1 Wednesday, 19 January 2011
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.06 a.m.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning
6 everyone in and around the courtroom. This is case IT-08-91-T, the
7 Prosecutor versus Mico Stanisic and Stojan Zupljanin.
8 JUDGE HALL: Thank you, Madam Registrar. Good morning to
9 everyone. May we have the appearances please.
10 MS. KORNER: Good morning, Your Honours. Joanna Korner and
11 Crispian Smith for the Prosecution.
12 MR. ZECEVIC: Good morning, Your Honours. Slobodan Zecevic,
13 Slobodan Cvijetic, Eugene O'Sullivan, Ms. Tatjana Savic, Ms. Suzanna
14 Mohr, and Ms. Alexandra Laskowski appearing for Stanisic Defence this
15 morning. Thank you.
16 MR. KRGOVIC: Good morning, Your Honours. Dragan Krgovic and
17 Aleksandar Aleksic appearing for Zupljanin Defence.
18 JUDGE HALL: Before -- yes, Ms. Korner.
19 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, I have a matter to raise, but I'll wait
20 until Your Honour has finish the --
21 JUDGE HALL: I was just going to say before the witness was
22 returned to the stand, we were alert that you may have had a matter to
24 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, I think we need to go into private
25 session for this.
1 JUDGE HALL: Yes.
2 [Private session]
11 Page 18918 redacted. Private session.
10 [Open session]
11 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.
12 [The witness takes the stand]
13 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Brown, good morning to you. Again for the
14 record I remind you that you are still on your oath. Yes, Mr. Zecevic.
15 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
16 WITNESS: EWAN BROWN [Resumed]
17 Cross-examination by Mr. Zecevic: [Continued]
18 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Brown.
19 A. Good morning, Mr. Zecevic. Thank you.
20 Q. Mr. Brown, your expert's report in items 239 to 256, you speak
21 about the co-operation between the military and the police. Page 18718
22 of the transcript contains your analysis of a document P1787, which is
23 tab 34 in the Prosecution binder. It's footnote 321, 348, 455, and 720.
24 I remind you that the discussion related to this document
25 pertained mostly to the issue of co-ordinated action. Do you remember
1 that? Do you remember that you spoke with Ms. Korner about that topic?
2 A. Yes, I did.
3 Q. Mr. Brown, before we analyse this document, we are going to
4 return to this document later, that's what I mean to say. But before
5 that I think we owe it to the Trial Chamber and all the participants here
6 in the courtroom to explain what exactly "co-ordinated action" means.
7 Mr. Brown, co-ordinated action is a military term that denotes a method
8 of the execution of a joint task wherein two or more units act in
9 co-ordination towards achievement of a task assigned by their superior
10 commander. Would you agree with this definition?
11 A. It's not solely a military term, I would argue, but it can be
12 used in a military context clearly. And I would agree that it usually
13 means two or more units acting together in order to achieve a common
14 goal. It doesn't necessarily mean to say that it couldn't be two units,
15 two organisations from different components, but I agree that there is a
16 co-ordination component. There usually is multiple actors and they are
17 acting normally in concert to achieve a common aim or a common goal.
18 Q. The essence is that the co-ordinated action is ordered by a
19 superior commander, isn't that so?
20 A. Well, the actors involved can have their own command chain, and
21 as I maybe mentioned when we were discussing this previously, you can
22 have --
23 Q. Mr. Brown, excuse me. I have to interrupt you. You did explain
24 that and that is not in dispute. It is clear that the units have their
25 own chains of command, but the essence here, what I'm now asking you
1 about is the following: Somebody ordering a co-ordinated action of two
2 units with two different chain of commands, that person, that individual
3 or a command is superior to both those units then because that is the
4 command that is in a position to order the co-ordinated action?
5 A. Well, in relation to the military unit taking part here, so this
6 is a Kotor Varos light brigade unit, I would agree, yes, that I would
7 imagine the corps command has instructed its subordinate formations to
8 conduct operations. What others who are taking part in the operation may
9 or may have not been asked to do, I do not know, but in relation to this
10 military unit, I would suspect that its superior command has been made
11 aware or it has instructed this unit to conduct operations in that area.
12 Q. Sir, let us take an example. Let's take a look at P1787, tab 34.
13 That's the document that you spoke about with Ms. Korner.
14 Sir, this is a document dated 23rd of July, issued by the command
15 of the Light Infantry Brigade Kotor Varos. I say that through this
16 document the command of the light infantry brigade as a superior command
17 orders its subordinated units defined in items 1 to 5 and item 8, orders
18 them to execute a certain task. This document is signed by the commander
19 of the Light Infantry Brigade Kotor Varos who is Mr. Manojlo Tepic. So
20 the command of the Light Partisan Brigade is the superior command to all
21 the units enumerated in items 5.1 to 5.8, would you agree with that?
22 A. Yes, the companies that are under -- that form the core of the
23 light brigade.
24 Q. Well, then, if we analyse this document, in particular its page 3
25 and onwards, we are going to see that out of 8 points in which the
1 superior command of the Light Infantry Partisan Brigade Kotor Varos, that
2 out of these 8 points, only in 5.2 and 5.3 we find units of the MUP. So
3 out of 8, you have MUP in two points and not in six points; is that
5 A. There's also a reference in paragraph 11 in relation to security
6 support so presumably his security staff, but also a reference, acting in
7 concert with neighbours and the police forces on the ground.
8 Q. I know that, but now we are talking about the tasks assigned to
9 the subordinated units, and that's item 5 in this order, isn't it?
10 A. Yes, it would seem from the documents that the 2nd Infantry
11 Company, the pioneer platoon, and the security support staff of the
12 brigade have been given tasks to co-ordinate or have some form of
13 co-ordination with the local police.
14 Q. When you answered a question posed by His Honour Judge Harhoff,
15 page 18727 [Realtime transcript read in error "18727"] of the transcript,
16 you said that this was a true subordination, resubordination of the
17 police units to the army and if that were the case, then you said that
18 you would have expected that they would have received specific and very
19 explicit tasks in this order. Do you remember that you said something to
20 this effect?
21 A. Yes, I would have expected if there was a police formation that
22 was subordinated directly to this brigade, that I would see that
23 replicated in one of the sub-formations and the tasks given to it.
24 MS. KORNER: I am so sorry, can I have the page again of the
25 transcript? It's come out as 1827.
1 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] 18721. Judge Harhoff asked how
2 about the legal structure and then ...
3 Q. Sir, so the tasks of the subordinated units, any task that would
4 entail a co-ordinated action with the MUP units, we can find here only
5 assigned to the two units, the pioneer platoon and the 2nd Infantry
6 Company, is that true?
7 A. And the security support staff. I'm presuming this brigade had
8 some security personnel, security officers, security staff who conducted
9 security tasks on behalf of the brigade, and they've also have a
10 highlighted role. So those three components would seem to be the ones
11 that are -- have been given this role of ...
12 Q. I accept that, I accept that. It is obvious that the police
13 would have been involved with some sort of security aspect of this
14 situation. However, I claim that items 5.2 and 5.3 give to the police a
15 very explicit and very specific task or tasks such as with part of your
16 forces acting in concert with the forces of the SJB Kotor Varos organised
17 checking of unknown individuals and foreigners entering the area. So
18 now, I don't know when you say this is not specific, in what way is it
19 not specific? Do you think that this order should also contain a
20 particular point where the check-point is to be set up in order to
21 control the entry of unknown persons and foreigners? Do you think that
22 they should tell them the exact geographical point where the check point
23 should be and that only that would be sufficiently explicit and specific?
24 A. I don't believe point 5.2, the tasks given there, are specific
25 tasks given to the police. I think this is a section that gives the
1 tasks to the 2nd Infantry Company, the 2nd Infantry Company is to
2 organise the checking of unknown individuals and foreigners entering the
3 area in concert with the police. He is not instructing in this
4 paragraph. It doesn't read the police contingent are to do the
5 following. This paragraph refers to the tasks given to the 2nd Infantry
6 Company, and I would imagine what has happened here is that there's been
7 some co-ordination meeting where it's been agreed that both the 2nd
8 Infantry Company will conduct the organised and checking of individuals
9 and that the police will do the same.
10 Q. Mr. Brown, with all due respect, I am kindly asking you to
11 respond to my questions. The fact that you have your own understanding
12 of what might have happened, which falls into the realm of speculation,
13 this is contrary to what is written here. What is written here it says
14 in a co-ordinated action with Kotor Varos SJB forces sets up control of
15 the entry of unknown persons and foreigners. A moment ago we agreed the
16 meaning of the phrase "co-ordinated action." Now I put it to you that
17 both in this case and some other cases that we are going to review, the
18 command of the Light Infantry Brigade ordering this co-ordinated action
19 is a superior command both to the 2nd Infantry Company of its own and to
20 the Kotor Varos SJB because this SJB, according to the law, was
21 resubordinated to the army for the purpose of executing this task?
22 A. I think I'd have to disagree with you.
23 Q. Thank you. Let's move to the next document to demonstrate this.
24 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Can the witness please be shown 65
25 ter document 2624, tab 19 in the Prosecution binder.
1 Q. It's a directive of 6th of June 1992, issued by
2 Lieutenant-General Ratko Mladic, and it's been issued by the Main Staff
3 of the VRS.
4 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] I apologise. I've just been told
5 that in the meantime this was entered into evidence and this is now
7 Q. You refer to this document in your statement given in July of
8 2009, therefore I suppose that you have seen this document?
9 A. Yes, I hadn't seen this document when I wrote my report, but I
10 think it was one of the documents referenced when I made my statement or
11 reviewed some documents last year, I believe, or probably the year
13 Q. Would you be so kind to take a look at this document which is
14 entitled directive for further actions, and then in the first three or
15 four paragraphs it specifies and portrays the prevailing situation, and
16 in the remainder of the document we can read about the goals of this
17 operation listed under A, B, C, and D. And then under item 5, they speak
18 about tasks of the units, so let's look at that. That's on page 2 in
19 Serbian. The last paragraph, item 5. And I suppose it's the next page
20 in English as well.
21 Sir, what you can see here is that this is about the tasks of the
22 1st Krajina Corps, and General Ratko Mladic says the 1st Krajina Corps,
23 et cetera, in a co-ordinated action with the 2nd Krajina Corps and in a
24 co-ordinated action with East Bosnia Corps. Unfortunately in the English
25 translation, it says in concert with the 2nd Krajina Corps and co-action,
1 which means that this is the document that gave rise to the problem that
2 we pointed out because the word "Sadjestvo" was first translated as in
3 concert and then second time it was translated as co-action. I think we
4 have all agreed, including the CLSS, that the word "Sadjestvo" should
5 always be translated as a co-ordinated action. Can you see this, sir?
