1 Wednesday, 30 May 2012
2 [Prosecution Closing Statement]
3 [Open session]
4 [The accused entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.07 a.m.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning to
7 everyone in and around the courtroom.
8 This is case IT-08-91-T, the Prosecutor versus Mico Stanisic and
9 Stojan Zupljanin.
10 JUDGE HALL: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
11 Good morning to everyone.
12 May we have the appearances, please.
13 MR. HANNIS: Good morning, Your Honours. Can you hear me?
14 For the Prosecution, I'm Tom Hannis. To my left is our
15 Case Manager, Sebastiaan van Hooydonk. To my right, Joanna Korner,
16 Matthew Olmsted, Rafael La Cruz, and Alex Demirdjian. And on the back
17 row, the two gentlemen are a couple of our interns, Edin Cengic and
18 Nedim Muminovic is closest to the court reporter. Thank you.
19 MR. ZECEVIC: Good morning, Your Honours. Slobodan Zecevic,
20 Slobodan Cvijetic, Eugene O'Sullivan, and Ms. Tatjana Savic, appearing
21 for Stanisic Defence this morning. Thank you.
22 MR. KRGOVIC: Good morning, Your Honours. Dragan Krgovic,
23 Aleksandar Aleksic, Michelle Butler, Miroslav Cuskic, Milena Dzudovic and
24 Joyce Boekestijn, appearing for Zupljanin Defence today.
25 JUDGE HALL: Thank you. Before we begin, we've been alerted that
1 the parties may wish to raise a housekeeping matter with reference to
2 tomorrow's scheduling.
3 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, that was going to be me, but I've
4 spoken to the Defence about the matter, which was the possibility of
5 starting at 9.00 by going to Courtroom III. I had, of course, completely
6 forgotten that Mr. Krgovic is in the case which is being heard before and
7 so, unfortunately, it doesn't look as though we can do anything about
9 JUDGE HALL: Thank you.
10 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, I asked Mr. Hannis very kindly if I
11 may encroach for five minutes on his time just to deal with two matters
12 relating to Zupljanin that I -- in my rush to try and finish, I meant to
13 deal with yesterday.
14 Your Honours will recall that I referred to a document which he
15 had sent to the minister on the 20th of July. And can I ask that
16 document P583 be put up.
17 This is a document which is addressed, in fact, to the minister,
18 or it's addressed to the MUP but headed underneath that for the minister
19 although it is not on the part we've got up in the screen, and it begins
20 by talking about the armed conflicts between the forces of the Serbian
21 republic and the Muslim Croat and the first sentence reads:
22 "We have informed you about the progress and the results of those
23 conflicts on a regular basis."
24 As I said, Mr. Hannis will be dealing with the matter of
25 communications in a moment.
1 It then goes on to deal with the various categories of people who
2 have been imprisoned, and it talks about, as you will see on the screen,
3 the --
4 Yes, I'm sorry, Your Honours. I'm going to ask -- I'm sorry.
5 I'm afraid it's my fault. We've obviously got the wrong bits up. Could
6 we put up the whole document instead. It makes it easier.
7 Yes. Thank you.
8 As you will see, dated the 20th of July, and there's the -- the
9 sentence I've just referred to. And then it goes on to deal with the
10 numbers of people arrested. And it talks about the three categories, and
11 Your Honours will recall those categories are referred to in various
12 documents that emanate from Prijedor and Sanski Most. And at the bottom
13 of that paragraph the last independence:
14 "The third category is made of adult men on which so far the
15 service doesn't have any information of security interest for us, so they
16 can be treated as hostages."
17 JUDGE HARHOFF: Ms. Korner, who send this is letter?
18 MS. KORNER: If we go to the bottom, Your Honours, will see the
19 next page. It's sent by Zupljanin.
20 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you.
21 MS. KORNER: And, Your Honours, it then goes on to suggest
22 various solutions. Perhaps if we just look at those solutions we can see
23 on that page. The charges should be raised against persons for whom the
24 service has documentary proof, persons, old persons, if any of them
25 assume a decisive attitude.
1 Now, Your Honours, what we say is this whole document is
2 indicative of Zupljanin's attitude towards the prisoners, his knowledge
3 as well. It doesn't say release them. It says:
4 "Assume a decisive attitude to exchange military men of no
5 security interest to us who can be treated as hostages."
6 And, Your Honours, we say that whole document, exemplifies the
7 attitude of Zupljanin towards these prisoners.
8 JUDGE HALL: Ms. Korner, your highlighting of this paragraph,
9 this concluding phrase in this paragraph, apart from the -- anything that
10 might have been -- any concepts that may have been lost in the
11 translation, what comes over in the English, what, in your submission,
12 was -- is that intended to convey?
13 MS. KORNER: The -- the -- the suggestions.
14 JUDGE HALL: Yes.
15 MS. KORNER: Yes. Your Honour, we say instead of -- in
16 particular, paragraph 2, instead of saying part of the Defence case
17 against Mr. Zupljanin is that he didn't know about prisoners, and when he
18 did know, he was prepared to deal with them in a proper manner and have
19 them released.
20 We say this document shows the very contrary. He's not doing
21 anything of the sort. He's talking about hostages. He's talking about
22 assume a decisive attitude. And all of this is being sent to the
23 minister, his co-accused, Mico Stanisic.
24 I hope that's clear, Your Honours.
25 And, Your Honours, we say that one of the points that is made, if
1 you look and we come back to that at the very end of what we say, is
2 that -- that the Defence urge upon Your Honours in their final brief that
3 he took all steps that he was able to comply with the law and not to, in
4 any way, allow any crimes to be committed or go undetected or unpunished.
5 And we say this is very far from what the documentation produced at the
6 time reveals.
7 Your Honours, finally, can we ask that Your Honours look at a
8 very short video-clip P0265. This is Zupljanin and others being
9 interviewed on January the 12th, 1993, about the -- effectively the
10 security situation. One of the other people in the studio is, in fact,
11 then the assistant minister, Tomo Kovac. And I think Your Honours will
12 see a quick clip of what he looked like in 1992.
13 [Video-clip played]
14 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, there we see Zupljanin saying exactly
15 what the Prosecution say, is that the police did, as they say they did,
16 they tasked which normally would have been outside their responsibility,
17 which would be the guarding of camps, where they say this was a necessity
18 because of the -- as they put it, the citizens are to be protected on
19 specific territory.
20 Your Honours, thank you very much for the extra time.
21 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, this morning I want to begin by
22 talking about communications, a matter that's been discussed a lot in
23 this courtroom, or more often in Courtroom III, I guess, during the past
24 couple of years.
25 On the screen, the first slide I want to show you lists some of
1 the various means and modes of communication that were available to the
2 accused and to RS MUP in 1992. They had telephones, fax machines,
3 teletype and teleprinters for sending coded communications, had
4 short-wave and ultra short-wave radios. When necessary, they could use
5 human beings as couriers. There were frequent face-to-face meetings and
6 collegiums at both the headquarters level, the CSB levels, and in
7 addition to the MUPs country-wide communication system there were two
8 other republic-wide communication systems that could be used by the MUP.
9 One was the army system, once the VRS was in place, and there was
10 also the Ministry of Defence which had its republican -- republic
11 communications centre. You'll recall Mr. Vukovic who worked there
12 testified about that system that was primarily for the use of the
13 republic level political organs but they had the means to communicate
14 with all the municipalities. He testified that all three of those
15 communication providers assisted each other from time to time as needed
16 and as necessary.
17 I just give you one example of the use of an alternative
18 communications network. Mr. Tutus testified at page 7712 about a time
19 when he needed to get in touch with the minister. The communications
20 system in Banja Luka was having some problems on that occasion, so he
21 went to the centre, and reading from line 6 on that page he said:
22 "I couldn't directly contact the minister so I went to the
23 communications centre. I asked the operator to connect me with the
24 minister through other means of communication that Republika Srpska had
25 at its disposal at the time, and he did put me through to General Tolimir
1 through some sort of military communications. And from Tolimir, I asked
2 the connection to Stanisic. Ten minutes later or less I got feedback
3 from General Tolimir that Mr. Stanisic agreed with my decision."
4 That is just one example of the alternative means being used.
5 Vukovic's testimony has more detail, and that's at transcript
6 1761 through 24, 17655 and 17691 to 92.
7 In addition, you've heard how part of the problem was that the
8 post telegraph and telephone system, the PTT system, was disrupted
9 because of the war and the division of territory. You have in evidence
10 one reference pertaining to that system. In Exhibit P1755,
11 General Mladic's notebook, regarding a meeting on the 31st of July, he
12 receives a report from the chief of communications for his Herzegovina
13 Corps. At page 393 and 394 of both the English and the B/C/S, in
14 e-court, the chief reports a communications system is fully operational.
15 And on 394 he reports that the PTT system of the SAOH, the Serbian
16 Autonomous Region of Herzegovina, is better now than before the war.
17 That's the report on the 31st of July.
18 Now, if we could go to the next slide. If you really need or
19 want to do some more research into the state communications, there are
20 several sources that you can look at. They're various annual reports;
21 VRS MUP annual report, P625 [Realtime transcript read in error "P265"]
22 we'll look more at that in a minute; P624 [Realtime transcript read in
23 error "P264"] is the annual report for Banja Luka CSB; the testimony of
24 the various communication witnesses, Mr. Vukovic, I mentioned.
25 MR. ZECEVIC: Sorry, Mr. Hannis, just for the sake of record, you
1 said "625" and "624" and it was recorded "264" and "265." I'm sorry to
2 interrupt you, but I think it's important.
3 MR. HANNIS: Thank you. That's correct. I did think I said and
4 intended to say 625 and 624.
5 The communication witnesses, including Mr. Vukovic, were
6 Mr. Kuzunovic, from RS MUP at the top level; Mr. Pejic, who worked in the
7 CSB in Sarajevo; Mr. Rakovic in CSB Banja Luka; Mr. Jankovic from
8 Prijedor; and Mr. Raljic from Kotor Varos.
9 A couple of the log-books, I have spared you all of the pain in
10 bringing any log-books and trying to discuss them today. But, again, I
11 would encourage you to have a look at them. P1428 is the communications
12 log-book that was initially used in Vraca by Mr. Kuzunovic at the MUP
13 headquarters level, and then later you heard that very same notebook was
14 taken over and used as the log-book for CSB Sarajevo by Mr. Pejic. That
15 one, if you would look at some of the testimony of Mr. Pejic we walked
16 through several of the links. And P1025 is the Prijedor log-book that we
17 spent a lot of time with Mr. Jankovic.
18 Intercepts were another means of communication and you have a
19 number of intercepts in evidence. I think the Defence all along and
20 still in their brief try to argue about the weight of that evidence and
21 still have an issue with them. I think Your Honours should be well
22 satisfied by know that that evidence is something reliable. A number of
23 those had been confirmed by the actual speakers. Many of them are
24 self-authenticating to a certain extent just based on their contents.
25 The caller comes. You hear him ask, May I speak with Mr. Stanisic.
1 Someone comes on the phone and says he is Mr. Stanisic. They have a
2 conversation about something we know about from either other telephone
3 conversations or other documents that make sense in the context of date
4 and the events that are going on. And we think you can rely on those.
5 Collegiums we have six RS MUP collegiums. July, August,
6 September, October and November, and a reference to the one in December.
7 We don't have the actual minutes to that but we have documents referring
8 to it both before it occurred and after it occurred. And you can see
9 from those collegiums that there must have been other communications
10 prior to the meetings. You can't get a group of people together unless
11 the meeting is scheduled and people are informed that they need to come
12 and attend, and the fact that they did occur indicates prior
13 communications and the contents of the collegium. You see what they're
14 talking about. You see that they've had prior communications about those
15 kinds of things.
16 Assembly sessions, the Bosnian Serb Assembly met several times in
17 1992. Can you see from those lengthy conversations in some of the
18 assembly sessions that there's been a lot of communication, not only
19 among the delegates but with other people outside the assembly, including
20 police and army personnel.
21 And, likewise, government sessions. I think there some 60
22 government sessions in evidence. We may not have all 60 but there are
23 approximately that many. Mr. Stanisic was a member of the government as
24 the minister of interior in 1992. He often attended. When he's not
25 present, his absence is generally noted and one of his representatives is
1 attending; I think on one occasion, Mr. Kovac, Mr. Njegus, various
2 peoples whose names you will recognise as members of the MUP
4 Now, we have more details about the communication in our final
5 trial brief in paragraphs 881 through 886. I refer you there for further
6 detail. And if we could go to the next slide. This is P625, the MUP
7 draft annual report. There are two sections that deal with
8 communications. This first one was entitled: Reporting and informing.
9 This, I believe, has more to do with the -- the section of the MUP that
10 dealt with analysis where they send out requests for information or they
11 sent out questionnaires. They received information back and prepared
13 You see from this excerpt taken from pages 22 and 23 of the
14 English in P625, 31 and 35 in the B/C/S, talks about a number of reports
15 that were prepared during the year. And concerning reporting and
16 informing, some 4170 dispatches were sent to the centres and other
17 organs, and about 4400 were received.
18 Now, this is different from the next slide. This is also in the
19 report. Section 3 was about task and duties of communications and
20 cryptographic data protection. You see the numbers here of dispatches
21 sent and received. In addition to the dispatches, it notes that:
22 "Some 9.585 short-wave radio connections were established from
23 the communications centre base alone ..."
24 Again, this is for the period from April through December 1992.
25 Related to that, we should look at the next slide which is the
1 report for the period from 4 April 1992 to 31 April 1992 for the CSB in
2 Banja Luka. And, again, we'll have two different types of communication
3 and reporting. This first one you have on the slide is the cryptographic
4 data protection and communications system. There were a total of 15.981
5 dispatches received. That includes both the open and closed or coded
6 dispatches, if my math is right. And something near 14.339 were sent.
7 That's a total of both the open and closed dispatches.
8 In addition to that, it notes that they forwarded 2.297
9 dispatches. You may recall evidence we heard where, on occasion, for
10 example, I think Zvornik was one, where they were not able to communicate
11 with Sarajevo but they were able to communicate with Bijeljina and they
12 requested that Bijeljina forward dispatch to Sarajevo. I believe that
13 this is what was happening in Banja Luka as well. Sometimes they were
14 requested to forward a dispatch that another unit could not connect with
15 at the time.
16 Go to the next slide. Still in P624, the report for Banja Luka
17 CSB. This about task and assignments concerning analysis and
18 information. I think this is the same that was seen in the MUP
19 headquarters report concerning reporting and informing.
20 Total of 111 reports on security issues were submitted to
21 government organs in municipalities. 206 reports were submitted to the
22 army. 632 reports to the MUP. I assume that means MUP headquarters from
23 CSB Banja Luka.
24 And the bottom paragraph you see the centre's professional
25 council held regular meetings. This is the collegium on the CSB level;
1 an example of communications occurring at that level.
2 If we could go one more slide and just want to touch briefly on
3 some of the Defence claims regarding communications that were made during
4 the trial. There was a reference to the extreme drop off in the number
5 of dispatches as a reflection of the difficulties the RS MUP was having
6 in 1992. And I think Mr. Kuzunovic was the first one that this was put
7 to that, Gee, before the war wasn't there about 300.000 dispatches a
8 year, and here in this reports you only see 4.000 or 8.000, some much
9 smaller number. First of all, we don't have a document reflecting what
10 the number was in 1991 or the first three months in 1992, we only have
11 that Bare testimony.
12 In addition you remember before the split, the MUP of Bosnia
13 covered more than the 70 or so municipalities that we eventually had in
14 the RS. There was something in the neighbourhood I think of 110 or 109
15 municipalities is the evidence about the total territory. In addition, I
16 think Mr. Pejic is the one who told us that before the war, there were
17 all kinds of dispatches that were sent that simply did not get sent
18 during the war time for some pretty obvious reasons. If you're engaged
19 in a war it's probably not worth your time or effort to be sending out a
20 dispatch to try and locate a stolen bicycle or a car or other kinds of,
21 sort of, routine police business that is done during peacetime.
22 In addition, there were obviously fewer policemen working in the
23 RS MUP because it was a smaller area, fewer personnel, so they're fewer
24 policemen to actually be doing police work that requires reporting and
25 sending dispatches about. And for security reasons Mr. Pejic, I think,
1 also mentioned this: That there were more comms, more communications,
2 done outside the dispatch system. You've seen from some of the
3 intercepts that the speakers were aware that oftentimes they were being
4 eavesdropped on. You heard the expressions of concern about sending
5 dispatches by fax for security reasons, and so much more of the
6 communication occurred either by face-to-face communication or outside
7 the dispatch system.
8 Mr. Pejic at transcript page 12129 and 1230 -- 12130. Before the
9 war, dispatches that went from the SUP toward the centres and police
10 stations could include 100 or 200 dispatches in a packet because
11 dispatches are used to inform relevant institutions of all security
12 relevant matters such as stolen vehicles, whereas during war-time those
13 wouldn't be so numerous.
14 He went on to say:
15 "But it was expected the number of dispatches about security
16 relevant events become much greater but such information was, however,
17 mostly transmitted by phone or in direct contact between the officers,
18 and dispatches were used only when other means of communication were not
19 possible. I believe that the officers in charge compensated for that
20 through telephone communications or other types of communications."
