1 Friday, 21 January 2011
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.08 a.m.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning to
6 everyone in and around the courtroom.
7 This is case IT-08-91-T, the Prosecutor versus Mico Stanisic and
8 Stojan Zupljanin.
9 JUDGE HALL: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
10 Good morning to everyone. May we have the appearances, please.
11 MS. KORNER: Good morning, Your Honours. Joanna Korner and
12 Crispian Smith for the Prosecution.
13 MR. ZECEVIC: Good morning, Your Honours. Slobodan Zecevic and
14 Eugene O'Sullivan appearing for the Stanisic Defence this morning.
15 MR. KRGOVIC: Good morning, Your Honours. Dragan Krgovic and
16 Miroslav Cuskic for Zupljanin Defence.
17 JUDGE HALL: Thank you. And unless there is some reason to
18 delay, could we have the witness back on the stand, please.
19 [The witness takes the stand]
20 JUDGE HALL: Good morning, Mr. Brown. Before I invite
21 Mr. Krgovic to continue, I give the usual reminder, that you're still on
22 your oath.
23 Yes, Mr. Krgovic.
24 MR. KRGOVIC: Thank you, Your Honours.
25 WITNESS: EWAN BROWN [Resumed]
1 Cross-examination by Mr. Krgovic: [Continued]
2 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Brown.
3 A. Good morning, sir.
4 Q. You may remember that yesterday we discussed that document,
5 Zupljanin's speech, or presentation, when he complains about the conduct
6 of the army. I'll continue in the same vein. Do you know that the
7 individual operations groups or groups or brigades placed the
8 headquarters of their respective brigades in the police stations? In
9 your paragraph 2.101 you mention such a group of brigades and you cite
10 some documents of this type. The relevant footnote is 455.
11 Do you remember that?
12 A. I'd have to look at the reference, but I do know that in some
13 cases the -- the police headquarters was used and I think the reference
14 you're talking about is maybe to do with Skender Vakuf. But I'd have to
16 Q. I'm going to show you document 2D07-0052 in -- under tab 8 in the
17 Zupljanin Defence binder. Let me repeat, 2D07-0052.
18 Mr. Brown, this is an order dated 16 July, as far as I can tell,
19 by the Brigade Group Command Skender Vakuf. Let us see the signature on
20 the last page. Actually, I think it's the last-but-one page.
21 You see here as the commander of that brigade group
22 Lieutenant-Colonel Bosko Peulic, and you see who it was sent to, the
23 corps command, and the command of the 122nd Light Infantry Brigade. The
24 command of the 1st Infantry Brigade and the command of the Light
25 Kotor Varos Infantry Brigade. Isn't that right?
1 A. Yes, it would seem to be that's the distribution.
2 Q. And I take it that you know that at the corps -- corps brigade --
3 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction at the corps command.
4 MR. KRGOVIC:
5 Q. Brigade groups were established to carry out tasks. In the
6 general area of Vlasic this group was formed which was headed By
7 Lieutenant-Colonel Peulic; correct?
8 A. That's correct. I think Vlasic was a key tactical feature and
9 was on the front line between Central Bosnia and the corps, and although
10 Commander Peulic was concurrently commander of the 122nd Light Brigade he
11 was also operations group commander, which had a wider zone, I believe.
12 Q. As commander of that group, the Kotor Varos Light Brigade was
13 subordinate to him and he was in a position to issue orders to them;
15 A. I believe that was the case, sir, yes.
16 Q. Please take a look at page 7 in the Serbian now. It's page 4 in
17 the English version of this document.
18 Item 5.3 the last paragraph reads: "The command post" - KM - "is
19 to be located in the Kotor Varos SJB building and the forward command
20 post" - IKM - "is to be set up on Mount Borja and at Krusevo Brdo
21 village, as necessary."
22 Did you have in mind this particular paragraph when in your
23 report, you referred to the Kotor Varos Light Infantry Brigade?
24 A. I'm not sure. I don't think my reference refers to this document
25 or does it?
1 Q. [In English] Yes?
2 A. It does? Okay. Yes, I guess that's what I mean. I know -- I
3 think there were maybe other references, maybe in Skender Vakuf itself
4 there was times they used the police station. But here it would seem to
5 say that the command post of the Kotor Varos brigade is to be located in
6 the police stations. And bearing in mind, I think the references in that
7 5.3 about cooperating with the SJB it wouldn't surprise me that was a --
8 that was to occur and I'm assuming the forward command post was to be
9 placed in a location reasonably close to where they expected some
10 activity to come, that would be usually what happened. And invariably
11 the commander would at the forward command post and the rest of his staff
12 would be at the command post itself.
13 Q. The headquarter of this brigade group and of
14 Lieutenant-Colonel Peulic was at Skender Vakuf, isn't that what you
15 wanted to say?
16 A. I think that's right, yes, sir. I don't know the details that
17 well. But I believe there were some references that OG Vlasic's
18 headquarters were in Skender Vakuf.
19 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I seek to tender this
20 document into evidence.
21 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
22 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 2D133, Your Honours.
23 MR. KRGOVIC:
24 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Brown, answering a question of mine
25 yesterday, namely, whether you knew that in some cases individual SJBs or
1 entire police complements were placed under the military command, you
2 said that you didn't know or weren't sure that anything like that
3 happened. Do you remember?
4 A. I don't see that from the military documents that entire SJBs
5 were placed under the command of the military. At least not from the
6 Krajina documents. I did obviously accept there was a comment in a
7 document that you showed me yesterday that that was ... a complaint.
8 Q. Do you know that the entire police complement in a certain area
9 was placed under the control of the military?
10 A. Which area in particular are you talking about, sir?
11 Q. In certain brigade zones or specifically in the zone of
12 responsibility of the brigade commanded by Mr. Peulic. That is the
13 122nd Light Infantry Brigade, or the 343rd Motorised Brigade, which
14 conducted activities in the general area of Dubica and Sanski Most.
15 A. I'm afraid I don't agree with that. I don't see documents that
16 Colonel Peulic made that clear in the references that I have seen in the
17 Krajina documents. He doesn't seem to make that clear in the references
18 in the Crisis Staff, Kotor Varos Crisis Staff, documents. He didn't seem
19 to make that clear as being the case when he referenced the incident on
20 Vlasic mountain which occurred in his zone, and General Talic didn't make
21 that except for that one reference I've talked about with Mr. Krgovic
22 [sic] on the 1st of July, which I don't see as being implemented.
23 So I wouldn't agree with you that the military commanders believe
24 that in the entire zone -- their zone that the police are under their
25 command. Far from it. I see numerous references about cooperating with
1 them rather than them being subordinates.
2 Q. Let us take another look at 1D406. That's tab 28 in the
3 Zupljanin Defence binder. I believe it was tendered by Mr. Zecevic but I
4 also have it in my binder. That's the order dated the 1st of July.
5 This is the order where Mr. Talic orders --
6 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please see the following
7 page -- or, rather, the first reference is to the 343rd Motorised Brigade
8 under item 1, and under item 4, the 122nd Light Infantry Brigade is
9 referred to.
10 Could we please go to the following page now.
11 Q. You see this paragraph toward the bottom. In the conduct of
12 combat activities all police forces, and I repeat, all police forces,
13 shall be placed under the command of the zone commander who shall decide
14 how they are used."
15 Mr. Brown, isn't this a clear-cut case of an order where
16 General Talic orders that all police forces in the above-mentioned zones
17 shall be placed under the command of the zone commander, and some ten
18 days later, there's Mr. Zupljanin's presentation in which he objects to
19 his practice, this practice?
20 A. I think I've discussed this document before, and there's an
21 ambiguity in the document and in the reference. It may well be what is
22 he discussing here is that after the agreements that were articulated in
23 May and June that police formations can be subordinated or used in combat
24 operations that he -- he is saying that under those circumstances where
25 they are involved in combat operations, zone commander as -- has the
1 right to -- placed under his command. I don't read this as being him or
2 the one reading is I don't read it as being him saying that wherever
3 policemen are in the zones of the various zone commanders articulated,
4 that all police in combat operations are to be subordinated there,
5 because after this document -- it's not reechoed in any other document I
6 noticed in the Krajina Corps collection, and after this document, the
7 same process of requesting support appears to have been in place. We've
8 seen, for example, the documents in November or October where that's the
9 case, and the references that I have seen about combat operations do not
10 specifically reference specific police units, so for example the
11 Kotor Varos Light Brigade document at the end of July does not have a
12 reference to a specific police company or formation that the commander is
13 ordering. The references continue to be, after this, of cooperation with
14 the police and a process by which if -- if -- if police -- additional
15 police support is required, it has to be agreed through the command and
16 the police authorities.
17 So I -- I flag this document up myself in the report. It does
18 seem to be a slight anomaly. It does appear to have different readings
19 to it. But I don't see after this that is there any change that zone
20 commanders or commanders subordinate to General Talic are doing anything
21 other than they were before which was cooperating with the police and in
22 exceptional circumstances making formal requests or requesting police
23 support, which in some cases was granted. So I don't read this as being,
24 irrespective of what it says, either it was actually implemented in that
25 manner that all zone commanders commanded police. I see it potentially
1 meaning or potentially there was a problem he wanted to address or that
2 it was a reemphasis to say that once there was agreement and police were
3 placed at the -- for the use of the military that it was the zone
4 commander who was the one that was to decide how they were to be used.
5 Q. Mr. Brown, I reviewed your report thoroughly, including the
6 footnotes. Until the month of September and possibly until October, I
7 was unable to find a single document in which requests are made to the
8 CSB to use units or any sort of application to the corps command as
9 provided for by rules and regulations to address the CSB and request
10 for -- requests -- resubordination of units. That practice only starts
11 in September but before that I haven't seen a single document
12 corroborating what you're saying that requests actually had been made.
13 Do you agree with me?
14 MS. KORNER: No, no. Can I make the same, please, objection as I
15 made with Mr. Zecevic. That's a speech. It is irrelevant what
16 Mr. Krgovic has found or hasn't found. It's not a question at all, it's
17 a comment. And how is the witness supposed to answer that?
18 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] This is clearly a question. I
19 haven't found it and I asked the witness whether he has any reference to
20 show me the contrary. What I'm saying is that from the outbreak of the
21 conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina up until the autumn of 1992, have you
22 found a single document where a corps command requests something from the
23 CSB? I'm referring to the spring and the summer, until that letter by
24 Mr. Zupljanin dated 18 September.
25 A. I would have to look at my documents and I don't know them all.
1 It may be that document -- there was -- that express need. I do know
2 there was formed police units in the operation corridor. Now, what the
3 process behind that was and what was requested, I'm not sure. And I
4 would have to check my references again. But the -- the process as laid
5 down in May and June was that requests should be made.
6 Q. [Previous translation continues] ...
7 A. And it may well have been that in the spring --
8 Q. Mr. Brown, I must interrupt you. You will have an opportunity to
9 review these documents. I haven't found any, but you can possibly
10 continue about this after the break.
11 But let us move onto another topic. In your report, you deal
12 with the issue of the CSB special unit which you mention several times.
13 You were -- you cited some documents, so please take a look at -- please
14 bear with me. The reference is 281; footnote 414.
15 You cite a document of the Crisis Staff here; that is, the
16 minutes taken at the Crisis Staff meeting, and you say that that document
17 is about the event that happened in front of the health centre. It's
18 Exhibit P46; tab 29 of the Zupljanin Defence.
19 Please take a look at this document which you cited. Also there
20 footnote 359 it says in item 2: "Within the framework of this item,
21 events were discussed which occurred in the course of the day, which was
22 considered the most serious since the outbreak of the war in Kotor Varos.
23 The final outcome of today's fighting is still unknown. In the health
24 centre, six people have been registered as killed and 19 wounded."
25 Obviously, this is about killed and wounded Serbs who were
1 provided medical assistance in the health centre and not about Muslims or
2 Croats, as you say.
3 A. I'm not sure my report says it is Muslims or Croats. I think my
4 report says one of the minutes which was the 40th made mention that the
5 CSB had been engaged in unauthorised behaviour, and that this session
6 mentioned that six people had been killed and wounded and around the
7 health centre. And my report isn't to look at the details of the -- the
8 actual incident although I'm aware of it, not -- not in depth, but my
9 report was making the issue that they were aware that there had been
10 unauthorised behaviour there and that people had been killed in the
11 health centre.
12 If your position is that those people are Serbs and the wounded
13 were Serbs, then the document doesn't say one way or the other, but I do
14 know there was an incident, a somewhat notorious incident at the health
15 centre involving the CSB, allegedly. My report isn't about the incident,
16 per se, in terms of the detail of it. It's just that the Crisis Staff
17 were clearly aware of this incident and that it allegedly involved the
18 CSB special unit.
19 Q. But the document you cite in footnote 414 and which you link to
20 unauthorised behaviour is something altogether different from the
21 incident in front of the health centre which happened some days earlier.
22 I believe that's obvious from the document.
23 A. Well, is your issue that there are two separate incidents?
24 Q. Yes.
25 A. Okay. I don't know the chronology of the crime base incidents in
1 Kotor Varos.
2 Q. And when, in this paragraph 2.80, and in footnote 415, you speak
3 about things and you remember that you discussed this report with the
4 Prosecutor too, so let me quote to you your words: "The massacre of
5 the -- of members of a special police detachment in Kotor Varos
6 municipality has additionally aggravated interethnic relations in the
7 area and made the overall security situation more complex."
8 MS. KORNER: Could I have the page number in the transcript,
10 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] It's paragraph 280 in Mr. Brown's
12 Q. Mr. Brown, you commented for the Prosecutor --
13 MS. KORNER: Yes, no, I'm sorry that's why I got a bit confused.
14 What's happening there it's not Mr. Brown's words he is quoting the VRS
15 document. That's why I got a bit confused. If one looks at the report.
16 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Ms. Korner, please let me finish.
17 I have just read out this part and now I'd like to -- so in the previous
18 footnote, answering to the Prosecutor's question.
19 Q. On page 18760 you said that this section you quoted was a
20 mistake. That this wasn't a massacre of the special police but the other
21 way around. It's a massacre of Muslims and Croats conducted by the
22 special police. Do you remember saying that? If you want, I can show
23 you the document.
24 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] It's 65 ter 3707. It's tab 18 in
25 the Zupljanin Defence binder.
1 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, I'm sorry. I'm not trying to interrupt
2 Mr. Krgovic, but it read, and the question was put as though Mr. Brown
3 was making that assertion, that it aggravated interethnic relations.
4 At the report at page 280 says: "This incident was later
5 reported as a massacre in a 1st Krajina Corps daily combat report to the
6 Main Staff."
7 There is then a quote from that combat report which is what
8 Mr. Krgovic read to him, which is then footnoted.
9 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] We have a reference in
10 paragraph 2.50. That's where Mr. Brown claims that this report by the
11 Krajina Corps refers to the incident that happened in front of the health
12 centre and where the Muslims were victims.
13 Q. Is that your understanding of this document?
14 A. My understanding of this Krajina Corps document is that it's
15 referring to the activities of the special police unit, not a massacre
16 that's happened to them. I -- I don't know the full details of the CSB
17 and what they were doing, but I was not aware that the CSB unit was
18 massacred or had a significant -- significant combat casualties. That
19 doesn't seem to be made note of in the minutes at the Kotor Varos Crisis
20 Staff. So my assumption is that the CSB -- they may have had casualties,
21 I don't know, but they were not portrayed as having had a massacre done
22 on them. And my inference from the comments of the -- the two comments
23 of the Kotor Varos Crisis Staff staff meetings and the reference in the
24 Krajina Corps document a number of days later is that they are
25 referencing a massacre at the Kotor Varos -- I'm sorry, the special unit
1 of the CSB conducted and that that massacre is aggravated interethnic
2 relations. That's how I read this. If you have documents that the CSB
3 were massacred in Kotor Varos, I'm happy to comment on those, but I -- I
4 read this as the massacre has been perpetrated by the special unit.
5 Q. Mr. Brown, paragraph number 3, in this order clearly states that
6 the massacre was perpetrated on the members of the police. There is no
7 doubt in this text.
8 A. You're right, sir, that's what the document reads. My own view
9 of this in light of the information I've just discussed is that --
10 that -- that this is either a typing error or a misreporting, and I --
11 from what I know, I do not believe this is a massacre that has been
12 perpetrated on the CSB but it is referencing the problem that has been
13 caused because of the incident involving the CSB. And it's a combat
14 report, sir, not an order.
15 Q. Mr. Brown, would you take a look at 2D08-0119, which is tab 34 in
16 the Zupljanin binder.
17 It's a monograph listing members of the Ministry of Interior who
18 were killed together with the dates of their deaths and their pictures.
19 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] That's the front page. Can I have
20 the next page.
21 Q. Take a look at Milan Ivkovic. Centre of public security
22 Banja Luka, killed on the 29th of June, 1992.
23 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Can I have the next page, please.
24 Q. Then Nenad Kalamanda, centre of public security from Banja Luka,
25 killed on 29th June, 1992 and then Zeljko Kukic. And he was a member of
1 the police station in Kotor Varos.
2 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Next page.
3 Q. Slavisa Marinkovic. Banja Luka public security centre, killed on
4 29th of June 1992.
5 And then Zoran Racic. Public security centre Banja Luka, killed
6 on 29th of 6th, 1992.
7 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Next page, please.
8 Q. Predrag Stokuca, public security centre Banja Luka, killed on
9 29th of June, 1992.
10 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Next page, please.
11 Q. Drazenko Savic, public security centre Banja Luka, killed on 29th
12 June 1992.
13 Then Dragisa Stanivukovic. Also public security centre
14 Banja Luka killed on 29th June 1992.
15 These were the killings discussed at this meeting in Kotor Varos
16 when they talk about the people killed on 29th of June, they say that the
17 fighting on that date was very fierce and that there were five or six
18 killed and 1999 injured so far in the fighting and that's the people that
19 they are talking about.
20 Would you agree with me?
21 MS. KORNER: Just a moment, please. I'm sure -- it may well be
22 that Mr. Krgovic is right but he is making the assertion. All that we
23 can see at the moment is that these people were killed. What's the link
24 between that and --
25 JUDGE HALL: On a particular date.
1 MS. KORNER: On a particular date. Well, can I just ask -- I
2 mean, I'm sure Mr. Krgovic is right but what is the evidence of the link.
3 MR. KRGOVIC: I can make the link. It's just starting point.
4 MS. KORNER: All right.
5 THE WITNESS: Well, you -- in answer to your question, if -- if
6 these individuals were all killed in Kotor Varos on that day in combat
7 operations, you may well be right. Obviously it lists their names and
8 where they came from and what -- what unit they were from. Under the
9 circumstances of how they were killed is not clear to me but you may well
10 be right. This is the first time I have seen this material.
11 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Brown, sorry, but if this would have been
12 people killed in -- policemen killed in combat operation, would military
13 report speak of a massacre or of killings? Is this for -- for -- for
14 military people a massacre, if it's killing in combat?
