1 Thursday, 14 July 2011
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.21 p.m.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honours. This is case
6 IT-08-91-T, the Prosecutor versus Mico Stanisic and Stojan Zupljanin.
7 JUDGE HALL: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
8 Good afternoon to everyone. May we have the appearances today,
10 MR. HANNIS: Good afternoon, everyone. I'm Tom Hannis, along
11 with Crispian Smith for the Prosecution.
12 MR. ZECEVIC: Good afternoon, Your Honours. Slobodan Zecevic,
13 Slobodan Cvijetic, Eugene O'Sullivan, Ms. Tatjana Savic, and we are
14 joined with our interns, Amanda Gruenhagen and Fernando Dutra, all
15 appearing for Stanisic Defence this afternoon. Thank you very much.
16 MR. KRGOVIC: Good afternoon, Your Honours. Dragan Krgovic and
17 Aleksandar Aleksic, appearing for Zupljanin Defence.
18 JUDGE HALL: Thank you.
19 MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] Just a moment, I would like to
20 report that I am also present here. I'm always left out of the
22 JUDGE HALL: Thank you, Mr. Cvijetic.
23 Before the usher escorts the witness back to the stand,
24 Mr. Hannis, the -- when we were calculating the time that this witness --
25 that would be needed to complete this witness's testimony, as is the
1 usual practice, the calling party having indicated 20 hours, the like
2 amount of time was anticipated by the Prosecution. The -- in fact,
3 Mr. Zecevic spent 12 hours, and is there any reason why the Chamber
4 should be thinking in terms of your spending a greater amount of time
5 than that in your current examination of cross-examination?
6 MR. HANNIS: Well, Your Honours, in that 12 hours, the witness
7 covered a lot of territory. I think during the Prosecution's case
8 in-chief there were a number of times where cross-examination exceeded
9 the time in direct. I -- I personally find I'm having some difficulty in
10 getting short answers to questions, so it is taking me longer than I
12 Also, a number of the answers, as you've seen, I have been adding
13 documents almost daily and that's in part because of --
14 JUDGE HALL: [Microphone not activated]... one of the reasons
15 that prompted our question.
16 MR. HANNIS: Yes. It is because I get an answer to a question
17 which opens the door that I feel I need to address. It -- when I'm
18 expecting the answer to be perhaps, I don't know, I get an answer that, I
19 do know because of X, Y, and Z. And then I find myself in the position
20 that I feel I need to go and find a document that addresses X, Y, and Z.
21 This is the last Defence witness. In some ways, in my personal
22 view, he is more of an expert on police matters than the designated
23 police expert was, and I think the time -- the extra time that I'm asking
24 to have with this witness will be well-spent and useful to Your Honours
25 in making your final assessment in this case.
1 JUDGE HALL: So where -- where do you project -- how much longer
2 do you project your cross-examination to be, Mr. Hannis?
3 MR. HANNIS: Well, Your Honours, I was informed that I think I've
4 spent 8 hours and 9 minutes up to this point in time. And judging by the
5 page number I'm on and the page number I have to go to in my notes, I'm a
6 little less than halfway, so I projected that I would need another 10 or
7 12 hours, which would take us into Monday.
8 JUDGE HALL: Thank you. This is a matter to which we may have to
9 return, but thank you, Mr. Hannis.
10 Could the usher please escort the witness back to the stand.
11 [Trial Chamber confers]
12 [The witness takes the stand]
13 JUDGE HALL: Good afternoon to you, Mr. Macar. I remind you
14 you're still on your oath.
15 WITNESS: GORAN MACAR [Resumed]
16 [Witness answered through interpreter]
17 JUDGE HALL: Yes, Mr. Hannis.
18 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour.
19 Cross-examination by Mr. Hannis: [Continued]
20 Q. Mr. Macar, yesterday near the end of the day, I asked you about
21 RS Assembly sessions you attended in 1992. I think we established that
22 you may have attended only one, that being in December.
23 But other than yourself, do you know what MUP, RS MUP personnel,
24 attended Assembly sessions in 1992? And I mean apart from
25 Minister Stanisic, who is reflected in -- in one or two of the Assembly
1 sessions as having been present and spoken. But anyone else in the RS
2 MUP who attended Assembly sessions in 1992?
3 A. I don't recall whether there were any other representative
4 presents -- well, that depended on the topic discussed. When crime was
5 discussed, I was there. And the operational and counter-sabotage
6 section, parts of the administration and the relevant centres and public
7 security stations were represented. Now, as for which other senior
8 officers from the MUP headquarters were present there, I don't really
9 know. I can't recall.
10 Q. All right. Thank you. The last document I think we looked at
11 yesterday was the one signed by Mr. Trbojevic over the typewritten name
12 of Mr. Djeric, addressed to Mr. Kljajic about investigations related to
13 the vehicles from TAS, the car factory in Vogosca.
14 My question for you today is: Did you never hear it mentioned in
15 1992 that Momcilo Mandic and/or Dusko Malovic and some of his men from
16 the special police platoon were involved in taking cars from TAS?
17 A. In the operational materials, I don't think that any mention was
18 made of Mr. Mandic and Mr. Malovic. And now whether there was any
19 speculation in the public or in some circles, it's possible, but I don't
20 know about that.
21 Q. And in the operational material, as far as what was happening to
22 the cars that were being taken from there, did you have information that
23 many of them were being taken to Serbia and sold?
24 A. Yes, some of the cars were sold in Serbia. I already said that
25 in my evidence. And this prompted us to contact the Serbian MUP, seeking
1 assistance from them. We wanted to give them the data about the number
2 of vehicles that we had gathered until that time, and all the other
3 details so that they could take appropriate measures to identify any such
4 vehicles that may have been registered in the meantime in the territory
5 of Serbia.
6 Q. Okay. And did you receive information that -- that some of the
7 cars from TAS that had been sold in Serbia, the proceeds from such sales
8 were being used to buy equipment for the RS MUP?
9 A. I know that some stations received approval from the
10 Crisis Staffs to sell a certain number of vehicles in order to obtain, to
11 procure equipment. Some of it went to the MUP; some perhaps to the
12 municipality; and maybe even to the army. But there were such cases.
13 Q. But did know about cases where -- where MUP headquarters and/or
14 the special police, under Mr. Karisik had permission to take cars from
15 TAS and sell them in Serbia?
16 A. I don't know that Mr. Karisik, who was commander of the special
17 police brigade, had permission to sell cars in Serbia.
18 Q. Or anyone else in the MUP headquarters?
19 A. I don't know. And it was not usual practice for anyone from the
20 MUP headquarters to sell cars.
21 Q. Last week, at page 22927, regarding the problem with the stolen
22 cars, you said that one of the ideas proposed by the minister of the
23 interior was to "relocate the vehicles to a safe territory" and put under
24 the jurisdiction of the commodity reserves administration of
25 Republika Srpska.
1 Can you tell us some details about when and where and how this
2 idea was proposed by the minister?
3 A. When the first information came in that in the Vogosca
4 municipality in the TAS factory compound there was a large number of
5 already-assembled vehicles, Golf cars, and that people started taking
6 those vehicles away on various grounds. And that the factory was in a
7 combat zone. The minister's associates made this proposal, and the
8 conclusion reached by the minister and his associates was that, in a
9 combat zone, it would be difficult to provide appropriate, physical
10 security for those vehicles in the whole compound where the vehicles were
11 located. And as far as I can recall, a small military unit secured the
12 TAS factory in April and May, but they did not have enough personnel.
13 Q. I'm sorry --
14 A. And the minister proposed --
15 Q. Okay. I wanted to stop you there because you're telling me the
16 why, but my question was: When and where and how was this proposal made?
17 Could you please answer those questions for me.
18 A. Well, I really tried, and I do apologise for being too extensive.
19 I tried to give you an explanation --
20 Q. I understand that --
21 A. -- why --
22 Q. -- but I was just asking, when, where, and how. Can you answer
23 those first?
24 A. How: Based on the reported that we received, the minister and
25 his associates concluded that a proposal be made to the government, to
1 relocate the vehicles to a safer area and to place them under the control
2 of the relevant state authorities who were able to perform this task and
3 do it in accordance with the law.
4 Q. Okay. You've answered how and to whom. Can you tell me when
5 this proposal was made and where it was made? Was it made orally; was it
6 made in writing?
7 A. I think it was May, and the minister -- well, I don't remember
8 any written documents, although there had been an extensive
9 correspondence about the TAS case, but the minister was able to present
10 to the government at the session of the government, or to the prime
11 minister, this proposal. So he could do it orally or in writing.
12 Because that's the way the communication goes.
13 Q. Okay. So, as far as you know, there's no written proposal
14 reflecting this; right? You've not seen such a document.
