1 Wednesday, 27 March 2013
3 [Open session]
4 [The accused entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 3.30 p.m.
6 JUDGE HALL: Thank you.
7 New technology. Good afternoon to everyone. May we have the
8 appearances, please.
9 MS. KORNER: Good afternoon, Your Honours.
10 Joanna Korner, Tom Hannis, Matthew Olmsted, Alex Demirdjian,
11 Rafael La Cruz, and Case Manager Sebastiaan van Hooydonk for the
13 MR. ZECEVIC: Good afternoon, Your Honours. Slobodan Zecevic,
14 Slobodan Cvijetic, Ms. Alex Laskowski, and Mr. Dominic Kennedy, appearing
15 for Stanisic Defence this afternoon. Thank you.
16 MR. KRGOVIC: Good afternoon, Your Honours. Dragan Krgovic,
17 Aleksandar Aleksic, Michelle Butler, David Martini, and Lennart Poulsen,
18 appearing for Zupljanin Defence.
19 JUDGE HALL: Thank you. And now I will do what I ought to have
20 started with, namely, to ask the Registrar to call the case.
21 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honours. This is case
22 number IT-08-91-T, the Prosecutor versus Mico Stanisic and
23 Stojan Zupljanin.
24 JUDGE HALL: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
25 Before I continue, I just wish to confirm that the accused can
1 both hear me in a language that they understand.
2 THE ACCUSED STANISIC: [Interpretation] I can hear you perfectly
3 well and I greet you.
4 THE ACCUSED ZUPLJANIN: [Interpretation] I also perfectly hear you
5 and I greet you.
6 JUDGE HALL: Thank you. The Trial Chamber is sitting today to
7 deliver its judgement in the case of the Prosecutor versus Mico Stanisic
8 and Stojan Zupljanin. I now read a summary of the Chamber's findings.
9 The full written judgement will be made available at the end of today's
11 At the outset, the Chamber wishes to express its gratitude to
12 counsel for the Prosecution and the Defence, the Registry staff, the
13 Chamber's own staff, and all others who have contributed to the conduct
14 of this trial.
15 The judgement is a lengthy document, reflecting the size and
16 complexity of this case. The trial commenced on 14th of September, 2009,
17 and concluded on the 1st of June, 2012. The Trial Chamber sat for
18 354 days, during which it admitted the evidence of 199 witnesses, entered
19 4.377 exhibits into evidence, and took judicial notice of
20 1.042 adjudicated facts.
21 The concept of a greater Serbia has a long history. One of its
22 aspects was the extension of Serbia into those portions of Croatia and
23 Bosnia and Herzegovina containing substantial Serb populations. This was
24 strongly pursued in the late 1980s and on into the 1990s. Through public
25 speeches and the media, Serbian political leaders emphasised a glorious
1 past and informed the audiences that if Serbs did not join together, they
2 would again be attacked by Ustashas, a term used to instill fear in
3 Serbs. The danger of a fundamentalist Muslim community was also
4 presented as a threat. After the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia
5 began, the theme of the Serb-dominated media was that, if Serbs became a
6 minority, their existence would be endangered. The media presented the
7 Serbs with a choice between waging war or being subjected to non-Serb
9 The present case pertains to the role and responsibility of
10 Mico Stanisic and Stojan Zupljanin in events that occurred in Bosnia and
11 Herzegovina following the creation of the Republika Srpska in Bosnia and
13 Mico Stanisic was the minister of the interior of
14 Republika Srpska. The Ministry of the Interior will be referred to as
15 MUP in this summary.
16 Stojan Zupljanin, during the indictment period, was the chief of
17 the Regional Security Service Centre of Banja Luka. From May to
18 July 1992, he was also a member of the Crisis Staff of the Autonomous
19 Region of Krajina, hereinafter referred to as the ARK.
20 Mico Stanisic and Stojan Zupljanin are charged with ten counts of
21 crimes against humanity and violations of the laws or customs of war.
22 One of the modes of this criminal responsibility is their participation
23 in a joint criminal enterprise, or JCE. The objective of the alleged JCE
24 was to permanently remove Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats, and other
25 non-Serbs from the territory of the planned Serbian state. The JCE
1 allegedly came into existence no later than the establishment of the
2 Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia on the 24th of October, 1991,
3 and continued until the signing of the Dayton Accords in 1995.
4 The objective of the alleged JCE is said to have been achieved by
5 means which allegedly included the commission of the crimes enumerated in
6 Counts 1 to 10.
7 Mico Stanisic is charged with criminal responsibility for crimes
8 committed in 20 municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He allegedly
9 participated in the creation of Bosnian Serb entities and forces that
10 implemented forcible takeovers of municipalities, and in the development
11 of Bosnian Serb policy at the leadership level in order to secure these
12 takeovers and the forcible removal of the non-Serb population. He also
13 is said to have commanded, directed, and assisted in the co-ordination of
14 MUP forces, when acting jointly or in co-ordination with Crisis Staffs,
15 the Army of Republika Srpska, referred to as the VRS, and other Serb
16 forces, in order to implement the objectives of the JCE.
17 Stanisic allegedly facilitated the establishment and operation of
18 camps and detention facilities in which Serb forces beat, sexually
19 assaulted and killed non-Serb detainees. It is therefore alleged that,
20 while being under a duty to protect, as the minister of the interior, he
21 failed to take adequate steps to protect Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats,
22 and other non-Serbs.
23 Furthermore, Stanisic allegedly encouraged and facilitated the
24 commission of crimes by Serb forces by not taking adequate measures to
25 investigate, arrest, or punish the perpetrators of such crimes, and, as
1 such, contributed to the maintenance of a culture of impunity by
2 participating in sham inquiries into these crimes.
