1 Monday, 10 March 2008
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.
6 JUDGE PARKER: Good morning.
7 And good morning to you, sir.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.
9 JUDGE PARKER: Would you please stand and read aloud the
10 affirmation that is given to you now.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
12 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
13 WITNESS: BLAGOJA MARKOVSKI
14 [Witness answered through interpreter]
15 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you. Please sit down.
16 Now Mr. Apostolski has some questions for you.
17 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Good morning Your Honours.
18 Examination by Mr. Apostolski:
19 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Blagoja Markovski.
20 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Your Honours, before I start
21 asking questions of the witness, we have prepared a binder containing his
22 report, so if we could distribute those.
23 Q. Dr. Blagoja Markovski, my name is Antonio Apostolski. We know
24 each other already, but let me officially introduce myself with you.
25 Together with Jasmina Zivkovic, we appear for the Defence of Mr. Johan
2 Before I start asking you questions, I would like to indicate
3 that, although you and I speak the same language, you should still wait
4 for my questions and your answers, as well, to be interpreted in the
5 language understandable for everyone in the courtroom, so let's be
6 mindful of that and facilitate the work of the interpreters.
7 Could you please tell me your full name for the transcript?
8 A. My name is Blagoja Markovski.
9 Q. Is everything written in your CV that we find in tab 1 of the
10 binder that you just received a contract description of your academic
11 professional and other performances?
12 A. Yes. What is of essential significance.
13 Q. I won't ask you about your CV. Let me just ask you what was the
14 topic you dealt in your Ph.D. thesis, and what was the issue that you
15 developed therein?
16 A. The topic of my Ph.D. thesis was the possibilities for resolving
17 an internal state crisis in transition circumstances. This is actually
18 the current issue of 2001 in the Republic of Macedonia, but also early
19 than that, in the period, in the region of southeastern Europe, where in
20 parallel with the societal transition, there were also some backwards
21 activities taking place in terms of security situation; and from this
22 aspect, this problem has been developed broadly, but the focus has been
23 placed on the Republic of Macedonia, the situation in the Republic of
24 Macedonia in 2001.
25 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I seek to tender
1 into evidence 65 ter 2D688; that is, the CV of the Dr. Blagoja Markovski.
2 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, this will be Exhibit number 2D00100.
4 Thank you.
5 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Did the Defence give any materials to you so that you would
7 prepare your report?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Could you clarify for me how did you arrive at the positions you
10 are presenting in your report?
11 A. With regards to the final conclusions I'm presenting in the
12 report, I used various materials for those, and I could divide those into
13 three groups: The first group are the official documents issued by the
14 organs of Republic of Macedonia; the second group are documents
15 assessments, conclusions developed by the international factor present in
16 the Republic of Macedonia, primarily documents of representatives of the
17 United Nations, OSCE representatives that were present with relatively
18 large numbers in the Republic of Macedonia during the crisis, documents
19 coming from the NATO structures that were also present in the Republic of
20 Macedonia , and with which the organs of the Republic of Macedonia
21 cooperated through the structures of KFOR in Kosovo; and the third type
22 of documents are the documents that representatives of the armed
23 extremists have submitted to the Prosecutor's office or to the
25 I apologise. Of course, I had my own documents, since I am
1 studying this area for a long time already. I'm analysing it; and as I
2 said, it does not deal with the Republic of Macedonia only but with the
3 broader region. So I had my own set of documents dealing with certain
5 Q. You were a witness to the events in 2001?
6 A. Yes. In the course of 2001, I was an active military officer,
7 lieutenant-colonel. I was head of the service of the public relations
8 service in the army of the Republic of Macedonia and at the same time
9 spokesperson of the army. So from this aspect, one could say that I have
10 been an eye-witness to the events of 2001.
11 Q. After you finalised your report, did you introduce any
12 corrections to it?
13 A. Yes. I introduced corrections from two aspects.
14 After my arrival here to The Hague, I had certain consultations
15 with you, and I was indicated that considering the fact that the issues,
16 the mission, the tasks, the structure of the Ministry of Interior has
17 already been discussed to quite a large extent, I was suggested that I
18 should omit the items dealing with the Ministry of Interior; and from
19 this aspect I agreed. So I have omitted them from the report. They are
20 no longer part of the report.
21 Item 422 -- I apologise.
22 Item 34, Law on Internal Affairs, together with paragraphs 91 to
23 98; item 43, structure and forces of the Ministry of Interior, with
24 paragraphs 150 to 185; and item 525, the role of the Ministry of
25 Interior, including paragraphs 226 to 238. As I said, those
1 paragraphs and these items have been omitted from the report. They're no
2 longer part of the report, and that was done by my consent.
3 The second segment of corrections dealt with a completely
4 different issue; and here, as difficult it is for me, I must admit that
5 this has been done because of a mistake that I had made; namely, in item
6 422, service in the army, when elaborating on the structure positions and
7 definitions dealing with the army of the Republic of Macedonia, in my
8 report, I had used the Law on Service in the Army; whereas, you indicated
9 that considering the fact that this law, the Law on Service in the Army,
10 has been adopted and entered into force after the events of 2001, this
11 document cannot be of relevance. This is why I withdrew what I planned
12 to say on the basis of the Law on Service in the Army, and introduce
13 corrections with regard to the rule book on service in the army which was
14 a document that was in force in 2001.
15 So from this aspect, item 422 and paragraphs 110, 111, 112, 113,
16 114, and 115 are now similar in content to what has been presented before
17 but they're now based on a relevant document; and amended and corrected,
18 they now have a new format.
19 At the same time, further in the text of the report, where,
20 again, I was invoking the Law on Service in the Army, I have amended the
21 report. In paragraph 207, instead of the words "pursuant to Article 12
22 of the Law on Service in the Army," I have used "pursuant to Article 28
23 on the Law on Defence." So the definition of this paragraph deals with
24 the Law on Defence and not the Law on Service in the Army.
25 The same has been done in the paragraph 208, as well as
1 paragraph 211, where the definition I'm giving about the contents of
2 paragraph 211 pursuant to Article 13 of the Law on Defence, was
3 corrected. What I'm asserting there is actually pursuant to the combat
4 rules applicable in the army of the Republic of Macedonia.
5 Amendment has been introduced to the paragraph 372, where, in
6 line 7, the words "pursuant to Article 12 of the Law on Service in the
7 Army," are replaced to "pursuant to Article 28 of the Law on Defence,"
8 and the inverted comas are deleted because this no longer deals with the
9 Law on Service in the army.
10 The final amendment is in paragraph 382. At first and second
11 line, the words "Saso Vekovski" are stricken as is the footnote dealing
12 with the two words.
13 These are all the corrections that have been made to the report.
14 Q. I thank you for the exhaustive explanation.
15 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Your Honours, could the amended
16 report, together with the amendments, be introduced into evidence; that
17 is, 65 ter 2D729.
18 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, the amended report shall be given
20 exhibit number 2D00101, and the amended report be given Exhibit number
21 2D00101.1. Thank you, Your Honours.
22 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Mr. Markovski, I wouldn't like to repeat in my questions what has
24 been already been stated in your report, so I will just ask you questions
25 in order to explain with greater precision some of the positions taken in
1 your report.
2 In your report, your position disagrees with the notion that, in
3 the Republic of Macedonia in 2001, the events should be defined as
4 classical war or armed conflict. Why is that? Why are you making this
6 A. Yes. This indeed is my definition. I disagree that the events
7 of 2001 should be defined as classic war or classic armed conflict as a
8 synonym in terms of contents of a war, and this is due to several reasons
9 and due to the conclusions that I arrived at when analysing the events
10 from a scientific aspect.
11 Let me try to do this in brief; although, I believe that
12 simplification of some complex processes as war and peace might lead to
13 certain misunderstanding, but let me try briefly through several
14 sentences to explain my position.
15 For instance, let's define war and peace as two polar extremes:
16 Peace would be the one, and war would the other. It would be very good
17 if we would have a possibility as you lawyers have the scales of justice,
18 and then weigh the things towards one or the other side, and say, "Okay,
19 this side prevails so it is peace"; or put some additional weights on the
20 side of war, and say, "Yes, this looks more like a war."
21 Such black and white image would give us an opportunity to react
22 very swiftly and to define very quickly any situation that belongs to the
23 type of peace or type of war. However, I'm not sure there is a
24 possibility at all to give a definition, that we have an absolute peace
25 or that, on the other hand, we could speak about an extreme of war.
1 So between these two polar opposite, war and peace, there are a
2 number of societal processes taking place. These processes do not follow
3 a straight line. They are sinusoidal. So in the realm of peace, there
4 are both positive and negative societal processes, but also there are
5 positive and negative processes, also I'm saying conditionally speaking,
6 on the side of what is war.
7 For instance, on the side of the peace, from an external
8 viewpoint, we could have various border disputes; minority problems, such
9 as fostering or care for minorities coming from the same ethnic
10 affiliation; also economic pressures; fight for raw materials; also
11 asymmetrical threats, like terrorism, organised crime, which could have
12 the aim of achieving a short-term, but also a long-term, position of
13 interest. In the internal plane, and following the same reasoning, there
14 are economic, societal, minority problems, internal crime. And, of
15 course, in the internal plane, we also have the threats of asymmetrical
17 This could all bring about a crisis in any society, in a given
18 point of time. If it is caused by internal factors, it could be military
19 political; and if it is caused by internal factors, it could be then
20 internally political. The military political crisis usually has the aim
21 of achieving short-term or long-term objectives. The internally
22 political has the aim of achieving various partial interests; economic,
23 social, political, separatist, and various other interests.
24 Somewhere in this conglomerate of social processes, on the side
25 leading to negative elements or leaning towards war, we have the military
1 conflict or armed conflict which could have a low, medium, or high
3 The basic feature of armed conflict of a how intensity is that we
4 have manifestations of violence. Sometimes, we have demonstrated opened
5 armed violence in terms of incidents, and I'm primarily referring to
6 armed incidents; exchange of fire, activity of terrorist organisations
7 and individuals, as well as activity of the organised internal crime.
8 And at the end we have the war, which, as I said, from what is
9 known thus far in the science, that this is the extension of the
10 political aims achieved through military means, could be or could serve
11 from today's viewpoint as basis to review the issues of war, but without
12 having full merit as definition that would help us define all forms of
13 use of violence, especially at this moment the typical threats such as
14 the asymmetrical actions.
15 Q. Before I start my next question, I would kindly ask you to speak
16 a bit slower so that the interpreters could interpret you better.
17 A. Yes, I will try that. Thank you.
18 Q. So what would be the application of this to the Macedonian case,
19 regarding which you assert in paragraph 11 that it has been an internal
20 state crisis which was a result of the terrorist and separatist
21 tendencies and activities, supported by the armed individuals, and with
22 the involvement of armed individuals from a neighbouring country in
23 circumstances of sharp economic, social, and internally political
24 difficulties in the Republic of Macedonia?
25 A. Let me go back to the origin of crisis, in general.
1 As I mentioned before, there is really great difficulties in
2 defining ideal state or ideal peace in today's time. But let's suppose
3 that society starts with a state of stability. This state could be
4 disrupted if, in the society, and it happens very often, there are
5 certain problems that I discussed in my previous discussion; economic,
6 societal, minority related, asymmetrical threats related, et cetera.
