1 Thursday, 7 July 2011
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning to
6 everyone in and around the courtroom.
7 This is case IT-08-91-T, the Prosecutor versus Mico Stanisic and
8 Stojan Zupljanin.
9 JUDGE HALL: Thank you, Madam Registrar. Good morning to
10 everyone. May I have the appearances, please.
11 MR. HANNIS: Good morning, all. For the Prosecution, I'm
12 Tom Hannis along with Crispian Smith.
13 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours.
14 Slobodan Zecevic, Slobodan Cvijetic, Eugene O'Sullivan, and
15 Ms. Tatjana Savic, appearing for the Stanisic Defence this morning.
16 MR. KRGOVIC: Good morning, Your Honours. Dragan Krgovic for the
17 Zupljanin Defence.
18 JUDGE HALL: [Microphone not activated]
19 [Prosecution counsel confer]
20 [The witness takes the stand]
21 JUDGE HALL: Good morning to you, Mr. Macar. Before I invite
22 Mr. Zecevic to continue, I remind you, you're still on your oath.
23 WITNESS: GORAN MACAR [Resumed]
24 [Witness answered through interpreter]
25 JUDGE HALL: Yes, Mr. Zecevic.
1 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
2 Examination by Mr. Zecevic: [Continued]
3 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Macar.
4 A. Good morning.
5 Q. Mr. Macar, yesterday, toward the end, we discussed document 1D94,
6 which is at tab 46.
7 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] And I kindly ask for that document
8 to be displayed again.
9 Could the usher please hand this binder to the witness.
10 [In English] Thank you.
11 Q. [Interpretation] Tab 46. You told us that this document was
12 signed by Mr. Vujicic, the chief analyst of the RS MUP.
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. In the last-but-one paragraph, there's an instruction that the
15 Sarajevo CSB compiled a detailed report on the measures to prevent crime
16 with statistic indicators, according to criminal offences reported and
17 discovered, et cetera.
18 Do you remember if the CSB ever did that?
19 A. Yes, I do. The Sarajevo CSB did actually compile such a report.
20 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Let us show the witness 1D188,
21 please. That's at tab 47.
22 Q. We saw that the previous document was dated 23 August. There is
23 no date on this document. But, on page 2, there's a reference to a
24 letter from the Ministry of Justice which was received on the 25th of
25 August. We can read that in the last paragraph.
1 Is this that report of the CSB mentioned in that letter?
2 A. Yes. There is the very report, and I believe that there was also
3 a cover letter. But this is the report.
4 Reference is made here to the document from the Ministry of Justice and
5 the document that we have just seen in the paragraph you mentioned.
6 Q. Thank you. Sir, yesterday we spoke about that letter from the
7 prime minister and the other letter from the Ministry of Justice, and on
8 page 22930 of yesterday's transcript, you mentioned a campaign against
9 the Ministry of the Interior, including the minister personally,
10 Minister Stanisic. Apart from the prime minister and his deputy, as well
11 as some members of parliament were involved, and so was Ms. Plavsic, as a
12 member of the Presidency.
13 Before that, you had said that there had been a clash between
14 Mr. Stanisic and Djeric regarding that campaign. What was the basic
15 objection of Prime Minister Djeric and these other persons to the work of
16 the ministry and the minister personally?
17 A. Let me first point out the following: I was able to contact the
18 then-Prime Minister Djeric, whom I know personally. He wasn't a man all
19 too familiar with the functioning of public administration. The minister
20 of the interior of Republika Srpska, Mr. Stanisic, without the assistance
21 of the cabinet or other line ministries, could not create on his own the
22 necessary preconditions for the normal functioning of the MUP. It is
23 understandable that requests, especially from the administrations at
24 headquarters, where certain weaknesses were identified whilst touring
25 on the ground, were conveyed to the minister, and he in turn conveyed
1 them to the Prime Minister, asking that the cabinet implement certain
2 measures faster. We realised that other ministries were also created
3 from scratch, but Mr. Stanisic, just as he expected us to do some things
4 faster, also tried to get it done through the cabinet. But the problems
5 in Vogosca, especially with regard to TAS, were used to blame the Ministry
6 of the Interior. The ministry was blamed for the situation in Vogosca,
7 and not only Vogosca, also Rajlovac and Ilidza, maybe. In Vogosca, there
8 were large stocks of goods, not only at TAS but in other factories, too.
9 And then the ministry initiated the relocation of vehicles to prevent
10 pillage and destruction due to combat operations, but there was strong
11 resistance from the municipal authorities, that is, the Crisis Staff, and
12 information started going laterally toward the cabinet and Mr. Djeric.
13 Q. I apologise, sir, but I must, again, ask you to speak slowly. Part of
14 your answer wasn't recorded. It was recorded that the minister was blamed
15 for this situation in Vogosca. I believe that you said something else.
16 A. No, not the minister. There was an attempt --
17 Q. Just a moment, please.
18 A. The MUP, not the minister.
19 Q. So it was the ministry?
20 A. Yes, the ministry as an administrative body.
21 Q. Please continue and explain slowly.
22 A. After the unsuccessful proposal to relocate to a territory which
23 was not susceptible to combat operations and which can be physically
24 secured, the vehicles remained in the Vogosca municipality in the same
25 space which could be exposed to combat operations and under the control
1 of the Vogosca Crisis Staff. And something similar happened in Rajlovac
2 where there were large stocks of goods, including oil and various
3 consumables. And it was similar in Ilidza. The Crisis Staffs wanted to
4 be in control of that property.
5 That was one side of the story. And the minister requested the
6 government that the judicial bodies be finally set up, that is, courts
7 and public prosecutor's offices, without which the police couldn't
8 function. But the preparations, especially in the prosecutor's office,
9 were very slow, and the process of nominating new prosecutors took a long
10 time. And there was lateral information flow, that is not vertical or
11 official, in other words, to blame the ministry for general crime,
12 whereas, the non-existence of judicial bodies was neglected. Behind
13 these initiatives, there were some individuals who tried to conceal their
14 own inactivity, and it was, in fact, the Crisis Staff who wanted to be in
15 control of those goods to be able to distribute them as they thought fit;
16 and, on the other hand, it was our intention to place all these under the
17 control of the commodity reserves of the republic.
18 Q. Let us sum this up, sir. In your opinion, was the position of
19 the minister and the ministry in line with the laws and regulations that
20 were in force?
21 A. Yes, it was. Because, under the law, all stocks of goods,
22 unprotected goods, were to be placed under the control of the commodity
23 reserves authority.
24 Q. And if I understood you correctly, some individuals from
25 Crisis Staffs and local authorities who had effective control over these
1 goods in their territory didn't like that?
2 A. Yes, exactly. The Crisis Staffs didn't like that because we had
3 already observed that some of these goods were being sold, allegedly in
4 order to buy either food for the citizens, or uniforms, or whatever,
5 which was certainly beyond the control of the RS. And it -- approval for
6 every such transaction was required; approval either from the government
7 or from the commodity reserves authority.
8 Q. Let us look at P427.8, which is tab 44.
9 [Microphone not activated]
10 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
11 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. This is a report on some aspects of the work done to date and the
13 tasks ahead.
14 This document was compiled by the MUP and distributed, as we can
15 see, to the president of the Presidency and the prime minister. It was
16 made after the first collegium of the ministry which took place on
17 11 July 1992.
18 Were you familiar with this document in 1992?
19 A. Yes, I was.
20 Q. All these problems we discussed on Tuesday, all these problems
21 that the ministry faced. And we listed them and you commented. Are all
22 these problems listed in this document which was submitted to the
23 president of the Presidency and the prime minister?
24 A. I think that nearly all problems of which the MUP headquarters
25 was aware are listed in this report and submitted to the authorities in
2 Q. Let us just comment on what is written on page 4. And that's
3 page 5 in e-court. It may be page 4 in English.
4 I'm afraid that we'll have to move to the following page in
5 English. Or, actually, no. We should have gone back to page 3; I
6 apologise. Page 3 in English. It's because the line spacing of the
7 original is greater.
8 In English, the -- it's the fourth paragraph from the bottom; and
9 in the original, it's the second paragraph from the top. And it's about
10 war crimes.
11 It was pointed out that the priority for both the national
12 service and the crime investigation service is to detect war crimes,
13 provide documentation (then which documentation) and file criminal
14 reports. Documents also provided for war crimes committed by Serbs.
15 Tell me, sir, does this faithfully reflect the position of the
16 ministry at that period?
17 A. This probably faithfully reflects the position of the ministry
18 and the minister, as well as the collegium and the crime police
19 administration and directorate at the HQ.
20 I'd just like to point out one thing: In addition to what the
21 report says, at all the meetings and briefings that we had with the
22 minister, there was one general position. Crimes were never broken down
23 the ethnic lines. The general attitude was always that we were trying to
24 shed light on war crimes, and that certainly was very much the position
25 taken by the HQ.
1 JUDGE HALL: If I may, Mr. Zecevic. Mr. Macar, I think I
2 understand what your -- what you last said as probably being a partial
3 answer to the question I'm about to ask, but the -- whereas, on the one
4 hand, the document says what it says, there is -- and it may be a fault
5 of the interpretation, but your answer was, "This probably reflects the
6 position of the ministry," and I'm wondering why you use the word
8 As I said, I'm not unmindful of the remainder of your answer, but
9 could you explain why you said -- why you used the word "probably"?
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That might be somewhat inaccurate.
11 I did say probably but this is, generally speaking, the position of the
12 Ministry of the Interior, to shed light on war crimes regardless of the
13 ethnic background of the citizens and persons involved.
14 If I said probably, this is because this is just an extract.
15 There are more documents previously produced about this by the minister,
16 the chief of the crime police, documents that provided a more
17 comprehensive overview of war crimes and the position taken in that
18 respect. The general position taken by everyone there was that we needed
19 to work, in order to shed light on war crimes, regardless of the victims'
20 ethnic background.
21 JUDGE HALL: Thank you.
22 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Sir, let us try and clarify this.
24 I think you said "for the most part" and not "probably." Let me
25 make sure I understand what you're trying to say. Is it your position
1 that this document does not contain all of the problems that the ministry
2 was encountering in its work? Is that what you were trying to say?
3 A. Yes, that's precisely what I was trying to say. There was some
4 previous documents that we analysed and used where we offered a far
5 broader view of these problems, all of the problems that we were
6 encountering, and that also included specific guide-lines for the work of
7 the SJBs.
8 Q. If there is any need, we can go through the document in its
10 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Zecevic, could you remind me the tab number
11 of this document, please.
