110711IT

Page 23074

1 you're in a position to continue with us. And before I invite

2 Mr. Zecevic to resume his examination-in-chief, I remind you that you're

3 still on your oath.

4 WITNESS: GORAN MACAR [Resumed]

5 [Witness answered through interpreter]

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning. I understand.

7 MR. ZECEVIC: May I, Your Honours?

8 JUDGE HALL: Yes, please.

9 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you very much.

10 Examination by Mr. Zecevic: [Continued]

11 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Macar.

12 A. Good morning.

13 MR. ZECEVIC: I note that the second microphone has not been

14 turned on. Oh, I'm ... it's going on and off.

15 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Macar, I only have a few questions left for

16 you and a few documents I want to show you.

17 Let me remind you that we spoke on Friday about criminal

18 complaints and the communication between members of the ministry and the

19 prosecutors in 1992.

20 The document I want to show you is 338D1, tab 96.

21 This is a document of the basic public prosecutor's office at

22 Kljuc. It is marked KTA 3/93 and dated 1 February 1993. It was sent to

23 the public security station of Kljuc. It is about an event that happened

24 at 30 July 1992, namely, the destruction of a mosque in Kljuc. It was

25 signed by Dragan Kojic, public prosecutor. There is also a stamp.

Page 23075

1 On pages 2 and 3, there's the minutes of the on-site

2 investigation, or, rather, the on-site investigation report that was

3 made.

4 Are you familiar with this case, sir? The demolition of the

5 mosque in Kljuc?

6 A. I think so. At sometime in September 1993 when we analysed some

7 problems in the territory of the Banja Luka CSB.

8 As far as this document is concerned, I cannot tell, based on it,

9 whether there had been a previous report by the Kljuc SJB. And in the

10 procedural -- in the -- in the procedure, it was also the prosecutor's

11 duty to inform the SJB or the CSB that had territorial jurisdiction if

12 they learned about the commission of a crime and give them the relevant

13 information. This doesn't show whether the SJB had previously submitted

14 any report about the event in question.

15 A request is made to the SJB to conduct additional checkups or

16 additional investigation about the event concerned.

17 Q. Do you know what KTA stands for? In what meaning the

18 prosecutor's office uses it?

19 A. It's -- KTA is the sign used for marking cases at the public

20 prosecutor's office.

21 Q. There's an instruction of the public prosecutor sent to the

22 public security station. The latter is being instructed to proceed in

23 accordance with Article 151 of the Law on Criminal Procedure. Do you

24 remember the provisions of Article 151 of the Law on Criminal Procedure

25 of the former SFRY which was in force at the time in the territory of the

Page 23076

1 Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

2 A. Article 151 of the Law on Criminal Procedure of the former SFRY,

3 which was transposed in the RS, dealt with the duty of the security

4 services with regard to information about crimes or the perpetrators

5 thereof. 153.

6 Q. Let us take a look at page 2 now. This is a record of the

7 on-site investigation or an on-site investigation report which was made

8 on 30th July when the mosque was demolished. Those present were an

9 investigating judge, a criminal inspector, a forensic technician, and a

10 person -- another person from the prosecutor's office.

11 I believe that you have already confirmed that you knew this

12 crime inspector?

13 A. Yes. Mr. Gajic. And I also know the forensic technician,

14 Mr. Gavrilovic.

15 Q. Sir, since an on-site investigation report was made on the day of

16 the event itself, and it says here the judge and duty was informed at

17 10.00 on the 30th of July, that about 0300 hours that morning, the mosque

18 had been destroyed.

19 Can you tell us, based on all this, if the Kljuc SJB, in fact,

20 informed the investigating judge and forwarded the relevant documentation

21 to the public prosecutor's office?

22 A. The Kljuc SJB informed the investigating judge which can be seen

23 from this document and the investigative judge was in charge of the

24 on-site investigation.

25 Under the law, that is, the Law on Criminal Procedure, when the

Page 23077

1 investigative judge goes on site, he also writes a report. He also

2 collects information from the SJBs or CSBs that come to the site together

3 with the investigative judge. The site must be secured previously by

4 members of the SJB, and it was the judge's duty to make a report and

5 submit a copy -- actually, the prosecutor's office, after the on-site

6 investigation, requests information, especially in cases involving

7 unknown perpetrators, and the -- the police station is required to

8 continue working on the case.

9 Q. Under the then-Law on Criminal Procedure, who is in charge of the

10 investigation?

11 A. It's the investigative judge. Only in case of minor criminal

12 offences, such as minor crimes against property or so, investigative

13 judges would let the security services complete the investigation in

14 practice. But, as I said, those were mostly minor criminal offences.

15 Q. Under the then-Law on Criminal Procedure, could the investigative

16 judge and the public prosecutor give instructions to members of the MUP

17 with regard to procure information or evidence?

18 A. Yes. They were duty-bound to do so.

19 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I seek to tender this

20 document, unless there are objections.

21 MR. HANNIS: No objection.

22 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.

23 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 1D659, Your Honours.

24 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be shown

25 339D1, tab 98.

Page 23078

1 Q. Sir, this is a document that contains a total of ten instructions

2 of the basic public prosecutor's office at Kljuc sent to the public

3 security station from 24 July 1992 through 1 February 1993. They are

4 about various serious crimes, such as murder, rape, or other cases of

5 violent death.

6 Take a look, sir. You will see that there's mention made of the

7 victims, and can you say anything about their ethnicities?

8 A. Most persons are Muslims. However, one person, Milomir Buljan --

9 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter is not sure if that is the

10 correct name.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- could be a Croat. I remember

12 the family name Buljan because there was a well-known football player by

13 that name.

14 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. On page 7 in the Serbian version, there's this memo, and I

16 suppose it's on page 3 or 4 in English. It's the last page, anyway. It

17 says:

18 "Regarding the murder of Milan Buljan from Ponjire."

19 This must be a mistake. It says 13 December 1993. And since the

20 date of the memo is 1 February 1993:

21 "Instructions are given to proceed in accordance with Article 151

22 of the Law on Critical Procedure."

23 Is that what you meant?

24 A. Yes. There was a renowned football player by the name of Buljan.

25 He was a Croat and played for a club based in Split, Croatia.

Page 23079

1 Q. Let us go to page 3. There's a memo dated 10 August 1992. It's

2 marked KTA 61/92, and signed by Dragan Kojic public prosecutor. It was

3 sent to the Kljuc SJB. It's about the death of Alija Filipovic, which

4 occurred on the 2nd or 3rd of August, 1992. It says:

5 "I request that you take ... measures ... to identify the

6 perpetrator or perpetrators, and ... file a criminal report and

7 corroborate it with necessary evidence."

8 There are ten such examples. Was this the usual type of

9 communication that went on between the prosecutor's office and members of

10 the MUP?

11 A. Yes. This was the usual procedure when it comes to the

12 communication between the public prosecutor's office and the members of

13 the MUP. The prosecutor's office is informed by means of a criminal

14 complaint about the crime and its known or unknown perpetrator. When the

15 criminal complaint is filed against an unknown perpetrator, this is a

16 type of communication by which the prosecutor requests subsequent

17 activities and the collection of material evidence about the crime and

18 its perpetrator.

19 Q. So all the events are from the time-period relevant for the

20 indictment in 1992. With regard to the last recorded event, there must

21 be a typo, because it says it was -- it occurred in 1993.

22 Tell me, sir, such a written instruction from the public

23 prosecutor, is it binding upon the MUP members?

24 A. Yes, it is. The same way the Law on Criminal Procedure is

25 binding.

Page 23080

1 Q. In a situation when either the investigative judge or the public

2 prosecutor issues such an instruction to the bodies of the MUP, do the

3 MUP executives, such as you who were chief of the crime enforcement

4 administration, can you change such an instruction issued by the public

5 prosecutor or the investigative judge?

6 A. No member of the MUP, executive or staff, can change a

7 prosecutor's order. And they also cannot change the Law on

8 Criminal Procedure.

9 Q. Thank you.

10 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I seek to tender this

11 document, unless there are objections.

12 MR. HANNIS: No objection.

13 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.

14 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 1D660, Your Honours.

15 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Mr. Macar, I'm going to show you a document for you to comment.

17 We're moving onto a different topic now. 40D1, tab 77.

18 Sir, this is a document dated 21 October 1992. It's an

19 authorisation. In the signature block we see the typed name of the

20 minister, Mico Stanisic. The document number is 10-2/75/92.

21 And the minister authorises the assistant for the police,

22 Tomo Kovac, to discharge all duties of the minister in his absence.

23 Let me first ask you if you can tell by this number which

24 administration drafted this document?

25 A. That would be the administration for analysis which typed this

Page 23081

1 document up, in accordance with the order of the minister.

2 Q. This is the 21st of October, 1992. Can you explain to us why

3 this kind of authorisation was issued?

4 A. I think that I have already given you an answer to that question,

5 or at least part of it in my previous answers.

6 There was some political pressure from some spheres in

7 Republika Srpska as early as in the first half of 1992. And by October,

8 there was an escalation and a culmination, in effect. In my opinion,

9 I -- well, I was quite surprised to hear that the minister was

10 transferring the authorisation, all his powers to Mr. Kovac because I

11 thought that there would be more of an issue of assistance in the

12 establishment of the ministry, especially in light of the fact that the

13 headquarters of the MUP switched to Bijeljina, and there was a lot of

14 effort to set up the organisational units and to step up the activities

15 in the field to set up the chain of command. Unfortunately, the pressure

16 really escalated from the government and some of the political circles,

17 and this is why this gentleman, in fact, why the minister transferred the

18 powers onto Mr. Kovac, empowering him to carry on the activities in the

19 Ministry of the Interior. I think that quite soon Mr. Stanisic, indeed,

20 was removed from office.

21 And I would like to add here that the MUP headquarters in

22 Bijeljina were set up in rather peculiar circumstances because of the

23 pressure exerted by the political circles on the MUP.

24 Q. Sir, when you say political pressure from some actors or players

25 in Republika Srpska, you did say right at the beginning that in

Page 23082

1 October there was a culmination of those pressures.

2 Could you please tell us what political circles did you have in

3 mind? Or, rather, first, tell me, was the pressure exerted on the

4 minister and the ministry?

5 A. Well, it was aimed at the minister himself but also on the

6 ministry. And as I've already said, it started by Mr. Djeric, and it

7 culminated, it was orchestrated by Ms. Plavsic, who was a member of the

8 Presidency.

9 Q. Do you know what was behind this pressure that was first exerted

10 by Mr. Djeric and was later orchestrated by Ms. Plavsic, as a member of

11 the Presidency?

12 A. Well, I think that some individuals in the executive branch of

13 the government and who were in power could not really find their bearings

14 in the beginning of the war. And they were not familiar with the civil

15 service that they were supposed to establish. Here, I'm primarily

16 referring to Mr. Djeric. And in the course of 1992, the Ministry of the

17 Interior and the minister demanded from the government to assist them in

18 setting up the ministry, but also to assist in setting up the other

19 bodies which were required for the ministry to function properly.

