1 Friday, 9 March 2012
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.10 a.m.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning
6 everyone in and around the courtroom.
7 This is case IT-08-91-T, the Prosecutor versus Mico Stanisic and
8 Stojan Zupljanin.
9 JUDGE HALL: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
10 Good morning to everyone. May we have the appearances today,
12 MR. HANNIS: Thank you. Good morning, Your Honours. For the
13 Prosecution, I'm Tom Hannis, with our intern Rose Cameron, and my Case
14 Manager Sebastiaan van Hooydonk.
15 MR. ZECEVIC: Good morning, Your Honours. Slobodan Zecevic,
16 Slobodan Cvijetic, and Eugene O'Sullivan, appearing for Stanisic Defence
17 this morning. Thank you very much.
18 MR. KRGOVIC: Good morning, Your Honours. Dragan Krgovic,
19 Aleksandar Aleksic, Miroslav Cuskic, Gillian Kelly, and Milena Dzudovic
20 appearing for Zupljanin Defence.
21 MR. LAZAREVIC: Good morning, Your Honours. Aleksandar Lazarevic
22 appearing for Mr. Tomislav Kovac.
23 JUDGE HALL: Thank you.
24 Yes, Mr. Hannis.
25 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, I had asked for five minutes just to
1 make two requests: One was to request -- I wanted to tender an exhibit
2 that was shown to the witness, but late in the day I was tired, my
3 learned friends intervened, and I forgot.
4 Beginning at transcript pages 27184 through 27186, I was showing
5 the witness 65 ter 30046. And it's tab number 135 in the Prosecution's
6 list. It's a 30 July 1992 appointment of Mr. Drljaca as SJB chief by
7 Mr. Zupljanin.
8 I note that it's on Mr. Zecevic's list this morning as something
9 to talk to the witness about.
10 MR. ZECEVIC: Well, I do object, Your Honours. I anticipated --
11 that is why I put it on the list. I anticipated that Mr. Hannis will
12 seek to tender it this morning. But if you -- if I correctly remember,
13 the witness confirmed that this document was illegal and that he didn't
14 know anything about it, but presumed it to be illegal.
15 Therefore, I see no basis -- apart from all other objections that
16 I already stated yesterday about the late disclosure and the
17 inappropriateness of the time that the Office of the Prosecutor is
18 seeking to tendered these documents, I object on this specific document
19 because there is no -- there has been -- there has been no connection
20 established with the witness.
21 Thank you.
22 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Krgovic, you were about to say something.
23 MR. KRGOVIC: Your Honours, I join the submission, what
24 Mr. Zecevic say.
25 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, if I may reply.
1 The witness didn't challenge the authenticity. He took issue
2 with -- he said it was illegal because centre chiefs didn't have the
3 authority to appoint. But I pointed out to him that he apparently wasn't
4 aware of the 25 April decision 01-25/92, which is referenced in the
5 document, which is in the evidence in our case as 1D73, which shows that
6 Mr. Stanisic at that time delegated authority to centre chiefs to appoint
7 SJB chiefs. It indicated they need to get -- they needed to consult, I
8 think, or get permission from the minister, but the document itself
9 that's being tendered indicates that there was prior approval by the
11 So we think we've established sufficient authenticity. We think
12 is relevant and probative on the issues, and we think it should be
13 admitted. Defence argument should go to the weight.
14 JUDGE HALL: Thank you.
15 Dealing --
16 Yes, Mr. Krgovic. You have something to add.
17 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] If I may add one thing.
18 The timing for the OTP tendering this document. This document is
19 not part of the personal file of Mr. Drljaca. The OTP had this document
20 much earlier and they had an opportunity to discuss with the witnesses
21 who were aware of the way of the appointment of Mr. Drljaca, and there
22 were witnesses who spoke about retroactivity and how these decisions were
23 adopted and antedated.
24 However, this witness, does not constitute a nexus between him
25 and this document and cannot offer a foundation for its admission. The
1 OTP could have done that much earlier by pointing out to the -- the
2 connection and explaining how this came about. We had, for example, with
3 witnesses Miskovic and Jankovic, and there was ample opportunity for the
4 OTP to come up with this document and put it to competent witnesses who
5 could be able to explain why this document was issued as it was.
6 This is prejudicial to us at this stage, and we don't have a
7 chance to provide proper explanation about the origin of this document
8 because we don't have available appropriate witnesses.
9 MR. ZECEVIC: If I may add, Your Honours. I'm sorry to take up
10 the time.
11 The submission which Mr. Hannis made concerning 1D73 is not price
12 and it is not correct. First of all, the document does not say what
13 Mr. Hannis is -- is suggesting, but something completely different. The
14 key point here is, Your Honours, that we have been disclosed the personal
15 file of -- of one Simo Drljaca. This personal file does not contain this
16 document, nor the approval of the -- of the -- of the minister for the
17 appointment of -- of -- of Simo Drljaca.
18 Furthermore, in the proceedings before this Tribunal, in Stakic,
19 the Defence of Dr. Stakic approached the Ministry of Interior of
20 Republika Srpska requesting the appointment of Simo Drljaca in 1992.
21 And -- and the information that they received is contained in this file,
22 the personal file of Simo Drljaca, stating that they do not have the
23 letter of appointment of Simo Drljaca from 1992 but only the -- the
24 documents starting from 1994 onwards.
25 Therefore, I see there -- I don't see any basis for -- for the
1 submission of -- or -- to -- to -- to tender this document made by the
3 Thank you very much.
4 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Hannis, could I hear you only on this matter of
6 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, my information is this document was
7 disclosed to the Defence on the 21st of July, 2010. And I don't have
8 presently the information from our MIF sheet indicating when and how we
9 received it. But I can check on that if that's pertinent or necessary
10 for your final decision.
11 JUDGE HALL: Well, I don't think it is necessary to repeat what
12 would have been said yesterday in terms of material which the Prosecution
13 may have had in its possession and chose not to advance when it was -- or
14 to tender when its case was being presented.
15 And in terms of the objection to the instant document as being in
16 the words of the witness illegal, of course, the document speaks -- what
17 the document says is what it says. The witness's view on the
18 regularity - my word, not his - is a matter of evidence which should have
19 to be taken into account when the time for assessment is made.
20 So the document is admitted and marked.
21 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P2463, Your Honours.
22 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour. My second request was to
23 re-open my cross to show the witness one document which is tab number 75
24 in the Prosecution's list. It's 65 ter number 30032. It's dated the 5th
25 of November, 1992, from the command of the Zvornik Light Infantry
2 It relates to the November 5th collegium meeting, which
3 Mr. Stanisic was chairing but left before the third agenda item along
4 with Mr. Kusmuk, Mr. Karisik, and Mr. Radovic because of a problem in
5 Zvornik. It's a combat report and it talks about the problem that broke
6 out between the special police and the military police and has an urgent
7 request that the ministers for national defence and interior come to
9 I did get in yesterday another document that indicated that the
10 minister and General Gvero had shown up in Zvornik to deal with the
11 problem, but this was sort of an intervening document to complete the
12 connection between the event and the appearance of the minister. It
13 relates to issues regarding communication and co-ordination between the
14 military and the police, and that's why I seek to do this.
15 JUDGE HALL: You -- you phrased your request as being -- to be
16 permitted to show the witness a document. I expect that there will be a
17 consequential application and no doubt we will hear from the other side,
18 if and when that consequential application is made.
19 So the witness may be -- if the usher would please escort the
20 witness to the stand.
21 JUDGE DELVOIE: Perhaps in the meantime, we could, Mr. Hannis,
22 with the tendering of the Koroman and Drljaca documents. You sorted that
23 out with the Registry, but we have to have it on record.
24 MR. HANNIS: Yes, Your Honour. We have sent an e-mail to them
25 and to the Defence listing, I think, for Koroman there were three
1 individual documents and for Drljaca there were four.
2 JUDGE DELVOIE: Well, as I understand it, we should now admit --
3 you clean up the -- the 65 ter numbers. The documents. And we should
4 now admit 65 ter 3042 and 65 ter 30043; is that correct?
5 MR. HANNIS: Yes, Your Honour. That would be my request. We
6 have removed the pages that we didn't talk about.
7 JUDGE DELVOIE: Okay. So we can -- we can do that, right?
8 MR. HANNIS: Yes. Yes. If -- unless there's a specific --
9 JUDGE DELVOIE: No objection?
10 MR. HANNIS: -- Defence objection to any.
11 MR. ZECEVIC: [Microphone not activated] Sorry. Yes, we do
12 object, and for the same reason I stated before.
13 JUDGE DELVOIE: Yes. But we -- unless I'm wrong, we decided upon
14 the objection, but my question whether you object now is whether there is
15 something about the clean-up and the -- the way the documents are
16 presented now.
17 MR. ZECEVIC: Well, I'm not sure, Your Honours, on which
18 documents we are talking about. I have -- I'm trying to --
19 JUDGE DELVOIE: We're talking about the documents from the
20 personal files of Malko Koroman and Simo Drljaca.
21 MR. ZECEVIC: But I don't -- I have a number of different
22 documents with the same 65 ter number, and I'm not sure which ones are --
23 are the ones that Mr. Hannis is seeking to tender. That is -- that is my
24 problem at the moment, Your Honour.
25 MR. HANNIS: I certainly have no problem, if he needs to take
1 more time, Your Honour. We did identify by specific ERN page numbers the
2 B/C/S page numbers that we're seeking to tender under those two 65 ter
3 exhibit numbers.
4 [Trial Chamber confers]
5 JUDGE HALL: To assist you, Mr. Zecevic, if I may build on what
6 Judge Delvoie has said, we have already ruled on the admissibility. It's
7 merely a question of you're being satisfied as to the tidying up
8 exercise, so we would hear from you later on that while you familiarise
9 yourself with the product that has now been --
10 MR. ZECEVIC: I understand, and I appreciate, Your Honours.
11 Thank you.
12 [The witness takes the stand]
13 JUDGE HALL: Good morning, to you sir. Again, at the start of
14 another day's hearing, I remind you of your solemn declaration.
15 Yes, Mr. Hannis.
16 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
17 WITNESS: TOMISLAV KOVAC [Resumed]
18 [Witness answered through interpreter]
19 Cross-examination by Mr. Hannis:
20 Q. Mr. Kovac, I apologise, I thought we were finished but I have one
21 more document to show you and ask you about this morning. The usher will
22 show you a hard copy in a moment. It's dated the 5th of November and
23 this relates to what we discussed yesterday about the 5th --
24 MR. ZECEVIC: Can we have the tab number, please.
25 MR. HANNIS: Yes. This is tab number 75. 65 ter 30032.
1 Q. You remember yesterday we were talking about the collegium
2 meeting on the 5th of November during which Mr. Stanisic, Mr. Kusmuk and,
3 I think, Mr. Radovic left early to go to Zvornik, and we saw one document
4 that reflected that the minister and General Gvero had actually gone.
5 I wanted to show you this one and ask you to look at item number
6 4. This is from the Zvornik Light Brigade. And item 4 says:
7 "Last night around 2200, a serious conflict broke out between
8 members of the brigade's military police and the RS special unit
9 stationed in Zvornik. The situation extremely urgent [sic] but remains
10 under the brigade commander's control. It's urgently requested that the
11 ministers for national Defence and of the interior come to Zvornik."
12 Did you know -- this is dated the 5th of November and
13 Mr. Stanisic and the others actually left a collegium meeting on the 5th
14 of November to go. Do you know that that was in connection with this
15 event about the conflict between the military police and the RS special
16 unit in Zvornik?