12 MR. ZECEVIC: The document tab number 34. It's P427.8. 34.
13 [Interpretation] Could we please look at page 3 of the Serbian,
14 which I assume to be page 2 in the English. Actually not. It's the page
15 that's already on the screen. So the English is good.
16 Paragraph 2 states:
17 "The shortage of personnel in all MUP services is also a limiting
18 factor. Many documents are missing. There are no penal records,
19 registers," et cetera.
20 Q. Was that another problem that you encountered?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Next paragraph:
23 "The political situation is greatly affecting the rifts."
24 I'll skip a portion there:
25 "In other communities, local politics is exerting a powerful
2 Was this a problem too?
3 A. Yes, a large-scale problem.
4 Q. Next paragraph:
5 "In some communities, neither the military nor the civilian
6 judiciary is functioning. Judges have not been elected. And in
7 Bosanska Krajina, for instance, several thousand court cases have not yet
8 been resolved. There are no judges for criminal cases. Judges receive
9 threats and are in fear. The courts do not function and hardened
10 criminals are released from prison, which affects the establishment of
11 the rule of law and the work of law enforcement organs."
12 Was this, too, one of the problems that you discussed and
13 testified about over the last couple of days?
14 A. Yes. And I did say that in the previous part of my statement.
15 Q. Next page, the last paragraph on page 4 of the Serbian reads --
16 which is the second-to-last paragraph in the English:
17 "A new political and territorial division of the RS was being
18 prepared which will replace the previously necessary forms such as
19 autonomous Serb areas and regions with districts."
20 Are you familiar with this, sir?
21 A. Yes, I am.
22 Q. Sir, let us go to page 6, paragraph 2, which is the next page in
23 the English. It reads:
24 "What is not negotiable is the fact that the Ministry of the
25 Interior ..."
1 It's the third paragraph from the bottom of the page up in the
3 "What is not negotiable is the fact that the Ministry of the
4 Interior is a professional organisation, not influenced by politics.
5 This means not influenced by individuals, groups, factions and parties."
6 Do you remember this being the position of the highest ranking
7 employees of the Ministry of the Interior at the time?
8 A. Yes. In most municipalities and SJBs, we would come across local
9 politicians exercising a great degree of influence, and also the
10 Crisis Staffs, too. It was the position of the ministry, right from the
11 outset, that the Ministry of the Interior should provide approval and
12 formalise appointments in SJBs and CSBs in keeping with the Law on
13 Internal Affairs.
14 Q. [Microphone not activated]
15 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for Mr. Zecevic, please.
16 JUDGE DELVOIE: [Microphone not activated]
17 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Page 9, the last paragraph, talks about the prevention and
19 documenting of war crimes. That's page 10 in the Serbian, in e-court,
20 and I assume page 8 of the English. It's probably page 7. Or 6. Yes.
21 Paragraph 3 of page 6.
22 It reads:
23 "Preventing and documenting war crimes by using all legally
24 prescribed methods for documenting such activities ..."
25 Do you remember that this, too, was emphasised by the ministry at
1 the time and that was also its position?
2 A. Yes. The administration was involved in formalising this request
3 on working methods. And we inserted deliberately what can you see in the
4 brackets here: Photographs, audio recordings, expert opinions, medical
5 findings, witness and eye-witness testimony.
6 As I said earlier in my evidence, the Ministry of the Interior
7 was under-equipped, in terms of materiel and technology, and this applied
8 to our public security stations as well the CSBs. We were unable to
9 create the logistical conditions quickly enough to equip those stations,
10 particularly when it came to photograph and film equipment and
11 technology. Based on the pre-war organisation of the Ministry of the
12 Interior of Bosnia and Herzegovina, there were labs, photo labs, in CSBs
13 so that it would sometimes be the case that certain rolls of film would
14 just lie there for weeks on end without being developed; whereas, there
15 were some private labs which ended up developing those rolls.
16 Q. Sir, page 11 in e-court, page 10 for you, the English reference
17 is the page that we have. That's two paragraphs down.
18 It reads:
19 "To resolve these problems and the dispute over jurisdiction
20 between the MUP and the Army of the Serbian Republic ..."
21 The next paragraph talks about resolving existing problems and
22 outstanding issues with the justice ministry. Do you remember whether
23 these problems were discussed at any of the collegium meetings of the
24 Ministry of the Interior of the RS?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. [Microphone not activated]
2 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for Mr. Zecevic, please.
3 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Along the same lines, on the next page, it's still the present
5 page in the English. It reads, in paragraph 1:
6 "In keeping with the Law on Criminal Procedure and the Law on
7 Internal Affairs, and in order for the MUP to only process persons before
8 the actual trial or before their hand-over to the judicial organs, which
9 is the result of the work of the SUP [as interpreted], there needs to
10 be ..."
11 The second-to-last paragraph in the English:
12 "Special emphasis should be placed on the issue of relocating
13 certain citizens, villages, et cetera, because this does not fall within
14 the competence of the MUP, although efforts are being made to link it to
15 the MUP."
16 Do you remember whether this subject, too, is something that was
17 discussed at the collegium meetings of the Ministry of the Interior?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. What we see here, is it consistent with the position that you
20 took at the collegium meetings?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Last paragraph, last sentence in the English.
23 The next paragraph of the Serbian and the last sentence in the
25 "Another conclusion was that the MUP must be funded solely from
1 the budget of the Serbian Republic ..."
2 Was that another position taken at one of those meetings of the
3 ministry at the time?
4 A. Yes, that was the position of the Ministry of the Interior of the
6 Q. Mr. Macar, this note or information was submitted to the highest
7 ranking bodies of the RS at the time: The president of the Presidency,
8 and the prime minister. You submitted all these requests and all this
9 information. Did those bodies do anything about it; and, if so, what?
10 A. What I personally observed and what I remember is that after this
11 information was made available and after the meetings of the minister
12 with the president and prime minister, the pace increased, the pace of
13 establishing judicial organs, both civilian ones and in the military. I
14 also think that the commodity reserve administration's work improved.
15 If I may add, concerning the last conclusion that you read, which
16 deals with the confiscated items, perhaps the formulation here was a bit
17 clumsy, as I know that it was a suggestion coming from the crime police
18 and crime police administration; namely, that the confiscated items that
19 some citizens took from abandoned houses and so on, and we learned about
20 it when they crossed check-points and so on, that all of these
21 confiscated items should be put under the jurisdiction of the commodity
22 reserves administration. We didn't know where these items came from, and
23 the commodity reserves administration had its municipal commissions who
24 could take in the confiscated items.
25 Overall, the pressure on the ministry still existed. The
1 ministry had its planned activities. And owing to that, its work, the
2 organisation of its work, continually improved. However, due to
3 objections and complaints concerning judicial organ, complaints which
4 said that the ministry did not work well, the pressure of even greater
5 intensity continued. And this pressure came from one part of the
6 government cabinet.
7 Q. Let me show you several orders of the Ministry of the Interior so
8 that we can illustrate the point; namely, what the ministry did following
9 the circulation of this information.
10 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown 1D58,
11 tab 36.
12 Q. Mr. Macar, this order is dated 23rd of July, 1992, signed by
13 Minister Mico Stanisic.
14 In the preamble, it say:
15 "Proceeding from the conclusions reached at the meeting of
16 executive employees held on 11 July 1992, the meeting of the
17 collegium ... on 23rd July, 1992, at the minister's enactment," number
18 such and such, "this order is being adopted, or issued."
19 Tell me, do you know about this order?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Tell me, please, what was the reason behind this order, if you
22 know? Why was it issued?
23 A. The situation with the war territory of Republika Srpska and
24 Bosnia and Herzegovina, and especially the large number of refugees who
25 had come from the territory under the control of Croatian and Muslim
1 forces, as well as an increase in the number of crimes committed, all
2 made it necessary to increase the number of active and reserve policemen
3 in the municipal organs of the interior and SJBs, as well as staff
4 members of the crime police.
5 The Ministry of the Interior, in its headquarters, received
6 information that in certain SJBs and in the municipal organs of the
7 interior, certain persons joined the reserve force who previously had
8 been convicted, who had a criminal record. A particular problem, as we
9 could see in the previous document that we saw, the previous information,
10 was that, due to war operations, certain records were destroyed, and I
11 will tell you exactly which regards later on. Also, there was a large
12 influx of residents coming from the territory under the control of Muslim
13 and Croatian forces.
14 Q. Mr. Macar, I apologise. I have to interrupt you. Our time is
15 limited. We have a lot of documents, and I would like us to focus on the
17 My question was: What was the reason for issuing this order,
18 such an order? If you can give us a one-sentence answer.
19 A. The reason for issuing this order was that they realised that
20 reserve police forces had among its members people who had criminal
21 records, who had convictions, criminal convictions.
22 Q. Thank you. The fact that somebody was convicted for crimes
23 committed, did that affect that person's ability to become a member of
24 the Ministry of the Interior?
25 A. People with criminal convictions were not eligible to become
1 members of the Ministry of the Interior in accordance with the law.
2 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Could we now see 1D59, which is a
3 document of the Ministry of the Interior, sent to CSBs, dated the 24th of
4 July, dealing with the same issues.
5 Q. I don't know whether you can tell us who signed it. It says here
6 "for the minister of the interior," and we see somebody's signature.
7 A. This is my signature. And this was done pursuant to the request
8 of Mr. Stanisic.
9 Q. Tell me, sir, we see that in this document they give an
10 instruction that members of the ministry who had been criminally
11 prosecuted or against whom there were proceedings pending, ought to be
12 dismissed from their service in the ministry.
13 Tell me, please, based on this document, they were supposed to be
14 dismissed from which position, from which service?
15 A. They were supposed to be dismissed from their jobs in the
16 Ministry of the Interior, both in active or reserve force, although we
17 did not have information that there were any such persons within the
18 active police force, persons with criminal convictions. They were mostly
19 in reserve forces.
20 Q. The fact that these persons were being relieved of their duties
21 in the ministry and that they were being placed at the disposal of the
22 army, did it in any way affect any pending criminal proceedings against
23 these individuals?
24 A. As it says here in the document, all of those who had criminal
25 convictions, meaning that they had already been convicted by any court in
1 Bosnia and Herzegovina for crimes committed, the criminal records in
2 Bosnia and Herzegovina were kept in the jurisdiction where they resided.
3 And we needed access to those records to know whether somebody had
4 criminal convictions. Due to the fact that there was a lot of movement
5 of the population --
6 Q. I have to interrupt you. I apologise. We are clear on that.
7 So if somebody had a criminal conviction, then that person wasn't
8 eligible to become a member of the ministry. Then -- you have already
9 explained that to us.
