1 Friday, 28 September 2007
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
5 JUDGE PARKER: Good morning.
6 Judge Van den Wyngaert is unable to sit this morning and we'll
7 proceed under the Rule.
8 There's a procedural matter, we gather.
9 Mr. Mettraux.
10 MR. METTRAUX: I'm grateful to Your Honour.
11 We would kindly ask to go into private session, please, Your
13 JUDGE PARKER: Private.
14 [Private session]
11 Pages 5729-5735 redacted. Private session.
5 [Open session]
6 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we're in open session.
7 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Saxon.
8 MR. SAXON: Thank you, Your Honours.
9 Your Honours, the Defence complained because the Prosecution did
10 not provide to them a so-called investigator's note describing two
11 conversations with Mr. Baki Halimi during the last part of 2005.
12 It is correct, Your Honours, that until Wednesday the Prosecution
13 did not produce such a note and disclose it to the Defence. The
14 Prosecution did that on Wednesday because it received a communication from
15 Defence counsel indicating that the statement of Prosecution investigator
16 Thomas Kuehnel refers to a meeting with Mr. Baki Halimi. And when I
17 received -- and the Defence asked, Well, is there an investigator note?
18 Can you please give us a record of this meeting. I then spoke with the
19 investigator in this case, and I asked the investigator to produce a note
20 from his notes that he wrote at that meeting. And I will say in all
21 candour, Your Honour, that I was present at one of those meetings with
22 Mr. Halimi in late 2005 and simply, Your Honour, there was an error. No
23 investigator note was produced in late 2005.
24 But the matter doesn't end there, Your Honours. In a signed
25 witness statement by Prosecution investigator Thomas Kuehnel, at paragraph
1 98 Mr. Kuehnel relates that in a meeting with Mr. Baki Halimi, Mr. Halimi
2 told the Prosecution that he was: "Raising funds for the NLA during
3 2001." That witness statement was disclosed to the Defence in March of
4 2006. So the Defence have been in possession of the core point from the
5 conversation with Mr. Halimi, the conversations I should say, for the past
6 18 months.
7 Therefore, in the Prosecution's submission, with respect to Mr. --
8 with respect to information provided by Mr. Halimi back in 2005, there has
9 been no disclosure breach under Rule 66(B) or Rule 68. The Defence
10 counsel asked the Prosecution counsel for an investigator note and we
11 provided one.
12 If I can turn now to my colleague Mr. Mettraux's submissions about
13 the liability of the testimony of Mr. Bushi and whether that testimony
14 should be allowed. First of all, I should also tell -- I should say to
15 the Chamber that there was certainly no intent on the part of the
16 Prosecution to lead false evidence.
17 Yesterday in a conversation with Mr. Mettraux I was candid with
18 him when he asked me if I "believed Mr. Baki Halimi," what Mr. Halimi had
19 previously told the Prosecution. Whether Mr. Halimi because Mr. Halimi
20 had informed the Prosecution that during 2001 he provided logistical
21 support to the NLA and I told Mr. Mettraux, yes.
22 Therefore, Your Honour, at the close of this trial, the
23 Prosecution will not rely on Nazim Bushi's evidence provided during direct
24 examination on a particular point and this is at page 5609, line 1 to line
25 3, where Mr. Bushi said that Baki Halimi was not assisting the NLA in any
2 However, Your Honour, the final result should not be to discard
3 the remainder of Mr. Bushi's evidence.
4 Your Honour, if the Prosecution has reason to believe that a
5 witness may not be giving completely truthful or accurate evidence on one
6 point, does that mean that the remainder of the witness's evidence cannot
7 be presented? And in the Prosecution's submission, the practice and the
8 jurisprudence of this Tribunal would answer no.
9 In fact, Your Honours, it is an everyday occurrence at trials
10 before this Tribunal that witnesses provide testimony that may not be
11 fully truthful or accurate and the task is then left to Trial Chambers
12 after hearing all of the evidence, to determine what weight, if any, to
13 give to such evidence. And I would respectively refer the Trial Chamber
14 to the Appeals Chamber's discussion of the effort of Witness AT in the
15 Kordic appeal judgement, paragraphs 244 to 294 of judgement dated 17
16 December 2004. And that discussion by the Appeals Chamber confirmed
17 decisions made by the Kordic Trial Chamber with respect to the evaluation
18 of a Witness AT in the Kordic trial judgement.
19 So, Your Honour, in the Prosecution's submission, both the
20 practice of this Tribunal and the jurisprudence of this Tribunal would
21 not -- would not support the discarding of Mr. Bushi's evidence.
22 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Mettraux.
23 MR. METTRAUX: Your Honour, if I could be permitted to reply very
25 The complaint identified by Mr. Saxon to the effect that our
1 complaint is one about a failure to disclose material clearly relevant to
2 these proceedings and clearly falling within the terms of Rule 68 is
3 incorrect. Yes, this is one of the issue relevant to this matter, but
4 this is not the nut of the problem. Our concern here, Your Honour, is
5 that the Prosecution has sought to elicit, positively elicit evidence
6 which it knew to be false or should have known to be false. The
7 Prosecution attempt to limit the question to whether or not Mr. Halimi was
8 or wasn't a member of the NLA and what role he plays is not correct. The
9 proofing notes which were given to us by the Prosecution in the past few
10 days have a much broader scope of relevance.
11 The second complaint of the Defence is that the Prosecution is now
12 seeking to rely on evidence that it has failed to investigate properly as
13 mentioned by my colleague Mr. Apostolski.
14 A third complaint is that the Prosecution seeks to rely on the
15 evidence of a man who has shown his willingness not to be truthful with
16 the Prosecutor or with the Chamber.
17 Mr. Saxon has indicated that it is for the Chamber ultimately to
18 decide on the reliability or otherwise of a witness and that is correct.
19 There is, however, an obligation in the Prosecution's own internal rules
20 of 1999, Article 2, which compels them only to elicit evidence which they
21 know to be true or believe can contribute to the finding of the truth.
22 Your Honour, the matter is not one of the Defence ability to
23 cross-examine this witness, in our submission. This witness should never
24 have been brought before this Chamber. Furthermore, and I reiterate the
25 fact that the unreliability we submit of Mr. Bushi in relation, in
1 particular, to Mr. Halimi is revealing of his willingness and readiness to
2 be untruthful about the two matters, the two sole matters which are
3 relevant to his evidence, the presence and role of the NLA in or around
4 Ljuboten on the 12th, and his unwillingness or unwillingness to assist the
5 Trial Chamber in obtaining reliable information about the inner
6 functioning of his organisation, the NLA.
7 MR. SAXON: May I make a 30-second point, Your Honour?
8 JUDGE PARKER: Only because the issue is so significant,
9 Mr. Saxon. Otherwise, if there was a matter, you ought to have dealt with
10 earlier. But yes.
11 MR. SAXON: It is simply to correct a statement that my learned
12 colleague Mr. Apostolski made earlier where Mr. Apostolski said that the
13 investigator note disclosed recently to the Defence indicate that Sulejman
14 Bajrami, one of the named victims in this case, was a member of the NLA.
15 This is not correct. The investigator's notes say that according to
16 Mr. Halimi, Sulejman Bajrami was not a member of the NLA.
17 JUDGE PARKER: I think that, Mr. Apostolski, you should have
18 another word.
19 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] It seems I will have to resort to
20 my 30 seconds, Your Honours.
21 I said that the brother of Sulejman was a member of the NLA.
22 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
23 [Trial Chamber confers]
24 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Saxon, the Chamber would like to be made more
25 clear in its understanding of the reasons why there had not been a
1 complete and adequate disclosure as required, in particular by Rule 68.
2 MR. SAXON: An oversight, Your Honour. I cannot give a better
3 explanation than that.
4 Yesterday, after the investigator note related to Mr. Halimi was
5 produced and disclosed on Wednesday, I then began a review of all other
6 investigator notes in the Prosecution's possession, and identified several
7 more investigator's notes which I thought had been disclosed in early
8 2006. They had not been and they were disclosed yesterday. One of them
9 at least in particular is relevant to the evidence of Mr. Bushi.
10 JUDGE PARKER: Had not been for the care, then, of the Defence of
11 Mr. Boskoski, this trial might have reached its conclusion without matters
12 of such materiality being revealed. Is that the situation?
13 MR. SAXON: That's possible, Your Honour, yes.
14 JUDGE PARKER: The Chamber proposes to adjourn now for a little
16 --- Break taken at 9.37 a.m.
17 --- On resuming at 9.44 a.m.
18 JUDGE PARKER: An issue of considerable significance has been
19 raised by counsel for the two accused.
20 It appears to the Chamber that if it is considered closely, the
21 primary issue is a failure of the Prosecution to have disclosed material
22 information in its possession, information which could well assist the
23 Defence of each accused in the pursuit of their respective cases.
24 The failure to disclose has now been corrected. The focal
25 significance of the information, which has not been disclosed until this
1 late stage, directly relates to the present witness, who is still in the
2 course of cross-examination. It is therefore the case that the material
3 effect of this information now disclosed is able to be used by both
4 Defences in dealing with the witness and in the pursuit of the balance of
5 their respective cases in the trial.
6 It is also the case that this information may have been of value
7 to the Defence for each accused in dealing with some previous witnesses.
8 If there has been some significant adverse effect, that can be dealt with
9 by an application, most obviously, to recall any witness who is so
11 The Chamber is concerned that there should have been such a
12 significant failure in compliance with the rules of disclosure. It is a
13 matter in which the Chamber accepts that there was no knowing or
14 deliberate withholding of information, and, indeed, that is not suggested
15 by counsel for the Defence. But the Chamber is concerned to ensure that
16 the fairness of the trial is not adversely affected, and it therefore will
17 insist that the Prosecution now undertake a complete and further review of
18 its material to ensure that there is no further failure to disclose what
19 is, quite obviously, information of significance to each Defence.
20 [Trial Chamber confers]
21 JUDGE PARKER: Counsel, in particular for Mr. Boskoski, did raise
22 some additional matters in his submissions.
23 It does appear to the Chamber that each of those matters are
24 really directed to the weight and reliability which should, in the end, be
25 given and attributed to the evidence in particular of the present
1 witness. Those are matters upon which, in light of all the evidence in
2 the trial and the submissions which will undoubtedly be made about them,
3 can and will be effectively considered by the Chamber in its final
4 evaluation of the case.
5 We would add that there can be no question that a witness's
6 evidence may, in part, be reliable, and, in part, not, and the
7 circumstance that in some part evidence is not reliable or is false does
8 not necessarily preclude that witness being called by the Prosecution,
9 despite the particular obligations on the Prosecution in the case, nor, of
10 course, by the Defence, if it is that they choose to call evidence in the
12 We are therefore of the view that despite what has occurred, the
13 fairness of the trial is not so adversely affected as to call for any more
14 drastic action on the part of the Chamber. In particular, we are not of
15 the view that it is appropriate that we should order that this present
16 witness's evidence should cease or that we should direct ourselves to
17 disregard what has been said by the witness to date. In fact, in our
18 view, the fairness which we owe to each accused in their trial is likely
19 to be better served by allowing to the Defence full opportunity to explore
20 all aspects of the witness's evidence with a view to a more full and
21 adequate disclosure of its deficiencies.
22 For these brief reasons, the motion of the Defence will not be
24 The witness should be called.
25 MR. METTRAUX: Your Honour, perhaps to indicate a very short
2 The Defence is obviously ready to continue with the
3 cross-examination and we will. It may be, however, that we will seek the
4 postponement of the rest of the cross-examination at some stage, in
5 particular in relation to the issues material to the documents which have
6 been given to the Defence with a view to perhaps obtain further
7 information from Macedonia.
8 At this stage, Your Honour, we will propose to continue and should
9 the need arise, we would indicate it to the Chamber later on.
10 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you for that indication, Mr. Mettraux. The
11 Chamber had understood that from the effect of your submission and
12 proceeded on that basis.
13 MR. METTRAUX: I'm grateful to Your Honour.
14 JUDGE PARKER: But clearly, if either Defence is adversely
15 affected in some significant way by the late disclosure, that is a matter
16 that should be raised.
17 [The witness entered court]
18 JUDGE PARKER: Good morning, Mr. Bushi.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.
20 JUDGE PARKER: I remind you of the affirmation that you made at
21 the beginning of your evidence which still applies.
22 Mr. Mettraux.
23 MR. METTRAUX: I'm grateful to Your Honour.
24 WITNESS: NAZIM BUSHI [Resumed]
25 [Witness answered through interpreter]
1 Cross-examination by Mr. Mettraux: [Continued]
2 Q. Good morning, Mr. Bushi.
3 A. Good morning.
4 MR. METTRAUX: Your Honour, before we start with the evidence
5 there is a matter which yesterday we had omitted to do and that was to
6 tender the last document which was shown to the witness. This was Rule 65
7 ter 1D822, this was a special report of the OSCE dated the 21st of March
8 of 2001 which contains a declaration by all Albanian political parties
9 represented in the parliament of the Republic of Macedonia and which
10 rejected the actions and violence of the so-called NLA.
