Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 6498

1 Friday, 19 October 2007

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.

6 JUDGE PARKER: Good morning.

7 Two people on their feet. Mr. Mettraux.

8 MR. METTRAUX: Good morning, Your Honour, and thank you to

9 Mr. Saxon for giving me precedence. Simply to indicate that I would wish

10 to excuse Ms. Residovic, who will be here later this morning.

11 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, Mr. Mettraux, for that courtesy, but you

12 don't need to repeat it just for occasional absences. We fully

13 understand.

14 And good morning to you, sir.

15 THE WITNESS: Good morning, Your Honours.

16 JUDGE PARKER: I'm sorry you waited yesterday and then had to be

17 disappointed, but we had reached nearly the end of the day.

18 THE WITNESS: It's perfectly all right, sir. Thank you.

19 JUDGE PARKER: May I remind you of the affirmation which I think

20 is still sufficiently in your memory. It still applies.

21 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

22 JUDGE PARKER: Now, Mr. Saxon.

23 MR. SAXON: Thank you, Your Honour.


25 Examination by Mr. Saxon: [Continued]

Page 6499

1 Q. Mr. Bezruchenko, if you could turn, please, to what is the

2 document at tab 26 of your binder. This is 65 ter number 969.2. It was a

3 document which the Prosecution received from the Archive of the Military

4 Intelligence Department of the Ministry of Defence of Macedonia.

5 And, Your Honours, this document is referenced at footnotes 106,

6 116, 122, 285, 286, 288 and 289 in Mr. Bezruchenko's amended expert

7 report.

8 Do you recognise this document, Mr. Bezruchenko?

9 A. Yes, I do.

10 Q. And just, in general terms, what does this document deal with?

11 A. Generally speaking, this document deals with various aspects

12 related to the National Liberation Army. It deals with the organisation,

13 structure, logistics, strategy, tactics, financial support and other

14 issues.

15 Q. All right. Can we turn, please, to page 3 of this document. It's

16 also page 3 in the Macedonian version.

17 Mr. Bezruchenko, what does this page of the document tell us?

18 A. This page presents an organisational diagram of the NLA. At the

19 top of this page, you see the box indicating the NLA Command Staff, and

20 below this box you see two boxes indicating the western and eastern

21 fronts, and you also see, at the bottom of the page, six boxes indicating

22 six NLA brigades; namely, 111th, 112th, 113th, 115th, 116th.

23 Q. And at the top, there's a box that says: "NLA chief of Staff,

24 General Major Gzim Ostreni." Do you see that?

25 A. Yes, I do.

Page 6500

1 Q. The significance of the fact -- What is the significance, if any,

2 of the fact that the six brigades are mentioned here?

3 A. In my assessment, the significance of this fact is many-fold.

4 First of all, it means that the NLA had the Military Staff, General Staff,

5 which was at the top of the military hierarchy and in charge of planning

6 military operations on the ground, which is the most essential function of

7 any military organisation. And the NLA also had combat units on the

8 ground of the brigade size, which is six units in various parts of the

9 country; namely, in eastern and western front.

10 Q. Okay. Can we turn, please, to page -- excuse me, paragraph 42 of

11 Mr. Bezruchenko's amended report, please. This is Part 2.2.2 of

12 Mr. Bezruchenko's report, dealing -- and this part deals with the NLA.

13 Do you see paragraph 42, Mr. Bezruchenko?

14 A. Yes, I do.

15 Q. Just very briefly, what are the important facts that you describe

16 in paragraph 42?

17 A. Paragraph 42 is based on various sources which are the

18 international sources, namely, NATO sources, Macedonian military sources,

19 as well as the NLA sources, and there is general agreement relating to all

20 these sources, general concurrence, that the NLA had six brigades on the

21 ground and had its headquarters which was located in Prizren sometime,

22 then in Djakovica, and they also had headquarters in various locations.

23 Q. If you can turn your mind a little further down the page, please,

24 at what is paragraph 45. The salient facts that you describe in this

25 paragraph are what?

Page 6501

1 A. This paragraph describes various sources and assessments related

2 to the NLA personnel strengths. For example, the document which is cited

3 under footnote 40 estimates the initial strengths of the NLA at 2.400 men,

4 or another source, which is the source made by prominent Macedonian

5 military experts in their book which was released after the conflict,

6 estimates the strengths of the NLA up to 8.000 men. It's really difficult

7 to make a precise estimate of what was the actual fighting force on the

8 NLA at the last stage of the conflict, but I think the figure of 8.000 is

9 not too far from reality.

10 Q. All right. If we can return to what is tab 26, please, what we

11 were looking at a moment ago, 65 ter 969.2, and if we can look at what is

12 page 4 in the English version, also page 4 in the Macedonian version.

13 We see here, in paragraph 6 at the top of page 4, we see a list

14 of -- it appears to be weaponry. Can you describe what this document is

15 telling us here?

16 A. I believe this document was released sometime around the date of

17 26 September 2001, which was the date of closing the NATO Operation

18 Essential Harvest dealing with collection of NLA weapons. This document

19 deals with assessments of various arms and weaponry in possession of the

20 NLA.

21 While just skimming through the document, you can easily assess

22 the amount of the weaponry in NLA's disposal. For example, automatic

23 rifles of Yugoslav, Chinese and Bulgarian origin, 12.000 pieces;

24 semi-automatic rifles, 2.000 pieces; sniper rifles, 800 pieces; light

25 machine-guns, 300 pieces; pistols, 12.000 pieces, and so on and so on and

Page 6502

1 so on.

2 Well, of particular significance on this list, in fact, are some

3 weapons which could contribute significantly into the NLA war effort.

4 These are, for example: Anti-aircraft missiles, Srela-2 missiles

5 apparently in the inventory of up to 150 pieces; Stinger, American-made

6 missiles of similar type. Well, in fact, pretty close in its design to

7 Strela-2M, around 20 pieces; antitank missiles, around 90 pieces.

8 Multi-barrelled grenade launchers, 1500 pieces; recoilless cannons, 80

9 pieces. So this is a pretty impressive list.

10 At the bottom of this page, you also see the figures which

11 represent the amount of weapons collected by NATO forces in Macedonia

12 throughout the operation dubbed Essential Harvest.

13 Q. That was after the Ohrid Agreement?

14 A. Yes, that was after the Ohrid Agreement.

15 Q. Do we see a discrepancy?

16 A. Yes, we definitely see a discrepancy here. A very superficial

17 analysis of this document would suggest that only a small fraction of the

18 weapons had been collected.

19 MR. SAXON: If we can turn to what is page 13 in this -- in the

20 English version of this document. And it's page 12 in the Macedonian

21 version, Your Honours.

22 Q. Mr. Bezruchenko, do you want to turn to page 13 in the English?

23 A. I'm just watching it on the screen, but let me do it now.

24 Q. It has the words: "Training of members of the so-called NLA" at

25 the top.

Page 6503

1 A. Okay.

2 Q. It's the 13th page in the English version.

3 A. Sorry. Just one sec, please. I'm still watching for the document

4 on the screen.

5 Q. Can you see it on the screen, Mr. Bezruchenko? Could you work

6 that way?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. What was, if any, the significance of the information on this page

9 underneath the heading: "Training of members of the so-called NLA"; what

10 do we see here?

11 A. Well, this page describes locations of various training centres

12 which apparently were during the military training for the NLA, and we

13 have numerous locations here. Well, in Kosovo for a while, in the

14 Republic of Albania, as well as locations in Macedonia proper, probably

15 about two or three dozen of such locations.

16 Q. And why would the existence of these training centres be

17 significant for the purposes of your work?

18 A. The training of military personnel is one of the factors which

19 contributes to the combat efficiency of any military force. It's probably

20 one of the most important factors, anyway, which would suggest to me that

21 if such training centres did exist, the NLA had an institutional,

22 established capabilities of establishing, running and administering such

23 centres, as well as producing sufficiently-trained fighters.

24 MR. SAXON: Can we turn, please, to what is page 18 in the English

25 version, and it would be page 16 in the Macedonian version. It's a

Page 6504

1 paragraph starting at the top. You might be able to see it on the screen,

2 Mr. Bezruchenko:

3 "The terrorist activities were carried out on a principle of

4 connected vessels, that is, by transferring the focus from one to another

5 crisis region and by constantly maintaining tension in the entire crisis

6 territory."

7 Q. Are you with me?

8 A. Yes, I am.

9 Q. Why, from a military -- from a military perspective, what do you

10 take from that description of the NLA activity?

11 A. Well, this is the classic military strategy, if you wish, which is

12 aimed at extending the adversary's forces over a wider area to make sure

13 that the adversary does not really concentrate his forces at one decisive

14 point to deliver a decisive blow or strike. It also makes it difficult

15 for the adversary to exercise manoeuvre of the forces and shift the

16 reinforcements and supplies from front to front.

17 Essentially, this is a classical strategy to put an adversary into

18 a disadvantageous position.

19 Q. Mr. Bezruchenko, I believe it was last week when you were

20 testifying. At page 6058 of the transcript, you provided a military

21 definition of the term "armed conflict," and as part of your definition,

22 you said the following. You said:

23 "A conflict is normally of protracted nature. It involves use of

24 arms and weaponry and is normally waged for attainment of certain military

25 or political goals."

Page 6505

1 Do you remember that?

2 A. Yes, I do.

3 MR. SAXON: If we could turn, Your Honours, please, to what is

4 paragraph 150 of Mr. Bezruchenko's amended expert report. For those

5 following in English, it's on page 41.

6 Q. Do you see paragraph 150?

7 A. Yes, I do.

8 Q. I'm wondering whether -- if you could just focus on the first

9 sentence or so of that paragraph and explain to us, in general terms, what

10 the NLA's strategy was and aim during 2001.

11 A. Okay. Your Honours, I would just read this paragraph out loud. I

12 mean, I will read just the first sentence out loud:

13 "Analysis of the NLA's strategy indicates that the aim was to hold

14 and expand the territory under its control, stretching the government's

15 forces to the limit, thus denying the government the opportunity to

16 exercise any authority in the NLA-controlled areas."

17 In fact, my assessment is that the NLA's strategy was indeed aimed

18 at expanding the territorial control of certain areas in Macedonia and

19 dislodge the government forces from those areas, exercising their own

20 authority there. Its strategy was also to deny the entry of the

21 government forces in these areas and any attempt of the government forces

22 to recapture those areas were invariably met with armed resistance, which

23 resulted in casualties for the Macedonian security forces.

24 As the reports in the media were hitting the front pages of

25 Macedonian and international newspapers, well, the pressure on the

Page 6506

1 government to do something about the crisis and this war was mounting.

2 Well, this is what exactly was happening, and the NLA's political goals

3 were partly based on attracting the attention of the International

4 Community to the crisis in Macedonia.

5 Q. Mr. Bezruchenko, could you turn your mind, please, to the very

6 next paragraph. It's paragraph 151. Because you just brought us to that,

7 I wanted to ask you: Were the NLA's military objectives, according to

8 your assessment, directed towards a central political goal?

9 A. Well, yes, they were. The paragraph 151 describes the military

10 objectives that the NLA had in mind.

11 Q. Take a look at the very first sentence of paragraph 151, if I may.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Focus your attention. What was the central goal?

14 A. The central goal was to accept the terms of settlement of the

15 conflict on the NLA terms.

16 Q. Who would accept that -- the terms of the conflict?

17 A. Well, those political parties which signed the agreement.

18 Q. You're referring -- well, can you take a look at what the first

19 sentence says, Mr. Bezruchenko?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. It says --

22 A. The NLA?

23 Q. "To force the government to accept NLA terms of settlement of the

24 conflict."

25 A. Yes, that's right.

Page 6507

1 Q. All right. And what were they, were they, what you referred to as

2 the consecutive military objectives of the NLA, what were they?

3 A. In my assessment, there were a number of objectives that the NLA

4 had, and of course they could not really be realised simultaneously in one

5 go. The initial objective was to establish a basis for operations in

6 remote mountain areas on the border with Kosovo, namely, Skopska Crna Gora

7 and Sar mountains. The military geography of the area offered advantages

8 to the NLA. It was difficult for the government forces to access --

9 MR. SAXON: Sorry, Mr. Bezruchenko.

10 MR. METTRAUX: Sorry to intervene, Your Honour, but the witness

11 appears to be reading simply from the report. I'm not sure if it's of any

12 use in that case.

13 JUDGE PARKER: If it's from the report, it would not seem to be

14 directly objectionable, but I leave it to Mr. Saxon to decide whether it

15 is the most practical way he wants to proceed.

16 MR. SAXON: Thank you, Your Honour.

17 Q. Mr. Bezruchenko, just very briefly, can you describe what the

18 military objectives of the NLA were?

19 A. Okay. Very briefly, the initial objective was to establish a

20 sufficient base for operations on the ground. It was only logical to

21 assume that such base naturally could exist in the remote mountain areas

22 on the border with Kosovo and Albania, which would provide easy access for

23 supplies of weapons, ammunition and personnel across the border.

24 The second objective was to concentrate military activities in two

25 key areas, again, not too far away from the border. Those were Tetovo and

Page 6508

1 Lipkovo.

2 The next objective was to expand gradually the territory of

3 control around these two areas, pushing down south from Tetovo, south and

4 southwest, and from Lipkovo, southeast.

5 Another one was to expand these territorial gains to such a degree

6 that it would make it very difficult for the Macedonian government and

7 authorities to exercise control in these areas and to move their forces

8 sufficiently, in an efficient way, to defeat the NLA.

9 And finally, in the course of the conflict, inevitably there would

10 come a point where this territorial control, coupled with the NLA

11 activities and mounting casualties, would force the government to accept

12 the terms of political settlement.

13 Q. Thank you. And just to clarify, you mentioned Lipkovo. Is

14 Lipkovo in the same general area as Kumanovo?

15 A. Yes, it is.

16 Q. If we can go back to what is tab 26 in your binder, 65 ter number

17 969.2, but this time to page 18 -- again page 18 in the English version,

18 page 17 in the Macedonian version. It's the same page where we were

19 before, Mr. Bezruchenko.

20 A. Okay.

21 Q. You see, towards the bottom of the page, there is a subtitle

22 called: "The NLA's Strategy." Do you see that?

23 A. Yes, I do.

24 Q. And that tells us to take over control -- first of all, "to

25 attract and to maintain international attention and intervention," and,"to

Page 6509

1 take over control of the undefended territory and protection of the same

2 with minimum losses (to avoid close combat), to force the government of

3 the Republic of Macedonia to negotiate."

4 And you see that phrase in parentheses, "Close combat"?

5 A. Yes, I do.

6 Q. Why was that part of the NLA strategy?

7 A. This was the expression of the classical doctrine of asymmetrical

8 warfare which was employed by the NLA. Well, it is only obvious that in

9 direct combat, the NLA would certainly suffer from the disadvantages which

10 it had, which were represented by the advantages of the Macedonian regular

11 forces which were better armed and better equipped.