17 A. I suppose there was no special conflict. I think it was a purely
18 military conflict among individuals, so I don't know what you think is
19 important in this entire context.
20 So this is a conflict between soldiers, where people gathered in
21 a single area and it had to do with military conduct. I don't know what
22 you would like to elicit from me with regard to this context.
23 Q. Well, the fact that the minister and -- and three high-level MUP
24 officials left a collegium meeting, and those things only happen about
25 once a month, seems to suggest that this was important. Surely
1 Mr. Stanisic couldn't have gone off to every conflict between police
2 and -- and -- and the military; right? He wouldn't have had time to do
3 anything else. Why was this one so urgent; if you know?
4 A. I don't think it should have been urgent. The outcome of a
5 serious conflict are always dead or wounded people. In this particular
6 instance, this did not happen. This was a simple matter of relations
7 between young servicemen. There was a special unit deployed in that town
8 after paramilitary units had been removed from there. After they had
9 eliminated Zuc and other paramilitary formations, they arrived there.
10 But I'm sure you had an opportunity to explore that.
11 Q. All right. I have no further questions, Your Honour. I would
12 tender it just to show the connection between the meeting and the later
13 arrival of the minister and make whatever arguments I can from that at
14 some later day.
15 JUDGE HALL: Is there a connection -- is there, from what you
16 have thus far elicited, established a connection, Mr. Hannis?
17 MR. HANNIS: Well, Your Honour, I think this the link between the
18 meeting which shows that the minister and the other three individuals
19 left and the other document that we got in yesterday showing that the
20 minister and General Gvero had arrived. This is the request that
21 initiated the departure from the meeting which resulted in the showing up
22 later the same day. It's inextricably intertwined with the other two
23 documents in evidence, I believe, Your Honour.
24 JUDGE HALL: I don't know why the caution post hoc ergo propter
25 hoc comes to mind, but I may be wrong.
1 Mr. Zecevic, you have an objection.
2 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, it is not disputed that the minister
3 left, for an urgent business, the collegium on the 5th of November. So I
4 don't -- I don't really -- I don't really see the purpose because this
5 has nothing to do with the charges. It is completely irrelevant event
6 for the purposes of this trial, so ...
7 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Krgovic, you wanted to add something? I saw you
8 moving. I --
9 MR. KRGOVIC: Mr. Zecevic submits everything that I wish.
10 JUDGE HALL: Yes, Mr. Hannis.
11 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, it's been an important issue in this
12 trial. The relations between the military and the police,
13 resubordination, who controls who, whether it is co-ordinated action,
14 et cetera. The fact that the military makes an urgent request for the
15 minister to show up and both ministers show up within hours is something
16 that may be of importance in your final resolution of this case.
17 [Trial Chamber confers]
18 MR. ZECEVIC: But ...
19 [Trial Chamber confers]
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If I may ...
21 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Hannis, when it said the conflict between
22 members of the military police and the Republika Srpska special unit
23 stationed in Zvornik, am I right to understand that to be the special
24 police unit?
25 MR. HANNIS: I -- I believe so, Your Honour.
1 JUDGE DELVOIE: I see Mr. Zecevic nodding.
2 MR. ZECEVIC: [Microphone not activated] Yes.
3 [Trial Chamber confers]
4 [Trial Chamber and Legal Officer confer]
5 JUDGE HALL: Admitted and marked.
6 MR. HANNIS: I --
7 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P2464, Your Honours.
8 MR. HANNIS: I apologise, Your Honour. I have apparently misled
9 you in one aspect of this. My Case Manager pointed out to me that
10 65 ter 30033, which is the other document dated the 5th of November about
11 the minister and General Gvero showing up, which I discussed with the
12 witness yesterday, wasn't tendered and is not in. But I would -- I would
13 tender it now, and I apologise for having believed and led to you believe
14 that it was already in.
15 [Trial Chamber confers]
16 JUDGE HALL: So that, too, is admitted and marked.
17 MR. HANNIS: Thank you very much.
18 Q. Thank you, Mr. Kovac.
19 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P2465, Your Honours.
20 JUDGE HALL: Yes, Mr. Zecevic [Microphone not activated]
21 Cross-examination by Mr. Zecevic:
22 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Kovac.
23 A. Good morning.
24 Q. Mr. Kovac, I would have to ask you a big favour. Since we both
25 speak the same language, we are going to overlap unless we make a pause
1 between each question and answer that you give me, and this is going to
2 be -- to make life very difficult to the interpreters who are doing a
3 fantastic job and who interpreted everything that you discussed with
4 Mr. Hannis and the Judges over the past two or three days. Now please
5 pay attention to that.
6 Now, sir --
7 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Can we have assistance from the
8 usher, in that he be given a binder.
9 Q. The first document that I wish to show you is marked tab 149.
10 That's P2459. You can find numbers on the side and please look for 149,
11 and you'll have no problem in locating it.
12 Sir, the document shown to you by the Prosecutor yesterday is
13 this one. You remember that. It's an information that came from Ilidza
14 on 13 June. Do you remember that?
15 A. Yes, I do.
16 Q. Mr. Hannis read a quote to you, but I think that inadvertently he
17 omitted read paragraph 2 on the last page, and I'm going to read it out
18 to you. It reads -- and it's page 3 in the e-court in the Serbian and I
19 suppose number 2 in the English. It reads:
20 "The National Security Service department in Ilidza Serbian
21 public security station as well as the services of this SJB are working
22 on shedding more light to and on documenting Milic's above-mentioned
24 Are you aware of the fact that they investigated Milic's
1 A. Yes, I am. But, as I insisted yesterday, I would really like to
2 have the previous paragraph read as well. I can do it, or maybe you can
3 do it, because that will give us a full picture.
4 There were groups who came from outside of Ilidza and they tried
5 to persuade them to attack the station, the public security station, and
6 also to organise the assassination of the station's commander. This was
7 going to give us a full picture of the situation. And now I can answer
8 your question.
9 Q. I'm merely interested in one thing, sir, and since our time is
10 limited please focus on my questions. Here's what I'm only interested
11 in: Do you know and is it true what we read here that the National
12 Security Service and the public security station investigated all illegal
13 activities of this person and his group, including, of course, the attack
14 on the public security station. Are you aware of that or not?
15 A. Certainly, I am. And certainly we launched a series of
16 activities to follow and shed more light on the group headed by this
17 Milic. It was a serious case for us, and it was a delicate matter
18 because he had links to former National Security Service staff. And
19 before the war, the Croatian Intelligence Service gave him the task to --
20 to disrupt the interethnic relations at Ilidza.
21 Q. If I understood you correctly, this person eventually got killed
22 or died due to an overdose.
23 A. This person was found dead in specific circumstances. He had
24 overdosed and we knew that, apart from these other activities, he was
25 also a link in the transit chain, transport chain of drugs travelling to
2 Q. You also discussed another document with Mr. Hannis yesterday and
3 I'm speaking about tab 150; document P648. You remember that you also
4 discussed this document with Mr. Hannis yesterday and you did it at
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. At the last page of this document, we see the signature of the
8 person who drafted it. It says Ilidza public security station chief,
9 Tihomir Glavas. Do you see it?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Yesterday you commented on this and said about this document that
12 this is an epic inclination which is understandable, bearing in mind the
13 war-time context and that they overly praised you to indirectly praise
14 themselves and be decorated. And you also said that to your mind,
15 Tihomir Glavas was a solid police officer. Do you remember?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Let's go to page -- pages 6 and 7 of this document where the
18 proposals for decorations can be found. Your name is the first one
19 mentioned, and let's go to item 5.
20 A. Item 5 is Tihomir Glavas, chief of Hadzic SJB, assistant to chief
21 for the police of SJB Ilidza, and then chief of station.
22 Q. Tell me, is this the same Tihomir Glavas who signed this
24 A. Yes, the same man.
25 Q. In other words, he proposes himself for a medal in a document
1 that he signed.
2 A. Yes, exactly.
3 Q. So much about the value of this document.
4 MR. HANNIS: Objection, Your Honour. That's a submission for
5 final arguments, not an appropriate comment when the witness is
7 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, I withdraw that. I'm sorry.
8 Q. [Interpretation] In 1992, sir, when you came to the Ministry of
9 the Interior - I mean, the ministry headquarters - if I understood your
10 evidence well, you said that --
11 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Could you please give the witness
12 some more water. He's asking for water. Here.
13 Q. [Interpretation] So, if I understood your evidence correctly,
14 meaning that the consolidation process of the MUP at that moment had
15 already begun.
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. You also said in your evidence that Mico Stanisic spoke to you
18 before you were transferred to the MUP, and I believe that you said that
19 there were stories about him telling you that he needed professionals in
20 the police with experience and moral integrity to create the RS MUP
21 properly, and that everything be done in accordance with the law. Have I
22 summed up your evidence correctly?
23 A. Yes. In a nutshell, he needed people who were police officers
24 through and through and not loyal to local communities or open to other
25 influences. And, of course, he needed people with enough energy to
1 implement the things that were necessary. The Ministry of Interior had
2 to be completed.
3 Q. If I remember well, you mentioned in that context that one of his
4 demands was that those people be without party ties. In other words,
5 independent from party politics and, in fact, true professionals.
6 A. Yes. It was along those lines. I believe that when he chose me
7 for that post, he, at the same time, outlined the course of action of the
8 Public Security Service and made a statement regarding relations with
10 Q. In the course of that consolidation process, some activities were
11 initiated, so please confirm whether I'm right. After the opening of the
12 corridor, conditions were created for integrating the RS MUP into a whole
13 and establishing links along lines of work.
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. The action to significantly reduce the reserve force was begun.
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. An action was initiated with regard to individuals who were
18 admitted to the police without previous vetting to be discharged from the
19 police and put at the disposal of the army.
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Public security stations began to be set up, and at MUP
22 headquarters, there was a separation of the police administration and the
23 crime enforcement administration.
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. The consolidation and setting up of the National Security
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. The initiation of the consolidation and setting up of some CSBs,
4 such as Bijeljina, Sarajevo, Trebinje, and the re-establishment of the
5 Doboj centre.
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. The abolishment of various so-called special police units that
8 had been set up by some public security stations, CSBs, Crisis Staffs,
9 and the like, and the setting up of a special unit detachment with each
10 CSB under the command of the special police brigade, headed by Karisik
11 and the ministry.
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Based on this new, stronger position of the special police
14 brigade commanded by Karisik and the ministry, as of June 1992, this
15 brigade took on paramilitaries in Brcko, Bijeljina, Zvornik and so on?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Wasn't the intention of the RS MUP at that moment to settle
18 accounts with all kinds of crime and put an end to war crimes, including
19 illegal camps and the like?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. In order to achieve all these objectives that I mentioned - but I
22 add that this is not a comprehensive list - some personnel changes were
23 made, both in the ministry headquarters as well as in the public security
24 stations on the ground?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. It's a fact that you also came to the RS MUP in that framework of
2 personnel changes.
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Do you agree with me when I say that this was a process that was
5 started and on which you also embarked from the outset?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. What was the desire behind that process? The setting up of the
8 rule of law and make sure that the ministry functioned in accordance with
9 the law?