3 Stojan Zupljanin is charged with criminal responsibility for
4 crimes committed in eight municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
5 ARK municipalities. Zupljanin allegedly participated in the formation of
6 Bosnian Serb entities and the forces that implemented the forcible
7 takeovers of municipalities. In order to implement the objectives of the
8 JCE, he allegedly commanded, ordered and directed members and agents of
9 the MUP, when co-operating or acting jointly with Crisis Staffs, the VRS,
10 and other Serb forces, and participated in the formation, financing,
11 supplying, and supporting of special units. He allegedly facilitated,
12 established or operated camps and detention facilities in which Serb
13 forces beat, sexually assaulted and killed non-Serb detainees.
14 Therefore, Zupljanin allegedly failed, while being under a duty
15 to protect, to take adequate steps to ensure the protection of the
16 civilian population in the Autonomous Region of Krajina. It is alleged
17 that he instead encouraged and facilitated the commission of crimes by
18 Serb forces against Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Muslims, and other non-Serbs.
19 Furthermore, he allegedly failed to take the necessary steps to
20 investigate, arrest, or punish the perpetrators of these crimes, thereby
21 contributing to the maintenance of a culture of impunity including by
22 participating in sham inquiries concerning these crimes.
23 The Trial Chamber will now briefly summarise its findings on the
24 crimes alleged to have been committed in 1992 in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
25 In the early hours of the 3rd of April, 1992, a paramilitary
1 group known as the Serbian Defence Forces, or SOS, set up check-points
2 and blockaded the town of Banja Luka. The blockade was orchestrated by
3 high-ranking members of the Serbian Democratic Party, hereafter referred
4 to as the SDS, and was backed by Serb municipal authorities, the police,
5 and the Territorial Defence, hereafter referred to as the TO. Many
6 non-Serbs were dismissed from their jobs, including those in leading
7 positions. Members of the police, including members of the Banja Luka
8 CSB Special Police Detachment, began rounding up Muslims and Croats,
9 searching their apartments, beating them, looting their property, and
10 taking them to the Banja Luka CSB where police and state security
11 inspectors interrogated them and frequently beat them.
12 The municipality of Banja Luka also hosted the largest detention
13 camp of the ARK, known as Manjaca. Starting in mid-May 1992, Serb
14 civilian police were Prijedor, Sanski Most, Kljuc and other ARK
15 municipalities transported thousands of detainees to Manjaca. About
16 98 per cent of the detainees were of Muslim and Croatian ethnicity. In
17 Manjaca, prisoners were held in unsanitary conditions, were not provided
18 with sufficient food or medical care, and were beaten on a regular basis.
19 Several Muslims and Croats died as a consequence of the beatings. Others
20 died of asphyxiation while being transported in locked refrigerator
21 trucks from Prijedor to Manjaca. As a consequence of the campaign of
22 violence, by September of 1992, thousands of Muslims and Croats had left
23 the municipality. Before they could leave, however, Serb authorities
24 forced them to surrender and leave most of their property behind.
25 Between May and September of 1992, the 19th Infantry Brigade of
1 the VRS and Serb police, fighting together, took control of Donji Vakuf.
2 There were at least seven clashes in Donji Vakuf between the Serb police
3 and Muslims, with the Serb police sometimes being supported by VRS units.
4 Between mid-June and mid-September of 1992, Muslim and Croat male
5 civilians were arrested by Bosnian Serbs soldiers, military police, and
6 police officers. They were detained in the public security station, or
7 SJB. They were also confined at the TO warehouse, the Vrbas Promet
8 factory, and a detention facility known as "the House." In these
9 locations, the detainees were regularly beaten. Naim Sutkovic, an
10 elderly detainee, died as a result of a severe beating at the warehouse,
11 and two detainees were killed at the factory. In the course of 1992,
12 12.970 Muslims and 480 Croats left Donji Vakuf due to harassment and
13 threats by Serbs.
14 On the 7th of May, 1992, JNA forces entered the town of Kljuc,
15 imposed a curfew, and set up check-points at important locations
16 throughout the municipality. From then onwards, arbitrary arrests of
17 Muslims and Croats were carried out by Bosnian Serb police. As a result,
18 Bosnian Muslims from surrounding villages were arrested and taken to
19 detention facilities at a school and the SJB building in Kljuc. From
20 mid-1992 onwards, villages in the municipality that were predominantly
21 inhabited by Muslims and Croats were shelled by Serb forces. This was
22 accompanied by the looting of their valuables.
23 On the 1st of June, 1992, approximately 76 detainees were killed
24 in Velagici by VRS soldiers. On the 10th of July, 1992, at least 144 men
25 were killed by Serb police and VRS soldiers during mopping up operations
1 in Biljani. Significant numbers of persons living in the municipality of
2 Kljuc were forced from their homes between May 1992 and January 1993.
3 On the 11th of June, 1992, Serb forces commenced the takeover of
4 the town of Kotor Varos and the surrounding villages, all of which were
5 inhabited by Muslims or Croats. A total of 14 Muslim and Catholic
6 monuments in Kotor Varos were heavily damaged or completely destroyed in
7 1992, most of them in July and August, by fire, explosives or shelling.
8 The Banja Luka CSB Special Police Detachment and police from Kotor Varos
9 arrested and detained Muslim and Croat individuals at the Kotor Varos
10 SJB, the Kotor Varos prison, and the sawmill. Detainees at the SJB were
11 brutally beaten and held in inhumane conditions with insufficient food,
12 water, and sanitation facilities. At the Kotor Varos prison, detainees
13 were physically mistreated by soldiers and some were beaten to death or
14 were executed after being beaten.
