the handwriting, from the handwriting expert, yes, we --
22 that adds weight to the decision that we have made in this case.
23 MS. KORNER: But, Your Honour, that's a little -- I think -- but
24 may I say, out of caution, that's a little difficult because we haven't
25 put the evidence in, in this case; we merely asserted yesterday that
1 there was this evidence available if Your Honours needed to hear further
3 JUDGE HALL: I did say to the extent that we can import.
4 So if there is nothing further, could we have the witness return
5 to the stand.
6 [The witness takes the stand]
7 JUDGE HALL: Good morning, Mr. Brown. Before Mr. Zecevic resumes
8 his cross-examination, I remind you you're still on your oath.
9 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.
10 JUDGE HALL: Now, as a matter of curiosity, Mr. Zecevic, your
11 time estimate, does it still hold, in terms of what you had indicated
12 yesterday? I mean before we started.
13 MR. ZECEVIC: Well, Your Honours, I estimated five hours, but
14 that was well before the direct examination. I will be able, at the --
15 probably at the second break to give you an indication whether I would be
16 needing some additional time or not. At this point, I'm truly sorry but
17 I can't give any estimate. I would hope to finish by end of today, but
18 it's very likely that I will spill over to tomorrow.
19 JUDGE HALL: Thank you. You said additional; I was thinking of
20 reduction. But please continue.
21 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you very much.
22 WITNESS: EWAN BROWN: [Resumed]
23 Cross-examination by Mr. Zecevic: [Continued]
24 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Brown, yesterday we spoke about the laws and
25 regulations which, in my opinion, and you agreed, are important for the
1 understanding of the matters you dealt with in your expert report. You
2 certainly have reviewed the Law on All People's Defence, haven't you?
3 A. Yes. I believe I have, although it was some time ago.
4 Q. It's a fact that from the aspects of doctrine and strategy of the
5 armed forces of former Yugoslavia, that law was one of the most important
6 because as it deals with the concept of all people's war to the minutest
7 detail; correct?
8 A. Yes. It was a law that clearly dealt with the Yugoslavian view
9 on how the country was to act in a state of war or imminent threat of
11 Q. I agree. It's a fact also, isn't it, that in the
12 Law on All People's Defence, and later we will also see that it also
13 applies to the strategy which is a document that elaborates this matter,
14 many issues that you dealt with in your expert report are contained, such
15 as Crisis Staffs, the Territorial Defence, commanding the TO, leading the
16 TO, volunteers, and the like. All these are explained and defined. Do
17 you remember that?
18 A. Yes. I do. I'm not sure if - I now would have to review it -
19 but whether Crisis Staffs are the words or phrases that they use. But
20 from what I remember, the law regulates the Territorial Defence, the
21 army, and also I think they often call them sociopolitical communes or
22 organisations at local or regional level, as well as the
23 League of Communists, I believe.
24 Q. Well, the law was adopted in 1982. At that time, the only
25 political party on the territory of the former Yugoslavia was the
1 Communist Party. And I agree with you that the law doesn't mention
2 Crisis Staffs but committees for All People's Defence and social
3 self-protection. I believe that is what you meant; correct?
4 A. Yes, I think that's the case.
5 Q. But those committees basically are the same thing. Although in
6 1992 they were called Crisis Staffs, they were actually the same thing as
7 these bodies which in 1992 existed in the field and about which you speak
8 in your report; correct? I mean as far as powers, structure, and their
9 role go.
10 A. Well, again, I would have to review all those bits and details,
11 but I would agree generally that there was a structure in
12 All People's Defence which was about mutual cooperation in all the
13 fields. All People's Defence was a mechanism by which federal republic
14 and local or municipal organs were to have a role in the defence of the
15 country. And at local level or regional level, there were secretariats
16 for National Defence, there were civil protection issues, there were
17 civilian bodies that were meant to have function in assisting in the
18 defence of the territory, along with the Territorial Defence and the
19 JNA -- or the army.
20 Q. I will read out a section of text to you. Document 1D00-4042,
21 tab 3, Article 74. And the page is 11 or 12, I believe, in Serbian, and
22 I believe it's page 43 in English. Article 74.
23 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] if we can get Article 74 on the
24 screen, please. That's on page 12 in the Serbian text. And in the
25 English translation, I believe it's page 43.
1 Q. This Article refers to -- or, rather, it refers to Article 72,
2 which lays out which bodies exercise command and control over the
3 institutions of All People's Defence and social self-protection. And you
4 will see here, halfway through the first paragraph, first it says:
5 "If the competent organs mentioned in Article 72 are unable to
6 discharge their tasks and duties, committees for All People's Defence and
7 social self-protection shall carry out activities and measures in order
8 to make these organs capable of continuing their work, and they shall
9 mobilise the resources of All People's Defence, et cetera, until the
10 appropriate organs are able to discharge their tasks and duties."
11 This means, effectively, that command and control over the bodies
12 of All People's Defence are in the exclusive remit of these competent
13 organs, isn't it, sir? In a specific municipality.
14 A. Is it possible to look at Article 72 to talk about what the
15 competent organs they're referring to are? I'm assuming that means the
16 military or the TO, but is it possible to look at Article 72?
17 Q. Certainly. That would be the previous page. There's a reference
18 to Article 72, paragraph 1, the first paragraph of that article.
19 I needn't read it out to you. You can read it for yourself.
20 A. And could you move back to Article 74 again?
21 MR. ZECEVIC: Can we have Article 74.
22 THE WITNESS: Well, it's rather a lengthy article, both of them,
23 but I read this as saying that in relation to -- bearing in mind the
24 topic is to do with organs of local national defence, if they -- if the
25 organs referenced in 72 are unable to fulfill their function, these are
1 taken on by the committees for All People's Defence, which I'm assuming
2 were the localised individuals who worked at municipal or local level to
3 assist in the mobilisation, provide logistic support, and the likes.
4 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Sir, Article 74 says, in the second sentence that I have already
6 read out to you but I will do so again:
7 "If the competent organs mentioned in Article 72, paragraph 1, of
8 this law are unable to discharge their tasks and duties, committees for
9 All People's Defence and social self-protection shall ..."
10 And then the last sentence:
11 "... shall mobilise the resources of All People's Defence and
12 social self-protection in their area and direct them until the
13 appropriate organs are able to discharge their tasks and duties."
14 This means, sir, that these committees mobilise all forces of
15 All People's Defence, issue orders to them, carry out activities, and so
16 on. That's what it means, isn't it?
17 A. No. Well, it may mean that, if the competent organs referenced
18 in 72 don't fulfil their function. And I'm assuming that this cuts to
19 this issue of, you know, everyone had a function or a role within all
20 Yugoslav -- All People's Defence. And if the localised organs of
21 authority were unable to function, then the committees for All People's
22 Defences would be empowered to take over that responsibility, which could
23 include the issue of mobilisation or other issues like logistic support
24 or cooperation. That's how I read it.
25 Q. I agree that all of this has been encompassed. However, this
1 particular regulation is unambiguous and it envisaged exactly what their
2 legislators had in mind. But let us not waste any more time on this
4 I'm going to show you now Article 104. And just for reference,
5 on the same page you can see Article 75, which says that National Defence
6 committees are responsible for their work to the organs that had set them
7 up. In other words, if we are talking about a municipality, that would
8 be the Municipal Assembly.
9 Now, back to Article 104, on page 18 in Serbian and page 67 in
11 Mr. Brown, I don't know if you had an opportunity or if you were
12 interested at all in these matters, but Article 104 explains the notion
13 of resubordination of militia or police in accordance with the law. This
14 is something you discussed with Ms. Korner on the first day of your
15 testimony. And it says that the police may be used for carrying out
16 combat operations during which time the police shall be subordinated to
17 the commanding officer. And it says, at the end, the reserve police --
18 forces of the police shall be reinforced by military conscript.
19 Did you have an occasion to take a look at this article?
20 A. I haven't looked at it recently, but I obviously read it now.
21 Q. Sir, are you aware that in the event of an imminent threat of war
22 and other emergencies, units of the TO may carry out work relating to
23 maintaining public law and order, be engaged to fight terrorists and
24 other sabotage forces, and carrying out other tasks relating to social
25 self-protection? TO units shall be engaged in these tasks when they
1 cannot be carried out by the internal affairs organs in a timely and
2 effective manner. I have read this from the strategy of All People's
3 Defence and social self-protection. For reference, that's page 58 in
4 document 1D00526. I think it's under tab 4. What I've just read to you
5 is on page 58, which is 31 in e-court in the Serbian and page 5 in the
7 Now, the essence is that TO units, during an imminent threat of
8 war and other emergencies, is entitled, under the law and these
9 strategies, to act as if they were members of the Ministry of the
10 Interior. Were you familiar with this?
11 A. No. It wasn't a part of my report to look at that particular
12 issue. And I don't know if you're referencing the Law on All People's
13 Defence or a different --
14 Q. I am reading this portion from the strategy of All People's
15 Defence, which is a document, an official document, published by the
16 Presidency on the 20th of May, 1987. And in its preamble it says that
17 this strategy shall be implemented from the date of its coming into
18 force. And it is an integral part and provides a better understanding of
19 the law that we are talking about. So this regulation, as well, was in
21 MR. ZECEVIC: Now I see that Ms. Korner is on her feet.
22 MS. KORNER: I've just got a query. Your Honours, this document
23 has not been fully translated, and it may be for obvious reasons, because
24 it's a huge document, but the paragraph that Mr. Zecevic has just
25 referred Mr. Brown to appears, as it were, in isolation. I have no idea
1 what the preceding or succeeding paragraph is about. I would ask that we
2 can have a translation giving the context of all of this.
3 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, we asked the CLSS to
4 translate the entire document at the very beginning, i.e., in September
5 two years ago when we started these proceedings.
6 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
7 JUDGE HALL: Sorry, Mr. Zecevic, please continue.
8 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] At the time, the documents was
9 returned to us and we were instructed to highlight the relevant portions
10 of the document which will then be translated. We were told that it was
11 impossible to have the entire document translated.
12 Now, I have to say that I am more than surprised that the OTP to
13 date has not obtained such a significant document in English. It is
14 almost incomprehensible that despite all the cases that we had before
15 nobody thought it would be well-advised to have it translated.
16 However, if we gain support from the Trial Chamber and from the
17 OTP as well, we are going to reiterate our request to the CLSS to have
18 this crucial document translated. And it is extremely important for
19 understanding the Law on All People's Defence. For that reasons, I think
20 that it must be translated in its entirety, but that means that, as
21 I said, we would need support from the Trial Chamber due to the fact that
22 we were denied the request to have the whole book translated.
23 Or perhaps Ms. Korner may, with her associates and co-workers,
24 select certain portions that she deems worthy of translation and then
25 we'll do it.
1 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, I'm sorry, it's no good Mr. Zecevic
2 trying to blame the OTP for his own shortcomings on this. My complaint
3 is that this document has taken one paragraph in isolation, as we can
4 see, and we have no idea what the context is. And Mr. Zecevic wants to
5 make certain assertions to the witness based on a paragraph taken out of
6 context. If he wanted to use it, then it was his obligation, not the
7 OTP's, to make sure that a proper translation of such sections, not just
8 paragraphs, was obtained.
9 JUDGE HALL: I have heard what counsel on both sides have said.
10 And it seems to me that the practical solution to this problem, given the
11 limitations which CLSS obviously has and notwithstanding the inevitable
12 differences that would arise in adversarial proceedings in this context,
13 one side may think that certain parts are necessary and the other side
14 other parts, wouldn't the -- a way, and I understand Mr. Zecevic's
15 explanation to Ms. Korner's last comment is that it was at the invitation
16 of CLSS that the portions were highlighted which they were able to
17 accommodate the translation of. So I'm wondering whether it is not
18 possible, and perhaps I'm being terribly naive here but that's the
19 prerogative of judges, for counsel, out of court, to agree portions of
20 the -- this voluminous work, that would include in this case the
21 paragraph now in contention, and arrange to have those translated into
22 one of the working languages of the Tribunal.