10 My question was this: What about proceedings, criminal
11 proceedings, that were under way, that were ongoing at that particular
12 moment against certain individuals who were then relieved of their duties
13 in the ministry and placed at the disposal of the army? Did this
14 document that we now see affect in any way the criminal responsibility
15 and any pending criminal proceedings against those persons at that
17 A. Criminal proceedings take some time, and in cases where we
18 learned that there were any pending criminal proceedings in the territory
19 of Republika Srpska, such persons could not become members of the
20 Ministry of the Interior, and they were placed at the disposal of the
22 Q. I have to interrupt you yet again.
23 Were criminal proceedings against these persons terminated due to
24 the fact that they were relieved of their duties in the Ministry of the
25 Interior and placed at the disposal of the Army of Republika Srpska? Yes
1 or no.
2 A. No. Because criminal proceedings fall under the jurisdiction of
3 judicial organs.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I see the time. Are
6 we implementing the same schedule today?
7 JUDGE HALL: Yes. Well, I assumed that that schedule would run
8 for the duration of this witness's testimony.
9 So we take a break and resume in 15 minutes.
10 [The witness stands down]
11 --- Recess taken at 10.01 a.m.
12 --- On resuming at 10.20 a.m.
13 [The witness takes the stand]
14 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Mr. Macar, I'm going to show you document 1D176, which is at
16 tab 41.
17 Before commenting on this document, let me ask you something.
18 Maybe you can give us a brief explanation. Here's a hypothetical example
19 for you to explain how things were dealt with at the time.
20 If the MUP were to hire a person who was a former employee of the
21 MUP in a place which was outside the Serbian territory -- Serbian
22 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, let's say Tuzla as an example, were you,
23 at the ministry, able to come by the personal file of that person?
24 A. No, we were not.
25 Q. Were you able to come by any police file of that person, if his
1 or her residence was previously outside the territory of the
2 Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
3 A. No, we weren't.
4 Q. How did you get information that the person in question may have
5 been -- may have stood trial for a criminal offence?
6 A. We received such information from individual refugees from those
7 areas, or possibly from some former MUP members who had left those areas
8 and were hired by our MUP. In such cases, since we were unable to get
9 more in-depth information of that nature, such persons were returned to
10 the VRS, to be at their disposal, and that went through the
11 Ministry of National Defence.
12 Q. Thank you. This order dated 27 July 1992 comprises a total of 11
13 items. Are you familiar with this order, which is signed by the
14 minister, Mico Stanisic?
15 A. Yes, I am.
16 Q. In item 2 of this order, for the second or third time, reference
17 is made to that order of 23 July that we saw, with regard to the
18 differentiation between -- or --
19 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: In the
20 Ministry of the Interior.
21 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. That is to say the removal of persons who were not eligible to be
23 ministry employees.
24 In item 4, we read that all special units established during the
25 war in the areas of Security Services Centres, must be disbanded
1 immediately and placed under the command of the Army of the Serbian
3 It goes on to discuss the special purposes police detachment of
4 the MUP of the RS.
5 If you know, tell us what the reason was for disbanding these
6 special units and what the reason was for the establishment of the
7 special purposes police units in the areas of the CSBs.
8 A. The disbanding of special units that had been established in the
9 framework of CSBs was done because the ministry never approved their
10 establishment. Their members had not been vetted. And they didn't have
11 decisions on appointment from the ministry headquarters.
12 At that time, there was this strong inclination to use police for
13 combat operations, and many such units were resubordinated to the VRS and
14 basically spent their time at the front line. The complex security
15 situation in the RS required a much higher level of organisation of
16 special units which were to be used primarily for security purposes, and
17 only secondarily for defence. That's why it was decided that a police
18 detachment be established which was under the direct command of the
19 Ministry of the Interior.
20 Q. That police detachment which was under the direct command of the
21 MUP, who was its immediate commander?
22 A. Mr. Milenko Karisik was its direct commander.
23 Q. After this order, that is, in the second half of 1992, did this
24 unit have platoons with all CSBs in the territory of the Serbian Republic
25 of BH?
1 A. During the setting up of police detachments, organisational units
2 were established with the CSBs. They were not commanded by the CSBs but
3 they shared their facilities. But they were still under the direct
4 command of Mr. Karisik; that is, of the MUP. And the decision to
5 relocate parts of the unit to the centres was due to the fragmentation of
6 the territory and the complex security situation which required efficient
8 Q. Thank you.
9 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please show the witness
10 678D1, which is at tab 42.
11 Q. This is a document dated 30 July 1992. The author of the
12 document is the War Presidency of Trebinje municipality. Its president,
13 Bozidar Vucurevic, is ordering that the special police platoon of the
14 Trebinje CSB be disbanded.
15 The fact that the president of the War Presidency issued an order
16 to disband a special police platoon is something that we would like to
17 hear your comment on. What happened here?
18 A. I have already stated which problems the MUP faced with regard to
19 the leaders of the Crisis Staffs or the autonomous regions. There were
20 attempts on their part to control the security organs in their territory.
21 It is unusual for Mr. Vucurevic to issue such an order and he sent it to
22 the Trebinje CSB, and this exercise on the part of the -- of
23 Mr. Vucurevic was not in line with the Law on Internal Affairs.
24 Q. Please wait a moment, please. Not -- your entire reply was not
1 The previous order that we have seen signed by Minister Stanisic,
2 who was to implement the order to disband these units?
3 A. The chiefs of the CSBs.
4 Q. Who was chief of the Trebinje CSB; do you remember?
5 A. If I remember correctly, it was Krsto Savic.
6 Q. Now, instead of a decision of the chief of the CSB, Mr. Savic,
7 there's an order by the president of the War Presidency. What do you say
8 about that?
9 A. It is obvious that Mr. Savic also had problems in the territory
10 of the Trebinje centre because some individuals thought that their role
11 was much stronger than what was envisaged by the law, and this is an
12 example of that.
13 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document into
14 evidence, unless there are objections.
15 MR. HANNIS: No objection.
16 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
17 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 1D642, Your Honours.
18 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] P605, tab 58, please.
19 Q. This is a document of the Banja Luka CSB, dated 19 August, signed
20 by the chief of the centre, Stojan Zupljanin, and it was distributed to
21 all SJBs in their territory.
22 It says re: Order of the minister of the interior of 10
23 August 1992 and the dispatch of 17 August 1992.
24 And the contents of these are related in its entirety.
25 Items 1 and 2 spell out detention measures and security of the
1 collection centres.
2 Are you familiar with this order of the MUP?
3 A. Yes, I am. Through the police administration, and 03 is their
4 classification mark. And through the analytics department, whose
5 classification mark is 10.
6 Q. Under the law, how long could the police detain a person
7 suspected of committing a crime?
8 A. Under the Law on Criminal Procedure, up to three days.
9 Q. Paragraph 1 says that measures of detention and custody can only
10 be applied within the existing rules.
11 What is that in relation to?
12 A. Custody and detention could only be imposed within the premises
13 of the SJBs and CSBs; for example, while a person was being interviewed.
14 As for detention, that also applied to the justice system,
15 including the prisons that were under the justice ministry.
16 Q. Where it says here existing rules or regulations, what is that in
17 reference to? Is that in reference to the provisions of the Law on
18 Criminal Procedure that we commented on a while ago?
19 A. Yes, the Law on Criminal Procedure of the RS.
20 Q. Do you see this after item 2, it talks about the -- securing the
21 collection centres that's -- are under the VRS. It says that
22 disciplinary measures, and, if necessary, other measures shall be taken
23 against those not in compliance.
24 And it goes on, the last portion of the paragraph:
25 "For the implementation of this order, I will take measures as
1 prescribed by the law against any commanders in the organisational unit
2 which is their responsibility under Zupljanin."
3 In the last paragraph, again, says:
4 "I once again repeat that the order should be made urgently and
5 in a consistent manner. Please immediately inform the Banja Luka CSB
6 about the result ..."
7 Sir, can you please explain why many of these orders that we have
8 been looking at seem to stress the responsibility of employees in the
9 leading positions in the Ministry of the Interior, and that all these
10 constant threats being made of disciplinary and other measures that might
11 be taken against them, in keeping with the existing laws. Why is that?
12 A. Generally speaking, the interior minister, Mr. Stanisic, was very
13 consistent in his application of the law. Whenever there was a meeting
14 with the heads of public and state security units and other leaders, he
15 was adamant every time that one had to work in compliance with the Law on
16 Criminal procedure and all the other laws that were security related and
17 affected the security situation. The same information was passed along
18 down the chain of command to those working in the field, in order to step
19 up discipline in those segments that the ministry could directly affect
20 and in reference to those appointments that the ministry itself had made.
21 In some of the SJBs, we couldn't have a proper subordination
22 system of those because all of the people in the leading positions there
23 had been appointed by the local Crisis Staffs and the municipal bodies,
24 so the Ministry of the Interior and the centre did not have an
25 appropriate role to play, such as that envisaged by the Law on
1 Internal Affairs.
2 Q. Thank you very much.
3 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have 1D48, tab 94.
4 Thank you.
5 Q. This is a dispatch from very late in 1992. The date is the
6 17th of December, 1992. Addressed to all CSBs chiefs, all the
7 directorates at the HQ, and all the public security stations. Signed by
8 Minister Mico Stanisic.
9 Conclusion was adopted that it is necessary to conduct checks of
10 all MUP employees through operative, misdemeanour and criminal records.
11 Again, it says:
12 "All persons with a criminal record and employees with a negative
13 operative checks are to be relieved of duty immediately in accordance
14 with the Law on Internal Affairs.
15 "Deadline: 15 days.
16 "Failure to carry out this task in the set period will be
17 punished most severely.
18 "I forbid the payment of wages to employees who have not been
20 Are you familiar with this ministry dispatch, sir?
21 A. Yes, I am.
22 Q. Could you please comment on the dispatch? Explain what it is in
23 reference to.
24 A. By the end of 1992, the Ministry of the Interior had created
25 conditions and rules to have personal files on each and every employee of
1 the Ministry of the Interior. This, above all, implied that the numbers
2 of both the active and reserve forces should be organised in keeping with
3 the assessments of the actual situation on the ground in the various
4 municipalities. It was sometimes the case in certain public security
5 stations that this order was not complied with, or at least not fully, in
6 terms of increasing or reducing the number of reservists, which was very
7 much a function of the security situation that prevailed in a certain
8 area. On the other hand, based on the existing documentation and the
9 records throughout the RS, our intention was to keep the files as up to
10 date as possible on all of our workers.