15 Over 300 Muslim and Croat women, children, and elderly men were
16 held at the sawmill. Female detainees were taken out of the main hall of
17 the sawmill during the night and raped by members of the Serb forces. On
18 the 25th of June, 1992, Serb forces killed approximately 26 men on the
19 way to and in front of the medical centre. Thousands of Muslim and Croat
20 residents were transported out of Kotor Varos or fled as a consequence of
21 the mistreatment, intimidations, looting, and destruction of property and
22 religious buildings.
23 Erb forces took over the municipality of Prijedor on the
24 30th of April, 1992. The perpetrators in Prijedor comprised members of
25 the local Crisis Staff, active and reserve police, the TO, the JNA, and
1 the VRS. Blockades and check-points were established around the towns
2 and villages, and the movement of Muslims and Croats was curtailed. They
3 were dismissed from their places of employment. Muslim members of the
4 police were relieved of duty and replaced by persons of Serb ethnicity.
5 Radio announcements made pejorative references to Muslims and threatened
6 to deploy everything that belonged to them, including mosques and
7 historic monuments, which were reduced to ruins. Muslims and Croats were
8 required to identify their homes with white flags on the windows. Most
9 of these homes were looted and then razed to the ground. Over
10 1.000 people were killed during the takeover of Prijedor.
11 Inhabitants of towns and villages in and around Prijedor were
12 escorted to improvised detention camps in Trnopolje, Omarska and
13 Keraterm. Their belongings were taken from them during the course of
14 transit and at arrival in these camps. The conditions in these camps as
15 well as at the Prijedor SJB and the Ljubija football stadium were
16 deplorably inhumane. Detainees, including women, children, the old and
17 the infirm, were beaten, sexually assaulted, and deprived of basic civic
18 amenities such as appropriate food, water, shelter, sanitation, and
19 medical help. The Chamber has found that several persons died in these
20 detention facilities as a result of the ill-treatment and torture. Over
21 100 persons were executed in Room 3 at Keraterm camp in one night around
22 the 25th of July by Serb guards. At Omarska camp, where the red and
23 white houses came to acquire particular infamy among the approximately
24 3.000 inmates, mass executions were conducted from late July onwards. At
25 Trnopolje, the detainees were primarily women and children, and the women
1 were routinely subjected to rape.
2 Eventually detainees were expelled in convoys to Muslim-held
3 territory. Over 33.000 residents of Prijedor and its neighbouring towns
4 and villages left the area in the course of the conflict in 1992. On the
5 21st of August, 1992, one such convoy of four buses from Trnopolje, which
6 was escorted by Prijedor policemen and members of the intervention
7 platoon, stopped along its route at the cliffs called Koricanske Stijene
8 in Skender Vakuf. Between 150 and 200 men were ordered off the buses,
9 made to kneel at the edge of the gorge, and then executed. One witness
10 testified that he turned to his father and said, "Father, throw
11 yourself." The father then pushed him off the cliff. Grenades were
12 thrown into the gorge to make sure that no one survived. This witness
13 was one of only a few survivors. None of the policemen involved in the
14 incident were held accountable for their involvement.
15 On the 25th of March, 1992, the president of the Sanski Most
16 branch of the SDS announced that all Serb territories in the municipality
17 were declared to be part of Republika Srpska. In April, the 6th Krajina
18 Brigade of the JNA set up check-points in the town of Sanski Most. Serb
19 authorities formed a Crisis Staff which was controlled by the SDS. The
20 Crisis Staff, with the help of paramilitaries, began dismissing Muslims
21 and Croats from their jobs. Serb paramilitaries blew up businesses
22 belonging to Muslims and Croats. In May, upon orders of the Crisis
23 Staff, the JNA and the TO carried out an operation to confiscate illegal
24 weapons. This operation only targeted citizens of Muslim and Croat
25 ethnicity. After conducting military operations against non-Serb
1 villages and settlements, members of the 6th Krajina Brigade, including
2 its military police, looted property, destroyed houses and mosques, and
3 arrested about 1600 Muslims and Croats. These men were kept in harsh
4 conditions in detention facilities in Sanski Most where policemen and
5 members of the TO beat them. Women and children were also temporarily
6 detained before Serb civilian authorities organised convoys to expel them
7 to Muslim-controlled territory. By the end of 1992, almost all of the
8 Muslims of Sanski Most had fled as a consequence of the campaign of
9 violence carried out against them by Serb forces.
10 In early 1992, Teslic, a Serb-majority municipality, was declared
11 a constituent part of Republika Srpska. Non-Serbs were arrested,
12 detained, and questioned by Bosnian Serb police. Non-Serb police
13 officers who did not sign a declaration of loyalty to the Serb MUP were
14 dismissed. In June 1992, Serb forces searched and looted houses
15 belonging to Muslims and Croats in Teslic. The army indiscriminately
16 shelled the Bosnian Muslim villages of Stenjak and Teslic, following the
17 expiration of the deadline issued to the inhabitants to surrender their
18 weapons. Thousands of Muslims and Croats fled Teslic. Hundreds of
19 Bosnian Muslims and Croat men were arbitrarily detained at the SJB
20 building and the TO warehouse. While in detention, detainees were
21 subjected to beatings and deplorable living conditions, including serious
22 overcrowding and lack of sanitation facilities. At least three men were
23 killed while in detention at the TO warehouse as a result of beatings
24 they received.
