1 Wednesday, 6 July 2011
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.06 a.m.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning to
6 everyone in and around the courtroom.
7 This is case IT-08-91-T, the Prosecutor versus Mico Stanisic and
8 Stojan Zupljanin.
9 JUDGE HALL: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
10 Good morning to everyone. May we have appearances, please.
11 MR. HANNIS: Good morning, Your Honours. For the Prosecution,
12 I'm Tom Hannis along with Crispian Smith.
13 MR. ZECEVIC: Good morning, Your Honours. Slobodan Zecevic,
14 Slobodan Cvijetic and Eugene O'Sullivan, appearing for Stanisic Defence
15 this morning. Thank you.
16 MR. KRGOVIC: Good morning, Your Honours. Dragan Krgovic and
17 Aleksandar Aleksic appearing for Zupljanin Defence.
18 JUDGE HALL: Thank you. Before the witness resumes the stand,
19 there are two matters which the -- I'm sorry, Mr. Cvijetic.
20 MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] Just a minute. My presence was
21 not noted in the transcript. I do apologise.
22 JUDGE HALL: Thank you. There are two matters which the Chamber
23 wishes to raise. I would invite Judge Harhoff to deal with one of them.
24 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you. On the 22nd of June, the Chamber
25 directed the Zupljanin Defence to liaise directly with the Prosecution
1 when it is able to confirm whether any of its witnesses are willing to
2 meet with the Prosecution. And we further directed that the Prosecution
3 would do what is necessary to bring it formally before the Chamber, if
4 further intervention were necessary.
5 The Chamber understands that such an update was indeed informally
6 communicated amongst the parties. But we would ask you, Mr. Krgovic,
7 just to state for the record the position of your witnesses on this
9 Are you able to do that?
10 MR. KRGOVIC: Yes, Your Honour, there is no change in this
11 position, nor our witness is willing to meet with the Prosecution.
12 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you.
13 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, may I inquire because the last message
14 I recall seing about this there was an indication that there were three
15 witnesses, SZ-004, 005 and 001, who had not been contacted. I just
16 wondered if that was still the same, or if they have been contacted and
17 indicated they don't want to talk to us either.
18 JUDGE HARHOFF: My understanding from Mr. Krgovic's answer was
19 that none of the witnesses to be called by Zupljanin are willing --
20 Is that correct, Mr. Krgovic?
21 MR. KRGOVIC: You are correct, Your Honour.
22 JUDGE HARHOFF: Well, following from this, the Chamber recalls
23 that, also on the 22nd of June, the Prosecution had made a formal
24 application to have this fact considered a relevant factor when
25 addressing its request for cross-examination under Rule 92 bis (C) on the
1 Zupljanin motion for the admission of the statements of these witnesses.
2 We would like to invite the Prosecution to substantiate its
3 request by putting forth a reasoned argument as to how the unwillingness
4 of the ten character witnesses to speak or to meet with the Prosecutor's
5 office is a relevant fact under 92 bis (C). It should provide the
6 reference to any authority that you have on this subject, if possible.
7 And, Mr. Hannis, do you think you could provide us with a reason
8 during the course this day?
9 MR. HANNIS: Well, Your Honour, I guess I would request
10 permission to have a day to file something in writing for you.
11 JUDGE HARHOFF: You wouldn't have to do it in writing, just
12 orally would be fine. But we need to be sure that we have understood
13 fully the background and the reasons for your request.
14 MR. HANNIS: Yes, Your Honour. And it relates to the 92 bis
15 witnesses who -- to the extent that they are character witnesses, their
16 statements are in the general nature of, I knew Mr. Zupljanin many years
17 and he never said a bad thing about a non-Serb.
18 Well, our position is that goes to the acts and conduct of the
19 accused which is a factor that leans in favour of having that witness
20 appear. Because how else are we going to be able to explore the basis
21 for their opinion?
22 JUDGE HARHOFF: That wasn't the point, Mr. Hannis. If I
23 understood Ms. Korner correctly, she said that the fact that the
24 witnesses had refused to speak to you was, in itself, something that
25 would favour their being called for cross-examination, and it is this
1 argument that we are interested in understanding better.
2 MR. HANNIS: In a way, Your Honour, it's like trying to prove the
3 negative. Without being able to speak to them, we don't know. If we
4 spoke to them, we might be satisfied this is a person who knew him but
5 only knew him in this limited extent, and therefore we don't have a
6 problem with their opinion being expressed because it won't carry much
7 weight. But with not being able to speak to them, we have no idea about
9 And neither will the Court, frankly. I think you need that
10 information to weigh their evidence.
11 [Trial Chamber confers]
12 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Hannis, does this exhaust your answer to my
13 question, or would you still need more time to consider it?
14 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I would like to have more time to
15 consult with Ms. Korner to see if she had some additional input.
16 JUDGE HARHOFF: By the end of the day, if possible. Thank you.
17 MR. HANNIS: Yes.
18 JUDGE HALL: Thank you, Judge.
19 The second matter is more of a housekeeping nature. When the
20 witness returns to the stand this morning, I intend to inform him that
21 the -- having consulted with VWS through the kind assistance of the
22 Court Officer, we have decided that in order to accommodate his peculiar
23 circumstances, we would vary the sitting times so that we sit in sessions
24 of an hour each with a 15 minute break.
25 So, therefore, we would sit from 9.00 to 10.00, from 10.15 to
1 11.15, 11.30 to 12.30, and 12.45 to 1.45, which, arithmetically, we trust
2 should still keep us within the four hours permitted each day. And this
3 also means that everyone concerned - and, in that, I include the Judges -
4 would have to impose the discipline on themselves to return at the end of
5 15 minutes.
6 But before that is communicated to the witness, I just wondered
7 whether counsel had a view on the varied sitting times.
8 MR. HANNIS: I have no problem with that, Your Honour.
9 MR. ZECEVIC: No problem with that either, Your Honours, and I'm
10 grateful to the Trial Chamber for that. Because I see that the witness
11 is having problems sitting longer than ...
12 JUDGE HALL: And you, likewise, Mr. Krgovic, I take it.
13 MR. KRGOVIC: I have no problem with that, Your Honour.
14 JUDGE HALL: Yes. So we're grateful to counsel for their
15 co-operation in this matter.
16 So if there's nothing else that -- to delay us, could the witness
17 be returned to the stand, please.
18 [The witness takes the stand]
19 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Macar, good morning to you, sir. Welcome back.
20 I trust you are recovered from yesterday.
21 Before Mr. Zecevic continues his examination-in-chief, there are
22 two matters. First of all, is what would become the usual reminder that
23 the Chamber would give that you're still on your oath.
24 WITNESS: GORAN MACAR [Resumed]
25 [Witness answered through interpreter]
1 JUDGE HALL: The second matter is that you would recall that at
2 the beginning of yesterday, I explained to you how the sessions are
3 broken up in the -- how the day's sitting is broken up into sessions.
4 Taking into consideration your peculiar circumstances, it has been
5 decided that we will sit in hourly sessions with a 15 minute break in
6 between. And we have been informed through VWS that that would suffice.
7 So the first break then would be at 10.00 this morning. And we would
8 have a 15-minute break, and then resume for another hour and so on, until
9 we come to the end of the day's sitting at 1.45.
10 I trust that this works out for you and everyone concerned.
11 Yes, Mr. Zecevic.
12 Examination by Mr. Zecevic: [Continued]
13 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, sir.
14 Mr. Macar, before we go back to yesterday's topic, we have two
15 corrections for the transcript. Page 22860, yesterday's LiveNote, you
16 were saying that in parallel to the establishment of the administration
17 in the ministry's HQ, it was necessary to get help for the setting up of
18 the centres of the security services that did not exist prior to
19 April 1992.
20 And then you named a total of five, those that didn't exist and
21 those that did in fact exist. But this didn't come across with any
22 clarity at all.
23 A. Before April 1992, the ones that didn't exist were Sarajevo, that
24 is, the Sarajevo-Birac-Romanija region, Bijeljina, and Trebinje.
25 Q. And which were the ones that did exist?
1 A. The Sarajevo public security centre --
2 Q. No, no. Just take it easy, please. When I ask that the ones
3 that did exist, I mean Security Services Centres of the MUP of the RBiH
4 those that did exist before 1992 and that now became part of the MUP of
5 the RBiH.
6 A. Banja Luka and Doboj.
7 Q. Thank you very much.
8 At page 22867, I asked you about the situation at Pale and at
9 Sokolac at the time. And you said in one word: A disaster. You talked
10 about Sokolac. Can you tell us more about Pale and the situation there?
11 A. Having arrived at Pale in the last quarter of April 1992, the
12 situation was very much alike. There were lots of people coming in as
13 refugees. The local economy was in tatters. There was nothing to buy in
14 shops. It was very chaotic. The municipal authorities had nowhere to
15 put up these people arriving. People would wander around parks looking
16 for a place to sleep.
17 Q. What was the situation regarding the electricity and water
18 supplies, as well as the telephone lines?
19 A. No electricity in Pale. I know because the building when I
20 arrived, say, on or about the 20th of April, the electricity supply had
21 been cut off. The same thing applied to the water supply, and there was
22 probably a casual link between the two.
23 Q. 22867, you said:
24 "The Muslim forces left us two or three telephone lines because
25 those lines went through the central post office in Sarajevo. There were
1 those two or three telephone lines that they could eavesdrop on. We used
2 those lines for our communications."
3 As you say, lines went through the central post office in
4 Sarajevo, but were those phone lines cut as well?
5 A. No. They weren't. Probably for the reasons that I listed
6 because they were using these lines to eavesdrop on our communications.
7 There were several dozens of telephone lines in the Vrace area that were
8 operating but for no longer than a couple of days. All of them were cut
9 off, save for two or three of them in one building and there was a third
10 telephone line in the building in which I was staying, and two in the
12 Q. Did you know about the fact that the other side were listening
13 onto your conversations?
14 A. Yes. They were ten or 15 phone lines to begin with, and they
15 left only two. So if you add two and two together ...
16 Q. How did you use those phone lines then?
17 A. The line I was using, in nine out of ten cases, were used by
18 inspectors to get in touch with their families, to check the situation.
19 In emergencies, we used it for professional purposes, for our work.
20 Q. Thank you.
21 A. I apologise, I promised that I would try and remember the date
22 when the incident occurred in Milici. You remember me explaining about
23 the courier system that we used and the reason I remember that day. The
24 incident occurred at Milici when those people were ambushed and the
25 boksit company drivers were killed there. I was a part of that column
1 and then I turned off to go and deliver mail to someone, thereby avoiding
2 the incident. That happened on the 27th of May, 1992. The reason I
3 remember is because on 25th of May, I was staying at Vrace and then I was
4 on my way to visit a family in Vojkovici. I wanted to wash there and get
5 some civilian clothes so that I could press on to Belgrade. On that
6 occasion, at one point along the Vrace-Vojkovic road, there was a car
7 that was struck by a bullet which then ricocheted and hit yet another
8 car. There were two of us in the car. The 25th was also the Youth Day
9 in the former Yugoslavia. So the first time the bullet hit that car
10 along that road. Two days later, I was headed for Belgrade on through
12 Q. Thank you. Sir, we talked yesterday about documents that you had
13 a chance to see after your arrival at the RS MUP.