12 MR. SAXON: Okay. If we can turn now to the very next page,

13 please, still on page 17 in the Macedonian version.



16 Q. In the middle of the page, there is a paragraph that begins

17 with: "For a coordinated presentation ..." Do you see that?

18 A. Yes, I do.

19 Q. And that paragraph says:

20 "For a coordinated presentation of the Albanian political subjects

21 in the Republic of Macedonia at the forthcoming negotiations, in the

22 course of July, in Prizren a meeting was held between Ali Ahmeti on one

23 side and leaders of the largest Albanian political parties in the Republic

24 of Macedonia, Arben Xhaferi, Imer Imeri, when they signed a declaration

25 that they support the political demands of the so-called NLA."

Page 6510

1 Do you see that?

2 A. Yes, I do.

3 Q. This declaration, did it become known by a particular name?

4 A. Yes, it did.

5 Q. What was that?

6 A. Prizren Platform.

7 Q. Can you just speak up a little bit, please?

8 A. Prizren Platform.

9 Q. Okay. And why was the signing of this Prizren Platform

10 significant for you, if it was?

11 A. One should be remind that the DPA and PDP, the two biggest ethnic

12 Albanian political parties, were parliamentary parties in Macedonia with

13 legally-elected representatives in the Macedonian Assembly. The

14 significance of the fact that this declaration was signed by

15 representatives of these political parties and the NLA was that, in fact,

16 the political parties, these political parties, supported the political

17 goals of the NLA.

18 MR. SAXON: Okay. Your Honours, at this time I would seek to

19 tender this document, please.

20 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Mettraux.

21 MR. METTRAUX: Your Honour, we won't object to the actual

22 tendering of the document, but there may be issues that are relevant to

23 weight and also to the line of questioning of the Defence, and those

24 matters would be first: The Prosecution has indicated, I believe, that

25 the document comes from the Archives of the Military Intelligence Service

Page 6511

1 in Macedonia, but we would be grateful if Mr. Saxon could indicate whether

2 he knows it, who prepared this document, on the basis of what information,

3 and also, Your Honour, the date, if any, at which this document was

4 prepared.

5 MR. SAXON: Your Honour, the Prosecution does not know who

6 prepared this document. There is no indication on the document. It does

7 not know on what basis it was prepared, although if you allow me, I might

8 be able to help us by asking Mr. Bezruchenko a few questions.

9 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.


11 Q. Mr. Bezruchenko, when you read this document, given your military

12 experience, do you have at least an assessment or a sense of who it would

13 have been prepared and from what kind of information?

14 A. I would imagine that this document was prepared by the analytical

15 section or department within the Macedonian Military Intelligence, which

16 is G2 of the Macedonian General Staff, and the document was prepared on

17 the basis of analysis of available information which had been collected by

18 the Macedonian Military Intelligence throughout the conflict. I believe

19 the document was apparently prepared and released sometime in September

20 2001.

21 MR. SAXON: Your Honours, the Prosecution -- obviously, this

22 document does not have a date on it. However, the English translation

23 indicates that most of the time the English translation is written in the

24 past tense, so that would seem to indicate that this document would have

25 been prepared at least sometime after the Ohrid Agreement. And since

Page 6512

1 Operation Essential Harvest was well underway, that would be another

2 indication that perhaps as early as September of 2001, this document could

3 have been created.

4 JUDGE PARKER: The document will be received.

5 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P485, Your Honours.


7 Q. Mr. Bezruchenko, if you could turn, please, to paragraph 95 in

8 your amended expert report, please.

9 Your Honours, this is on page 24 of the English version.

10 And this part of the amended expert report is part 2.5. It's

11 entitled: "NLA command and control."

12 Q. Are you with me, Mr. Bezruchenko?

13 A. Yes, I am.

14 Q. There's a summary there. You don't need to read it all, but can

15 you just briefly describe your assessment of the NLA's command-and-control

16 system, please?

17 A. Of course, the NLA can't really be equated with sophisticated,

18 modern armies, but there are numerous examples which essentially would

19 suggest that in this world, there are lots of various armies and groups

20 which are fighting with some degree of efficient control. Well, my

21 assessment is that the NLA had basic elements of the command-and-control

22 system. It had the political leadership, it had the General Staff, and it

23 had the combat units on the ground which were implementing the orders of

24 the political leadership and General Staff. It also had basic command

25 procedures.

Page 6513

1 Q. It did have a functioning chain of command?

2 A. Yes, it did. If it had the political leadership and if it had the

3 General Staff and if it had the brigades on the ground, it definitely had

4 the line of command.

5 Q. And could you describe the military hierarchy of the NLA? You

6 discussed this briefly in paragraph 96.

7 A. As I mentioned at the very top of the NLA was the political

8 leadership, Ali Ahmeti and his immediate staff. On the level immediately

9 below him was the NLA General Staff or Military Staff as it is referred in

10 some documents. This Staff was headed by Major General Gzim Ostreni.

11 There was an intermediate link as well of two original commands, the

12 Kumanovo Command and the Tetovo Command, and finally there were six

13 brigades on the ground. In short, it was a vertical hierarchy which was

14 functioning from top to bottom as in any other military organisation.

15 Q. In paragraph 96, you refer to the principle of unity of military

16 and political control. Can you briefly describe what this principle of

17 unity means, in a military sense?

18 A. Well, in a way, this principle can be traced back to certain

19 doctrine or elements of the Yugoslav People's Army, but it would take some

20 time to explain this in detail.

21 Well, in short, this principle applies that one person at the top

22 or, rather, one body at the top would combine both political and military

23 functions, thus defining political objectives and military objectives in

24 support of political objectives.

25 Q. And in a military sense, why -- why is the existence of this

Page 6514

1 unity, why is that important?

2 A. Because this is an efficient way of attaining the political and

3 military goals on the ground.

4 Q. Thank you. If you could turn, please, to what is at tab 27 of

5 your binder, please. And this is Exhibit P321. And if we could turn,

6 please, to what is ERN R037-6682 at the top. It's the page

7 entitled: "NLA Command and Control." It's page 42 in the Macedonian

8 version.

9 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Mettraux.

10 MR. METTRAUX: Your Honour, simply for the assistance of the

11 Registry, I think it's 6862, rather than 6682.

12 MR. SAXON: I'm grateful. If I misspoke, I apologise.

13 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.

14 MR. SAXON: Yes, it's 6862.

15 Q. Can you see this on the screen, Mr. Bezruchenko?

16 A. Yes, I can.

17 Q. And this is a page entitled "NLA Command and Control," and we see

18 Ali Ahmeti at the top, and then below him Gzim Ostreni, and then two other

19 gentlemen lower down. But then at the bottom, we see another line with a

20 series of numbers preceded by the letter "G." Can you tell us what this

21 bottom line means and why this is significant for you?

22 A. These bottom lines indicate the structure and organisation of the

23 General Staff. "G" essentially means a certain service within the General

24 Staff. And this is the way any general staff in any army in the world is

25 organised, or at least this is the fact in many cases.

Page 6515

1 "G" normally would stand for personnel -- G1 would generally

2 stand for personnel matters; G2 for intelligence; G3 for operations; G4

3 for logistics; G5 for civil military matters; G6 for communications; and

4 then come the resources management, and this is the way this General Staff

5 apparently was organised.

6 Q. Just so that the record is complete, what would G7 refer to?

7 A. Management of -- resources management.

8 Q. And G8?

9 A. This would be, well, essentially the same thing as resources

10 management, I guess.

11 Q. Okay. If we can now turn to what is tab 28 in your binder, and in

12 e-court this should be 778 -- 65 ter 778.11. It says "National Liberation

13 Army" at the top, "General Staff," and then in large bold letters --

14 careful. In large bold letters, it says: "Development of mobilisation,"

15 and it should be "personnel," not "personal, "and materiel formation of

16 the General Staff."

17 Do you see that, Mr. Bezruchenko?

18 A. Yes, I do.

19 Q. Can we turn to what is page 1 of this document. It's page 2 in

20 the Macedonian version.

21 A. Okay.

22 Q. And we see a table here. Do you see that?

23 A. Yes, I do.

24 Q. And there's a title above the table "Basic Mobilisation Plan"?

25 A. M'mm-hmm.

Page 6516

1 Q. Can you tell us, please, what is this table and what does it

2 depict?

3 A. Well, in any army of the world, any basic organisational unit is

4 structured according to a certain plan, which is sometimes called -- or at

5 least in the West, it is called "The Table of Organisation and Equipment."

6 In some armies of the world, and I think in the former JNA as well, it was

7 "Formation," "Formacija." Well, a basic organisation plan is normally a

8 plan which calls for filling in such formation or tables of organisation

9 and equipment.

10 Just to make it a little bit simple, this is the kind of a plan

11 which determines the number of personnel, equipment and any other

12 resources which would be required for a military unit to function

13 efficiently. This particular document explains how many personnel this

14 unit, in this particular case, the General Staff would have and how it

15 would be organised into departments. As you can see, the departments

16 which are mentioned in this document from G1 to G8 are exactly the same as

17 those mentioned in the previous document.

18 Q. And can you recall who produced this document?

19 A. This is the NLA document, and apparently it was produced by

20 Gzim Ostreni.

21 MR. SAXON: I would seek to tender this document, Your Honour.

22 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Mettraux.

23 MR. METTRAUX: Well, Your Honour, we'll object at this stage.

24 First, we would wish to know who provided the document in question

25 to the Prosecution or, rather, its origin or chain of custody, as it's

Page 6517

1 called.

2 The second question which we have is also when this document was

3 prepared and whether the Prosecution has any indication at this stage. We

4 believe that if, indeed, this document was or at least is said to have

5 been prepared by Mr. Ostreni, perhaps the best time to seek to tender that

6 document would be when Mr. Ostreni appears as a witness.

7 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Saxon.

8 MR. SAXON: Your Honour, this document was provided to the Office

9 of the Prosecutor on the 29th of July, 2005, and without reviewing

10 Gzim Ostreni's witness statement right now, to the best of my recollection

11 this document was prepared by Mr. Ostreni during 2001.

12 [Trial Chamber confers]

13 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.

14 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P486, Your Honours.


16 Q. Mr. Bezruchenko, I'd like to ask you, please, to turn to tab 29 in

17 your binder, and this document is Exhibit P00459, Your Honours.

18 If we can just take a look at the first page for a moment,

19 Mr. Bezruchenko. At the top, there's a title "National Liberation Army,

20 General Staff," approved by NLA Commander Ali Ahmeti. And then it

21 says: "Personnel and materiel formation of the brigade."

22 Do you see that?

23 A. Yes, I do.

24 Q. And if we turn to the next page, please, again I believe we see

25 what you referred to as a table of --

Page 6518

1 A. Organisation and equipment.

2 Q. Table of organisation and equipment. Thank you. But if I

3 understand correctly, this would be relating to at the level of a brigade;

4 is that correct?

5 A. That's right, sir.

6 Q. If we could turn, Mr. Bezruchenko, to what is page 7 in the

7 English version and page 5 in the Macedonian version, please.

8 A. Yes, I see that.

9 Q. We see here, in the middle of this table, we see a reference. It's

10 in bold. It says: "S-1 Personnel Sector," and on the following pages we

11 see: "S-2 Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Sector," and later on we

12 see, on page 9 of the English version: "S-3 Operations and Training

13 Sector."

14 What does this -- what is the meaning of this letter "S" and the

15 numbers?

16 A. Well, again "S" is the letter which stands for various sections at

17 brigade headquarters level, and this indicates the sections which are in

18 charge of certain basic functions of the brigade staff.

19 Q. And if I'm understanding you, would the letter "S" in this context

20 have the same function as the letter "G" in the table that we saw for the

21 General Staff?

22 A. That's absolutely right. The only difference is the scope of the

23 actual activities.

24 MR. SAXON: If we could turn now, please, to --

25 Q. Before we turn away from this: Again, have you seen such tables

Page 6519

1 at the brigade level before in your career?

2 A. Of course.

3 Q. Why do you say, "Of course"?

4 A. Yes, I have seen those.

5 Q. All right. Well, would such tables be common or not amongst

6 armies of the world?

7 A. They are absolutely common. This is, in fact, one of the most

8 fundamental documents to build up an efficient fighting force.

9 MR. SAXON: Okay. If we could turn, please, to what is tab 30 in

10 your binder, Mr. Bezruchenko.

11 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Mettraux.

12 MR. METTRAUX: Your Honour, before we move on, if we could ask for

13 assistance from Mr. Saxon and perhaps the witness, whether the Prosecution

14 has any idea of the date at which this document was prepared. The front

15 page suggests the year of 2001, but if Mr. Saxon has any further

16 information about this matter, perhaps through the witness.

17 MR. SAXON: I can ask the witness, if you'd like. I don't have

18 any additional information beyond what I gave upon my colleague's previous

19 request.

20 Q. Mr. Bezruchenko, do you have any idea when, specifically, in

21 2001 this document was produced?

22 A. I do not have this idea, but I would imagine that the document was

23 probably produced early in 2001, perhaps January 2001, maybe before that.

24 Q. If we can go to tab 30, please -- but you're not sure about that?

25 A. No, I'm not.

Page 6520

1 Q. Tab 30 is Exhibit P00460. This is a document, again, it

2 says "National Liberation Army, General Staff" at the top, approved by NLA

3 commander Ali Ahmeti. Here we do see a date, 20 April 2001, and it's

4 entitled -- it should be: "Personnel," not "personal," "and Materiel

5 Formation of the Infantry Battalion."

6 And we see a series of tables in this document, Mr. Bezruchenko.

7 Do you see that?

8 A. Yes, I do.

9 Q. This time dealing with battalion command and apparently

10 organisational issues on the battalion level. From a military

11 perspective, why, if at all, is this document significant for you?

12 A. Well, this is a very significant document, because this is, in

13 fact, the basis and the backbone of the organisation of a basic tactical

14 unit in the field, an infantry battalion.

15 Q. Okay. And what, if anything, does this document tell you about

16 the structure of the NLA, the overall structure?

17 A. Well, it tells me that the NLA apparently had professional

18 military planning documents for building an efficient combat force at its

19 disposal, and apparently the NLA was striving to build such a force on the

20 basis of professional military documents.

21 Q. And these documents, what do they tell us, if anything, about the

22 hierarchy of the NLA?

23 A. Well, these documents suggest that the NLA had a military

24 hierarchy, well, from the highest level, which was the political and

25 military leadership, to the lowest level, which was apparently an infantry

Page 6521

1 squad.