11 Your Honour, we would seek to tender this document.
12 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
13 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit 1D225, Your Honours.
14 MR. METTRAUX:
15 Q. Mr. Bushi, do you recall that on Wednesday when we parted I was
16 asking you questions about the goal and purpose of your organisation. Do
17 you recall that?
18 A. Yes, I do.
19 Q. And do you recall stating your belief that your organisation had
20 the support and I think you said moral support of the Albanian community
21 in Macedonia. Do you recall that?
22 A. Yes, I do.
23 Q. And do you recall that I showed you a declaration signed by all
24 political parties represented in the Republic of Macedonia, which rejected
25 the violence used by your organisation. Do you recall that?
1 A. Yes, I recall it.
2 Q. And would you agree with the proposition that the suggestion that
3 you had large support, moral or otherwise, from the Albanian population in
4 Macedonia is incorrect. Do you agree with that?
5 A. I abide by what I said about the moral support, whereas in
6 parliament only two political parties were represented, which does not
7 necessarily mean to say that they were the sole representatives of the
8 Albanian people.
9 Q. Sir, I will ask the question again.
10 Do you agree with the proposition that in fact and in truth you
11 were not welcomed in the Albanian communities which your group occupied.
12 Do you agree with that proposition?
13 A. No, I do not agree with it. It is not true.
14 Q. Do you agree with the proposition that the entire international
15 community, every state, every international organisation, rejected your
16 movement as an illegitimate criminal organisation, a terrorist group and
17 extremist organisation. Do you agree with that?
18 A. I do not agree with that because the NLA was not a terrorist
19 organisation. It was a regular army with its uniform and logo and the
20 internal rules.
21 MR. METTRAUX: Could the witness please be shown what is Rule 65
22 ter 1D827, please.
23 Q. But let me put that to you in view of your response first,
24 Mr. Bushi. Isn't the truth that it was the lack of legitimacy and the
25 lack of support from the entire international community that led to you
1 pretend to be an army and give yourself military sounding names and
2 military sounding organisations. Do you agree with that?
3 A. No, I do not agree with that.
4 Q. Mr. Bushi, this is a document, I apologise again it is a document
5 that is in the English only. It doesn't have a Macedonian or an Albanian
6 translation. But this is a document which comes from the OSCE, the
7 Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, it is dated the 3rd
8 of May of 2001.
9 MR. METTRAUX: And, Your Honour, I will simply indicate there are
10 a number of redactions made in the text of the document. Those redactions
11 were made by the OSCE prior to disclosure to the Defence.
12 I'll ask the registry to turn to page 3 of this document that will
13 be 1D00-7221.
14 Q. Sir, this is a document that talks about the situation in early
15 May 2001 in and around Vaksince and Slupcane. And I would simply read one
16 paragraph to you from this report. Is says this --
17 A. I apologise, I don't have this document in front of me.
18 Q. Well, I should be apologising, Mr. Bushi. The document doesn't
19 exist in Albanian or in Macedonian. I will therefore have to read it out
20 to you. Is says this.
21 A. Okay. But please more slowly if you can.
22 Q. "There is it deep concern that given the fact that the inhabitants
23 of the villages under control of the ethnic Albanian armed group east of
24 the Crna Gore are not permitted to leave, a call by the government for
25 them to do so would achieve little. Whilst it is a logical demand to make
1 and in line with what one might expect of any other country in similar
2 circumstances, there is a fear that the military/police action may ensure
3 later this afternoon putting many of the assessed 20.000 inhabitants at
4 risk. It is clear that the ethnic Albanian armed group would claim that
5 all villagers are supporters of their cause. This is it emphatically not
6 the case."
7 Isn't that the case, Mr. Bushi, that in fact and in truth your
8 movement had no support in any part or in very limited part of Macedonian
9 society, whether Albanian or Macedonian?
10 A. The NLA had the support of all the Albanians, whereever they
12 Q. And you also know that in a number of villages, including in
13 Ljuboten, Mr. Bushi, villagers protested your presence or your attempts to
14 infiltrate the villages. Are you aware of that?
15 A. No, I'm not aware of that.
16 Q. Do you recall, Mr. Bushi, telling my colleague and myself on
17 Wednesday that the purpose of your organisation was allegedly to promote
18 the human rights of the Albanian people and to deal with what you
19 perceived to be discriminations in public and official function. Do you
20 recall saying that?
21 A. Yes, I recall that.
22 Q. Well, Mr. Bushi, I'm putting to you that that is just a facade and
23 the real purpose of your organisation was to carve a part of the territory
24 and to keep power and money for the leaders of your moment. Is that
1 A. No, this is not correct. Had we wanted to take over parts of the
2 territory, we would have done so.
3 Q. And I'm also putting to that you to achieve that goal you used
4 violence to undermine Macedonian stability and had recourse to criminal
5 and terroristic means to achieve your goals. Do you agree with that?
6 A. Can you please indicate to me what terrorist acts the NLA has
7 committed? And it is not true what are you putting to me. The NLA
8 engaged in a war because the Albanian people was discriminated as of 1990s
9 onwards, even earlier than that, so I can't ask you to indicate a single
10 crime or a single terrorist act committed by the NLA.
11 Q. Well, we will come to the crimes and the alleged discrimination in
12 a moment, Mr. Bushi. But isn't that right that the issues or the goals
13 which you claim to pursue through means of violence, murder, expulsion,
14 torture, sexual violence and others were in fact being properly dealt with
15 in democratic fashion by the elected authorities of Macedonia. Do you
16 agree with that?
17 A. No, I do not agree with that. I don't know where you got this
18 information from. It is not at all true, Your Honour.
19 Q. Well, will you perhaps agree with that then, Mr. Bushi, had you no
20 intention - and by "you" I mean you and your organisation - to play by the
21 democratic rules, to start a political party and to put your ideas forward
22 with a view to seek the support of the people who you claim supported your
23 movement. Do you agree with that?
24 A. Our aim, when the first democratic party for democratic prosperity
25 was form was that after we saw that, the political parties did nothing to
1 redress the demands of the Albanian people, which fell in the deaf ears of
2 the Macedonian authorities.
3 Q. Well, we'll turn to that right now, Mr. Bushi.
4 MR. METTRAUX: But before I do so, Your Honour, I would seek to
5 tender the document that is on the screen.
6 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
7 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit 1D226, Your Honours.
8 MR. METTRAUX: Would the registry please bring up what is Rule 65
9 ter 1D713, it has an ERN of 1D00-6274.
10 Q. Mr. Bushi, the document that I am about to show you is again,
11 unfortunately, in English only so there is no translation in Macedonian or
12 Albanian, but I will read it out to you.
13 This is the record of a hearing before the committee on foreign
14 relations of the United States of America at the Senate. It concerns the
15 crisis in Macedonia and US engagement in the Balkans. It dated the 13th
16 of June of 2001.
17 MR. METTRAUX: I will ask the registry to turn to page 1D00-6278.
18 And if you could please focus on the bottom of the page.
19 Q. Mr. Bushi, want I want to read to you is simply the last paragraph
20 on that page which is, if you wish, an introduction of the subject matter
21 of this particular hearing of the US Senate, and it says the
22 following: "Today's hearing has a two-part focus. First, we will discuss
23 the extremely volatile situation in the former Yugoslav Republic of
24 Macedonia, a country that just one year ago was considered a model of
25 inter-ethnic cooperation but now teeters on the brink of civil war."
1 MR. METTRAUX: I'll ask the registry now to turn to page
3 Q. Mr. Bushi, what I'm going read to you is the statement of one
4 high-ranking US Senator, Mr. -- or Senator Helms who expressed his view
5 about the situation in Macedonia in the following terms: "Until recently
6 Macedonia was a model, albeit an imperfect one, for inter-ethnic
7 co-existence and democratic rule in Europe's most war-torn region. Now,
8 within the past few month things have changed. Ethnic Albanian terrorists
9 are today using violence in an effort to undermine Macedonia's stability."
10 Mr. Bushi, do you agree that's what you were doing at that time in
12 A. It is not true. The reality is different from what you read to
13 me, the actual reality was completely different.
14 Q. Let's go on reading then. Senator Helms says: "Now, I realise
15 that there are legitimate Albanian grievances--" well, I missed a
16 sentence. I will start again: "Indeed, I am impressed by the restraint
17 with which the government of Macedonia has responded to these vicious
18 attacks. Now, I realise that there are legitimate Albanian grievances in
19 Macedonia but none warranting a turn to violence."
20 And he goes on to say this: "This point has been wisely
21 underscored by the refusal of Macedonians leading ethnic Albanian parties
22 to side with the terrorists. Instead, ethnic Albanian parties have
23 condemned violence and are working with other Macedonian political parties
24 as part of a national unity government, and the potential success of this
25 unity government is a threat to all ethnic extremists in the Balkans."
1 Isn't the truth, Mr. Bushi, that you and your organisations made
2 everything in your power using violence, crimes to prevent a unity
3 government to take care of those issues which you say you were trying to
4 promote. Isn't that the truth, Mr. Bushi?
5 A. I will respond to your question.
6 But, Your Honour, I would kindly ask you to give me more time to
7 go in greater length in my response.
8 JUDGE PARKER: Try giving your answer, Mr. Bushi.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is not true what the counsel is
10 putting to me. You should know that in the Macedonian parliament there
11 was a member who later joined the NLA members precisely because of the
12 discrimination that was perpetrated against Albanians from 1991 because
13 the demands put forward by the Albanians through their political parties
14 were disregarded.
15 I know that the United States, NATO and the international factor
16 does not sit down to negotiate with the terrorists. In 2001 the war was
17 over after an agreement was signed, namely the Ohrid Framework Agreement
18 with guarantees put forward by the United States, NATO, and the European
20 MR. METTRAUX:
21 Q. Well, Mr. Bushi, I'm grateful for this answer and we go to the
22 issue of the parliament in a minute.
23 MR. METTRAUX: But at this stage I will ask the registry to turn
24 to page 1D00-6284. And will ask the registry to focus on the second half
25 of the page. Thank you.
1 Q. Mr. Bushi, what I'm about to read to you is a statement made by
2 Ambassador James Pardew, senior advisor on the Balkans, Bureau of European
3 Affairs, Department of State, and it still before the US Senate, but
4 before I do that, do you know who Mr. James Pardew is and was in 2001?
5 A. Yes. I remember that.
6 Q. And can you help the chamber -- [Previous translation
7 continues] ... and can you tell what function --
8 A. He was one of the mediators between the NLA and the Macedonian
9 forces, especially in the case of the withdrawal from Haracin.
10 Q. But his real function was not to mediate between you and the
11 government; his real function was to assist the legitimate democratic
12 political parties in Macedonia to reach an agreement which would allow the
13 country to return to a more peaceful existence. Isn't that true,
14 Mr. Bushi?
15 A. It is true, but that was also true.
16 Q. Well, let's look at the evaluation which Mr. Pardew gave of the
17 situation in Macedonia in 2001. And I will read it out to. It starts
18 with the word "the situation today."
19 "The situation today in Macedonia is precarious. The insurgence
20 National Liberation Army, NLA, launched its first attacks in north-west
21 Macedonia in February. Since then, the fighting has continued off and on
22 largely in ethnic Albanian areas. Most recently the NLA occupation of the
23 town of Aracinovo near Skopje and its airport poses a potential threat to
24 NATO supply lines."
25 And he goes on to say this: "No one should mistake the position
1 of the United States administration. We absolutely oppose the NLA's use
2 of violence to undermine the democratically elected Macedonian government
3 and its leaders. We condemn the NLA's apparent effort to provoke an
4 overreaction by the government against Albanian citizens in order to
5 bolster their support from the ethnic Albanian community."
6 And that's what I put to you yesterday, Mr. Bushi, or Wednesday -
7 you may recall it - that's what you were trying to achieve in Ljuboten
8 when you ordered your men, the people under you in your organisation, to
9 shell the position of the Macedonian forces in or around Ljuboten. You
10 tried to lure them into the village to create an incident and then to use
11 it for propaganda purposes and to increase the support of your
12 organisation. Isn't that what you did, Mr. Bushi?
13 A. No, it is not true. I already said that. We didn't need such
14 propaganda because the NLA was an organised army force and we could have
15 infiltrated everywhere we wanted in Macedonia, not only in Ljuboten. From
16 what I see here, James Pardew didn't say anywhere that NLA is a terrorist
18 Q. Well, we will come to that in a minute. But at this stage you
19 will recall that I showed a document where NATO officers had expressed the
20 same view, namely that you were trying to provoke incidents involving the
21 Macedonian forces to bolster the support of your organisation. Do you
22 remember that document?