14 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be shown
15 65 ter 798D1, which is tab 14.
16 Q. Sir, the header reads: "Federal Secretariat of the Interior."
17 You have the number there. The date is the 22nd of April, 1992.
18 Subject: State commission for genocide, responsibilities of the
19 OUP, internal affairs organ. If you move on to page 4, you see who it
20 was addressed to or to delivered to. It was signed by the federal
22 Are you familiar with this document, sir?
23 A. Yes, I am.
24 Q. Go on, please.
25 A. The date is the 22nd of April. I think I was there when the
1 document came in. We read it, and, as was customary for the operatives
2 in the Ministry of the Interior before the war, we were trained to act in
3 keeping with the existing Laws on All People's Defence and the
4 Ministry of the Interior, what to do in a war or when there is a danger
5 of a war. But none of us were trained for an ethnic war or a civil war.
6 There were very few inspectors there from ...
7 Q. Mr. Macar, this couldn't be recorded. Please repeat the latter
8 part of your answer when you said that members of the Ministry
9 of the Interior were not prepared or trained. What for? Slowly, please.
10 Slowly. It is impossible to follow.
11 A. Members of the Ministry of the Interior, in the pre-war period,
12 were not prepared or trained for a civil war, for the eventuality of an
13 ethnic war. Most of the operatives working with the crime police, in
14 particular, were not properly trained for a situation in which war crimes
15 were occurring. That is why we would have found this material helpful.
16 When familiarising ourselves with the subject matter as well as with the
17 institution that was now being set up, this was something that we could
18 use to broaden our familiarity with this area.
19 Another thing I would like to point out is about the security
20 service centres in the pre-war period. They covered crimes against life
21 and limb, such as murder, aggravating murder, and they -- their purpose
22 was to shed light on crimes such as those in their own areas and our task
23 now was to set up a total of three centres to provide some sort of
24 training back at the HQ and train people for that type of work.
25 In municipal bodies, the operatives mostly dealt with
1 property-related crime. Murder, aggravating murder, and crime against
2 life and limb were not the types of crimes that they pursued in municipal
4 Q. Mr. Macar, the first sentence here reads:
5 "The federal secretariat of the interior informs that at the
6 session of the federal council held on 18th of March, 1992, the Assembly
7 of the SFRY adopted a decision on the formation, scope, and composition
8 of the state commission for the collection of data for verification of
9 war crimes, crimes of genocide, and other crimes against humanity and
10 international law committed against Serbs and other ethnicities during
11 the armed conflict in Croatia and other parts of the country."
12 Were you familiar with this decision of the SFRY Assembly,
13 specifically its federal council?
14 A. I was familiar, but not before I'd received this document.
15 Q. Did this letter impose any obligation on the ministry of the
16 Republika Srpska; and, if so, what kind of obligation with regard to this
17 war crimes commission?
18 Please wait before starting your answer.
19 A. The obligation was to submit information to the Federal War
20 Crimes Commission.
21 Q. Did you act pursuant to that?
22 MR. HANNIS: May I interpose an objection at this point. I think
23 this is really calling for a legal conclusion on the part of this
24 witness, whether or not the newly created Republika Srpska had any
25 obligation to the federal Yugoslavia. Because we have had no evidence in
1 this case that the RS was a part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
2 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] I accept this objection.
3 Q. Sir, let us take a look at the last page, page 4, so we may see
4 to who this letter was distributed.
5 A. It was distributed to the MUP of Serbia, of Montenegro, of the
6 Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, of the Republic of
7 Serbian Krajina; then to the State Commission; then to the
8 Federal Prosecutor's Office; to the Federal Secretariat of Justice; and
9 the Federal Secretariat of National Defence.
10 Q. Thank you. Let me repeat the question. I believe that
11 Mr. Hannis is satisfied now.
12 Did you act pursuant to this instruction issued by the
13 Federal Secretariat of the Interior?
14 MR. HANNIS: Let me interject. I'm not satisfied now. The fact
15 that Mr. Gracanin may have felt he had some control or authority over the
16 Republika Srpska by sending this to them does not necessarily mean it
17 existed. It may show the existence of a joint criminal enterprise but
18 not necessarily a formal legal relationship between the Federal Republic
19 of Yugoslavia and Republika Srpska. And this witness can't testify to
20 that. He can testify about whether or not they responded, I agree.
21 JUDGE HALL: I suppose, though, Mr. Hannis, that it is a matter
22 of inference. So isn't this a matter on which submissions will be made
23 at the end of the exercise? No doubt, as I said, Mr. Zecevic will
24 correct me if I'm wrong, but the distribution list to which the witness
25 has been referred arising from that, there are certain inferences that he
1 is inviting the Chamber to draw.
2 MR. HANNIS: Yes. Yes, that's fine, Your Honour. But my
3 original objection was asking the witness to make an inference which I
4 think he is not in a position to do. He is not a legal expert.
5 JUDGE HALL: I think I see the point, Mr. Hannis.
6 So, Mr. Zecevic, you would rephrase the question in such a way as
7 to avoid inviting the witness to -- to draw inferences which are properly
8 the provenance of the Chamber.
9 I suppose that is what Mr. Hannis' objection is.
10 MR. HANNIS: My most recent objection was really just to the
11 comment by Mr. Zecevic that I was satisfied. I really don't have an
12 objection to his last question. It was simply put to the witness whether
13 or not he responded to it or his agency responded to that. And that's a
14 fair question. But I didn't feel comfortable sitting there having the
15 Court think that I was satisfied.
16 JUDGE HALL: So now he knows.
17 MR. HANNIS: Yes.
18 MR. ZECEVIC: I appreciate, Mr. Hannis. However, my first
19 question before your first objection was: Did you act in accordance with
20 this instruction, like the last question.
21 That is my misunderstanding of your objection. I'm sorry, but --
22 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Macar, the question was: Did you act
23 pursuant to this instruction?
24 A. That's how I understood your question in the first place. Up
25 until October 1992, our priority was to establish a crime police
1 administration at headquarters and establishing crime prevention services
2 in the centres and reinforcing these compatibilities in the stations.
3 Only later in 1993, 1994, and 1995 did the information flow toward the
4 secretariat increase. I even attended a meeting where we exchanged
5 experiences and received some technical assistance with regard to taking
6 action with regard to war crimes.
7 Q. When was that meeting held?
8 A. In 1993.
9 Q. Tell me, please, sir, since this is a decision by the
10 Federal Assembly of the SFRY, dated the 18th of March, 1992, tell me
11 whether, on that day, the 18th of March, 1992, the Socialist Republic of
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina was part of the SFRY?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Thank you.
15 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Unless there is an objection, I
16 seek to tender this document.
17 MR. HANNIS: No objection.
18 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
19 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit 1D635, Your Honours.
20 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be shown
21 document 1D73, tab 15.
22 Q. Are you familiar with this document, sir?
23 A. Yes, I am.
24 Q. This document is already in evidence, and you're familiar with
25 it. We needn't, therefore, comment it in detail.
1 What is the meaning of item 2 of this document?
2 A. The MUP, or the minister, gives approval for conferring some
3 duties and tasks on some persons and bodies which are listed here.
4 Q. We have heard that from the very beginning, that is, the 19th of
5 April, you were with the MUP. Tell us whether this order of the minister
6 was implemented in practice?
7 A. It often was not, probably due to the fragmentation of the
8 territory and the influence of the Crisis Staffs in the municipalities.
9 Many executives, such as chiefs of stations and heads of crime prevention
10 services, did not receive approval from the minister for their
12 Q. Thank you.
13 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] The following document is 1D150.
14 That's tab 16.
15 Q. This document is one of the Ministry of the Interior of the
16 Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was signed by
17 Minister Alija Delimustafic. It's dated 29 April. And it relates, the
18 decision of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina of 27 April. And we see
19 it contains four items.
20 Are you familiar with this order?
21 A. I'm, indeed, familiar with this document. I don't precisely
22 remember. It was from late April or early May. But this order shows a
23 continuity of activities that go back to the 15th of March, when the
24 headquarters of the 2nd Army District were besieged. We had intelligence
25 that there was observation of military facilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
1 that there had been incidents, and this was the culmination of these
2 activities which happened in March.
3 Q. Sir, this is late April. Were JNA members, at this time, still
4 in their barracks and facilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
5 A. In the city of Sarajevo, the JNA was in its barracks and was
6 considered a regular army. That is why such a bluntly phrased order, a
7 war time order I may call it, was a surprise.
8 Q. Thank you. I'll show you document 1D324, MFI. That's tab 17.
9 It's a document dated 7 May 1992 signed by the then-chief of the
10 Bijeljina CSB, Predrag Jesuric.
11 Tell me what -- how did you communicate with Bijeljina at that
13 A. There were no communication lines that could be used by the
14 police. And sometime in April, I believe that instructions were issued
15 that faxes should be installed to enable communication. I even think
16 that instructions were issued that fax machines should be borrowed or
17 supplied from the storage of the MUP, to be used for this purpose.
18 Q. This is a report which says that, due to a break in the
19 telephone, telegraph and fax communications, during the period from the
20 last report you didn't receive reports although they were compiled by the
21 chief of the Bijeljina CSB.
22 Does this report describe the situation in the territory covered
23 by the Bijeljina CSB; and are you familiar with the document?
24 A. Yes, I am familiar with this document, just as with many others
25 that came in from the field.
1 Q. Mr. Macar, how many dispatches did the crime enforcement
2 administration send out in this initial period from about April till the
3 end of summer 1992? Actually, how many were received at headquarters?
4 A. The crime enforcement administration at the headquarters of the
5 MUP, up until October when it moved to Bijeljina, I believe received 31
6 documents. Due to difficulties in communicating, also for very simple
7 reasons, such as shortage of paper, but, more importantly because of the
8 disorganisation in the centres that were only being established,
9 communication was very difficult, and only very urgent dispatches were
10 sent to the minister. But they were very few. If we take into
11 consideration the situation on the ground. Only when technical
12 compatibilities were enhanced and the information system became normal
13 again, the number of documents that circulated rose again. And that can
14 be checked by taking a look at the records that we kept from
15 April through October 1992.
16 Q. Did you or other administrations, depending on the subject
17 matter, were -- were you acquainted with the contents of the dispatches
18 received by the ministry?