20 Otherwise everything was in vain. And, now, as to why Ms. Plavsic joined

21 in this campaign, I don't know. But I think that she took at face value

22 some of the information that came in from some municipalities, in

23 particular, in the Sarajevo region, where the ministry was trying to

24 place under its control, or, rather, to prevent the theft of property

25 from some businesses and to prevent the unlawful disposition of this

Page 23083

1 property. And from these areas, misinformation came into the ministry,

2 and the ministry ended up being accused of all the misdeeds that happened

3 in each and every municipality. And now this all came together with what

4 Mr. Djeric was saying, and there were constant attacks practically each

5 and every month on Mr. Stanisic. It escalated to parody, you could say.

6 With the arrival in Bijeljina, because of this pressure, the situation

7 arose where the senior officers in Bijeljina could not say who the

8 personnel that was supposed to set up the ministry were, what they were

9 all about. Most of the Serbian last names end in "ic." I have to

10 explain this for your benefit, Your Honours. But we had five or six

11 senior officers, Macar, Zuba, Kovac, and so on, and those circles

12 launched pressure which spread to the public, and the public demanded the

13 MUP to check who we are, what our ethnic background was. So the pressure

14 went all the way down to the grassroots level, from the very top levels

15 of the political life.

16 Q. Sir, do you know at what assembly Mr. Djeric's cabinet fell? At

17 what session of the assembly did all the ministers resign?

18 A. I think it was in November 1992. Well, I can't really be more

19 specific about that. I attended most of the sessions of the assembly

20 between 1992 and 1995 because there were always some items on the agenda

21 that had to do with the work of the MUP, and the MUP representatives had

22 to be present there to report. In the course of my attendance to those

23 assembly sessions, I became aware of the work of some of the deputies who

24 were instructed to intervene, to speak, in order to exert pressure on the

25 ministry and the minister. And here I am speaking about the pressure

Page 23084

1 exerted or originating from Ms. Plavsic. I, in fact, got most of my

2 information from those deputies.

3 Q. Do you recall being present in November 1992 at this session of

4 the assembly in Zvornik when the government fell?

5 A. No. I was not in Zvornik. It is one of the few assembly

6 sessions that I did not attend.

7 Q. Do you know about the conflict between Ms. Plavsic and

8 Minister Stanisic that pertained the -- to the volunteers and groups that

9 came into Republika Srpska?

10 A. Yes, I know about this conflict. The position of the MUP and of

11 the Republika Srpska army, once it was established, was that, in

12 organisational terms, all the armed forces had to be under the control of

13 the Ministry of Defence. Or, rather, that all the army personnel had to

14 be under their command. But Ms. Plavsic, acting on her own initiative,

15 this was probably in the course of her visits to Belgrade, to visit her

16 relatives, she would get in touch with various people, and she arranged

17 for the volunteers to come. And we mostly had security problems because

18 of those volunteers, and Republika Srpska army had most of those problems

19 because it had to try to place them under their control. They also

20 caused problems for the municipalities where they arrived.

21 Q. Thank you.

22 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document,

23 unless there are any objections.

24 MR. HANNIS: There is an objection, Your Honour. This document

25 does not have a signature. It does not have a stamp. So there's no

Page 23085

1 indication that it came from the minister. Based on the number, this

2 witness says it comes from the analytical section and he said it was

3 probably typed up by someone from there. But we have no indication

4 whether or not this was a final document, whether it was actually

5 implemented. The appropriate person would be someone from that

6 administration, perhaps Mr. Kovac, or perhaps whoever actually authored

7 the document.

8 But from this witnesses has added, you don't have sufficient

9 basis to admit this one.

10 JUDGE HALL: My query, Mr. Zecevic, would have been that we have

11 the witness's testimony as to the political goings-on that occurred at

12 this time, and this document doesn't -- it's almost a footnote. Do we

13 really need it, apart from the points that Mr. Hannis has made?

14 MR. ZECEVIC: Well, Your Honours, I -- I disagree with the points

15 which Mr. Hannis was making because of the witness's testimony, and I can

16 elaborate on that. But if Your Honours feel it is not required, then I

17 do agree it is just to support the witness's testimony. This document is

18 just to support witness's testimony. But if Your Honours are satisfied

19 with the testimony as sufficient for this -- for this point, I don't

20 insist on -- on introducing this document.

21 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, I would like to add the document says

22 that the ministry authorises Mr. Kovac to perform all ministerial duties

23 on his behalf, in his absence. There is no indication of whether his

24 absence is referring to an absence for two hours that afternoon, for the

25 rest of 1992, or for what period at all.

Page 23086

1 [Trial Chamber confers]

2 JUDGE HALL: Of course, Mr. Zecevic, the Chamber wouldn't

3 necessarily take on board your comments about being satisfied because

4 that suggests a conclusion which would be premature for us. But,

5 basically, we understand what you are saying and treat your comment as --

6 as a withdrawal of your application to tender the document.

7 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you. I apologise, Your Honours. I didn't

8 mean to suggest anything of the kind.

9 JUDGE HALL: Of course, not.

10 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Mr. Macar, are you familiar with this document, and are you

12 familiar with the situation; and, if so, how?

13 A. Well, I tried to say something a little while ago to assist you.

14 Yes, I am familiar with this document. I saw it in Bijeljina,

15 the original, signed and certified by --

16 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Zecevic, it has been brought to our attention

17 that the witness may have been trying to indicate something to the

18 Chamber?

19 Mr. Macar?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Well, I violated the

21 procedure. I tried to say something into the microphone while you were

22 conferring regarding this document.

23 Let me explain the procedure, how documents were drafted.

24 I was able to see the original signed and certified, and the

25 documents were usually done in three copies. This copy was used in order

Page 23087

1 for the person who actually took receipt of the original document. And

2 it is indicated here 21st of October, 1992, personally received by

3 Mr. Mitrovic. He was Mr. Kovac's driver. He took receipt of the

4 certified document. And this is why this copy is not signed. It is

5 usually kept in the analysis administration, in its files. And the

6 original was kept in legal and personnel administration, certified and

7 stamped. This is a document that simply proves that somebody took

8 receipt of the original signed and certified document, which I was able

9 to see.

10 JUDGE HALL: Thank you, sir.

11 Yes, Mr. Zecevic.

12 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Sir, I have to ask you again because of the comments made by my

14 learned friend, what was the reason, very briefly and concisely, for this

15 kind of authorisation to be issued to Tomo Kovac?

16 A. The main reason was the political pressure and other kinds of

17 pressure. That was the basic reason why the minister delegated his

18 authority to Mr. Kovac, or, rather, transferred his powers on Mr. Kovac,

19 so that Mr. Kovac could continue being in charge of the Ministry of

20 the Interior.

21 Q. Thank you. Just a few questions, sir. I'm hoping that we should

22 be able, by the end of the first session ...

23 Did you receive any kind of decoration in 1993 or 1994 when

24 decorations were awarded by the Republika Srpska -- by the

25 Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

Page 23088

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Are you familiar with the procedure of awarding decorations; and

3 who was it that awarded them?

4 A. The nominations for decorations came from the local communities,

5 the local authorities. Then, in case of members of the VRS, they came

6 from the organisational units of the army. And there were also other

7 public authorities involved.

8 The idea of awarding decorations originated due to an intention

9 that individuals should be acknowledged for their contributions to the --

10 to the public good, especially members of the army. But some

11 organisations nominated individuals of doubtful qualities. All these

12 nominations were submitted to a commission that was to check them and

13 narrow down the circle of candidates. But given the war time conditions,

14 it was questionable to what extent they were able to really do their job.

15 It was my position back in 1993, and it hasn't changed since, I

16 was also nominated for a decoration, the Karadjordjevo Star of the

17 Second Order, and I said even then that my name shouldn't have been on

18 that list because there were people who had done much more than I. The

19 basic idea of decorating persons was to acknowledge the bravest and to

20 pay tribute to the fallen members of the armed forces. And 782 police

21 officers got killed in that war. If we add to that number the hundreds

22 of wounded and disabled, especially in 1992 and 1993, the use of MUP

23 members, that is, police officers and the armed forces, was out of

24 proportion. For all these reason, all these people deserve to be

25 decorated much more than I.

Page 23089

1 As I said, that was my position back then, and is hasn't changed

2 since.

3 Q. You have explained that - if I understood correctly - the

4 initiative was with the local authorities.

5 A. Yes, to a great extent.

6 Q. With regard to VRS members, who was it that nominated persons to

7 be decorated?

8 A. It all originated from the commands of lower-ranking units, and

9 it went up the ladder.

10 Q. Sir, and here's my last question for you, sir.

11 I believe that it was at the beginning of your testimony that you

12 said to us that you met -- that you first met Mr. Stanisic in 1977 or

13 1978 when you took up employment; is that correct?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. So by 1992 you had known him for 15 years, and you co-operated in

16 1992. Tell us your opinion about Mr. Stanisic, sir, especially with

17 regard to his attitude toward members of other ethnicities or members of

18 other peoples from the former Yugoslavia.

19 A. As I haven't had the opportunity to do so when replying to a

20 previous question, let me say now that Mr. Stanisic was held in high

21 esteem in police circles as a good professional. He was very disciplined

22 and a model officer. From the time I first met him, to his two terms in

23 office as minister, he never once, in a meeting or outside, said anything

24 bad against non-Serbian citizens. I never heard anything of the kind.

25 Before the war, he worked for companies where he was in a

Page 23090

1 managerial position, and in those companies there were also members of

2 other ethnicities. I heard that he had -- he was on friendly terms with

3 non-Serbs and had friends among them.

4 I have never heard Mr. Stanisic say anything bad about non-Serbs,

5 in spite of the war and anything that occurred then.

6 Q. And here's my last question: Given the fact that you co-operated

7 with Mr. Stanisic, especially in 1992 and during his second term in

8 office in 1994, tell us about Mr. Stanisic's attitude toward crime.

9 A. As I have already pointed out, Mr. Stanisic was, first and

10 foremost, a police officer. Even as a minister, he wasn't a politician.

11 He was a professional police officer.

12 His attitude towards everybody and especially towards crimes

13 committed during the war, was always the same: He insisted that every

14 crime should be solved and no distinctions should be made between crimes.

15 Never could one feel at a collegium or any other meeting that

16 Mr. Stanisic had double criteria, and I'm certain that he still feels the

17 same today.

18 Q. Thank you, Mr. Macar. No more questions for you.

19 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, I see the time.

20 JUDGE HALL: So that conveniently brings us to the first break.

21 And we would hear from Mr. Krgovic when we return.

22 [The witness stands down]

23 --- Recess taken at 10.00 a.m.

24 --- On resuming at 10.18 a.m.

25 [The witness takes the stand]

Page 23091

1 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Krgovic.