15 THE WITNESS: The -- I have seen other references where the 1
16 Krajina Corps used the phrase "massacre" for the killing of Serbs. For
17 example I think there was an ambush of policemen in Mrkonjic Grad earlier
18 in the war, quite early on. I think a group of policemen travelling in
19 an area with some military were ambushed and killed. That was called a
20 massacre as opposed to killings in a combat zone and so that was one
21 other example. I mean, at times they used that phrase "massacre" when
22 they talk about killings of their own. They don't necessarily
23 differentiate between -- sometimes or in that one case. They may well
24 have used the phrase "massacre" when actually people were conducting
25 combat operations as we would recognise that.
1 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
2 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Can I have P45. That's a video
3 about this event, and I want it placed from 12:02.
4 Q. I have an English transcript here so that you can follow the
5 names and the events.
6 [Video-clip played]
7 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "it is very difficult to get to the
8 bodies of the dead soldiers, much mor difficult than the fighting itself.
9 This is when the blackmail starts. The enemy first mutilates the dead
10 body, cuts the face, gouges out the eyes, cuts off the head and
11 invariably asks for several live extremists in exchange for the body of a
12 dead and mutilated Serb. So the bodies of the dead soldiers were only
13 delivered today. The enemy used blackmail and demanded all sorts of
15 Policeman speaking: "We got our comrades back after three days.
16 We complied with all the requests they put to us. They asked us to bring
17 a hodja's son who had not even been arrested. We went to the yard, to
18 the town, brought him, made an offer. They asked for 17 of the living in
19 exchange for our number of dead. We gave them to them. And look what
20 they returned to us. Our men mutilated and burnt. And we shall pay them
21 back. We shall remember and pay them back for this."
22 Reporter: "Could you identify the dead and mutilated
24 Second Policeman: "By their uniforms."
25 Question: "Only by their uniforms?"
1 Answer: "Yes."
2 Another Policeman: "The lads were mutilated, their eyes gouged
3 out, their heads set on fire, and the rest."
4 Reporter: "They did that, gouged out the eyes and burned the
5 heads of Serb fighters. And so, after several days the bodies of the
6 dead soldiers were here today."
7 A Policeman: "My best friends."
8 MR. KRGOVIC:
9 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Brown, they speak here about the massacre of
10 the members of the special unit of the police. You could also see their
11 dead bodies. So, isn't that a very accurate interpretation what we find
12 in the report by the Krajina Corps that a group of the members of the
13 special police had been massacred by the members of Muslim and Croat
14 forces in Kotor Varos, and that that's what caused interethnic tensions.
15 Wouldn't you then agree that what it says in the combat report is
16 accurate and what it says in your report is inaccurate, which also leads
17 us to the conclusion that a number of your conclusions that you made
18 based on this are also inaccurate.
19 JUDGE HALL: Could you pause there, please, Mr. Krgovic.
20 You have -- there's nothing wrong with the propositions that you
21 put to the witness. It's just that they -- one builds on the other, and
22 I think in fairness to the witness and to the Chamber to understand it,
23 we should get his answers one at a time.
24 MS. KORNER: And, Your Honour, the last is no more than a speech.
25 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] But if you read the report
1 carefully, you will see that if you interpret this document in this
2 particular way, you will arrive at a number of conclusions. We are
3 certainly going to go through all these conclusions and the witness is
4 certainly going to have a chance to respond.
5 Q. One question for you, Mr. Brown. Isn't it true, based on what
6 you've seen, the two documents that you have seen, isn't it true that
7 your interpretation of the report of the 1st Krajina Corps is incorrect?
8 A. Yes, I'm prepared to accept that that could be a modified
9 assessment. Now, whether you would describe the action and the ambush as
10 a massacre, or whether would you describe it as an unfortunate occurrence
11 in a combat zone, is something, you know, maybe different. But I'm more
12 than prepared to -- to modify my assessment that clearly there was an
13 incident, how it was described and what reaction is a separate issue, and
14 I'm more than happy to amend my -- my -- my reference that the
15 Krajina Corps was making reference to the incident in which policemen,
16 local and CSB policemen, were killed. That's one issue.
17 Do I think that that -- I think one of your questions was in
18 relation to ethnic tensions?
19 Q. Yes. This incident, an incident in which Serbs were killed
20 caused interethnic tensions and not the other way around. So your
21 conclusion is wrong. The tensions arose because of a crime committed on
22 Serbs, not on Muslims.
23 A. But I wouldn't necessarily agree with that. I wouldn't doubt
24 that that incident in itself could and would cause tensions. But the
25 operation that was going on at the time, I would argue was linked to the
1 operational instructions of some weeks back that there was a desire to
2 take control of Kotor Varos municipality through the documentation that,
3 for example, came out on the 9th of June and that Kotor Varos was seen as
4 an area that needed to be controlled and operations were mounted in
5 Kotor Varos. Now, as part of that operation, I would accept that it
6 seems that some policemen were killed there. That in itself might well
7 have inflamed -- inflamed the situation further. I would imagine that
8 type of video, if it's going out on TV, is also likely to further
9 aggravate the circumstance. But I wouldn't agree with your -- your
10 assumption that interethnic tensions in Kotor Varos started or were
11 caused because of that incident. They certainly would have done nothing,
12 I would assume, to reduce it, but that incident, I would argue has to be
13 placed in the context of the desire to control Kotor Varos municipality
14 that fell from instructions prior to this date.
15 Q. Mr. Brown, didn't you cite this document by the 1st Krajina Corps
16 and used it as an example of an incident in which members of the special
17 police massacred Muslim population which then led to the aggravation of
18 interethnic tensions.
19 Isn't that your interpretation of the document while the actual
20 situation is the other way around and you made a mistake while evaluating
21 this document and while deriving your conclusions?
22 A. I'm more than prepared to amend that document -- inference based
23 on the pictures that you've shown of those individuals in that war book.
24 I'm more than happy to amend that. I do not -- as I said to you in the
25 beginning, this report has limitations. I didn't see every single
1 document, I hadn't seen that war book of the fallen before. So I'm more
2 than happy to amend that.
3 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Krgovic, I didn't see or hear anything on
4 this video that links the video to the report and the killings you
5 referred to on the 29th of June. I'm sure there is, but ...
6 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour, I was simply
7 trying to save time. I'm going to continue with the same video. I think
8 it's 9:59.
9 [Trial Chamber confers]
10 MR. KRGOVIC: There's a transcript. It's your evidence.
11 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated]
12 MR. KRGOVIC: 9:59.
13 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated]
14 MR. KRGOVIC: Second page, just -- go to next paragraph in
15 English. After this. Next paragraph. It's tab 93. We can find the
16 name of the --
17 MS. KORNER: It's my fault. My -- the translation of the video,
18 the transcript, my copy stops and I don't know if the one in e-court does
19 with the bit that we just played, namely the gouging out of the eyes and
20 all the rest of it. There's no further English. And Mr. Krgovic is
21 going to play more of the video.
22 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, there is a
23 paragraph that follows the name. I have it in my copy. Mr. Brown has it
24 in front of him. That's where you can find the names.
25 MS. KORNER: Oh, I see, we're going to replay it. Oh, I see, I'm
1 sorry, yep.
2 [Video-clip played]
3 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Kozara, Grmec, Sator and other
4 Bosnian Krajina mountains and hills are once again calling for revenge.
5 Stojanka, mother Knespoljka brought forth new Srdjans and new Mladjens
6 and Mrdjans, and has once more sent them into the battle against the
7 enemy. Krajina is grieving again in its heart, in Banja Luka and
8 neighbouring villages. Seven more heros have been buried, all of them
9 members of the special police detachment, Drazenko Savic, Slavisa
10 Marinkovic, Dragisa Stanivukovic, Predrag Stokuca, Milan Ilkovic, Zoran
11 Racic, and Nenad Kalamanda. Seven saplings stolen from the heart of
12 Krajina, the bosoms of Krajina mothers..." and so on and so forth.
13 MR. KRGOVIC:
14 Q. [Interpretation] So Mr. Brown, you can see that we can find here
15 all the names of the people that we found in the book.
16 JUDGE DELVOIE: You went too fast.
17 MR. KRGOVIC:
18 Q. [Interpretation] Sir, so we can find the seven names here, people
19 killed on the 29th of June, 1992, whose bodies were then exchanged on the
20 4th of July, the same day that the report by the Krajina Corps was made.
21 So that's people killed on the 29th whose bodies were exchanged on the
22 4th. I think that it's now clear from this.
23 A. I'm more than happy to accept that's the case, sir, and I'm more
24 than happy to amend my report in that respect. I don't think it alters
25 my view in relation to the situation in Kotor Varos. The operations that
1 were conducted as a result of documents prior to that, the reference to
2 the Crisis Staff meetings and the incidents at the health centre which I
3 believe was around 26th/27th. But I'm more than happy to amend that.
4 There clearly was an incident later in which some policemen were killed
5 or ambushed and killed, or whatever the circumstances were and that the
6 Krajina Corps report of a few days later is referring to that ambush as
7 opposed to other incidents. I'm more than happy to amend that, sir.
8 Q. And then further on, your conclusion, in paragraph 2.50, where
9 you interpret this order dated 1st of July by General Talic, places under
10 his command the police, and then delegates that authority to the military
11 commanders, that is in the same paragraph and rests on the same
13 A. [Previous translation continues] ... I'm more than happy to amend
14 that conclusion, sir, as well, based on that information. I don't know
15 whether the incidents and activities in Kotor Varos had a -- had a -- had
16 a bearing on that more generally. Maybe the CSB police units were --
17 well, I'm more than happy to amend that position too, sir, or drawing
18 that inference in relation to that incident in the health centre.
19 MS. KORNER: But Your Honour, the only -- I'm just raising it now
20 and I say it again, of course, it's a matter for Your Honours, but at the
21 moment we've got on the 29th of June, these six or seven people being
22 killed and we've got a video that they're members of the special police.
23 I'm still not clear how it is said to be those that we discussed outside
24 the health centre. That's all.
25 JUDGE HARHOFF: Do you have any evidence of this, Mr. Krgovic?
1 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I think that this
2 should be sufficient. All these documents that I have submitted should
3 be convincing enough for Ms. Korner.
4 The problem stems from that the fact there was an erroneous of an
5 interpretation of a report mentioned in a report by the 1st Krajina Corps
6 and then Ms. Korner made a wrong interpretation and derived wrong
7 conclusions. There was no massacre in front of the health centre.
8 That's why I'm trying to focus on this. Of course, the Court is going to
9 deliberate on this. We are certainly going to bring more participants in
10 these events to elaborate on the details, but I think that for the time
11 being, my explanation should be sufficient. Or, rather, the evidence I
12 have submitted so far. I don't have enough time to go into details.
13 This is simply one of the segments of my examination. I have more videos
14 and more documents but I don't have time at this particular moment.
15 There are more important things that I still want to go through.
16 Mr. Brown accepted that he would change something that Ms. Korner would
17 not change, but that's really her own discussion.
18 MS. KORNER: I'm not trying to persuade Mr. Krgovic to carry on
19 with this, but I'm simply pointing out that --
20 MR. KRGOVIC: [Microphone not activated]. It's comment.
21 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone not on.
22 JUDGE DELVOIE: Microphone.
23 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we have the document in
24 footnote 34, 2D08-0119. I would like that admitted.
25 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
1 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit 2D134, Your Honours.
2 MR. KRGOVIC:
3 Q. [Interpretation] It was a short digression, Mr. Brown, but we are
4 actually still dealing with the subject of resubordination.
5 In answer to a question by Mr. Zecevic you mentioned the police
6 brigade operating in November 1992. In the reporting chain and the chain
7 of responsibility according to the doctrine and the practice that was in
8 force at the time, to whom did that brigade report? Or, rather, to whom
9 its commander reported and sent his combat reports to?
10 A. Well, I don't know because I don't have the archive of that
11 brigade, but I would assume they would -- they would -- they would pass
12 it to the superior operational group commander in the zone.
13 Q. You know that this brigade, although it was formed by the request
14 of the 1st Krajina Corps and sent outside the zone of responsibility of
15 the 1st Krajina Corps, was actually in the complement of the
16 East Bosnia Corps commanded by General Simic. Do you know that?
17 A. I don't know that, sir, no.
18 Q. I'll show you a document. 2D07-1144.
19 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, we are not getting a document on
20 e-court. Ah, thank you.
21 MR. KRGOVIC:
22 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Brown, this is a regular combat report of
23 the command of the police brigade from the CSB Banja Luka. You see on
24 the right-hand side who it is being sent to, the command of the
25 Eastern Bosnia Corps?
1 A. It would seem that that's the case. Whether between its
2 establishment it was moved to the command of the East Bosna Corps or what
3 change may have happened, I don't know, or whether, at that particular
4 time in December he was instructed to pass combat reports to the East
5 Bosna Corps commander, I don't know. But it may well have been that it
6 was moved or actually placed upped the command of the East Bosna Corps,
7 bearing in mind that the East Bosna Corps had a significant part to play
8 in -- in operations in the corridor.
9 Q. Further on, when you were responding to Mr. Zecevic's questions
10 yesterday about the police brigade from the Republic of the Serb Krajina,
11 the RSK, do you know that roughly it was the same. They were included in
12 the establishment of the Army of Republika Srpska but they were
13 officially the police brigade of the RSK with the same kind of rights and
14 responsibilities, like the police brigade from Banja Luka?
15 A. I don't know the details of the RSK MUP's engagement. All I know
16 is that they were certainly present in operations in the corridor.
17 Q. Do you see paragraph 2 of this order? This is what it says:
18 "During the day, units of the brigade went to reconnoitre enemy positions
19 and organised defence and heightened security of redeployment areas
20 particularly in the area that was taken over from the 3rd Battalion of
21 the police brigade of the RSK, the Republic of the Serb Krajina."
22 So in fact they were a police brigade just like they were the
23 Banja Luka brigade, right?
24 A. It would seem that they had been given a designation like that.
25 This is a report, by the way, not an order.
1 Q. A report. I don't know if I misspoke at some point, but I agree,
2 it is a report.
3 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I'd like to tender
4 this document into evidence.
5 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 2D135, Your Honours.
7 MR. KRGOVIC:
8 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Brown, in your report and in your testimony,
9 when answering Ms. Korner's questions, you spoke of a document.
10 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be shown
11 P611; Prosecution tab 51.
12 Q. Remember this? It's the state of combat morale in the
13 1st Krajina Corps.
14 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have page 2 of this
16 Q. See this paragraph here? "All units and armed formations have
17 essentially been put under the control of the 1st Krajina Corps although
18 there is still resistance from the CSB ..."
19 It's at the very top of the page in the English version.
20 If I understood your interpretation correctly, you said that
21 basically this observation has to do with the special unit of the CSB of
22 Banja Luka and that it had not been placed under the control -- remember,
23 it doesn't have to do with Prijedor. Judge Harhoff also asked you about
24 your interpretation of this.
25 So my question would be the following. Do you know this document
1 of the 3rd of September? Namely, that the unit, the special unit, the
2 detachment of the CSB Banja Luka had been disbanded a month before that
3 and placed under the command of the 1st Krajina Corps, and that your
4 understanding of this document is erroneous?
5 A. Sorry, could you -- are you saying that the CSB had been
7 Q. The unit, the special police detachment that you spoke of, had
8 been disbanded a month before this report and placed under the corps
10 A. I know that -- and again, I don't know the details in terms of
11 the MUP but I know that there had been a move to disband the CSBs and
12 that that had been internally resisted, at least initially, because I
13 believe there was some demonstrated need. So at the regional level I
14 believe there was some resistance to having the CSB disbanded but I do --
15 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. --
16 THE WITNESS: I don't know the details of it -- I do know --
17 well, I don't know if they were subsequently disbanded and integrated
18 into the military or not.
19 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Brown, are you referring to the special units
20 of the CSB or the CSB as such?
21 THE WITNESS: CSB special units, sir.
22 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you for this clarification.
23 MR. KRGOVIC:
24 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Brown --
25 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Or, rather, could the witness be
1 shown P1252, tab 21 of the Zupljanin Defence. 1502, sorry. P1502.
2 Q. Mr. Brown, I don't know if have you this document. I don't think
3 you do. This is a report on a visit to the Security Services Centre by
4 MUP officials from headquarters. And look at number 1, the conclusion.
5 Actually, it's on page 2 in English.
6 Paragraph 1, where it says that: "The special police detachment,
7 100 men strong, will be put at the disposal of the 1st Krajina Corps
8 under the command of General Talic as of the 10th of August 1992."
9 And then, further on, paragraph 2: "The handover of the unit
10 will be carried out on the 10th of August at 8.00 in Kotor Varos where
11 the unit is deployed. The handover will be attended by Djuro Bulic SJB
12 sector chief, on behalf of the CSB, and by Colonel Bogojevic, military
13 security chief, on behalf of the 1st Krajina Corps. "
14 And then the second paragraph of item 5.
15 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] We need the next page in English.
16 Q. I shall paraphrase, but in the territory of the centre, that is
17 to say, in the area of the public security station there are no special
18 police units or any other units. That is to say that from that moment
19 onwards there is no special unit. It has been placed under Talic's
21 You will agree with me that your interpretation of this document
22 is erroneous on the basis of the previous document that I had shown you.
23 A. Well, this is the first time I have seen this document and I
24 wouldn't necessarily say that it indicates a contradiction between the
25 assessment report that you showed me first. And I would have to read
1 both of them together. But the assessment report written, I believe, in
2 September, is an assessment of the state of morale for August so it is
3 looking back at the situation in August. Now -- and it's saying -- I'm
4 assuming it is referencing or referring to that this unit should have
5 been integrated into the military but that problems, despite this
6 instruction presumably, despite this instruction, that problems are still
7 existing in that regard.
8 So although the morale report is dated September, it is
9 referring, I assume -- and, again, I would have to read them both
10 together -- I haven't read this document before, but it may well be that
11 this was what was to be agreed, but in reality there still remained
12 problems that hadn't been resolved when the morale of the -- the officer
13 who wrote the Krajina Corps report stated that all units and formations
14 had been brought in but there are still problems with this.
15 So it doesn't necessarily disagree with me -- my -- my -- my
16 point that the corps still felt there were problems in this regard. But
17 I'd have to -- I'd like to read this document in its entirety and --
18 Q. You will have an opportunity do so. I'm going to print the
19 document out in English and you will have the opportunity of seeing both
20 documents during the break.
21 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, if this would be the
22 right time for the break, I would kindly ask that we take the break now,
23 which would mean that it's a few minutes early, but I would like to be
24 able to give the expert these documents so that he could prepare for the
25 rest of his testimony.
1 MS. KORNER: Can I just ask whether Mr. Krgovic is able to give
2 an indication of how much longer he's going to be.
3 JUDGE HALL: I was about to ask the same question. Indeed I was
4 going to suggest that during the break if counsel can -- if Mr. Krgovic
5 and Ms. Korner could meet and report when we come back, because even with
6 the extended session, I'm wondering - and perhaps my apprehension is
7 wholly unwarranted - but having regard to what Mr. Krgovic has indicated
8 in terms of the numbers of matters into which he still intends to go,
9 whether it is realistic to think of completing this witness, as I said,
10 even with the extended session. But counsel would speak and report when
11 we get back. So -- because the report would so indicate, if that
12 unfortunate event were to occur, where we go from there.
13 So we return in 20 minutes.
14 [The witness stands down]
15 --- Recess taken at 10.26 a.m.
16 --- On resuming at 10.51 a.m.