19 A. It depended on the whereabouts of the individual executive. He
20 may have been in the field at the moment. But, otherwise, we were almost
21 in the same office at Vrace. So we had the opportunity to get acquainted
22 with everything.
23 But, anyway, the minister did inform us at meetings.
24 Q. When did the crime enforcement administration move to Bijeljina;
25 and what was the reason?
1 A. As I have said, there were no resources at Pale, no materiel or
2 technical equipment for the ministry headquarters. The same problem
3 existed for the other ministries. There were permanent suggestions to
4 the minister, and he agreed that it was impossible to establish the
5 ministry headquarters there. Then a decision was taken to move the
6 ministry to Bijeljina, in October.
7 Let me add the following: For a considerable time in April, May,
8 June, and part of July, some administrations were at Vrace, and they were
9 exposed to constant shelling, sniper fire, and so on. And that's another
10 reason why we were unable to set up normal communication and a normal
11 functioning of the ministry.
12 Q. Thank you. The Bijeljina CSB, when was its establishment
14 A. On paper, the centre had been in exist earlier, but, in reality,
15 only when the ministry arrived in Bijeljina, it took off the ground. The
16 centre and its organisational unit started being set up from October 1992
17 which process ended in 1993.
18 Q. Thank you.
19 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] If there are no objections, then I
20 move that this -- the MFI mark should be removed from this document.
21 MR. HANNIS: No objection.
22 JUDGE HALL: So the MFI qualification is taken away.
23 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Just one more document before the
24 break. That's about how much time we have.
25 Could the witness be shown 5 -- oh, P1013, which is tab 18.
1 Q. Sir, this is a dispatch of the Security Services Centre in
2 Banja Luka, but I'm showing it to you because this dispatch reproduces in
3 the entirety the enactment of the Serbian -- MUP of the Serbian Republic
4 of BH, number 01-57/92. So we have the entire text of this enactment and
5 this dispatch is sent by chief of the CSB, Stojan Zupljanin, to all
6 public security stations.
7 In paragraph 1, this text mentions unprincipled behaviour of the
8 reserve policemen. Can you please explain to us, what is unprincipled
9 behaviour of the reserve force, the reserve police force?
10 A. I -- let me first tell you that I'm familiar with this order,
11 enactment, that was sent to all stations. I think that this was a typo.
12 And instead of "unprincipled," there should have been "unprofessional
13 behaviour" of the reserve force members. Whoever typed it made a
14 mistake. I don't know whether the mistake was made at the centre or
15 elsewhere, but the word that should have been here is "unprofessional
16 behaviour," because we never used in our police work this phrase
17 "unprincipled behaviour." And I remember it from the time when the order
18 was drawn up.
19 Q. Thank you.
20 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, given the time, and
21 given the topics that I'm dealing with, I think it would be a good time
22 for our break, as I'm about to move to another topic.
23 JUDGE HALL: Yes. So we would return in 15 minutes.
24 [The witness stands down]
25 --- Recess taken at 9.58 a.m.
1 --- On resuming at 10.17 a.m.
2 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, while the witness is coming in, I
3 indicate Ms. Korner would like to address the issue of the question you
4 had, Judge Harhoff. And I suggested that maybe we do it at the end of
5 the day since the witness may be getting tired anyway. If we could save
6 five minutes at the end of the day, she will come in and answer your
7 question better than I have so far. Thanks.
8 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you. We accept that.
9 [The witness takes the stand]
10 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Mr. Macar, yesterday, and also this morning during the first
12 session, we touched upon some problems that you encountered in setting up
13 the administration for crime prevention in the MUP headquarters. You
14 mentioned problems with communication, personnel, and so on.
15 Tell me, did you have any problems with -- with the equipment;
16 and, if so, what kind of problems those were?
17 A. You are referring to materiel and technical equipment, and I
18 would like to mention that in the former Ministry of the Interior, the
19 equipment procurement was a centralised process. There were forms,
20 records, and so on. We started working from scratch. We had nothing.
21 So starting from plain typewriters to paper, everything needed to be
22 obtained, and we had to find a way to do it. We also needed fuel. We
23 did not have sufficient number of vehicles, and so on. So we had to make
24 do with friendly contacts that we had with what was left in warehouses
25 and so on.
1 I know that one of the colleagues brought the first typewriter,
2 and we were overjoyed that we had something to type on. We did have some
3 leftover typewriters but no tapes for them. And in Vrace and Pale, there
4 were no shops selling such office supplies. Similar problems were
5 encountered in the centres that were in the process of being established,
6 let alone the communication system which was non-existent. We didn't
7 have the basics. We didn't have premises. We didn't have typewriters.
8 We didn't have the paperwork for record-keeping, and so on. And the
9 identical situation was in the police stations.
10 As for the equipment needed for the work of crime police, it was
11 also non-existent. Before the war, we received our supplies on a monthly
12 basis, and the requests were sent from centres to the ministry. And in
13 this new situation, we lacked everything. We had no cameras. We had no
14 film for cameras. We had no supplies needed to perform on-site
15 investigations and work on the ground. Even before, in the centres, we
16 had film development laboratories, because police stations would send
17 their camera films to be developed to the centres in their film
18 laboratories, and this no longer could be done. We needed a lot of time
19 to set it all up. Republika Srpska was also in the process of being
20 created. They needed a budget. There was no system of payments at the
21 level of the country, and the minister of the interior could not provide
22 supplies for their units. If we add to this situation the fact that the
23 whole territory was torn into fragments and the difficult logistical
24 situation, then you can imagine under what conditions we had to function.
25 I apologise. Let me just mention this: That for two months, I
1 personally, from my own funds, funded fuel for two vehicles of the
2 Ministry of the Interior, and I don't want to mention anything smaller
3 than that.
4 Q. Since you mentioned that the territory was torn into fragments,
5 let me show you a document, tab 35, 1D580.
6 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Could the usher please assist us
7 with this map. Can we have the original of this map without -- without
8 the markings, the markings of the previous witness. And we also need the
9 entire map of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 65 ter of the Prosecution, 1013.
10 I apologise. 65 ter 10133. My mistake; I apologise.
11 Q. Mr. Macar, can you see this? It's rather small.
12 A. I will do my best.
13 Q. Is it better now?
14 With the assistance of the usher, could you please mark the
15 headquarters of the Trebinje CSB?
16 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness's microphone be switched on,
17 please. The interpreters cannot hear him.
18 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Would you please move microphones so that the interpreters can
20 hear you.
21 A. I'm trying to find my way on this map. Bilice, Gacko. This is
22 not the exact territory but roughly so. This border area towards
23 Montenegro on the one side, and Visegrad on the other side.
24 Q. So the area that you just circled, is that the territory in the
25 jurisdiction of the Trebinje CSB?
1 A. Yes. Those were the following municipalities: Trebinje, Gacko,
2 Nevesinje, Bilice, Ljubinje, Foca, Grude, Visegrad and Cajnice.
3 Q. Carry on, please.
4 A. The communication with Foca, Grude, and Cajnice was disrupted and
5 could only be accessed via Montenegro and Serbia.
6 Q. Could you please put number 1 within this circle. Thank you.
7 A. [Marks]
8 Q. Now tell us, please, we can see where Sarajevo is, and Pale.
9 Perhaps you could mark where Pale is?
10 A. Let me just say this: Not just Pale, but for a long time, the
11 ministry's centre was located in Vrace.
12 Q. Put number 2 where the ministry's centre was located. Just take
13 it slowly, please. Would you explain to us or draw for us the route that
14 could be taken to the territory under the jurisdiction of the Trebinje
15 CSB, the territory that you marked with number 1.
16 A. Sarajevo, Sokolac, Han Pijesak, Maslenica, Zvornik was the only
17 route. And then one would cross into Zmajevo, the territory of Serbia,
18 continue on to Bajina Basta, Uzice, Novo Varos. And then one would cross
19 into Montenegro, via Prijepolje, and then continue on via Niksic, to
20 arrive in Trebinje. That was a road that would require 10 to 12 hours.
21 Q. Thank you. Now, tell me, please, in that period of time, that is
22 to say, April, May, June, was it possible physically to communicate with
23 the Banja Luka and Doboj centres?
24 A. No. Until the corridor was -- was made accessible, it wasn't
25 possible to reach Banja Luka or Doboj.
1 Q. All right. Thank you. Could you please put numbers 3 and 4,
2 where Banja Luka and Doboj centres are.
3 A. [Marks]
4 Q. And also underline Bijeljina, and put number 5 there to mark the
5 fifth CSB. Thank you.
6 A. I apologise to Their Honours. If I may say that in Visegrad and
7 Cajnice, in order to reach these areas one had to travel via Serbia.
8 There were no direct roads to those areas, and one had to travel via
9 Serbia to reach them.
10 Q. Would you please mark the territory of Visegrad, Rudo, and
11 Cajnice, and put an A there.
12 A. It is in very small letters. It's somewhere here. But I can't
13 really see because the letters are very small.
14 Q. Thank you. Thank you. That's enough.
15 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Unless there's objections, I tender
16 to admit this document.
17 MR. HANNIS: Well, Your Honour, no objection.
18 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Zecevic, I fail to see the marking of the E.
19 Where is it on the map?
20 MR. ZECEVIC: I didn't ask for a marking by E.
21 JUDGE DELVOIE: The last marking.
22 MR. ZECEVIC: A.
23 JUDGE DELVOIE: Now it's all gone.
24 MR. ZECEVIC: Do we have it saved? Can we show it again for the
25 benefit of the --
1 JUDGE DELVOIE: It's okay. Thank you.
2 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you very much.
3 JUDGE HALL: So the marked map is admitted and marked.
4 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 1D636, Your Honours.
5 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Mr. Macar, did the crime squad exist throughout that period,
7 between April and the end of summer 1992, in public security stations in
8 the territory covered by the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina MUP?
9 A. Most public security stations did have crime squads throughout
10 the period. The manning levels were not sufficient though. There were
11 some stations that had no crime squads. I do remember certain periods of
12 time when the inspectors toured those, and they would say that they were
13 getting some manpower from the reserve units. For the most part, the
14 crime squads did not have appropriate manning levels. Even when they
15 did, it wasn't consistent with the population numbers or, indeed, the
16 extent of the problems arising throughout those areas.
17 We also took a long time taking in the situation in its entirety
18 that prevailed in these public security stations.
19 Q. What was the situation regarding the operating legal system
20 throughout 1992 in the territory of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and
22 A. There were all these problems that we were encountering in our
23 work in the MUP: Lack of equipment, low manning levels, financial
24 problems. The legislators and the executive bodies were encountering
25 most of the same problems. Up until the summer of 1992 or thereabouts,
1 the prosecutors and courts were not operating throughout the RS
2 territory. I think it wasn't before June and July the prosecutors and
3 judges were officially and formally appointed. Now they probably took
4 some time to set up their own operations. It required some time. But
5 they started operating, to some extent, at least, from August that year
7 The following fact corroborates just that. The Sarajevo centre
8 had certain problems. There was a station that was part of the centre.