2 Again, if I could draw a little bit longer on this specific

3 document. This document describes the organisation of an infantry

4 battalion as made up of three infantry companies, a fire support company,

5 and certain support elements. This is a typical structure for an infantry

6 battalion anywhere in the world.

7 MR. SAXON: If we can turn, please, to what is tab 31,

8 Mr. Bezruchenko, and this is Exhibit P00461.

9 Q. Again, this is a document that was provided to the Office of the

10 Prosecutor by Gzim Ostreni. It's entitled "Regulation on the Competencies

11 and Work of the Brigade Command."

12 What is the function and importance of this document,

13 Mr. Bezruchenko?

14 A. Well, this is, again, an important and one of the fundamentally

15 basic documents in any army in the world which describes the functions,

16 responsibilities and areas of function of activities of brigade officers.

17 As you can see, the document is structured in such a way as to describe

18 the activities, functions and responsibilities of each sector of the

19 brigade staff.

20 Q. Mr. Bezruchenko, can we turn, please, to what is page 3 in the

21 English version.

22 MR. SAXON: Your Honours, this is page 4 in the Macedonian

23 version. It would be the next page in the English version, please, and

24 the next page in the Macedonian version.

25 Q. Mr. Bezruchenko, at the top of this page it says "General

Page 6522

1 Provision," but I'd like you, please, to direct your attention to what is

2 the fourth paragraph of this page, which begins with the phrase: "Both

3 written and oral orders ..." Do you see that?

4 A. Yes, I do.

5 Q. That sentence -- that paragraph says this:

6 "Both written and oral orders are to be carried out without

7 reserve. To carry out the orders they have received, the members of the

8 UCK must contact their direct superiors within a specified period of

9 time."

10 What significance, if any, do you take from this paragraph?

11 A. Well, this paragraph is, in fact, one of the basic requirements of

12 efficient functioning of any army, and this requirement is an agreement of

13 one of the basic principles of the command and control, which is

14 subordination.

15 Q. Thank you. Can we turn to the next page, please, in both

16 versions, and we see here, Mr. Bezruchenko, what appears to be a fairly

17 complex organogram. Do you see that?

18 A. Yes, I do.

19 Q. It's entitled "Structure of the Brigade Command" Do you see that?

20 A. Yes, I do.

21 Q. In your assessment, Mr. Bezruchenko, did the structure of NLA

22 brigades develop to this level of complexity during the crisis time in

23 2001?

24 A. No, it didn't.

25 Q. If we can turn, please, to the next page, Mr. Bezruchenko, and

Page 6523

1 this is page 6 in the Macedonian version. This page, it says: "3.

2 Commander of the Brigade." And there are a number of provisions here

3 laying out the responsibilities of the brigade commander.

4 We see, in paragraph 3:

5 "With regard to his activities and general state of the brigade,

6 the brigade commander is to be directly responsible to the UCK commander."

7 Do you see that?

8 A. Yes, I do.

9 Q. Number 6, it says:

10 "He is to organise work throughout the Brigade Command, while

11 carefully respecting rules, regulations and orders from the UCK Command."

12 Do you see that?

13 A. Yes, I do.

14 Q. And number 7 says:

15 "He is to be ensure and insist that all staff members of the

16 Brigade Command and their direct subordinates carry out their duties and

17 obligations with precision and punctuality and in accordance with

18 periodical, monthly and annual work plans."

19 Do you see that?

20 A. Yes, I do.

21 Q. Would these responsibilities for a brigade commander, would they

22 be common in armies around the world?

23 A. Yes, indeed, they would be common.

24 Q. If we can turn, please, Mr. Bezruchenko, to what is paragraph 71

25 of your amended expert report, please.

Page 6524

1 MR. SAXON: Your Honours, this is on the bottom of page 17 of the

2 English version of the amended expert report.

3 Q. Are you at paragraph 71, Mr. Bezruchenko?

4 A. Yes, I am.

5 Q. And in this section, you had analysed a number of the documents

6 that we've just looked at briefly here, and then you say this in paragraph

7 71:

8 "Analysis of these documents suggests that NLA leadership was keen

9 to develop NLA brigades as a strong fighting force with emphasis on

10 sabotage and protracted operations."

11 Do you see that?

12 A. Yes, I do.

13 Q. Help us understand something, please. In a military sense, what

14 does the term "sabotage" mean?

15 A. Well, "sabotage" would essentially be described as a covert

16 operation which would include such things as, for instance, crossing the

17 enemy lines and operating behind the enemy lines, with the goal of blowing

18 up bridges, various vital objectives, capturing prisoners, attacking

19 convoys, attacking headquarters, these kind of things.

20 Q. And so acts of sabotage, in a military sense, how common are they

21 in modern warfare?

22 A. They're extremely common. If you look back, for instance, to the

23 Second World War, well, each army of the world which was involved in this

24 conflict, specifically say, German forces, British forces, Russian forces,

25 they all used these kind of tactics.

Page 6525

1 Q. Mr. Bezruchenko, earlier in your testimony, at page 6067 of the

2 transcript and actually a short time ago today, you used the term -- you

3 refer to something called "asymmetrical warfare," and I should have asked

4 you to define that technical term.

5 Can you explain, please, to the Judges what the term "asymmetrical

6 warfare" means?

7 A. Well, asymmetrical warfare is a recently-developed term or

8 doctrine, if you wish, which describes the type of warfare which would be

9 regarded as opposed to a conventional warfare. Asymmetrical warfare --

10 Q. Can I stop you there?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Maybe this will help us understand. First perhaps if you would --

13 could you please define what you mean by "conventional warfare"?

14 A. There are various definitions of "conventional warfare." Some

15 scholars believe conventional warfare is something opposed to nuclear

16 warfare, for instance, but a more common understanding of this term is

17 that conventional warfare is the type of warfare which is common for two

18 opposed armies clashed in the field.

19 The classical example of such warfare would be the First World War

20 or Second World War.

21 Asymmetrical warfare is the term which is ascribed mostly to

22 various partisan, guerrilla or rebel forces which are disadvantaged in

23 terms of weapons and equipment as compared to more better-equipped and

24 better-armed forces and therefore would have to resort to special tactics

25 to relegate these advantages of an adversary force to a level that would

Page 6526

1 actually make it possible for them to carry on fighting.

2 Q. Mr. Bezruchenko, why, in 2001, did the NLA need to use tactics of

3 asymmetrical warfare?

4 A. Because they were not so well equipped. They had weapons which

5 were probably sufficient, but they were not as good as the weapons at the

6 disposal of the government forces. For example, they didn't have combat

7 aircraft. They had no jets, they had no helicopters, and they didn't have

8 enough artillery, long-range artillery.

9 Q. If you can, please, help us, can you give us a few examples of the

10 asymmetrical tactics that the NLA used during 2001?

11 A. A classical example of asymmetrical tactics in this kind of

12 warfare would be a raid or an ambush. Infiltration is also one of the

13 examples of asymmetrical tactics, in a way. And, in fact, if you are

14 talking specifically about the conflict in Macedonia in 2001, there were

15 at least several examples where the NLA was successful in carrying out

16 ambushes with sufficiently-heavy losses for the Macedonian security

17 forces.

18 Q. I'd like to ask you to turn your mind, Mr. Bezruchenko, to what is

19 part 3 of your amended expert report. This part is entitled "Government

20 Security Forces." And perhaps if we could start at what is paragraph 218.

21 Your Honours, this is at page 58 of the English version.

22 And I'd like you just to give us -- well, perhaps I can speed this

23 up.

24 Is it correct, Mr. Bezruchenko, in paragraph 218 you explain that

25 section 1 of part 3 describes the structure, organisation, chain of

Page 6527

1 command, strength and weaponry of the Macedonian Army; is that right?

2 A. Yes, that's right.

3 Q. And then paragraph 219, you explain that section 2 of part 3

4 addresses the forces of the Ministry of the Interior. It's the Law on

5 Internal Affairs, Internal Regulations, the structure of the Ministry, the

6 Ministry's chain of command, the powers and authority of the Minister of

7 the Interior, as well as special police units. Is that how you organised

8 your work?

9 A. Yes, that's right.

10 Q. Can we please turn to paragraph 266, please. This is at the

11 bottom of page 74 in the English version. And before paragraph 266, we

12 see a subtitle, "". It's titled "Army of the Republic of

13 Macedonia, Command and Control Concept."

14 Can you just tell us, please, briefly, Mr. Bezruchenko, what is

15 the purpose of this section of your report?

16 A. Well, the purpose of this section of the report was to describe

17 the command-and-control concept. Well, this section outlines the military

18 hierarchy, the chain of command, and the principles of command and

19 control.

20 Q. Of the Macedonian Army; is that correct?

21 A. Yes, that's right.

22 Q. All right. Can we please turn to what is paragraph -- it's the

23 next page in the English version. At the bottom, we see paragraph 271.

24 It's a very short paragraph -- actually, it's not, but there's just a

25 sentence -- the first sentence is on page 75 of the English version. Do

Page 6528

1 you see that?

2 A. Yes, I do.

3 Q. And you refer to seven principles which were listed in a 1983

4 publication of the Army of the former Republic of Yugoslavia,

5 called "Command and Control." Do you see that?

6 A. Yes, I do.

7 Q. Starting on the next page, you describe seven principles of

8 command and control, and can you briefly describe these principles to us,

9 please?

10 A. Well, these are the principles as they were outlined in the

11 document which you have mentioned, and I believe the same principles were

12 adopted as the basic command-and-control principles in the Army of the

13 Republic of Macedonia.

14 Well, at the top is the principle of single authority. In

15 Macedonian, it is "jednostar jasenstvo", and this is the same word almost

16 in B/C/S as well. And this principle means that there is only one officer

17 who is supposed to give orders to the personnel and units below him and to

18 whom these personnel and units report.

19 Q. How about the principle of subordination?

20 A. This is another important principle of the command and control,

21 which in fact was expressed in Macedonian law on defence, and this

22 principle implies an obligation for all military personnel to carry out

23 the orders issued by their superiors.

24 Q. Okay. You described what is principle number 3, "Unity,"

25 previously, so we don't need to review that, but we see principle 4

Page 6529

1 is "Perpetuity." What does that mean in the military sense?

2 A. Well, this means that the principles of command and control, and

3 in fact the actual control of units, well, must be exercised at all times

4 in an absolutely cohesive and an uninterrupted manner, because any

5 disruptions can lead to grave consequences in combat situation, of course.

6 Q. Principle number 5, "Flexibility," what is that?

7 A. This also means that the command and control should be flexible

8 enough to ensure that it functions without interruptions in any

9 situations. Well, perhaps I'm going to explain it a little bit

10 simplistically, but this means that if a commander is to exercise control

11 of his units at all times in combat situation, he should really have

12 various scenarios which might envisage, well, interruption of control,

13 difficult situations, people killed, wounded, and these kind of things,

14 but in spite of that, he must make sure that this happens at all times.

15 Q. And principle number 6, it's called "Operativeness." What does

16 that mean?

17 A. That means that the commander, when exercising these functions,

18 must in fact be -- I would put it as having a front edge on the adversary.

19 He should plan and exercise his action in such a manner as to respond

20 quickly and adequately to any challenges which may be presented on the

21 battleground by the adversary forces.

22 Q. And, Mr. Bezruchenko, the seventh and last

23 principle, "Confidentiality," can you help us with that, please?

24 A. This is another important principle, which means that the matters

25 of significance in any army of the world must be treated with

Page 6530

1 confidentiality; that is, the documents which are important, well, for

2 various reasons, and there are various rules and regulations which apply

3 to confidentiality and secrecy, must be made inaccessible for anyone

4 besides those personnel which should have the authorised access to them.

5 Q. Thank you, Mr. Bezruchenko.

6 Paragraphs 272 through 274, you talk a little bit more about these

7 principles, and can you just help us, please. In your assessment, did the

8 officers of the Army of Macedonia -- were they aware of these principles

9 and did they try to implement them?

10 A. Well, yes, they certainly must have been aware of these

11 principles, and they definitely, well, had an obligation to apply these

12 principles.

13 Q. The next section, which I'm not going to go over with you, section

14, there you describe the role, tasks and structure of the Army of

15 Macedonia, but I'd like to ask you some questions, please, about the

16 second part of part 3, where you talk about the Ministry of the Interior.

17 And if we turn to what is paragraph 369, this is on page 106 in the

18 English version, Your Honours. And before that paragraph, we see -- this

19 is a subsection, 3.3.3, "The Ministry of Interior Command and Control

20 System."

21 Are you with me, Mr. Bezruchenko?

22 A. Yes, I am.

23 Q. And in paragraph 369, you refer to Article 6 of the Law on

24 Internal Affairs and its relationship to command and control between the

25 Minister of the Interior and the employees of the Ministry. Help us

Page 6531

1 again, please. Why is Article 6 important?

2 A. Article 6 reflects the principle of subordination and the system

3 of command and control.

4 Q. And in 2001, who was the person or position at the top of the

5 Ministry of the Interior, at the top of the chain of command and control?

6 A. It was the minister.

7 Q. If you can turn, please, to page 118 of your amended expert report

8 in the English version. It's paragraph 424. There is a subsection here,

9, titled "Disciplinary Powers," and in paragraph 424 you refer to

10 Article 65 of the Law on Internal Affairs. It's a description of types of

11 violations of labour discipline, and the minister's responsibility

12 regarding the dismissal of employees."

13 Do you see that?

14 A. Yes, I do.

15 Q. If we turn to the next page, paragraph 425, and this is at page

16 106 in the Macedonian version, and paragraph 425 you quote from Article 65

17 of the Law on Internal Affairs:

18 "More severe cases of violation of labour discipline, for which a

19 worker may be relieved from the work, the length of the dismissal

20 deadline, as well as cases which do not grant the right to such deadline

21 shall be formulated with a legal act issued by the minister."

22 What, if anything, do you find significant in that article,

23 please?

24 A. My reading of this article would be as follows: It is the

25 minister who would have the rights to decide to relieve an employee of the

Page 6532

1 Ministry of his duties, as well as to decide when such action would need

2 to be taken. I would also say that this action would need to be reflected

3 in a legal act issued by the minister, most probably an order.

4 MR. SAXON: Your Honour, I'm about to go on to another topic.

5 Would this be an appropriate time to take the first break?

6 JUDGE PARKER: It will. Very well, Mr. Saxon, we will have the

7 break and resume at 11.00.

8 --- Recess taken at 10.28 a.m.

9 --- On resuming at 11.06 a.m.

10 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Saxon.


12 Q. Mr. Bezruchenko, could you please turn to page 122 of the English

13 version of the amended expert report. We're going to be looking at

14 paragraph 441. It's the first paragraph beneath a subtitle -- subsection

15 called "Special Police Unit 'Lions '." Are you there, please?