2 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Good morning again, Your Honours.

3 Cross-examination by Mr. Krgovic:

4 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Macar.

5 A. Good morning.

6 Q. Mr. Macar, we have already met some ten days ago. We met

7 briefly. This is just for the record. My name is Dragan Krgovic. I am

8 Defence counsel for Mr. Zupljanin, and I'm about to ask you some

9 questions about your testimony so as far, as well as some things you have

10 already discussed with Mr. Zecevic.

11 Let me first ask you for some clarification. You mentioned the

12 name of a forensic technician from Banja Luka. That person is

13 Vilko Maric.

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. He's a Croat by ethnicity, isn't he?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And as far as I understood you, he worked at the forensic centre

18 in Banja Luka in 1992. Later, he moved onto the newly established centre

19 in Banja Luka.

20 A. In 1992, Mr. Vilko Maric worked for the forensic department in

21 the crime enforcement section of the Banja Luka CSB. And in 1993, when

22 the ministry established a forensic centre in Banja Luka, which, in

23 organisational terms, was a subunit of the crime police administration,

24 Mr. Maric was transferred to that forensics centre.

25 Q. Just a bit more clarification.

Page 23092

1 In 1992, all the staff of the forensic centre in Banja Luka were

2 actually members of the Banja Luka CSB. And in 1993, when the centre was

3 established as a separate organisational unit, they became members of

4 that separate organisational unit of the MUP; is that correct?

5 A. Yes. And if I may explain, some of the forensic staff from the

6 centre were transferred to the forensic centre which was an

7 organisational unit of the crime enforcement administration.

8 Q. And, in 1992, this staff that was transferred were tasked to

9 conduct on-site investigations or secure a crime site, and they were

10 issued orders to do so by some senior crime enforcement officers;

11 correct?

12 A. The forensic department of the CSB was ordered, or, actually,

13 received orders from its superiors at the Banja Luka CSB.

14 Q. And, in 1993, the situation changed somewhat, didn't it?

15 A. Yes. In 1993, the forensics centre was an organisational unit of

16 the crime enforcement administration of the ministry itself. That was

17 a -- that was an organisational unit in Banja Luka.

18 Q. And, in 1992, if one of the people working there, such as

19 Brane Buhovac, had to go somewhere and carry out an investigative

20 measure, they received orders to do so from Stojan Zupljanin or

21 Djuro Bulic; right?

22 A. Yes. In the system of subordination, the forensic department had

23 above it the chief of the crime enforcement section and then, further up,

24 the chief of the centre, upon whose request they had to act.

25 Q. And up until 1993, they didn't receive orders from your service.

Page 23093

1 It had to go through a centre, right?

2 A. Almost until the end of 1992, we didn't have functioning

3 communication, nor was the administration able to --

4 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please repeat his answer.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Just like most of the staff of the

6 centre.

7 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. I apologise, you will have to repeat because the interpreters

9 were unable to follow you.

10 My question was: Up until 1993, they couldn't receive

11 instructions or orders from your service, but because the -- in that

12 respect, they were under the Banja Luka CSB; is that correct?

13 A. In brief, yes.

14 Q. That's what I wanted to clarify. When you were answering

15 Mr. Zecevic's question, you were referring to two periods, one before the

16 end of 1992, and the other, starting in 1993.

17 Mr. Macar, I can see that you are in distress. If you should at

18 any moment feel that you cannot continue, we can have an earlier break.

19 A. No, we can continue. For the time being, I can still find a

20 position that I can bear.

21 Q. In your previous testimony, you touched upon some topics that I

22 would like to discuss with you now. That's why I gave you some documents

23 which partly deal with the things you spoke about.

24 So please take a look at tab 2 in your binder. And the exhibit

25 is P624.

Page 23094

1 Answering Mr. Zecevic's question, you mentioned various sources

2 of information that you received and your familiarity with the situation

3 on the ground. One of the ways the ministry learned about the work of

4 the individual centres was through periodical and annual reports;

5 correct?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Please go to page 7 of this document, which is page 4 in English.

8 Actually, it is marked 6 on the hard copy; whereas, it's 7 in e-court.

9 Mr. Macar, do take a look at footnote 1 at the bottom of page 6.

10 It mentions the personnel strength of the MUP. I'm interested in the

11 following information: On 31 December 1992, there was a total of 1.203

12 activity duty and 5.065 reserve policemen in the territory of the

13 Banja Luka CSB which, if my math is correct, totals 6.288 members.

14 Please go back to page 2 in hard copy, which is page 2 in English

15 as well.

16 Now there is something here that I want to discuss with you. In

17 line 7 from the top, the participation of MUP members in the war is

18 mentioned. It says:

19 "... 5.34 employees were engaged in combat operations for 114.529

20 days."

21 You said that, as far as you knew, the percentage of police

22 officers taking part in combat operations was up to 70 or 80 per cent.

23 You remember saying that?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. And if we look at 6.288 employees, about 5.000 of them took part,

Page 23095

1 that would be about 60 [as interpreted] per cent of the overall strength

2 who took part in the combat operations in the Banja Luka CSB area; is

3 that correct?

4 A. Yes.

5 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] I am sorry, I do apologise. I said

6 80 per cent, or 80.1 per cent, according to my calculation.

7 Q. And, Mr. Macar, you will agree that such a high percentage of

8 employees who took part in combat operations affected substantially the

9 security situation in the Banja Luka CSB area; is that correct?

10 A. Well, not only the security situation in the Banja Luka CSB, but

11 in all the other centres as well. And if we add to this, that by the end

12 of the year, there were only 1.200 -- 100, 1.200 active-duty policemen;

13 in other words, people who had some experience in the security tasks.

14 And the Banja Luka CSB had 24 public security stations within its area.

15 And out of the 24 SJBs, to the best of my recollection, at least 16 were

16 in the combat area, or, rather, bordered on the areas where combat

17 operations were ongoing. And the massive participation of the security

18 services personnel in the combat operations affected the security

19 situation definitely, and also affected the quality of work of the public

20 security stations.

21 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

22 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Please look at page 2 in this document. In e-court, in the

24 Serbian, that would be page 3, and page 2 in the English version.

25 Well, as in all the reports that we have seen, we have the basic

Page 23096

1 characteristics of the security situation and public law and order, and

2 you spoke about that in answer to my colleague Mr. Zecevic's questions.

3 I will now read this part so that you can see whether this

4 corresponds to the knowledge that you gained through the reports or from

5 other sources when you visited the ground.

6 And it says here that a characteristic for the situation is the

7 conduct of combat operations in various areas. And then it goes on to

8 say about some organisational issues. And then it says repeated

9 disturbances of law and order and inability to maintain it, and to --

10 there's a danger that this might go out of control, physical and armed

11 attacks on the police officers, unauthorised use of weapons, lack of

12 compliance with the law, and increasing levels of civil disobedience, a

13 decrease in the level of social tolerance, spreading of rumours and

14 disinformation, an increase in the most serious forms of crime,

15 brigandry, causing of general danger, general sense of insecurity,

16 poverty, and the precarious social conditions for a growing number of

17 people.

18 Mr. Macar, you will agree with me that this situation prevailed

19 not only in the Banja Luka CSB but -- or, rather, that it prevailed in

20 the whole of the Banja Luka area?

21 A. Well, based on the reports, the situation was almost the same.

22 Well, the same, actually.

23 Q. I asked you not about Banja Luka as -- but Republika Srpska as a

24 whole.

25 A. Yes, that's what I actually meant. It was the same throughout

Page 23097

1 Republika Srpska.

2 Q. Please look at page 5 in e-court. That's page 6 in the Serbian

3 version and page 4 in the English version.

4 Mr. Zecevic asked you a number of questions and showed you a

5 number of documents about some crimes that were committed by people in

6 uniform. And let me read this passage to you, and I would like to ask

7 you whether this tallies with your knowledge?

8 That's the second paragraph, that says:

9 "In an atmosphere of radical deterioration of the security

10 situation, which keeps getting more complex, there has been a marked

11 escalation of crime ... by armed groups and individuals of Serbian

12 ethnicity who tend to deny the authority and block the work of legal

13 government organs. The criminal activity of criminal groups and

14 individuals creates an impression of anarchy and lawlessness in the

15 public ... which seriously undermines the reputation of the legal

16 government institutions and creates distrust in them, especially because

17 some of these groups and criminals use uniforms and the insignia of the

18 army and police of Republika Srpska when committing their [sic] crimes."

19 And then there is a description of the crimes they commit.

20 And then it goes on to say:

21 "Another security problem is the operation of groups and

22 individuals of Serbian ethnicity aimed at seizing power in an illegal

23 manner."

24 Mr. Macar, you know that in some municipalities there were some

25 groups, wearing all kinds of uniforms, actually had power throughout

Page 23098

1 1992?

2 A. Some groups were in power and a number of them tried to use

3 violence, in order to influence the existing government bodies.

4 Q. [Microphone not activated]

5 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

6 MR. KRGOVIC: Sorry.

7 Q. [Interpretation] Let me now show you a part that has to do with

8 crime. Could you please look at page 9, page 10 in e-court, and page 6

9 in the English version. That would be more of your purview.

10 Mr. Macar, the first paragraph about the number of criminal

11 complaints submitted in the Banja Luka area, in answer to Mr. Zecevic's

12 question, you spoke about criminal complaints that were filed against

13 unidentified perpetrators. And here we have a figure that unidentified

14 perpetrators committed --

15 THE INTERPRETER: Could the counsel please repeat the figure.

16 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. The percentage is 47.3 per cent of crimes that were not solved.

18 Well, the percentage of solved crimes, if you compare it with the some

19 other periods before and after the war or with other countries, how would

20 you describe it, as satisfactory or not satisfactory?

21 A. Well, even in peacetime conditions this would be a considered a

22 satisfactory number of crimes solved, if you are talking about crimes

23 committed by unidentified perpetrators.

24 Q. And in this report we can see that these are crimes that are

25 being committed systematically and that are not typical of peacetime

Page 23099

1 conditions: Arson, torching, mass murders, aggravated robberies, and so

2 on; is that correct?

3 A. Yes, that is correct.

4 Q. And all CSBs and all SJBs, not just the centre in Banja Luka,

5 faced this kind of problem for the first time, in effect, of -- once the

6 war broke out?

7 A. I think that when Mr. Zecevic asked me a question, I said that

8 the MUP personnel of -- the personnel of the MUP of the former Bosnia and

9 Herzegovina did not have adequate training to act in a civil,

10 ethnic-based war, especially in a war where everybody had weapons and

11 when crimes were so widespread, theft, robbery, murders, and so on. The

12 police suddenly had to operate to act against armed criminal groups whose

13 equipment were superior, in some cases, to military equipment and

14 weapons. And also, the rugged terrain was another tactor. The number of

15 Security Services Centre personnel involved in the war, which meant that

16 the number of operatives in the field went down. In the initial stages,

17 this all affected the sharp rise in crime. And it took quite some time

18 for the ministry and for the SJBs to adapt to this new situation. One of

19 the main reasons, as I've already said in my previous answers, for the

20 minister to give this order to transform the special unit into a special

21 detachment that would be operating at the regional level, the reason was

22 that we wanted to have this kind of force to assist the regular police in

23 maintaining the security situation at acceptable levels.