7 And if the state, through its bodies - in today's time in
8 democratic states, in modern states, we have primarily the crisis
9 management system - so the state, with its bodies, fails to undertake
10 prevention measures in a timely fashion, this problem will grow into a
11 dispute. The dispute also, if no timely measures are taken, can
12 escalate, and its escalation then grows into a crisis.
13 The crisis, in itself and by itself, contains three stages, if we
14 may say so. The first one is the emergence as the mildest form or the
15 first stage in the crisis itself, The second one is the escalation, and
16 the third one is the resolution or the resolving or the deescalation.
17 In the initial, introductory stage, in the emergence of the
18 crisis, we could have various factor, various risk factors, which could
19 be of -- which could be open in type or often undercover nature. This
20 is why the prevention organs, when dealing with the crisis, should
21 without delay assess all the risks and threats present in the society or
22 in a country.
23 The escalation of the crisis is defined and characterised by an
24 open inception of problems, seed of problems, destablisation, or
25 disputes. We have already various contradictions such as still unarmed
1 violence. We have situations and state of confrontations between the
2 entities in a society, regardless of whether these are political entities
3 or other interest groups or self-organised individuals and groups.
4 The confrontation starts which then means non-adherence to the
5 norms and laws of the state, also intimidation. We have open threats,
6 ultimatums, and even armed incidents and use of forms of violence.
7 Q. Can I interrupt here, to be more precise about the Macedonian
9 A. There was no need to interrupt, because I was going to continue
10 right now. This is something that I had to say because the Republic of
11 Macedonia, back in 2001, facing all these risks and threats that I have
12 mentioned so far, and lacking appropriate system for prevention, which
13 would be established and legally regulated was lagging behind all these
14 events. At the moment, when the crisis could have grown into a military
15 armed conflict of a low, medium, and higher intensity, with the
16 assistance of international factor, most of all the international
17 community and the structures of NATO and the OSCE, it asked for
18 assistance. And the crisis at that particular moment, immediately before
19 it escalated in the third stage of deescalation and dealing with the
20 crisis, the result of that being the fact that in the Republic of
21 Macedonia, there was no bloodshed of the type as we could see in the
22 other regions on the Balkans and south-east Europe.
23 And for these reasons, the Republic of Macedonia, in a much
24 simpler way, started the post-crisis period which provided the
25 opportunity for further development.
1 Q. If I understood you well, the crisis was stopped by the
2 international factor before it escalated in war.
3 A. Not by the international factor but jointly the international
4 factor; that is to say, the Republic of Macedonia with the assistance of
5 the international factor, and this was an assistance that was really
7 Q. Thank you for the comprehensive answer. Throughout your report,
8 you are discussing armed extremist groups of ethnic Albanians. Is there
9 a lack of -- is there a difference between your definition and the name
10 given to these armed groups?
11 A. It is true that throughout the crisis these armed groups, back in
12 2001, were named or called and given different definitions, amongst which
13 the most common once were terrorists, armed extremists, adventurists, and
14 many others, not to mention them all, all the definitions that could
15 portray the real situation of the activities of these groups are
17 It is my personal opinion after all the analysis that I have
18 carried out, and to a great extent I was helped by the need to analyse
19 all these events for my Ph.D. thesis, I came to the conclusion that we
20 are discussing after all about armed extremists from the Albanian ethnic
21 origin in the Republic of Macedonia which, contrary to the law, and the
22 opportunities in the Republic of Macedonia, took arms illegally, and
23 using the force of the arms tried to achieve certain political goals.
24 Their type of action in the majority of the cases was according
25 to the generally scientifically accepted terminology of terrorism.
1 However, they did not perform terrorist acts on a daily basis. For
2 instance, throughout the month of April in the Republic of Macedonia, the
3 situation was more or less relatively without armed incidents or
4 provocations. This means that I would call these armed extremist groups,
5 but I am not negating the method of their activity as terrorism.
6 Q. Thank you very much for your answer.
7 Going further, in paragraph 54 in your report, you state the
8 following: "The goal of the armed Albanian extremists in the Republic of
9 Macedonia was to achieve their political ambitions through gaining
10 territory and illegally getting the power by holding and maintaining
11 constant tension that will gradually expand to the wider border area
12 along the northern border."
13 How did you come to this conclusion regarding the goals of the
14 armed Albanian extremists?
15 A. One has to bear in mind that the events, back in 2001, in the
16 Republic of Macedonia were happening in a situation when, regardless of
17 the way how we qualify it, it was a situation of democraticisation of the
18 society in the Republic of Macedonia. This would mean that Macedonia was
19 entering the process of its democraticisation to a great extent.
20 The parliamentary democracy was in force in Macedonia at that
21 time, which means that the citizens, in a multi-party general election,
22 they would elect their representatives in the parliament, and they had
23 the opportunity to be represented by the MPs in the Macedonian
25 During this period, we had 25 Members of Parliament of the
1 Albanian ethnic origin in the Macedonian parliament; that is to say,
2 members of parliament who belong to the political parties who were of the
3 mainly Albanian ethnic origin. We also had ten or so additional Members
4 of Parliament who belonged to the other minority communities.
5 According to the constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, in
6 the Republic of Macedonia, and according to the rules of procedure, the
7 rule book of the parliament of the Republic of Macedonia, democracy in
8 the Republic of Macedonia more or less developed; or at the beginning of
9 its development, allowed for all disputes and questionable issues to be
10 resolved through dialogue; that is to say, in a democratic manner.
11 The armed Albanian extremists, it was obvious that their goal was
12 not for the problems that objectively existed in the Republic of
13 Macedonia, to resolve them in a democratic manner through the
14 institutions of the system; but with the manifestation of their
15 activities, they were trying to create a certain situation, state where
16 they would be able to control one portion of the territory of the
17 Republic of Macedonia, and with additional attempts to establish their
18 own political power on this territory.
19 That is why one cannot discuss any fights for rights of any of
20 the minority groups in the Republic of Macedonia, the Albanian one
21 included, because these activities and requests of theirs were not
22 supported by any other minority or ethnic community, as we would call
23 them later on.
24 And the methodology itself of what they did pointed out that
25 there is a major discrepancy between what they present as a goal for the
1 manifestation of their armed violence and what they really practiced in
2 the field.
3 Q. Going further, in paragraph 55, you state the following: "The
4 crisis intensified and grew into armed provocations and incidents at the
5 beginning of the first half of February 2001."
6 Then you continue, saying that: "However, the preparations and
7 the creation of the crisis originates from earlier," and you said that
8 this happened with act of independence of the Republic of Macedonia.
9 As a confirmation of this, you refer to the occurrence of
10 paramilitary units in the Republic of Macedonia, in order to establish a
11 quasi-state situation and bringing down the constitution.
12 Who is the one who established this paramilitary formations? Do
13 you remember his? Can you explain this?
14 A. Yes. We are talking about the beginning of the 1990s, or one
15 year or two years after the independence of the Republic of Macedonia,
16 when a single group comprised of members of the Albanian ethnic community
17 in the Republic of Macedonia. At that time in accordance with the
18 definition of the constitution, members of the Albanian minority in the
19 Republic of Macedonia tried to establish paramilitary formations, with a
20 final goal by using violence to implement their political goals.
21 Q. Do you remember about something in relation to the paramilitary
23 A. Yes.
24 MR. SAXON: Your Honours.
25 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Saxon.
1 MR. SAXON: Maybe my colleague could explain what the relevance
2 is of events in Macedonia in the early 1990s to the events in 2001 that
3 are the subject of this trial, because the Prosecution is having trouble
4 seeing that.
5 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Apostolski.
6 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Your Honours, the expert is
7 explaining the genesis of the crisis that contributed for the start of
8 the crisis in 2001, and he is locating when it started and how it
9 developed later on; and, therefore, I believe that this is also relevant
10 in order to corroborate the explanation by Dr. Markovski with respect to
11 the development and genesis of the crisis as a result of the events of
13 JUDGE PARKER: It is your case, then, is it, Mr. Apostolski, that
14 the events of 2001 had their beginnings virtually ten years earlier?
15 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.
16 [Trial Chamber confers]
17 JUDGE PARKER: Please continue, Mr. Apostolski.
18 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be
19 shown what is 65 ter 2D538, please.
20 Q. Before you see the document on the screen, are you familiar with
21 the incident or the case with the paramilitary?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. How is it familiar to you?
24 A. I am familiar with it because the appropriate bodies in the
25 Republic of Macedonia detected this case in the stage when it was not
1 fully developed; that is to say, it did not provide for the establishment
2 of a crisis situation; however, there was a situation of established
3 paramilitary structures.
4 It is also familiar to me, maybe I cannot remember precisely, but
5 I believe it was back in 1994 or 1995, in this respect, there was a court
6 case in the Republic of Macedonia, and the leaders of these activities
7 were sentenced by the Macedonian courts.
8 Q. Do you remember any particular individuals of this court process?
9 A. Yes. I remember almost all individuals who participated in the
10 court proceedings. Let me just mention a couple of them. The first one,
11 Mithat Emini, I remember him well because we come from the same place.
12 We have been born and we use live in the same place. And the second
13 person is Haskaj. He was an assistant in the Ministry of Defence at the
14 same time period when I was working at the ministry. His name is Husein
16 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be
17 shown what is 65 ter 2D538, please.
18 We don't have the document on our screens. Very well, we see it
20 Q. Do you see, in front of you, there is a judgement?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Is this judgement the one that you referred to earlier? It says
23 the district court in Skopje as a second instance criminal court.
24 A. Yes. This is the verdict, the judgment that I referred to
1 Q. It says the appeals of the accused, Mithat Emini, and all the
2 others, and then the individuals are listed. Then it says these are
3 partly upheld; and, furthermore, you can read that the decision, the
4 judgment of the district court, Skopje Court II in Skopje, shall be
5 changed only with respect to the sentence.
6 Do you see this at the very bottom of the screen.
7 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Can we see the second page,
9 Q. And one can read the sentences, the reversal of the judgment.
10 And at the very bottom, it says that, as far as the rest of the judgment,
11 it is being upheld, confirmed?
12 A. Yes. I can see it, and this is what I already said.
13 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Can we please show page number
14 14 of the document.
15 Can we scroll to the bottom of the page, please.
16 At the very bottom, if you can see, in the English version,
17 please, the very same page.
18 The following page in English, please. Very well. Thank you.
19 Q. Can you see in the Macedonian version the sentence starting: "On
20 the 6th of July 1995."
21 This is the seventh row from below on the Macedonian page?
22 A. Yes, I can see it.
23 Q. It says: "On the 6th of July, 1993, from the defendant, Husein
24 Haskaj, there was a request sent for the creation of a special unit in
25 the village of Ljuboten; and during November 1993, there was a -- weapons
1 have been confiscated that were presented as evidence. All this, in the
2 opinion of the court, points to the continue unit of the activities
3 undertaken between October 1991 and November 1993."
4 Do you see this?
5 A. Yes.
6 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Your Honours, this document is a
7 subject of a motion for the bar table; but bearing in mind that the
8 expert is mentioning it in his report, the existence of the paramilitary
9 formation, and he recognised these documents. I tender this document
10 into evidence.
11 JUDGE PARKER: Without troubling you, Mr. Saxon, we would not be
12 prepared at this moment to receive this document, Mr. Apostolski, and
13 will deal with it in the course of dealing with the motion that is
14 presently before the Chamber.
15 Thank you.
16 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour, and that
17 is why I informed you that is a subject of a motion.