16 A. Yes, I am.

17 Q. Just very briefly, according to your review and your research.

18 What events led to the formation of the unit that became known as the

19 Lions?

20 A. At some point of the conflict, it has become abundantly clear that

21 there was something wrong with the strategy used by the Macedonian

22 security forces.

23 The conflict began sometime in January 2001, and all the time

24 until August there was no decisive defeat inflicted on the NLA. I think

25 the Macedonian public became especially frustrated after the battle of

Page 6533

1 Aracinovo which was the indication that the NLA was capable of

2 establishing its base in the immediate vicinity of the capital, which was

3 a pretty dangerous development, so apparently at the very top of the

4 Macedonian political establishment it was decided that additional forces

5 were required which would be specifically trained and equipped for

6 asymmetrical warfare and counter-insurgency operations. This

7 consideration probably led to the decision to establish a special police

8 unit which later received the name Lions.

9 Q. The battle at Aracinovo that you mentioned, that took place in the

10 last part of June 2001; is that correct?

11 A. In fact, the NLA entered Aracinovo on or about 9 June 2001, and

12 the battle took place in the next two weeks to follow.

13 Q. If you can turn, please, Mr. Bezruchenko, to the start of part 4

14 of your report, and it's on page 129 of the English version -- excuse me,

15 128 of the English version. Part 4 is entitled "The attack on Ljuboten,"

16 10 to 12 August 2001.

17 And is it right, Mr. Bezruchenko, in this section, this part of

18 the report, you summarise the information available related to the events

19 in Ljuboten on that weekend from the documents that you had available to

20 you?

21 A. Yes, that's right.

22 Q. If you could turn, please, to paragraph 484. It's page 129 of the

23 English version. In that paragraph, you discuss the degree of active

24 resistance from the village of Ljuboten on the 12th of August, and you say

25 in the very first sent sentence, that the degree of resistance is hard to

Page 6534

1 measure. But then you say this in the last sentence:

2 "Assuming that combat casualties normally serve as the main

3 indicator of the degree of an adversary's level of armed resistance, the

4 level of resistance from Ljuboten to Tarculovski's group on 12th August

5 was probably light to nonexistent."

6 Can you explain to the Judges how you came to this opinion?

7 A. Many Macedonian military documents suggest that there was fire

8 coming out of Ljuboten levelled at the Macedonian security forces.

9 However, it is difficult to measure what kind of volume of the fire was.

10 Macedonian military documents suggest that there was at least a number of

11 military targets in Ljuboten, among them a machine-gun, but given the fact

12 that there were no casualties among the Macedonian military forces, well,

13 it would be difficult to measure what kind of exact degree of resistance

14 was offered from the village. So my conclusion was that it was probably

15 light.

16 Q. Let me ask the question perhaps in a slightly different way. If

17 the members of the security forces of Macedonia had received heavy

18 casualties in Ljuboten on that weekend, what would your conclusion have

19 been? Would it have been different?

20 A. Yes, it would have been different. My conclusion in this case

21 would be that the village was heavily protected and whatever group -- the

22 NLA group could have been there would have been well armed and organised.

23 Q. Okay. Mr. Bezruchenko, can you briefly describe to the Judges

24 what is part 5 of your report, please?

25 A. Part 5 of my report represents the chronology of the conflict, and

Page 6535

1 this chronology was drawn on the basis of various documents which, among

2 others, included media reports, Macedonian military documents, Macedonian

3 police documents and some NLA documents as well.

4 Q. And this chronology relates to -- includes events from January to

5 October 2001?

6 A. That's right. Well, more precise, the bulk of this chronology

7 relates to January and September 2001, and as we know, September 26 was

8 the date when the NLA officially announced that it was disbanded.

9 Q. And what was your purpose in creating this chronology?

10 A. Well, in military analysis chronology is an important instrument

11 which suggests the concept of the operations, how the operations were

12 evolving on the ground, and what were the political or military objectives

13 behind these operations.

14 Q. Would a chronology also relate to the intensity of a conflict?

15 A. Yes, of course it would.

16 Q. Now, it's my turn. Mr. Bezruchenko, if you can go back to the

17 binder with exhibits, please, and if you could turn to what is tab 32 in

18 the binder.

19 MR. SAXON: Your Honours, this is 65 ter number 159. It was

20 received from Gzim Ostreni in 2005. And, Your Honour, this exhibit, for

21 lack of a better word, actually has two parts, and the first part I'd like

22 to show to the witness is a map, and I believe that you should have a

23 colour copy of this map in your binder. And this is the map that I hope

24 that you have. At least that was the plan, anyway.

25 Q. And perhaps if you could pull out the map, Mr. Bezruchenko. And

Page 6536

1 we see the word "Direktive" in big, bold letters on the upper left-hand

2 side. We see a date on the upper right-hand corner, "13 June 2001". And

3 then towards the bottom of the page, we see a blue stamp and the words

4 above that "Komandant," and then we see the signature of Ali Ahmeti there.

5 And, Mr. Bezruchenko, if you could describe to the Judges -- if

6 you could describe what this map shows, perhaps starting with the yellow

7 colour that we see on the upper left-hand portion.

8 A. This is an operational planning document, and it represents

9 essentially the concept of NLA operations as devised, as we can see from

10 the date, 13th June 2001.

11 Q. At about that time, what was going on sort of globally with

12 respect to the conflict? Where was the NLA?

13 A. The NLA was advancing and regrouping itself, and the fighting was

14 continuing despite the attempts to arrange cease-fire. The yellow colour

15 would indicate the areas which were easily under NLA control or at least

16 to where the NLA could move without significant hindrance. The green

17 colour would indicate the axis of advance that were planned for the NLA to

18 move along.

19 Q. Can you indicate what this map seems to indicate in terms of the

20 intended axis of advance, following this green colour?

21 A. Generally speaking, this means that the NLA was planning to

22 advance further deep into the country from north and from west. As we can

23 see, the main axis of advance were planned to be from Tetovo to the east

24 towards the capital of Skopje, in the area of Kumanovo. You can see two

25 prongs from the north and from the south, which were apparently aimed to

Page 6537

1 encircle Kumanovo. In the west, you can see several prongs from the area

2 adjacent to the border with Albania to the east in the direction of

3 Gostivar and further Kicevo, and in the south we again see a number of

4 prongs aimed for Ohrid.

5 Q. And by looking at this plan from a military perspective, what

6 objective or objectives can you assess from this plan? What was the NLA

7 trying to do?

8 A. The NLA was trying to grab as much territory as possible and put

9 it under its control.

10 MR. SAXON: Okay. If we can turn to the document that accompanies

11 this map, and it's also in your binders, Your Honours. It has a heading

12 at the top "Ideas for Conducting the Operation."

13 Q. Mr. Bezruchenko, the first paragraph under this heading says that:

14 "While continuing to increase the number of units in the brigades

15 in line with the establishment, active combat operations will be

16 undertaken with a view to breaking up and eliminating the enemy's troops,

17 so as to block and take over the towns and main roads of Western Macedonia

18 as rapidly as possible."

19 Do you see that?

20 A. Yes, I do.

21 Q. It says that:

22 "The Skopje-Debar, Skopje-Kicevo-Struga roads will be blocked,

23 making enemy communications impossible, and it says then, in phase 1, the

24 blockades would be erected in the area of the village of Grupcin, Mavrova,

25 Gryka e Derventes/Derventska Klisura, et cetera. So what does this

Page 6538

1 paragraph of the plan indicate?

2 A. Well, this is the fundamental idea of the concept of the operation

3 which was based apparently on three major objectives: To break up the

4 Macedonian security forces; to occupy main towns in Western Macedonia; and

5 to deny the capabilities of moving and manoeuvring of the Macedonian

6 security forces along the main roads in the country, at least in its

7 western part.

8 Q. We see down below it says:

9 "The operation will be conducted in two stages."

10 You see stage 1 by 10 July, stage 2 by the end of July.

11 To your knowledge, was the NLA successful in completing these

12 stages by the given dates?

13 A. No.

14 Q. If we can turn, please, to the next page in the English version,

15 which will be page 2 in the Macedonian version. And at the top of the

16 next page, we see a section four with the subtitle "Deployment and Tasks

17 of UCK Forces." Do you see that, Mr. Bezruchenko?

18 A. Yes, I do.

19 Q. And it begins:

20 "The 113th Brigade will, by 10 July 2001, make preparations to

21 capture or cut off the town of Kumanova and block the Kumanova-Kriva

22 Palanka and Kumanova-Sveti Nikole roads."

23 Below that -- I won't go on yet.

24 Did the NLA succeed in capturing Kumanovo at that time?

25 A. No, it didn't.

Page 6539

1 Q. But what did it succeed in doing with respect to Kumanovo?

2 A. The situation in the area of Kumanovo was pretty serious. The NLA

3 managed to establish control over a number of villages in the area and was

4 gradually expanding its control.

5 I believe that with time passing by, they probably could indeed

6 reach the objective of cutting the road between Kumanovo and

7 Kriva Palanka.

8 Q. The next paragraph says:

9 "At the same time, the 113th Brigade troops holding the village of

10 Aracinovo will form the 1st Battalion of the 114th Brigade, and gradually

11 continue recruiting to full strength at brigade level with personnel and

12 fighters from Skopje and villages in the northern part of Skopje, as well

13 as the villages south of Kumanova."

14 From a military perspective, what do you take from this? What is

15 happening here?

16 A. This indicates a pretty serious development. This indicates that

17 the NLA, (a), was building up another brigade and, (b), and this brigade

18 was supposed to operate in the area of the capital.

19 Q. All right. The next paragraph talks about the 115th Brigade's

20 battalion in the Derventa area, saying:

21 " ... will continue efforts to expand at brigade level, also

22 forming a 2nd Battalion in the Karsijak area and beyond ..."

23 And then it talks about preparations to take over additional

24 areas.

25 What, if anything, do you see significant about these

Page 6540

1 instructions?

2 A. Well, the significance of this particular paragraph is that it

3 provides instruction for the 115th Brigade to expand and form another

4 battalion in the area of Zadem [phoen] which is another mountain feature

5 between Tetovo and Skopje. And as we know from the chronology, there was

6 a very successful ambush carried out by NLA in this very area on the 8th

7 of August. So the significance of this paragraph, to briefly emphasise it

8 again, is that this 115th Brigade was actually being raised to cut the

9 communication between Tetovo and Skopje, which is again classical military

10 tactics and operation.

11 Q. Just so that the record is clear, did you mean the 115th Brigade

12 or this battalion of the 115th Brigade?

13 A. It is apparent from this paragraph that the 115th Brigade was in

14 the process of building up its forces, so I'm talking about 115th Brigade

15 here as a whole.

16 Q. Okay. The next paragraph, we see that: "The 112th Brigade in the

17 area to the west of Tetova will send a company to close the Skopje-Tetova

18 road in the area of Grupcin village."

19 To your knowledge, did that occur at some point?

20 A. I'm not certain if this particular event did occur, but I know

21 that the NLA forces were indeed operating in the area of Mountain Zadem as

22 I mentioned previously. Whether it was the 112th Brigade or the 115th is

23 difficult to establish, but I would be inclined to believe it was the

24 115th.

25 Q. Indeed, this paragraph mentions both the 112th and 115th Brigades.

Page 6541

1 A. That's right, which may suggest that these two brigades were

2 cooperating in this area.

3 Q. If you could turn to the next page, please, Mr. Bezruchenko.

4 There's a subtitle here called "Balance of Forces." Do you see that?

5 A. Yes, I do.

6 Q. And it says:

7 "The balance of forces on the Western Macedonia front is currently

8 a 1:5 ratio in favour of the government troops, and they are greatly

9 superior in terms of equipment, but by towards the end of July, it will

10 still be 1:2 in favour of the government forces, and in the field of

11 equipment, tank, aircraft units, et cetera, it will remain the same."

12 And then it says:

13 "The morale of the UCK forces plays a significant role in

14 ameliorating the balance of forces between the government forces and the

15 UCK and will alter the ratio to a proportion of 1:10 in favour of the UCK

16 infantry."

17 What is your assessment of what is being said here?

18 A. My reading of this paragraph would be to suggest that apparently

19 the government's security forces indeed had the numeric preponderance of

20 the NLA in the Western Macedonia, but due to the process of reinforcement

21 being brought in, as well as building up of the NLA units, the ratio of

22 forces was rapidly changing and declining in favour of the NLA.

23 This paragraph also speaks about high morale of the NLA forces,

24 which allegedly ensures superiority over the NLA -- I mean, over the

25 security forces.

Page 6542

1 Q. And in your research to write your report, what did you learn

2 about the level of morale of the NLA forces as opposed to the level of

3 moral of the Macedonian security forces?

4 A. I have come across a number of military documents in the process

5 of writing my reports which suggest that the level of morale of the NLA

6 was indeed quite high and at times was superior to that of the Macedonian

7 military forces. I have also read some Macedonian military documents

8 which tend to suggest that the mobilisation effort generally was

9 considered as unsuccessful, meaning that the morale of the troops which

10 were supposed to be mobilised and dispatched to the front was not really

11 at the appropriate level.

12 Q. Mr. Bezruchenko, just so that the record is clear, when you

13 referred to the mobilisation effort just now, were you referring to the

14 efforts by the Macedonian government to mobilise more men or by the NLA?

15 A. I'm referring to the efforts of the Macedonian government.

16 Q. Okay. Down below we see a paragraph related to anti-aircraft

17 defence potential. If you could turn to the next page, Mr. Bezruchenko,

18 or last page, there is a sentence. It's the last sentence. It's page 4

19 in the Macedonian version. It says:

20 "International Conventions must be strictly respected during all

21 operations by UCK troops, and the treatment of civilians and facilities

22 must be at the required level."

23 Why is this important for an army?

24 A. The respect for international conventions in times of war is an

25 important factor which contributes, (a), to the morale of fighting forces

Page 6543

1 and, (b), makes it a legitimate force. Therefore, in brief, I would say

2 that it was very important for the NLA to maintain the level of discipline

3 and to ensure that the respect for the Geneva Conventions would be at the

4 appropriate level.

5 MR. SAXON: Your Honours, I would seek to tender this map and the

6 written texts that accompany it, please, into evidence.

7 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.

8 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P487, Your Honours.


10 Q. If you could turn, Mr. Bezruchenko, to what is tab 33 in your

11 binder, please.

12 MR. SAXON: Your Honours, this is 65 ter number 611.1.

13 Before I go on, that last exhibit is referred to in

14 Mr. Bezruchenko's report at footnotes 34, 143, 236, 237, that's the map,

15 and the ideas for conducting the operation in footnotes 79, 130, 131, 136

16 and 143.

17 Mr. Bezruchenko, 65 ter number 611.1 is another map. It was

18 obtained from the archives of the Ministry of Defence of Macedonia,

19 February of 2006.

20 Your Honours, it is referred to at pages 400 -- excuse me,

21 footnote 434 of Mr. Bezruchenko's amended expert report.