10 A. If I may give a more comprehensive answer. I have been brief so
11 far. One of the motives of us professional police officers in
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina, when we decided the police of -- to leave the police
13 of Bosnia-Herzegovina, apart from the need to side with the -- our own
14 people, it was much more important, actually, when we came to the sad
15 insight that we were working in a criminal MUP headed by
16 Alija Delimustafic and in a state organisation where the institutions are
17 in the service of one people and one party, and at that time, it was the
18 Muslim people and the SDA party.
19 As a professional at Ilidza, I was being humiliated. The
20 president of the then-Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic,
21 when he came to an official state conference, he was -- or security was
22 provided to him by an illegal organisation called the Patriotic League
23 and the MUP couldn't get near him. All that induced us to create a MUP
24 that was up to the criteria we were imbued with during our training and
25 not a MUP like that of Bosnia-Herzegovina. A MUP that would not be ruled
1 by individuals, parties, or para-parties, even if they are from the
2 Serbian people.
3 Q. Thank you. Sir, one of the ways to reach those goals that you
4 mentioned was the need for the MUP to keep law and order, to prosecute
5 offenders, to submit criminal offences to the relevant institutions, and
6 do everything that a MUP has to do in a country, in accordance with the
7 law and the constitution?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Sir, since for a while in 1992 you were a very close associate of
10 Mr. Mico Stanisic, do you have reason to doubt that these were also the
11 goals of Mr. Stanisic?
12 A. No. In 1992 we were totally on the same wavelength with regard
13 to these things. At that time, I had the greatest powers to -- to put my
14 ideals and -- or, rather, ideas about the structure and functioning of
15 the MUP into practice.
16 Q. Sir, in the documents we received, I found some statements of
17 yours; for example, that, in your opinion, Mico Stanisic, in 1992, burned
18 out in his efforts to set up a MUP in accordance with the law and the way
19 it should be and cracked down on all types of crime, and that he was
20 removed from his post because he lost political support for his efforts.
21 Do you stand by that statement?
22 A. I do.
23 Q. Sir, was the loss of that political support in late 1992 a
24 result, in your view, of precisely these efforts on your part within the
25 MUP to crack down on all types of crime and prosecute the perpetrators
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Sir, in your evidence yesterday, you told us that everything that
4 was, in your view, done positively by you in 1992, with a view to
5 improving the conditions in the MUP of role, was practically reversed in
6 1993 while Mr. Ratko Adzic headed the MUP?
7 A. Yes, that's correct.
8 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Zecevic.
9 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes.
10 JUDGE DELVOIE: If I may go back to the previous topic; that is,
11 Mr. Stanisic's burnout in 1992.
12 You say that you have -- you found "some statements of yours; for
13 example ..."
14 Could you tell us what documents you are referring to?
15 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes, Your Honours.
16 I have -- I believe it's -- it's -- I have found it on -- on --
17 on two -- two places, but, at this point I can only give a reference to
19 It's the --
20 JUDGE DELVOIE: That will do.
21 MR. ZECEVIC: It's P841. And I can quote directly from -- from
22 this. This is an interview of Mr. Tomo Kovac from 1996, 1st of March,
24 JUDGE DELVOIE: For me, it's okay. For the moment we have the
25 exact reference. It's okay for me.
1 MR. ZECEVIC: Okay.
2 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
3 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. To be on the safe side, I will remind you of your exact words.
5 "Mico Stanisic burnt out while performing his role twice. He
6 approached his tasks with great enthusiasm and burnt out."
7 Do you recall these words?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Sir, we spoke of the situation in 1993. It is a fact, is it not,
10 that after Mico Stanisic's deposition as well as yours and other MUP
11 staff, at a point in time when Ratko Adzic was appointed minister of the
12 interior of Republika Srpska, not only were all the activities for the
13 betterment of the organisation that were undertaken in 1992 neutralised,
14 but the situation went back to the starting point or even to a state of
15 affairs that was worse than it had been at the start of the process.
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Please help yourself. I apologise for interrupting you.
18 A. Yes, definitely. This process was halted and matters took a
19 different course. We got an individual who had come from the Crisis
20 Staff who had a different mindset which had an idea of how things were to
21 function locally but had no idea of how the rule of law should be
22 enforced and how the institutions at the central level were to function.
23 We mounted some sort of resistance to what he was introducing at
24 that level in the MUP, but the process was, nevertheless, halted.
25 Q. When you say "the process was, nevertheless, halted," you mean
1 the process of betterment which was launched in 1992.
2 A. Yes. I meant the process to complete the building of the
3 institutions and staff with a view to enforcing a rule of law, which is
4 one of the basic tenets of any functioning state.
5 Q. Thank you. Sir, you will agree with me, will you not - you did
6 say that a moment ago - that what was peculiar about the situation, which
7 characterised the year 1992, was the existence of these Crisis Staffs and
8 the power, the enormous power they wielded locally where they were
9 absolute masters of the situation?
10 A. Well, at the point of the breakup of the state, they were
11 definitely in that position. All the decisions were made at one level
12 only. There were no two-tier decision-making structures. They had
13 everything under them: The army, the organisation, the municipality. And
14 even the better part of the police, although we were the first ones to
15 leave that circle because we had already shaped up our structure.
16 Q. Sir, you say that already you had the contours of the ministry in
17 place. The power that the -- that the Crisis Staffs had adversely
18 affected the MUP, its authority and effective control that it had over
19 its elements.
20 A. Well, it is impossible to generalise across the board. There
21 were places where the leadership of the Crisis Staff was normal, as it
22 were, whereas there were also places where we had our public security
23 stations headed by individuals who were strong enough to prevail and make
24 sure that things were done in accordance with the law.
25 Q. If I understand you correctly, what I said about this adverse
1 effect on the work the MUP, it was felt but not everywhere. It was,
2 though, a negative manifestation of the time, was it not?
3 A. Yes. Yes, I -- up to some 30 per cent, which was already enough,
4 to create enormous problems for us. And, as a result, this is where we
5 are today.
6 Q. Sir, the power that the Crisis Staffs wielded locally was
7 reflected in the authorities in general and especially in the central
9 A. Well, of course. Because all these local authorities had their
10 representatives in the assembly. And the National Assembly of
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time was the highest political and legislative
12 body which had an influence, in part, over the executive as well. And as
13 a result of that, they were able to topple three governments in war time,
14 which is not an occurrence you would easily see around the world.
15 Q. Yesterday you spoke of certain changes in the staff with
16 Mr. Hannis and Their Honours. You spoke of certain staff having been
17 removed. I have a couple of cases in my hands here, and I'd like to you
18 comment on them.
19 You will remember that yesterday you commented on a case related
20 to Mr. Stevan Todorovic.
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. I think you explained this yesterday. We have the entire
23 documentation on file. But I would like you to clarify the transcript.
24 Page 27071, and I'll read out the relevant part in English so that you
25 would get the accurate quote.
1 [In English] "That was obvious while Mr. Adzic was minister and
2 wanted to do some things that were contrary to the wishes of us
3 professionals. I understood it to be Mr. Stanisic's wish to do the
4 things that I was doing. And it follows from some documents that
5 Minister Stanisic was involved in some proceedings, except in the case of
7 [Interpretation] Well, this is why I am about to ask you to
8 clarify this. But let me summarise this.
9 The fact of the matter is, Mr. Kovac, that at the time when
10 Mico Stanisic was minister in 1992, you, as chief of administration,
11 deployed inspectors of the administration of the MUP to Samac to a
12 fact -- to carry out a fact-finding mission; did you not?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. The chief of the Security Services Centre, Mr. Bjelosevic,
15 proposed in 1992 that a new individual be pointed as chief of the public
16 security in Samac - that's to say, Petar Cancar - because, as he put it,
17 of frequent and gross misconduct in the service on the part of
18 Stevan Todorovic; is that right?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. The fact that Stevan Todorovic, at some point in 1992, was taken
21 into custody. That was another fact that was listed; right?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Sir, in relation to Malko Koroman, are you aware that
24 Malko Koroman was the chief of the public security station at Pale,
25 pursuant to a decision issued by the minister, Alija Delimustafic, in
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Sir, you were shown a document yesterday, 65 ter 10 -- or,
4 rather, yes, 10373, which is tab 151.
5 It's a document dated the 11th of January, 1993. And Acting
6 Minister Radomir Njegus signed the document.
7 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: Acting assistant
9 MR. ZECEVIC:
10 Q. [Interpretation] And this is a cover letter relating to
11 Malko Koroman; right?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Sir, at this point in time, on the 11th of January, 1993,
14 Mico Stanisic was already removed from his position in the ministry, and
15 you, too, if I understand your evidence, correctly, had been divested of
16 all powers by your leadership as of the 1st of January?
17 A. Yes. I was supposed to be deputy minister, but I actually stayed
18 behind as chief of the police administration. So this is a document sent
19 by the assistant minister to the chief of the administration.
20 THE INTERPRETER: Can the witness please repeat what he said
21 last. It was too soft.
22 JUDGE DELVOIE: The witness is asked by the interpreters to
23 repeat his last answer.
24 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm Sorry, Your Honours. Sorry to interrupt, Your
25 Honours. Did you want to --
1 JUDGE DELVOIE: Did you hear -- did you hear what I --
2 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes, I did.
3 JUDGE DELVOIE: Okay. So if the witness can do that.
4 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Sir, please speak slowly and clearly and say briefly what it was
6 that you said.
7 A. It transpires from this document that it was sent to the chief of
8 the police administration which was the position I was discharging at the
9 time, and it was sent by the acting assistant minister. So the new
10 minister had already appointed assistant -- acting assistant minister.
11 You could already tell that I was the third in the hierarchy of the
12 ministry at the time, and this was definitely during the time of
13 Minister Ratko Adzic.
14 MR. HANNIS: Sorry to intervene. But could I ask my learned
15 friend to clarify, because it sounds like the witness is suggesting that
16 Mr. Njegus is the acting minister for the MUP rather than the acting
17 minister for -- assistant minister for administration for legal and
18 administrative affairs. I just want to be sure that's correct.
19 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Can you explain this?
21 A. No. I didn't mean the minister. But you can see the new
22 hierarchy that is in place --
23 Q. No, no, sorry. A moment. You have probably misunderstood. This
24 is the question. Look at the document. On the 11th of January, 1993,
25 did Radomir Njegus write this letter as the acting assistant minister or
1 in some other capacity?
2 A. Well, you can clearly says that he was writing this as the acting
3 assistant minister.
4 MR. HANNIS: I'm sorry, Your Honours. It's my understanding
5 there are many -- there were many assistant ministers in the MUP for the
6 various administrations, police administrations, communications, et
7 cetera, as opposed to acting minister, and that's -- that's where my
8 confusion lies. Is it acting minister as Mr. Kovac was at times where he
9 acted for Mr. Stanisic in 1992, or is it acting minister for one of the
10 ten administrations within the MUP headquarters.
11 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Can you clarify this issue for Mr. Hannis?
13 A. Let me recall that at the time there were only two assistant
14 ministers within the organisation during Stanisic; that was Dragan Kijac
15 and Tomislav Kovac. Under the new organisation -- or, rather, under the
16 new minister, Radomir Njegus was chief of the administration for
17 personnel. But since it says here that he is acting assistant minister,
18 this means that he was appointed by the minister and not by the
19 government. That was the power of the then-minister who could appoint a
20 person to be acting assistant minister.
21 So he was assistant minister - that's to say, Radomir Njegus -
22 under the authority of the minister and not of the government. Because
23 under the law it was the government that was supposed to appoint
24 assistant ministers, but he was here as acting assistant minister until
25 such point as the government may decide to appoint him to the post of
1 assistant minister.
2 Q. I think you have clarified this issue sufficiently.
3 Sir, when you say that during the time Mico Stanisic was minister
4 there were two assistant ministers, and you named Dragan Kijac and
5 yourself, you meant the chiefs of the National Security Service,
6 Dragan Kijac, and the public security administration of which you were
7 the chief at the time; right?