18 Q. Going further, in your report where you -- when you were
19 discussing the role of the parliament and the parliamentary committee on
20 security and defence in item 191 of your report, you say the following:
21 "Pursuant to Article 124 of the constitution, a war situation is when
22 there is a direct danger of attack on the Republic or when the Republic
23 has been attacked or was war has been declared?"
24 I would like to ask you whether a state of war has been declared
25 in the Republic of Macedonia back in 2001?
1 A. Back in 2001, a war of -- a state of war was not declared.
2 Q. According to your professional opinion as a military expert, what
3 was the reason for not declaring state of war?
4 A. There were opinions within certain political circles and clearly
5 presented positions that the crisis in the Republic of Macedonia can be
6 dealt with and resolved only by introducing state of war.
7 But also there was a large number of people in the political
8 entities and the state leadership that the conditions that were to be
9 seen in the Republic of Macedonia at that time cannot be qualified as
10 being that complex in order to declare a state of war.
11 So this is confirmed also by Article 124, because, in order to
12 declare a state of war, in accordance with this particular Article in the
13 Republic of Macedonia, there have to be present three conditions. Three
14 conditions have to be satisfied.
15 The first condition is that an immediate danger should --
16 imminent danger should be posed to the Republic of Macedonia, and this
17 was not the case because none of the situations, no cross-section of the
18 process could have not been defined as imminent military danger that the
19 Republic of Macedonia was faced with. This would mean attack coming from
20 any of the neighbouring countries.
21 The second condition, to declare state of war, would be if the
22 Republic of Macedonia is under attack. And according to the definition
23 of all the events, it was not attacked by any of the neighbouring
24 countries, military alliance, or any other international military
1 And the third condition, another country should declare war to
2 Republic of Macedonia, but it is a fact that, in 2001, nobody declared
3 war to the Republic of Macedonia.
4 Accordingly, and according to my positions, it is justified that
5 there was no state of war declared in the Republic of Macedonia in 2001.
6 Q. Apart from the parliament, was there any other state authority
7 that could make a decision for declaring a state of war?
8 A. Yes. According to the constitution of the Republic of Macedonia,
9 a state of war can be declared by the president of the Republic of
10 Macedonia, who, in the same time, is the supreme commander of the armed
11 forces, according to the Law on Defence. But also another prerequisite
12 must be met in this case, and that prerequisite being for a president to
13 declare a state of war, there must be a state or a situation when the
14 parliament cannot convene.
15 Before the crisis and during the crisis, as well as in the
16 post-crisis period, the parliament was in a permanent session. So the
17 president, in fact, could not exercise his right; although - I don't know
18 how important that may be for this Chamber - I would like to say that the
19 position or the stance of the president coincided with the stances of all
20 others who thought that, in Macedonia, there shouldn't be a state of war.
21 Q. Thank you for your answer.
22 Dr. Markovski, in item 239 from your report - that is chapter 6
23 under the headline appearance of armed Albanian extremists - you define
24 the armed forces or the army in general, and you state: "According to
25 the international military law, according to The Hague rule-book for war
1 law from 1997, and the Geneva Conventions for protection of war victims
2 of 1949, armed forces are defined as land, navy, and air forces, as well
3 as all other armed formations (police units, units of Territorial
4 Defence, factory protection or industrial protection, guards, national
5 guards), and all other voluntary armed forces that, according to the
6 internal regulations of a country, have their insignias, regardless of
7 their size or specialty."
8 Furthermore, you state: "Parts of the armed forces are
9 considered to be units of the organised resistant movement which belong
10 to a war party, regardless of the fact whether they conduct war on their
11 own or in other countries or occupied territory, under the condition that
12 their military members are organised (to be headed by a person that is
13 responsible for his subordinates), then that they have a recognition mark
14 that can be visual as a certain distance, that they openly carry weapons.
15 And another condition is to follow the rules of war law when conducting
17 Could you tell me, in reference to what I just read, whether the
18 territory groups of the so-called NLA could be defined as armed forces;
19 that is, an army?
20 A. If we see item 1 of this paragraph 239, we cannot speak about
21 armed forces in the sense that you are putting to me as a question.
22 The doubt, whether these armed forces or armed groups or armed
23 extremist groups, could be defined as armed forces or an army; and,
24 obviously, we must have in mind the last sentence reading that parts of
25 armed forces are also conceded units of organised armed resistance.
1 However, very soon this doubt will be eliminated, because even in
2 this case, there are several preconditions that must be met in order to
3 define one armed formation as armed forces or an army.
4 Let me start with the last condition, and then I will go to the
5 first one.
6 First of all, whenever we have combat activities, they must obey
7 or abide by the war laws. I wouldn't like to reiterate, because in the
8 report, I elaborate all terrorist acts to a great extent, all acts of
9 other types of violence against civilian population in the Republic of
10 Macedonia, the expelling of the population and detaining civilian
11 population, and so on and so forth, which does not give us the right to
12 say that they actually abided by the war law.
13 The second precondition that is stated here is to carry weapons
14 openly. Absolutely, in no case, these extremist armed groups did not
15 carry weapons openly. On the contrary, following the logic, hit and run,
16 they would use their weapons, then they would mingle with the civilian
17 population, and then pretended to be normal civilians as anybody else.
18 The third precondition stated here as a second precondition is to
19 have a recognizable mark that could be noticed at a distance. As far as
20 I could understand this precondition, it means that they needed to have
21 uniforms with all the necessary insignias. And in this report, I believe
22 this Honourable Chamber, you can see a series of cases when certain armed
23 prove significances and incidents were carried out; and during them, the
24 perpetrators did not wear uniforms or had parts of the uniforms that were
25 not really uniforms, according to the definitions.
1 And the last that I would like to comment on, and which is given
2 here as the first precondition, their members should be organised and
3 headed by a person that is in charge of his subordinates.
4 In several documents, one can see that these armed extremist
5 groups were headed by Ali Ahmeti. In many other documents, it is claimed
6 that he was the so-called head or leader of these groups, which also
7 gives us the reason to suspect that this condition was not fully
8 fulfilled, having in mind what I just said about previous conditions.
9 It is obviously that we are not talking about -- about armed
10 groups which can be called armed forces or an army; and commensurate to
11 this, they cannot be a party or a side in the events that happened in
13 Q. According to your analysis, did the terrorist group NLA have the
14 support of the Albanian ethnic population in Macedonia?
15 A. There are divided opinions about this, whether and to what extent
16 the members of the Albanian ethnic community in Macedonia supported these
17 extremist armed groups.
18 It is a fact that in many documents - and especially I appreciate
19 the fact that these documents were produced by the international factors
20 in the Republic of Macedonia - one can say that when we speak about the
21 Albanian ethnic community in Macedonia, there were three groups of --
22 three groups that were directly linked to the armed extremist groups.
23 The first group were those that supported; that is, gave support
24 to these armed extremists. The second group are those that were forced
25 or compelled under pressure to support these groups. And the third group
1 are those that were loyal to the Republic of Macedonia and who didn't
2 support the armed groups at all.
3 The documents from this period give the stance of the political
4 factors that belong to the Albanian ethnicity; and in all of their
5 official statements, there was no support to the armed extremist groups
6 whatsoever. On the contrary, they appealed to them to leave the weapons
7 and through democratic manners, and through dialogue, since such
8 possibility in Macedonia existed, to resolve all the existing problems
9 that were objectively present in the Republic of Macedonia.
10 Q. What kind of conclusion did you have from your analysis
11 pertaining to the fact whether the terrorist NLA groups have support from
12 the international community?
13 A. I absolutely and responsibly claim that these armed terrorist
14 groups did not have the support of the international factors. I support
15 this with several documents that are stated here in this report; and on
16 this occasion, I would like to remind of the Resolution 1345 of the
17 Security Council of the United Nations, which calls for a peaceful
18 resolution to the problems on the territory of former Yugoslavia.
19 What referred to the situation in Macedonia, these extremist
20 groups are called terrorists or, to be more precise, defines or qualifies
21 their activities as terrorist activities. Such disagreements were shown
22 by the OSCE and the NATO structures in the Republic of Macedonia, and all
23 of these documents are stated here in this report. Because when I was
24 presenting my conclusions about this issue, I call upon these documents
25 and I state them in my report.
1 Q. In your opinion, and on the basis of your analysis and from the
2 evidence that you had at disposal, did the terrorist group of NLA have
3 any military structure?
4 A. If we take into account the reality, all conclusions and
5 estimates speak that these groups did not have the organisation of a
6 military structure. Allegedly, it could have been heard that the NLA
7 structures were composed of six brigades; but taking into account all
8 factors or standards of an army structure, these brigades could not be
9 brigades in any aspect. They were not brigades judging from their
10 membership or composition, nor could they be brigades according to their
11 weaponry, nor their internal structure, as it was shown by the extremist
13 In Mr. Ostreni's report, he, himself, confirms that these
14 brigades were in the stage of establishment; and that during the crisis
15 period in 2001, they were uncapable of conducting any operation as an
16 organised army. But the so-called brigades worked according to their own
17 independent plans and intentions; and, obviously, this does not speak of
18 an organised structure, let alone an army.
19 Q. Let me follow up. Was there a coordination and continuation of
20 the actions conducted by the terrorist group of NLA?
21 A. Although we are speaking about a crisis that lasted several
22 months, some people say it was seven-month crisis. Some say it was
23 nine-month crisis, depending on the beginning or end of the crisis. But
24 this is not really relevant. What is relevant and important is that
25 during this period of seven or nine months, there were no continuous
1 armed provocations or incidents. I would just like to remind that the
2 whole month of April was really quiet. There were no armed incidents or
3 armed provocations of a larger scale.
4 On the other hand, I never came across a document which would
5 speak of any planned organised action by these so-called organised
6 brigades, especially not -- no document about their co-action or
7 documents about any combat activities. As I said previously, Mr. Ostreni
8 confirmed that himself.
9 So we are not talking about planned combat activities, we are not
10 talking about joint activities or cooperation between the so-called NLA
11 structures or the self-proclaimed brigades, and certainly we cannot speak
12 of combat activities that were conducted in a planned pattern and in --
13 following certain continuity.
14 Q. Looking at the documents, Dr. Markovski, did you find anything
15 that spoke about NLA having headquarters --
16 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: "General Staff,"
17 instead of "headquarters."
18 A. The documents that I analysed and documents that belonged to the
19 members or the structures of the armed extremist groups of the different
20 ethnicity in the Republic of Macedonia, it was mentioned that, allegedly,
21 there was a General Staff.
22 This structure, in the public, released several press releases,
23 mainly following some activities for which responsibility was claimed by
24 them, and they presented these press releases as released from the
25 so-called General Staff of the NLA.
1 However, there was a serious problem here, in respect of the
2 continuity or the establishment of that General Staff and the continuity
3 of its role and its activities. From the analysis of the documents of
4 the international factor, as well as the documents of these extremist
5 groups, it is -- it can be concluded that the General Staff existed in
6 2000 and even in 2001, while other documents speak that the chief of the
7 General Staff was Mr. Gzim Ostreni.
8 However, there are documents that state that in this period,
9 Mr. Ostreni held a very high position within the protective corps of
10 Kosovo. And the documents are pretty precise in this respect, saying
11 that due to the disrespect of the work procedures within the Kosovo
12 Protection Corps, on the 14th of April, he was dismissed from duty, or
13 was replaced. And the so-called General Staff of these extremist armed
14 groups in the Republic of Macedonia are manned with this person after he
15 was dismissed from the Kosovo Protection Corps; that is, after the 14th
16 of April.
