1 Friday, 16 September 2011
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.11 a.m.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning
6 everyone in and around the courtroom.
7 This is case IT-08-91-T, the Prosecutor versus Mico Stanisic and
8 Stojan Zupljanin.
9 JUDGE HALL: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
10 Good morning to everyone. May we have the appearances, please.
11 MS. KORNER: Good morning, Your Honours. Joanna Korner and
12 Crispian Smith for the Prosecution.
13 MR. ZECEVIC: Good morning, Your Honours. Slobodan Zecevic,
14 Slobodan Cvijetic, and Ms. Deirdre Montgomery appearing for Stanisic
15 Defence this morning. Thank you.
16 MR. KRGOVIC: Good morning, Your Honours. Dragan Krgovic and
17 Miroslav Cuskic, appearing for Zupljanin Defence.
18 JUDGE HALL: Thank you.
19 [Trial Chamber confers]
20 JUDGE HALL: Before we continue, the -- picking up on where we
21 left off yesterday in terms of today's scheduling, against the goal of -
22 and let me say parenthetically that we have just confirmed this through
23 VWS with the witness - against the goal of having the witness released
24 today, we are in the process of investigating the possibility of sitting
25 beyond the time indicated yesterday afternoon, to accommodate
1 Mr. Krgovic's re-examination. And the present disposition of the witness
2 is that it may be -- it may mean that we would take the -- a break at
3 1.30 and resume at 2.30, but that remains to be seen. That's still in
4 the process of being worked out.
5 Ms. Korner, was there something that you wished to say?
6 MS. KORNER: Well, Your Honours, the first on that, of course,
7 I -- I -- I'd be very grateful if could I have an extra 15 minutes on top
8 of the 20 minutes, given that we started late. I do need every second to
9 finish --
10 JUDGE HALL: Yes. We're not unmindful of how these
11 investigations have affected you.
12 MS. KORNER: Thank you very much. Your Honours, no, I just
13 wanted -- yesterday, when -- in -- effectively in response to something
14 the witness said, I, without having had an opportunity to check,
15 paraphrased what I understood he'd said about delegation of powers, and I
16 was invited to go for the -- remind the witness of the actual words he'd
17 used in the transcript, and of course because it'd arose ex improviso, I
18 didn't have it, but I checked it last night and the relevant parts are at
19 pages 23703 -- 23704, and further, in 23805, and effectively at 23704,
20 "The president was the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces," said the
21 witness, "but the president cannot exercise command over the army."
22 So what he was -- I think was being put to him and what he was
23 agreeing with, was that it was the president's powers as
24 Commander-in-Chief of the army that were delegated to or could be
25 delegated to the Chief of Staff or the head of the staff.
1 And then, later, he -- he -- it was -- the question, I think this
2 was Mr. Cvijetic, at page 23085:
3 "The minister of the interior within the ministry may order this
4 kind of use," that's combat activities, "but exclusively by doing so and
5 executing an order of superior command. He can never do it
6 independently," it was put.
7 And the answer was:
9 So effectively what's being suggested to the witness or what was
10 being suggested to the witness was that if the minister of the interior
11 wanted to order the use, it had to be on the basis of superior command,
12 which I take to be the president.
13 And that's what the witness says. I'm not saying that's what we
14 accept, but therefore my summary of it was, I agree, inaccurate.
15 JUDGE HALL: Thank you.
16 [Trial Chamber and Legal Officer confer]
17 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
18 JUDGE HALL: Yes. So the Registry is now requested to make the
19 necessary arrangements to facilitate the extended sitting this afternoon.
20 Thank you.
21 Could we have the witness back on the stand, please.
22 [The witness takes the stand]
23 JUDGE HALL: General, good morning.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.
25 JUDGE HALL: And the -- I remind you, before Ms. Korner
1 continues, that you're still on your oath.
2 And the -- we have received your communications in terms of
3 the -- how we are going to proceed for -- for the rest of the day, and we
4 still expect that you would be released by the end of today's -- today's
5 sitting. Although that may -- may be a little longer than we had
6 indicated yesterday.
7 Thank you.
8 Yes, Ms. Korner.
9 MS. KORNER: Yes.
10 WITNESS: VIDOSAV KOVACEVIC [Resumed]
11 [Witness answered through interpreter]
12 Cross-examination by Ms. Korner: [Continued]
13 Q. General, could we have, please, another look at the document you
14 were asked a great deal about it in -- by Mr. Krgovic, I believe, and
15 also Mr. Cvijetic, and that's the 1st of July Talic order, which is, I
16 think 1D406. Tab 44 in our binder. It was also in the Defence binder.
17 Yes. This is General Talic, on the 1st of July, setting out, as
18 it were, zones of responsibility to try, presumably, to make things more
20 Were you aware that on the 1st of July, 1992 Operation Corridor
21 was still going on?
22 A. Yes, Ms. Korner. I think that Operation Corridor went on at that
24 Q. And if we go to the particular line that's caused so much
25 controversy, if you like, that's on page 2, I think both in English and
2 Now, it says:
3 "In the conduct of combat activities all police forces shall be
4 placed under the command of the zone commander," he has divided things
5 into zones, as we saw, in the earlier part of this order, "who shall
6 decide how they are used."
7 That would mean, would it not, General, that what he is talking
8 about there is if there are police units which have been resubordinated
9 for the purposes of combat, it is the zone commander who will decide how
10 they're to be used in that combat.
11 Would you agree with that?
12 A. Ms. Korner, this is a very precise order, and I agree with you
13 that the corps commander specifies under which conditions in the carrying
14 out of combat activities all police forces shall be placed under the
16 Q. Yes. But I think -- it's not -- one shouldn't read it as meaning
17 that every police force within every zone commander is under that
18 command, should one? It should be read as when the police are being used
19 for the purposes of combat, in other words, resubordinated to the army,
20 it's the zone commander who has the ultimate decision as to how they are
22 A. Ms. Korner, you are right.
23 Q. Yes, thank you.
24 A. Of course, the question is which forces those are and how strong
25 they are, if that's a what you mean. We would have to be acquainted with
1 the specific situation on the ground.
2 Q. Quite. And if one looks at the next page, which is the
3 distribution list, that is all the subordinate commands to the
4 1st Krajina -- units, sorry, and, as we can see, it doesn't include, does
5 it, any of the CSB chiefs or anything like that, or the minister?
6 A. That's correct, Ms. Korner.
7 Q. Thank you. So I won't ask you about that.
8 Now could we move, please, again to the -- a document you were
9 asked about before, which is the July 11th meeting of the MUP, and that
10 is document number P160. And it's tab 49A.
11 And that was a document that you hadn't seen, I think, until you
12 got here, because it's not on your bibliography.
13 If we look, please, at item 13 of the conclusions of the meeting,
14 which is page 24 in English, and I think it's page - difficult to tell -
15 I think it may be about the same page in B/C/S. Yep. Thank you very
17 "In order to overcome the identified problems and issues of
18 jurisdiction between the MUP and the army of the Serbian Republic, we
19 need to prepare a joint meeting an outline all the problems and agree on
20 a solution to assure [sic] more effective co-operation and co-ordinated
22 And then they set out the particular issues that we can see.
23 Paramilitaries. And over the next page in English, problems about
24 engagement of police in combat, co-ordinated action of the army and the
25 MUP on crime prevention, and so on and so forth.
1 Would you agree, General, that that suggests that although in
2 your mind, and possibly in the mind of army officers, it was clear who
3 had the authority, this was not entirely clear to the police side of it?
4 A. Ms. Korner, it is possible that this created huge problems for
5 the police.
6 Q. Yes. Because although, as you say, the military view was that
7 they had the right to do anything they wanted effectively, that was not a
8 view shared by the police?
9 A. Well, I don't know if I put it that way, that the military could
10 do whatever they wanted. But they had the right to take a police officer
11 who was under work obligation and transfer him to the status of military
12 conscript under the law. And then he becomes a military person.
13 Q. Yes. Well, that's what you say. And it may well be that in
14 theory you're right. But that's actually not what happened, was it, on
15 the ground?
16 A. That is correct, madam. I'm -- I'm saying how it should be in
17 accordance with the rules and regulations.
18 Q. All right.
19 MS. KORNER: Can we then move then, please, a little further on
20 in time. Can we come, please, on the same topic, though, as this whole
21 question of resubordination. And could we look, please, at another law.
22 Q. Now you said, General, in answer to a question -- this is at page
23 23693 of the transcript, and it's on the third day of your testimony. I
24 think it was -- it was Mr. Krgovic. He said:
25 "General," a question, "when drafting your report, did you come
1 across any rules about the competencies of the command of the land army
2 in the VRS, and I have in mind 1992?"
3 And you said:
4 "I didn't come across such a document."
5 Well, I'd like you to have a look, please, at the provision,
6 entitled: "Provisional Service Regulations," which is document, please,
7 20248, and it's at tab 66A.
8 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] I apologise. I don't know if it
9 was correctly interpreted, but I spoke about the corps role of the land
10 army. That is a specific document.
11 MS. KORNER: Well, that's not --
12 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] We were quoting from a specific
13 document. The rule of the land army of the JNA, and then I moved onto
14 the adequate rule of the VRS.
15 MS. KORNER: Well, Your Honour, I'm sorry, that's not the way it
16 came out. If the translation was in error, that's one thing. But it
17 followed on from a number of pages of discussion on the schematic, the
18 supreme commander, then the documents that the General had looked at and
19 said he came across certain documents where one finds the president of
20 the republic is authorising the commander of the Main Staff, and so on
21 and so forth. And then the question as recorded at the top of page
22 2569 -- sorry, 23693:
23 "When drafting your report, did you come across any rules about
24 the competencies of the command of the land army in the VRS?"
25 Now if Mr. Krgovic tells me that that's not what he meant to say
1 or if the translation is wrong, then, of course, I accept that.
2 Q. So, General, you weren't meant -- by that answer, you weren't
3 intending to say that there were no laws or regulations relating to
4 command and control drafted in 1992?
5 A. Ms. Korner, it is difficult for me to remember what I said. I
6 think I meant that in order to explain the topic and the problem, the
7 rules and regulations I was able to find in the Republic of Serbia were
9 Q. Ah ... yes, that may be so, but -- all right. It's not that
10 you're asserting, General, that no rules and regulations were drafted
11 during the course of 1992 that had affected command and control of the
13 A. I did not assert that, Ms. Korner.
14 Q. All right. Can we, in any event just have a quick look at this
15 document. Although it was entitled provisional service regulations, it
16 said it applied from the day of their adoption --
17 MS. KORNER: Sorry, we need to go, please -- well, first of all,
18 can we have a look at the second page in English and the second page in
19 the B/C/S, the distribution list.
20 Q. This was being sent on, in fact, by Mr. Vukelic from the
21 1st Krajina Corps. It's their version of it, so we can see it's sent to
22 their units. And, again, we'll see that it's not sent to any police,
23 CSB, to the minister, or --
24 MS. KORNER: And then if we look at the fourth page in English
25 and B/C/S. Yep. Sorry, no. Fourth page -- oh, fifth page in English
1 then. Sorry. It's the right page in B/C/S but it's the fifth page in
2 English, please.
3 The Presidency of the Serbian Republic adopted in a session held
4 on the 18th of August, 1992, the provisional service regulations of the
5 army. And it's signed and stamped in the original by Karadzic.
6 Can we just look, please -- can we move on, then, another one,
7 two -- another three pages. It's page 8 in English, and in B/C/S -- and
8 B/C/S, it's, yes, yes, three pages as well.
9 Q. Headed: "Rights and Duties of Army Members.
10 "2. Persons employed in the army are military personnel and
11 civilian employees. Military personnel are soldiers, cadets, active-duty
12 servicemen, and reservists, while serving in the army. And active-duty
13 services [sic] are commissioned officers, non-commissioned officers, and
14 contract soldiers. Civilian employs are civilians performing certain
15 specialised jobs in the army."
16 There's no mention there, is there, in defining who is a member
17 of the army and police officer who are resubordinated under the powers of
18 Article 104?
19 A. Ms. Korner, in this specific article, and I add that I would have
20 to read the entire document, but in this article you are right in saying
21 that police officers belonging to the army force are not mentioned at
23 Q. Well, as I say, General, you can a copy of the whole thing. But
24 if I'm wrong, I'm sure I will be corrected by Defence counsel.
25 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, it doesn't appear this is in the law
1 library unless we've missed it, but -- so it should be added, I believe,
2 and we can probably do that by agreement, unless I hear any objections to
4 MR. KRGOVIC: [Microphone not activated]
5 MS. KORNER: Sorry?
6 MR. KRGOVIC: [Microphone not activated]... law library.
7 MS. KORNER: Well, not according to us it isn't. I mean, only
8 if -- but it may well be we've missed it somewhere because the title in
9 English is quite often not what -- not. Now, right, can we move, please,
10 now to have a look at a document which is P611. And it's at tab 74.
11 Q. Now, this is another one of the reports on the state of morale.
12 This is for August 1992. Done by -- in fact, it comes from the General,
13 apparently. If we go to the last page. I think it's signed on his
15 All right. And now can we go back, please, to the body, and it's
16 paragraph 2, which is on page 3 in English, and page 4, I think, in
17 B/C/S. Yes.
18 I merely want to ask you if you agree that this is an example of
20 "The overall political and security situation in August 1992 was
21 characterised by the following: The activities of several paramilitary
22 governments ... armed formations, increased extremism towards Muslim and
23 Croatian population," and so on, "and a continued effort to place the
24 organs of the authorities and the MUP, Ministry of Interior, above the
25 military formations and the army" I ought to know what RiK stands for,
1 but I can't remember, "system."
2 So stopping there, for a moment, General, does that again, is
3 that a demonstration in this report of what appears to be, from the
4 army's point of view, a misunderstanding of who's in charge?
5 A. Well, Ms. Korner, it's hard for me to confirm that, because,
6 here, I believe, the report is about problems in the field, about the
7 conduct of some authorities and the MUP. And that's how I read it. And
8 as we see, it says the attempt to place themselves above military
9 formations and the system of command and control.
10 Q. And it goes on to say:
11 "For these reasons the 1st Krajina Corps commander held a meeting
12 with all unit commanders and municipal presidents at which he pointed to
13 the problem of the existence of para governments and paramilitaries and
14 the need to overcome the crisis in view of the objectives of the war we
15 are waging and at --" I think that must be "at the present time."
16 Would you accept from your knowledge of the period, the documents
17 you've looked at, either for the purposes of report or elsewhere, that
18 although there were tensions between the political, the army, and the
19 police, and arguments about jurisdiction, all three shared the same goal?
20 A. Madam Korner, it should be understood that all these elements
21 should be aimed at protecting the Serbian people, if I understand your
22 question correctly.
23 As for how they individually interpreted that goal or implemented
24 it on the ground, one can partly see from what is noted here.
25 Q. Yep. And you would say, I accept because you said it before,
1 that the goal was the defence the Serbian people.
2 The report goes on to talk about the tensions in Kotor Varos,
3 Kljuc, Sanski Most, and Prijedor, because of the large number of arrested
4 citizens for whom there is no evidence or criminal reports that they
5 participated in armed rebellion. And then it goes on to talk about the
6 CSB in Prijedor.
7 Just pausing there for a moment, General, you've not been shown
8 any of the documents that come out from the -- from Manjaca camp, have
9 you, by the Defence?
10 A. I cannot recall, Madam Korner.
11 Q. Well, can we put it this way: They're not in your bibliography,
12 none of them have turned up in the list of documents that the Defence
13 were going to show you, even if they didn't show them all. So if they're
14 not there, can we take it that you weren't shown them?
15 A. That is correct, Ms. Korner.
16 Q. Now, the last thing I want to deal with on this document is --
17 relates to something we're going to come on to in a moment.
18 Could we have a look, please, at the third paragraph, the effect
19 of military organisation and war operations, and that's two pages on, I
20 believe, in both English and B/C/S. It should be page 7 on the top --
21 no, next page, sorry, in B/C/S then, sorry. And it's page 6 in English.
22 And the second paragraph begins:
23 "The prevention of these occurrences," he has described what's
24 been going on, "lies in the fact that a state of war has not been
25 declared ..."
1 Now, you said in your mind there was no difference between an
2 imminent threat of war being declared and a state of war. But it
3 appears, and we've seen it in other documents, General, or the Court has,
4 that certainly to the mind of General Talic it would appear there was a
5 difference, do you agree, from this one statement?
6 A. Madam Korner, I think that I said that there was no difference.
7 But as for the authority of certain commanders and structures in each of
8 those states, it's difficult for me to give an assessment of this report
9 of the corps commander from the position that I am in.