21 Second remark of the 30 per cent increase to be expected during
22 the war was a suggestion I think initially put by Mr. Zecevic to one or
23 more of the communication witnesses. We never heard a basis for that
24 estimate, and I fail to see what that could possibly be based on. None
25 of the witnesses had been in the experience of going through a -- a war
1 in their former country and comparing the communications with peacetime
2 communications. It seems like a completely wild, out-of-the air guess
3 and has no basis that you can rely on.
4 Finally, completely cut off was a phrase, I think, we heard often
5 from witnesses about the situation regarding communications. I think
6 we're not completely cut off. People got around. Mr. Stanisic and all
7 the RS big shots, Mr. Karadzic, Koljevic, Krajisnik, Mrs. Plavsic,
8 Trbojevic and Djeric, including the RS Assembly members were able to
9 travel around. They all showed up in Banja Luka on May 12th for the
10 Assembly session, and you will see from the Assembly sessions they met at
11 various locations throughout the RS in 1992.
12 I guess one of the best examples I would refer you to in -- it
13 was generally like for the police and communications in 1992 come from
14 the testimony of ST-179 at T7472 through 76. They basically said at the
15 beginning of the conflict they used couriers for communication. By June,
16 the telephones were working. By August, teleprinter and telegraph was
17 working. He also said that the SJB chiefs had periodic, at least monthly
18 meetings with their CSB chief, including one that was held at the hotel
19 Kosude [phoen] where Mr. Stanisic had his office at the time. And at
20 those meetings the SJB chiefs would regularly inform the CSB chief about
21 events and steps that needed to be taken and that the CSB chief would
22 draw conclusions and forward them to the minister, Mr. Stanisic.
23 Your Honours, I guess that's where I want to sum up. Yes, there
24 were problems with communications and there were difficulties. But one
25 thing I'd like about communications witnesses, generally, compared to
1 politicians or policemen or generals from the army in this kind of case
2 is that the communication guys are engineers, and their job is to figure
3 out how to make things work, not to have a discussion about whether it
4 should work or who is going to be in charge of it working, whatever.
5 They try to solve problems and that's what they did. When the telephone
6 didn't work, then they tried to set up a radio-relay connection. They
7 used couriers, they delivered messages face to face. It is obvious that
8 communications were occurring. Things weren't ideal. They never are.
9 But can see from the totality of the evidence, the people who needed to
10 know got the information, maybe not as quickly as they would have liked
11 in the ideal circumstance, but it was not the situation the Defence would
12 have you believe that some kind of prehistoric situation with no
13 communications or post-apocalyptic situation where everything has been
14 destroyed and you have to resort to signal flares and smoke signs.
15 Communications worked.
16 Now let me talk about Mr. Stanisic, unless there's a particular
18 Now I want to talk about Mico Stanisic, minister of the interior
19 for the RS MUP in 1992, and back for a while in 1994.
20 First slide, character evidence. In his brief, Mr. Stanisic has
21 put character into evidence, and I would point out that the good
22 character is not a defence to the charges, might be a factor you consider
23 for mitigation in sentencing, but it is not a Defence to charges. Good
24 people sometimes do bad things. But, indeed, the character witnesses
25 cited in the Defence brief at paragraphs 20 and 41 include some folks
1 that I would highly suggest to you are not the most reliable witnesses
2 that have appeared here, including, Mr. Macar, Mr. Planojevic,
3 Mr. Zepinic. And it's odd that Mr. Stanisic refers to Mr. Zepinic as one
4 of his character witnesses, on the one hand, and then when it comes to
5 Mr. Zepinic's evidence, in transcript 5828 through 5832 about the
6 incident where he says Mr. Stanisic pulled a gun or him, they ask you to
7 completely disregard that. But I would say there's other evidence that
8 suggests that Mr. Zepinic may be telling you the truth about that and
9 that it's not out of character for Mr. Stanisic in 1992.
10 We heard some testimony about the loud argument in confrontation
11 between Mr. Stanisic and Mr. Djeric. Djeric talked about that at
12 transcript 2583. You had some partial corroboration that such an event
13 occurred from Trbojevic at transcript 4122 and 23.
14 And a third person, ST-127, at transcript 11912 through 13 told
15 you a detailed example. Reading from line 17 of 11912:
16 "His driver called me up from Jahorina and told me that the
17 minister had ordered me to wait for him in the room where we met last.
18 And I was there. He came. He was extremely angry, furious which
19 surprised me greatly. I was flabbergasted. I entered the room and
20 Mr. Stanisic -- I don't know how to put it. It would be a bad thing for
21 me to say that he shouted or hollered, but it was terrible for a highly
22 educated man in such a high position the way he behaved. I felt like a
23 slave. I didn't dare move. He walked up and down in the room shouting,
24 accusing me of obstructing this or that. And I didn't know what to --
25 could happen at any moment, and it went on for an hour at least. And I
1 know once it was over, nobody could be found in the neighbouring offices.
2 In those angry outbursts and in issuing threats to me, he went on, and I
3 noticed that he was armed. He had a pistol in a holster and he touched
4 that holster several times, and I didn't know that, what he might be able
5 to do that. I had never seen him like that. And, finally, he said to me
6 extremely angrily that on the following morning I would be out in the
7 trenches with the military somewhere on Mount Jahorina."
8 So three different sources talking about that aspect of his
10 And one intercept - this is the next slide I would like to show
11 you - it's a phone call on the 18th of April, 1992, between
12 Minister Stanisic and Radomir Kojic. We'll talk about him a little bit
13 later. And you'll see that Mr. Kojic is informing him about another
14 individual named Zoka who has arrested certain people, and they made an
15 agreement that those people would be brought to Vraca and handed over.
16 He says:
17 "They can beat them. They can do whatever they fucking want.
18 And then we will move them because we have no space here."
19 Mr. Stanisic's reaction was: Fine.
20 Let me go to the next slide. The Defence pointed out that
21 Mr. Stanisic co-operated with the OTP. Again, if anything that goes
22 perhaps to mitigation for sentencing if there's conviction, but from a
23 reading of the totality of the interview it's our position that the
24 co-operation was more in the nature of an effort to try and make the case
25 against him go away. We believe a fair reading of the interview shows
1 that he was less than fully forthcoming. And if you would take the time,
2 Your Honours, I would encourage you to look at P2309 at pages 26 through
3 35 in the English to give you a little flavour of the interview.
4 Mr. Tieger, the Prosecutor at the time, who was asking him about
5 the minutes of the 11 July collegium in Belgrade and the subsequent
6 17 July analysis and conclusions taken from that meeting. In particular,
7 asking him about what Mr. Zupljanin had said about the numerous Muslims
8 who had been rounded up by the army and the Crisis Staff who were trying
9 to round up as many as possible and putting them in these undefined camps
10 under miserable conditions. And in the -- in the conversation, the way
11 the questions and answers went, I think illustrates that he was not
12 really co-operating. He quibbled with Mr. Tieger's reference to the
13 number of people being detained as many, many, and insisted on a number.
14 When Mr. Tieger suggested that those people were victims, he said:
15 "Who do you mean?"
16 Mr. Tieger had to clarify:
17 "I mean those Muslims that you agreed were being held in those
18 camps without any criminal charges against them."
19 Please have a look.
20 A couple of other instances in the interview I want to refer to
21 just to try and illustrate the point.
22 Next slide, please. He was asked if he was involved in any
23 operational aspects of what the MUP was doing during the time he was at
24 Vrace which you will recall was in the first few weeks of the war. His
25 answer was:
1 "The minister is not involved in the operation aspect. It's a
2 minister's duty to provide guide-lines for the work of MUP and to adopt
3 legal regulations."
4 But, what do you actually do while I was at Vrace, you will see
5 was more in the nature of some operational work. If we can go to the
6 next slide. There are a series of intercepts. I'm not going to put them
7 all up in the interests of my limited time but you have him speaking
8 directly with Mr. Karisik who was head of the RS MUP special unit. The
9 first instance on 1 July, he tells them to destroy those targets. The
10 next day he is telling, Take them down, screw them. Do not take any
11 risks, just take them down.
12 Again, get down those targets.
13 And the last one is not a conversation with Mr. Stanisic but with
14 Karisik and Mr. Kusmuk who at the time was the assistant minister for
15 police administration. Mr. Karisik is requesting Kusmuk to get a
16 particular tam vehicle with an anti-aircraft gun. Mr. Kusmuk advising
17 that can only be done with the approval or permission of the minister, so
18 the minister is involved in the operational aspects and the work at that
20 Next slide. Also in the interview, there was a discussion about
21 the relationship between the minister and his subordinates and how there
22 were difficulties caused by the political authorities, the Crisis Staffs.
23 And Mr. Stanisic said all the time up until their dissolution, the Serb
24 Autonomous District which happened in September, the head of the CSBs as
25 well as the heads of the police stations did not merely hold the position
1 of head of CSBs or police stations, they were also members of
2 Crisis Staffs and War Presidencies. And a little further down, he goes
3 on to say, And because the minister did not have de facto jurisdiction
4 during that period of time - here's my emphasis added - you cannot find a
5 single order of the head of the CSBs or the head of the police stations
6 referring to any order of mine or any of my assistants between April and
7 September. You may remember off the top of your head we have many orders
8 of the minister and from some of his assistants that are referred to
9 specifically in orders of the CSBs and referred on down to the SJBs.
10 We'll show you a few.
11 If we could go two slides over. 1D73 is an exhibit that is the
12 25 April order from Minister Stanisic numbered 01-25 delegating his
13 authority regarding appointment of certain personnel to CSB chiefs. We
14 have in evidence P384 which is Mr. Zupljanin forwarding that order --
15 which referring to order specifically in his appointment of Mr. Vrucinic
16 as the chief of Sanski Most SJB. It's also cited by the Doboj chief,
17 Mr. Bjelosevic, in 1D464, his appointment of the deputy for CSB,
18 Mr. Milan Savic, who you will recall associated with the Mice.
19 P1004 is Mr. Stanisic's order of May 4th, and again you'll see
20 that that was forwarded by Mr. Zupljanin, referred to by number, and it
21 shows up in the Prijedor log-book.
22 1D58 is Mr. Stanisic's 7 July order to take measures against MUP
23 members who commit criminal acts, again cited by Mr. Zupljanin, forwarded
24 to Prijedor appearing in the log-books. It's also cited by CSB chief,
25 Krsto Savic, and forwarded to his subordinate SJBs.
1 Those are a few examples of the orders from Mr. Stanisic between
2 April and September. So clearly, that statement in his interview was not
4 Next slide. This is only a small one. This was when Mr. Tieger
5 was asking Mr. Stanisic about the events when the 400 or so prisoners
6 from Bratunac were brought to Pale. You may recall that testimony. And
7 Mr. Stanisic claimed that he didn't know about that, that he was out of
8 town. The evidence indicates this occurred on the 15th and 16th of May.
9 Mr. Tieger pressed Mr. Stanisic for information about where he
10 was, where he had been during the time. He said:
11 "Well, sir, I just wasn't there and I should disclose this thing
12 during the procedure of presenting evidence."
13 We don't know where he was. We know that on 12th of May he was
14 in Banja Luka. We see him at the parade, the police parade, the day that
15 the Assembly met. We know that on the 15th of May he was writing his
16 order creating war units; 1D146. And we know on the 16th of May he was
17 writing up a follow-up order about reporting about war crimes against
18 Serb victims. But we don't know where he was. Skipina says that he did
19 tell Stanisic about the Bratunac group the day after they were
20 transported, but no further information.
21 Finally, if we could go to the next slide on the interview. One
23 Again, this is when Mr. Tieger was asking about the July 11th
24 collegium. Mr. Stanisic said:
25 "Mr. Tieger, since they are documents in the concept of my
1 Defence hinges on the documents I would prefer not to discuss them at
2 this time ... I had some documents that I would prefer not to
3 disclose ... you need to understand the Defence hinges on a certain
4 strategy ... keeping undisclosed in keeping with rules of undisclosing
5 documents since I am accused."
6 Now, Your Honours, the Defence pointed out in the brief that
7 under the statute in the Celebici judgement, it's inappropriate to
8 comment on a defendant's non-testifying. However, I found no Tribunal
9 jurisprudence dealing with the situation we have here where the accused
10 has chosen to waive his right and speak. His interview in 2007 was done
11 pursuant to the Rules. He was cautioned before each and every session.
12 His lawyer was present with him and so he did speak about a number of
13 matters, but he spoke selectively. And we say based on jurisdiction from
14 other domestic jurisdictions, US, Australia, elsewhere, that, in that
15 case, when a defendant partially waives his right, he cannot use that as
16 a sword.
17 I see Mr. Zecevic on his feet.
18 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, I -- Your Honours, I have to object to
19 this, because it is -- I mean, perhaps I will give the reasons later, but
20 I think this line is quite in contrast with the jurisprudence of this
21 Tribunal; because Tribunal jurisprudence is very clear about the fact
22 that there is -- and the Statute for that purpose, that the accused
23 cannot be compelled to testify in a case.
24 JUDGE HALL: It's an argument, Mr. Zecevic.
25 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you.
1 JUDGE HALL: We -- we hear Mr. Hannis, and we would consider it,
2 just like all the other arguments.
3 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honours. This may again raise the
4 issue Ms. Korner spoke about before that there may be a request for some
5 further submissions on particular legal matters that we can outside of
6 the framework of the argument, but I did want to point this out; because
7 we think that in these circumstances where a defendant has made some
8 statements and made certain assertions about what he has or what he might
9 show and then he doesn't, that we can comment on that to you, and that's
10 something you can consider, at least related to the -- to his credibility
11 or to what weight to give the statement that he did make.
12 The one US Supreme Court case I would cite to you is Rylander
13 versus United States, 103 Supreme Court 1548, a case in 1983. The
14 holding there was in the US. Our constitutional privilege then applies
15 to the fifth amendment, the protection against self-incrimination.
16 Rylander held that an accused could not convert the privilege from a
17 shield against compulsory self-incrimination, which it was intended to
18 be. You cannot convert that into a sword whereby a claimant asserting
19 the privilege would be freed from adducing proof in support of a burden
20 which would otherwise have been here. And, yes, there are several cases
21 from Australia and England, but I want to move on to more factual
23 All right. If we could go to the slide on background.
24 Four brief topics I want to touch concerning background raised by
25 the Defence: SDS, arming, council of ministers, national security
2 Defence have argued that Mr. Stanisic was not a member of the
3 SDS. We think the evidence shows that he was. If he wasn't a
4 card-carrying member, he was certainly a -- an important affiliate,
5 associate, supporter, and fan of the SDS. We would ask you to look at
6 P883. This is referred to in the Defence -- in Mr. Stanisic's brief at
7 paragraph 34 pointing out the mistranslation, originally referred to a
8 list of people as members of the SDS. And he pointed out that the
9 correct translation should be "cadre of the SDS." I'm not sure how that
10 helps. My understanding of "cadre" refers to members of an organisation
11 who are the core members, the key members around whom you would build
12 your group; comes from, as I understand, the Latin quadro, meaning
13 square. So the fact is that Mr. Stanisic is listed as being part of the
14 cadre of the SDS holding a position in the ministries.
15 You can also look at P1467 and P522, which shows his involvement
16 or connection with SDS activities. 522, his -- his being listed as a
17 member of the Crisis Staff of the SDS for the city of Sarajevo. And
18 being assigned a task that arises from the December 19th instructions,
19 the Variant A and B instructions. He claims he never saw it, but he is
20 listed and assigned a task that would be appropriate for him in his
21 position at the time.
22 P1467 is 25 September 1991 decision of the SDS appointing a
23 regionalisation staff and naming Mr. Stanisic to that.
24 And, I guess, the best argument is whether he is a member or not
25 he is certainly a supporter, and that's found in a statement he made at
1 the Assembly on the 23rd and 24th of November. It's from P4100 [sic] at
2 pages 50 -- yes.
3 This -- he says:
4 "He's here to stress this to you as well that I, as a man, have
5 followed policies of the SDS Presidency and our deputies in the former
6 state. I have always followed these policies. Those who want to
7 separate me from them, I will always be with them until it is shown that
8 their wishes an intentions differ from those of the people."
9 That was on the 23rd and 24th of November, 1992.
10 Let me talk a little bit about arming. The best example of this
11 is also a comment from an Assembly session but this one comes from his
12 colleague, Mr. Mandic.
13 If we could go to the next slide.
14 This is an Assembly session on the 30 and 31st of December, 1993,
15 P1990, English page 164, B/C/S page 197.
16 Mr. Mandic is speaking:
17 "Vito," meaning Zepinic here, I believe, "Vito and Delimustafic,
18 it is true gentleman that they want to put me in prison. And do you know
19 why? Because together with Stanisic I pulled out 560 Hecklers from the
20 MUP to Romanija and distributed them to Sokolac, Rogatica, Han Pijesak
21 and Pale."
22 You've heard other evidence or references to Mr. Stanisic and
24 Council of ministers. Mr. Stanisic was a member of the council
25 of ministers. Initially a minister without portfolio.
1 Oh I see in the transcript at line -- page 23, line 2, it says
2 "P4100." It should be "P400," is the exhibit number for that
3 Assembly session in November.
4 Now, as a member of the ministerial council, Mr. Stanisic
5 attended the very first meeting held on 11 January. You'll see this in
6 document P268. And at that session, if we could go to the next slide,
7 oh, I see it's on the screen now.