17 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, we've discussed -- sorry. We discussed
18 how long Mr. Krgovic is going to be. He thinks the full next session,
19 plus possibly a little bit of the last session.
20 I estimate - and I know that my estimates are notoriously bad -
21 but I estimate about an hour's worth of re-examination. So depending on
22 Your Honours' number of questions, if any you have for the witness, we
23 should be able to finish with an extra session today.
24 [The witness takes the stand]
25 JUDGE HALL: Thank you. Well, the witness who would have been
1 walking in and heard the last part of your comment I'm sure is relieved
2 to hear that.
3 Yes, Mr. Krgovic, please continue.
4 MR. KRGOVIC:
5 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Brown, I hope that you had an opportunity to
6 see all of this document during the break, the document that I had showed
8 A. Yes, I did, sir.
9 Q. Did you manage to see it? On the basis of this document, on the
10 10th of August, the special unit of the CSB Banja Luka was transferred to
11 the corps and placed under its command; isn't that right?
12 A. From the -- from the document, that would seem to be what was --
13 what was requested or -- or to be decided. I mean, quickly trying to
14 look at the document in some kind of context and I haven't seen the other
15 references or some of the other references noted in the document it would
16 seem that this is one of the documents that -- or sequence of events that
17 may have fallen from that general issue of paramilitaries on the 28th of
18 July and trying to bring groups under the command of the army that fall
19 into that category. Because, on the 28th of July, there is a reference
20 in that document that some members of the SOS, for example, are in the --
21 the CSB Banja Luka special unit and then possibly the sequence of events
22 from this, just based on the document you've shown me there, is that
23 there is this desire to bring that unit under the command of the army.
24 There clearly is a meeting or some decision around that time as well,
25 27th of July, from the minister of the interior. There's obviously a
1 series of meetings that go on in Banja Luka in early August in relation
2 to, presumably, what to do with the special unit, Banja Luka Special
3 Unit, and I think there's presumably some kind of hesitancy that this
4 should be integrated into the army, at least from the reference, because
5 it says that platoon commanders and members of special units rejected the
6 suggestion. Then clearly there's a decision after that meeting that this
7 unit should be placed under the command of the army and this is to be
8 done in Kotor Varos on -- on the 10th of -- 10th of August. But as I
9 said earlier, it may well be the reference in the morale report for
10 August is referring to the fact that, despite this, there was still some
11 difficulties or problems, maybe reflecting what's said at paragraph 3 of
12 the document that some individuals, members of the special unit
13 themselves, rejected the initial idea of being placed under the army.
14 So maybe that is my reading of the context of this document, but
15 I don't know all the background to the workings of the Banja Luka Special
16 Police Detachment.
17 Q. Thank you. Do you know, Mr. Brown, that towards the end of
18 July 1992, at the level of all of Republika Srpska, all of these special
19 units were disbanded on the basis of an order issued by the minister in
20 order to establish a single special unit in the MUP and that that was
21 actually the reason why these units were disbanded?
22 THE INTERPRETER: Please switch off microphones that are not
23 being used.
24 THE WITNESS: Well, I don't know. I'm not an expert on the issue
25 of the MUP and their special units and the reasons behind their
1 disbandment or formation. As I said, maybe my brief reading of this
2 document, bearing in mind the timing in the military documents and some
3 of the references contained in it, is that there was a desire, bearing in
4 mind what seemed to be at least from the military document that there are
5 some undesirables within the CSB special -- Banja Luka special unit that
6 it should be placed under the command of the army. And maybe the
7 document in September talking about what was happening in August was that
8 that wasn't completely successful or at least there were still some
9 issues to be resolved.
10 Q. Mr. Brown, when you dealt with the participation of police units
11 in combat operations, you said, in paragraph 248 of your report, you
12 talked about cooperation or joint operations between the police and
13 military in the municipalities of Banja Luka, Sipovo and Jajce.
14 Do you know on the basis of which principle these operations were
15 carried out? Were police units resubordinated to a specific military
16 unit with a view to carrying out certain operations? When you say "joint
17 operations" or "cooperation," is that what you meant in terms of
18 cooperation between the military and the police, based on the principle
19 of resubordination?
20 A. Well, I think I've discussed that at length earlier on. I would
21 have to go into the individual references about Sipovo and Banja Luka and
22 Jajce but I'm assuming what I've done is referenced the phrases that the
23 army used, which is "cooperation," "joint operations." I think I have
24 covered that quite exhaustively in the last two or three days.
25 Most of the references I see in the military documents, or many
1 of them refer to "in cooperation," "in concert ."
2 Q. Specifically when you speak about Jajce, you're talking about
3 coordinated action. You're not talking about resubordination. Do you
4 know which form this took, these operations around Jajce? What kind of
5 police participation was there?
6 A. I'm not sure, sir. I don't know the details of the very large
7 operation that occurred later in 1992 in -- in Jajce. I didn't go into
8 every -- every area. I would have to look at the references that I have
9 got in relation to that.
10 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We cannot hear
11 Mr. Krgovic.
12 MR. KRGOVIC:
13 Q. [Interpretation] I'm going show you a document, P411,
14 paragraph 13 in Prosecution tab 69. Sorry. Defence tab, Stanisic
15 Defence tab.
16 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] 65 ter 262.
17 Q. Sir, this is one of the first documents that I found, if I can
18 put it that way, from October, which treats things lawfully. That is to
19 say, how resubordination should be carried out.
20 You see here a document of Mr. Zupljanin's. You see the preamble
21 where it says: "Pursuant to a request from the command of the
22 1st Krajina Corps of the Army of Republika Srpska to engage 158 members
23 of the police from the Banja Luka CSB region, who will be resubordinated
24 to the command of the 1st Krajina Corps, to execute designated tasks in
1 It is obvious that this operation in Jajce involved police
2 participation on the basis of resubordination; isn't that right?
3 A. Yes. And have I never said that police could not be subordinated
4 to the military. This would seem to be another example where there
5 clearly was some agreement, some request from the Krajina Corps which was
6 accepted by the CSB, and that police individuals from these
7 municipalities were to be engaged in combat operations presumably in --
8 in trying to liberate, as they often referred to it, liberate Jajce,
9 which was successfully done. Clearly there's been agreement and it's
10 been accepted and the police are to be -- Mr. Zupljanin is instructing or
11 ordering, ordering his subordinate police units, to -- to go and place
12 themselves within the Krajina Corps.
13 Q. As for the system of commanding subordinated units you know that
14 in accordance with the then doctrine of the JNA and the Army of Republika
15 Srpska there was the principle of singleness of command and
16 subordination. So there's a single commander and there's a single chain
17 of command. There are no parallel chains of command.
18 A. Well, there's a general principle of unity of command, yes, of
20 Q. This unit, when it is resubordinated to the 1st Krajina Corps,
21 receives orders directly from the military commander in that chain of
22 command; isn't that right?
23 A. I would expect so. I don't know what the agreements were, but
24 the -- that -- I would imagine the police units were given to -- given a
25 particular area or to a particular commander as agreed by the police and
1 by the -- by the -- by the military.
2 Q. I'm not going to ask you about this anymore. My colleague
3 Mr. Zecevic devoted quite a bit of time to this principle of
4 resubordination, so I'm going to move onto something else.
5 There was something I wanted to discuss with you in relation to
6 your analysis, the one that we have here.
7 Mr. Brown, in your analysis, you spoke in detail about the
8 5th Corps, that is to say, whether the JNA still existed in the territory
9 of the Bosnian Krajina and then the relationship with the SDS and the
10 local certain authorities, the Serb side, if I can put it that way, with
11 the JNA. You talked about that relationship, as it were.
12 What about the members of the SDA and the Muslim people? What
13 was their attitude towards the JNA in the area and towards the
14 mobilisation that was carried out in 1991?
15 A. If I deal with the issue of the mobilisation in 1991 first, I do
16 know that a large number of Muslims and Croats did not respond to the
17 mobilisation. Some did, and obviously those JNA members that were
18 already serving, continued to serve. Generally, there are comments that
19 in 1991, for the operations in Croatia, you know, there were people who
20 did not respond to the mobilisation. And it's not an area that I looked
21 at in great depth in terms of numbers or statistics, but there were
22 issues more widely with the response of non-Serbs to -- to the
23 mobilisation. But some did respond, I have to say.
24 Sorry, your second area was in relation to?
25 Q. SDA.
1 A. No, I -- the report was not an analysis of the -- you know,
2 the -- the political workings of the SDA or -- or their forces. But I --
3 I'm more to happy to concede there were problems of mobilisation,
4 non-Serbs in '91, for operations in Croatia.
5 Q. Were you aware of this official call of the SDA? As a matter of
6 fact, President Izetbegovic that Muslims and Croats should not respond to
7 mobilisation in JNA units? This is 1992.
8 A. I'm not sure of the details, but it would not surprise me.
9 Q. And it's precisely for that reason that, inter alia, the
10 structure was changed, the structure of the members of the JNA in the
11 area, which contributed to a significant decrease in the number of Croats
12 and Muslims in the JNA, in relation to the number of the Serbs.
13 A. Well, clearly, if reservists are not responding to the
14 mobilisation that would alter the actual structure of units, yes. It may
15 not have been so prevalent certainly in the early months of 1992 or even
16 actually for the war in Croatia in 1991. It may not have been so
17 prevalent for active members of the JNA from non-Muslim ethnicities. I
18 do know there was a problem, as I say, of mobilisation and undoubtedly
19 that might have meant that units were short and that, you know, the --
20 the balance would have been affected.
21 That's not to say that non-Muslims in entirety didn't respond,
22 because I believe some of them did.
23 Q. [Previous translation continues] ...
24 A. Sorry, I meant non-Serbs, yeah.
25 Q. With regard to the period preceding this, the share of Muslims
1 and Croats in the JNA was negligible, right?
2 A. Well, I can't say whether it was negligible or not. I mean,
3 there were other problems. It wasn't just that mobilisation of non --
4 Muslims and Croats was a problem. I think there were also problems that,
5 bearing in mind the JNA was a federal body of individuals from
6 ethnicities in Serbia, Serbs from Serbia who also didn't respond to the
7 mobilisation. So it wasn't a case that all Serbs responded in the whole
8 of the FRY and that non-Serbs didn't. But I -- as I say, I'm happy to --
9 to -- to concede there was clearly a problem of the mobilisation. I
10 mean, I think a lot of Croats in particular were unhappy with what was
11 going on in Croatia and the operations in Croatia, so it was probably
12 reasonable for many of them to feel that they didn't want to fight in
13 that area.
14 Q. Speaking about the military situation in general, in the area of
15 Krajina which borders on Croatia, but also beyond, the 5th Corps
16 transferred some of its units from Western Slavonia to Bosnia-Herzegovina
17 and the reason being - and I believe you mentioned that in your report -
18 to prevent the war from spilling over from Croatia to Bosnia-Herzegovina.
19 That was one of the reasons for transferring the units from
20 Western Slavonia to Bosnia-Herzegovina, wasn't it?
21 A. I -- it's probably one of the reasons. I mean, there was
22 agreement, UN agreement, a UN-brokered agreement, I forget the exact
23 dates, but I think it was the early part of 1992 that the JNA should
24 withdraw anyway. So they were obligated to withdraw. But General Talic
25 phases that withdrawal and some units were withdrawn early and I believe
1 in some of his documents he was -- you know, moves them back into areas,
2 and I think even in some of his documents references to prevent
3 interethnic conflict. I don't shy away from that.
4 Q. And what essentially happened was that the war did spill over
5 from Croatia to Bosnia-Herzegovina because the first conflict in
6 Bosnia-Herzegovina was a consequence of Croatian forces crossing the
7 border carrying out some activities and killing some people, such as
8 Sijekovac in March 1992 and Malovan near Kupres and those were the first
9 clashes, military clashes in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Sijekovac is near
10 Bosanski Brod, by the way.
11 A. I don't know the fine detail of chronology and I will defer to
12 you. I know there were clashes in Bosanski Brod and the -- there were
13 Croatian, mainly Croatian populated municipalities in the area and there
14 were clashes and problems. But there were also clashes and problems in
15 other areas, so in -- if you talk about March that -- that may well have
16 been the case there, but there were clashes in Bijeljina, for example,
17 and in -- in late March and early April. So it wasn't necessarily simply
18 that -- the area that you mentioned in Bosanski Brod. I believe there
19 were other areas around that time too.
20 Q. Mr. Brown, talking about the military situation in the
21 Bosnian Krajina, answering a question of the Prosecutor, you said that
22 you didn't analyse the operations of the Muslim and Croatian forces in
23 that area because that wasn't your task, but, rather, that you focussed
24 on the operations of the 1st Krajina Corps in the territory controlled by
25 it. I hope I correctly understood that answer that you gave Ms. Korner.
1 A. Yes. I mean, I didn't avoid the issue completely. As I say, the
2 collection was a JNA/VRS collection and they clearly made references to,
3 in some cases, specific incidents, so for example the ambush of soldiers
4 coming back in Kljuc. There were smaller incidents. They also reference
5 sometimes generically that non-Serbs are armed and there are armed groups
6 operating in certain areas. But I didn't specifically go into looking at
7 the ABiH, for example or... That wasn't within really the brief of the
8 report. But, undoubtedly, there were non-Serbs who were armed.
9 Q. Mr. Brown, talking about the military situation in an area, if my
10 understanding is that your report is to present the military situation in
11 an area, isn't it necessary to present data about the enemy forces too?
12 Because that would be required to paint a complete picture of the
13 military situation and explain why this or that had to be done. Am I not
15 A. Yes, I would agree. I mean, clearly, if I had, you know, if
16 the -- if the brief that I was given was to include that, and also if the
17 material was there, and I had an archive of the ABiH and wanted to do
18 that, then -- then clearly it would be more complete. That really wasn't
19 the function of the report. It was to look at the archive that had been
20 collected. You know, I -- I have mentioned the limitations of the report
21 and, you know, this is not an exhaustive study of everything relating to
23 My analysis in relation to the issue of the arming of the
24 non-Serb population or armed groups formed military formations from the
25 ABiH or elsewhere, really is drawn from the Krajina Corps collection.
1 There weren't many references. There wasn't a big intelligence file or
2 brief outlining their view of what the non-Serbs were armed with, the
3 breakdown of their companies or formations or groupings, even if you
4 like, on the points of contact in places like Central Bosnia or in the
5 corridor. They -- they make reference and often quite generically. But
6 you know, I was working with the materials I had and my analysis in that
7 area is based on that and the general conclusions I got was, yes, there
8 was a severance of the corridor. Yes, there were clearly some Croatian
9 units armed in the municipalities you talked about in -- in the corridor
10 area, quite well armed. But, in relation to the municipalities that they
11 took control of in the early period, those municipalities seemed to be
12 reasonably uncoordinated. Control was taken really quickly. The
13 references that they have to armed groups are often very sort of general
14 and quite low-ish level. But that isn't to say that -- the non-Serb
15 population were not conducting actions. They were. Maybe that's a
16 long-winded way of answering your question, but I didn't look at it in
18 Q. When you dealt with the mobilisation in detail, or with the TO
19 units, as far as I understood, in that phase before the creation of the
20 VRS, the TO units were a regular military formations in the area and they
21 had the status of combatants, just as the JNA, right? Whether it's the
22 TO controlled by the Serb side or the Muslim side or the Croatian side.
23 We're basically talking about armed forces there?
24 A. Yes. The TO was slightly more complicated, I think, in the
25 5th Corps, in that there was mobilised Territorial Defence units that had
1 been mobilised for operations in Croatia and who were already working
2 under the JNA. One of those, for example, would be the 6th Brigade from
3 Sanski Most. So there was that component.
4 And also in April there was, after the mobilisation instruction
5 from the SRBiH, there was the Serbian TO, which seemed to mobilise
6 additional personnel, presumably often linked to the SDS or the municipal
7 authorities, and they gradually - or quite quickly, I think - developed
8 in municipalities. So that when, for example, the 6th Brigade went back
9 to Sanski Most, there was an existing Serbian TO unit there, and I think
10 both of them were involved in operations in Sanski Most. But I guess the
11 word "combatants" has a legal phrase but my understanding is that, yes,
12 they were armed formations.
13 Q. And TO members, whether we're speaking the Serb TO, or the
14 Croatian TO, or the Muslim TO, had the status of combatants and the right
15 to protection under the Geneva Conventions in case of being captured by
16 the enemy side and becoming prisoners of war, right?
17 A. Yes. I'd have to look at my Geneva Conventions again and -- but
18 no -- if it's an armed formation they have protections, clearly.
19 Q. In your report, Mr. Brown, you also touch upon the armed
20 resistance of non-Serbs in paragraph 2.196 and the following. And
21 there's a reference to a mobilisation list and the footnote is 650.
22 Let me show you the respective document. It's tab 45; 1D04-9510.
23 The tab is -- the tab number is in Mr. Zecevic's binder.
24 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Please bear with me.
25 Q. You comment to this in your report.
1 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please see the second page
2 of the document.
3 Q. In paragraph 2.606 of your work, you say that there about 2400
4 names on that list. Although some individuals have not signed to certify
5 that they received a mobilization call, and you also mention the weapons
6 in possession of the persons on those lists. Can you see that in your
7 report? I'm talking about the list of the Kozarac TO, right?
8 A. Yes, that would seem to be what the document says.
9 Q. And, based on your analysis of some additional documents, you
10 concluded that the date of this document is some day in early May 1992;
11 correct? This can also be found in paragraph 2.206 toward the end, the
12 last sentence. Do you agree with me?
13 A. I think that's what I wrote that it may well be around that time.
14 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I seek to tender this
16 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
17 [Trial Chamber confers]
18 THE WITNESS: I mean, it's a list. It is very incomplete and it
19 doesn't necessarily articulate more than what it says on the document.
20 It's ...
21 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Krgovic, what do you seek to show with this
23 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I seek to show the
24 list of mobilised members of the Kozarac TO. The list shows the persons
25 mobilised in May 1992 and the list contains 2400 names.
1 I agree with Mr. Brown's remark that not all individuals have
2 signed that they were mobilised to the Kozarac TO, but the list shows
3 that at the moment when the conflict broke out in Kozarac, at least about
4 2.000 people were mobilised to the TO of Kozarac municipality.
5 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, I'm sorry, but this is an matter that
6 arises as a result of this, and I think and I'm sorry to raise it now I
7 think for safety's sake Mr. Brown ought to just briefly leave court.
8 Because we can't ask him to take his earphones off.
9 JUDGE HALL: Yes, Mr. Brown.
10 [The witness stands down]
11 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, Mr. Sejmenovic gave evidence before
12 this Court not very long ago. He was limited, of course, from our point
13 of view to the matter of the adjudicated facts. However, as Mr. Krgovic
14 knows, he gave lengthy, lengthy testimony about these lists in previous
15 cases. He was not asked a single question by Mr. Krgovic about those
16 lists, and think Your Honours might have had an explanation which would
17 have been more assistance now that I heard -- I waited until I heard why
18 Mr. Krgovic wants to put this in and he wants to put it in as evidence
19 that 24,000 -- I'm sorry, 2400 were mobilised effectively by the Muslim.