10 Q. Right. But can I put it this way: Wasn't the difference, as far
11 as the military were concerned, that in a state of war their powers to
12 take command and control were increased, which did not happen when it was
13 simply an imminent threat of war?
14 A. Madam Korner, my opinion is that, regarding the authority of the
15 commanders, there is no major difference between the immediate threat of
16 war and the state of war, but there is a difference in the procedures,
17 deadlines, and similar based on my knowledge of these regulations.
18 Q. All right. The final sentence of this paragraph is, I suppose we
19 should go on. He is talking about "... bad interpersonal relations
20 under -- undermined by alcoholism, lack of principles, failure to take
21 measures to protect troop lives. The most prominent example in the
22 negative sense is Colonel Lisica, who, despite personal courage, also
23 demonstrates personal arrogance."
24 Now can we move from that document, please, to document which is
25 P683. It's the next tab, 74A.
1 And this goes back to what we were talking about, about the use
2 of police and leaving the police undermanned. This is to the CSB,
3 written on behalf of Simo Drljaca, chief of the SJB, Prijedor.
4 On 15th of September 1992 the Prijedor SJB received a telephone
5 call from Lieutenant-Colonel Majstorovic from the Prijedor garrison who
6 said "a telex had arrived in the garrison from the 1st Corps signed by
7 the commander, General Talic requesting --"
8 Now, can we just make sure that's the word, "requesting"?
9 A. That is correct.
10 Q. "... that 100 policemen from the reserve police force of Prijedor
11 SJB be put at the disposal of the Army of the Serbian republic ... by
12 1400 hours."
13 "We are unable to meet the request of the 1st Krajina Corps
14 because we do not have this number," of this policeman whom we can set
15 aside, and he explains why.
16 "Earlier this month, we took 417 policemen including seven active
17 police policemen off the roster and gave them to the Serbian army in
18 order to go to the Han Pijesak area.
19 "If we were obliged to meet the request of the 1st Krajina Corps,
20 we would be forced to give up policemen from the Prijedor reserve force."
21 So, General, doesn't it appear that despite your assertions of
22 what the law and the regulations say, it was not an order from the army,
23 it was a request, which Drljaca said he couldn't meet, and he had
24 reported it up to his chief of the CSB, Stojan Zupljanin?
25 A. That is correct, Madam Korner. In several places here, the word
1 "request" is mentioned and not "order" or "command."
2 Q. And doesn't this also square with what I was putting to you
3 yesterday that were policemen were to be used by the army it had to go up
4 through each side's chain of command. Here we see General Talic sending
5 an order to the lieutenant-colonel, who, at his level, puts in the
6 request to the SJB, and the SJB chief says, Sorry, no can do, and reports
7 to his chain of command?
8 A. Madam Korner, I agree that it would have been better had the
9 mutual communication been better and if this were to be resolved jointly.
10 But I think that we could clarify that there are situations in law when
11 the commanders can decide on their own, as I said, to transfer a
12 policeman from the work duty to the military service duty. And perhaps
13 that clarification of mine would help to clear up any dilemmas that you
14 might have.
15 Q. I understand that. You're saying, your reading the rules and
16 regs as they applied in the JNA, and prior to this war, mean that's what
17 can happen. But that is clearly, I would suggest, not what either the
18 army or the police thought, is it? Not in 1992 in the VRS.
19 Or maybe -- I'm sorry. It's not what the police thought, I
20 suggest, and I suggest it was unclear to the army as well.
21 A. It's possible, Madam Korner, that people in war time did not
22 study the regulations well or were not familiar with them in the proper
23 way. On both sides.
24 Q. All right.
25 MS. KORNER: Can we then look very quickly at a document I think
1 you already looked at. It's the second communication from Zupljanin
2 about this question of the relationship between the army and the police.
3 It is document P1094, tab 75.
4 Q. Now, Zupljanin in this is, the 18th of September, is making his
5 position absolutely clear not only to the SJBs but he is copying it to
6 the minister for information, to the command of the 1st Krajina Corps,
7 the 2nd Krajina Corps, and to the leaders of the organisational units in
8 the CSB.
9 "In recent times there has been an increasing number of
10 requests ..."
11 Can I confirm with you that the word is "requests"?
12 A. That is correct, Ms. Korner.
13 Q. "... from lower commands of the army of the Republika Srpska on
14 the territory of Banja Luka ... for the engagement of active and reserve
15 forces of the police in army formations on lines of contact with enemy
16 forces ... requests for the departure of police ... to protect
17 corridors ..."
18 "With regard to the above, I draw the attention of the security
19 of the SJB chiefs to the following: In accordance with the agreement of
20 the most senior representatives of the army and the Ministry of Interior,
21 the Banja Luka CSB ordered the adjustment of the reserve police force to
22 bring it down to the lowest possible ratio ..."
23 Now, is the thinking behind that that if you reduce the number of
24 reserve police, then you increase the number of men who are available to
25 serve in the army?
1 A. Ms. Korner, in every municipality or republic or region, there is
2 an authorised organ dealing with the defence matters, and they have
3 records of all the military conscripts. In the event of mobilisation and
4 the imminent threat of war, these people, based on their earlier war time
5 assignment, would report to the place where their war time assignment was
6 so that, here, the chiefs of the public security services and unit
7 commanders could, depending on the situation, reduce or increase the
8 numbers or ask that authorised organ to assign these people, pursuant to
9 their assignment and organisation, according to establishment.
10 Q. Yes. I'm sorry, my question is a simple one, and I'm not quite
11 clear that you're answering it.
12 You're either a reserve police officer or you're a reserve
13 military officer, correct, after you've done your military service?
14 A. No, it's not quite like that, Ms. Korner.
15 Q. All right. Thank you. Well, maybe I better give you the -- but
16 is the idea --
17 A. But I can explain the difference.
18 Q. Well, all I want to know is, if -- if you agree with this, and if
19 you don't, then say so and I'll move on because it's not the point I want
20 to deal with.
21 That if you decrease the number of reserve police, you thereby
22 increase the pool of those available to serve in the military.
23 A. I cannot answer affirmatively, Madam Korner, because, besides the
24 military duty, there is the material obligation and the obligation to
25 serve in the civilian protection, so that does not necessarily mean that
1 these people would end up in the army.
2 Q. Well, okay. I think we can agree on this, just to move on, that
3 decreasing the reserve police pool enables those persons who are no
4 longer reserve policemen to be assigned to other war time tasks?
5 A. That is correct, Ms. Korner.
6 Q. And then, at the bottom of the page in English:
7 "At the same time, we draw to the attention of SJB chiefs the
8 fact that members of the active and reserve police forces may be engaged
9 in combat activities according to the principle of resubordination to a
10 superior army command only in the event that combat activities are taking
11 place on the territory covered by the designated SJBs and with the
12 approval of the chief of the SJB [sic]."
13 So do you understand that to mean, and I hope it's the same in
14 the Serbian language, it's been translated, that Zupljanin is saying here
15 that, As far as I, the chief, am concerned, you cannot, as an SJB chief,
16 allow your officers to be resubordinated unless the combat activity is
17 taking place within your territory, and I, Stojan Zupljanin, have
19 A. Well, I don't know how I can comment.
20 Q. Well --
21 A. I rather would not comment.
22 Q. Well, I'm sure you wouldn't, General, because it doesn't square
23 with what you have been propounding. But this document is not just what
24 Stojan Zupljanin thought about it, and I agree only he could tell us, but
25 he meant it to be read, as he says, in the next page --
1 MS. KORNER: Can we turn over -- sorry. Can we turn over. Can
2 we go to the next page in English and also in B/C/S.
3 Q. You may not be able to see that, what I just read to you, because
4 it was on the next page.
5 Do you see the part I've just read to you? And I'm sorry,
6 General, I didn't realise that we hadn't -- you hadn't got it.
7 And then it says:
8 "In order to achieve full collaboration and synchronisation of
9 the work of the army and police of Republika Srpska, I ask corps
10 commanders to draw this to the attention of their subordinate commands,
11 through their lines, and brief them on the agreements that were
12 established at a high level."
13 It cannot be read any other way, can it, General, other than the
14 way I suggested?
15 A. I think here Mr. Zupljanin, and it says here:
16 "I kindly ask the corps commander to draw the attention of the
17 lower-ranking commands."
18 Q. Could you pause there for a moment. The word "kindly" doesn't
19 appear in the English translation. Where do you say that appears?
20 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: I ask.
21 MS. KORNER: Thank you.
22 Q. Yes. I'm sorry, I interrupted you. Carry on.
23 A. Ms. Korner, I quote the last paragraph:
24 "In order to achieve collaboration and synchronisation of the
25 work of the army and police of Republika Srpska, I ask corps commanders
1 to draw this to the attention of their subordinate commands through their
2 lines and brief them on the agreements that were established at joint
3 meetings at the highest level."
4 Q. Yes. And you -- and from -- you deduce what from that?
5 A. Madam Korner, I told you how I interpret the rules and
6 regulations. I can see that the practice was different, and I emphasise
7 that, in exceptional circumstances, the commanders could take people on
8 their own from work duty and transfer them to the military duty. And in
9 other cases, the regulations intend for this to be done by the authorised
10 organ upon the request of the units, military units.
11 Q. Yes. All right. I think you've dealt with that.
12 All right. Can we now move, please, to another aspect of matters
13 you were asked about. You were asked -- just get this right. Yes. This
14 was the -- a question of disciplinary -- who would discipline them. And
15 you were shown the document from General Talic about deserting Prijedor
17 MS. KORNER: And can we look, please -- no, I'm sorry. That's --
18 it is a topic I want to deal with, but it's not the one.
19 I want to look at, please, the documentation surrounding the
20 General Lisica, Colonel Lisica, as he was then, and Mr. Bjelosevic, chief
21 of the Doboj CSB correspondence.
22 Q. Because you were only shown one letter and I would like you to
23 look at that in context.
24 MS. KORNER: So could we have a look, please, at the document
25 which is P683 -- no, sorry. P -- sorry, yes. 1D283 -- 263, which is at
1 tab 75A.
2 Q. This is Bjelosevic to, in fact, Colonel Lisica, who responds to
3 it. 2nd of October.
4 "Due to the worsening security situation in the area of Serbian
5 municipalities" et cetera, et cetera, "... we are forced to withdraw the
6 police from combat operations on the front in Bosanski Brod and
8 Do you accept that he's not saying "please, may we withdraw,"
9 he's telling Colonel Lisica that he is going to withdraw them?
10 A. That's what it appears to be, Ms. Korner, but you cannot say
11 definitely whether he is asking him to do that or making the decision to
12 do that. Perhaps he is just informing him of the situation. It's
13 difficult to say what the word "forced to" means and what the
14 consequences of that would be.
15 Q. All right. He goes on to say:
16 "We will carry out the withdrawal of the police from these fronts
17 on the 4th of October, 1992."
18 In the last -- he then complains about uniformed -- he wants
19 closer ties with the military police.
20 "We hope you will correctly understand the reasons why we are
21 forced to withdraw the police from the battle-field. We also expect your
22 positive reply with regards to our request to organise and achieve a
23 higher level of association..."
24 Now, let's look at the only document that you were actually
25 shown at -- and I take it you were not shown the original letter by the
1 Defence because it wasn't on their list.
2 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] I apologise, I think Ms. Korner is
3 talking about the Stanisic Defence and is talking about that document.
4 MS. KORNER: Yes --
5 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Because there linked document.
6 There is a request, this one, and then there is a reply by Commander
7 Lisica to this where he does say, I do not permit that.
8 MS. KORNER: Do you know, I am just about to come to that, and I
9 made it clear I was just about to come to that. But my complaint is
10 that -- or the General has confirmed, rather by my complaint, that a
11 selected number of documents were shown, which I suggest are out of
13 Q. Now can we have at a look at the only document in this series
14 that you were shown by the Defence, which I was just about to, which is
15 tab 90 -- 92 of the Defence binder and is one --
16 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] I think this is an inappropriate
17 comment. Ms. Korner is leading the witness wrongly. She said that this
18 document hadn't been shown, which is wrong. It had been shown to him.
19 MS. KORNER: Let's ask the General rather than having this
20 unseemly --
21 Q. General, were you shown this document by either Mr. Krgovic or
22 Mr. Cvijetic, the one that we just looked at on the screen, which is the
23 first letter?
24 A. Ms. Korner, I will be as fair as so far. If it was shown to me
25 and if it can be found in my bibliography then I seen it, because I made
1 an oath to speak the truth, but I don't remember every single document.
2 If it was shown to me, I saw it.
3 Q. All right. Can we go then, please, to the document that you
4 actually looked at in court. As I say, that is Defence document 1D264.
5 MS. KORNER: We've got it up.
6 Q. This is the reply you were shown. Oh, no, it isn't. We haven't
7 got it up. Sorry.
8 MS. KORNER: Can we have it up, please. 1D264.
9 Q. This is the reply from Colonel Slavko Lisica, saying:
10 "I've understood your --" he calls it a proposal. "We're
11 satisfied with their work. We're going to pull them out for a rest, and
12 the reasons you provided are valid, but you don't understand the
13 situation we are in."
14 It was actually Mr. Cvijetic who was asking you about this
15 because he went on about there was Colonel Lisica putting defence above
17 And then can we look at the last of -- letter in this, please,
18 at -- which is 1D265, which is at tab 75B.
19 Now, did you see this letter, Colonel -- General? I'm so sorry.
20 A. Well, Ms. Korner, my reply would be the same in respect of all
21 documents. If it was shown to me, and if it's in my bibliography
22 then ...
23 Q. No, well it's clear it's not in your bibliography and you weren't
24 shown it in the court.
25 6th of October, Mr. Bjelosevic writes back saying:
1 "I received your reply of the 3rd --" and there's an order which
2 he's talking about, the 4th, which I don't believe we have. But anyhow.
3 "... all the more since I believe the co-operation between TG 3
4 and Doboj CSB has been excellent. Did we not fulfil each and every one
5 of your requests, put at your disposal a vehicle," and so on.
6 Whilst I was issuing -- could you -- the English here is rather
7 odd. Could you just read the sentence that comes after the words "poorly
9 A. Ms. Korner, I quote:
10 "While I was giving approval for the engagement of the police in
11 combat, without my consent or an order of the minister of the interior,
12 there was looting and disorder at a massive scale behind the lines, and
13 particularly, by military deserters ..."
14 Q. Okay. If you stop there, thank you, because that's the only part
15 I want.
16 All right. So reading that, if we look at this, the overall
17 picture is Bjelosevic writes to Lisica saying, I'm pulling the troops
18 out. Lisica says, No, you can't. And Bjelosevic then writes back
19 complaining that they co-operated and that approval has been given by him
20 for the use of police in combat; is that right?
21 A. Well, Ms. Korner, that's what one can conclude judging on this
23 Q. Right. And if, as is -- as General Talic complained,
24 Colonel Lisica is a very arrogant officer, then the -- I suppose can we
25 put it this way, it's a matter of common sense, isn't it, that the
1 relationship between the police and the army, at the lower levels
2 certainly, and possibly at higher levels, would -- might depend on the
3 character of the persons involved?
4 A. That is possible, Ms. Korner, but I'm saying here how people
5 should act and what is in line with the rules and regulations.
6 I would like to reiterate that the commander has the right to
7 take police officers who are under work obligation and change their
8 status to become military conscripts.
9 What you asked me yesterday - and I'm trying to help you here and
10 provide a foundation - who instigates proceedings, that depends on the
11 status of the police officer at that point in time; whether they are
12 under work obligation or military conscripts. And I can add that this is
13 provided for by the Law on All People's Defence from 1982. That's a
14 document which I enclosed, and in Articles 23, 24, 25, and especially 26,
15 that -- or, rather, all that regulates work obligation. And, if you
16 wish, I can read out Article 26.
17 Q. No. We've got all these articles -- it talks about, I agree,
18 about work obligation. But, all right.
19 MS. KORNER: Your Honours I will allow myself to be sidetracked
20 down this road, but I would ask for the extra time that I -- because this
21 is the General, I think, responding to my request that he -- I identify
22 the law. But I've got a number of other documents I want to put to him.
23 [Trial Chamber confers]
24 MS. KORNER: But I have only got about half -- well, I've got 35
25 minutes left.
1 [Trial Chamber confers]
2 JUDGE HALL: By extra time, you mean the extra 15 minutes that we
3 lost at the beginning?
4 MS. KORNER: No. If I'm going to be allowed to side -- if the
5 General wants to make this point, which I can -- he wants me to look at
6 Article 26. And I don't want to stop him because it wouldn't be fair,
7 but I don't actually particularly want to deal with this. I have got
8 other matters that I want to deal with.