9 We would have the right to keep persons in custody for up to three days
10 and then process cases involving murders, murders of two persons or more,
11 but there was no one to file our criminal reports with. I remember that
12 sometime, like, June or July that year, I toured the Sarajevo area,
13 Sokolac, Han Pijesak, Vlasenica, just to see whether there was a properly
14 operating prosecutor's office, where, regardless of their respective
15 jurisdictions, I could submit a criminal report, until such time as
16 proper prosecutors in courts were set up in Sarajevo. We had some
17 problems with the citizens and the people we arrested, too. We could
18 only keep them for up to three days. So, obviously, when they saw those
19 people at large again after three days in such neighbourhoods and towns,
20 people would protest and obviously they would voice their displeasure and
21 direct their anger at the Ministry of the Interior.
22 Q. Sir, you provided a brief comment in relation to one of the
23 documents that I showed you in the earlier course of your evidence. Was
24 there any local influence being exerted on any local officers of the
25 Ministry of the Interior throughout the territory? How did that
2 A. In most of those, the -- there was appreciable influence of the
3 local authorities and the Crisis Staffs. This concerned the fundamental
4 logistics issues as well as their salaries, which they received from the
5 municipal bodies. The municipal Crisis Staffs affected the appointments
6 that were made, and the persons who were appointed to all of the leading
7 positions in the police stations and crime squads.
8 Q. How long did that problem persist for, from the perspective of
9 the Ministry of the Interior?
10 A. Having toward some of the territory --
11 Q. Could you please focus on my question. How long for? That was
12 my question. Could you give us a time-frame.
13 A. A part of the problem was resolved -- well, actually, not
14 resolved but the conditions were created to resolve it. We abolished the
15 autonomous regions and also the Crisis Staffs, although there were still
16 some ramifications that persisted for some time afterwards. We tried to
17 take all of these things in our stride and deal with it as we went along
18 in order to restore the influence of the ministry itself.
19 Q. Mr. Macar, for the umpteenth time, please, speak slowly. It is
20 quite physically impossible to follow what you are saying because of the
21 speed and I can only imagine how hard the interpreters must find it. It
22 is recorded here that you said, "We abolished the autonomous regions and
23 the Crisis Staffs." Who and when abolished the autonomous regions in the
24 territory of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina?
25 A. The decisions were political, and they were decisions taken by
1 the government of the RS.
2 Q. Do you remember whether constitutional amendments were made in
3 that regard, that is, to abolish the autonomous regions?
4 A. I do remember that. That was a prerequisite to have those
6 Q. Do you remember, properly speaking, when that occurred? What
7 year, what period of time?
8 A. I think it was sometime in August 1992.
9 Q. Do you remember when the decision was taken to abolish the
10 Crisis Staffs? What time-period, what year?
11 A. It was in 1992. I think sometime in September, if memory serves.
12 Q. Sir, you've enumerated all these problems for us, the problems
13 that you were encountering in your work. Did people at the Ministry of
14 the Interior discuss these problems?
15 A. Yes. At collegium meetings and briefings at the HQ.
16 Q. Did you attend any of these collegium meetings and briefings?
17 A. Yes, for the most part.
18 Q. Did you adopt any conclusions regarding these problems?
19 A. By all means we would provide opinions and proposals, table those
20 to the minister. There would be discussions, and then conclusions were
21 adopted, as a result.
22 Q. Any conclusions in relation to the situation regarding the
23 influence of the local bodies of government on the local units of the
24 Ministry of the Interior, specifically the public security stations; and,
25 if so, what conclusions?
1 A. This was debated at the collegium meetings and the reporting
2 sessions of the Administration of the crime investigation police.
3 Especially after touring the public security stations
4 further afield, we informed the minister that the Crisis Staffs were
5 overbearingly influential. When one arrived in those areas, most of the
6 leaders were members of the Crisis Staffs. They would tell us directly
7 that they had been receiving orders from the Crisis Staffs to carry out
8 certain tasks and missions. It was based on decisions taken by the Crisis
9 Staffs that police officers were sent to the front line too.
10 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Can the witness please
11 repeat the figures that he has just mentioned. Thank you. We didn't
12 catch those.
13 JUDGE HARHOFF: [Microphone not activated] ... repeat the figures
14 that you just mentioned. Can you please repeat the figures, because the
15 interpreters didn't catch it. Thank you.
16 THE WITNESS: Between 70 and 80 percent of police officers,
17 particularly throughout the Sarajevo area, were deployed to the front
18 line within the armed forces of the RS. And their deployment there was
19 at the request of the Crisis Staffs.
20 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. In a purely functional sense, how did that situation affect the
22 Ministry of the Interior of the RS?
23 A. One of our conclusions was this: The heads of the public
24 security stations should, as a matter of priority, inform the
25 Crisis Staffs of their work. And for the most part, they weren't
1 informing the Security Services Centre or the Ministry of the Interior in
2 situations where that was required. There are two aspects to this. One
3 was a technical aspect. It was physically impossible to communicate with
4 the centre, or the minister, the HQ. That is part of the reason why they
5 had to communicate with the Crisis Staffs.
6 Q. In a functional sense, how did this affect the work of the
7 ministry? So what I want to know is this: Could the ministry establish
8 a functional hierarchy in keeping with the law?
9 A. No.
10 Q. Why?
11 A. Firstly, most of the people in the leading positions, the chiefs
12 and heads of public security stations, were never appointed by the
13 minister but by the local Crisis Staffs, which is why they believed that
14 they should prioritise their reporting to the Crisis Staffs, the bodies
15 that previously appointed them to their positions. I think that is
16 probably one of the most important reasons why the ministry, or, rather,
17 the security centres were unable to have a consistent subordination
18 system, in terms of the way they functioned.
19 Q. Thank you. Sir, 1D84 is our next document. This is tab 24.
20 Signed by Dobro Planojevic; date, the 5th of June, 1992.
21 Are you familiar with this, sir? What is this about?
22 A. I am familiar with it. Mr. Planojevic and I had a chance,
23 throughout this period of time, to discuss security-related information.
24 This document was produced on that basis.
25 The document is a reminder and a guide-line to the centres and
1 stations, public security stations, in terms of what approach they should
2 take to certain cases. A portion of this document discusses steps that
3 were taken to combat crime and certain deviations committed by members of
4 the police that had been observed.
5 Another portion of the document talks about the need to act and
6 the ways in which to act when documenting war crimes.
7 Q. When you say "documenting war crimes," did the Ministry of the
8 Interior distinguish between cases involving different ethnic
9 affiliations of the perpetrators and the victims?
10 A. The Ministry of the Interior, starting from the minister to the
11 crime enforcement administration, to other administrations, such as the
12 police administration, when we discussed war crimes, we included crimes
13 committed against any inhabitants of Serbian Bosnia-Herzegovina,
14 regardless of their ethnic affiliation. Any documents about that were
15 sent to public security centres, and these forwarded them to the public
16 security stations in their territory.
17 Q. To illustrate what you're saying, let us take a look at 113D1,
18 which is under tab 28.
19 This is a letter of Jovo Cokorilo, chief of CSB, which he sent to
20 public security stations. The CSB in question is that of Trebinje and
21 the date is 24 June 1992. It says:
22 "We received the following document from the Ministry of the
23 Interior of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina."
24 And then the contents of that document received from the ministry
25 is -- are stated.
1 What is this about?
2 A. This is a document forwarded to the public security stations, and
3 this is about an enactment sent out by Mr. Planojevic. I know
4 Jovo Cokorilo. He was a very conscientious chief, and I note that the
5 document signed by Mr. Planojevic is dated 5 June 1992; whereas,
6 Mr. Cokorilo's document is dated 24 June. We have just discussed the
7 difficulties in communication and how difficult it was to forward
8 documents in a timely fashion, and this is another illustration of that
10 Q. Thank you.
11 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document,
12 unless this is an objection.
13 MR. HANNIS: I understood -- I'm sorry, I thought it was already
14 in. No objection.
15 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
16 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 1D637, Your Honours.
17 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 Q. Speaking about this, we were able to see from a number of
19 documents shown in this trial that sometimes war crimes committed against
20 Serbs are singled out. Can you tell us if you know anything about this;
21 and, if you do, what was the reason?
22 A. Yes, I do. I know about this.
23 The reason why information was requested from public security
24 centres and public security stations was because a report had to be drawn
25 up, pursuant to the request of a government body. I think it was the
1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and possibly for the Presidency, too. But
2 I'm sure about the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
3 In 1992, there was much propaganda. The Serbs were represented
4 in various ways, very bad ways, which you probably know. The Ministry of
5 Foreign Affairs wanted to present the situation on the ground as
6 realistically as possible. That's why we compiled information for this
7 report to the government.
8 Q. These war crimes against Serbs, were they committed in the
9 territory controlled by the RS MUP or not?
10 A. The most part of the information that we submitted to the
11 ministry was about crimes committed in areas controlled by Muslim or
12 Croatian forces. Since there were many such -- since there was -- there
13 were many people that had come or that were coming from those areas, we
14 also received information about these crimes and their perpetrators.
15 Where we did not have pertinent information, we filed criminal complaints
16 against unknown perpetrators, or, if we were unable to obtain good
17 evidence, we would make Official Notes to be dealt with at a time when we
18 get more evidence.
19 Q. Did you have information concerning the war crimes committed
20 against Serbs in territories controlled by Muslim or Croatian forces that
21 they were processed by the judicial bodies in those territories?
22 A. The MUP collected much evidence and many criminal complaints were
23 submitted, but I don't know of any one such case being processed. Even
24 now, only a few cases are being dealt with by the judicial bodies of
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina, although hundreds of files have been submitted.
1 Q. Sir, we have been able to see a number of criminal complaints for
2 war crimes. It was stated here in this court that crimes committed by
3 Muslims or Croats against Serbs were treated as war crimes; whereas, in
4 similar situations, when Serbs committed such crimes against members of
5 other ethnicities, the MUP treated such crimes as aggravated murder or
6 some other type of murder but not as a war crime.
7 Can you comment on the reasons, if you know them?
8 Just wait for my question to be recorded.
9 A. I refuse, with determination, any claim that the MUP acted in the
10 fashion that you described, with premeditation. The public security
11 stations and public security centres submitted criminal complaints for
12 war crimes when they had information that a war crime had been committed
13 and whenever they were able to collect evidence to support their
15 When there were murders of individuals or more persons, when the
16 motive of the murder was unknown, or when the motivation was personal
17 gain, and such crimes were committed against Serbs, too, there were even
18 perpetrators who did these things against anybody, regardless of
19 ethnicity. And I repeat, these were murders or aggravated robbery with
20 lethal outcome --
21 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please repeat the last
23 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Please repeat your last sentence, sir.