6 A. Yes, this is the task set the corps.
7 Q. Sir, it is not in dispute that Ratko Mladic represents a higher
8 command with regard to all the three corps, the 1st, the 2nd Krajina
9 Corps, and the East Bosnia Corps?
10 A. No, the Main Staff which Ratko Mladic headed sat above those
12 Q. Sir, that's the point. Only a superior command is entitled to
13 order a co-ordinated action to be carried out by units. In this
14 particular instance, Ratko Mladic is not issuing an order to the 1st
15 Krajina Corps as could have been inferred from your interpretation of the
16 previous document, but rather issuing an order to the 1st, the 2nd
17 Krajina Corps, and the East Bosnia Corps; is that correct?
18 A. I think the order is what it is. It's a directive from the
19 command, the commander of the Main Staff, to subordinated corps, and
20 those corps are to co-operate in a large operation in the corridor, well,
21 there was Sarajevo as well, but that's what he is ordering. But the
22 document is what it is.
23 Q. But, sir, the essence is as follows: In this document regardless
24 of the fact that initially the task is assigned to the 1st Krajina Corps,
25 the Main Staff of the VRS is giving an order to the 1st Krajina Corps and
1 the 2nd Krajina Corps and the East Bosnia Corps instructing them to act
2 in a co-ordinated action together; is that correct?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Very well. So if in this case the co-ordinated action applies to
5 all the listed units, why did you say with regard to the previous
6 document that this did not apply to police units?
7 A. I'm a little bit unclear in your question. There's --
8 General Mladic is well within his right to ask, to order actually, his
9 subordinate corps to co-ordinate together to conduct an operation in the
10 corridor. The Kotor Varos Light Brigade orders its subordinate units in
11 that operation, the various companies and support functions and platoons,
12 to conduct operations, and one of the tasks it sets, one of its
13 subordinate formations, is to co-ordinate with the police in Kotor Varos.
14 I don't see that somehow the second one automatically implies that the
15 Kotor Varos Light Brigade therefore commands all the police. I think
16 there are two different tasks going on, but in this one, in this
17 directive, Mladic is saying, and generally at the higher level the
18 instructions are more general and they are larger, a number of corps are
19 to co-operate together in order to conduct a large military operation.
20 Now, what would likely follow from that is that each corps would look at
21 the tasks set, look at the areas that it has to work with, have planning
22 meetings with the corps that they have been told to co-operate with to
23 come with up with a plan of action that would result in the execution of
24 this order. Which I believe is what happened.
25 Q. Sir, please concentrate on my question. First of all in this
1 directive, Ratko Mladic, if you read it, as a superior command is issuing
2 an order to subordinate units to carry out a co-ordinated action
3 specifying exactly the tasks, and I'm not going into details of those
4 tasks. Now, I put it to you, sir, that an entirely identical principle
5 was applied in the tasks that we looked a moment ago assigned by the
6 Kotor Varos Light Infantry Brigade, and the essence is that I'm telling
7 you that when the command of Light Infantry Brigade says a co-ordinated
8 action, that implies that at that point in time the police units are
9 resubordinated to the army. Due to that, the commander of the Light
10 Infantry Brigade can issue orders for co-ordinated actions to all units
11 and hence all these units are under his command, just as was the case in
12 the order issued by Ratko Mladic to the corps.
13 If you still disagree with me, I can show you another document
14 that would clarify the matter.
15 A. I would disagree with you that the Kotor Varos Light Infantry
16 Brigade from this instruction has subordinated police units that it
17 commands and it is giving instructions to. I do not see that from that
18 document, and I do not believe that the Mladic document is anything other
19 than a high level directive to subordinate corps to co-operate in the
20 execution of a large military task in the corridor and also in relation
21 to operations in Sarajevo.
22 Q. Let us then look at a third document. I have a whole host of
23 documents that can show that you are -- that you are not right.
24 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] It's document 1D049216, that's the
25 tab 34, footnote 134.
1 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, I am going to object again, and
2 particularly in the light of the matter I raised this morning, to
3 comments and remarks such as "I can show you a whole host of documents
4 that will show you are wrong." That is pure comment. He can put what
5 documents he likes and then thereafter make submissions at the
6 appropriate time.
7 MR. ZECEVIC: I apologise to Mr. Brown and to you, Ms. Korner.
8 You are right. It was inappropriate.
9 Q. [Interpretation] I apologise, Mr. Brown.
10 A. No problem at all, sir.
11 Q. Thank you very much.
12 [Interpretation] Mr. Brown, this document that you deal with in
13 your footnote 144 in your report is an order issued by the 1st Krajina
14 Corps dated the 31st of July, 1992, and this order was given by the 1st
15 Krajina Corps to its subordinate units as their superior command; is that
17 A. Yes. Have you got a tab for that, sir, or?
18 Q. Tab 34 in the Defence binder, although I don't know if you have
19 that particular binder with you.
20 A. I don't, sir. I probably know this is a rather large document as
22 Q. It is. I don't know if you prefer -- I promise that over the
23 break I'm going to prepare this document for you in English, and I don't
24 think it will be helpful if I gave you my copy in the Serbian, but you
25 are right and I'm going to instruct some people for all the documents
1 that I intend to use in my cross-examination to be printed and hard
2 copies given to you.
3 Now, this document refers to the same issue, therefore I don't
4 think you will have any difficulties in understanding both what is
5 written in the document and my questions. Now, let's go to page 6 where
6 it reads "I have decided ..." Actually, it's page 7, item 5.2, which
7 starts with "I have decided ..."
8 Item 5.2. Tasks of subordinated units.
9 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] That's page 7 in Serbian, and it
10 is ERN number 0084-1213. Since there are some pages inserted, it could
11 be then page 14. Thank you. That's the right page.
12 Q. Now, sir, General Talic under item 5.2 refers to TG 2 and orders
13 Tactical Group 2 as follows:
14 "In coordination with Tactical Group 1 and Tactical Group 3
15 organises persistent and active defence applying massive barrier system,"
16 et cetera et cetera.
17 You can see this?
18 A. Yes, I can see that, sir.
19 Q. This means that here this section is entitled tasks of
20 subordinated units, so there is no doubt that Tactical Groups 1, 2, and 3
21 are the units subordinated to General Talic's command; isn't that right?
22 A. Yes, that would seem so, sir.
23 Q. Very well. Let's move on. Item 5.3 on the next page, it talks
24 about the tasks of Tactical Group 3, and it reads:
25 "In co-ordination with Tactical Group 2 and the Srbac Light
1 Brigade organise the defence," et cetera.
2 In this instance again, Tactical Group 3 that is receiving the
3 order and the units TG 2 and the Srbac Light Brigade are again units
4 subordinated ... As I said, these units are yet again units subordinated
5 to the General Talic's command; correct?
6 A. Yes, it would seem so.
7 Q. Okay. 5.6 on the next page. Now we have a Combat Group 2 and it
9 "In co-ordination with the 1st Detachment" -- and this task is
10 being given to Combat Group 2, "In co-ordination with the 1st Detachment
11 of Posavina Brigade, part of the IBK forces, and MUP forces, block the
12 bridgehead established in the region of Orasje ..."
13 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] First of all, I can give you a hard
14 copy of this document in English if the Usher would be so kind to help.
15 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
16 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. So we are talking about item 5.6.
18 A. Yes, I see that on the screen, sir.
19 Q. And what one can see here is again a task given to MUP forces to
20 take part in a co-ordinated action, and they are being given a very
21 explicit and clear tasks such as block the bridgehead in the region of
22 Orasje, then capture Orasje and a number of villages, and eventually
23 reach the Sava river and organise defence there. You will agree with me
24 that there is no doubt that the MUP forces are subordinated to the army
25 in this particular instance, wouldn't you?
1 A. I would not agree with you, sir. This section is an instruction
2 to Combat Group 2. Talic is ordering Combat Group 2 which is a
3 subordinate unit of his corps. He is not ordering the 1st Posavina
4 brigade which I don't believe was part of his corps. He is not ordering
5 the East Bosnia Corps, nor is he ordering the MUP. I believe what he is
6 saying, he is ordering Combat Group 2 which is a subordinate formation to
7 co-ordinate with these units which are not under his command in order to
8 conduct this operation, I believe this is in the corridor area, and I
9 would agree with you it would appear that the Posavina Brigade, the IBK
10 forces, and the MUP forces are involved in combat operations there. But
11 what he is doing is he is telling Combat Group 2 who clearly are going to
12 be part of that operation, to co-ordinate with those other units in order
13 to execute this particular task in this particular area.
14 I don't know exactly where that is or whether it took place or
15 what planning meetings may have gone on as a result of that, but in
16 reading the document very briefly, I would have to say, General Talic is
17 ordering his subordinate formation Combat Group 2 to co-ordinate with
18 units that are not part of his corps, which would seem to be a recognised
19 military task which goes on all the time.
20 Q. But, sir, Mr. Brown, if what you are saying is true, how do you
21 think, then, that this can function in reality? What I mean is I as
22 General Talic, or I don't know who, issue an order to my subordinate unit
23 to carry out a co-ordinated action with units that are not under his
24 command and he expects them to execute this tasks. Is this what you are
1 A. I have to say from my military experience, this happens all the
3 Q. [In English] Okay.
4 A. Neighbouring formations are conducting operations, different
5 formations and different command with the same objective. It's happening
6 now and it's happened in my military service, and I don't see this as an
7 issue that surprises me.
8 Q. [Interpretation] But tell me this, sir: In your view how is it
9 possible then for the Combat Group 2 to execute a co-ordinated action
10 with East Bosnia Corps if they are not under the command of General
11 Talic? One may expect the East Bosnian Corps to say no we are not going
12 to comply and also the MUP forces could have said that, they could have
13 just said no, these are not our tasks and our goals.
14 A. Combat Group 2 is under General Talic's command. Clearly Combat
15 Group 2, I don't know the details of the group and I don't know what its
16 task specifically, although you can read it from here, is, but clearly
17 Combat Group 2 has been given a task by General Talic as part of this
18 operation. I would assume, I don't know the East Bosnia Corps and I
19 haven't seen the documents from the East Bosnia Corps, that it was
20 probably quite likely that this, a similar instruction was given to the
21 East Bosnia Corps in the same way the Directive 1 -- General Talic wrote
22 his own directive as part of that operation. I would assume that a
23 larger directive came from the Main Staff which also went to the East
24 Bosnia Corps and that the East Bosnia Corps was to be part of a task in
25 relation to this wider, I believe, corridor area.
1 But what would then happen, normally what happens, is there's
2 some kind of planning process in which it is agreed which units are going
3 to take part and what their roles and responsibilities will be. So of
4 course the East Bosnia Corps or the MUP could say we are not taking part
5 in this, that's a different issue completely. They might decide that the
6 task that they'd been set is too great for the forces they have, but
7 that's why you have these planning formations. But I go back to my
8 point, Combat Group 2 has been given instructions by General Talic to
9 co-ordinate with units which do not fall under the 1st Krajina Corps
11 Q. Mr. Brown, with all due respect, honestly I can say that at one
12 point you have confirmed what I am alleging. There should be a superior
13 command which sets out a task such as blocking a bridgehead in Orasje,
14 capture Orasje, and reach the river Sava and organise defence. This must
15 be set by a superior command. It is saying this to Talic, it is saying
16 the same thing to East Bosnia Corps and also to the 2nd Krajina Corps,
17 and then they pass on these orders to their subordinated units, including
18 the resubordinated units of the MUP, because there must be a higher level
19 command to issue this kind of order. You yourself said that there was a
20 directive issued to that effect. Therefore, what I'm trying this whole
21 time is to establish that a co-ordinated action involving a number of
22 units is something that can be ordered only by a superior command?