9 JUDGE HALL: Well, Mr. Krgovic could pick that up in
11 MS. KORNER: Certainly.
12 JUDGE HALL: And we're at the time for the first break for the
14 [The witness stands down]
15 --- Recess taken at 10.25 a.m.
16 --- On resuming at 10.54 a.m.
17 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours --
18 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Zecevic.
19 MR. ZECEVIC: -- I notified the Registrar and the Court Officer
20 before the beginning of today that there is a matter I would like to
21 raise concerning the translations. And I -- and together with
22 Ms. Korner, we tried to resolve that situation over the break, but it --
23 we didn't -- we didn't resolve it.
24 And in the meantime there was another issue of the -- of the --
25 of the interpretation which I think was not correct in the transcript.
1 So I would need to raise this before the witness leaves, and I don't know
2 whether Your Honours would permit me to do so right now, or would you
3 like me to do that a bit later?
4 JUDGE HALL: The -- perhaps when Ms. Korner has finished her
5 cross-examination may be a convenient point before Mr. Krgovic begins his
6 re-examination, since it involves the witness who is presently on the
8 MR. ZECEVIC: I understand. Thank you.
9 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, the difficulty is the General has now
10 raised this question of what's in the Law on National Defence, which, I
11 think, was a response to something I put to him yesterday and invited him
12 to look for it. But I do have to deal with it. I cannot let it be dealt
13 with for re-examination because it's quite an important issue. And so
14 I -- I would ask, I'm afraid -- I appreciate that the General has been
15 here for a long time, but these really are major issues, and I would,
16 therefore, ask that I be given added time to deal, I hope fairly shortly,
17 with this thing he has just raised, and then to complete my
18 cross-examination with -- I have another dozen or so documents I want to
19 look at very quickly with him, but that would certainly take the whole of
20 the 35 minutes or so that I have left.
21 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
22 [Trial Chamber confers]
23 MS. KORNER: So, Your Honours, can I, in effect, I'd like another
24 45 to 50 minutes, please.
25 JUDGE HALL: You mean in total?
1 MS. KORNER: Yes.
2 [Trial Chamber confers]
3 [Prosecution counsel confer]
4 JUDGE HALL: Ms. Korner, the guillotine will descend 40 minutes
5 after the witness resumes the stand.
6 And while the witness is being escorted back to the stand, on
7 behalf of the chamber, we express our gratitude to CLSS for being able to
8 accommodate at very short notice the extended sitting which we have had
9 to arrange for today.
10 MS. KORNER: While we're waiting for the General to come in,
11 could we have document 1 -- L1 up on the screen, please.
12 [The witness takes the stand]
13 MS. KORNER:
14 Q. General, I want to deal extremely quickly, please, so please keep
15 your answers short, to what you've just raised with me.
16 You directed our attention to the parts of the Law on National
17 Defence which relate to work obligation.
18 Could we have up Article 23, please, at speed.
19 That sets out work obligation, and it talks about the time of war
20 and immediate threat of war, all citizens able to work, blah, blah, blah.
21 Next please could we have Article 24. It's on the screen there.
22 We need to go to the next page in English.
23 "Members of the police and other authorised official persons
24 employed with the internal affairs organs shall carry out their work
25 obligation within the internal affairs organ [sic]."
2 A. Correct, Ms. Korner.
3 Q. And Article 26, please, which is the next -- 26, yes, thank you.
4 "The performance" -- ah sorry, yes, Article 26:
5 "Performance of tasks and duties required by the armed forces and
6 the occasional performance of work significant for the defence of the
7 country shall be ordered by the competent municipal organ.
8 "In time of war if the need for immediate combat action of the
9 armed forces so required and the competent organ is unable to issue
10 tasks [sic]," blah blah.
11 You're reading that article, aren't you that the brigade
12 commander can then take over police?
13 MR. ZECEVIC: Battalion commander.
14 MS. KORNER: I'm sorry. Battalion commander.
15 Q. Yes?
16 A. That's correct, Ms. Korner.
17 Q. Whether that's right or wrong doesn't really matter for these
18 purposes because there was no state of war at this period in 1992, was
19 there? And there's a clear distinction drawn between immediate threat of
20 war and state of war in the original article.
21 A. Ms. Korner, I said that, in my opinion, there are no great
22 differences when it comes to the jurisdiction of the commander in a state
23 of imminent threat of war, on the one hand, and in a state of war on the
25 MR. KRGOVIC: Maybe I'm wrong, but maybe it's translation issue.
1 It was -- says in this article: "In the war."
2 [Interpretation] The imminent threat of war is not mentioned
3 here. The state of war isn't mentioned, either.
4 MS. KORNER: I fully appreciate it is talking about in time of
5 war, not an imminent threat of war.
6 Q. And it may be, may it not, General, one of the reasons why
7 General Talic was complaining that a state of war had not been declared
8 and, indeed, as we saw or as we know in 1994, maybe to get round the
9 problems, a state of war was declared?
10 So it does have an illegal effect, doesn't it General? Or if
11 you'd -- I mean, you told us you're not a lawyer, so if you don't know,
12 say so.
13 A. The previous article should also be read. That I believe it also
14 mentions the imminent threat of war. And to my mind, the law should be
15 interpreted as a whole. That is why I relied on this law.
16 Q. All right. Well, General, I suggest to you that contrary to what
17 you are asserting these provisions had no effect on the actual --
18 certainly on the actual reality and indeed as you yourself said, let me
19 just find it, page ...
20 When I was asking you about a document from Mr. Bjelosevic, when
21 you quoted -- no, sorry. Zupljanin document in September. And you said:
22 "Ms. Korner I told you" --
23 This is it page 20, line 12:
24 "I told you how I interpret the rules and
25 regular legislations [sic]. I can see the practice was different, and I
1 emphasise that in exceptional circumstances the commanders could take
2 people on their own from work duty and transfer them to military duty and
3 in other cases the regulations intend for this to be done by the
4 authorised organ upon the request of the units, military units."
5 And you were referring there, were you not, the authorised organ,
6 to the MUP?
7 A. No, Ms. Korner. The competent municipal organ. I said it was an
8 organ from the defence system, and it has a very wide authority.
9 Q. But do you agree that it's clear from the --
10 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm -- I'm really sorry. I know Ms. Korner you're
11 pressed, but the witness was starting to -- the -- give the answer, and
12 the part of his answer was not recorded. And I think it's important. He
13 mentioned the minister of defence.
14 MS. KORNER: Do you know, I'm not at all clear under right
15 Mr. Zecevic keeps standing up. This is not his witness. This is
16 Mr. Krgovic's witness.
17 Q. However, General, repeat, please, your answer.
18 A. Ms. Korner, it is very difficult for me to do that because I,
19 too, am trying to be helpful. Here it says that this is in the remit of
20 the municipal defence organ which is under the Ministry of Defence.
21 I wanted to add that, during a war, conscription has priority
22 over any other duties, and that is clearly stated in various laws.
23 Q. Yes. But clearly the article we looked at earlier, Article 24,
24 intends that the police shall be, if you like, exempt from this
25 all-encompassing conscription of those under work obligation. Because it
1 says they will do it in the ministry of internal affairs unless, and I
2 suggest that it's quite clear from Article 26, it's talking about if
3 there's an actual time or state of war.
4 And you say you don't agree with that. So that's all I want to
5 deal with you on this.
6 MS. KORNER: Can we move, please, back to what I'm trying to do
7 at considerable speed this morning, and that is look at the documents,
9 Q. You were shown during the course of your examination-in-chief, or
10 cross-examination, so-called, by Mr. Cvijetic, a document in which
11 General Talic sent to the CSB and the 343rd Brigade, a complaint about
12 deserting soldiers, saying that criminal charges had to be brought. And
13 he was quoting what the Main Staff had apparently told him.
14 And you say that's a clear example that the military dealt well
15 discipline. Do you remember saying that?
16 A. I cannot remember what I said, but I can comment --
17 Q. No, I don't want your comment.
18 A. -- the document with you, Ms. Korner.
19 Q. No, you've already commented. I want to show you another
20 document, please.
21 Do you agree that desertion is a military offence?
22 A. That's correct, Ms. Korner.
23 Q. Do you also agree that failing to obey an order is a military
25 A. Likewise, Ms. Korner.
1 Q. All right. Could you have a look now, please, at document --
2 Exhibit 1888, I think. Tab 75C.
3 A. Ms. Korner, if you allow, while we're waiting --
4 Q. No, the document's here.
5 This is a document, the 18th of October, which is being sent to
6 the SJB by Stojan Zupljanin to the chief. Looks like it's Gradiska, I
8 It starts:
9 "At the request of the 1st Krajina Corps on 12th of October, 107
10 members of the police," in fact, it's a number of them, "36 from
11 Banja Luka, 35 from Prijedor, 35 from Gradiska, and a senior worker from
12 Banja Luka CSB were resubordinated to the Republika Srpska to carry out
13 specific tasks. On the 17th of October 1992 all 35 workers of Gradiska
14 refused to take any further orders from the officers and voluntarily
15 returned to Gradiska. The chief the CSB ordered on the 17 October that
16 on the morning of the 18th a new police platoon at Gradiska was to be
17 sent to continue the tasks, that all workers who refused to obey orders
18 were suspended, and criminal measures filed against them."
19 Do you accept that it is clear from this, that for this breach of
20 military discipline, it is the police who are taking the disciplinary
21 measures? Or, indeed, criminal measures, in fact.
22 A. Ms. Korner, in this case, these persons were military conscripts,
23 and according to what I say in my report, proceedings should have been
24 instigated by the military commanders to whose contingent these persons
25 belonged --
1 Q. Yes.
2 A. -- if this is your question.
3 Q. Yes, but that is not what's happening, is it, from this document?
4 It's not the military. It's the police who are bringing these charges.
5 Do you agree with that, before I put my next question to you?
6 A. Ms. Korner, I'm trying to see where it states that the police
7 initiated things. But in any case it's better for someone to start
8 things off rather than no one doing it, from the aspect of establishing
9 law and order and determining responsibility.
10 Q. I quite agree. But the point that I'm trying to make to you is
11 that your assertion, which is that only the military could take
12 proceedings because these were military conscripts, is misconceived. And
13 that's because you haven't looked at all the documents.
14 A. No, Ms. Korner.
15 Q. Right. And I suggest to you that when you say they become
16 military conscripts, they remain, I suggest, policemen who have been
17 resubordinated for the purposes of unity or singleness of command but
18 that if disciplinary proceedings are to be taken, it will be done within
19 their own chain of command.
20 Do you accept that?
21 A. No, Ms. Korner.
22 Q. All right. Because, logically, I suggest to you, it would be
23 inconceivable that the military would take these measures, first, because
24 I don't imagine they had any desire to, because it was a lot of
25 administrative work. But, second, because they had no power to remove
1 these people as police officers, did they? Which is the ultimate
2 disciplinary sanction.
3 A. Ms. Korner, when a person is being transferred from work duty to
4 military duty, their status changes. They receive a different
5 assignment. They received a different coloured paper. And all of that
6 is in force for as long as they are a military person. They are assigned
7 different powers and are responsible along the military line. This is
8 what the military rules and regulations state. And in war time, you
9 cannot interpret it other than like that, because those issues are
10 exclusively under the jurisdiction of military commanders when they are
11 dealing with military personnel.
12 Q. I know. That is the Defence case and that the case you are
13 putting forward.
14 But my suggestion to you is, logically, how could the military
15 in -- take disciplinary proceedings which meant the removal of a police
16 officer as an authorised official? He couldn't, could he? Only the
17 minister could do that?
18 A. Ms. Korner, that person is not a policeman at that point. They
19 are a military conscript. So the question whether they would return to
20 their previous post is something that, again, has to follow procedure,
21 through the authorised organ so that his status could be changed again.
22 And, on the -- in the Law on Military Duty, for which you say has not
23 been seen here but which I did provide, and in Article
24 111 [as interpreted] it says precisely when somebody starts their
25 military duty and when they end it.
1 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, I believe the witness said Article 11,
2 and it's recorded 111.
3 MS. KORNER:
4 Q. All right, General. I don't want to get too bogged down in this.
5 Do you have any explanation then why, on the face of this
6 document, Zupljanin is saying that the chief of the Banja Luka CSB
7 ordered, firstly, a new police platoon; and, secondly, criminal measures
8 to be filed against them?
9 A. Ms. Korner, I don't want to comment this particular case. I'm
10 talking about the rules and regulations and what they state and how it
11 should have been done. I personally agree that this is something that
12 should have been sanctioned and that it's better that someone did it,
13 rather than no one.
14 Q. Yes. You're talking about your interpretation of rules and
15 regulations of which you have no idea of their application to the VRS or
16 the MUP during 1992. That's correct, isn't it? You simply don't know
17 what happened in practice.
18 A. No, Ms. Korner.
19 Q. Okay. Can we look now, please, quickly at document number 76,
21 A. I apologise, Ms. Korner, but I'm confused. I think you put two
22 questions to me just previously. Perhaps one should have had the answer
23 yes and the other one no, if I have a right to that.
24 Q. Yes.
25 A. I cannot think so quickly.
1 Q. Yes. I see that, yes. You're going to say, yes, it's your
2 interpretation; and, no, you don't know about -- and you agree that you
3 don't know what happened in practice. I accept that.
4 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Well, now, perhaps Ms. Korner needs
5 to put the questions again, because now this is not clear.
6 MS. KORNER: No. You can re-examine.
7 Yes. All right. Directive 4, very quickly, please. That's not
8 Directive 4. P1780.
9 Q. And this deals with the -- the police brigade that you were again
10 only shown one document about.
11 Have you seen -- no, I don't think you've seen this before.
12 This is the directive that was issued by the Main Staff in
13 respect of further operations. And, in fact, I don't think we need to
14 look at it because, I beg your pardon, what comes out of it is what is
16 MS. KORNER: Can we have a look, please, at the next document.
17 The date of Directive 4 was the 19th of November.
18 So could we have a look now, please, at document P1668,
19 Your Honours, which is under seal - it's tab 77 - and therefore shouldn't
20 go out on the screen.
21 Q. It's dated 21st of November, two days later. It's from Talic to
22 Zupljanin. It's headed: Engaging the Unit in Combat Activities."
23 And then:
24 "In accordance with expressed needs our detailed assessment, the
25 requirement to remain [sic] the existing corridor ..." et cetera.
1 "It's our opinion that the engagement of strong forces from your
2 units would be necessary and unavoidable."
3 And then in the third paragraph:
4 "We therefore ask you to immediately begin preparing, organising,
5 and establishing police units ..."
6 Do you go the word is "ask"? It's not "order," it's "ask"?
7 A. Ms. Korner, it says both. First, it says we ask --
8 Q. Okay. Can you read out the --
9 A. -- and then --
10 Q. Read out -- read out the whole paragraph, please.
11 A. "We ask you to immediately begin preparing, organising, and
12 establishing police units with a strength of at least two battalions, and
13 more, if possible."
14 Q. Yes. And you say it says both. Where is the word "order"?
15 A. After the word "molimo vas," we ask you to immediately begin.
16 Then this would be the tone of an order that relates to preparing,
17 organising, and establishing, and it determines precisely the strength.
18 It's possible that it's something that's being asked -- that is being
19 asked regarding the strength and the preparations themselves. It's
20 difficult for me to interpret this document of the commander of the 1st
21 Krajina Corps.
22 Q. All right.
23 A. I think.
24 Q. Well, I agree that it's not fair to ask you that.
25 Can we look, please, at the next document then in this whole
1 series which led up to the January document that you were shown by the
3 Could we look, please, at 2D119, also under seal, so not on the
4 screen. Not on the public screen.
5 22nd of November, so the following day, Zupljanin -- yep.
6 Zupljanin issues the order because it's gone from the minister, he says:
7 "In accordance with the order of the Ministry of Interior of
8 Republika Srpska ... on the basis of a dispatch from the commander of the
9 1st Krajina Corps ..."
10 And that's the one that we've just looked at because it's got
11 that number, 730192. So clearly Talic has sent this to minister, copied
12 it Zupljanin, and the minister has now given him the order. Would you
13 agree with that?
14 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry. I'm sorry, this is unfair because if
15 Ms. Korner is showing the document of Talic referring to the document,
16 she must refer to the order of the minister as well. That is the
17 document from 15th of May.
18 MS. KORNER: Yes. I agree.
19 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes, but the --
20 MS. KORNER: Why do I have to show it to him again?
21 MR. ZECEVIC: But that that document precedes.
22 MS. KORNER: I accept that entirely.
23 Yes, I see -- okay. I see the point Mr. Zecevic is making. I
24 said that the order has gone from Talic to the minister.