20 There is ample evidence that could have been given by Mr. Sejmenovic
21 about this and had we known this was going to go in in this fashion then
22 he would have been asked those questions.
23 So if it is to go in for the purpose which Mr. Krgovic wants to
24 put it in, then I'm going to invite Your Honours to allow us to recall
25 Mr. Sejmenovic who has personal knowledge of these lists.
1 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] If I may reply.
2 Could Ms. Korner give me a reference of -- to Mr. Sejmenovic's
3 testimony showing that he wasn't asked? He was asked and he gave
4 evidence that he didn't know about the strength or the members of the TO.
5 Whereas Mr. Brown cites this document in his work, that's why I showed --
6 showed it to him.
7 Mr. Aleksic examined Witness Sejmenovic. He did ask him a
8 question about the strength of these units and the answer was that he had
9 no knowledge about it. As Ms. Korner says, this is nonsense.
10 MS. KORNER: Well, Your Honours, I didn't bring it in, because I
11 didn't realise that it was going to come up. I do have the passage and
12 can I assure Your Honours that if you look at the transcripts for either
13 Stakic or the Brdjanin cases, he gave lengthy explanations about it.
14 MR. KRGOVIC: I don't care about. He was --
15 [Interpretation] This witness testified viva voce and he said
16 that he has no knowledge about it. Or, rather, he avoided answering.
17 And he was called to testify about adjudicated facts, which did not refer
18 to this, and yet we asked him about it.
19 And Mr. Brown talks about this document in two paragraphs. He
20 interprets it, he analyses the armaments and, of course, he is the person
21 to ask about these things and through whom I wish to tender this
22 document, and these are the grounds for my application to tender the
24 JUDGE HALL: For the time being, notwithstanding what Ms. Korner
25 has indicated in terms of what she proposes to do if this document is
1 tendered, it seems to me that the basis for the admission at present is
2 that the -- this is a document cited by the witness who is presently on
3 the stand and it is one that Mr. Krgovic is questioning the basis on
4 which he utilizes it.
5 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, no, no. I fully accept -- and if that
6 was simply related to his report, but Judge Harhoff asked why it was
7 being tendered and effectively it is being tendered to show that 2400 men
8 were mobilised into what was effectively a Muslim territorial
10 Your Honour, I will find the passage at the break that I'm
11 referring to.
12 JUDGE HALL: Could we have the witness back on the stand.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, 1D04-5901 shall be given number
15 [The witness takes the stand]
16 MR. KRGOVIC:
17 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Brown, do you know that parallel to the
18 mobilisation that was conducted by the Serb authorities in the territory
19 of Krajina, to call them that, the Muslim side also performed a
20 mobilisation in the territory of the Socialist Republic of
21 Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 1992.
22 A. Yes. I forget the date. Was it 5th, or 6th, or 7th or 8th of
23 April. Round about that. But, in early April, I believe, yes.
24 Q. And you certainly know that, in line with that call-up, there was
25 a request by the Muslim TO that the armaments that were -- that were
1 formerly in the TO warehouses but was, at that moment, in the possession
2 of the JNA to be handed over to the units of the TO of Bosnia-Herzegovina
3 once the JNA starts pulling out?
4 A. Well, I don't know the details of the mobilisation instruction.
5 There were TO warehouses and in order to get weapons I'm assuming to go
6 mobilise, they were requesting that fact. If that's the case. But I
7 don't know the details of the -- of the -- the ABiH or the Bosnian
8 government's mobilisation. I believe it was related to activities in
9 Bijeljina and other areas, some period -- some days, actually, prior to
10 that. There had been attacks in Bijeljina and I think around the period
11 of the mobilisation also in Zvornik. But in relation to the -- what the
12 mechanics of that mobilisation, I'm a little bit unclear.
13 Q. Do you know that the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of
14 Bosnia-Herzegovina and the MUP, the MUP of the SRBiH, that the Muslim
15 Croat MUP, issued an order to attack JNA units during their attempts to
16 pull out of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as to erect barriers or hinder
17 them in that process, as a consequence of which a conflict flared up in
18 the territory of the Bosnian Krajina?
19 A. I know that in the Krajina area there was during this period of
20 uncertainty as to exactly what the JNA's position was going to be that
21 there was unease that certain JNA units were to be pulled out of the
22 Krajina and that that necessitated, I believe, a blockade of
23 Banja Luka -- I will it was maybe one of the strategic units a rocket
24 unit or something of that nature but that in the Krajina area there
25 were -- there were certain -- certainly barricades established because
1 they felt the JNA shouldn't leave.
2 I'm not sure in your question whether you mean the Republic of
3 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Are you talking about the government in Sarajevo?
4 Q. Yes, exactly. I mean the Sarajevo authorities. I will show you
5 the relevant document.
6 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] 1D151; tab 95 in the Stanisic
7 Defence binder.
8 I referred to three tab numbers and that's why I needed some time
9 to find the document; I apologise.
10 Q. Mr. Brown, please take a look. The commander of the TO staff of
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina, Colonel Hasan Efendic, from Sarajevo on 29th of
12 April, orders that columns and units of the former JNA must be hindered
13 in their attempts to leave the territory of BiH. And it says that
14 military facilities in the wider area from which attempts are being made
15 to remove equipment and materiel must be blocked.
16 And then item 4 says: "Quickly plan and begin combat activities
17 in the entire territory of the Republic of BH and coordinate them with
18 the staffs of the TOs of the regions, counties, and the -- the republic."
19 To me, this looks like a -- a call to wage war on the JNA and
20 actually a sign for the start of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This
21 order is based on a decision of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina of
22 27 April.
23 A. Well, at face value, it would seem that the Bosnian government
24 are unhappy with the fact that equipment and materiel that could be of
25 use presumably to them is -- is being -- is being removed by the JNA and
1 that they want -- and they believe that this is in contrary to agreement
2 annotated at the beginning, and they believe that JNA columns or
3 facilities should be blocked in order that that property is not -- is not
4 taken away. Clearly in the last paragraph, they are -- they are
5 anticipating combat operations. And bearing in mind the timing of this,
6 this is the end of April. There already had been significant clashes
7 and -- and conflicts in places like Zvornik and Bijeljina, Sarajevo,
8 and -- and probably elsewhere, that they are -- they are preparing for
10 I don't see it specifically as a direct war on the JNA. I -- I
11 see it more along the lines of there's been an agreement. They don't
12 believe that agreement has been honoured, whatever that was, and the JNA
13 are pulling out equipment that they think is either rightfully theirs or
14 should be theirs and they are to block these convoys and facilities in
15 order to stop that -- that happening.
16 I know that subsequent to this, in May there were some convoys
17 that were attacked, JNA convoys attacked. There was a very famous one,
18 or infamous one, I suspect, in Sarajevo, in May, I believe, but ...
19 Q. Mr. Brown, item 4 says: "Quickly plan and begin ..."
20 So all the members of the TO are hereby ordered to begin combat
21 activities in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, right?
22 A. [Previous translation continues] ... that's what it says. And
23 clearly the -- the activities that have been going on in the previous
24 weeks and the deterioration of the situation in Bosnia more widely has
25 necessitated them to -- to -- to instruct that planning an operation to
2 Q. Mr. Brown, before this date, 30th of April, I have only analysed
3 the municipalities mentioned in my client's indictment, Prijedor,
4 Sanski Most, Teslic, Kotor Varos, Banja Luka, and in those territory,
5 there were no armed clashes before this date. There were no attacks, and
6 I also haven't found them in your report. There were just individual
7 incidents. Everything that happened, happened after this date; isn't
8 that so?
9 A. Yes. In general, most of the attacks in the Krajina, in terms of
10 the municipality attacks, occurred from the middle or late May. Although
11 there were takeovers of municipality, for example Prijedor. I know there
12 was a takeover -- the SDS took over Prijedor actually properly on this
13 date or if not the day after.
14 This document also maybe needs to be placed in context what is
15 happening with the declaration of an imminent threat of war and the
16 mobilisation of the Serbs or the -- at least through the SDS which
17 occurred, you know, a few days prior to this. So there is a contextual
18 background. But, no, the attacks that you mentioned in those
19 municipalities did occur generally in the middle - late May, June, and
20 July, I suspect.
21 Q. So, except Kotor Varos, where the conflict broke up some time in
22 June, in other municipalities Sanski Most, Prijedor and Kljuc, the
23 conflicts broke up between approximately the 15th and the 30th of May,
24 1992. And it all had the same characteristics: Attacks on columns of
25 the military passing through certain areas. That was a unifying
1 characteristic of those attacks. They would attack columns at certain
2 points, set up by the Muslim forces, right?
3 A. I don't believe that is a pattern. I didn't see an attack on a
4 column in Sanski Most. There was an incident that I know at a
5 check-point in Hambarine in Prijedor in which two people were killed or a
6 small number of people were killed. There was an attack in Kljuc at the
7 end of May, I believe, in which a passing JNA bus was shot. And I think
8 there was also a separate incident or maybe it was related I think when a
9 policeman was killed. There was one incident, I remember, in Novi, I
10 believe, I think a policeman or a military policeman and a policeman were
11 killed, but that -- that was it, that I remember in detail. Sanski Most
12 didn't have that, and Prnjavor didn't have that. Banja Luka, I don't
13 remember having that. So I wouldn't agree with you that it was somehow
14 a -- a pattern.
15 Q. When I say all these actions, although specifically in Prijedor
16 it took part during the period of five or six days, in Kljuc as well. So
17 bearing in mind the dates and the kind of the attack, to me, it tells
18 that those attacks were synchronized.
19 MS. KORNER: Well, it doesn't matter what it tells Mr. Krgovic.
20 It's a question of the inferences that Your Honours draw and the witness
21 should be asked a question.
22 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] I'm asking him whether that is
23 true, whether my conclusion is correct. That's my question.
24 THE WITNESS: I don't agree that that's the case especially when
25 you place some of the contextual background of instructions through the
1 chain to make plans for the disarmament of areas. Operations and
2 planning operations were already going on, and certainly in some of those
3 municipalities these minor and unfortunate incidents where people were
4 killed did occur but I don't believe it appeared to me to be some
5 coordination. Clearly there were ethnic tensions in these municipalities
6 and incidents occurred, unfortunate incidents occurred, but I do believe
7 that planning was already under way to take control of these territories,
8 as articulated in my report.
9 Q. Mr. Brown, if you analyse a certain military situation in a
10 certain region - let me now revert to my original intended question - in
11 order to gain a clear insight into the strength of, for instance, a
12 corps, and into the strength of the enemy, it would be necessary to take
13 a look at the corps analysis for 1992. Isn't that so?
14 So just as you commented on the combat-readiness analysis made at
15 the level of the Main Staff with Ms. Korner, similar analysis were made
16 at other levels, for instance, corps levels, so I would like that ask
17 whether you had a chance to look at the analyse of the combat readiness
18 of the 1st Krajina Corps?
19 A. I'd have to go through my report again. I can't remember if
20 there was one. I do remember there was one done from the
21 2nd Krajina Corps but I'm not sure I have got the one from the
22 1st Krajina Corps. It may be there, I have to see. I would have to
23 check again. I think they all had to write one prior to the --
24 April 1993 one written by the Main Staff.
25 Q. A question of general nature: In order to gain a complete
1 picture of the events in the field and the military situation, it would
2 be necessary to compare the forces, to make a comparison between enemy
3 forces and a certain side forces, in order to gain a full insight into
4 the situation.
5 A. Well, I think I have answered that previously. You know, in --
6 in -- if -- if the analysis was to contain absolutely everything,
7 clearly, you know, documentary evidence, an analysis of the enemy, if
8 that's the phrase, the enemy side would be valuable. That wasn't the
9 nature of this analysis. It was focussed on the documents of the
10 Krajina Corps and, you know, I make no apologies that that -- in some
11 areas could be seen as a limitation.
12 I go back to my, I think, the general thrust of the area about
13 the non-Serb resistance or defence in that in those municipalities that
14 you talked about and in the Krajina municipalities generally, control was
15 established very quickly. That's not to say that the area of the
16 corridor wasn't a problem, that that took a long time, a relatively long
17 time, or months, I guess, in the end to completely expand it to the river
18 although they were quite successful initially to get a route through,
19 that is not to say in Jajce predominantly Croat defences were stubborn
20 and resisted for a period of time. In part that is probably because of
21 the terrain there, which is incredibly difficult from a military
22 perspective; it's very mountainous. Maybe it's a testimony to the
23 success of the corps that they even managed to take that territory. But
24 I do look at it, generically, in that in particular with the
25 municipalities and with the assets that the corps had and cooperation
1 with the other organisations and civilian agencies and police that
2 control seemed to be taken over in a matter of days, which leads me to
3 the conclusion that the defences of these places at the time were not
4 strong, were not coordinated, did not have significant weaponry,
5 certainly in comparison to what is available to the -- to the army and
6 the VRS, and I can only conclude that the defences were rudimentary at
7 best, I guess.
8 Q. Mr. Brown, if we look at the strength of an enemy, a necessary
9 element of such a analysis should be the casualties of the unit facing
10 the enemy, isn't it?
11 You are now describing the 1st Krajina Corps as a well-trained,
12 well-armed and well-structured and organised unit; isn't that so?
13 A. Yes. I would -- I would argue that it was -- I can't say for all
14 the components and when they were mobilising individuals that -- the
15 degree of training but it was a corps that had been in combat operations
16 for a significant period of time and it did seem from the documents that
17 they had a functioning command process and reporting process. And from
18 the documents that I have seen, they were very well armed. They had
19 armoured assets; they had tanks; they had artillery; they had aircraft;
20 they had an air force in Banja Luka, and they had helicopters; they had a
21 communication chain. So from that perspective it would seem to be a -- a
22 well-functioning military corps.
23 Q. If we talk about whether we could compare the strength of the
24 sides in the conflict, you, as an analyst, what would you say, what would
25 be a standard percentage of casualties of a certain unit, if the sides in
1 the conflict are approximately equal? What is then the percentage of
2 casualties on -- on one side, that we could say that it is an acceptable
3 percentage of casualties or a normal per cent of casualties. I'm
4 asking you that in case that you maybe performed some analysis besides
5 this report that we are dealing with now?
6 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Krgovic, where are we going with this?
7 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I would like to show
8 what are the parameters that could enable us to establish the strength of
9 the enemy. He didn't analyse the strength of the Muslim side in his
10 report or at least not enough to give us a real picture of their
11 strength. I'm going to come to a specific example of the
12 1st Krajina Corps later. This was just an introductory question to find
13 out what are generally accepted standards for that and then I'm going to
14 go to a specific example.
15 JUDGE HARHOFF: I think to be honest, Mr. Krgovic, if this
16 witness is unable to assess or to make any evaluation of the strength of
17 the Muslim army at that time, I don't think it would help as much to try
18 and draw an inference from the number of normal casualties from a general
19 theoretical point of view. I don't think this will bring us any further
20 to the truth. And, still, I have difficulties in fully understanding or
21 appreciating the relevance of this.
22 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, my point is this: The
23 witness did touch upon, to a certain extent, to the forces of the Muslims
24 and Croats, and he basically describes them as unorganised and unarmed.
25 So, now, what I wanted to find out with him, is if he talks
1 specifically about casualties of the 1st Krajina Corps and I'm going to
2 show documents later I would like to make a comparison, because the
3 Defence certainly doesn't agree with this evaluation by the expert that
4 Muslims and Croats were badly organised and unarmed and I'm now going to
5 try to show this through the -- a report by the 1st Krajina Corps. The
6 intention of my introductory question was to find out what are general
7 standards. I don't know whether the witness can answer that question but
8 the question is very simple. It is a introductory question which will
9 then be followed by a specific question about a specific document and a
10 specific analysis. And that's my last topic for this witness.
11 JUDGE HARHOFF: I think you should ask the witness then if he can
12 inform us of the number of victims on each side.
13 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Exactly yes, yes. I first wanted
14 this specific thing. That was my intention but then I thought I would
15 first go generally, find out the percentages in general and then later on
16 go on.
17 Q. Mr. Brown, you heard this. Do you happen to know what are
18 general standards about Courts percentage-wise when two forces of
19 approximately the same strength are facing each other?
20 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Krgovic, I'm sorry, we're not going to go
21 down that line.
22 MR. KRGOVIC: Okay.
23 JUDGE HARHOFF: If you want to put a question to the witness
24 relating to the number of casualties at a specific moment between the two
25 sides of the conflict, then get on with that question.
1 MR. KRGOVIC:
2 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Brown, do you know what were the casualties
3 of the Krajina Corps in 1992? And do you consider this -- excuse me.
4 Do you consider that such an element would be important to
5 analyse the military situation in Krajina in the relevant period?
6 A. I don't know the figures of casualties for the Krajina Corps of
7 1992. It may be something I could find out through going through all the
8 documents. They undoubtedly took casualties. They -- in -- at times
9 took, you know, not unsubstantial casualties. My assessment is that most
10 of those casualties -- large numbers of casualties may have taken were as
11 a result of operations in the corridor and Jajce, in particular. When
12 you talk about casualties, if you say, Do I know what the casualties of
13 the 1st Krajina Corps were for 1992, it would be very difficult for me to
14 draw an inference about which operations, specifically, and where. They
15 did suffer casualties. They do at times make reference to small --
16 smallish, in terms of numbers and we're talking, you know, five, six,
17 seven, eight, in operations in the municipalities. So, for example, I
18 believe, in Prijedor, General Talic made a reference to -- it may have
19 been around eight or nine, maybe a few more or less, when he talked about
20 congratulating the 343rd Brigade. I don't make the assertion that the
21 armed -- well, I don't make the assertion that there were no armed
22 formations on the non-Serb side. I don't make -- I can't comment on
23 their organisation and structure because I haven't seen through the
24 Krajina Corps documents many references to that. A lot of the time they
25 refer to groups of individuals, small bands of individuals operating and
1 we're talking about the municipality attacks. The -- from the documents
2 I see in that period of May and into -- into June and specifically in the
3 municipality areas, I do not see the corps took large numbers of
4 casualties. I don't doubt they took large -- large -- but significant
5 casualties up on the corridor area where I do believe that there was more
6 of an organised and well-prepared defence in part because those
7 municipalities had been -- or control of those municipalities had been
8 taken over by, I believe, predominantly Croat forces and there were
9 references to Croatian units coming over the border in to defend that.
10 So it doesn't surprise me that the casualties were in the
11 corridor area were noticeable and there were also, I have to say,
12 references in the documents to self-inflicted casualties, and it seems to
13 be a particular problem that they suffer where people go home, shoot
14 friends or negligently discharge a weapon or a hand-grenade goes off and
15 people are killed. There are references to that as well.
16 But in relation to the municipality attacks I don't large number
17 of casualties. I see larger ones at Jajce and I see larger ones in the
18 corridor, and there are the occasional references to people having
19 accidents. So that, from the casualty component, is what I see.
20 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Krgovic, we will take the break now.
21 MR. KRGOVIC: Going to be time for a break. I have just one
22 document more. After break.
23 [Trial Chamber confers]
24 [The witness stands down]
25 --- Recess taken at 12.05 p.m.
1 --- On resuming at 12.33 p.m.
2 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, may I very quickly deal with the point
3 that I was raising in respect of Mr. Sejmenovic just before Mr. Brown
4 comes back.