23 A. The task given to Combat Group 2 clearly has been given by a
24 superior command. It may well be that Combat Group 2 is the most
25 important unit taking part in this operation, but when General Talic has
1 been given his instruction by the Main Staff and he has done his staff
2 planning, he decides that Combat Group 2 has to fulfill this task. And
3 it may well be that he realises that there are other factors that in
4 order for Combat Group 2 to succeed, that he requires additional support.
5 He may, for example, feel that the flanks of Combat Group 2 are weak and
6 that what he wants the East Bosnia Corps to do is to secure those flanks
7 while Combat Group 2 take part in the operation.
8 It may well be that when General Talic has done his appreciation,
9 he realizes Combat Group 2 has to conduct this operation, but there are
10 problems that require some assistance from the MUP or from the Posavina
11 Brigade. And so what he's -- but it could also be that the main player
12 in this is the East Bosnian Corps, but what he has done, he has -- he has
13 given instructions to Combat Group 2 and he has clearly appreciated that
14 there is a co-ordination requirement component involving these other
15 actors that needs to be resolved and that's what he's instructing Combat
16 Group 2 to do.
17 Q. Mr. Brown, I'm asking about the principle of command and control
18 in the army, and you are talking to me about specific operations. I'm
19 taking these examples in order to show what it was like in the real world
20 and in 1992 at that. But basically I'm talking about the principle
21 involved. Please focus, please respond to those questions. I'm talking
22 about the principle. In order for two units that have different commands
23 to take part in co-ordinated action, a superior command has to give them
24 an order for this co-ordinated action to both units involved and to set
25 their objective. You go there together, don't you? Is that right or is
1 that not right?
2 A. I don't believe that is always the case.
3 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Let us have a look at 5.11 of this
4 document as well.
5 Q. We are still dealing with paragraph 5 where the late
6 General Talic is setting the tasks for subordinated units. And now 5.11
7 pertains to the Banja Luka Light Brigade's group. You do remember saying
8 that Mr. Talic -- I think that was your position, that he asked the Main
9 Staff to establish this command of this group of the Banja Luka Light
10 Brigade's group that was under the 1st Krajina Corps; right.
11 A. That's right, yes.
12 Q. Now, the light brigades, there's no dispute there, they are under
13 the Krajina Corps; that is to say, General Talic commands them and now is
14 giving them a task. And this is what he says:
15 "In co-ordination with the MUP forces and the 1st Krajina Corps
16 units in the garrison, establish complete control" and so on and so
18 Now, this is what I'm putting to you: That these are all the
19 units that he is giving an order to, the light brigades, the MUP forces,
20 and the units of the 1st Krajina Corps and the garrison, that all of
21 these units are subordinated to him and he is issuing them an order for
22 co-ordinated action?
23 A. I wouldn't agree with you, sir. He is ordering the Banja Luka
24 Light Brigade's group to co-ordinate with the MUP and other units in the
25 garrison to establish control.
1 Q. All right.
2 A. He is not ordering the MUP. He is ordering the Banja Luka group
3 of light brigades to co-ordinate with the MUP.
4 Q. All right. Tell me then who is it that issues orders to the MUP
5 forces to carry out this task, this very same task? Who is ordering the
6 MUP forces to carry out this very same task with the light brigade's
7 group and the units of the 1st Krajina Corps and the garrison, who is it?
8 A. Well, I'm not an expert on the MUP and the chain of command of
9 the MUP so I'm not sure, but I would --
10 Q. Very well, thank you. I mean, Mr. Brown, I put a question to you
11 and if you are say together me that you are not an expert and that you
12 cannot respond to that question, there's no need for us to waste any
14 A. I would say that there probably had to be some co-ordination
15 meeting with the senior MUP in Banja Luka, but I don't know the
16 structures or how that would function.
17 Q. I know, but even if there were this kind of co-ordination, which
18 did not exist, somebody has to issue the order for that MUP organisation
19 to carry out this task, that Talic is ordering his own units to carry
20 out, isn't that right? It has to be a higher command, a superior
21 command, do you agree with that?
22 A. Yes, a higher police command, I would imagine.
23 Q. And this higher police command, who is it issuing orders to them,
24 the General Staff?
25 A. I would imagine there is a recognised chain of command in the MUP
1 in the same way there was in a military, but I'm not an expert in that.
2 Q. I understand that, sir. But now I'm asking you a question based
3 on fundamental logic. If somebody issued an order to Mr. Talic to carry
4 out this task, and then in order to carry out the order that he was given
5 he is issuing an order to his own subordinate units; right?
6 A. Yes, he is issuing an instruction here to [Overlapping
7 speakers] ... Brigade.
8 Q. You agree with that, so if that is on the left-hand side, if I
9 can put it that way, the army is on the left-hand side and on the
10 right-hand side it's the police, the MUP, and there had to be some kind
11 of a higher MUP command telling the lower MUP command that this task
12 should be carried out. That's your position right?
13 A. Not necessarily. What might have happened here is that
14 General Talic, in order to, whatever he is doing for the Banja Luka --
15 secure Banja Luka for all intents and purposes, in his assessment when he
16 looks at that, he realises that the Banja Luka group of light brigades
17 needs to do certain things and he realises he hasn't got the manpower or
18 there are legal issues or it makes sense to have the police engaged in
19 that, there might have been a planning meeting at the Banja Luka level to
20 say can you assist in this, or we require your support in this, or we are
21 going to be conducting an operation here in this particular area at this
22 particular time, you need to be aware of this, is there anything that you
23 need to do in that regard, or can we have your support in that. And it
24 may well be that that planning meeting is enough, or it may well be that
25 the MUP decide that no we have to have instructions from the senior
1 level, or it may well be that this is a joint operation well known to the
2 police and there is a similar type of instruction going on. I don't
3 know. But what I do know is that General Talic clearly has identified a
4 function and a role for the Banja Luka light brigades which in his
5 assessment necessitates co-ordination with the police. How that
6 co-ordination occurred, what requests may have been made, and the chain
7 of command from the MUP is out with my expertise.
8 Q. I fully agree, Mr. Brown, however, by the very logic of things
9 somebody has to have authority over somebody else just as Talic has
10 authority over his subordinate units in order to instruct them to carry
11 out a particular task. The way you are interpreting things to us seems
12 to show that Mr. Talic is establishing that he does not have enough
13 soldiers, that he needs MUP support, and that then he goes somewhere and
14 says please, give me a number of policemen so that we can carry out this
15 task. And then somebody from the MUP says, no, I don't want to do that,
16 and then that task is not carried out, although the task was issued by
17 the supreme commander President Karadzic and it was then repeated by the
18 Chief of the General Staff Ratko Mladic. So what do you think, if that
19 were the situation, what would happen to General Talic? General Talic
20 would not carry out the task that he was assigned and what happens then?
21 He says to Ratko Mladic, sorry, Ratko, I could not carry out this task
22 because these guys from the MUP said we don't want to. Do you seriously
23 believe that that is the way things work in war time and would there be
24 any logic for things to function that way?
25 A. I'm not quite sure of your question. All I can say is that from
1 paragraph 5.11, General Talic is instructing his subordinate formations
2 to establish complete control in the wider area of Banja Luka and in
3 assessing that task and giving that task the brigade, he has set a role
4 to co-ordinate with MUP forces. And it may well be that that -- I would
5 imagine the MUP are establishing check-points and doing functions in
6 Banja Luka and he realises that that needs to be co-ordinated with the
7 police. That's my reading of this section. How that co-ordination
8 happened, what chains of command the police have is really not something
9 I can comment on.
10 Q. Okay. Now we are going to try to explain that as well. I would
11 like to move for this document to be admitted, 1D24126?
12 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
13 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit 1D405, Your Honours.
14 THE WITNESS: Are we finished with this, sir?
15 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes.
16 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
17 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. I mean, the problem is, Mr. Brown, that part of your paper that
19 the Prosecution is trying to get admitted has to do with co-operation, it
20 is entitled co-operation between the army and the police. And what is
21 suggested there is that there was a certain way in which this
22 co-operation was carried out. Although you are telling me that that was
23 not part of your expertise, due to the reasons that I've just mentioned,
24 namely this is included in your expert opinion that the Prosecution
25 wishes to have admitted into evidence here, I have to set some things
1 straight here with you irrespective of your expertise. After all, I
2 think it was your duty to have a look at this documentation before you
3 wrote this up or rather while you were writing it?
4 MS. KORNER: It's a speech and its an improper speech. The
5 witness is here to answer questions, his expertise he has always said is
6 in the military side and the documents that relate to that. The purpose
7 of cross-examination is to ask questions, not to make speeches like that.
8 JUDGE HALL: Indeed, I note, Mr. Zecevic has continued to lapse
9 into speeches, but we'll move on.
10 MR. ZECEVIC: Okay, I just wanted to give an explanation before
11 the next set of document is given to -- is shown to the witness. In all
12 fairness to the witness, that was the only purpose I tried to explain why
13 I'm going to show him these documents.
14 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Zecevic, are you moving on to something else
15 and thus leaving the issue of co-operation?
16 MR. ZECEVIC: No, no, not at all, Your Honours.
17 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thanks.
18 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be shown
19 1D46. That is tab 154.
20 Q. Sir, this is an order of the Ministry of the Interior.
21 Unfortunately --
22 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, in order to be fair to the witness, I
23 don't know if -- I assume that the witness has not seen a couple of the
24 documents which I need to present to him. And I suggest the following:
25 That we adjourn at this point, that I make the photocopy of the English
1 versions of these documents, provide the witness that he can consult them
2 during the break, and then when we return we can continue. That is my
3 suggestion if it pleases the Court.
4 JUDGE HALL: Yes, that seems eminently sensible. I suppose we
5 should take our half-hour break.
6 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes, thank you very much, Your Honour.
7 JUDGE HALL: Yes.
8 [The witness stands down]
9 --- Recess taken at 10.17 a.m.
10 --- On resuming at 11.23 a.m.
11 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, we discussed over the break the length
12 of time that Mr. Brown is likely to be, and it seems to all of us that he
13 is still going to be here on Friday morning at the rate we are going. I
14 just wonder if somebody perhaps could mention it to him of Your Honours,
15 so that if he has made any plans to get away, he may have to forget about
17 JUDGE HALL: Thank you.
18 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, just one intervention in the
19 transcript at page 25 line 2, I offered the document, it's a 1D405 but
20 the identification number I think was recorded wrong. It's a document
21 1D049216. And that is the document 1D405.
22 [The witness takes the stand]
23 JUDGE HALL: Before Mr. Zecevic continues, two matters.
24 Notwithstanding the late start for this session, for the usual reasons we
25 would have to take a break before we rise for the day and after
1 discussions with the Court Officer, we'll take that break at 12.30.