8 A. Yes. Well, as far as I know, there were two assistant ministers
9 at the time and no more. And I explained as far as I could tell what the
10 difference was between an acting assistant minister and an assistant
11 minister. Now, I don't know if there was somebody there from before and
12 may have been removed. This is something I can't go into.
13 Q. Sir, I'm going to show you another document, which I believe was
14 shown to you yesterday, although I'm not sure.
15 Now let us go back to Malko Koroman. You know that he was
16 appointed by Mr. Alija Delimustafic as the chief of the Pale SJB back in
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Let's look at document 65 ter 30042. That's tab 152. And it's a
20 decision on temporary assignment of Malko Koroman dated 1st April 1992.
21 Have you managed to find the document? Tab 152.
22 No, that's not the document. It's ERN 03240401.
23 MR. HANNIS: Yeah. I think the problem, Your Honour, I think
24 this is one of the documents from which we had removed the ones that I
25 didn't show the witness, and we only have in e-court now the ones that I
1 showed the witness about Mr. Koroman yesterday. And I didn't show him
2 the April 1992 appointment.
3 MR. ZECEVIC: Well, I'm sorry, Your Honours. I wasn't aware that
4 these documents had been withdrawn from the e-court.
5 Now the only way would be that we probably put it on the ELMO. I
6 don't see what else can we do.
7 JUDGE HALL: Well, could we take the break --
8 MR. ZECEVIC: Oh, yeah, yeah -- no, no. This is -- this is
9 the -- yes. This is the document. No, no, we found it. Thank you very
10 much. I'm sorry, I wasn't aware.
11 Q. [Interpretation] Sir, look at the document on the ELMO.
12 A. Yes, I can see it, and I have it in front of me.
13 Q. Very well. Sir, you see that pursuant to this decision
14 Malko Koroman is temporarily assigned to Ministry of Interior of the
15 Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an inspector at the
16 Sarajevo CSB, so he was not appointed chief of the SJB Pale?
17 A. Yes, yes. It's clear to me.
18 Q. Were you aware of that?
19 A. Yes. I knew what his status was when I joined the ministry.
20 Q. Thank you. Tell me, sir --
21 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Zecevic, I don't know whether this document
22 is in evidence now or whether you want to tender it. Is it in evidence?
23 MR. ZECEVIC: Well, honestly, I'm not sure, Your Honours.
24 JUDGE DELVOIE: I don't think it is.
25 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I think it is as another exhibit. It's
2 JUDGE DELVOIE: Should we say that parties check this during the
3 break. Would that be a good idea?
4 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes. That is what I wanted to suggest.
5 [Trial Chamber confers]
6 JUDGE HALL: The Registrar has confirmed that it is in evidence.
7 MR. ZECEVIC: Much obliged. Thank you.
8 JUDGE DELVOIE: Can the Registrar tell us what the exhibit number
10 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P1416, Your Honours.
11 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you very much.
12 MR. ZECEVIC: I see the time, Your Honours.
13 JUDGE HALL: So we continue in 20 minutes.
14 [The witness stands down]
15 --- Recess taken at 10.27 a.m.
16 --- On resuming at 10.55 a.m.
17 [The witness takes the stand]
18 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you, Your Honours.
19 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Kovac, a minute ago, I showed you this
20 decision relating to Malko Koroman. Did you know that back in
21 April 1992, Malko managed to assemble 3.000 people at Pale who, with the
22 use of weapons, prevented his dismissal from the position of the SJB
24 A. Yes. I had heard of that, but I wasn't participating in that. I
25 was at Ilidza at the time. I heard of this information. So these were
1 the remnants of small communities, and this is something that was
2 reflected in the communities that had Crisis Staffs and their own local
3 institutions without any consciousness or awareness that they should be
4 subordinated to higher authorities, so people were not skillful in acting
5 in a stately manner. So this one of the most striking example of that
6 that we encountered.
7 Q. Thank you. I'd like to show you document -- tab 37. It's 1D644.
8 While we are waiting for you to find the document, let me ask you this:
9 You know Ostoja Minic?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. He was an inspector in the administration for crime control at
12 the MUP; is that correct?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Sir, this is a report on the inspection and the activities of the
15 Pale SJB which relates to the period April through to
16 December 1993 [as interpreted]. It was compiled on the 8th of March,
18 Let us look at the last and the penultimate pages which contains
19 proposals for future activities. That's page 5 in the Serbian, and I
20 suppose it's the same page in the English.
21 MR. HANNIS: Proposals -- I'm sorry. Proposals begin on page 6
22 of the English for e-court [Overlapping speakers].
23 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you very much, Mr. Hannis.
24 [Interpretation] So page 6 in the English.
25 Q. Have you found it? It's on page 5. There's a subtitle which
1 says: "Proposed Tasks and Measures." And it's at the bottom of page
3 A. I don't think I have page 5.
4 Q. Look at the --
5 A. Yes, I have it.
6 Q. And within the context of the proposed tasks and measures, it is
7 said that additional statements should be taken from the following
8 employees, and then we see the names of Malko Koroman and other senior
9 officials from the public station. Do you see that?
10 A. Yes, I do.
11 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Can we now move to page 6 in the
12 Serbian; page 7 in the English.
13 Q. You're going to see it shortly on your screen. And look at item
14 2. One of the proposed measures by Ostoja Minic was that once the
15 statements are taken from the proposed Pale SJB employees, it is
16 necessary to analyse it for possible elements of crime, the crime
17 administration in the Sarajevo CSB, senior officers should be informed
18 accordingly. And once the criminal responsibility has been assessed,
19 criminal reports should be submitted to the competent prosecutor's
21 Do you see this?
22 A. I do.
23 Q. Was this proposal made by Inspector Ostoja Minic in accordance
24 with the Law on Interior?
25 A. Yes, it is. But it also has to be in line with the Law on
1 Criminal Procedure, because that also governs such matters -- measures.
2 Q. Mr. Kovac, since, in the MUP of Republika Srpska, you discharged
3 the most serious duties, such as acting minister and minister and
4 assistant minister, I suppose that you are quite familiar with the
5 political aspect of running a ministry.
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. When I say this, I'm referring to the situation in which you, as
8 a minister, with a view to improving the operation and performance of the
9 ministry, are in a position in which sometimes you must make certain
10 political and strategic compromises?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Can you please answer that question?
13 A. Yes, yes.
14 Q. These compromises were made in order for the ministry to achieve
15 certain results while you were in office.
16 A. Well, at least while I was there, these compromises had more to
17 do with personnel solutions, not so much in the domain of the law. So
18 these were feasible compromises because we were really exposed to strong
19 pressures concerning personnel issues. However, when it came to the
20 implementation of the law, these kind of pressures were rather more
21 subtle and not so open.
22 Q. Thank you. I was particularly referring to personnel issues and
23 the compromises that had to be taken and were unavoidable, which is only
24 understandable when it comes to any ministry anywhere, including
25 Republika Srpska.
1 Now, let me quote an example for you and I would kindly ask you
2 to comment on it, on the basis of your good knowledge of these issues.
3 Mr. Kovac, if you have a situation in which certain executive
4 from your ministry, and you are not satisfied with his performance,
5 nevertheless, enjoys undivided support of the political structures and
6 the population in the territory of the police station that he is at the
7 head of, would you dismiss such person by utilizing your powers and
8 authorities and thereby risk to be faced with a public outrage and
9 ultimately your dismissal; or would you first remove such an executive
10 from the territory in which he enjoys such support by offering him a
11 pompous position without any substantial function? As you put it
12 yesterday, would you put him on ice?
13 A. The skill of management, especially in terms of implementing the
14 law and pursuing the decided policy, is that you try to remove the
15 undesirables in the least painful way possible. So with a view of doing
16 that, we did so-called rotations. We move them from the centre to the
17 republic, or we recommended them to be appointed advisors to prime
18 minister or somebody else. So with a new staff we managed to fulfill our
19 tasks. And quite often we made it easier for those people who were in
20 certain positions, because by shifting them to other positions we helped
21 them because they didn't have capability to undertake proper legal or
22 other measures in this environment. Sometimes the fate of their families
23 was at stake as well, so this was another obstacle that prevented them
24 from implementing these measures, so that is the reason why we resorted
25 to giving them these kind of decorations and probably sent them to
2 Q. If I understood you correctly, you agreed with me that you did
3 this in order to allow the people appointing to the posts that were
4 vacated by other people whom you rotated to other positions, you -- in
5 that way you would help these newcomers in establishing normal operation
6 of a state -- of -- SJBs?
7 A. Yes, that is correct. But during my term of office, and I think
8 that equally applies to Stanisic's time, I don't think that there were
9 many instances of the so-called rehabilitation of such personnel. I
10 think that this happened more frequently during the terms of office of
11 Adzic and Rakic. This is, generally speaking, but maybe if you would
12 analyse it in detail you would find out exactly what I meant.
13 Q. So if I understood you correctly, during the time that
14 Mr. Stanisic was the minister, and also during the time when you were the
15 minister, the rehabilitation of the personnel who had been shifted due to
16 the reasons that we explained earlier, happened less frequently than
17 during the terms of office of Ministers Adzic and Rakic?
18 A. Yes. It clearly stems from the decision issued at the time, and
19 I wouldn't like to personalise this issue. You just have to look at the
20 decisions issued.
21 Q. Sir, in this situation, when we were discussing the personnel and
22 staff members that had to be relocated from their home turf where they
23 enjoyed strong support, if there were indications that such members of
24 the staff had committed criminal offences, in your opinion, would such
25 criminal offences be treated particularly cautiously in order to find out
1 all the facts and then proceeding to filing a report to the prosecutor's
3 A. We worked on collecting information about everyone for whom there
4 were indications, and I don't think that there was any operative or an
5 executive who can say that he had been prevented or stopped from
6 collecting information or from offering his opinion. Let me quote the
7 example of Milic [as interpreted] in the case of Pale and Samac because
8 he was involved in that. As I said, nobody within the ministry prevented
9 them from undertaking measures or from filing criminal reports. This
10 equally applies to operatives or inspectors or chiefs of administrations.
11 Only when we reach the level assembly deputies, according to the
12 law, we had to request that they be stripped of their immunity, and there
13 were cases like that. And Minister Stanisic was involved in these
14 procedures. I wasn't.
15 Q. On page 37, line 2 of the transcript you're recorded of having
16 mentioned the example of a certain Milic but it should be Minic; right?
17 We remember him from Samac.
18 A. Yes. Minic is the name. I believe his first name was Ostoja.
19 He was professional and uncompromising, and we gave him the opportunity
20 to work the way he preferred to.
21 Q. Thank you. He was recorded as Milic and that was the reason for
22 my intervention.
23 Sir, yesterday, on page 27187 --
24 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Zecevic.
25 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes.
1 JUDGE DELVOIE: Just to have a clear record, can I ask you: When
2 you're talking about rehabilitation, do you mean reappointment?
3 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes, I do.
4 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
5 MR. ZECEVIC: Well, that in my opinion means when the witness
6 said rehabilitations, successful -- another appointment after some time.
7 JUDGE DELVOIE: Yeah. Thank you.
8 MR. ZECEVIC: But if you want me to clarify with the witness, I'm
9 happy to do so.
10 JUDGE DELVOIE: I don't think it's necessary.
11 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you. I understand.
12 Q. [Interpretation] On page 27187, Mr. Hannis put something to you,
13 and I'll re-read it in English.
14 [In English] "Well, I know earlier you told us that you talked
15 about this rotation of staff to keep some of these guys from thwarting
16 investigations. But sending Mr. Drljaca who was suspected in connection
17 with misconduct, at least, connected to the Koricanske Stijene case,
18 sending him to Banja Luka as deputy chief doesn't seem to be a very good
19 place to put him, is it?"