25 Bijeljina was brought under Serb control after four days of
1 fighting which began on the 31st of March, 1992, with the arrival of a
2 group of feared paramilitaries known as Arkan's Men. By the
3 3rd of April, dozens of non-Serbs, including women and children, had been
4 killed, some of them shot at close range. In the ensuing months, Muslim
5 residents were increasingly terrorised through a campaign of intimidation
6 and violence, culminating in the murder of two prominent Muslim families.
7 While the attacks were orchestrated by the SDS Crisis Staff, the
8 killings, looting, searches and seizure of property were carried out by a
9 special police unit and various paramilitary formations.
10 Wealthier Muslims could obtain passports for exorbitant fees and
11 leave. Others, however, were simply bussed to the demarcation line or
12 detained at the Batkovic camp. This camp held more than 1200 detainees,
13 most of whom had been transferred there from detention camps in other
14 municipalities. The camp's sanitary and sleeping conditions were poor,
15 and detainees were beaten on a regular basis, some of them so severely
16 that they died.
17 On the morning of the 10th of June, 1992, Serb paramilitaries
18 entered Bileca. Together with the Serb police they arrested about
19 140 Muslims and unlawfully detained them for months. The prisoners were
20 held in appalling conditions and were systematically beaten by members of
21 the police and paramilitaries. Two detainees died as a consequence of
22 the beatings. After the arrests began, Serb forces imposed restrictions
23 on the movements of the Muslim population, looted their property, and
24 razed their houses and mosques. As a consequence of this campaign of
25 violence, the Muslim population fled Bileca.
1 On the morning of the 17th of April, 1992, the town of
2 Bosanski Samac was forcibly taken over by Serb forces, which included JNA
3 soldiers. Over the next two days, the non-Serb population was forced to
4 surrender their weapons to the JNA. Immediately after the takeover,
5 large-scale arrests and looting by Serb forces started. In April 1992,
6 businesses and private buildings belonging to Muslims and Croats were
7 targeted, damaged, and destroyed by the JNA and other Serb forces. On
8 the 7th of May, 1992, 16 Muslim and Croat detainees who were being held
9 at Crkvina warehouse in Bosanski Samac were shot and killed by a member
10 of the a Serb paramilitary unit. On the 26th of April, 1992,
11 47 detainees were forcibly transferred from Bosanski Samac to Brcko by
12 JNA personnel, and on the 4th of July, 1992, between 70 and 180 non-Serb
13 detainees were transferred to a village in Croatia.
14 On the 30th of April, 1992, Serb forces blew up two bridges
15 linking the town of Brcko to Croatia. The explosion killed between
16 70 and 100 civilians. The following day, 1.000 members of Serb forces,
17 including JNA paramilitary and TO battalions, launched an attack on
18 Brcko. Muslim neighbourhoods were shelled and looted, their houses
19 destroyed and left to burn. Paramilitaries and a special unit called the
20 Red Berets flocked to Brcko to loot and plunder. Muslim and monuments
21 units were attacked, with three mosques destroyed within minutes on one
22 afternoon. Large numbers of Muslims and Croats fled the municipalities.
23 From May to August 1992, Muslim and Croat civilians were arrested and
24 detained in at least 14 locations. Non-Serbs detained at Luka camp were
25 held in a crowded hangar. Their valuables were confiscated and they were
1 forced to perform manual labour. Women were raped and detainees were
2 beaten with particular cruelty.
3 Each night for at least five nights, camp commander Goran Jelisic
4 came to the door of the hangar and yelled for volunteers to come out.
5 The detainees who emerged were lined up against a wall where soldiers
6 beat and cursed them. One detainee was then pulled from the line and
7 forced to lie on the asphalt with his head over a grate. This detainee
8 was shot in the back of the head. Detainees who were lined up at the
9 wall were forced to remove the body, and the killing was then repeated
10 with at least one more detainee from a wall. Detainees who remained in
11 the hangar heard the same thing every time a group was taken, a voice
12 saying, "Lie down. Lean your head against the grate." And then a shot.
13 Approximately 50 men were killed each night in this manner.
14 On the 3rd of May, 1992, Serb paramilitaries, the police and the
15 JNA took over the town of Doboj and the Serb Crisis Staff took control of
16 the municipality. Members of the Banja Luka Special Police Detachment
17 and paramilitaries, including the Red Berets, Predo's Wolves, and
18 Martic's Men, terrorised the town, raping, looting, and murdering the
19 Muslim and Croat population. The Red Berets and other paramilitary
20 groups took the possessions of Muslims and Croats, arrested them, beat
21 them at the CSB, and delivered them to the Doboj central prison which was
22 run by member of the Republika Srpska Ministry of Justice under the
23 instruction of the Serb Crisis Staff in Doboj. They were detained in
24 unsanitary conditions and beaten by paramilitary soldiers in the
25 evenings. During the working day, detainees were taken to the CSB and
1 beaten there. In the same period, Serb forces destroyed Muslim and
2 Catholic monuments. As a result of the intimidating atmosphere,
3 thousands of Muslim and Croat residents fled Doboj in 1992.
4 By April 1992, the town of Gacko was under the control of the
5 JNA. The village was looted and burned, and at least 137 Muslims were
6 killed. Thereafter, 270 Muslims and Croats were kept at six detention
7 facilities. Detainees at the Power Station Hotel were kept under
8 appalling conditions, threatened, abused, and sexually assaulted. Some
9 were beaten and some killed. Those taken to the Gacko SJB building had
10 their belongings confiscated and were given insufficient food and water
11 in cramped unsanitary conditions. Many were repeatedly beaten.