23 As I sit here, I see no alternative, but I'm willing to hear
25 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, it's all very well, but what my
1 complaint is that they've picked a paragraph, it may well be that the
2 rest of it supports their contention but I simply don't know that and nor
3 does anybody else. And this is not a proper way, to just take a
4 paragraph out, even with the complaint of CLSS. Your Honours, I don't
5 want to waste any more time on this. I'm certainly going to say that
6 this document, in its present translated form, cannot form part of any
7 law library or whatever. I think it is coming out of the law library.
8 MR. ZECEVIC: That is precisely the fact, that's the strategy of
9 the All People's Defence is a part of law library, and it's been
10 stipulated by the parties. And that's why I'm so ...
11 MS. KORNER: Well, Your Honours, I certainly didn't, and --
12 MR. ZECEVIC: Surprise.
13 MS. KORNER: Well, I certainly didn't appreciate that what was
14 being put into a law library was an annotated, apparently annotated by
15 the Defence, version of the document, not even the original document is
16 in the law library.
17 MR. ZECEVIC: No, no, that's -- that's -- that's completely --
18 MS. KORNER: Well, then, why is this one out?
19 MR. ZECEVIC: That's completely incorrect, Ms. Korner. The whole
20 document is a part of the law library. The whole document is a part of
21 the law library in its original form. The problem that we have is that
22 we have to approach, we have to ask, the CLSS to translate. If they say,
23 No, we are not translating the whole document, please mark the parts
24 where you think are relevant, and that is what we will translate; that's
25 what we did. There was no other way for us. The Prosecution has their
1 own translation department, and I would have hoped that, as I said, that
2 the Prosecution has the -- at least the draft translation of the whole
4 JUDGE HALL: Anyway, I don't think that this matter can be
5 resolved at this stage. And what I would suggest is that, Mr. Zecevic,
6 you proceed, and the -- at some point, Ms. -- the Prosecution may be in a
7 position to challenge the context of the relevant passage to which you're
8 referring the witness. But at this point it seems as if we aren't going
9 to make any progress by arguing the methods any further.
10 MS. KORNER: No, but, Your Honour, I don't know I'm challenging
11 the context or not because I don't know what the context is. I'm simply
12 pointing out, and may I say that if I had realised that the law library,
13 whether it's an annotated or an unannotated version, did not contain a
14 proper translation, then I wouldn't have agreed. And I'm afraid we're
15 going to have to go back over the law library and see what else hasn't
16 been translated.
17 JUDGE HALL: That's possible. But for the moment what I would
18 suggest is that you flag this particular paragraph and see where you
19 stand by the time -- when the time comes for re-examination.
20 MR. ZECEVIC: Well, Your Honours, this gives me a grave concern.
21 We spent more than six months agreeing on the law library, and it was a
22 joint effort by both parties, and we jointly filed the law library
23 documents with all its -- with all the documents in. And that was
24 throughout the whole Prosecutor's case and according to the instruction
25 of the Trial Chamber, and my understanding that we are going to stipulate
1 to that, we didn't insist that any of the documents would be -- would be
2 admitted as the exhibit. Now, if Ms. Korner -- if I understand right
3 that Ms. Korner is going to revisit that, then we are just -- this is
4 just not acceptable for us because then we will have to -- to return to
5 point one and then ask all the documents to be admitted because we intend
6 to rely on those documents. And based --
7 JUDGE HALL: If I might interrupt, Mr. Zecevic. The concern that
8 you are now articulating is something which would occur to everyone in
9 the Court, including the Chamber, but, again, it is not something that
10 can be resolved at this moment. And we are now all alerted that it may
11 be something to which we will have to return at some -- at some point in
12 the future, but let's proceed with the cross-examination of this witness.
13 MR. ZECEVIC: I understand, Your Honour.
14 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, can I just on that note say the rule
15 is, and it may be we weren't thorough enough in checking, that a document
16 which is admitted has to be in one of the working languages of the
17 Tribunal. Now, I imagine that a cursory check was done and nobody
18 appreciated certainly that this document was only partially translated.
19 Because the front page has been translated, and all the rest of it ...
20 and that's the problem. That's why I say it will have to be revisited.
21 I mean, as a matter of strict rules, there has to be a translation.
22 MR. ZECEVIC: I don't want to go any further. I would just state
23 that we have at least 20 documents which were produced by the Office of
24 the Prosecutor which have only partial translation and were admitted in
25 this case. But let me move on, Your Honours.
1 Q. [Interpretation] Sir, in this very same document, just for the
2 sake of confirming what Ms. Korner has raised as a problem, if you look
3 at page 151, that's in the book, whereas it's page 77 in e-court,
4 page 12 in the English, it reads that in introducing and maintaining
5 public law and order and carrying out other tasks of social
6 self-protection, TO units enjoy all the powers as those enjoyed by the
7 organs of the Interior. This is in the section entitled, "Engagement of
8 Armed Forces in Emergencies."
9 I presume that you are not familiar with this section either.
10 You haven't read this part of the document. Is that correct?
11 A. I haven't seen any of the document.
12 Q. Very well. Sir, let me ask you, then, the following: I'd like
13 to clarify three principal questions with you. In your report, item 1.83
14 to 1.100, you speak about responsibilities of a unit; that was under
15 tab 64 of the OTP which contained a map of a unit AOR, which is
16 65 ter 10639. So tab 64 in the OTP binder. That's the footnote of your
17 item 143. Is that correct?
18 A. [Previous translation continues] ...
19 Q. Sir, tell me please, very briefly, how do you understand the term
20 "area of responsibility" of a specific unit?
21 A. Well, an area of responsibility is a zone or a piece of terrain
22 set by a commander that that military unit is responsible for, in terms
23 of its conduct and operations.
24 Q. Thank you very much. Can you tell me, please, the fact is that
25 it is incumbent on lower-ranking units to report regularly to
1 higher-ranking units in all armies in the world, which naturally included
2 the 1st Krajina Corps in 1992; would you agree with that?
3 A. Yes. It's a recognised principle that lower formations report to
4 higher ones.
5 Q. And at least in the case of the VRS and before that in the JNA
6 those were dubbed daily combat reports; is that correct?
7 A. Yes. Sometimes they're called regular combat reports.
8 Q. And on the basis of such daily combat reports, let's say that
9 343rd Motorised Brigade from Prijedor sent daily reports to the
10 1st Krajina Corps; correct?
11 A. I would assume so. I haven't seen, for example, the archive of
12 the 343rd Brigade, so I can't say that -- how often they sent them. But
13 I would assume that as the corps itself wrote daily combat reports, that
14 it was receiving similar reports from subordinate units.
15 Q. So, since the 1st Krajina Corps sent their own daily reports to
16 the Main Staff of the VRS, originally that was the command of the
17 2nd Military District at the time of the JNA and then it became the
18 General Staff of the VRS, they compiled these daily reports on the basis
19 of the daily reports collected from their subordinate units; is that
21 A. Yes, I would assume so. It may well have been that some of these
22 reports were through telephone communications or meetings. But, you
23 know, not having seen the archive of subordinate units, I can't say
24 exactly. But it's clear that information was coming from subordinate
25 units to the corps which was then compiling its own regular combat report
1 which it forwarded to the Main Staff, or, as you say, in the day of the
2 JNA, the 5th Corps would report to the 2nd Military District in Sarajevo.
3 Q. Thank you. And my third question: Yesterday, you will remember
4 that we spoke at the beginning about combat tasks. Now, within a combat
5 action, each task that is assigned within this action is actually a
6 combat task; is that true?
7 A. No, that is not true, sir.
8 Q. Let me give you an example. If a unit in the course of carrying
9 out an offensive attack, one of the lesser units is tasked with guarding
10 a road or whatever, could that be described as a combat task?
11 A. The phrase -- normally in combat operations, there are multiple
12 actors. There clearly will be potentially fighting formations, infantry
13 units or armour or artillery, but usually in combat operations there are
14 many other support functions. These could be logistics, medical, police,
15 military police issues, so it's not the case that what I understand to
16 be, when we are referencing combat operations, that it means exclusively
17 the forceful end of combat tasks.
18 Usually, in military operations, in the planning phase, as I say,
19 there are multiple actors who have roles in order to assist in the
20 completion of combat operation. So it's not always the case that many of
21 these actors -- and, in fact, from my knowledge, most of the actors
22 involved in combat operations tend to be in a supporting function. So it
23 may well be in your example where you say a lesser unit is tasked with
24 guarding a road, that it may not be involved in combat operations, i.e.,
25 the fighting component at all, but that its function of guarding that
1 road may assist in the -- in the end result, which could be allowing
2 logistic supplies to securely traverse an area; it could be assisting in
3 securing a road that was to be used for medical evacuation; it could be
4 used to protect the road that could assist in the evacuation of
5 prisoners. So my point is that combat operations do not just involve
6 those who are firing weapons or weapon systems.
7 Q. Sir, the essence of a combat task is that it opens up a
8 possibility for an individual or a unit to come in close contact with the
9 enemy, to exchange fire, and that what makes it a combat task. That's
10 the difference. Because it allows for a possibility of exchanging fire
11 with the enemy. Is that right?
12 A. I would generally agree with you. But that doesn't mean to say
13 that everybody involved in the combat task is likely to -- to be involved
14 in that exchange of fire or it would expect to. My point is that
15 multiple actors can be involved in what are generally called combat
16 operations, without the exchange of fire, as you know.
17 Q. Thank you. One more question: You are aware that the concept of
18 the Yugoslav People's Army, as well as the concept of the Army of
19 Republika Srpska, were both based on the unity and singleness of command.
20 Are you aware of that?
21 A. Yes, I am.
22 Q. Sir, on the first day of your testimony, Ms. Korner showed you
23 one of the directives. A directive is, as it were, an order of the
24 highest level, because usually it comes from the General Staff of an
25 army. This is how the sequence of order is established.
1 A. In -- some armies don't phrase it as a directive. But in terms
2 of the VRS, it was -- they were called directives. They came through the
3 Main Staff. And General Mladic or, I believe, in the case of some of the
4 directives, Dr. Karadzic signed them. So yes they came from the highest
5 organs of the Serbian authorities.
6 Q. Do you remember that on the first day of your testimony you
7 looked at a document P1779, tab 58, that's the Prosecution document, and
8 you spoke at the page 18658 to 18663 of the transcript about it. And the
9 document in question is a more detailed working-out of the fourth
10 directive that you also mentioned, that is, P1780; is that correct? Do
11 you remember that?
12 A. Yes, I do, sir.
13 Q. You will certainly agree with me that every directive has to be
14 put in a certain context, bearing in mind the time that it was created
15 in, especially when we think about the particular order that the unit is
16 supposed to execute in a certain area; is that correct?
17 A. Yes, I would agree with you.
18 Q. I'm going to show you a document now, but I would like you to
19 confirm that this document, P1779 and P1780, could you confirm that they
20 date from the November 1992, the directive and also the more detailed
21 working-out of that directive in the Zvornik Light Brigade?
22 A. Sorry, are you going to show me a document? I'm unclear.
23 Q. It wasn't my intention because I think that you have it at hand.
24 It's tab 58. 1779. I would simply like us -- like us to place this into
25 a context. It's basically a document that dates from the end of
1 November 1992.
2 A. Yes, the Drina Corps command document you're referring to.
3 Q. And also the directive number 4, P1780; it also dates from
4 November 1992 -- end of November?
5 A. You're right, yes, sorry.
6 Q. Now I'm going to show you a document that, in my opinion,
7 explains the reasons underlying the directive and also the part quoted by
8 Ms. Korner. That's 1D04-9459, tab 153.
9 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated] Sorry, Your Honours, can
10 I ask is there a translation of this document?
11 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes.