20 Your answer:
21 "Well, you are not being precise. This is an assistant centre
22 chief, but I think he was assistant chief without specific tasks. I
23 don't know if he really had work at the time. That's when you give a
24 decision to somebody without any duties, to remove him, to put him on
25 ice. And this -- but this man had stronger political support than all
1 the rest of us together; that must have been why."
2 [Interpretation] Do you remember that the Prosecutor put this to
3 you and your answer to that?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. No, I'm just interested in whether you remember. I will ask you
6 a question.
7 A. Yes, I remember.
8 Q. Sir, by shifting a person, and let's suppose that it's about Simo
9 Drljaca here, from a municipality where he enjoys full support and where
10 he's very powerful, you achieve, firstly, that that person is removed
11 from his support which weakens him; right?
12 A. Under the circumstances, yes, clearly.
13 Q. Secondly, such a shift, the shifting of that person from the
14 municipality or the place where he has support makes it possible to
15 conduct an investigation into that person without him interfering; right?
16 A. Yes, certainly.
17 Q. And, thirdly, and possibly most importantly, the situation in the
18 place from which that person is being taken can then be put in order and
19 things can become legal, and the procedure in connection with prosecuting
20 that person becomes possible?
21 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please repeat his answer
22 because we needed a break between question and answer.
23 MR. ZECEVIC:
24 Q. [Interpretation] You were too fast. Please repeat your answer.
25 A. Certainly. These are the initial actions to establish the
1 responsibility of any individual, but these processes take a while, up to
2 20 years, as we can see here. But we shouldn't -- certainly we went
3 about it that way, to establish anybody's responsibility in a given area.
4 Q. And if I understood you correctly, the documents that were
5 obtained during the process of establishing responsibility, were obtained
6 for the purpose of initiating criminal proceedings at some point; right?
7 A. Our immediate goal was to find out what happened, to assert -- or
8 establish the facts, as can be seen from the reports of the Banja Luka
9 CSB, and the inspectors carried out an audit in Prijedor pursuant to the
10 order of the centre chief and our instruction. Those documents would
11 first, based on which we, from the ministry HQ, established that members
12 of the Public Security Service had committed some illegal acts beyond
13 their remit, beyond their authority. And these are the initial elements
14 which we thus documented.
15 Q. Thank you, sir. Thank you for this clarification.
16 Considering the positions of Malko Koroman and Simo Drljaca in
17 their respective municipalities and the support that they enjoyed from
18 the local bodies, Crisis Staffs, and the citizens themselves, was this
19 approach to tackling that problem at the time fully sensible?
20 A. Yes. Only I would like to single out Malko Koroman. He was not
21 held responsible for war crimes at any time. He wasn't even accused by
22 the Bosniak side. He committed some other offences, but, so far, nobody
23 has ever accused Malko Koroman of war crimes. There were illegal actions
24 on both sides, but Malko Koroman was never suspected of war crimes.
25 There were irregularities in his work, a lot of irregularities. But they
1 were not that serious. Even now, 20 years after the war, nobody has ever
2 accused him of war crimes. No official body, as far as I know.
3 Q. Thank you. Talking about crimes possibly committed by members of
4 the MUP, the essence there is certainly their criminal responsibility,
5 not disciplinary accountability; right?
6 A. Well, certainly talking about war crimes, it's clear that a war
7 crime is a criminal offence. And if anybody learns of a war crime, he
8 must also launch disciplinary proceedings. Disciplinary proceedings can
9 be launched without criminal accountability, but not the other way
11 Q. I agree. But the essence is the following: If it is established
12 that somebody committed a crime, then disciplinary accountability is
13 understood; right?
14 A. Yes, certainly. The Law on Internal Affairs imposes a duty on
15 senior officers to launch proceedings if they learn that somebody
16 committed criminal offences, especially in connection with discharging
17 their duties. So they must launch proceedings against the member of the
19 Q. But the purpose is filing a criminal complaint.
20 A. Yes, that too. And in order to facilitate criminal proceedings,
21 for the perpetrator not to be in a position where he had power and where
22 he could disrupt the proceedings.
23 Q. What was a disciplinary policy in place in the ministry in 1992?
24 Can you tell us. Will you agree with me when I say that there was a
25 quite strict disciplinary policy in place toward members of the MUP.
1 A. There were two ways of going about these things: One was to
2 discharge somebody from the MUP; and the other was to replace somebody
3 from their position, especially if it was a position of authority. The
4 most appropriate measure for cleansing the MUP, which is the term that we
5 used at the time.
6 Q. And that was done in 1992 in all cases where it was possible;
8 A. It went through a process. I can refer to the period as of
9 August. I know how -- how fast that went then. We were strengthening
10 the institutions and that enabled us to take energetic and comprehensive
11 action. But you quoted some decisions that -- which show that with a few
12 moves we removed thousands of people from the reserve force and from the
13 ranks of active-duty officers because these people were unfit to be
14 police officers. From the first initial stage, when many responded to
15 either the call-up to join the reserve force out of patriotism, in the
16 second half of the year we decided to give these people to the army and
17 screen out all these members that we didn't need. So we reduced our
18 numbers and, certainly, we got rid of para-groups and para-individuals
19 who -- who stuck with the -- with police units or police stations.
20 Q. Thank you.
21 A. Because we had a huge problem --
22 Q. Go ahead but be brief.
23 A. We had a great problem. At one point, there was an instruction
24 from a member of the Presidency of the RS, Biljana Plavsic, to put all
25 volunteers under control and all individuals. And that was done by some
1 stations initially. But, later, we went -- we had to go to great lengths
2 to remove these people from the reserve police force and the active-duty
3 force, for that matter, because it transpired that many of them, due to
4 their mindset, their past, and so on, were unfit for either the reserve
5 force or the active-duty force, and we had great problems in the process
6 of cleansing our ranks from these individuals.
7 Q. Let us finish this topic of disciplinary accountability.
8 You certainly know that the MUP, in September, adopted a
9 rule-book on disciplinary accountability at a time of imminent threat of
10 war, which is 1D54, at tab 158.
11 A. Yes, certainly. And I was involved in the drafting.
12 Q. And that rule-book shortened the disciplinary procedure.
13 Disciplinary commissions were abolished. CSB chiefs and administration
14 chiefs of the MUP, as well as the commander, were empowered to impose
15 sanctions for more serious infractions. And under Article 15, the
16 minister, in the second instance, decided about such cases, and his
17 decision was final. Do you remember?
18 A. Yes, I do.
19 Q. Is the adoption of such a rule-book, or does it tally with the
20 overall intentions of the ministry in 1992 to crack down on
21 irregularities within the ministry and punish their members for their
23 A. Yes, I remember that very well. I know when we were adopting
24 this. We needed a rule-book that was operational and, yet, in accordance
25 with the law. It had to be suitable for use in war time because under
1 the previous rule-book - let's call it the peacetime rule-book - there
2 was much leeway for individuals or commissions to act destructively when
3 it comes to the launching and the conduct of disciplinary proceedings.
4 So it was about compatibility with the times and the
5 circumstances on the one hand and the -- our needs on the other. I made
6 relevant proposals to the minister. I also had experience because before
7 the war I had been a long-standing member of the disciplinary board of
8 the MUP of Bosnia-Herzegovina, so I did have experience with efficiency
9 and with what we wanted to get out of the -- these new rules, the effect
10 that we wanted to achieve, and we wanted to get rid of undesirable
11 individuals as fast and as easily as possible.
12 Q. Do you know that over 95 per cent of disciplinary proceedings in
13 1992 were -- resulted in appeals and the appeals were mostly dismissed in
14 the second instance as -- and the sanction was mostly the most severe
15 one; namely, the discharge from service?
16 A. Yes, I do know about it. I was involved. The centre chiefs, in
17 the first instance, especially in connection with removal from the
18 service, their decisions were mostly confirmed in the second instance.
19 That was our policy at the time, and I believe that the facts and the
20 evidence fully corroborate these decisions.
21 Q. Sir, I have only a couple of short questions left for you.
22 A moment ago, I read out for you -- are you feeling uncomfortable
24 A. No, no, not at all.
25 Q. A moment ago, I read out for you the suggestion that was put to
1 you by Mr. Hannis yesterday in relation to Simo Drljaca. He mentioned
2 the crime at Koricanske Stijena. You said that after the crime took
3 place you came to learn of it but that it was within the remit of the
4 crime prevention administration that was led by Mr. Macar; right?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Do you know, sir, that in September of 1992, in connection with
7 the Koricanske Stijene case, the Banja Luka CSB filed a criminal
8 complaint with the prosecutor's office having jurisdiction. Do you also
9 know that the police recovered the survivals, they found the survivals,
10 and that their statements were taken in accordance with the Law on
11 Criminal Procedure and that, as a result, perpetrators were being sought.
12 Were you aware of this?
13 A. Yes. I was aware of the fact that there was the intention to
14 fully prosecute the case.
15 Now, as for the various details and how far they went along is
16 not something that I can tell you. I note that there was a process
18 Q. Sir, you were shown a document yesterday, P2463, which is
19 tab 154. I think have you it in the other binder of documents.
20 It is a longish reference in yesterday's transcript at 27184.
21 That's the page of the transcript. I will try to summarise your evidence
23 Commenting upon this document, you said that the document was not
24 legally valid, and you provided your comments on the analysis. You told
25 Mr. Hannis that you were very familiar with these issues and that you
1 knew what you were talking about. I'm interested in a different aspect
2 of the matter.
3 Sir, every individual working for the MUP has a personnel dossier
4 on the records; right?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. This sort of decision and purportedly the approval of the MUP
7 minister, which the document refers to, necessarily has to be present in
8 the personnel file of the individual it refers to; right?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. If I were to tell you that the personnel file for Simo Drljaca,
11 which is kept in the RS MUP archives, does not contain this document or
12 the document where, apparently, the minister gave his consent, what would
13 your response to that be?
14 A. Well, this was precisely what I was about to comment on
16 Q. Well, you did say -- and I don't know if there's need for you to
17 repeat it because what you did say is in the record, so please be brief.
18 A. This method of proceeding, even had the consent of the minister
19 been given, is not in keeping with the law. Quite another thing, which I
20 was opposed to as one of the persons in position of authority from day
21 one, was this sort of standard procedure in terms of personnel, because I
22 know that behind such a decision there had to have been a political
23 support and there had to have been some political clout behind it.
24 Because later on when there were problems in removals and all of it, the
25 decision was brought to him by the chief of centre, and when he was
1 supposed to be deposed, the law was applied and the chief of centre was
2 not required.
3 At that point they were quite familiar with the law. They knew
4 it was the minister of the interior who had to remove them. They were
5 also aware of a different law, and they knew how to proceed when the
6 political circles didn't need him anymore. So this was a vicious circle
7 that we were unable to enter, in fact. Once you embark on an unlawful
8 situation, and once this is coupled with political interests and the
9 situation on the ground as it is, it is impossible to man the structure
10 or to run a structure properly.
11 This is why, from day one, I was -- I clashed openly with all the
12 tendencies that thwarted the process of centralisation of the MUP. And
13 that made it impossible to have this two-tier system of either the
14 criminal or disciplinary responsibility. It was impossible to develop
15 the embryo of the state based on such procedure. This is a clear example
16 of all our problems.
17 This is something that I wanted to add yesterday.
18 Q. Very well. You've completed your answer now. I have limited
19 time. That's why I need to interrupt you.
20 A. Well, I have always been forthcoming when it came to that, so you
21 will appreciate that I needed to say this.