5 Would Your Honours have a look, please, on the screen at part of
6 the transcript. This is cross-examination by Mr. Aleksic at transcript
7 page 17504. Right.
8 JUDGE DELVOIE: What is the date? [Microphone not activated]
9 MS. KORNER: Ooh. 18th of November.
10 JUDGE DELVOIE: [Microphone not activated] thank you.
11 MS. KORNER: And can we look, please, wait a minute. Maybe six
13 [Prosecution counsel confer]
14 MS. KORNER: Yes, we need to go just a little further down the
16 Now this is the question by Mr. Aleksic.
17 "Q. To avoid going through your.
18 JUDGE HARHOFF: Line number please.
19 MS. KORNER: Oh, I'm sorry. 17505, line 16.
20 Now, Your Honours. Can I just ask Your Honours to look at it
21 rather than reading it out. But he says: "To avoid going through your
22 extensive testimony in the Stakic case" - and then purports to summarize
23 that testimony, ending up with: "Is that fair to say? "
24 "A. In part."
25 And then Mr. Aleksic moves to a completely different topic. Now
1 that is a problem, of course, with a compound question like that and the
2 fact that Mr. Aleksic or indeed Mr. Olmsted actually, to be fair to say,
3 I suppose, didn't stand up and say that is an amazingly compound question
4 and what do you mean by "in part". And that was it.
5 The document that was never -- was never put to him. As
6 Mr. Aleksic says there was extensive testimony and his summary, we would
7 suggest, is inaccurate. And the fact remains, Your Honour, and that's my
8 reason for caution over this document and I don't, as I say object to it
9 being admitted as to the fact because it's part of the report, but it is
10 not, we would suggest, based on that question and answer evidence, that
11 2400 men were under arms.
12 Now to complete was actually asked, Mr. Olmsted in re-examination
13 did actually ask something about it and we need go to page 17523 to 4.
15 "You were asked a few questions regarding the expansion of the
16 Kozarac TO and I want to see if we can clarify the time-line here."
17 And he then asked about the meeting.
18 "And then returning to Kozarac when the decision was made to
19 expand the TO."
20 Now because the document which should have been put at that stage
21 to him was never put, Mr. Olmsted obviously was limited as to what he
22 could deal with in -- in re-examination. But the answer there was, as
23 Your Honours see: "That was the period when intensive activities were
24 under way to turn the TO into a proper establishment. The establishment
25 of the TO practically started the same day when we returned from the
1 meeting to which the -- at which the ultimatum was issued. We didn't
2 even manage to finish this list. There was no time, there was no
3 opportunity to go visit somebody for a second time to ask for their
4 consent. You could notice about the list that a certain number of people
5 were said not to be at home. There was no time to go back the next day
6 or the day after and see whether that particular person was at home."
7 So, Your Honours, at no time was a suggestion put to him: Those
8 lists show, Mr. Sejmenovic, don't they, that you mobilised 2400 men.
9 If it is going to be asserted that as Mr. Krgovic said that these
10 lists show nothing, show that 2400 men were under arms then certainly we
11 would request that Mr. Sejmenovic be re-called and deal with these lists
13 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, may I respond to this?
14 First of all, I showed this document to the expert so that he
15 could confirm what he had already stated in his report. That was all. I
16 only limited myself to what Mr. Brown said about the -- this document in
17 his report. That's ail I need. I don't need anything more.
18 As far as Mr. Sejmenovic is concerned, the Prosecution had a
19 chance to deal with it if they wanted to. Mr. Sejmenovic, however, is
20 not from Kozarac; he happened to attend a meeting there. And I think
21 that because of that, he is not the person who could testify about that.
22 He is just an MP who attended a meeting. When he was asked in Stakic
23 about it he said that he didn't know anything about it, about the
24 strength, about the manpower. And Mr. [indiscernible] told him, So you
25 know nothing about it? And he confirmed it, and that's all.
1 If Mr. Sejmenovic is to be called here to interpret a document
2 which did he not draft and the process of mobilisation in which did he
3 not take part, there's no point in that. I have nothing to add to what
4 the expert said about this document.
5 Mr. Olmsted or, rather, the Prosecution, was aware of this
6 document and was aware of the report produced by the expert witness,
7 Mr. Brown, or at least that's what I assume.
8 So no good reason has been shown to re-call Mr. Sejmenovic to
10 MS. KORNER: Two things, Your Honour.
11 First, we were limited by what the adjudicated fact was that
12 Mr. Sejmenovic was dealing with.
13 Second, the document should have put to him because his name
14 appears on it. And -- yes, that's the other thing. Thank you very much.
15 I have been reminded, it's not on our 65 ter list. It was disclosed to
16 the Defence. So that was our other limitation on it.
17 But as I say, in order to base that suggestion that Mr. Krgovic
18 wishes to make that there were 2400 people actually armed and active.
19 That is what Sejmenovic should have been asked about.
20 JUDGE HALL: I don't know that any useful --
21 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] [Overlapping speakers] ...
22 JUDGE HALL: I don't know that is there any further useful
23 purpose to take this matter at this point.
24 Regardless of what has passed between counsel so far today, I'm
25 disinclined to anticipate what Mr. Krgovic may or may not do. I prefer
1 to limit the effect of this document to -- as Mr. Krgovic has said, it is
2 a document which is -- part of the footnote in the witness's report and
3 it is for that purposes -- for that purpose alone, the purpose of
4 continuity, I suppose that it was relied on. Now what may happen and
5 what may happen as a consequence of what may happen, I would prefer to
6 deal with when we reach that point.
7 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, I agree but that is not what
8 Mr. Krgovic said. He said in terms, I'm relying on it to show that 2400
9 men were under arms as part of my case.
10 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] I didn't say that. I said there
11 was a list, listing 2400 people, of which some were mobilised and some
12 were not. And that's exactly what Mr. Brown said in his report. That's
14 JUDGE HALL: So we leave it there for the time being.
15 [The witness takes the stand]
16 JUDGE HALL: For the sake of the record, which didn't pick up the
17 overlapping conversation, the completion of my observations that we leave
18 it there for the time being. Thank you.
19 We will -- this session, which will conclude at the usual time of
20 1.45, we will resume, the extended session, at 2.30 and finish at 4.00 at
21 the latest.
22 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we have 1D04-9090; tab 29 in
23 Stanisic binder.
24 [In English] I have problem with e-court.
25 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Brown, this is the analysis of combat
1 readiness of the 1st Krajina Corps for 1992?
2 A. That's correct, sir, yes.
3 Q. Mr. Brown, when, in your report, you spoke about the activities
4 of the 1st Krajina Corps, did you have an opportunity to consider this
5 document while making your report?
6 A. I can't remember if I have referenced this document. I'd have to
7 check. Is it from the Krajina Corps collection?
8 Q. Yes, as far as I know this is a document that was only recently
9 disclosed to us.
10 Of course, it would be necessary to include this document into
11 your analysis in order to gain a full picture into the activities of the
12 corps in 1992.
13 A. I -- I would check if I have referenced this or not. I'd like to
14 check that.
15 Q. I haven't found it. That's precisely why I mention it. Maybe I
16 missed it, but I haven't found it.
17 Now, can we take look at the first page - that is, the next
18 page - on the screen. I think you may have mentioned it in footnote 713,
19 but I'm not sure.
20 A. Yes, I think it's there. Yes, I think it's referenced in that
22 Q. When you wrote about the tasks. So, now, let us take a look at
23 the next page, where they talk about reports, activities and casualties.
24 Can you see here that in Croatia -- now let me just check whether
25 that's the correct page. It's also the next page in Serbian. That's
1 page 3 in Serbian and - just a moment - I think it's the previous page in
3 Can you see it at the very bottom. "In the course of combat
4 activities in Slavonia, 378 troops from the corps were killed and 2.874
5 were wounded."
6 And then it goes on. Page 16 in Serbian; 12 in English.
7 And here it says: "Losses, amounting to 2953 troops killed and
8 13.324 wounded, had the most negative influence on morale."
9 Mr. Brown, when we take into account the manpower of the corps
10 itself, which was between 65 and 70.000 soldiers and officers, we can see
11 here that about 20 per cent of the combatants of the 1st Krajina Corps
12 were hors de combat. That is a significant loss, isn't it?
13 A. I'm not sure that's 20 per cent, sir. At least not -- not by my
14 maths. But I don't doubt, that the corps, as I said before, took
15 significant casualties. And in particular the large operations in the
16 corridor and in Jajce and on the contact lines in the sort of Vlasic
17 area, and presumably I know that there were reports, soldiers on the
18 front line in the corridor were being shelled from over the river in
19 Croatia. So I don't doubt that the corps took a lot of casualties.
20 These casualties, when hes -- he may well be talking about
21 including all the casualties he had in Western Slavonia as well. They
22 took casualties there. So I don't doubt that they took casualties. And
23 other corps in other areas took casualties. And this is, you know, maybe
24 over a one-year period, if he is talking about Western Slavonia he is
25 taking probably from November to all the way through to whenever this
1 report was written, or the end of December 1992, potentially. I don't
2 say that the corps didn't take casualties at all. It did. And, you
3 know, probably in some units the casualties were high. But my point is
4 that when I looked at the municipality attacks, and you discussed that
5 before, I didn't see large numbers of casualties being taken there, but I
6 make no bones that, in the whole period of the reporting period and
7 especially in the corridor area where the fighting, was quite
8 significant, that the corps took casualties.
9 Q. Sir, that information concerning Slavonia was on the previous
10 page and that is where this comes from. That is what I showed you.
11 You're saying that Operation Corridor was when? In June? That's when
12 there was a breakthrough, right?
13 A. There was a breakthrough in June. It was expanded through the
14 summer and they had to maintain the front lines -- actually, they had to
15 maintain the front lines for the whole of the war. So there was a
16 significant deployment of forces there. And there were instances where
17 Krajina Corps units were sent to other areas. I know -- whether it is
18 exactly in this reporting period but I know that some elements of the
19 Krajina Corps were sent to other fronts. So you know I don't -- as I
20 say, I don't dispute that the corps took casualties.
21 Q. Apart from the corridor, do you know of the members of the
22 1st Krajina Corps having been sent somewhere in 1991? Because sometime
23 in the Autumn that was the area of responsibility of the
24 Eastern Bosnian Corps, where the police brigade was sent.
25 A. No. It's a long time, but I remember some component of the
1 1st Krajina Corps, I believe, was sent either to the East Bosna Corps or
2 the Drina Corps, a small component, and it went off to do some activity
4 But my point is that the corps was active. It was active in 1992
5 and it was active during this period and it had been active in
6 Western Slavonia. I don't dispute if this is what's written as the
7 casualty figures that that's what the corps suffered and -- yeah, I --
8 that what's it says.
9 Q. In relation to the total number, Mr. Brown, the total number of
10 corps members, very simply, if when we add these two figures up, 13324
11 wounded, 2953 killed, it's about 16.000 soldiers in relation to the
12 strength of the corps which, at the end of 1992, was about 65.000.
13 That's about 20 per cent, isn't it?
14 A. I thought you were talking about people killed. But if you add
15 the casualties up, it may well get there.
16 Q. Hors de combat. That's what I'm saying, so I'm including both
17 the wounded and the killed. I understand that to be a military term.
18 Mr. Brown, let's move on to page 46 of this document. There
19 you're going to see the losses per month.
20 You see -- I mean, it's the same page in English too.
21 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated]
22 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] There's just the list. It probably
23 hasn't been translated for some reason. Because it is Attachment
24 number 1.
25 Q. You see the wounded in the first column and in the last one, the
1 killed persons, POG, poginolje [phoen] so look at January, February,
2 March, April ment and then from May onwards, when the conflict started in
3 Bosnia-Herzegovina. You see that the number is on the rise all the way
4 up to December 1992?
5 A. Yes. And it doesn't surprise me. But, again, I would say that,
6 you know, the casualties are significant, become more significant, and
7 the conflict generally begins to break out but in particular in the
8 months of July, August -- June, July, August, and that's when the
9 corridor operation is, and later on you have operations in Jajce.
10 I mean, I'm going from the B/C/S version and if you tell me that
11 the last column is killed at least that would say -- and I guess maybe
12 the wounded column would mirror that.
13 Q. Mr. Brown, as far as I can recall, that document of the 24th of
14 June that was shown to you by Mr. Zecevic, I think, it says that
15 Operation Corridor was over by that date. So these losses, in September,
16 October, November, December, have to do with Operation Jajce.
17 So from June all the way up to December there is an constant
18 trend: Over 200 casualties per month, and over 1.000 wounded soldiers
19 per month.
20 My question was, when speaking of losses and the strength of the
21 other side, I mean, this refers to the strength of the other side, how
22 well equipped and armed the other side was. Isn't that right?
23 A. Well, it -- I can't say whether it is well or not. I mean,
24 Operation Corridor, to answer your first part first, it was initiated in
25 June, and they were successful within a number of weeks or days, I think,
1 actually, in establishing a corridor link. But there were subsequent
2 operations after that to expand the corridor all the way up to the river.
3 The initial success of the corridor, in essence followed the road linking
4 the East Bosna Corps and the Krajina Corps. But follow-on operations in
5 July and August and actually continuing through most of the year related
6 to expanding the corridor all the way up to the river. And then once
7 they'd succeeded in that, there was the problem of Croatian forces over
8 the river conducting operations or shelling and conducting -- so they
9 presumably took some casualties there.
10 Concurrently with that, they also had a problem in the Doboj area
11 and in essence the front line between Central Bosnia and Doboj, and that
12 continued through the period of -- of summer, late summer, and into the
13 end. So, yes, the initial success of the Operation Corridor was in a
14 matter of weeks in achieving the goal of getting the link but it
15 continued to be a problem for the corps in terms of clearing out the area
16 initially and holding on to the territory both from Croatia to the north
17 ands in the Central Bosnia issue in the south.
18 In Jajce, Jajce is a pretty difficult place. It's relatively
19 mountainous. It is it -- it was probably quite a good - easier - place
20 to defend and it was a struggle for the corps to take that territory and
21 I'm assuming that a lot of the casualties, maybe some of the casualties
22 that relate to the summer are a reflection of that. It's large gorges,
23 it's quite mountainous and it -- it wasn't initially successful as
24 Operation Corridor for example.
25 Then once they succeeded with that there was always the lines of
1 contacts with Central Bosnia which presumably by that time I make no
2 bones there was a defensive component or an armed component on that line
3 of contact and presumably the casualties figures reference that. I think
4 I said that on a number of occasions.
5 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Krgovic, are we not getting far away from the
6 nature of the attack against individual villages and municipalities in
7 this line of questioning?
8 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. Mr. Brown gave
9 an extensive answer and I actually wanted to narrow it down.
10 Q. So, Mr. Brown, if we look at this report as it is, you cannot
11 infer who was killed during individual attacks at various locations
12 mentioned in the indictment, and who were those who were killed in other
13 locations that are not mentioned in the indictment specifically the
14 locations you mentioned in your report, Prijedor, Sanski Most, Kljuc?
15 A. I don't think you can infer or extract that from these general
16 corps-wide figures. I do know or do remember of one document in late
17 May, maybe in the first day or so of June, which is a combat report in
18 which -- or it might be a summary report, in which they discuss the issue
19 of territory of Kljuc being taken over, activities in Sanski Most and in
20 particular referencing activities in Prijedor. They go on to say that
21 the 343rd brigade was involved, and in a line there they say in combat
22 action I think 8 -- 8 soldiers were killed and 24 wounded. It is not
23 clear if he is specifically referring to Prijedor or whether he is
24 referring to all the combat operations in those municipalities at the
1 So that's one that I can remember, but I don't see that there
2 were that many of that nature, and I think from these figures, they are
3 general figures presumably being produced for a larger document and I
4 don't think you can break it down as to where people were killed at what
5 time and in which location.
6 Q. Mr. Brown, at any rate, the fact that the losses sustained by the
7 corps were so big, shows that they were facing a very strong opponent. I
8 mean, losses of 20 per cent in modern warfare, that is a lot. I don't
9 know if you have that kind of information.
10 A. Well, I may dispute the percentage figures because I would have
11 to go back and look at the size of the corps. I don't dispute that the
12 corps was taking significant casualties at times. In some of the
13 operations that they were asked to do, particularly Jajce, I think, and
14 to a degree the corridor too, were maybe not easy operations and it
15 wouldn't surprise me if casualties were occurring and maybe even
16 significant casualties in individual units.
17 Q. As for Operation Corridor, I mean, all of these operations that
18 took place from the summer onwards, that's all the area of responsibility
19 of the Eastern Bosnia Corps because that is where the bottleneck was, as
20 it were, and that's where the corridor had to be extended and this was
21 the unit that fought the most in that area.
22 A. It was a joint operation between two corps. I don't know the
23 exact details of the East Bosna Corps; it was a far smaller corps in
24 terms of number. I think the most significant corps that was involved in
25 that was the Krajina Corps, in terms -- certainly in terms of its size
1 but it was a joint operation. Both corps were to link up from either end
2 of the corridor.
3 MS. KORNER: I'm sorry to interrupt, Mr. Krgovic, just on this
4 question, but the thing is but I'm getting slightly -- wondering where
5 the 20 per cent comes from.
6 Page 3 of the document that is he referring to says the corps is
7 around 108.000 people and then it says losses amounting to 2953 killed.
8 That makes 2.3 per cent by my reckoning, or by my working out.
9 JUDGE HALL: Well, with all the figures in the report we can all
10 do the arithmetic ourselves and I don't think we need get hung up on
11 these percentages.
12 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, I agree, Your Honour.
13 Q. Mr. Brown -- or actually, Your Honour, I'd like to tender this
15 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
16 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 2D137, Your Honours.
17 MR. KRGOVIC:
18 Q. [Interpretation] I think we're bringing your cross-examination to
19 an end. As far as I understood things, basically in your paper, you
20 dealt with the activities of the 1st Krajina Corps in this analysis of
21 yours. All of these other parts, if I can put it that way, were things
22 that you sort of added on in passing but basically you focussed on the
23 1st Krajina Corps, didn't you, or, rather the 5th Corps of the JNA,
25 A. Yes, predominantly the archives of the 5th Corps and the
1 1st Krajina Corps, and it was to do with operations in the Krajina area.
2 But clearly in looking at other documents or materials I saw, it may have
3 a bearing on that but it's referencing the Krajina area.
4 Q. The 1st Krajina Corps, that is, and therefore, its scope is
5 limited. It does not provide what the situation was throughout the
6 Krajina, right?
7 A. Well, there were a number of municipalities which fell within --
8 in the Krajina area fell within the zone of the 2nd Krajina Corps, I
9 believe. I think we mentioned Kljuc was one that transferred at some
10 stage and I believe that some of the other municipalities, if they're
11 Krajina areas in that general zone fell within the 2nd Krajina Corps, not
12 the 1st Krajina Corps, and I didn't look at that area.
13 Q. In essence, this analysis of yours should be entitled, The
14 military situation in the area of responsibility of the
15 1st Krajina Corps, rather than in Bosanska Krajina, right?
16 A. I --
17 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Krgovic, it's what it is, not what it's called.