25 A. The characterisation of these crimes was not such, or motivated
1 by the desire to qualify crimes against one ethnicity as being one type
2 of crime rather than another. The qualification depended on the
3 information, or the evidence, that the public security station or the
4 public security centre had been able to gather.
5 Let me add that the qualification of the security services was
6 not binding upon the prosecutor. Because the latter, having received a
7 criminal complaint, or upon completion of an investigation, could
8 re-qualify that crime.
9 Q. When you say "qualify," you mean label a crime in an indictment.
10 A. Not only in an indictment. When a criminal complaint was
11 submitted to the prosecutor's office, which was due process, when a crime
12 was committed, even with premeditation, that labelling was not binding on
13 the prosecutor.
14 Q. I understand as much, sir. But you say -- you said
15 "qualification." Do you mean the determination of the type of crime
16 which was used by the prosecutor in the indictment? And I say
17 "indictment" because that's the basis for criminal proceedings before a
18 court. That's why I'm asking.
19 A. Yes, you're right. I understand your question now.
20 Q. Thank you.
21 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, I see the time.
22 JUDGE HALL: Yes. So we would take the break now and return in
23 15 minutes.
24 [The witness stands down]
25 --- Recess taken at 11.15 a.m.
1 --- On resuming at 11.33 a.m.
2 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Zecevic, I don't know whether this was
3 communicated to you, but Ms. Korner has indicated that 20 minutes she
4 would need, so you would pace yourself accordingly.
5 MR. ZECEVIC: At the end of the day.
6 JUDGE HALL: Yes.
7 MR. ZECEVIC: The last session.
8 JUDGE HALL: In the last session, yes.
9 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you.
10 [The witness takes the stand]
11 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Mr. Macar, at page 28 of the LiveNote, one of your answers during
13 the last session, we talked about these problems being discussed at
14 collegium meetings and briefings that were held, the problems that you
15 were encountering in your work, that you identified in your work, and
16 then the problems were presented at briefings and collegium meetings of
17 the ministry, at the ministry's HQ.
18 Based on your knowledge, did the local Crisis Staffs pay their
19 salaries to the members of local public security stations?
20 A. Yes, I know about that. In most cases, due to the fact that the
21 budget and payment systems were not functioning, local municipal organs,
22 that is to say, Crisis Staffs, paid salaries and provided materiel and
23 technical equipment to the SJBs.
24 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown 614,
25 tab 23, please. 614D1, please, tab 23.
1 Q. Mr. Macar, this is a conclusion reached by the
2 Prijedor Crisis Staff, signed by Dr. Milomir Stakic. The date is 5th of
3 June, 1992. And this document is entitled: "Conclusion on the method of
4 calculation and payment of salaries, organisations," and so on, for the
5 month of May.
6 Do you know that such and similar documents were issued by Crisis
8 A. Yes, I know about this. I know that by way of their decisions
9 and pursuant to requests for supplies, et cetera, from the SJBs, the
10 Crisis Staffs would pay their salaries and other types of materiel and
11 technical equipment.
12 Under item 1 here, we see that they mention paying out salaries.
13 And here we see that they had a provision that the families of those who
14 had gone missing or were in prison would receive salaries for the missing
16 It says here in this conclusion that the public security stations
17 needed to issue receipts for the monies received.
18 Q. Thank you.
19 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] If there are no objections, I
20 tender this into evidence.
21 MR. HANNIS: I do have an objection. The witness said he is
22 familiar with these kind of documents, but there is no indication that he
23 was ever at the Prijedor Crisis Staff or knows Dr. Stakic or whether this
24 was issued, or the basis of his claimed information about Crisis Staffs.
25 We haven't heard any foundation about his source of information about
1 knowing what Crisis Staffs did and when they did it and how they did it.
2 JUDGE HARHOFF: And, Mr. Zecevic, may I add a question about the
3 relevance of this document.
4 MR. ZECEVIC: Well, Your Honours it precisely show what the
5 witness's testimony is about, that the Crisis Staffs -- it confirms that
6 the Crisis Staffs were paying the salaries of the ministries -- of the
7 SJBs, local SJBs, yes.
8 JUDGE HARHOFF: Is that a contested issue?
9 MR. ZECEVIC: Well, I think it is, based on the objection from
10 Mr. Hannis. Because it is my understanding that Mr. Hannis does not
11 agree with --
12 MR. HANNIS: My objection about this particulars document is more
13 a general objection, just evidentiary wise. This witness wasn't in
14 Prijedor, wasn't a member of the Crisis Staff, doesn't know anything
15 about it.
16 So this is not the appropriate witness to put this document in
18 As far as whether some Crisis Staffs paid some policemen at
19 sometime during 1992, I don't think that is an issue. We have alleged a
20 joint criminal enterprise between the police and the political structures
21 in the army. So in that regard, it doesn't matter to us so much, but it
22 is just a specific evidentiary point about this document with this
24 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Mr. Macar, on what basis do you know this? How do you know about
1 the influence that the local Crisis Staffs had on the local SJBs? You
2 said that you discussed it in collegium meetings and in briefings within
3 the ministry. But, please, tell me, how do you know about this?
4 A. The first concrete information I received was in the meetings
5 that I attended in the territory of the Sarajevo Security Centre, as well
6 as from the inspectors of the administration who went to inspect certain
8 As for Prijedor, throughout 1992 and partially in 1993, they were
9 paid by the municipality. And I learned about this in early 1993, when
10 we had our first meeting with the -- with the management, with the senior
11 leadership of the Prijedor station. In most of the municipalities, it
12 was the Crisis Staff who paid salaries to the members of the SJB, to the
13 staff workers of the SJB, in their territory, and also provided other
14 types of support, such as fuel and so on.
15 Q. I hope that I have been able to clarify now the origin of the
16 knowledge that the witness has about these specific matters.
17 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] So, once again, I tendered this
18 document into evidence.
19 MR. HANNIS: I don't object. I will address it in
21 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
22 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 1D638, Your Honours.
23 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Sir, at the headquarters of the ministry, did you have any
25 information about the relationship between the local Crisis Staff with
1 their respective local SJBs; and, if so, where did that information come
3 A. At the ministry headquarters and in the administration where I
4 worked, we did have information about the influence that the
5 Crisis Staffs had over the SJBs and the senior staff members in the
6 stations. This information mostly came from the reports that we received
7 and also came from the information gathered while either inspectors or
8 staff members from other organs came to inspect SJBs.
9 In late 1992, I personally had occasion to see in Prijedor what
10 influence the Crisis Staff there had over the Prijedor SJB.
11 Q. We will come to that later.
12 Tell me, did you know that local Crisis Staffs, given the
13 relationship between Crisis Staffs and SJBs, issued certain instructions
14 and orders that the SJBs were to carry out?
15 MR. HANNIS: I'm sorry, could we have some specification as to
16 the time-frame for this. Because there's been much made of the fact that
17 there were no communications. Phone lines weren't working, and yet he
18 has all this information about the Crisis Staffs.
19 So are we talking about 1993, late 1992, April, May, June? Some
20 specification, please.
21 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Sir, you have heard the Prosecutor. Tell us, please, about the
23 time-frame, when you received this information.
24 A. The information concerning the influence that the Crisis Staffs
25 had and also orders that they issued to SJBs came to me already in
1 June or July, when the first inspections by inspectors started in the
2 administration of crime police, and also inspections of CSBs. This was
3 in the Sarajevo region first, and then, starting in October onwards, in
4 the Doboj area, and then in March, as I have said, in the Krajina region,
5 especially in Prijedor.
6 Q. In March of which year?
7 A. 1993.
8 Q. Very well. I will now show you a document, 619D1 [Realtime
9 transcript read in error "691D1"], which is tab 57.
10 Before we look at the document, Mr. Macar, let me ask you this:
11 Do you know whether, in 1992, local Crisis Staffs changed their names,
12 changed their composition, in terms of membership; and do you know what
13 they were called?
14 A. As far as I recall, sometime until September/October 1992, they
15 were known as Crisis Staff. And later on, they were known, I think, as
16 War Presidencies, or War Commissions.
17 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Zecevic, just for the record, you asked to
18 see document 691.
19 MR. ZECEVIC: 619D1. It's tab 57.
20 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you. Let's just get it the right for the
21 record. Thanks.
22 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Sir, this document has a heading: "A summary of conclusions
24 adopted by Prijedor municipality Executive Committee relating to the
25 public security service and regional command from 29 April to
1 17 August 1992."
2 It is signed by the Crisis Staff/War Presidency.
3 And here we see the conclusions that the Crisis Staff or the
4 Executive Committee of Prijedor submitted to the public security station.
5 Do you know, and, if so, how do you know, that such conclusions were sent
6 by the Executive Committee of Prijedor to the public security station to
7 be implemented?
8 A. There was am incident which took place in Prijedor sometime in
9 November, and that caused me to look into the situation and the conduct
10 of senior staff members. When we had a meeting in March, I inquired into
11 how the public security station in Prijedor functioned because there had
12 already been some indicia back in November that the command was in the
13 hands of the Crisis Staff, or War Presidency. In March, I was surprised
14 to hear that regular, routine police duties and tasks that are normally
15 performed by SJBs or CSBs were taken over by the Crisis Staff and regular
16 police -- we're talking about regular police tasks that SJBs is supposed
17 to carry out in co-ordination with the centre. That was the first time I
18 saw how a municipal organ or body interfered in the work of the SJB. It
19 was normal for a SJB to inform about the situation in the territory of
20 the municipality, but it wasn't normal for a Crisis Staff to criticise
21 its work, and it wasn't normal for a SJB to receive orders and
22 instructions from any municipal organ. For me, it was simply
23 incomprehensible at the time. However, it did confirm the information
24 that we started receiving back in July and October about the situation on
25 the ground in Republika Srpska. However, I had no idea that had -- they
1 interfered to this extent.
2 Q. Just to clarify the time. What year?
3 A. 1993.
4 Q. Sir, you say that these problems were discussed at collegium
5 meetings and briefings at the ministry's HQ. You said this at page 28.
6 The minister was kept informed about these things.
7 Do you know, and, if so, how do you know, do you have anything
8 indicating that, at the time, the minister took any steps to deal with
9 these problems that were raised at collegium meetings and briefings? Did
10 he contact any state bodies or other bodies about this?
11 A. I do know that the minister informed the government, based on
12 information received from all the various administrations, particularly
13 from the police, the crime police, and probably the state security
14 bodies, too. I know that this was one of the topics discussed at the
15 government meeting.
16 Q. Do you know if any steps were taken about this or, indeed, any
17 measures? Did the government do anything about it?
18 A. I think soon after the information was received and spread, the
19 autonomous regions and Crisis Staffs were abolished. I'm not sure which
20 was abolished first, the one or the other. But both things took no
21 longer than a month.