15 A. Well, there was no need for any kind of written document because
16 it could have been done orally. An oral proposal could be made at the
17 session of the government or proposed to the prime minister and there was
18 no need to have paperwork. You could just say that there is a great
19 value in those cars, and this had to be relocated in order to safe-guard
21 This was the general position of the ministry, not only when it
22 came to the TAS factory, but for all the depots or warehouses where
23 valuable goods were stored, and it was impossible, because of the war and
24 lack of personnel, to secure them properly.
25 MR. HANNIS: If we could have a look at Exhibit 1D93. This was
1 Defence tab 44.
2 Q. Mr. Macar, you will see this is a document dated 29 July 1992
3 from you to the chiefs of several SJBs, the administration for financial
4 affairs, the special purposes police detachment CSB at Sarajevo, and the
5 minister himself for information.
6 Do you remember sending this document out in connection with the
7 TAS investigation?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. And if you could look at the bottom -- or the last
10 paragraph above your signature. It's page 2 of the English, and in
11 e-court, page 2 of the B/C/S as well.
12 My last paragraph translation reads:
13 "Report on vehicles sold by the SJB and special police detachment
14 in order to acquire materiel and technical equipment and the like."
15 That suggests to me that you were already aware in late July 1992
16 that the special police had sold certain Golf vehicles -- or certain
17 vehicles from TAS. That's correct, isn't it?
18 A. No.
19 Q. Then --
20 A. But I can give you an explanation.
21 Q. Well, yes, that's my question then. If you didn't have that
22 information, why are you asking the question about reporting on vehicles
23 sold by them?
24 A. This part of the document was phrased in this way because there
25 were some reports regarding -- from some of the SJBs. And since there
1 were some speculations that the ministry was involved in all this, to the
2 effect that the ministry itself had stolen the vehicles and disposed of
3 them, and the purpose of those speculations, of course, was entirely
4 different. We demanded that all public security stations and the police
5 detachment whose elements were deployed in the Sarajevo area to check
6 whether they had sold any such vehicles, and if yes, to provide this kind
7 of information. So this went for all the SJBs, although we did have some
8 information already for some of the public security stations, such as
10 Q. Okay. And in an answer you gave last week, you said:
11 "This operation continued for a number of years."
12 When was it finally completed, if ever?
13 A. Well, since this was active, I'm sure that in 1997
14 [as interpreted], there were some cases where vehicles were found in
15 Montenegro or Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina. The information was coming in,
16 and in those isolated cases -- well, the search for those vehicles was
17 ongoing. It was still active. And if any information came in,
18 indicating that there was such a case, checks were always run. This was
19 not something that demanded the entire ministry and the centres to be
20 involved because people who are operatives, they only do this kind of
21 work and nothing else. So if a -- two such vehicles are identified
22 somewhere, checks were run to see how the vehicles were obtained, and it
23 is enough for a single inspector to do it. They can do it in a very
24 short time.
25 Q. In the course of the investigation, how many RS MUP personnel
1 were ever implicated and/or charged in connection with the taking of
2 vehicles from TAS?
3 A. After 19 years, I really can't tell you how many. But there were
4 quite a few.
5 Q. Do you recall any of them being from the special police? Either
6 Mr. Karisik's special police or Mr. Malovic's special police platoon.
7 A. As regards the special unit, well, I don't really recall. I
8 don't know what you mean when you say, "Mr. Malovic's special police
10 I don't recall that anyone from that group had ever been accused
11 of this. I really don't recall because there were so many people working
12 in the ministry. I can't really say. But it was determined that they
13 were selling those cars. Some of them were identified, and criminal
14 reports were filed against them. But now I can't really tell you whether
15 somebody from the Sekovici SJB or this organisational unit or that.
16 Nineteen years have passed, after all. I would have to look at some
17 documents and then -- to jog my memory. I think that very few people
18 would be able to recall those details after 19 years.
19 Q. Well, you are the guy who could remember receiving 31 dispatches
20 in 1992. So I thought you might remember if there was anybody from the
21 special police who was implicated in this.
22 You mentioned nobody from Malovic but you didn't specifically
23 answer my question about Mr. Karisik's special police. Anyone from that
24 unit implicated, or charged, or disciplined?
25 A. I think that I've already responded to that question. Given the
1 time-lapse, I really can't say who it was and from which organisational
2 unit, because there were so many employees. I can really say whether it
3 was from Vlasenica, Sekovici. After 19 years, it is absurd to even think
4 that I could remember.
5 And as regards the dispatches, the number of dispatches,
6 Your Honours, many bad things which were a professional disgrace. I had
7 records from April 1992 to 1999 containing 30 or 31 dispatches, and this
8 is something that really left a bad taste in my mouth, and it's still
9 going on.
10 Q. Okay. I want to ask you specifically about someone else.
11 Malko Koroman. Did you ever have any information that he or any of his
12 employees were involved in taking vehicles from TAS factory?
13 A. When it comes to aggravated theft, stealing cars from the TAS
14 compound, and as for Malko and somebody else from that police station
15 going to steal vehicles, I had no information to that effect.
16 Q. Did you not have some information that some Golf vehicles were
17 seized from Mr. Koroman and a couple of his colleagues by the
18 Yellow Wasps at that check-point in Zvornik? You didn't see that
19 information that came out during the interviews of the arrested
20 Yellow Wasps in early August 1992?
21 A. When it comes to the Pale station and the Yellow Wasps, yes,
22 I'm -- I know that the Pale station gave a certain amount of weapons to
23 the members of the Yellow Wasps group. Based on the information
24 collected by us from SJBs, and this fell in the jurisdiction of the
25 Bijeljina police station to whom we provided assistance, we who worked in
1 the administration, there were five or six Golf vehicles that they seized
2 at the check-point, manned by Yellow Wasps, as military police. There
3 were additional two vehicles who had been seized, but I think that
4 members of that unit actually took them to Serbia. I remember that
5 because that was the first Golf model that was a four-wheel drive. On
6 that occasion, we identified five or six vehicles that had been seized by
7 the Yellow Wasps.
8 When working with that unit, I don't think we ever came across
9 any documents indicating from whom the Golf vehicles had been seized.
10 The Golf vehicles that we found with them were without licence plates,
11 and we were able to establish their origin based on the numbers in the
12 engine. And we thus established that those vehicles came from the TAS
13 factory and that they had been seized from the TAS compound.
14 Q. You don't recall seeing in the statements any of the
15 Yellow Wasps that they had, indeed, originally seized some cars from
16 Mr. Koroman and his colleagues but then, after discussions, returned, at
17 least a couple of them, which is why Mr. Koroman was willing to provide
18 those men with weapons when they came to Pale later.
19 You don't remember seeing that in the statements, the interviews
21 A. As for them seizing vehicles from Mr. Koroman, I can't remember
22 that after all this time. A number of statements had been taken, over
23 80. But what I remember are the weapons provided by the Pale station and
24 given to some members of that unit.
25 There were 80, perhaps even 100 statements taken, together with
2 Q. I understand there were several statements taken. But you, as
3 the policeman in the crime administration, certainly would have been
4 interested in the information that a chief of a SJB was giving weapons to
5 non-policemen. Wouldn't that -- wouldn't the mere distribution of
6 weapons to someone who is not in the police by Mr. Koroman have been a
7 violation of the Law on Internal Affairs or some police regulation?
8 A. As for your previous question, let me tell you, I never took any
9 statements personally. It's just that inspectors told me about it in
10 meetings. And as soon we learned that Mr. Koroman had given some weapons
11 to somebody in the Yellow Wasps, we conveyed that information. We did
12 not conceal it. We naturally informed the head of the public security
13 department, who, at the time, was in Bijeljina, and even in the reports
14 we submitted, both in the beginning, upon learning about this, and at the
15 end, we included this. And it was the head of the public security
16 department who, in his line of work -- who was in charge of organising
17 further investigation concerning those weapons, and I believe that he, in
18 fact, did it, via the Sarajevo centre.
19 Q. As a matter of fact, Mr. Koroman never got disciplined, or
20 removed from the MUP, or criminally prosecuted for that activity, did he?
21 A. What I remember is that the minister tried to remove Mr. Koroman
22 from office in 1992.
23 Q. Yes. And that was in April 1992; right?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Months before this event. Did he try to remove him after
1 August 1992?
2 A. I don't know. Because once I learned about this event, I
3 contacted Mr. Cedo Kljajic, who was head of the public security
4 department, and he was my immediate superior and was in Bijeljina at the
6 If I may add just one sentence. Disciplinary proceedings cannot
7 be instituted based on only one piece of information. Additional checks
8 need to be carried out in order to institute either disciplinary
9 proceedings or criminal proceedings.
10 Q. Okay. We saw earlier when you testified your role in a
11 commission to investigate certain activities by Mr. Kljajic and
12 Dragan Andan in Bijeljina, in connection with matters that eventually led
13 to disciplinary action at least against Mr. Andan. Was there any
14 commission formed to investigate Mr. Koroman that you know of?