2 The second thing, Mr. Brown, counsel, plural, have asked me to
3 alert you that their sense of the progress of your cross-examination,
4 continued cross-examination, re-examination, means that your testimony
5 is -- will certainly extend into Friday. So that such arrangements as
6 you would have made, you could bear that in mind. Thank you.
7 Yes, Mr. Zecevic.
8 THE WITNESS: Sorry, Your Honour, is it likely to finish on
9 Friday or is it likely to extend after that? I only say because I have
10 some commitments which I would like to sort of honour this weekend.
11 JUDGE HALL: My impression from what counsel -- of what counsel
12 said is that it will finish on Friday, but could I have counsel
13 confirmation on that?
14 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, I will endeavour to finish today, but
15 I might really have a little bit of time tomorrow, and it is my
16 assessment that knowing what we discussed between us, I believe that it
17 is very likely that the witness -- Mr. Brown will finish on Friday, that
18 is only from the point of the counsels. Of course, if the Trial Chamber
19 has the questions, that's a different matter, of course.
20 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
21 JUDGE HALL: And I'm reminded that we have a firm fixture for
22 videolink on Monday. So it appears, Mr. Brown, that every effort will be
23 made to ensure that your testimony is completed by Friday. Thank you.
24 THE WITNESS: I appreciate that.
25 JUDGE HALL: Yes, Mr. Zecevic.
1 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you.
2 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Brown, in order to put everything into the
3 right context could you be shown again 1D004042; that is, the Law on
4 Total National Defence that we looked at yesterday. We commented on it,
6 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] It's Article 104 that I would like
7 to see. I'm not sure what page that is in e-court. I'll try. It's page
8 18 and 67. It's 18 in Serbian and 67 in English.
9 Q. Mr. Brown, Article 104 says in paragraph 2:
10 "During its engagement for combat activities in the armed forces,
11 the police shall be under the command of the authorised officer in charge
12 of the combat activity."
13 And in paragraph 1, it says that:
14 "The police may also be used for carrying out combat activities
15 for the armed forces in accordance with the law."
16 Remember that we looked at it yesterday and commented upon it?
17 A. Yes, that's what it says in the Law of All People's Defence.
18 Q. That is the law that was in force at the time in the territory of
19 Republika Srpska; right?
20 A. I'm not a legal expert, but I don't believe that was. The RS
21 began to implement and issue their own instructions and laws, so I'm not
22 sure that 1982 Law on All People's Defence was still functioning in
23 relation to Republika Srpska or Bosnia at that time but again I defer to
24 a constitutional legal expert, but in my view I don't think this law was,
25 certainly de facto, did not seem to be in operation.
1 Q. Sir, there is the constitution of Republika Srpska and the Law on
2 the Implementation of the Constitution. It's a constitutional law on the
3 implementation of the constitution; however, let's not comment upon that
4 now because this goes beyond your expertise. It is contained in the
5 documents that make up our legal library.
6 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Could the witness now be shown
7 1D146, tab 154. 1D46, I apologise. That's the document that we had a
8 few moments ago.
9 Q. Sir, let me ask you something before we move on to this document.
10 It is a fact, isn't it, that when we looked at those directives of the
11 Main Staff that were signed by General Ratko Mladic, these directives
12 were sent only to army units; right?
13 A. I would have to check the distribution but I think they did only
14 go to the corps. I don't know if they also went to the Presidency or
15 other people above him, but in terms of going down I think it was only to
16 the corps headquarters.
17 Q. I don't want us to waste time now so I'm not going to show you
18 these documents.
19 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] However, for the purposes of the
20 transcript, it is P1780 and P -- just a moment, please, P1794. In both
21 documents, or rather it is obvious on the basis of both documents that
22 this was only sent to the units of the Army of Republika Srpska.
23 Q. Sir, another general question before I move on to the original
24 question that I wanted to put. You know that in Republika Srpska the
25 supreme commander was the president, Mr. Karadzic, and that according to
1 the Law on the Army, he was the only one who had the right of command and
2 that he could transfer that right to the Chief of the Main Staff,
3 General Ratko Mladic, you do know that, don't you?
4 A. I am aware of the Law of the Army. I would like to refresh
5 myself if that's exactly the case, but in general I think that's probably
6 true, whether it's the president of the Presidency or whether it's the
7 president, I am not sure I would have to refresh myself, but clearly the
8 president of the Presidency had that function.
9 Q. All right. Sir, in this document, paragraph 7, that's a document
10 of the ministry dated the 15th of May, 1992. I don't know whether you've
11 seen it before, however, on page 2 in paragraph 7, subparagraph 3, it
13 "While participating in combat operations, the units of the
14 ministry shall be subordinated to the command of the armed forces," which
15 is in accordance with the Law on Total National Defence which we saw a
16 few moments ago; right?
17 A. Well, not exactly. The language is slightly different. I think
18 in the setting aside the issue of whether the Law on All People's Defence
19 was relevant -- in 1982 was relevant at this time, I think Article 104
20 says they may be subordinate or they may be involved in combat
21 operations. Here this -- sorry.
22 Q. Yes, but when they are carrying out combat operations they are
23 subordinated to the officer in charge, that is what the law says; right?
24 A. That's what 104 says, yes.
25 Q. Very well. So this order simply copied the text of the law in
1 this part; right?
2 A. I can't say whether they copied it or whether they used it as a
3 guide or whether it was something different.
4 Q. I accept that. Sir, during the direct examination you looked at
5 P1789, that is Prosecution tab 24. Number 24. That is an order of the
6 command to the 1st Krajina Corps dated the 19th of June, 1992. It is
7 footnote 357 in your expert opinion, and you analysed this briefly with
8 Ms. Korner, if I remember correctly. Is that right?
9 A. Yes, I think Ms. Korner mentioned in reference this document.
10 Q. Sir, this is what this order says. Use of police in armed combat
11 operations, and then it says:
13 "In the zone of responsibility of the 1st Krajina Corps, there
14 are different ways in which the police can be used in armed combat
15 operations in order to overcome the problems involved. I hereby issue
16 the following order."
17 And then Mr. Talic says in paragraph 1 what the general tasks are
18 that the police is carrying out in accordance with the Law on the
19 Interior. Do you agree with what I've read out so far?
20 A. The document seems to reflect that, yes.
21 Q. However, in paragraph 2 as opposed to the interpretation that was
22 given during your direct examination, Mr. Talic says:
23 "The police may be used in direct combat operations on the front
24 only exceptionally when it is necessary to hold and strengthen the front
25 line until the arrival of military units."
1 And then paragraph 3:
2 "In other cases," I emphasise that part, "In other cases it is
3 necessary to inform the chief of the Security Services Centre and receive
4 his approval."
5 Sir, this document seems to indicate the following: First of
6 all, in the preamble it says that there are different ways in which the
7 police can be used and because of this variety of ways in which the
8 police can be used, Mr. Talic is issuing this order. Do you agree with
9 me up to this point?
10 A. That's what he has written here, yes.
11 Q. In paragraphs 2 and 3 in essence Mr. Talic says: For direct
12 combat operations, the police may be used without informing MUP organs
13 and without receiving their approval if that is what the situation is at
14 the front line. In all other cases, however, it is necessary to inform
15 the MUP organs and to receive their approval; right?
16 A. That's what he has written in the document, yes, sir.
17 Q. So there's a clear distinction, isn't there, between a situation
18 when the military due to its own opinion for the needs that exist in the
19 front line may engage the police, and on the basis of this it seems that
20 Mr. Talic is saying that in that case it is not necessary to ask for
21 anyone's approval or to provide information to that effect to anyone;
22 whereas, in all other cases for carrying out planned operations, that is,
23 one has to provide information to that effect to the ministry and to ask
24 for their approval. Isn't that right?
25 A. Yes, I would read this as bearing in mind the context of the
1 time, and this comes in the middle of the corridor operation, but this is
2 relating to front line, I think I maybe have mentioned this in direct,
3 front line combat tasks, for example, that were occurring in the corps at
4 that time in the corridor, and that in exceptional circumstances,
5 presumably he means here if there is a weakness in the front line or if
6 there's a counter-attack by the enemy formation, that in exceptional
7 circumstances police can be used, but there are limitations and that they
8 are to hold and strengthen the front prior to the arrival of military
9 units. So in essence it's to plug a front line if there is a problem.
10 And in other cases, informing chief of CSB -- an approval by the CSB is
11 required, presumably reflecting some of the documents and the situation
12 as seem to have been in late May when there are, I think, General Talic
13 made a passing instruction that police had -- you know, that authority
14 had to be sought from the CSB.
15 So I read this document in the context of what was happening in
16 the corridor and in the context that if the front is weak or there is a
17 problem there, that police in exceptional circumstances can be used but
18 they are to be used in essence in a limited way until the arrival of
19 military formations.
20 Q. Sir, Mr. Brown, this document is dated the 19th of June, but it
21 does not refer to the corridor at all, you can see that from the document
22 itself. On the other hand, the front line does not exist only at the
23 corridor, right? There is a front line on the western side of the
24 Krajina, Skender Vakuf, Kljuic, Kotor Varos, isn't that right?
25 A. Yes, I mean the main -- the main combat, if you like, front that
1 Talic was concerned about at this time was especially the corridor, and I
2 accept you are right there was a front line with central Bosnia which
3 there was, if you like, combat activities against Croatian forces in
4 central Bosnia so that was an area that he was concerned with as well.
5 Q. However, less than 12 days after this document, on the 1st of
6 June, 1992, the very same General Talic and the same command of the
7 Krajina Corps issue a new order, 1D049057. In your report, the footnote
8 is 358 and the Defence tab is number 14.
9 A. Can you check the tab again sir because I don't have that as
10 number 13.
11 Q. Defence tab 14, Defence, not the Prosecution. I think that this
12 document should be included in the documents you received during the
13 break that had been photocopied for you.
14 A. That's right, I think it is here.
15 Q. Sir, this document is also one of the documents that you
16 commented with Ms. Korner. On page 2, item 11, the third paragraph from
17 the bottom in Serbian, I think that is the next page in English. It
19 "As determined by in this order the exclusive right to command
20 and employee units rest with the zone commander."
21 And further on:
22 "In the conduct of combat activities, all," and I emphasise, "all
23 police forces shall be placed under the command of the zone commander who
24 shall decide how they are used."
25 Sir, in your report, 2.50, page 82, you yourself say that this
1 order of the 1st of July is obviously contrary to the instruction of the
2 19th of June, 1992, the document we've just looked at; is that right.
3 A. Well, the document on its own with that instruction, I think I
4 highlight it in the report, seems to be a change, it's not necessarily
5 contrary, I guess, but it seems to indicate at least at that time and in
6 this instruction a change from one that requires the approval of the CSB
7 and a procedure by which police are to -- can be used in combat
8 operations. Why this came about, I do not know. I do not know if there
9 was some agreement that had been reached. I don't know what the
10 discussions were prior to this. I can't say. But as I think I highlight
11 in the reports, it's the only document actually I saw in the Krajina
12 Corps that referenced this.
13 Q. That's what you said on page 18732. You said that that was the
14 only document that you saw with such clear formulation. You said
15 something to that effect. However, may I give you another suggestion in
16 this enumeration of things that gave rise to this document. You will
17 agree that there is also a possibility that this document is the first in
18 a series of documents that we are going to look at which actually
19 reflects the legal situation which army had not respected up to that
20 point, or maybe they hadn't respected it in full?