23 A. I remember that document, but it is their own statement. We have
24 quite different strategies and that is why we had the successes we had in
1 Q. Well, we will put this document aside, the Senate record, and we
2 come back do it in a minute but I'll show you another document in the
3 meantime. That is Rule 65 ter 1D688 and it has an ERN 1D00-6053.
4 Mr. Bushi, this is again a document in English. This one is a
5 report from a renowned military magazine called Jane's Intelligence Digest
6 and it is from the 1st of February of 2001 and there are several parts of
7 this document I would like to read to you.
8 If the registry could go to the second part of the page. Thank
9 you very much.
10 The assessment of this review, Mr. Bushi, about what was going on
11 in Macedonia, in particular and in the Balkans in general was as
12 follows: "Current events in the Balkans indicate that Jane's Intelligence
13 Digest oft-repeated warnings of an escalating series of regional conflicts
14 are proving accurate. In a space of a week ethnic Albanian terrorists
15 have launched an attack on a Macedonian police station, 2.000 Kosovar
16 Albanians have been fighting with KFOR troops in Mitrovica and there has
17 been a serious upsurge in the conflict between the Serbia forces and
18 ethnic Albanians in southern Serbia."
19 Then it goes on to say: "All of these incidents have a common
20 root, radical Albanian nationalism."
21 I will ask the registry to turn to the next page, please, and to
22 focus on paragraph which starts with the words: "The low-level attacks."
23 The magazine goes on to say that: "The low-level attacks against
24 the Macedonian police which began last year are supposedly the work of the
25 so-called liberation army, four of whom have been arrested. Ethnic
1 Albanians make up an estimated 25 to 35 per cent of Macedonia's population
2 of 2 million and are settled predominantly in the west of the country.
3 "The Macedonian Albanians currently have a tense but generally
4 productive relationship with the government in Skopje. Prime minister
5 Ljupco Georgievski's coalition government includes an ethnic Albanian
6 party among its partners. Many observers suggest that the Macedonian
7 Albanian leadership is willing to wait for a generation before pressing
8 their demands for independence. This is because of the Albanian's higher
9 birth rate would provide them with an increasing democratic advantage as
10 this century progresses."
11 And if we can turn to the next page, please.
12 The piece goes on to say: "At present KLA terrorism in Macedonia
13 is still a relatively minor issue just as it was in Kosovo from 1995 to
14 1998. The KLA started its activities by attacking Serbian police
15 patrols. However, the ultimate aim is to provoke the authority into
16 making a military response which will serve to unite the ethnic Albanian
17 minority in western Macedonia."
18 Mr. Bushi, there again you will agree that this magazine and its
19 authors have also taken the view shared by members of the US Senate that
20 is what you were up to, what you were doing with your activities was to
21 seek to lure the local authorities, in particular the security forces, to
22 respond to your attacks with a view to attract sympathy for your
23 organisation and I will add that did you that in complete disregard for
24 the well-being of the citizens, whether Albanians or Macedonians.
25 Do you agree with that?
1 A. No, I do not agree with that, sir. You know that when the Tetovo
2 University was opened by the Albanians with their own funds, the
3 Macedonian police killed a student for the sole reason that he wanted to
4 learn in his own mother tongue as the other Macedonian citizens.
5 What kind of provocation are you talking about, coming from what
6 side? The actual situation in Macedonia and what these newspapers write
7 is quite different. We have facts to prove that. If we want to speak on
8 the basis of facts, let's do that. If we want to speak using statements
9 such as these, we can write -- or you can write such statements every day.
10 MR. METTRAUX: Your Honour, the Defence seeks to tender this
12 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
13 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit 1D227, Your Honours.
14 MR. METTRAUX: I'll ask the registry to go back to Rule 65 ter
15 1D713. That is the Senate record of a hearing on the 13 of June of 2001.
16 And I will ask the registry to turn to page 1D00-6291.
17 If the registry could focus on the second half of the page,
19 Q. I'm going read another passage, Mr. Bushi, of this record of the
20 Senate of the US Senate about the situation in Macedonia and there is a
21 question which is being asked of Ambassador Pardew by the chairman of the
22 committee, which is senator called Joseph Biden, and he asked this:
23 "Let me begin, Mr. Ambassador, by asking you about something you
24 directly -- you indirectly referenced but I would like to be more direct.
25 What do you think is the proximate cause of the violence in Macedonia
2 And if one looks down further down in the text is the answer of
3 Ambassador Pardew.
4 JUDGE PARKER: Yes Mr. Apostolski.
5 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] I apologise, Your Honours, but
6 the accused are not receiving interpretation in the Macedonian language.
7 Now it is all right.
8 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you very much.
9 MR. METTRAUX: I'm grateful again for the indication to
10 Mr. Apostolski.
11 Q. Mr. Bushi, I'll read to you the answer that Ambassador Pardew gave
12 to the question of chairman Biden about what was the proximate cause of
13 the violence in Macedonia and he said this:
14 "Senator, first of all let me start with the situation back before
15 February. The Macedonian government was in a dialogue with its Albanian
16 minority community which is substantial. The estimates range from 25 per
17 cent to 35 per cent of the population is ethnic Albanian. They were in a
18 dialogue. They had brought them into the government in many areas, but
19 that dialogue continued because their record in dealing with the rights of
20 their minority citizen was not perfect.
21 "Beginning in February while most of everyone's attention was
22 focussed on southern Serbia and the insurgency that was ongoing there, a
23 group of extremists - exactly whether they were Macedonia originated in
24 Kosovo is not quite clear - began to form and to take military action
25 against the government forces in north-west Macedonia."
1 Mr. Bushi, you will agree that when you and your colleague took up
2 arms against the state purportedly to defend certain rights or human
3 rights of people you claim to represent, those very issues were in fact
4 being dealt with by the democratically elected authorities. Do you agree
5 with that?
6 A. No, I do not, because these issues were not treated in a
7 democratic way. Had that happened in reality the war of 2001 would not
8 have happened. As I said earlier, the Macedonian political class imposed
9 this war on us. At that time we were represented by 25 to 35 per cent, as
10 it is said in the document, I wouldn't have said maybe 35 per cent, as I
11 pointed earlier, until 2001 in the police forces --
12 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter didn't hear the percentage of
13 the Albanian representation.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And can you tell me now out of this
15 percentage in representation of Albanians, where do you see this equality
16 and what representation do you have in mind? Can you point a concrete
17 case of a fair representation of the Albanians which would be 15 per cent,
18 16 or 70 [as interpreted] per cent. Menduh Thaci started to negotiate
19 with his partner Ljupco Georgievski and they had no political agendas
20 during their mandate. They only had their private business agendas and
21 time will prove this true. There was a demand for an Albanian university
22 at the time.
23 Q. Mr. Bushi, you asked for percentages and I will give you some in a
24 minute but at this stage you indicated that because they were not treated
25 in that democratic way, are you suggesting that the election by free
1 citizen of representatives of the political party which they choose of the
2 ethnicity of the party which they choose and the involvement of ethnic
3 Albanian ministers and parties in the government is not a democratic
4 route. Is that what you are saying?
5 A. Now I will tell you why I'm saying this.
6 The Albanian democratic party did not win the election at that
7 time. The PPD won the elections. However, Ljupco Georgievski took for
8 his partner Menduh Thaci. The same thing happened on the year of 2006 on
9 the 5th of July when the BDI won the majority of votes, the democracy says
10 that the people should decide on who will represent them in the assembly.
11 Q. Mr. Bushi -- [Previous translation continues] ...
12 A. I apologise, but I did not finish. Let me finish with my answer,
14 Q. Mr. Bushi, is your evidence that what you did --
15 A. Would you allow me to finish my answer, sir. I only have two or
16 three more words.
17 JUDGE PARKER: Your answer, please finish, Mr. Bushi, but it is a
18 very long answer and you're ranging well beyond the question, but please
19 give your answer on this occasion.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I will try to be as
21 short as possible and within the context.
22 The same thing is happening nowadays. The PPD is in coalition
23 with the VMRO-DPMNE and I don't know how well-informed you are with the
24 current political situation in Macedonia. I thank you and sorry for
25 taking so much time.
1 MR. METTRAUX:
2 Q. And just one last question before the break. From your response,
3 Mr. Bushi, on the stand what you didn't like in the democratic party is
4 that the representatives or the people who represented the interests of
5 the Albanian people in parliament and governments were not to your liking,
6 not of the people of Albanian ethnicity in Macedonia. Is that correct?
7 A. No, it's not what we will choose but those who will be chosen by
8 the people should represent their people, not those who are chosen by
10 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction, page 34, line 2: PPD
11 should be replaced with PDSH.
12 MR. METTRAUX: Your Honour, I'm not sure whether you would wish to
13 take the break at this stage or in view of the procedural matters, you
14 prefer to continue.
15 JUDGE PARKER: It is necessary I think to have the break now,
16 Mr. Mettraux, and we resume at five minutes past 11.00.
17 --- Recess taken at 10.33 a.m.
18 --- On resuming at 11.07 a.m.
19 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Mettraux.
20 MR. METTRAUX: Thank you very much, Your Honour.
21 Q. Mr. Bushi, there are two more passages of the record of the
22 Senate, the US Senate which I would like to bring to your attention. The
23 first one is at page 1D00-6295.
24 MR. METTRAUX: And if I could request the registry to go to the
25 middle of the page, please.
1 Q. Mr. Bushi, what I will read out to you is a further assessment by
2 Ambassador Pardew, the US envoy to Macedonia in 2001, about what was going
3 on in the country and in particular what the Macedonian government at the
4 time was trying to do.
5 And it says this: "The Macedonian government was working in an
6 open -- in an ongoing dialogue with the Albanian community at the time
7 this fighting broke out. That process was not moving rapidly enough in
8 either our view or in the view of the Albanian community. I think this
9 conflict has heightened the awareness of the government that they do need
10 to take actions here. There are any numbers of inequities in terms of
11 Albanian participation in the institution of government, the police force,
12 the military, their access to resource, their cultural identity, language
13 and so forth. Those issues are on the table in the discussions that are
14 going on now with the legitimate and accepted political parties that the
15 Macedonian government has been dealing with all along."
16 Isn't that the truth, Mr. Bushi, that at the time when you took up
17 arm under the pretense of defending or promoting the human rights of the
18 Albanian community in Macedonia, those issues were dealt with by the
19 government perhaps not rapidly enough but all of them were on the table
20 being dealt with democratically. Do you agree with that?
21 A. No, I don't agree with that, because of the following:
22 Had these demands been on the table of discussions between the
23 Macedonian and Albanian parties, Isli -- Isni Thaci, the member of the
24 Albanian democratic party, would not have left the parliament but instead
25 he did and he joined the ranks of the NLA.
1 Q. Well, let me ask you this, then. Isn't the truth that you were
2 not willing to wait for the democratic process to follow its course but
3 what you really wanted was power for yourself and your organisation. Do
4 you agree with that?
5 A. That is not true. We no longer trusted the Macedonian
6 institutions since from 1991 there was no progress in the issue of the
7 Albanians being treated equally with the Macedonians.
8 Q. Well, let me read to you another statement of Mr. Pardew what he
9 says about the goals, the true goals and purposes of your organisation.
10 That's the previous page of that document. That's 1D00-6292.
11 Mr. Bushi, Ambassador Pardew was asked by a senator about the
12 goals and purpose of your organisation and that is what he said: "Senator,
13 at its most basic level, I think the objectives of these people who are
14 running this insurgency are personal power for themselves and they are
15 pretty flexible on what they would accept. I think some of them would
16 like to see this romantic notion of a greater Albania but that is probably
17 a very small element. I think some of them would like to partition
18 Macedonia, but at the end of the day I think they are seeking greater
19 political influence inside the Albanian community both in Macedonia and in
21 Mr. Bushi, isn't that the truth what your organisation is all
22 about is to get power for yourself through the use of violence. Do you
23 agree with that?
24 A. No, this is not true. I don't agree with that. And when you
25 speak about division of Macedonia, sir, the prime minister at that time
1 Ljupco Georgievski, came up with a proposal for division of Macedonia and
2 our political representative Ali Ahmeti did not agree with that proposal
3 and Ljupco Georgievski is coming up with a similar proposal even nowadays.
4 Q. Well, let's stick with the goals and purposes of your organisation
5 for the moment.
6 You will recall that you told my colleague that what you were
7 allegedly seeking through the activities of your organisation was greater
8 representation of the Albanian minority in public and official positions.
9 Do you recall telling me that?
10 A. This is true.
11 Q. Sir, in the year 2001, can you tell this Chamber how many Albanian
12 ministers were in the government at that time?