17 This fact is confirmed with the personal statements given by
18 Mr. Ostreni, who really said that he didn't know how the General Staff of
19 the so-called NLA was established, nor did he know where the General
20 Staff was located until his arrival. He also said that he was not
21 familiar with the activities of the so-called NLA before his arrival; or
22 at least whenever he was asked about it, he always disassociated himself
23 from what could be qualified as terrorist groups.
24 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Saxon.
25 MR. SAXON: Your Honour, at line -- beginning at line 9 page 27
1 of the transcript, the witness describes "documents that state that in
2 this period, Mr. Ostreni held a very high position within the protective
3 corps of Kosovo. And the documents are pretty precise in this respect,
4 saying that due to the disrespect of the work procedures within the
5 Kosovo Protection Corps, on the 14th of April, he was dismissed from duty
6 or was replaced."
7 I could be wrong, Your Honour, but I don't believe that -- well,
8 first of all, this is a fairly important matter because it goes to the
9 credibility of an important Prosecution witness. I don't believe that
10 such documents or such facts are referred to in the expert report of the
11 witness. And I would be grateful if perhaps my colleague, at some point
12 before the end of cross-examination, could provide the Prosecution with
13 such documents.
14 JUDGE PARKER: Perhaps, Mr. Apostolski, you can look at that over
15 the break. We have now reached the time for the first break and will
16 resume at five past 11.00.
17 --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.
18 --- On resuming at 11.07 a.m.
19 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Apostolski.
20 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.
21 With regards to the issue that my colleague from the Prosecutor's
22 office raised, I will leave that question for his cross-examination of
23 Mr. Markovski, since perhaps -- since Dr. Markovski has worked for a
24 longer career in the army and he might have information so I believe that
25 my learned friend will be able to deal with that issue during
2 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Saxon.
3 MR. SAXON: Your Honour, the problem that the Prosecution sees is
4 that the witness shortly before the first break referred to documents
5 that he relied on to make the point that he made, and it may very well be
6 difficult for the Prosecution to deal with this matter in
7 cross-examination without knowing what those documents are.
8 JUDGE PARKER: We appreciate that at the moment, Mr. Saxon,
9 Mr. Apostolski, the proposition asserted by the witness appears to be
10 entirely unsupported. So, in the absence of identified support, that
11 will be its status. If there is support for the proposition which
12 emerges in the course of the evidence, if the Prosecution is embarrassed
13 by a failure of early notice of that support, we will deal with that
15 Thank you, Mr. Apostolski.
16 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Mr. Markovski, do you remember before the break we discussed the
18 organisational structure of the so-called group NLA?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. In your expert report, you have dealt with many documents related
21 to the organisational structure of the NLA that were submitted by the
22 so-called group, NLA. Can we agree with this?
23 A. Yes. These are documents coming from representatives of the
24 extremist armed groups in the Republic of Macedonia.
25 Q. Since you have analysed these well in your report, each of those
1 documents individually, could we have a general conclusion about those
2 documents? Could you give us that?
3 A. Yes, of course. I have analysed them individually, and I drew
4 the conclusions in my report. What is common for all these documents
5 that were offered and on the basis of which I ran the analysis of the
6 contents of the documents, the conclusion is that those are not documents
7 of the armed Albanian extremists in the Republic of Macedonia.
8 Without repeating what I said in the report, I have indicated
9 there the reasons, the basis for such conclusion, since it is a nonsense
10 to accept documents like those, if in a given document the need to
11 liberate Kosovo is discussed, if in another document the need to link
12 with the structures at Kosovo is discussed, if in a third document the
13 need to act in coordination with the activities of the Kosovo Guard,
14 Guardist Brigade, I apologise, if in a document it is even mentioned that
15 the drivers in the brigade need to have their vehicles prepared to serve
16 the needs of the members of the Kosovo Guard.
17 So it is obvious that the purpose, the intention of the drafter
18 of this document, is to represent the so-called NLA as an organised
19 structure, a military structure, whereby the drafter of the documents has
20 availed themselves of the opportunity of having such documents previously
21 drafted by some other formation, those documents being in the same
22 language and script used by the Macedonians of Albanian ethnicity, and
23 these documents are then represented as documents of the so-called NLA.
24 I am really specifically elaborating on each of these documents
25 in my report. If there is a need we can discuss my conclusions on this
1 basis, but I believe that they are presented very clearly and I uphold
2 the position that these documents that were tendered into evidence in
3 order to corroborate the notion of the so-called NLA being organised are
4 actually not their documents. The so-called NLA is not an organised
5 structure, and I believe that this could not be accepted as their
6 document. And the fact that other structures documents are submitted in
7 support and in order to justify the existence and the activities of the
8 so-called NLA must be condemned.
9 Q. In your report, item 279, when mentioning Ali Ahmeti, next to his
10 name in quotation marks you say "commander-in-chief and "political
12 Why are you using those quotation marks?
13 A. In many documents, not coming from Macedonian sources but
14 international as well, when mentioning Mr. Ali Ahmeti and his position,
15 his office within the armed extremist Albanian groups in 2001 in the
16 Republic of Macedonia, the so-called political ideologist notion is
17 mentioned or the so-called representative of the armed Albanian
18 extremists, and from this aspect we should accept such definition that I
19 have used.
20 However, I have in mind when speaking about Ali Ahmeti as a
21 supreme commander and the "political representative," so have I in mind
22 the fact also that I haven't encountered any documents and I really made
23 efforts to find any such documents that Mr. Ali Ahmeti was indeed the
24 leader of the so-called NLA. This would presuppose him being elected by
25 those that he represents.
1 In this case, because there is no such document, he could be a
2 self-appointed and therefore so-called leader.
3 Q. Thank you for your answer. Dr. Markovski, in your expert
4 knowledge and experience, which is the lowest level of military
5 organisation that should have its own archives, records of their
7 A. It is customary in any army across the world, and so also in the
8 Balkan region and specifically in the Republic of Macedonia, that the
9 lowest level of organisation is the independent platoon within the
10 structure of the army organisation, and after it, company, battalion,
11 brigade, et cetera.
12 So the lowest level where records should be kept about all the
13 activities that a military unit has conducted is the platoon, or, I
14 apologise, the independent platoon, as the first and basic unit where all
15 the planned and executed activities must be recorded.
16 Just as an example, in the Macedonian army in the period that
17 we're discussing, we have had several such independent platoons, so even
18 within those units that were deployed in combatting the threats coming
19 from the armed extremist groups to infiltrate larger cities and urban
21 Q. Within the documents you researched, did you find any archive
22 documents from any of the units or structures of the so-called NLA?
23 A. No. And, actually, in the documents that I had the opportunity
24 to analyse, there is a notion of an imaginary battalion and imaginary
25 brigade, so this is a document about an organisation and formation, a
1 structure of a battalion and a brigade unnamed once without numbers,
2 without identification number, which means that such document filed with
3 anyone or submitted to anyone's review could pertain to any unit within
4 the Balkans. Within the south-eastern Europe region, and even within the
5 global ways in which the armies are organised.
6 So we are not discussing any specific unit here. We are
7 discussing some imaginary units that, following certain patterns, are
8 copied from some other formations and are represented as being their
10 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be
11 shown P487, Exhibit P487.
12 We could move back to the previous one.
13 Your Honours, my learned friends from the Prosecutor's office
14 were requested by us to show us the original of the map, and the
15 Prosecutor's office informed us that they have it only in electronic
16 version, because the witness, Gzim Ostreni, has provided them with an
17 electronic version only. So there is no hard copy original map and we
18 never had it.
19 Q. Dr. Markovski, have you seen this map, the one that you see on
20 the screen?
21 A. Yes, I have seen it, and I have analysed it.
22 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Could we zoom in on the upper
23 part of the map.
24 Q. Could you tell me what is the analysis that you made with regards
25 to this map?
1 A. First of all, I analysed the drawing of this map, and I do
2 understand the Albanian language a bit, so it should be a directive or it
3 should be a decision to carry out a certain operation.
4 The territories are marked as well as the directions of the
5 activities. Probably we will see the narrative part accompanying this
6 map later so we will be able to comment on that as well, since the image
7 without the text would be superficial and the other way around, so we
8 need to analyse them both.
9 Q. Did you analyse the locations that are marked with yellow?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Did the Defence indicate to you that you should run an analysis,
12 if you are able to, about where the village of Ljuboten is, as well as
13 the village of Ljubanci?
14 A. Yes. Although this map is obviously of poor quality, but
15 considering my knowledge of the situation, I am able to locate Ljuboten
16 and the markings on this map.
17 Q. Could you try and locate the village of Ljuboten here in this map
18 and mark it.
19 A. I would be grateful if you could zoom in a bit further so that
20 I'm able to mark precisely.
21 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Could we zoom in a bit further,
22 in the central part of this map. A bit further, if that's possible.
23 Could we zoom in a bit further, please.
24 Q. Is this sufficient or do you need more?
25 A. I think I am able to mark it now.
1 Q. If you could -- yes.
2 A. This is where Ljuboten should be located. To the west of it, we
3 have Ljubanci and to the south-east of it we have Aracinovo and Matejce
4 is to the east.
5 Q. Thank you. Could you mark it with number 1 next to this red
7 A. [Marks]
8 Q. And --
9 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] I see that my colleague is on
10 his feet.
11 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Saxon.
12 MR. SAXON: I'm very sorry to interrupt. Your Honour, there may
13 be a mistake in the translation, I'm just not sure. At the very end of
14 page -- of page 34 and the beginning of page 35 the witness is quoted as
15 saying that to the south-east of Ljuboten is Aracinovo. I'm just not
16 quite sure if that's what he meant to say or not. I could be wrong.
17 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation]
18 Q. So is it correct, what you stated?
19 A. Yes, it is correct. This is what I stated. Aracinovo is to the
20 south from Ljuboten.
21 Q. So it is correctly written in the transcript that it was to the
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. And if the chief of the so-called General Staff of the NLA, the
25 witness Gzim Ostreni, has asserted in his evidence that the territories
1 under the NLA, of the so-called NLA control are marked in yellow, what
2 would you say, as a military expert, under whose control was Ljuboten,
3 and if the map is accurate.
4 A. If the colour yellow depicts the territories where the armed
5 extremist groups were present, then, according to what is shown in this
6 map here, it turns out that in Aracinovo -- or, I apologise, in Ljuboten
7 there have been armed extremist groups. This is in the territory that is
8 marked in yellow.
9 Q. Very well. Thank you.
10 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I seek to tender
11 this photograph into evidence.
12 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, that will be Exhibit 2D00102. Thank
14 you, Your Honours.
15 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be
16 shown the next page of Exhibit P487. N003-0063-ET; and the Macedonian
17 version is N003-0063-MF.
18 We see here the Albanian version, but would it be possible to
19 delay the Macedonian and the Albanian version --
20 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: Macedonian and
21 English versions.
22 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] I repeat, the Macedonian page is
24 We now see the Macedonian version, but if we can have the English
25 version back on the display. It is fine now.
1 Q. Have you reviewed this document when preparing your report?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Could you comment on it, in brief.