12 Detainees saw others executed and were forced to clean up the blood
13 afterwards. One man was forced to watch a close relative being raped by
14 members of the Red Berets. He was then kicked in the face, breaking his
15 nose and cheek-bone. Some of the detainees were taken to a bridge near
16 Kotlina, shot by police officers, and thrown off the bridge. In May and
17 June, 800 Muslim women and children were transported out of the city.
18 When the JNA and police attacked Fazlagic Kula on the 17th of June,
19 hundreds more fled.
20 In March 1992, in Ilijas, the SJB split along ethnic lines and
21 the Serb Crisis Staff took over the military and civilian institutions in
22 the municipality. On the 27th of May, members of the Ilijas SJB attacked
23 the village of Gornja Bioca. They torched Muslim houses, killed two
24 people, and wounded a little girl. A group of men from the village were
25 taken into custody and imprisoned in several detention facilities in
1 succession. On the 4th of June, Serb soldiers and police attacked the
2 majority Muslim village of Ljesevo, killing 20 Muslim villagers and
3 displacing the others to Podlugovi where they were detained along with
4 persons from other villages in Ilijas. The Croat and Muslim detainees
5 were beaten and forced to sing Serb nationalist songs. Around the
6 17th of August, detainees were transferred by Serb military police and
7 personnel of the Ilijas SJB to a detention centre in Vogosca known as
8 Planjo's House.
9 In late March or April 1992, the police in Vogosca were divided
10 along ethnic lines. A large part of the municipality was brought under
11 Serb control by army units and the police between the 4th and
12 17th of April, 1992. Subsequent to the refusal to surrender, the
13 predominantly Muslim village of Svrake was bombed by military aircraft
14 and taken over on or about the 3rd of May, 1992. Up to 1.000 Muslims
15 were then detained at the Semizovac barracks. All were released after
16 two to three days, except 100 prisoners who were transferred to a
17 detention facility called "the Bunker." There, they were beaten by
18 members of the Serb police at Vogosca, held in poor conditions, and used
19 for dangerous labour and as human shields. On the 8th of July, the Serb
20 municipality of Vogosca created another detention facility in Vogosca at
21 Planjo's House. At this prison, more than 100, mostly Muslim, detainees,
22 were held, beaten, and used as human shields.
23 From March 1992 onwards, members of the Pale police and reserve
24 police arrested Muslims and Croats and detained them at the Pale
25 gymnasium and the SJB building. These detainees were abused by soldiers,
1 by members of the special police under Rajko Kusic, and sometimes by
2 civilians. The police did nothing to stop this, and some detainees died
3 from the beatings. At the Pale gymnasium, detainees were starved and
4 kept in such unsanitary conditions that they were eventually covered in
5 lice. Despite this, they were forced to work. On the 22nd of May, 1992,
6 Serb forces launched attacks on Renovica and Donja Vinca. They burned
7 homes belonging to Muslims, and the villagers were arrested and
8 transported from Pale to Muslim-held territory. In the entire
9 municipality of Pale, constant pressure was put on the Muslim citizens to
10 leave. By early July 1992, the Pale SJB, by order of the Pale Crisis
11 Staff and Municipal Assembly, facilitated the transfer of over a thousand
12 non-Serbs out of the municipality in a series of convoys. After they
13 left, members of the Pale police claimed the Muslims' property.
14 On the 14th of April, 1992, the Uzice Corps of the JNA entered
15 Visegrad. Convoys were organised, emptying many villages of their
16 non-Serb population. The JNA withdrew from Visegrad on the 19th of May,
17 1992, leaving behind Serb paramilitary units, including one led by a
18 member of the reserve police, Milan Lukic. These units carried out
19 widespread operations of mistreatment and humiliation such as rapes,
20 theft, destruction of property, and arbitrary killings. On the
21 7th of June, 1992, Milan Lukic abducted and executed five Muslim men on
22 the bank of the Drina river. On the 14th of June, 1992, Milan Lukic,
23 Sredoje Lukic - who was a member of the Visegrad regular police - and
24 other armed Serbs, locked a group of Muslim civilians, predominantly
25 women, children and elderly persons, in a house on Pionirska Street. The
1 house was set on fire, and persons who tried to escape were shot.
2 Approximately 66 persons were killed in this incident. Hundreds of
3 non-Serb civilians were found to have been killed and at least 11.000
4 Muslims fled from the municipality of Visegrad.
5 In April 1992, the municipality of Vlasenica was divided along
6 ethnic lines, and on the 19th of April, the Serb Crisis Staff took over
7 power of the municipality. Muslims were subjected to discriminatory
8 measures: They were forced to surrender their weapons, dismissed from
9 their jobs, and assigned work obligations. Their homes and shops were
10 broken into and painted with anti-Muslim signs, their property stolen,
11 and the town mosque destroyed. Muslim residents fled Vlasenica as a
12 consequence of this treatment. The TO, JNA, and Vlasenica special police
13 units conducted operations in predominantly Muslim villages, such as
14 Zaklopaca and Drum, during which they detained or killed the Muslim men,
15 removed the women and children to Muslim-controlled territory, and
16 destroyed their homes. Muslims were detained at Vlasenica municipal
17 prison, the SJB building, the Susica camp. Detainees were subjected to
18 interrogations, beatings, rape, killings, and other inhumane conditions.
19 On the 21st of May, 1992, at least 28 Muslim males from the municipality
20 of Bratunac who were being detained in Vlasenica were shot and killed at
21 a location outside Nova Kasaba.