24 I have to apologise if I was too broad in my explanations.

25 Q. Please look at paragraph 3, or, rather the third paragraph in

Page 23100

1 this report again on this page, where it says -- well, you spoke at

2 length to my colleague, Mr. Zecevic, about the crimes and the criminal

3 complaints that were filed for murder in the first degree. Well, they

4 could be qualified as war crimes or murders. But here it says that some

5 criminal complaints were filed for the crime -- crimes against humanity

6 and public law, and some municipalities are mentioned here: Teslic and

7 Knezevo SJBs. Knezevo, where is that?

8 A. Skender Vakuf.

9 Q. I'm sorry, I spoke too fast. Teslic and Knezevo.

10 So, Mr. Macar, do you know that the criminal complaint for

11 Koricanske Stijene which are in the Knezevo SJB territory, whether there

12 are any other complaints were filed for the war crime that may have

13 happened there in 1992?

14 A. I know there was some crimes in Teslic where criminal complaints

15 were filed.

16 Q. That would be the Mice Group?

17 A. Yes. Well, that's what they were called. That was their

18 nickname, Mice.

19 Q. But the criminal complaint for Koricanske Stijene in the Knezevo

20 SJB?

21 A. The complaint for Koricanske Stijene was filed initially a crime

22 by unidentified perpetrators and action was taken to identify the

23 perpetrators. Since the perpetrators were wearing police uniform,

24 probably those were reserve police officers from Prijedor. That's what

25 was discovered.

Page 23101

1 Q. You were explaining to Mr. Zecevic that when you arrived in 1993,

2 you were informed that they had joined the VRS and that measures were

3 being taken to find them; do you remember?

4 A. Yes, I said that. There was information that a number of

5 perpetrators had been identified - I don't know now if there were two or

6 three of them identified - and that these persons had joined a VRS unit,

7 and that measures were being taken to identify and locate them in order

8 to bring them in.

9 Q. [Microphone not activated]

10 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, Please.

11 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Please move onto page 24 in your version. It's page 25 in

13 e-court and Serbian. And page 14 in English.

14 Mr. Macar, the second paragraph from the top, you have just said

15 or told -- told us about the problems the police was facing at the time:

16 A shortage of staff, and especially police staff, to work under difficult

17 conditions.

18 That was a significant factor affecting the work of the police,

19 wasn't it?

20 A. Yes, it was.

21 Q. An assessment made by Mr. Zupljanin in his report is that the

22 impression is created that the situation is -- or, rather, that the

23 authorities are losing control over the situation. The ineffectiveness

24 of the security organs and services in carrying out the duties envisaged

25 by law which is primarily reflected in the slow processing of the crimes,

Page 23102

1 that was a problem that prevailed in the entire territory of the RS,

2 wasn't it?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Answering Mr. Zecevic's question, you also spoke about the roles

5 of Crisis Staffs. I'm going to read out the following paragraph to you,

6 which is on the following page in English. The inefficiency,

7 unprofessional attitude, has contributed to ...

8 "... the ineffectiveness, lack of professionalism, and negligence

9 in the work of a number of SJB staff is largely a result of the

10 functional and operational independence of a number of SJBs from the

11 centre which is greatly undermined the overall unity and social role of

12 the security organs and services."

13 What does that mean, Mr. Macar, "functional and operational"?

14 Could you please explain?

15 A. Individual SJB senior officers, some of whom didn't have previous

16 experience in policing, organised their work in such a way that

17 Crisis Staffs or some circles in the municipal authorities were actually

18 running and directing the SJBs. And a practice spread that the

19 Crisis Staff, rather than the CSB, was their superior body, which means

20 that they weren't really in the chain of subordination of the MUP.

21 That's how the functional system of security was disappearing. That was

22 certainly not in line with the Law on Internal Affairs.

23 Q. And, as we see in the following sentence:

24 "... some of these SJBs link their activities to local politics

25 and local political leaders, neglecting their legal obligations and

Page 23103

1 authority."

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Please move onto the following page, which is page 25 in your

4 binder, 26 in e-court, and 15 in the English version.

5 I'm interested in the second paragraph where Mr. Zupljanin

6 discusses this problem and says:

7 "A number of SJBs ignores the centre's requests for information

8 on certain issues and fails to react promptly to certain requests ...

9 thus jeopardising the unity of the security organs and services and their

10 ability to operate as a single security system. In such circumstances,

11 it is very difficult to have the overall security situation under control

12 and ... assess and make valid security assessments and estimates. Thus,

13 by becoming independent, the SJBs inevitably undermine the integral

14 security system of the region and the Republic; that is, they brought

15 into question the integral function of the security organs and services

16 and weakened the entire defence" --

17 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: "Protection system."

18 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Mr. Macar, this is a realistic picture of the security system,

20 not only of the Banja Luka region but the entire RS in 1992, isn't it?

21 A. Are you referring only to this paragraph or ...

22 Q. I pointed out this part about the security system.

23 A. Here, the problems are -- with some SJBs are related in an

24 analytical manner. Those problems were caused by the chiefs of those

25 SJBs, especially those who had not been appointed by the MUP or nominated

Page 23104

1 by the Security Services Centre. The Banja Luka centre, at other

2 centres, had very little influence on that. There were such cases in

3 other centres, too.

4 Q. And, specifically, answering Mr. Zecevic's question, you pointed

5 out Prijedor as a typical example of an SJB breaking loose from both the

6 Security Services Centre and the MUP.

7 A. Yes. And I was shocked by the -- by the extent of that problem.

8 By the scope of that problem.

9 [Defence counsel confer]

10 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] I apologise, I'm just being

11 informed that not your entire reply was recorded.

12 Q. You were shocked by the scope of the problem and what else? The

13 non-recognition of the centre and the ministry on the part of the people

14 in Prijedor?

15 A. I literally said not only by the extent of disrespect but also by

16 the lack of knowledge or ignorance of the role of the ministry

17 headquarters.

18 Toilet?

19 Q. Did you have anything to say, sir?

20 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

21 JUDGE HALL: I think we would take the break a little early and

22 come back in 15 minutes.

23 [The witness stands down]

24 --- Recess taken at 11.03 a.m.

25 --- On resuming at 11.24 a.m.

Page 23105

1 JUDGE HALL: While the witness is on his way in, we'll take the

2 next break at 12.30, and then after 15 minutes, we will be back, more or

3 less, on track.

4 [The witness takes the stand]

5 JUDGE HALL: Yes, Mr. Krgovic.

6 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. In your reply recorded on page 31, lines 17 through 19, you

8 mention disrespect and ignorance of the role of the ministry headquarters

9 and added -- you also added a -- of the centres, too. Didn't you?

10 A. Yes, I did. I said it twice.

11 Q. And when you say "centres," you mean the Banja Luka CSB?

12 A. Yes, the Banja Luka CSB.

13 Q. Mr. Macar, take a look at page 26 in your binder, which is 27 in

14 e-court, and it's page 15 of the English translation.

15 In this first paragraph, some things are dealt with that you

16 discussed with Mr. Zecevic, that control should be introduced over these

17 members of the MUP that didn't abide by the regulations?

18 And in the following paragraph, we see that it says, "Out of" --

19 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We cannot see the relevant

20 section in English.

21 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] It's at the bottom of the page,

22 continuing on page 16 in English.

23 I will read it again for the interpreters:

24 "Certain duties envisaged by the law were not carried out because

25 of fear and apprehension, and in some cases because of involvement in

Page 23106

1 various criminal affairs. And there were attempts to shift

2 responsibility to others and even to the centre."

3 Q. Mr. Macar, this especially applied to Prijedor, wasn't it, and

4 especially after the removal of Mr. Drljaca, when he was trying to

5 present things in such a manner as to clear him from any responsibility;

6 correct?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Please look at another document, Mr. Macar. It's in tab 1.

9 That's P595.

10 Mr. Macar, in addition to this annual report in the pre-war

11 times, the practice was to file periodical repots, depending on the

12 needs, whether of the SJBs or the Security Services Centres.

13 A. Well, the practice was to file reports every three month, six

14 months, and the annual reports, or, on demand, whenever the Ministry of

15 the Interior or the public security department requested that reports be

16 filed at other times.

17 Q. Could you please look at page -- the next page, in effect,

18 introductory remarks. Look at the footnote, number 1:

19 "The report from the centre was supposed to contain the reports

20 of the SJBs to incorporated all the reports of the SJBs."

21 That was the principle?

22 A. The centre's reports were based on the activities of the SJBs and

23 the centre itself in the headquarters for those tasks that were within

24 their purview.

25 Q. Let me quote from the footnote where it says:

Page 23107

1 "Furthermore, some of the SJBs, despite the insistence from the

2 centre and despite exceeding all the deadlines, have not filed their

3 reports by the 27th of July, 1991 [as interpreted], as they were supposed

4 to."

5 And then there's a list of municipalities that did not file their

6 reports and two of them are in -- listed in the indictment, Skender Vakuf

7 and Donji Vakuf. That probably has a number of causes, Mr. Macar, but

8 this speaks to the fact that, as we have already discussed, that some

9 SJBs became, de facto, independent of the centre and of the ministry; is

10 that correct?

11 A. Well, yes, that can be a cause.

12 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Just a correction. Page 34,

13 line 5, the date is the 27th of July, 1992.

14 Q. And then the centre states in the report that the quality of the

15 reports is rather low in terms of the analysis, and it does not

16 correspond to the circumstances and the situation. Mr. Zupljanin is

17 insisting here that the centre itself was unable to determine what was

18 really going on, on the ground for a number of reasons, of course. Is

19 that so?

20 A. Well, in many public security stations, as I've already

21 indicated, there was a lack of trained personnel, personnel who would be

22 able to perform all of their tasks. And that is why even the periodical

23 reports boiled down to some statistical data and there was no appropriate

24 analysis of the security situation of each and every security factor. It

25 was just barest statistics. There was no assessment of the situation

Page 23108

1 from the station itself. They did not describe the situation, and they

2 did not describe the measures taken or justify failure to take measures.

3 They did not specify their plans to deal with their own failures and

4 defects and also to deal with the problems on the ground.

5 Q. Mr. Macar, could you please move on to page 11 in the hard copy.

6 That would be page 8 in the English version, and I believe that in

7 e-court, that would be page 9, or, rather, page 12 in the Serbian.