8 You'll see that the conclusion under number 2 about the
9 priorities for the council of ministers included the defining of ethnic
10 territory, establishment of government organs in the territory, and the
11 economic disempowerment of the current authorities in the
12 Socialist Republic of BiH.
13 If we could go to the next slide. On the next page of the
14 document it mentions that a working group is going to be composed, and
15 Mr. Stanisic is responsible for the work of the group. Even though
16 Mr. Zepinic is in the group and Mr. Zepinic is the highest ranking Serb
17 in the joint MUP at the time, Mr. Stanisic is designated to be
18 responsible for the work of this group which is to deal with issues
19 regarding the organisation and scope of national security and frame a
20 concept about it.
21 You'll see shortly thereafter in, I think, the next meeting of
22 the council of ministers that they come up with a proposal for the
23 creation of a national security council which, indeed, is what happened.
24 And the minister of the interior was an ex officio member of the
25 national security council, and Mr. Stanisic didn't work with that body.
1 The Defence in their brief say that, Well, the national security
2 council wasn't really a body with any authority. It didn't have any
3 executive authority. It was only advisory. I think if you review all
4 the evidence that it was something more than a mere advisory body; in
5 effect, it acted in the place of a Presidency during that interim in the
6 early part of 1992 before a RS Presidency was actually created.
7 On that, I would refer you to the testimony of Mr. Djokanovic,
8 later on a republic War Commissioner, at one time minister for youth and
9 sports I believe was his title in the RS. His testimony at page 3569 and
10 70, he is speaking about in the first few weeks of the war he was at
11 Vrace. And he was present at a meeting in late April or early May where
12 Mr. Karadzic was in Vrace. Mr. Stanisic was at this meeting. He
13 believed that Mr. Karisik was there as well. And he said at line 1 on
15 "The people there were interested in the Serb side cutting the
16 city in two. In other words, to divide the city from Vrace towards
17 Skenderija by the football pitch. And I think someone mentioned this to
18 Mr. Karadzic, and Karadzic replied that he could not issue and order to
19 that effect. That is something that would have to be decided by the
20 council for national security."
21 So here you have early discussion on what turned out to be one of
22 the six strategic objectives, dividing the city of Sarajevo, and
23 Mr. Karadzic indicating that that was something that he couldn't decide
24 but it would have to be decided by the council of national security.
25 This is in late April or early May.
1 Next slide, please. A plan to split the BiH MUP. Ms. Korner has
2 spoken about this during his presentation on the introduction. And as
3 already mentioned, indication of this can be found -- another indication
4 about the fact that there was a plan I think is reflected in some of the
5 year-in reports from various MUP SJBs.
6 I would urge you to look at the Prijedor SJB report, P689.
7 Mr. Drljaca's reporting about the covert preparations outside the station
8 in early 1992. Covertly forming Serbian police stations and arming
9 Serbian personnel.
10 P348 is the Zvornik annual report. It also referred to the
11 illegal activity of Serbian personnel in the MUP in making plans for a
12 potential separate Serbian MUP. And you may recall with Mr. Kovac we
13 showed him some of the award nominations that were put forward for him
14 talking about his involvement in illegal activity in arming the Serbs and
15 making preparations for creating a new Serbian MUP. It's almost as
16 though it is a point of pride in these reports. And, again, that
17 counters a Defence argument that there was no plan and that they only
18 were trying to go along with Cutileiro. Don't make sense.
19 Next, Stanisic's authority. Clearly, Mr. Stanisic had the power
20 to appoint and replace CSB and SJB chiefs. You heard Mr. Kovac talk
21 about that. You've seen his order from 25 April in 1D73. Mr. Olmsted
22 will talk about this in more detail in his presentation.
23 Regarding disbanding the specials and reducing the reserve, the
24 primary document is 1D176. And related to this issue of reducing the
25 reserve force and removing criminals, there's been some debate about what
1 Mr. Stanisic said in the Assembly session, again on the 22nd -- or 23rd
2 and 24th of November, 1992. Mr. Zecevic pointed out that there initially
3 was a mistake in the interpretation but I want to go back to the
4 document. It is P400 at page 17 in the English, and 17, 18 in the B/C/S.
5 Can we have the next slide. Oh, I'm sorry, I'm not ready for
7 But it was pointed out that the correct interpretation was:
8 "They took in thieves and criminals, because I tell you not a
9 single doctor picked up a rifle to defend his country, not a single
10 intellectual. Out priority, our intentions were good and maybe that's
11 where we went wrong."
12 I urge Your Honours to look closely at Mr. Stanisic's entire
13 speech in that section of the Assembly session. And read in context, we
14 believe, "they" is referring to himself and the MUP.
15 Now, Mr. Mandic, good friend of Mr. Stanisic, at least in the
16 context of this case, when he testified, went out of his way, I would
17 say, not in response to a question that was put to him, but at transcript
18 9564, he volunteered and said, Can I just add something, Judge? He
19 volunteered that they didn't mean RS MUP or Mico Stanisic but, instead,
20 referred to powerful people who invited in the paramilitaries from
22 Well, we say that doesn't make sense in the context of this, and
23 one reason I say that is based on another remark attributed to
24 Mr. Stanisic closer in time to his 27 July order about removing
25 criminals. And that can be found in Mladic's notebook, P1755, at
1 pages 373 to 375.
2 If we could show the next slide, please.
3 Very same day that Mr. Stanisic had issued that order, 27 July,
4 he and Mr. Trbojevic, deputy prime minister, had a meeting with
5 Mr. Mladic. And Stanisic is noted as saying:
6 "I had to take everyone into the police."
7 "I had to take everyone into the police."
8 "... but the army has now taken over the lines. We are now in a
9 position to choose policemen."
10 That's consistent with the interpretation that what he was saying
11 in the Assembly in November 1992 was that, yes, in the beginning they had
12 to take criminals and thieves into the police because there was a war on,
14 If we could go onto the next slide.
15 Noted in the same meeting, again, still Mr. Stanisic speaking
16 apparently. He said:
17 "I sent an order this morning that within five days on placing a
18 whole section of forces within the competence of the army."
19 That's a reference to his 1D176 order.
20 And he is noted as saying:
21 "The minister of interior ... has sole jurisdiction in its
23 Now, I want to play a video, Your Honour, if I have time. It's
24 about, I don't know, a minute and a half before the break. And before we
25 start the video I just want to ask Your Honours to take note of what
1 Mr. Stanisic is wearing around his neck in -- not this video.
2 No. Sorry. Yes, this one.
3 [Video-clip played]
4 MR. HANNIS: You can see the subtitles. I don't know if you can
5 hear the sound.
6 [Video-clip played]
7 MR. HANNIS: Mr. Stanisic with members of special unit. The
8 first one was Mr. Karisik.
9 [Video-clip played]
10 MR. HANNIS: All right. And --
11 JUDGE HALL: Sorry, am I missing something when you asked us to
12 take note of what he was wearing around his neck?
13 MR. HANNIS: Yes, at the beginning, I don't know if you were able
14 to see what he was wearing around his neck. We can go back to it, but I
15 would indicate it appears to be an Orthodox cross.
16 [Video-clip played]
17 MR. HANNIS: You see?
18 JUDGE HALL: Yeah, I notice that. But the --
19 MR. HANNIS: And the reason I bring that to your attention,
20 Your Honour, is that the Defence in their final trial brief portray
21 essentially Mr. Stanisic as too nice a guy to have even thought about
22 these crimes or doing any of these kind of crimes, and they pointed out
23 to his remarks on the 30th of March in Sokolac, when he announced that,
24 From today, we have our own Serbian MUP, and in the Assembly on 27th of
25 March when he was selected as the minister of the interior. I think on
1 both of those occasions he made remarks to the effect that he wanted to
2 have a professional police organisation and not one that was related to
3 politics, and that he wanted one that would do its job of protecting all
4 the people of all nationalities.
5 Now, the point I'm trying to make is: Here's the minister of the
6 interior purporting to be the representative -- the protector of people
7 of all ethnicities. In the context of this conflict that was ongoing,
8 what he is wearing, I would assert to you, is something that would not
9 give comfort to the non-Serbs. That's not a standard issue for the
10 police. And it seemed to me that there's a message to be conveyed, just
11 certainly a message that would have been received by the non-Serbs
12 viewing that.
13 JUDGE HALL: I follow you.
14 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
15 Is it time for our first break, Your Honour?
16 JUDGE HALL: Yes.
17 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
18 JUDGE HALL: 20 minutes.
19 --- Recess taken at 10.22 a.m.
20 --- On resuming at 10.48 a.m.
21 MR. HANNIS: Thank you. Your Honours, now -- we've just seen
22 Mr. Stanisic and his special unit under Milenko Karisik, and I do want
23 to talk briefly about the special units. Under the
24 Law on Internal Affairs for the RS MUP, Article 36 was the provision that
25 gave the minister the power to create special units.
1 And we have evidence in this case that Mr. Karisik's special unit
2 was under the direct authority of Mr. Stanisic. Mr. Planojevic testified
3 about that at transcript 16404. We've had other witnesses indicate that
4 and other documents that reflect it. But I also want to talk about Dusko
5 Malovic. He was head of the special police platoon, sometimes referred
6 to as the Sokolac Platoon. We say the evidence shows that this group was
7 also under the direct authority of Minister Stanisic.
8 Exhibit P1422 is a 15 June 1992 document, an order from
9 Mr. Stanisic to Mr. Malovic's unit, the Sokolac unit of the special
10 police, to carry out mobilisation of conscripts. And you've seen a
11 number of payroll documents concerning Mr. Malovic's units.
12 Mico Davidovic testified at transcript 13606 about Mr. Malovic
13 and his unit being under the authority of the minister. We've had a lot
14 of debate, I guess, between me and Defence counsel about whether or not
15 Malovic and his unit were responsible for personal security of the
16 minister. We have had some evidence about that. Mr. Planojevic in his
17 suspect interview with the OTP had indicated that's what he did, but when
18 Mr. Planojevic came to testify he backed off that testimony. And I think
19 you'll recall, I went through that with him in his statement about how he
20 first came to mention it. It wasn't in response to a question. He
21 volunteered it, which is more consistent with it being genuine. We think
22 his change of testimony was because he was here in front of Mr. Stanisic
23 and that drove the change.
24 You should also look at Mr. Kovac's statement to the Bijeljina
25 prosecutor's office, investigating the murder of the three Muslim
1 families in September of 1992. I'll talk more about that in a minute.
2 Let me move to the Bijeljina murders. Next slide, please.
3 I know this is not a charged incident in the case, but we think
4 it's necessary to talk about it because it reflects on matters of
5 credibility, regarding Mr. Stanisic and other witnesses in the case. It
6 also relates to his connection with the Malovic unit, which ties in with
7 the failure to punish certain individuals and to take actions. And so
8 let me talk about it briefly.
9 Mr. Stanisic has worked very hard to have any connection between
10 him and that event removed or obscured. Mico Davidovic testified at
11 transcript 13552 through 54 and 13604 through 07, as well as in his
12 92 ter statement, P1557.01 at paragraphs 151 and 152.
13 Malovic generally admitted that his unit had done that crime.
14 Davidovic told you that he had a meeting with Mr. Stanisic after he,
15 Davidovic, had spoken with the OTP on -- on other matters. And
16 Mr. Stanisic asked him if he had said anything about that event. Reading
17 from Davidovic's transcript, 13552:
18 "On one occasion, I met with Mr. Stanisic in Sremska Mitrovica
19 and Stanisic had some questions about why I talked to the investigators
20 of the Tribunal, whether he was also interesting to them, whether I had
21 given any statements, and I said, Yes, I talked to them. They also ask
22 about him in that context, his activities concerning the disarming of
23 paramilitaries in Zvornik, and other places was also discussed. And as
24 far as this family from Bijeljina is concerned, I said that question had
25 not been asked. And then he said, Please don't place me in that context.
1 Because he doesn't want to get involved and he doesn't want me to place
2 him in any context related to that," and that's the first time this
3 family was mentioned with him.
4 He goes on talking about meeting with Dusko Malovic in Belgrade
5 sometime after the event, asking him, who killed those people there. And
6 Malovic told him that Drago Vukovic, the head of secret police of state
7 security in Bijeljina, had ordered it. And shortly after that
8 conversation Mico Stanisic and Frenki Simatovic arrived. This was in
9 Belgrade at the Bosanska Vija [phoen] and Stanisic -- and -- and
10 Davidovic left shortly after that.
11 Now, this was public knowledge at the time. You heard the
12 testimony that the Radical Party, headed by Mirko Blagojevic in Bijeljina
13 had put out a press release about the murders and suggesting that it had
14 been committed by Dusko Malovic and his unit. It's interesting to note
15 also that eight days later, eight days after the murder on the 3rd
16 of October there was a collegium of the RS MUP in Bijeljina presided over
17 by Mr. Stanisic. Mr. Kovac was at that meeting, and Mr. Kovac is listed
18 as having briefed the group on the security situation.
19 Now, I asked him when he testified if he recalled having informed
20 the group about the murders, and I don't have his precise answer in front
21 of me. Please refer to the transcript. But I think the gist was he
22 didn't recall. If he knew and if he knew whether or not he had said
23 anything about it. It's hard to imagine that the murder of three Muslim
24 families, 25 some people including women and children happening in a town
25 like Bijeljina at that time and having been mentioned in the press, was
1 not something that would have been part of the security briefing eight
2 days later in Bijeljina.
3 And I even asked Mr. Davidovic a question about whether he had an
4 opinion as to whether it was possible that the minister did not know
5 about it. And Judge Hall rightly admonished me that I was really asking
6 him to speculate, and I -- I took -- I took his suggestion because he
7 said that maybe what I needed to do was raise it later. Transcript page
8 13607. Judge Hall:
9 "We have the evidence of the publicity of this. We have the
10 evidence of the fact that the number one accused was a minister at the
11 time, and it is probably an inference, a reasonable inference that you
12 would, at the appropriate time, invite the Chamber to draw, but I think
13 that's as far as can you take it now with the questions for this witness.
14 And I said:
15 "I will take your point, Your Honour. I will save that for
16 submissions later. That's my submission now and all the evidence -- I
17 think it is a reasonable reference to draw. Thank you."
18 Also, related to that, Mr. Stanisic made a statement to the
19 Bijeljina prosecutor's office that was investigating the case. In 2003,
20 he wrote a statement - it's in Exhibit P1543 at pages 65 to 67 - and in
21 that, he claims he didn't know anything about it until apparently some
22 years later that he had issued an order for Dusko Malovic to be sent to
23 Bijeljina and put at the disposal of Mico Davidovic, head of the public
24 security station, and under the full control of MUP senior officer
25 Tomo Kovac and Cedo Kljajic. Said he never got any information
1 concerning any unlawful activities of the special police platoon or
2 Malovic, and that he was never informed about the incident either in
3 writing or verbally as stipulated in the instructions and he didn't -- he
4 didn't learn about the event until sometime after December 1992 after he
5 had left the MUP. Said, I wish to reiterate the atrocities in this sort,
6 making me especially eager to seek accountability of whoever the
7 perpetrators may be especially if they come from the ranks of those who
8 professionally take care of protecting lives.
9 JUDGE HARHOFF: Please slow down.
10 MR. HANNIS: Sorry. I do get speedy sometimes.
11 We say he had good reason to know who it was and he didn't take
12 any action.
13 And concerning his version of what happened, you've heard
14 testimony from Mr. Davidovic and Mr. Andan. Mr. Davidovic wasn't head of
15 the public security station. He was already gone from Bijeljina by the
16 end of August. He certainly wasn't there in September, in late
17 September when the murders happened. Mr. Andan confirmed that.
18 Mr. Andan wasn't there either because he had been removed. He had been
19 suspended by Mr. Stanisic's decision on the 9th or 10th of September.
20 You have that document in evidence confirmed by Mr. Kovac. Now, we don't
21 have the information from Mr. Kljajic, but Mr. Kovac also made a
22 statement about those events, and that's in Exhibit P2460 at pages 5
23 and 6 of the English and page 4 of the B/C/S. He says:
24 "On my first arrival at the Bijeljina SJB in September 1992, I
25 found the so-called Dusko Malovic's platoon headed at that time by
1 Malovic, by Malovic's deputy, Kuzunovic, who told me at that time their
2 job was to prior security for MUP Bijeljina SJB buildings. I also know
3 that they had gone a number of times from that location and provided
4 security for Mr. Stanisic while he was moving through the territory.
5 They briefly stayed until November, approximately, when they definitively
6 left the area following Mr. Stanisic's removal. That is everything in
7 the task they carried out that I and the police administration knew
8 about, and I believe that, as far as I know, they weren't receiving any
9 other task, although I did not have any command over them because, as
10 provided by law at that time, they were directly linked to
11 Minister Stanisic and they never set off anywhere without Malovic's
13 And it may shed some light on it, P737 is a 30 October interview
14 of Mr. Stanisic in "Javnost" magazine or newspaper. One of the questions
15 that he was asked at page 3 of the English and column 3 on the single
16 page in B/C/S. Question:
17 "Some are inclined to accuse the special units of the
18 Ministry of the Interior of the abuse of power when performing their
19 duties in Bijeljina."
20 Stanisic said:
21 "We're determined to protect our constitutional order and unity
22 of Republika Srpska because we're obliged to do so by the constitution.
23 Anyone who decides to disturb the above mentioned has to be aware that we
24 are categorically going to use all the available legal measures to
25 prevent and defeat such attempts. It is not true that the special unit
1 abused the power in Bijeljina."