21 A. Well, I'm not a legal expert but I think I can say that prior to
22 this this was not what was happening. Prior to this instruction, I did
23 not see that zone commanders were -- had police units placed under their
24 command, they were in essence deciding how they were going to be used. I
25 didn't see that in any of the mobilisation instructions or establishment
1 instructions being required by General Talic. I didn't see that in any
2 of the combat reports that that was happening, and I didn't see that in
3 things like directive that had common relation to the corridor. So
4 certainly prior to the 1st of July, I did not see that happening. I have
5 to say --
6 Q. All right.
7 A. -- that post the 1st of July I didn't see it happening either.
8 Q. All right. We are going to take a look at it now.
9 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] I would like this document to be
10 admitted into evidence.
11 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
12 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit 1D406, Your Honours.
13 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] 1D049057, tab 14, footnote number
14 358 in the expert report.
15 Q. Sir, I'm going to show you document 1D99. That is the order by
16 the supreme commander that bears the same date, 1st of July. Could the
17 usher please assist you, I think that this is one of the documents that
18 we had added to our list subsequently and it may have not been
19 photocopied for you. It's just a single page. I think that it won't be
20 a problem for you to take a look at it now. That's 1D99.
21 Here you can see that the president of the Presidency,
22 Mr. Karadzic, on the 1st of July, 1992, says:
23 "On the basis of my constitutional powers as the supreme public
24 commander of the armed forces of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and
25 Herzegovina and on behalf of the Presidency of the SR Bosnia and
1 Herzegovina, I hereby issue the following order," and what he is ordering
2 is that two platoons of police forces should be resubordinated to a
3 military unit. Do you see this?
4 MS. KORNER: Special Police. Sorry, Your Honour, I'm reading
5 Special Police, is that right?
6 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Special Police is also part of the
7 police. It's a brigade within the Ministry of the Interior. I don't
8 think that there is a need to burden the witness with those details right
9 now. The details that he doesn't know enough about, but that's certainly
10 not in dispute.
11 THE WITNESS: That's what the document says, so yes.
12 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. All right. Now I'm going to show you the following document,
14 1D100. That's an intervention or rather a memo sent by the minister
15 about this order given by the supreme commander. Tab 145.
16 A. Is that one within the binder that was given me at the break,
18 Q. [In English] That is correct, yes. [Interpretation] That's a
19 document by the minister dated the 6th of July, 1992.
20 A. I'm not sure I have that one, sir.
21 Q. I'm sure that the copies have been given to you, but you can take
22 a look at it on the screen in front of you. It's just a single page. In
23 this document which refers to the previous document - that is the order
24 by the supreme commander about the resubordination, specifically two
25 platoons from the Special Police brigade of the Serbian MUP - the
1 minister asks and reports that the order had been executed in accordance
2 with the law and the constitution, that they had been resubordinated to
3 the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, however, because of the need for them to
4 carry out their tasks in accordance with the Law on the Interior, he
5 requests that these policemen should be returned in order to perform
6 their normal duties. Do you see that?
7 A. Yes, I think he clearly feels a need to come back to perform
8 other duty and the tasks should be given to the army, I believe, is that
9 my reading of the document? I think that seems to happen.
10 Q. Exactly. Sir, the next document is 1D76 dated 19th of July.
11 MS. KORNER: Tab?
12 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Tab 146.
13 Q. And that's a memo sent from MUP and signed by Mr. Mico Stanisic.
14 And here it says that during the first meeting of the MUP collegium held
15 on the 11th of July, 1992, it was concluded that briefings should be
16 prepared for a meeting with army representatives. And then further on
17 under (b) it says that:
18 "Data information regarding police involvement in those combat
19 actions where their involvement was not necessary should be gathered."
20 And then it says it should include the number of policemen
21 involved in combat actions break down by month, April to July, and for
22 the sake of comparison, the number of policemen who continue to work at
23 their regular jobs within the domain of the MUP during the same time.
24 Sir, this document shows us that on the 11th of July on the first
25 collegium of the MUP of Republika Srpska meeting of their executives, a
1 problem arose related to the involvement of the police with the military
2 and their inability -- the inability of the police because of the lack of
3 manpower to perform the normal duties defined by law. And that is why
4 they request first, to solve the situation, to clear it with the army,
5 and second, they want to have data that they could use in support of
6 their request. Do you agree with that?
7 A. Well, clearly the issue of the amount of time that the police are
8 spending in combat operations would seem to be a concern there, and what
9 they want to do is to find out facts on the ground about what is the
10 case; how many policemen were involved and how many were not while doing
11 presumably regular police jobs.
12 Q. All right. I'm aware that you didn't see these documents in
13 sufficient quantities and that is the reason that I cannot continue with
14 my questioning about this.
15 A. Well, this is the first time I've seen the document, so I've only
16 just had a brief overview of them.
17 Q. That's why I'm going to show you something else in order to
18 illustrate that the situation which was very problematic and caused
19 concern to the MUP of Republika Srpska, that this situation continued.
20 I'm going to show you P1094, that's footnote 360. That's a document that
21 you looked at before. This is a document coming from the CSB in Banja
22 Luka signed by Mr. Zupljanin. Tab 52.
23 Okay. I think I also got it on the ... This document also
24 speaks about the resubordination of the organs and members of the MUP to
25 the army in its last paragraph, and they relate the wording of the law
1 and the contents of the order of the 15th of May, which we looked at,
2 saying that the police members may be engaged in combat activities
3 according to the principle of resubordination to the superior army
4 command; is that right?
5 A. Yes, and that they can't be used in territories outside their own
7 Q. Sir, it is obvious that there isn't a unity of opinion between
8 the police and the military about the number of the members of the MUP
9 that had been resubordinated to the army during that period, which is for
10 the most of 1992. So notwithstanding the law and the orders that we have
11 examined, this problem was obviously an acute one.
12 In order to illustrate that, I'm going to show you P427, item 8.
13 It's tab number 7. That's a document that you received during the break.
14 And that is information of the Ministry of the Interior dated 17th July,
15 1992. It was addressed to the president of the Presidency and the prime
16 minister. At the very beginning, page 3 of this document, I think this
17 is the previous page in English, you can see the following in the second
18 paragraph in Serbian beginning with the words "first of all." Excuse me,
19 I can't find it in English. The page that I need has number 0324-6857.
20 That's the corresponding page to our Serbian page.
21 Page 2, second paragraph from the bottom they tell me. Yes, I
22 found it, yes. Here the ministry points out to the supreme commander and
23 the prime minister that there is a problem, and they say this has mostly
24 to do with the fact that the police are still on the first combat lines,
25 for instance 100 per cent in Herzegovina, over 70 per cent in the Doboj
1 region, et cetera, although this was justified at the beginning, and that
2 there had been some talks of them being included into the military police
3 during the combat activities.
4 MS. KORNER: I am sorry, could you read the whole paragraph
5 there, please.
6 MR. ZECEVIC: Ms. Korner, I'm reading the whole paragraph in
8 MS. KORNER: Well, it's completely -- it's coming out differently
9 in English from what's on the screen.
10 MR. ZECEVIC: I am really sorry. [Interpretation] One of the
11 participants in the debate described this graphically questioning the
12 legitimacy of the police because "the army is in the streets controlling
13 traffic, and police are in the trenches."
14 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, there is a problem here because
15 there's quite a significant part in the English translation which we are
16 all looking at which has not come out in the translation from what
17 Mr. Zecevic read out. After the words: "This was justified in the
18 beginning, or that the army keeps civilian police within its ranks after
19 their agreed engagement" is how the translation is in English and has not
20 been translated from what Mr. Zecevic read out, which is why I asked him
21 to read the whole paragraph. Now, whether that's because the translators
22 couldn't keep up with the speed, I don't know.
23 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] I'm going to read it again.
24 MS. KORNER: Slowly.
25 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. "This has mostly to do with the fact that the police are still on
2 the first combat lines, 100 per cent in Herzegovina, over 70 per cent in
3 the Doboj region, although this was justified at the beginning, or that
4 the army keeps civilian police within its ranks after their agreed
5 engagement in combat activities as part of military police units: All
6 this affects the discharge of their regular duties and tasks."
7 And I think that the rest was interpreted properly.
8 Sir, this shows another problem or rather the identical problem
9 that the police is trying to suggest to the supreme commander and the
10 prime minister, and that is that because of the engagement of the police
11 forces on front lines, they are unable to carry out their normal duties
12 defined by the law; is that right?
13 A. Well, it would seem to be a problem that once the police had
14 agreed to dispatch policemen to combat zones, that the army was keeping
15 them there and that in some areas that this was a problem, so I agree,
16 certainly, this looks like an issue that they are concerned with.
17 Q. In essence, it means that there is no agreement because if there
18 is an agreement -- or maybe that there is an agreement which is not being
20 A. Yes, it would seem that there clearly has been the agreement that
21 the process should be that there's a co-ordination, there's an agreement
22 for how many need to go, and presumably for how long, and that in some
23 cases, I mean, I can't talk about Herzegovina, I don't know that area at
24 all, but Doboj I know was a big conflict zone, became more prevalent in
25 the corridor operations, and that in that area the military are not, at
1 least at face value, not honouring that agreement there.
2 Q. I'm going to show you a concrete example. Now that you mentioned
3 the area of Doboj, the Doboj municipality, it is also mentioned in this
5 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Can we show 1D263 to the witness.
6 It's tab 82.
7 Q. This is a document written by the chief of the centre and it is
8 addressed to the operations group command of the Serbian Army. Single
9 page. It's just one page. You see that it is dated 2nd of October,
10 1992, and in the document, the chief of the centre informs that due to
11 the security situation in the area of the Serbian municipalities of
12 Doboj, Derventa, and Modrica, they are forced to withdraw the police from
13 the front line on the 4th of October, 1992. Then he gives the reasoning.
14 He says that he hopes that the Serbian Army operations group command will
15 correctly understand the reasons because of which he is forced to
16 withdraw the police from the battle-field. Do you see that?
17 A. Yes, I do, sir.
18 Q. So this is perfectly in line with the document that we just
19 looked at which said that 70 per cent of the police in the Doboj region
20 is engaged on the battle-field. It seems that it was precisely the
21 security situation within the territory that made the police to withdraw
22 their members from the battle-field; is that so?
23 A. Well, the 70 per cent bit I'm not sure you can necessarily draw,
24 because I think that instruction is some months before so this is a
25 little bit later, but clearly they -- there are these other issues that
1 they want to -- appear to want to deal with and so they want to withdraw
2 their police. Presumably these are municipalities that were successfully
3 taken in operation corridor, Derventa, Modrica, and the likes.