15 A. As you know, I spent August in Bijeljina. Perhaps even early
16 September. And then there was a move to Pale and back to Bijeljina.
17 I apologise. If I could have some water, please.
18 Therefore, I cannot say with certainty whether the CSB or the
19 head of the public security department did anything, whether he ordered
20 the CSB to carry out some measures because the CSB had jurisdiction over
21 the SJB and whether he asked for proceedings, be it disciplinary or
22 criminal, to be instituted against [Realtime transcript read in error
23 "by"] Mr. Koroman.
24 Let me just correct something that you have mentioned. When it
25 comes to Mr. Dragan Andan and Mr. Cedo Kljajic, perhaps I didn't explain
1 that enough. But concerning the disciplinary proceedings against
2 Mr. Andan, pursuant on the information that came from some figures in
3 Bijeljina, we learned that Mr. Andan used a piece of equipment - I think
4 it was a poker machine - in a house. And since it already leaked through
5 the media, and there was a member of the ministry who had come to
6 Bijeljina to improve the law and order that had been disrupted, so the
7 minister instructed that checks be made concerning this poker machine.
8 Based on what we learned, it seems that the rules of procedure were not
9 complied with, based on the rules in the ministry that regulate the
10 operations. I absolutely do not doubt the honest intentions of
11 Mr. Andan, but when means of that nature are used, there has to be a
12 certain criminal procedure followed, explaining why things are done in a
13 certain way. This is according to the rules that exist within the
15 The mere fact that somebody --
16 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Hannis, first of all, how much longer are you
17 going to pursue this matter of the TAS cars? And, secondly, I think you
18 should keep your witness focussed.
19 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, I wasn't talking about the TAS cars
20 anymore. Now I was talking about the failure to discipline Mr. Koroman.
21 But I take your point. I will try and get him to limit his answers as
22 best he can.
23 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry. Sorry, Mr. Hannis. I just have one
24 intervention in the transcript. 14:22, he says here, "... be it
25 disciplinary or criminal, to be instituted by Mr. Koroman." I think
1 "against Mr. Koroman" would be -- was the answer. I know that is what
2 the witness said. He said "against Mr. Koroman," not "by Mr. Koroman."
3 MR. HANNIS: That makes sense to me.
4 Q. But, Mr. Macar, as a professional policeman with many years of
5 experience, would you agree with me that there seems to be some
6 disproportionate treatment here? Mr. Andan was disciplined for some
7 technical misuse of a poker machine, for which the evidence shows he had
8 authorisation from Mr. Kljajic to use in some sort of undercover
9 investigation; whereas, Mr. Koroman, who, at the minimum, was giving
10 weapons, and I think the weapons are listed in a document we have,
11 including automatic weapons; I think at least one hand-held
12 rocket-launcher. And nothing happened to him.
13 Would you agree that seems disproportionate?
14 A. I can tell you only about the events that I took part in, and
15 those are the checks made concerning Mr. Andan. Since the head of the
16 administration is not authorised to institute disciplinary proceedings
17 and, in addition to that, I was also a co-ordinator, then what the head
18 of the public security department did in relation to the SCB that has --
19 SCB -- CSB that has jurisdiction over SJB, I really don't know, because
20 the crime administration is not authorised to institute disciplinary
21 proceedings against chiefs of SJBs.
22 Q. I'm not sure you -- you understood me question. It just -- I'm
23 asking your opinion as a professional policeman whether it's a more
24 serious matter for a SJB chief to give weapons to unauthorised personnel,
25 particularly unauthorised personnel like the Yellow Wasps, who were known
1 to have been engaged in illegal activity, as opposed to a policeman who
2 fails to properly use a poker machine that he has been authorised to use
3 for an undercover investigation.
4 Can you answer that question? Doesn't the first one seem to be a
5 more serious violation?
6 A. If Mr. Koroman did provide weapons at the time when the public
7 security department had information incriminating members of
8 Yellow Wasps, then that is certainly a more serious violation.
9 Q. Thank you, sir. I want to move to Exhibit 1D58. This was
10 Defence tab 36.
11 Did you find that one?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. This is an order from the minister which says:
14 "Proceeding from conclusions reached at the meeting of executive
15 employees ... on 11 July ... the meeting of the collegiate body on
16 23 July and the minister's act 01-57 ... as well as other conclusions,"
17 he orders legal measures to be taken against all MUP members who have
18 committed crimes and that they should be dismissed.
19 I'm curious. There's a reference to a collegium meeting on the
20 23rd of July which is not a meeting for which we have a document. But do
21 you recall attending that meeting? I believe, based on other evidence
22 we've heard in the case, this is probably the last one that
23 Mr. Planojevic attended as head of the crime administration. It was
24 about 12 days after the Belgrade meeting.
25 Do you remember a collegium that you would have attended on the
1 23rd of July?
2 A. You said -- you asked something about Mr. Planojevic and then you
3 asked me about whether I remembered the collegium that I attended. I
4 can't really tell you whether I attended it or not. I need to see the
5 agenda. Until I see the minutes from the session, it's hard for me to
6 say what transpired there.
7 Q. I don't know either because I don't have the document.
8 But, do you recall, were you in attendance at the meeting when
9 Mr. Planojevic last was in his position as the head of the crime
11 I don't know if you were at the meeting because, I think,
12 Mr. Stanisic already knew at that time that Planojevic was leaving, and
13 so I wondered if you, perhaps, were invited to the meeting because it was
14 envisioned that you would be taking over?
15 A. It is quite possible that I attended the meeting, but I would
16 like to see the minutes, just to see what topics were covered, because
17 that would trigger my memory. All minutes indicate who attended the
19 As for the order, I am familiar with these matters because at
20 least a dozen times these matters were discussed, be it in short meetings
21 with the minister, or just in passing, or within administrations, and
22 with colleagues. These were constant topics that we discussed, and there
23 were a number of documents sent out on these matters.
24 MR. HANNIS: Perhaps, Your Honours, this is an appropriate time
25 for our first break.
1 JUDGE HALL: Very well. We reconvene in 15 minutes.
2 [The witness stands down]
3 --- Recess taken at 3.14 p.m.
4 --- On resuming at 3.36 p.m.
5 MR. HANNIS: While the witness is coming in, Your Honours, I
6 wondered if you might give me some guidance about how much time you will
7 allow me, because if I --
8 JUDGE HALL: We intend to respond to that, but we'll do it when
9 the witness is present so the witness would have an understanding as to
10 how much longer he will be with us.
11 MR. HANNIS: Okay. Thank you.
12 [The witness takes the stand]
13 JUDGE HALL: Before you continue, Mr. Hannis, and we are saying
14 this so that the witness can be aware of this as well, the -- returning
15 to the matter that was raised at the beginning of today's sitting, in
16 terms of the length of time that you anticipate your cross-examination
17 would take, we have considered what you indicated to us, and we have
18 determined that we expect that you should complete your cross-examination
19 in the course of Monday so that Mr. Zecevic can be begin his
20 re-examination of the witness on Monday, and the witness would, by
21 everything being considered, be away and released on Tuesday.
22 MR. HANNIS: Thank you very much for that, Your Honour.
23 Q. Mr. Macar, yesterday, we touched briefly upon the time-period in
24 the early August 1992, when I suggested to you that there was quite a bit
25 of media activity relating to the existence and the conditions in -- in
1 camps, or collection centres, or detention facilities, whatever name you
2 may prefer, in Manjaca and Omarska. And I want to show you a document
3 that I think followed closely on that event.
4 MR. HANNIS: It's Exhibit P192. This is at Prosecution tab 86.
5 Q. I have the hard copy, if the usher would assist me in handing it
6 to you. It's only two pages, but it may be easier to work with.
7 It's dated the 8th of August, 1992, and I will tell you that
8 that's -- that's one day after public announcement by Mr. Djeric, the
9 prime minister, reacting to a CNN report about Omarska and Manjaca.
10 MR. HANNIS: And, Your Honours, for the record, that is
11 Exhibit P179.23.
12 Q. On the back page, you will see this comes from Tomo Kovac. You
13 know who he is and was at the time. I believe this was at the very first
14 day or two that he was in his new position as the assistant minister for
15 police duties and tasks.
16 Do you recall when he started in that job? Did you see him that
17 day? Or were you still working on the Yellow Wasps case on the 8th of
19 A. I don't know that Mr. Kovac worked on the Yellow Wasps case.
20 Now we're talking about Bijeljina, right, at the time when I was
21 there. Now, as to when he was appointed assistant minister, whether it
22 was in the middle of that year, I can't really tell you the date.
23 Q. I think we have another document on that in -- in evidence. But
24 we can see that apparently by the 8th of August, he is in that position
25 because that's the title we see by his name on the back page; right?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Thank you. Have you seen this document before?