11 Q. I see an order here by Mr. Stanisic, the then-minister,
12 forbidding the payment of wages, of salaries. This being December 1992,
13 up until December 1992, was the ministry already being financed from the
14 federal budget, and was there a centralised payment system through the
15 Ministry of the Interior, through which all members of the ministry
16 throughout the territory received their salaries?
17 A. I think that applied to most of the territory. But there were
18 certain public security stations that failed to obey the order in
19 establishing this centralised system through which salaries were then
21 Q. Thank you.
22 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have 1D522, tab 88.
23 Q. Sir, this document was signed by Minister Mico Stanisic. It's
24 another dispatch from late in 1992. The number is 10-013, and it is
25 addressed to the municipal assemblies, the president, and the chairman of
1 the Executive Board. It's about persons being proposed for leading
2 positions in the ministry.
3 Paragraph 2 reads:
4 "We wish to inform you that, given the emphasised legal
5 responsibility of the chief of the Security Services Centre for the
6 general security situation in the area of the centre, the ministry has
7 set relevant norms, according to which chiefs of these centres are the
8 only ones authorised to recommend ... personnel ... for appointment in
9 their respective areas, including the SJBs."
10 Sir, are you familiar with this dispatch?
11 A. Yes, I am familiar with the dispatch, and it is a result of feedback
12 received following the minister's order relating to the method of
13 personnel verification in the CSBs and SJBs. There were certain anomalies
14 in some municipalities where the heads of CSBs were not able to have
15 normal communication with the municipal leaders and appoint proposed
16 candidates to certain positions due to obstruction by municipal
17 leadership. And that is why the minister, after some meetings, had no
18 choice but to send this and remind municipal leaders of responsibilities
19 of the Ministry of the Interior under the law and the procedures of the
20 Ministry of the Interior concerning the selection of personnel.
21 Q. This dispatch that serves to remind the municipal presidents and
22 presidents of Executive Boards, how successful was it? Did it yield any
23 particular results; and, if so, what kind? Partial results, full results?
24 A. In some municipalities –- in some municipalities, even despite
25 this –- instruction, not to say a warning, there were no results
1 whatsoever, and perhaps even more obstruction ensued.
2 Q. Thank you. Sir, let me ask you this: What is the basic function
3 of the crime administration of the MUP attached to the headquarters, in
4 relation to the CSBs across the territory?
5 A. Some of the functions would include monitoring the work of the
6 crime squads across the stations, providing technical assistance,
7 proposing measures and activities to combat any emerging forms of crime.
8 Generally speaking, training employees by organising courses and
9 seminars, collecting information regarding the situation across the
10 police stations and forwarding this to the centre, particularly the
11 relevance service in charge of materiel and technical assistance.
12 Personnel assessments and such-like.
13 Q. Did the crime administration of the Ministry of the Interior
14 attached to the HQ, which is where you first worked as a co-ordinator,
15 and then you held a leading position, that of one of the heads, did the
16 administration tour these CSBs and inspect these CSBs throughout the RS;
17 and, if so, when -- from when on?
18 A. In 1992, we didn't have formal inspections. We did tour these
19 institutions, and we performed some training in both the CSBs and the
20 SJBs further afield. I think the first visit included meeting the heads
21 at the Sarajevo CSB, and then towards the end of the year, we started
22 taking up activities with the other centres, too.
23 Q. Do you remember the month this occurred, the first instructive
24 tour or visit?
25 A. The first meeting with the heads of the crime squads in the
1 Sarajevo CSB I believe occurred in February. I can't remember the exact
3 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: The interpreter is not
4 sure about the month the witness mentioned.
5 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. It says February. Which month did you mention?
7 A. July 1992. But I can't remember the exact date.
8 Q. At the very outset, I asked you a question, and you said that
9 back in 1992 you did not do formal inspection, formal monitoring. What
10 was the reason for that?
11 A. In order to perform a formal audit of one of the stations or
12 centres, or the centre itself, first of all, some time is required, and
13 you need to enlist the assistance of quite a number of inspectors to be
14 involved in that. You need to collect operative information from all of
15 the police stations. No such audit could be performed competently
16 unless, of course, you had between 10 and 15 days to spare in each of the
17 stations. There were also these tours, as we called them. We would send
18 out a number of inspectors and determine the exact number of days based
19 on the existing resource, such as fuel, food. At one point, the number
20 of days was determined based on the number of cans of canned food that we
21 had to feed those inspectors working in the field. It was impossible to
22 even get them a decent place to sleep in some of these places. We simply
23 didn't have the kind of logistics that this required, and we had to make
24 do. We used personal contacts. They would call on their friends.
25 Sometimes there were hotels or restaurants operating in these areas and
2 Q. Thank you. You explained about the Sarajevo Romanija-Birac CSB.
3 You say that, as far as you remember, it happened in July 1992.
4 Do you remember when the instructive tours of other CSBs
5 occurred, such as those in Doboj, Banja Luka, and so on?
6 A. The first inspection of the Doboj centre was conducted by the
7 mixed team with members from two administrations. I think it was
8 pursuant to a request of Mr. Kovac, who, at the time, was acting head of
9 the public security department.
10 As for the Banja Luka centre, it -- an inspection was planned for
11 November. And prior to that, whether it was late August or early
12 September, part of the Trebinje centre was also inspected, as well as
13 Visegrad, Rudo, Cajnice and Foca. The Trebinje centre at the time could
14 not conduct even basic functioning. They had no communications centre.
15 And to reach them, one had to go via Montenegro. And we would go to
16 Visegrad from Bijeljina, also via Serbia and Montenegro. I think that
17 all of this is mentioned in the report that was drawn after that.
18 Q. Mr. Macar, please remind us, I think that you said it, but if you
19 can tell us again, when did the crime prevention administration get
20 transferred to Bijeljina?
21 A. The decision to transfer the headquarters of the ministry to
22 Bijeljina was issued in the second half of September. And then in early
23 October, I personally took part in setting up the administration within
24 the headquarters of the ministry, setting up the basic lines of work that
25 needed to be operational, and so on. We had really only very few staff
1 members. We were staffed at a very low level and couldn't even carry the
2 basic functions with that amount of staff members.
3 So the work was -- started in early October, and it continued
4 through November.
5 Q. Tell me, please, based on your recollection, why was this
6 administration, as well as some other administrations and the
7 headquarters, moved to Bijeljina in the second half of 1992?
8 A. Because of its location. It was equidistant to Banja Luka and to
9 Sarajevo. And also Bijeljina had many more resources needed for the
10 headquarters than Pale. Pale is a small place, and it had very limited
11 resources. And a large police facility, that was built before the war
12 broke out, existed there. It had all the features needed to move the
13 headquarters of the ministry to that place, and then it was possible to
14 create the communication systems and everything else needed for the
15 proper functioning of the ministry.
16 Q. Tell me, please, these -- these formal inspections, formal audits
17 of the CSBs and SJBs were conducted by whom? Who was sent to conduct
19 A. A part of the activities was conducted pursuant to the head of
20 the public security department. And, at that time, it was a mixed
21 composition, with members from crime police and some other
22 administrations within the ministry. And later on, it was the workers of
23 the crime police administration who had been sent by the headquarters to
24 perform that.
25 Q. Did you personally take part in any of these formal inspections,
1 formal audits in the second half of 1992?
2 A. I personally toured Doboj. I attended the meeting in Doboj. And
3 inspectors, within their lines of work, inspected SJBs. My intention
4 was, after Doboj, to tour the Banja Luka CSB and the Prijedor SJB because
5 that was the plan.
6 The security situation in Prijedor was out of our control, and
7 the SJB was also outside of our control. It was clear that the CSB in
8 Banja Luka could not control the work of the Prijedor SJB.
9 Q. Do you remember when Doboj, Prijedor, and Banja Luka were toured?
10 A. Doboj was toured in early November. I remember that it was
11 extremely cold, minus 17 or 18. I think that we spent three days there.
12 And what I particularly remember is that we slept in a -- in a demolished
13 abandoned building. I think that it was the pensioners' centre. And
14 there were no windows, no heating, but we had to sleep there in that
16 And then in November, at around the time of my birthday, which is
17 the 14th of November, we went onto Banja Luka. And then we were supposed
18 to go to Prijedor.
19 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Zecevic, I'm a little bit confused here. A
20 little while ago, the witness said that these inspections were no formal
21 inspections nor audits. And then now you ask about, "Do you remember
22 when Doboj, Prijedor, and Banja Luka" -- oh no, here you say "were
24 Did you personally take part in any of these formal inspections,
25 formal audits?
1 Are we talking about the formal ones or are we talking about
2 the -- the witness answered "tours."
3 Are we within the concept of we didn't do formal audits?
4 MR. ZECEVIC: It is, I guess, the interpretation. Because,
5 Your Honour, there are two different -- two different terms and different
6 procedures. One is -- I will say in Serbian.
7 [Interpretation] Instructive audit is the first one; and
8 instructive touring is the second one.
9 Q. I would ask the witness to explain what is what.
10 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] And in my question, I asked about
11 the instructive touring or instructive visit.
12 Q. Please go ahead, Mr. Macar.
13 A. The terminology that we used was such that there was a visit, or
14 touring, of the SJBs. The objective of which was to inform the
15 organisational structure in the SJB within the crime service or
16 elsewhere, to inform ourselves about the personnel matters,
17 organisational matters that existed there in that SJB, as well as to see
18 what equipment and materiel they had, as well as to learn about the crime
19 rate and types of crimes in that area.
20 When we say instructive visit or instructive touring, we refer to
21 the visits made to SJBs in order to assist them, to give them advice
22 about how crime service should operate or what action needs to be taken
23 in a particular case.
24 As for the instructive audit, or instructive supervision, that
25 refers to the checks or inspection, as His Honour mentioned, of the work
1 of the crime service, of each employee in the crime service.
2 JUDGE DELVOIE: That's a kind inspection that takes 15 days to --
3 to do; is that right? More or less.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] At least 10 to 15 days.
5 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you. And then you said, Mr. Macar:
6 "I personally toured Doboj. I attended the meeting in Doboj.
7 And inspectors, within their lines of work, inspected SJBs."
8 Do you recall the names of those inspectors?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was not an inspection. It was a
10 visit. Touring of the SJB.
11 JUDGE DELVOIE: Okay. Touring, yes. Do you recall the names of
12 the inspectors that toured those SJBs?
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As far as I can remember,
14 Sinisa Karan, Nikola Milanovic. Now whether Mitar Lukic from the
15 white-collar crime section came, or one of his inspectors -- but I think
16 it was Mitar Lukic.