12 MS. KORNER: Where?
13 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Sir, this is a combat order dated 30th of September, 1992, that
15 the combat order issued by the commander of the armed forces of
16 Srebrenica, Naser Oric, and some other commanders as well. This combat
17 order is dated 30th of September, 1992. Have you had a chance to see
18 this document?
19 A. I've not seen this document before. Do you want me to read the
20 whole thing?
21 Q. Maybe you should take a look at the document during the break and
22 then you could give your comments on it after the break. You shouldn't
23 read the document now. It will be a waste of time.
24 A. Okay.
25 Q. My associates will give you a copy through the usher.
1 A. Thank you, sir.
2 Q. Sir, I would like us to concentrate on a document that you
3 analysed with Ms. Korner. It is tab 62; that's the Prosecution tab.
4 P1781. That's the analysis of combat readiness and activities of VRS in
5 1992. That's something that you mentioned on the first day of your
6 testimony, page 18664 of the transcript, up to and including 18686.
7 And you said that this particular copy that you analysed and
8 included in your report, and you also showed us to you during your
9 testimony [as interpreted], that that is a copy obtained from the archive
10 of the 1st Krajina Corps.
11 A. Yes, I believe it was, sir.
12 Q. I assume that the -- there is no reason to doubt the authenticity
13 of this document.
14 A. No, sir. It was within the wider collection of the documents
15 that had been seized, I believe, from the corps headquarters prior to me
16 joining the OTP.
17 Q. Since you quoted the document on a number of occasions in your
18 report, I assume that it is rather relevant for your report, especially
19 information contained therein.
20 A. Yes, I believe it's a relevant document. I mean, it's not the
21 only one, obviously, and it's one of many, but I do believe it's
23 Q. In order to be very clear, I'm going to try to follow the
24 methodology of Ms. Korner. You first spoke about page 10 in English, and
25 page 11, concerning the two periods mentioned in the analysis, two
1 periods in the development of the command and control in VRS.
2 A. Yes, that's referenced in that -- sections.
3 Q. I think that the page in English ought to be 10, and it's page 11
4 in Serbian, one page after this one. Now we have the correct page in
5 Serbian, yes. I'm sorry, I was guided by the transcript, 18665. That's
6 when you spoke about it. So the last paragraph in English.
7 In its analysis, the Army of Republika Srpska divided its process
8 of command and control into two periods: the first one from the
9 1st of April to the 15th of June, and the second period from the
10 15th of June onwards. Is that correct?
11 A. Yes, that's what they indicate.
12 Q. And here they say, the same page, that the first period is mostly
13 characterised by self organisation on the municipal and on the regional
14 units which then were transformed into municipal and other regional units
15 based on the -- on the TO units. And you also spoke about this, it says
16 that these units usually secured and liberated their municipalities and
17 stopped at that. So in essence those units were self-organised and they
18 had a very local character; is that correct?
19 A. Yes. I believe they generally did. From my reading of the
20 military documents, the Territorial Defence units weren't the only ones
21 involved in that. Certainly in the Krajina Corps. I can't talk about
22 other areas. But in the Krajina Corps, it wasn't just the
23 Territorial Defence that was -- that was involved in that. Clearly,
24 elements of the 5th Corps, 1st Krajina Corps, were engaged too. There
25 had been announcements in April by the Serbian authorities to establish
1 the Serb TO and to secure territory. So although the dates seem -- there
2 is -- they reference the 15th of June, for example, yet the army was
3 established on -- at the 16th Assembly Session on the 12th of May, and
4 it's clear that the VRS were already functioning in that period between
5 the 12th of May and the 15th of June. But in terms of a division, it
6 would seem that that -- the characteristic is generally borne out by the
7 documents that I have reviewed.
8 Municipal authorities were involved in taking control of
9 territory, it did involve, at times, Territorial Defence units, along
10 with support from the VRS or the JNA. And then later, as they describe,
11 there were more strategic operations. For example, you mention these
12 directives. But the characterisation, I think, is reasonably accurate.
13 Q. Let us clarify one thing here. I think that it is necessary to
14 clarify the reasons because of which the army decided to divide this
15 period in two. It is a fact, isn't it, that it was only on the
16 12th of May that the Assembly made a decision to establish the
17 Army of Republika Srpska?
18 A. Yes, they announced it on the 12th of May.
19 Q. Up until that point, there was JNA.
20 A. Yes. There was the JNA and there was the Serbian Territorial
21 Defence too. But there was the JNA.
22 Q. It's also a fact that the JNA withdrew pursuant to an order from
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina but only on the 19th of May.
24 A. On the 19th of May there was an instruction in relation to the
25 withdrawal of the JNA. However, in reality, what happened, although
1 there may have been some withdrawals of strategic forces and some other
2 issues, in reality, at least in the Krajina Corps, the JNA did not
3 withdraw. The JNA was simply transformed into the VRS.
4 Q. I know that. But the essence here is that up until at least the
5 12th of May all orders, all directives, were issued by the organs based
6 outside the territory of Republika Srpska. They were the JNA organs, it
7 was -- then there was the Presidency of the SFRY and similar organs;
8 isn't that true?
9 A. When you talk about all orders and directives, were you talking
10 about all orders and directives through the JNA, or are you talking about
11 more widely than the JNA?
12 Q. I'm talking about the military aspect. Until the 12th of May,
13 the military could not possibly receive any order from Mr. Karadzic
14 because the Army of Republika Srpska did not exist up until that moment.
15 So it received the orders from the JNA and the Presidency, because the
16 Presidency was the Supreme Commander. Is that true?
17 A. There were -- there was clearly a chain of command from the
18 1st -- the 5th Corps to the 2nd Military District, and they seemed to
19 follow that. However, there were instructions in this prior period that
20 the JNA or units of the 1st -- the 5th Corps were to establish
21 communications with organs, and there clearly were links to the Serbian
22 authorities prior to that. But formally, yes, I would agree with you
23 that the chain of command from the 5th Corps ran through to the
24 2nd Military District, which I'm assuming then ran to the federal
25 secretariat for National Defence.
1 Q. Page 13 of the same document, both in English and Serbian, we can
2 find the clarification, the clarification of the initial situation from
3 the 1st of April until the 15th of June, 1992. And it says here, the
4 first paragraph, point 111:
5 "The infantry units which, through self organisation, grew on a
6 massive scale out of the Territorial Defence and other units were used
7 only at the beginning of the war according to the decisions of
8 Crisis Staffs and similar authoritative bodies."
9 Sir, this is completely in line with what we said in the
10 beginning when we were talking about the Law on All People's Defence;
11 isn't that so?
12 A. Well, it is what it says in the document, but it -- and it would
13 seem to be borne out in some municipalities that I observed that
14 Crisis Staffs were heavily involved in -- in the process of securing
15 territory at the municipal level. I wouldn't say that that was the
16 only -- that the only way that infantry units were used. You know, the
17 43rd Motorised Brigade, if this is dealing with the -- or the
18 5th Kozara Brigade, for example, some of those were used, for example, in
19 assisting in the taking over of power in Prijedor in -- at the end of
21 So I wouldn't argue that it was only that, but it would seem to
22 be that the Crisis Staffs in that early period did have a significant
23 input into the taking of control of territory at municipal level.
24 Q. Sir, I'm simply giving you comments of this analysis. I have no
25 hidden agenda here. I'm not trying to establish something that is not
1 contained in this document. I simply want to get your comments on this
3 The second sentence:
4 "Among the infantry units, there were also units which
5 represented various political structures, which were sometimes in
6 opposition to the overall objectives of our war. Some of them developed
7 into 'paramilitary formations,'" in inverted commas. "These units mainly
8 executed missions in the territories of their own municipalities or even
9 in smaller areas. Initially, the units elected their own commanders."
10 Now, when it says here that they elected their own commanders, it
11 does contain a certain degree of mockery, this sentence, doesn't it?
12 A. I wouldn't like to comment whether it's a mocking statement or
14 Q. Surely you will agree with me that it is not possible to elect
15 one's own commander. Commanders are always sent by orders. They are
16 always appointed by a higher command.
17 A. Normally that would be the case. But clearly I think they are
18 highlighting that at times this didn't happen.
19 Q. I entirely agree with you. And if you look at the following
20 sentence, you can see: The target of actions were chosen collectively,
21 and individuals or groups sometimes abandoned the set goals.
22 When they say "chosen collectively," they are referring,
23 obviously, to Crisis Staffs and other bodies which made such decisions,
24 and then sometimes in execution of those orders, certain units would
25 abandon the goals, or maybe even the Crisis Staffs themselves would
1 abandon the goals.
2 That's the conclusion that we can draw from here, isn't it?
3 A. That's -- yeah, that would seem to be one of the conclusions that
4 could be drawn.
5 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm reminded about the time, Your Honours.
6 JUDGE HALL: Yes. If this is convenient, we are a couple of
7 seconds short of 10.25. If this is a convenient point.
8 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes, thank you very much.
9 JUDGE HALL: So we take the break, to resume in 20 minutes.
10 [The witness stands down]
11 --- Recess taken at 10.24 a.m.
12 --- On resuming at 10.53 a.m.
13 JUDGE HALL: While the witness makes his way back to the stand,
14 we have a brief ruling to deliver.
15 On 1 November 2010, the Prosecution filed confidentially its
16 17th motion for protective measures. In an oral ruling of 25 November,
17 the Trial Chamber denied the motion without prejudice with regard to
18 Witnesses 32 and 36. Subsequently on 9 December, the Prosecution filed
19 confidentially a motion seeking reconsideration of the Trial Chamber's
20 25 November oral ruling. On 15 December, the Defence orally responded to
21 this motion and stated that they took no position.
22 The Trial Chamber notes that by denying, without prejudice, the
23 Prosecution's motion of 1 November with regard to 32 and 36, it clearly
24 opened the possibility for the Prosecution to file a new, well-founded
25 motion for the protective measures initially denied. Therefore, it is
1 procedurally unhelpful to reintroduce such a request by way of a
2 reconsideration motion.
3 Consequently, the Chamber will treat the Prosecution's motion as
4 a supplemental motion and will disregard the arguments for
6 The Trial Chamber notes that ST-032 and his family reside in the
7 area where the alleged events described in his statement occurred. The
8 Trial Chamber further notes the security incidents described in the
9 newspaper article and the letter attached to the motion. The Chamber is
10 satisfied that the fear expressed by this witness, should it become
11 publicly known that he gave evidence before the Tribunal, has been
12 established and has an objective foundation. Accordingly, the Chamber
13 grants the Prosecution's request for a pseudonym for ST-032.
14 The Trial Chamber is not satisfied that ST-036's fear has a
15 strong objective foundation. Nevertheless, the Trial Chamber notes that
16 while the witness no longer resides in the area where the events
17 described in his statement occurred, he still has family there with whom
18 he remains in close contact. The Chamber further notes that the witness
19 is a victim and survivor of violence and that he declared to the
20 Prosecution that he feels "extremely stressed whenever he receives calls
21 from the ICTY which causes him to have to use medication."
22 Furthermore, the Trial Chamber notes that having -- after having
23 opposed the 1 November motion, the Defence did not take a position with
24 regard to the 9 December motion.
25 Having considered all the above, including the right of the
1 accused to a fair trial and seeking to maintain a fair balance between
2 the protection of victims and witnesses on the one hand and the right of
3 the public to access information on the other, the Trial Chamber grants,
4 in the interests of justice, the Prosecution's request for pseudonym for
6 The Trial Chamber also recalls its decision of 2 November in
7 which it ordered the Registrar, after the Trial Chamber has ruled on the
8 Prosecution's 17th motion for protective measures, to ensure that the
9 evidence admitted is entered into the trial records in accordance with
10 all protective measures in place and assign exhibit numbers to the
11 statements, official transcripts, and associated exhibits admitted into
13 [The witness takes the stand]
14 JUDGE HALL: Yes, Mr. Zecevic, you may continue.
15 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you, Your Honours.