22 Q. Thank you. Sir, you spoke about the following problem: There
23 was no functional legal system in place, or judicial system in place.
24 What about the military courts? The military judicial? I'm talking
25 about the period between April and the end of summer of 1992.
1 Were those operating? First of all, did that exist at all
2 throughout the period specified?
3 A. As far as I remember, up until August, the same problems
4 persisted as in relation to the civilian judiciary and courts. The same
5 situation applied to the military plain. I think they only started
6 operating sometime in August, the military prosecutors and judges.
7 Q. What implications, if any, did that fact have vis-a-vis the
8 functioning of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republika Srpska of
9 Bosnia and Herzegovina?
10 A. The non-existence of judicial bodies, specifically the
11 prosecutors, obviously, was a source of difficulties in the work of the
12 RS police, particularly the crime police. There were a number of serious
13 crimes where it was necessary to confirm with the prosecutors, inform
14 them of any crimes that were -- serious crimes that were committed and
15 get advice on what to do.
16 There were no prosecutors in some areas covered by existing
17 public security stations. There was also the problem of the respective
18 jurisdictions, civilian and military, because there were no military
19 prosecutors. Throughout this period, the public security stations had no
20 choice but to simply register certain events but were still unable to
21 forward cases to a prosecutor. Cases were filed in the hope that such a
22 time would arrive, when military prosecutors would start operating.
23 Q. When you say registered certain events in the hope that once the
24 military judicial bodies got off the ground, appropriate criminal reports
25 could be submitted and filed.
1 What about the MUP of the Republika Srpska of Bosnia and
2 Herzegovina? Did the MUP have a list of standardised formats, documents,
3 that were required for the work of the MUP?
4 A. Yes. Standardised formats and documents existed that were
5 supposed to be used by all of the SJBs and CSBs, ranging from criminal
6 form, the format used by crime police and the forensic people, and a
7 number of other modules and forms that were used in the work of the crime
8 police. In particular, forms to be filled in when people's flats were
9 searched, person's vehicles were searched to seize, when persons were
10 searched, and so on and so forth.
11 Q. Were all these various forms and documents prescribed, in terms
12 of an existing standard or norm, and were these really available in SJBs
13 under the MUP of the Republika Srpska?
14 A. There would normally be certain decisions, provisions and
15 instructions prescribing the format. As for the actual supplies of
16 equipment, stationary, including log-books and forms, this worked in a
17 centralised basis. From the Ministry of the Interior of the former
18 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, all these were printed in one place, and
19 certain stations had old stocks, so to speak. But there wasn't too much
20 of that to go around because this had to be printed on a monthly basis.
21 So they were using up their old stocks. Most of the stations were
22 encountering difficulties regarding the availability of these log-books
23 for criminal reports and other types of forms. So we wanted to have more
24 of all of those for the work of the crime police, and we wanted these
25 documents to be reprinted, new copies to be printed. I think it wasn't
1 before the end of 1992 that we started printing new copies and
2 distributing these forms and documents to the SJBs throughout the
4 There's one thing that I would like to add: Those CSBs that were
5 being set up had nothing in stock, not a single sheet of paper. They had
6 none of those documents because they were just being in the process of
7 being established. That is why the SJBs and the centres had no choice
8 but to keep provisional records and to use ordinary notebooks to keep
9 these records.
10 Q. What about the so-called KU log-book? Would that be one of those
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. What was the first time those were printed to meet the needs of
14 the RS BiH MUP, specifically?
15 A. I think sometime late in 1992.
16 Q. How did it work up until that time? Based on what you know, how
17 were records kept in the SJBs and CSBs that had no forms to use?
18 A. It depended on the versatility of those working there. Some were
19 using ordinary notebooks. Some were simply biding their time, waiting to
20 receive the right formats and documents so they could start keeping their
21 records. It really depended on their resourcefulness.
22 Q. This was a small digression. And now I'm going back to the issue
23 of military courts.
24 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be shown
25 566D1, tab 60.
1 Q. Sir, the date here is the 24 of August 1992. Notification on the
2 commencement of the work of the military court and military prosecutor's
3 office. To: The Ministry of the Interior, signed by Assistant Commander
4 Ljuban Kosovac.
5 If you turn the page, you will find the document itself. It's
6 got a handwritten portion there.
7 First of all, have you seen this document, sir; and, second of
8 all, can you comment?
9 A. Yes, I am familiar with this document. All the SJBs and CSBs,
10 particularly the crime squads there, were to be informed of this
12 Q. The handwritten addition there, in the upper right corner, Pero,
13 addressed to, and so on and so forth, and then someone's signature there.
14 Can you sled some light on that?
15 A. Pero was head of the analytics department. On behalf of the MUP,
16 he is sending this to the Sarajevo CSB, and they're supposed to then
17 inform the SJBs. So this is sent to Sarajevo and the stations, because
18 the best part of the corps was in territory covered by the CSB. Signed
19 by Dragan, a person I believe to be Dragan Kijac.
20 Q. Pero, his last name by any chance?
21 A. Petar Vujicic.
22 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] On to our next document.
23 65 ter 25D1, tab 61.
24 Q. A letter by the ministry. The date is the 25th of August. The
25 number is 10-265 from 1992. It says by approval, probably, of the
1 minister. There's a signature there. And then there's sent to the
2 Sarajevo CSB.
3 What does the number 10 stand for?
4 A. As I mentioned before, the analytics department uses this as a
5 code. And the signature, I think, belongs to Mr. Vujicic on behalf of
6 the minister. This reflects the substance of the document that we had
7 previously received from the army. And some further details are
9 Q. Thank you.
10 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, if there are no
11 objections, I would like to tender this document. Just for the sake of
12 completeness, perhaps we should also admit the previous document, since
13 this document is in reference to the previous one. I'm not sure how the
14 Chamber feels about it, or, indeed, if the Chamber wants to admit both
15 documents covering the same subject.
16 MR. HANNIS: It seems to me, they logically go together. I have
17 no objection to both of them being admitted.
18 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter 566D1 shall be given number
20 1D639. And 65 ter 25D1 shall be given Exhibit 1D640. Thank you.
21 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Sir, earlier today in your evidence, you told us about some
23 percentages, the ratio between the members of the Ministry
24 of the Interior working in the Sarajevo CSB, the Romanija-Birac CSB and
25 its territory, specifically those involved in combat missions. You
1 remember that, don't you?
2 A. Yes, I do.
3 Q. Did you have any information regarding this issue that you
4 received from other CSBs?
5 A. Yes, I did.
6 Q. What was the situation in those other centres regarding the
7 number of members of the Ministry of the Interior who were actively
8 performing combat operations, and at which time did you receive that
9 information? I am trying to forgo an objection on Mr. Hannis's part
11 MR. HANNIS: I appreciate that attempt, but not only what time
12 did you receive the information, but for what time-period was that
13 percentage in effect.
14 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you very much.
15 Q. [Interpretation] You heard the addition by Mr. Hannis, sir. If
16 you can, please answer the whole thing.
17 A. In 1992, from April until the end of the year, members of the
18 MUP, uniformed members, were, to a high degree, engaged. That included
19 active-duty police officers and reserve police officers, as well as crime
21 It was in July that the first meeting with the CSB of
22 Sarajevo-Romanija-Birac was held, and we received information about the
23 engagement of crime investigators and regular police officers within the
24 armed forces of the RS. In September, October and until the end of year,
25 there were visits to individual centres. And at collegium meetings of
1 the MUP, too, I had the chance to hear information about the number of
2 MUP members on the front line with the armed forces. As early as July --
3 Q. You said you had information about their percentage. Can you
4 state that percentage?
5 A. The percentage was between 70 and 80 per cent. That applies to
6 many stations. And there were hardly any stations with a percentage that
7 was lower than 50 per cent.
8 Q. Please continue.
9 MR. HANNIS: And could we have a time-period? Is that for the
10 entire year, for April and May, for which SJB, which CSB? Can we have
11 some more specific breakdown.
12 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Can you be more specific? Later we will see some documents about
15 A. I believe that I have given the time-span in my previous answer.
16 From April till the end of 1992. And for most police stations,
17 50 per cent of their members were out there with the armed forces, and
18 for some police stations that percentage was 70 per cent and more.
19 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please repeat his enumeration
20 of the CSBs.
21 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Please go a bit slower because of the toponyms that you
23 mentioned. Could you please repeat the last part of your answer. Which
24 CSBs and which SJBs were you speaking about?
25 A. I was speaking about the Banja Luka CSB; the Doboj CSB; the SJBs
1 belonging to the Bijeljina centre; the Sarajevo-Romanija-Birac CSB; and
2 the Trebinje CSB.
3 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please see document 116D1,
4 which is tab 71.
5 Q. Before we take a look at the document, tell us if the engagement
6 of MUP members for combat missions applied to both active-duty and
7 reserve police officers?
8 A. Both. And also to crime investigators.
9 Q. Thank you. This is a dispatch from the Trebinje CSB. Its number
10 is 18 from 1992. And it's dated 30 September. It refers to a dispatch
11 from the ministry dated 18 July.
12 We read:
13 "Reference: Your dispatch strictly confidential of
14 18 July 1992."
15 Tell us, Mr. Macar, what does that mean?
16 A. This is the reply to that previous dispatch. I believe there was
17 a request in that previous dispatch to provide information about MUP
18 members serving with the armed forces.
19 And since you interrupted me a minute ago, with your leave, I
20 would like to add that due to the massive involvement of the security
21 services, especially crime investigators with the armed forces, we have
22 repeatedly pointed out to the minister to try to do something through the
23 government or the Ministry of Defence, or the military commands, because
24 we were being criticised daily by the minister for the results of the
25 crime enforcement service's work. In most centres and public security
1 stations, however, over 50 per cent of their personnel was at the front
2 line, and this certainly affected the pace of their work and the quality
3 of their results, especially the crime enforcement service.
4 Q. Thank you. In the last paragraph, the centre chief,
5 Mr. Krsto Savic, says:
6 "On 28 September 1992 at the request of the command of the
7 Herzegovina Corps and the Trebinje military department, the complete
8 police reserve force of the Trebinje SJB was seconded to the command of
9 the Serbian army."
10 Is this anything you know?
11 A. Well, let me first comment on this term, "military department."
12 It was an organisational unit of the Ministry of Defence. And since the
13 reserve force was assigned to public security stations upon their
14 decision, they could also decide that they should be deployed to the
15 theatre of war, to serve there.
16 Q. When they were carrying out combat missions - I mean MUP
17 members - were they resubordinated to the command of the VRS or not?
18 A. Yes, they were. And they acted in compliance with the rules and
19 regulations about military service.
20 Q. Thank you.
21 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document,
22 unless there are objections.