2 No question to the report about what abuses are you talking
3 about. He just simply categorically denied.
4 All right. Let me move on briefly to the next slide.
5 Paramilitaries. We have some brief information about that.
6 Mr. Nielson in his expert report talks about the relationship between the
7 RS MUP and paramilitaries in his exhibit 508, paragraphs 361 to 378.
8 Mr. Davidovic told you that Stanisic had an agreement with Arkan
9 about coming to Sarajevo. In exchange further assistance in helping
10 fight, they were allowed to loot and take what they wanted from the area.
11 Regarding paramilitaries in Sarajevo, you also have in evidence
12 information about Seselj's men and some local paramilitaries in Ilidza,
13 including Brne's Chetniks, Brne Gavrilovic. Have a look at Exhibit P646
14 which is a 6 August report from Ilidza, Tomo Kovac, basically his last
15 day as chief in Ilidza before he went to join MUP headquarters. In it,
16 he is praising the work of volunteers, Serb volunteers, compared to the
17 work of the VRS in Ilidza. And it includes the information about the
18 amount of ammunition that the RS MUP has furnished to those volunteers to
19 help in the fighting.
20 Next slide, please. Camps, detainees, and exchanges.
21 Discussed in our final trial brief at paragraph 648 to 668, in
22 Stanisic's brief, I think he tries to make the claim that he didn't know
23 about this until the July collegium on the 11th in Belgrade. The
24 evidence is clear that he had information to put him on a notice far
25 before that. They knew from the very start on the 6th of April after
1 Vrace had been taken over by Karisik, Mandic, non-Serb cadets had been
2 captured, and Stanisic ordered them interrogated and then to be exchanged
3 for Serb prisoners, including Radomir Kojic, the gentleman who we saw on
4 the intercept earlier in my remarks. This testimony comes from
5 Mr. Skipina at transcript 8300 through 04.
6 On 6 June, you have in evidence P427.07. It is an order from the
7 central exchange commission, the body that was created to deal with
8 exchange of prisoners and dead bodies and other persons. It was directed
9 to those whose employees were securing persons in custody. And if you
10 look at the last page of that exhibit, you'll note that it was sent to
11 the MUP, to CSBs, but it was not sent to the army. So on the 6th of
12 June, at least the exchange commission had the understanding that
13 prisoners were being guarded by the police.
14 On the 10th of June, Exhibit P179.7 [sic], it's a government
15 session. That's .07. It's a government session attended by
16 Minister Stanisic, and during the meeting there's a mention of the
17 Ministry of Justice to report about prisoners with special attention on
18 the treatment of civilian population, all information putting Stanisic on
19 notice about detainees being -- detained in facilities guarded by the
20 police before the 11th of July.
21 Let me go to a new topic. Next slide. A big argument put
22 forward during the Defence case was that Mr. Stanisic couldn't have any
23 effective control over subordinates because of inference from the
24 Crisis Staffs. Talked about the appointment of SJB chiefs.
25 Recall, first of all, how things happened in the beginning. The
1 Variant A and Variant B instructions were issued to the SDS municipal
2 organs. Variant A was for those municipalities where there was a Serb
3 majority, where they were effectively were in power in charge of the
4 municipal assembly. Variant B, to those municipalities where they were a
5 minority and had to set up, basically, a shadow government and work
6 covertly. But those instructions provided for the SDS to include as a
7 member in their Crisis Staffs in the municipality in Variant A to include
8 the chief of police or the commander; because in a Serb majority
9 municipality, one of those two positions would be held by a Serb under
10 the inter-party agreement about division of appointments.
11 In the -- in the Variant B municipalities that was not the case,
12 and the instruction in Variant A and Variant B was to include someone
13 from all the appropriate municipal organs that was a Serb to be in that
14 position so that when the time came of -- came for a take-over, that
15 person could assume the role. That's how some of these SDS-appointed
16 police chiefs came into being. Because when the split happened, and when
17 the MUP, the RS MUP came into being on 30 March, according to
18 Mr. Stanisic's pronouncement in Sokolac, he and the RS MUP wasn't in a
19 position to make appointments all over the board.
20 So that's why they didn't have RS MUP appointees in some
21 municipalities at the beginning. However, the RS MUP could and did
22 replace municipality-appointed or SDS Crisis Staff appointees during
23 1992. Mr. Bjelosevic told you, Oh, we couldn't do anything about
24 Stevo Todorovic in Bosanski Samac because he was appointed by the local
25 municipal authorities, the Crisis Staff. So he wasn't really a member of
1 the MUP, so we couldn't discipline. We couldn't do anything. That's
2 not -- that's not the case. Mr. Olmsted may speak a little further about
3 this, you have the example in Zvornik. Just after the Yellow Wasps round
4 up the local police chief, I think it was Mr. Veselic, was replaced by
5 the RS MUP, and he was a Crisis Staff or provisional government, or
6 whatever the body was called in Zvornik at the time. He had been
7 appointed by the municipal authorities, no hesitation in replacing him.
8 Article 27 of the Law on Internal Affairs calls for SJBs to
9 execute the regulations pertaining to law and order issued by the
10 municipal authority.
11 So it's agreed that in time of emergency or state of imminent
12 threat of war, the Crisis Staff stands in place of the municipal
13 authority so this provision should be read as applying to them. And, if
14 the Crisis Staff is passing some regulation pertaining to law and order,
15 and we say setting a curfew, maybe ordering the roundup of weapons from
16 suspected individuals who might try and overthrow the government. All
17 those kind of things are regulations pertaining to law and order, and the
18 Law on Internal Affairs says that the police station -- that the SJB is
19 to implement those orders.
20 Mr. Stanisic's final trial brief citations about inference don't
21 really support the point. Have a look at the footnote 600 --
22 paragraph 600 to 601 and footnotes 1193 to 1195. Those documents don't
23 really stand for the point that they pertain, or that they purport to
25 For example, P750 is one of the footnoted documents. That's a
1 document from the War Presidency of Kljuc addressed to Banja Luka;
2 because they have received dispatches that are asking them to set up
3 facilities and accept prisoners who are now being moved out of Manjaca
4 and returned to various local municipalities, and the Kljuc war staff
5 says, We can't do that. We're unable to provide reception centres. We
6 don't meet the basic requirements for that. We're proposing to delay the
7 return until further notice. Or, they are taken over by humanitarian
8 organisations operating in Banja Luka with reception centres at their
9 disposal. It's not -- this is not the Crisis Staff ordering the local
10 police to do anything. It's a request from the Crisis Staff to
11 Banja Luka CSB for relief from something that they don't have the
12 facilities to do. P668 is one of the footnoted documents and it is from
13 Simo Drljaca to Mr. Zupljanin informing him that the Prijedor
14 War Presidency has decided to reduce the number of policemen guarding
15 prisoners in Keraterm, Trnopolje, and Omarska. It notes that the armies
16 refuse to take up that duty, and Mr. Drljaca is requesting that some
17 arrangement be made with the army and saying he cannot -- he cannot
18 implement the Crisis Staff decision. It's not that is he implementing a
19 Crisis Staff decision contrary to what the -- what the MUP wants, he has
20 been requested to implement something and he's not doing it. So this is
21 the exact opposite of the point the Defence is trying to make. It is not
22 the Crisis Staff interfering with the work of the police.
23 Have a look at each of those documents cited for those footnotes
24 I mentioned and see whether they pertain or not.
25 Skip the next slide please, and can we go to P163. Yes.
1 Now, regarding the relationship between the municipal authorities
2 or the regional authorities and the RS MUP, at the Trebinje collegium on
3 20th August Mr. Stanisic addresses directly. It is in Exhibit P163 at
4 page 8 of the English and pages 10 through 12 of the B/C/S.
5 And this is one of the conclusions pointed out by Mr. Stanisic.
6 Number one:
7 "CSB chiefs and their associates must be and are the
8 representatives of the ministry for the region, which is why they should
9 establish day-to-day co-operation with republican deputies," the Assembly
10 guys from the region, "and other representatives of the regional
11 authorities. SJB chiefs should, in the same manner, establish relations
12 with representatives of the municipal authorities. The reason for this
13 is that we are a professional service protecting the interests of the
14 people, and such an activity and orientation requires direct, daily
15 direct contact with the representatives of a legal authorities."
16 As we've said before relating to the issue of subordination and I
17 would say relating to this issue about relations between the
18 Crisis Staffs and police really doesn't matter. This is a joint criminal
19 enterprise. They're in it together.
20 At that same meeting, Mr. Stanisic also made a remark, that I may
21 be stealing from Mr. Olmsted. If we could look at the next slide in item
22 number 5 said:
23 "When performing their duties, police officers cannot take sides
24 whatever the demands and attempts in this stage of establishing the
25 organs of municipal and republican authority. Their work must be only --
1 must only be based on the law ... it's the only way to avoid contributing
2 to the instability of a situation in a certain area. In this sense, we
3 must resolutely support each and every one of our members, even when they
4 overstep the exercise of lawful authority to a limited degree."
5 That's reflective of the general attitude that we talked about
6 during the trial in our pleadings. Serbs didn't want to arrest other
7 Serbs for committing crimes against non-Serbs in the context of this
9 Two or three other brief items. Thank you.
10 Credibility. Next slide, please. You're the Judges of
11 credibility, sat here in the courtroom. You watched everything come in
12 and testify in front of you. You will make those discussions. I suggest
13 to you, in many cases you have to reject substantial portions of the
14 testimony of some individuals because they simply were not credible, not
16 Talked about Stanisic's interview and reasons that may undermine
17 credibility about portions of that. But I want to mention, in
18 particular, two Defence -- two witnesses: One who actually testified in
19 the Prosecution case, Mr. Mandic, and a Defence witness, Mr. Macar.
20 Mandic -- just one little episode that is reflective, I think.
21 You will see his cross-examination by Ms. Korner. He had testified in
22 the Krajisnik case that regarding his infamous dispatch of 31 March
23 separating the MUP, that in Krajisnik he testified under oath that
24 Mico Stanisic ordered him to send that out. When he came here, after
25 meeting with the Defence, he testified that, Oh no, no, I was wrong, that
1 was a mistake. It wasn't Mico Stanisic. It was Velibor Ostojic, the
2 minister of information, who remind him that the Law on Internal Affairs
3 had been passed on the 23rd of March and was due to come into effect
4 eight days later, and, therefore, because he was a highest ranking Serb
5 in the joint MUP he had a responsibility to send it out and he sent it
7 Read that testimony, transcript 9405 through 9409, and see if
8 it's plausible. It's really not. The way he testified about it
9 initially makes much more sense. Mr. Stanisic would have been the one to
10 tell him to do it. Mr. Stanisic, on the 30th of March, had announced,
11 From today, we have our own Serbian MUP in Sokolac. The dispatch goes
12 out the very next day.
13 When he testified here that it was Ostojic and he was asked,
14 Well -- well, where was Mr. Mandic -- where was Mr. Stanisic at the time?
15 He ended up by saying, Oh, I -- he was on vacation. He wasn't on
16 vacation. He was doing his tour of the autonomous regions announcing the
17 new Serbian group. He was in Sokolac on the 30th. He was on Trebinje on
18 the 31st. We have evidence about that.
19 Mr. Macar wo was a Defence witness, he was biased. He
20 volunteered favourable information on topics where he really had no basis
21 of knowledge to assert the things he claimed.
22 Two short examples about him.
23 One, really, in a non-responsive answer, he took the opportunity
24 to slam Mico Davidovic by saying that he was not a person who, quote,
25 page 23411:
1 "Mr. Davidovic, he had no experience with the crime enforcement
2 or the criminal procedure act. He had experience with something else all
4 And in cross-examination I asked him how much did he really know
5 about Mr. Davidovic. Did he know he been a policeman since 1974? That
6 he had worked as chief of the general crime section in the Tuzla CSB
7 which covered 18 municipalities. He was in charge of 17 plain clothes
8 detectives. He later became the SJB chief in Bijeljina. Then became the
9 chief inspector in the federal SUP in Belgrade and pointing out all those
10 things to him I asked him if that would change his opinion about whether
11 or not he had no experience and asked him if he was willing to withdraw
12 his comments. Page 23412, he said no. He knew nothing about him. He
13 mentioned that opinion and when faced with the evidence that he was
14 wrong, he still refused to agree.
15 And the other story he told about Prijedor and his snub by
16 Mr. Drljaca. He claimed that he first had gone to Banja Luka CSB and met
17 with Mr. Zupljanin who opened the door and discovered that he had failed
18 to forward on the message to Prijedor about the inspection that Macar and
19 his group were going to do. But when he came to testify here, he then
20 recalled, Oh, no, no, it really wasn't Mr. Zupljanin who did it, it was
21 Mr. Bulic, a dead guy, conveniently, who had told him that. And he
22 didn't know why he said Stanisic before when he talked to the
23 Prosecution, but that was wrong. And that when he went to Prijedor, he
24 helpfully added for the Defence that Mr. Drljaca had said, I'm not having
25 anything to do with you because my bosses, which Mr. Macar explained he
1 understood to mean municipal authority, didn't tell me anything about it.
2 Well, they wouldn't have told have told him anything about it because his
3 municipal bosses wouldn't have known about it. The whole store about
4 Zupljanin forgetting to send the document and the snub doesn't hold up.
5 You saw the kind of man Mr. Macar was and the position he held. It
6 doesn't make sense that he would have suffer as snub like that without
7 having gone to Zupljanin right away to tell him about his subordinate
8 acting that way or reporting it -- he claims he reported it but we have
9 no document. We found no document. He sat on the collegium with
10 Mr. Drljaca in 1994, never raised anything about it. You've heard
11 evidence about the disciplinary procedure changing and he could have
12 raised it himself. He did not. It does not make sense. He explained
13 how angry and humiliated he was by the event and he took no action.
14 Doesn't make sense.
15 Finally, one brief video. This is P2039. It's just some video
16 footage from the Assembly session on the 30th and 31st October in
17 Prijedor. We just want you to see who is attending.
18 [Video-clip played]
19 MR. HANNIS: Mr. Krajisnik.
20 [Video-clip played]
21 MR. HANNIS: General Mladic.
22 [Video-clip played]
23 MR. HANNIS: Mico Stanisic.
24 [Video-clip played]
25 MR. HANNIS: Mr. Mandic.
1 [Video-clip played]
2 MR. HANNIS: Mr. Zupljanin.
3 [Video-clip played]
4 MR. HANNIS: Mrs. Plavsic.
5 [Video-clip played]
6 MR. HANNIS: And Mr. Karadzic.
7 [Video-clip played]
8 MR. HANNIS: Finally, Your Honour, in summing up, my time is --
9 is out.
10 Mico Stanisic's early and substantial participation in -- in and
11 his contributions to the creation of the RS and the RS MUP, combined with
12 the fact that he was called back in 1994 for a second term as a minister
13 of the RS MUP, that alone should tell you something about how his
14 colleagues viewed him and what he helped do in 1992. And during which
15 time, in 1994, his second term, he didn't do anything to punish the
16 personnel who he knew by his own admission, in some cases, whom he knew
17 had been involved in crimes and/or cover-ups of crimes comitted by police
18 show his support for those crimes and those perpetrators.
19 You take all that together, it clearly establishes that he was a
20 knowing and willing participant in the JCE, and you should find him
21 guilty on all counts.
22 Thank you.
23 [Prosecution counsel confer]
24 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
25 MR. OLMSTED: Your Honours, ordinarily the police play a central
1 role in the protecting of citizens of a country. As Drago Borovcanin
3 "In every government there are some ministries which are the most
4 important, among them is always the Ministry of Interior, which is in
5 charge of maintaining law and order and protecting citizens and their
7 That's transcript page 6828.
8 During periods of ethnic conflict, the police role in protecting
9 citizens and, in particular, those susceptible to persecution is crucial.
10 Tomislav Kovac acknowledged this, referring to the unlawful imprisonment
11 and mistreatment of non-Serbs at detention facilities throughout the RS.
12 He admitted:
13 "According to the law and according to the hierarchy, we, that
14 is, RS MUP, were the strongest structure within the state; and,
15 therefore, our legal and our ethical duty and obligation was to prevent
16 these occurrences."
17 Transcript page 27151.
18 While the VRS had the responsibility not to engage in activities
19 that unlawfully harmed the citizens of the former BiH, the RS MUP was
20 unique among the Serb forces in that they bore the affirmative duty under
21 the law to do everything in their power to protect the population. Under
22 Article 42 of the RS Law on Internal Affairs, this affirmative duty of
23 the police applied:
24 "At all times, regardless of whether they're on duty on whether
25 such a duty is part of a special assignment," and, "even when their life
1 is endangered."
2 Amidst the endemic and systematic crimes that were comitted
3 against the Muslims, the Croats and other non-Serbs in the territory of
4 the RS from the onset of the indictment period, the police should have
5 dedicated their attention and resources to protecting the non-Serb
6 population. This, the evidence shows, they did not do.
7 The most blatant evidence of the failure of the police to protect
8 the non-Serb population was their direct participation in the crimes
9 commit the against that population as described yesterday by
10 Mr. Demirdjian.
11 Another important aspect of the police failure to protect was
12 their failure to investigate, arrest, and punish Serb perpetrators of
13 crimes against the non-Serb population, and this is what I will address.