16 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Brown, let us first finish what we were
17 talking about concerning the analysis of combat readiness. Let us return
18 to page 11 and be more specific about the second period. That can be
19 found on page 10 in the English version in e-court. And this chapter
20 reads that between the 3rd and the 19th May, the Main Staff of the VRS
21 was constituted and that pursuant to a decision of the Presidency of the
22 RS of 15 June about the organisation, establishment, and commanding of
23 the VRS, the army started functioning, all pursuant to an order of the
24 commander of the Main Staff of the 16th of June, which was -- which dealt
25 with the implementation of the main objectives.
1 You have already commented on that, so I believe we do not need
2 to repeat that for the record, do we?
3 A. No. Only that I think the decision of the Presidency of the
4 15th of June was probably -- I haven't seen a document relating to this,
5 but it probably took some of the recommendations that had been requested
6 of the various corps. And presumably some staff work or some work had
7 been done in that period in early June to have the formal -- a formal
8 document coming from the Presidency.
9 But I think in my report I would argue that almost immediately
10 after the 12th of May the VRS is functioning. General Talic clearly
11 knows that he has to send reports up to the Main Staff. He's responding
12 to mobilisation instructions. And the Directive 1, for example, was
13 dated the first week -- or the 9th of June. So clearly work had been
14 going on within the VRS Main Staff, and I think this date of the
15 15th of June is probably when a formal document was written.
16 At least that's my assessment.
17 Q. On page 18655 you deal with the interim period between the
18 12th of May and the 15th of June, and you said that there was a sort of
19 lacuna or vacuum in that period, if I remember correctly. But
20 objectively speaking, the army functioned, which isn't in dispute, by the
22 A. I wouldn't call it a vacuum, sir.
23 Q. Well, I quoted you. That's what you said on page 18655. Let me
25 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated] I can't see it.
1 MR. ZECEVIC:
2 Q. Sir, you say, 18665, line 21:
3 "That doesn't mean to say that I think when this army was
4 established on the 12th of May that they were not -- the Main Staff was
5 somehow in vacuum, because there are, for example, the mobilisation
6 instruction was passed on the 20th of May by Presidency, passed down
7 through the Main Staff to General Talic."
8 MS. KORNER: He said they weren't in a vacuum, not they were.
9 MR. ZECEVIC: The Main Staff was somehow in a vacuum.
10 MS. KORNER: No. Sorry, Your Honours.
11 MR. ZECEVIC: That is what is written in the transcript. I
12 believe all of us can read.
13 MS. KORNER: Yes, but I think it's ... he's saying: That doesn't
14 mean to say that I think when this army was established on the
15 12th of May that the Main Staff was somehow in a vacuum.
16 MR. ZECEVIC: Well --
17 Q. [Interpretation] I apologise if I misunderstood you. At any
18 rate, sir, it is obvious that the army considered the period from the
19 1st of April to the 15th of June an irregular period in a way; isn't that
21 A. No, I wouldn't describe it as that, and I don't think they
22 describe it as that. I think the period is marked by a transition from
23 the JNA into the VRS. That's how I would see it. And the initial
24 establishment of the VRS components.
25 Q. Mr. Brown, it's a fact, isn't it, that up until 19 May -- and now
1 I'm only referring to facts -- up until 19 May the JNA was present in
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina; up until 12 May, there is no Assembly decision to
3 establish the VRS; the army here speaks about units that organised
4 themselves, that were commanded by commanders elected in a
5 self-management-like way; and fourthly, a general mobilisation was only
6 ordered on the 19th of May. The first directive is dated 9 June. These
7 are all facts that you also mentioned in your -- in your document. And
8 are you saying that all these facts do not point to the existence of a
9 situation of irregularity?
10 A. I'm -- I wouldn't necessarily say one way or the other whether
11 they were regular. I agree with you those were the stated facts and
12 those are the descriptions that are referenced in this document.
13 Q. But, sir, 20 minutes ago you and I agreed that one of the basic
14 principles upon which the organisation of the JNA and the VRS is founded
15 was unity of command and singleness of command. These are the principles
16 upon which both the JNA and the VRS were founded. So the period
17 until -- roughly until the beginning of June is marked by the absence of
18 these principles. There is -- there is no unity of command or singleness
19 of command. Isn't that correct?
20 A. Well, within the JNA and the VRS, I would say there is. I would
21 certainly agree that there are these other bodies; for example, the Serb
22 TO, the mobilisation of the Serb TO in April and the involvement of the
23 Serb TO as municipal level. But clearly, in that period, March, April
24 and May, the JNA, at least in the Krajina Corps, are moving closer to the
25 position of the SDS and are involved in cooperating with and assisting
1 the TO, the Serb TO, and integrating those units into the newly
2 established VRS. After all, General Talic himself orders his units, when
3 he goes back -- when they go back to many of the municipalities, to
4 establish cooperation and coordination with the authorities on the
6 Q. We will speak about that later. Let us first comment that
7 Directive 4, the document that I gave you for review during the break.
8 You have reviewed the order issued by Naser Oric, dated
9 30 September 1992, haven't you?
10 A. Yes, I have briefly looked at it over the break.
11 Q. Among others, on page -- just a moment. The document is
12 1D04-9459, tab 153. On page 4 of the Serbian text, and I assume that the
13 page reference is the same for the English text, there is the decision
14 passed by Naser Oric and it says:
15 "We decided to attack the well-known Chetnik stronghold of
16 Kravica with a brigade numbering 1500 fighters and destroy it
18 I suppose that this is not the right page. We need page 5 of the
19 English translation. Or probably it is 6, then.
20 MS. KORNER: Seven.
21 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Seven, I apologise.
22 Q. Yes, the first sentence that I read out can be found here.
23 You will certainly know that the village of Kravica was indeed
24 attacked. This is a generally known event which occurred on Christmas
25 day in January 1992, when Naser Oric's forces massacred the people in
1 that Serb village. Do you -- are you -- do you know of that event?
2 A. That area is not one that I know well. I would defer to someone
3 else that does.
4 Q. And at the very end there is a comment or, rather, Naser Oric's
5 conclusion. I suppose, that can be found on the following page of the
6 document or possibly at the very bottom of this page, I believe it's the
7 following page in English. You see that Naser Oric's conclusion and his
8 instruction is that as many children as possible must be taken prisoner,
9 who will then be exchanged on -- in line with the all-for-all principle.
10 You will agree with me, sir, won't you, that this wartime order
11 must be placed into the context of the directive and the tasks given to
12 the Drina Brigade which we saw, and that is P1779. Am I not right?
13 A. Yes, I would accept -- again, I don't know this area well and you
14 mentioned a date of December and whether this is after the period --
15 after the directive, I'm not sure. But certainly the first part of the
16 instruction seems to be dated prior to the directive, the RS directive;
17 and the combat order, at least the first part of the combat order, at
18 face value, seems to be an order instructing Muslim forces in that area
19 who are surrounded to break out towards Tuzla in order to -- in order to
20 allow refugees and the population who are not going to be mobilised and
21 the wounded to move out, and, as part of that operation, to conduct a
22 combat operation in a particular area.
23 Again, I don't know the details at all, but if this occurred, it
24 would seem to have set some, you know, be a part of the contextual
25 chronology of the events in that area.
1 Q. Thank you. Let us return to document P1771. That is the tab 62
2 in the Prosecution binder. We already commented on it.
3 On page 18681 of your testimony on the first day, the Prosecutor
4 read out to you a paragraph - on pages 45 and 46 in English, and in
5 Serbian it's page 41 - about military and political meetings which the
6 military says have taken place, and several meetings of the unit command
7 and the local authorities are mentioned. Do you remember commenting on
8 that? It's the following page in English. Paragraph 2.1.2. And the
9 second paragraph in the text. It begins with, "Despite all the
10 problems ..."
11 I'm being warned that on page 35, 15, P1771 is mentioned, whereas
12 I'm talking about document P1781.
13 While the Prosecutor was reading this section to you, he -- she
14 stopped off halfway through it. There is a sentence that reads:
15 "A series of military and political consultations was held to
16 consider the situation, course of combat operations, the functioning of
17 political authorities and problems of cooperation between civil
18 authorities and the army. Numerous joint actions were organised to
19 harvest the crops, prepare and construct infrastructure facilities,
20 procure fuel, and generally carry out preparations for winter, provide
21 for refugees and the families of fighters killed and wounded in battle,
22 and such like."
23 Sir, when we spoke about your experience as a member of the
24 British army yesterday, you said that as a member of the British army,
25 you provided support or assistance upon the request of civilian
1 authorities in Northern Ireland; isn't that correct?
2 A. Yes. The -- the overall military operation there was, in fact,
3 characterised as support to the civilian authorities.
4 Q. Sir, it's a fact, isn't it, that as we have seen, and as you well
5 know from the laws and regulations that you reviewed, that the JNA and
6 the VRS consistently and greatly relied on the support of the civil --
7 civilian authorities and the people, generally speaking.
8 A. Yes. I would agree with that. I mean, at the end of the day,
9 the people are the ones who provide conscripts for the army. But more
10 widely, yes, there is logistic issues, and funding was another issue. So
11 I would accept that point, yes.
12 Q. So that, if I understand you properly, you and I agree that
13 essentially there must be some sort of relationship between the army and
14 the civilian authorities in an area; right?
15 A. Yes. And I believe there was -- at least in the area that
16 I looked at, there was within the VRS and the authorities in the Krajina
18 Q. Further on in the commentary of this document, on page 72 of the
19 document - that's 73 in English - the Prosecutor read to you an entry
20 about the ethnic affiliation of the -- of professional officers serving
21 in the VRS. Do you remember that?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Speaking about that, during the examination-in-chief you spoke
24 about removing non-Serb officers round about June 1992 from positions of
25 authority in the VRS, or, to be more specific, at least in the
1 1st Krajina Corps.
2 A. Yes. I believe that's also contained in a small section in the
4 Q. It's a fact, sir, isn't it, that the conflict in the territory of
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina, according to its main characteristics, was a civil
6 war and that the parties to the conflict were basic -- were basically
7 different in terms of ethnicity, that the parties were based almost
8 exclusively on the ethnic principle; correct?
9 A. Well, I'm not sure if there's some legal issue in relation to
10 civil war, but it would seem to me, at face value, that certainly was an
11 internal conflict. Or maybe there was legal issues, whether it was
12 external as well. But there was a civil war, yes, and the parties
13 divided very much on ethnic lines.
14 Q. I understand, sir, that you are not a legal expert, so I'm not
15 insinuating anything of the kind. I'm merely focusing on that which you
16 came to testify about as an expert.
17 On page 78, and in English I believe it's page 86, which is in
18 section 5.2, security measures. Under item 3, the security
19 administration of the VRS speaks about a counter-intelligence assessment.
20 MR. ZECEVIC: That's at the very beginning of the text. I don't
21 believe that this is the correct page. Page 78, as far as I remember --
22 oh, yes, this is it. I apologise. So it was 87.
23 Q. You see here that the counter-intelligence assessment is to the
24 effect that about 600 cases were identified in units in the territories
25 of the RSK and the FRY and that this counter-intelligence assessment was
1 not made for any unit of the VRS. They go on to list the reasons why, in
2 their opinion, ethnic affiliation of the officers is a huge problem for
3 the security of the units and for the -- and of the Army of
4 Republika Srpska.
5 Can you see that?
6 A. Can I -- is it paragraph 3 that's relevant?
7 Q. [In English] Yes.
8 A. Can I just take a second to read it?
9 Q. By all means.
10 A. Yes, would -- do you want me to comment on this?
11 Q. Well, I would just ask a couple of questions.
12 A. I'm sorry, yes.
13 Q. [Interpretation] Undoubtedly then, not from the aspect of
14 counter-intelligence, the ethnic affiliation of an officer in a high
15 position in the VRS is a risk in terms of the possibility of leaking
16 information from that position to the enemy. That is their assessment,
17 isn't it?