22 Q. Well, I'm grateful for that.
23 Sir, I have to go back to that issue again. The point of the
24 matter was that, for some of the employees, as was the case here, there
25 was strong political pressure and huge support that they enjoyed in their
1 respective territories; right?
2 A. Of course. Amid the war psychoses, especially one that prevailed
3 in the Kozara area that had suffered greatly in World War II, a new
4 psychoses was developed, one that the prevalent feeling was that the
5 horrible events of World War II were going to repeat themselves in that
6 area on both sides. Some felt it harder; others less hard than that.
7 Q. Sir, Mr. Hannis showed you yesterday a number of documents,
8 decisions from 1994, and in doing so suggested that regardless of your
9 evidence and your statement that it was the intention of the ministry
10 that all the employees who were in violation of the law, including
11 Simo Drljaca and some others, should be removed from their positions and
12 should have proceedings instituted against them, so he suggested that the
13 1994 decisions were the ones that appointed these same individuals to
14 some other posts or duties within the MUP.
15 Do you recall that?
16 A. Could you please show me these documents? I didn't have an
17 opportunity to review them properly yesterday. Is it possible to have
18 these documents? I don't have them with me. And I need to have them to
19 be able to answer.
20 Q. Let's take it slowly, sir. I'm doing my best.
21 A. Well, I wasn't quite clear on that yesterday, and I'd like to
22 have a better look.
23 Q. I will give you the same documents that the Prosecutor showed to
24 you yesterday. One of them is the Koroman, Malko set of documents; and
25 the other is the Drljaca, Simo set of documents. The only problem now is
1 that I don't have the documents anymore.
2 A. You're trying to save on paper again?
3 Q. That's tab 153. Some of the documents were admitted only this
4 morning, so we don't have them in the tab. I gave the witness what our
5 assistants prepared for us from the Defence. Sir, have you had a look?
6 A. Yes. Can I keep them while I'm commenting on them? You can go
7 ahead and put your question to me and --
8 Q. Pause there for a moment. So you have had a look at the
9 documents. You have them before you now.
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Tell me, sir, do you allow for the possibility that the reason
12 why such decisions were issued in 1994 and later and why some of these
13 individuals were appointed to positions within the MUP was a decision
14 that had been made based on the political circumstances prevailing at the
15 time, for instance, in 1994. Do you allow for that possibility?
16 A. Can we go back to the date, please?
17 MR. HANNIS: I'm sorry, Your Honours. I object to the form of
18 the question as it relates to any documents that were signed by this
19 witness, because if he's the one who signed the decision like the one
20 that's on the screen now, you don't have to ask him if he allows for the
21 possibility. He either knows if he signed it because of political
22 pressure or he didn't.
23 Now he may be ask to speculate about what Mr. Stanisic or some
24 other minister signed, but the one signed by him, certainly he must know
25 whether he did it on his own or based on some political pressure.
1 MR. ZECEVIC: I accept, Mr. Hannis. Thank you very much. You
2 are right.
3 Q. [Interpretation] You did hear what Mr. Hannis had to say. Tell
4 us, some of the documents that you signed, were they the result of
5 political circumstances? Were they in any way forced out of you? And
6 did you make them under political pressure or not?
7 A. Let us first clarify one thing. Let us set out Malko Koroman
9 He was an individual who was appointed pursuant to these
10 decisions to the post of, as it reads here, chief inspector of police. I
11 didn't appoint Malko Koroman, so this is a decision on fast-track
12 promotion to a different rank, so this isn't a decision on his
14 Let me clarify. These decisions appointing him as chief
15 inspector meant that, in operative terms, he was assigned to the most
16 difficult operative missions. He was sent out into the field and, thus,
17 it was -- he was prevented from making any important decisions back in
18 the headquarters. For instance, people who were not given to policing
19 duties, were not capable of performing them, I would send them out to the
20 war-affected areas where they would have to deal with combat. So my view
21 of Malko Koroman's case indicates that his case is completely different
22 from that of Simo Drljaca.
23 The appointment of Malko Koroman is something that I accept,
24 since I was the one manning the police administration, that -- that his
25 appointment was the result of my policy, whereby these people who were
1 not capable of performing public security duties were sent out to perform
2 the duties of participation in the war, as it were. And so he was
3 treated in the same way. He had the obligation of a conscript, as it
4 were. Just -- he was just a member of the police. But that was what he
5 was to be doing there. And I think we've clarified Koroman.
6 As for Simo Drljaca, in the interviews I gave on several
7 occasions, for reasons which were the ones because of which the Trial
8 Chamber invited me here, I spoke on behalf of the Ministry of Interior,
9 and I said on several occasions that whenever a decision had to be taken.
10 What was the sort of relationship I had with Zika Rakic? Oftentimes they
11 would ask who was the minister of the two of us. I was deputy minister
12 at the time. They asked me how it all worked.
13 Whenever the political circles wanted to have some of their
14 cadres appointed somewhere, well, you see, this was the time when
15 Zika Rakic was minister. You see that he signed this. So whenever it
16 suited them to have me deal with the matter operatively, then they would
17 allow me to deal well it operatively. The way the policy of staffing was
18 enforced can be seen precisely in this appointment where Simo Drljaca is
19 appointed as chief of the public security centre in Prijedor. This was
20 done by Zika Rakic who, himself, had been appointed there with a
21 political mission, a mission from his political party, and his mission
22 was that at some point where there was disagreement between us, as a
23 minister, by virtue of his position, he would enforce the sort of
24 personnel policy that suited them. And this is what he did. You can see
25 that this was shortly after the departure of Stanisic, after he was
2 So it was Zivko Rakic who appointed him. An indisputable fact is
3 that these people were appointed, but it also says something about the
4 rotation of the various ministers and the general policy applied to the
5 Ministry of Interior. As you look at this specific decision you see that
6 behind the decision is Zika Rakic and behind Zika Rakic there is
7 politics. Politics equals Zika Rakic. And then on the other side you
8 have the professional running of the Ministry of Interior.
9 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the counsel, please.
10 JUDGE DELVOIE: Mr. Zecevic, I take it you have a clear
11 understanding with Mr. Krgovic about the division of time allotted for
12 this witness.
13 MR. ZECEVIC: [Microphone not activated] Yes, Your Honours. I
14 have just two more questions.
15 JUDGE DELVOIE: Thank you.
16 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Sir, was -- the second dismissal of Mico Stanisic in 1994 came as
18 a result, again, of the political pressure for him to be removed and for
19 this person, Rakic, to be installed in his place, and you said about him
20 that he was implementing the political will of the leadership.
21 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please repeat the beginning
22 of his answer due to the overlap.
23 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Just please slow down. Start from the beginning.
25 A. I believe that Stanisic embarked immediately on --
1 Q. Sir, you have to wait until my question is finished, sir.
2 A. Yes, I understand. I think that in his second term of office,
3 Stanisic fiercely launched a campaign of settling scores with the Speaker
4 of the Assembly, Krajisnik, and all the other people around him. I
5 primarily refer to the struggle that they had with relation to the
6 commission of crimes. Let me finish.
7 Q. No. I'm going to read out to you a portion of your statement,
8 and I would just like to ask you whether you agree. And I'm doing that
9 due to time constraints.
10 A. You are starting to behave like the Prosecutor.
11 Q. Unfortunately, I would very much like if I had more time to
12 discuss with you, but, as you heard, the Trial Chamber has reminded me of
13 my time limitation.
14 Now, this is a transcript of the conversation you had.
15 Unfortunately, I don't have the exact date, but it is marked T0002323
16 through 2331. That's page 17 of 232 in the Serbian, and it says:
17 "So it means that Stanisic is in power only for seven or eight
18 months and then he is dismissed. Zika Rakic is brought to fill his place
19 and he entered into conflict later on, although he was a person in whom
20 the party had enormous trust because the previous Minister Stanisic did
21 not want to succumb to the political will during his second term of
22 office. They didn't dare give me the position of the minister with all
23 the powers. Instead they chose Zivko Rakic who was a trusted member of
24 the SDS and whose duty was not to interfere too much in his own job."
25 Is that more or less what you wanted to say?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And, lastly, one more question.
3 Sir, at the beginning, you and I discussed the situation in which
4 towards the end of 1992 and the dismissal of Mico Stanisic and the
5 bringing of Ratko Adzic as minister, everything had to start from
6 scratch. And perhaps the situation was even worse than it had originally
7 been, and you agreed with me.
8 Tell me, in your opinion, and in view of the initial results and
9 the objectives that you set out in 1992, had Mico Stanisic not been
10 dismissed, would you have succeeded in persevering and establishing the
11 MUP in a proper way and would all members of the MUP who committed
12 crimes, as well as other perpetrators, have been brought before justice?
13 I asked about your opinion.
14 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours. Objection. That calls --
15 JUDGE HALL: Before the --
16 MR. HANNIS: -- for speculation.
17 JUDGE HALL: Before you answer the question.
18 Yes, Mr. Hannis.
19 MR. HANNIS: That calls for speculation, Your Honour. He has not
20 been called to testify as an expert witness. This is pure speculation.
21 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Zecevic -- I have -- I agree, Mr. Hannis,
22 that -- I -- I'd -- your -- your question would invite speculation upon
24 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, the witness remained in MUP, and he
25 explained at length what was the intention and what was the policy of the
1 ministry in 1992. He also explained what was the situation in 1993. I'm
2 just asking him, does he think that, in case they continued, that they
3 would have achieved their goal? Was there that -- their intention.
4 [Trial Chamber confers]
5 JUDGE HALL: The -- the "what ifs" of history, as of life,
6 Mr. Zecevic, while fascinating, don't offer useful answers.
7 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you very much. I understand, Your Honours.
8 I don't have any further questions for this witness.
9 Q. [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Kovac. This is all I wanted to
10 ask you. Have a nice day.
11 MR. KRGOVIC: Your Honours, I see that it is almost time for a
12 break, so shall I start or maybe we can make --
13 JUDGE HALL: Perhaps we could take the break now, and have you
14 any idea of how long you think you would be?
15 MR. KRGOVIC: Your Honour, I think 30, 40 minutes.
16 JUDGE HALL: Yes. So we take the break and return in 20 minutes.
17 [The witness stands down]
18 --- Recess taken at 12.04 p.m.
19 --- On resuming at 12.27 p.m.
20 [Trial Chamber confers]
21 [The witness takes the stand]
22 JUDGE HALL: Yes, Mr. Krgovic.
23 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.
24 Cross examination by Mr. Krgovic:
25 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Kovac.
1 A. Good afternoon.
2 Q. My name is Dragan Krgovic, and on behalf of Zupljanin Defence
3 team, I'm going to ask you a few questions relating to your evidence so
5 I'm going to read a portion of the document that you discussed
6 both with Mr. Zecevic and the Prosecutor. So could --
7 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Would the witness please be shown
8 2D10-2038. It's tab --
9 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Krgovic please repeat the tab number.
10 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Tab 15.
11 Q. Sir, what you see before you is a personnel file of Simo Drljaca.
12 Please go through the documents.
13 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Unfortunately, Your Honours, we
14 have an English translation for some of the documents, but the whole file
15 hasn't been translated.
16 Q. And I would kindly ask the witness just to leaf through the
17 documents, and I would have two questions of general nature.
18 Mr. Kovac, you will agree with me that in this personnel file of
19 Mr. Drljaca there is no other document from 1992.
20 A. Yes, I will agree with you.
21 Q. And if you look at page 2 of this document, this is what
22 Mr. Zecevic was referring to, relating to Mr. Stakic's Defence team, to
23 have proof of the appointment of Mr. Drljaca, and this is the response
24 that they received, that this document did not exist in his file even
25 back then; is that correct?