13 A. I would say four. But representation should not be looked as --
14 to the level of the assembly. There was no similar representation in the
15 institutions. If you're familiar with the process of the formation of the
16 government in Macedonia, you should know that this is an agreement between
17 the members of the parliament discussing certain issues on the table.
18 What is important is the representation in institutions. Even in those
19 ministries which were headed by Albanian there were no Albanian employees.
20 Q. Well, let's take one institution at the time. I was not talking
21 about the parliament at this stage, Mr. Bushi, but in fact there were not
22 four, there were five Albanian ministers in the government at the time.
23 Do you agree with that?
24 A. I agree.
25 Q. And the government of Macedonia at the time was made of 14, 1-4,
1 ministers. Is that correct?
2 A. I don't remember the exact number but it should be more or less
3 that figure.
4 Q. You would agree that there was more than a third of ministers of
5 Albanian ethnicity at that time. Do you agree with that?
6 A. Yes. However, as I said, you cannot speak of a representation of
7 Albanians only through five ministers in the government. Within Macedonia
8 there are many institutions and at that time the representation in this
9 institutions was 1 to 2 per cent.
10 Q. Well, let's stick with the government for a bit longer.
11 Do you know how many deputy ministers were of Albanian ethnicity
12 at that time?
13 A. Let's say four or five or three. I don't remember exactly.
14 Q. Well, there were four. And, again, four out of 14. So that is a
15 bit less than a third this time. Is that correct?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. And one of them was the deputy minister of the Ministry of
18 Interior. Is that correct?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. That's Mr. Refet Elmazi. Is that correct?
21 A. Yes. Who nowadays beats MPs in the Macedonian assembly.
22 Q. Would you agree Mr. Bushi, that as far as the government of
23 Macedonia is concerned and as far as the year 2001 is concerned, there was
24 adequate representation of the ethnic Albanian minority in the
25 government. Do you agree with that?
1 A. Sir, I don't agree. There are 700.000 or 800.000 Albanians in
2 Macedonia and you cannot speak of a fair representation of Albanians by a
3 number of five or six deputies. If you speak of a proportionate
4 representation which will be in line with the number of the -- percentage
5 of the population, 25 or 26, then I would agree. If we speak about the
6 Ministry of Defence, for example, when there are 8.000 or 9.000 officers,
7 when -- or 10.000, 12.000 officers, and if you compare it to 80 or 90
8 officers, then you in percentages would be 1 or 2 per cent. That's why
9 I'm saying cannot speak of fair representation of the Albanians from 2001
10 we still haven't reached the just representation but there has been a
12 Q. Mr. Bushi, can you answer my question about the government. Would
13 you agree that the representation of the ethnic minority, Albanian ethnic
14 minority was in line or in fact perhaps even superior to the democratic
15 percentage -- demographic, I should say, percentage of the Albanian
16 community in Macedonia. Do you agree with that?
17 A. No, I don't agree with that and I don't know which formula you're
18 using to come up with these figures.
19 Q. Well, perhaps I should ask you this, Mr. Bushi: How many
20 ministers or what percentage of ministers or MPs or other public offices
21 would satisfy your organisation that is there a fair representation of the
22 ethnic Albanian community? What percentage is acceptable to your
24 A. For us, I'm not speaking now about MPs. This should be based on
25 the vote of the people. It with be 3, 10, 20, 30, depends on the turnout
1 of the population in the voting. But for ministers, for example, this is
2 again an agreement between the governmental parties.
3 Q. [Previous translation continues] ...
4 A. I did not finish. And I please ask you to let me finish my
5 answer. You asked me about the ministries. For us it is not important.
6 You can have one minister in the government. For us it is important to
7 have an equal representation in the Macedonian institution, for example,
8 to have Albanians employed in the public administration, in the army, in
9 the police, in the judicial system and other ministries. So we are all
10 seeking just a representation that we rightfully deserve, according to the
11 statistics of the population.
12 Q. Well, Mr. Bushi, I agree with you. There was a democratic process
13 in place at that time in Macedonia, and in fact the citizens of the
14 Republic of Macedonia have made use of that democratic process by voting
15 for certain parties to represent their interests in the parliament of the
16 Republic of Macedonia. And I'm going ask you this: Do you know how many
17 ethnic Albanians were members of the parliament of the republic in the
18 year 2001. Do you know that?
19 A. To my knowledge, 25.
20 Q. Well, that's absolutely correct, Mr. Bushi. There were two
21 Albanian parties, which made together 21 ethnic Albanians and four ethnic
22 Albanian independent. And can you tell perhaps this Chamber as well how
23 many members there were in the parliament in the year of 2001?
24 A. I want to make a correction. 21 were Albanians. There are two
25 political parties and no independent candidates. 14 members came from the
1 party for democratic prosperity while the 11 others came from the party --
2 democratic party of the Albanians while the Macedonian assembly numbered
3 120 MPs at the time.
4 Q. That's right. There were 120 MPs at the time and there were 25
5 ethnic Albanian in the parliament at that time. You would agree that it
6 is slightly superior to about 20 per cent of the voting population. Is
7 that correct?
8 A. On the basis of the number of MPs yes.
9 Q. And you agree, Mr. Bushi, that the ethnic Albanian community at
10 the time was able to vote for the party which they thought best
11 represented their interests and they so did. Would you agree with that?
12 A. I agree.
13 Q. And would you also agree with that, Mr. Bushi, that today in
14 parliament there is still the same number approximately of representatives
15 of the Albanian community and there is only one slight difference in the
16 representation of this community is that you and your party have now
17 grabbed a bit of power by getting a number of your men in parliament. Do
18 you agree with that?
19 A. No. The only difference here is that we won the parliamentary
20 election of 5th July, 2006 with 11 deputies, while the party which is the
21 ruling party with the VRMO-DPMNE has 18 members.
22 What is going on with Macedonia is totally different from the
23 situation in 2006 and 2007. As a result of the government coalition, the
24 [indiscernible], BDI Macedonia won the candidate status country for
25 integration in the EU and NATO structures, but now Gruevski liked Menduh
1 Thaci as an individual and what they are doing is creating a political
2 crisis in Macedonia.
3 Q. Well, let's put that in simple terms, Mr. Bushi. Do you agree
4 today there is the same number of ethnic Albanian ministers in government
5 as there was in 2001. Do you agree with that?
6 A. The number of ministers is the same but the employees in
7 institutions, this number differs. In the Ministry of Interior today you
8 have 17 or 18 per cent. In the army, again, the same percentage. In
9 other institutions as well, in the judicial system, in the courts. So the
10 number has reached a difference from 2001. But the number cannot be the
11 same now with the one compared to five years ago. As I said earlier, you
12 cannot look at the representation with a number of ministers in the
13 ministry. You should look at this with the number of representations in
14 the institutions. The number of deputies MPs in the parliament, on this
15 number it is the population who decides, not Ali Ahmeti or Gruevski. It's
16 the population who chooses the number of MPs that will represent them.
17 Q. And isn't the case, Mr. Bushi, that when you say that the current
18 government is creating a political crisis in Macedonia, you are doing
19 nothing else than what the leader of your political party, the former
20 leader of your organisation Mr. Ahmeti said in parliament a few months ago
21 is that he would bring back 2001 if you and your party didn't get your
22 way, and by that he meant a big sharing of power with his political
23 party. Is that what you're telling?
24 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters kindly ask the witness to slow
1 A. It's not Ali Ahmeti who wants this. It is the population that
2 decided on this. They voted on the 5th of July and they entrusted the BDI
3 to represent the demands of the Albanian before the Macedonian assembly.
4 Today the BDI has 15 mayors starting from Struga up to Kumanovo.
5 MR. METTRAUX:
6 Q. So we can agree on one thing, Mr. Bushi, is that what you care
7 about is the interest of your political party and your organisation, not
8 the interest of the Albanian people. Do we agree on that?
9 A. This is not true, sir. As I said earlier, people voted on 5th of
10 July and they trusted their vote to Ali Ahmeti and the BDI won the
11 majority of the votes to represent the Albanians in the assembly.
12 Q. Didn't the BDI, sir, get 13 seats in the parliament, which is
13 about 10 per cent of the voting population. Isn't that what happened?
14 A. That was not the case. The 5th of July election resulted in BDI
15 having 18 members, PDSH 11 members.
16 Q. And several of the elected member of your political party later
17 left your party, disgruntled by your politics, is that right, so now
18 you're down to 13 seats. Isn't that correct, Mr. Bushi?
19 A. It is not correct that we have 13. We have 16 members, sir, but
20 this happens in the parliament of Macedonia because someone is offered
21 means, opportunities, business opportunities and for this reason they vote
22 some, but the majority of the Albanian population gave the vote to the BDI
23 on the 5th of July, and that's a fact.
24 Q. Well you've also mentioned the mayors and claim to have 13 mayors
25 within your ranks. Do you know how many ethnic Albanian mayors there was
1 in --
2 A. No. I said 15. I didn't say 13. I said 15.
3 Q. Going back to the year of 2001 when you and your group took on the
4 states through violence for the alleged purpose of promoting the position
5 of the Albanian ethnic community in Macedonia, do you know how many ethnic
6 Albanians were mayors in the country at the time?
7 A. I don't know the accurate number, but there were mayors of some
8 villages with the exception of Tetov and Gostivar. I don't know the exact
10 Q. Well, would 26 out of 123 be about right, Mr. Bushi?
11 A. It may be true, but in 2004 the electoral code was abandoned. So
12 if there were 123 communes at that time, now the number is about 70 or
13 80. I'm not sure. There is a change, actually, that with the amendment
14 made to the self-governing authorities, the borders, the borders of the
15 municipalities have changed. So in Skopje we have Izmet Mexheti, the
16 chairman of the commune of Cair, that of Strumerko [phoen].
17 Q. The point that I'm taking to is slightly different. I don't think
18 we need to go into the detail of local laws at this stage.
19 But what I'm putting to you is that in 2001 when you took up arms
20 allegedly to help the ethnic minority get a greater representation in the
21 state, there were more than 20 per cent of the mayors which is another
22 elected position in Macedonia which were held by members of that community
23 which corresponds, more or less, to the demographics of the country.
24 Would you agree with that?
25 A. Yes. We are talking of commune chairmen but not all their rights
1 and powers that they had in 2001 and the amendment of the electoral and
2 the local governing which, after the Ohrid Framework Agreement had -- were
3 given greater powers in the context of the decentralisation of central
4 power and to the local power. We cannot talk of the rights of the
5 chairmen of communes rights which they had from 2001 onwards because the
6 change is major in the sphere of the powers and competencies of the
7 commune chairmen.
8 MR. METTRAUX: Your Honour, before I move on to another document I
9 seek to tender Rule 65 ter 1D713. This is the record of the hearing
10 before the committee on foreign relation of the United States of America.
11 It is dated 13 of June, 2001.
12 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
13 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit 1D228, Your Honours.
14 MR. METTRAUX:
15 Q. Isn't the truth this, Mr. Bushi, is that you and your organisation
16 were never willing or ready to play the democratic game and you bullied
17 every person, Albanian or Macedonian, who dared to disagree with your
18 agenda. Do you agree with that?
19 A. No, it is not true, sir.
20 MR. METTRAUX: Could the witness please be shown 1D158, please.
21 It is N005-7408 for the Macedonian translation.
22 Q. Mr. Bushi, what I'm about to show you is a document which I think
23 you have on your screen in the Macedonian language. This is a summary of
24 security related intelligence. This was gathered by the Ministry of
25 Interior of the Republic of Macedonia and more specifically by the
1 administration for security and counter-intelligence, the UBK, and it is
2 dated the 19th of March of 2001.
3 I'd like to draw your attention to the second paragraph in that
4 document. I will read it out to you.
5 It says this: "We were informed that the leaders of the newly
6 established NDPA party of Kastriot Hajisheksa [phoen] are exerting
7 tremendous pressure in the parliament upon Arben Xhaferi and the followers
8 of the DPA to withdraw from the government. Similar pressure is also
9 being exerted by the Albanian emigrees in western Europe and the USA.
10 Their aim to provoke a political crisis in Macedonian."
11 And further down in the text the UBK says the following: "The
12 services source from the BPA informed us that the BPA leadership is being
13 pressured to withdraw from the government."
14 Is that correct, Mr. Bushi, that you and your colleagues from the
15 NLA were putting pressure, including physical threats, upon the
16 democratically elected of the Albanian community for them to leave the
17 government and thus create a crisis in the country. Do you agree with
19 A. No, I do not agree with that, sir. Show me one example of a
20 member being beaten or killed.
21 Q. Well, I'll show you another example, Mr. Bushi. Is that correct
22 that in May of 2001 a grand coalition of political parties which included
23 all major political parties including two Albanian political parties
24 formed a new coalition government. Are you aware of that?