22 On the 8th of April, 1992, Serb policemen and paramilitaries,
23 together with TO and JNA units, shelled and took over the town of
24 Zvornik. Military operations continued throughout April, May and June,
25 and Serb forces took over several Muslim villages in the municipality.
1 After the attacks on Muslim villages, Serb policemen, paramilitaries and
2 members of the JNA and TO expelled the Muslim population, destroyed their
3 houses and mosques, and stole their property. Serb forces also arrested
4 hundreds of Muslim men and detained them in facilities in and around the
5 town of Zvornik. Serb policemen and members of the TO beat and
6 mistreated the detainees. At the Dom Kulture in Celopek, the
7 Yellow Wasps and other paramilitaries, with the knowledge of the police,
8 severely beat and wounded Muslim prisoners. They also humiliated,
9 sexually abused and mutilated them. Dusan Repic, one of the Wasps's
10 leaders, forced two pairs of fathers and sons to perform sexual acts on
11 each other, including intercourse and penetration with a broom handle.
12 Other members of the Wasps cut off detainees' penises and ears and forced
13 other prisoners to ingest them. If a prisoner did not do so, he was
14 killed. Between the end of May and the beginning of June 1992, members
15 of the TO and the paramilitaries, including the Yellow Wasps and
16 White Eagles, executed at least 497 detained Muslim prisoners. Starting
17 from April 1992, thousands of Muslims were either expelled from the
18 municipality by Serb forces or fled as a consequence of the campaign of
20 In an annex to the Judgement, the Trial Chamber has set forth its
21 analysis of the forensic evidence and its findings in relation to each of
22 the 17.735 individually named murder victims in the indictment.
23 The Trial Chamber will now summarise its findings on the
24 Prosecution's allegation that a joint criminal enterprise came into
25 existence no later than the 24th of October, 1991, and continued
1 throughout the period of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina until the
2 signing of the Dayton Accords in 1995. The Prosecution alleges that the
3 objective of the JCE was to permanently remove Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian
4 Croats, and other non-Serbs from the territory of the planned Serbian
5 state by means which included the commission of the crimes alleged in
6 Counts 1 through 10.
7 In its written judgement the Trial Chamber has found that
8 following the declaration of independence in the Bosnian Assembly by the
9 delegates of the Party of Democratic Action and the Croatian Democratic
10 Union on the 15th of October, 1991, the SDS and the Bosnian Serb
11 leadership began to create separate and parallel Bosnian Serb
12 institutions and to establish Serb municipalities within
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina. The leadership of the Serbian Democratic Party
14 issued the Variant A and B instructions. The main purpose of these
15 instructions was to prepare the local Serb communities and their leaders
16 to take over power in municipalities across Bosnia and Herzegovina.
17 What followed, as just described, were the violent takeovers of
18 those municipalities and the ensuing widespread and systematic campaign
19 of terror and violence which resulted in the removal of large numbers of
20 non-Serbs from those municipalities by way of commission of the crimes
21 that the Chamber has found were committed. Throughout the indictment
22 period, the Bosnian Serb leadership was in charge of the events taking
23 place in the municipalities through its control over political and
24 military structures. On the basis of the numerous statements of the
25 Bosnian Serb leadership at the time, the Chamber finds that the goal of
1 these actions was the establishment of a Serb state, as ethnically pure
2 as possible, through the removal of the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian
4 The Chamber therefore is satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt,
5 that a common plan came into existence no later than the 24th of October,
6 1991, and remained in existence throughout the indictment period. The
7 objective of the common plan was to remove Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian
8 Croats from the territory of the planned Serbian state through the
9 commission of the crimes of deportation and forcible transfer, as crimes
10 against humanity.
11 The Trial Chamber now turns to the question of whether the
12 accused in this case were members of this joint criminal enterprise.
13 Stojan Zupljanin was born on the 22nd of September, 1951, in the
14 village of Maslovare, in the municipality of Kotor Varos. In 1975, after
15 graduating from law school, he started a career in the police. During
16 the indictment period, he was chief of the Banja Luka Security Service
17 Centre of the Ministry of Interior of the Serbian republic, otherwise
18 known as the Banja Luka CSB. By the 6th of May, 1992, the CSB had in its
19 areas of responsibility the SJBs of all of the municipalities that were
20 part of the Autonomous Region of Krajina, that is, the ARK. While there
21 ask no evidence that Zupljanin was a member of the Serbian Democratic
22 Party, he undoubtedly had strong ties to it. As the highest police
23 authority in the ARK, Zupljanin had the legal duty to protect the entire
24 civilian population regardless of religion, ethnicity, race or political
25 beliefs. On the 5th of May, 1992, Zupljanin became a member of the
1 Crisis Staff of the ARK. From April until the end of July 1992,
2 Zupljanin issued several orders to his policemen to follow the
3 instructions of this regional body. These orders included the
4 disarmament of Muslims and Croats and restrictions on the amount of
5 currency and valuables that could be brought out of the ARK.