18 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Well, in his report, Mr. Brown says
19 that he is speaking only of the 1st Krajina Corps and the title says
20 Bosanska Krajina, so this is the zone of two corps, right?
21 Bosanska Krajina was the area of responsibility of two corps whereas you
22 analysed only the 1st Krajina Corps, right.
23 A. I did. Although there are references in the 1st Krajina Corps to
24 units that were involved in taking over municipalities or conducting
25 operations outside what became the Krajina Corps area. For example, the
1 6th Brigade was involved in taking -- or in -- combat operations of
2 taking control of Bosanska Krupa. That later fell within the zone of the
3 2nd Krajina Corps. The 1st Krajina Corps was involved in part until
4 there was a transfer of AOR in -- in Kljuc. There are references to
5 Bosanski Novi in the report, even though it subsequently fell outside the
6 zone of the 1st Krajina Corps, although elements of the 1st Krajina Corps
7 units were involved at times in combat operations there. Some of the
8 municipalities in the Jajce area fell within the 2nd Krajina Corps and
9 there was a joint operation at certain stages.
10 No, I didn't utilise, generally, documents from the
11 2nd Krajina Corps. I didn't have their archive. But I do reference,
12 where appropriate, documents that took about municipalities that fall
13 outwith the Krajina Corps. So I -- I hope that it's as exhaustive as it
14 can be from the archive about many or most, I guess, of the Krajina
15 municipalities. But it's another limitation.
16 Q. So you agree with me that the document of your analysis does not
17 represent an exhaustive analysis of all developments in the Bosnian
18 Krajina in 1992, right?
19 A. I believe that's even referenced in the first page or the
20 introduction. It isn't an exhaustive analysis. I think it could be a
21 lifetime's work, potentially, if it was.
22 Q. Thank you, Mr. Brown.
23 MR. KRGOVIC: I have nothing further.
24 THE WITNESS: Thank you very much, sir.
25 JUDGE HALL: Re-examination.
1 Re-examination by Ms. Korner:
2 Q. Mr. Brown, firstly, the report. I'm going to deal with
3 Mr. Krgovic's -- a few matters of Mr. Krgovic's cross-examination after
4 that and I think after the break deal with the larger themes that
5 Mr. Zecevic raised with you.
6 Firstly there was a suggestion which came from Mr. Zecevic that
7 your impartiality in writing this report had been affected by the fact
8 that you'd been requested to do that. When you were asked to produce
9 this report, was that for two reasons, firstly, of course, General Talic
10 was on trial?
11 A. Yes, he was, at that time.
12 Q. And, secondly, in connection with the idea of whether this was
13 joint criminal enterprise or not, between the army, the military, and the
14 civilian, political ...
15 A. I'm not sure I was asked with that in mind particularly. I --
16 from what I remember, when I first arrived at the Tribunal, there was
17 this archive that hadn't necessarily been looked at in this manner and I
18 started to look at it as part of my job, discuss it with my manager and
19 it was clear to me that the document collection was very valuable. So
20 there was a suggestion that an analysis report should be written about
21 what this material may say. I'm not -- I mean, clearly that there was at
22 the time was -- I don't think General Talic was necessarily in trial at
23 the time but maybe there was an indictment. I forget the timing exactly.
24 But this issue of joint criminal enterprise I'm not sure was one
25 that was set as an issue at the beginning. It was a very general request
1 to look at this material to see what the Krajina Corps collection said
2 and within the caveat of a time-frame and it was left up to me to decide
3 what should be included in that.
4 Q. Well, that was the -- going to be the next question? Were you
5 ever told what to put in that report?
6 A. Not at all. I organised the material in a manner that I thought
7 appropriate. I never was asked to include certain sections and I don't
8 think I was even asked at the end to make any amendments. From what I
9 remember, I think it was a case of this is my report here it is and typos
10 and all that kind of stuff. I set the report, I set the -- the table of
11 contents and I decide what went in it.
12 Q. And I think you've answered what was going to be my last
13 question, is, were you ever asked to remove something of your report,
14 because it did not fit with any theory that the Prosecution might be
16 A. Not at all. And I wouldn't have done so if I didn't believe what
17 was in the report.
18 Q. All right. Thank you. All right. I want to go back, because
19 we've just been looking at it, to that last document which has just been
20 made an exhibit, the 1st Krajina Corps's own analysis which I think you
21 said would have gone to the Main Staff for inclusion of the overall
22 analysis of the VRS; isn't that right?
23 A. Yes, I'd imagine that's exactly the process that occurred. They
24 wrote theirs, it went to the Main Staff, it was compiled by staff
25 officers at the Main Staff and then subsequently disseminated out. As we
1 discussed earlier.
2 Q. If we could have that document up on the screen -- that's coming
3 up. Can we look, first of all, in the English at page 3, which I
4 think ... it should be same in B/C/S, I think.
5 MS. KORNER: English, page 3, please. Yep. Thank you.
6 Q. Just so we see there, because I don't think your attention was
7 drawn to it, the third paragraph: "The command of the corps immediately
8 began mobilisation and supplementary conscription so that now the corps
9 is composed of 48 units, equivalent to regiments or brigades with a total
10 of around 108.000 people."
11 I'm told it's the next page in B/C/S. Then if we go to page 12
12 again. Oh, B/C/S ... page 12 as well. Yes, thanks.
13 I'm not interested in the figures of the troops you have been
14 shown that already. At the paragraph at the end of the page in English:
15 "We achieved significant results in activities related to
16 prisoner of war exchanges. Within the 1st Krajina Corps's zone over
17 9.200 prisoners were exchanged, of which 2.300 were military personnel
18 from the former BiH [sic] plus the bodies ..."
19 So should -- Mr. Brown should one read that as showing that the
20 other effectively 6900 were not military?
21 A. It would seem to appear so, I -- maybe this is also a reflection
22 of some of the documents in Manjaca where it is clear that they believe
23 that many people who are in there, don't deserve to be in and were not
24 caught in combat zones or don't have uniforms or weapons. And maybe this
25 is another reflection that a significant number of people that were held
1 were not in fact categorised as military personnel but were presumably,
2 to all intents and purposes civilians.
3 Q. And then if we go -- there's a further part about that at the top
4 of the next page in English, page 13.
5 "Our commission was not confined to the 1st Krajina Corps's area
6 of responsibility and worked for all endangered Serbs. Although many
7 criticise the decision of the government of the RS to close down the
8 Manjaca prisoner of war camp they are not sufficiently aware of the
9 effects of the exchanges conducted by the commission of the 1st Krajina
11 And I think we saw somewhere else, Mr. Brown, that it was shut
12 down in November of the previous year?
13 A. Yes, I think it didn't actually completely close until December.
14 I think the last prisoners left then.
15 Q. And then still on this same report, can we go, please, and this
16 is really referring to one of the themes raised by Mr. Zecevic in which
17 I'm going to return in more detail. But could we go to page 21 in
18 English, and page 26. Although we'll need to go to the next page in
19 B/C/S for that, what I want. Yes. If we go to the next page it's the
20 paragraph, the fourth paragraph there.
21 "In cooperation with the SNB and the CSB in Banja Luka,
22 successful operations were carried out to identify the ringleaders and
23 cut short illegal military organising by Muslim and Croatian elements in
24 the corps's area, the plan for which did not give us any great surprise."
25 Now it has been put to you in the most positive terms by
1 Mr. Zecevic that the army in the territory of the Bosanska Krajina,
2 1st Krajina Corps, at all stages was ordering the CSB - I don't think
3 we've heard about the SNB --
4 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, this -- this is not correct
5 interpretation of what I said.
6 I was -- I was referring to the law and the resubordination of
7 the units to the -- the -- the -- the police units to the military
8 command in certain cases.
9 MS. KORNER: I'm sorry, this says this is talking specifically
10 about operations which -- I better ask Mr. Brown.
11 Q. Mr. Brown what do you read "operations, successful operations
12 were carried out" to mean?
13 A. I think he is referring to all the references that seem to occur
14 in the Krajina Corps documents about taking control of municipalities
15 that we've discussed previously. And maybe is he also discussing wider
16 operations in the corridors and the likes. But I think -- he's -- as I
17 have said, in a number of cases the corps documents predominantly discuss
18 cooperation with the police, not the Krajina Corps commanding them -- the
19 police, or taking control of CSBs, SJBs. Most of the references I've
20 seen relate to the issue of cooperation.
21 It's also not just the military documents that say that. Some of
22 the police documents I have seen reflect that too. And there were
23 clearly mechanisms in which police could be placed under the control of
24 the military or to be involved with the military, conduct joint
25 operations with the military, but it seems that the mechanism for that
1 was to reach some agreement at the corps and CSB level and maybe in
2 areas, in particular, I think, in the corridor, there probably were
3 instances where police units were placed under the command of military.
4 But in relation to the vast bulk of municipality attacks or municipality
5 operations that I see, the references are to cooperation, and I imagine
6 that to be that there was a police task, there were military tasks, and
7 together what they did was to control that territory.
8 Q. Right.
9 A. And I think the cooperation component is fairly routinely
10 actually referenced in the military documents that I saw.
11 MR. ZECEVIC: Just -- I think I might of help to Ms. Korner.
12 The problem is again with the translation of the document, you
13 see. Because the translation of the document says that the particular
14 part says, "in that cooperation." But it refers to the previous --
15 previous -- previous paragraph of this document.
16 MS. KORNER: I'm so sorry. Really, Mr. Zecevic can't give
17 evidence about this.
18 MR. ZECEVIC: [Overlapping speakers] ...
19 MS. KORNER: Just a moment, he can certainly read out what
20 appears in the document and I'm willing to listen to the translation but
21 he can't assert that it relates to the previous paragraph.
22 MR. ZECEVIC: Well, I can read the whole paragraph.
23 But I would need the whole -- the whole Serbian page.
24 It says in the original: [Interpretation] "The focus of activity
25 in the first half of 1992 was on the Western Slavonian theatre of war and
1 directed toward agents' positions and the uncovering and stopping of all
2 forms of subversive activity."
3 MS. KORNER: You haven't got your earphones on. The interpreter
4 is quite some way behind you. Can you slow down slightly.
5 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] "... and stopping all forms of
6 subversive activity. An example being in the units by the Army of the
7 Republic of Croatia. And the second half of the year, also toward the
8 Muslim and Croatian military factor in the zone of the corps in the
9 territory of the former BH."
10 Now the second paragraph follows: "In this cooperation, with the
11 SNB, CSB Banja Luka, activities were successfully carried out to identify
12 the ringleaders and the prevention of the activity of illegal military
13 organising of the Muslim and Croatian factor in the zone of the corps
14 in -- in which respect, we haven't had substantial surprises -- we
15 haven't been substantially surprised."
16 Your Honours, to my mind, the meaning of what I've read out in
17 Serbian differs significantly from the meaning of this inadequate
18 translation that we have here.
19 Thank you.
20 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Zecevic, you are referring to the "in this
21 cooperation"? Which is not reflected in the translation. Is that right?
22 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes. That is why I said it refers to the previous
23 paragraph. Because it said "in this cooperation" and they were talking
24 about the cooperation in the previous [Overlapping speakers] ...
25 JUDGE DELVOIE: [Overlapping speakers] ... thank you. It was
1 just to clarify. Thank you.
2 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, I see no reference to any earlier
3 cooperation in that paragraph. But I don't want to waste time and I
4 think it is a matter for argument and submission.
5 But can we turn over the page, please, to page 22 in English, and
6 I would have thought it is ... oh, it is, yep.
7 It says: "The work of the security organs and the military
8 police is closely connected with the organs and services of the CSB and
9 the military prosecutor's office in the corps zone, and on this level, we
10 have had a number of positive experiences and results."
11 You were shown a number of documents I think many ever
12 Mr. Zecevic which showed tension, as it were. From your overall reading
13 and analysis of the documents, how would you see this as a summary of the
14 activity between them, CSB and the corps.
15 A. I think I say in my report that the relationship at times wasn't
16 seamless and that there were tensions. I don't doubt that was the case.
17 But it doesn't seem to have been of such magnitude that the system
18 collapsed and broke down and these -- both those organs were -- were
19 unable to function and at each other's throats, despite these problems
20 General Talic appeared to be saying, We have cooperated, we have a need
21 to cooperate, and there's been positive results because of that.
22 Q. All right. That all's want to ask you about that document --
23 JUDGE DELVOIE: Ms. Korner, if I may, could we have page 12 of
24 this document on the screen, please.
25 Mr. Brown, in the last paragraph 9.200 prisoners were exchanged
1 of which 2.300 were military personnel from the former BH ..."
2 It's the word "former, the former BH" that strikes me. Is this,
3 in your opinion -- does this in your opinion make a difference between
4 prisoners of war, military from the opposite side in general as opposed
5 to civilians?
6 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I think he is making a difference here
7 that a number of the people he is categorising as military personnel
8 whether they've been captured in the zone of combat operations throughout
9 the whole of 1992. But --
10 JUDGE DELVOIE: So you take it that this phrasing, this language,
11 means every armed man taken prisoner in the combat zone? It's not a more
12 restricted category, in your opinion. I was just wondering. I was a
13 little bit puzzled by the language used.
14 THE WITNESS: I think the way I read this is they've taken a
15 large number of persons and a small section of them 2.300, they view as
16 being military personnel.
17 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
18 MS. KORNER: Yes, can we then deal with a couple of other matters
19 raised by Mr. Krgovic today.
20 Q. At page 54, line 12, he asserted to the Judges that, in your
21 report, you described the forces of the Muslims and Croats as unorganized
22 and unarmed. And just let's get an accurate reflection of what you did
23 say in your report, please. Paragraph 2.205.
24 Did you describe them in that paragraph: "In relation to
25 specific weaponry available to non-Serbs this often appeared limited,
1 both in terms of numbers and compatibility."
2 A. Yes, I did, Ms. Korner, and I believe that to be the case. I
3 didn't see many examples, if any actually. I'm not talking about
4 necessarily what was happening from Croatia, sometimes artillery was used
5 over the river or from Central Bosnia, but in the municipalities, I very
6 rarely saw if any reference to heavy weapons, and by that I mean
7 artillery, large-calibre machine-guns. I -- I think the weaponry that
8 they seemed to have was somewhat limited to small arms.
9 Q. And at paragraph 2.209, you talk again about the limited
10 weaponry, and then say: "Some general comments on the comparison between
11 non-Serbs and the VRS should be noted. The non-Serb forces were in the
12 position of having to organise a completely new structure at best on the
13 remnants of the Bosnia and Herzegovina TO or local manpower. The Serb
14 forces were part of a recognised and structured military and police
15 formations. They had maintained control of large amounts of weaponry and
16 TO weapons had been put under the control of the JNA and the VRS had
17 inherited ..."
18 Is that the view that you formed when you looked at such
19 documents as were available to you on the defence force -- the -- the
20 non-Serb forces?
21 A. Yes, Ms. Korner, I think I would stand by that analysis of the
23 Q. And then finally, and perhaps that's probably I can deal with
24 that before we break, it was a document, 1D151 was shown to you, on the
25 29th of April, the order, I think, by Mr. Doko about the JNA and it was
1 put to you that they were attempting to prevent the JNA leaving Bosnia by
2 ordering fire on them. And I think looking at what you said about this.
3 Page 47, yes, and you answered, in relation to -- there was uncertainty
4 in relation what the JNA was and there was a blockade of Banja Luka.
5 Now, I want you to have a look, please, at a document that you
6 reference, in fact, in your footnote 42. It's P551.
7 No -- thank you. It's coming on.
8 And it's an article from Glas newspaper and if we look at the
10 "At today's extraordinary session of the Bosnian Krajina
11 Assembly, the region's National Defence Council and the Banja Luka War
12 Staff were authorised to declare a state of war?"
13 Just a moment. Is there a -- can we look at the next page of the
14 translation. It may be in that.
15 MS. KORNER: I'm so sorry, Your Honour, I didn't check. Because
16 it came up during cross, I didn't actually check the document. I just
17 better look at the reference in the reports here is what I want. I
18 forgot it was such a long document.
19 Yes, it should begin:
20 "An extraordinary session of the Banja Luka began ..." --
21 Sorry, can we go back to the first page, I'm so sorry. Actually
22 it is in the first paragraph. If we could highlight that.
23 They're talking about the -- the JNA's new status after the
24 proclamation of the new Yugoslavia and that some units of the
25 Banja Luka Corps on the move.
1 "However, decisions were finally ... forbidding any movement, to
2 any extent of JNA units and their resources and equipment from the
3 territory of the Bosnian Krajina, that is, from the territory of the
4 Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina."
5 So does it appear from what you've seen today, Mr. Brown, that
6 both sides were anxious to stop the JNA from pulling out, for different
8 A. Yes. And I think both sides stress the issue of resources and
9 equipment. Presumably because they wanted to control some of it.
10 Q. Yes. Thank you.
11 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, I have dealt with all the matters that
12 Mr. Krgovic raised, and I will move to the other matters after the break.
13 --- Luncheon recess taken at 1.44 p.m.
14 --- On resuming at 2.33 p.m.
15 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, while we're waiting can I just ask, it
16 will give me some indication, are Your Honours intending to ask
17 questions, and if so how long do you think Your Honours will need, so I
18 don't get bogged down.
19 [The witness entered court]
20 [Trial Chamber confers]
21 JUDGE HALL: In short, Ms. Korner, we still expect to the finish
22 the witness well within the 90 minutes that we have set aside.
23 MS. KORNER:
24 Q. Mr. Brown, I now want to go back to some of the matters you were
25 asked about by Mr. Zecevic. At page 1880 [sic] of the transcript, he was
1 asking you about the dismissals in the 1st Krajina Corps, and he put it
2 to that you because they came from, in inverted commas, a different
3 ethnicity it was justified to dismiss them and what he put to you was as
4 I say at page 18880:
5 "Certain officers of the 1st Krajina Corps whilst they were
6 discharging their duties did things that were absolutely in contravention
7 of both of law and military ethnics. Under such circumstances you would
8 agree with me that their removal would have been fully justified,
9 wouldn't you?"
10 And you said: "Well, from the documents that I have seen, I
11 don't think the non-Serbs in the military were removed on the basis of
12 contravention of law and military ethics."
13 So I would like to you have a look at some of those documents,
15 Could we have up exhibit -- oh, golly, P1295, I hope. Oh, yes,
16 sorry, .18, just a moment. Yes, P1295.18.
17 And I think you reference this document in your report, 9th of
18 June, Colonel Vukelic, reporting on the meeting of the Crisis Staff of
19 the -- the regional Crisis Staff, and said there:
20 "It was stated that within the units of the 1st Krajina Corps,
21 and the units of the air force, anti-aircraft, et cetera, there are 67
22 officers of Muslim or Croatian nationality. An ultimatum was issued
23 requesting removal of these persons from vital command posts."
24 And that's the document you had in mind, was it, when you gave
25 that answer to Mr. Zecevic?
1 A. Yes, I think the Crisis Staff clearly were unhappy with this.
2 They put pressure on the corps, the corps indicated that they were --
3 that they -- the demand was justified but that they had problems in
4 essence trying to replace the officers that were to be purged, but they
5 recommend, the corps, that is, that they accelerate this process of
6 sending them back to the FRY for -- for processing.
7 Q. Yep. All right. And let's in fact, as we'll see, the same day
8 it appears that this was sent up to the Main Staff.