4 Q. Can you tell me this, we commented somewhat on this yesterday,
5 and we said that Colonel Slavko Lisica was the commander of the
6 operations group of the Serbian Army. Do you remember that?
7 A. Yes, I forget if it was Tactical Group 1 or 3, but he was
8 tactical group commander in that area.
9 Q. Just as an example, I'm going to show to you document 1D264 --
10 JUDGE DELVOIE: Before we leave this document, I would like to
11 ask a question.
12 Mr. Brown, if this -- in this instance there would have been a
13 formal resubordination decision as we saw a few documents ago coming from
14 the highest echelons of the republic, could then the police - and here
15 it's signed for the chief of the centre - unilaterally withdraw the
16 resubordinated units from the army? Was it in his power to do so if
17 there was a formal resubordination decision?
18 THE WITNESS: From my experience much of that would depend on the
19 agreement that was made prior to the operation being conducted. I don't
20 doubt that the police could in certain circumstances be subordinated to
21 military formations. I didn't see much of it. Most of it was in
22 relation to co-operation and on-going operations where they would seem to
23 play their part. But a lot of it would be dependent on what was agreed
24 prior to the inclusion of these police in the military operations and
25 that would undoubtedly involve agreement with superior commands in both.
1 So I can't tell you whether for this particular operation the police that
2 were involved in the tactical group that was in Doboj, which presumably
3 was related to on-going operations in expanding the corridor and control
4 of territory in that area, I can't tell you from this document whether
5 the police were allowed to unilaterally withdraw. It may, for example,
6 have been that the agreement to involve the police, setting aside what
7 they were going to do specifically, but the agreement had a time-period
8 that they were to be subordinated for a period, and at the end of that
9 period they were to withdraw, and if the military kept them, the
10 commander might have been well within his rights to remove them. So much
11 depends on what the agreement was and that's what happens in planning
12 meetings and co-ordination meetings.
13 JUDGE DELVOIE: So what you are saying is that resubordination
14 decisions, as they can follow from the law, are made on the basis of
15 agreements between the police and the military?
16 THE WITNESS: I would expect they would be. It might be
17 different if it was related to military formations, because clearly
18 they're -- the Law on the Army, unity of command, but even in relation
19 to, from my experience, where other army units are resubordinated, they
20 usually are agreed periods of time, roles and responsibilities, some
21 issues don't necessarily, you know, for example, disciplinary issues may
22 not apply. But in relation to police, I would imagine there is a
23 planning component and there's an agreement in relation to what these
24 police will do and how long they will be there for.
25 JUDGE DELVOIE: And agreed by whom?
1 THE WITNESS: Agreed by the -- through the police chain and
2 through the police command and agreed through the military chain.
3 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
4 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. We are now going to look at document 1D264, which is in fact a
6 response to the letter that we have just seen. It was sent by the
7 commander, Colonel Lisica, and in which there's a detailed explanation of
8 the relationship between the chief of the public security centre and the
9 commander of the Doboj tactical group. We've seen that the previous
10 document was dated the 2nd October, and this one is dated the 3rd
11 October. And it is entitled "Withdrawing of Police Force from Combat
12 Operations - Response" sent to Doboj CSB, and the commander, Colonel
13 Lisica, says as follows:
14 "I have understood your proposal and I underline your proposal
15 regarding the withdrawal of police forces from combat operations."
16 And then he goes on to say two or three sentences down:
17 "I do not authorise the withdrawal of the police forces."
18 So, sir, it is obvious who the superior commanding officer is in
19 this situation, isn't it?
20 A. Well, he clearly doesn't believe that they should be withdrawn
21 and he authorises it in his opinion they shouldn't be withdrawn. He
22 doesn't order in this respect or make it clear that these police are to
23 be ordered to stay, but clearly he believes that they shouldn't and he
24 has a disagreement between the two and he authorises that they shouldn't
25 be, so they are presumably within his unit and clearly there's a tension
1 between the two.
2 Q. Sir, we are both reading from the same document. How explicit
3 should one be in an order issued by a superior officer if he says quite
4 clearly and unequivocally I do not authorise the withdrawal of the
5 police? He is writing to the CSB Doboj chief and says, I have considered
6 your proposal and I do not allow and I do not authorise. Sir, it is
7 quite clear that Colonel Lisica in this situation is a direct superior
8 officer, and it's up to him whether the police would be pulled out of
9 combat operations or not; is that correct?
10 A. Well, he clearly believes he has that authority, yes.
11 Q. Thank you.
12 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I move that both
13 this document 1D263 and 264 have the designation MFI removed from them.
14 MS. KORNER: Your Honours may not recall, but these two documents
15 were the subject of some considerable discussion a very long time ago.
16 The page numbers go from in the transcript 9949 through to 53 because
17 it's evident, and this was the discussion that was raised, that these
18 documents which have not been seen by the OTP before, come from some kind
19 of a bound book. You may -- I think the discussion may come back to you
20 when you look at the bottom of -- we need the -- yeah. And
21 Mr. Demirdjian who was dealing with this dealt with -- we said we
22 objected to this until we knew where these documents came from and it was
23 not sufficient to assert that it was given to them, to the Defence by
24 this organisation for co-operation in war crimes in Banja Luka.
25 Your Honours will recall, for example, when Mr. Krgovic tried to
1 produce these maps and it turned out they were documents that had been
2 produced at a later stage. Until such time as the Defence give us
3 chapter and verse as to where these documents actually were obtained from
4 by this centre which all they have to do was ask and get the response, we
5 object to their admission in evidence.
6 Furthermore, this witness cannot comment other than to say that
7 he has read, as Mr. Zecevic put it, what he read, he can give no further
8 useful or indeed relevant evidence. What's happened now is that both
9 Mr. Zecevic and the witness have been commenting on what they see. So,
10 as I say, at this stage we still object.
11 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, Mr. Brown is an OTP
12 expert witness, I do agree that his area of expertise are military
13 issues; however, his expert report as I said many times deals with the
14 problems of co-operation between the military and the police. We heard
15 that many times and he commented on this both during examination-in-chief
16 and cross-examination. Therefore, I think it is completely appropriate
17 to have certain documents that relate to these specific issues to be
18 tendered through this witness.
19 Now, as for what Ms. Korner is saying, the fact is that the OTP
20 objected to the admission of these documents at one point in time. After
21 that, we furnished the OTP with a document of the Ministry of the
22 Interior of Republika Srpska stemming from the office of the minister.
23 It's a document dated 16th of October, 2007. It's a document produced by
24 the government of Republika Srpska, and the government organ which is
25 called the Republican Secretariat for Relations with the International
1 Criminal Tribunal in The Hague for Investigation of War Crimes. So we
2 are talking about a government secretariat which is an integral part of
3 the government of Republika Srpska.
4 In this document they enumerate all the documents that they
5 provided and that includes 1D263 and 264 and they feature under 77 and 78
6 in their letter. What Ms. Korner is suggesting that we request the
7 Government of Republika Srpska to supply us with information as to the
8 provenance of these documents and things of that nature. First of all,
9 we are not able to extract this kind of information from the Government
10 of Republika Srpska because we are simply a Defence team who is kindly
11 asking this secretariat to do them a favour, and the same applies to the
12 Committee for Co-operation with the ICTY in Belgrade, the republican
13 secretariat of Republika Srpska, and a whole plethora of similar organs
14 that exist in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. Therefore, first of all,
15 we are not capable of producing this, and, on the other hand, these
16 organs have no reason whatsoever to accommodate our request.
17 After all, I don't think this is our obligation at all. We
18 received this document from an official organ. If the OTP have an issue
19 with this, they should address it with this particular organ because the
20 OTP, I think, enjoys more authority that any Defence team and therefore I
21 move for this document to be tendered into evidence.
22 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, this is simply nonsense. It is not
23 good enough to say we got these documents and that is it, and that is all
24 we have to establish from this, whatever it is, the republican
25 secretariat for relations. We say if the Defence want a document entered
1 into evidence which is challenged, the onus is on the Defence to
2 establish that this document is genuine and where it comes from. And it
3 costs nothing, nor do we accept for one moment, that the Defence cannot
4 do what exactly what we did, which is ask them where does this document
5 come from, what is this page 36 of. That's all they had to ask, and they
6 didn't. And so we say until such time as they establish that this is a
7 genuine document which comes from a collection of some sort, it should
8 not be admitted into evidence.
9 JUDGE HALL: Did I understand, Mr. Zecevic, correctly, that since
10 this issue was first raised, that there has been provided a letter of
11 some sort from the agency which had the custody of this document.
12 MS. KORNER: Yes. It simply says: Here is a list of the
13 documents we sent you, full stop. And we have said over and over again
14 to Mr. Zecevic and Mr. Krgovic, that's not good enough. If we ask you
15 where does this document come from, it is not the slightest good telling
16 us that it comes from the centre for co-operation or from the liaison
17 officer between the Republika Srpska and the Tribunal. We actually mean
18 that you need to show us where does this -- and the Trial Chamber, what
19 is this page 36 of? We asked that at the time and we've never ever
20 received a response.
21 [Trial Chamber confers]
22 MS. KORNER: And Your Honour, can I make the points why I'm
23 taking this point, it's because it is -- it could be potentially
24 misleading to the Trial Chamber, particularly when you see something like
25 this. There's other correspondence surrounding this which may throw a
1 completely different light on matters.
2 MR. ZECEVIC: I don't think that was proper, Ms. Korner, because
3 if you have some documents, you should have notified us about it that
4 that would at least give any doubt that this is -- that these documents
5 are not authentic or whatever you are trying to suggest.
6 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, I'm not trying to suggest --
7 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Zecevic -- hold on a minute. One question
8 that needs to be put at least is to Mr. Zecevic, and the question is
9 this: Do you know what the title of the publication is in which this
10 document appears? I mean, if I see correctly on the page, this is page
11 138 of a book apparently, and the document is a photocopy from the book.
12 Do you know the title of the book?
13 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, I don't have any indication nor I can
14 say that this is a book. That might be as long as -- as far as I'm
15 concerned, that might be the archive of the 3rd Tactical Group in Doboj,
16 and maybe it was archived like this and given the pages. I really don't
17 know. Nor I believe that the -- that the republican secretariat will
18 ever indulge me in giving me any kind of information about that
19 because --
20 JUDGE HARHOFF: Did you try?
21 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, I am asking them for help to give me.
22 I don't have -- I don't have resources nor I have -- nor do I have the
23 investigators in the field. The only means how can I get some documents
24 is either from the disclosure of the Office of the Prosecutor or by
25 assistance of the relevant state, I underline, state organs in the
1 region, not Republika Srpska but all others. I don't have other means of
2 getting any documents. And if I am asking them to help me, I cannot go
3 over there and ask them, well, this is not good enough, I need you to
4 tell me who is the person who got this, give me the whole chain of
5 custody. I simply cannot do that, Your Honours. I am sorry.
6 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, the answer to your question is no,
7 Mr. Zecevic hasn't tried. But, I'm sorry, can I make it clear, I'm not
8 suggesting that Mr. Zecevic is deliberately trying to mislead the Court.