18 A. I don't read this per se dealing with that issue. I would accept
19 that the VRS may view those in -- from a different ethnicity in a
20 position of authority, that there is a risk there. I would accept that
21 position. But I think this paragraph relates to the fact that they
22 initially hadn't conducted counterintelligence assessments in units and
23 when they did, that there were some cases which were highlighted.
24 But they're more widely just -- than just the VRS. There clearly are
25 individuals who may fall in the category of those from other national
1 affiliations, but there are others who maybe have family relationships,
2 there are others who -- members of other military intelligence
3 organisations, so there's a number of categories, presumably. Out of all
4 those categories, they have 600 cases which they are looking at.
5 Q. But in any case, from the security point of view held by the army
6 security organs, all these facts enumerated under item 3 constitute
7 potential risks for the security of the army; is that correct?
8 A. Yes. I would accept that that could be the case.
9 Q. And it is also a fact, isn't it, that some officers, after they
10 had left the active-duty service in the Yugoslav People's Army, led
11 units, and even sometimes rebellious units, not to mention that in the
12 armies on the opposite side they held command positions. I suppose that
13 you are also aware of that, aren't you?
14 A. I didn't study the army, the Bosnian army. There was others who
15 looked at that. I know that that is a reference in the Krajina Corps
16 documents that they are very worried that not only that the individuals
17 will go on to the other side. And I would assume that there were --
18 without knowing the details, I would assume that there were ex-JNA or
19 ex-TO members in the ABiH. It would seem that that would be the case.
20 Q. Mr. Brown, let me remind you that on the first day you confirmed
21 to me that you attended the interviewing of, for example,
22 Mr. Osman Selak. In his statement, he confirmed that while he was in the
23 Army of Republika Srpska, at a position of responsibility, he
24 concurrently provided information to the opposite side. After his active
25 service was terminated, he became a resistance movement leader in
1 Banja Luka, if I remember correctly his words. Are you aware of that?
2 A. It's been a long time since I worked here --
3 MS. KORNER: Could I have the actual page of the statement?
4 MR. ZECEVIC: At the break I will provide the paragraph --
5 relevant paragraph.
6 Q. [Interpretation] I fully agree; I just thought that you would
7 have remembered this as something outstanding.
8 Now, sir, from that point of view, the dismissal of non-Serb
9 officers, in terms of how security organs thought, was something that was
10 fully justified, wasn't it?
11 A. Well, I wouldn't necessarily agree that just because someone is
12 from one ethnicity that that would mean that they have to be removed.
13 I accept that there could be a risk and that risk might need to be
14 managed, and it would seem that when this policy within the army of
15 removing those non-Serb was implemented that it seemed to be echoed
16 throughout other structures of the RS. So I wouldn't automatically say
17 it was justified as well.
18 Q. But in view of the context and the nature of the conflict that
19 was going on in the former Yugoslavia and in light of the facts mentioned
20 before, it has been confirmed without any doubt that certain officers of
21 the 1st Krajina Corps, while they were discharging their duties, did
22 things that were absolutely in contravention of both the law and the
23 military ethics. Under such circumstances you would agree with me that
24 their removal would have been fully justified, wouldn't you?
25 A. Well, from the documents that I've seen, I don't think the
1 non-Serbs in the military were removed on the basis of contravention of
2 law and military ethics. I think there was a decision to put non -- and
3 I'd to refresh myself on the documents, but there was a decision to put
4 non-Serbs -- to send them back to Belgrade, have their service in essence
5 terminated. And it wasn't -- at least from the documents anyway, it
6 wasn't on the basis that they had broken the law or that they had done
7 something wrong in terms of military ethics.
8 Now, the reference in the analysis readiness report indicates
9 that there has been investigations, intelligence investigations, to see
10 if there are weaknesses or security risks within the corps. And they've
11 highlighted a number of those. It doesn't say that they are senior
12 officers, presumably it's corps-wide. Actually it's VRS-wide, I believe.
13 So I don't think it's just the 1st Krajina Corps. So -- and those are
14 risks that are being looked at, investigations ongoing.
15 But in relation to the Krajina Corps, it's my belief that the
16 non-Serb officers were sent back to Belgrade, they didn't come back, and
17 it wasn't done because of any apparent investigation or breaches of
18 the -- of military discipline or law.
19 Q. I agree with you, but it might have been the case in individual
20 instances. But basically the order that you mentioned and commented
21 during -- in examination-in-chief was definitely inspired by the risk
22 that the security administration is talking about.
23 A. Well, I think I would argue that the timing of the removal of
24 non-Serb officers from the 1st Krajina Corps is as much related, if not
25 exclusively related, to the discussions that were going on at the
1 regional level in the Krajina about having non-Serb officials in
2 positions of authority. And it was clear that at the 12th -- or, sorry,
3 the 16th Assembly Session, that this issue was being discussed, because
4 Mladic is one of the, in fact, probably the only official there who
5 says -- we talked about Colonel Hasotic -- he's the only one who's
6 saying, No, there are reasons why we should have these people within the
7 VRS. And one of those reasons he gives is that he would rather have them
8 in the trenches fighting with them than in the trenches opposite fighting
9 against him.
10 But despite that, it's clear that within a matter of weeks Mladic
11 himself pushes out an instruction saying that these individuals are to go
12 to Belgrade and have their status assessed. And they certainly don't
13 appear to come back to the 1st Krajina Corps.
14 Q. Thank you. I would most kindly ask you, Mr. Brown, because my
15 time is limited, to focus and to give me direct answers. Whatever you
16 have said in examination-in-chief is already on record. Therefore,
17 kindly focus on my specific questions.
18 Now, the last thing that I would like to discuss with you,
19 vis-ā-vis this report, is item 10 on page 80 in Serbian and page 90 in
20 English. So item 10, which you commented on transcript page 18685.
21 I have the third sentence specifically in mind here, and I think
22 that my learned friend Ms. Korner also read it, and it says:
23 "Cooperation with the MUP of Republika Srpska is not deemed very
24 good due to the passivity of the organs and lack of their desire to
25 cooperate with us."
1 This is, again, the position that the security organs of the
2 Army of Republika Srpska had taken; is that right?
3 A. Yes. It's as it says, that clearly there are issues with
4 cooperation. Obviously, they particularly point out cooperation with the
5 RSK and Serbia and give an example of why what has happened when
6 cooperation hasn't gone well. But I -- you know, I take it at face value
7 that this is a reference that there needs to be areas of improvement in
8 that area -- in that field.
9 Q. We are going to document this in our further examination.
10 Now I'd like to move to the question of Crisis Staffs. You spoke
11 about this under the chapter of cooperation between military and civilian
12 authorities, that's 18685, and it starts at 18702 of your
13 examination-in-chief. We both agreed on the nature of these
14 Crisis Staffs as being similar to the committees for All People's Defence
15 and social self-protection that were enshrined in the Law on All People's
16 Defence; is that right?
17 A. Yes. In respect, maybe not necessarily in those who are
18 fulfilling the functions, but in terms of the All People's Defence there
19 were civilian bodies at various levels that were to cooperate with the
20 Territorial Defence, be involved in mobilisation, have a secretariat for
21 National Defence, liaise with the JNA, and the likes; and these would
22 seem to be similar to the Crisis Staffs in the documents that I observed
23 in the Krajina. May well have been that all we did was to utilise that
24 type of template.
25 Q. Sir, you must know that the Crisis Staffs existed throughout the
1 territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that all the conflicting parties --
2 all parties to the conflict had them; is that correct?
3 A. Again, I'm not aware of all the details, but I would -- I think
4 I remember some references that colleagues had talked, so it wouldn't
5 surprise me that there were Crisis Staffs in other areas.
6 Q. Sir, bearing that in mind, I was somewhat surprised by your
7 comment under 1.103, where you talk about the Crisis Staffs and the role
8 of the SDS in the formation of these Crisis Staffs. Now, are you aware
9 that the first Crisis Staff that I managed to identify in this case was
10 established by the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina? Did you know that?
12 A. I'm not aware of that, sir.
13 MS. KORNER: I'm sorry, that's giving evidence.
14 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. I'm going to show you the document 1D108, tab 151.
16 Sir, I don't know if you had an opportunity to see this document
17 before. It's minutes of the meeting of the Presidency of the
18 Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina held on the
19 21st September, 1991.
20 Have you ever seen this document before?
21 A. No, I haven't, sir.
22 Q. In other words, you are not aware of the Crisis Staff headed by
23 Ejup Ganic being established by the Presidency?
24 A. No, I haven't sir. The Crisis Staffs really were not the focus
25 of my report, and I know that there were other colleagues in other
1 analytical teams that were looking at the issue of Crisis Staffs. But
2 I haven't seen this document before, sir.
3 Q. Thank you. In your work, you make reference to a government
4 instruction, which is P70 of the OTP document, that -- your footnote 292,
5 which is an extract of the instruction --
6 THE INTERPRETER: Could the counsel please repeat the details of
7 the instruction.
8 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] I apologise.
9 Q. This is an instruction or, rather, an excerpt from the
10 instruction for the operation of the Serbian people in municipalities.
11 It's dated the 26th of April, 1992, and it was signed by Prime Minister,
12 Professor Dr. Branko Djeric. In other words, it's P70 document, OTP
13 tab 3.
14 You made reference to this instruction in your footnote 292; is
15 that correct?
16 A. Yes. I believe that's correct. I know I do reference it in the
18 Q. And you specifically commented item 4 of this document, where it
19 is explicitly stated that the command of TO and police forces shall
20 exclusively be carried out by professional personnel, therefore any
21 interference with the command and control of TO and the use of the police
22 should be prevented at any cost.
23 That was your comment; right?
24 A. That's what the document says, sir, yes.
25 Q. I believe that your comment in your report was that, in spite of
1 that, there is evidence beyond any doubt that the Crisis Staffs,
2 irrespective of what is said here, commanded the TO, issued instructions,
3 and used the police force. And then you go on by citing a number of
5 A. Yes. Can you point me to the part of my report that says that,
7 Q. If you please give me a moment. I rephrased what you said. I
8 may be wrong. In paragraph 2.26, you have quoted this particular excerpt
9 from Mr. Djeric's instruction, but then under item 2.28 you said it was
10 not only the SDS or local Crisis Staffs that stressed the need for
11 cooperation or attempted to control the TO in the period prior to its
12 full integration into the VRS.
13 A. Yes. I would stand by that comment there.
14 Q. Sir, are you aware that the Government of Republika Srpska, as
15 early as on the 23rd of May, 1992, adopted a conclusion and proposed
16 measures to be introduced towards terminating the Crisis Staffs?
17 A. I'm not aware of that, sir. I'm not an expert on Crisis Staffs.
18 I know that the Crisis Staffs remained in existence past that date, from
19 the documents that I've seen. And then there were instructions on the
20 changing of Crisis Staffs into War Presidencies. But I don't know the
21 full details of the operations of Crisis Staffs. I know that other
22 analysts worked on this.
23 Q. Sir, the reason I'm asking you this is not that you didn't deal
24 with Crisis Staffs but, rather, this was prompted by your comment under
25 items 1.107 to 8, under item 1.108 -- 7, you say that the Crisis Staffs
1 were a major factor in the general pursuance of policies of the SDS and
2 the functioning of the self-proclaimed Bosnian Serb organs on the ground.
3 This is what you claim.
4 A. And I would argue that from the documentation I've seen, that
5 that would seem to be the case. We mentioned the analysis report; it
6 also talks about the importance of the municipal organs. So I would
7 stand by that comment.
8 Q. Sir, item 1.108 contains the conclusion that I just made
9 reference to a minute ago, and this is what you say:
10 "Although it was not necessarily envisaged that the Crisis Staffs
11 were to directly command or order military units into combat actions,
12 especially as the military had their own recognised chain of command, at
13 times, and in certain municipalities, the Crisis Staffs did pass
14 instructions to the military to carry out certain combat activities."
15 This is what's written here.
16 Now, let us go back to 1.107. Sir, if I tell you, as I already
17 did, that it was the government who requested the Crisis Staffs to be
18 abolished way back on the 23rd of May, 1992, would that have altered any
19 of the conclusions that you reached in your item 1.107?