4 A. First of all, I wish to remind that this document originates, or
5 at least this is the date it bears, from 13th of June, 2001. I would
6 like to remind that this is a significant period with regards to the
7 crisis in the Republic of Macedonia, since, on the 8th of June, President
8 Trajkovski tables a plan to resolve the crisis in the Republic of
9 Macedonia primarily through political dialogue.
10 This plan was officially presented by President Trajkovski in the
11 parliament of the Republic of Macedonia, where, in addition to the MPs
12 that made up the parliament, all the other relevant factors in the
13 Republic of Macedonia were present, having in mind both political as well
14 as ethnic and religious representation.
15 This plan was simply accepted, endorsed by the parliament, and
16 already on the 12th of June the government came with an official
17 statement that it not only joins the acceptance of the plan of President
18 Trajkovski to resolve the crisis through dialogue but is even prepared
19 through -- to make it operational through planned measures and
21 As I mentioned, this document of the so-called NLA was issued on
22 the 13th of June, so five days after President Trajkovski's plan was
23 presented and made official and one day after the confirmation that the
24 government is ready to make it operational, to make the plan of President
25 Trajkovski operational.
1 These needs -- or this should give us the idea that regardless of
2 the attempts and efforts that the Macedonian state and political
3 leadership have made to find a solution for the crisis through a
4 political dialogue, Ali Ahmeti has signed on the 13th of June ideas to
5 run operations. So, actually, he did not accept President Trajkovski's
6 plan and his recipe to resolve the crisis is obviously through military
8 However, let me deal now with the analysis of the contents of
9 this idea, to run this operation. I don't want to be misunderstood;
10 however, some commander, if he would come to me to take an exam with this
11 kind of operation, it is not just that he would pass the exam but I would
12 send him back to the first grade to study both tactics and organisation
13 of the military structures. I do apologise for saying this, but I will
14 tell you why it is I do this.
15 First of all, this is not the correct form, nor content for
16 conducting any type of operation. Secondly, everything written here is
17 so unrealistic, impossible to implement, and, indeed, it does not deserve
18 any further attention, and any possible taking of these activities in
19 accordance with these kind of ideas with conducting the operation would
20 only cause a major bloodshed.
21 I will just remind you about a particular segment of this idea
22 for conducting the operation. This is really military lack of literacy,
23 to be able to plan, for instance, that in the second stage by the end of
24 July Kumanovo is going to be taken over and controlled and the roads
25 Kumanovo-Kriva Palanka, Kumanovo-Sveti Nikole, Kumanovo-Skopje will be
1 placed under control.
2 In order to further elaborate this problem, I would like to say
3 the following, that the -- in order to control the roads from Kumanovo to
4 Kriva Palanka and Kumanovo to Sveti Nikole, probably you need troops and
5 equipment far too powerful and much more than what was presented or what
6 was said that is at the disposal of these terrorist extremist groups in
8 And number two, even if they succeed in doing that, the
9 configuration of the terrain is such that they would need at least to
10 establish a military base comparable to Bonstil in Kosovo in order to be
11 able to sustain it and to maintain it under control.
12 The other ideas are similar. I don't know want to go into
13 further detail. From the military point of view this is amateur stuff,
14 and the beginning of any type of implementation of this idea for the
15 conducting of the operation would only cause major catastrophe and huge
16 number of victims but not implementation of the ideas and implementation
17 of the plan itself.
18 Q. You mentioned the configuration of the terrain on the road from
19 Kumanovo to Kriva Palanka and from Kumanovo to Sveti Nikola. Can you
20 please explain what kind of configuration it is and why would you mention
22 A. This is a terrain which is overhanging on the surrounding area
23 and we are discussing an open space. There are no forests which, on the
24 other hand, would be a very good target to act against those units that
25 might be located on this position from any possible direction in the
1 neighbouring regions.
2 Just in order to remind you, immediately following these
3 cross-roads, especially the cross-roads Kumanovo to Sveti Nikole, there
4 is a terrain which, during the Second World War, the people who were
5 fighting at the location of Stracin, they died, and even today the soil
6 in Stracin is still red from their own blood.
7 Q. Thank you very much for your answer to my question.
8 Now let us move to another topic?
9 The Defence of Mr. Johan Tarculovski asked you to provide an
10 expert opinion about the events from 10th to 12th of August, in the
11 village of Ljuboten in 2001. In the documents that you disposed of and
12 reviewed in order to prepare the report about the events in Ljuboten, you
13 are claiming that in the village of Ljuboten there was a structure of an
14 armed group, Albanian armed group provocation and incidents, and this is
15 your summary provided.
16 When drafting your position and report about Ljuboten, you were
17 using many documents coming from different bodies of the security
18 institutions of the Republic of Macedonia, amongst others, documents from
19 the operative centre General Staff G2 within the Ministry of Defence, as
20 well as information of the subordinate units and commanders of the
21 General Staff of the Macedonian army. Is this correct?
22 A. Yes, you're correct.
23 Q. Now, I would like to ask you, did the president of the state,
24 being commander-in-chief, get a report from the security structures?
25 A. Yes. The security structures are obliged to provide regular
1 reports to their supreme commander.
2 Q. In what manner does the president receive information?
3 A. There are several ways to inform the supreme commander about the
4 events that are going on and are related to the security, both in
5 peacetime, in normal conditions, but also in conditions of crisis. The
6 regular manner in which the president is being informed about the
7 situation related to the security is through the operative centre of the
8 General Staff of the army of the Republic of Macedonia, which, during its
9 work and operation of the units for 24 hours they prepare a summary
10 information, and this information, every single day at 8.00 a.m. the next
11 day, is being sent to the commander, that is to say, the supreme
13 In the event that we might be facing an extraordinary event, then
14 the Chief of Staff, after receiving this information and after being
15 informed about the incident, he would inform the president on the very
16 same day when he hears about the event, and the very next morning at 8.00
17 a.m., this information with a more explanation will be supplied or
18 submitted to the Supreme Commander.
19 Q. This would mean that the events in Ljuboten on the 10th of
20 August, 2001, where eight soldiers have been killed and a few more
21 injured, the president should have been informed by phone by the Chief of
23 A. Yes, that is correct.
24 Q. And when would he receive the regular report?
25 A. The regular report, with more information about the incident, he
1 would receive it the very next day at 8.00 a.m.
2 However, the president, being the Supreme Commander, if he is
3 interested to receive this information sooner, he can order the Chief of
4 Staff, together with all the relevant information about a particular
5 event, for the Chief of Staff to come to his cabinet in order to inform
6 him in person.
7 Q. With regards to what I asked you earlier about the materials that
8 you have been using in relation to Ljuboten, on the basis of your opinion
9 provided about the events in Ljuboten, I would like to ask you more
10 specifically the following: Does the president of the state have the
11 opportunity to dispose of the documents that you have used in your
13 A. Yes. I am quite sure that he would dispose of these documents
14 because these documents are very important and they would be a part of
15 the information with which the Supreme Commander would be acquainted.
16 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Could Dr. Markovski please be
17 shown what is Exhibit P301.
18 Q. Can you see the document in front of you?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. This is a report about a terrorist attack prepared by the command
21 of the 3rd Guardist Battalion, village of Ljubanci, 10th of August, 2001.
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Amongst others, it speaks of the following:
24 "The unit that was at the Zdravec position replied to the
25 activity of the terrorist in order to provide the opportunity to give
1 help to the victims. At the same time, in coordination with the
2 battalion command, fire was opened with a mortar fire, shells of
3 120-millimetres and two weapons, B-1, 76 millimetres.
4 "After that the terrorist ceased their action and they withdrew
5 in the action of Sveti Kamen, position 1628, and a smaller group (three
6 to four) in the direction of Ljuboten. Also the latter was noticed by
7 our lateral positions as they entered one of the two abandoned sheepfolds
8 and fire was opened upon them with 15 missiles from the cannon B-1, after
9 which one of the terrorists was noticed as he fled above the sheepfold in
10 the direction of the facility Kuljim, and the sheepfold was destroyed."
11 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Can we see the second page of
12 this document, please.
13 Q. On -- the second page of this document reads as follows: "Two of
14 them at the entry to the village, in the further activities by our unit,
15 four terrorists have been killed, two of them at the entry of the
16 village, one above the drinking fountain above the village Ljuboten, who
17 was accompanied by a horse, and a fourth in the region above the small
18 woods on the road leading into the village with a mule with a load?"
19 Now I would like to ask you whether the president would have this
20 type of information about the events in Ljuboten.
21 A. First of all, the operative centre of the General Staff would be
22 provided with this information, then the operative centre of the General
23 Staff would prepare a summary of the most important events, and then they
24 would submit this to the president, i.e., to the Supreme Commander. And
25 if the head of the operative centre believes that besides the prepared
1 summary, the overall content of the information is important, then the
2 whole information can be supplied as an appendix to the report given to
3 the Supreme Commander.
4 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be
5 shown what is 65 ter 742, ERN N002-4490, N002-4492.
6 Your Honours, this is a document that can be found on the 65 ter
7 list of the Prosecution, and we informed the Prosecution that we were
8 going to use this document.
9 Q. Can you see, this is a document, a report about extraordinary
10 incident. On the top one, can read, Republic of Macedonia, Ministry of
11 Defence, General Staff of the army of the Republic of Macedonia,
12 1st Guardist Brigade. The reference number is provided and the date is
13 10th of August, 2001.
14 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Can we please show to the
15 witness the second page of this document.
16 Q. One can see that it was prepared by commander Colonel Blazo
17 Kopacev. It reads, under paragraph 11 on this page, and it provides a
18 short summary of the incident: "Immediately following the explosion on
19 the soldiers and the soldiers who came to their aid, sniper fire has been
20 opened and auto weapons fire from the direction of the slopes at Svinski
21 Kamen and Bel Kamen and a mosque in the village of Ljuboten. Our forces
22 respond with all disposal weaponry on these targets, after which the
23 attackers retreated."
24 Can you please tell me who is Colonel Blazo Kopacev?
25 A. At that time, the commander, Colonel Blazo Kopacev, was the
1 colonel of the Guardist Brigade.
2 Q. Is this document that the president of the state could have had
3 at his disposal?
4 A. Yes, that is correct.
5 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Your Honours, bearing in mind
6 that the document is on the 65 ter list of the Prosecution, the Defence
7 informed the Prosecution that we are going to use this document, and that
8 is why I seek to tender it into evidence, to be placed on our list and to
9 be accepted as evidence.
10 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
11 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit number
12 2D00103. Thank you, Your Honours.
13 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be
14 shown Exhibit 2D42; page 8 in the Macedonian version and page 7 in the
15 English version.
16 Can we show the first page, first of all, so that the expert can
17 see what type of document it is.
18 Q. Can you see the document in front of you?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. This is a log on the information received on 10th and 11th of
21 August, 2001.
22 A. Yes, that is correct.
23 Q. There are several parts in this document. We have the reference
24 number. In the second column, we have the date; the third one, the time;
25 the fourth column, the origin of the document.
1 A. Basically, the source of the information.
2 Q. Then in the following column, we have the contents of the
3 information; furthermore, who has been informed; the time when the
4 information was provided; and the name of the person who informed them.
5 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Can we now see the eighth page
6 in the Macedonian version and page number 7 in the English version.
7 At the very bottom of the English version, number 13, please, and
8 in the Macedonian version, number 13.