25 A. Yes. Yes, extended coalition. I know that.
1 Q. And the purpose of that grand coalition, Mr. Bushi, was to try to
2 deal with the issues which you claimed justified your violence and your
3 insurgency. Is that correct that was the goal of this coalition?
4 A. I don't know what the goal of that coalition was. I just know
5 that it was extended or a grand coalition.
6 Q. But what you will know for certain, Mr. Bushi, is that you and
7 your colleagues did not stop attacking security forces or cleansing
8 villages and areas from citizens. You continued with your activities. Is
9 that correct?
10 A. Yes, we continued with our activities, that's correct.
11 Q. And your activities, Mr. Bushi, were essentially to provoke the
12 Macedonian forces, kill and maim civilians and representative of the
13 authorities and members of the security forces. Those were your
14 activities. Is that right, Mr. Bushi?
15 A. Our activities were dealing directly with the Macedonian police
16 and army forces but not against the civilians. We have a fact during the
17 war in Karadak area, we had hostage taken by the Macedonian army and the
18 civilian before the Ohrid Framework Agreement was signed, they were
19 released to go home, and we had our rules and I mentioned that earlier on
20 the first day of my testimony here. At the centre for training, when we
21 clearly indicated to the soldiers that no hostage, either military or
22 civilian, could be killed. And that nobody should shoot at the civilian
24 Q. Well, we will come to your rules and compliance therewith. But
25 isn't the truth, Mr. Bushi, that the way in which your organisation was
1 promoting, you say, the human rights and position of the Albanian minority
2 in Macedonia at the time was by blowing up convoys of army, shooting and
3 executing members of the security forces. That's how you advanced your
4 agenda. Is that correct?
5 A. Yes, it was a conflict.
6 MR. METTRAUX: Your Honour, I'd ask that the witness be shown Rule
7 65 ter 1D712. It has been shown already on Wednesday and I will ask the
8 registry to go to page 1D00-6272.
9 Q. Mr. Bushi, what I'm about to show you is the same document
10 prepared by the human rights organisation the Balkan human rights which is
11 associated with the Helsinki committee and there's a number of matter of
12 relevance to this case which they highlight in this report. And I would
13 like to bring to your attention one particular part of this report or
14 collection of information and it relates to the NLA against new government
15 in Macedonia. And I will read that out to you. There is no Macedonian.
16 "The Albanian guerillas of the National Liberation Army, NLA, in
17 Macedonia said Tuesday that the new government of national unity would
18 only continue the bloodshed and destructions and that negotiation with the
19 NLA are the only hope to end the crisis in the country."
20 I'll stop there for a minute, Mr. Bushi. Isn't the truth that all
21 you were interested in again was to be involved yourself, not the Albanian
22 community, but yourself and your colleague into that process and that you
23 did not give the Macedonian government a chance to achieve any of the
24 goals which you say you were pursuing. Do you agree with that?
25 A. No, I do not agree with that. It is not true.
1 Q. And then there's a comment which is attributed to one of your
2 colleague, another so-called brigade commander, Mr. Sokoli and he says
3 this: "Any kind of government that it is created with the cooperation
4 between the EU without the inclusion of the NLA would only continue the
5 bloodshed causing even more damage."
6 Isn't this, Mr. Bushi, a direct threat from your colleague
7 Mr. Sokoli that they would not stop until that time when you would become
8 part of the matter? Is that what he's telling here?
9 A. This is not true. At that time we did demanded to have contacts
10 with the political parties for them to uphold or demands, until the Ohrid
11 Agreement was signed.
12 Q. Mr. Sokoli goes on to say this: "According to Sokoli it is not
13 time for governments of unity but it is time for Macedonian authorities
14 and NLA to sit at the table and negotiate. If it has come to this crisis,
15 then the initiators of the crisis should sit down, the Macedonian party on
16 one side, that is shelling the Albanian villages and the Albanian party on
17 the other side that are protecting the villages, Sokoli said."
18 But what Sokoli said, with respect, Mr. Bushi, is nonsense because
19 that is precisely what was happening at the time, wasn't it? All
20 democratically represented political parties, Albanian and Macedonian,
21 were sitting at the same table to try to improve the situation of the
22 minority in Macedonia. Isn't that right?
23 A. Are you talking now about the Ohrid Agreement, sir, the talks
24 which led to that agreement?
25 Q. No, Mr. Bushi. I'm talking about the new government that was set
1 up in May of 2001 with a grand coalition including the two Macedonian
2 Albanian political party represented in parliament at the time.
3 A. Yes. But for us, it was unacceptable until we realise our goals,
4 the amending of the preamble in the constitution and the realisation of
5 the demands put forward by the NLA.
6 Q. And Commander Sokoli goes on to say that: "Commander Sokoli
7 harshly criticised two Albanian parties with influence in Macedonia,
8 meaning the democratic party of Albanians DPA and the party for democratic
9 prosperity PDP. According to Sokoli after the recent crisis in the
10 Kumanovo region, these parties do not represent the Albanian population in
11 Macedonia anymore." And he says this: "It is not possible that a
12 political party such as the PPD or the DPA fails to raise its voice
13 against the shelling to continue representing the interests of the
14 Albanian population."
15 But, in fact, Mr. Bushi, what was happening at that time is that
16 you were bringing that onto the people who you claim you were represented
17 [sic]. When new government was set up in May of 2001, you refused to play
18 the democratic game and lay down arms. Isn't that the case?
19 A. On the 14th of February, there were no political parties until the
20 26th of September until the Ohrid Agreement.
21 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... Mr. Bushi, weren't there --
22 A. [Previous translation continues] ... democratic games were being
24 Q. -- two political parties represented in the parliament all through
25 the year of 2001 and from May the 12th or the 14th of 2001, those two
1 political parties were also represented in the government. Isn't that the
2 case, Mr. Bushi?
3 A. They were in the government, but they were no longer our
4 representatives because by that time we had our own institutions, the
5 General Staff, the brigades, our political representative.
6 Q. And when you are talking about "our representative," you are
7 talking about the representative of your terrorist organisation? Is that
9 A. I wouldn't call him terrorist but the army.
10 Q. Well, that's what you call it to give it legitimacy, Mr. Bushi,
11 but isn't the truth that the word at large - and by that I mean every
12 state in this world and every international organisation - called you by
13 two names. One was a terrorist organisation made of terrorists and the
14 other one was an extremist organisation made of criminals. Is that how
15 you were described at the time, Mr. Bushi?
16 A. It is not true. I said earlier, I know that United Nations, the
17 United States of America, NATO and others do not sit down to talk with
18 terrorists. On this occasion they did sit down with us and discuss with
19 all the open questions and we reached the Ohrid Framework Agreement. They
20 became as a guarantor to this agreement, both NATO, the EU. We were a
21 regular legitimate army for the Albanians with our uniforms and logo. We
22 didn't commit any terrorist or criminal act.
23 Q. What I'm putting to you, Mr. Bushi, is that in fact you fooled no
24 one, that the international community at all time in 2001 did regard you
25 as a terrorist organisation or an extremist organisation and actually
1 never sat with you to negotiate the Ohrid Agreement. The Ohrid Agreement
2 was signed between all political party in the country at the time and the
3 international community and the Macedonian authorities refused to sit with
4 an organisation they considered to be criminal. Isn't that the case,
5 Mr. Bushi?
6 A. This is not the case. Everyday international representatives came
7 to Ali Ahmeti to discuss the issue of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. It
8 was not reached by the political parties but by the NLA which was
9 presented then by the political parties that were involved in it.
10 Q. Well, we'll come to the Ohrid Agreement and your alleged
11 involvement therein at a later stage. But at this stage I'll ask that
12 registry show Mr. Bushi Exhibit 45, Exhibit P45.
13 Your Honour, this is the so-called "White Book" prepared by the
14 Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Macedonia and it has been tendered
15 by the Office of the Prosecutor and I would ask the registry to turn to
16 page N005-7606-0171, and in the Macedonian this would be page N001-5212.
17 Mr. Bushi, I will ask you to focus your attention on a part of the
18 page which has a subheading saying: "Terrorists must be defeated."
19 MR. METTRAUX: Your Honour, this document the "White Book"
20 contains a number of statements made by various political figures,
21 including ambassadors, presidents and so on and they are reprinted in this
23 Q. Mr. Bushi, what I'd like to read to you is a statement made by
24 Mr. Mark Dickenson who, at the time, was Great Britain's ambassador in
1 This is what he said: "The terrorists do not take the advice of
2 reasonable people because they themselves are not reasonable. It seems to
3 me that what they really want is not what they say they want. In their
4 communiques, one time they say they want a federalisation of the country;
5 the other, they demand the status of a constituent nation. And the next
6 time they would most probably demand that the Macedonian constitution must
7 guarantee them the grand prize of the national lottery each week."
8 Isn't that true, Mr. Bushi, that all through the crisis in 2001
9 your organisation just kept on changing its alleged purposes with a view
10 to attract support that you never had. Is that correct?
11 A. It is not correct.
12 MR. METTRAUX: Can the witness please be shown Rule 65 ter 1D320,
13 please. That would not be the correct document. That would be Rule 65
14 ter 1D320 and the ERN would be 1D00 dash -- I'm grateful. Thank you very
16 Q. Mr. Bushi, what I'm going to show you is a statement of Mr. Peter
17 Matthiesen, who you will recall was the military attache of the German
18 embassy in Macedonia at the time.
19 The Macedonian version of this statement is at 1D00-2966. And I
20 ask the registry please to turn to page 18 of this statement. This would
21 be paragraph 85, please.
22 Mr. Bushi, Mr. Matthiesen was asked to give his view as military
23 attache for the German embassy at the time of the goals and purpose of
24 your organisation and that is what he told the Prosecution: "The stated
25 objective of the NLA was the demand for more political rights for the
1 Albanian minority. However, according to my assessment, the NLA were
2 fighting for greater Albania. In this context, the travel by Mr. Ali
3 Ahmeti to Kosovo just before the signing of the Ohrid accord must be
5 Do you agree with that, Mr. Bushi, that in fact what you were
6 aiming at was not more political right for the Albanian minority; what you
7 were trying to achieve is to carve a bit of the territory out of
8 Macedonia. That's what your grand goal was. Is that correct?
9 A. No. This was not our goal. As I said earlier, this was the goal
10 of Mr. Georgievski to divide Macedonia at the time but we as NLA did not
11 accept that.
12 Q. Well, perhaps you will tell me what symbol appears on the flag of
13 your organisation, the so-called NLA, and also on the patches worn by your
14 so-called soldiers. Can you tell this Chamber that appears on this flag
15 and patches?
16 A. On the uniform, we had the patch that all the Albanians have in
17 the entire world. It's the eagle and the inscription, National Liberation
18 Army, and Albanians they have one flag wherever they are in Montenegro, in
19 Albania, in Macedonia in Kosovo, in Purisevo.
20 Q. And, Mr. Bushi, that is the symbol as you indicated of the
21 Albanian nation. . You were not fighting under the flag or with the
22 patches of the Macedonian nation. Is that correct?
23 A. Of course.
24 MR. METTRAUX: Could the witness please be shown Exhibit P45,
25 please. This time it would be at page N005-7606-0167. The Macedonian
1 version would be N001-5208.
2 Q. Perhaps, Mr. Bushi, I should put this proposition to you: Would
3 you agree that your actions in the year --
4 A. I apologise. I don't have the Macedonian version before me.
5 Q. I apologise. The Macedonian version would be at N001-5208.
6 Mr. Bushi, would you agree that your actions and the actions of
7 your organisation in the year of 2001 rather than promoting the rights and
8 interests of the Albanian community in Macedonia, your action in fact
9 undermined the rights of the people you claim to represent. Do you agree
10 with that?
11 A. No, I don't.
12 Q. Well, I'll read to you what the President of the United States of
13 America, President George Bush, said on the 21st of March 2001 about
14 this. He said this: "A small group of extremists determined to
15 destabilize the democratic multi-ethnic government of Macedonia," that's
16 how he described you. Then goes on to say: "The United States and its
17 allies have a long standed commitment to the sovereignty and territorial
18 integrity of Macedonia."
19 Then he adds: "The insurgents in Macedonia claim to be advancing
20 the cause of the Albanian minority. They are not. In fact their violent
21 methods are hurting the long-term interests of ethnic Albanians in
22 Macedonia, Kosovo and throughout the region. We support instead those
23 political leaders in Macedonia and the region who have rejected violence
24 and terror in favour of democracy and dialogue as a way to achieve
25 political change."
1 Do you agree that this is in a few sentences this encapsulates the
2 position of the international community at the time, Mr. Bushi, that your
3 group of men were men of violence who did not want to play the democratic
4 game and who did not represent the best interests of the Albanian
5 community. Do you agree with that?