17 And then there was another member whose name just now escapes me.
18 Perhaps it will come to me later in the day.
19 JUDGE DELVOIE: [Microphone not activated]... thank you.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If I may add, I remember that there
21 were five of us because we just barely fit into one car.
22 MR. ZECEVIC: I see the time, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE HALL: Yes. So we take the break now and resume in
24 15 minutes.
25 [The witness stands down]
1 --- Recess taken at 11.15 a.m.
2 --- On resuming at 11.35 a.m.
3 [The witness takes the stand]
4 MR. ZECEVIC: May I continue, Your Honour?
5 JUDGE HALL: Yes, please.
6 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you very much.
7 Q. [Interpretation] Sir, let us just try to make things fully clear.
8 Your trip to Doboj, Banja Luka, and Prijedor was that an
9 instructive visit or something else?
10 A. Yes, it was a visit. That was our first opportunity to go to
11 that area and learn about the situation that prevailed in the crime
12 enforcement services, to get information about the security situation,
13 and the functioning of the services in Prijedor, especially as there was
14 information that the station there was not fully controlled by the CSB of
15 the MUP.
16 Q. Mr. Macar, when was the first instructive audit conducted at the
17 Banja Luka CSB and the SJBs that belonged to that centre, including the
18 one in Prijedor?
19 A. A partial instructive audit took place in September 1993.
20 Q. Thank you. Let us return to November 1992.
21 Was that visit to the Banja Luka and Prijedor CSBs -- did it take
22 place? Did it happen?
23 A. No. The meeting in Banja Luka was scheduled for the 14th, I
24 believe, and it was to begin at 11.00, with the leadership of the crime
25 police in Banja Luka. Upon arrival in Banja Luka, we went to the centre,
1 and that's when I first met the head of the crime police. I think it was
2 Dusan Tegeltija at the time. He received me and my co-workers in his
3 office. I supposed he was aware of our arrival and of the nature of the
4 meeting. Since it was already past 11.00, I asked him whether he knew
5 about the meeting, and he replied in the negative.
6 After that, I went to the upper floor to see Mr. Zupljanin, chief
7 of the Banja Luka CSB. I asked him whether he knew about the meeting.
8 He invited me to a cup of coffee, but I met him on his way out. He was
9 going to a meeting. And he said something like he was sorry. Actually,
10 he said that he had forgotten to relate the information to the head of
11 the crime enforcement service. The meeting had been scheduled by a
12 dispatch that was sent. This generated a negative attitude toward
13 Mr. Zupljanin on my part.
14 Later, I found out that -- that the deputy chief, Djuro Bulic,
15 was actually in charge of communication with the head of the crime
16 enforcement service. This -- the latter, however - I mean Mr. Bulic -
17 was absent at the time for private reasons. However, after that, there
18 were no more communication problems with Mr. Bulic.
19 Unfortunately, the meeting never took place.
20 Q. It seems that part of your answer has not been recorded.
21 Did you subsequently check the information that the failure to
22 organise the meeting was due to Mr. Bulic's mistake? If so, who was the
23 source of that information?
24 A. I did check how -- how this came about. Mr. Bulic was absent
25 for family reasons. He went to Belgrade and stayed there maybe even a
1 month after the meeting. When I returned to the ministry, I couldn't but
2 check why it had happened that way. And then I found out that it was up
3 to him to organise the meeting and attend it. Generally speaking,
4 Mr. Bulic was a responsible civil servant, and he proved that by his
5 later work.
6 Q. I apologise once more, but you are really going fast.
7 A. I apologise.
8 Q. When Mr. Bulic was returning from Belgrade, did he come to the
9 minister headquarters in Bijeljina?
10 A. I think that he was actually on his way to Belgrade when he
11 called at our headquarters. And then I asked him directly why it
12 happened that way, because I wondered if there was -- there was some
13 hidden reasons. And then he said that it was his personal mistake, not
14 to acquaint the head of the crime enforcement service with the need to
15 attend the meeting.
16 Q. Thank you. And what happened after that? Where did you go after
17 the meeting did not place at the Banja Luka CSB?
18 A. I believe that we spent the night at the Bosna hotel. I believe
19 it was the only place where one could find accommodation. And then we
20 travelled on to Prijedor.
21 Q. What happened when you arrived at Prijedor?
22 A. Between 8.30 and 9.00, we had already visited the SJB. That's
23 when I first met Mr. Drljaca and his co-workers. He received us in a
24 large meeting room. As far as I remember, apart from him, there was his
25 assistant, the chief of the crime enforcement service, and the heads of
1 the other services. I think that Prijedor had one or two police
2 stations. Once they introduced themselves, we also introduced ourselves.
3 I introduced myself as co-ordinator from the crime police administration
4 and acting chief. I introduced my colleagues. And I stated the reason
5 of our visit. I asked him whether he was familiar with the MUP dispatch
6 and the dispatch from the centre. His reply was strange and surprising
7 to us at the time. It was something like, I'm not interested about any
8 dispatches, especially those from the CSB.
9 My bosses never told me about the reason for this meeting. And
10 then he said that, as far as he was concerned, the meeting was over and
11 that we were free to go and have breakfast.
12 After that, he and his colleagues stood up and so did we. The
13 entire process took no longer than 15 or 20 minutes.
14 As far as I remember, we went to a building. I think it was
15 called Aviator's Club or something. We ordered coffee. And in the
16 conversation with the man, I asked him, Do you know what you're doing?
17 Do you know that this is an offence? And, after all, we've travelled a
18 couple of hundred kilometres under difficult conditions. And then he
19 replied in the same vain, My bosses never told me anything about this.
20 And I'm almost fully certain that he told me that the bosses from the
21 Crisis Staff, or, actually, the municipal authorities were the ones. I
22 explained to him that I would report about it to my superiors. I refused
23 to stay for breakfast, and just like he had said that the meeting was
24 over, I replied -- I then said to him, for us, the breakfast was over.
25 And we left for Bijeljina.
1 Q. Did you inform anybody, and, if so, who, about this incident in
3 A. Yes. I informed Mr. Kovac, who was head of the public security
4 department, or maybe acting head, as my -- because he was my immediate
6 Q. Are we talking about Mr. Tomo Kovac or another Kovac?
7 A. I think that his official name was Tomislav Kovac.
8 Q. Do you remember Mr. Kovac's reaction? Did he say what he would
9 do about it?
10 A. Well, we commented the situation in Prijedor. I was sorry that I
11 possibly misinformed him that, due to Mr. Zupljanin's mistake, the
12 meeting in Banja Luka was not held. Clearly he had to inform his
13 superiors, but I don't remember because Mr. Zupljanin -- Mr. Stanisic, as
14 minister, was actually on his way out already due to the pressures
15 exerted on him. And through the Ministry of the Interior, the government
16 had to be informed because this was a clear case of disobedience of an
17 organisational unit to the leadership of that same organisation.
18 Q. Do you know whether Mr. Kovac informed the government about this
20 A. I cannot be certain. But, at any rate, he should have.
21 Q. Sir, do you know what the situation at the Bosanski Samac SJB
23 A. Based on the report drawn up after visiting the Doboj centre, and
24 that covers the Samac SJB too, which was initially conducted by a mixed
25 team and, later, by a team of crime police officers, information was
1 collected to the effect that the Samac SJB was not acting in accordance
2 with the Law on Internal Affairs. In other words, they didn't obey the
3 orders of the ministry. They were, more or less, being commanded by the
4 Crisis Staff of Samac municipality.
5 I also learned from the same reports that the SJB chief was not
6 appointed to that position, in keeping with the Law on Internal Affairs.
7 In other words, he was not confirmed in his position by the ministry
8 after conducting checks.
9 Q. Did you ever meet Mr. Todorovic?
10 A. Yes, I forgot to point that out. Chief Stevan Todorovic.
11 Sometime late in 1992, I met Mr. Todorovic.
12 An incident occurred involving certain military units of the VRS,
13 and he was arrested by members of military bodies. Information was
14 gathered by the Ministry of the Interior, and after that, it became clear
15 that Mr. Todorovic could no longer remain in that position. Late in
16 1992, he came by the Ministry of the Interior, acting slightly strange,
17 looking slightly strange, and so on and so forth. As far as I was told,
18 he was there to check his own status following those incidents and all
19 the information that had been gathered about his work.
20 Q. Do you remember who he was there to see?
21 A. He was waiting with the secretary outside Mr. Kovac's office.
22 Q. Do you know what he was told by Mr. Kovac about his status?
23 A. I don't know what Mr. Kovac told him specifically, but I do
24 remember a meeting at which a general conclusion was reached by Mr. Kovac
25 and everybody else there that Mr. Todorovic had to be removed.
1 Q. Do you know if he was eventually removed?
2 A. Not before the end of 1992, but he certainly was over the
3 following months. Every time there was a removal that had to be done,
4 the same thing transpired. In those municipalities where the local
5 Crisis Staffs and the local leadership had significant influence over the
6 work of the police stations, one had to carry out some political
7 preparations, and there had to be political pressure by the leaders of
8 the RS beforehand, in order to be able to make the appropriate
9 replacements or removals, and in order for new people to be appointed to
10 those positions.
11 We had some negative experiences, when, for example, assessing
12 that a certain person was not the right person for a certain position and
13 then trying to remove that person, or, rather, the minister trying to
14 remove that person from that position. Some local politicians and
15 friends and acquaintances of those persons organised support rallies to
16 voice their discontent at the fact that these persons were being removed
17 from office. There was always the danger that the effect of the rallies
18 might spill over to some military units of the VRS through the
19 acquaintances, the supporters of this leader, or, indeed, the
20 spokesperson himself.
21 Q. Can you provide an example?
22 A. Textbook example would be the events at Pale municipality and the
23 attempt that was made there to remove the public security station chief.
24 Q. His name?
25 A. Malko Koroman.
1 Q. When did that occur, the removal of the Pale public security
2 station chief, Malko Koroman?
3 A. In the first half of 1992, but I can't remember the month. I
4 know it was a large-scale incident with people gathering around the SJB
5 building. Later on, I spoke to some friends who were members of the
6 armed forces, and I heard that this was about to spill over also to some
7 units of the VRS. This was an attempt to get them involved in the
8 rallies too, in order to keep the person in office and make his removal
10 Q. Was Malko Koroman eventually removed from that position; and, if
11 so, when?
12 A. I think it was early 1993.
13 Q. What about Simo Drljaca, as chief of the SJB? Was he, too,
14 removed from that position; and, if so, when?