9 We don't have -- we haven't been shown what was the request by the
10 Defence which produced these documents, what is the wording of the
11 request, and that's the problem.
12 [Trial Chamber confers]
13 JUDGE HALL: We thank counsel for their assistance. It seems to
14 us that as far as the status of these documents are being moved from --
15 being marked for identification where the last objection was taken to
16 where they are now, that the Defence has not done what, in the Chamber's
17 view, they could have done and ought to have done to satisfy the Chamber
18 as to the authenticity of these documents, and one of the things that is
19 startling is, as Ms. Korner has pointed out, that we have it in the
20 original as page number which suggested is one of -- either out of a book
21 or one of a series.
22 So the letter to which Mr. Zecevic has referred, it may be a
23 start, but it does not in the Chamber's view advance the evidential
24 status of these documents beyond where we were when this was last
25 canvassed. So they remain marked for identification, and it is up to the
1 Defence to, if they wish to rely on these as matters of evidence, to do
2 some further investigation or to have those who had the custody of these
3 documents provide information as to the -- their origin, and the
4 publication or whatever the file is from which it comes. 138 may be a
5 folder in a file, we don't know what it is.
6 MR. ZECEVIC: I understand, Your Honours. We will send -- we
7 will sends the letter accordingly as instructed. And we will provide, if
8 we may, this of paragraph of the transcript in order to support our
10 JUDGE HALL: And we are passed the time when I indicated we would
11 have to take a break, so we would rise now and resume in 20 minutes.
12 [The witness stands down]
13 --- Recess taken at 12.39 p.m.
14 --- On resuming at 1.03 p.m.
15 [The witness takes the stand]
16 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Mr. Brown, in order to provide additional illustration of what we
18 were discussing earlier, I need to show you some other documents as well.
19 Therefore, could the witness please be shown 1D002315, which is tab 77,
20 i.e., one of the documents printed for you for your benefit during the
22 Sir, this is a letter sent by the Security Services Centre of
23 Doboj under number 295/1/92. I think it's dated 10th of September, 1992.
24 In this letter, the centre chief is conveying to the SJB an order issued
25 by the army operations group, and here he says:
1 "Enclosed please find an order of the Serbian Army Operations
2 Group, confidential number 1345.1/92 of 8 September 1992, for the purpose
3 of its implementation."
4 And he is quoting the order, and then he says:
5 "Start implementing the order immediately and continuously and
6 inform this centre of the measures taken and the results achieved by 17th
7 September 1992," signed the chief of the centre.
8 Now, sir, one can see from this document that the CSB is
9 conveying orders of army operations groups within the system of public
10 security stations that are subordinated to it; is that correct?
11 A. I don't read it that subordination necessarily is there at all.
12 I think the military order has clearly been received or and under what
13 measures, I don't know that occurred. I don't know what the military
14 order itself said, but the content would appear to be that there are
15 individuals with uniforms or people are misusing uniforms and they want
16 to stop that, and that it may well have been that the military commander
17 expressed an unease with that, passed an order down his own chain of
18 command, but also included, you know, discussions or meetings with the
19 police to say this will also be an issue that you can help resolve.
20 Without seeing the initial order, I don't necessarily say that you can
21 somehow say that there was that subordinate chain, but clearly they are
22 working in co-operation to try and sort out a problem which they have
23 identified, which I may have to read that little bit, but presumably it's
24 the misuse of uniforms.
25 Q. Sir, it says very clearly here we are sending an order related to
1 the operations group in order to have it carried out. So it's the order
2 of the operations group. Do you agree?
3 A. Yes, but the order might be a military order instructing only
4 military personnel, I may say military police in this case, or other
5 units, and the police are simply passing that on and saying what I want
6 you to do is to help the military in this respect. Now, it may well be
7 that the police are on the distribution list for the military order, but
8 without seeing it, I can't say that. But I don't think you can draw the
9 inference necessarily. The only way you can look at this is that there
10 is a subordinate relationship between the military passing a direct order
11 to the police for its passage down the chain of command. I can't say
12 that without seeing the initial military instruction.
13 Q. Unfortunately, we don't have that and I do accept your answer as
14 far as that is concerned.
15 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be shown
16 1D267. That is tab 126. Again it was marked for identification. Your
17 Honours, just perhaps we can -- the previous document can be MFI'd in
18 order that we just keep the track of the documents which were -- have
19 been shown to the witness.
20 JUDGE HALL: Yes, Mr. Zecevic.
21 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this will become 1D407 marked for
23 JUDGE DELVOIE: Was that tab 77, Mr. Zecevic?
24 MR. ZECEVIC: That is correct, tabulator 77.
25 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, just for the record, the ERN number
2 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you.
3 Q. [Interpretation] Sir, this is a document of commander Lisica,
4 Slavko of Operations Group 3. He signed the document. I think the date
5 is the 7th of October, 1992, and this has to do with the organisation and
6 establishment of the public security system in the town of Bosanska Novi.
7 And this is what it says here, in paragraph 2:
8 "A platoon from the Derventa public security station led by
9 commander Radmilo Sljivic who has been provisionally appointed deputy
10 chief of Bosanski Brod public security service, will join the strength of
11 the Bosanski Brod battalion. A platoon from Doboj municipality will also
12 join," I underline that again, a -- so "a platoon from Doboj municipality
13 will also join the strength of the battalion."
14 Mr. Brown, this paragraph number 2 unequivocally shows that the
15 Derventa platoon was resubordinated to the Bosanski Brod battalion and
16 also the platoon from the public security station of Doboj.
17 Colonel Lisica obviously appointed a commander as well for this platoon
18 in Derventa. Do you agree?
19 A. It would seem a platoon, he is ordering a platoon from the
20 Derventa public security station, as you say. It may well been that this
21 is one of these examples where it's recently liberated territory, as they
22 often called it. Bosanski Brod was one of the key municipalities in the
23 operation corridor and its seizure allowed the corridor could be secured,
24 and maybe this is -- and Commander Lisica may well have been, I guess, a
25 tactical group commander in that area. And so it probably relates to the
1 initial -- some initial establishment in that area, I guess.
2 Q. Sir, there's no doubt that paragraph 2 shows that the Derventa
3 platoon is resubordinated and, in addition to that, a platoon from the
4 Doboj public security station, so there's two platoons right?
5 A. Well, it doesn't make it clear from the Doboj whether it's an SJB
6 or whether it's some other platoon, but at least from the translation it
7 doesn't necessarily say whose provisionally appointed the commander,
8 whether it's Lisica or whether it's someone else, but it's clear that the
9 platoon would seem to be working in that area.
10 Q. I accept your answer because the translation is inadequate in my
11 view. I'm going to read the last sentence once again. I think that we
12 are going send this translation to have it supervised because in my view
13 it does not reflect the original exactly. This is what the original
15 "Also, the battalion should include," I under line that, "include
16 a platoon from the public security station of SO Doboj."
17 A. Actually, I just see that on the translation, sorry, the original
18 does say SO Doboj, so I assume that means, as you --
19 Q. Thank you. I see that this document has also been MFI'd, I
20 assume that Ms. Korner has the same objection that she had already raised
21 in relation to the previous document. However --
22 MS. KORNER: Yes, these are all -- all these particular set of
23 documents where we see Lisica and Bjelosevic are all part and parcel of
24 the same set that was put to the witness via Mr. Cvijetic, and the same
25 problem arose and all the Defence are unable to tell us where these
1 documents come from, so the answer shortly is yes, for the moment we do
3 MR. ZECEVIC: Okay.
4 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Zecevic, before you move on to another
5 document. Mr. Brown, would you say that without the word being used, the
6 word "re-subordination" being used, this has to be seen as a
7 re-subordination order?
8 THE WITNESS: Yeah. It would seem at face value. I don't know
9 the circumstances surrounding or any other, but it seems that there may
10 have been an agreement that this could happen, you know, prior to this,
11 may have been communications with the higher police formation allowing
12 this, but it would seem that Lisica, that this police platoon is being
13 placed under the authority of that battalion.
14 JUDGE DELVOIE: What strikes here as well is under number 4,
15 brief Mr. Andrija Bjelosevic, chief of the Doboj region, on this order,
16 so this is not -- this is really an order to do something?
17 THE WITNESS: Yes. It is stated that. Now, it may well be that
18 Mr. Bjelosevic in a previous meeting agreed that this was to happen, and
19 what he is doing he is carrying that out, that agreement, and now he is
20 wanting to brief him that this has happened and, oh, by the way we need
21 some additional -- make sure they have some uniforms, so that --
22 JUDGE DELVOIE: But now, the agreement you don't read anything
23 about an agreement in this document, is that right? This document is
24 only an order, it has nothing to do -- well, there is perhaps an
25 agreement on the basis on it, but you can't read that in this document,
1 is that right?
2 THE WITNESS: No, you can clearly read that there is a
3 relationship to a higher police unit with the name in the bottom at
4 paragraph 4, but the document itself doesn't say whether there was an
5 agreement. It doesn't say that there wasn't an agreement.
6 JUDGE DELVOIE: Okay. Thank you.
7 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Mr. Brown, this order of Mr. Lisica's that we analysed, we
9 analysed its paragraph 2, says in paragraph 4:
10 "Brief Mr. Andrija Bjelosevic on this order. He is the chief of
11 the Doboj region of the public security service. As far as he is able,
12 uniforms and communication equipment will be supplied by him, and
13 Bosanski Brod municipality will provide assistance and the engagement of
14 some state security service operatives."
15 It is obvious that Lisica is instructing his subordinates that
16 Mr. Andrija Bjelosevic should be made aware of this order, which seems to
17 suggest that until that point, Mr. Bjelosevic did not know anything about
18 this order; right?
19 A. I don't think you can read it like that at all. You could read
20 this that an agreement has happened, an agreement was made. Mr. Lisica
21 or Colonel Lisica issued an order for it to be executed, and then that's
22 been notified back up the police chain. You could also read it the way
23 that you read it. So it's not clear from the document on its own.
24 Q. I agree. Thank you. Let us have a look at another document.
25 1D003666. Tab 84.
1 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I've just received
2 information from my colleague in relation to the objection that had just
3 been raised by Ms. Korner in relation to the previous document 1D266. I
4 beg your pardon. No, it's one of the documents that are yet to come, I'm
6 Q. Sir, 1D003666 is the document we see now. That is a document
7 dated the 3rd of November, 1992. The chief of the MUP centre of
8 Republika Srpska is hereby informing the ministry that Nenad Milicic, a
9 certain Nenad Milicic, commander of the Bosanski Brod battalion, upon the
10 liberation of Bosanski Brod was appointed by Colonel Slavko Lisica,
11 commander of TG 3, as acting chief of the Bosanski Brod public security
12 station, on the 2nd of November, 1992. Further on, it says that the
13 centre, or rather, the head of the centre has some information to the
14 effect that Mr. Milicic had engaged in some kind of illicit activity. So
15 we see from this document as we did from the previous one that it's not
16 only that Colonel Lisica or the army is ordering the use of police units,
17 but as a matter of fact, they or he is appointing a chief of a public
18 security station?