3 A. No.
4 Q. Okay. You see in the first paragraph he is talking about a way,
5 perhaps, to solve problems related to the keeping of members of other
6 ethnicities in the facilities and collection centres located in war
7 zones. And he is proposing that the status of these people be legally
9 Do you -- do you know what he meant about that? What was their
10 status before the 8th of August?
11 A. I can't speculate as to what he thought. I can assume that
12 perhaps something was not really proper, whether it was improper in terms
13 of procedure or documents, I can't really speculate, because I did not
14 see any of the materials and I did not take part in the drafting of the
15 materials, so I did not take part in it at all.
16 Q. Okay let me read part of the next paragraph and ask you a
17 question related to that. It says:
18 "The basic problem in the field is that not all the responsible
19 bodies are advised in the procedure of receiving such persons and their
20 further treatment, so there are cases when members of the Ministry of the
21 Interior receive, and sometimes even participate in the actual capture of
22 persons in areas of combat activities, and then continue to organise
23 their accommodation and living conditions, the period of detention and
24 their entire fate."
25 Now, to me, it seems like he is suggesting that part of the
1 problem is that some of these people who are taken in, in areas where
2 combat activities are going, are being detained under circumstances where
3 perhaps they ought not to be detained because there's no evidence they've
4 participated in a crime. They appear to be civilians. And they're being
5 detained for more than three days without any criminal charges being
6 filed. All those would be contrary to the established procedures of the
7 Ministry of Internal Affairs; right?
8 A. I would need this more closely. So if I may be allowed to do
10 Q. Sure, take your time.
11 A. As far as I can see, it says here "cases in which personnel of
12 the Ministry of the Interior accept, or receive ...," and it doesn't say
13 here from whom they receive, "and sometimes even take part in the actual
14 capture of persons in areas of combat activities ..."
15 I can't now speculate whether there were some combat operations
16 in the immediate vicinity of which, or in the location where they went
17 on, whether there were any other persons, or whether captured soldiers
18 were there, I can't really read this from here.
19 And then it goes on to say and they organised their accommodation
20 and living conditions ...
21 I did not know that police in Republika Srpska had sites,
22 facilities to which they brought prisoners or civilians who were in the
23 combat zones and whether they were held there as perpetrators of crimes,
24 because that might be an explanation. If they committed crimes, then we
25 can talk about some kind of a legal basis, the -- which is the provision
1 that they may be kept in custody for up to three days.
2 Q. If you'll go on to the next paragraph you see Mr. Kovac says that
3 he believed part of the problem is there are insufficient categorisation
4 of people in these facilities and reception centres. And he talks about
5 three categories: Prisoners of war, who are entitled to certain kinds of
6 treatment under the Geneva Conventions; persons who committed crimes;
7 and, third, the civilian population.
8 Do you see that?
9 A. Yes, I can see it. And I would like to see the information based
10 on which Mr. Kovac received the data. What kind of persons were actually
11 detained in those collection centres.
12 Q. I'd like to ask him that, too.
13 The -- the next paragraph -- the second paragraph following -- if
14 you go to the second page for you, I think it starts at the top of the
15 back page. It says:
16 "The civilian population, despite belonging to another ethnic
17 group whose extremists are at war with the Serbian Republic of BH can
18 only be considered refugees under somewhat stricter control of the
19 Serbian Ministry of the Interior."
20 And it talks about accommodation of some of these persons being
21 carried out by charitable organisations and certain local authorities.
22 But if you could go to the next-to-the-last paragraph, then he says, "I
23 am presenting this problem in this way because" -- and this is page 2 of
24 the English:
25 "Because the international institutions will not accept any other
1 treatment of members of other ethnic groups, regardless of the situation
2 our people face under the rule of Muslim and Croatian authorities."
3 So, sounds like, he is concerned about the fact that Serbs being
4 held prisoners by the Muslims and Croats are not being treated the way
5 civilians should be treated. But, nevertheless, he feels that in the RS,
6 civilians, even though they may be members of an ethnic group who is at
7 war with the Republika Srpska, need to be treated in a way that the
8 international institutions will accept.
9 Do you disagree with that?
10 A. Well, just as my assessments sometimes are too broad, this one is
11 too. I would like to go back to what is written here.
12 The problem is presented in this manner, it says here, because
13 the international institutions will not accept any other kind of
14 treatment of people from other ethnic communities, so we're not talking
15 about prisoners or civilians who were in collection centres. And further
16 up in the text that you quoted, Mr. Kovac states that the control of the
17 Serbian ministry should be stepped up. I think that this is a reference
18 to the need to ensure the safety of the sites where civilians were.
19 So I would like to see what this report is based on, what this
20 document is based on, although I can't see anything in this text which
21 would indicate that the police, at least in most of this text except for
22 the first part, the way that the police treated those people. And even
23 in that part of the text, the operation of the public security station
24 that were under increased influence of the Crisis Staffs which, in fact,
25 perhaps I could go as far as saying that they controlled them.
1 Q. I'm sorry --
2 A. And I believe that --
3 Q. You -- I have to stop you because I have limited time and you've
4 gone beyond my question which simply was: Do you disagree with that?
5 And I take it you do disagree.
6 Let me ask you though, do you recall looking at the minutes from
7 the 11th of July meeting in Belgrade of the MUP senior staff. And I
8 showed you the portion where Mr. Zupljanin was talking about the problem
9 of the army and the Crisis Staffs wanting to bring in as many Muslims as
10 possible and putting them in these undefined camps, many times in bad
11 living conditions. Don't you think that's part of what Mr. Kovac is
12 talking about here, the situation where the army and the Crisis Staffs
13 are rounding up as many non-Serbs as possible and sticking them in camps
14 and sometimes leaving the police with the dirty work of guarding those
15 people, being held in the camps till they were either exchanged or
16 allowed to move out, in some fashion?
17 A. Well, I wouldn't say this is a leading question.
18 Perhaps the report, and perhaps some other reports were used by
19 Mr. Kovac. Now whether the minutes -- I can't really speculate on his
21 Q. Okay. Thank you. Let me show you something different. This is
22 1D59. It's Defence tab 37. I think that's in your binder.
23 This is a document dated the 23rd -- or, I'm sorry, the 24th of
24 July, 1992. It's over the typed name of Mico Stanisic. But I think you
25 told us this is actually your signature for Minister Stanisic; right?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And can you tell us how you were given authority to sign for him?
3 Was that in writing, or was that orally?
4 A. Orally, on the spot, in the building where we were. And let me
5 address the Honourable Trial Chamber because we always have to go back to
6 the 29, 31. You can see on the 24th of July the log number is 11. So in
7 July, you have number 11, from the crime enforcement service or section
8 log-book. Because now we can go back to this old story about 29 or 31
10 Q. Thank you. And how often did you -- or were you authorised to
11 sign for the minister in 1992? Was this the only time that you did it?
12 A. Yes. But one, two, or three, I can't really recall. I do
13 remember this particular case. So if you're asking me about a number,
14 not many. And in practice, the minister would issue such documents. We
15 did not have technical capabilities. The minister did not have his
16 associates and his whole office to order them what to type and then to
17 sign it. He would use those administration heads who were present, and
18 that's why you have among the signatories the gentleman from the analysis
19 section and so on, whoever was present at the time. Whoever was in a
20 meeting with the minister at the time.
21 Q. Okay. Going back to the number of 31, when you gave that answer
22 as -- I'll check the transcript if you disagree, but I understood what
23 you had said about the number 31 was 31 was the number of dispatches that
24 you received in the crime administration in 1992. But now, you are
25 talking about it as though 31 is the number that you sent out from your
1 administration. Which is it? Is it those that you sent out or those
2 that were received?
3 A. Both documents that were sent and received. Not only the
4 dispatches but also reports in writing so the total number is between 29
5 and 31. That covers all the documents. Documents that came in, because,
6 at that time, whoever was this charge entered everything in the same
7 log-book, in the same protocol. The things that came in, and those that
8 were sent out.
9 Q. All right. Well, then you're saying, in 1992, a total number of
10 dispatches, both incoming and outgoing, added up together, those that
11 relate to your crime administration, totals 31, or 29 to 31; is that
13 A. From April to October. Not just dispatches. I'm referring to
14 all the written documents that came in and out -- and went out. And
15 there are records in the crime police administration concerning this.
16 There are records to this day.
17 Q. Well, before -- I think a couple of times when you talked about
18 this, you were saying for 1992. Now you're [indiscernible] it to
20 MR. ZECEVIC: No, no, I'm sorry. Mr. Hannis, I can give you the
21 reference where the witness said -- and it was actually your question
22 yesterday when the witness explained that how he knows that is from the
23 notebook that they needed to renew once they came into the -- into
24 Bijeljina on the 3rd of October.
25 So, therefore, it is not -- what you just said is not what the
1 witness actually claimed.
2 MR. HANNIS: I'm talking about the first time he answered the
3 question about how many documents, on direct.