14 Another important aspect of the police failure to protect was
15 their failure to investigate, arrest and punish Serb perpetrators of
16 crimes against the non-Serb population. And this is what I will address.
17 The evidence shows that the police stood at the threshold of the criminal
18 justice system. It was their duty to conduct the initial investigation
19 of a crime, to identify and arrest perpetrators, to preserve evidence,
20 and to initiate the criminal proceedings by filing a criminal report with
21 the prosecutor that was supported by sufficient proof of that crime.
22 Even after filing a criminal report, the police remained an
23 integral part of the criminal justice process. The prosecutor and court
24 depended upon the police to conduct searches, to locate and bring in
25 witnesses, to secure evidence and crime scenes, and to conduct forensic
1 examinations, and where there was evidence of additional crimes, to file
2 supplemental criminal reports regarding those crimes.
3 As the former Sanski Most prosecutor, Delic testified, if the
4 police did not perform their role:
5 "The criminal procedures could not be completed."
6 Transcript page 1526.
7 So how well did the police perform their duties to investigate
8 and report Serb perpetrators of crimes against non-Serbs in 1992? The
9 Chamber admitted into evidence the reports of RS district prosecutor
10 Gacinovic and RS MUP head of the police, Vasic, which analysed the data
11 contained in the criminal case log-books of the municipal and regional
12 police and prosecutors offices from the indictment period.
13 Both witnesses focussed their intention on identifying in these
14 log-books any crimes that fell within the indictment schedules. They
15 also looked for serious crimes committed by Serb perpetrators against
16 non-Serb victims. In particular, they looked at crimes of violence, such
17 as war crimes, murder, rape, serious bodily injury and robberies, as well
18 as grave property crimes such as those comitted with explosive devices.
19 Gacinovic also identified cases of aggravated theft against
20 non-Serbs. Even with this inclusion of this additional crime, her data
21 did not differ significantly from Mr. Vasic's. However, for consistency
22 aggravated thefts had been excluded from the summary I shall now provide.
23 In eight charged municipalities, Pale, Visegrad, Bosanski Samac,
24 Vlasenica, Ilijas, Bileca, Gacko and Kljuc, the police filed no criminal
25 reports for serious crimes committed by Serbs against non-Serbs during
1 the indictment period. Not one.
2 In seven charged municipalities, Vogosca, Bijeljina, Prijedor,
3 Brcko, Donji Vakuf, Kotor Varos, and Skender Vakuf, the police reported
4 just one serious crime committed by Serbs against non-Serbs during the
5 entire indictment period. In Prijedor, Kotor Varos, and Skender Vakuf,
6 the sole crime was an attempted murder, and the attempted murder case in
7 Kotor Varos was reported before the Serbs took over the SJB in the
8 municipality in June of 1992.
9 In two charged municipalities, Zvornik and Doboj, the police
10 reported only two serious crimes committed by Serbs against non-Serbs.
11 And in Sanski Most, the police reported four such crimes. This includes
12 a rape case that Your Honours heard evidence about that resulted in a
13 suspended sentence in 1993 under the reasoning that the victim and the
14 majority of the other Muslims from Sanski Most had moved away, making it
15 less likely that the perpetrator would commit the same or similar crimes
16 in the future. That's P122.
17 In Teslic, the police reported five crimes, serious crimes
18 against non-Serbs. One of the five, the criminal report against the
19 Mice Group did not appear in the police crime log-book for Teslic, but it
20 did appear in the prosecutor's log-book. This is precisely why the crime
21 log-books of both the police and the prosecutor's office were analysed to
22 deliver a complete and accurate picture to the Trial Chamber.
23 Finally, in Banja Luka the log-books reveal that the police filed
24 18 criminal reports for serious crimes by Serb perpetrates against
25 non-Serb victims during the indictment period. As several of these
1 criminal reports pertain to the same perpetrators for related number
2 crimes, the number is, in fact, closer to 14 as we discuss in our final
4 Compared to the other 19 municipalities, 14 criminal cases may
5 seem significant. However, this number pales in comparison to the 4.660
6 reports filed by the police in Banja Luka in 1992, nor does it adequately
7 account for the large number of non-Serbs who were murdered, robbed and
8 exposed to other acts of violence, often by criminals with direct links
9 to the Serb police and politicians. As described by a number of
10 Banja Luka witnesses as well as the adjudicated facts.
11 For example, the unchallenged adjudicated fact, 1067 states that
12 over 31 non-Serbs were killed by Serb forces in Banja Luka municipality
13 between March and October of 1992. However, the police in Banja Luka
14 reported that for the expanded period of the 1st of January through 20th
15 of December based upon the combined work of the SJB, the CSB and the
16 military police, only three criminal cases were filed against Serb
17 perpetrators for the killing of only eight non-Serbs. This could be
18 found in 1D233. According to this report, five of these eight non-Serb
19 victims were killed by the Sugic brothers and two were killed by
20 Zeljko Ceko. The two murders by Ceko occurred on the
21 5th of December, 1992, and so are, in addition to those, covered by
22 adjudicated fact 1067. Soon after their initial arrest the Sugic
23 brothers and Ceko were released from detention, allowed to return to the
24 VRS units and were not prosecuted for these murders during the conflict.
25 As evidenced by Ms. Gacinovic's report, the figures I have
1 provided for the 20 charged municipalities did not significantly improve
2 between 1993 and 1995. In other words, it was not just a matter of the
3 police needing time to investigate the crimes comitted against non-Serbs
4 in 1992. Throughout the conflict, these crimes were simply disregarded.
5 Vasic and Gacinovic's data is consistent not only with each other
6 but also with the evidence of former judges, prosecutors and SJB chiefs
7 who testified before this Chamber, as well as echoed in the evidence of
8 the crime-base witnesses.
9 For example, ST-79 testified that the Visegrad police did not
10 interfere in any way with the criminal activities of paramilitaries.
11 And, as a result:
12 "There was no trust whatsoever either in the police or the army.
13 To me, it all seemed that these White Eagles who were doing this
14 throughout the town, and even while the Uzice Corps was there, it
15 appeared to me that they were under their" --
16 MR. ZECEVIC: Sorry. It appears that the accused and the rest of
17 the -- the -- the lawyers that does not have the Serbian translation.
18 I'm sorry.
19 Sorry to interrupt but ...
20 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
21 MR. OLMSTED: Is it working now? They're indicating that they
22 can hear now.
23 JUDGE HALL: And, Mr. Olmsted, you may wish to slow down, please.
24 MR. OLMSTED: I will slow down. Thank you.
25 And I'll just go back and finish the quote of ST-79:
1 "To me, it all seemed that these White Eagles who were doing this
2 throughout the town, and even while the Uzice Corps was there, it
3 appeared to me that they were under their protection."
4 That's transcript page 2247.
5 This statistical information does not speak by itself. Rather,
6 it is the evidence of the widespread crimes committed against the
7 non-Serb population that gives this data articulation, including the
8 1.735 non-Serb victims of kill incidents charged in the indictment which
9 represents only a fraction of the total number of non-Serb killings that
10 occurred in the charged municipalities and the many more instances of
11 beatings, rapes, robberies and other violent crimes committed against the
12 non-Serb population.
13 This is the bigger picture, Your Honours in which the police
14 failure to investigate and report crimes must be assessed. What is clear
15 to us from viewing this data 20 years later must have been evident to the
16 accused in 1992 through the daily reports they received and their other
17 sources of information about the work of their subordinates and could
18 only have been terrifyingly obvious to the non-Serb population living
19 amidst these uninvestigated and undeterred crimes.
20 In response to this evidence, the Defence rely on three
22 First, that the prosecutor's offices and judiciary were not
23 functioning in 1992.
24 Second, that the SJBs lacked the resources to investigate crimes.
25 And, third, that the military had sole jurisdiction to
1 investigate the crimes at issue in this case.
2 None of these arguments is supported by credible evidence.
3 The prosecutor's offices and courts were functioning in 1992.
4 Many without interruption caused by the outbreak of the conflict.
5 For instance, the entries in prosecutor's office log-books for
6 Zvornik, Teslic, Sanski Most, Pale, Bijeljina, and Banja Luka, which also
7 covered Donji Vakuf and Skender Vakuf, showed that these prosecutor's
8 offices were functioning continuously from early April -- early
9 April 1992 onwards.
10 Ms. Gacinovic provided evidence that after the conflict began,
11 she continued to perform her role as deputy prosecutor in Trebinje which
12 had jurisdiction over Bileca until she was appointed Trebinje district
13 prosecutor in August.
14 In Vlasenica, the prosecutor's office log-book shows that the
15 office was open for business from 14 May onwards.
16 With few exceptions, the judicial process was, at most, only
17 briefly disrupted in the municipalities when the Serb authorities fired
18 the non-Serb prosecutors and judges from their positions. Serbs who
19 already held these positions remained in them and the non-Serbs who had
20 left were quickly replaced by other Serbs.
21 For example, at a meeting in May, in Sanski Most, the non-Serb
22 prosecutor and the non-Serb president of the court were dismissed by the
23 Sanski Most SDS leadership and at the same meeting replaced by Serbs.
24 The former non-Serb judge and prosecutor were subsequently arrested and
25 sent to Manjaca camp.
1 The formal appointments of Serb judges and prosecutors by the RS
2 government lagged behind the unofficial appointments at the municipal
3 level. For example, former Visegrad prosecutor, Drasko, began performing
4 the duties of prosecutor at the beginning of September even though his
5 formal appointment did not arrive until October. Nevertheless, the
6 evidence shows that between May and October, the RS government issued
7 appointments to 276 judges and 80 prosecutors. This can be found
9 The Chamber has heard the evidence from a number of prosecutors
10 and judges. And each indicated that not only were their offices
11 functioning despite the difficult conditions but they were willing and
12 able to accept and process any criminal reports filed by the police.
13 Even if the Trial Chamber were to accept the Defence suggestion
14 that the judiciary was slow to begin functioning, one would except to see
15 a flood of criminal reports filed by -- filed against Serb perpetrators
16 for serious crimes against non-Serbs once these institutions began to
17 function. This did not occur. In fact, the problem was not that the
18 judicial was dysfunction but rather that the police were simply not
19 filing criminal reports.
20 If we can look at the next slide. As Mandic wrote in his
21 November 1992 report on activities of the RS Ministry of Justice:
22 "We are faced with the fact that a large number of criminal acts
23 have been carried out in Republika Srpska. Official organs have filed a
24 small number of criminal reports to the judicial organs. That is why
25 there is a distinct lack of co-operation between the prosecution organs
1 and the Ministry of Interior."
2 In his report on the crime situation in the area of Teslic
3 municipality from June to September 1992, Teslic prosecutor, Peric,
4 expressed a similar view, writing:
5 "Recorded crime is a fraction of the real crime existing in
6 society today. Most criminal acts remain undiscovered, and many crimes
7 are tolerated by the authorities for various reasons. The prosecutor's
8 office has knowledge of the day-to-day looting of properties, houses and
9 business premises being set on fire and destroyed, armed robbery and
10 murder being committed for base motives, et cetera."
11 He then states:
12 "There is no criminal Prosecution for most of these acts."
13 He further reporter:
14 "The destruction of religious buildings is a war crime against
15 civilians because of the way and circumstances in which it was
16 perpetrated. The Serbian people will carry a heavy burden of historical
17 responsibility until the perpetrators of these and similar criminal acts
18 are brought to justice."
19 Peric then demands:
20 "The state and its law enforcement organs must urgently answer
21 the following question: What are the causes of these serious crimes and
22 why are they not being disclosed? An answer to this question should be
23 sought from the command of the Teslic Serbian Brigade and the interior
24 ministry organs."
25 Your Honours, this question was left unanswered until this
2 Mandic and Peric's reports emphasise the essential role of the
3 police in the criminal justice system. Until the police identified the
4 perpetrators of a crime and filed a criminal report against the known
5 perpetrators supported by sufficient evidence, the prosecutors and courts
6 could not initiate criminal proceedings.
7 The prosecutor witnesses who testified during the trial confirmed
8 this was the procedure that existed both prior to and during the
9 conflict. It is also clear from the document evidence.
10 For example, upon receiving the unknown perpetrator criminal
11 report filed by Zupljanin regarding the killing of non-Serb detainees
12 outside Manjaca camp in early August, Deputy Prosecutor Kovaci sent the
13 report immediately back with the request that the CSB conduct a complete
14 criminal investigation into this case in order to find perpetrators,
15 witnesses, and other individuals, and determine other circumstances
16 related to the commission of this crime. After the perpetrators are
17 found, they must be arrested.
18 As Kovacevic testified, he was merely reminding the police of
19 their independent duty to investigate and report such crimes before he
20 could take any action with regard to the case. As the evidence showed,
21 the police never complied with this request to complete the investigation
22 and, as a result, the police perpetrators in this case were never
24 The police were also aware that it was their duty to identify
25 perpetrators. For example, at the end of Exhibit 1D360, an unknown
1 perpetrator criminal report, CSB Doboj chief, Bjelosevic, informed the
2 prosecutor's office:
3 "Operative action and measures taken so far have not resulted in
4 establishing the identity of the perpetrator or perpetrators. If found,
5 we will send you a separate report."
6 Note that the only document Bjelosevic attached to this report
7 was the court's on-site investigation report. As shown by other examples
8 of unknown perpetrator criminal reports in evidence, the police typically
9 conducted scant, if any, investigation, before filing one of these
10 reports. The filing of a criminal report against an unknown perpetrator,
11 therefore, is -- really served only an administrative purpose, permitting
12 the police log-books to reflect that a criminal report was filed with the
13 prosecutor's office even though the police had not completed their duties
14 to investigate the crime.
15 And, yet, after filing one of these unknown perpetrator reports,
16 the police typically took no further action to solve the case.
17 Ms. Gacinovic testified that her analysis of the unknown perpetrator
18 reports filed with the prosecutor's office for serious crimes against
19 non-Serbs in 1992 showed that, generally, the crimes remained
20 uninvestigated and unsolved by the police throughout the conflict.
21 In the rare instances when the police filed a criminal report
22 against the Serb perpetrator for crimes against non-Serbs, the Defence
23 rightly criticise the prosecutors and courts for failing to indict, try
24 and conflict the perpetrators. The hands of the prosecutors and the
25 courts were by no means clean in this matter.
1 For example, of the 18 criminal reports the police filed in
2 Banja Luka for serious crimes committed by Serbs against non-Serbs, most
3 of the perpetrators were never prosecuted or convicted. The perpetrators
4 charged in at least seven of these reports were released soon after their
5 initial arrest, including Branko Palackovic, Goran Davidovic,
6 Radomir Boskan and the Sugic brothers.
7 As detention in each of these cases was mandatory, the accused
8 had the duty, given their high level positions within the criminal
9 justice system, not to remain idle while these perpetrators were unlawful
10 released. In fact in one of the cases against Radomir Boskan and two
11 other members of the CSB Banja Luka special police detachment, Zupljanin
12 facilitated the perpetrator's release sending a clear message that the
13 police would not stand in the way of a policy of releasing Serb
14 perpetrators of crimes against non-Serbs.
15 THE INTERPRETER: Would the speaker please slow down for the
16 benefit of the interpreters. Thank you.
17 MR. OLMSTED: The accused assert that by failing to act they were
18 just following the rules of procedure regarding detention which gave the
19 judiciary the power to extend detention or release suspects after the
20 initial three-day period. However, their strict adherence to these
21 procedures in the case of Serb perpetrators, such as Palackovic, and the
22 Mice Group contrasted with their attitude toward the indefinite
23 imprisonment of thousands of innocent non-Serbs in police-operated
24 detention facilities throughout the RS.
25 The Defence's second argument, that the police were unable to
1 investigate serious crimes in 1992, is contradicted by the RS MUP's own
2 year-end reports. For example, CSB Banja Luka's year-end report shows
3 that the police in the ARK filed criminal reports for 537 serious
4 criminal offences, using the definition of Gacinovic and Vasic, against
5 364 perpetrators between April and December 1992. That's found in P624.
6 CSB Sarajevo reported that, for the same period, it filed 118
7 criminal reports for serious crimes committed by 241 perpetrators. This
8 is found in P740.
9 The RS MUP year-end report indicated that for April through
10 December period, the police filed 494 cases for crimes against life and
12 Incidentally, the RS MUP report also indicates that the police
13 "helped" the military by arresting 9.469 army deserters and persons
14 avoiding military service. This assistance illustrates that the police
15 could arrest fugitives when they put their minds and their resources to
17 When these numbers that I have just provided are compared to the
18 findings of Vasic and Gacinovic, that the police filed only 38 criminal
19 reports of serious crimes committed by Serbs against non-Serbs during the
20 indictment period, they place in vivid relief the failure of the police
21 to investigate and report crimes committed against the non-Serb
23 Finally, the Defence justify the police failure to investigate
24 and report crimes against the non-Serb population by arguing that these
25 crimes fell within the sole jurisdiction of the military courts. The
1 Stanisic Defence goes so far as making the assertion based on Mandic's
2 testimony that "all persons from 16 to 70 years of age were under the
3 authority of the military judiciary." That can be found in
4 paragraph 591.
5 This notion of absolute military jurisdiction over all crimes
6 flies in the face of the overwhelming evidence in this case. It should
7 be noted that nowhere in their briefs did the Defence address the
8 evidence of former military prosecutor Jovicinac on the military court's
9 jurisdiction. They choose to ignore it completely.