6 Stojan Zupljanin, in concert with the Banja Luka TO and members
7 of the Serbian Democratic Party and the ARK, was one of the key actors
8 behind the organisation of the blockade of Banja Luka on the
9 3rd of April, 1992. When the non-Serb community in Banja Luka demanded
10 police protection, Zupljanin either provided false assurances or openly
11 refused it. In addition, Zupljanin dispatched his policemen, including
12 the Banja Luka CSB Special Police Detachment, to disarm the Muslim and
13 Croat population and to participate with other Serb forces in the
14 takeover of municipalities in the ARK. While engaged in these
15 operations, Zupljanin's special police detachment which he had created
16 and staffed with Serb nationalists, some of whom with prior criminal
17 records, committed heinous crimes against Muslims and Croats, including
18 rape, torture, and murder. Zupljanin, despite being repeatedly informed
19 of the crimes of this special unit, continued engaging it in operations
20 in close contact with Muslim and Croat civilians, whom the detachment
21 continued to abuse. Zupljanin was also aware of the unlawful arrest and
22 detention of thousands of Muslims and Croats in the ARK, of the harsh
23 conditions in which they were interned, and of the abuses and other
24 crimes that were cruelly inflicted upon them. In spite of this
25 knowledge, Zupljanin continued engaging his policemen in guarding the
1 unlawfully detained prisoners and ordering the transfer and
2 transportation of detainees from police-controlled facilities to the
3 Manjaca camp. Zupljanin did issue a number of orders exhorting ARK
4 policemen to respect the law, but these orders were ineffective and, as
5 found by the Trial Chamber, not genuinely meant to be effectuated.
6 Notably, on the 20th of July, 1992, Zupljanin proposed to Stanisic to
7 treat unlawfully detained non-Serbs as hostages and to exchange them for
8 Serb prisoners.
9 In spite of his extensive knowledge of the commission of crimes
10 against non-Serbs, including by his subordinates, Zupljanin failed to
11 investigate these crimes or to discipline the perpetrators. In relation
12 to at least two incidents where large numbers of Muslims were killed by
13 members of the police, Zupljanin misled the judicial authorities in an
14 effort to shield the perpetrators from criminal prosecution.
15 The Trial Chamber finds, beyond a reasonable doubt, that through
16 these acts and omissions, Stojan Zupljanin both intended and
17 significantly contributed to the plan to remove Bosnian Muslims and
18 Bosnian Croats from the territory of the planned Serbian state.
19 Moreover, the crimes that the Trial Chamber has found fall outside the
20 plan, such as murder, extermination, unlawful detention, and torture,
21 were foreseeable to Zupljanin. The Chamber has examined the evidence
22 linking the physical perpetrators to members of the JCE and finds that
23 the crimes committed in the ARK municipalities were imputable to at least
24 one member of the JCE and thereby to Stojan Zupljanin.
25 Mico Stanisic was born on the 30th of June, 1955, in the village
1 of Ponor, in the municipality of Pale. In 1973, he commenced work with
2 the SUP in Sarajevo and became an inspector after graduating from law
3 school in 1982. Stanisic attended the first meeting of the Council of
4 Ministers of the Bosnian Serb Assembly. At this meeting, the demarcation
5 of the boundaries of ethnic territory for the Serbs was the priority, as
6 well as the establishment of governmental organs in that territory.
7 Stanisic was involved in the establishment of the SDS and worked to
8 promote and implement its policies. During the indictment period, he was
9 the minister of interior of the self-proclaimed Republika Srpska. As the
10 highest authority in Republika Srpska on matters of interior affairs,
11 Stanisic had the legal duty to protect the entire civilian population,
12 regardless of religion, ethnicity, race or political beliefs. Stanisic
13 shared a close relationship with Radovan Karadzic and other leading
14 members of the JCE, and he was a key member of the decision-making
15 authorities from early 1992 onwards.
16 Stanisic had overall authority over the police forces of
17 Republika Srpska and employed the internal affairs organs in accordance
18 with the policies and decisions adopted by the Presidency, the National
19 Security Council, and the Bosnian Serb Assembly, or the BSA. His
20 conduct, presence at key meetings, attendance at sessions of the BSA, and
21 acceptance of the position of minister of interior, all indicate his
22 voluntary participation in the creation of a separate Serb entity within
23 Bosnia and Herzegovina by the ethnic division of the territory. To this
24 end, Stanisic made active police forces reinforced with unqualified
25 reserve policemen available for co-ordinated action with the armed forces
1 in order to effect ethnic divisions on the ground.
2 Despite being aware of the commission of crimes by these joint
3 forces, Stanisic consistently approved the deployment of his police
4 forces in this manner. He also permitted the continued use of reserve
5 forces by the army, primarily for the purpose of guarding prisons and
6 detention camps. Stanisic only sought to withdraw regular policemen from
7 combat activities towards the end of 1992, when most of the territory of
8 Republika Srpska had been consolidated.
9 The Trial Chamber received evidence that Mico Stanisic issued
10 orders in the course of 1992, particularly between the months of July and
11 August, for the protection of the civilian population. However, Stanisic
12 failed to use the powers available to him under the law to ensure the
13 implementation of these orders, despite being aware of the limited action
14 taken subsequent to his orders. Moreover, the orders in relation to
15 detention camps were prompted by the scrutiny of the international
16 community and were mostly concerned with the image of Republika Srpska in
17 the eyes of the world. By failing to remove errant personnel from the
18 police forces, Stanisic violated his professional obligation to protect
19 and safe-guard the civilian population in the territories under his
20 control. The fact that Mico Stanisic had the ability to do more is borne
21 out by the decisive manner in which he pursued the theft of Golf vehicles
22 from the RS MUP and the harassment of local Serb leaders by paramilitary
23 groups after the outbreak of hostilities.
24 The Trial Chamber finds beyond a reasonable doubt that, through
25 these acts and omissions, Mico Stanisic both intended and significantly
1 contributed to the plan to remove Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from
2 the territory of the planned Serbian state. Moreover, the crimes that
3 the Trial Chamber has found fall outside the plan, such as murder,
4 unlawful detention, and torture, were foreseeable to Stanisic, except for
5 the crime of extermination which will be dealt with in a moment. The
6 Chamber has examined the evidence linking the physical perpetrators to
7 the members of the JCE and finds that the crimes committed in the
8 municipalities, save for the appropriation or plunder of property and
9 wanton destruction in Bileca, were imputable to at least one member of
10 the JCE and, therefore, to Mico Stanisic.