23 MR. HANNIS: Just my general evidentiary objection. I don't know
24 that this witness saw this document before this year. However, I know
25 Krsto Savic was the chief in Trebinje. It looks regular on its face.
1 Probably would be more proper to come in through a bar table motion or
2 through another witness, but in order to save time, I won't object.
3 JUDGE HARHOFF: Relevance?
4 MR. ZECEVIC: Well, Your Honours, there are two points concerning
5 this. It confirms the testimony of the witness, shows the time - this is
6 the end of September - and also it clearly says that -- that the -- that
7 the members of the MUP were put under the command of the Army of the VRS.
8 And that is a live issue, Your Honours, in this case.
9 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
10 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 1D641, Your Honours.
11 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, I see the time. It's two minutes
12 before, but I --
13 JUDGE HALL: Yes. So we would take the break now.
14 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes. Thank you very much.
15 [The witness stands down]
16 --- Recess taken at 12.26 p.m.
17 --- On resuming at 12.49 p.m.
18 [The witness takes the stand]
19 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you, Your Honours.
20 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Macar, do you know the Butmir penitentiary
21 near Sarajevo?
22 A. Yes, I know it. Its colloquial name was Kula.
23 Q. Did you go there in 1992?
24 A. I did. I had a specific errand.
25 Q. Do you remember when it was exactly? And tell us more about it.
1 A. As far as I remember, it was in May. I think it was in May.
2 The ministry headquarters was at Vrace then, and the minister
3 informed Dobro Planojevic that he had received information that as a
4 consequence of a clash with the Territorial Defence in the area of
5 Dobrinja, some civilians started retreating with the members of the TO.
6 The TO members had brought some civilians to that penitentiary.
7 There were no large facilities in the area to put up so many
8 people. The minister requested us to check whether there were any
9 civilians in the area after that operation of the TO, and we were to
10 inform the minister. I think that he had said that somebody in the
11 government, or maybe the Red Cross, had received information and we were
12 to -- to go on a fact-finding mission.
13 Planojevic and I went to see the duty officers of the
14 penitentiary which originally was used only for small-time delinquents.
15 And we some 30 or 50, maybe, people there. A number of civilians had
16 been put up there, and they were provided accommodation and food, the
17 same food that was also given to the inmates. And they were to stay
18 there until a safe return to Dobrinja became possible.
19 We informed the minister accordingly. And upon completing our
20 task, we left. We didn't stay long. As far as I know, a few days later
21 through the Red Cross and possibly another international organisation,
22 they were escorted over the Vrbanija bridge, I think, and crossed over to
23 the side controlled by the Muslim and Croatian forces.
24 Q. When you say that you spoke to the duty officer of the
25 penitentiary at Butmir, under whose jurisdiction was that facility or
1 what was the status of that duty officer there?
2 A. The Butmir penitentiary was under the jurisdiction of the
3 Ministry of Justice. And the person in charge was also an official of
4 that ministry.
5 Q. Do you know whether there was a police station in the framework
6 of that penitentiary, a police station called Kula or Novo Sarajevo?
7 A. The former Butmir penitentiary is a complex of buildings. In one
8 of the facilities which is separate from the penitentiary itself and has
9 nothing to do with its operations, there was the Novo Sarajevo station
10 which was later moved to another facility with a separate entry, which
11 was in a marginal position -- location in that complex. They had a
12 separate entrance.
13 Q. Do you remember who the chief of that SJB was?
14 A. I think it was Mr. Milenko, or Milanko, Tepavcevic when it was
16 Q. When you and Mr. Planojevic went there to carry out your
17 fact-finding mission as ordered by its minister, did you visit the Kula
18 or Novo Sarajevo police station?
19 A. No, we didn't. Because the entrance to the penitentiary and the
20 administrative building were right next to the gate. We went there and
21 immediately asked for the duty officer from whom we received information
23 Q. Do you know whether the police station or its members had any
24 authority with regard to the persons detained or locked up at that
25 penitentiary facility?
1 A. The penitentiary facility and the police station were completely
2 separate and had different functions. The members of that police station
3 had no authority over anything in the other facility. Only if there was
4 a person suspected of committing a crime, then they could be asked to
5 conduct some investigative activities there.
6 Q. Thank you. I'm about to show you document 1D98, which is at
7 tab 20.
8 During your evidence, you said at one point that at collegiums
9 and briefings in the ministry, the minister criticised you because of the
10 results of the work of the crime police. That was when we spoke about
11 MUP members being used for combat operations.
12 Do you remember that?
13 A. Yes, I do.
14 Q. Sir, this is a memo from the prime minister, Branko Djeric, sent
15 on the 25th of May, 1992, to Cedo Kljajic personally at the Ministry of
16 the Interior in Sarajevo.
17 Tell me, please, what position Mr. Kljajic held at the time in
18 the ministry?
19 A. He was under-secretary for public security.
20 Q. Tell me, please, in the organisational sense, the administration
21 where you at that time served as a co-ordinator, that is to say,
22 administration for crime prevention, was under which larger organisation?
23 A. The crime police administration, just like other administrations,
24 existed within the public security department. Cedo Kljajic was the
25 immediate superior to heads of all administrations, because he was in
1 charge of public security.
2 Q. Thank you. Would you please look at this document and explain
3 it, gives your comment, tell us what this is about.
4 A. The first fact that comes to mind is that the prime minister sent
5 this memo to Cedo Kljajic personally, even though the ministry is headed
6 by somebody else; by Mr. Stanisic.
7 What is particularly interesting and what this memo speaks of is
8 that in Vogosca municipality the security situation was extremely
9 complex. This municipality was basically surrounded during war time. It
10 had a SJB which was not within the organisational system of the
11 Ministry of the Interior, while there was a motor vehicle factory in its
12 territory, the factory called TAS, which put together vehicles, Golf
14 After the war broke out, a number of vehicles were destroyed by
15 shelling, by Muslim and Croat forces, while, on the other hand, people
16 started going to the parking lot of the factory, where the newly
17 assembled vehicles were parked, and started stealing the cars.
18 The Vogosca SJB did not take appropriate measures, nor did the
19 army, under whose jurisdiction TAS was. They did not take any measures
20 to protect the property of the factory. Given the complex war time
21 situation and the fact that the public security station in Vogosca was
22 not carrying out and was not able to carry out its regular tasks aimed at
23 protecting the property, one of the ideas proposed by the minister of the
24 interior was to relocate the vehicles to a safe territory and -- and put
25 under the jurisdiction of the commodity reserves administration of
1 Republika Srpska.
2 However, the idea was immediately criticised by the Crisis Staff,
3 or the municipal leadership of Vogosca, and they started unjustified
4 pressure campaign against the ministry, accusing the ministry and the
5 minister himself and saying that it -- that the police was to blame for
6 the situation that the factory found itself in, insinuating, even, that
7 the police organised the theft of these vehicles.
8 It was obvious that the Crisis Staff did not want to let this out
9 of its control, let the factory out of its control, as well as the
10 ability to use the property of the factory. Crisis Staff, as well as
11 some political circles in Vogosca lobbied and tried to gain access to the
12 prime minister and supply to him this information, which was basically
14 On the other hand, you can see that in this document, they also
15 mention oil in Ilidza. The Crisis Staff from Rajlovac, which is in
16 Ilidza municipality, tried to manage and disburse oil supplies from this
17 area. This is where there were cases of theft of oil. And in order to
18 prevent the commodity reserves administration of Republika Srpska taking
19 over these oil supplies, the ministry and the minister were accused again
20 of not taking all appropriate measures to protect these assets.
21 Soon thereafter, there was a conflict between Mr. Djeric and
22 Minister Stanisic. I've known Mr. Djeric from before the war. He used
23 to teach at the Faculty of Economics while I was a student there. I have
24 high respect for him as a theoretician and somebody who is good in
25 playing cards. And I also know him to be somebody who reacts quickly,
1 based on unverified information. He was basically good in economic
2 theory. That was his forte, but he really was a lousy member of the
3 government, of the cabinet.
4 Q. Sir, this memo of the prime minister requests a report to be
5 submitted on the status of property and safety of persons, and this is
6 requested of the Ministry of the Interior.
7 Was this information provided to the government?
8 A. Yes, it was. I think that, initially, we had trouble gathering
9 information because of all the trouble that existed out on the ground.
10 Q. Did I hear you well, you said that the information you received
11 was incomplete?
12 A. Yes, I said it was incomplete because there were difficulties in
13 gathering information from the ground, from SJBs, and so on.
14 Q. I will show 1D62, tab 21.
15 This document is dated the 26th of May; that is to say, on the
16 day following the previous document. Here we see that the centres are
17 required to provide information which would then be forwarded to the
18 government cabinet. This particular document was sent to the Sarajevo
19 CSB. Is that the questionnaire that was sent pursuant to this request of
20 the government?
21 A. Yes. The police administration drew up a questionnaire with a
22 list of data that needed to be provided.
23 Q. Tell me, sir, administration for crime prevention where you
24 worked, did it deal with the problems at TAS and theft of vehicles and
25 equipment from the factory in Vogosca?
1 A. Together with the crime police of the public security station,
2 the crime police administration worked on this and had an operation
3 entitled TAS. This operation continued for a number of years, given the
4 tasks that needed to be done, both in the territory of Serbia,
5 Montenegro, and the entire territory of Republika Srpska.
6 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] For the sake of the Chamber, I will
7 say that these are 1D93 and 1D183, tabs 44 and 45.
8 Q. And since I see what time it is, no need to show you these
9 reports of yours.
10 Let me now show you 1D94, which is tab 46.
11 On page 59, line 4, what I said was actually a question.
12 Sir, these requests and the criticism coming from the prime
13 minister, did they continue? We saw that it took place in May. Did it
14 continue afterwards as well?
15 A. Yes. Not only coming Mr. Djeric but also in that campaign
16 against the ministry and against Minister Stanisic personally, a number
17 of other members of parliament got involved, including Mrs. Plavsic, and,
18 if I'm not mistaken, Mr. Trbojevic.
19 Q. What position did Mr. Trbojevic hold in 1992?
20 A. I think he was deputy prime minister.
21 Q. [Microphone not activated]
22 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please. Microphone.
23 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. This document, sir, is dated 23rd of August, 1992. It is signed
25 by authorisation of the minister by whom? You can tell us that. It was
1 sent to the Sarajevo CSB. And in the introductory part, it says that at
2 the 47th Session of the government cabinet of Republika Srpska, they
3 discussed crime prevention, and then they go on to speak about TAS and
4 other crimes. They also mention a letter dated 19th of August from the
5 Ministry of Justice. And then further on, this document requests the
6 Sarajevo CSB to compile a detailed report.
7 Can you please tell us who signed this document and also tell us
8 whether you know something about it?