25 Q. It is based on the minister's order of the 15th of May and the
1 document has gone from Talic to Zupljanin who then makes this order. I
2 accept that.
3 Do you see there that in fact at this stage of the game the
4 person who is appointed to command this police brigade, which I fully
5 accept, General, was resubordinated properly to the 1st Krajina Corps.
6 Do you see that the commander was a gentleman named Brane
8 A. That's correct, Ms. Korner.
9 Q. Who was in fact -- who was in fact, and the Court knows this, was
10 a member of the MUP.
11 Right. And then what then happens, we can see, is -- well, what
12 we know is that Lieutenant-Colonel Peulic gets -- replaces Mr. Pecanac,
13 and then he is replaced in the one document that the Defence showed you
14 in January, by this other military officer.
15 Now, can we look next, please, at 1D172.
16 I can't remember whether you were shown this document or not,
17 General. Have you seen this document before? This is the establishment
18 of the Supreme Command.
19 A. Ms. Korner, I think that the document is there, in the
20 description of my work. I'm not sure, but I would have to check.
21 Q. Don't worry. I'm not -- [indiscernible]
22 A. Because earlier I --
23 Q. Yes. Anyhow, all I want to ask you about is this. Article 2
24 says who the Supreme Command is: The president, the supreme commander of
25 the Presidency, national assembly, prime minister, national defence, and
1 the minister of the interior.
2 Would you agree that this is an attempt to try and, as it were,
3 pull together what was effectively the reality of the situation, that the
4 minister of the interior, during the course of 1992, had the power to
5 refuse to give his men to the army and, therefore, it was decided to pass
6 this law?
7 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, which law are we talking about?
8 MS. KORNER: Decision, sorry. I beg your pardon, decision.
9 Q. Make this decision.
10 A. Ms. Korner, this is a decision on the forming of the Supreme
11 Command, and I don't understand why we're talking about the powers of the
12 minister of the interior. I cannot just put that in the context that
13 you --
14 Q. All right.
15 A. -- would wish for --
16 Q. Are you able to think of a reason why, when, according to you,
17 the minister of the interior should -- had no power to -- to make any
18 orders in respect of the army, he should now suddenly become part of the
19 Supreme Command?
20 A. Ms. Korner, I think that the Supreme Commander commands the army
21 on behalf of the Supreme Command, not the Supreme Command.
22 Q. All right. I think I made my point.
23 Moving on, speedily, please. Can we look now, please, at the MUP
24 report for the year 1992, P625.
25 Can we look, please, at - one, two, three -- fourth page in
1 English. And fifth page, I think, yes. Thank you.
2 MS. KORNER: Do we see -- actually, you need to go to the next
3 page in B/C/S, please.
4 Q. The activities of police employees from the beginning of the
5 armed conflict varied from one station to another. For example:
6 "Employees in police stations in Bihac," et cetera, et cetera,
7 "joined in the combat activities from the outset whilst other
8 municipalities where there was less fighting, or it began later, the
9 police at first began to carry out their regular tasks and duties which
10 included disarming groups --" and I'm sorry. Doesn't say "which
11 included," I'm suggesting that's what it says. "Disarming groups,
12 finding and seizing weapons, and when the need arose they joined the Army
13 of the Republika Srpska.
14 Do you see that?
15 A. I can see that, yes.
16 Q. It makes a distinction, does it not, with their regular duties
17 which included disarming groups, unspecified, and then when the need
18 arose, joining the RS, I suggest -- the VRS, as resubordinated police
20 A. That is correct, Ms. Korner.
21 Q. Yes, I don't think I need more about this. Now, I want to look,
22 please, finally at the 1994 law that you were shown by Mr. Cvijetic. And
23 this is Defence tab 16, L317. I say "finally." I do have three more
24 documents on other aspects I want to put to you, but this is the last one
25 on the topic of resubordination.
1 This is Decree on the Promulgation of the Law on the
2 Implementation of the Law on Ministries During an Imminent Threat of War
3 or a State of War, and I think agreed with Mr. Cvijetic, this was to
4 regularise, wasn't it, and incorporate into a law the various earlier
5 laws and practice of what had happened. Would you agree with that? I
6 think you did agree with that with Mr. Cvijetic?
7 A. I do agree, if that is I what I said about that.
8 Q. Now, I want to look at, please, with you, the law of -- first one
9 what you looked at, the Law on Implementation of the Defence, Article 2,
10 the armed forces include the units of the Ministry of Interior.
11 And then can we look, please, at the -- the implementation on the
12 Law of Affairs [sic], please, which is page 9 of the English.
13 Is that what's showing?
14 MS. KORNER: Could somebody please indicate to me where it is in
16 MR. CVIJETIC: [Interpretation] Page 4; and in the English, it's
17 page 9, Article 4.
18 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated] Not interested in Article
20 "Procedures to be adopted by the ministry. The ministry may take
21 the following measures."
22 Q. So it's setting out the procedures that the ministry of internal
23 affairs will take in those circumstances; is that right?
24 A. Right.
25 Q. Move on, please, to the next part, 3: "Responsibility of
1 ministry personnel."
2 Disciplinary measures -- Article 9, sorry.
3 "Disciplinary measures shall be imposed by the Ministry of
4 Interior [sic] or a person authorised by him."
5 It then sets out what the punishments shall be, that -- what the
6 sanctions will be, and says in Article 11:
7 "Disciplinary proceedings issued before this law entered into
8 force shall be completed according to the provisions of this law."
9 Then the next part is the use of police in combat operations.
10 Article 12 through to 17. Which is really, to a large extent,
11 reincorporating Article 104 and adding to that article about what happens
12 to the police.
13 But nowhere does it say that the minister's right to conduct
14 disciplinary proceedings does not apply when members of the MUP are
15 resubordinated, does it, General?
16 A. Yes. But, Ms. Korner, I don't have the whole law in front of me.
17 But I still maintain that in situations when police units are
18 subordinated to a military commander and become military conscripts, then
19 that would be under the jurisdiction of the military commander.
20 Q. I know you keep asserting it, and I know that's what the Defence
21 case is. But, surely, General, even you will admit that in a law that
22 was passed to make it abundantly clear what the relationship between the
23 MUP and the army was, they would have said, Disciplinary proceedings will
24 be conducted by the minister unless resubordination has taken place, in
25 which case, it is the army?
1 A. That's right, Ms. Korner.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 JUDGE HALL: Ms. Korner, you were allowed an extra five minutes
4 to accommodate the loading of documents and the other interruptions, but
5 your time is now expired.
6 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, with the greatest respect, I really
7 would ask that I be allowed -- because there have been a number of
8 assertions which I have not covered -- I have at least -- I would ask at
9 least that I can put two more documents because we've not covered at all
10 the -- the -- the Crisis Staffs.
11 Your Honours, I haven't reached the 20 hours I asked for. I knew
12 this would be a lengthy cross-examination. I did not realise, of course,
13 that I would have to spend so much time on his report and the sources.
14 But, Your Honour, that is important. Whatever the Defence may complain
15 about, because of the submissions I shall be making at the end, which I
16 tried to make in the middle.
17 Your Honours, I would ask that I be allowed to put these
19 [Trial Chamber confers]
20 JUDGE HALL: Ten minutes, Ms. Korner.
21 MS. KORNER: Thank you.
22 Q. General, you told Mr. Cvijetic that during the course of your
23 examination of documents you had looked at documents relating to Crisis
24 Staffs. They do not appear in your bibliography, they did not appear in
25 any of the lists of the Defence -- well, I'm sorry, your bibliography for
1 the report. So can we take it that you did not look at any documents
2 when preparing your report that were issued but the Crisis Staffs?
3 A. I do not remember, Ms. Korner.
4 Q. All right. I want to show you, however, because in relation to
5 town commands, you've made various assertions that they are set up by a
6 military officer, and it's entirely him who sets them up.
7 I want you to look, please, at a document, P448, which is at
8 tab 55.
9 MS. KORNER: In English, could we look, please, at the third
10 page; and in B/C/S, it is page ... the third page, I think. No,
11 bottom -- yes, that page. Bottom.
12 Q. These are the books of minutes that were kept by the Kljuc Crisis
13 Staff and there they set out -- it's on 27th of May, the relationship
14 between the military and civilian authorities shall be as follows. The
15 military authorities will follow the orders of the civilian authorities.
16 The civilian authorities will not interfere with the way they are
18 Although it's -- it's rather pre-emptory put, that, in fact, is
19 right, isn't it? Because it was the political element that set the goals
20 and it was for the military to carry out those goals. Would you agree
21 with that?
22 A. That is correct, Ms. Korner, if you're referring to that period.
23 Q. Right.
24 MS. KORNER: And then, can we look next, please, at document --
25 sorry, page 3 of this document in English -- oh, sorry, two pages on in
1 English. And it's -- the trouble is this was labelled very badly,
2 Your Honours, in the original.
3 In the B/C/S, it's -- it says, 38 -- it's got no page number so I
4 can't tell. It says 3003 or 500573884 -- 883, sorry. Yes.
5 Q. This is meeting of the 29th of May. And it says, under the
6 session the following was concluding [sic] that a defence command should
7 be set up and that Major Bosko Lukic should be appointed a commander.
8 Its commander.
9 Do you accept that from this document the Crisis Staff is making
10 the decision that a town command should be set up? A defence command
11 it's called, I'm sorry.
12 A. Ms. Korner, as far as I remember, I said that, according to the
13 laws and regulations, defence commands shall be set up. That is mostly
14 done in a situation when the authorities in the area concerned are not
15 functional, or when the situation demands that all forces be integrated
16 and put under the command of the defence commander. And I cannot see
17 from this who it is that's supposed to do that, to set it up.
18 The commander of the defence command is directly appointed by the
19 superior officer.
20 Q. Well, I know that's what you say. And can I say I accept
21 entirely town commands came into existence when the civilian authorities
22 were unable to function.
23 However, here, it would appear, that the defence -- the municipal
24 Crisis Staff of which, I don't know whether you know that, the SJB chief,
25 the military -- the local military chief, were all members. Did you know
2 A. The command of the town command includes all the organs in the
3 area. I'm talking about what the theory says and how it should be. I
4 don't know how it really was in this particular case.
5 Q. All right. Well, here, the Kljuc Crisis Staff is saying the
6 defence command should look [sic] up, and can we look, please, finally,
7 and that is the last document I want you to look at, is at document
8 P1783, at tab 29.
9 The meeting of the Kljuc Crisis Staff that we looked at was the
10 29th of May. On the 31st of May, we have Colonel Galic putting into
11 effect the order or the request of the -- the Kljuc Crisis Staff and
12 setting up the --
13 MR. KRGOVIC: Where is in this document? Where is mentioned in
14 this document? Or is this suggestion by Ms. Korner, because it is not
15 what is in this document.
16 MS. KORNER: I'm sorry, I don't understand Mr. Krgovic's
18 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Where does the document say that
19 the commander is implementing the decision of the Crisis Staff?
20 MS. KORNER: It's my suggestion. On the 31st -- 29th of May, and
21 I -- on the 29th of May, the Kljuc orders -- municipal Crisis Staff
22 orders that a defence command be set up.
23 On the 31st of May, Colonel Galic sets up a defence command.
24 Q. With the assistance of Mr. Krgovic, are you going to say,
25 General, that these two events are not connected?
1 A. Ms. Korner, these two events are -- probably are connected, but
2 it's the division commander here who decides about setting up a defence
3 command of the town. He is the superior commander of the brigade
4 commander. It is not logical for the president of the municipal assembly
5 who was in power should take a decision to renounce power and transfer
6 himself to another organ where a military officer would be his commander.
7 Q. No. The situation is this, isn't it: That where there was a
8 complete breakdown of civilian authority for as short a period as
9 possible - and I haven't got time to show other documents, but that's
10 evident - what's called a town or defence command was set up. That's
11 right, isn't it?
12 A. That's right Ms. Korner.
13 Q. And as soon as it was possible for the normal civilian, that is
14 to say, municipal presidents, police and the like, to function, the town
15 command was abolished?
16 A. That's right, Ms. Korner.
17 Q. Yes. General, thank you very much.
18 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Krgovic, before you begin, you would recall that
19 Mr. Zecevic, there is a matter that he raised with which he wanted to
21 General, we're near time for the break, but there is an short
22 procedural matter with which we have to deal so I would ask the usher to
23 escort you out a little ahead of us. And we would resume in 25 minutes.
24 [The witness stands down]
25 JUDGE HALL: Yes, Mr. Zecevic.
1 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you very much, Your Honours.
2 Your Honours, yesterday, during the cross-examination of this
3 witness, on pages 63, line 1, to 68, line 1, Ms. Korner was suggesting to
4 the witness when reading from the document, which is 1D46 -- if we can
5 have that document up, please. Ms. Korner suggested to the witness that
6 the -- that the wording of the document says that means -- that the word
7 "may" means that it is not given that police forces will be used. "It is
8 within the authority of the minister or the chiefs of the CSB."
9 Your Honours, the problem is that this is wholly erroneous
10 interpretation and misleading to the witness. We didn't want to raise
11 it, because, at the time when it was -- when the question was asked,
12 because it would be -- it might be perceived as we are trying to coach
13 the witness. But this is an important thing, Your Honours, and it's very
14 illustrative of the -- of the problems that -- that might develop further
15 on where Your Honours are going to determine the issues in this case, and
16 the understanding of our friends from the Office of the Prosecutor;
17 namely, linguistic interpretation of the meaning of the word is done from
18 the translation, as opposed that it's done from the original. From the
19 original, Your Honours, it is very clear, it's at paragraph 7 that I'm
20 talking about. Paragraph 7, first page.
21 It is -- it is very clear from the Serbian language that the word
22 "may" is used to -- to state the authority of the persons who are
23 entitled to take that decision. It has nothing to do with their
24 understanding, as Ms. Korner is putting, whether -- whether it's given
25 that the police will be used or -- or that they have any -- any -- any
1 doubts about that.
2 It is just that the -- that the word "moze," m-o-z-e, in Serbian
3 language, is used as "can," as "may." There is no distinction. So the
4 question that is answered in this paragraph 7 is: Who can order the use
5 of the police forces in combat? And it says:
6 "The use of the police in combat can be ordered, or may be
7 ordered by ..."
8 Therefore, it strictly, from the -- from -- from the Serbian
9 language, it's strictly, and there is no doubt about it whatsoever, that
10 this refers to the persons, the three persons, the minister, the
11 commander of a special brigade in the case of the CSB Sarajevo, and the
12 other CSB officers.
13 Therefore, I -- I -- I'm just raising this because this is a --
14 this is a problem which we will be facing when -- when -- when we are --
15 when we are coming down to the actual presentation of -- of our final
16 submissions. And this is, in my opinion, a relatively big problem, and
17 I'm not sure what is the -- what is the -- the best way how to -- to deal
18 with this.
19 JUDGE HALL: If I may inject a measure of confusion, Mr. Zecevic.
20 I refrained yesterday, when Ms. Korner was pursuing this, from making the
21 observation that, apart from the inherent difficulty of dealing with the
22 interpretation from one language to another, even among English speakers
23 in the construction of statues, the word "may" is confusing because
24 whereas ordinarily it is permissive, there are occasions in which "may"
25 is mandatory.
1 So it struck me at the time, and from what you have said today I
2 am reinforced in that view, that this is a matter ripe for argumentation,
3 and no doubt at the appropriate time the Chamber is going to have the
4 benefit - and I use that term advisedly - of submissions from both sides
5 to the extent that anything turns on this.
6 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you very much, Your Honours. I understand.
7 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, can I say, we did try to reach
8 agreement, but there's, I'm afraid, for Your Honours -- the reasons that
9 Your Honour has already articulated, those that I consulted who -- who
10 are native speakers of the language, didn't wholly agree with
11 Mr. Krgovic's interpretation of it. And as I said, of course, it is
12 Stanisic's right not to give evidence, but in the end, the only person
13 who can explain what he meant by that order is the minister himself.
14 And as Your Honour has said, the rest is for argument and what
15 follows and that will be the difference between the two of us.
16 Now, the second -- I believe Mr. Zecevic has another matter that
17 he wanted to raise on interpretation.
18 JUDGE HALL: Yes, Mr. Zecevic.
19 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, today, at page -- I'm sorry. Page
20 19, line 23. The witness was shown the document - just bear with me
21 Your Honour, one second - it's document P1094. And then a part of it was
22 read to the -- to the witness. And -- or it was -- Ms. Korner was asking
23 the witness to read the part of the -- of that document. And the witness
24 says, 19, 23:
25 "I think here Mr. Zupljanin, and it says:
1 'I kindly ask the corps commander to draw the attention of the
2 lower-ranking commands.'"