22 Q. Briefly, Mr. Bezruchenko, what do we see on this map in front of

23 us? What does it say at the top?

24 A. At the top, it says "The decision of the Commander of the 1st

25 Guards Brigade for Defence."

Page 6544

1 Q. And what do these markings on the map indicate? We see markings

2 in red, with bits of yellow, and then we see markings in blue.

3 A. The markings in blue stand for the position -- positions of the

4 Macedonian security forces. In this particular case, this is the 1st

5 Guards Brigade, and on the extreme left of its zone -- sorry, on the

6 extreme right of its zone of responsibility, you see the zone of the

7 3rd Guards Battalion. The red markings represent the NLA forces.

8 Q. We see some arrows. If we can perhaps focus on the red markings

9 on the upper right-hand side of the document. We see some red arrows

10 going from top towards the bottom. What do these red arrows indicate?

11 A. These arrows indicate the axis of advance of the NLA forces.

12 Q. From what area towards what area?

13 A. From north, in this particular case obviously from the area of

14 Kumanovo, towards southwest, towards the capital, and again from west in

15 the direction of east again towards the capital.

16 Q. And based on your knowledge and the other documents that you have

17 seen, can you give an estimate of when this map would have been created or

18 the time period that it reflects?

19 A. Early June 2001.

20 Q. And we see on the bottom right-hand side that it is stamped with

21 the signature of the commander who apparently produced this map.

22 Your Honours, I would seek to tender this map, please.

23 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Mettraux.

24 MR. METTRAUX: Your Honour, we will not object to the tendering of

25 that document at this stage, but we would like to place it on the record

Page 6545

1 that three different witnesses were members of this particular

2 organisation, were called by the Prosecution at the time, and were not put

3 the document or asked to provide any information in particular as regard

4 the time or as regard the other matters that have been commented upon.

5 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.

6 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P488, Your Honours.


8 Q. Finally, Mr. Bezruchenko, could you please turn to what is tab 36

9 in your binder, and this is marked for identification Exhibit P00464,

10 Your Honours. It is referred to in footnotes 4, 27 and 28, 41, 137, 315,

11 327, 463 and 465 of the amended expert report, and at footnotes 1, 4, 5

12 and 8 of the amended addendum to the expert report. And you saw this, part

13 of this exhibit briefly, Your Honours, with witness Nazim Bushi. This is

14 a book entitled "The War in Macedonia in 2001".

15 I take it you're familiar with this book, Mr. Bezruchenko?

16 A. Yes, I am.

17 Q. And who are the authors of this book?

18 A. The authors of this book are recognised Macedonian military

19 experts, former Chief of General Staff and doctor, Mitre Arsovski, and his

20 colleagues, Kuzev and Damjanovski and I believe Mr. Kuzev is a colonel and

21 Mr. Damjanovski is a general.

22 Q. I'd like to discuss with you briefly several portions of this book

23 which have been translated into English, and perhaps if I can ask the

24 assistance of the Court Officer. If we can call up the portion that has

25 the ERN range N006-3017 to N006-3033.

Page 6546

1 And this page here is actually page 96, for those who are

2 following along in the Macedonian version, and this part of the book, this

3 chapter, is entitled "Measures of the Competent Organs of the Government

4 in the Field of Defence." Are you with me, Mr. Bezruchenko?

5 A. Yes, I think so.

6 MR. SAXON: Could we turn, please, to what is page 7 in the

7 English version. It is the bottom of page 105 in the Macedonian version.

8 That's it. And if we could focus on the bottom of the page, please, for

9 now.

10 This is a subsection entitled: "The government of the Republic of

11 Macedonia," and it says that:

12 "The government of the Republic of Macedonia, as bearer of the

13 executive government of the Republic, has a very prominent role in the

14 field of defence."

15 Q. Do you see that?

16 A. Yes, I do.

17 Q. "In addition to proposing the most significant documents in this

18 field, it is also responsible for submitting numerous regulations and

19 decisions that regulate specific segments of the defence system and the

20 armed forces."

21 And then there's a reference, we see, to the Law on Defence,

22 and -- we see at the beginning here a list at the bottom of page 7 of the

23 responsibilities of the Government of Macedonia in this regard.

24 If we could turn to the next page in the English version and to

25 the bottom of page 106 in the Macedonian version, and this portion of the

Page 6547

1 book is referred to at paragraph 402(a) in the amended addendum to the

2 amended expert report.

3 Do you see, Mr. Bezruchenko, we see in the middle of the page,

4 above the bold line, it says:

5 "Not all of the government's responsibilities enacted in the Law

6 are listed below, since some of them were explained in other sections. As

7 a result, only part of them are listed here."

8 Do you see that?

9 A. Yes, sir, I see it.

10 Q. And it says in bold:

11 "Orders the use of the police during martial law to support the

12 army."

13 And it says:

14 "It is immediately noticeable that the police is used to support

15 the army during martial law."

16 But then it tells us:

17 "In 2001, the government fully adhered to this regulation in the

18 Law on Defence and ordered the police to be used in a time of war, though

19 without declaring martial law."

20 And then it says:

21 "All of the misunderstandings between the police and army

22 originated precisely from this."

23 The next paragraph tells us this:

24 "Since martial law was not declared, the police was not under

25 joint command and acted independently. One can only imagine what the

Page 6548

1 situation is like when two ministers from the same government, Ministry of

2 the Interior and Ministry of Defence, have two armed components at their

3 disposal, one of which is 'commanded'," in quotes, "by the Prime Minister

4 through the Ministry of the Interior, while the other is under the command

5 of the President of the Republic through the Defence Minister."

6 You told us a bit before about the importance of unity of command.

7 What does this paragraph suggest to you in terms of how well the security

8 forces were functioning at that time?

9 A. Apparently there were certain discrepancies in the functioning of

10 the chain of command of the Macedonian security forces. Apparently the

11 Macedonian authorities failed to establish a single centre of command

12 which would be in charge of operations of both the army and the police.

13 Q. The next paragraph, it says:

14 "The two ministers, from differing political provenances, rather

15 than enduring on the course of joint defence of national and state

16 interests in such a complicated and dangerous security situation, seemed

17 to be 'fighting' for elevated positions in their parties, the government

18 and the defence."

19 And then it says:

20 "As a result, it could be said that the two armed structures - the

21 police and the army - were each fighting on their own front. This type of

22 deployment of the police, as the Prime Minister's armed force, caused a

23 rift in the management and command of the joint security forces of the

24 Republic of Macedonia."

25 Would it appear, Mr. Bezruchenko, that the authors of this book

Page 6549

1 and you would agree as to the results of these kinds of conflicts?

2 A. I fully concur with the conclusions of the authors of this book.

3 MR. SAXON: If we can turn now, please, to another portion of this

4 book which has the ERN range N006-3064 to N006-3067. And it begins at

5 page 143 in the Macedonian version.

6 Q. Are you with me, Mr. Bezruchenko?

7 A. Yes, I think I am.

8 Q. The top paragraph says this:

9 "Apart from the fact that the then-valid Law on Defence clearly

10 regulated the use of the police in wartime conditions, during our war,

11 there were different and opposing views on who controls and commands the

12 police."

13 Do you see that?

14 A. Just a moment, sir.

15 Q. It's the top of that paragraph.

16 A. I'm not entirely certain if we are on the same page here.

17 Q. Can you read it on the screen?

18 A. This is the middle of the page, is it?

19 Q. Mr. Bezruchenko, can you look at me, please?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. This is what the page looks like. It says: "Deployment of the

22 armed forces on the front."

23 A. Yes, I see that.

24 Q. Can you look at the paragraph above that, please?

25 A. Yes, I see it.

Page 6550

1 Q. And it says that there were -- it says:

2 " ... During our war," at the top, "there were different and

3 opposing views on who controls and commands the police."

4 Do you see that sentence, the third and fourth line down from the

5 top.

6 Mr. Bezruchenko, if you look at the third line from the top,

7 you'll see a phrase that says "during our war."

8 A. I don't see it, sir. It's probably the right -- the wrong page.

9 Q. Okay. Well, your page should have at the top of it an ERN number

10 N006-3064. Can you go to the next portion of the report, please,?

11 MR. SAXON: Or if the usher could assist me. If the usher could

12 provide me with Mr. Bezruchenko's binder, I will turn to the page.

13 Thank you so much.

14 Q. If you look -- if you could look at what I've just highlighted,

15 Mr. Bezruchenko.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. You see it says:

18 " ... During our war, there were different and opposing views on

19 who controls and commands the police."

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Do you see that?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And then a little bit later, it says this:

24 "In a state of war, the police shall be used to carry out combat

25 tasks as an integral part of the army."

Page 6551

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. "This article of the Law on Defence was clear to everyone except

3 the politicians of 'relevant' parties in power."

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. "However, the fact remained that there was duality in command and

6 control, because the Prime Minister commanded the police through the

7 Minister of the Interior, while the Supreme Commander commanded the Army.

8 This is why there were many uncoordinated combat operations in the war,

9 which contributed to greater casualties, the loss of whole battles and

10 struggles, and even the war as a whole."

11 Do you see that?

12 A. Yes, I do, I see that, sir.

13 Q. Help us understand something, please. This phrase "duality in

14 command and control," what does that mean? What does it usually mean?

15 A. This would describe two or more chains of command in cases where

16 the command-and-control system would be disrupted, and resulting in

17 multiple chains of command, whereas in fact only one should exist.

18 Q. Okay. If we can turn to the next page, please, in the English

19 version. This is page 145 in the Macedonian version. There is a

20 paragraph in the middle of the page, Mr. Bezruchenko. It begins with the

21 phrase: "We have to point out ..." Do you see that?

22 A. Yes, I do, sir.

23 Q. It says:

24 "We have to point out that during the war there was a wise

25 reticence of the President of Parliament, and Parliament did not declare

Page 6552

1 whether Macedonia was in a state of war or not. Only then does it become

2 perfectly clear why there were such a difference of views in the sphere of

3 command and control of the army and the police."

4 And in the next paragraph, we're told:

5 "In the broad coalition government, the Defence Minister was from

6 the SDSM Party, the Minister of the Interior from the VMRO-DPMNE Party,

7 and the Minister of Justice from the DPA."

8 And later on:

9 "The Minister of Defence had carte blanche for command and control

10 of the army, stipulated by law."

11 And then we're told:

12 "On the other hand, the Minister of the Interior did not wish to

13 remain without an 'army', so besides having the legal part of the police,

14 following a government decision, he established an illegal unit called the

15 Lions, promoting the president into its unlawful supreme commander. As

16 such, he did not want to subordinate to the lawful Supreme Commander by

17 fighting with his own army (the police), making his own decisions,

18 tactical variants, and fighting in the territory of his choice and with

19 his own opponent."

20 Do you see that?

21 A. Yes, I do, sir.

22 Q. Would this be another or a particular example of so-called duality

23 of command?

24 A. Yes, a typical one, sir.

25 MR. SAXON: And, Your Honours, there was one portion of this book

Page 6553

1 that was shown to you during the testimony -- redirect examination of

2 witness Nazim Bushi, and those are the conclusions. And I'd just like to

3 briefly look at one page of that. This portion of the book has ERN

4 version -- ERN range N006-3325 to N006-3334.

5 If we can turn to what is the third page in the English version,

6 and it's page 407 in the Macedonian version, please.

7 Q. Do you see paragraph 7 there? This should be the last portion of

8 this book that you have in your binder.

9 A. M'mm-hmm.

10 Q. And it says "Conclusions" at the top.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. If you turn to the third page, please, paragraph 7 at the top, and

13 it says this -- do you see paragraph 7?

14 A. Yes, I do, sir.

15 Q. "The belligerent forces which the Republic of Macedonia set its

16 security forces against were varied, but they were united in terms of

17 their ultimate goal."

18 And then later on it says:

19 "Together they represented a joint armed force of an imaginary

20 Greater Albania. Therefore we can conclude that Macedonia was essentially

21 in an informal war with Albania and its fundamental goal of uniting all

22 Albanians in the Balkans in one state."

23 Do you see that?

24 A. Yes, sir, I see it.

25 Q. My question for you is simply this: In your assessment, was the

Page 6554

1 principle of unity of command in effect with the NLA forces?

2 A. Yes, it was.

3 MR. SAXON: Your Honour, I would seek to tender now what has been

4 marked for identification as P464.

5 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.

6 THE REGISTRAR: Under the same number, Exhibit P464, Your Honours.

7 MR. SAXON: Mr. Bezruchenko, I have no further questions for you.

8 Thank you.

9 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.

10 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, Mr. Saxon.

11 MR. METTRAUX: Good afternoon, Your Honours.

12 Cross-examination by Mr. Mettraux:

13 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Bezruchenko. My name is Guenael Mettraux, and

14 I'm appearing on behalf of Mr. Boskoski.

15 A. Good afternoon, sir.

16 Q. Mr. Bezruchenko, you will recall that on the first day of your

17 examination-in-chief, you were asked a number of questions from Mr. Saxon

18 about a concept known as "operational control." Do you recall that?

19 A. Yes, I do, sir.

20 Q. And in your evidence-in-chief, you indicated that in your view,

21 the concept or doctrine of operational control, according to that

22 doctrine, "the minister is", and I quote, "The one who is ultimately

23 responsible for all operations, actions of the Ministry, as well as his

24 subordinate personnel."

25 Do you recall saying that?

Page 6555

1 A. Yes, I do.

2 Q. And you recall that upon an objection by the Defence, Mr. Saxon

3 indicated that your discussion of this concept, the doctrine of

4 operational control, was discussed in, I believe, paragraph of

5 your report; is that correct?

6 A. Yes, it is.

7 Q. And I would simply like to draw your attention to a particular

8 paragraph of that report which is contained in that section. That is

9 paragraph 371 of the report, at which you say the following:

10 "Several Macedonian Ministry of Interior documents suggest that

11 Minister of Interior Boskoski exercised operational control of police

12 forces, which was manifested in orders to deploy police at crisis areas."

13 Mr. Bezruchenko, do you recall making that statement or would you

14 wish to see the report?

15 A. I would be grateful to Your Honour if you could give me a chance

16 to find this particular section of the report.

17 Q. Mr. Bezruchenko, that will be page 107 of your report, and that's

18 paragraph 371.

19 MR. METTRAUX: Your Honour, this is Exhibit P466 perhaps for your

20 assistance.

21 THE WITNESS: I'm at page 107 now, sir.


23 Q. Thank you, Mr. Bezruchenko. And if I could ask you to look at

24 what is paragraph 371, please.