6 A. I know the final position of the international factor and that is
7 that they were the guarantor of the Ohrid Agreement. That was signed by
8 the political parties but proposed by Ali Ahmeti.
9 Q. But you also know, Mr. Bushi, that all through the year of 2001
10 the international community in its entirety continued to view your
11 organisation as a criminal organisation bent on destabilizing a democratic
12 state. Do you agree with that?
13 A. No, I don't, because of the fact that I had a meeting with a
14 British captain in Nagustak village. To my knowledge, he was a member of
15 NATO forces, of representatives of the US and Great Britain, and they do
16 not speak with terrorists.
17 Q. Well, let's look at Rule 65 ter 1D286. It has an ERN 1D00-2826.
18 Mr. Bushi, again I apologise, this is in the English language
19 only. This is a joint statement by President George W. Bush of the United
20 States and Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder of Germany on the occasion of a
21 trans-atlantic vision for the 21st century. It is dated the 29th of March
22 of 2001.
23 I would like to draw your attention on to one particular statement
24 with those two gentlemen made in that statement.
25 They said this: "Both our countries have long-standing
1 commitments to the territorial integrity of Macedonia. We strongly
2 condemn the violence perpetrated by a small group of extremists trying to
3 destabilise that country's democracy multi-ethnic government. Their
4 violent methods are hurting the long-term interests of the ethnic
5 Albanians in Macedonia, Kosovo and throughout the region.
6 You would agree, Mr. Bushi, that again what President Bush and
7 Chancellor Schroeder were saying is the same. They regarded you, the
8 world regarded you as extremists, terrorists, criminals that would not
9 play the democratic game and that did not serve the interests of your
10 alleged supporters. Do you agree with that?
11 A. Again, I will repeat. We were not terrorists or criminals. These
12 could be in the beginning of the war when Mr. Thaci and his coalition
13 partners, the former Prime Minister Ljupco Georgievski called us
14 terrorists, but as time went by the entire policy changed and it ended up
15 in signing of the Ohrid Agreement.
16 I will repeat again: Had we been terrorists, the US would never
17 sit and negotiate with us.
18 Q. Well, we'll see what the US is calling you then. If the witness
19 could be shown Rule 65 ter 1D233 and I would ask the registry to go to
20 page 1D00-2542?
21 Mr. Bushi, this document is a document that was prepared by the
22 public prosecution of the Republic of Macedonia. It is dated the 20th of
23 November of 2001. And it contains again compilation of certain statements
24 made by a number of political figures in relation to the events in
25 Macedonia at the time.
1 This one is from Mr. Colin Powell of the United States and it is
2 dated not from the beginning of the crisis, as you said, but from the 13th
3 of April of 2001.
4 And this is what Mr. Powell said: "The international community and
5 the United States of America are deeply concerned about the terrorist acts
6 in Macedonia and south Serbia." And then further down he says: "Extremist
7 groups are damaging the long-term interests of the ethnic Albanians in
8 Macedonia and in Kosovo and in the whole region."
9 And that again was the position of not only the US but of the
10 entire international community at the time, wasn't it? They considered
11 you, in the alternative, terrorists or extremists that used terrorist or
12 criminal means to achieve their goals. Do you agree with that?
13 A. No, I don't agree with that. The Macedonian government at that
14 time portrayed us in this picture before the world. I will repeat again.
15 If you have a fact or an example of a terrorist or criminal act carried
16 out by us, please let me know which one it is.
17 Q. Well, we'll come to those, Mr. Bushi, you can be concern of that.
18 MR. METTRAUX: But at this stage I will ask that the registry
19 should bring up Rule 65 ter 1D852. It is 1D00-7473, please.
20 Q. Mr. Bushi, this is again in English only. This is a review -- a
21 news review prepared by the United Nations interim administration mission
22 in Kosovo, also known as UNMIK. And it is dated from the 9th of April of
23 2001. There is no Macedonian or Albanian translation.
24 Mr. Bushi, it should appear in a second on your screen and when it
25 does I'd ask the registry to go to the second page of the document, which
1 would be 1D00-7474.
2 First I'd like to tried a statement attributed to Mr. Alexander
3 Prosko [phoen], the United States ambassador to the North Atlantic
4 Council. He said this: "Mr. Prosko spoke bluntly to the interim
5 administration council members. No parallel existed between the
6 experience of the Albanians in Kosovo over the past decade and those
7 undergone in the FYROM, the Republic of Macedonia."
8 It goes on: "Donors would pose the question, why spend money on
9 people who refuse to play by democratic rules," he said, speaking directly
10 to the IAC Kosovar Albanian members, Prosko hammered home his point. The
11 choice is yours, don't blow it."
12 And then there's a passage about what Lord Robertson, then the
13 Secretary-General of NATO said in the same form. He said this: "Lord
14 Robertson agreed that the situation for minority Albanians in FYROM was a
15 million miles away from Milosevic's Kosovo. NATO intervened to save
16 Kosovo and its people to build democracy and a multi-ethnic society,
17 Robertson emphasised."
18 And then there's a quote attributed to Mr. Robertson and he says
19 this: "We will continue to fight on exactly the same basis when a small
20 country is put under threat by a bunch of armed gangsters." And then he
21 likened your organisation, the NLA and its fighters, to Milosevic's
22 thugs. Then Lord Robertson emphasised that the Kosovar leadership needed
23 to demonstrate its bellwether attributes by ensuring the men of violence
24 were marginalised and banished from the political process.
25 Mr. Bushi wasn't that a fair summary of what the position of the
1 international community was at the time, that they considered you as what
2 Mr. Robertson once said, "a bunch of murderous thugs?"
3 A. Regardless of what we were called, I will repeat again, we were a
4 regular army. When you speak of a multi- ethnic country, Macedonia did
5 not have such a picture, after the first parliamentary election
6 Macedonians started to call all these institutions Macedonian, Macedonian,
7 TV, Macedonian parliament and so on.
8 Q. Isn't that the truth, Mr. Bushi, that you the members of the
9 so-called NLA were the only ones to regard yourself as an army. The rest
10 of the world regarded you as murderous thugs. Do you agree with that?
11 A. I wouldn't say that all called us so.
12 Q. Well, for instance, to say of your cousins, so to say, would you
13 agree that Albania and the Albanian government at the time considered you
14 to be terrorists. Would you agree with that?
15 A. No, I don't agree with that.
16 MR. METTRAUX: Could the witness please be shown Rule 65 ter
17 1D712, please.
18 Q. Mr. Bushi, this is again the same summary of various reports which
19 have been collected into this document by the Balkan human rights
20 organisation, and I will ask the registry to go to page 1D00-6272. And I
21 will ask the registry, please, to go to the last subheading on this page
22 which starts with the word "Meta." Thank you.
23 I will read the passage to you. There's a subheading saying
24 Meta: "Albania will never favour terrorism or extremism." It
25 says "NATO's chief George Robertson and head of the European committee
1 Romano Prodi, received Albanian's prime minister Ilir Meta in Brielle.
2 Robertson assessed the stand of the Albanian government as moderate in
3 connection with the incidents in Macedonia. The Albanian prime minister
4 ensured NATO's general secretary that the Albanian government would be
5 consistent in its stand that it will serve the interests of Albania and
6 stability in the region. After his meeting with Prodi, Meta said that
7 Albania had never and will never favour terrorism or extremism in any
9 And then he said this: "We are doing or maximum to keep our
10 borders with Macedonia under control," Meta said. "We want to promote
11 cooperation with all country in the region and we condemn extremism and
12 extremists who think that they can solve problems using violence."
13 "We also expressed our full respect towards the territorial
14 integrity of Macedonia and the sovereignty of Skopje' government." And
15 then Meta also emphasised that Tirana has requested that the Macedonian
16 government engages in making a concrete improvement of the conditions and
17 rights of the Albanian minority by isolating extremists.
18 And then Meta told the EU yesterday his government would not allow
19 the country to become a base for ethnic Albanian rebels fighting in
20 Macedonia. "From Albanian territory," he said, "There is no help that is
21 going to the terrorists."
22 Q. Were you aware of the position of the Albanian government at the
23 time towards your organisation, Mr. Bushi?
24 A. Sir, this is not an official document issued by the ministry of
25 foreign affairs in Albania or the government of Albania. So I don't
1 accept that. It's not like you say.
2 Q. Well, would you accept the same statement then if it came from an
3 official United Nations government, Mr. Bushi?
4 A. I have no comments on that.
5 Q. Well, I'll show you Rule 65 ter 54 then. This is it ERN
7 The Macedonian version would be N000-N019-MF.
8 Mr. Bushi, this is an official document from the United Nations
9 which we received through the Office of the Prosecutor. It is dated the 7
10 March of 2001 and it is the record of a meeting of the Security Council of
11 the United Nations and it also contains a presidential statement which
12 condemns violence by ethnic Albanian extremists in the former Yugoslav
13 Republic of Macedonia.
14 I would first ask the registry to turn to the second page of that
15 document. That would be N000-N020, please.
16 And I'll just read to you one passage at this stage. It says
17 this: "In the ensuing discussion council members unanimously condemned
18 the violence perpetrated by ethnic Albanian extremists affirmed the
19 sovereignty and territorial integrity of the former Yugoslav Republic of
20 Macedonia and commended that country's government for the restraint it had
21 shown and for its plans to address the situation."
22 Then I'll ask the registry to turn to page N000-N026, please.
23 You will see, Mr. Bushi, that Albania at that time was in fact
24 represented at the Security Council of the United Nations. And its
25 representative at the time was a person called Agim Nesho.
1 I believe this would be a few further -- a few pages further down
2 the line. That would be N000-N026. Thank you. And if I can ask the
3 registry to focus on the bottom of the page, please. In particular, the
4 last three line, please.
5 Mr. Bushi, I will read to you what the representative of the state
6 of Albania said before the Security Council of the United Nations. He
7 said this: "Albania was deeply concerned by the recent violence in this
8 region. His government had repudiated and renounced the behaviour of the
9 terrorist group. He commended the response of the government of the
10 former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and was confident it would continue
11 to show proper restraint and wisdom."
12 And then the representative of Albania continues by
13 saying, "Albania supported efforts to solve ethnic Albanians problems in
14 the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia by constitutional means. In his
15 view, acts of violence run contrary to the interests of Albanians and of
16 ethnic Albanians political sector in Macedonia."
17 He also said that this: "It deprived all Albanians of the
18 international support and sympathy that they had won during the war in
20 Would you agree then, Mr. Bushi, based on this official document
21 that the position of your neighbour, Albania, was to reject your group as
22 a terrorist group and to reject the methods and means which you had chosen
23 to achieve your alleged goals. Do you agree with that?
24 A. I do not agree with that. It is not an official document of the
25 Albanian ministry of foreign affairs or government.
1 MR. METTRAUX: If we can turn back to Rule 65 ter 1D712, please.
2 I'll ask the registry to turn to page 1D00-6273.
3 Q. Is that correct that this position, Mr. Bushi, the position of the
4 Albanian government at that time that you were a terrorist outfit or an
5 extremist outfit was shared by all other member states of the United
6 Nations in 2001. Do you agree with that?
7 A. It is not true.
8 Q. Well, I'll read a statement attributed to President Bush of the
9 United States once again.
10 It says this: "US President George W. Bush supports the efforts
11 of the government of Macedonia to fight the extremists who have brought
12 violence to the region, White House press secretary Ari Fleischer told
14 At least it shows you that that was the position of the United
15 States, Mr. Bushi, that they considered you to be a terrorist or an
16 extremist group. Do you agree?
17 A. I didn't know, and maybe it was in the beginning, because the date
18 was 7th of March. In the beginning, it might have been so. But I would
19 want to see a document by the United States prior to the Ohrid Agreement
20 where they called us terrorists or extremists.
21 Q. I'm going to show you one then and it is dated the 30th of April
22 of 2001. It is Rule 65 ter 1D818. It's 1D00-7180.
23 Sir, again, there is no translation or interpretation --
24 translation, I'm sorry, in either Albanian or Macedonian of this document.
25 This is a record, semi-official record, from one of the US
1 government web sites about press briefing by this US State Department, and
2 it is dated, as I mention, the 30th of April of 2001. And as you will
3 see, the representative of the United States State Department was asked a
4 number of questions about the situation in Macedonia at the time. And
5 this particular press briefing dealt, in part, with an incident that took
6 place in the town or village of Velce.
7 Perhaps we go into this document, sir. Do you know what happened
8 a view days before on the 29th of April in 2001 in Velce? Do you know
9 what happened there?
10 A. I said that I want to see a document of July/August. The date
11 here is 30th of April.