10 As Mr. Jovicinac explained, the primary jurisdiction of the
11 military courts in 1992 was over crimes committed by members of the army.
12 Under Article 3 of the RS Law on the Army, members of the army were
13 limited to soldiers, military cadets, reserve soldiers once they had
14 reported to their military units for duty, and civilian employees under
15 military contract. It did not include ordinary citizens or civilians,
16 did not include police officers, and did it not include reserve soldiers
17 who had not yet joined their military units.
18 The military court's jurisdiction over civilians was limited to
19 the crimes enumerated under Article 13, paragraph 1 of the SFRY Law on
20 The military courts. These crimes related to offenses against the state
21 order, such as armed rebellion, and crimes against the army, such as
22 desertion. The military courts did not have jurisdiction over general
23 crimes committed by civilians against other civilians.
24 In fact, Article 15 of the Law on The military courts states
25 where a soldier and civilian commit a crime as co-perpetrators, the
1 civilian court had jurisdiction over both the military and civilian
2 perpetrators. This is what happened against the Mice Group in Teslic.
3 Article 16 of the Law on Military Courts restricted the jurisdiction of
4 the military courts even further. If a soldier who committed a general
5 crime left the army before an indictment was filed, the civilian courts
6 assumed jurisdiction over that former soldier.
7 The restrictions on the military court's jurisdiction over crimes
8 were practical as well. As the Defence noted, the military courts were
9 not fully functioning until July or August of 1992. And until then, it
10 was incumbent upon the civilian police and courts to investigate all
11 crimes regardless of the status of the perpetrators. Once the military
12 courts began to function their two top priorities were, according to the
13 VRS prosecutor office instructions found in Exhibit 2D107, crimes against
14 the state order and crimes against the army, towards which the military
15 courts and prosecutor's office expended considerable resources as shown
16 by their reports.
17 Their third priority was war crimes. But as we can see from the
18 contemporaneous orders issued by the VRS, such as P1098.20, and P685, as
19 well as illustrated by the cases listed in the VRS prosecutor's annual
20 report for 1992, that is, P1284.55, this priority only pertained to war
21 crimes committed by enemy combatants against Serbs.
22 Your Honours have already heard evidence regarding the work of
23 the VRS military courts in 1992, and admitted into evidence the 1 KK
24 military prosecutor's log-books for this period. This evidence is
25 revealing in three respects.
1 First of all, it shows that the military courts were not
2 exercising jurisdiction over civilians.
3 Secondly, it confirms that the civilian police were not filing
4 criminal reports against Serb perpetrators regardless of their status for
5 serious crimes comitted against non-Serbs with the military prosecutor's
6 office either.
7 And, thirdly, it shows that the military failed to prosecute Serb
8 soldiers for crimes against non-Serbs. They were acting in the same
9 manner as the civilian police.
10 With regard to war crimes, the Law on Military Courts is equally
11 clear. The military exercised jurisdiction only over such crimes
12 committed by soldiers or prisoners of war; that is, enemy combatants.
13 This has been confirmed by witnesses Jovicinac, Drasko and Gacinovic.
14 It is also confirmed by the applicable SFRY regulations on the
15 application of international law of war in armed forces. Paragraph 37 of
16 these regulations assigns military court jurisdiction. It reads:
17 "Trials of military personnel who violate the laws of war which
18 entail criminal liability fall under the jurisdiction of the Yugoslav
19 military courts. If a member of a foreign armed force, that is, an enemy
20 combatant, violates the laws of war he shall be tried by the military
22 Noticeably absent from this provision is any indication that the
23 military courts exercise jurisdiction over non-enemy civilian who
24 committed war crimes; that is because they did not.
25 Go to the next slide. That the police had jurisdiction to
1 investigate war crimes committed by civilians is also evidenced by
2 Stanisic's own instructions to his subordinates on 16 May.
3 He wrote:
4 "Measures and activities conducted to document war crimes. These
5 activities must involve collection of information and documents on war
6 crimes against the Serbs. This implies conducting an on-site
7 investigation with the entire team in all cases of crimes against the
8 Serbs, and we particularly point out that a doctor's report must not be
9 forgotten, and photo and video documentation, witness statements, and so
10 on, must be compiled pursuant to the Law on Criminal Procedure."
11 Clearly, Stanisic is instructing his police forces to investigate
12 and file criminal charges for war crimes against Serbs and not just those
13 crimes outside the RS, as the Defence have suggested. The order to
14 conduct an on-site investigation and to comply with the rules of criminal
15 procedure would otherwise make little sense.
16 Your Honours, I'm advised this is probably the best time to
18 JUDGE HALL: We return in 20 minutes.
19 --- Recess taken at 12.05 p.m.
20 --- On resuming at 12.27 p.m.
21 MR. OLMSTED: Your Honours, I want to return to the issue of war
22 crimes jurisdiction as this came up many times in the course of this
23 trial. The police jurisdiction over the investigation of war crimes
24 committed by civilians was also established by Stanisic's own witness,
25 Simo Tusevljak, who authenticated a number of criminal reports for war
1 crimes committed against Serbs that he filed with the civilian courts in
2 1992 and 1993. The Defence contend that it was the policy of the accused
3 that all war crimes should be investigated, regardless of the ethnicity
4 of the victims. As addressed comprehensively in our final brief, the
5 evidence does not support this contention. Rather, following the
6 instructions of the RS MUP leadership, the police focussed their
7 resources exclusively on investigating war crimes committed against
9 For example, although Goran Macar claimed that in August 1992 he
10 instructed his RS MUP crime inspectors to investigate all crimes
11 committed by the Yellow Wasps, including war crimes, this was clearly not
12 the case. As Mr. Hannis has discussed, Mr. Macar's testimony is subject
13 to serious questions of credibility. But telling is the list of
14 questions found in the notebook of a RS MUP crime inspector that was used
15 during the interrogations of the Yellow Wasps members. The questions are
16 limited to issues of vehicle thefts, sales of apartments, and lists of
17 unwanted Serbs. None of these questions pertained to war crimes against
18 non-Serbs. This can be found at P403.
19 Equally telling are the Official Notes from the police interviews
20 of the members of the Yellow Wasps, many of which are in evidence in this
21 case, and none of which mention war crimes committed against non-Serbs.
22 If you look at the -- yes, we have the next slide up.
23 Your Honours have already heard evidence that the military prosecutor's
24 office transferred jurisdiction over Dusan Vuckovic, the only Yellow Wasp
25 member who had at one time been in military custody, to the civilian
1 authorities after determining that he was not a member of the VRS. And,
2 yet, the police never fulfilled their duty to supplement their criminal
3 report to include crimes, any crimes, beyond the vehicle thefts which
4 were at issue in the original criminal report they filed with the
5 Bijeljina prosecutor.
6 By the way, this evidence also shows that the military did not
7 exercise jurisdiction, criminal jurisdiction, over paramilitary groups,
8 such as the Yellow Wasps, unless and until these groups were absorbed
9 into the army under Article 9 of the RS Law on the Army.
10 Contrary to the assertions in the Stanisic Defence brief, the
11 police did not hand over the members of the Yellow Wasps to the
12 authorities in Serbia because the prosecutor and the courts in Bijeljina
13 were not functioning. Your Honours have heard from former Bijeljina
14 judge, Simeunovic, who was assigned to this case and nothing in her
15 testimony even suggested that she or the prosecutor were unable to
16 proceed with the prosecution of case against the Yellow Wasps, nor did
17 the police hand over the members of the Yellow Wasps to the Serb
18 authorities. These paramilitaries were released from detention by the
19 investigative judge because, as she explained, the police failed to
20 charge them with anything more serious than vehicle thefts and she was
21 unaware of any war crimes allegations against them. Some of the
22 Yellow Wasps members returned to Zvornik; some left for Serbia; and
23 others were absorbed into the VRS Drina Corps.
24 In its year-end report, the RS MUP confirmed that it -- that its
25 interest in war crimes was limited to those committed against the Serb
1 population. It states:
2 "The focus of the operative work in CSBs and SJBs was on
3 detection, documenting and reporting members of the enemy army who had
4 committed acts of genocide against the Serbian people, torched or
5 destroyed immovable property, cultural and religious monuments and other
7 Turning to police crimes against non-Serb population. Although
8 the RS MUP stated in its year-end report that criminal reports were
9 brought against 29 RS MUP employees between April and December 1992 -
10 this can be found P625, page 27 - Mr. Vasic, utilising the police crime
11 log-books as well as his resources as head of the RS MUP police was able
12 to identify only four cases, four cases, in which police officers were
13 charged with serious crimes against non-Serbs in the indictment
14 municipalities during this period.
15 The first instance was against Radomir Boskan and the two other
16 members of the CSB Banja Luka special police detachment. These are the
17 police officers that Zupljanin played a role in their escape from
18 detention. Contrary to the assertion in the Zupljanin brief, Zupljanin
19 did not request their prosecution of Boskan and his co-perpetrators.
20 The criminal report emanated from the SJB, which, as Your Honours
21 heard, was consistently critical of this special police detachment and
22 the crimes they were committing around the municipality. It did not
23 emanate from the CSB, as it should have, nor were these police officers
24 ever prosecuted for their crimes.
25 The seconds instance was for a robbery committed by a former
1 member of the CSB Banja Luka special police detachment in October, most
2 likely while he was subordinated to the VRS.
3 The third instances was the criminal report against certain but
4 not all police members of the Mice Group in Teslic. Milan Savic, the CSB
5 Doboj deputy chief who was the police leader of the group, was never
6 charged with these crimes, because the MUP leadership deemed it was not
7 expedient to criminally charge a high-ranking police official. Those
8 officers who were charged were subsequently released from detention and
9 have yet to be prosecuted for the crimes against non-Serbs in Teslic.
10 And the fourth instance was against an SJB Prnjavor police
11 officer for the robbery of a non-Serb. Beyond these four instances,
12 there is no evidence in this case of any other police officers charged
13 with serious crimes against non-Serbs during the indictment period in the
14 20 indictment municipalities. Equally evident is to the accused's
15 failure to discipline their subordinates for crimes against non-Serbs.
16 For example, with regard to CSB Banja Luka, the Chamber heard the
17 evidence of Radomir Rodic regarding the disciplinary cases filed against
18 Serb police officers for offences committed between April and
19 December 1992 that were recorded in a CSB Banja Luka disciplinary case
20 log-book. The Chamber heard that Zupljanin terminated police officers
21 for failing to show up at work, for firing their gun at a stop sign, and
22 killing Serbs. No police officers were disciplined for crimes comitted
23 against non-Serbs.
24 Now, the Zupljanin Defence assert in their brief that Rodic
25 testified that the CSB Banja Luka disciplinary case log-book was
1 incomplete, an incomplete record of the disciplinary reports against
2 police officers. This mischaracterises his evidence. Rodic testified
3 that for some of the entries involving multiple police officers who
4 co-perpetrated the same disciplinary offence, the name of only one of the
5 police officers is listed in the log-book, followed by the notation "and
7 Equally incorrect is the Defence's -- Defence assertion that
8 disciplinary proceedings for a criminal offence could not be initiated or
9 completed if a police officer voluntarily resigned. Rodic testified that
10 in such instances disciplinary proceedings continued despite the
11 resignation and there are examples of this is in the CSB Banja Luka
12 disciplinary log-book.
13 With regard to the region covered by CSB Doboj, when Bjelosevic
14 was asked whether he called -- he recalled instituting any disciplinary
15 proceedings against his subordinates for offences related to the
16 mistreatment of non-Serbs, he was only able to recall a case against CSB
17 Doboj crime inspector Solaja. As it turned out, Bjelosevic's
18 disciplinary decision, P2347, showed that he terminated Solaja's
19 employment for the opposite reason: For assisting non-Serbs escape to
20 Belgrade using false identification cards. A disciplinary decision that
21 Stanisic upheld in December.
22 In fact, a protected witness testified that it was not uncommon
23 for Serb police officers to be disciplined for helping non-Serbs during
24 this period. I reference transcript page 3727.
25 In other regions, the Chamber has heard evidence that SJB Vogosca
1 chief Maksimovic was disciplined for TAS vehicle thefts but not for the
2 crimes that occurred under his watch at the bunker and other locations,
3 other detention facilities in Vogosca. And SJB Visegrad police officer
4 Sredoje Lukic was disciplined for releasing a Serb prisoner and not
5 reporting to work on occasions, but not for the house fire on
6 Pionirska Street or any of the other crimes that and police officer
7 Milan Lukic committed against the non-Serb population in Visegrad.
8 The Stanisic Defence contend that Stanisic lacked the authority
9 to initiate or decide in the first instance disciplinary proceedings
10 against his subordinates. This was not the case.
11 As Tomislav Kovac testified, Stanisic "was the one person who had
12 to make the decisions on both accepting people into the service and
13 dismissing them from the service." Transcript page 27076. When
14 Judge Hall asked Dragan Andan whether it was possible for the minister to
15 both initiate and decide a disciplinary case, Andan answered in the
16 affirmative. Transcript page 21780.
17 In fact, Article 115 of the RS Law on Internal Affairs gave the
18 minister the power to decide who could initiate disciplinary proceedings.
19 And Article 5 of the RS MUP war time disciplinary procedures stated that
20 a disciplinary case "may be initiated at the initiative of any worker of
21 an internal affairs organ," which must have included the minister himself
22 as well. 1D54.
23 Furthermore, there are examples where Stanisic did exercise his
24 authority to discipline his subordinates. As Mr. Hannis pointed out, he
25 dismissed SJB Bijeljina chief Andan for failing to follow proper
1 procedures regarding the use of a confiscated poker machine and he
2 dismissed SJB Bijeljina crime police chief Danilo Vukovic for drunk and
3 disorderly behaviour at a bar.
4 Your Honours, although the ultimate punishment under the police
5 disciplinary procedures termination of employment was an insufficient
6 form of punishment for any of the police crimes alleged in the
7 indictment, the failure of the accused to ensure that their subordinates
8 were disciplined for crimes against non-Serbs is relevant for at least
9 three reasons:
10 First, had they disciplined their subordinates for these crimes,
11 it would have sent a message to the police force that such crimes would
12 not be tolerated.
13 Secondly, it would have shown to the non-Serb population that the
14 RS MUP was serious about ensuring that the police protect all citizens
16 And, thirdly, the accused failure to discipline their
17 subordinates for these crimes reflected their more general disregard for
18 crimes committed against the non-Serb population.
19 I want to briefly address the Defence suggestion that Stanisic's
20 orders beginning sometime after the 11th July collegium meeting to
21 replace RS MUP personnel -- or, to place RS MUP personnel at the disposal
22 of the army was a form of disciplinary punishment.
23 First, these orders were primarily directed at augmenting the
24 army with those police officers who had outlived their usefulness to the
25 RS MUP, as Stanisic and General Mladic had agreed during the July meeting
1 that Mr. Hannis discussed. This can be seen by his -- Stanisic's
2 27 July order - that's 1D176 - in which Stanisic classified both criminal
3 and unneeded police officers as surplus persons to be sent to the army.
4 In addition, if Stanisic was serious about preventing or
5 punishing police crimes, his orders would have expressly and explicitly
6 stated that these surplus officers must be arrested, subjected to both
7 disciplinary and criminal proceedings. They do not, nor did Stanisic
8 instruct the police to inform the VRS of the criminal conduct of police
9 officers they were putting at the army's disposal. Thus, a police
10 officer who mistreated non-Serbs at Omarska or at Luka camp could have
11 very well ended up guarding non-Serb detainees at Manjaca or Batkovic.
12 All Stanisic was doing was shifting a problem from one organ to another.
13 In order to justify their inaction in punishing their
14 subordinates, both accused argue that the police committed these crimes
15 while resubordinated to the military. Ms. Korner has already addressed
16 how the evidence does not support the Defence suggestion that the police
17 were almost entirely resubordinated to the military during the indictment
18 period. But even if the Trial Chamber were to accept the Defence's
19 extreme interpretation of resubordination, this did not diminish the
20 accused's authority or duty to prevent and punish their police
21 subordinates. The Defence are misguided in their assumption that the
22 principle of unity of command means that a resubordinated police officer
23 cannot have two superiors. As a matter of law, a subordinate can be
24 under the command of more than one superior, and each superior can be
25 held responsible for the subordinate's crimes. I direct the
1 Trial Chamber's attention to the Strugar Trial Chamber Judgement
2 paragraph 367.
3 Moreover, there is nothing novel about RS MUP commanders
4 retaining control over MUP force, even when such forces have been
5 temporarily resubordinated into the army.
6 In the Popovic case, the Trial Chamber found that the RS MUP
7 forces resubordinated to the VRS still retained their internal chain of
8 command, and as a result held Ljubomir Borovcanin, deputy commander of
9 the RS MUP special police brigade, had effective control over such
10 resubordinated MUP units. I direct the Trial Chamber's attention to
11 paragraphs 3, 184, 1567 to 1569.
12 Your Honours, while this is not controlling authority, the
13 Prosecution submits it is highly persuasive. Now, while the VRS may have
14 assumed responsibility for assigning combat tasks to resubordinated
15 police officers during a particular combat operation, the RS MUP --
16 JUDGE HALL: Sorry to interrupt you, Mr. Olmsted.
17 I see that you have cited Strugar and Popovic which you admit may
18 be persuasive to us in our findings, but your own proposition that, as a
19 matter of law, a subordinate can be under the command of more than one
20 superior, and each superior can be held responsible for the subordinate's
21 crimes, is there anything in the -- either the evidence or the
22 representations before this Tribunal to which you could refer us to
23 support your assertion?