25 A. Yes, sir.

Page 6556

1 Q. And simply to refresh your memory about a statement you make in

2 this report, you said the following:

3 "Several Macedonian Ministry of Interior documents suggest that

4 Minister of Interior Boskoski exercised operational control of police

5 forces, which was manifested in orders to deploy police at various crisis

6 areas."

7 Can you see that?

8 A. Yes, I can see that, sir.

9 Q. And do you recall making that statement --

10 A. Yes, I do.

11 Q. -- in your report?

12 Is it correct, Mr. Bezruchenko, and please correct me if I'm

13 wrong, that the supposed relevance of your evidence on that particular

14 issue or the issue of so-called operational control, is to suggest that at

15 the relevant time Minister of Interior Boskoski was somehow able to

16 exercise control of police forces during police operations; is that

17 correct?

18 A. If you believe a certain -- I mean, if you assume that a certain

19 function of operational control is deployment of forces on the ground,

20 that is exactly the case, sir.

21 Q. And as you just indicated, this doctrine or theory would, as one

22 of its elements, require that the transfer of people or members of a

23 particular entity to another location be part of the -- or be evidence, if

24 you wish, of operational control; is that correct?

25 A. Yes, that's right, Your Honour.

Page 6557

1 Q. And your evidence on that point, Mr. Bezruchenko, is based on your

2 military expertise; is that correct?

3 A. Yes, that's right, sir.

4 Q. And I think you've indicated, in response to a question of

5 Mr. Saxon, that the definitions which you've used -- or at least I think

6 you made the point in relation to armed conflict, that definitions which

7 you used are military definitions; is that correct?

8 A. Yes, that's right, sir.

9 Q. And this would apply in particular to the concept of operational

10 control; is it correct?

11 A. Yes, that's right, sir.

12 Q. And I think you indicated, again I believe it's in response to a

13 question by Mr. Saxon asked during your first day of examination, about

14 ARMED conflict in particular, that you had relied on the military

15 definition of that concept, and for that purpose you had relied upon a

16 particular publication of, I believe, the Department of Defence of the

17 United States. Do you recall saying that?

18 A. Yes, I do, sir.

19 Q. And that publication would be the Joint Publication 1-02 of the

20 Department of Defence; is that correct?

21 A. As far as I can recall, yes, sir.

22 Q. And do you agree or are you aware of the fact that this particular

23 document, the so-called Joint Publication, JP1-02, also contains a

24 definition of what constitutes operational control?

25 A. Yes, sir.

Page 6558

1 Q. And as you did with the definition of "armed conflict," would you

2 regard this definition as generally reliable about what would constitute

3 operational control?

4 A. Yes, sir.

5 Q. And I would like to ask you or, rather, to show you that

6 definition, Mr. Bezruchenko. You are quite familiar with it, but it may

7 assist others.

8 MR. METTRAUX: And if I can ask the Registry to bring up what is

9 Rule 65 ter 1D928. The ERN range is 1D00-7874, 1D00-7885. Your Honours,

10 simply for the record, the document in its entirety is several hundred

11 pages' long. We have uploaded parts of the document which contain a number

12 of definitions or terms which we may wish to present to ask comments about

13 from Mr. Bezruchenko.

14 I would ask the Registry, please, to turn to page 391 of that

15 document. That would be page 1D00-7885. 883; I apologise. And if the

16 Registry could scroll down a bit on the page. Thank you.

17 Q. Mr. Bezruchenko, do you have in front of you the entry, so to say,

18 which defines the concept of operational control?

19 A. Yes, I see that.

20 Q. And I'd like to read it, and if you can follow with me, please,

21 Mr. Bezruchenko, I will ask you a few questions about this. The

22 definition of that concept is as follows:

23 "Operational control. Command authority that may be exercised by

24 commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command."

25 And I will just stop here for a second. Is that correct that in

Page 6559

1 military doctrine, the concept of operational control only applies at a

2 particular level of the military hierarchy; is that correct?

3 A. Well, it really depends on what you mean by "any particular level

4 of military hierarchy."

5 Q. Well, is it correct that at least as far as the US or DOD

6 definition of the concept is concerned, the concept or the doctrine of

7 operational control would apply only at echelons which are at or below the

8 level of combatant command; is that correct?

9 A. Yes, or we can say, in fact, not necessarily combatant command,

10 but any institution involved in the combat.

11 Q. Well, if we stick for a minute with this particular definition,

12 Mr. Bezruchenko, we'll see later about the possibility of applying this to

13 other circumstances. But will you agree that as far as the definition

14 given by the DOD which I understand applies to all branches of the

15 American army, the doctrine of operational control would only apply at or

16 below the level of combat command -- combatant command; is that correct?

17 A. This is what the document says, yes.

18 Q. And is that a fact that you felt you should mention in your

19 report, and did you do so?

20 A. I think I did.

21 Q. Then the definition goes on to say this:

22 "Operational control is the authority to perform those functions

23 of command over subordinate forces involving organising and employing

24 command and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving

25 authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational

Page 6560

1 control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military

2 operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to

3 the command.

4 "Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of

5 subordinate organisations. Normally this authority is exercised through

6 subordinate joint force commanders and service and/or functional component

7 commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to

8 organise commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander

9 in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned

10 missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative directions

11 for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal

12 organisation, or unit training."

13 Before I ask you a number of questions about this particular

14 definition, Mr. Bezruchenko, you've just indicated your belief that you

15 had made -- or you have given an indication in your report that this

16 doctrine would not apply at or below the level of combatant command, and

17 would you recall in what part of that -- of your report this note would

18 be, if you can recall?

19 A. I don't think that I made any direct reference, well, to this

20 particular document in my report, but essentially the whole of my report

21 was based on the concept of operational control as stipulated in this

22 document.

23 Q. So in answer to the question, you haven't specifically addressed

24 the fact that this doctrine, at least as far as this particular definition

25 is concerned, only applies at a certain level of the hierarchy in the

Page 6561

1 military; is that correct?

2 A. This is a common knowledge among military experts, I would -- if I

3 may say so, and I don't really think that it really warrants to make any

4 references to this particular document. This is essentially a compilation

5 of military terms which everyone is aware of.

6 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters kindly ask that a pause be

7 maintained between question and answer.


9 Q. Mr. Bezruchenko, we've been warned for the first time, about

10 pausing between question and answer, that is.

11 A. Thank you, sir.

12 Q. Is it correct, Mr. Bezruchenko, as you've just indicated, that in

13 fact you do not make any reference to that particular document, and I'm

14 talking about the documents we're looking at right now and which you say

15 you have used, at least as far as the definition of "armed conflict" is

16 concerned, there is no reference to that document in your report; is that

17 correct?

18 A. If you specifically mean, sir, whether I quote this particular

19 document in my report and whether it is mentioned in any of the footnotes,

20 the answer, to the best of my knowledge, is "no."

21 Q. I'm grateful for that, Mr. Bezruchenko. Is it correct that if one

22 looks at this particular definition of what the concept of operational

23 control is, it refers, in various parts, to, I think, the idea of

24 operation, operational, and also mission. Is that correct, that's what it

25 refers to?

Page 6562

1 A. Yes, that's right.

2 Q. And is that correct also --

3 JUDGE PARKER: Sorry. Yes, Mr. Saxon.

4 MR. SAXON: I'm very sorry to interrupt.

5 To assist the interpreters, I've been signaled that it might be

6 helpful if Mr. Bezruchenko could sit a little bit further away from the

7 microphone.

8 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.

9 MR. METTRAUX: I'm grateful to Mr. Saxon.

10 Q. Mr. Bezruchenko, is that correct that the concept of operation,

11 which you've used in several parts of your report or made reference to, is

12 also a military concept?

13 A. Yes, it is indeed, sir.

14 Q. And the concept which you've used or the way in which you've

15 utilised this concept is again you've used it in military fashion; is that

16 correct?

17 A. Yes, that's right, sir.

18 MR. METTRAUX: And if the Registry could go to the previous page

19 of the document that is now on the screen. That would be formally page

20 390 of the entire document, and it's 1D00-7882.

21 Q. And, Mr. Bezruchenko, if I can ask you to focus on the last entry

22 of that document. There is an entry called "Operation." Can you see

23 that?

24 A. Yes, I can see that, sir.

25 Q. And I will read to you the definition which the Department of

Page 6563

1 Defence of the United States gives of that concept in military doctrine.

2 It says this:

3 "1. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic,

4 operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative military

5 mission."

6 Then:

7 "2. The process of carrying on combat, including movement,

8 supply, attack, defence, and manoeuvres needed to gain the objectives of

9 any battle or campaign."

10 And I suppose you will agree that this is again a pretty classical

11 definition of the concept of operation in military doctrine. Do you agree

12 with that?

13 A. I do, sir.

14 Q. And what it refers to in paragraph or number 1 and 2 is "Military

15 mission" in 1, and more specifically the process of carrying out combat in

16 number 2; is that correct?

17 A. Yes, that's right.

18 Q. And again your conclusions and findings in that regard were

19 military in nature, based on your military expertise; is that correct?

20 A. Absolutely, sir.

21 Q. And can you agree, Mr. Bezruchenko, with the suggestions that

22 orders given, for instance, to provide fire support, in the context of,

23 say, a military mission, or orders to use troops in combat, would be an

24 indication or would be perhaps even evidence of the possibility that

25 operational control is being exercised? Do you agree with that?

Page 6564

1 A. Yes, I agree with that, sir.

2 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters kindly ask the witness to maintain

3 a pause before responding.

4 MR. METTRAUX: Your Honour, would that be a convenient time or is

5 it 12.30?

6 JUDGE PARKER: We would normally run to 12.30. We --

7 MR. METTRAUX: It's my fault, Your Honour. I believed it was

8 12.15. I will continue.

9 JUDGE PARKER: We use diminishing periods, because counsel and

10 witnesses increasingly tire during the period, so that the later period is

11 longer than the first.

12 MR. METTRAUX: I think it's a wise course, Your Honour. I'll

13 continue.

14 Q. Mr. Bezruchenko, in your report you've applied the concept or the

15 doctrine of operational control to the Ministry of the Interior of the

16 Republic of Macedonia; is that correct?

17 A. That's right, sir. If I may comment on that at this point.

18 The reason for that being the simple fact that the forces of the

19 Ministry of Interior were involved in the war on Macedonia in 2001.

20 Q. Well, I'm grateful for that, Mr. Bezruchenko. I will ask you this

21 question, then: Are you aware of a particular law or a particular

22 regulation that is applicable to the Ministry of Interior and which relies

23 upon the concept of operational control?

24 A. My question -- sorry, my answer to this question would be as

25 follows: In fact, the whole concept of functioning and hierarchy, as well

Page 6565

1 as the operational control, of the Ministry of Interior is fundamentally

2 described in the Law on Internal Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia, and

3 in a sense these fundamentals do not necessarily differ from the

4 fundamentals of the command and control as described in the Law on Defence

5 of the Republic of Macedonia. There are the same three basic principles

6 there; the single authority, subordination, and the unity of command.

7 Q. Well, if I can ask you simply to answer the previous question,

8 Mr. Bezruchenko. Are you aware, through your research or the review of

9 the material which you have reviewed or consulted for the purpose of

10 preparing your report or otherwise, come across a reference to the

11 doctrine or the theory of operational control as would be applicable to

12 the Ministry of the Interior?

13 A. I don't quite understand what you actually mean, sir.

14 Q. Well, my question is this: You have indicated in your report and

15 in evidence that this particular doctrine, which is, as you indicated, a

16 military sort of doctrine called "operational control," would be

17 applicable in your view to the functioning and structure or mechanism of

18 the Ministry of Interior, and my question, it's only a preliminary

19 question, is whether in your review of the material in particular -- I

20 should qualify that. In your review of the laws and regulations that are

21 applicable to the Ministry of Interior, you have come across this

22 particular doctrine or this particular theory in the form of a statement

23 to the effect that it would be applicable to the Ministry of the interior?

24 A. The definition of "operational control," as provided by this

25 specific document, is in fact a military definition and is also an

Page 6566

1 academic definition, if you wish. But answering your question more

2 specifically, if I came across any documents related to operational

3 control as applied to the Ministry of Interior, I would say, yes, there is

4 at least one book of rules which describes essentially the operations of

5 the Ministry of Interior.

6 Q. Well, I'm grateful for that, and this was the next question I had.

7 MR. METTRAUX: The rule of book [sic] is Exhibit P96, and if the

8 witness could be shown that document, please. This would be

9 R042-4624-ET-01 in the English, and the Macedonian would be R042-4623-01,

10 I believe.

11 Mr. Bezruchenko, is it the particular document which you have just

12 referred to?

13 A. Could you kindly go to the next page?

14 Q. In the English or the Macedonian?

15 A. It doesn't matter.

16 MR. METTRAUX: Could the Registry assist, please.

17 THE WITNESS: Yes, indeed, this is this document.

18 MR. METTRAUX: And if I could ask the Registry to turn to Article

19 154 of the rule of books. I believe this would be page R042-4643-ET-02

20 [Realtime transcript read in error "R042-4643-80-02"] in the English. It

21 would be -- I will repeat. It would be R042-4643-ET - England and

22 Tom - -02, and in the Macedonian this would be R042-4623-22.

23 Do you have Article 154 in front of you, Mr. Bezruchenko?

24 A. Yes, I do, sir.

25 Q. And if I can ask you to direct your attention to the, if you wish,

Page 6567

1 the third indented part of that article, it starts with the words:

2 "Direct preventive engagement by the authorised officials ..." Can you

3 see that?

4 A. Yes, I see that.

5 Q. And if you go further in the text of that provision, you will see

6 a reference in the English version to: "... operational control over

7 dangerous areas ..." Is that correct?

8 A. Yes, that's right.

9 Q. And I will ask your assistance in the Macedonian now, which I

10 believe you have on the other side of the screen, and look at the same

11 article. Can you see that particular passage, the same passage we just

12 looked at, Mr. Bezruchenko?

13 A. Could you please read this -- kindly read this passage again,

14 please.

15 Q. Certainly, at least in the English, Mr. Bezruchenko. This starts

16 with the words: "Direct preventative engagement by the authorised

17 officials by undertaking appropriate measures for physically averting an

18 attack ..."

19 And it goes on, and in approximately the middle of that paragraph,

20 there's a reference to something called "operational control over

21 dangerous areas." Can you see that?

22 A. Yes, I can see that.

23 Q. And can I ask you, Mr. Bezruchenko, please, to locate the same

24 passage in the Macedonian version.

25 A. If you could be a little bit -- I mean if it could be a little bit

Page 6568

1 magnified somehow.

2 MR. METTRAUX: Could the Registry --

3 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters kindly ask the witness to pull

4 up the microphone so we can hear, and kindly maintain a pause before

5 answering.

6 MR. METTRAUX: You're being asked to do many things at the same

7 time.