12 Q. Well, one step at a time, sir. We will stay with this one for a
13 minute. But do you know --
14 A. [In English] Okay.
15 Q. Do you know what happened in Velce on the 28th or of April of
17 A. [Interpretation] In Velce.
18 Q. That's right.
19 A. No.
20 Q. Well, you asked me before if I could ask you about crimes
21 committed by your organisation. Perhaps you will remember that in Velce
22 on the 28th or 29th of April of 2001 a group of -- or members of your
23 organisation ambushed a military convoy at the time, just like your
24 brigade did at Ljubotenski Bacila, and what they did at the time is to
25 blow up the truck and execute and burn the survivors of this explosion.
1 Do you recall that incident?
2 A. I do.
3 Q. And you would agree, I hope, that the NLA that did that in Velce.
4 Do you agree with that?
5 A. This is what I have to say: What was done was done by NLA in
6 Velce. But it was in the context of an armed conflict between the NLA and
7 the Macedonian army, and everything that was committed when people were
8 dressed in uniforms, we don't consider it as a terrorist act.
9 The same applies to the Macedonian killing our forces. In the
10 case of the civilian massacre against the civilian population in Ljubanci
11 or in Tetovo, when a father and a son were killed by the Macedonian
12 forces, this is an act of terrorism.
13 Q. So, Mr. Bushi, if I understand you properly, burning or setting
14 alight a person or shooting him at close range is all right if he wears a
15 uniform of the Macedonian security forces. Is that correct?
16 A. They were not burned. They were fired at, and it is something
17 else what happened there. They were not set fire to.
18 Q. Were you privy to the autopsy report about that particular
19 incident, Mr. Bushi?
20 A. No.
21 Q. So you don't know whether they were burned or not, are you?
22 A. I saw some photos, but it is not true that they were burned.
23 Maybe they were shelled with nitroglycerin. This is something that causes
24 burns, of course, when you use it.
25 Q. I see. Well, let's see what the United States Department -- or
1 the State Department have to say about this. It is at page 1D00-7189.
2 And there's a gentleman called Mr. Reeker who is the spokesman of the
3 State Department, and he said this: "I will just point out for those of
4 you that missed it over the weekend, we did issue a statement on Saturday
5 soundly condemning the attack on Macedonian security forces by armed
6 ethnic Albanian extremists, and that statement obviously still stands.
7 This was an ambush that extremists -- by extremists that resulted in the
8 death of eight Macedonian soldiers. We want to extend our condolences to
9 the families of those eight who were killed and to the entire country of
11 Then he goes on to say this: "We noted or have discussed that
12 there has been a strong condemnation of that barbarious attack by the
13 Macedonian Albanian political leader Arben Xhaferi."
14 And I will stop there for a minute, Mr. Bushi. You have mentioned
15 Mr. Xhaferi several times in your attack against him and his political
16 party. Isn't that the truth, Mr. Bushi, that you didn't like Mr. Xhaferi
17 so much--
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. -- because he, unlike you, was willing to go the democratic way and
20 to deal with those issues which concerned his people in a democratic
21 fashion. Is that why you didn't like Mr. Xhaferi and still don't like
22 Mr. Xhaferi?
23 A. We didn't like Mr. Xhaferi, not him personally but his political
24 party, because it followed anti-Albanian policy. And it was a
25 businesslike political policy. They discussed tobacco, coffee, alcohol
1 issues, and we have facts that prove that.
2 Q. Well, just for the record, you'll confirm that Arben Xhaferi was
3 an Albanian, right?
4 A. Albanian.
5 Q. Then Mr. Reeker goes on to say: "We have encouraged other ethnic
6 Albanian leaders to condemn this extremist violence as well."
7 And then he goes on to say this: "As you know, we very much
8 support the necessary steps Macedonia is taking to prevent armed
9 extremists from disrupting inter-ethnic cooperation and dialogue which has
10 been taking place in Macedonia over the last few weeks. I think that it
11 should be said that such violence and terrorist activity greatly arms the
12 interests of ethnic Albanians in Macedonia and throughout the region and
13 those that are perpetrating this type of violence should realise this."
14 Then later on he is asked another question, and he says
15 this: "For a decade now, as an independent country, Macedonia has in many
16 ways been a model for how you can be a multi-ethnic country. That is not
17 to say that there aren't problems there. Just as we and other country
18 face these problems, so does Macedonia. The point to make is that the way
19 to address this is through the political dialogue, and I think what we
20 have seen is that they have taken that seriously."
21 MR. METTRAUX: And then if the registry can turn the page, please,
22 to 1D00-7190.
23 Mr. Reeker continues to this: "The violence that is perpetrated by
24 this extreme extremist groups doesn't perpetuate that at all." He was
25 talking of the interest of the Albanians. "It makes the process more
1 difficult. It inflames passions. It makes the situation for ethnic
2 Albanians in Macedonia and throughout the region more difficult as they
3 pursue that.
4 "So you know very well we have been very supportive of Macedonia
5 taking the necessary steps to prevent the armed extremists from disrupting
6 inter-ethnic cooperation and the process of political dialogue which is
7 under way there. And again, we think that those armed things, those
8 terrorist acts which have occurred a tragedy which occurred again this
9 weekend resulting in the loss of life simply makes the situation more
10 difficult and does little to feed progress. And it makes the interests of
11 ethnic Albanians throughout the region more difficult to look at in a
12 serious light."
13 Stopping for a minute there, would you agree, Mr. Bushi, that at
14 least as far as the US state department was concerned, your activities
15 which you say were legitimate combat activities against the Macedonian
16 forces were regard in a rather different light by the international
17 community? They called it terrorist acts. Do you agree with that?
18 A. No, I don't agree. I don't know what they said at that particular
19 moment. What I know is that the Macedonian police forces know -- knew
20 that there was an army, there was a brigade 112 in that area of Velce and
21 Tetovo and of course the conflict between armed forces cannot be called
22 terrorist. Terrorist acts are those carried out against civilians. I
23 mentioned the example of a father and a son killed on a street in Tetovo.
24 You cannot compare these two cases. In Velce it was an action
25 carried out by the NLA. I don't know what exactly happened. Let's
1 suppose that this took place but this was a conflict between two armed
2 forces, not between an armed force and civilians. And I would repeat
3 myself again: From 1991 to 2001, there was no political dialogue between
4 the political party. The Albanian political parties in the parliament
5 articulated their demands. But I will repeat here again: The war, the
6 2001 war, was imposed on us by the Macedonian political class.
7 Why they didn't care to represent fairly the Albanians in the
8 institutions or to allow them to use their maternal language before the
9 2001. How can you call Ali Ahmeti a terrorist when he is accepted by all
10 countries in the world and they do talk to him and negotiate with him.
11 MR. METTRAUX: Your Honour, would that be a convenient time?
12 JUDGE PARKER: Very well. We resume at five past 1.00.
13 --- Recess taken at 12.33 p.m.
14 --- On resuming at 1.07 p.m.
15 [Trial Chamber confers]
16 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Mettraux.
17 MR. METTRAUX: Thank you very much, Your Honour.
18 Q. Mr. Bushi, do you recall that before the break you said that you
19 were an army and that you were engaged in what you called a conflict or a
20 war with the Macedonian authorities. Do you recall that?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Would you agree that this army and this war that you were involved
23 in with the Macedonian authority existed only in your mind and that of
24 your colleagues and in no one else's mind. Do you agree with that?
25 A. This is not true.
1 Q. Do you agree that as I showed to you earlier and as you well know,
2 the international community as a whole continued to refer to your actions
3 as terrorist acts, extremist actions or pure and simple criminal acts. Do
4 you recall?
5 A. What you're saying is not true.
6 Q. And when you say that your so-called political leader, Mr. Ali
7 Ahmeti, was a significant or at least a relevant political figure at the
8 time, I suppose you know that he was put on a list, a black list in the
9 United States, banned from travelling, asset frozen and that he was
10 regarded as an extremist. Do you know that?
11 A. As I said earlier, it was in the initial stages of the war because
12 this is how the Macedonian police, army and government portrayed us before
13 the international community.
14 Q. That is quite wrong, Mr. Bushi. That happened on the 27th of June
15 of 2001. Do you recall?
16 A. What are you talking about? About the black lists?
17 Q. It's so-called presidential order from George Bush the President
18 of the United States which placed your organisation, the so-called NLA,
19 and a number of its leaders and members on a black list, travel banned and
20 assess restrictions, 27 of June of 2001. Are you acquainted with that
22 A. I am aware of that but for your information, Menduh Thaci is also
23 on the black list despite that he was not a member of the NLA. A
24 Macedonian general Stojanov or Stojanovski's his last name was also on the
25 black list and he was a leader of the Lions.
1 Q. And the European Union also adopted such travel restriction and
2 freezing of assets against the leadership of your so-called NLA. Is that
4 A. This was at a certain time, but not today. Menduh Thaci continues
5 to remain on the black list of the United States of America.
6 Q. And other government such as the Swiss government also took
7 measures against members of your organisation, in particular those who
8 were collecting funds in Switzerland and in other places on the basis that
9 those people were a threat to national security. Are you aware of that?
10 A. No I'm not aware of that and such things did not happen.
11 Q. Can we go back to Rule 65 ter 1D818, please, and I will ask the
12 registry to turn to page 1D00-7190, please.
13 Mr. Bushi, I'd like to go through the rest of this document with
14 you. This is again the transcript of a press briefing of the United
15 States State Department and I would like to draw your attention to a
16 number of additional comments made by the representative of the State
17 Department Mr. Reeker.
18 In the middle of the page can you see that -- it's 1D00-7190,
19 please. It starts with the word: "There is no place in Macedonia."
20 It would be a bit further down in the page, I believe. Thank
22 I'll read to you the remarks made by Mr. Reeker. It says
23 this: "There is no place in Macedonian for armed Albanian extremists
24 perpetrating this kind of terrorist attack. And we have been very firm
25 about that. You will see when we discuss or if you have reviewed already
1 the 'patterns of global terrorism' report that discusses in south-east
2 Europe groups of ethnic Albanians who have conducted armed attacks against
3 government forces in southern Serbia and Macedonia since 1999. We have
4 been quite resolute from here that that violence is counterproductive and
5 simply not the way to go."
6 You will agree, I hope, Mr. Bushi that at least as far as the US
7 State Department is concerned, there was no armed conflict. There was a
8 terrorist organisation or an extremist organisation using terrorist means
9 that was taking on a democratically collected government. Do you agree
10 with that?
11 A. No, I don't agree with that.
12 Q. And then Mr. Reeker goes on to say: "As I said, they have had to
13 take necessary steps to prevent, try to prevent disruption of the
14 inter-ethnic dialogue and we continue to support them in that." And he is
15 talking about the Macedonian authority. Then he's asked by a journalist
16 as follows: "You keep calling them armed extremist groups. I mean, are
17 you going to -- does it matter that you don't -- you are not calling them
18 terrorist at this point?"
19 Then if we could turn to the next page. It would be 1D00-7191,
21 The response of Mr. Reeker was this: "I think you know very well
22 and we can review with you again at this afternoon's briefing the process
23 of determining a designation under our law of terrorists. I did not and
24 the secretary has noted on a number of occasion that this type of
25 terrorist activity carried out by these groups is something that we
1 condemn in the strongest possible terms."
2 Would you agree, sir, that at least in April 30 of 2001 the State
3 Department described your activities, the activities of your group or
4 organisation, he described them as terrorist activity. Do you agree with
6 A. No, I don't. I will emphasise again, you are talking about
7 statements all the time. I asked you earlier, give me an example or a
8 fact of a terrorist attack or act in Macedonia during the 2001 conflict.
9 Q. Would you agree me, sir, that the United States and the United
10 Nations, we will see, were not the only organisations and not the only
11 states that regarded and called your organisation, the so-called National
12 Liberation Army, as a terrorist organisation. Do you agree there were
13 other states and other international organisations that called you those
15 A. I don't know what they said, but I will repeat again, the NLA was
16 a regular army and not a terrorist organisation. When you call it a
17 terrorist organisation, I want you to show you some facts.
18 Q. Well, in that case I will show you what is Exhibit 1D17.
19 Mr. Bushi, this is a document entitled Paris declaration of the
20 OSCE parliamentary assembly. It took place between the 6th and 10th of
21 July 2001.
22 Sir, do you know what the OSCE is?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. And do you agree that the OSCE, the OSCE membership consists of
25 most, if not perhaps all, European states. Do you agree with that?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And during that particular session of their assembly on the 6 to
3 10 of July of 2001, the OSCE adopted a number of resolutions and I would
4 like to show you one. It is at page 4 of that document, please.
5 Mr. Bushi, I will have to read it out to you again. There is no
6 Macedonian or Albanian translation. But it reads as follows: "And that
7 is the --
8 A. Which item are you referring to?
9 Q. It would start at paragraph 32, Mr. Bushi. That's towards the end
10 of the page and this is the parliamentary assembly of the OSCE which says
11 this: "It believes conflict in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
12 and southern Serbia has the potential to destabilize the entire region.