9 Q. Can you see this?
10 A. Yes, I can.
11 Q. This is information received from G2.
12 A. Yes, that is correct.
13 Q. Received on the 10th of August at 1655.
14 A. Yes, that is correct.
15 Q. Can you please explain to us what is G2.
16 A. Yes. G2 is the intelligence sector within the Ministry of
18 Q. It reads here that information has been received.
19 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Can we please turn to the next
20 page in the English version:
21 Q. "Information received that a group of around 100 individuals has
22 to depart from the region of the village of Matejce towards the villages
23 of Ljubanci, Ljuboten, Brodec, and Kodra Fura, with a task to conduct an
24 attack on the points of the defence and security forces. Additionally,
25 intelligence has been received that, allegedly ..." -- we don't really
1 need to read any further. This is the important bit.
2 Did the president of the state, would he have this type of
3 information, this information at his disposal?
4 A. Yes. Bearing in mind the importance and the significance of this
5 information, it would be part of the report.
6 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Saxon.
7 MR. SAXON: Your Honour, it's a bit difficult to understand the
8 record, as it is now. And just for clarification, could the witness be
9 asked whether he knows whether the president received this specific
10 information or whether this was the kind of information that the
11 president might have received.
12 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Let us clarify then. You, as an expert, and a person with a
14 large experience, member of the Ministry of Defence, according to your
15 knowledge, can you please give me an answer, whether the president would
16 have had this type of information at his disposal?
17 A. I was not just a member of the army during this period, but quite
18 often, and in accordance with the distribution of the tasks, I also had
19 the obligation of chief person of the operative centre on duty on a
20 particular date, for on-duty call for 24 hours.
21 And from my personal experience, but also the knowledge that I
22 have assessing, on the other hand, the importance and significance of
23 this information because it is rather important for the information to
24 the president, I would say that, absolutely, yes, the president would
25 have had this information at his disposal.
1 Q. Thank you. Does this confirm the fact that the president of the
2 state was very well informed about the security situation in the region?
3 A. Yes. The president was capable and at any time he would have had
4 a realistic picture about the security situation.
5 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Saxon.
6 MR. SAXON: Sorry for the interruption again. It just appears to
7 the Prosecution that my colleague is starting to ask leading questions
8 about what could be a very crucial topic.
9 JUDGE PARKER: I think that's the case, Mr. Saxon.
10 Mr. Apostolski, could you be much more careful about your
11 questions. Thank you.
12 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Very well. I will be more
13 careful, Your Honours.
14 Q. Let us move to another topic.
15 What would happen if a subordinate officer falsely informed his
16 superior that the president issued him an order to undertake an action?
17 A. Any superior at any post, including the chief of the General
18 Staff as the highest military officer in the army, does not have the
19 right to file false reports, because, in doing so, he would violate the
20 military discipline which, at that time, was regulated with the rule book
21 on the service in the army; that is to say, by an act like this, he would
22 severely violate the military discipline.
23 This would, in turn, mean that he would be dismissed or even let
24 go. This is, I believe, pursuant to Article 31 of the rule book on the
25 service in the army, but this can be checked. This is a document that is
1 being discussed in my report.
2 Q. I would like to ask you now specifically about Ljuboten, about
3 the events in Ljuboten.
4 What would happen if the commander of the 3rd Battalion, Mitre
5 Despodov, would inform the Colonel Kopacev, brigade commander, that he
6 spoke to the president and he received an order from the president and if
7 this was untruth?
8 A. In this case, according to the prescribed procedure, the Major
9 Despodov would find himself in a situation where he would be punished;
10 that is to say, he would be denoted of his ranks or he would be relieved
11 from the army.
12 Q. As you said, you had been in the army for a long time. Do you
13 know what happened with Major Mitre Despodov after 2001?
14 A. Yes, of course. Long after 2001, I still stayed within the
15 Ministry of Defence, and I know very well that then-Major Mitre Despodov
16 was promoted in the rank of lieutenant-colonel and was in charge of the
17 training command in the General Staff of the army of Macedonia.
18 Q. Thank you, Dr. Blagoja Markovski, for your reply.
19 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] And, Your Honours, I have no
20 further questions for this witness.
21 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you Mr. Apostolski.
22 Ms. Residovic, do you have any questions.
23 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Your
25 Cross-examination by Ms. Residovic:
1 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Dr. Markovski. Although we met
2 previously, let me introduce myself. My name is Edina Residovic, and
3 together with my colleague, Guenael Mettraux, we are defending Mr. Ljube
5 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, since I'm going to
6 use several documents in the course my examination, we, for the Chamber
7 and for our colleagues from the Prosecution, as well as for the witness,
8 we prepared several binders that we are going to use in questioning this
10 Q. Dr. Markovski, I would like to ask you, just like my colleague
11 did, to wait until my question is translated before you reply, so that we
12 go I have the opportunity to the interpreters what I'm asking and what
13 you are replying. Do we understand each other?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. In paragraph 197 and 198 of your report, you speak about the
16 constitutional position of the president of the Republic of Macedonia.
17 Is that correct?
18 A. Yes, it is correct.
19 MS. RESIDOVIC: I would like the witness to be shown the Exhibit
20 P91, Article 79 of the constitutional of the Republic of Macedonia; and
21 in reference with this Article, I'm going to ask you the following
23 Q. Mr. Markovski, is it that is correct that the Article 79 of the
24 constitution of the Republic of Macedonia establishes that the president
25 of the Republic of Macedonia is the Supreme Commander of the armed forces
1 of Macedonia?
2 A. Yes, it is absolutely correct.
3 Q. Dr. Markovski, is it correct -- is my understanding correct if I
4 were to say that under armed forces are considered to be both the army
5 and the police?
6 A. Yes, it is correct.
7 Q. Dr. Markovski, is it correct that in 2001, very often, instead of
8 armed forces, the term security forces was used?
9 A. Yes. As a synonym to the armed forces, correct.
10 Q. Is it true, Mr. Markovski, that this term "security forces" also
11 encompassed the army and the police forces?
12 A. Yes, that is correct. And there is also a document that confirms
13 your conclusion.
14 Q. You just mentioned a document, and I would like to ask you to
15 look the document of tab 17.
16 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] That is Exhibit 1D313. It is a
17 Law on Special Rights of the Members of the Security Forces. I
18 apologise. That is in tab 17, so it is Exhibit 1D313.
19 Q. I'm going to ask you, you just said a document that says
20 precisely what security forces are.
21 In front of you, you have a law on special rights of members of
22 the security forces of the Republic of Macedonia and the members of their
23 families. Did you have this law in mind when you said that there was a
24 document that sets precisely who composes security forces?
25 A. Yes. That is exactly the law that I had in mind, together with
1 its Article 2.
2 Q. Is it correct, Dr. Markovski, that this term, "security forces,
3 "as a synonym for the armed forces, was used mainly because the Law on
4 Defence reduced the constitutional provisions and said that armed forces
5 are only the forces of the army of the Republic of Macedonia?
6 A. Yes. In the previous law of 1995, it was defined that the
7 president was the Supreme Commander of the armed forces. And with the
8 new law that was adopted that the second half of the 2001, the word
9 "armed forces" was replaced with "army," which, in fact, did not reduce
10 the rights and responsibilities of the president as the Supreme
11 Commander, but this may be one of the reasons why the decision was made
12 more precise about what were the security forces in 2001.
13 Q. You just explained about the new Law on Defence.
14 Could you tell me if the constitution, in any way, restricted the
15 authority of the president as the Supreme Commander?
16 A. No. The constitution does not limit these rights with any of the
18 Q. We saw the Exhibit P91 and Article 79, item 2, which determines
19 that the president of the Republic of Macedonia is the Supreme Commander
20 of the armed forces of Macedonia.
21 In paragraph 3 of the same Article, it is said that the president
22 of the Republic of Macedonia executes his duties and responsibilities
23 within the constitution and the laws.
24 Please tell me, Dr. Markovski, having in mind this provision, do
25 the laws, or any law in particular, can restrict the established
1 constitutional authority of the president of the Republic of Macedonia as
2 the Supreme Commander?
3 A. No. These laws that you have mentioned, that we are discussing,
4 cannot restrict the constitutional authority of the president; that is,
5 the Supreme Commander of the armed forces. They can only operationalise
6 the provisions and paragraphs within the constitutional of the Republic
7 of Macedonia that pertain to the president.
8 Q. Tell me, Dr. Markovski, does this position of the Supreme
9 Commander that is performed by the president of the country is limited to
10 the state of war or state of peace, or the president of the country is
11 always the Supreme Commander of the armed forces?
12 A. I believe that earlier, when responding to the question by
13 Mr. Antonio, I mentioned that the president is a Supreme Commander both
14 during peace and war.
15 Q. I apologise for maybe repeating the question for which you
16 already gave an answer; but responding to the question of my learned
17 colleague, did I understand you well that the authority of the president
18 of war and his role of a Supreme Commander, was it only for the state of
20 A. Yes, that is so.
21 Q. Dr. Markovski, please tell me, having in mind the analysis of the
22 documents that you made and on the basis of your personal and
23 professional experience in 2001, did the president of the state use his
24 authority as the Supreme Commander, although state of war was not
1 A. Yes. This is the factual situation, that is correct.
2 Q. Is it correct that he directly derived his authorities from the
3 constitutional provisions?
4 A. Yes, and he would emphasise that.
5 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown
6 Exhibit 1D52.
7 Q. And you have it in tab 11.
8 Here we see 1D52, under seal. We have the decision of the
9 president of Macedonia, dated 7th of August, 2001, about the use of the
10 army of the Republic of Macedonia. That is an order.
11 And in the preamble of this order of the president, it is said:
12 "Pursuant to Article 79, item 2 of the constitution of Macedonia, and in
13 accordance to the newly established safety situation, I issue," and so
14 on. End of quotation.
15 Is this one of the documents that confirm your response that the
16 president frequently used his constitutional right to issue orders?
17 A. Yes, this is precisely so. And the president is rather precise
18 in this decision, and he refers to Article 79, item 2 of the constitution
19 which provides him with this right.
20 Q. Dr. Markovski, when you were analysing the document that you
21 stated in your report, and in accordance with your personal experience,
22 do you know if the president issued orders to the army and the police,
23 and whether the army and the police had the obligation to implement those
25 A. Yes. The answer would be yes and yes. Yes, he issued orders
1 both to the army and the police; and, at the same time, both army and
2 police were obliged to implement orders.
3 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] I will ask that the witness is
4 shown 1D90, page 1D43 -- 4036 in Macedonian; English version, 1D4038.
5 Q. Before that, let me ask you, were you familiar --
6 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] You can turn the document in
7 tab 15.
8 Q. Were you familiar with the decision of the minister of the
9 interior affairs to disband the reserve composition of the police?
10 A. Yes, I did have such document.
11 Q. And do you know what happened with that decision?
12 A. This decision, upon order of the Supreme Commander, the
13 president, was withdrawn by the minister of the interior.
14 Q. On this page of this document, in the last paragraph after the
15 three asterisks, it said the composition of the reserve structure, and
16 then it is said: "The minister of the internal affairs, at the press
17 conference, said that the members of the reserve composition of the
18 Republic of Macedonia will be demobilised and withdrawn from the
19 check-points around Skopje."
20 When you were responding to my question, did you have in mind,
21 that, in 2001, you were also familiar with the decision written in this
23 A. Yes, that is correct.
24 Q. Please look at the document in tab 16.
25 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] That is Exhibit 1D91, and that is
1 the page 1D41 -- 4042, and the English is it 1D4042.