4 Q. But let's get it straight right now. You're talking about the
5 period between April and October 1992, and you say the total number of
6 dispatches sent and received by your administration was between 29 and
8 Is that what you are telling us?
9 A. Dispatches and memos, various documents.
10 Q. One of the documents we looked at earlier today was the document
11 from you to several SJBs, to the special police detachment, to the
12 minister for his information only, requesting information about the
13 stolen cars.
14 Now, did you receive no responses from any of those people to
15 that one dispatch alone?
16 A. Could I see the document, please.
17 Q. Sure. It's 1D93, I believe, was the one I showed you, dated the
18 29th of July. It's tab 44 in your binder.
19 And, by my count, it goes out to 12 different SJBs. Did none of
20 them respond to you between 29 July and the end of October 1992?
21 A. Let me assist you to understand this part as well.
22 The Security Services Centre of Romanija-Bircani area, dealt with
23 the TAS factory matters. The information arrived via a collated document
24 sent by that centre. The organisational system was such that the
25 information was sent to the centre. Through various reports coming from
1 stations, through dispatches, via courier and through other means, all of
2 this arrived to the Sarajevo-Birac CSB, and all of this information was
3 then sent in one report.
4 Q. So you're saying that if there were any responses from those 12,
5 11 or 12, SJBs they all sat in CSB Sarajevo until sometime when they were
6 collated and put together and sent to you as one document.
7 Is that what you're saying?
8 A. Yes. Because when we were supposed to draft a review, since the
9 Sarajevo, Romanija, and Birac centre did not have all of the information
10 compiled in one place, I sent the dispatch to all of their stations and
11 to the police detachment which was attached to that centre. Its
12 headquarters were within the centre. I think that the centre then sent
13 out more extensive report, stating that the Sekovici station knew nothing
14 concerning that. Or some other station.
15 Q. Okay. Let me go to something else.
16 You were asked about the situation where certain individuals who
17 had been relieved of their duties in -- in the ministry and put at the
18 disposal of the army, what happened to those persons, if there were any
19 pending criminal proceedings in place at that time? You were asked
20 whether those criminal proceedings terminated because they'd been
21 relieved of their documents, and you said no.
22 My question is: What happened to any ongoing criminal
23 proceedings against a person, for example, a reserve MUP policeman, who
24 had been relieved of his duties and put at the disposal of the army and
25 sent off to the front line. What happened to pending criminal
1 proceedings against a person like that?
2 A. It is the prosecutor's office that is in charge of criminal
3 proceedings. If an instigation was commenced pursuant to the
4 prosecutor's request, then it is an investigative judge who has to
5 undertake certain steps. And then once the indictment is confirmed,
6 court proceedings are instituted.
7 The minister of the interior could not affect, nor did it have
8 any authority to affect the work of judicial organs.
9 Q. I'm trying to understand though how -- how it played out in real
10 life, because I see what, in English, I would call a Catch-22 situation.
11 Reserve policemen engages in some kind of conduct, criminal conduct, that
12 results in proceedings being initiated against him, which would have been
13 in a civilian court, right, if it was for something he did while he was a
14 reserve policeman. The criminal proceedings would be in a civilian
15 court, rather than a military court. Right so far?
16 A. Yes. If the crime was committed in the territory of the
17 municipality which is not in the war zone, because any area that is part
18 of a war zone falls under the military jurisdiction.
19 In the war zone, every policemen is resubordinated to the
20 military command, and it is the military rules that are in effect.
21 Q. Okay. Well, we may have some disagreement about that. And we'll
22 talk about that later.
23 But a reserve policeman who has been subjected to criminal
24 proceedings in a civilian court who, in the meantime, because, as we all
25 know, criminal proceedings often take a long time to go through the
1 process, in the meantime he has been taken off by the army and he is on
2 the front line. Now, when he is under the army and on the front line,
3 the civilian court don't have any jurisdiction over him at that moment,
4 do they? Because he is in the army fighting at the front line.
5 A. If a person committed a crime as a civilian, then, naturally, the
6 civilian prosecutor's office and the court would have jurisdiction.
7 Q. But my point is: In the meantime, after the proceedings have
8 started and before they are completed, that person has been taken off by
9 the army and is fighting at the front line. Now, how does the civilian
10 court get a hold of him because is he in the army? And wouldn't the army
11 say, No, no, don't touch that guy. He's working for me right now.
12 Isn't that how it worked in real life?
13 A. If any soldier or military commander did something of that sort,
14 I simply don't know about it, and I couldn't speculate about it.
15 Q. Okay. But I mean, civilian courts didn't have any jurisdiction
16 over -- of the RS member; right?
17 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm -- I'm -- I'm wondering what is the basis of
18 Mr. Hannis's question. We know that the witness is not -- is not a
19 lawyer. This is a strictly legal question, the question of jurisdiction.
20 I don't know ...
21 JUDGE HALL: I don't know what Mr. Hannis's intention was, but
22 the impression I had was about what happened in practice, not so much
23 the -- the -- strict legal principles.
24 Did I misunderstand you, Mr. Hannis?
25 MR. HANNIS: No, Your Honour. I'm trying to find out, as
1 Judge Harhoff often does, is, we know what it says in the law but what
2 happened in real life.
3 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes, but, Your Honours, that is precisely --
4 understanding this, I didn't object before. But this question is:
5 "I mean, civilian courts didn't have any jurisdiction over the RS
6 member; right?"
7 That was the question and that is why I objected.
8 JUDGE HALL: Yes, yes. I understand, Mr. Zecevic.
9 MR. HANNIS:
10 Q. All right. I take it, Mr. Macar, you wouldn't know the answer to
11 that question; is that correct?
12 A. If you would be so kind to repeat the question. I wasn't
13 focussed enough, and I'm experiencing some problems.
14 So would you please repeat the question.
15 Q. I will. I noticed that you were holding your back earlier. Do
16 you want to have an earlier break?
17 A. If we could go into closed session and I will explain what I have
18 to say.
19 JUDGE HALL: Yes, we go into closed session.
20 [Private session]
11 Pages 23315-23319 redacted. Private session.
6 [Open session]
7 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we're back to open session.
8 [Trial Chamber confers]
9 JUDGE HALL: So we would resume at, say, 4.50.
10 --- Recess taken at 4.28 p.m.
11 --- On resuming at 4.59 p.m.
12 JUDGE HALL: We will report to counsel as to how we've resolved
13 these matters, but it probably should be in private session, so we'll
14 wait until the witness comes back into court.
15 [Private session]
11 Pages 23321-23322 redacted. Private session.
19 [Open session]
20 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we're back in open session.
21 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
22 Q. Mr. Macar, I'd like to show you now Exhibit 1D176. I think this
23 is in tab 41 of your binder. It was a Defence document.
24 You see this is the -- an order from Mr. Stanisic dated the 27th
25 of July, 1992. And the preamble says, in my English:
1 "In accordance with the order by the President of the
2 Presidency ... and the request of the Assembly of the Serbian people
3 which was in session on 25 and 26 July 1992, I hereby order ..."
4 And number 4 in the order is:
5 "Immediately disband and place under the command of the army of
6 the Serbian republic all special units formed during the war in the areas
7 of Security Services Centres."
8 One of my first question is: Do you know what is referred to as
9 the order by the President of the Presidency? Did you ever see what that
10 order was and what it said specifically?
11 A. I don't remember the order issued by the President of the
12 Presidency. And I don't know its context, and I don't know the format in
13 which it was written.
14 Q. Thank you. I don't know that we have seen it in this trial so
15 far either.
16 You said at page 22960, when asked about this item 4, you said
17 the reason for disbanding of the special units was done "because the
18 ministry never approved their establishment. Their members had not been
19 vetted, and they didn't have decisions on appointment from the ministry
21 Now, this order makes reference to, in addition to the
22 President's order that we don't know what it says, makes reference to the
23 request of the Assembly, which was in session on 25 and the 26 July. I
24 understand from your prior answers that you did not attend that session
25 of the Assembly on 25 and 26 July; correct?
1 A. Could you just tell me where it was held and then I will be able
2 to give you an answer? Because that's how I remember them.
3 Q. My notes indicate that was held in the Jahorina, Hotel Bistrica.
4 And I think you said you weren't sure about that one, is actually what
5 you said.
6 A. I said that I was not sure. I said I might have been present.
7 Q. Okay. Now given the fact that we have this order, which includes
8 an order to immediately disband the special units, does that refresh your
9 memory about what -- whether you might have attended the session, in that
10 there might been some discussion about criminal behaviour of special
11 police units or anything of that nature?
12 Do you remember?
13 A. If the topic related to the crime enforcement section, then I
14 would like to see the items on the agenda that pertained to the work of
15 the ministry; and if there was anything that had to do with the crime
16 police, then I could tell you, with greater certainty, whether I was
17 present there or not.
18 And the order to disband special units was not issued because
19 there were some reports about crimes committed by those units or
20 individuals from those units. That was not the only reason.