1 A. That's what this documents says.
2 Q. Mr. Kovac, were you aware that in 1992, in order to have an
3 unbroken service, some decisions were issued retroactively in order for
4 certain individuals to cover specific periods, although they didn't have
5 a proper legal decision?
6 A. Yes, I am aware of that practice, although I never resorted to
7 it. But I know that Ratko Adzic and Dragan Kijac did that. Unless
8 somebody actually did some duties, I myself never issued such a decision
9 when I was the minister. But there were was no need for that. People
10 were not retiring at the time, and there was no need for such recourse.
11 Q. Thank you, Mr. Kovac.
12 Let us go back to a topic that you discussed with the Prosecutor.
13 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, lest I forget, can we
14 have this entire document admitted into evidence but marked for
15 identification because some parts of document haven't been translated
16 yet. Provided there's no objection from Mr. Hannis.
17 MR. HANNIS: No objection from me, Your Honour. It does
18 duplicate some of the materials we already have. But, however, it does
19 include one document, which is sort of a two-page form, which includes
20 kind of his whole history in the MUP because it is counting the years of
21 credit he has. That may be of some value. I don't know how Your Honours
22 prefer to handle it. But I don't object.
23 [Trial Chamber confers]
24 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
25 [Trial Chamber and Legal Officer confer]
1 JUDGE HALL: The extended discussion which counsel would have
2 observed that the Bench has had with the Registry -- with the Registry
3 relates to what it is we're admitting. As I understand it, and the
4 Registrar will correct me if I'm wrong, we already have, subject to
5 Mr. Zecevic's satisfying himself with the accuracy of the numbering, the
6 matter we dealt with this morning, we already have a portion of this as
7 an exhibit. And the question is: What do we do those yet-to-be
8 translated parts that Mr. Zecevic wishes to add. So it appears that once
9 Mr. Zecevic has come on board, in terms of the -- what the existing
10 exhibit is, the order that we would now make is that that exhibit be
11 completed by the addition of -- of -- of the yet-to-be translated
13 Clear as mud?
14 MR. HANNIS: That's fine, Your Honours. I understand the concern
15 about having duplicate exhibits, and I think it's impossible to avoid in
16 a case of this size and complexity. I know in a recent review I did
17 notice that we still have some cases where there is a P number for an
18 exhibit, then the same document has a 1D number.
19 But I have no objection to this whole thing coming in, and it
20 makes sense it does. Now, whether you want to just admit this whole
21 thing, and we'll use it for all things concerning the personnel documents
22 of Mr. Drljaca. The trouble is we've had references to a different
23 exhibit number a different document number with -- with the witness, but
24 the ERN is the same, I think. So if we had this as the exhibit, I think
25 maybe that would resolve the problem.
1 JUDGE HALL: [Microphone not activated]
2 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
3 JUDGE HALL: Sorry.
4 [Trial Chamber confers]
5 JUDGE HALL: The microphone might not have picked me up. The
6 existing Exhibit P2462.
7 MR. HANNIS: And that has three or four separate documents out of
8 this 28-page exhibit. This is the more complete document. I certainly
9 have no objection to that being the one, and we can probably follow from
10 the transcript because I think I mentioned specific ERN numbers or dates
11 to the other ones when we identified them individually. If that makes
12 sense, Your Honours, then we give this one a new number and it's
13 basically the master document if we want to look at Simo Drljaca
14 personnel documents.
15 JUDGE HALL: Thank you.
16 MR. KRGOVIC: Your Honour, it's convenient to me, so ...
17 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
18 JUDGE HALL: So to summarise where we are, this is part of 2462,
19 but the parties need to -- everybody has to have an understanding as to
20 what makes up that -- that exhibit, and that's a detail that is still in
21 process of being refined.
22 MR. HANNIS: Maybe I can propose we make this 2462A, and we all
23 understand that this is the master document, although I see that
24 apparently is not a good idea.
25 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
1 JUDGE HALL: I'm reminded that adding suffixes to exhibit numbers
2 creates its own set of confusion, so, yeah...
3 MR. KRGOVIC: May I continue, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE HALL: Yes, please.
5 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Mr. Kovac, I'm going to show you a document, Exhibit P160.
7 That's tab 1 of the Zupljanin Defence binder. For you to be able to
8 follow what I'm asking more easily, I'll give you a hard copy. You won't
9 find what I need in these binders in front of you, so you can put them
11 It is document 1. See those yellow stickies on the side?
12 Please go to page 5 in your copy. And, in e-court, it's page 8
13 of the Serbian, page 7 the English.
14 While we're wait, let me ask you if you remember that the
15 Prosecutor put it to you yesterday that the actions concerning these
16 collection centres only began after the news broadcast on CNN, and you
18 A. Yes, correct. I disagreed.
19 Q. Please take a look at the second paragraph from the top. We see
20 what Mr. Zupljanin is saying at this meeting held on the 11th of July.
21 It's about the army and Crisis Staffs and the conditions in the camps and
22 the observance of norms.
23 Please move on to document -- or, rather -- move to page 27. In
24 Serbian, it's 30 -- in Serbian, in e-court, it's 30; and 25 is the
25 English page number.
1 These are the conclusions of the meeting. It's page 27 in your
2 copy, sir. You see the conclusion of the senior officer. The fourth
3 paragraph from the bottom, deal with the issue of collection centres, the
4 jurisdiction of the relevant organs, and organising a joint meeting with
5 the Ministry of Justice.
6 Basically, Mr. Kovac, the solution of these problems, or, rather,
7 the tackling of these problems begins then, and not as the Prosecutor put
8 it to you, after the news on CNN; right?
9 A. I cannot comment. I wasn't in charge of that, nor did I watch
10 CNN. Our activities were continuous, and I pointed it out repeatedly,
11 that what I did was not the final or -- that's a wrong choice of words.
12 That was not an official application sent to the government. But, of
13 course, as these problems were arising, we were dealing with them
14 altogether. And I cannot speak about CNN because CNN means nothing to
15 me. We followed these problems. We had documents that show the
16 chronology of our actions in any part of the RS. And, of course, it's
17 chronologically connected with the problems that existed.
18 Q. Mr. Kovac, the Prosecutor showed you minutes yesterday, minutes
19 of the extended collegium session of the ministry, and you began to
20 answer but you were interrupted. So I would like to pick up from there.
21 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Document, tab 105 in the
22 Prosecution binder. 65 ter 20218.
23 Q. You will see it on the screen. You don't -- there's no hard copy
24 for you. Page 4 in the Serbian and in the English also.
25 These people were present, and you spoke about the commission
1 from the Banja Luka CSB. You can see that the last person mentioned
2 represents the commission for the administration of the CSB and SJB. I'm
3 reading the last paragraph now. Branimir Pecanac, on behalf of the
4 commission for the administration of the CSB and SJB.
5 And what you said about managing the CSB Banja Luka at the time,
6 it was managed by that commission, that group of people, then; right?
7 A. Yes, that's right.
8 Q. Mr. Kovac, you provided detailed answered to the Prosecutor about
9 events from September 1993 until the establishment of this working group.
10 At that time, Stojan Zupljanin didn't really manage the CSB, although,
11 formally, he was at that position; right?
12 A. Yes, that is correct. He did a decision appointing him to that
13 position, but the CSB was actually managed by the commission appointed by
14 the government because, in Banja Luka, there was a state of emergency due
15 to a military rebellion in that area.
16 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] There's a mistake that I've just
18 Q. You said that the state of emergency was proclaimed by the
19 president and not the government; right?
20 A. That was the case, if I remember well. It must have been the
21 president of the republic based on his authority. But I may be mistaken.
22 I don't think it was the government though. But what it boils
23 down to is that the CSB was managed by this commission.
24 Q. Mr. Kovac, when you were examined by the Prosecutor and the
25 Bench, you were painting a picture of the situation that prevailed in the
1 MUP and the CSB at the time.
2 You said that when the war began, the institutions of the
3 internal affairs of Bosnia-Herzegovina fell apart, and that applies to
4 Yugoslavia, too. And as from April, the MUP system did not operate
6 A. Well, if need be, I can clarify. Bosnia-Herzegovina, as
7 different from the other republics -- there was simultaneously the
8 dissolution of Yugoslavia and the dissolution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and
9 the state was dissolving institutionally and with regard to the system of
11 What do I mean when I say "institutionally"? When there is a
12 conflict in an area and the joint army, the JNA, is no longer
13 operational, it doesn't exist, and there's interethnic conflict, that
14 type of war where civilians -- where there were conflicting civilians,
15 then the military dimension becomes impossible to control and you cannot
16 speak of an organised state. There are negative processes if the society
17 and the state are dissolving. And the institutions that were
18 established, or at least officially envisaged, I mean, the MUP of the RS
19 and the Crisis Staffs, they were embryo of the state and step by step
20 they were being put under control and they, in turn, enable other
21 institutions of the state to start operating, such as the public
22 prosecutors' offices and the Ministry of Justice. So, in parallel, there
23 is the function of the Army of the Republika Srpska which puts the armed
24 people under the control of a military structure. So this is this
1 And the same was happening on the other side. There was an
2 undefined mass where it is difficult to tell a fighter from a soldier,
3 and on -- on the one hand and a civilian on the other hand. I'm, first
4 of all, referring to men. So there were groups that were in conflict
5 with each other. And it all depended on the power and the -- the
6 swiftness of the leadership that -- to -- how and when they would be able
7 to establish a sort of ground zero. And then the conditions were very
8 similar to those in any civil war, be it in the Congo or anywhere else.
9 The events were very similar. Only the difference is in the outcome,
10 which powers eventually managed to gain control over the entire area.
11 Q. Let us look at document P621 now; tab 6 in the Zupljanin Defence
13 Mr. Kovac, you spoke rather extensively about the influence of
14 the local authorities, the local Crisis Staffs, on the functioning of the
15 MUP bodies. I now show you this report on the work of the Banja Luka CSB
16 from 31 July till 30 September 1992. Now, please, go to page 20 in your
17 hard copy; whereas, in e-court, it's 43 in Serbian and also in English.
18 Here, Mr. Zupljanin, in his report, deals with some of the
19 matters you have just spoken about.
20 And in sentence one he says:
21 "Generally speaking, it appears that the situation is
22 increasingly getting out of control of the organs of legal authority,
23 which is partly within the zone of responsibility of security organs and
25 That was the beginning of paragraph 1.
1 Now paragraph 2. He speaks more specifically about these things.
2 I quote:
3 "Inefficiency, lack of professionalism and superficiality of work
4 in a number of SJBs contributed to a large extent to the functional
5 detachment of a number of SJBs from the centre. This has gravely
6 affected the overall unity and the social role of the security organs and
8 Mr. Zupljanin goes on to say, I quote:
9 "Parallel to that, some of the SJBs connected themselves with
10 local politics and local political leaders, thereby neglecting their
11 legal obligations and powers."
12 In the last paragraph Mr. Zupljanin says the following --
13 MR. HANNIS: I'm sorry, Your Honour. If the Defence is conceding
14 that Mr. Zupljanin offered that report, I'll accept that, but his name
15 doesn't appear on it, his signature doesn't appear on it, and I don't
16 know if we've had any evidence to that effect. He can say this is the
17 report from the CSB Banja Luka, but I don't know if it is was prepared by
18 Mr. Zupljanin or the -- some other worker.
19 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I would just like to
20 show the last page of this document -- actually, the last-but-one page in
21 e-court, where we will see Mr. Zupljanin's signature. I believe that
22 there can be no doubt about this being Mr. Zupljanin's signature, but if
23 the Prosecutor still fosters some doubts. Oh, this is a Prosecution
24 Exhibit, by the way, and so far it has not been disputed that
25 Mr. Zupljanin is author of this document.
1 MR. HANNIS: I'll accept that, Your Honour. It doesn't appear
2 referenced in the English translation I have in the binder I received
3 from the Defence.