2 Q. In the end of this document, it is said that: "The police
3 reservists are returning to the check-points and the Ministry of Internal
4 Affairs withdrew the decision for the demobilisation of the police
5 composition, and ordered for remobilisation which will be processed
6 selectively. The remobilisation of the police reserve composition is
7 conducted upon a request of the Supreme Commander of the Macedonian armed
8 forces, Boris Trajkovski, due to the actual security situation in the
10 Does the contents of this document correspond to your knowledge,
11 Dr. Markovski, about the decision of the Supreme Commander to withdraw
12 the decision of the minister of internal affairs?
13 A. Yes, it does.
14 Q. Thank you very much.
15 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, maybe this would be
16 a convenient time for a break.
17 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, thank you, Ms. Residovic.
18 We will resume at 1.00.
19 --- Recess taken at 12.31 p.m.
20 --- On resuming at 1.03 p.m.
21 JUDGE PARKER: Ms. Residovic.
22 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours.
23 Q. Dr. Markovski, the president of the state, as the Supreme
24 Commander, has issued order also for the joint operations, to both the
25 army and the police. Is that correct?
1 A. Yes, that is correct.
2 Q. I will kindly ask you to look at the document in tab 10.
3 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] that is Exhibit 1D58, under seal.
4 Q. That is a decision of the president of the Republic of Macedonia
5 dated 4 June 2001, where, in item 1, it is stated: "The army of the
6 Republic of Macedonia and the units of the Ministry of Interior shall
7 prepare and carry out an attack operation in the broader region of
8 Skopska Crna Gora mountain?"
9 Tell me, Dr. Markovski, is my understanding correct, if I were to
10 say that this is a direct order of the Supreme Commander to the units of
11 the Ministry of Interior as well?
12 A. Yes. Since the Supreme Commander, by its decision, orders that
13 the army of the Republic of Macedonia and the units of the Ministry of
14 Interior should prepare and carry out the aforementioned operation.
15 Q. In paragraph 2 of this decision, it is stated: "Preparation of
16 the units should begin immediately, and the operation should start upon a
17 decision of the head of the General Staff of the army of the Republic of
19 Is it correct, Dr. Markovski, that president of the state, as the
20 Supreme Commander, also brought the decision who would be the immediate
21 head of the operation?
22 A. Yes. This is the reading of this paragraph, and it is also noted
23 that the operationalisation and the preparations will be done upon an
24 order of the General Staff.
25 Q. With -- in one part of your expert report, point 4.2, you spoke
1 about the army of the Republic of Macedonia and its organisational
2 structure, service, recruiting, et cetera. Is that correct?
3 A. Yes, that is correct.
4 Q. Could you agree with me, Mr. Markovski, if I were to say that no
5 other state structure in the Republic of Macedonia works in the same way
6 as the army of the Republic of Macedonia?
7 A. Yes. This is an inherent feature of the Republic of Macedonia,
8 of the army of the Republic of Macedonia to act like this. So no other
9 structure works like this.
10 Q. Is it true that the main feature is commanding in the army of the
11 Republic of Macedonia, while in the other state structure we have
13 A. Yes, precisely. In the army the orders are carried out based on
14 principle of command, while in the other structures we have management.
15 They are all synonyms in Macedonian, "upravuranjge," "rakovodenje,"
17 Q. Am I right, Dr. Markovski, if I say that the basic principles
18 upon which the army of the Republic of Macedonia is founded, and which
19 are known to most of modern continental armies, were known in the JNA as
20 well and remained applicable in the army of the Republic of Macedonia in
22 A. Yes. Those are internationally recognised and I would say
23 verified principles of command, and they are applicable in the Republic
24 of Macedonia. That would mean in the army of the Republic of Macedonia.
25 Q. Dr. Markovski, is one of these principles the unity of the
1 command when deploying forces and means?
2 A. That is one of the main principles, without which a structure
3 like this could not be operational, could not function.
4 Q. And is it correct that this principle of unity of command does
5 not tolerate possibility of dual command within a single combat
7 A. You're absolutely right. In one combat operation, there could
8 be -- there could not be two commanders. The operation is led by a
9 single commander.
10 Q. Is it also correct, Dr. Markovski, that the next main principle,
11 upon which the army of the Republic of Macedonia was founded, was the
12 principle of singleness of command?
13 A. Yes, precisely.
14 Q. And would it be correct if I stated that this main principle
15 excluded any possibility for other type of command, than with a single
16 head, in a joint combat operations and activities carried out during that
18 A. Yes, precisely. The operation must presuppose a single
19 commander. This is the principle of singleness of command.
20 Q. And is it correct that the next basic principle in the army of
21 the Republic of Macedonia was the obligation to carry out the orders and
22 decisions of the superior officers? That would mean full subordination
23 in the carrying out of decisions and orders.
24 A. That is a principle and also a legal obligation binding any
25 military officer.
1 Q. Does it mean, Dr. Markovski, that it is precisely because of the
2 principles upon which the army of the Republic of Macedonia is
3 established, that any use of other forces carrying arms - police, for
4 instance - would require that, in a joint operation or action, the police
5 is necessarily placed under the command of the officers of the army of
6 the Republic of Macedonia?
7 A. Starting from these principles, and I hope we clarified them, you
8 are completely right. This is how things must be.
9 Q. In paragraphs 86, 87 of your expert report, you spoke about the
10 new Law on Defence being adopted, and it entered into force on the 8th of
11 June, 2001. Is that correct?
12 A. Yes, this is correct.
13 Q. Is it correct, Dr. Markovski, that some provisions of this law
14 were identical to the provisions of the old law. You mentioned Article 1
15 and some other Articles at the beginning. So the new law was immediately
16 applicable with regards to those provisions. Is that correct?
17 A. The new law followed the development processes in the defence
18 sector in the Republic of Macedonia, and that was the reason for its
19 adoption. I am not completely clear what your question is.
20 Q. Is it correct that some provisions of the law that were either
21 fully identical to the ones in the previous law or have clearly regulated
22 a given situation were applicable immediately? Is that correct?
23 A. Some were; some were not. And in the final provisions of the
24 law, it is indicated which among the new positions or new provisions in
25 the law are immediately applicable and which are delayed for a certain
1 period of time, because in order to apply them, the adoption of secondary
2 legislation was necessary.
3 So this is how it depended, which of the secondary legislation
4 items would be adopted when, in order to be able to promote, if I may say
5 so, some of the new provisions in the law; and the final provisions of
6 the law make it precise which are those new provisions.
7 Q. Thank you very much. You already answered the next question that
8 I was about to ask. Is it true that the final and provisional clauses of
9 the new law established that the new law is applicable until the
10 regulation is adopted which is necessary to make the new provisions of
11 the law, those that you indicated, applicable?
12 A. Not only I wish to confirm this; but even beyond, some of the
13 provisions are still not in force -- provisions of the new law are still
14 not in force because secondary legislation was not adopted to date.
15 Q. And this avoided a legal gap, so all organs were able to act,
16 applying either provisions of the new law or provisions of the old law.
17 Is that correct?
18 A. Yes, you're absolutely right.
19 Q. Considering the position of the president of the Republic, tell
20 me, is it correct that his position of the Supreme Commander towards the
21 armed forces, including both the army and the police, remained completely
22 identical throughout 2001, identical to what has been stipulated in the
23 old law?
24 A. Yes, that is correct.
25 Q. In paragraph 4.2.3 -- actually, in this part, paragraph 116,
1 et cetera, you spoke about calling up the reserve forces to join the army
2 of the Republic of Macedonia. Is that correct?
3 A. Yes, that is correct.
4 Q. In relation to this, Dr. Markovski, I will kindly ask you to
5 clarify a given situation, and it is true that it has been discussed at
6 length before this Chamber.
7 Namely, is it correct that all citizens of the Republic of
8 Macedonia of full age, after serving their conscription military service,
9 are given a place in the reserve forces?
10 A. Every citizen of the Republic of Macedonia who serves their
11 conscription military service has the duty, within 24 hours from the
12 discharge from the army after the conscription period ends, has the duty
13 to report to the unit of the Ministry of Defence --
14 Q. Ministry of?
15 A. I apologise. Ministry of Defence where the person will be
16 deployed within a unit of the reserve forces, where they will perform if
17 there is need for that; in other words, they are given a military
19 Q. And, as you said, the military deployment for every citizen of
20 the Republic of Macedonia of full age is kept at records in the Ministry
21 of Defence. Is that correct?
22 A. Yes. This is a special unit that deals exclusively with those
23 issues within the Ministry of Defence.
24 Q. And for each of the citizens, there is the military deployment or
25 deployment for every single individual in case where a call-up of the
1 reserve forces is needed. Is that correct?
2 A. Yes. This is one of the main functions of this unit.
3 Q. And is it correct that no citizen of the Republic of Macedonia of
4 full age could have two military deployment posts at the same time, to be
5 simultaneously in the tank unit and infantry, or to be simultaneously in
6 the infantry or in the police reserve. Is that correct?
7 A. No. Every citizen who has served their conscription service can
8 have a single deployment within a single unit.
9 Q. So, for a citizen of full age to be transferred, for instance,
10 from the army of the Republic of Macedonia into the police of the
11 Republic of Macedonia, it would be necessary to, first, change the
12 military deployment as recorded in the Ministry of Defence, is that
13 correct, if they were not originally deployed to serve in the police, of
15 A. Yes. As I said, no citizen of full age can have two military
16 deployments at the same time. This means that the reservist, the citizen
17 of the Republic of Macedonia of full ages, could not have simultaneously
18 military deployment within an army unit and within a police unit. That
19 is impossible.
20 Q. And can I conclude from your answer, Dr. Markovski, that if
21 someone actually came to a police station that, without having changed
22 their military deployment records, this very fact that the person has
23 come to a police station would not make him a police reservist?
24 A. It is absolutely impossible, because for such transformation, if
25 I may call it so, a consent or agreement must be given by a head of the
1 unit of the Ministry of Defence dealing with the deployment of the
2 reserve forces.
3 Q. And, Dr. Markovski, if someone failed to meet the requirements
4 for the unit or for the structure where the military deployment was
5 originally planned, what would happen to such person?
6 A. You raise as dilemma, what if they failed to meet the
7 requirements, but I would broaden this. It might be due to health reason
8 that they are unable to serve on that post any longer, then they would be
9 given another deployment post, depending on the professional and
10 vocational training, also military training and compatibility to perform
12 Q. And is it correct that this other deployment would decided by the
13 Ministry of Defence, "it" being the civilian body that keeps the records
14 of military reservists?
15 A. It is only the Ministry of Defence, yes, that unit within the
16 Ministry of Defence.
17 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] I will kindly ask now that the
18 witness is shown the 65 ter document, 1D1295.
19 That is a document in tab 19 in the binder, and the page is
20 1D2091 and the English 2D0297.
21 Q. Dr. Markovski, this is a document of the Ministry of Interior,
22 sector for internal affairs, Skopje, section for defence preparation.
23 The date is 25th of September, 2001, and it is sent to the Ministry of
24 Defence, regional unit for defence, Karpos, Skopje. Subject is
25 notification delivery.
1 "We notified you that the following reserve conscripts are
2 deleted from our register of reserve composition conscripts with approved
3 military disposition in SVR-Skopje, list with code II/3" and then we have
4 a name. Then "list with code II/7," and then there is another name
6 "We are seconding the above mentioned reserve conscripts to your
7 competence for any deployment within other units within the reserve
9 Tell me, Dr. Markovski, is this the way in which that the section
10 for defence preparations in the Ministry of Internal Affairs has the duty
11 to inform Ministry of Defence in order to remove a person from the list
12 of police reservists if they have originally been included in that list?