24 [Prosecution counsel confer]
25 [Trial Chamber confers]
1 MR. OLMSTED: I mean, Your Honours, the position of the
2 Prosecution is that the police maintained really singleness of command
3 over the MUP forces except for the purposes of operations on the front
5 An so -- the evidence -- we shall -- we suggest the evidence
6 reflects that. What I'm simply proposing is that there is jurisprudence
7 before this Tribunal that it makes no difference because you can have
8 parallel chains of commands and there is quite a bit of jurisprudence on
9 that issue.
10 To go into more detail, we would ask that we be given a few
11 minutes, perhaps tomorrow, to address this and point the Trial Chamber to
12 the places where we deal with it in our final brief as well as in the
14 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, I'm sorry to interrupt Mr. Olmsted,
15 but I was going to ask Your Honours at the end of today, in the light of
16 what Mr. Zecevic raised dated in respect to Mr. Hannis's address on the
17 Stanisic interview that Your Honour -- even though Your Honours have
18 ruled that we can't do this in writing, Your Honours, we would say that,
19 of course, we filed our briefs at the same time. We didn't know what the
20 Defence were going to say about the law. In the light of the this and
21 the intervention to Mr. Hannis's address, we would ask that on Friday,
22 Your Honours grant some time to deal with matters of law.
23 Can I just put it that way at this stage.
24 JUDGE HALL: It may be appear that that may be a sensible course
25 to take.
1 MR. OLMSTED: Thank you, Your Honours.
2 The RS MUP retained ultimate command over their police officers
3 and this is shown by the evidence of -- that both Stanisic and Zupljanin
4 had the power to organise their subordinates into war units and provide
5 them with training and equipment, the power to decide whether and when to
6 resubordinate police units to the VRS, the power to participate in the
7 command of combat operations of these war units, as Zupljanin did in
8 Orasje in November of 1992, and the power to withdrew the units from the
9 front lines when they deemed it necessary as Ms. Korner discussed during
10 her statement.
11 Indeed Stanisic's 15 May order establishing war units instructed
12 that all such units be under the direct command of an RS MUP commander,
13 and he also created a staff headed by himself to oversee these units.
14 These measures were clearly taken to maintain RS MUP control over any
15 police units engaging in combat activities with the VRS.
16 The accused also retained the authority to discipline and
17 criminally charge police officers for crimes committed while
18 resubordinated. With regard to disciplinary measures, as the ultimate
19 punishment was termination, this punishment logically could only have
20 been meted out by the RS MUP. Even in 1994, when the RS law was amended
21 to place the RS MUP within the armed forces during a war or imminent
22 threat of war, the law explicitly preserved for the RS MUP the power to
23 discipline its police officers. That's L317.
24 With regard to criminal investigations, as Mr. Jovicinac
25 explained, the resubordinated police officer did not fall within the
1 definition of military personnel under the Law of the army. And,
2 therefore, they were not subject to military court jurisdiction for
3 general crimes or for that matter, war crimes. This made sense. A
4 police officer was typically resubordinated for only a short period of
5 time, one, two, maybe three weeks. And Article 16 of the SFRY Law on the
6 Military Courts it would have been unlikely that an indictment could be
7 filed against him before he returned to his regular police duties.
8 Moreover, as Mr. Jovicinac suggested, the prosecution of police
9 crimes was a delicate issue as RS MUP had a separate chain of command.
10 The VRS was extremely hesitant to assume jurisdiction over police crimes,
11 leaving it to the police hierarchy to address them. This is precisely
12 why General Talic sent a request to CSB Banja Luka to take action against
13 police deserters in October of 1992. That's 1D411.
14 If we can look at -- yes, we have the slide on the screen. In
15 fact, this Chamber has in evidence an example of Zupljanin exercising
16 disciplinary and criminal jurisdiction over police officers for crimes
17 committed while resubordinated. In a 18 October dispatch regarding
18 police who on 17 October refused to obey VRS orders while resubordinated,
19 Zupljanin ordered that:
20 "All workers who refused to obey orders were to be suspended and
21 criminal measures filed against them."
22 If we can look at the next slide. To show that these were not
23 just hollow words, if we look at the CSB Banja Luka disciplinary case
24 log-book, we see an entry against Ljubisa Nikolic and others from
25 SJB Gradiska for a violation committed on 17 October, 1992, and the
1 result was termination of employment.
2 Finally, I want to address the Defence contention that certain of
3 the more notorious SJB chiefs, such as Todorovic, Drljaca and Koroman
4 were untouchable, immune to any attempts by the accused to discipline,
5 remove or criminally investigate them.
6 The Defence rely primarily on two arguments:
7 First, they contend that because the Crisis Staffs appointed
8 these individuals SJB chief, the accused were powerless to discipline
9 them. Mr. Hannis addressed this issue. He discussed Variant A and B
10 instructions. And, in fact, they called for in the interim period when a
11 municipality was taken over for the municipal authorities to appoint SJB
12 chiefs temporarily until the RS MUP was in a position to take over the
13 duty of appointing police in those particular municipalities, not all of
14 them but some of them.
15 Stanisic was aware of this, and that is why on 25 April he issued
16 a decision in which he ordered CSB chiefs to obtain preceding agreement
17 of the Ministry of Interior before distribution of employees onto next
18 jobs and assignments.
19 Your Honour, the operative word being "next."
20 To avoid ambiguity, he clarified under item 4:
21 "The decisions which deal with taking over the distribution of
22 the employees within the MUP (Ministry of Interior) of the Serbian
23 Republic BH and were issued before issuing this decision have all legal
24 effects on persons named."
25 In other words, Stanisic was ratifying the prior appointments of
1 SJB chiefs and other members of the police leadership. If, as the
2 Stanisic Defence assert, Todorovic was appointed by the Bosanski Samac
3 Crisis Staff on 28 March and if Koroman was appointed before 1 April by
4 the BiH MUP, then Stanisic's 25 April order effectively confirmed those
6 With regard to Drljaca, the accused ratified his appointment on
7 30 July 1992, applying it retroactively to 29 April; that is, the day
8 before the take-over, the Serb take-over, of Prijedor.
9 Contrary to the assertion by the Stanisic Defence, Zupljanin's
10 mention in the written decision that this appointment was made with prior
11 approval of Stanisic was not just standard language. We can see this by
12 comparing Drljaca's appointment with that of Dusan Jankovic as commander
13 of SJB Prijedor. Under Stanisic's 25 April order, both positions, both
14 appointments required the formal approval of the RS MUP but we can see
15 that while Drljaca's appointment mentions the prior approval of the
16 minister, Jankovic appointment does not.
17 Your Honours, there are examples in evidence where the RS MUP
18 removed SJB chiefs who were initially appointed by the municipal
19 authorities. Mr. Hannis has already mentioned Marinko Vasilic who --
20 there is no contention that he was appointed by the Zvornik Crisis Staff.
21 However Stanisic had no problem removing him in October or November 1992
22 for failing to report to the RS MUP. And while the Prosecution maintains
23 that Boro Maksimovic, chief of SJB Vogosca, was ap pointed by Stanisic,
24 the Defence contend that the Crisis Staff appointed him. If this is the
25 case, this is yet another example where the RS MUP was able to remove a
1 SJB chief appointed by municipal authorities.
2 The second argument raised by the Defence is that it would have
3 been dangerous for the accused to remove these SJB chiefs from their
4 positions in 1992 through the use of force or other means. This raises a
5 question, Your Honours: Dangerous to whom? If the Defence are
6 suggesting it would have been dangerous to the accused or their police
7 subordinates, the RS Law on Internal Affairs required them to put the
8 safety of citizens before their own. And, indeed, the police did not
9 hesitate putting their lives on the line when it came to the issue of
10 vehicle thefts.
11 If the Defence are suggesting that the safety of the civilian
12 population would have been placed at risk, then they are ignoring the
13 evidence that the lies of the non-Serb population were already in grave
14 danger and remained so, so long as these SJB chiefs remained in their
16 While it is easy to -- while it is easy to pass the blame to
17 these SJB chiefs, particularly in the case of Todorovic and Drljaca --
18 THE INTERPRETER: Would the speaker please slow down for the sake
19 of interpreters.
20 MR. OLMSTED: -- who are no longer alive to provide evidence to
21 the contrary, the fact is that these SJB chiefs were kept in their
22 positions because they were effective and essential participants in the
23 joint criminal enterprise. Recall that Zupljanin was part of the ARK
24 delegation that visited Omarska and other detention facilities in
25 Prijedor in July. Immediately after that visit, Brdjanin announced to
1 the media on behalf of the delegation, that Prijedor is an example of a
2 job well done. P1378.
3 In an interview before assuming his new position as RS MUP
4 Assistant Minister in 1993 Drljaca showed no signs that he placed himself
5 above his superiors or the Law on Internal Affairs. He stated:
6 "If something has not been done well, then I am to be replaced,
7 not them," referring to his subordinates "because they were carrying out
8 my orders, and the orders of Banja Luka CSB ... and the MUP minister."
9 Contrary to the assertion by the Zupljanin Defence, Drljaca was
10 not removed by the Prijedor Crisis Staff; rather, Drljaca stated during
11 his interview that he urged the RS MUP minister to replace him in order
12 to allow the dust to settle.
13 Stanisic's actions and inaction during his second term as RS MUP
14 minister in 1994 reflect his state of mind in 1992 with regard to these
15 SJB chiefs. He appointed Drljaca chief of CJB Prijedor in April 1994.
16 He appointed Koroman chief of CSB Sarajevo police tasks and duties in
17 January 1994 and chief inspector of RS MUP police special operations in
18 May 1994, and as for Todorovic, he remained in his position as SJB
19 Bosanski Samac chief throughout Stanisic's second term as minister.
20 Your Honours it is not that the accused were unsuccessful in
21 their efforts to remove the SJB chiefs from their positions or to punish
22 them for their crimes. It is that they took no actions to do so, but,
23 instead, chose to praise and promote them.
24 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, in order that the general public
25 doesn't think that the Office of the Prosecutor is entirely staffed by
1 white male North Americans, I'm going to conclude what the Office of the
2 Prosecutor wants to say in this case.
3 And, Your Honours, I want to do so, please, by --
4 JUDGE HALL: And I would remind you that you have 37 minutes.
5 MS. KORNER: And I am well aware of that, Your Honour. We have
6 been timing ourselves very careful and checking with the Court.
7 Your Honours, we want to look, in conclusion, in a little deal at
8 one of the major and most notorious massacres that took part in this --
9 in 1992 and which is one of the crimes charged in this indictment, and
10 that is that of Koricanske Stijene.
11 Your Honour, because, really, what happened there on the 21st of
12 August, 1992, and thereafter encapsulates all the themes we say that we
13 have attempted to address throughout the course of the last day and a
14 half: The unwarranted attacks on non-Serb areas; the rounding of unarmed
15 civilians by a mixture of police and military personnel; their
16 incarceration in a detention facility; the loading onto buses of
17 prisoners to take them out of Serb-controlled, Serb-held areas; the
18 whole-scale killing of those being transported; and the subsequent,
19 deliberate, flagrant omission by both of the accused in this case to do
20 anything about the known killers or discipline the officer who was direct
21 in charge of them.
22 Your Honours, very few people, very few men, survived the
23 killing. One of them was ST-65 from whom Your Honours heard, if only
24 briefly, but his testimony in a previous case came in. He was a native
25 of the Prijedor municipality, who, on the 20th of July, was taken with
1 his father from his village by armed uniformed men, some of whom were in
2 the olive-drab-type camouflage uniforms and some in police. He was able
3 to identify a photograph of the police uniforms and he had reason to know
4 from his background, which, as he is a protected witness, I'm not going
5 to go into, what police uniforms looked like.
6 He and the rest of his village in response to the disarmament
7 order had given up all of their weapons and uniforms some time before he
8 was taken. And he and his father and the other men, not only from his
9 village but from elsewhere, this was part of the attack on the Brdo area
10 of Prijedor, was taken to Trnopolje.
11 One month later, buses arrived and the prisoners were told to
12 board them. They were driven from Trnopolje to the cross roads where
13 Banja Luka and Kozarac, where, effectively, the roads there meet, and
14 there they linked up with other buses. The convoy then set off towards
15 Travnik. The escort, and there is no dispute about this at all,
16 Your Honours, was the Prijedor or part of the
17 Prijedor Intervention Platoon. Whilst they were on the buses, the
18 prisoners were robbed of their valuables and money that they had left.
19 Yet another facet of the persecutory activities of the RS MUP during this
21 Once they reached the area of Koricanske Stijene, the men were
22 ordered out of the bus, and in military fashion, two by two, were ordered
23 towards the edge of the abyss and ordered to kneel down there.
24 Can we have a look for a moment - I know Your Honours have been
25 there - just to remind yourself of the view that these men must have had
1 as they looked down on the road over the abyss. The marking, of course,
2 were made by one of the witnesses.
3 This is how ST-65 described what had happened to him, not in this
4 trial, but in the previous trial, and the transcript is P1769-01 at
5 page 6905:
6 "When we knelt down, we could see this enormous abyss below us
7 and then I could hear the person saying, person behind me, one of the
8 Intervention Platoon, 'Here we exchange dead for the dead and living for
9 the living' ... that's when the shooting started from fire-arms. I saw
10 that people were starting falling down into the abyss and then my father
11 pushed me there in the precipice."
12 He fell, became unconscious and found himself, when he woke from
13 the -- when he regained consciousness, with a broken ankle. Shortly
14 thereafter, whilst he was still there, men came down, he said, and were
15 shooting survivors in the head. He does not know why or how he survived.
16 Eventually he managed to crawl to an inhabited area. He was found there
17 by member of the military. He was taken to Skender Vakuf and from there
18 to Banja Luka hospital.
19 On the way, a statement was taken from him, and he said
20 tape-recorded. He was able to recognise some of the Intervention Platoon
21 who were involved in the massacre, a massacre of approximately 200 men,
22 including the witness's father.
23 Whilst he was in hospital, in Banja Luka, he gave a further
24 statement, as did two or three of the other survivors. So, we have, in
25 hospital, witnesses, victims in Banja Luka.
1 What happened about the investigation? The killings were
2 reported in the evening of the same day, the 21st of August, to
3 Lieutenant-Colonel Peulic when he came back from a meeting at
4 headquarters. He was the officer in charge of the unit that was
5 stationed in the area. He immediately went out, although it was night,
6 inspected the area, saw the blood, and he sent a telegram, both to the
7 1st Krajina Corps and to the CSB Banja Luka. And this is the telegram
8 that he sent addressed to the 1st Krajina Corps. He talks about the
9 refugee convoy moving towards Travnik:
10 "The Prijedor and Sanski Most CSB police were escorting the
12 So clearly he had received by the evening of that date, very,
13 very accurate information:
14 "At the same time, the convoy stopped in the area of
15 Koricanske Stijene, refugees were taken out and genocide against the
16 civilians was committed by killing them in various ways and throwing them
17 into the river canyon."
18 "Numbers of police members participated in the liquidation. The
19 units an individuals from the 22nd Light Infantry Brigade had nothing to
20 do with this."
21 "And we ask the following measures be taken."
22 One of the features that we've been attempting to explain through
23 this case is that the shovelling of blame elsewhere, and here the army
24 saying, Absolutely nothing to do with us. Correctly as it turned out on
25 this occasion. This is police.
1 Zupljanin was aware of what had happened by the very next day.
2 The Defence quote -- forgive me, Your Honour, what he said to
3 Mr. Buhavac, apparently with approbation. And this is paragraph 65.
4 Mr. Buhovac was the man who died, the technician, forensic technician,
5 from Banja Luka and his statement, however OTP objections, was
6 admitted -- his interview, rather, with the OTP.
7 Paragraph 65, the Defence say this of the Zupljanin final brief:
8 "Zupljanin was also notable for his efforts in investigating
9 crimes comitted by Serbs against non-Serbs. When he heard about the
10 massacre at Koricanske Stijene, his first reaction, as recorded by
11 Branko Buhovac in an interview by the Office of the Prosecutor, was one
12 of 'horror' with him explaining to Buhovac, chief of forensics in
13 Banja Luka," forgive the expression, but I think it has to be repeated,
14 "fuck. Some jerks did something stupid."
15 Now Your Honours may think that is a thoroughly inappropriate
16 remark to have been made under any circumstances when you're being told
17 that your police have massacred 200 people. It is, however, possibly
18 explicable by the fact that this happened roughly two weeks after the
19 camps at Prijedor had been exposed to international attention by ITN and
20 other news media, and, therefore, no doubt, the Bosnian Serbs were very
21 concerned about the possibility that this might attract even more
22 unfavorable publicity.
23 According to the witnesses who attended subsequent meetings, it
24 was openly admitted the words used by at least one witness was "boasted"
25 by Drljaca that it was Prijedor police who had committed the killings.
1 The only orders given by Zupljanin at this stage were that the bodies
2 should be recovered, and we would suggest that he had at the back of his
3 mind, as I say, the international media.
4 Clearly as the scale of the massacre became clear, higher level
5 government officials began to attend meetings at Banja Luka.