20 I can show you the document, that's P217, tab 155 of the
21 Stanisic Defence team, item 4, which is the minutes of the meeting of the
22 cabinet or the government of the 23rd of May.
23 A. I would like to see it if I'm meant to comment on that document.
24 Oh, here it is.
25 Q. [In English] It's in front of you, sir.
1 A. Thank you, sir.
2 Q. [Interpretation] Item 4.
3 A. I wouldn't necessarily change at all the reference I have in my
4 report. I mean, I think from item 4, they are -- appear to be discussing
5 the establishment of War Presidencies, and I mentioned that there were
6 Crisis Staffs and later on they were changed to War Presidencies. But as
7 far as I'm aware, there was not much of a change in practicality. I
8 don't think I would change the reference in my report that you allude to.
9 Q. Sir, do you know that on the 31st of May a decision was taken to
10 form War Presidencies, and this decision was amended on the 10th of June,
11 when decision to set up war commissioners' office were -- was taken, and
12 we are talking about considerably different organs from the Crisis Staffs
13 and War Presidencies? Are you aware of that?
14 MS. KORNER: No, no. That's not a proper question. That's a
15 matter of argument. It's not accepted. It's not evidence.
16 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, I accept that, but I'm trying to save
18 Q. [Interpretation] Do you know that a decision was made on the
19 10th of June to set up wartime commissioners' offices?
20 A. No, sir, I'm not aware of that.
21 Q. Do you know that it was the government who appointed
22 commissioners to these offices responsible for individual municipalities?
23 A. That was not part of my report, sir, and I'm not aware of that.
24 Q. But bearing in mind that it is you who state that the
25 Crisis Staffs were important and that you stand by that statement, you
1 told me so when I gave you a chance to change your view, after you have
2 been able to acquaint yourself with the documents that you hadn't
3 reviewed before, so now I have to ask you: Why do you think that the
4 Crisis Staffs were abolished and changed if they were so important, as
5 important as you claim in your report?
6 A. Well, my report is not a report on the functionings of the
7 Crisis Staffs. But it's clear to me that when the Crisis Staffs were in
8 operation, that they were an important feature in seizing control of
9 territory and a vehicle by which civilian police and military structures
10 would function in order to take control of territory. And documents from
11 Prijedor, documents from Kljuc, references from Sanski Most, some
12 references from Kotor Varos would seem to bear that out.
13 Now, I can only go back in saying that I'm not an expert on
14 Crisis Staffs, so the chronology of Crisis Staffs and how they may have
15 changed, I'm aware, as I said, that they established War Presidencies;
16 but in terms of a full analysis of that or any other bodies, it was
17 out -- it was out with the remit of this report.
18 Q. All right. I accept your explanation.
19 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Brown, I concur with counsel Zecevic that we
20 have to explain -- accept your explanation, but are you able to form an
21 opinion about why the Crisis Staffs were replaced with the war
23 THE WITNESS: It may well have been that the Crisis Staffs had
24 fulfilled their function. It may well have been that in a number of
25 municipalities they'd done as they'd been expected, what had been
1 expected of them. There might also be some chronology in relation to the
2 establishment of Crisis Staffs and then the subsequent establishment of
3 the VRS. The establishment of the Crisis Staffs, again, I'm not an
4 expert on this, but there was a fairly protracted period, I believe, and,
5 if you like, the formal establishment; it was still possibly unclear on
6 exactly how the JNA was going to fit into the picture. And it may well
7 have been that once that was resolved and the full establishment of the
8 VRS and the integration of the TO, that might have had a different -- you
9 know, the Serb authorities may have looked at it slightly different --
10 differently. But I do countenance all this that I am not an expert in
11 the issue of Crisis Staffs, and I didn't study them in detail.
12 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you.
13 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Mr. Brown, today, at the very beginning, I read to you certain
15 passages from the Law on All People's Defence and we had some comments on
16 that and we saw that in certain cases, those organs, the commissions for
17 All People's Defence - I think it was Article 74 that we looked at - in
18 case that competent authorities were unable to execute their functions,
19 those local organs were supposed to execute All People's Defence,
20 organise actions, and lead the defence in the territory. So this whole
21 situation -- and we have also seen the report by the military, that they
22 have divided it into two periods and said that the first period, up until
23 the mid-June, they said that it was very chaotic, from April to
24 June 1992. You are going to agree with that, based on all the documents
25 that we have reviewed so far?
1 A. Is your question about whether I think the situation was chaotic,
2 or is your question about whether -- related to this issue of
3 All People's Defence and the bodies taking control?
4 Q. The first question is: Do you agree with me that the situation
5 was chaotic?
6 A. Yes, I think it could be classified as that, very much so.
7 Q. Then if you bear that in mind, I claim that the reason that on
8 the 23rd of May the decision was made to abolish the Crisis Staffs and
9 then on the 31st to introduce War Presidencies and immediately after
10 that, on the 10th of June, to introduce war commissioners' offices, the
11 only reason for all that is the fact that the central authorities were
12 attempting to organise and control governmental bodies in the territory,
13 which was not the case up to that time.
14 A. Well, I would not agree with that position. I would argue that
15 Crisis Staffs appeared, in the areas that I saw documentation, to do very
16 much as had been expected of them in April, that these were not
17 organisations or groups acting on their own, and that the establishment
18 of Crisis Staffs by the Serbian authorities had been to take control of
19 territory. And that's very much what they did. And the Crisis Staffs
20 had a reporting chain, they weren't operating on their own, they had a
21 reporting chain from the documentation that I have seen, for example,
22 Kljuc municipality seemed to act on instructions that were passed down to
23 them. It was a municipality where there was civilian TO and military
24 involvement and police involvement. And I can't tell you why they may
25 have wanted to change Crisis Staffs into War Presidencies or anything
1 else, and it might have been an embryonic process of establishing the
2 Bosnian Serb authorities, but I wouldn't say -- I wouldn't agree with
3 your characterisation of Crisis Staffs.
4 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Zecevic, this is a convenient point to take the
5 break, I suppose.
6 MR. ZECEVIC: Oh, yes. I'm sorry, Your Honours.
7 JUDGE HALL: So we would resume in 20 minutes.
8 [The witness stands down]
9 --- Recess taken at 12.09 p.m.
10 --- On resuming at 12.35 p.m.
11 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, before the witness is brought in,
12 please, can I just raise one matter. And it really -- the simple points
13 is that when propositions are being put from other evidence, it must be
14 put accurately. And Your Honour will have heard that I've objected on a
15 number of occasions. At page 40 of today's transcript -- 40, yes,
16 line 5, the question was put to Mr. Brown:
17 "Mr. Brown, let me remind you that on the first day you confirmed
18 to me that you attended the interviewing of, for example,
19 Mr. Osman Selak. In his statement, he confirmed that while he was in the
20 Army of Republika Srpska, at a position of responsibility, he
21 concurrently provided information to the opposite side.
22 "After his active service ... terminated, he became a resistance
23 movement leader in Banja Luka, if I remember correctly his words. Are
24 you aware of that?"
25 As far as the second aspect, that is, the leader of the
1 resistance movement, is concerned, that is correct. That was contained
2 in the statement which Mr. Brown was present at of the -- in 2000.
3 As far as the first is concerned, Your Honours, that is
4 incorrect, because it's not contained in this statement; it's contained
5 in a later statement at which Mr. Brown was not present when it was
6 taken. And accurately he confirmed that he had sent information not to
7 the other side in terms of the opposing army or anything like that, but
8 to Muharem Krzic - which is a different matter - who was the leader of
9 the SDA in Banja Luka.
10 And the implication, of course, Your Honour, was that,
11 particularly in the context of the removal of Muslims from the military,
12 that they were passing information to the other military side. So,
13 Your Honours, that's all that I want to say. But I am saying that when
14 propositions are put, they cannot be summarised like this but they must
15 be put in an accurate fashion. And particularly here where, as I say,
16 the implication was that Mr. Brown personally heard Mr. Selak say that --
17 Colonel Selak say that.
18 JUDGE HALL: Thank you.
19 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, very briefly. I'm sorry I wasn't
20 aware that Mr. Brown was not present at the -- at the time when Mr. Selak
21 was giving his second statement. However, he was an employee of the
22 Office of the Prosecutor. That is why I took the inference that he was
23 informed about that. But, in any case, it wasn't meant to suggest
24 anything else but the facts which Osman Selak stated in his statements,
25 Your Honours. I mean, if I -- if I made a mistake, I am really sorry
1 about that, and I will try to avoid making such mistakes in the future.
2 But I think this was -- this was fairly understandable, at least from my
3 point of view, that he was aware what Osman Selak was talking about in
4 all his statements.
5 JUDGE HALL: Thank you, Mr. Zecevic.
6 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, two more things. I missed to offer
7 one document which the witness commented upon, that's tab 153. It's
8 document 1D04-9459. It's the -- it's the order of
9 30th of September, 1992, signed by Naser Oric, which the witness
10 commented. And if there is no opposition, I would like to tender this
11 document into evidence.
12 MS. KORNER: Well, Your Honour, I'm not altogether clear at the
13 moment from anything that's been said by the witness as to how this is
14 relevant. It was preceded by the assertion that Naser Oric's forces
15 massacred the people here, this well-known event, and, of course,
16 Naser Oric was tried and acquitted of this particular charge, it's fair
17 to say. But if Mr. Zecevic can explain why it's relevant, then I'm
18 perfectly prepared to not object to it.
19 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, I produced this document as the
20 reason why the Directive 4 was issued and subsequently the document which
21 is P1789 -- 779, the order to Drina Brigade. And I asked the witness
22 whether he agrees with that proposition, and he agreed with that
23 proposition. That is the only reason why I introduced this document.
24 And I must remind the Trial Chamber that I considered the
25 Directive 4 to be irrelevant and it was admitted. Therefore, I think we
1 are entitled to show the context of how the -- how it came about to this
2 Directive 4.
3 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, despite the fact I don't think at the
4 moment there is any evidence linking them, I accept that it could be said
5 to be relevant to the context, and therefore I don't object.
6 JUDGE HALL: So it's admitted and marked.
7 MR. ZECEVIC: And, Your Honours, the last thing is I promised --
8 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you. This will become Exhibit 1D402,
9 Your Honours.
10 MR. ZECEVIC: I promised that I could be able to give assessment
11 of time needed for cross-examination.
12 I'm afraid, Your Honours, I have three more issues that I would
13 like to discuss with the witness, and I'm pretty certain that I might
14 need two sessions tomorrow. Because of the number of the documents.
15 JUDGE HALL: We have been warned.
16 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you very much.
17 JUDGE HALL: Thank you.
18 Could we have the witness back on the stand.
19 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Zecevic, what about -- perhaps I missed it,
20 but what about the document under tab 3 in your list?
21 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, that's part of the law library.
22 JUDGE DELVOIE: Oh, yes. Thank you.
23 MS. KORNER: And it's fully translated.
24 MR. ZECEVIC: Well, the law library is stipulated, as far as I'm
1 [The witness takes the stand]
2 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. I hope you're not tired, Mr. Brown. One hour remains today, and
4 I know that these things are not easy. Not easy for me either.
5 Mr. Brown, during your direct examination, page 18691 to 692, you
6 spoke with my learned colleague Ms. Korner about document P1783, which is
7 tab number 15 in the Prosecution binder.
8 I will remind you that this is an order coming from the command
9 of the 30th Partizan Brigade, dated the 31st of May, 1992, entitled,
10 "Formation of the Defence of Kljuc."
11 Do you remember that you commented this document?
12 A. Yes, I do, sir.
13 Q. Among other things, let me remind you that at the page 18692 you
14 said that that's a unique document, that a defence of Kljuc was mentioned
15 there, and for you this made it an unusual document. I think I'm
16 paraphrasing you here.