4 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Let us return to what we are talking about, Mr. Kovac.
6 Do you agree with me, sir, that the situation was like this not
7 only in the territory covered by the CSB Banja Luka but almost in the
8 entire RS territory during that period from the start of the conflict
9 almost until the end of 1992.
10 A. No, I don't agree. There were such problems in the whole
11 territory, but we can see from this that the Banja Luka CSB
12 professionally registered all events, and we see what their attitude
13 toward them is, and I never denied that.
14 However, if we are to analyse this document, you'll see that no
15 mention is made of the MUP. I mean, MUP headquarters. And that's a
16 problem that I've always pointed out. They needed the assistance of the
17 entire MUP. I mean, a -- the MUP as a system, the MUP as a force. They
18 were the largest centre, and they are clearly stating that they are
19 unable to cope with the problems identified. So what was the way out?
20 Only the strengthening of the Ministry of Interior.
21 I won't say that there were differences between us there. But
22 our assessment was with regard to Mr. Zupljanin that they were unable to
23 cope with the problems in their area. That the ministry, as a whole, had
24 to act and crack down on problems one by one. That has to do with the
25 efficiency of the MUP, and it has also to do with political power. The
1 chief of the centre obviously needed the political power of the minister
2 of the interior and all of us in the ministry in order to resolve these
3 problems. They are clearly outlining the problems and the problems
4 really were the way they described them, and they had a good attitude,
5 the correct attitude toward those problems, but I always kept repeating
6 the power to solve these problems -- and this is not a criticism. We, as
7 the higher-ranking body, knew about that. And we were physically able to
8 reach them. I believe that after this point in time, the situation
9 started improving, once we had linked up physically. And that is the
10 need for processes applied by the ministry because we wanted to focus on
11 one territorial body and help it to solve all their problems.
12 Q. I fully agree with you, Mr. Kovac, and I think that was the view
13 held by Mr. Zupljanin.
14 I will show you a document where this is precisely what
15 Mr. Zupljanin said.
16 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Can the witness be shown P624.
17 Q. Which is behind tab 7 in your binder. This is the report -- or,
18 rather, yes, the report behind tab 7. It's a report on the work of the
19 centre for an entire year.
20 Let's look at the page where the programme was listed for the
21 entire centre. It's the last page of the document. It reads here -- and
22 please look at the last paragraph, more extensive co-operation with the
23 MUP on co-ordinating tasks of internal affairs. Of course, the problem
24 up to that point was since there was no physical contact, no assistance
25 could have been given; right?
1 A. Yes. This was an issue for us, the fact that we were not
2 physically connected. We had to work on that and we had to raise
3 awareness on their part that without a proper MUP, we would not be able
4 to address the problem properly and within the ambit of the law,
5 especially in view of the political difficulties they were in.
6 Q. Mr. Kovac, when it comes to the problems that we believe existed
7 objectively in Republika Srpska, the problem that was peculiar for the
8 Banja Luka CSB was the fact that out of some 15 public security stations
9 that existed there before the war, it mushroomed into an organisation of
10 26 public security stations that existed in 1992; is that right?
11 A. Certainly. At some point, and for a brief period of time, a
12 political concept was being entertained of the SAO Krajina with its
13 government and its various agencies. I was explaining that the SAOs
14 constituted a psychological and operational problem for us on our way to
15 put together the MUP as an executive branch. And one of the problems
16 that Stanisic had with Koroman at Pale was the functioning of the
17 SAO Romanija and the related stations. This was a general occurrence and
18 a process.
19 At some point, the SAOs had a role of getting organised and
20 moving to become independent from the central organs in
21 Bosnia-Herzegovina. And since that had gone further down the road, it
22 was very difficult for us to reintegrate them into a single state
23 security system, complete with all the other difficulties that we had
24 including civil war, war, destruction in general, and other processes
25 that were disruptive of the social tissue for the people, as such, as
1 well as the institutions at large.
2 Q. As a result of that process, the Banja Luka CSB was far too large
3 to be able to function efficiently. It had to be divided up into a
4 number of smaller centres which was, in fact, done at last in late 1993;
6 A. Well, we -- we annexed some of these parts to the Doboj CSB and
7 proceeded to put together a CSB in Prijedor. In other words, we would
8 have three centres. Not only that, we organised other republican
9 institutions in the area, such as, for instance, the elements of the
10 special police brigade, elements of crime services and forensic
11 examination, institutions. Plus, we had our own detached MUP offices in
12 these areas. All these were necessary measures in order for us to set
13 things on the right course and provide meaningful assistance to making
14 these services efficient.
15 And, of course, let me add that there was a -- an open division
16 between state and public security bodies so that the CSB chief no longer
17 had within his remit the state security structure. In other words, the
18 CSB chief had a reduced scope of duties by that token.
19 Q. And, in fact, only after you had applied these measures were the
20 conditions put in place for the Banja Luka CSB to operate properly in
21 keeping with the law and the regulations governing the work of the organs
22 of internal affairs?
23 A. Well, after the September events which made it apparent to the
24 political and military leadership of the Krajina what it meant to
25 obstruct the work of state organs, only after those events were we able
1 to make it clear to them that there should not be improper political
2 influence and that there should be proper relations between the various
3 state administration bodies.
4 Q. Thank you, Mr. Kovac. I have no further questions for you.
5 [Trial Chamber confers]
6 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Kovac, we thank you for your coming to assist
7 the Tribunal by your testimony. You are now released, and we wish you a
8 safe journey back to your home.
9 We are not going to rise immediately. We have certain
10 administrative matters with which to deal, so I would invite the usher to
11 escort you from the courtroom.
12 And, Mr. Lazarevic, we thank you for your assistance, and you are
13 free to withdraw, if you wish.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you. Thank you.
15 [The witness and counsel withdrew]
16 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Zecevic, first of all, have you been able to
17 satisfy yourself as to the accuracy of the numbers of those -- the
18 exhibits that -- that we have?
19 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
20 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes, Your Honours. I do have -- I do have all --
21 all the -- all the actual pages if -- it refers to four documents
22 concerning -- from the file of Mr. Drljaca, four pages, and three pages
23 from the file of Mr. Koroman. And I believe everything has been in
24 order. Thank you.
25 JUDGE HALL: Right, so exhibit [Microphone not activated].
1 Exhibits 2461 and P2462 are now in order. Am I correct,
2 Madam Registrar?
3 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
4 JUDGE HALL: Oh yes, sorry. Subject to the addition of the -- of
5 the yet-to-be translated documents.
6 Any there any other matters that counsel wish to raise?
7 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I had been requested to at some point
8 in time put on the record some changes that made to exhibits in e-court,
9 but I don't know that we need necessarily do that today because I
10 anticipate at some time in the near future we probably need to have some
11 sort of administrative hearing to deal with some unresolved matters and
12 setting of the date for the final trial brief and closing submissions,
13 et cetera.
14 I note we had general parameters, but I think we still have to
15 resolve the matter of Mr. Zecevic's submission and the final decision on
16 the consolidated hyperlinked spreadsheet, the POD, and I think there was
17 a Prosecution's request to perhaps call two witnesses. And so until
18 those matters are finally resolved, I think we can't have a firm date for
19 the final trial brief.
20 JUDGE HALL: What the Chamber wishes to say is that with the
21 conclusion of the testimony of its own witnesses, it will issue its
22 decisions on the outstanding motions which relate to evidence in due
23 course, and the dates for the final briefs an arguments will be tied to
24 the date that the last decision on evidence is issued, and these dates
25 will be specified for the parties in the forthcoming Scheduling Order.
1 So I trust the ...
2 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
3 [Trial Chamber and Legal Officer confer]
4 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Hannis, the advice to me that inasmuch as
5 notwithstanding what I have just said, there is a possibility that we may
6 not have to formally sit again. Whether you are -- I'm to inquire as to
7 whether you are able now to deal with these -- sorting out these 65 ter
8 numbers or whether you would be -- you would prefer to deal with
9 it subsequently -- [Overlapping speakers].
10 MR. HANNIS: I can do it now, Your Honour. I have a list of some
11 15 or 20 documents to which changes have been made in e-court, such as
12 translations uploaded, et cetera. That's what I have. But it sounds
13 like perhaps you're talking about something else.
14 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
15 [Trial Chamber and Legal Officer confer]
16 JUDGE HALL: The view seems to be that there would be no harm in
17 your doing it subsequently in writing. But you -- what you have before
18 you is the -- is the matters in which we were inquiring.
19 MR. HANNIS: Yes, Your Honour. But I think it's been a tough
20 week and it's Friday and this is not the most exciting stuff, and I think
21 it could be adequately handled with a written, or I could just attach
22 this. For example, item 1 is: Exhibit P00034, unofficial transcript of
23 testimony has been replaced with official transcript.
24 JUDGE HALL: It seems to me it would be more efficient and more
25 practical to do it in writing, because we're dealing with numbers and
1 it's quite easy in terms of the transcript for --
2 MR. HANNIS: That would please me, Your Honour. Thank you.
3 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Krgovic, you seem to be rising.
4 MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. I have a
5 submission to make.
6 In the past couple of weeks we received huge material from the
7 Prosecution under Rule 68. These were interviews and testimonies of
8 certain witnesses that we have been disclosed with only now. Based on
9 the information I received from my learned friends from the OTP, the
10 disclosure process has not been completed yet and we are soon to receive
11 more such material.
12 Your Honours, the material is, and Ms. Korner agrees with me on
13 this score, clearly exculpatory for a my client. The Defence needs to go
14 through the material, and I wanted to let Their Honours know that
15 perhaps - we are still considering the possibility - we will file a
16 motion in some ten days do re-open the Defence case for Mr. Zupljanin in
17 order to have some of these statements and testimonies admitted into
18 evidence. I am telling you this by way of an announcement so that it
19 wouldn't come as a surprise. We are still in the process of going
20 through the material that we received only recently.
21 I know the difficulties the Prosecution have with the searches of
22 the material that they have. The material has surfaced at some point to
23 their surprise. Therefore, I wanted to put Their Honours on notice of
24 our probable filing within -- in due time.
25 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, one other point just before you go. I
1 understand that there will be some Scheduling Order forthcoming. I
2 wonder if you are able to indicate to us today before you leave if
3 there's a not-before-date by which the final trial brief will not be due
4 in terms of it will not be due before Easter, or it will not be due
5 before Queen's Day at the end of April. Just to give us general
6 parameters, if that's possible.
7 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Hannis, even I were inclined to agree with that
8 as a purely sensible suggestion, the alert that Mr. Krgovic has just
9 indicated, that, of course, is in the context of the ongoing disclosure
10 obligation which the Prosecution has, it may be imprudent for the Chamber
11 to say that at this point. So we take things, as usual, one step at a
13 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, it seems that the gist of what
14 Mr. Krgovic has indicated will not do anything to make the date earlier
15 than it already is. It would only make it later.
16 [Trial Chamber confers]
17 JUDGE HALL: Mr. Hannis, to the extent that some small measure of
18 comfort may be afforded you, as of today we could say it would not be
19 before Easter.
20 MR. HANNIS: [Microphone not activated] Thank you.
21 JUDGE HALL: So, with that, we take the adjournment.
22 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.20 p.m.,
23 sine die