15 A. It was early 1993. I think the minister at the time was
16 Ratko Adzic at the time of Drljaca's removal.
17 Q. Do you know if the initiatives for these three SJB chief
18 removals - I'm talking about Malko Koroman, Stevan Todorovic, and
19 Simo Drljaca - do you know when these initiatives were first launched?
20 A. I know about Mr. Todorovic. Chief of the CSB, Andrija
21 Bjelosevic at the time, on several occasions, informed the ministry.
22 Q. Let's try and cut this short, if we can, sir. I want to know the
23 year. When, if you know, the initiatives to remove these people from
24 office occurred?
25 A. 1992.
1 Q. Thank you. Sir, 1D571, tab 69, is our next document.
2 This is a report following inspection of the Foca, Cajnice, Rudo,
3 and Visegrad SJBs. The date is the 14th of September, 1992. Signed by
4 three names, Nikola Milanovic, Milomir Orasanin, Ostoja Minic. The three
5 names are there, yet a single signature.
6 Sir, are you familiar with this report?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. What about the three persons whose names we can see at the bottom
9 of the document? Which administration did these three persons belong to?
10 A. The crime police administration, of which I was then head.
11 Q. Was this an instructive visit; and was it pursuant to your orders
12 that they went there?
13 A. Yes, this was such a visit. And it was pursuant to my order that
14 these people were sent to the SJBs specified in the document.
15 Q. A while ago -- a while ago, you touched upon the question of the
16 Trebinje CSB. What about Foca, Cajnice, Rudo and Visegrad? What about
17 these SJBs? Which CSB did these belong to, in territorial terms?
18 A. These SJBs, in territorial terms, belonged to the Trebinje CSB.
19 Q. According to your information, did the Trebinje CSB encounter any
20 difficulties, in relation to these four SJBs?
21 A. As I said earlier on in my evidence, the problem had to do with
22 all types of communications, and I mean roads and equipment. The
23 representatives of the Trebinje CSB did not have a chance to tour these
24 stations in order to see how well they were performing their tasks, or,
25 indeed, in order to have a chance to see what sort of problems they were
2 Q. Was that the reason these inspectors were dispatched on an
3 instructive tour? One of the reasons for that.
4 A. Yes, it was one of the reasons they were dispatched.
5 Q. Thank you.
6 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be shown
7 42D1, tab 84.
8 Q. Sir, this is a report bearing the date of the
9 29th of October, 1992. Addressed to the assistant minister for police
10 and the assistant minister for crime prevention. Submitted by Inspector
11 Ostoja Minic and Inspector Goran Saric.
12 This is about taking into custody Milorad Tesic and Milan Kanlic
13 in Brcko. Inspector and commander of the MUP being taken into custody by
14 members of the military.
15 Were you familiar with this case, sir?
16 A. Yes, I was. In 1992, there were frequent incidents involving
17 members of the VRS. There were individual and group attacks being
18 carried out on members of the Ministry of the Interior. We used this
19 kind of information to put together collective reports to cover all of
20 our incidents involving the VRS. These were then to be submitted to the
21 minister so he could get in touch with the leaders of the VRS to see if
22 we could overcome these problems. Attacks were frequent. Men were often
23 detained or taken into custody by individuals or groups from the military
24 police or the VRS.
25 Q. Was this report meant for the RS government?
1 A. Yes, it was meant for the government.
2 Q. Was your expectation that the government would take measures to
3 deal with situations like these?
4 A. It was only natural to expect that the prime minister would take
5 this up with his defence minister. The interior minister would be
6 summoned too, and then they would get in touch with the leaders of the
7 VRS to revolve these situations.
8 Q. What about these inspectors who submitted the reports, Minic and
9 Saric? Which ministry administration did they belong to?
10 A. Ostoja Minic belonged to the crime police administration, my own;
11 and Mr. Goran Saric, to the police administration.
12 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Unless there are any objections, I
13 would like to tender this document.
14 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I -- perhaps my learned friend could
15 ask the witness if he received this document. He is one of the
16 addressees. If he could just confirm that he received it in 1992, I
17 might not have an objection.
18 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry. I thought it was apparent from his
20 Q. [Interpretation] Sir, Mr. Macar, did you receive this report in
21 the course of 1992, as is stated in the heading?
22 A. As can you see in the heading, although this is an mistake here,
23 it says assistant minister for crime prevention, the inspector who
24 carried out these checks, upon his return, typically informs his superior
25 and then jointly they draw up the report, which is what you see here.
1 Q. Have you had occasion to see this particular report?
2 A. Yes. Even, if I may be allowed to add, Mr. Minic and Saric drew
3 up this report together in the premises of the crime police.
4 MR. HANNIS: I still didn't hear the answer, but I assume he
5 means he did see it in 1992. And if that's the case, I don't have an
7 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Let me repeat my question again.
9 You see now why it is important to give very concrete answers to
10 questions so as not to waste time. We've lost five minutes over this.
11 Did you receive this document back in 1992? Yes or no.
12 A. As I have already said, I saw this document, yes.
13 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
14 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 1D643, Your Honours.
15 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown 118D1,
16 tab 90.
17 Q. Sir, this is a report on the situation at the Gacko police
18 station on 9 December 1992. Inspection was conducted and the situation
19 assessed, following which we see that some measures were being proposed,
20 and this document is signed by Milorad Cuk, chief of police.
21 Do you know this Mr. Cuk; and can you tell us where he worked?
22 A. Yes, I knew Mr. Cuk. He was chief of police in the Trebinje CSB.
23 Q. Did the Gacko police station fall under the Trebinje CSB?
24 A. Yes. The Gacko police station belonged to the Trebinje CSB.
25 Q. Thank you. Sir, I'm going to show you P988, which is tab 104.
1 This is the aide-memoire for instructive audit or inspection. We
2 don't see the date. We just see what needs to be provided, what steps
3 need to be taken.
4 Can you tell us, do you know who is the author of this document;
5 and when and where it was drawn up?
6 A. Yes, I'm fully familiar with this document.
7 The author of this aide-memoire, or checklist, for instructive
8 inspection is myself, personally. We used certain parts of this
9 checklist when conducting instructive visits also.
10 As I have said earlier, crime prevention administration, with its
11 headquarters at the ministry, had problems with human resources. I'm
12 here referring to the fact that we were forced to hire crime police
13 workers for our administration who had experience in crime prevention
14 matters but only at the municipal level; at the level of municipal
15 organs. And none of them ever held a position in the former Ministry of
16 the Interior of the former Bosnia and Herzegovina, nor have experience of
17 working in the headquarters of the ministry or in the crime police.
18 Q. What you just told us, was that the reason why you drew up this
19 checklist or not; and could you tell us when this checklist was written,
21 A. That was the reason for me to write this checklist, or
22 aide-memoire. And another reason was the quality of the reports they
23 wrote following instructive visits. The checklist was written either in
24 December 1992 or in January 1993. I wrote it personally. I consulted my
25 colleagues to make sure that I covered everything.
1 Q. Let me show you another document. I think we have sufficient
2 time before the break. That's 65 ter 50D1, tab 99.
3 Mr. Macar, earlier on we spoke about the situation at the
4 Pale SJB and about the removal of Mr. Malko Koroman, the chief of the
5 SJB, the attempt to remove him in early 1992 and also his subsequent
6 removal in 1993, in early 1993.
7 We see here a report dated March 1993. This is a report on the
8 inspection and activities of the Pale SJB and the activities of its crime
9 investigation service for the period from April to December 1992. It
10 says at the bottom that the report was written by Minic, Ostoja. This is
11 page 6 of this document.
12 Tell me please, do you know this report? And to which
13 administration did Inspector Ostoja Minic belong?
14 A. Yes, I am familiar with this report. And as for Mr. Minic, he
15 worked for the crime police administration in the ministry headquarters.
16 Q. Do you remember whether this was the first inspection of the
17 Pale SJB after the MUP of Republika Srpska was established?
18 A. I think that this was the first inspection done by a member of
19 the crime police administration.
20 Q. On page 5 of this document, in the Serbian text, there is a
21 proposal of measures and action. And then there's three paragraphs, 1,
22 2, and 3. That's almost at the end of the document. Page 5 and 6.
23 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] I see now that there is a mistake
24 in the translation of this document. The original says that the report
25 is for the period April-December 1992. Whereas, on the first page of the
1 translation, it says April to December 1993.
2 Since the report was written in March of 1993, it is obvious that
3 this is a mistake in translation, and we will resolve it with the
4 translation service.
5 Q. Sir, very briefly, can you give us a brief comment of these
6 proposed measures and activities that your inspector, Ostoja Minic, gave
7 following the inspection and visit of the SJB?
8 A. The proposed measures and activities were a result of the
9 anomalies that he recorded in his report.
10 Q. In item 3, he emphasises the will and initiative displayed by the
11 newly appointed chief of the SJB, Pekic, Petko, to deal with the
12 accumulated problems:
13 "So far, we have had full co-operation and we expect it to be so
14 in the future."
15 Do you remember whether Petko Pekic was appointed as chief of the
16 SJB following the removal of Malko Koroman?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. This report, which pertains to the 1992, did you see it in early
19 1993, once your inspector wrote it?
20 A. Yes. Immediately after it was written, I received the report,
21 and I discussed it with Mr. Minic.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Unless there are objections, I
24 tender this into evidence.
25 MR. HANNIS: No objection.
1 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
2 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 1D644, Your Honours.
3 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] I see the time, Your Honour. Time
4 for the break? Thank you.
5 JUDGE HALL: [Microphone not activated]... we return in 15
7 [The witness stands down]
8 --- Recess taken at 12.33 p.m.
9 --- On resuming at 12.48 p.m.
10 [The witness takes the stand]
11 JUDGE HALL: Yes, please continue, Mr. Zecevic.
12 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you, Your Honours.
13 I was asked by Mr. Hannis at the beginning of today's session for
14 couple of minutes -- that we adjourn a couple of minutes before, because
15 this is an housekeeping matter, as I understood, to be discussed.
16 MR. HANNIS: I did want to raise something concerning an
17 agreement about adjudicated facts. It's long standing, and it's just a
18 matter of trying to get something on the record. But I think actually
19 maybe it is better if I do it tomorrow or Monday when I'm more organised
20 and have all the background information.
21 So I encourage my friend to use the full time remaining.
22 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you very much. Thank you very much.
23 [Interpretation] Could we please see document 108D1, tab 103.
24 Q. This is a document dated 21 May 1993 and it refers to the
25 dispatch of -- from the CSB Banja Luka, dated 20 May 1993, the entire
1 contents of which is quoted. And in the signature block we read:
2 "Chief of the public security station, Bogdan Delic."