11 With respect to the crime of extermination, the Chamber reviewed
12 the evidence on Stanisic's responsibility for this crime pursuant to the
13 remaining modes of liability charged in the indictment. With regard to
14 the incidents of extermination in the municipalities of Kljuc,
15 Kotor Varos, Prijedor, Brcko, Visegrad, Vlasenica, Zvornik, and
16 Banja Luka, the Trial Chamber finds that Stanisic is not criminally
17 responsible for instigating the crime of extermination, nor is he
18 responsible for aiding and abetting this crime. The Trial Chamber
19 further analysed Stanisic's liability for extermination under the
20 doctrine of command responsibility and finds that he either did not know
21 or did not have reason to know that extermination was about to be, was
22 being, or had been committed. In the case of Koricanske Stijene,
23 although Stanisic did come to know of the extermination of over 150
24 Muslim men within days of the crime, the Trial Chamber finds that he does
25 not bear criminal responsibility for these crimes because the Prosecution
1 failed to prove that Stanisic failed to take necessary and reasonable
2 measures to punish the perpetrators in relation to this incident.
3 This completes the summary of the findings of the Trial Chamber.
4 I will now read out the disposition of the Trial Chamber, as
5 contained in the written Judgement:
6 Will the accused Mico Stanisic please rise.
7 For all the foregoing reasons, and pursuant to Articles 23, 24,
8 and 27 of the Statute of the Tribunal, and Rules 98 ter, 101, 102, and
9 103 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Tribunal, the
10 Trial Chamber hereby decides as follows. The Trial Chamber finds you,
11 Mico Stanisic, to be guilty, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Statute, of
12 the following counts:
13 Count 1, persecution, as a crime against humanity, through the
14 following underlying acts: Killings; torture, cruel treatment, and
15 inhumane acts; unlawful detention; establishment and perpetration of
16 inhumane living conditions; forcible transfer and deportation; plunder of
17 property; wanton destruction of towns and villages, including destruction
18 or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to religion and other
19 cultural buildings; imposition and maintenance of restrictive and
20 discriminatory measures;
21 Count 4, murder, as a violation of the laws or customs of war;
22 Count 6, torture, as a violation of the laws or customs of war.
23 In relation to the following counts, on the basis of the
24 principles relating to cumulative convictions, the Trial Chamber does not
25 enter convictions for:
1 Count 3, murder, as a crime against humanity;
2 Count 5, torture, as a crime against humanity;
3 Count 7, cruel treatment, as a violation of the laws or customs
4 of war;
5 Count 8, inhumane acts, as a crime against humanity;
6 Count 9, deportation, as a crime against humanity;
7 Count 10, inhumane acts (forcible transfer), as a crime against
9 The Trial Chamber finds Mico Stanisic to be not guilty, pursuant
10 to Articles 7(1) and 7(3) of the following count. That is count 2,
11 extermination, as a crime against humanity.
12 The Trial Chamber hereby sentences Mico Stanisic to a single
13 sentence of 22 years of imprisonment. Mico Stanisic has been in custody
14 since the 11th of March, 2005, and, pursuant to Rule 101(C) of the Rules,
15 he is entitled to credit for the time spent in detention thus far.
16 Pursuant to Rule 103(C) of the Rules, Mico Stanisic shall remain in the
17 custody of the Tribunal pending the finalisation of arrangements for his
18 transfer to the state where he shall serve his sentence.
19 Mico Stanisic, you may now be seated.
20 Will the accused Stojan Zupljanin please rise.
21 The Trial Chamber finds you, Stojan Zupljanin, to be guilty,
22 pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Statute, of the following counts:
23 Count 1, persecution, as a crime against humanity, through the
24 following underlying acts: Killings; torture, cruel treatment, and
25 inhumane acts; unlawful detention; establishment and perpetuation of
1 inhumane living conditions; forcible transfer and deportation; plunder of
2 property; wanton destruction of towns and villages, including destruction
3 or wilful damage to institutions dedicated to religion and other cultural
4 buildings; imposition and maintenance of restrictive and discriminatory
6 Count 2, extermination, as a crime against humanity;
7 Count 4, murder, as a violation of the laws or customs of war;
8 Count 6, torture, as a violation of the laws or customs of war.
9 In relation to the following counts, on the basis of the
10 principles relating to cumulative convictions, the Trial Chamber does not
11 enter convictions for:
12 Count 3, murder, as a crime against humanity;
13 Count 5, torture, as a crime against humanity;
14 Count 7, cruel treatment, as a violation of the laws or customs
15 of war;
16 Count 8, inhumane acts, as a crime against humanity;
17 Count 9, deportation, as a crime against humanity;
18 Count 10, inhumane acts (forcible transfer), as a crime against
20 The Trial Chamber hereby sentences Stojan Zupljanin to a single
21 sentence of 22 years of imprisonment. Stojan Zupljanin has been in
22 custody since the 11th of June, 2008, and, pursuant to Rule 101(C) of the
23 Rules, he is entitled to credit for time spent in detention thus far.
24 Pursuant to Rule 103(C) of the Rules, Stojan Zupljanin shall remain in
25 the custody of the Tribunal pending the finalisation of arrangements for
1 his transfer to the state where he shall serve his sentence.
2 You may now be seated.
3 After the Court rises, the Registry will distribute copies of the
5 The trial is now completed.
6 And this hearing stands adjourned.
7 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.47 p.m.