17 A. Yeah, maybe it's the phrase "defence command" was a phrase that
18 I hadn't heard before. And this is a document from the -- a subordinate
19 unit of the corps. So, again, it's -- it was a little bit unusual in
20 that respect.
21 Q. All right. Let us then analyse this, through the footnote
22 contained in your report.
23 MR. ZECEVIC: 1D365, can we have this document? That's tab 1 in
24 the Prosecution binder.
25 Q. This is a document from 1991, dated the 25th of November, and
1 it's instruction on conducting the civilian affairs in the crisis areas.
2 Do you remember this document?
3 A. I didn't know of this document until it was in the binder. It's
4 not a document, I don't think, I've referenced in my report, and it
5 wasn't one that I -- I'd seen until it was placed in the binder.
6 Q. I have to apologise. I thought that all the documents contained
7 in the binder, the Prosecution binder, are the documents contained in
8 your footnotes, the documents that you analysed. Did you maybe during
9 the proofing see that document?
10 A. I'd have to check my footnotes again, but I don't think this is
11 one that's referenced in my report. I think this week was the first week
12 I'd seen it.
13 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, I can confirm he -- I showed this to
14 Mr. Brown when he was -- when I spoke to him.
15 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you, Ms. Korner.
16 Q. [Interpretation] Sir, bearing in mind that you saw this document,
17 I would like you to take a look at the third page of the document titled,
18 "Tasks of the Civilian Affairs Organs in the Command of the JNA Units and
19 Command of Settlements."
20 A. I see that, sir, yes.
21 Q. Do you see item number 7? One of the tasks mentioned here by
22 Major General Milan Pujic, deputy secretary for National Defence, is:
23 "In case the civilian government fails to function, ensure the
24 necessary conditions within the JNA units' command, that is, the town
25 command for the forming and the functioning of the organs of civilian
1 government and other organs and bodies."
2 When he mentions town commands, town is a rather more loosely
3 defined term than a city or a settlement, isn't it?
4 A. Yes. I mean, a town, I'm assuming, is not a city; smaller than a
5 city, obviously.
6 Q. You will agree with me that these instructions, dating from
7 November 1991 defining the tasks of the organs and units in charge of
8 civilian affairs, that they had envisaged the possibility of the
9 establishment of the command of a settlement, which includes also a town
11 A. Well, reading this document, it authorises a particular staff
12 function, which is the civilian affairs command. I think I mentioned
13 there was often an officer appointed to civilian affairs within a staff
14 of a formation. This would seem to give tasks to that staff branch, and
15 that if, when a civilian government isn't functioning in an area that the
16 JNA are to be operating, that one of the roles of this branch within the
17 command is to ensure conditions that civilian authorities can function.
18 So whether it relates to -- in an area where there is no civilian
19 authority, that the JNA are to -- a staff branch is to assume that
20 function. Based on the date of the document, it probably is relating to
21 operations in Croatia and what they're expecting to do in Croatia, and I
22 believe that the possible context behind this was that when the JNA
23 conducted operations in Croatia at this time, they were expecting --
24 their goal, in essence, was to try and get Croatia -- I mean their role
25 was to try and get up to the Hungarian border, in essence to bring
1 Croatia back into Yugoslavia, I assume. And so maybe they felt that one
2 of the functions in that operation would have been that territories would
3 not have had a friendly or a functioning civilian government, and maybe
4 this was a -- relating to that.
5 But town command is not one that I've seen regularly reported
6 through documents, I think as I said previously.
7 Q. But you would allow for the possibility that this instruction may
8 be linked with the document that - we looked at it a little while ago,
9 P1783 - which was the order by the command of the 30th Partizan Division
10 to mount the Defence of Kljuc?
11 A. No, I wouldn't say it was linked. And in fact, in relation to
12 the defence command, I believe than in the Kljuc Crisis Staff minutes of
13 a couple of days prior to this document it was accepted and agreed that
14 defence command should be established. So this document, I believe, is
15 linked to the decision of the Crisis Staff in Kljuc a few days prior to
16 this. And the Crisis Staff of Kljuc consisted of commanders from
17 subordinate formations of this command, police, and the civilian
18 authorities of Kljuc. So I suspect what happened with this document was
19 that a decision was made at the Kljuc Crisis Staff and agreed that a
20 defence command should be formed and that what fell from this was this
21 more formalised document.
22 Q. I'll definitely have to show you some other documents now in
23 order to show you that your chain of reasoning is incorrect.
24 MR. ZECEVIC: Can we have 65 ter 886, which is tab 152 in the
25 Defence binder.
1 Q. Sir, this is, again, an order by another brigade, by a command of
2 another brigade, 19th Partizan Brigade, dated 13th of June, 1992, and it
3 relates to Skender Vakuf, which is also within the zone of responsibility
4 of the 1st Krajina Corps, at least that was the situation at the time.
5 No, I didn't mean Skender, I meant Donji Vakuf. And in item number 1,
6 you can see that Defence command for the town of Donji Vakuf is being
7 established. Do you see that?
8 A. Yes, I do, sir.
9 Q. Have you seen this document before?
10 A. I don't believe I have, sir.
11 Q. But certainly this document too refers to the establishment of
12 the command of the town defence, just as in the document that we saw
13 about Kljuc; right?
14 A. Yes, it seems to make reference to a defence command.
15 Q. Please take a look at page 4 of this document. I believe it's
16 very telling, what it says. The last page. The signature is that of the
17 commander, Colonel Branislav Grujic and Captain 1st Class Rade Radic, who
18 confirms the authenticity of the signature. I believe that the correct
19 page in English is the one before this.
20 Item 5 shows that Lieutenant-Colonel Branislav Grujic, the
21 commander of the brigade, appoints the commander of the public security
22 station and that is one Sefulo Sisic, Captain 1st Class. And then
23 Jovo Satara, deputy commander of the public security station and one
24 Srdjan - I can't read his last name - assistant commander of the public
25 security station. In this case, then, the commander, Branislav Grujic,
1 who commands the 19th Brigade, appoints Captain 1st Class, in other
2 words, a member of the army, he commands -- he appoints him commander of
3 the Donji Vakuf Public Security Station; isn't that right?
4 A. It would seem so from this document. I don't know whether there
5 had been some agreement prior to this or discussions prior to this or
6 what had happened before, but at face value from this document, yes.
7 Q. Unless there are objections, I seek to tender this document.
8 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 1D403, Your Honours.
10 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. I'll show you some more documents, sir, much like this one. But
12 let me ask you something before that. From your analytical review of the
13 documents about the 1st Krajina Corps and its military operations, are
14 you familiar with the name of a Colonel Lisica who was the commander of
15 the Doboj operations group?
16 A. Yes, I know the name, sir.
17 Q. Colonel Slavko Lisica. I'll show you of those documents.
18 1D00-2304. The document is dated 29 August 1992. And that's tab 76 in
19 the Defence binder.
20 Here, this Mr. Lisica, in the first paragraph, refers to the
21 instruction we have just discussed. He says:
22 "On the basis of instructions on the work of organs of civilian
23 affairs in times of combat operations and of demonstrated need, I hereby
24 issue the following order ..."
25 Then he says:
1 "The Derventa town command from today on shall only deal with
2 military issues, while all civilian matters shall be transferred to the
3 civilian authorities."
4 [Technical difficulty]
5 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you.
6 Q. [Interpretation] Well then, Mr. Brown, this document, in its
7 first paragraph, as I said, states that it was issued on the basis of
8 instructions on the work of organs of civilian affairs in times of combat
9 operations and if demonstrated need. This certainly refers to document
10 1D365, which I showed you a little earlier and which is under tab 1 of
11 the Prosecution. Isn't that right?
12 A. I don't know if the VRS issued their own instructions for the
13 organs of civilian affairs. It may well have been that the VRS in its
14 regulations, bearing in mind this is late 1992, or whether they took
15 existing regulations from the JNA; but they are obviously making
16 reference to some document about the organ of civilian affairs in the
18 Q. I accept that. Here, the commander, Colonel Slavko Lisica,
19 orders that the town command of Derventa from that day on, which is in
20 late August 1992, shall deal only with military issues, whereas all
21 civilian matters shall be transferred to the civilian authorities.
22 This clearly means that from the moment Derventa was liberated,
23 which I believe was in June or July 1992, until the end of August the
24 town command of Derventa was in place and functioned, and that within its
25 remit were not only military matters but also civilian matters. Isn't
1 that right?
2 A. Looking at this document on its own, I assume what might have
3 happened here is that Derventa was taken in Operation Corridor and there
4 wasn't a functioning civilian government initially, bearing in mind it
5 wasn't, I believe, a Serb municipality. And possibly, here, the military
6 were asked to do, as had been noted before, to establish some kind of
7 town command, and then when the civilian authorities were fully
8 established, that the town command basically was handed over to the
9 civilian War Presidency and that the town commander was to become the
10 representative on the War Presidency in Derventa. And I am assuming that
11 the town command may have been established because the military took that
12 area in Operation Corridor 92.
13 Q. I mostly agree with your explanation. The essence is that in
14 this document too, which is linked to some instruction on the work of
15 civilian organs, the notion of town command is mentioned. That was
16 actually the gist of my question.
17 A. Yes, it references town command. I mean, the reference you
18 showed me from Donji Vakuf may have been a similar situation. I know
19 that Donji Vakuf was a very tense municipality. It was right on the
20 border and there was a lot of combat activity. And if I'm not wrong,
21 I think the municipality was split, and there were -- there was a lot
22 of -- I'd have to remind myself, I think, but it was a municipality that
23 saw quite a lot of combat operations. And it may well have been that the
24 reference you had beforehand was a similar sort of position, where there
25 wasn't a functioning government and that the town command may have been
1 established there. But, again, I'm not an expert on the situation in
2 Donji Vakuf.
3 Q. It's a fact, sir, isn't it, that in your work, under 2.215, you
4 deal with a similar situation?
5 A. Sorry, the reference again, sir?
6 Q. 2.215. And the last sentence reads: "The following weeks in the
7 Posavina were terminated by the establishment of military authority in
8 Odzak municipality."
9 That's a similar situation as the one in Derventa, isn't it?
10 A. I believe it was.
11 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document
13 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
14 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit 1D404, Your Honours.
15 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] All right.
16 Q. Let us now make use of the time left today and deal with another
17 topic that you spoke about on examination-in-chief, on page 18702 and the
18 following pages, that is, the issue of paramilitaries.
19 You dealt with that issue from 2.57 through 2.72 of your
20 analysis. And you commented on paramilitaries for the first time when
21 you were analysing combat readiness, which is document P1781.
22 If you remember, there the military says that some groups have
23 sprung into being, some paramilitary groups, whose goals in the war were
24 sometimes contrary to those of the VRS. Do you remember that section of
25 the analysis of combat readiness in 1993?
1 A. Yes, I do.
2 Q. Let us now look at document P591, which is tab 36 in the
3 Prosecution binder. And you refer to it in some footnotes, namely
4 footnotes 368 and 382 in your analysis. That's an information -- that's
5 a report on paramilitary formations in the territory of the
6 Serbian Republic; it's dated 28 July 1992. And among others, various
7 groups you commented upon were that the Prosecutor are mentioned here.
8 On page 3 of this document, mention is made of a certain paramilitary
9 group in Zvornik municipality. Do you remember that?
10 A. Is this the one in the area of Zvornik? "Things have
11 reached ..." That reference there?
12 Q. Yes.
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Here in this document we see, in the last-but-one paragraph in
15 Serbian, on the fourth from the bottom in English, it says:
16 "In the area of Zvornik, things have even reached the stage where
17 an illegal TO staff, which has some paramilitary units under its command,
18 demands that a Zvornik brigade of the army be placed under their
20 Can you see that?
21 A. Yes, I do see that, sir.
22 Q. Sir, I don't know if you remember from the analysis of combat
23 readiness where the security administration mentions an arrest operation
24 conducted in cooperation with the bodies of the Ministry of the Interior.