3 Then Ms. Korner:
4 "Could you pause there for a moment. The word 'kindly' doesn't
5 appear in the English translation. Where does that appear?"
6 "Interpreter's correction: I ask."
7 Ms. Korner: "Thank you."
8 Your Honours, the word is "molim." The word is "molim." It is:
9 "I kindly ask."
10 Now, Ms. Korner is using -- Ms. Korner is using this document to
11 show the relationship between Mr. Zupljanin and the corps commander. The
12 nature of the relationship --
13 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated]
14 MR. ZECEVIC: Please, Ms. Korner.
15 Trying to show the -- the relationship between the two persons.
16 And in my opinion, this might create a different understanding than it is
17 in the document itself. It's, again, Your Honours, with all due respect,
18 the same problem as I -- as I -- as I stated before.
19 JUDGE HALL: So unless I'm missing something, is this -- does
20 this have to be referred back for translation? Or, again, is this a
21 matter which will be left to argument.
22 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes, yes, but all means, it needs to be re-sent
23 back to CLSS to retranslate.
24 Thank you.
25 JUDGE HALL: You don't resist that, Ms. Korner?
1 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated] Your Honours, in fact,
2 funnily enough, my understanding of the word "molim," which I have heard
3 on a number of occasions, is it means "please."
4 But I think if there is a dispute, and it's a Defence document,
5 it needs to go back for translation.
6 JUDGE HALL: Yes. So ordered.
7 So we return in 20 minutes.
8 --- Recess taken at 12.08 p.m.
9 --- On resuming at 12.33 p.m.
10 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
11 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Krgovic, I would remind you that we would be
12 adjourning at 1.30, with a view to reconvening at 2.30.
13 MR. KRGOVIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
14 [The witness takes the stand]
15 Re-examination by Mr. Krgovic:
16 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon.
17 A. Good afternoon.
18 Q. Let us return to the last topic you discussed with Ms. Korner,
19 and that was the town command, or defence command of Kljuc.
20 You then said who was authorised to take that decision, and in
21 connection with that, let us take a look at a document.
22 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, it's -- please bear
23 with me. 65 ter 2025.
24 THE INTERPRETER: Could all unnecessary microphones be switched
25 off. Thank you.
1 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] It's 20225. That's tab 12 in the
2 Prosecution binder.
3 Q. General, this, according to the Prosecution, is from the
4 1st Krajina Corps. It says: "Duty team."
5 Please look at page 78 in the Serbian.
6 And it's on pages 59 and 60 in English.
7 There's an entry here, paragraph 2:
8 "The commander decided to set up a special command for the
9 defence of Kljuc and the entire municipality, which is to comprise," and
10 he is now listing the units and the control of the area.
11 And it goes on to say that another battalion is to be set up from
12 the Kljuc area to be deployed in the area of Krasulje, Ramici, Kamicak
13 and some independent companies and police are included there.
14 General, this is a document from the corps command. Can you
15 please comment on these authorities, or authorisations, as -- about which
16 you spoke to Ms. Korner. And what is the relationship between this
17 battalion and the part where the police is mentioned?
18 A. Mr. Krgovic, this document confirms what I said to Ms. Korner,
19 that the military commander decides about setting up town commands. He
20 determines the structures and forces, all of which in conditions when the
21 authorities are not functional. All forces are then under the command of
22 the town command commander, and they're all subordinated to him.
23 Q. It goes on to say that another battalion is to be set up from the
24 area of Kljuc and there are some independent companies and police.
25 What about these independent companies and police with regard to
1 paragraph 26 of the Law on All People's Defence? Could you please
2 comment on this paragraph, bearing that in mind.
3 A. Mr. Krgovic, the police mentioned here is subordinated to the
4 commander of the town defence command. This is a direct resubordination
5 of all forces, not only the police, in that area. This police here, if
6 that's what you mean, has the status of subordinated unit with regard to
7 the commander of the town defence command.
8 Q. I'll show you another paragraph from this document.
9 MS. KORNER: I'm sorry, before we leave this document, could we
10 be shown on the screen the date of this entry? Which is on the previous
11 page in English.
12 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] The date is 30 May. I apologise, I
13 wanted to show the first page, but I don't know the page reference for
14 the English version.
15 Q. Please look at page -- yes, here you see it, it's 30 May.
16 And now let's see page 13 in the Serbian and 11 in the English.
17 General, Ms. Korner showed you this document in the context of
18 information and the functioning of communications, as well as the good
19 functioning of the corps, or corps. And I'll read out this paragraph and
20 these are supposed to be the words of Major Kojic.
21 It says:
22 "A generally disorganised situation.
23 "Every TO staff runs a separate operation.
24 "Second Lieutenant Dabic and the lieutenant from the special
25 purpose unit working according to a plan of their own.
1 "I cannot go on like this, I am asking for someone to come here
2 and co-ordinate all this because I feel like leaving.
3 "There is no communication with anyone.
4 "A single command should be established and all actions
5 co-ordinated, otherwise, this will all come to nothing."
6 General, this document of the 1st Krajina Corps, what does it say
7 about the general situation in Republika Srpska, to your mind?
8 A. Mr. Krgovic, when I was writing my report and making my
9 assertions, I don't want to quote wrongly now, but the foundation for my
10 assertions is, first and foremost, the analysis of combat readiness of
11 the VRS, where at several places there is talk about the problems with
12 the functioning. There was a section about morale, as far as I remember,
13 another section about communications, the poor training level of the
14 force, the failure of officers from Serbia to arrive, and the like.
15 Q. General, when Ms. Korner asked you about some of the things you
16 said in the introductory part, you referred several times to analysis of
17 combat readiness. General, are you able to tell us so that we would all
18 know, what is an analysis of combat readiness? What does this document
20 A. Mr. Krgovic, an analysis of combat readiness is one of the
21 compulsory activities of the units and commands at all levels. It is
22 carried out at the end of the calendar year, and it's a summary by
23 specifically determined questions, as well as an analysis before that of
24 the overall situation in the army, pursuant to pre-set elements of combat
25 readiness. And this is something that is used to this day in all the
1 armies, and the top state leadership is informed about its conclusions,
2 if we're talking about the top level, where an analysis of the entire
3 army is carried out.
4 So it's a statement of the status, the problems, the way to
5 resolve the problems, relationships, organisational issues, and numerous
6 other issues. It deals with -- it usually ends with conclusions,
7 assignments to subordinated units, as well as a proposal for measures
8 relating to the superior command. And, in this instance, this refers to
9 the state leadership.
10 Q. General, if we wanted to see what the situation was in a specific
11 army, in a specific time-period, what the problems were, what the
12 situation was, which document would be the best used for such a purpose?
13 A. Mr. Krgovic, it would be this precise document. And that's why
14 it's always given the highest confidentiality classification.
15 Q. You mean the analysis of combat readiness?
16 A. That is correct, Mr. Krgovic. I was thinking of the analysis of
17 the combat readiness of a command, a unit, and its importance grows with
18 the levels of command that it covers. The higher the level, the greater
19 the importance.
20 Q. General, now I'm going to show you 01071, tab --
21 JUDGE HALL: If I may, Mr. Krgovic.
22 General, the -- one -- one of your answers to Mr. Krgovic -- "as
23 well as a proposal for measures related to superior command. And in this
24 instance this refers to state leadership." Is this -- when you say
25 "state leadership," do I understand you to mean political leadership, as
1 contrasted with the highest military leadership?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, since we're talking
3 about an analysis of combat readiness of the highest military level, I
4 meant that the proposed measures would be submitted to the top. In this
5 specific case, to the president of the republic as the Supreme Commander.
6 And that is something that is the -- the commander's duty and the
7 Main Staff to submit this to the supreme commander, i.e., the president,
8 once a year.
9 JUDGE HALL: And do I correctly infer when, in one of your
10 earlier answers, you talked about the -- I think you used the word
11 "elements" against which the performance is measured, this is also set by
12 the leadership at that level.
13 Am I correct in that conclusion?
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, the elements of
15 combat readiness that are being analysed and used to develop the rules
16 are set by the rules and regulations. For example, number one would be
17 the control -- command and control; number two would be level of
18 training; number three would be morale; four would be personnel policies;
19 five would be logistics and so on and so forth.
20 There's no need for me to mention all the details.
21 These are pre-set elements, set by the rules and regulations.
22 JUDGE HALL: Thank you, General.
23 Yes, Mr. Krgovic.
24 Q. [Interpretation] General, you mentioned earlier that there are
25 analyses of combat readiness at different levels. In this analysis of
1 combat readiness of the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska, which
2 information from subordinated units is this report supposed to contain?
3 Are these their analyses, are there separate reports, or is it something
4 completely different?
5 A. Mr. Krgovic, before the analysis, analyses are carried out by the
6 commands in the units for lower-ranking units. Before this analysis, the
7 command of the corps analyses are completed. And in this analysis would
8 include all the results and the situation represented in the analyses of
9 lower-ranking commands. So this is how it proceeds, all the way up to
10 the battalion command. Analyses have to be conducted in their own
11 commands and units before they go up to the next level.
12 Q. General, Ms. Korner put a lot of questions to you from your
13 introduction, and she showed you a series of documents about the
14 functioning of the former JNA and the relationship of the JNA during a
15 certain time-period and its combat readiness.
16 So I would like to ask you: In the analysis on page 9 in the
17 Serbian and 8 in the English, if we can just comment on one particular
19 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Second paragraph from the top,
20 please. Command and control sector.
21 Q. It states:
22 "Intelligence and reconnaissance activities were organised in
23 keeping with our capacities, although we had very limited resources after
24 the collapse of the control and command system of the 2nd Military
25 District of the former JNA."
1 General, are you able to tell us what this 2nd Military District
2 was? What did it cover.
3 A. The 2nd Military District, as far as I can remember, was
4 headquartered in Sarajevo, and it covered a significant area of Bosnia
5 and Herzegovina. If I remember correctly.
6 Q. In respect of your assertions in your previous testimony, when
7 the JNA, as it was withdrawing from Croatia and Slovenia, at the same
8 time was falling apart, and in light of that information, are you able to
9 comment on this paragraph?
10 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated] Sorry, could I have an
11 exact reference to that answer? Page number.
12 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours I'm able to do that at
13 the break. Yesterday the witness was answering these questions, so I was
14 just speaking generally. He talked about the withdrawal and the falling
15 apart of the JNA. I will find the references. He did mention that
16 several times.
17 Q. But I think he is able to comment on this paragraph.
18 A. Mr. Krgovic, as far as I can remember, and I know, that I said
19 that the Yugoslav People's Army from Slovenia to Bosnia and Herzegovina
20 was gradually falling apart, that people stayed in their republics, that
21 numerous materiel and equipment also remained in these republics, and I
22 think that this fits in with this assessment here from the combat
23 readiness analysis.
24 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
25 MR. KRGOVIC:
1 Q. [Interpretation] And the last paragraph where it says:
2 "Order and discipline are not at the required level, although we
3 did introduce temporary regulations --"
4 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We need the reference.
5 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we look at the next page in the
6 Serbian and the next -- page 9 in the English, please.
7 Q. "There are adequate laws on defence and the army, but this was
8 not implemented in some units. The combat [as interpreted] of soldiers
9 in some units is not always pursuant to the regulations in effect,
10 although there are major differences from unit to unit."
11 And then it goes on.
12 MS. KORNER: I'm sorry, what's come out on the screen -- sorry,
13 and the translation, it was quite difficult to hear, but it says "the
14 combat of soldiers in some units." I think what should be there is
16 MR. KRGOVIC: I agree.
17 [Interpretation] Yes, it says here the conduct of soldiers. You
18 are correct.
19 Q. And then you have the fourth paragraph from the top, where
20 certain failings are pointed out. And it says:
21 "Individual --"
22 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters need a reference in the English
24 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Krgovic, could you give the interpreters a
25 reference to the English text because they don't have it.
1 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] This is page 10; I apologise.
2 Q. General, it says:
3 "Command and control was particularly influenced by the lack of
4 adequate senior cadre at the level of companies and battalions.
5 Considerable reserves, according to some officers of active officers, and
6 the links of units to their home territory, desertion, and incomplete
7 execution of the mobilisation ..."
8 General, let's now look at your introduction. This is page 3 in
9 the Serbian version, paragraph 2. And you comment there, you were
10 answering questions about this by Ms. Korner, when you wrote this
11 introduction. Can you please tell me what the purpose of the
12 introduction was. Was it your intention to deal with these matters in
13 detail, the beginning of the war, the introduction ...
14 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated] Sorry, I [Overlapping
15 speakers] ...
16 MR. KRGOVIC: [Overlapping speakers] ... [In English] I rephrase.
17 Q. [Interpretation] General, I apologise. What was your intention
18 in writing this introduction?
19 A. Mr. Krgovic, when I wrote this introduction, all I wanted, and as
20 I did state in the introduction, was to place my work in the context of
21 the conditions prevailing at the time or in the context of the situation
22 at the time in the Army of Republika Srpska on the basis of their
23 conclusions and to point out to the difficulties and problems that
24 existed in that initial period of the war.
25 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
1 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we go back to this document,
2 P1781. Can we now have page 27, please, in the Serbian version, and
3 page 30 in the English.
4 Q. You answered a lot of questions by Ms. Korner about the
5 information that I read to you earlier on. On page 23994 of the
6 transcript, you said that, lines 11, you said that this was a basis for
7 your analysis of combat readiness, and in several places, page 24012, you
8 also refer to that source of information, and several times, these things
9 that I found quickly. So I want to draw your attention to this part
10 about the communications system in the Army of Republika Srpska. I'm
11 going to show you this paragraph. It's the second paragraph from the
12 top. It states:
13 "From the very beginning of the war, and with its further
14 escalation, the stationary part of the system of communications of the
15 former JNA was disrupted, as well as the communications of other
17 And then in parentheses they are mentioned. It's the post
18 office, the MUP, television, radio, power generation and distribution,
19 enterprises, and railways, as well as the power generation and
20 transmission systems suffered major damage, and part of the war weaponry
21 and equipment of the communications corps left in the territory of the
23 And then it goes on to say:
24 "The mobile section of the communication system was also
25 considerably disrupted by the move of parts of and some entire signals
1 units of the former JNA into the Army of Yugoslavia."
2 And then it goes on to say:
3 "The greatest problem faced by the signals body of the Main Staff
4 of the Army of Republika Srpska in planning and organising communications
5 was the breakdown of the stationary segment of the communications system,
6 especially of some vital facilities Bjelasnica, Zlovrh and Vlasic."
7 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] And now I would like to move to the
8 next page; page 28. And this would be page 31 in the English. Page 28
9 in the Serbian; 31 in the English.
10 I'm sorry, there is some sort of discrepancy between the English
11 and the Serbian versions.
12 Could you please scroll up this first page, where it says:
13 "From the previous diagram you can see ..."
14 Actually, I think it's one page back in the English; I apologise.
15 You can see that from a total of 16 communications nodes, five of
16 them -- yes. That is the one, the paragraph-but-last in the English
18 "16" -- "the above diagram shows that of a total of 16
19 stationary communications hubs, five of them ... were abandoned and left
20 in enemy territory, while one stationary communications hub ... was
21 seized by the enemy ..."
22 Can you scroll down, please, so I can see the end of the
24 "No less of a problem for" --
25 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters need a reference.
1 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Krgovic, once again, the interpreters ask for
2 a reference.
3 MR. KRGOVIC: Yes, I apologise.
4 [Interpretation] It goes on to say, and the page of the English
5 translation is -- lower down. Could we scroll down in English.
6 Q. "In planning and establishing a new organisation of
7 communications, the considerably disrupted system of stationary
8 communications centres and auxiliary communication centres of the former
9 JNA, posed no less a problem. Of a total of 32 facilities, 11 were
10 abandoned or captured and three were damaged ..."
11 And there's another page, General, that deals with
12 communications, and given this combat readiness analysis, please explain
13 to us your introductory section where you speak about poor
15 A. Mr. Krgovic, that is exactly what I had in mind when I stated my
16 assessments. Even more so, since it's well known that the communications
17 system is the most important foundation, or one of the most important
18 elements, for good command and control of units and formations for
19 successful transmission of orders, as well as successful reporting,
20 bottom-up reporting.
21 If this system is disrupted, as we can see in this analysis, then
22 the conditions for all activities between the commands and units are much
23 more difficult.
24 Q. General, you spoke extensively about the setting up of the VRS.
25 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Let's go to page 13 in both
1 linguistic versions.