8 Perhaps I should give the paper copy to Mr. Bezruchenko.

9 Q. If you can look at the -- it's again Article 154. It's the second

10 indented part of that document, and I believe I have highlighted in blue

11 part of that.

12 A. Yes, I can see that.

13 Q. Can you see that, Mr. --

14 A. Yes, I can see that.

15 Q. Is it correct that, in fact, the original Macedonian refers not to

16 operational control but to operative control, "operativna kontrol"; is

17 that correct?

18 A. It can be translated both ways, but semantically I don't really

19 see any big difference here.

20 Q. Perhaps I should ask you this, then: Are you aware of any

21 internal regulations or instructions of the Ministry of Interior which

22 contain a definition of the concept of operational -- let me ask you

23 first, of operational control? Are you aware of any documents similar in

24 kind, if you wish, to the one from the DOD which would contain a

25 definition of operational control? Are you aware of any such documents?

Page 6569

1 A. Are you specifically referring to Macedonian Ministry of Interior,

2 sir, or do you mean documents in general?

3 Q. No, I apologise. About the Ministry of Interior in particular,

4 Mr. Bezruchenko.

5 A. Operational control related to the Ministry of Interior. No, I

6 don't think so.

7 Q. Are you aware of any particular internal instructions or

8 regulations applicable to the Ministry of Interior which refer to the

9 concept of operative control?

10 A. Well, there is a number of such documents, and in fact one of

11 those which is the one that I'm holding in my hands now.

12 Q. And you agree that the definitions used by the Ministry of

13 Interior actually all refer to that concept of operative control as I

14 cited from the original, and you will correct me, it's "operativna

15 kontrol"; is that correct?

16 A. Well, I don't really see, again as I mentioned, really any serious

17 difference between "operativna" which is in Macedonian, and "operational"

18 which is in English. In fact, these two notions, expressed in different

19 languages, of course, essentially apply to the same idea, which is

20 control, well, for execution of a certain mission. It's just to put it

21 simply.

22 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please move closer to the

23 microphones, because the interpreters cannot hear him, anything.

24 MR. METTRAUX: I apologise to the interpreter for cutting off.

25 Q. Mr. Bezruchenko, the view that you just expressed, is that a

Page 6570

1 personal view of yours or is that something you say, you base on

2 particular material and regulation of the Ministry of Interior of which

3 you are aware of?

4 A. Both.

5 Q. And when you gave this definition or made this distinction which

6 in your view applies between the concept of operational and operative,

7 which document in particular would you be referring to?

8 A. Well, for instance, the one which I'm holding now.

9 Q. And you agree that all of those documents refer to "operativni,"

10 "operative"; is that correct?

11 A. Well, not necessarily.

12 Q. Are you aware of a document that would refer to what would be -- I

13 apologise. You will excuse me for the accent -- to something called

14 "operacijonalni kontrol" "operational control." Are you aware of any

15 documents containing those words?

16 A. I'm sorry, sir. This is a purely semantical thing.

17 Q. Perhaps I will simply move on and ask you this question for the

18 last -- simply to clear up the matter. Is that your evidence that you are

19 not aware of any regulations or internal instructions applicable to the

20 Ministry of Interior where that particular concept of operational control

21 is defined; is that correct?

22 A. If you are specifically referring, sir, to what is termed in

23 Macedonian as "operacijonalni kontrol," no, I didn't see anything like

24 this.

25 Q. Thank you, Mr. Bezruchenko. Is that correct also that in --

Page 6571

1 MR. METTRAUX: I apologise, Your Honour.

2 JUDGE PARKER: I think we've reached a convenient time,

3 Mr. Mettraux.

4 MR. METTRAUX: Thank you.

5 JUDGE PARKER: I think it will be to everyone's benefit if we

6 break now and resume at 1.00.

7 --- Recess taken at 12.30 p.m.

8 --- On resuming at 1.04 p.m.

9 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Mettraux.

10 MR. METTRAUX: Thank you, Your Honour.

11 Q. Mr. Bezruchenko, is it correct that in a number of documents which

12 I think you have reviewed and one or two of which have been admitted in

13 evidence already, there's a reference to an organ or an entity which, in

14 those documents, is referred to as the Operations Control Centre, and I

15 believe in one document it even says "Operational Control Centre of the

16 MOI." Are you aware of those documents -- or any of those documents, I'm

17 sorry?

18 A. Excuse me, there's some problem with the translation, I'm afraid

19 believe.

20 MR. METTRAUX: Could the witness be assisted?

21 THE WITNESS: It suddenly switched over to Macedonian. Maybe I

22 should put it off.


24 Q. I believe it would be number 4, Mr. Bezruchenko, in English.

25 A. Thank you.

Page 6572

1 Q. I'll ask you the question again, Mr. Bezruchenko.

2 Is that correct that in a number of documents which I believe you

3 have reviewed and a number of which were admitted, there are references to

4 a location or a body known as the Operations Control Centre? And I

5 believe that one document refers to even an Operational Control Centre.

6 Are you aware of any such document, Mr. Bezruchenko?

7 A. Sir, are you referring to military Macedonian documents or are you

8 referring to police documents?

9 Q. I'm sorry, I should have specified that the second time I asked

10 the question. I mentioned specifically about the MOI.

11 A. Operational Control Centre. There was a headquarters for

12 Operational Action Ramno established in the Ministry of the Interior.

13 Yes, that I know.

14 Q. And that headquarter which you are referred to as the Operational

15 Control Centre in Macedonian is known as "DOC"; is that correct?

16 A. I'm not sure if this specific abbreviation implies to DOC.

17 Q. Well, would you be familiar with the expression "Dezurni

18 Operativni Centar"?

19 A. Yes, I would.

20 Q. And this would be the Operational Control Centre which you have

21 referred to; is that correct?

22 A. Not necessarily, sir. I believe we should really clarify what

23 this abbreviation means, whether it is "Dezurni Operativna Centra" which

24 literally means "duty officer in the Operational Centre," or whether it

25 means "Dezurni Operativni Centar" which means "Duty Operation Centre."

Page 6573

1 There is some difference here.

2 Q. But in terms of substance, Mr. Bezruchenko, is that correct that

3 the duty or responsibility of that body was, in effect, to centralise

4 information which is relevant to the work of the police and, inter alia in

5 criminal cases, to pass that information on to the investigative judge and

6 prosecutor; are you aware of that?

7 A. I would imagine that this body would have a number of functions.

8 One of those functions would be the nerve centre for collecting all

9 information related to the operational situation in Macedonia, meaning the

10 military situation at the fronts, as well as, perhaps, the operation

11 related to criminal activities. What other functions could be, and I

12 could perhaps give a little bit extended explanation, this may include

13 also the control functions for actual carrying out these operations in the

14 field.

15 Q. Well, let me ask two questions, then. Is it correct that this

16 body in fact existed prior to the crisis in 2001; are you aware of that

17 fact?

18 A. I know that "dezurni," that is duty officer at the operational

19 centre, probably existed prior this fact, but this is an officer. Not

20 really a body, one officer.

21 Q. And when you say in your response that: "This may include also

22 the control functions for actual carrying out these operation in the

23 field," are you stating a belief of yours or are you suggesting that you

24 have material -- or you have reviewed material for the purpose of your

25 report, which indicates that in some instances the Operative Control

Page 6574

1 Centre or Duty Operative Centre, as it should be called, they did so,

2 Mr. Bezruchenko?

3 A. I would be specifically referring to the headquarters of the

4 Operational Action Ramno.

5 Q. And is that your evidence, Mr. Bezruchenko, that the headquarter

6 of what you called the Operational Action Ramno was -- or the function of

7 that centre included the control functions for actual carrying out of

8 operations in the field; is that your evidence, Mr. Bezruchenko, or is

9 that an opinion?

10 A. I believe that this headquarters definitely had a role in planning

11 and actual carrying out of operations in the field, but I don't really

12 think this was actually limited exclusively to Operational Centre Ramno.

13 Q. And when you say you believe that the Operational, as you call it,

14 Centre Ramno had a role in planning and actually in carrying out of

15 operation in the field, could you be more precise and indicate what, in

16 your view, allows you to form that conclusion?

17 A. In the course of preparation of my report, I came across numerous

18 documents marked "Operation Ramno." Most of these documents are reports

19 from various police bodies and units on the ground to the Operational

20 Centre Ramno. It is pretty obvious in this case that as these reports

21 were actually forwarded to Operational Headquarters Ramno, it was this

22 specific headquarters which was responsible for collecting

23 collecting/analysing these reports, as well as suggesting possible

24 operational response measures.

25 Q. And did you see any such documents that would suggest possible

Page 6575

1 operational response measures or did you only see the first type of

2 material which you've indicated, namely, information coming towards the

3 headquarters? In other words, let me ask you perhaps this question: Did

4 you see any order signed by the Operational Centre Ramno, as you call it?

5 A. I'm not indicating that Operational Headquarters Ramno was issuing

6 any orders. I only said that it had a role in planning and carrying out

7 such operations.

8 Q. Did you see perhaps any plan or map of an operation prepared by

9 the Headquarter Ramno?

10 A. I didn't see any maps.

11 Q. And when you say that you saw earlier the possibility that they

12 made possible operation -- or suggestion, it is line 3, suggestion of

13 possible operational response measures, could you tell in what form you

14 suggest those suggestions were being made?

15 A. Well, these could be made in the form of verbal suggestions or

16 proposals at briefings and meetings at the Ministry of Interior.

17 Q. Did you hear or were you present or were you told about any

18 particular instances of such verbal orders being given, and if so, by

19 whom?

20 A. These would be a normal routine procedure in the Ministry of

21 Interior in a situation where a war was going on in the country. I don't

22 really think that the situation warranted any detailed paperwork regarding

23 the situation.

24 Q. So the answer to my question is, in fact, that you have not seen

25 any evidence of any such verbal order, but that instead it is a belief

Page 6576

1 that you draw from your experience; is that correct?

2 A. That's right. I did not see any orders specifically coming from

3 the Operational Ramno headquarters, but I have seen lots of reports coming

4 to this --

5 Q. Is it also correct -- sorry, did I cut your answer, Mr. --

6 A. No, that's fine.

7 Q. Is it also correct that, Mr. Bezruchenko, as you were preparing

8 your amended report and your evidence in this courtroom, you realised that

9 this concept or this doctrine of operational control could come to clash

10 with another aspect of the Prosecution case, or at least what the

11 Prosecution case had evolved to be; is it correct?

12 A. No, not really. I don't quite understand what you mean.

13 Q. Well, let me ask you this, then: Do you recall that during your

14 examination-in-chief, you were being asked a number of questions about

15 disciplinary matters and disciplinary issues by Mr. Saxon? And I refer to

16 the first part of your examination-in-chief on the 4th of October.

17 A. [No verbal response].

18 Q. Sorry, Mr. Bezruchenko, I will ask you again. Do you simply

19 recall being asked a number of questions about disciplinary issues and

20 disciplinary competencies by Mr. Saxon on the 4th of October, 2007?

21 A. Yes, I do.

22 Q. And do you recall making or giving that particular answer to

23 Mr. Saxon in relation to one of his questions? You said this, and it's

24 the 4th of October of 2007 at page 6070. You said this:

25 "Normally, operational control does not include such issues as

Page 6577

1 discipline and logistics," you said.

2 Do you recall saying that?

3 A. Yes, I do.

4 Q. And do you agree that this is, in fact, a correct and accurate

5 position under military doctrine, as is evident from the definition of the

6 DOD; do you agree?

7 A. Yes, I do.

8 Q. And according to that doctrine, and applying again the standard

9 which the DOD, for instance, applied, this would mean that a military

10 officer or a superior who has operational control over a group of men does

11 not have disciplinary or logistical responsibilities in relation to that

12 group; is that correct?

13 A. No, this is wrong, Mr. Mettraux. I'm afraid we have completely

14 different interpretations of that concept of operational control.

15 We should not mix up two things here. The operational control is

16 operational because it implies operations. Disciplinary control is

17 something else. It implies discipline.

18 Q. Well, let me read out to you again the passage from the definition

19 given by the DOD which I read out to you. I'll just read the passage

20 which is relevant here, and it says:

21 "It does not" - that is, operational control - "does not, in and

22 of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of

23 administration, discipline, internal organisation, or unique training."

24 Do you agree that according to this definition, at least, the

25 concept of operational control does not include discipline or matters of

Page 6578

1 discipline, as it says; do you agree with that?

2 A. Yes, as defined in this particular document, it is, but this is

3 only part of the answer to the question. The full answer to the question

4 would be that one person, one commander in the field, would normally

5 combine both operational and disciplinary control, so these two types of

6 control are distinctly different.

7 Q. Is it correct, Mr. Bezruchenko, that this is, in fact,

8 inconsistent, what you just said, inconsistent with the definition of the

9 DOD which I just read out to you?

10 A. No, it is not. There is no inconsistency here.

11 Q. Is it also correct, Mr. Bezruchenko, that this new statement that

12 you've made about the combination of operational and disciplinary control

13 is not specifically made in your report; is that correct?

14 A. This is a very obvious thing, at least to a military expert,

15 Mr. Mettraux, and I don't really think this is something which could be --

16 I mean, I don't really think this is something which a person could have

17 two opinions about.

18 If a military commander in the field has full responsibility for

19 his troops, he has to have both the operational and disciplinary control.

20 In other words, if I'm a commander of a unit and some man in my unit has

21 committed a breach of discipline, I am the first person up the chain of

22 command to be reported about this to and to take proper measures.

23 Q. Are you suggesting that the definition that is given in the

24 lexicon of the DOD is not accurate in terms of military doctrine when it

25 excludes discipline from the realm of operational control?

Page 6579

1 A. No, there is nothing wrong here. I'm saying again, Mr. Mettraux,

2 and perhaps this is some kind of misunderstanding, that you should

3 differentiate between operational control, which is exclusively directed

4 at operations and nothing else, and disciplinary control, which is

5 directed at discipline, and these two types of control are perfectly

6 legitimate to be combined in one commander.

7 Q. Isn't it correct --

8 THE INTERPRETER: Please make breaks between questions and

9 answers. Thank you.

10 MR. METTRAUX: I apologise to the interpreters.

11 Q. Isn't that correct that for the first time, Mr. Bezruchenko, in

12 your evidence-in-chief on the 4th of October of 2007, at page 6070, you

13 said this:

14 "These" - and the words should refer to disciplinary

15 powers - "would be granted to the next superior of the commander who would

16 have the operational control of his troops on the ground."

17 Is it what you said?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And does this particular comment appear, as far as you can recall,

20 anywhere in your report?

21 A. Again, I don't see any discrepancy here, because what I actually

22 said was that if I commit a disciplinary breach, the next person up the

23 chain of command is supposed to take care about this breach of discipline.