21 Q. Well, I'm willing to agree with you that that may not have been
22 the only reason, if you'll agree with me that it was one of the reasons.
23 Can you do that?
24 A. The primary reason - this is what I knew - was that the special
25 units had to transform and had to be put under the control of the MUP
1 headquarters. In the course of April and May, the centres set up those
2 special units and the senior officers and rank-and-file personnel of
3 those units were not verified by the ministry headquarters. And the
4 concept, according to which those units were used, because when this
5 order was issued, the concept was put together whereby special units were
6 to be used primarily for security and also as a -- combat units, to take
7 part in the fighting, under the command of the Republika Srpska army and
8 in line with the Law on National Defence.
9 Q. But the -- it seems unlikely that the Presidency order -- or, the
10 requests from the Assembly would have been based upon knowing that the
11 proper procedure had not been followed in the MUP but, rather, the fact
12 that some of those special units and some individuals in some of those
13 special units were engaging in crimes.
14 Would you agree with me about that?
15 A. No.
16 Q. And in the course of your inspection tours carried out by -- by
17 the inspectors in the CSBs and the SJBs later in the year, did you not
18 hear about; for example, crimes, including murders committed by the
19 special unit from Banja Luka, during operations in Kotor Varos earlier in
20 the year?
21 You didn't hear reports about that?
22 A. No.
23 Q. All right. Let's look at tab 58 in your binder. This is
24 Exhibit P605. And this is actually from Mr. Zupljanin in the Banja Luka
25 CSB forwarding to his SJBs an order of the minister which talks about,
1 item number 2:
2 "The Serbian army is directly responsible for ... security of
3 collection centres."
5 "In the event that it should lack manpower ... war time
6 assignments should be allotted."
7 Did you see that; and were you aware of this order?
8 A. The order of the minister, as I have already noted -- well, I saw
9 it not in August, but when the decision was made, and that was in
10 September; the decision to relocate the MUP headquarters to Bijeljina.
11 In order to prepare for the establishment of the crime police in the
12 headquarters, and this went parallel with reporting to the minister, the
13 purpose was to take, as soon as possible, measures to visit the CSBs and
14 SJBs. And to this end, I put together the list of the CSBs and all the
15 SJBs that belonged to them. I collected some data from the analysis
16 section and the office of the ministry. The data pertained to the orders
17 and demands that were sent to the centres and the reports that we
18 received from the centres regarding the security situation in the field.
19 And that's when I became acquainted with the minister's order.
20 Q. Okay. You mean this order that we've just been looking at;
22 A. Yes. The order of the minister that Mr. Zupljanin conveyed to
23 the offices out in the field.
24 Q. And in the order immediately after item number 2, it talks about
25 "disciplinary and, if need be, other measures should be taken against
1 those who fail to obey the above order."
2 Related to that, Mr. Zecevic had asked you to explain why this
3 order and some of the others that you had been looked at prior were going
4 out -- why there were so many of these orders going out, emphasising the
5 responsibility of employees and these constant threats made of
6 disciplinary and other measures. And your answer, page 22964, line 12
8 "Generally speaking, the interior minister, Mr. Stanisic, was
9 very consistent in his application of the law."
10 And I guess I would agree with you, to the extent that he was
11 very consistent in issuing warnings about the failure to obey orders,
12 because we have seen a number of documents where he does that. But,
13 Mr. Macar, I would suggest to you that he was not consistent in following
14 up on those warnings and disciplining people who violated them, such as
15 Mr. Drljaca, Mr. Koroman, and others.
16 Do you agree with me about that?
17 A. I wouldn't say that the minister wasn't consistent in following,
18 following up, because the minister or any other single person cannot
19 check on everything on their own. There are all those CSBs that need to
20 carry out certain checks, pursuant to the powers they have.
21 We talked about the problems. Now, I'm speaking in hypothetical
22 terms. If there was an order issued that something needed to be done
23 within eight days, that doesn't mean that, be it either due to the war
24 activities or any other problems, that that was a realistic deadline.
25 Sometimes there were objective reasons why a -- disciplinary proceedings
1 could not be undertaken against somebody who did not abide by the
2 eight-day deadline because there could have been some very valid reasons
3 why they did not comply with the deadline. And this is quite a complex
4 process that cannot be completed within 24 hours.
5 Q. Okay. Let me try and pose the question this way and -- and bear
6 with me.
7 I know you are a parent. You have children. I have children.
8 We both have been children of parents, and let me give you the example of
9 a parent who constantly is warning a child not to do something and
10 threatening that, If you do that, I'm going to spank you, or I'm going to
11 ground you, or I'm going take away your allowance. But if there are
12 repeated threats made over time and there is never any action taken out,
13 isn't it often the common result that the person warned the child or the
14 employee or the policeman, if there are constant threats, but when the
15 rules are broken and no discipline is enforced then an attitude is
16 created where the child or the employee, or the policeman thinks, Ah,
17 well, he doesn't really mean it, nothing is going to happen, so I don't
18 have to pay any attention to that.
19 Are you familiar with that phenomenon?
20 A. Well, I did have some problems with failing to punish my daughter
21 in my family life. But, as far as the ministry's concerned, I know that
22 disciplinary proceedings were conducted and that some employees were
24 We did not keep records of that in the crime police, because I'm
25 anticipating your question. But the influence of the ministry and the
1 CSBs towards the public security stations, which was not in line with the
2 Law on the Interior, on internal affairs, and if in a station, senior
3 officers were selected and appointed by institutions that were not part
4 of the ministry, well, you could not really institute disciplinary
5 proceedings against them.
6 And, as regards the question whether the minister took measures.
7 Yes, he often, not only threatened. In fact, his management style was
8 that at each and every meeting he would make very energetic demands, and
9 he did not threaten people with disciplinary proceedings. He said, You
10 would be dismissed, unless you do this or that. And I think that I tried
11 to apply the same standard, the same treatment to my subordinates. But
12 on the ground, where the ministry did not have an influence, I don't know
13 who was in a position to institute disciplinary proceedings when those
14 people were outside of the legal framework of the ministry.
15 Q. Let me ask you this then: You know who Stevo Todorovic was in
16 Bosanski Samac; yes?
17 A. Stevan Todorovic was the station chief in Bosanski Samac.
18 Q. And we've had some evidence that he had not been initially
19 appointed by the ministry, but, rather, had been appointed by the local
20 Crisis Staff. Is that consistent with your information?
21 A. I learnt that from a report filed by the crime police officers
22 who had visited the Doboj CSB.
23 Q. And we've had a suggestion or some evidence that because he had
24 not been appointed by the ministry, the ministry could not remove him.
25 Is that what you were just explaining before now? Is that your
1 understanding of how it worked? Because he hadn't been appointed by the
2 ministry, he couldn't be removed by the ministry.
3 A. I think that, in this context, I did not say -- or, if I did, let
4 me correct myself. I remember from the reports of the joint group that
5 went there and some crime police personnel, that, primarily, there was a
6 political problem in Samac because of the Crisis Staff which made it
7 impossible to remove Mr. Todorovic from office. And I know that the
8 Doboj CSB chief, Andrija Bjelosevic, had problems likewise in
9 implementing the orders that had come from the minister, in terms of
10 proposals for the appointment of personnel on the orders of the minister.
11 Now, as for how it proceeded, I know only what was reported in
12 the reports filed by the crime police because the crime police chief did
13 not have the power to appoint or dismiss police station chiefs and
14 commanders, so I really could not tell you what happened afterwards.
15 Q. Okay. I'm still not sure I'm clear. Who did have the power to
16 remove a police chief, a SJB chief, like Mr. Todorovic. Who had that
17 power? Was it the CSB chief, or the minister, or both?
18 A. Your Honours, we have seen an order by the minister, whereby he
19 transfers some of the powers for the appointment of chiefs to the centre
20 chiefs because of the situation, the fact that the territory was not
21 contiguous, but the selection of the personnel was done by the minister.
22 Because of the problems that we have already seen, the influence of the
23 Crisis Staffs, some of the Crisis Staffs, on the appointment of personnel
24 in some municipalities was so great that not only did they disrupt the
25 normal procedure for the dismissal of people from office, but they were
1 prepared to cause large-scale incidents in order to prevent the
3 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, there's -- there is one intervention in
4 the transcript.
5 It says here, line 23, page 48:
6 "The fact that the territory was not contiguous, but the
7 selection of the personnel was done by the minister."
8 That is not what the witness said.
9 Maybe you can clarify that.
10 MR. HANNIS:
11 Q. Mr. Macar, you heard what Mr. Zecevic said. Do you understand
12 that and can you clarify?
13 A. Yes. I have understood.
14 I think that I said that the minister conveyed via his order part
15 of the powers to the chiefs of CSBs when it comes to proposing personnel
16 for the positions of the chief of stations and other senior positions.