2 [No interpretation]
3 "The infantry units which through self-organisation grew on a
4 massive scale out of the Territorial Defence and other units, were used
5 only at the beginning of the war according to the decisions of the Crisis
6 Staffs and similar authoritative bodies. Among the infantry units there
7 were also units which represented various political structures, which
8 were sometimes in opposition to the overall objectives of our war."
9 General, it says:
10 "... sometimes in opposition to the overall objectives of our
12 In your report you also touched upon these topics and you
13 mentioned improvisation, if I remember correctly. Can you comment on
14 this section?
15 A. Mr. Krgovic, these are only some of the significant problems
16 pointed out in this analysis, and I took them into consideration when I
17 wrote about the organisation of the VRS, its level of training, and its
18 overall functioning, especially during the initial period of the war.
19 Q. On page 24012 of the transcript, line 6 through 11, Ms. Korner
20 asked you to give an example of a private commanding a unit, and you said
21 that it could be found in the analysis of combat readiness.
22 Please take a look at page 71 in the Serbian.
23 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] It's paragraph 4.3, 79.
24 Q. The second paragraph says:
25 "A large number of the officer establishment posts have been
1 filled with soldiers who, by their courage, resolution [as interpreted]
2 and professionalism have won for themselves positions of leadership and
3 even command."
4 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] And let's go to the following page,
5 which is 72 in the Serbian version. It's the third paragraph here, which
6 discusses a similar topic.
7 Q. "So far this problem has been addressed by assigning
8 non-commissioned officers and brave and able soldiers, mostly from blue
9 collar occupations, to the mentioned establishment posts. Although they
10 are discharging their duties successfully and capably, they cannot be
11 promoted to the rank of officer."
12 And when you were answering Ms. Korner's question about these
13 instances, what did you have in mind when you had to give a specific
15 A. Well, Mr. Krgovic, I meant the allegations in this analysis. It
16 is well-known that there must be four years' education to be appointed to
17 an officer's position, but these were conditions of war. The situation
18 was the way it was, and this is how it was assessed in their analysis.
19 Q. General, speaking about these things, on page 23984, lines 9
20 through 19, you said about a footnote that there was a mistake in your
21 reference. I wanted to correct that, but Ms. Korner didn't allow me.
22 Please take a look at your report now. Paragraph 93.
23 You were -- provide a citation at footnote 43. And I will now
24 show you footnote 44, which is 57D2; that's the 65 ter number.
25 MS. KORNER: I'm sorry, I'm sorry to interrupt. I'm now
1 confused. My understanding was the only footnote that the General said
2 was a mistake he corrected was in relation to the -- the number of the
3 Law on All People's Defence. I know you got up at this stage and said
4 there was a --
5 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Sorry, Ms. Korner. While you were
6 examining, the witness said on page 9 that the footnote was -- had a
7 wrong number. I offered to give the correct number of the footnote, but
8 I couldn't, so I have to do it with the witness now.
9 57D2; that's a 65 ter number.
10 The following page, please.
11 Q. General, you are dealing with a command here, and you say that
12 it's a continuous process which --
13 THE INTERPRETER: Could we have the reference, please, when
14 counsel is reading.
15 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] That's in paragraph 93 of your
17 MS. KORNER: [Microphone not activated]
18 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Paragraph 93 of the report.
19 Q. And you say that this is footnote 43. Actually, it is footnote
20 44. Did you mean that when you said you had made a mistake on
21 page 23984?
22 A. That's correct, Mr. Krgovic.
23 Q. General, you were asked a number of questions in the previous
24 session about when a person becomes a military conscript, and you
25 provided an interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Law on All
1 People's Defence.
2 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please show 1D264 to the
3 witness. I think that the Defence -- or the tab in the Defence binder is
5 Let us enlarge, please. 92; I apologise.
6 Q. It says here:
7 "I have understood your proposal regarding the withdrawal of
8 police forces from combat operations. We are satisfied with the work of
9 the police ... thus far, and we have decided to pull them out for a short
10 while for rest so that we may engage them in upcoming operations. The
11 reasons you provided are valid, but it seems to us that you do not
12 comprehend the situation we are in. I do not authorise the withdrawal of
13 the police ..."
14 General, bearing in mind the authority, or the powers, he has
15 under Article 26 of the Law on All People's Defence -- or I go about it
16 another way.
17 Could you please comment on Colonel Lisica's document in relation
18 to Articles 24 through 26 of the law that you commented on for
19 Ms. Korner?
20 A. Mr. Krgovic, I can tell from the content of this document that
21 the police units are subordinated to this commander and that he is
22 deciding about their use. That is why he explicitly does not authorise
23 their return. Such -- and similar examples I tried to interpret in
24 relation to the aforementioned articles of the Law on All People's
25 Defence, which articles deal with the execution of work obligation,
1 material obligation, the obligation to serve in civilian protection, and
2 military conscription. Under these provisions, the commanders were able
3 to take such decisions, depending on the situation, but I also said that
4 this should not be the usual practice, but, rather, an exception.
5 However, they did have the right to act that way. They had the power to
6 do so.
7 Q. Now, we heard what you said. Did Mr. Bjelosevic have the right
8 to withdraw his units? Did he have the power to do so?
9 A. Mr. Krgovic, it is my opinion, and I claim that Mr. Bjelosevic
10 did not have that right.
11 MR. KRGOVIC: I think it's convenient time for the break, it's
13 JUDGE HALL: Yes. So we take a break now.
14 And we resume at 2.30, we'll sit until 4.00. And then from 4.30
15 to 6.00, if necessary.
16 [The witness stands down]
17 --- Luncheon recess taken at 1.30 p.m.
18 --- On resuming at 2.34 p.m.
19 [Trial Chamber confers]
20 [The witness takes the stand]
21 MR. KRGOVIC:
22 Q. [Interpretation] During the last part of the cross-examination,
23 the Prosecutor showed you a document.
24 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be shown
25 Exhibit P01094, tab 75.
1 Q. You were shown the first portion of the document and you
2 commented on it with me.
3 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could Mr. Krgovic please
4 be asked to speak up. Thank you.
5 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Krgovic.
6 MR. KRGOVIC: Yes.
7 JUDGE HARHOFF: The interpreters are concerned that they can't
8 hear you, so if you could please speak up a bit. Thanks.
9 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have page 2 of this
11 Q. General, you discussed this document with Ms. Korner. This last
12 sentence which reads:
13 "I would kindly ask the corps commander [as interpreted] to draw
14 the attention of their subordinate commands through their own lines."
15 When answering a question by Ms. Korner you said this was a plea
16 by Mr. Zupljanin addressed to the corps commander.
17 Can you please explain the difference in our language between a
18 plea and a request.
19 A. Mr. Krgovic, when you make a plea, when you say, Could you
20 please, or May I please ask you, it's something that people with good
21 manners often do. That is often the case. Nevertheless, this is a war
22 situation. A difference between a plea and a request also tells us about
23 the relationship between the two people. If you make a plea to someone,
24 you say, May I please ask you, it is also possibly indicative of your
25 inferior position. If you make a request, that is something to do if you
1 are in a superior position. For example, in terms of rank.
2 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Krgovic, in light of what the witness has
3 just explained to us, and, notably, with regard to the comments made by
4 the Presiding Judge before the lunch break, I don't think that we need to
5 go any further into this issue about whether it means one or the other
6 thing. I think it's clear to us what's going on here.
7 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] [No interpretation]
8 Q. Sir, at page 23757 and onwards, I showed you this document and I
9 asked you to comment in the light of practice. There was the protest by
10 Mr. Zupljanin about the way the police were used.
11 A question for you, sir: We know what the powers were, as you
12 defined them, and we know the Law on Defence. In keeping with those,
13 what if a commander of a certain unit, battalion level or higher up, as
14 you suggested, were to change the status of the members of a certain
15 unit, based on the practical needs, in keeping with the provisions of
16 this article. What about a public security station chief or an official
17 like that? Would they be in a position to refuse this? What would be
18 the status of that particular act produced by the battalion or brigade
19 commander? What his relationship be vis-a-vis these persons?
20 A. Mr. Krgovic, if the law endows a military commander with the
21 possibility or, indeed, the right to change the status of a person who is
22 under a work obligation, and changes that status into the status of a
23 military conscript, in that situation, a police chief would be in no
24 position to oppose. The police chief may be unhappy about it, and might
25 even be right to be unhappy about something like that because if you
1 change someone's status like that and you turn a police officer with a
2 work assignment, a work obligation into a military conscript, what that
3 means is that the military conscript might as well remain there for the
4 remaining duration of the war, which means that person is no longer in a
5 position or, indeed, able to perform his tasks.
6 That is how I, for my part, interpret the discontent,
7 dissatisfaction, or, as you say, the protest lodged by the chief of the
8 public security station.
9 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] May the witness please be shown
10 exhibit 65 ter 479D1. It's a Stanisic Defence document. Tab 120. It's
11 a Zupljanin Defence document. My apologies. It's from the Stanisic
12 list, but it's at tab 120 of the Zupljanin Defence.
13 Q. Sir, you see the document. It's a corps command document signed
14 by the chief, Mr. Talic. It reads:
15 "Engagement and co-ordination TO units. Warning."
16 There is a translation mistake there. It reads: "Co-ordination"
17 and it should be "co-ordinated action," because the original reads
18 "sadejstvo." That is what we decided, term "co-ordinated action," with
19 TO units.
20 As you said, General, there were some problems regarding this.
21 The document begins like this. It's the -- it's a document by the corps
22 command and delivered to the 5th Brigade, the command of the 5th Brigade.
23 Could you please have a read, sir. The introduction reads:
24 "In combat operations so far and in the resubordination and
25 co-ordination between JNA and TO forces in the zone of responsibility of
1 the 5th Corps, there have been different interpretations ..."
2 And could you please read Article 1.
3 A. Mr. Krgovic, I quote:
4 "All TO units and staffs in the zone of responsibility of JNA
5 brigades shall be resubordinated to these commands."
6 Q. Paragraph 3, please. Rather, paragraph 2; my apologies.
7 A. Mr. Krgovic, I quote:
8 "A decision on the engagement and use of TO units shall be taken
9 by the commander of the unit to which the TO unit has been attached,
10 after consultation and agreement with the appropriate officer of the TO
11 unit in question."
12 Q. Paragraph 3, please.
13 A. Mr. Krgovic, paragraph 3 reads:
14 "JNA brigade commanders shall consider any attached TO units and
15 any other reinforcing units as elements of their own combat deployment
16 and shall take care of these units by providing food and making sure to
17 make proper use of them."
18 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Can Mr. Krgovic please be
19 asked to speak up. We cannot hear him. Thank you.
20 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] It is quite obvious that I can't
21 pull the mic up which means that I will have to bend a little.
22 Q. Can you please comment on this document in the light of your
23 discussion today and on the previous days with Ms. Korner.
24 A. Mr. Krgovic, I realise that this document was only sent to a
25 single unit, the 5th Infantry Brigade. I suppose that, in the sector of
1 its zone of responsibility, there were some irregularities, such as
2 occurrences of dual command. For this reason, I assume the commander
3 issued a warning, emphasizing, in clear and precise terms, who would be
4 resubordinated to whom, who would be responsible to whom, all of which is
5 in keeping with the principles of singleness of command and unity of
6 command, as well as the principle of subordination, which is a principle
7 that is preponderant and valid in any army.
8 Q. Paragraph 3, the brigade commander here says that the attached
9 units shall henceforth be considered and other reinforcing units.
10 What about these reinforcing units? What could that be? Could
11 that be the TO, could that be some other units?
12 A. These reinforcing units could also be tactical groups, or even
13 police units being resubordinated to the brigade commander.
14 Q. And what about this sentence, what does it mean:
15 "... shall consider as elements of their own combat
16 deployment..." such and such units.
17 What does that mean?
18 A. Mr. Krgovic, this means that you can move them around within your
19 own unit. They are now elements of your own combat deployment. You are
20 free to use them as you see fit and as you decide for missions that these
21 elements of the combat deployment would normally be considered suitably
22 trained for.
23 Q. General, in the case at hand, we have members of some
24 subordinated units, units of the TO, or what are called reinforcing units
25 who, for example, commit a crime or a disciplinary infraction. Who would
1 be in charge of initiating proceedings against these persons?
2 A. Mr. Krgovic, this would be the sole responsibility of the brigade
3 in question or the -- of the commander of the brigade in question or the
4 commander of whatever unit we're talking about because all of the
5 individual members are subordinated to the commander of that unit.
6 Q. Would it be possible for someone else other than the commander to
7 initiate proceedings against these persons? I mean someone who is not
8 part of the chain of command, strictly speaking.
9 A. Mr. Krgovic, as for what we see here in this document, and as for
10 what the rules say, this is solely the responsibility of that unit's
11 commander, and no one else. I can't say definitely. I think there are
12 probably some situations where that too might be possible. But if this
13 official is physically there, if he is present in the unit or in the
14 reinforcing unit, it would be the sole responsibility of that unit's
15 commander. He would be in charge of initiating any proceedings and
16 punishing any disciplinary infractions.
17 Q. My question was about the precise point in time at which they
18 were resubordinated.
19 A. Yes, Mr. Krgovic, I did understand your question, and that is why
20 I corrected myself by saying at the time. During their resubordination
21 to the commander of that unit.
22 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
23 MR. KRGOVIC:
24 Q. [Interpretation] Ms. Korner showed you the document, and she
25 pointed out she believed your interpretation to not be correct. Do you
1 stand by your position?
2 MS. KORNER: I'm sorry, Your Honour, I don't follow that. Which
3 document? I didn't show him this document. I've never seen it before in
4 my life.
5 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] The previous document. That's what
6 I mean. I meant the CSB document concerning disciplinary infractions and
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Krgovic, I stand by my position
9 as uttered some minutes ago. I believe I also phrased it the same way in
10 my report.
11 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, may this document
12 please be admitted into evidence. Thank you.
13 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Krgovic, you asked the witness to read out
14 the document, which he did. And I thought that you asked him to do so
15 because you wanted to have the contents of that order on the record in
16 order not to submit it for -- into evidence. And now you're asking for
17 the admission -- could I suggest, in light of the enormous time pressure
18 that we're under this afternoon, that you do either one or the other but
19 not both, please.
20 MS. KORNER: And Your Honours, also, I'm sorry, I don't see how
21 this document is relevant. Mr. Krgovic is trying to suggest -- and the
22 General said it may be the police, but there is not one iota of evidence
23 to suggest that this is anything other than a document dealing with
24 resubordination of TO units to the 1st Krajina Corps, and it is pure
25 speculation and guess-work that other reinforcing units, as, indeed, the
1 General said, is police. Nor does it assist, on the face of it, with who
2 is responsible for disciplinary proceedings where the resubordinated
3 brigade of the police are concerned.
4 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, this document is
5 relevant, especially in the light of yesterday's cross-examination by the
6 OTP. They were talking about attaching units and resubordinating units.
7 And it is not subordination that is implied, that was her position
8 yesterday and this document shows otherwise. My next question to this
9 witness will, of course, be whether this document is in relation to these
10 principles of resubordination and attachment, whether that is in relation
11 to the police as well. That's my next question.
12 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, the disciplinary aspect is concerned
13 with whether when police are resubordinated to a military, the
14 disciplinary infractions are carried out by the police chain of command
15 or the military. It is not intended to suggest that military units
16 resubordinated Anto units which were in fact like infantry units at that
17 stage of the war in October, would not have had military disciplinary
18 procedures carried out. Because obviously the TO was
19 part of [indiscernible] -- was part of the military and it would be the
20 military's job.
21 Our argument is, as I've expressed very clearly, I believe, to
22 the General, which he doesn't accept, is that police, when
23 resubordinated, if at that stage they commit disciplinary offences, we
24 say based on the evidence it is the police chain of command, and we
25 therefore say this document does not assist one way or another.
1 [Microphone not activated] No, Mr. Zecevic does not have a right
2 in this ...
3 [Trial Chamber confers]
4 JUDGE HALL: Yes, Mr. Zecevic.
5 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, Your Honours. I didn't want to get up,
6 but I just needed to. I must have -- must -- must stand up.
7 Ms. Korner just said:
8 "... we say based on the evidence it is the police chain of
9 command, and we therefore say this document does not assist one way or
10 the other."
11 Clearly Ms. Korner is testifying now. She is making submissions.
12 I -- I -- I go along with Mr. Krgovic, and I think that the document is
13 relevant we do not object that it be admitted.
14 Thank you.
15 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, I take objection to this. It is not
16 for Mr. Krgovic [sic] to stand up and -- this is not his witness. I
17 should not have to deal with two different counsel, if not three. This
18 is Mr. Krgovic's submission. We object, and I'm not giving evidence.