9 Could you look now, please, at Exhibit P1747.
10 Dated the same day as that memo or report from Colonel Vukelic,
11 from the Main Staff, to the command of the 1st Krajina Corps, referencing
12 the document. And I'll just check. Actually, yes, it's that document
13 itself which must have been sent up, because the reference is the same,
15 "Officers of Muslim or Croatian nationality must be sent on leave
17 A. Yes, so they clearly decided to accept that recommendation and
18 send them to the FRY for -- and I don't believe they came back.
19 Q. All right. Yes. Next topic then, please, that you were asked
20 about -- that I want to re-examine about, rather, is this question of
21 town commands.
22 At page 18897, I think it is, no, that's where the questioning
23 start. You were being questioned about document 1D365. And -- which was
24 the general instructions about town commands which came out in 1991.
25 And the question at page 18899: "You would allow for this
1 possibility that this instruction may be linked with the document which
2 we looked at a little while ago, P1783 which was order by the command of
3 the 30th Partisan Division to mount the defence of Kljuc."
4 Your reply was that, no, you wouldn't say it was linked. You
5 said that: "I believe that in the Kljuc Crisis Staff minutes, a couple
6 of days prior to this document, it was accepted and agreed that the
7 defence command should be established."
8 Could you have a look at Exhibit P448, please.
9 And it's page 5 in the English and page 28 in the B/C/S.
10 And may I just compliment you on your quite remarkable memory,
11 Mr. Brown. It is a comment, because it was two days before.
12 This is a meeting of the Crisis Staff on the 29th of May. At the
13 session, the following was concluded under 2:
14 "That a defence command should be set up than Major Bosko Lukic
15 should be appointed its commander."
16 Again, can I ask, was that what you were thinking of the?
17 A. Yes. Clearly they're getting briefings on the situation and
18 dealing with some other issues and they've obviously had some conclusion
19 at that meeting that a defence command should be established. I'm
20 assuming there was some military representative there and there was an
21 agreement and maybe what followed from that was the 30th Division's more
22 detailed instruction about the defence command.
23 Q. All right. And then at the very end of your cross-examination
24 because you had been checking your report you brought to Mr. Zecevic's
25 attention another document that dealt with this topic which was a -- a
1 report by, again, Colonel Vukelic of the 17th of June.
2 MS. KORNER: And could we have a look at that, please -- it's 65
3 ter -- this was not on our 65 ter list. But it has been brought --
4 Mr. Zecevic is asking questions about it and the witness reminded us of
5 it and so I'm going to ask that it -- when I've looked at it with him be
6 added to our 65 ter and admitted and marked. It's 10642; footnote 847 of
7 the report. Actually, it's the assistant commander. Yes. I said it's
8 Vukelic; it is, in fact, as we'll see, Vojinovic. It is dated 17th of
9 June addressed to the Main Staff, the civilian defence sector. And can I
10 just pause there because I said addressed. From all the documents that
11 you looked at, do you understand that the person to whom the document is
12 being sent is the person, the addressee, that appears under the date.
13 A. Yes. I mean, it -- command of the 1st Krajina Corps dated -- 1KK
14 reference number and its date and then underneath that is usually who
15 it's going to. The other option is they don't have the addressee, in
16 essence, above that title but have it right at the very end. But in this
17 case this is going to the Main Staff and presumably the civilian defence
18 sector means the staff officer, the equivalent staff officer at the
19 Main Staff.
20 Q. And if we go to the second page in English, I think it's -- it's
21 still on that [indiscernible] page in B/C/S. We see there:
22 "The civilian affairs organs of the corps command, town commands,
23 municipal councils, local communes and assistant commanders for civilian
24 affairs -- for civilian and subordinated units have been engaged in
25 creating conditions for the return of refugees, the organisation and the
1 formation of the Territorial Defence staffs and units and the
2 accommodation of UN forces."
3 And again, is -- is that what you were referring to?
4 A. Yes. That -- I -- I think as a civilian affairs officer, he's
5 presumably liaising with whichever body in all the areas of the corps
6 deal with various civilian affairs matters and there seems to be a
7 general introductory comment about what he is doing.
8 Q. And then the fourth paragraph again is he going -- I think it is
9 Colonel Vojinovic is referring back again to a Crisis Staff meeting of
10 the autonomous region.
11 "It was decided that elected deputies should begin forming
12 civilian governments in the municipalities of Donji Vakuf and Derventa
13 with the help of the units of the 1st Krajina Corps in that area."
14 Now you said as far as you could see these town commands applied
15 in -- in areas where there was problems with civilian government.
16 MR. ZECEVIC: Can we have the Serbian version of the --
17 MS. KORNER: Oh, sorry, next page in -- I'm so sorry. It's
18 there, isn't it, isn't the last paragraph on Serbian?
19 MR. ZECEVIC: [Overlapping speakers] ... I'm sorry.
20 MS. KORNER: [Overlapping speakers]... all right. Although it
21 may go over the page. I think it goes over the page as well.
22 THE WITNESS: Yes. From the limited documents that I think I've
23 seen, I would -- it would probably seem to be that town commands were
24 rather related to areas where there was no civilian presence at all or no
25 existing presence, or in areas where the corps had recently captured, if
1 you like, and I think in this case it would appear there was a meeting at
2 the ARK region in which these two areas were discussed and it was agreed
3 that in order to form civilian governments there that they were requiring
4 the assistance of the Krajina Corps.
5 MS. KORNER:
6 Q. Yeah. We can look at -- Oh, I'm sorry, Your Honour, can I ask
7 that it formally be added to the 65 ter and then admitted?
8 JUDGE HALL: Is there any objection?
9 MR. ZECEVIC: No, Your Honours.
10 JUDGE HALL: So admitted and subsequently -- so entered on the 65
11 ter list and then marked as an exhibit.
12 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P1798, Your Honours.
13 MS. KORNER:
14 Q. Can we just look at one further document on this topic, please,
15 in fact specific to Donji Vakuf. That is 65 ter 899. You were shown
16 some documents about that by Mr. Zecevic, about Donji Vakuf.
17 This is to the Ministry of Interior -- sorry. From the Ministry
18 of Interior the public security centre at Srbobran. Dated the 4th of
19 October, 1993. Sorry. Yep. And addressed to somebody called
20 Slobodan Jakovljevic. Sorry about the pronunciation. It's headed,
21 "Chronological factual report on the setting up the a Serbian SJB public
22 security station and police participation in the war."
23 And it sets out the events in Donji Vakuf. And can we go to the
24 second page, please, in English. And I think it's the second page in the
25 B/C/S as well. Yep. The paragraph that begins in English: "The 30th of
2 They talk about the bridge being destroyed, the mobilisation, and
3 then the Serbian flag being raised. "Because of all this and because
4 they would not lay down their arms, the Muslims moved out en masse and on
5 the 10th of May, 1992 there were only around 2.000 Muslims left in the
6 town. The police took over the task of disarming and apprehending the
7 already known extremists. We were helped in this task by the Serbian
8 army, which had already taken possession of all the strategic positions
9 around the town. Of course, we were also assisted by the people. At
10 that time, the only state or municipal institutions that were still
11 operating were the police station and army command."
12 Again, Mr. Brown, does that seem to go with what you were able to
13 ascertain from the limited documents that you were able to see on town
15 A. Oh yes, it seems that there isn't a functioning civilian
16 organisation there and that the police and army are operating and that
17 was the reason why later on they decided to establish one and seek
18 assistance from the Krajina Corps and establish -- through the civilian
19 affairs to establish some kind of municipal government.
20 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, may that document be admitted and
21 marked, please.
22 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] I think that this document had been
23 bar tabled by the Prosecutor.
24 MS. KORNER: It has, Your Honour, but it doesn't matter. It's
25 still easier to have it admitted and marked now.
1 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] We've already stated our views on
2 this document, and we objected.
3 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated]
4 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] 1993.
5 MS. KORNER: In that case even more so do I ask that it now be --
6 I -- I am afraid I hadn't read the objections by the Defence but even
7 more so do we ask that the document be marked and admitted. Mr. Krgovic
8 can explain how any objection he raised still stands.
9 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Krgovic.
10 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] As for the admissibility of this
11 document, we've already presented our arguments when it was bar tabled.
12 So I don't need to repeat my document -- my arguments and I think that
13 the decision should be made in that context.
14 JUDGE HALL: I appreciate that you would have previously
15 indicated the basis of your objection. But inasmuch as the present
16 application overtakes the bar table motion, could you -- would be so kind
17 as to remind us as the basis of which you objected, which may in fact
18 have changed in the light of where we are now with the application.
19 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, as far as the
20 objection is concerned, as far as Donji Vakuf documents are concerned,
21 the Prosecution did not call any evidence in relation to Donji Vakuf, so
22 none of these documents could have been checked, both in terms of the
23 content or the correctness of these documents. No link was established
24 through think witness and that is the essence of our objection in
25 relation to Donji Vakuf.
1 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, we didn't --
2 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, as for the Stanisic Defence, we have
3 stated our views when the document was bar tabled. Right now, I cannot
4 see this document properly. It hadn't really been notified and I would
5 really have to look at the document in its entirety. I would have to
6 read it in order to give the Trial Chamber my views on this now. We have
7 already objected, so I really cannot recall at this point in time what
8 our objection was exactly. There were several hundred bar table
10 Thank you.
11 MS. KORNER: [Previous translation continues] ... the document is
12 inadmissible. It relates to matters which are outside the temporal scope
13 of the indictment and the Prosecution failed to call any witnesses from
14 Donji Vakuf.
15 First, it's wrong to say it falls outside the temporal scope of
16 this indictment because it talks about the events of 1992.
17 Second, we didn't call any evidence on Donji Vakuf because we've
18 got adjudicated facts but this document has always - never been removed
19 or replaced - been on our 65 ter list.
20 Third, the circumstances have changed because Mr. Zecevic opened
21 the door to this by his cross-examination on town commands and
22 Donji Vakuf specifically.
23 MR. ZECEVIC: But, Your Honours, I really don't see any reference
24 to town command to this -- in this document. Not a single one.
25 MS. KORNER: There is no reference to town commands but
1 Mr. Brown's answer has been that where -- that where civilian government
2 wasn't functioning properly that appears to have been one of the reasons
3 for a town command to be there. This document supports what he says.
4 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, I think this is a submission.
5 Because the document itself does not refer to town command, and if
6 Ms. Korner wants to connect Mr. Brown's answer about the town commands to
7 this document this is part of her submission at the later stage in the
8 proceedings. But it has nothing to do with whatsoever with the -- with
9 the town commands, Your Honour.
10 JUDGE HALL: Thank you. And if I may add, Ms. Korner, you would
11 forgive me for having thought from your previous answer that this
12 clarified this -- what to us was this new problem of town commands but we
13 now understand that it's a inference that you would be inviting the
14 Chamber to draw.
15 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, if you take that document, yes, it's an
16 inference. But, Your Honour, as I say, the circumstances are now
17 completely different, and I think it's as well, at least if nothing else,
18 to remove one document from the bar table to deal with it now. As I say,
19 part of the Defence objections are just wrong in any event.
20 [Trial Chamber confers]
21 JUDGE HALL: We will have the document marked for identification
22 in the meantime to allow Mr. Zecevic to fully articulate such objections
23 as he thinks he has. I think we have heard Mr. Krgovic's objection, but
24 Mr. Zecevic, as I understand him, when he would have fully digested it,
25 may have an objection beyond what he may or may not have said in the --
1 in the -- on the bar table application.
2 So we would make a determination next week, but in the meantime
3 we'll mark it for identification.
4 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, can I say that was Mr. Krgovic's --
5 that was a joint objection. He had Mr. Zecevic's objection. It was a
6 joint -- I read out to you what both of them said. There was nothing
7 further he said.
8 JUDGE HALL: Let's move on.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit number, Your Honours is P1799, marked for
11 MS. KORNER: Actually, while we're at that time, can we have the
12 document back again, please. We might as well look at one other part of
13 it. Just to show why it's relevant and clearly admissible.
14 Q. The paragraph after the one I've just looked at talks about some
15 of the -- no, sorry, the last paragraph on that page being: "On the 4th
16 of June" -- I'm sorry:
17 "3rd of June" - paragraph before that - "an operation was planned
18 together with the VRS against a larger Muslim village. The police
19 and" -- it explains what it is, "the police was giving the task the
20 liberating the left bank of the river Vrbas and the VRS the right bank."
21 Do you know anything about this operation, Mr. Brown?
22 A. I don't in detail. I would have to go back to some of the corps
23 documents to see whether it is reported up and maybe who too took part.
24 But it would seem to be a joint operation of which the police were
25 dealing with one part and the military were dealing with another.
1 Q. All right. Yes. Thank you. Now, can we look at, please, the
2 larger topics of the question of the military ordering the police on
3 which Mr. Zecevic spent most of the time and the so-called status of the
4 police if they were resubordinated.
5 MS. KORNER: Sorry, Your Honour, just for a moment lost 1892.
6 Q. Yes, it originally -- when you were asked to look at Exhibit
8 MS. KORNER: Perhaps we ought just to remind ourselves of that.
9 If we can have that up again on the screen. Yep.
10 Q. And it was put to you that -- it was being tasked were being
11 given to the police, and you said, at page 18923: I don't believe
12 that" -- at tab 5.2.
13 Can we have that up, please, it's page 3 in English and same in
15 "There are specific tasks given to the police."
16 If this was the infantry brigade commander giving orders to the
17 police in Kotor Varos, what would you expect to see?
18 A. I would expect to see a section similar to the sections
19 throughout the report, 2nd Infantry Company, pioneer platoon, I would
20 expect to see a subsection there with the police's units name and then
21 giving very specific instructions in the way the rest of the subordinate
22 formations are. I don't see that. Normally what happens in an order
23 like this, all the components that are under your command are given a
24 specific instruction and here he does that with the companies, the
25 pioneer platoon, the security section and anybody else he believes he
1 commands. If the police were subordinated to him I would expect to see a
2 similar subsection.
3 Q. Thank you. Now can we look, please -- yes. You were asked. We
4 can see -- not sure whether you were asked about directive 1, and I don't
5 know why... yes.
6 MS. KORNER: Sorry, Your Honours.
7 [Prosecution counsel confer]
8 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, I'm not quite clear I need to ask the
9 witness about this.
10 Q. Can we actually go to another document which you were definitely
11 asked about. And that's Exhibit 1D -- actually, oh, sorry, 65 ter is
12 1D405. Now, this is the order securing the territory. And -- from the
13 1st Krajina Corps dated the 31st of July. And it was put to you, in
14 terms, about this document that tasks were being given to the MUP forces
15 and they're being given very explicit and clear tasks and that "there is
16 no doubt that the MUP forces are subordinated to the army in this
17 particular incidents. Wouldn't you agree?"
18 And that's at page 18951 and you said, No, not agree with you,
19 and indeed, you pointed to the fact that Talic couldn't order units which
20 are not under his command. And I think you drew the Court's attention to
21 the Posavina Brigade, which we can see at paragraph 5.6. Do you remember
22 that, Mr. Brown?
23 A. Yes, I think I do.
24 Q. Now I want you to look, please, at -- at the end of this document
25 at the distribution list, please, which you'll find at 18 in the English
1 and 17, I think, in B/C/S.
2 That does not contain, does it, the units -- it's not distributed
3 to the units under the East Bosnia Corps command, is it?
4 A. No these are all 1st Krajina Corps units.
5 Q. And it does not appear that was distributed either or sent to the
6 Banja Luka CSB or to the MUP?
7 A. No, it's not on the list.
8 Q. I want you to look then, as it were, as a mirror document not
9 unfortunately for the same time-period but around that time-period.
10 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, this is a document from the
11 East Bosnia Corps, document, yep. 65 ter 10645.
12 Your Honour, although it wasn't on our list it was disclosed as
13 long ago as September 2006 to the Defence.
14 Q. Do we see there that under 2:
15 "The task of the East Bosnia Corps as follows. One part of the
16 force is to defend the existent front lines, carry out or confirming(?),
17 regrouping and then move on to the liberation of Modrica with energetic
18 actions in coordination with the 1st Krajina Corps?"
19 This obviously all to do with the corridor; is that right?
20 A. Yes, maybe as I said before the East Bosna Corps were pushing one
21 way, and the Krajina Corps were pushing the other in order to secure the
23 Q. And three:
24 "One part of the 1st Krajina Corps forces will lead the attack
25 towards Modrica" - wherever it is - "with a task to, in joint action with
1 East Bosnia Corps, break enemy forces ..."
2 Now is that the East Bosnia Corps giving orders to the
3 1st Krajina Corps?
4 A. No. It's informing subordinate -- whoever's in the distribution
5 list, presumable subordinate units of the corps that the Krajina Corps
6 have a role in this operation and in fact they're leading the attack
7 towards Modrica and there's going to be a joint operation with the
8 East Bosna Corps to secure the corridor.
9 Q. Yes, thank you.
10 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, may that be again added to the 65 ter
11 and marked and admitted. It arises purely from cross-examination.
12 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm -- I'm not sure, Your Honours, that -- I
13 haven't seen this document printed. Maybe it was announced that it would
14 be used. But as far as I know only one document was announced that it
15 was going to be used. And I haven't seen this document ever in my life.
16 So I don't know whether it was disclosed to the -- to the Defence
17 at all, and when. And I have -- yeah, I heard, Ms. Korner. I'm not
18 disputing what you are saying. I just have to confirm that with my
19 staff. And I would like to see the -- the whole document again before I
20 would be able to give my opinion on the document.
21 Thank you.
22 [Trial Chamber confers]
23 JUDGE HARHOFF: Ms. Korner, we are not quite certain of just how
24 this document arises out of cross.
25 MS. KORNER: In the part I just read, the suggestion was that
1 General Talic is giving orders because the MUP are mentioned in that
2 original order that he was asked about.
3 Mr. Brown said, No, that's not right. And what's more, it's
4 clearly not right because you can see that he is mentioning the
5 East Bosnia Corps in the same terms as the MUP and he cannot give orders
6 to the East Bosnia Corps. And what I'm trying to show is that you see
7 exactly the same sort of thing in the East Bosnia Corps and it supports
8 Mr. Brown's assertion that what we are looking at where the MUP are
9 mentioned in these military documents in these terms is not a case where
10 the -- General Talic is giving orders.
11 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honour, if -- if I may be of assistance.
12 We do not dispute the fact that General Talic is not commanding
13 the -- the units of 1st Krajina Corps -- East Bosnia Corps. But what I
14 did, Your Honours, and what was the point of my cross-examination was
15 that there is a higher authority which gives the -- the order for
16 coordinated action and I have shown to the witness the directive by
17 General Mladic to all the corps, to East Bosnian, 1st 2nd and
18 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. With all they got was the same -- some of them
19 got the same focus, same target, and it was said in this directive in
20 coordinated action you are to do -- to reach that -- that -- specific
21 target. That is the whole point.
22 I'm not -- I'm not suggesting at any time that it was the -- it
23 was Talic that is giving the orders to the units which are not under his
24 command. I'm just saying that he is - and I'm staying by that - he is
25 giving the order to the MUP units because they are under his command and
1 they are resubordinated to the -- to the army.