13 It opposes ethnic Albanian groups in the former Yugoslav Republic of
14 Macedonia, Kosovo, and southern Serbia who have instigated violence this
15 past year, condemns repeated acts of terrorism in the former Yugoslav
16 Republic of Macedonia."
17 Stopping there for a moment, do you agree that the OSCE, as with
18 the United States and others, again, referred to your activity not in
19 terms of an armed conflict in which you and your colleagues were involved
20 but in terms of terrorist acts against a legitimate democracy. Do you
22 A. I see the document, but I do not agree with it, because we didn't
23 carry out any terrorist act. Please, I will repeat again, give me a fact,
24 not to me personally but give this Tribunal a fact of such an act.
25 Q. And then it goes on to say this. That is the parliamentary
1 assembly. It calls upon the legitimate political representative of
2 Macedonians, Albanians and other ethnic groups in the former Yugoslav
3 Republic of Macedonia to focus on continued political dialogue and not
4 violence to resolve pressing issues and grievances of ethnic minorities.
5 Do you agree that the OSCE was also enticing the authorities,
6 Macedonian, Albanians and other ethnic group, to continue with the
7 political dialogue. Do you agree with that?
8 A. Yes. They appealed for that.
9 Q. And the parliamentary assembly of the OSCE also felt it had to say
10 this: "It reiterate its full attachment to the territorial integrity and
11 sovereignty of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia which must be
12 respected in the interest of all its citizens and for the stability of the
14 Mr. Bushi, you will agree that the OSCE felt it had to state this
15 because you and your organisation were attempting to dismember the
16 Republic of Macedonia. Do you agree with that?
17 A. This is not true. It is not the way you're putting it. We also
18 guarded the territorial integrity.
19 Q. But you agree that this is not the perception of the OSCE in any
20 case, as far as you can tell from this declaration.
21 A. This is their view on it.
22 MR. METTRAUX: Could the witness please be shown Rule 65 ter 54,
23 please. This is N000-N019.
24 Q. Mr. Bushi, this is again the same document that I have shown you a
25 bit earlier. It is an official record from the United Nations about a
1 particular meeting that took place on the 7th of March of 2001 at the
2 Security Council of the United Nation. And I would like to take you on a
3 tour of world views about your organisation.
4 And I will start with the first page. It says this: "The Security
5 Council this evening strongly condemned the recent violence by armed
6 ethnic Albanian extremists in the north of the former Yugoslav Republic of
7 Macedonia and in particular the killing of three soldiers for that
8 country -- from that country in the Tanusevci area."
9 Can you see that?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. And do you agree that it was the Security Council's view in its
12 totality that you and your colleagues were an ethnic Albanian extremist
13 group using violence. Do you agree with that? That is the way they
14 described you.
15 A. This is how they described us in the initial stages and this bears
16 a date of March 2001. I will repeat myself again: The Ohrid Agreement
17 was reached and nowhere is it stated that the NLA was a terrorist army.
18 This agreement was signed by both Macedonian and Albanian political
20 Q. Well, before I --
21 A. Under the supervision of the USA, NATO and EU.
22 Q. Well, perhaps simply to clarify this, Mr. Bushi, is that your
23 evidence or in any case your brief that after the signing of the Ohrid
24 Framework Agreement on the 13th of August of 2001, the world stopped to
25 call you extremists or terrorists. Is that your belief?
1 A. That's correct.
2 Q. And then I will go on to read that document to you. It says in
3 the next paragraph -- well, first let me ask you this perhaps.
4 Can you recall the particular incidents in which the Security
5 Council refers, the killing of the three soldiers in the Tanusevci area.
6 Do you recall that?
7 A. Vaguely, yes.
8 Q. Well, vaguely enough to acknowledge, perhaps, that this is
9 regarded and called by the Security Council not as an act of legitimate
10 warfare, as you would have it, but as evidence of violence by an armed
11 ethnic Albanian extremist. Would you agree?
12 A. Yes, this is what they said.
13 Q. And then it goes on to it says this: "In a presidential statement
14 read by Council president Volodymyr Yelchenko of Ukraine, the council
15 described the events as a threat to the stability and security not only of
16 the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia but also of the region."
17 Then in the next paragraph: "The council expressed support for
18 actions taken by the government of the former Yugoslav Republic to address
19 the violence with an appropriate level of restrains and to preserve
20 political stability and foster harmony between all ethnic components of
21 its population."
22 Then I would like to show you in that document what various
23 states -- the way in which various states described your organisation and
24 how they qualified your actions and I'd like to turn to page N000-9021.
25 If you look at the -- first at the top of this document you will
1 see there is the record of a statement made by Srdjan Kerim, then the
2 minister of foreign affairs of the Republic of Macedonia. And he recalled
3 that in the past few weeks unidentified extremist militant groups had
4 occupied the northern border village of Tanusevci from where they had
5 continuously provoked armed incidents resulting in the death of three
6 Macedonian soldiers on 4th March.
7 Can you see that?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. If you can now look at the bottom of the page, please. This is
10 the position of the United States of America through its representative
11 James Cunningham. He said: "There was little disagreement about the
12 responsible and careful way the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
13 government will handled the violence in the northern part of the country
14 or about the desire of the council to provide support for future helpful
16 And if we could turn the page, please. Mr. Cunningham continues
17 by saying this: "He asked the foreign minister to inform his government
18 that the council understood the prudence with which it had acted and that
19 it saw the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as an example of
20 democracy based on the rule of law and inter-ethnic cooperation and that
21 the United Nations would do all it can to ensure its accomplishments were
22 not undermined."
23 You would agree, sir, that the description given by the
24 representative of the US of the situation at the time, as far as
25 democratic nature of society in Macedonia differs quite significantly from
1 the one you have proposed in this setting. Do you agree with that?
2 A. I don't agree.
3 Q. Well, let's turn to the next representative at the Security
4 Council. It is Jean-David Levitte of France. And he said this to the
5 council: "The council was meeting at a time when small armed groups were
6 provoking serious incidents in the -- on the Yugoslav-Macedonia border,
7 that destabilisation at the regional level must be strongly condemned.".
8 Then if we turn to the Chinese representative further down on the
9 page, Mr. Shen Guofang, he condemned the actions of the extremists.
10 That's how you described you. If you look at the very bottom of the
11 page, there's a statement attributed to the representative of Singapore
12 Kishore Mahbubani and he said that the entire council condemned the ethnic
13 Albanian extremists, if you turn to the next page. And then if you look
14 further down at the representative of Norway, Mr. Ole Peter Kolby, he said
15 that "Macedonia had legitimate security concerns that must be addressed
16 and its sovereignty and territorial integrity must be protected." He then
17 adds: "Norway condemned all terrorist attacks in the region." He
18 said: "They threatened both internal and regional security. Leaders must
19 isolate extremists and clearly condemn violence."
20 We can turn to the view of the United Kingdom, also a permanent
21 member at the Security Council which said the Council seemed pretty
22 unanimous on both the foreign minister's proposal and the situation. He
23 condemned the recent violence by ethnic Albanian extremists and welcomed
24 the dialogue between the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, NATO and
25 KFOR on practical steps.
1 I'll stop here for a moment. Do agree that all those dates again
2 described your activities as violence, your group as either terrorists or
3 your action as terrorist in nature and your group either as terrorists or
4 as extremists. Do you agree with that?
5 A. No, I don't agree with that. I don't know what you mean by the
6 term "terrorist" or "terrorism." The way that these statements describe
7 the situation differs completely from the real situation on the ground.
8 Please, sir, present here one single fact to prove your point, namely that
9 NLA was a terrorist organisation.
10 Q. If you go down the page on this document to the statement by the
11 representative of Tunisia you can read that Tunisia condemned the violent
12 actions by the extremists. Can you see that?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And if you can turn to the next page, please. You will see that
15 the representative of Colombia condemned the threats made by the
16 extremists. Can you see that?
17 A. Yes, I do.
18 Q. And then there's the representative of Mali who condemned the
19 illegal and violent terrorist actions by the ethnic Albanian. Can you see
21 A. Yes, can I.
22 Q. The representative of Mauritius condemned the actions of the
23 extremists. Can you see this one?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. And then there's the council president, the representative of
1 Ukraine, who says, speaking in his national capacity, strongly condemn
2 attacks on Macedonian soldiers by extremist Albanian forces and deplored
3 the violent death of three of them a few days ago. Do you agree again
4 that in the view of the Ukraine representative, in any case, what you were
5 doing was not legitimate acts of warfare but crimes committed against
6 Macedonian soldiers. Do you agree?
7 A. I -- yes, because they know that Ukrainian soldiers were also in
8 Macedonia. They know very well how many soldiers they lost.
9 Q. And can you look a bit further where Ukraine also commended the
10 Macedonia government for its measured response to the situation so far and
11 its inclination to seek a political solution. Can you see that?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. And then there's the representative of Sweden Pierre Schori, who
14 spoke on behalf of the European Union and the associated countries of
15 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
16 Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Cyprus, Malta and Turkey as well as Iceland
17 and Liechtenstein and if we can turn to the next page, again Mr. Schori,
18 the representative of Sweden, condemned the rising number of incidents in
19 the area including the ethnic Albanian extremist attack on 4 March near
20 the village of Tanusevci which resulted in the death of three soldiers.
21 And if we go down that page there's the statement of Vladimir
22 Sotirov of Bulgaria where he said the action of the armed Albanian
23 extremists, that's the way he referred to your activities.
24 And if we can turn to the next page, please. There's the
25 statement of representative of Yugoslavia who also referred to you as
1 ethnic Albanian terrorism. And if we go further down that page, there's,
2 once again, the statement which I have read to you from the representative
3 of Albania, Mr. Agim Nesho, which referred to you as a terrorist group and
4 made the point that the acts of violence, your acts of violence run
5 contrary to the interests of Albanians and of ethnic Albanians political
6 sector in Macedonia.
7 Can you see that, Mr. Bushi?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. So will you agree, Mr. Bushi, that the international community was
10 absolutely consistent and unanimous in the view it took of the nature of
11 your organisation as an extremist or terrorist organisation that used
12 violence against the Macedonian state. Do you agree with that?
13 A. No, I do not, sir. Terrorist acts were committed by the
14 Macedonian police when, in Manastir of Bitola where Albanians were beaten
15 up, their houses were set fire to. A mosque was burned, which to this day
16 is destroyed. That is a terrorist act where the police forces of the
17 Macedonian government killed civilians.
18 Show me one single act committed by the NLA like the ones
19 committed by the Macedonian police forces. In Manastir of Bitola, there
20 wasn't a single NLA soldier.
21 Q. And you said earlier in response to one of my question, Mr. Bushi,
22 that you believed that those names that you were called, extremist and
23 terrorist, were just a thing of the early days and that it soon stopped.
24 And I would like to show what you what is Exhibit 1D115, I believe. It
25 has an ERN 1D00-2009.
1 It could possible possibly be 1D15 rather than 115. Thank you.
2 Sir, this is a statement by the president of the Security Council
3 of the United Nations again. It is dated the 13 of August of 2001 and it
4 greets, if you wish, the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement the same
5 day. And in the statement the president says this on behalf of the
6 Security Council. It reiterates its call to all who have contact with
7 extremist groups to make clear to them that they have no support from any
8 quarter in the international community. The council condemns the ongoing
9 violence by extremists and call on all parties to respect the cease-fire.
10 The council rejects any attempt to use violence, including the use of
11 land-mines, to undermine the framework agreement which has been negotiated
12 by the democratic elected political leadership of the former Yugoslav
13 Republic of Macedonia.
14 Do you agree that on the 13th of August 2001 after the Ohrid
15 Agreement had been signed the Security Council through its president
16 continued to refer to your group as extremists and referring to your
17 ongoing violence by extremists and asking those who had conduct to you to
18 ensure that you would respect the cease-fire. Is that the way you were
19 being described on the 13th of August of 2001?
20 A. Sir, I read here, as you say, that they have called us, in the
21 same word. But in fact we were de facto and de jure a regular army and
22 not at all a terrorist army and nobody can convince me of the opposite.
23 You can convince me only if you provide facts. You only resort to
24 statements here. I'm giving you facts, namely that the Macedonian police
25 and army have committed a terrorist act against Albanians in the course of
1 the conflict of 2001.
2 MR. METTRAUX: Your Honour, that may be a convenient time.
3 JUDGE PARKER: Very well.
4 We adjourn now. We resume on Monday at 9.00 in the morning.
5 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.43 p.m.,
6 to be reconvened on Monday, the 1st day of October,
7 2007, at 9.00 a.m.