19 There is no mention whatsoever, as the General has said, of the police in
20 this document.
21 JUDGE HALL: Ms. Korner, this is not the first time that you
22 have -- that -- an intervention about Mr. Zecevic's involvement in this,
23 and the -- the -- we have not responded up to this point for the obvious
24 reason that, although, strictly speaking, this is Mr. Krgovic's witness,
25 this is an general understanding that -- that he is a common witness to
1 the Defence. That aside, in this instance, we are satisfied on the basis
2 of your objection that this document does not assist and ought not to be
4 MR. KRGOVIC:
5 Q. [Interpretation] General, now that we're dealing with
6 disciplinary responsibility, is it possible in the military in a unit
7 which is under the command of a military officer to have two different
8 organs, to have two different systems be in charge of disciplinary
9 proceedings and initiating them?
10 A. No, Mr. Krgovic.
11 Q. In case there is a violation of military discipline, a case of --
12 of military duty while the combat is on, is it possible for somebody else
13 outside of the military chain of command to investigate such cases and
14 take steps in -- in connection with them?
15 A. No, Mr. Krgovic.
16 Q. General, during cross-examination, a number of questions were put
17 to you with respect to co-ordinated action, and you explained that in
18 your report. You explain how you viewed the co-ordinated action.
19 And I will now show you a document.
20 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Please show the witness P00680,
21 tab 122.
22 Q. It was suggested to you that co-ordinated action between the MUP
23 units and the army units did not automatically amount to resubordination.
24 So would you please look at page 3 of this document.
25 Paragraph 3.5 which is page 5 in the Serbian version.
1 It says here:
2 "When carrying out combat operations, the CSB and SJB units shall
3 be under the direct command of the unit officers," and you explain that,
4 "in keeping with the combat rules of the armed forces of Republika
5 Srpska. In the event of co-ordinated action with the Army of Republika
6 Srpska, the units shall be resubordinated to the command of the armed
7 forces in charge of combat operations."
8 General, the last page of this document is signed by chief of the
9 centre, Stojan Zupljanin.
10 Can you tell us, General, or, rather, can you give us your
11 comments concerning this paragraph about the co-ordinated action between
12 the police forces and the army.
13 A. Mr. Krgovic, in my report, and also in my replies, I clearly and
14 in detail explained that the notion of co-ordinated action not only in
15 the former JNA and in the Army of Republika Srpska but in all armies is a
16 strictly military notion which includes military forces, armed forces.
17 Co-ordinated action cannot be carried out with somebody who has merely a
18 work obligation. This is why the commander is first needed to give an
19 appropriate status to a policeman who has a work obligation. He needed
20 to be transferred into military obligation, and only then was it possible
21 to have a co-ordinated action with this person who, thus, becomes a
23 In accordance with the rules of international laws of war, one
24 may kill members of armed forces. By giving the status of that person
25 and making that person a military conscript, you automatically provide
1 that person all the protection under the law and all the protection
2 against any adverse consequences. This is why I emphasise that the
3 term -- the notion of "co-ordinated action" is a strictly military term,
4 unlike co-operation, which is a somewhat different notion.
5 As for co-ordinated action, it always pre-supposes
6 resubordination. It pre-supposes singleness of command and
8 Yesterday, I did not have time to fully conclude this topic.
9 Co-ordinated action could be of an internal nature, within that unit, and
10 of an external nature. It can be between that unit and some other
11 forces. However, in that case, the relations, the place, and the role of
12 each individual is strictly defined, and one is always subordinated to
13 one's commander.
14 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, for Mr. Krgovic.
15 JUDGE DELVOIE: [Previous translation continued]... microphone.
16 MR. KRGOVIC:
17 Q. [Interpretation] When Mr. Zupljanin, in this document, says:
18 "In case of co-ordinated action with the units of Army of
19 Republika Srpska, units shall be resubordinated to the command of armed
20 forces in charge of combat operations."
21 Is this a correct attitude, a correct view?
22 A. The only possible one. This is the only way in which one can
23 protect the people involved in this, by defining it in this way.
24 Otherwise, they would not be considered members of armed forces and they
25 would not be permitted to take part in combat operations.
1 Q. General, further on, it was suggested to you that resubordination
2 of the police to the army in such large-scale operations, such as
3 Operation Corridor, and that there were no such cases in practice. And I
4 will show you some exhibits demonstrating this, P1298 or, rather, 1928.
5 I apologise.
6 MS. KORNER: To be accurate, I didn't put that there were no such
7 cases in practice.
8 MR. KRGOVIC:
9 Q. [Interpretation] General, this is a report on the work of the
10 public security station in Donji Vakuf between the 1st of April, 1992 and
11 25th of December, 1992.
12 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: 25th of December,
14 MR. KRGOVIC:
15 Q. [Interpretation] So would you please look at the next page of
16 this document.
17 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] The penultimate paragraph. The
18 next page in English.
19 Q. And it begins with the following words:
20 "In the middle of May, both active and reserve police forces
21 actively joined the army in combat operations and in crushing the
22 resistance in villages inhabited by Muslims."
23 And then this paragraph goes on to describe these activities, and
24 what I'm interested in is the last paragraph:
25 "During participation in combat operations, the workers of the
1 public security station were resubordinated to the command of the RS Army
2 (the 19th Krajina Brigade)."
3 Then they go on to give a number of 11 combat operations
4 involving the police.
5 General, would you please give a brief comment of this. Of the
6 paragraph and of the report.
7 A. Mr. Krgovic, this is yet another example which shows that it was
8 only possible to use the police in combat operations via this mechanism
9 by resubordination. By doing that, the status of policemen was changed,
10 from one status to a different status.
11 It is well known that it is only based on that status that, after
12 the war, people can get various benefits, entitlements, compensation in
13 case of injury, death, and similar consequences that can ensue in war
15 Q. General, during your testimony here, did either side show you a
16 single document that would point to something completely opposite from
17 what you described to us here, concerning the resubordination of police
18 forces to the military in combat operations.
19 MS. KORNER: Well, Your Honours, the --
20 MR. KRGOVIC: Sorry, I'll rephrase because I'm not quite precise.
21 MS. KORNER: Okay.
22 MR. KRGOVIC:
23 Q. [Interpretation] Were you a shown a single document that would
24 make you change your conclusion about the principle of resubordination,
25 as described in your report, and as explained here before the Trial
1 Chamber during your testimony.
2 A. No, Mr. Krgovic. Not as far as I can recall.
3 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
4 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. General, would you please look at paragraph 133 of your report.
6 Here, you deal with the issue of responsibility for the acts of
7 the subordinates. It goes on to say:
8 "A military officer is personally responsible for violations of
9 the laws of war if he knew or could have known that a person subordinated
10 to him or other units or individuals were preparing such violations."
11 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, I don't believe I asked a single
12 question about that paragraph or on that issue at all in
14 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] I'll deal well that, Ms. Korner.
15 MS. KORNER: Well, no, I'm sorry. Before you can re-examine it
16 has to arise from cross-examination.
17 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Be patient, Miss. Wait up, please.
18 Q. You quote footnote 60, the control and command, manual for
19 military academies. The application of international law of war and the
20 armed forces of the SFRY. That's in the footnote.
21 General, what about a brigade commander who would have heard
22 about this during his training, would that commander not have to be
23 familiar with these regulations?
24 MS. KORNER: One, that's leading, and it's still not a matter
25 that's come out of cross-examination.
1 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] You mentioned the person of the
2 brigade commander and his responsibility for subordination. I'm not
3 mentioning the name for obvious reasons. You even quote something he
4 wrote about his own responsibility for punishing subordinates. That
5 stems directly from your cross-examination. You even specified a brigade
7 MS. KORNER: No, I'm sorry, Your Honours, I don't follow this at
8 all, I'm afraid. What I quoted to the General and he declined to accept,
9 as Mr. Krgovic rightly points out, and for the sake -- safety's sake, we
10 better go into private session.
11 JUDGE HALL: We go into private session.
12 [Private session]
10 [Open session]
11 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.
12 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Krgovic, you appreciate the distinction?
13 Ms. Korner's last comment.
14 MR. KRGOVIC: Yes.
15 Q. [Interpretation] General, yesterday Ms. Korner showed you this
16 paragraph about a specific situation. Or, rather, stated her position
17 regarding this specific situation.
18 My question: We have a resubordinated police officer, in a
19 specific case, and a brigade commander, who was in charge of initiating
20 disciplinary proceedings and who is authorised to take measures?
21 A. Mr. Krgovic, as I've pointed out on more than one occasion, if a
22 police officer is subordinated to a military unit commander, he is
23 effectively a military conscript and has that status.
24 In that case, it is the commander of the military unit that is
25 responsible for initiating any proceedings or, indeed, pressing charges
1 against this subordinated individual.
2 JUDGE HARHOFF: And, General, do we take it to mean that this
3 also includes disciplinary proceedings? In contrasts of criminal
4 proceedings arising out of a -- a major offence.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour, that's right.
6 Any kind of responsibility, moral responsibility, material
7 responsibility, disciplinary responsibility, criminal responsibility.
8 Your Honour, the status of that person in that case is the same
9 of that of any other member of the unit for the duration of the
11 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Krgovic, it strikes me as if we have come as
12 far as we can possibly get with this witness in relation to the issue of
13 proceedings -- okay. So I suggest that, again, in light of the time
14 pressure that we are under this afternoon, that you move onto something
16 Very well. Please proceed.
17 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] I am done with this. This was my
18 last question on the subject.
19 Q. General, sir, two days ago, you spoke about the concept of
21 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] May the witness please be shown
22 65 ter 20259; tab 110, OTP.
23 Could we please zoom in on the portion where it talks about
24 combat. This is midway down the middle paragraph, or column.
25 Q. General, you quoted the military lexicon, describing combat as
1 the basic and most widespread form of combat activity.
2 General, what would be the broader concept here? Combat activity
3 or combat?
4 A. Mr. Krgovic, combat activities are the broader concept of the
5 two. As is obvious, combat is one and perhaps the simplest form of
6 combat activities. There are higher forms and more complex forms of
7 combat activity, such as battle and operation, as the most evolved, most
8 complex form that a combat activity may take.
9 Q. What about the conduct of an operation? Would that comprise a
10 single action or several actions? And can you please explain.
11 A. Mr. Krgovic, as I've said before, operation is the most complex
12 form of combat activity. This means that it comprises a number of
13 battles or situations of combat, the objective being to inflict as many
14 losses on the enemy as possible throughout a war. In terms of character,
15 in terms of substance, in terms of the number of men involved, it
16 represents the most complex, the most evolved form of combat activity.
17 Q. Yesterday you were asked a question about this. During the
18 conduct of combat operations, while cleaning up, or mopping up, which
19 category would that particular action belong to?
20 A. Well, now you're making me think back -- you make me remember all
21 these details. In addition to combat and battle, as you suggest
22 yourself, there are many other combat actions that are performed, as well
23 as tactical actions or procedures. All of that might entail what you
24 suggest; mopping up as a tactical action.
25 Q. Is that part of combat activities?
1 A. Yes, indeed. That's right, Mr. Krgovic.
2 Q. What about combat task, a combat assignment?
3 A. Mr. Krgovic, a combat task is clearly and precisely defined in
4 relation to each unit, depending on its level, depending on the
5 situation. One must define what that unit is expected to do
6 specifically, within the framework of an operation, in a combat situation
7 or in a battle. What it is expected to do in order to achieve the
8 objective of a certain operation or the objective of certain combat
10 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters didn't hear the question. The
11 microphone was off.
12 MR. KRGOVIC:
13 Q. [Interpretation] Performing a combat task, tactical operations,
14 if I may put it that way -- or, rather, when we have a resubordinated
15 unit, during these activities, were these resubordinated units under the
16 command of the commander performing these activities?
17 A. That's right, Mr. Krgovic.
18 Q. I'll move onto a different subject now.
19 General, during the resubordination process - and now the unit is
20 subordinated to the military commander - so during the process itself, is
21 the unit bound to carry out each and any of his orders during this
22 situation, while all of this applies?
23 A. Yes, indeed, that's right, Mr. Krgovic.
24 Q. Ms. Korner asked you about POWs yesterday. What in case POWs are
25 being transported, taken somewhere? What about securing the place where
1 these POWs are assembled, put together? What about securing their
2 transport to a camp?
3 A. Mr. Krgovic, the same thing applies. POW transport can be
4 secured in a variety of ways. All of this is regulated by the military
5 commander in charge, and he was put in charge by his superior commander.
6 He must carry out this task. The commander in charge of transporting
7 POWs is allowed to use certain units, certain equipment to make sure that
8 the transport of POWs from point A to point B is safe.
9 Q. General, you were asked yesterday whether you came across an
10 order or a directive by the VRS invoking Article 104 of the Law on All
11 People's Defence.
12 General, what is the established practice in the army? When an
13 order is issued, or when instructions are issued, does one usually invoke
14 a particular article of the law, a particular rule, a particular
16 A. No, Mr. Krgovic. What applies in our case is do first and
17 complain later. You receive an order, the preamble normally invokes in
18 no uncertain terms another order by a superior officer, or one invokes a
19 particular situation. It is based on that that you put together your own
21 Q. General, you were shown a document yesterday. It's P2390.
22 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] May the witness please be shown
23 that document.
24 The last paragraph, please.
25 Q. It reads:
1 "Situation in the zone of responsibility of the 2nd Military
3 "Propaganda activity and charges laid against the JNA as the
4 main ... party ... responsibile for the recent events are continuing."
5 General, you addressed this before this Honourable Tribunal. You
6 talked about the effects of propaganda. Ms. Korner showed you this
7 document during her cross-examination. Can you please tell us how this
8 propaganda, if I may call it that, and documents such as these affected
9 the way some components of the JNA treated those doing the actual
11 A. Mr. Krgovic, I'm afraid I did not completely understand your
12 question. My concentration may be wearing off.
13 MR. KRGOVIC: I tried to --
14 Q. [Interpretation] I'm trying not to put leading questions.
15 In your report, you discuss this very issue of the attitude the
16 JNA had vis-a-vis -- let me help you. When addressing propaganda aimed
17 against the JNA.
18 In this report, we see some propaganda activities aimed at the
19 JNA. How did such activities impact the attitude of the JNA officers.
20 A. Mr. Krgovic, a similar method or scenario was used, starting from
21 Slovenia, down to Bosnia, with the aim of breaking up the JNA. It was
22 best achieved by people leaving its ranks. As I have said before, it
23 started in Slovenia. Unusual situations began to take place, but one
24 needs to expect that in a war. For example, in my own unit, there was an
25 assistant commander of the battalion who abandoned his position, his
1 position being a senior one, in order to join the Slovenian TO.
2 Q. General, you seem to have gone off on a tangent. I'd like us to
3 focus on the first part of your answer.
4 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we look at P2391 for that
6 Q. Before that, let me ask you this: As the JNA was withdrawing,
7 did its ethnic composition change, and, in what way, especially once you
8 arrived Bosnia? What was the ethnic composition of the remaining part of
9 the JNA?
10 A. Mr. Krgovic, I can only cite examples from my own unit, although
11 I'm aware of similar situations elsewhere. I can say that most
12 Slovenians and Croatians, including officers, as well as soldiers,
13 remained behind. Many Muslims did stay with the JNA, as far as Bosnia,
14 when they began leaving us. Macedonians and Montenegrins remained, as
15 well as Albanian, Hungarians, and other ethnicities which were then
16 represented in the JNA.
17 Q. We have this report before us shown to you yesterday by
18 Ms. Korner.
19 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please zoom in. Item 2.
20 The penultimate paragraph.
21 Q. It reads:
22 "Part of the officers in the 92nd Motorised Brigade openly -- is
23 openly against the JNA for not taking a different approach in Bijeljina
24 and Zvornik, whereas, they do not apply the same standard when they refer
25 to Bosanski Brod."
1 Do you know which event they have in mind when they mention this
2 ban on intervention?
3 A. Mr. Krgovic, given the fact that this was in April, it could be
4 the issue of the Posavina, although I'm not certain. It concerned an
5 attack of the Croatian armed forces against the Serbs, or on the Serbs
6 who lived there, although I'm not certain.
7 Q. Does Sijekovac ring a bell?
8 A. It is difficult for me to recall it, Mr. Krgovic.
9 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please show another
10 document to the witness then, which is -- please bear with me. I seem to
11 have written down an incorrect number.
12 P20246. 65 ter 20246. Apologies. Tab 6A of the Prosecutor.
13 Q. General, it was suggested to you yesterday in relation to this
14 document that the JNA did nothing. Please read carefully paragraph 4.