6 Deputy Minister Avlijas was at one, Defence Minister Subotic at another.
7 Again, the focus was not on the arrests of the perpetrators but on the
8 recovery of the bodies.
9 On the 31st of August, Mico Stanisic who had been told, according
10 to what he said in interview to the Office of the Prosecutor, some three
11 days after what had happened issued his one and only order in respect of
12 this killing. It is P870. No attempts to pursue the matter or give
13 instructions to Assistant Minister Kovac or Macar after this order were
15 Zupljanin then waited until the 11th of September to sent this
16 order to Drljaca, and this is P1380 and it combines the two.
17 Mr. Stanisic's order issued on the 31st of August, you can see, orders a
18 full investigation in accordance with the laws and regulations of the
19 killing of 150 Muslim people in the area of Skender Vakuf:
20 "You will inform this ministry immediately about the results of
21 the investigation, and in the case that the above-mentioned allegation is
22 confirmed, you will start legal proceedings against the perpetrators."
23 Well, by that stage, everybody knew and had been discussing that
24 it was the Prijedor Intervention Platoon who had committed these murders.
25 No explanation is given or was available to us as to why that
1 order wasn't forwarded until the 11th of September.
2 Between the 11th of September and the 13th of October, Zupljanin
3 and Drljaca engaged in a correspondence over the names and whereabouts of
4 the officers who were involved. And those are set out at correspondence
5 set out in paragraph 990 of our final brief.
6 On the 8th of September, Zupljanin sent an unknown perpetrator
7 report to the Banja Luka prosecutor. That's P1567. The report makes
8 absolutely no mention of the fact that Prijedor police were involved,
9 although that was known to all, and, in particular, Zupljanin by the
10 8th of September.
11 On the 30th of September, the prosecutor's office asked the
12 police to continue investigating and to identify and arrest suspects.
13 That was it. Nothing further was done; neither by Mico Stanisic, to make
14 any further inquiries, nor by Zupljanin.
15 The matter didn't resuscitate itself, really, until 1999 when the
16 file was reopened. When Mico Stanisic returned as minister in 1994, he
17 took no action about it. His reaction to all of this, when interviewed
18 by the Office of the Prosecutor, was to blame Zupljanin. The -- two
19 accused in this case have not run a -- sometimes known in -- in the
20 common law world as a cut-throat Defence, in other words, where each
21 blames the other, they have run a Defence together. However, in -- when
22 he was first interviewed, Mico Stanisic had this to say. The first
23 reference to it is in P -- no, it's not up. P2302, at pages 2 to 3, when
24 he was being interviewed and asked questions, he said this -- the
25 context, I suppose, we ought to put in is: When he returned in 1994 he
1 had given -- been given information about war crimes and he was being
2 asked what information that he had, and he started off by saying, this at
3 is page 1, that he:
4 "... personally did not have any information about war crimes.
5 There were public rumours, particularly through the media, and
6 particularly because I was in a position here to listen to what foreign
7 and local reporters were saying."
8 At page 2, he went on himself to bring up Koricanske Stijene:
9 "In 1992, when Koricanske Stijene happened, I did whatever I
10 could in my capacity. I sent an order to inform both the military and
11 civil because I didn't know whether it was the jurisdiction of the
12 civilian or military office of the prosecutor, an order that an on-site
13 investigation should be carried out and that all measures envisaged by
14 law should be undertaken to resolve this case, to solve this case," and
15 we've seen the one and only order.
16 He goes onto give a long answer and then said this: "Certain
17 activities" -- and this is at page 3:
18 "Certain activities were conducted amongst the investigating
19 judge and the prosecutor between 1990 and late 1992, at the end of 1992.
20 But in 1993, all activities related to this case were terminated. That
21 was one of the fundamental reasons why I removed Stojan Zupljanin from
22 his position."
23 He was asked: Why you removed him from his position in 1994,
24 which we say is incorrect, in any event, "because I had left in 1992 so
25 it wasn't possible for me."
1 And then he goes onto deal with that.
2 Later, and this is at P2310, at pages 20 to 22, he said:
3 "It was of special interest for me to solve Koricanske Stijene,
4 which was what I mentioned two or three days ago. And for that reason, I
5 assigned all chiefs of centres at that time to different tasks, because I
6 was not able to exclude them."
7 He is asked what he meant by "exclude," and he said:
8 "I didn't have such authority, but I moved all the chiefs of CSBs
9 where they worked so they wouldn't represent an obstacle to the
11 And one of the themes that has come out on this case is that
12 nobody who knowingly committed crimes ever seems to have been removed.
13 They all got promoted; Drljaca being the obvious example.
14 "As soon as I had replaced Stojan Zupljanin from the position of
15 chief of centre, he went to Krajina in Croatia to become the advisor to
17 And then he went onto deal with -- he was then asked:
18 "Q. Were there any particular chiefs that you were concerned
20 "A. Stojan Zupljanin. But a commission was set up. Actually,
21 the chiefs of administration were ordered together with their teams and
22 inspectors to analyse the work of the MUP from the beginning until 1994.
23 "Q. I'm sorry. You were concerned, in particular, about
24 Zupljanin and no other CSB heads?
25 "A. Well, all -- through Zupljanin, the idea was to be a obtain
1 the information through Zupljanin why nothing was done in 1993 regarding
2 the case of Koricanske Stijene, because both then and now, I am convinced
3 there was an influence. Someone did influence the hiding of the
4 perpetrators or trying to cover for the perpetrators."
5 Now, Your Honours, we do not ask Your Honours to rely on that at
6 all. Indeed, Mr. Zupljanin wasn't present at that interview to confirm
7 or deny it. We say it's yet another example of trying to shift the
8 blame, his own responsibility, to someone else.
9 In September and October -- or, I'm sorry, in September or
10 October - I think it's October but it's not clear - Zupljanin was
11 interviewed, as was Talic, about this incident, not surprisingly once the
12 internationals got to hear of it, despite all attempts to stop them, they
13 pounced on it. Was interviewed by a reporter from "ABC Night-Line" at
15 We can start with Talic.
16 [Video-clip played]
17 "Reporter: ... General Momir Talic.
18 "Our investigation showed that no soldiers participated.
19 "Reporter: Having cleared themselves, General Talic's men turned
20 over both survivors to the police in Banja Luka. But police chief Stojan
21 Zupljanin told me:
22 "We have no living witnesses who can confirm or deny the
24 "Reporter: At least Zupljanin admits the incident occurred. He
25 says it's under investigation and he showed us files of evidence, even
1 let us watch his ballistics expert examine bullets that were found at the
2 scene. He promises:
3 "The Serbian people will see to it that all the guilty parties
4 are tried in a court of ..."
5 MS. KORNER: Yes. Well, it has been slightly chopped off,
6 but ...
7 Your Honours, that was lie after lie. There are no living
8 witnesses to Zupljanin's certain knowledge, sitting in the hospital --
9 the witness who we've spoken about was in hospital for some months and
10 eventually, because he was so negligently treated - putting it at its
11 lowest - he lost his foot, and the investigation, they don't know who it
12 is. They knew perfectly well who had done it.
13 The Intervention Platoon police who had committed the killings
14 were sent out of the way to Han Pijesak. However, within weeks they were
15 returning to Prijedor to work, to the SJB. The leader of that platoon
16 who gave the orders, a man named Miroslav Paras, was actually given an
17 award by Karadzic for his police work in 1992. And Drljaca, the man in
18 charge of the SJB who boasted about the killings, as Your Honours have
19 heard, was promoted and also given a medal in the course of some of these
21 Your Honours, in the light of what we have just gone through, we
22 suggestion that the Defence assertion that Zupljanin was notable for his
23 efforts in investigating crimes committed by Serbs against non-Serbs,
24 with specific reference to this crime, doesn't even begin to get off the
1 In conclusion, Your Honour, the Stanisic Defence, at
2 paragraph 20, invited you to conclude that the Mico Stanisic of 20 years
3 ago is the same person that the Trial Chamber has been observing during
4 the Trial. That's the word used. We suggest that's not a helpful
5 observation. Because, in effect, it's inviting you to say that because
6 there are no outbursts from the dock, or anything like that, if is, as is
7 said earlier in that paragraph, you are to conclude he was not capable of
8 committing the crimes for which he is charged.
9 Apart from how that is supposed to reflect on his co-accused, we
10 suggest, is obviously not the proper way of looking at the matter.
11 Along the same lines, the final brief for Stojan Zupljanin prays
12 in aid his consistent and sincere expressions of sympathy for those who
13 suffered, adding:
14 "It is notable that such behaviour is not a regular practice
15 before this Tribunal."
16 Leaving aside that this Trial Chamber has no idea what is regular
17 practice in other courts or what's happened in other trials, nor, indeed,
18 have any way of gauging how sincere those expressions were, again, we say
19 it is not a proper way of asking the Trial Chamber to deal with the case.
20 We submit that you have to look at the evidence of what the
21 accused did and said during and after the relevant period. An objective
22 look at that evidence, we submit, will show that the two accused were
23 fully committed to and did everything in their power to carry out the
24 objectives of the joint criminal enterprise, in the full knowledge that
25 it would involve the commission of the crimes alleged.
1 Your Honour, the joint criminal enterprise could not have been
2 put into effect without their commitment, their personal commitment, and
3 the commitment of the forces that were under their command. I can do no
4 better than repeat the words of Mr. Olmsted: "During periods of ethnic
5 conflict, the police role in protecting citizens, particularly those
6 persecuted, is vital."
7 In this case, we say, on the evidence that Your Honours have
8 heard, they did the very opposite of what their duty should have been,
9 and they joined in the persecution, the killings, and the like. Not, of
10 course, in their personal capacity; but, if anything, their role was more
11 important, because they were the ones who gave the orders and set the
12 standards. And it's for those reasons that we say, and have said in our
13 brief, that the proper sentence that they should receive, each of them,
14 is one of life imprisonment.
15 JUDGE HALL: Thank you, Ms. Korner.
16 Mr. Zecevic, can you usefully make use of the 15 minutes - well,
17 13 minutes - remaining today?
18 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes, Your Honours. I have a few technical issues
19 which I can deal with.
20 JUDGE HALL: Yes. Please proceed.
21 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you.
22 [Interpretation] Your Honours, in our closing arguments, we will
23 be addressing the final brief of the Prosecution, their closing
24 arguments, and we'll give an overview of our final brief and our
25 positions in respect of Mr. Stanisic's criminal responsibility.
1 Before I begin, I have several information [as interpreted] to
2 share of technical nature.
3 For the sake of the transcript, let me say that we identified an
4 error in our final brief at page 247, paragraph 683, under Roman V,
5 where, instead of number 675, number 677 should read.
6 Yesterday at page 6 of the transcript, Ms. Korner referred to
7 paragraph 53 of our final brief, specifically the first sentence of the
8 paragraph which lacks a reference. In fact, it is true that the
9 reference contained in footnote 90 does not relate to the statement in
10 the paragraph. Ms. Korner is right, and we are grateful to her for
11 drawing our attention to it. It's a technical error. In fact, the
12 reference to this statement was testimony by Witness Mandic at T --
13 transcript page 9626 to 9634, and it was listed in the next footnote,
14 footnote 91, which accompanies paragraph number 54.
15 I do apologise for these errors, which were the result of the
16 fact that we had to shorten our submissions to meet the word limit.
17 Likewise, at page 7 of yesterday's transcript, Ms. Korner
18 referred to paragraph 99 of our brief, which, according to her, related
19 to 1D116. It was stated that the conclusion made in that sentence did
20 not follow from the document referenced. However, the reference which
21 underlies the conclusion is the comment made by Witness Vlaski in
22 relation to 1D116, and the correct reference for that is contained in
23 footnote 161.
24 Your Honours, before I proceed with our closing arguments, I
25 would like to present to the Trial Chamber our position with respect to
1 what Mr. Hannis had to say at page 20 of today's transcript. However, in
2 view of what the guidance has been by the Trial Chamber in response to
3 Ms. Korner's question a moment ago, should I perhaps leave it for a later
4 time? For Friday?
5 JUDGE HALL: Well, we haven't fully decided how we're going to
6 deal with that. So if it's convenient, you can deal with it now.
7 MR. ZECEVIC: It is, Your Honours. Thank you very much.
8 [Interpretation] Your Honours, in presenting arguments, at
9 page 20, Mr. Hannis made a comment about the inferences that the Trial
10 Chamber should draw or the elements that it should take into
11 consideration, in view of the fact that the accused in this case did not
12 testify. I rose to object, and I apologise for that again. I'm not in
13 the habit of interrupting anyone's closing submissions, but I felt that I
14 needed to do so. At any rate, I will present our submissions on this
15 issue briefly.
16 In the course of this trial, I was able to identify three
17 references for our position and Article 21, para (4)(g) -- or Rule 21,
18 para (4)(g) of our Statute. I also have some of the ICTY jurisprudence
19 that I will list here and comment on briefly. In view of the fact that
20 they are in English, I will read them out in the original.
21 [In English] Perisic Trial Judgement:
22 "Under specific evidentiary consideration, (A), statements of the
23 accused ..." it's paragraph 35: Article 21(4)(g) of the Statute provides
24 that an accused shall not be compelled to testimony against himself. In
25 the present case, the accused elected not to give evidence during the
1 trial. In accordance with the existing jurisprudence of this Tribunal,
2 the Trial Chamber, in the determination of his guilt or innocence, has
3 not drawn any inference from his silence."
4 The Trial Chamber here, in footnote 51, cites the relevant -- the
5 relevant jurisprudence.
6 Second is Popovic Trial Judgement, against under specific
7 evidentiary considerations, paragraph 17:
8 "Article 21(4)(g) of the Statute provides that an accused shall
9 not be compelled to testify. No adverse inferences were drawn against
10 the accused who exercised their right to remain silent."
11 And, finally, Milutinovic Trial Judgement, paragraph 41:
12 "Evidence of accused. Of the six co-accused, only Lazarevic
13 elected to give evidence during the trial. In accordance with Article 21
14 (4)(g) of the Statute the Chamber has drawn no adverse findings from the
15 other accused's decision not to give evidence."
16 [Interpretation] Your Honour, our position is that it is
17 absolutely unacceptable to - before this Tribunal, in view of the
18 provisions of the Statute and clear jurisprudence - discuss this issue at
19 all, since various Trial Chambers and the Appeals Chamber discussed the
20 ICTY law -- case law plentifully and in view of the rights guaranteed by
21 the Statute for the accused appearing before the Tribunal.
22 Your Honours, I would like to move onto our closing arguments,
23 and with your leave, I should like to do so tomorrow.
24 JUDGE HALL: On this point that you have just made, Mr. Zecevic,
25 the question I'm asked -- you maybe thought to be unfair in the sense
1 that I didn't challenge Mr. Hannis with the reservation that I'm now
2 about to articulate when he made his proposition. But what I understood
3 him to be saying was not that he was inviting the Chamber to draw adverse
4 inferences against the accused in their failure to give evidence; and, as
5 you say, there is adequate jurisprudence in support of that. But he was
6 inviting a contrast between the fact of this choice and the
7 representations which the accused would have given in their -- in their
8 interviews at an earlier stage in these proceedings by the OTP. And I
9 confess that the reason why I didn't ask Mr. Hannis about that is because
10 I'm not clear myself as to what the evidential value of those earlier
11 interviews is.
12 MR. ZECEVIC: Well, Your Honours, I will try to explain as much
13 as I can.
14 The point of the matter, Your Honour, is the fact that
15 Mico Stanisic voluntarily give the interview to the Office of the
16 Prosecutor. Over five days. He gave his interview -- he was asked
17 whether this interview can be used in -- in a trial against you, he says,
18 I agree, you can use all this in a trial against me.
19 The Office of the Prosecutor, by the bar table motion, offers,
20 offers the interview of the accused Stanisic given on that particular
21 occasion for the -- for the truth of its contents. It offers it to
22 the -- to the Trial Chamber. That is what -- what the bar table -- bar
23 table motion says.
24 Therefore, in our opinion, this is the Prosecutor's evidence
25 which they offered. We accepted it because it is our client, and we have
1 nothing to be afraid of. In fact, we submit that we stand by his
2 interview, and we stand by his interview throughout our Defence -- our
3 Defence presentations and throughout this whole trial.
4 Now, Mr. Hannis's -- my understanding was that Mr. Hannis is
5 trying again to -- to challenge whether the -- whether -- whether you
6 should -- whether you should give weight or trust the contents of that
7 interview. But, again, Your Honours, it's -- it's -- it's our position
8 that the interview has been explicitly offered by the Office of the
9 Prosecutor. It is not the Defence who offered this interview. Perhaps
10 in that situation, he might have the grounds to -- to make such an
11 argument. But in case where the Office of the Prosecutor, by bar table
12 motion, asks that this document be admitted in their case as their proof,
13 I don't see how he can make this argument now.
14 Thank you very much.
15 JUDGE HALL: Thank you, Mr. Zecevic.
16 MS. KORNER: Your Honours, may I ask, then are Your Honours
17 going -- because we do have a reply on all of this.
18 JUDGE HALL: I was going to say that it looks suspiciously as if
19 we're going -- that this is going to be on the agenda for Friday.
20 MS. KORNER: Yes. Thank you.
21 JUDGE HALL: But we will see.
22 So we take the adjournment, to reconvene in this courtroom
23 at 10.00 tomorrow morning.
24 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.46 p.m.,
25 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 31st day of May,
1 2012, at 10.00 a.m.