8 So the English version, I believe, is page 8.

9 Mr. Zecevic asked you about some instances where buildings were

10 torched, some explosions, and so on. And I would like to bring your

11 attention to what Mr. Zupljanin highlights here as a problem, where he is

12 speaking about the criminal activities of groups and individuals, and the

13 combat operations. And then he goes on to say that there are instances

14 of unauthorised entry into citizens' apartments, blowing up socially

15 owned and privately owned buildings. And then he says, in paragraph 3:

16 "These activities have caused anger and resentments, mainly among

17 the Serbian people in whose name and with whose symbols heinous criminal

18 acts, looting, arson, and violence, are being committed. Fear is

19 generated among other ethnic groups which inevitably brings about ethnic

20 divisions and distrust in the institutions of the systems -- of the

21 system."

22 Mr. Macar, Mr. Zupljanin obviously is saying what all of you in

23 the ministry must have noted, how all those activities impacted on the

24 security station in Republika Srpska as a whole.

25 A. Well, most of those phenomenon often led the minister to issue

Page 23109

1 various instructions and guide-lines how to deal with those acts more

2 efficiently and effectively and also to co-operate better with the

3 relevant military organs in order to suppress such actions.

4 Q. We will wait, Mr. Macar, for this part of your answer to be

5 recorded.

6 In your reply, you said that these actions prompted the minister,

7 led the minister, and that's not recorded.

8 A. And the minister issued instructions and orders to the people on

9 the ground, demanding that more vigorous action be taken by the public

10 security sections and the CSBs to fight these kinds of activities and to

11 establish links with the relevant security organs in the military, in

12 order to keep them informed and to take joint action to fight these kind

13 of activities and to create a more favourable security situation.

14 Q. Mr. Macar, could you please move to page 24 in the hard copy that

15 you have in front of you. In e-court, it is 25 in the Serbian version,

16 and 16 in the English version.

17 Please read the last paragraph and then we will move onto the

18 next page.

19 That would be page 26 in the e-court, in the Serbian version,

20 your version, that's page 25. And we're still on the same page in the

21 English language where it is indicated that there should be co-operation

22 between the military and the organs of the Ministry of the Interior.

23 This is what you have been saying; right?

24 A. Yes, that's correct.

25 Q. When you talked with Mr. Zecevic, you spoke about a number of

Page 23110

1 factors that affected the solve rate of the crimes. Let me read the next

2 paragraph on page 25 where it says:

3 "Major problems for the services in this situation are caused by

4 the refusal of the citizens to co-operate. The avoidance of officials

5 and some mistrust and the passive role of the operative stronghold, so

6 that the initial data collected can be checked with some difficulty which

7 affects the accuracy of assessments of the social threat posed by

8 security-related developments and events."

9 Mr. Macar, each and every polices force in the world has some

10 informers, some sources, and it depends on the trust of the citizens in

11 order to be able to do its job and detect crimes.

12 Now, once the war broke out in Republika Srpska, this situation

13 changed. It was upside down.

14 A. Well, it's a characteristic for the entire Republika Srpska, not

15 only for the Banja Luka CSB area. There was fear, which is only natural

16 if you are in a war. And criminal groups and armed individuals who

17 committed crimes were rampant, and people were reluctant to come forward

18 and report some things they knew to the public security station

19 personnel. At our meetings, I always demanded that more vigorous action

20 be taken by the crime police. I was speaking as the chief of the crime

21 police department. And those who felt some fear, who were too afraid to

22 work, should leave the crime police. And I also had some understanding

23 for the fear of the citizens for their personal safety that they faced if

24 they decided to come forward, and that is something that was present in

25 each and every municipality in Republika Srpska. And I don't even have

Page 23111

1 to talk about those small villages where everybody is related to everyone

2 else. And, of course, the war exacerbated this situation, and the

3 situation this those small villages was even worse than it was in the

4 larger centres.

5 Q. Even the victims who survived some crimes were reluctant to

6 testify against the perpetrators because they feared for their safety; is

7 that correct?

8 A. Well, I think that it was a general phenomenon, based on the flow

9 of information that we received from the victims.

10 Q. Mr. Macar, there is a sentence here in this paragraph which

11 reads:

12 "The real nature of the security assessments is affected by lack

13 of information and co-ordination between the centre, the public security

14 stations, and the Ministry of the Interior and other CSBs in the Serbian

15 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina."

16 Do you agree with me, and do you agree what Mr. Zupljanin says

17 here that there was no co-ordination between the CSBs, the SJBs, and the

18 Ministry of the Interior, at least in this period that Mr. Zupljanin is

19 talking about here?

20 A. Well, I would like to say, first of all, that this lack of

21 communication between the stations, the centres, and the ministry itself,

22 and this inability to respond promptly on the part of the ministry,

23 primarily for technical reasons, especially at the beginning of the war,

24 that it caused greater problems for the ministry itself in the

25 headquarters, because they did not have information. They did not get

Page 23112

1 information promptly about what was going on, on the ground. And then,

2 based on this information, they were supposed to take specific measures

3 and issue instructions to the relevant areas. The public security

4 stations were duty-bound to operate in line with the Law on the

5 Internal Affairs and the Law on Criminal Procedure. The CSB, likewise,

6 had to do that.

7 Because of the difficulties that we have already described, at

8 the beginning of the war, in particular, the flow of information was

9 irregular, the flow of information from the stations to the centres. And

10 the centres themselves did not really know what was going on in each and

11 every segment of the security sector in the territories covered by the

12 public security stations.

13 Q. Here, at the bottom, Mr. Zupljanin says, when it comes to the

14 Banja Luka CSB:

15 "All forms of self-organising parallel bodies of the government,

16 self-contained territories of various types on various bases, terror and

17 violence against the population, and armed conflict and general anarchy

18 and chaos."

19 And then further on, as regards the security services personnel,

20 he notes that this puts them in the difficulty situation and makes it

21 very difficult for them to carry out their legal tasks, i.e.,

22 guaranteeing the public law and order, and security for the citizens and

23 their property.

24 Do you agree, Mr. Macar, that in those days, when the conflict

25 broke out in April, and then, later on, in 1992, that this actually

Page 23113

1 applied to the whole of Republika Srpska, and that the position of the

2 MUP personnel, because of this, was very difficult and that they could

3 not do their job as they were duty-bound under the law?

4 A. In numerous municipalities, the civilian authorities and also the

5 military authorities were at a loss. We're talking about Crisis Staffs,

6 a new practice came into being, that they were the most responsible and

7 that they had the right to manage all the structures, including the

8 security services. Those who had been with the MUP longer, who had had

9 more experience, were able to bypass these pitfalls. But the -- those

10 with less experience became the servants of these authorities. And the

11 Crisis Staffs affected the way the SJBs functioned greatly. They

12 practically issued instructions and orders to the SJBs which was in

13 direct contravention of the Law on Internal Affairs.

14 Q. Mr. Macar, I have no more questions of you.

15 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Hannis.

16 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.

17 Cross-examination by Mr. Hannis:

18 Q. Mr. Macar, my name is Tom Hannis. I'm a Prosecutor. I

19 understand that you have been experiencing some difficulties during your

20 time here, and I just wanted to indicate that if any time you feel like

21 you need a break sooner than the scheduled time, please let us know. And

22 with the Judge's permission, I would tell you that if it is urgent, and

23 you don't feel like you have time to wait for the translation, just hold

24 up your hand and start out of the room, and we'll understand. I don't

25 want you to suffer because it takes time for the message to get through.

Page 23114

1 I wanted to begin with what Mr. Zecevic started, but I guess

2 while we are just finished with Mr. Krgovic, I will ask you a couple of

3 questions about that.

4 Mr. Krgovic said that the two of you had met some ten days ago.

5 Was that the first and only time that you met with anybody from the

6 Zupljanin Defence team?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And how long did you meet with Mr. Krgovic?

9 A. I didn't really time it, but it wasn't a long meeting.

10 Q. Okay. Did he show you any documents in that meeting?

11 A. As far as I remember, we spoke more about some procedural

12 matters.

13 Q. Did you show him any documents that you might have had?

14 A. No.

15 Q. Thank you. With regard to Mr. Stanisic, Mico Stanisic's Defence

16 team, when did you first become aware that you were going to be asked to

17 be a witness for Mr. Stanisic?

18 A. I do not remember the exact time and date. I know that after

19 being interviewed by your investigators, I was asked and explained that I

20 may become a Prosecution witness in this trial. I know that some

21 colleagues of mine had already been called in that capacity. And I think

22 that Mr. Zecevic's assistant informed me over the phone that I was on

23 their list of Defence witnesses.

24 Q. And I have copies of -- of some notes of an interview or a

25 meeting that I think Mr. Zecevic or somebody from his Defence team had

Page 23115

1 with you in March of this year. Do you recall meeting with them and

2 being interviewed or discussing your possible testimony in this case?

3 A. We didn't speak about the case in March, but I was informed, but

4 I can't say when exactly, that I was short-listed as a Defence witness.

5 Q. Before coming here to The Hague for your testimony last week and

6 this week, did you have a meeting with Mr. Zecevic or anyone from the

7 Defence team to go over documents and discuss the content of your

8 anticipated testimony; and, if so, when and where was that?

9 A. Mr. Zecevic's assistant, whose name I now forget, informed me

10 that I was scheduled for the 20th of June. I was summoned when I had

11 some medical problems, and I remember that the correspondence went back

12 and forth five or six times. I was explaining -- or, rather, I was

13 explained what had to be done, and so on and so forth, but then I ended

14 up in the emergency ward for some urgent checkups.

15 Q. My question is: Did you have a face-to-face meeting with anybody

16 from Mr. Zecevic's team, Mr. Stanisic's Defence team, during this year,

17 2011? Not counting your proofing here in The Hague.

18 A. I do not remember seeing anybody on Mr. Zecevic's team this year.

19 I may have seen Mr. Cvijetic in passing, in Bijeljina, but we didn't

20 really know each other, nor did we communicate. So even if I did pass

21 him, or meet him on the street, I didn't say hello.

22 Q. Well, did you have a -- did you have an interview over the

23 telephone with the person who contacted you on behalf of Mr. Stanisic's

24 team? Because I have a document that's uploaded into e-court, the

25 document ERN is 1D07-0138 through 0144, and I thought there was a

Page 23116

1 notation on that document indicating it was from March of 2011.

2 So if you didn't have a face-to-face meeting, did you have a

3 discussion on the phone, an interview, if you will, about the contents of

4 your anticipated testimony?

5 A. No.

6 Q. We'll come back to that later then. When --

7 MR. ZECEVIC: [Microphone not activated]... I'm sorry.

8 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

9 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, there was not -- there was no original,

10 if you wanted to show the document to the witness. There was no original

11 on the -- on the monitor.