15 The second sentence from the top:
16 "However, in the morning hours, the activities became of higher
18 "Party leaders do not control the situation and are not capable
19 of stopping the activity. For this reason, they are unable to enforce
20 the curfew between 8.00 p.m. and 6.00 a.m., and MUP, at present, refuses
21 to participate in mixed patrols with the JNA."
22 General, can you offer comments regarding this last sentence?
23 What is the commander in question trying to say?
24 A. As far as I remember that period, there were political
25 negotiations round the clock, as well as different attempts to put a stop
1 to these interethnic clashes. One such measure that was agreed upon was
2 to conduct joint patrols, comprising members of the MUP and JNA. It
3 seems that the arrangement, however, was not honoured and that it is that
4 that is discussed in this part of the report.
5 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
6 JUDGE DELVOIE: Microphone.
7 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Apologies.
8 Q. Let me go back to your report.
9 In footnote number 10, you mention a date. And you refer to a
10 book: "Cessation Orchestrated by the Great Powers."
11 General, did you use any part of this book or any of the
12 positions put forth by its author in your report?
13 A. I did not, Mr. Krgovic.
14 Q. Let us study the footnote for a moment. It is 35D2; 65 ter.
15 Tab 10.
16 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] It seems I don't have the page I
17 wanted to show, Your Honours. Perhaps we could take an earlier break by
18 some five minutes so that I can come up with the appropriate page. And
19 once we are back, I'll wrap up in 30 minutes.
20 JUDGE HALL: Very well.
21 [The witness stands down]
22 --- Recess taken at 3.55 p.m.
23 --- On resuming at 4.34 p.m.
24 [Trial Chamber confers]
25 [The witness takes the stand]
1 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours --
2 Q. General.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, Your Honours, I
4 would like to ask your leave to more specifically define the position
5 that I presented a while ago when I spoke about the status of members of
6 the armed forces in relation to the provisions of the international law
7 of war. I believe I was slightly imprecise when I said that a while ago.
8 I have thought about it, and I think I'm getting a little tired, so that
9 was probably the reason.
10 JUDGE HALL: Yes, please proceed, General.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
12 When I talked about resubordination as an act and the fact that
13 they thereby become members of the armed forces, and under the rules of
14 international law, it was allowed to kill them; and they thereby became
15 legitimate targets. That is what I tried to say, and now I'm trying to
16 be more precise about it and specifically define it. It is allowed to
17 kill them.
18 JUDGE HALL: Thank you.
19 Yes, Mr. Krgovic.
20 MR. KRGOVIC:
21 Q. [Interpretation] General, you've answered my question, but I'll
22 move onto something else now.
23 I showed you this book, Cessation Orchestrated by the Great
25 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have OTP
1 Exhibit 2235; tab 97. 2235. 20235. That's a 65 ter number. Page 3,
3 Q. General, you see the editors of this book and the reviewers.
4 Professor Miodrag Starcevic is one of the names there. In answer to one
5 of the questions by Ms. Korner, 23907, page 23907, specifically, you
6 said -- 23965, you said that this was a book published by an institute
7 with a good reputation and very good references.
8 Do you know this gentleman, Miodrag Starcevic?
9 A. Mr. Krgovic, yes, I do know Professor Miodrag Starcevic. He is a
10 well-known and well-regarded expert for international law of war.
11 Q. Could you please look at a document for me, just to make sure we
12 mean the same person, we have the same person in mind.
13 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Just a minute, please. 2D101233.
14 The last page of the document, please. This is tab 118; Defence tab 118.
15 Q. Here, have a look. Miodrag Starcevic. His CV. A member of the
16 international humanitarian fact-finding commission.
17 A. Mr. Krgovic, I think I only met this gentleman once, so -- and
18 even that was a long time ago. I was still working as head of the morale
19 administration and as assistant chief of the General Staff. So this may
20 be the same person I met back then.
21 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
22 MR. KRGOVIC:
23 Q. [Interpretation] General, can we please go back to the Law on All
24 People's Defence. Paragraphs 24 through to 26 are the ones we will be
1 In the meantime, we have received a document from the OTP and
2 I'll ask you to comment. It's in relation to that law.
3 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] 65 ter 20264. OTP document 20264.
4 Page 2, please. Article 1.
5 Q. It reads:
6 "Work obligation units shall be organised for the needs of the
7 armed forces of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ... in war
8 and in the case of an imminent threat of war. Work obligation units
9 shall be organised by assigning them to -- by assigning to them citizens
10 subject to work obligation and not assigned to the armed forces or
11 subject to work obligation in bodies of the Interior Ministry."
12 General, to go back to your interpretation of this article,
13 number 4, 25, 26, what about the provisions of this decree? Have a close
14 look, please. Are they any different from the letter of the law; and are
15 the two interpretations different?
16 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, also, I think the General ought to be
17 asked if he has ever seen it before in fairness to him, or if this is the
18 first time he's seen this.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Ms. Korner, I've come across this
20 document already. I never had a chance to use it in my work though.
21 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Can you please answer the question, General.
23 A. Mr. Krgovic, I'm looking at Article 1. I'm looking for a
24 discrepancy. Then there is something there that confuses me.
25 Q. But my question was: Are there any discrepancies. If you don't
1 see any, please state so.
2 A. I see this: "For the needs of the armed forces in war and in
3 case of an imminent threat of war."
4 I see that this classification was added in relation to what
5 Article 26 says. It only says "in war."
6 Q. And what about how it relates to Article 25?
7 A. I established a link between Article 25 and Article 26. In my
8 opinion, the two are related. It reads:
9 "Among other things, that those liable for work obligation must
10 remain on their jobs and assignments, the ones they are performing,
11 unless they are called to serve in the armed forces or assigned to other
12 tasks and jobs."
13 Specifically in relation to practical matters, the next
14 paragraph says that such individuals may be assigned within their own
15 place of residence or outside their place of residence. They must act in
16 compliance with the assignment received.
17 And then Article 26. It specifies who is responsible and who is
18 authorised to change their war assignment.
19 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, I'm really sorry. I would invite
20 Mr. Krgovic or Your Honours to ask, and I'm sorry this arrived so late,
21 but the simple question is this: Whether Article 1 --
22 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
23 MS. KORNER: Oh, I'm sorry. The simple question is whether
24 Article 1 of this particular regulation, if it's correct as published in
25 the gazette, means that people who are assigned to work obligation for
1 the minister [sic] of interior may not be assigned to the military.
2 That's the -- the simple question.
3 Do you agree.
4 MR. KRGOVIC: [Microphone not activated]
5 Q. General, you have heard the question. Could you please answer
7 A. No, that is not my interpretation. My interpretation is what the
8 law says, the law that I used for my report, Ms. Korner. I see it as
9 being very specific and clear. Workers assigned a particular work
10 obligation during a war or during an imminent threat of war may change
11 their war assignment, and, if called upon by the relevant bodies, they
12 may also perform military duties.
13 Q. Thank you very much, General.
14 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, while Mr. Krgovic is looking for his
15 next document, can I say we're going to look for the official version and
16 then, by agreement, we'll add it to the law library.
17 JUDGE HALL: Thank you.
18 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. General, I have a series of questions for you about the
20 differences between the expert report that you produced for the Popovic
21 case and the present one.
22 You referred several times to the fact that these are two
23 different reports. Can you please explain what that difference is
24 reflected in? How are the two different? What does the difference
1 A. Mr. Krgovic, in the briefest possible terms, the substantial
2 difference between the two reports is the fact that we're dealing with
3 two different cases. We are studying two different cases.
4 Q. Are we looking at the same time-period, the same time-frame?
5 Both cases are two different ones. If so, each -- if so, which?
6 A. Mr. Krgovic, the focus of my second report, the present one, is
7 on 1992; whereas, the first report did not have a limited time-frame. It
8 was more about explaining the place and role of assistant commander for
9 morale. Firstly, in general terms; and, secondly, in a war time
11 Q. General, Ms. Korner spent quite some time in her
12 cross-examination probing the introductory part of your report. Would
13 you please open page 2 of your report and look at paragraph 2 and 3.
14 General, it says here: "Introduction."
15 And then please look at paragraph 14 where it says: "General
17 Tell me, please, General, when you wrote this, the introduction
18 and the general framework, what was your intention? What significance do
19 you think this part of your report holds? Why did you use that
20 methodological approach?
21 A. Mr. Krgovic, in order to research the topic that I did, I had to
22 place it in some general context which is described in the first part.
23 And I also had to give it some temporal context, which is discussed in
24 paragraph 14. I had to start from somewhere.
25 Q. Was that the main focus, the main topic of your report?
1 A. No, Mr. Krgovic. As I have said throughout my report, when
2 dealing with a command, organisation, rules and regulations, I attempted
3 to deal with the very important topic that I put before myself because I
4 considered that those cases or those phenomena of the use of police units
5 and their resubordination to military commanders were possible or could
6 be explained only by studying military rules and regulations because a
7 war is waged in accordance with military rules and regulations and it is
8 waged by soldiers, not by policemen. This is why I analysed the
9 organisation, command, principles, and structure in order to confirm this
10 position of mine which I considered to be the only
11 possible [as interpreted] in these cases, in order - I emphasise - to
12 classify or categorise those individuals as members of armed forces who
13 would fall under the provisions of the international laws of war.
14 Q. General, on page 23907, it was suggested to you by the
15 Prosecutor -- or, rather, the previous page, 906 and 907, it was
16 suggested to you that your idea was to ensure that the Defence got
17 General Gvero acquitted for Srebrenica, that that was your goal when
18 writing that report. And your reply was: "When I said that I wanted to
19 assist the Defence, I wish to explain that my aim was to explain the
20 principles existing in the army, and to assist, first and foremost, the
21 Trial Chamber."
22 MS. KORNER: He said -- well, I'm sorry.
23 [Microphone not activated] answer. He said, "You're right," to my
24 question, and then added that.
25 MR. KRGOVIC: But not when you say that only helped
1 General Gvero. "I wanted to explain this as a principle present in the
2 army, and I wanted to assist the Trial Chamber, first and foremost ..."
3 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, for Mr. Krgovic.
4 MR. KRGOVIC:
5 Q. [Interpretation] General, it was suggested to you by Ms. Korner,
6 and on page 23872, she said to you that, as a Defence expert, you wanted
7 to help the Defence. Could you explain to us what is your perception of
8 the role of an expert in this case before this Court?
9 A. Mr. Krgovic, I understand that, as an expert before this Court, I
10 have to be objective and unbiased. It is possible that prompted by the
11 suggestion of Ms. Korner, I uttered those words. However, I emphasise
12 and I have said earlier that I see my role, first and foremost, as that
13 of an expert before this Trial Chamber. I see that my role is to help
14 the Trial Chamber. Perhaps I was led in giving that answer by the
15 position that I held for the longest time in my career. As you could see
16 from my CV, I spent the longest part of my career in the position of an
17 assistant, assisting sometimes the commanders to take difficult
19 As you could see in my CV, at the end of my career, I held the
20 position of a commander, and I had to then take difficult decisions
21 myself, and I know that it's not easy to do that.
22 Q. General, when you drew conclusions and when you included them in
23 your report, did anyone influence you, influence your conclusions and the
24 views expressed in this report?
25 A. No, Mr. Krgovic.
1 Q. If you were not a Defence expert but an expert of the OTP or of
2 any other side, would the views expressed in your report be different?
3 A. No. Mr. Krgovic, I claim with full responsibility that I would
4 have provided identical answers, an identical report when it comes to
5 this topic, resubordination to military -- of police to military
6 commanders and military units.
7 Q. Thank you, sir. I have no further questions for you.
8 [Trial Chamber confers]
9 JUDGE HALL: General, we are grateful for your willingness to
10 assist the Tribunal, for your patience over the many days that you have
11 been with us. And your persistence, despite your own personal
12 difficulties. You would be pleased to know that you are now released,
13 and we wish you a safe journey back to your home.
14 There are a few matters with which the Tribunal must deal before
15 it rises, so I would ask the usher to escort you from the courtroom.
16 MS. KORNER: And before that, can I say that whatever submissions
17 I may be making about the General's evidence I too am grateful for his
18 patience over what was, obviously, a very lengthy cross-examination and
19 also his courtesy; although, I could have done without being called
20 Ms. Korner every time he answered a question. But I am very grateful.
21 JUDGE HALL: [Previous translation continued]...
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President --
23 JUDGE HALL: Sorry, you wanted to say something?
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I wish to thank you
25 and this Trial Chamber for the understanding you have shown and for your
1 fair treatment. Thank you.
2 Thank you.
3 [The witness withdrew]
4 JUDGE HALL: There are brief matters that the Chamber wishes to
5 address, but before I do that, I don't know if counsel from either side
6 have any observations or requests before we rise for the day.
7 MS. KORNER: I imagine Mr. Krgovic wants to ask that Your Honours
8 admit the report and the accompanying documents. As I've indicated to
9 Mr. Krgovic and to Mr. Zecevic, I will be objecting to the admission of
10 that report with some reasons for it, and I think we all feel that Monday
11 morning would be better for that.
12 JUDGE HALL: Very well.
13 The first matter is the admission of 659D1.
14 In its decision of the 15th of September the Chamber marked for
15 identification a document with Rule 65 ter number 659D1, pending the
16 provision of a complete translation. As one has now been provided, we
17 order that this -- the MFI qualification on this be removed and the
18 document be admitted and marked as a full exhibit.
19 And we record our appreciation for the assistance of Defence
20 counsel in noting the situation with regard to this document.
21 The second matter is the completion of the Rule 66(B) disclosure.
22 And we note that now that we have a revised batting order from the
23 Zupljanin Defence, we anticipate that the Prosecution can also confirm to
24 the Chamber that its disclosure of Rule 66(B) material to the Defence
25 pursuant to our decision of the 19th of August is now complete.
1 MS. KORNER: Is that -- are you asking me, Your Honours?
2 JUDGE HALL: Well, I paused. You may wish to -- when I say
3 "you," the OTP may wish to return to this when we reconvene on Monday.
4 MS. KORNER: Yes, but I do say --
5 JUDGE HALL: But I pause in the even that you are in a position
6 to respond now.
7 MS. KORNER: I am, with the exception of one witness, who I think
8 is still a query -- and I see Mr. Krgovic nodding, he is still a query
9 even though he is still on the list. We have, otherwise, completed
11 JUDGE HALL: Thank you.
12 The final matter is estimates for cross-examination, and in order
13 for forward planning and to make the most effective use of the limited
14 time available, we invite both the Prosecution and the Stanisic Defence
15 to provide the Chamber with its time estimates for cross-examination of
16 all remaining witnesses no later than Thursday, next, that's the 22nd of
17 September. And we take the opportunity to remind the Prosecution that
18 with the exception of the three Rule 92 ter witnesses, it will be granted
19 no more than the time estimated by the Zupljanin Defence for
21 We also remind all parties of the requirements of guide-lines 25
22 to 27 of the procedural guide-lines on the presentation of evidence of
23 Rule 92 ter witnesses. Estimates of time for cross-examination of the
24 three Rule 92 ter witnesses were expected "as soon as possible" after the
25 relevant decisions were issued on the 21st of July and the 22nd of
2 And as we rise for the weekend, the Chamber wishes to
3 acknowledge -- it would have earlier expressed its gratitude to CLSS for
4 agreeing to accommodate the extended sitting today, and we wish to
5 acknowledge the co-operation of everyone else who would have had to
6 facilitate this. We -- especially the support staff, that is the
7 security personnel, the court reporters, the court officers, and most of
8 all, the accused, whose ordinary schedule would have been disrupted as a
9 result of this extended sitting.
10 So we thankfully have completed a little earlier than we thought
11 we would have been here so --
12 You had something to add, Mr. Krgovic?
13 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honours.
14 I just wanted to notify you that we made a submission for some
15 documents to be added to our 65 ter list. This motion will reach you
16 very soon. It has to do -- do with documents that we wanted to add to
17 the list in relation to the next witness. The Prosecution has already
18 been notified of this and I wanted to notify the Chamber as well, that we
19 filed that motion, but it hasn't been distributed to the parties for
20 technical reasons. Not yet.
21 These are the documents that had been disclosed to us by the
22 Prosecution. Some in August. And some earlier. All of these documents
23 come from the OTP.
24 JUDGE HALL: So we are alerted.
25 Well, I trust that everyone has a safe weekend, and we reconvene,
1 I think, Monday morning, and we're in the courtroom for the duration of
2 this -- of the sitting of this case, during this period.
3 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 5.12 p.m.,
4 to be reconvened on Monday, the 19th day of
5 September, 2011, at 9.00 a.m.