25 It refers to a group that called themselves or were known as the yellow
1 wasps; they were a paramilitary group.
2 A. I don't know the reference in the document that you're referring
3 to. If you want me to, I can look at it. But I am aware of that group
4 in Zvornik. I don't know the area well and I don't know that
5 organisation, but I know the name.
6 Q. That is enough. On the last page of this document,
7 Zdravko Tolimir, the chief of security of the General Staff of the VRS,
8 gives instructions and orders what shall be done about all these
9 paramilitaries. He says that the paramilitary formations negatively
10 affect the Serbian people in two ways, and then he states the ways. And
11 he adds that every armed Serb in SRBH must be placed under the exclusive
12 command of the army of the SRBH or else he shall be disarmed and legal
13 measures shall be taken.
14 This is an instruction and an order of the chief of security of
15 the General Staff of the VRS, isn't it?
16 A. Yes, it is.
17 Q. Very well. After this document, which is dated 28 July 1992,
18 what followed was a document marked P593, tab 38 in the Prosecution
19 binder. And your footnote referring to it is at 373. This is an order
20 of General Talic or, rather, the command of the 1st Krajina Corps, signed
21 by General Talic, I believe, or somebody signed in his stead. It is
22 dated 30 July 1992. And the title is, "Disarmament of Paramilitary
23 Units, Order." You have already commented on this, both in the
24 examination-in-chief and in your report, didn't you?
25 A. I did, sir, yes.
1 Q. And if I remember correctly, then you put it in the context of
2 the implementation of the instruction of the chief of security of the
3 Main Staff with regard to the 1st Krajina Corps because that corps, two
4 days after the instruction and the order issued by the chief of security
5 of the Main Staff, issues an order in which he elaborates on the
6 procedure of disarming paramilitaries; correct?
7 A. Yes, one would seem to follow the other.
8 MR. ZECEVIC: Could we please see page 2. I would like us to
9 comment on items 2 and 3 and some others.
10 Q. But before that, it says -- or the command says:
11 "To prevent paramilitary organising and placing all units and
12 individuals under the command of the army of the SRBH and pursuant to the
13 Law on the Army and the decision of the Presidency of the SRBH, I order"
14 and then an itemised list follows, 1, 2, 3, et cetera.
15 In paragraph 1, General Talic or, rather, the commander of the
16 1st Krajina Corps gives an option that the paramilitaries shall be
17 offered to integrate into the army, where they can serve in accordance
18 with their military specialty and their skills; is that correct?
19 A. Yes, he does say that.
20 Q. At the moment when such formations, which are outside -- which
21 are not under the command of the VRS, should accept the offer to
22 integrate into regular units, they would become part of regular units
23 just as any other soldier, and they would be then -- become parts of a
24 certain corps; isn't that correct?
25 A. Yes. It would seem that that's the thrust of both documents,
1 that they are to be integrated into the VRS and if they're integrated,
2 they presumably come under the command of the relevant military
4 Q. However, item 2 includes a limitation, and General Talic says:
5 "Do not include in units individuals and groups which have been
6 involved in crimes and looting or have committed other criminal acts.
7 Disarm and arrest them and bring criminal charges against them" - and now
8 I stress - "in SR BH Army courts, regardless of their citizenship."
9 So, Mr. Brown, it follows from this that General Talic orders
10 that formations that were organised autonomously should be integrated in
11 the VRS but those who have committed crimes should not be integrated but
12 instead disarmed, arrested, and that criminal charges should be pressed
13 against them before military courts. That is, within the framework of
14 the military judiciary of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Isn't
15 that correct?
16 A. Yes. That's what is written in his instruction. Whether --
17 whether that happened or not is another issue, and I think I know of at
18 least, you know, the Milankovic case and the groups from Prijedor that
19 that didn't happen, and then also the issue of the SRBiH courts being
20 used in the Prosecution --
21 Q. Mr. Brown, please, I don't want to go into the details or
22 specific examples. I simply want to have your comment of this order.
23 Whether it was executed in the field and how it was executed in
24 the field is another issue that we are going to visit later. I'm simply
25 now concentrating on the basic meaning of this order, and I would like
1 you to focus on that.
2 Item number 3: "The 1st Krajina Corps orders that the
3 paramilitary formations, groups, and individuals belonging to them who
4 refuse to come under the unified command should be disarmed and arrested
5 in the cooperation with the SRBH MUP and that criminal charges against
6 them should be brought corresponding to the criminal acts that they have
8 So General Talic makes a distinction here between those mentioned
9 in item number 2, who were committing grave offences; for them he orders
10 the military organs to arrest them and disarm them and then give them to
11 the military judiciary. And the others, who committed not so grave
12 offences, among others avoiding the call-up or something like that, and
13 those people he places within the jurisdiction of the police organs.
14 They are supposed to disarm them and initiate criminal proceedings
15 against them. Is that correct?
16 A. Well, I think there is an ambiguity in his instruction, but he
17 does at face value say individuals who have been involved in crimes
18 shouldn't be included, yet he allows for the possibility that individuals
19 who have committed crimes can be allowed into the VRS as long as they
20 accept that they should be within the VRS. He almost says in paragraph 3
21 that, you know, if there are individuals who don't want to be -- bearing
22 in mind, presumably, the previous reference, they're talking about
23 individuals who are known to have committed crimes, there is the
24 possibility, or he allows for the possibility, that individuals who are
25 known to have committed crimes can be included into the VRS as long as
1 they willingly do so. But I do think there is a bit of an ambiguity
2 there because paragraph 2 does say at face value that we're not to let
3 people who are involved in crimes or looting in.
4 Q. That is precisely what I wanted to say. In item number 5,
5 Momir Talic, or the command of the 1st Krajina Corps, say:
6 "I forbid the existence of any paramilitary units, groups, and
7 individuals in the territory of the Serbian Republic of
8 Bosnia-Herzegovina. From now on, bring criminal charges against those
9 commanders, competent military territorial organs, and government organs
10 which enable paramilitary organising and avoidance of recruitment and
11 conscription, in accordance with the Law on the Army of the Serbian
12 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina."
13 And in item 6 he gives a deadline, the 15th of August, to disarm
14 all paramilitary formations.
15 But the essence of this, Mr. Brown, is as follows: The army's
16 worried about several facets of this situation. First, I agree with you
17 that they worry about the fact that there are some paramilitary
18 formations which are not under their control. Then, as number 2, we can
19 conclude that they are obviously worried also about the fact that these
20 paramilitary formations are committing crimes, and they demand that those
21 crimes be processed. And, as the third item, the army is worried about
22 the fact that certain individuals, by joining the paramilitary
23 formations, avoid their call-up duty as defined by the law, which means
24 that the army doesn't have enough soldiers. They don't have the soldiers
25 who do not respond to the call-up but instead join paramilitary groups
1 who are engaged in criminal activities.
2 Do you agree with my assessment of this order?
3 MS. KORNER: Sorry, Your Honours, it really -- really is -- it's
4 four -- it's four separate facets. I think it should be broken down, in
6 MR. ZECEVIC: Well, your -- Ms. Korner, I'm sure Mr. Brown is
7 perfectly capable to say, well, I agree with number 1, 2, and do not
8 agree with number 3 and 4, if he does not.
9 THE WITNESS: I'll try and work through your long question, sir.
10 I would agree that the issue is -- or one of the issues is that
11 they are unhappy that organs are working outside their control. And
12 I would agree that one of the reasons that they do indicate that is
13 because people are, in their eyes, avoiding the call-up. It's not the
14 only reason, I think. There are other reasons. For example, it causes
15 morale problems for soldiers who are on the very front line, when they
16 hear that individuals are behind the front line potentially looting and
17 making money. That was another feature, I think, in some of the
19 There is another feeling that individuals who are, say, on the
20 front line in the corridor are suffering casualties and having to stay on
21 the fronts line for periods of time when they might perceive others to be
22 behind not really doing their bit. So there are these issues that I also
23 think come into it. I think -- I would accept that in paragraph 2 there
24 is this apparent statement that they are not to have individuals who
25 committed crimes, but my view with the issue of paramilitaries is that
1 they want to have individuals in control under the army to provide
2 manpower and to conduct the operations that they want and it is not about
3 saying that this type of individual is the very last type of individual
4 we want to be giving a weapon and on the front line. They may have had
5 their value in the early stages, but now that we've got an army we want
6 to have them with us. I look at that document and the previous one as --
7 the undercurrent is that if they come under our control, they will be
8 acceptable, irrespective of what they've done.
9 What this document doesn't say, first and foremost, is: Anybody
10 who has been conducting criminal activities prior to this instruction
11 will, A, be charged, and, B, will find no place in the VRS; it doesn't
12 say that. You know, the document -- paragraph 5 says, I forbid the
13 existence of any paramilitary formations, groups, and individuals in the
14 territory, and -- but from now on bring - from now on bring - criminal
15 charges. Well, they may well have known that there are individuals who
16 fell into that category who have been doing that for months or a period
17 before, but they don't say, We should be charging these people because
18 they have caused problems or have conducted criminal acts. It's saying,
19 From now on if they are going to be doing this, we will charge them.
20 So it was -- my view of this is that this is about getting all
21 individuals in control and under the army, and not necessarily about what
22 they've done previously.
23 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Sir, this document, in its item number 2, as you've said, and I'm
25 only going to highlight the key point: Do not include in units such
1 people, instead, arrest them, disarm them, and bring criminal charges
2 against them in army courts.
3 Therefore, item 2 is about the individuals and groups who had
4 committed crimes before that point in time.
5 Sir, in your report, paragraph 2.185, footnote 616, you refer to
6 the document 1D368. It is, at present, marked for identification in this
7 case. This is tab 84 in the Defence binder, and that's a document coming
8 from the Military Prosecutor's Office attached to the Main Staff of the
9 army and which contains the guidelines for the criminal prosecution. You
10 refer to this document when you speak about bringing charges for criminal
11 offences and disciplinary measures in the Army of Republika Srpska. You
12 speak about it in 2.185.
13 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated] It's 84 in the -- in
14 LiveNote. It's not --
15 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Tab 44. [In English] I'm sorry, my
16 English is getting worse by the minute.
17 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Brown, it is correct that you referred to
18 this document in your report. And this document of the Military
19 Prosecutor's Office, in short, explains which are the most frequently
20 committed criminal offences and then gives guidelines to the prosecutor's
21 offices about bringing criminal charges against persons who have
22 committed criminal offences; is that so?
23 A. Yes. It's been some time since I looked at this, but I think
24 that's what it does deal with.
25 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, since the expert has
1 used this document in his report, I would now propose to admit it as
2 1D368 so that it is not only marked for identification any more.
3 MS. KORNER: Yes, Your Honours, I've just looked up, or
4 Mr. Smith's just looked up, I think the objection originally was that
5 there was an assertion that it -- that it was all to do with the war
6 crimes came within the jurisdiction of the Military Prosecutor's Office
7 but otherwise that the witness who was being asked about it wasn't the
8 right witness. And in the circumstances that Mr. Brown referenced it, I
9 can hardly say this is not the right witness. So I have no objection.
10 MR. ZECEVIC: That is precisely the -- that is precisely the
11 fact, because previously it was MFIed because there was not enough of a
12 nexus between the witness and this document.
13 JUDGE HALL: So the MFI status is lifted.
14 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you very much, Your Honours.
15 Your Honours, at this point I'm moving to another issue. Maybe
16 this would be a perfect moment for us to adjourn for today's
17 cross-examination. I'm sure Mr. Brown will appreciate as much as I do
18 your decision in that respect, your favourable decision in that respect.
19 Thank you.
20 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Brown, when you were on your way into the Court,
21 there was a discussion between the Bench and counsel for the Defence as
22 to how much longer they would be, and it seems that you will be with us
23 until Thursday.
24 So we rise now, to resume tomorrow morning at 9.00.
25 [The witness stands down]
1 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.42 p.m.,
2 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 19th day
3 of January, 2011, at 9.00 a.m.