13 A. Yes, you're absolutely right.
14 Q. Would you kindly now look at the document after tab 20.
15 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] That is 65 ter 1D1296, which is
16 1D09 -- 0292, and the Macedonian page -- that was the Macedonian page,
17 while the English is 1D0298.
18 Q. Dr. Markovski, again, we have a similar document coming from the
19 section for defence preparations within the sector for internal affairs
20 in Skopje, dated 21st of August, 2001. And, again, it is sent to the
21 Ministry of Defence. The subject is notification, delivered.
22 It reads: "We notified you that from the separated files of
23 reserve composition conscripts in your PEO, at the beginning of
24 April 2001, upon a completion of the prescribed procedure by our side
25 enlisted of VES in SVR Skopje by six conscripts altogether was
1 conducted," and the six persons are listed.
2 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Please can we turn to the second
3 page in the Macedonian version.
4 Q. "We inform you that the remaining nine conscripts for which the
5 files have been set aside upon the conducted checks, it was established
6 that they do not fulfil the prescribe the criteria for the enlistment in
7 VES in SVR Skopje?"
8 Is this also a document that is a collaboration of your claim
9 that any change, regardless if a person is being transferred in the
10 reserve forces of the police or for any other reasons has to be relieved
11 from the police services, it has to be done still within the unit at the
12 Ministry of Defence?
13 A. Yes. As far as I can understand this document, upon request of
14 the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Defence has provided these
15 people who were recorded and maintained at the Ministry of Defence; and
16 since they do not satisfy all the criteria, the document does not list
17 which ones - these can be professional criteria as well - the Ministry of
18 Interior is obliged to return their personal fails; that is to say, to
19 inform the Ministry of Defence that these individuals are accepted and
20 the others are being sent back.
21 This means that the continuity continues of the records being
22 maintained at the Ministry of Defence. This is the correct method and
23 confirmation of the fact that no military reservists can have two
24 different deployments, nor they can be lost in the records.
25 Q. Thank you very much.
1 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I seek to tender
2 the following documents, 1D295 and 1D296, first of all, to be included on
3 the list, and then to be accepted as evidence.
4 JUDGE PARKER: Those two documents --
5 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, the first one, 1D1295, and
6 the second one, 1D1296.
7 JUDGE PARKER: Are you sure that second number is correct?
8 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] 65 ter 1D1296.
9 JUDGE PARKER: Very well. Those two documents will be received,
10 and they will add to the list.
11 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 1D01295 shall be Exhibit number
12 1D00350, while 1D01296 shall be Exhibit number 00351.
13 Thank you, Your Honours.
14 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Can you please repeat it, because
15 it was not fully entered into the transcript.
16 THE REGISTRAR: 1D01295 shall be Exhibit number 1D00350, while
17 65 ter 1D01296 shall be Exhibit 1D00351.
18 Thank you, Your Honours.
19 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.
20 Q. Dr. Markovski, earlier, we discussed that the president of the
21 Republic, as a Supreme Commander, does not have any restrictions in
22 relation to issuing orders to the military, army, and the police, and the
23 operationalisation of the Joint Command when conducting a joint action.
24 Do you remember us discussing this?
25 A. Yes, that is correct.
1 Q. Dr. Markovski, if I were to ask you or suggest that the president
2 of the state, as a Supreme Commander, does not have any legal or
3 constitutional limitations even to manage a combat operation even on his
4 own, would it be true?
5 A. Yes. Considering the constitution and the laws, this is correct.
6 Q. Let us move to another topic now that you discuss in your own
7 report. You were discussing in details in your report, and that is why I
8 won't be asking about all the activities of the NLA.
9 But what I want to ask you is the following: Is it true that
10 these terrorists groups of the NLA started attacking in June, not just
11 the Tetovo region, but also in the region of Kumanovo and Skopje?
12 A. Yes. But it wasn't an organised activity but separate armed
14 Q. And some armed forces or groups entered the village of Aracinovo;
15 whereas, other groups started to threat with attacks on the refinery, the
16 airport, and the capital city of the Republic of Macedonia as well. Is
17 that correct?
18 A. Yes, this is correct. This is how it was.
19 Q. Is it correct that these terrorists sabotage groups used or
20 utilized the mountain Skopska Crna Gora along whose slopes parts of the
21 city are also located, and the whole city is located in the foot of the
22 mountain, in order to link up their groups in the Kumanovo and Tetovo
23 region with Kosovo, and to use these positions on the mountain in order
24 to threaten the capital city?
25 Is this correct?
1 A. Yes. You are completely right, because there was no link or
2 possibility for linkage of activities of certain extremist armed groups
3 from the Kumanovo region and their coordination with similar groups
4 coming or originating from the region of Radusa.
5 Q. In paragraph 338 in your expert report, you are discussing the
6 adoption or enactments of decisions for the establishment of the command
7 for defence of the city of Skopje. Is this correct?
8 A. Yes, that is correct.
9 Q. Was this decision a result precisely of these threats towards the
10 city of Skopje from the slopes of the mountain of Crna Gora?
11 A. Based on the professional assessments that have been conducted
12 within the security structures, I would say that this is precisely so.
13 Q. Please, can you take a look at the document in tab 1.
14 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] this is Exhibit 1D99.
15 Q. And please tell me whether this is the decision that President
16 Trajkovski made on the 11th of June in order to establish the defence
17 command for the city of Skopje?
18 A. Yes, this is the decision.
19 Q. Can you please take a look now at the document in tab 2.
20 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] this is Exhibit 1D100.
21 Q. Is it correct, Dr. Markovski, that the very same day, the
22 president of the Republic, being the Supreme Commander, issued a decision
23 for the mobilisation of the forces, in order to be able to fully
24 implement his decision for the establishment of the defence command for
25 the city of Skopje?
1 A. Yes, this is so. However, I would like to offer a clarification,
2 because here, it is being ordered to mobilise the 12th and the 16th
3 Infantry Brigade, the 1st Guardist Brigade, and the 8th Infantry Brigade.
4 At the time when this order has been issued, the 1st Guardist
5 Brigade and the 8th Infantry Brigade, they existed together with their
6 military composition; whereas, the 12th and the 16th Infantry Brigade, as
7 formations of the reserve forces, they only had the command structures,
8 and it was really necessary to mobilised these structures; that is to
9 say, to invite the reserve structures of these units to continue with the
10 activation of these couple of units.
11 Q. Please can you take a look now at the document in tab 3.
12 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] this is Exhibit 1D81. The page
13 is 1D3042 in the Macedonian version and 1D3048 in the English version.
14 Q. Are you familiar with this document, Dr. Markovski?
15 A. Yes, I have it as part of my analysis.
16 Q. Is it correct that the very same day when the president of the
17 Republic issued the order for the establishment of the defence command
18 for the city of Skopje at 1800 hours, the commander of the defence of
19 city of Skopje, General Mitevski, issued the order for the defence for
20 the city of Skopje?
21 A. Yes, that is correct.
22 Q. In this order, in the second paragraph of item number 1, one can
23 read the following: "After encountered failures in the clashes with the
24 security forces of the Republic of Macedonia, in the populated places on
25 the eastern slopes of Skopska Crna Gora, noticeable are the efforts of
1 the terrorists to transfer the action to the region of Skopje and to the
2 facilities of vital importance for the normal life of the population and
3 the operation of the bodies of the state authority. The terrorists
4 control the village of Aracinovo, where they have set up barricades on
5 the roads, and they conduct preparations for the defence of the village.
6 One can register their incursions also in the neighbouring villages."
7 Then it gives the other reasons.
8 My question is whether this order contains the basic reasons for
9 which the decision for the establishment of the defence command has been
10 established or made, about which you provided your own opinion in the
11 report and answered my previous questions.
12 So are these reasons, do they correspond to your own knowledge
13 and conclusions?
14 A. Yes. These are the basic reasons for the enactment of the
15 decision and order, as well as this order for the defence of the city of
16 Skopje; and, basically, you read them out loud, so there is no need for
17 me to repeat those.
18 Q. Dr. Markovski, can you agree with me that the defence of the
19 capital city is the most significant, if I might say so, defence task of
20 the military and all other armed forces, including the citizens of the
21 Republic of Macedonia?
22 A. Absolutely, yes. This is the basic qualification for the need to
23 defend the capital city of any country, including the Republic of
24 Macedonia, because this is where all the state and other capacities are
1 Q. Would you agree that, in this type of important tasks, one cannot
2 have more than one order, and the order issued by the commander for the
3 defence of the city of Skopje have to be followed by all other security
4 forces, including the police?
5 A. Yes, this is correct; otherwise, the situation would be diluted
6 and the final goal would not be achieved.
7 Q. If you take a look at item number 2 of this order by the
8 commander of the defence of the city, the task is being listed.
9 It says: "Task, in joint action with the neighbours and the
10 bodies of the Ministry of Interior and civil defence, to control the
11 access points towards the city of Skopje, to destroy the discovered
12 sabotage and terrorist groups, and hinder the infiltration of sabotage
13 and terrorist groups into the city and the region of the vital facilities
14 an action upon these."
15 First of all, I will ask you, Dr. Markovski, is my understanding
16 of this order correct if I say that this is an order that relates also to
17 the bodies of the Ministry of Interior?
18 A. This order relates, besides to the listed units of the army of
19 the Republic of Macedonia, to the bodies of the Ministry of Interior, but
20 also units of the civilian defence.
21 Q. Dr. Markovski, is my understanding of this order also correct, if
22 I were to say that the commander of the defence of the city ordered to
23 destroy the discovered sabotage and terrorist groups and to prevent their
24 infiltration in the city?
25 A. Yes, this is clearly mentioned here.
1 Q. And this task, is it correct that it was -- it would oblige all
2 the entities mentioned in this order?
3 A. Yes. This all refers to all the entities and bodies listed here.
4 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation]I will ask now for the second page
5 to be shown, the second page of this document.
6 Q. Item number 3 reads, "Neighbours."
7 Please, tell me, Dr. Markovski, who these neighbours are?
8 A. So we have an order for the defence of the city of Skopje, and it
9 is precisely addressed to the entities that are supposed to provide the
10 defence of the city of Skopje. As we already mentioned, these are the
11 army units that are listed here, the bodies of the Ministry of Interior,
12 and civilian defence. All of those, as part of the task, they have their
13 own field of responsibility defined by the constitutional and legal
15 So, as I mentioned, they have a particular field of
16 responsibility. Immediately besides those, they might have other units
17 of the army or security forces, and they also have their own field of
19 So when discussing neighbours, we are talking about the
20 neighbouring unit, the neighbouring bodies of the Ministry of Interior or
21 the civilian defence; that is to say, the neighbouring field or zone of
23 And just to mention, this zone of responsibility is not just left
24 or right, east or west, but also north and south. So this is how you
25 provide for the entirety of responsibility.
1 Q. Before we complete this part of the examination, two more
3 JUDGE PARKER: I'm sorry, Ms. Residovic, we haven't time for two
4 more questions. We've run over by two to three minutes already.
5 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Very well. Thank you.
6 JUDGE PARKER: We must now adjourn. We resume tomorrow morning
7 at 9.00.
8 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.46 p.m.,
9 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 11th day of March,
10 2008, at 9.00 a.m.