2 That's the point.
3 JUDGE HALL: We were going to have the document marked for
4 identification, pending what you - but having regard to -- sorry.
5 The -- having regard to your explanation, Ms. Korner, is it
6 necessary to go any further with this document?
7 MS. KORNER: Yes, it is, Your Honour. It is all very well to
8 say, of course he doesn't dispute. He knows that General Talic can't
9 give orders to other brigade -- corps. But he -- it's the terms of the
10 order and I see Judge Delvoie nodding -- he is saying, You look at that.
11 He is ordering the MUP. No, says Mr. Brown, because it is exactly the
12 same kind of order that he is giving. The terms are the same as in what
13 he says about the East Bosnia Corps and you see the East Bosnia Corps
14 using the same language when they can't --
15 And I think it is important and corroborative, Your Honour.
16 JUDGE HALL: Well, by a majority, Judge Harhoff dissenting we'll
17 have the document admitted and marked.
18 MS. KORNER: Thank you.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P1800, Your Honours.
20 JUDGE DELVOIE: Ms. Korner, I know I show lots of body language
21 and that's perhaps my civil judge's -- civil system background. But I
22 would ask you not to comment on that.
23 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, is quite right, and I do apologise. I
24 should not have commented on that.
25 Right, sorry.
1 Q. Can we then continue, please, with what was put to you by
2 Mr. Zecevic at page 18961. Yes, no I'm sorry. This, in fact, was a
3 question by Judge Delvoie relating to the document that you were being
4 shown which was at tab 52 in our bundle.
5 MS. KORNER: Do you know, it would really help ...
6 [Prosecution counsel confer]
7 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, just one comment while Ms. Korner is
8 finding the document.
9 I note that the document, the last document, P1800 was admitted,
10 but I was informed and it was confirmed by my staff that it wasn't
11 announced at all by the Office of the Prosecutor for re-direct.
12 MS. KORNER: I haven't announced any documents for re-direct at
13 all. I never do.
14 MR. ZECEVIC: Okay.
15 MS. KORNER: We sent to you a document that we had not yet
16 disclosed before.
17 Q. I'm sorry, I've got the wrong -- but in any event, if I can just
18 stick to this. I have forgotten --
19 MR. KRGOVIC: Is it general practice or general rules about it?
20 Shall we do that in the Defence case?
21 I think based on guide-lines that you are obliged to do that.
22 MS. KORNER:
23 Q. You were being asked by Judge Delvoie if -- whether what you were
24 saying was that resubordination decisions as they can follow from the law
25 and this is at page 18961 are made on the basis of agreements between the
1 police and the military. And your answer was:
2 "I would expect that they would be. I'm leaving out the rest of
3 it. I would imagine there is a planning component and there is an
4 agreement in relation to what the police will do and for how long they
5 will be there for."
6 And Judge Delvoie asked: "Agreed by whom?"
7 And you said: "Agreed through the police chain and through the
8 police command and agreed through the military chain."
9 Could you have a look now at P163. Sorry, it's 1D -- I'm so
10 sorry. I will eventually but I want 1D46, please, 15th of May. I'm
11 sorry. It is actually out of kilter; it's my organisation, I'm afraid.
12 But anyhow, if we can just have a quick look at that. Because it's under
13 the general head of this. This is the 15th of May, Mico Stanisic order.
14 MS. KORNER: And can we go please to paragraph 7, second page in
15 English and in B/C/S. "The use of the ministry units in coordinated
16 action" --
17 Now I not sure what the word is because it's in Cyrillic, but no
18 doubt Mr. Zecevic will tell me if it's the usual word.
19 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes.
20 MS. KORNER: It is, thank you.
21 Q. -- "with the armed forces of the Serbian Republic may be ordered
22 by the minister of the interior, commander of the police detachment of
23 the ministry, Sarajevo CSB, and chief of the CSB of the military for the
24 territory under his jurisdiction. The commander of the police detachment
25 and chiefs of CSB shall inform the ministry staff of any use of the units
1 described in the preceding paragraph and whilst participating in combat
2 operations the units of the ministry shall be subordinated to the command
3 of the armed forces. However, the ministry units shall be under the
4 direct command of certain ministry officials."
5 Now there is a slightly different point which I wanted to come on
6 to in a second but as I've dealt with that...
7 It was put to you that effectively once there was resubordination
8 the police who were there became military conscripts, as it were. How do
9 you read this particular document?
10 A. Well, it doesn't say that, or it doesn't say that to me. I think
11 the first part of paragraph 7 would seem to indicate some agree of
12 authorisation and some degree of agreement that where this is a
13 requirement for police units in coordination with the army that that can
14 occur but there has to be that agreement. So, agreement usually means
15 meetings or discussions or some kind of prepatory discussion to allow
17 In relation to your point, I think that is the case. I don't
18 think -- if this is the instruction, if it was the case that police
19 officers when they work in coordinated action with the military or are
20 subordinate to the military, they become soldiers or conscripts, I would
21 expect it to be very obvious in this document. I haven't read it all but
22 I don't think it says, Point 8, when police officers are subordinated to
23 the military, they become conscripts and are subjects to the law of the
24 army and the service guidelines. If that was the case, I would expect
25 such an important and critical order to be passed down clearly and it
1 doesn't say that at all.
2 Q. Yes, thank you. Very quickly, then, because we are running out
3 of time.
4 Could we now look at the document P163.
5 This is a summary, Mr. Brown, of a MUP meeting held on the 20th
6 of August in Trebinje. If we go -- which was attended by amongst others
7 Mico Stanisic. If we go please to the fourth page in English and it is
8 the fourth page also, I think, in ... no, sorry. Third page in B/C/S.
9 Second paragraph.
10 This is the chief of Trebinje CSB, Mr. Savic speaking he says:
11 "Paramilitary groups were present in the area of the CSB but
12 following the minister's order this problem was successfully resolved in
13 cooperation" -- I imagine it's the same word, is it, in B/C/S, I think
14 it's the second paragraph in there.
15 MR. ZECEVIC: No, it's not. This is the cooperation. This is
16 not the coordinated action.
17 MS. KORNER: All right.
18 Q. "In cooperation with the Army of the Serbian Republic."
19 MS. KORNER: Can we quickly move, please, to page 6 in English
20 and page 4 in B/C/S.
21 Q. This is actually just to note because it goes back to the point
22 of town commands and you were asked for example about, I think,
23 Bosanski Brod. "Mr. Bjelosevic, chief of Doboj CSB pointed out that most
24 municipalities in the Doboj area are affected by war (Bosanski Brod is
25 under occupation as are parts of Derventa and Tesanj)."
1 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm really sorry, Ms. Korner, but we need the
2 Serbian text. We're getting something completely different on the
4 MS. KORNER: Page 3, sorry, page 4. I thought I said page 4, but
5 obviously not. Page 4 in B/C/S and it should be the second paragraph --
6 sorry, fourth, one, two, three -- fifth paragraph down. "Chief of the
7 Doboj CSB, Mr. Bjelosevic pointed out that most municipalities in the
8 Doboj region are affected by the war (Bosanski Brod under occupation, as
9 are parts of Derventa and Tesanj), while the town of Doboj is constantly
10 under artillery attack [sic]."
11 Finally, this is the part I wanted to ask you about. Can we go
12 to page 7 in English and 5 in B/C/S. "In the previous period all the
13 police officers participated in combat activities at front lines
14 confirmed by the number of those killed. There is also an increase in
15 the requests by the Serbian Republic army commands for police employees
16 to be sent to the front," et cetera.
17 The word used is "request". Is that the word, Mr. Brown, you
18 would have expected to see if, as Mr. Zecevic suggests this was the army
19 able to order.
20 A. No it would seem to be another indication there was a process
21 which the army and police had come to agreement that if they were
22 required, they had to make a formal request and it had to be agreed, and
23 that would seem to be there. And maybe the reference to the large number
24 of policemen being involved in combat operations is because Doboj was on
25 the front line. It wasn't like the municipalities in the interior or
1 around Banja Luka; it was one of the municipalities that was really on
2 the front line, as would seem to be indicated by the reference earlier in
3 this document. Amongst others, because the military make many references
4 to that.
5 Q. And, finally, on this topic, and I've only got two more very
6 short documents, could you look at P613, please.
7 This is 18th of September, 1992. It's addressed to the SJBs and
8 the commander of the 1st and 2nd Krajina Corps, the minister of the
9 interior for information and to the CSBs. "The number of requests by the
10 lower commands of the army of the Republika Srpska ... to engage
11 active-duty and reserve police forces in army formations on the lines of
12 contact with enemy forces have increased lately," et cetera.
13 "In connection with the above I wish to draw the attention of SJB
14 chiefs to the following: In keeping with the agreement between the
15 highest army representatives and those of the minister of the interior
16 [sic] the Banja Luka CSB has ordered the restructuring ..."
17 And, again, that was a document that you were asked about in
18 connection with another paragraph, but does -- how does that fit in with
19 your understanding?
20 A. Well, maybe the police I guess are -- feel under pressure with
21 the requests coming in but clearly there is this process, again, similar
22 to the previous one, lower formations are asking for police support.
23 Presumably, the police feel that they can't give that support all the
24 time. Potentially, I don't know the details about the mop-up.
25 Potentially, this restructuring was to try and keep the police down to
1 the bare minimum that they feel acceptable and anybody spare was to be
2 handed into the army, therefore alleviating their problem of having to
3 use the police on the front line, but I -- I don't know the details of
4 that individual issue. But it -- it -- it again seems to indicate
5 problems that are viewed, meetings that are occurring and agreements
6 trying to be arranged in relation to the function of the police, the use
7 when they have to in front line combat operations and the needs of the
9 Q. Now, finally, the assertion is made fairly and squarely, by
10 Mr. Zecevic on page 18994:
11 "I hope you will agree with me that when members of the police
12 are resubordinated to the army they lose, first of all, their status of
13 authorised officials and secondly, they gain the same rights and duties
14 as any other military conscript."
15 You were asked if you would agree with that and he said -- you
16 asked, sorry, for the references, and Mr. Zecevic then said, "If I were
17 to show you relevant legislation on which I base this particular claim,
18 would it help?"
19 You said, "Yes."
20 Mr. Zecevic said he was going to prepare it but hasn't.
21 But, in any event, if the police under the resubordination
22 principle became military conscripts, or squaddies, or whatever the term
23 is, would you expect then that they would be paid by the army?
24 A. Potentially, yes. If, to all intents and purposes, individuals
25 ceased being a police officer and then to all intents and purposes become
1 soldiers within the corps, I would probably expect them to be treated as
2 any other soldier in the corps and paid.
3 Q. If they were totally independent of the police chain of command
4 and the police requisitioning and the like, would you expect requests
5 being sent for the police to provide arms and ammunition?
6 A. I -- I would suspect that the military would be undertaking that
7 whole logistic support.
8 Q. All right. Can I just show you, please, one document. 10517
9 which goes back to this police brigade under the command of
10 Lieutenant-Colonel Peulic.
11 And this is to the MUP of the Republika Srpska Bijeljina.
12 "Subject, request for the following: We ask you to provide the following
13 ammunition for the needs of the police brigade of the CSB Banja Luka."
14 And actually calls it the police brigade of the CSB, and it's
15 dated 23rd of December.
16 Again, if this was a completely -- these were army people under
17 an army command, would you expect a request like that and addressed in
18 those terms?
19 A. No I would expect -- I would expect Colonel Peulic to go to
20 logistic base in Banja Luka or through the staff to the logistics officer
21 there, and I would have expected him -- potentially it might been easier
22 for him to get through the logistics chain bearing in mind he was a
23 commander in the corps and would presumably would have had to equip his
24 own brigades in Skender Vakuf and Kotor Varos and presumably knew a
25 logistic base commander in Banja Luka well. I would more have expected
1 him to ask that through the military chain. If that -- if they were at
2 all, to all intents and purposes soldiers.
3 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, although it was part and parcel of a
4 particular set of documents, it wasn't on our 65 ter list and I think the
5 point is made without the necessity, Judge, you would be happy to hear,
6 of making it an exhibit in this case.
7 Your Honours, finally, and I see the time, as I just read out,
8 Mr. Zecevic promised that he would give the -- Mr. Brown, and indeed
9 myself, because I have made the request, the sections of the law which he
10 says prove the assertions he's making. He has declined to do that.
11 Your Honours, I, may I say, have got a whole tab of law documents which
12 are all in the law library to demonstrate properly through a witness that
13 his assertions, as such, are not borne out by anything we've seen, but as
14 I say, we're always open to being shown the relevant documentation. But
15 it seems to me that given the time and given the fact that Mr. Brown can
16 only -- it is it effectively me just reading the documents, I will leave
17 it. But I want to repeat the request that I made that Mr. Zecevic
18 produce the regulations and the laws that he says enable him to make that
20 JUDGE HALL: Well, Mr. Zecevic is reminded. Thank you.
21 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, that's all I have for Mr. Brown in
23 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, Your Honours, I was just -- I'm not
24 aware what is the status of this last document? I understand --
25 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated]
1 MR. ZECEVIC: We do not oppose, because -- because the problem
2 with this document, Your Honour, the document contains some other
3 comments on itself, which -- which clearly indicate that -- that the --
4 that the explanation given by -- by this witness in -- in the -- in this
5 re-direct right now is completely wrong. And, therefore, I -- now I have
6 to ask that this document be admitted. Because the reference to this
7 document and the comment by the expert is on the record. And the
8 document clearly does not say that, and we can explain that in the
9 meantime during the Defence case.
10 MS. KORNER: I'm perfectly happy -- I didn't bring it up because
11 I didn't want to start an argument - I'm perfectly happy to have it made
12 an exhibit.
13 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
14 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P1801.
15 [Trial Chamber confers]
16 JUDGE DELVOIE: That should be a Defence document.
17 THE REGISTRAR: I apologise, as Exhibit 1D418.
18 MS. KORNER: I should have formally asked -- I think there's a
19 problem with the exhibit number. I don't think it has come out properly
20 on the transcript. I should formally ask to move into evidence
21 Mr. Brown's original report and his extra report on the Mladic diaries
22 and we will provide the Trial Chamber with a list of the footnotes which
23 are on our 65 ter list and which we would like to have admitted as well.
24 JUDGE HALL: So admitted.
25 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honour ...
1 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
2 JUDGE HALL: Yes, Mr. Zecevic.
3 MR. ZECEVIC: First of all, the 1D of the document is not
4 recorded properly. I'm not sure what is the exhibit number.
5 THE REGISTRAR: The number is 1D418, Your Honours.
6 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you.
7 Questioned by the Court:
8 JUDGE DELVOIE: Can we have exhibit number 1D410 on the screen,
10 Mr. Brown, this is one of Colonel Lisica's orders. You see that.
11 A. I do sir, yes.
12 JUDGE DELVOIE: To me, when it was discussed here, it looked
13 as -- a case of resubordination, yet you seem to be very reluctant to
14 qualify it as an example of resubordination order. So I wonder whether
15 there's something I -- I'm missing. So I need your expert opinion why
16 are you not calling this a straightforward example of a resubordination
17 order. Or did I understand you -- did I misunderstand you?
18 A. Maybe I didn't necessarily make myself clear. I don't know what
19 the agreements could have been that resulted from this, but it would seem
20 that Colonel Lisica is instructing the formation of a mixed battalion
21 which includes a police component and this appointment as the battalion
22 commander. And I am assuming that what is he doing is he is going to
23 utilise or that his tactical group is going to utilise that.
24 What I'm saying is I am not sure what may have preceded that
25 allowing him the authority.
1 JUDGE DELVOIE: I do agree with that. But I was not referring to
2 the agreement that leads to, in your opinion, a resubordination order; I
3 was just referring to the order as such, regardless of how it came to be.
4 And then do you then agree that this is a resubordination order?
5 A. He would appear to have a mixed battalion that he can issue
6 instructions to, so I am assuming it is under his authority, yes, sir.
7 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you. Then one other question. In normal
8 circumstances, outside any context of war, it is misbehaviour for a
9 police officer to abandon his post, right?
10 A. I would very much agree with this.
11 JUDGE DELVOIE: Yeah. And he will be punished if he does so,
12 whether it is criminal penalty or disciplinary, right?
13 But, on the other hand, to abandon a combat post for a military
14 is another kind of crime, right?
15 A. Yes, sir.
16 JUDGE DELVOIE: Do you happen to know what in RS was the penalty
17 for that?
18 A. The -- I believe the guide-lines which we saw at some stage
19 during the cross-examination, the guide-lines for criminal prosecution,
20 make a list of -- of that. I'm not sure what the penalty was --
21 JUDGE DELVOIE: But it would be much more severe, I suppose, than
22 the penalty for a police officer leaving his post at a -- at a traffic
24 A. I would suspect so from a military perspective leaving your post
25 is -- I mean, [Overlapping speakers] ...
1 JUDGE DELVOIE: In wartime [Overlapping speakers] ...
2 A. [Overlapping speakers] ... in wartime, at the front line, if you
3 leave your post -- although you can leave your post in different guises.
4 You can do the same thing being at a check-point and you leave to go back
5 to your home. Or you could leave in a barracks, but in the front line
6 we're talking about absenting yourself from the front line. That is a
7 very severe --
8 JUDGE DELVOIE: Okay. Now my question is, when you remember the
9 document in which General Talic reported to CSB, the 79 policemen that
10 left their combat posts, and there was a discussion about, was this an
11 order or a request to the police to -- to -- to initiate prosecution, and
12 you took it as -- as such.
13 But then my question is: What would General Talic expect the CSB
14 to do then? Prosecute that, initiate prosecution as -- for the military
15 crime? Not for the police misbehaviour, I suppose.
16 A. Well, I can only go, I think, by what the guide-lines say, and
17 the guide-lines and service regulations apply only to military personnel
18 and military personnel are defined as soldiers, cadets, active and
19 reserve members of the army and it may well have been, irrespective of
20 what General Talic would have liked to have done, felt under the military
21 law he had not got the jurisdiction to do that and that he is passing
22 that to the CSB for them.
23 Now it may well have been that there was no quite equivalent
24 code -- charge in the civil code or the regulations for the MUP. It may
25 be that negligence or dereliction of duty or a more general crime could
1 have been more -- but I don't see that -- that the -- the guide-lines
2 apply directly and I think what General Talic is doing is leaving it to
3 the CSB to come up with the appropriate disciplinary process or charge
4 that falls within the CSB's remit.
5 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you very much. That's all I ask.
6 JUDGE HALL: Well, we thank you, Mr. Brown, for your evidence
7 before the Tribunal. You are now released and we wish you a safe journey
8 either back to your home or onward to your next assignment.
9 THE WITNESS: I very much appreciate your time, sir.
10 JUDGE HALL: And we take the adjournment to Monday morning, 9.00.
11 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, sorry, can I have a ruling on whether
12 I can have the report, the second report and the Mladic notebooks
14 JUDGE HALL: I thought we had so ruled. This is a question of
15 the numbers that the registry must assign, in the usual manner.
16 MS. KORNER: I'm sorry, I must have missed that Your Honour,
18 [Trial Chamber confers]
19 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
20 [The witness withdrew]
21 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.52 p.m.,
22 to be reconvened on Monday, the 24th day of
23 January, 2011, at 9.00 a.m.