17 The order was a result -- the order was adopted as a result of
18 the fragmentation of the territory and the inability to reach all SJBs
19 from the headquarters and also the inability to timely exchange
20 information, reports, and so on.
21 This is what explains it.
22 Q. Okay. But I'm -- I'm not clear. I know -- I think I know the
23 order you're talking about. It was from late April, where
24 Minister Stanisic issued this order delegating his authority regarding
25 selections of certain employees to the CSB chiefs.
1 Are we talking about the same thing?
2 A. Could you please repeat the question? I couldn't hear the
3 interpreter quite well.
4 Q. All right. Could we put up 1D73, which was at Defence tab 15.
5 I think it's tab 15 in your binder, Mr. Macar.
6 Is that the one that you were talking about?
7 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes, Mr. Hannis.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Just a moment, please.
10 MR. HANNIS:
11 Q. Now, having that in mind, and the circumstance in Bosanski Samac,
12 for example, Mr. Todorovic was apparently appointed as SJB head in Samac
13 by the local Crisis Staff. And, therefore, he wasn't appointed by the
14 CSB chief, Mr. Bjelosevic, who was the person to whom the authority would
15 have been applicable given this decision by Mr. Stanisic.
16 Am I write so as far? I see you nod your head, but I need you to
17 answer out loud.
18 A. In April, the ministry did not verify, confirm the position of
19 the chief of the station in Brod. The Ministry of the Serbian Republic
20 of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as it was known at the time.
21 I also know that Mr. Andrija Bjelosevic had huge problems with
22 the Crisis Staff in Bosanski Samac, when he attempted to implement the
23 lawful procedures and announce the removal of Mr. Todorovic from office.
24 Now, as for the details of that entire situation, I wouldn't be
25 able to tell you, because I knew about the problems with Samac from the
1 reports of inspectors who went to that SJB. But I know personally that
2 Andrija Bjelosevic encountered huge problems in removing Todorovic from
3 his position.
4 Q. As far as you know, there was no legal impediment. There was
5 nothing in the Law on Internal Affairs that prevented Mr. Bjelosevic from
6 removing Mr. Todorovic; right? It was a practical problem, a political
7 problem, or a public-support-in-Samac problem, but not a legal
9 A. As an economist, I will try to give you an answer.
10 Any change entails certain preparations to pass a decision,
11 stating that from this day on, it is not Goran Macar who is chief of the
12 station, but, rather, Zoran Macar. Unless the Crisis Staff accepts it,
13 the Crisis Staff who supports Mr. Todorovic -- or, rather, if
14 Mr. Todorovic is also a member of the Crisis Staff, and if there is an
15 event that disrupts the security situation in Samac, or if he manages to
16 affect or influence certain persons in the military, then the paper alone
17 has no force.
18 Moreover, transformation of special units and creation of a new
19 special unit under the command of the Ministry of the Interior was done
20 precisely in order to attempt to improve the security situation on the
21 ground and also to ensure that CSBs had all the support of the ministry
22 when it comes to personnel changes whenever it was expected that some
23 problems could erupt. For example, Andrija Bjelosevic went there on his
24 own, and he faced threats, and so on. And the intention of the ministry
25 could not be implemented without causing trouble. I'm now talking about
1 practical problems encountered on the ground.
2 Q. But the fact that it may have caused trouble is not a
3 justification to do your duty, is it? I mean, a bank robber may have the
4 support of his 16 cousins with shotguns, but that is not a reason that
5 you shouldn't go out and arrest him if you know that he committed the
6 bank robbery. It's part of the job; right?
7 A. It's not a good example, the example of removal of the head of
8 the police station.
9 If somebody, due to objective reasons, is unable to undertake
10 measures and activities that would cause graver problems, then perhaps -
11 I'm now speaking as an ordinary man -- then perhaps that could be
12 postponed by a day or two. This question is not properly addressed to me
13 because I worked in the crime police. It would have been properly
14 addressed to somebody else from the ministry.
15 What I'm giving you now is simply my view of the things because
16 within my powers, I could not remove head of the SJB. So I'm just giving
17 you my personal view.
18 Q. Okay. But let's see if can you agree with me about this. Had
19 the information that Mr. Todorovic was not appointed by the ministry --
20 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Hannis.
21 MR. HANNIS: Yes, Your Honour.
22 JUDGE HARHOFF: Have we not reached the end of how far we can get
23 with Mr. Todorovic? And is it really relevant to push on with this
25 MR. HANNIS: Well, Your Honour, if you're satisfied it is clear
1 about who had the authority to remove someone and the fact that removal
2 wasn't done, then I can stop.
3 JUDGE HARHOFF: I think that has been cleared.
4 MR. HANNIS: Okay.
5 JUDGE HALL: If you're now moving on to something else, perhaps
6 we should take the break, the final break for the day.
7 MR. HANNIS: That's fine, Your Honour.
8 [The witness stands down]
9 --- Recess taken at 5.44 p.m.
10 --- On resuming at 6.04 p.m.
11 [Trial Chamber confers]
12 [The witness takes the stand]
13 MR. HANNIS:
14 Q. Mr. Macar, it's correct that under the Law on Internal Affairs
15 for Republika Srpska - I believe it's Article 41 - that provides that the
16 minister is the one who shall decide which employees will be considered
17 authorised officials; right?
18 A. I don't know the law by heart. Can you read it out to me?
19 Q. Yes. This is under Article 41, and the third paragraph in my
20 English translation says:
21 "The minister shall decide which employees will be considered
22 authorised officials."
23 Do you have any reason to disagree with that?
24 MR. ZECEVIC: It is P181. I believe the witness asked to see
25 the -- the law --
1 MR. HANNIS: My translation was: Could I read it out.
2 Q. If you'd like to see it, I have it as Exhibit P530, 5-3-0.
3 If we could [Overlapping speakers] witness.
4 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes, right.
5 MR. HANNIS: Could we have P530. And in English, I'm at page 6.
6 And I'm not sure where Article 41 is in the B/C/S. It may be the same.
7 And if we could zoom in.
8 Q. Can you see that, Mr. Macar? I think it's the third paragraph.
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Would you agree, did I read it correctly?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. [Microphone not activated]... Thank you. Now, let me show -- let
13 me show you a document that you were showed on July the 7th. Page 22967.
14 Exhibit 1D522, which is tab 88 in your binder, Mr. Macar. And this was a
15 document that you talked about going from Minister Stanisic to the
16 municipal assemblies, and the president, and the chairman of the
17 Executive Committee.
18 It's not clear to me, was this addressed to all municipal
19 assemblies? Only to Bijeljina? Can you tell from looking at the
21 A. It says here:
22 "To the municipal assembly, to everyone, the president, and
23 chairman of the Executive Committee."
24 Q. But can you help me? Was it to all municipal assemblies in the
25 Republika Srpska? Was that intended?
1 A. I can't say. I didn't work either in the communications
2 department, nor was I involved in any way in sending out documents, and I
3 can't see on the face of it how it was sent. Given that it's November,
4 and this is not an original dispatch, I would like to know who signed it.
5 I think that this number indicates that this may have come from the
6 analysis department.
7 Q. Yes, I see it has the number 10-013-441 at the top. And you've
8 told us before that 10 pertains to the analysis administration.
9 Is this a teletype, this format? This looks like a teletype to
11 A. I can't say whether it was sent via regular mail, via a courier,
12 or whether this is a dispatch. I can't see.
13 Q. Can you see at the bottom the name Stanisic. It has two Ss and
14 two Is. And one of the communications witnesses, I think, told us that
15 that's an indication it was by teletype. That's how the diacritic in the
16 Serbian language was represented. So Stanisic would have two Ss and two
17 Cs. Does that help?
18 A. No. Because there were also typewriters where we had problems
19 with the diacritics.
20 Q. Did you -- did you personally regularly handle teletypes to know
21 what they looked like, in terms of the format?
22 A. To tell you the truth, as for those details, if -- if my name was
23 written with a C instead of a Ch, I would automatically read it as it
24 should be spelled. So I never paid attention to those minor details.
25 I know that we have electrical typewriters that were faulty when
1 it comes to diacritics.
2 Q. If you take a look at the last paragraph, my English translation
4 "Proceeding from this, as representatives of organs of civil
5 [sic] authorities in the personnel recommendation procedure in the SJB in
6 your municipality, you need to submit your recommendations, suggestions
7 and opinions to the chief of CSB ... responsible for your area and to
8 reach agreement on recommended candidates."
9 First of all, that reads to me like this document was intended
10 for all the municipal assemblies, not just one. It seems to be phrased
11 in the collective rather than individual sense.
12 Would you agree?
13 A. I really can't say whether it was sent to them because this was
14 not sent by my administration, and one could establish it via records of
15 the mail office of [indiscernible] or the records of dispatches that were
17 Q. No. But I'm just asking you in terms of grammar and semantics in
18 your language. In the English, the way it is translated into English, to
19 me, I would understand this as going to multiple recipients as opposed to
20 a single one.