9 A. The document was sign signed by Mr. Petar Vujicic. And
10 underneath, you can see that it says administration for crime prevention.
11 I'm familiar with the contents of this letter. I also am familiar with
12 the letter sent by the minister of justice to the Sarajevo CSB, and I had
13 occasion to discuss that letter with my colleagues from the centre.
14 If you realise that this first letter is from the 19th of
15 August and back in June, the courts and the prosecutor's offices were
16 appointed and set up, and they needed at least a month or two to get
17 going, and then we see that already on the 19th of August, they
18 criticised the work of the CSB, who, basically up until that time, had
19 nobody to send their criminal reports and other complaints and reports
20 to. Needless to say, they had nobody to consult with because it is
21 typical for police to consult in their work with the prosecutors, and
22 they were not able to do that.
23 And if I may, my personal opinion, having analysed everything,
24 and that opinion was shared by colleagues at the centre, was that this
25 too was part of the agreement and the co-ordination of one part outside
1 the government in the sense of launching an attack on the ministry,
2 specifically on Mr. Stanisic.
3 Q. Thank you very much, sir.
4 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I note the time.
5 Ms. Korner has arrived. Our instructions were to provide 20 minutes. We
6 might be providing a minute or two more, but I think this is a convenient
7 time for us to conclude with our witness for the day.
8 Thank you.
9 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Macar, there are certain procedural matters with
10 which the Chamber has to deal before it rises for the day.
11 So, as you would have heard Mr. Zecevic indicate, your testimony
12 for the day is now at an end. The usher would escort you from the
13 courtroom, but the Court will not be rising at this point.
14 So we will reconvene -- your testimony will continue tomorrow
15 morning in this Chamber. Thank you.
16 [The witness stands down]
17 [Trial Chamber confers]
18 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you for coming to the courtroom,
19 Ms. Korner.
20 We invited you, or, we invited a reply from the Prosecution in
21 order to clarify the arguments advanced by your office to support the
22 view that the mere fact that a Defence witness had declined to talk to
23 the Prosecution prior to his or her testimony would in itself be a factor
24 to be considered in favour of calling that witness for cross-examination
25 if he were to be admitted under 92 bis.
1 MS. KORNER: Yes.
2 JUDGE HARHOFF: So it is for this particular and single purpose
3 that we would have invited a [Overlapping speakers] ...
4 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, I saw that. Can I just, in a couple
5 of minutes, simply outline the background, although I know Your Honours
6 are aware of it.
7 The Defence motion was filed on the 29th of March, and we
8 responded on the 5th of April, requesting to know whether the, in
9 inverted commas, character witnesses were being called for the purposes
10 of mitigation or were part of the actual Defence put forward to the
11 charges. And openly and properly the Defence responded on the - just let
12 me get the date - the 12th of April, saying these character witnesses
13 were not just for the purpose of mitigation, they go specifically to the
14 Defence; namely, the lack of discriminatory intent which is necessary for
15 persecutions. Your Honours, we say that, as we said in our response, all
16 of these witnesses deal with the acts and conducts of the accused to the
17 extent that they all purport to say that they never saw any evidence in
18 the period, either before or during the indictment, that Mr. Zupljanin
19 had any discriminatory intent nor acted in any discriminatory fashion.
20 Your Honours, there are two witnesses in particular who go well
21 beyond that, in any event. Can I just remind Your Honours of who they
22 are. Those are SZ-17 and SZ-20 which talk about actual events.
23 Your Honours, the law which we have managed to research and which
24 we refer to some of the decisions in our motion, it does not appear this
25 matter has ever gone to appeal that we have been able to find. There are
1 four particular cases. It really begins with a Rwanda case, Nsabimana,
2 which is on the 15th of September, 2006; the Prlic decision of the 25th
3 of November, 2008; followed very shortly by one in the Popovic case.
4 And, Your Honours, unbeknownst to us when we filed, but we have
5 managed to find it, and Mr. Krgovic has copies of all of these decisions,
6 there was a more recent decision in the Prlic case which is on the
7 16th of February of 2010, which we commend to Your Honours because, in
8 particular, paragraphs 42 through to 44, they make it clear what we say
9 is the point in our case. Namely, that if the good character, so-called,
10 relates to the behaviour of the accused prior to the events if they're
11 linked to the events in the indictment, they are not admissible and we do
12 reiterate that.
13 To come to the very point that Your Honours raised this morning,
14 the decision, apparently, of the Defence witnesses to decline to see us
15 has an added effect for two reasons, we say. First, by interviewing the
16 witnesses, it would enable us to see whether or not they are aware of
17 what we would say are relevant, salient matters which go to what they
18 have to say about Mr. Zupljanin. And whether, in the light of their
19 knowledge of those matters, they would still adhere to what they say.
20 That could have been done by us if the witnesses agreed to see us, and we
21 might well, as a result, have agreed that there was no requirement for
22 them to attend.
23 The second matter is this: That it may well be that if they had
24 agreed to us and agree to make a statement or be interviewed by
25 tape-recording, we could apply to add whatever else is said to us, which
1 which consider to be relevant to this issue, to the 92 bis statements.
2 Your Honours, this is not a new concept. In the Karadzic case,
3 the opposite has been happening. The Prosecution applied to put in a
4 number of witnesses under 92 bis. Mr. Karadzic objected, but eventually
5 Judge Kwon, at page 489 of the transcript of that trial, said this:
6 "The Chamber is conscious of your efforts to interview
7 Prosecution witnesses and to agree, where possible, to the admission of
8 their evidence, pursuant to Rule 92 bis, following your interviews with
9 them and the submission of initial evidence you consider important."
10 He then went on to say, and I summarise, that the Chamber had to
11 make a decision, and so couldn't wait, and they would make their own
12 assessment of whether the requirements of admission of evidence under
13 Rule 92 bis are met:
14 "Should we admit the evidence of a witness under 92 bis whose
15 evidence you would wish to supplement with your own Rule 92 bis
16 statement, you are free to file a motion to that effect."
17 And my understanding is this has been happening. In some cases,
18 the witnesses refused to meet Mr. Karadzic. He tried to get a witness
19 summons. That was opposed, and the Chamber declined to issue witness
21 But, Your Honours, so we say it is a relevant factor when
22 considering whether these witnesses should attend for cross-examination.
23 We rely on our main submissions. None of these witnesses comply with the
24 requirement that it does not go to the acts and conducts of the accused.
25 Discriminatory intent is obviously a major issue when it comes to the
1 count of persecutions. But we say that it is further aggravated by the
2 refusal. They are perfectly entitled to do this, obviously, of any of
3 the 92 bis witnesses or any of the Defence witnesses at all, whether viva
4 voce or 92 bis, to meet with us.
5 And that's that the reason why we say it is a relevant factor.
6 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you, Ms. Korner. We will take your
7 comments into consideration.
8 Mr. Krgovic, do you have anything [Overlapping speakers] ...
9 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Indeed, I'll just respond to the
10 later portion where Ms. Korner talks about the link between Defence
11 witnesses being interviewed and a 92 bis ruling. I believe that the
12 appropriate case law is there, to look at cases like these; but, on the
13 other hand, we need to see these cases on a case-to-case basis. And when
14 the Trial Chamber makes a ruling, the Trial Chamber needs to look at each
15 individual case before it adopts a 92 bis ruling.
16 In the present case, the statements that we submitted address the
17 nature of the accused; obviously, his relationship towards the other
18 communities is part of his character. That is the reason why we place
19 these statements and submissions under 92 bis without further commenting
20 on his behaviour or actions in particular situations. In previous cases,
21 such statements, as were submitted under 92 bis, address individual
22 actions taken by the accused in specific situations. And here we have an
23 overall portrait, as it were, of Mr. Zupljanin's character being offered.
24 And that is why our motion is different from other such motions made in
25 or other cases.
1 Secondly, when addressing the specific example mentioned by
2 Ms. Korner in the Karadzic case, I wish to point out that there the
3 Trial Chamber decided on whether it -- when deciding on whether it would
4 accept or overrule the motion, no link was establish between
5 Mr. Karadzic's desire to meet these witnesses on the one hand and the
6 merits of the ruling itself on the other. As you can tell by looking at
7 the record, Mr. Karadzic requested to see the witnesses, to meet the
8 witnesses, in order to be able to obtain fresh evidence, new information
9 and thus complete the statement. The Prosecutor wants virtually the same
10 thing. They want statements from these witnesses in order to have fresh
11 evidence following the conclusion of their case.
12 It is for these reasons that I believe the Trial Chamber should
13 not take into account this line of reasoning when deciding on a ruling.
14 They want new evidence, fresh witnesses, new information from these
15 witnesses, that in order to resubmit a whole new statement introducing
16 new evidence, this, in our submission, constitutes precisely the reason
17 for the Chamber to throw the motion out. At this stage in the
18 proceedings, I do not believe the Prosecution should be allowed to take
19 that course of action.
20 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you, Mr. Krgovic.
21 JUDGE HALL: So we would take on board what counsel have said,
22 and the ruling which is in the process of being finalised would, if we
23 are satisfied that this is a relevant consideration, appearing therein.
24 And are there any other matters before we rise.
25 MS. KORNER: This is one thing, Your Honour, and this is a matter
1 of timing.
2 It has come to my attention this morning, and I'm afraid I
3 haven't had a chance to talk to the Defence about this, that it may well
4 be that the Haradinaj case will not run the full fortnight that's
5 assigned to it, or ten days I think it is, for various reasons.
6 If that is the case, would Your Honours then restart this case
7 earlier than the 30th of August? I appreciate it is a hypothetical
8 question, but it's a matter that I thought I ought to put before
9 Your Honours. [Overlapping speakers] ...
10 JUDGE HALL: I confess you have me at a disadvantage, Ms. Korner.
11 Because whereas I have seen the e-mail traffic, I haven't had the --
12 which have only come in while we have been sitting today, I haven't had
13 had a chance to digest it. So ...
14 MS. KORNER: Right. We haven't seen any e-mail traffic at all.
15 I got this on a personal level.
16 JUDGE HALL: Oh, I see. As we all suspected, this, what I
17 gather, is a novel approach of attempting to run two cases in parallel.
18 We are going to have to see how it goes. So we will start as the
19 schedule has indicated, and I would not be at all surprised if, come --
20 perhaps I shouldn't over-speak, but come fairly early on, we don't have
21 to revise our approach to this. And more than that, I'm disinclined to
22 say at this point.
23 MS. KORNER: Certainly, Your Honour. I understand. I just
24 thought I ought to float it so that perhaps at some state before the end
25 of next week we have a better idea of where everybody is.
1 [Trial Chamber confers]
2 JUDGE HALL: Thank you for alerting us, Ms. Korner.
3 So we take the adjournment, to reconvene tomorrow morning.
4 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.38 p.m.,
5 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 7th of July,
6 2011, at 9.00 a.m.