3 And as far as I can tell, it was forwarded to the Kozarac police
5 We read in paragraph 2:
6 "Due to poor communication within the OUP and the lack of
7 resourcefulness of some individuals in leading positions, neither the
8 Security Services Centre nor the Ministry of the Interior of
9 Republika Srpska have been kept regularly informed of these events."
10 It also says further down:
11 "Deliver detailed information on all disturbances of law and
12 order, criminal offences committed in your area in the period from
13 4 April to 31 December 1992 and 1 January to 15 May 1993."
14 It goes on to say:
15 "The report should include all these events and contain a precise
16 description of the place and time, the offence and its consequences, as
17 well as the measures taken by the OUP or the military security organ."
18 A deadline was set, and the original CSB dispatch was signed by
19 Stojan Zupljanin.
20 Do you know who Bogdan Delic is?
21 A. Yes, I do. I think he was a mathematics teacher. He hailed from
22 Sokolac. I met him in Prijedor and he was appointed station chief, after
23 Mr. Drljaca was removed.
24 Q. The situation described in this document, were you familiar with
25 it in 1993 when this was drafted?
1 A. Yes. If I may say briefly, that, as a consequence of the
2 relocation of the MUP to Bijeljina, apart from the organisation of the
3 lines of work, one of the priority tasks was the setting up of an
4 information system from the stations --
5 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please repeat.
6 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Just a moment, please. Could you repeat the last sentence
8 because you hurried again so it wasn't recorded:
9 "One of the priority tasks was the setting up of an information
10 system from the stations," and the rest is missing.
11 A. Setting up a system of passing on information about
12 security-relevant events along the following line: SJB, CSB,
13 administrations at headquarters, or Ministry of the Interior, and vice
14 versa, to make possible information flow from the ministry, or the
15 administrations at our headquarters through the CSBs down to the SJBs.
16 Because the system of passing on information had almost completely
17 stopped functioning so that the leadership in many cases was not informed
18 of the events on the ground. After visiting the centres, we observed
19 that the CSBs were not regularly informed by the SJBs, nor were they
20 informed in a timely fashion.
21 And if I may add, this request was sent out because in 1993 the
22 technical equipment and the communication technology was much better and
23 could make possible better information flow.
24 Q. You said that the leadership in many cases was not informed of
25 the events on the ground. Which leadership did you mean? Leadership of
2 A. The administrations at headquarters were not informed, the head
3 of the public security department or -- and the minister, and we also
4 observed that the SJBs did not pass on information along the lines of
5 work to the responsible person at the centre. And then, of course, the
6 centre chief also did not receive that information.
7 Q. Mr. Macar, do you know of the crime committed at
8 Koricanske Stijene in August 1992? When did you learn of it?
9 A. In August 1992, I was unaware of the incident at
10 Koricanske Stijene, or whatever the place is called.
11 As far as I remember, in late 1992 or early 1993 I got the first
12 information. When I was visiting the centre with the team, that's when I
13 first heard of it.
14 Q. When you were visiting the centre with your team, did you then
15 get complete information about the crimes committed at
16 Koricanske Stijene?
17 A. The head of the crime police --
18 Q. Please answer first with a yes or a no. I asked you this because
19 part of your answer, unfortunately, again, didn't make it to the
21 Please answer yes or no.
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Tell us when it was and what you were told then. What did the
24 head of the crime police at the Banja Luka CSB say to you then?
25 A. I think it was March 1993. He informed me of the event at
1 Koricanske Stijene, saying that about 150 - I'm not speaking from
2 memory -- 150 Serbs [as interpreted] had been killed.
3 Q. You said Serbs?
4 A. I said non-Serbs. Once they got that information with the public
5 prosecutor's office from Banja Luka, and the military prosecutor's
6 office, military magistrate, security organs -- military organs, that is,
7 they began an on-site investigation led by two prosecutors. On the team
8 of the CSB, there were violent crime inspectors and forensic technicians
9 from the crime enforcement service of the Banja Luka centre.
10 Q. Were you informed about any criminal complaints filed?
11 A. I was informed that a criminal complaint against unknown
12 perpetrators was filed with the prosecutor's office that had jurisdiction
14 Q. Were -- were you informed of the results of the efforts to
15 identify the perpetrators?
16 A. I was informed that two or three perpetrators had been
17 identified, and that, according to the information the security centre
18 had gathered, those persons were members of the reserve force or some
19 other police unit from Prijedor, that they had left the Prijedor area and
20 allegedly joined the army, some army unit.
21 According to the information they gave me, the CSB took measures
22 to try and locate these persons through the corps police, in order to
23 take them in.
24 Q. When you say "corps police," what do you mean? I don't
1 A. I'm speaking about the security organs of the Krajina Corps. I
2 cannot remember which unit it exactly was, but it was the military
4 Q. Thank you.
5 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Zecevic, are you moving on to something else
6 because I have a question relating to this document.
7 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes, please, Your Honour. I had another question,
8 but, please, by all means.
9 JUDGE HARHOFF: Well, Mr. Macar, that's something that confuses
10 me a bit in this document that we have on the screen, because the
11 instruction from the chief of the SJB in Prijedor starts out by saying
12 that since the outbreak of the war, there have been breaches of law and
13 order, criminal offences and conflicts of all kinds between employees of
14 the OUP internal affairs organ, and the members of the VRS army.
15 And then two paragraphs further down, he is then asking the
16 Kozarac police station to provide information on all disturbances of law
17 and order or criminal offences committed in your area by members of the
18 Army of Republika Srpska in a certain period.
19 What confuses me is that I thought that the power to investigate
20 the crimes committed by the members of the VRS would fall under the
21 authority of the military police and that all activities or crimes would
22 be investigated and perhaps prosecuted by the military prosecutor.
23 Whereas, here, it seems as if the civilian police is now suddenly called
24 upon to investigate crimes committed by the members of the army.
25 So my question to you is: Does this letter or this instruction
1 represent a transgression of the civilian police's authority into the
2 authority of the military police?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] For criminal offences committed by
4 VRS members, the authority was with the military security organs and
5 military judiciary organs. In case of an attack of the military police
6 on the civilian police, the latter would certainly ask its members about
7 the event and submit the relevant information to the military police or
8 the military judicial organs.
9 As has been said already, the setting up of military judicial
10 organs only began sometime in summer 1992.
11 JUDGE HARHOFF: But you haven't answered my question about why it
12 is that the civilian police is engaging itself in the investigations
13 against members of the VRS.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It wasn't possible to understand if
15 the -- it was understandable if the military police did not respond to
16 the reported event that the police of the RS would gather certain
17 information and submit it. The RS police had no power to detain or
18 arrest military personnel. They could hold them until the military
19 police arrived and then hand over to the military police any material
20 available to them.
21 JUDGE HARHOFF: So do I understand correctly that this dispatch
22 to the SJB in Kozarac was meant only to assist the military police in
23 their investigations?
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This dispatch primarily requests
25 that the Security Services Centre, through the ministry, should be
1 informed about any security-related events in the territory covered by
2 the Prijedor SJB.
3 JUDGE HARHOFF: I'm not sure I understand this fully. But maybe
4 you should just proceed, Mr. Zecevic. Thanks.
5 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes, Your Honours, I will try to -- first, I have a
6 correction in the transcript. But perhaps I should ask the witness.
7 Q. [Interpretation] Sir, your last answer, you say:
8 "This dispatch primarily requests that the Security Services
9 Centre, through the ministry, should be informed about any
10 security-related events in the territory covered by the Prijedor SJB."
11 I would say that there has been some permutation there. Can you
12 please slowly repeat your answer?
13 A. There's obviously been a mistake. My answer was this: The
14 instructions from dispatch ordered that the SJB in Prijedor inform about
15 any security-related events, the public security centre, through which
16 the Ministry of the Interior at the HQ would be informed.
17 If I may quote the dispatch:
18 "Because of the insufficient linkage between the organs of the
19 Ministry of the Interior or the failure of certain employees to find
20 their feet, the public security centre, or, indeed, the Ministry of the
21 Interior of the RS were not informed about these events in a timely
23 Q. Sir, does this memo simply seek information or are other
24 activities proposed here?
25 A. It's not just about information regarding the actual events.
1 It's also information about measures taken by organs of the Ministry of
2 the Interior, as well as military security organs, related to specific
4 Q. Does this document make any reference to an order to conduct an
5 investigation in relation to certain events?
6 A. The last part of the document focuses on the fact that --
7 Q. Sir, just a minute, please. My question is very clear: Does
8 this memo simply seek information or does it contain an order to conduct
9 an investigation?
10 A. This order seeks information so that one would be able to take in
11 the security-related situation over the preceding period about which we
12 had not been informed.
13 Q. Is that everything that they say in this document?
14 A. I think that's everything.
15 Q. Thank you.
16 MR. ZECEVIC: May I continue, Your Honours?
17 [Interpretation] If there are no objections, I would like to
18 tender this document for admission. It's in relation to 1992, although
19 it was produced in 1993, which I believe constitutes its relevance to us.
20 MR. HANNIS: Well, I'm not sure what the relevance is. They want
21 reporting about conflicts between the army and the MUP, as I read this
22 document. We already have evidence about that, the fact that there may
23 not have been sufficient reporting about it, I'm not sure how it adds to
24 our case.
25 MR. ZECEVIC: Let me respectfully read again this document:
1 "There have been breaches of law and order, criminal offences and
2 conflicts of all kinds ..."
3 Therefore, it refers to the breaches of law and order, criminal
4 offences and the conflicts. And the relevance of this document is that
5 it refers to the situation in -- from 4th April until 31st December 1992
6 and also is indicative of the fact that Mr. Simo Drljaca has been removed
7 from his position by at least May 1993.
8 MR. HANNIS: Well, it indicates someone else is in the position
9 of chief as of May 1993. But it doesn't indicate that Mr. Drljaca has
10 been removed or punished or sanctioned. It may indicated that he has
11 been promoted or moved to a higher position.
12 As for this document, paragraph 3 says: In order to gain an
13 insight into these events, make a competent assessment of relations
14 between the OUP, the police, and the VRS. Deliver to us information
15 about disturbances in law and order or criminal offences committed in
16 your area by members of the army.
17 So it is about the relation between the army and the MUP.
18 [Trial Chamber confers]
19 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 1D645, Your Honours.
21 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.
22 Q. Mr. Macar, are you familiar with a paramilitary formation known
23 as Yellow Wasps?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Do you remember whether the Ministry of the Interior carried out
1 an action against this group? If you do remember, if you're aware of it,
2 could you perhaps tell us what specifically was done during that action.