24 Q. I understand, Mr. Bezruchenko, this is now your evidence here. My

25 question is: Did you mention this particular view of yours or opinion of

Page 6580

1 yours anywhere in your report?

2 A. This is a very clear thing, Mr. Mettraux, and I don't really think

3 that, well, these smallest details would actually be a specific subject of

4 my report. This is simply hair-splitting.

5 Q. And if I understand your evidence correctly, this particular

6 statement that I've just read to you is not based on the doctrine of

7 operational control; is that correct?

8 A. Which specific statement do you mean, please?

9 Q. I will read it out to you again, Mr. Bezruchenko. It's from the

10 4th of October of 2007. It's page 6070, and it reads like that. It says:

11 "These powers," and you are referring at this stage to these

12 disciplinary powers, "would be granted to the next superior of the

13 commander who would have the operational control of his troops on the

14 ground."

15 A. If I could specify your question, Mr. Mettraux, disciplinary

16 powers in relation to what?

17 Q. Well, Mr. Bezruchenko, I'm asking you about the answer that you

18 gave to Mr. Saxon, to his particular question, and perhaps if I can assist

19 you, I can read the question that was put to you. It's again the same

20 page, Mr. Bezruchenko. It reads this:

21 "How does this paragraph" - that's paragraph 415 of your

22 statement - "relate to -- actually, let me step back a little bit.

23 There's a term that I'd like to ask you, if you can define a term for me,

24 please. The term is 'operational control'."

25 That's your response:

Page 6581

1 "Well, according to the concept of operational control, a

2 commander who is responsible to carry out a certain mission must exercise

3 his authority to organise, deploy and direct his forces in operational

4 sense, that is, to make sure that his mission is accomplished."

5 And then you added:

6 "Normally, operational control does not include such issues as

7 discipline, logistics and -- logistics."

8 And then Mr. Saxon asked you this:

9 "And when you say, 'Normally operational control does not include

10 such issues as discipline, logistics and -- logistics,' for example, the

11 aspect of discipline, who would be expected, if not the commander, to

12 exercise operational control with respect to discipline?"

13 And your answer was this:

14 "That would be -- these powers would be granted to the next

15 superior of the commander, who would have the operational control of his

16 troops on the ground."

17 Do you recall that exchange?

18 A. Yes, I do.

19 Q. And in answer to my question, did you make that particular point

20 which you made to Mr. Saxon in response to his question anywhere in your

21 report?

22 A. Yes. In fact, as is clear from this exchange, I provided an

23 accurate description of the operational control. And regarding the second

24 part of this exchange, the control of disciplinary powers or, in fact, the

25 disciplinary control belongs to the same person who is exercising

Page 6582

1 operational control of his particular unit. But if it is found that a

2 commander of this particular unit is committing some breaches of

3 discipline, it is next up the chain of command who is to take care of

4 that. It's as simple as that.

5 Q. Well, I have two questions to follow up on this. You first said

6 that, yes, you have made that point in your report. Would you remember

7 where, generally in your report, that evidence or that opinion would be

8 given?

9 A. Excuse me, sir. Which specific point you're referring to?

10 Q. I'm referring in particular to the suggestion that disciplinary

11 powers would be granted to the next superior of the commander who would

12 have the operational control of his troops on the ground.

13 A. My report was based on documents, sir, and I would like you to

14 please indicate to me which specific document you mean.

15 Q. I'm sorry, I think we're talking at cross-purpose,

16 Mr. Bezruchenko.

17 I understood that your evidence here is that this particular point

18 which you are now making to the effect that the disciplinary powers would

19 be granted to the next superior of the commander who would have the

20 operational control of his troops on the ground, is to be found somewhere

21 in your report, and my first question was: Could you indicate if, indeed,

22 this is to be found in your report, and if so, in what part of that

23 report, if you can recall?

24 A. First of all, Mr. Mettraux, I don't quite understand what you mean

25 by "operational powers" in relation to discipline. There is, in my

Page 6583

1 understanding, no such thing as operational powers in relation to

2 discipline. There are operational power -- I mean operational control and

3 there are disciplinary powers.

4 Well, regarding the specific point which you're referring to, the

5 point of disciplinary control was reflected in my report -- in the part of

6 my report, I mean, which speaks about the Law of Internal Affairs.

7 Q. So it is your evidence here, sir, that this particular point, and

8 I use the expression "powers" because it is the one you used in your

9 evidence-in-chief yourself, your evidence is that, in fact, that

10 particular point about these disciplinary powers granted to the next

11 superior of the commander, who would have the operational control of his

12 troops on the ground, is in fact, in your -- in the part of your report

13 that discusses the MOI; is that correct?

14 A. What is correct, sir, is that my report contains a portion on the

15 disciplinary powers of the head of the Ministry of Interior, as reflected

16 in the Law on Internal Affairs.

17 Q. And simply, Mr. Bezruchenko, I don't want to muddy the water, but

18 for the sake of clarity, this particular statement that I've read to you a

19 number of times, is it a statement which you recall as having been made

20 somewhere in your report?

21 A. I don't quite understand what you mean, sir. Which statement do

22 you mean?

23 Q. I apologise, Mr. Bezruchenko, for not being clear. Your statement

24 made at page 6070 to the effect that disciplinary powers, your terms,

25 would be granted to the next superior of the commander who would have the

Page 6584

1 operational control of his troops on the ground, is it, as far as you can

2 recollect, a statement or a finding or an opinion which you gave somewhere

3 in your report?

4 A. If we are referring to specific wording of what you call

5 "statement," well, I don't think I have this wording in my report.

6 Q. And simply to clarify the second matter for the record and to be

7 sure that we understand each other, Mr. Bezruchenko, I would like to be

8 clear on the issue of the scope, if you wish, of the concept of

9 operational control. Is your evidence now that the concept of operational

10 control does, in fact, include the concept of -- or does include

11 disciplinary powers?

12 A. No, sir, this is a wrong statement. As I mentioned previously,

13 and I repeat it again, there is operational control and there are

14 disciplinary powers, and there is no way of mixing these two up.

15 Q. And when the DOD says that operational control does not, in and of

16 itself, include disciplinary powers or matters of discipline, are you

17 taking issue with that proposal?

18 A. This proposal, as formulated in the DOD document, is absolutely

19 correct.

20 Q. And I believe that later in your evidence, sorry, you said to

21 Mr. Saxon, and again correct me if it's a poor summary, that in a normal

22 military structure superiors have disciplinary powers over their

23 subordinates. Do you recall saying that?

24 A. Yes, I do.

25 Q. And just as a matter of clarity, did you discuss at all the issue

Page 6585

1 of disciplinary powers in the context of the Ministry of Defence or the

2 army in your report?

3 A. No, I don't think so.

4 Q. Is that correct that you did not deal with any disciplinary powers

5 or any disciplinary competencies as might have the commander-in-chief of

6 the army; is that correct?

7 A. In my report, I was, among other things, describing the

8 legislation pertaining to the organisation of the defence of the country,

9 including the Law on Defence, and I think I provided maybe a, maybe a

10 little bit brief, a succinct description of the law and the basic clauses

11 it addresses, but I don't think that I made a specific point about

12 disciplinary powers in the military, which again are pretty obvious things

13 and I don't really think need any special attention.

14 Q. But you do pay attention in your report to the issue of

15 disciplinary powers in the Ministry of the Interior, as you say it; is

16 that correct?

17 A. Yes, I do, because the law deals with this issue.

18 Q. And so does the law applicable to the army; is that correct?

19 A. Well, I'm not entirely certain which particular clause deals with

20 this issue, but army is an army, and disciplinary matters in the army are

21 pretty obvious to me.

22 Q. Just going back to your report for a moment, Mr. Bezruchenko, is

23 it correct that in your report, you make the suggestions that

24 Mr. Boskoski, and I think I have read that passage to you already, had

25 operational control over -- of police forces; is that correct?

Page 6586

1 A. Yes, that's right.

2 Q. And is that correct that in your report, you also suggest that

3 Minister Boskoski had certain disciplinary responsibilities vis-a-vis

4 those forces; is that correct?

5 A. Yes, that's right.

6 Q. I will come back in a moment, Mr. Bezruchenko, to the issue of

7 disciplinary competencies and powers, as you see it.

8 MR. METTRAUX: If Mr. Bezruchenko would please be shown his report

9 once again. I believe this is Exhibit P466. And if the Registry could

10 please turn to page 107.

11 Q. Mr. Bezruchenko, this should be the same page I believe you still

12 have in front of you. This is the subsection of your report

13 dealing with operational control.

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. And I would like to turn your attention once again, on the same

16 paragraph, that's paragraph 371. That's the paragraph in your report

17 where you suggest that Minister Boskoski exercise operational control of

18 police forces, and you add that this operational control was manifested in

19 orders to deploy police at various crisis areas. Is that correct?

20 A. Yes, that's right, sir.

21 Q. And is that correct that for the -- for your conclusion, if you so

22 wish, to be correct in this matter, it would have to be accepted first --

23 I will simply list them for you, and you will tell me whether you agree

24 with them -- for your conclusions and approach to be accepted by this

25 Chamber, it would have to be accepted first that this military doctrine of

Page 6587

1 operational control is acceptable or is applicable, I'm sorry, in the

2 context of a military and civilian structure; is that correct?

3 A. I don't quite understand your question, sir.

4 Q. Well, let me put it slightly better. Do you agree that the

5 doctrine of operational control is a military doctrine?

6 A. As expressed in the document which I used, yes, it is basically a

7 military doctrine.

8 Q. And you will agree then, Mr. Bezruchenko, that for it to apply to

9 the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Macedonia in this case, it

10 would have to be accepted by the Trial Chamber that this military doctrine

11 can apply, in fact, to a civilian context; do you agree with that?

12 A. This may be an issue, and maybe not. In fact, if we come back to

13 the document which you have just shown to me, Mr. Mettraux, which is

14 "Pravilnik Za Vrsenje Na Rabotite," it clearly speaks, even in the

15 English translation, of an operational control. Well, so basically we are

16 back to the square 1.

17 Q. Well, if you can simply respond to the question, Mr. Bezruchenko.

18 Do you agree that in order to accept your conclusions and your findings on

19 that point as regard operational control, it would have to be accepted

20 that this particular military doctrine would apply in the context of a

21 civilian structure, such as the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of

22 Macedonia; is that correct?

23 A. My answer to this would be the following, Mr. Mettraux: The

24 forces of the Ministry of Interior were a component of the security forces

25 of the Republic of Macedonia and were deployed in combat operations on the

Page 6588

1 ground. Therefore, the concept of the operational control, as you define

2 it in its military application, would certainly be applicable to the units

3 of the Ministry of the Interior.

4 Q. So if I understand your response correctly, Mr. Bezruchenko, your

5 suggestion is that, yes, this doctrine -- military doctrine of operational

6 control applies or can apply to a civilian structure, and it does apply,

7 in your view, to the situation of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic

8 of Macedonia. Is that a correct summary?

9 A. I am specifically referring to the forces or, rather, units of

10 special police of the Ministry of Interior. I don't know to which extent

11 they could be described as civilian structures.

12 Q. Is your evidence then, Mr. Bezruchenko, somewhat qualified to the

13 effect that only those units, you mentioned the special police, for

14 instance, which took part in what you called "forces," "use of force," I

15 don't know what expression you wanted to use, would come under the

16 application of that doctrine, or would your application of that doctrine

17 be broader in scope?

18 A. If I may refer you to the book which was written by prominent

19 military experts, "The War in Macedonia," which clearly speaks about the

20 security forces of Macedonia being made of two components; the Ministry of

21 Interior, as such, as an institution, and the Armed Forces of the Republic

22 of Macedonia, so according to the opinion of these experts, and I tend to

23 concur with them, the concept of operational control, in its military

24 sense, will be equally applicable to the entirety of the entity which is

25 called the security forces of Macedonia, being - excuse me, sir - being

Page 6589

1 made up of forces of the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Interior

2 itself, as well as the Army of the Republic of Macedonia.

3 Q. I'm grateful for this, Mr. Bezruchenko. Perhaps I should ask you

4 this: Are you aware of any precedent or are you aware of any authority in

5 your field or in others which would suggest that, in fact, this military

6 doctrine could possibly apply to a civilian organ or a civilian

7 institution; are you aware of any such precedent or authority?

8 A. We may go back to the Law on Defence of the Republic of Macedonia,

9 which clearly speaks of a possibility of involvement of the Ministry of

10 Interior in military operations.

11 Q. But you do agree, Mr. Bezruchenko, that the Law on Defence does

12 not speak of operational control as regard the Ministry of Interior and

13 its forces; do you agree with that?

14 A. Yes, I do.

15 Q. Is it also correct that for the Chamber to accept your conclusion

16 on that point, it would have to accept that Mr. Boskoski in fact had such

17 so-called operational control; do you agree with that?

18 A. I don't quite understand your question, sir.

19 Q. Well, do you agree that your report -- I could put it better to

20 you, Mr. Bezruchenko. Your report suggests and you're inviting the

21 Chamber to accept two things: That not only did the theory of operational

22 control apply to the Ministry of Interior in Macedonia at the relevant

23 time, but in particular to the minister himself, Mr. Boskoski, and that in

24 this particular instance you say he had that control; is that correct?

25 A. Yes. I think, just for the record perhaps, I may say again that

Page 6590

1 in the war situation which was taking place in Macedonia in 2001, the

2 concept of operational control de facto applied both -- to both components

3 of the Macedonian security forces, these being the Ministry of the

4 Interior and the Army of the Republic of Macedonia.

5 Q. Is that also correct, Mr. Bezruchenko, that what you are inviting,

6 in effect, the Chamber to do is to apply this doctrine of operational

7 control to some extent, but not to its full extent, to Mr. Boskoski; is

8 that correct, that's in effect what you're asking the Chamber?

9 A. No, it's not, sir. There are no implications attached to my

10 statement. What I said is purely based on my professional experience.

11 Q. Isn't it correct, Mr. Bezruchenko, that in effect what you're

12 asking the Chamber to do is to apply this theory of operational control,

13 as far as you say is relevant to demonstrating authority on the part of

14 the minister over police forces, but to refrain from applying that

15 doctrine to its end when it relates to disciplinary matters? Would that

16 be a fair summary?

17 A. I'm afraid not, sir. I'm afraid I am repeating this again.

18 We do not really have to mix up two things, operational control

19 and disciplinary powers. These are absolutely different things. But that

20 does not necessarily mean that they can be combined in the authority of

21 one person. This is what I'm saying.

22 MR. METTRAUX: Would that be a convenient time, Your Honour?


24 We adjourn now for the weekend. We resume at 2.15 on Monday.

25 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m.,

Page 6591

1 to be reconvened on Monday, the 22nd day of

2 October, 2007, at 2.15 p.m.