12 MR. HANNIS: I will come back to it later.

13 Q. When you --

14 A. I apologise, if I may have just a minute to go to the toilet.

15 Q. Please.

16 [The witness stands down]

17 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, perhaps to save some time with the

18 witness, maybe I could ask the Court to ask of Defence counsel if they

19 could provide me with some guidance on this document, which we received

20 as being a statement or notes of an interview with Mr. Macar, and I don't

21 recall where I got it, but -- it was my understanding it was from

22 March 2011. It's not signed by the witness, so I'm not clear on the

23 provenance. It was loaded by the Defence, and I can use some assistance.

24 MR. ZECEVIC: Well, this -- this document is, to my recollection,

25 from March, but can I find out the precise date when it was received. It

Page 23117

1 was an e-mail sent by Mr. Macar to us, concerning the -- the issues

2 that we discussed during -- during the previous meeting that I had with

3 him.

4 I hope this is ...

5 MR. HANNIS: It's a start. Thank you.

6 [The witness takes the stand]

7 MR. HANNIS:

8 Q. Mr. Macar, are you okay to go on to our next scheduled break at

9 12.30?

10 A. Yes, yes.

11 Q. Now, we do have a document on the screen. I don't know if you

12 can see the B/C/S version. I have some information now that suggests to

13 me that perhaps -- is this an e-mail that you may have sent to

14 Mr. Zecevic sometime earlier this year?

15 A. Yes. I don't know exactly when. The questions to which I

16 provided answers were received from Mr. Cvijetic, I think. And I sent

17 them to their office in Belgrade. I got them on the phone, but I can't

18 give you a precise point in time, and this is a bit difficult for me to

19 look at. It's much easier to work with hard copies, if you have any.

20 Q. I will, later on, come to that, and then I'll provide you a hard

21 copy. For now, I just wanted to establish when that was created and who

22 it came from. Now I understand this is -- this is your own written work

23 that you sent as an e-mail in response to some questions that you had

24 received earlier from the Stanisic Defence team; correct?

25 A. Yes.

Page 23118

1 Q. Thank you. And, as I said, we'll deal with that later.

2 I want to go back to the beginning of your testimony last week on

3 the 5th of July. Mr. Zecevic began about asking you about the situation

4 just shortly before the conflict broke out in April of 1992. At

5 transcript page 22.808, you mentioned how, in the -- in the joint MUP, I

6 will call it, of Bosnia, there was, what you referred to, as a purge.

7 And you explained that term as referring to the situation where certain

8 people in leading positions were removed from those leading positions in

9 the ministry. And you said this started with the public security

10 stations and then went all the way up to the very top of the ministry.

11 One of my questions related to that was, this wasn't just a

12 matter of one ethnicity replacing another one; right? It wasn't

13 necessarily a matter of a Serb being replaced by a Muslim, or a Muslim

14 being replaced by a Croat, or a Croat being replaced by a Serb. I mean,

15 I understand that did happen sometimes. But sometimes, it was happening

16 that a Serb might be replaced by another Serb.

17 You're aware of situations like that happening in early 1992?

18 A. Speaking about the city Secretariat of the Interior in Sarajevo,

19 I do not know of cases when a Serb was appointed to a position which was

20 earmarked for a Muslim. And in the newly created situation, especially

21 in the uniformed police, maybe even over 40 per cent of the employees

22 were Serbs. Because that was simply due to the numbers in which the

23 individual groups responded to -- to calls.

24 As a consequence of the 1991 census, the structure was somewhat

25 corrected, through early retirement, which was possible at the time, or,

Page 23119

1 in some cases, due to changes in the job classification.

2 Q. You mentioned that at the beginning of your testimony. But the

3 point I'm asking about wasn't a real part of the problem, not so much the

4 ethnicity of the replacement, but the qualification of the replacement.

5 For example, in Bijeljina, before the war, it's my understanding that

6 Mico Davidovic had been the chief in the SJB in Bijeljina. And he had

7 been a professional policeman for some years before that. And he was

8 replaced by Predrag Jesuric, a lawyer, who was, as I understand it, a

9 founder and a member of the local SDS with no prior police experience.

10 Isn't that an example of the problem where political appointees with no

11 professional police experience were being put into these jobs throughout

12 Bosnia?

13 A. I do not remember that Mr. Davidovic was chief of the Bijeljina

14 SJB. I think that he was chief of a local police station somewhere in

15 the surroundings of Bijeljina. And from that position, he moved on to a

16 unit of the federal MUP, which, given his disposition and the way he

17 perceived of the service, was probably something that suited him well.

18 And Mr. Jesuric was, indeed, a lawyer, who had taken his bar

19 exam, but I don't remember which qualifications made Mr. Davidovic

20 eligible for some higher-ranking position in the MUP.

21 Q. You've talked a lot about the problems of the independence of

22 certain SJBs in 1992, due, in part, as you said, because of their

23 appointment by the local Crisis Staffs. And part of the problem was many

24 of those persons appointed to be SJB chiefs did not have prior experience

25 as policeman; correct?

Page 23120

1 A. I stated that there were some SJB chiefs without prior experience

2 with the MUP. And I spoke about the influence the Crisis Staffs had on

3 some SJBs, or a considerable number, in fact.

4 Q. You know Malko Koroman, who was the SJB chief in Pale for a time

5 in 1992; correct?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Do you know what he did prior to his appointment as a SJB chief

8 in Pale? Was he a professional policeman before that?

9 A. No.

10 Q. You testified on -- on the 5th of July about the 40 per cent of

11 Serbs, you said, working in the MUP and how they tended to apply more for

12 the uniform jobs. And then you went on to talk about the problem of --

13 in Sarajevo, of the number of Muslims being taken on as reserve

14 policemen.

15 You said many of those were Muslim citizens from Sandzak. How

16 many people are you talking about? Are you talking about dozens, or

17 hundreds, or thousands? Do you have a number?

18 A. You mean the number of Sandzak citizens who became reserve police

19 officers in the city of Sarajevo?

20 Q. Yes.

21 A. Dozens. I can give you an illustration. In front of my

22 courtyard, there were always a number of reserve police officers who

23 hailed from Sandzak which is a territory in the east of Montenegro or on

24 the south of Serbia. They are conspicuous by their accent. The SUP of

25 the centre of Sarajevo which was only a few buildings away from my

Page 23121

1 courtyard, had many such police officers, and our neighbours began

2 calling that little Novi Pazar. Don't misunderstand me to have anything

3 against the people from Sandzak. Even now, I have some friends and

4 acquaintances among them. But it wasn't normal, and it wasn't in line

5 with the criteria of the police for large numbers of persons from that

6 area to become police officers in the city of Sarajevo, even reserve

7 police officers, let alone active duty. And even -- they even were

8 appointed to the high positions in the ministry. And those were people

9 who worked in Novi Pazar, and they were unfamiliar with the security

10 situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They don't know the geography and

11 certainly didn't meet the conditions to become a senior officer in the

12 ministry, in a very responsible position, without having earned any

13 distinction in -- in the police before.

14 Q. Let me stop you there and ask you to please concentrate on my

15 question and try and just answer it as shortly as possible.

16 You gave the answer in one word, but then you went on for about

17 15 lines.

18 I want to talk specifically now about these reserve policemen

19 that you say were being hired in the dozens, Muslim citizens from

20 Sandzak. You said they were recognised by their accent. How many of

21 these dozens of newly hired reserve police did you talk to in order to be

22 able to hear their accent?

23 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm -- I'm sorry, I just have one intervention in

24 the transcript. It was written here 48:7 that the witness said they

25 don't know the geography. I believe -- I believe what the witness said

Page 23122

1 was quite different than that.

2 MR. HANNIS: Well, it is really non-responsive to my question.

3 I'm satisfied to let the Defence address it in re-direct.

4 Q. Unless you can tell me, Mr. Macar, in a short answer, what you

5 said instead of "they don't know the geography"?

6 Did you say something else there; and, if so, can you tell us

7 what it is, briefly?

8 A. I didn't say that they didn't know geography. I spoke about a

9 person appointed to a high position in the ministry who didn't even know

10 Bosnia-Herzegovina. He didn't -- wasn't aware of the problems the

11 ministry faced, and he didn't even know a single town in

12 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

13 Q. Can you give us some specific examples of someone fitting that

14 description, that was appointed to a high position and didn't know the

15 name of a single town in Bosnia? Who was that?

16 A. I did not say that they did not know the name of a single town.

17 They did not know -- they were not familiar with towns. You have to know

18 a town in order to be familiar with the problems that are prevalent

19 there, and this person did not know about the problems that existed in

20 Sarajevo and yet was appointed to a high position in the Ministry of the

21 Interior. For instance, Dazdarevic, Hasib, if I'm not mistaken, was his

22 first name.

23 Q. Okay. But it was not a qualification, for example, to be hired

24 as reserve policeman in Novo Sarajevo, or in Centar, in a local SJB to be

25 from that area; right?

Page 23123

1 A. In order to become a reserve policemen in a SJB, one had to have

2 permanent residence in the city of Sarajevo, or, rather, whatever the

3 municipality was, where the reserve public security station operated.

4 Q. And how was that permanent residence established? Did you have

5 to have been living for there for five years before applying for a job,

6 or five weeks, or five days? What were the rules about that, if you

7 know.

8 A. In order to be registered as a permanent resident, you first had

9 to de-register from your previous place of residence. So that was the

10 first condition in order to be granted the residence in a certain place.

11 And then, once the address was registered, the local public security

12 stations ran some checks, whether this person is, indeed, residing at the

13 registered address.

14 And I'm sure that the files are still available and the names of

15 the personnel are known. I think it would be an easy job to check

16 whether those persons had de-registered from their original places of

17 residence in Serbia and Montenegro, in order to qualify as permanent

18 residents of Sarajevo, in order to qualify for an identity card issued in

19 Sarajevo.

20 Q. But you, yourself, have never looked at those documents and made

21 that check; right?

22 A. In the course of my operative work, and the same goes for my

23 immediate subordinates, inspectors who actually did the job, we received

24 information as to how people got the jobs. I'm not now talking about all

25 of the people, 100 per cent of them. And I would like to say that that I

Page 23124

1 said in the year of 1990 and 1991, there was this huge influx of people

2 from Sandzak who moved en masse to Sarajevo. The assessment in 1991 was

3 that we were talking about 30.000 people. And in that period, they

4 played the key part in elicit trade, trafficking, in other words --

5 Q. Please, please stop. My question was: Have you, yourself,

6 looked at those documents and made that check? You've answered my

7 question, as far as I can see. I don't need the further comment.

8 Now, it was a well-known problem about the -- I'll use the term

9 the loading of the reserve force throughout Bosnia in late 1991. As a

10 matter of fact, there was a commission established that included some

11 individuals from the federal SUP that came to investigate that situation.

12 Did you know about that commission and its work in late 1991?

13 A. I know that such a commission existed, but I don't know about the

14 tasks of the commission, and I had nothing to do with it, because my post

15 was too low.

16 Now, let me try and give you an explanation as to the question

17 how I actually know that someone --

18 Q. No. Please. Mr. Zecevic may direct -- raise that with you on

19 re-direct, but let me carry on because I have a time-limit. We'd like to

20 get you out of here this week.