3 A. Yes. The Ministry of the Interior, in co-operation with members
4 of the VRS, took activities to disarm and bring in the paramilitary unit
5 known as Yellow Wasps.
6 Q. Our next document is 1D75, tab 49.
7 Did the crime prevention administration have any role to play in
8 this action; and, if so, what role, specifically?
9 A. The crime police administration used some of its men to assist
10 the Bijeljina public security station as they were trying to shed light
11 on certain general crimes that occurred. The crimes were perpetrated by
12 members of the paramilitary formation known as the Yellow Wasps.
13 Q. Sir, the memo is dated the 4th of August, 1992. It talks about
14 the activities taken by the MUP to shed light on the criminal activities
15 of a paramilitary formation in the territory of the Serbian municipality
16 of Zvornik. The memo, or report, was not signed. Nevertheless, we've
17 had a chance to see a cover letter that was attached to this memo,
18 bearing the same date that was submitted to the ministry, the HQ.
19 Are you familiar with this report or memo?
20 A. Yes, I am.
21 Q. Was this memo produced by your own crime prevention
22 administration or was it produced by one of the employees?
23 A. It was produced by the employees of the crime prevention
24 administration, and, in part, also by people from the Bijeljina public
25 security station who took part in this procedure.
1 Q. Your comment, please, on the last paragraph of this document,
2 which is page 3. It talks about information obtained by the Serb armed
3 forces military police and MUP national security operatives, indicating
4 that Dusan Vuckovic, also known as Repic, was committing a
5 massacre-genocide over citizens of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and
6 Herzegovina of Muslim ethnicity.
7 It goes on to state:
8 "Verification and materialisation of these -- of this information
9 was being performed by the Serb armed forces military police in
10 co-operation with the MUP national security operatives."
11 Is this a faithful reflection of the information that was
12 available to you at the time in relation to the actions of this man known
13 as Repic and what he did to these ethnic Muslims, who were also citizens
14 of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina?
15 A. I can say briefly the following: Information on the war crimes
16 committed by Dusan Vuckovic was available to both the public security
17 stations and to the national security. All this information was
18 forwarded to the military police and then pressed the matter further with
19 the military prosecutor. They took some operative steps to process this
20 information, and probably also information that was available to them.
21 Q. When you say process this information, would that also include
22 pressing charges for these crimes against the perpetrators?
23 A. Yes, that is what I had in mind. It is up to the military police
24 to file a report to the prosecutor, and then the prosecutor makes a
25 request for an investigation to take place and then the indictment
2 Q. What about the crime prevention administration of the MUP of the
3 RS? Did it also submit criminal reports against members of this same
4 paramilitary unit; and, if so, do you remember which?
5 A. Yes, I do remember. The public security station to which it was
6 to file criminal reports processed many cases of property-related crimes.
7 It filed a criminal report to the relevant prosecutor in Bijeljina.
8 If I may just say one thing that I believe is noteworthy. Having
9 reached agreement with the military police and the military prosecutor,
10 or, rather, involved in reaching agreement with those bodies were
11 Mr. Davidovic and Mr. Andan, who were directly involved in the action.
12 They assumed the responsibility to elucidate some of the property
13 related -- to have this elucidated by the Ministry of the Interior and
14 the public security station in Bijeljina which we were helping at the
15 time. So they were supposed to elucidate some of these property-related
16 crimes perpetrated by members of this military unit, paramilitary unit.
17 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] I hope the transcript will be
18 adjusted and corrected, because at this point in time, I'm unable to
19 ascertain whether what the witness said was, in fact, recorded.
20 Q. Just slowly, please, proceed with telling us your answer.
21 A. Mr. Davidovic and Mr. Andan explained to me that, following a
22 suggestion that was made by a member of the military police, they
23 accepted that the Ministry of the Interior should investigate some of
24 these property-related crimes, because there was information that was in
25 the possession of several different public security stations regarding
1 individual crimes.
2 When I say in several different stations, citizens who sustained
3 damage as a result of these crimes, somewhere along the Sarajevo-Zvornik
4 road had goods on items seized or taken from them as they were
5 travelling. Since this was in a forest somewhere having returned to
6 their places of residence, they would report these crimes. This part of
7 such operative material, as had been gathered, was processed. We managed
8 to identify several different crimes so the report or the criminal report
9 was submitted to the relevant prosecutor in Bijeljina.
10 Q. Sir, I'm looking at this document in front of us and it is dated
11 4 August 1992. I see that it is stated here that members of this unit
12 massacred and committed the crime of genocide against citizens of the
13 Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina who were of Muslim ethnicity.
14 So you had information that they had committed a war crime. Why
15 did not the crime enforcement service of the MUP of Republika Srpska
16 initiate criminal proceedings against these persons for war crimes
17 against the civilian population?
18 A. Launching proceedings for crimes committed by the Yellow Wasps
19 was under the jurisdiction of military bodies, the military prosecutor's
21 Q. Do you know if the military bodies, that is, the military
22 judiciary, ever initiated criminal proceedings against these persons for
23 war crimes?
24 A. I received informal or unofficial information that all legal
25 measures had been taken. But they were not obliged to inform us in
1 writing, so that I cannot confirm with full certainty what the final
2 result of their efforts was.
3 Q. Such a division of labour, was it agreed upon with the military
4 security organs? Namely, that they should be in charge of war crimes,
5 and you in charge of crimes against property.
6 A. Upon the request of military security organs, Mr. Davidovic and
7 Andan and the others who took part, accepted that they should deal with
8 crimes against property. If I had been present personally, I would have
9 insisted that if the military security organs needed assistance, that we
10 should provide it --
11 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please repeat.
12 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Please repeat your answer, because it was unclear to the
15 You said: "If I had been present personally, I would have
16 insisted ...," but you didn't explain what you would have insisted on.
17 Please try to be clearer in your answer.
18 A. If I had attended the meeting with the representatives of
19 military security bodies, when there was discussion about the following
20 division of labour. That some work but the resolving of crimes against
21 property be taken by the civilian police, and that we could also --
22 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter hasn't understood the witness.
23 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Once more, you were not understood, but possibly it will be
25 clearer when I ask my following question:
1 In your opinion, sir, why did the military judiciary have
2 jurisdiction over the Yellow Wasps, rather than the civilian judiciary?
3 A. The Yellow Wasps were members of the VRS, but they were not under
4 the control of the VRS. They had broken loose.
5 Q. Thank you.
6 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please see document 65 ter
7 of the Prosecution, or, actually, the Defence 964D1, which is tab 52.
8 Q. This is a document of the federal Ministry of the Interior. The
9 date is 8 August 1992. It was handed to the minister personally.
10 And it says:
11 "Report on the engagement of a group of federal Ministry of the
12 Interior police brigade members to provide expert assistance to the
13 Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina MUP."
14 On page 9, we see the signature of Milorad Davidovic.
15 Tell me, first, if you remember who the federal minister of the
16 interior was at the time?
17 A. I think it was Mr. Gracanin.
18 Q. You said Mr. Gracanin?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Thank you. Tell me about Mr. Milorad Davidovic. Which ministry
21 did he belong to?
22 A. According to the information I had, until the war broke out,
23 Mr. Davidovic was with the federal Ministry of the Interior of
25 Q. You told us that Mr. Davidovic took part in the arrest of the
1 Yellow Wasps. Does this apply to this Mr. Milorad Davidovic?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. In the preamble of this document, we read:
4 "Due to the growing security problems in the area of
5 north-eastern Bosnia which came to the fore in May and June, the MUP of
6 the Serbian Republic of BH asked the federal secretary of the interior of
7 the FRY to send, if possible, a number of police officers [sic] and
8 brigade Deputy Commander of the SSUP, Milorad Davidovic, to this area
9 with the aim of becoming directly engaged in stabilising the security
10 situation, establishing the legality of work and normal functioning of
11 the organs of internal affairs and ensuring the legitimacy of the
12 authorities. The federal secretary accepted the request from -- of the
13 SR BH MUP and sent a group of 17 members of the SSUP unit with the
14 necessary weapons and three all-terrain vehicles to the Bijeljina CSB ...
15 on 27 June 1992."
16 Are you familiar with these facts; and can you confirm them, sir?
17 A. Yes, I am; and I can confirm.
18 Immediately before being deployed to Bijeljina, I believe that
19 Mr. Davidovic was at Vrace to see Minister Stanisic. A day, or, anyway,
20 a short time ago, he set off for Bijeljina where the unit was going to
21 take care of the disrupted security situation, some clashes with military
22 units, and so on.
23 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I would seek to
24 tender this document. But the situation is as follows --
25 [Defence counsel confer]
1 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] The document was only received by
2 us very recently, and we wanted to include it on our 65 ter list which
3 was not opposed by Mr. Hannis, so it was done.
4 Had we been in the possession of this document earlier, we would
5 have asked the gentleman who signed it to authenticate it. But since
6 both the OTP and we received it only much later, I'm now in the position
7 to have to seek its admission through this witness, and I believe it is
8 not in dispute that it is highly relevant for this case.
9 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, I just want to say this is a document
10 the Prosecution has been looking for for years. Mr. Davidovic testified
11 about it when he testifying in the Krajisnik case. But he explained that
12 his copy of this document was taken when his apartment was searched many
13 years ago in Belgrade. It was produced by Mr. Karadzic during
14 Mr. Karadzic's trial when he was examining Mr. Davidovic. I think that
15 was the 26th or 27th of June. When we received it, we turned it over to
16 the Defence.
17 We would have liked to have had it when he was here. But
18 Mr. Davidovic confirmed in the Karadzic case - I can get you the citation
19 if you need it - that this, indeed, is a report that he authored and sent
20 to his boss in the federal SUP back in 1992.
21 So I have no doubts about its authenticity nor its relevance, and
22 I join in the request that it be admitted into evidence.
23 JUDGE HALL: So it's admitted and marked.
24 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit 1D645, Your Honours.
25 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you, Mr. Hannis.
1 MR. HANNIS: Can we check the number? I think we're up to 646
3 THE REGISTRAR: I apologise. The counsel is correct.
4 It's 1D646. Thank you.
5 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I note the time.
6 Q. Thank you, Mr. Macar.
7 JUDGE HALL: Yes. So we take the adjournment now to reconvene
8 tomorrow morning at 9.00. And I believe we're still in this courtroom.
9 [The witness stands down]
10 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.46 p.m.,
11 to be reconvened on Friday, the 8th day of July,
12 2011, at 9.00 a.m.