19 A. I can only say that that's what the document would seem to say.
20 I don't know the circumstances around it. It may well be that, you know,
21 in the immediacy of the liberation of Bosanski Brod, he as tactical group
22 commander appointed that position out with his authority or with the
23 authority of the municipalities, but it would seem from this document on
24 its own that that's what he is purported to have done.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] May this document also be marked
2 for identification, please.
3 JUDGE HALL: So marked.
4 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit 1D408 marked for identification, Your
6 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Brown, I'm slightly puzzled about this. I
7 think we've come across this once before, haven't we, with Mr. Zecevic's
8 cross-examination, namely that an army commander is appointing another
9 military person as chief of an SJB, chief of a MUP station. That appears
10 to me to be quite a far reaching authority which goes way beyond the mere
11 question of resubordination of police units to join a military operation
12 or combat operation under the army's control, so how are we to understand
13 this fact that suddenly we have to do with exercise of a power that would
14 greatly seem to exceed the need for the military to have police units
15 resubordinated under its control. What are we dealing with here? Do you
16 know where this authority comes from or why?
17 THE WITNESS: It does seem unusual to me, sir, I haven't seen
18 this before. I think the context of where this is occurring is possibly
19 important in that this is newly liberated territories, and it may well be
20 that Colonel Lisica thinks he has the authority in an area where there is
21 no municipality authority already established that he can do this. It's
22 one of the issues I think Mr. Zecevic was discussing yesterday. And it
23 may well be that Colonel Lisica is way overstepping his boundary and
24 thinks he can do that but in reality shouldn't have. Could be another
25 option. But I think the context of where this is occurring probably sits
1 centrally to where it is. This is Bosanski Brod, this was not a
2 territory that was controlled by the Serbs, it was taken in Operation
3 Corridor, possibly Slavko Lisica was the tactical group commander that
4 took that territory, and he felt that, you know, in lieu of no organising
5 or organised municipality because it was Croat, I believe, I'm not sure
6 exactly, that he felt that he had the authority to do that. He may well
7 have just overstepped his authority and appointed someone he knew. But I
8 can't tell you because it's not an area I know well, full operations in
9 the corridor was not something I delved in great detail in, and this is
10 one document that stands on its own, but I do think the context of where
11 it's occurring and the time it's occurring is possibly important.
12 I don't see that type of thing happening in the municipalities in
13 May, June, July, where it's Crisis Staffs already functioning, where
14 there's, you know, police/military civilian engagement, operations are
15 quick and over, you know, quickly. I think the context of this is
16 probably where it occurs and the time it occurs and that it was a
17 territory that was not, you know, it was I believe it was a Croat-held
18 territory that was taken in the operation.
19 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you.
20 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Sir, I'm' going to remind you of a document that is in relation
22 to the question put by His Honour. We looked at it a few moments ago.
23 It is dated the 1st of July, 1992. 1D406, tab 14. Prosecution tab 14.
24 May I remind you that Mr. Talic was saying what the areas of
25 responsibility were and you were saying that the language is very
1 explicit; namely, that all police forces shall be placed under the
2 command of the commander of the zone. Do you remember that document?
3 A. Yes, I do, sir.
4 Q. It is possible that Mr. Lisica derives his authority from this
5 document as well. However, I must say that I do agree with you that
6 basically he is overstepping his regular authority?
7 A. I would have to go through the document to see whether Colonel
8 Lisica was in command there. It may well be this is a document he
9 justified that action, bearing in mind this was sometime prior to this,
10 and I don't see in many instances the document the 1st of July being
11 implemented in areas. I can't tell you whether Slavko Lisica did use
12 this or whether he just believed that in zones that they are taking
13 territory that he, as a tactical group commander, could make such
15 Q. In order for us to show that this does not pertain only to
16 Operation Corridor or any other particular operation, I'm going to show
17 you another document, 1D000341. Tab 128. That is one of the documents
18 that is from the same period, but from a different territory. It
19 pertains to a document that the commander of the 1st Battalion of the
20 Serb army in the village of Osmace. This commander issued an order. I
21 don't know if you are aware of the fact that Osmaci is a village between
22 Zvornik and Tuzla in Eastern Bosnia?
23 A. I am not aware of that, sir.
24 Q. In this order which, in my view, resembles that instruction of
25 Mr. Talic's of the 19th of June, although it is outside his area of
1 responsibility, now, this is what it says:
2 "Owing to the serious situation at the front line, until further
3 notice, the Osmaci civilian police will not perform duties at the
4 check-point or any other type of assignment except at a front line
5 position. Muster them immediately and transport them to the front line.
6 At the front line, place these personnel under the command of the platoon
8 Sir, this order could hardly be more explicit. This order on the
9 re-subordination of the police.
10 A. I'm not sure who this order is going to, it doesn't have a
11 distribution list. It doesn't say --
12 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, the difficulty about -- sorry
13 Mr. Brown, the difficulty about taking these documents in isolation from
14 completely outside the area of this case is that we simply don't know
15 what the background is, and I'm not sure how much assistance that Your
16 Honours are going to get from this. And short of start of looking
17 through all the collections relating to all the other corps, which is
18 going to add immeasurably to the evidence in this case, as I say I'm not
19 sure how helpful this is.
20 MR. ZECEVIC: Well, Your Honours, I'm not sure if I correctly
21 understand Ms. Korner. I thought that the indictment covers the
22 territory of Zvornik municipality. If that is not the case, well, maybe
23 we are to expect the amendment of the indictment. Maybe Ms. Korner is
24 withdrawing the municipality of Zvornik from the indictment. This is
25 clearly a relevant, it is November 1992, it concerns the area of Zvornik.
1 I appreciate that the witness has not seen this document, but since, as I
2 explained already, the witness is an expert and in his area -- and in his
3 report, he deals with the co-operation of police and the army, I think
4 that is a sufficient ground for him to be shown this document.
5 JUDGE HALL: Yes, Mr. Zecevic. Please proceed.
6 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you.
7 JUDGE HALL: And if -- I would require two minutes before we wind
8 up for the day, and I would remind you, Mr. Zecevic, that having
9 requested five hours for cross-examination, at this point you have, you
10 are at 5 hours and 57 minutes.
11 MR. ZECEVIC: I understand, Your Honours. I'm really sorry, but
12 I have maybe less than six or eight documents to show to this witness and
13 then I will finish my cross-examination.
14 JUDGE HALL: Yes.
15 MR. ZECEVIC: May I ask that this document be MFI'd.
16 JUDGE HALL: Yes.
17 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 1D409 marked for identification, Your
19 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] We are going back to
20 Colonel Lisica's document now, 1D266, tab 129.
21 THE WITNESS: Sir, did you want me to comment on this previous
22 document or not?
23 MR. ZECEVIC: By all means. I'm sorry, I thought you did comment
24 it. Sir, you said "I'm not sure where this order is going to, it doesn't
25 have distribution list."
1 THE WITNESS: No, it doesn't have a distribution list, and I
2 don't think I can draw any contextual analysis from that single document.
3 It doesn't give you whether there was an agreement beforehand or what
4 discussions had gone on in relation this and there's no distribution
5 list, so I'm not sure if can say much more.
6 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, I also see it's not a document that
7 appears to come from us, so I wonder if I could ask where this comes
8 from. I mean, this is simply an inquiry, which corps.
9 MR. ZECEVIC: It is number 18 on the list which was provided to
10 you on the 11th of May, 2009.
11 MS. KORNER: So it's another document that you can't give any
12 further information about?
13 MR. ZECEVIC: Well, Ms. Korner, you asked for us to give you the
14 provenance of the document, we provided the provenance of the document by
15 the list which was provided to you by the government secretariat of
16 Republika Srpska. If there is anything else that you would specifically
17 need for this document, then you should say so and we will try to oblige
18 you with that.
19 Q. [Interpretation] In any case, sir, is it a fact, isn't it, that
20 this order could be interpreted as a direct subordination regardless of
21 any speculation about whether there is an agreement in existence or not,
22 but if you place this into the context, bearing in mind the order by
23 Mr. Talic of the 19th of June -- I can remind you, if you want, you spoke
24 about him, that's why I thought that it wouldn't be necessary. It's
25 P1789. Prosecution tab 24.
1 You will recall that Mr. Talic on the 19th of June in that order
3 "For immediate combat action at the front line, the police may be
4 used only exceptionally. If it is necessary to maintain the front until
5 the arrival of the military units. In all other cases, it is necessary
6 to inform and obtain an approval from the chief of the centre of security
8 Do you remember that?
9 A. I do, and that was referring to units in his command. I don't
10 believe the one that you've shown me reflects that. It may well have
11 been there was a very similar instruction from the East Bosnia Corps to
12 that effect.
13 Q. That was exactly my suggestion. That instruction was in force in
14 the whole of territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, regardless of whether
15 it pertains to the 1st Krajina Corps or the Eastern Bosnia Corps or some
16 other unit.
17 MR. ZECEVIC: I see the time. Perhaps this is an appropriate
19 JUDGE HALL: Yes, thank you.
20 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you.
21 JUDGE HALL: So, Mr. Brown, you are excused for the day and we
22 will resume tomorrow morning at 9.00.
23 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
24 [The witness stands down]
25 JUDGE HALL: I will be very brief. At the beginning of today's
1 proceedings, Ms. Korner, the Prosecution, sought clarification of the
2 certain portion of the decision which we would have delivered yesterday,
3 and while we are -- while it is regrettable that the language does not
4 appear as clear to the reader, especially the Prosecution who has raised
5 it, we took the advantage during the break to look at what we said
6 yesterday and we merely repeat paragraphs 20 and 21 of the ruling, and I
7 would say that -- and I would emphasise, the first sentence in paragraph
9 "In light of the above, the Trial Chamber found that the
10 Prosecution had not shown good cause for its request."
11 And we don't see the need to revisit this matter further. Thank
12 you. So we take the adjournment to tomorrow morning at --
13 MS. KORNER: Sorry, Your Honours. I know it's probably just me,
14 but you are saying -- all I want is a simple, if I may, respectfully ask,
15 you are telling us we asked too late? Is that the -- because there is a
16 real difference between any future action we take. If that's the
17 gravamen of your ruling, that we should have asked before, that's all I'm
18 asking for.
19 JUDGE HALL: Of course you would -- you, having heard what we
20 say, will advise yourself accordingly, Ms. Korner.
21 MS. KORNER: Well, you just said you repeated it. It really --
22 I'm sorry to persist in this, but there is a difference between saying
23 you applied too late and a difference between saying we are satisfied
24 that the evidence that there is is evidence on which we are going to rely
25 and we don't need anymore.
1 JUDGE HARHOFF: That's not what the ruling said.
2 MS. KORNER: Thank you.
3 JUDGE HARHOFF: The ruling emphasises the fact that it was not
4 new information.
5 MS. KORNER: Yes, thank you.
6 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.46 p.m.
7 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 20th day of
8 January, 2011, at 9.00 a.m.