21 Did you know that Mico Davidovic was a member of that commission?

22 A. No, I did not know that.

23 Q. And I take it you didn't attend any of the meetings where that

24 commission presented their findings to Mr. Delimustafic and Mr. Mandic

25 and others; right?

Page 23125

1 A. I was an employee of the Ministry of the Interior in the Sarajevo

2 SUP, not in the MUP headquarters. But I didn't even receive any

3 information to the effect that Mr. Davidovic was a member of the

4 commission.

5 Q. [Microphone not activated]

6 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

7 MR. HANNIS:

8 Q. I take it then the short answer would be no, you did not attend

9 any such meetings; right?

10 A. I did not.

11 Q. Nor read any written reports produced by members of that

12 commission; right?

13 A. No.

14 Q. Thank you.

15 MR. HANNIS: I note the time, Your Honours.

16 JUDGE HALL: Yes, so we take the break now, to return in

17 15 minutes.

18 [The witness stands down]

19 --- Recess taken at 12.29 p.m.

20 --- On resuming at 12.47 p.m.

21 [The witness takes the stand]

22 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.

23 Q. Mr. Macar, 55 more minutes. If you need to stop sooner, let us

24 know.

25 You mentioned in your testimony that in the summer of 1991 you

Page 23126

1 became aware that certain Muslims were being recommended or sent by the

2 SDA to Croatia for training by the Croatian MUP. Were you aware, in late

3 1991, early 1992, that certain Serbs were going for police-related

4 training outside of Bosnia, certain Bosnian Serbs? Did you know anything

5 like that?

6 A. Police training, I mean regular education, was carried out in

7 Belgrade, Skopje, and Zagreb. There were faculties and vocational

8 colleges for police forces, and up until that time, I was unaware of the

9 fact that any political party was sending the personnel, elected

10 according to their standards, to undergo training outside of Bosnia and

11 Herzegovina.

12 Q. Okay. Thank you.

13 MR. HANNIS: Could we show the witness Exhibit 1D135.

14 Q. Mr. Macar, this will be on your screen in a moment. And I

15 believe it's a document that you may have been shown before during the

16 OTP's interview with you. It relates to a meeting on the 11th of

17 February, 1992. This is tab 76 of the Prosecution's list.

18 And this is a meeting of certain Serb members of the BiH MUP. Do

19 you recall having been shown this document before?

20 A. This is a -- very inconvenient for me, the position -- the way

21 it's positioned.

22 Q. Is that better? That's just the first page. You see the list of

23 people attending?

24 A. I think one of the investigators had asked me whether I had

25 attended the meeting in Banja Luka at the previous meeting. And you can

Page 23127

1 see from this that I was not there.

2 Q. Yes. I see your name is not on the list, and I think you told

3 us -- you told that investigator at the time that you had not been at

4 this meeting.

5 Did you ever hear about it? Were you ever told about it by

6 anyone that there had been this meeting in February 1992 attended by

7 Mr. Mico Stanisic and Zupljanin and the others listed there? Did you

8 ever know about it?

9 A. No, not at the time.

10 Q. And you said "not at the time." Was there a time later when you

11 became aware of that? And I mean sometime before you were shown it by

12 the OTP investigator in 2005 or 2006, whenever that was. Did you become

13 aware of it sometime later in 1992?

14 A. No.

15 Q. Mr. Macar, maybe you and I can agree on one thing. Would you

16 agree with me that one of the -- one of the key contributors to the

17 breakup of the old MUP and, indeed, the breakup of old

18 Bosnia-Herzegovina, was the role of the nationalist political parties,

19 the SDA, the HDZ, and the SDS? Would you agree with that?

20 A. No, I would not agree where the argument that the existence of

21 nationalist parties per se resulted in the breakup. I would prefer to

22 say that some individuals from those nationalist parties did things that

23 led to the breakup of the former Yugoslavia itself, because the very fact

24 of their existence does not yield any results. There have to be

25 individuals who take certain action, probably as instructed by those who

Page 23128

1 controlled them.

2 Q. Okay. That's fair. I was trying to address it by phrasing my

3 question just talking about the role of those parties. But I take it

4 from your answer that we could agree that the actions of certain

5 individuals from each of those three nationalist political parties were a

6 key factor in the breakup.

7 Is that a fair statement?

8 A. If I can recall this correctly, and based on what I heard from

9 the media, the Serbian Democratic Party in Bosnia and Herzegovina took

10 action and agreed to take some action in the sphere of some negotiations

11 about the status of Bosnia and Herzegovina and former Yugoslavia itself,

12 and also negotiations about the internal structure of Bosnia and

13 Herzegovina.

14 I don't know that anyone from the SDS leadership - I'm now

15 talking based on the information that I got from the media, and we all

16 followed media very closely at the time -- that anyone took any action

17 that resulted in the situation that we witnessed in April and later on.

18 Q. Not aware of any actions by Mr. Karadzic, or Mr. Krajisnik, that

19 might have contributed to what followed; is that what you're saying?

20 A. I don't know that they took action that have led to the breakup

21 of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Based on what we could read in the media and what

22 I knew as a citizen and as a police officer, based on the conversations

23 with my colleagues and friends, I think that effort was made to continue

24 talks and negotiations, in order to avoid the worst possible outcome in

25 Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Page 23129

1 Q. Did you know about the activities of any SDS members in

2 connection with arming the Serbs - and I'm talking about not Serb

3 policemen but Serb civilians - before the breakup in early April 1992?

4 Did you know anything about that?

5 A. In the tasks within the purview of the city SUP, which I actually

6 did, the service did not receive any information that any of the Serbs

7 were arming the Serb citizenry on any basis whatsoever. And if my memory

8 serves me right, the Serbs still believed that there was the

9 Yugoslav People's Army as the regular armed force, and that the Ministry

10 of the Interior existed as a regular ministry, and that it continued

11 functioning as usual, despite the problems that were occurring by that

12 time. And my personal opinion was that this situation, within the

13 ministry, would be resolved, regardless of some anomalies that were

14 apparent.

15 Now as for the information that -- within the service, after all,

16 a Croat man was my superior, and if he had had any knowledge about the

17 Serbs being armed, he would have issued an order to me, because we were a

18 mixed group, to do something about it. We would have been ordered to do

19 something about it. There was a case where the city SUP took part in.

20 There was some report that weapons were stored in a house belonging to a

21 citizen in Pofalici, and there was a joint action by the relevant

22 stations, police stations in Sarajevo and the city SUP, and it turned out

23 that this was, in fact, false information. And a large police contingent

24 took part in this operation.

25 MR. HANNIS: Can we show the witness Exhibit P648. It's tab 65.

Page 23130

1 Q. Mr. Macar, I'll see if I have a hard copy for you.

2 Yes, with the usher's assistance, can I hand you a hard copy.

3 Sir, this a document dated the 20th of September, 1993. And it

4 comes from the then-chief of Ilidza SJB, Tihomir Glavas. Did you know

5 Mr. Glavas?

6 A. Yes, I do.

7 Q. And this document itself appears to be some sort of report on the

8 activities of Ilidza SJB from -- actually, from the beginning of 1991

9 through the end of 1992. And recommendations of certain individuals for

10 awards or decorations.

11 If you could turn to page 4 in the English, it's item number 1

12 for Tomislav Kovac. Yeah. I'm not sure what page that is for you, but

13 do you find the reference to Mr. Kovac? I think it --

14 A. Yes, at page 6.

15 Q. And you know Mr. Kovac. This is Mr. Kovac who later was the

16 assistant minister who was authorised to act for Mr. Stanisic, according

17 to you, in October 1992. It's the same guy we're talking about; right?

18 A. Yes. Mr. Kovac worked in the Ilidza station.

19 Q. And you'll see in this document, Mr. Glavas says about Mr. Kovac

20 that he made a special contribution to preparing the Serbian people for

21 defence, setting up the Serbian public security station, organising

22 illegal work, and arming the Serbian people?

23 You didn't know about that?

24 A. What period are we talking about?

25 Q. Well, before the split of the MUP in early April 1992. You

Page 23131

1 didn't know about that?

2 A. No, I did not know that Mr. Kovac was arming the Serb people.

3 Q. Okay. Thank you.

4 With Mr. Zecevic last week, on the 5th of July, you talked

5 about -- he asked you about some of the significant events in Sarajevo

6 shortly before the conflict actually started in April. And you mentioned

7 the murder of a wedding guest, and you mentioned the blockade of the

8 2nd Army headquarters on the 15th of March. But you didn't mention the

9 set-up of barricades all around Sarajevo immediately after that wedding

10 guest was murdered.

11 You remember that, though, right? That was a big deal in

12 Sarajevo, on the 3rd and 4th of March, 1992.

13 A. Yes, I remember this period when the roadblocks were set up in

14 Sarajevo.

15 Q. Did you know about the involvement of the SDS in the -- in some

16 of those barricades that were set up?

17 A. No, I was not a member of the SDS, and I don't know what role the

18 SDS played in the setting up of barricades. I know that in March there

19 was a great deal of tension in the city of Sarajevo. There was a great

20 deal of fear among the citizens. They feared for their own safety. And

21 according to the information that I have, the barricades in Sarajevo were

22 set up spontaneously, and now whether the SDS played any part in that, I

23 can't really say that. I can't give you an answer because I was not

24 familiar with what the SDS was doing.

25 Q. I understand. And I take it -- since the creation of the new

Page 23132

1 nationalist parties, have you ever been a member of any political party?

2 A. Up until 1987, I was a member of the League of Communists of

3 Yugoslavia. And at my own request, I stopped being a member of that

4 party. Until 2000, the year of 2000, I was not a member of any party.

5 Q. And in 2000, did you become a member of some party; if so, which

6 one?

7 A. The Party of Democratic Progress. Mladen Ivanic is the leader.

8 And last year, I decided that I don't want to be a member anymore.

9 Q. Okay. Thank you.

10 MR. HANNIS: If we could show the witness Exhibit P991.

11 Q. I don't have a hard copy of this one with me at the moment,

12 Mr. Macar, but let's first take a look at the first page. And maybe you

13 can tell me whether or not you have ever seen it, and that will maybe

14 shorten the exercise.

15 This is dated the 6th of March, 1992.

16 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, this is tab 77 on the Prosecution's

17 list.

18 Q. This is a report from the State Security Service in the

19 Ministry of the Interior of the then-joint MUP. Copies to the president

20 of the Presidency, to the assembly chairman, to the prime minister, the

21 deputy prime ministers, and to the president of the BH Presidency Council

22 for the preservation of constitutional order. And it is about the events

23 of 1, 2, 3, and 4 March in Sarajevo, relating in particular to the

24 barricades.

25 Did you ever see this document? I understand, given the level

Page 23133

1 that you were working with at the time and not being an addressee, it is

2 likely that you did not. But can you help us?