21 Can you help me with that, or is there no difference in Serbian?
22 A. Well, if you want a logical interpretation, it says here:
23 "To the municipal assembly, to the President, to the chairman of
24 the Executive Committee, to everyone."
25 This could mean that in one municipality this is being sent to
1 several persons, or it could mean that it is being sent to all
2 municipalities and all chairmans of the executive committee. It could,
3 therefore, mean just one municipality and two, three persons in one
4 municipality, or it could mean something else.
5 Q. You mentioned this is an example of how the minister was trying
6 to deal with some problems in some municipalities that, I guess, were
7 more independent than others. And at page 22967, you said:
8 "Names were put forward and persons were appointed in order to
9 obstruct the work of the municipal bodies."
10 What did you mean by that? Who was putting names forward to
11 obstruct the work of municipal bodies?
12 A. Knowing myself, I think that this is a case of misinterpretation.
13 Because I don't believe I could have said something like this. I think
14 it's an interpretation mistake.
15 I don't know in which context this was said and regarding which
16 document, but I am sure that I could not have said anything of this sort.
17 Q. Okay. This was said in the context of this document we're
18 looking at, this communication to municipal assembly, president, chairman
19 of Executive Committee. And the question Mr. Zecevic asked you about it
20 was; are you familiar with this dispatch?
21 Your answer was:
22 "Yes. It is a result of feedback received following the
23 minister's order, relating to personnel verification in the CSBs and
25 And then you followed up with what I quoted to you earlier, that
1 there were certainly anomalies in some municipalities. Now that you have
2 heard the background and the document which that related to, can you tell
3 us what you think you said before, or what you meant to say before, that
4 you now say was misinterpreted?
5 A. I'm convinced it was a mistake, because I could not have said
6 something like that.
7 Q. What should it -- how should it read?
8 A. I would interpret this document as a manner to introduce law and
9 order and compliance with the Law on Internal Affairs, on the part of the
10 minister. The municipal organs, municipal assembly, and municipal
11 Executive Committee could propose several candidates for the position of
12 the chief. However, that wasn't binding when it to comes to them being
13 confirmed for that position, because the Ministry of the Interior
14 collects also other information to see whether somebody is qualified for
15 the job, and they don't necessarily have to confirm one of the candidates
16 who had been nominated or proposed by the municipality.
17 This is as far as I know about the position normally taken at the
18 ministry and the regulations there.
19 Q. Okay. And the last paragraph, this follows up on what you just
20 said, it says:
21 "You need to submit your recommendations, suggestions and
22 opinions to the CSB chief and to reach agreement on recommended
24 Now I take that to mean the minister didn't think that the
25 municipal authorities had to agree with who the CSB chief wanted to
1 appoint, but I would guess this is rather more a diplomatic or a polite
2 way to suggest that they should try to work out an agreement. But, in
3 the end, didn't the law provide, and the minister, I'm certain, agreed
4 that it was his choice and the CSB's choice. It was the MUP's choice,
5 not the municipal authorities, not the municipal assembly; right? It
6 would be nice if they can all agree; but, in the end, the ultimate choice
7 is up to the MUP.
8 Do you agree with that?
9 A. As I have just said, presidents of municipal organs could propose
10 candidates and if some of the candidates suited the profile after certain
11 background checks and so on, if they had the necessary qualifications
12 after all the checks conducted by the ministry, the -- they could be
14 On the other hand, they didn't have to appoint any of the
15 proposed candidates to the position of the chief, unless -- or if that
16 person didn't meet all the criteria. That's as far as I know --
17 Q. Okay.
18 A. -- about the manner of appointment and the views of the ministry.
19 Q. Just to be clear, in your answer it said: They didn't have to
20 appoint any of the proposed candidates. When you say there -- when you
21 say "they" in that sentence, you mean the ministry, the CSB chief and/or
22 the minister; right? You're not referring to the civilian authorities;
23 you're referring to the MUP. They didn't have to appoint the ones that
24 the municipal assembly proposed.
25 A. The Ministry of the Interior was not bound --
1 Q. Thank you --
2 A. -- if the candidate didn't meet the criteria. If the candidate
3 met the criteria, then any expert was welcome in the Ministry of the
5 Q. Okay. You said further on in your answer about this document,
7 "Because of the proposals that were put forward in some municipal
8 bodies, the minister, after some meetings, had no choice but to go there
9 and remind some municipal leaders of their responsibilities and
11 Do you remember now any examples of municipalities where the
12 minister had to go and tell the municipal authorities about what their
13 responsibilities and obligations were, in terms of nominating people for
14 jobs, like the SJB chief?
15 A. I don't remember saying that the minister -- or could that part
16 be checked? It seems to me, I think, that I could not have said that the
17 minister went somewhere to check something.
18 MR. ZECEVIC: Could we have the reference because that is not my
19 recollection either, that the witness ever mentioned that.
20 MR. HANNIS: I'm reading from the transcript, page 22967,
21 line 15, was the part that you said before you thought was not correctly
23 It said names were put forward and persons were appointed in
24 order to obstruct the work of the municipal bodies.
25 And the next sentence says:
1 "And that is why the minister, after some meetings, had no choice
2 but to go there and remind some municipal leaders of their
3 responsibilities and obligations."
4 Q. I'm sorry, I can only work from the English I have in front of
5 me. I see you shaking your head. I guess if you disagree, and if could
6 you tell us what you think you actually said there, when talking about
7 this document.
8 A. It's a bit harder now because I have to put it in the context of
9 what I said previously.
10 However, I wasn't somebody to whom the minister was accountable
11 about whether he went -- about what he did and where he went. So I
12 certainly didn't say that the minister went to some stations and ...
13 This is something that I could not have uttered, and it's very
14 hard for me to now say what I may have meant. I definitely didn't mean
16 Q. Well, as you sit here now, are you telling me that the minister
17 never went to any municipal assembly to talk to them about their
18 obligations and responsibilities, in terms of nominating candidates for
19 SJB positions?
20 A. As a chief of the administration, I didn't deal with appointments
21 of SJB chiefs. I also didn't keep track of where the minister went and
22 on what business when he went to certain municipalities. What is the
23 duty of the chief of the administration and the co-ordinator is to inform
24 about any security-related matters, to inform the head of the public
25 security department, who, in turn, would inform the minister.
1 Now, as to what actions the minister took, I really couldn't tell
2 you anything about that.
3 Q. Okay. The next question from Mr. Zecevic at line 20 was:
4 "This dispatch that serves to remind the municipal presidents and
5 presidents of Executive Boards, how successful was it? Did it yield any
6 particular results; and, if so, what kind? Partial results? Full
8 And then, Mr. Macar, your answer was:
9 "This is an instruction, not to say a warning, despite which were
10 no results. Even more obstruction occurred" --or, "Even more obstruction
11 ensued, if I can put it that way."
12 My question about that is: What do you mean "even more
13 obstruction ensued"? Can you give us an example?
14 A. I wouldn't say that I was this imprecise. I stated that in some
15 municipality, there was a degree of obstruction. And since, on the 14th,
16 or on the 15th of November, I said I was in Prijedor, and this was rather
17 fresh in my memory, I know that in 1992 there were some personnel changes
18 in Prijedor. And it seems to me that it was only in late 1992 the same
19 thing happened in Samac. So I couldn't say in several municipalities. I
20 couldn't say that the degree of obstruction increased. I think that I
21 said in another sentence Prijedor and Samac.
22 I do apologise to the Honourable Trial Chamber, and I know that
23 Mr. Zecevic warned me that I spoke too fast and probably this affected
24 the interpretation.
25 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] I am afraid that the witness is
1 speaking too fast because what I'm hearing and what is recorded in the
2 transcript is, again, different.
3 MR. HANNIS:
4 Q. Mr. Macar, you're telling me now that you're certain you didn't
5 say what I've just read out to you, as far as an answer to the question
6 about whether or not it yielded any results. And that answer is recorded
8 "This is an instruction, not to say a warning, despite which
9 there were no results. Even more obstruction ensued, if I can put it
10 that way."
11 Now, first of all, I know you do often speak quickly and the
12 interpreters have a hard time following you. But, generally speaking,
13 that was one of your shorter answers. And I don't see here where you
14 mentioned any two specific municipalities. But you're telling me now
15 that Samac was one of the examples?
16 A. I apologise. I think, Your Honours, that I said that in another
17 sentence I mentioned Samac and Prijedor, as far as I can recall. But, at
18 any rate, I did not say that after this document, even more obstruction
19 ensued in more municipalities.
20 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, can we go into private session for a
22 JUDGE HALL: Yes.
23 [Private session]
11 Pages 23347-23349 redacted. Private session.
10 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6.42 p.m.,
11 to be reconvened on Friday, the 15th day of July,
12 2011, at 9.00 a.m.