3 A. No. I haven't seen it, nor did I have any special contacts with

4 state security. Because from January or, actually, February 1992, it

5 became obvious that the leadership of state security at the level of the

6 Sarajevo centre, and especially at the ministry headquarters, was, in

7 fact, the extended arm of the SDA party. Most of them, anyway.

8 And you could tell from individual events and from some

9 information that the service received from public security station.

10 Q. Okay. Let's show you another one, and I'll ask you a similar

11 question. This is Exhibit P643. And this is tab 78 on the Prosecution's

12 list.

13 Mr. Macar, this is a -- this is another report relating to the

14 barricades. This one is dated the 13th of March, 1992. And, actually,

15 it is more focussed on the specific activities of certain MUP members.

16 Did you ever see this report before?

17 A. No, I haven't seen it before.

18 Q. Okay. Now, sir, have you followed on TV or in the media the

19 proceedings in this trial, in Mr. Mico Stanisic's trial?

20 A. Very little. I don't even know if there were any direct

21 transmissions. Only when the agency reported about this trial.

22 Q. You're currently leaving in Bijeljina; is that correct?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. We've had several former -- and maybe, I guess, some are still

25 employed with the police. But we have had several former RS MUP

Page 23134

1 personnel testify in this trial. And, I wonder, in the past year or two,

2 have you had any conversations with anybody that you know that testified

3 in this trial?

4 A. I don't think that I spoke to anybody about this trial. No, not

5 about this trial. I don't really remember I did.

6 Q. Okay. That would have been my next question. But, first, it was

7 just to establish if you'd spoken to anybody who testified at the trial.

8 Do you know some of the former RS MUP employees living in Bijeljina who

9 testified here? Mr. Vlaski? Do you know him?

10 A. Mr. Vlaski lives in Banja Luka.

11 Q. My mistake. Who lives in Bijeljina that used to work in the MUP,

12 the RS MUP in 1992, when you worked there? Can you name those people for

13 me.

14 A. Who lives in Bijeljina of the people I knew from the period when

15 I was with the MUP? Milorad Maric; and then there's Miroslav Maric,

16 that's a different person; then there's Goran Saric; Ranko Sugalo.

17 Q. Anyone else at your level, that is, at the level of assistant

18 minister or the head of an administration at MUP headquarters?

19 A. Milos Zuban. Rade Radovic. There are probably more, but ...

20 Q. Now, you mentioned that just before the breakup, at the very end

21 of March, you had a meeting in your office with your boss, Jozo Leutar.

22 Am I pronouncing his name correctly?

23 Do you recall having a meeting with him in your office in late

24 March 1992 where he told you about a split of the then-existing BiH MUP?

25 A. No, that was not in my office. Due to the complex security

Page 23135

1 situation in Sarajevo, the immediate supervisors who were subordinated to

2 Mr. Leutar used his office throughout March, and it was in his office

3 that we had a -- that meeting.

4 Q. Do you recall specifically when that meeting was? What day, what

5 month?

6 A. It was in late February [as interpreted] 1992. Perhaps on the

7 31st.

8 Q. Mr. Macar, when you testified about it last week, at page 22.838,

9 you initially said in late March 1991, and then you corrected yourself

10 and said you misspoke, it was 1992.

11 But you did say March. And now you are saying February. You

12 said February 31st, and we all know February only has usually 28 or 29

13 days.

14 So is it the 31st of March?

15 A. I did not say February. I said March. I do know that much. And

16 the year is 1992.

17 Q. Okay. I'm sorry, I'm only reading what comes out on the English

18 translation.

19 Now, you've seen the next document that I'm going to show you,

20 which is P353. Yes, it is on both the Prosecution and the Defence list.

21 I think tab 4 for us -- for the Defence, and tab 6 for the Prosecution.

22 This is a dispatch sent by Mr. Mandic, essentially announcing the

23 existence of the newly created Serbian MUP in the Serbian Republic of

24 Bosnia and Herzegovina. Did you see that at the time, on the 31st of

25 March, 1992?

Page 23136

1 A. As I have said already, this dispatch was sent to the secretary

2 of the Sarajevo SUP and is -- if my memory serves me well, Mr. Kijac was

3 the one. And he had regular meetings with his co-workers and his closest

4 co-worker was Mr. Leutar because he was the head of the crime enforcement

5 service. I don't know how long the meeting was. We were in Mr. Leutar's

6 office. I cannot be certain if it was on the 31st or on the 30th, or

7 maybe on the 1st of April, when I learned about the contents of the

8 dispatch. It was read out to us. There was a Mr. Nuic present and other

9 people, too, in Mr. Leutar's office.

10 Q. Now, even if you don't recall what day it was that you might have

11 seen it in Mr. Leutar's office, isn't it a fact that this was headline

12 news all over town in Sarajevo? It was in all the newspapers on that

13 day, or the very next day, wasn't it?

14 A. If the newspapers received the dispatch before the addressees,

15 then they would have published it, but I don't see how they could have.

16 We see that it says DD, and urgency, so that all the addressees would

17 have received it on the 31st of March, and the media were only in a

18 position to report about it later, after the 31st, which means in early

19 April. I don't believe that they were -- they had that information

20 before. At least I don't think that they could have published

21 information from this dispatch.

22 Q. Well, isn't it true that sometimes dispatches like this were sent

23 to the local media the very same day they were being sent out internally

24 within the MUP?

25 A. You'd have to ask the media people about that. And, yes, there

Page 23137

1 was leakage of information from the MUP, but whether this document leaked

2 through somebody in the MUP is something I don't know. Bearing in mind

3 that the MUP was already breaking up, it wouldn't surprise me to learn

4 that some -- somebody from the MUP, indeed, related the contents of

5 dispatch to the media.

6 Q. We'll look at some other dispatches in a little bit.

7 But I want to ask you whether it was the 31st of March, or the

8 1st of April, or the 3rd of April, I think you mentioned, when you

9 learned about the contents of this dispatch. It wasn't a surprise for

10 you, Mr. Macar, was it, because you had already heard about the creation

11 of the new Serbian MUP of the Serbian Republic of BiH on the 30th of

12 March, in Sokolac, when you saw Mr. Stanisic addressing those policemen

13 under Mr. Zoran Cvijetic; correct?

14 A. Yes, I was present in Sokolac. And as I've already said, I was

15 familiar with everything that happened at the stadium and the information

16 that was disclosed to me then. Just like Mr. Leutar, when he paraphrased

17 this dispatch that he had received and he told me that in Mostar the

18 technical preconditions were created and that they also had staff and

19 everything necessary for the functioning of the Croatian MUP of

20 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

21 Q. You mentioned at - what do we call it? - the parade of the police

22 in Sokolac, on the 30th, that Mr. Milorad Maric was also there. And tell

23 us again, he was the chief of Ilijas SJB at the time?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Was he from Sokolac, too?

Page 23138

1 A. He was standing where I was standing, too. And there were other

2 citizens. Yes, he was in Sokolac.

3 Q. I understand he was there. But my question was: Was he from

4 Sokolac, like you?

5 A. No, he wasn't. He was from Ilijas.

6 Q. Okay. Do you know how he happened to be in Sokolac on that day

7 for this parade? Did he have some advance notice of it?

8 A. There were members of the Ilijas SJB at that parade, too. To the

9 best of my recollection, there were also representatives of Pale,

10 Sokolac, and other municipalities.

11 Q. And by that, I take it you mean uniformed policemen who were

12 participating in the parade. Is that -- is that what you're saying?

13 A. Yes. There was a review of the uniformed police.

14 Q. Did you personally know any of these uniformed policemen from the

15 other SJBs, like Pale and Ilijas?

16 A. I knew Mr. Maric because he used to work at the Sarajevo Centar

17 SUP. I think he was assistant commander or deputy commander. And I held

18 a position there at one time, too. I knew Mr. Koroman, whom I had met in

19 a previous period concerning some events in Sarajevo.

20 Q. Okay. So Malko Koroman was there, too? I wasn't aware of that.

21 A. If I remember it correctly. I think I saw him in the video-clip,

22 but in order to be fully certain, I would have to see it again.

23 Q. Okay. I was thinking the same thing, that maybe we could show

24 you the video. But I will leave that for tomorrow when I have more time

25 to set up the video.

Page 23139

1 Now, tell me, how did you first become aware that this event was

2 going to be happening on that day? I think March 30th in 1992 was a

3 Monday. How did you find out about it?

4 A. I've already said that a few days before the 15th, that's when it

5 was I believe, that my late wife and I took our daughters to my parents

6 at Sokolac. One went to kindergarten, and the other went to primary

7 school, but neither kindergartens nor schools functioning anymore in

8 town, and the situation was bad.

9 My wife worked at the Ministry of Finance of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

10 We decided that we should take our children to my parents, and we were

11 carrying some clothes and stuff, and on one day when I was in Sokolac, we

12 learned the news that there would be this parade at the stadium in

13 Sokolac.

14 After this parade, like everybody else, including police

15 officers, I was interested. And I had the opportunity to speak to

16 Mr. Stanisic briefly. He explained to me that, pursuant to a decision

17 taken by the Assembly of the Serbian People and in accordance with the

18 Cutileiro Plan, this was done. And I was interested in the further

19 developments. In the framework of the ministries, in order to

20 co-ordinate work at the level of Bosnia-Herzegovina, steps would be taken

21 to overcome the blockade of the work of the MUP.

22 I can state with full responsibility that in early January, at

23 least in Sarajevo, the functioning of the entire ministry was --

24 Q. I'm sorry, Mr. Macar.

25 A. -- blocked.

Page 23140

1 Q. Please. Please. My question was: How did you find out about

2 it, and you're going a little beyond that.

3 Your answer was translated as, page 65, line 20:

4 "I've already said that a few days before the 15th ..."

5 Did you mean -- did they hear you and translate you correctly?

6 Did you mean before the 30th of March, rather than the 15th?

7 A. I explained that maybe a few days before the 15th of March, my

8 late wife and I took the children to Sokolac. And, on the last weekend

9 in March, when we were staying at my parents' house to visit our

10 children, I learned that at the stadium in Sokolac, it was a stadium or

11 pitch of the local sports club, there would be this police parade.

12 That's what I have just said.

13 Q. Okay. What I'm trying to find out is specifically how you found

14 out and when you found out.

15 Did you find out on the day before, on the 29th of March, or on

16 Saturday, the 28th? And who told you about it? Or did you read it

17 somewhere? How did you find out, and from whom, and when?

18 A. If my memory serves me well, I heard that news from

19 Mr. Zoran Cvijetic, whom I met in one of the restaurants at Sokolac. And

20 the restaurant is near the family-owned shop where I used to go rather

21 often to have coffee and meet some acquaintances from Sokolac.

22 Q. Thank you for that.

23 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, I would like to use the video with

24 this witness to cover a few more matters relating to this. I know we're

25 ten minutes early, but given he has had some physical discomfort today,