Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 5317

 1                           Tuesday, 2 June 2009

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 2.18 p.m.

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  Good afternoon.  We await -- is there a matter you

 6     wish to raise, Mr. Djurdjic?

 7             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I would kindly ask that

 8     Ms. Marie O'Leary put forth our proposal on our behalf on the admission

 9     of evidence from the Milutinovic case.  It concerns a filing of Friday,

10     and we corresponded with the OTP.  She would like to familiarise you with

11     the outcome of that effort.

12             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

13             MS. O'LEARY:  Thank you, Your Honour, just to clarify, there was

14     no filing on Friday; there was a discussion with the Prosecution about

15     perhaps tendering the underlying documents to the -- of the Milutinovic

16     transcript that were not tendered.  They were ones that had been tendered

17     by the Defence teams largely in the Milutinovic case.  We had an e-mail

18     today from the Prosecution that there was no objection to tendering these

19     exhibits, so we were wondering if now would be a good time to list

20     through those and receive numbers if so admitted.

21             JUDGE PARKER:  How many are there?

22             MS. O'LEARY:  We have 11.

23             JUDGE PARKER:  Eleven.  And they were all tendered and received

24     in evidence in the course of the Milutinovic --

25             MS. O'LEARY:  I don't believe so.  I am sorry, Your Honour.  I

Page 5318

 1     don't believe so.  Two of them were discussed but were not tendered or

 2     admitted into evidence in Milutinovic; the remainder of them were.

 3             JUDGE PARKER:  Well the associated exhibits in Milutinovic come

 4     into one category.  We will have to learn from you about the other two.

 5     Could you tell us about those two, please.

 6             MS. O'LEARY:  Yes, Your Honour, the other two were a transcript

 7     of testimony of Roland Keith in the Milosevic case, it was discussed, by,

 8     I believe, one of the Defence teams, it was not admitted into evidence.

 9     It was not tendered, I don't believe.  Additionally, there was the ICTY

10     statement of John Clark which was given a number of 6D106; it was also

11     not admitted, but it was discussed.

12             JUDGE PARKER:  On what basis do we receive those?

13             MS. O'LEARY:  Your Honour, I believe that as they were discussed,

14     it would give some context to the totality of the transcript.  And as the

15     Prosecution was not objecting, we thought that it might help round out

16     the fullness of the transcript.  Of course, if you would like, of course,

17     Mr. Djurdjic can discuss it with the witness to give it a frame of

18     reference in this case, if you would like, of course.

19             JUDGE PARKER:  Take, for example, the statement of a person, of

20     Mr. Clark, what are we going to do with that statement if it is received

21     in evidence?  Do we treat it as evidence?  And we have not seen the

22     person, we don't know anything about it.

23             MS. O'LEARY:  I understand, Your Honour.  But I think that it

24     will be --

25             JUDGE PARKER:  Is it not the case that in the course of its, you

Page 5319

 1     say, discussion in the Milutinovic case, that any material portions of

 2     that statement would have been put to the witness and discussed by the

 3     witness?

 4             MS. O'LEARY:  Yes, I think so, Your Honour.

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  You're getting a wise nod.

 6             MS. O'LEARY:  As I'm being directed over here, we would withdraw

 7     that application then as far as those do not clutter the record, if you

 8     would see it at fit.

 9             JUDGE PARKER:  I think the transcript in Milutinovic might help

10     us enough with those.

11             MS. O'LEARY:  Thank you, Your Honour.

12             JUDGE PARKER:  So you then tender the ten or eight is it?

13             MS. O'LEARY:  Nine.

14             JUDGE PARKER:  Nine --

15             MS. O'LEARY:  Nine.

16             JUDGE PARKER:  -- well, I'm nearly there, aren't I?  And the list

17     is with the court officer, is it?

18             MS. O'LEARY:  It is.

19             JUDGE PARKER:  And there's no objection?

20             MS. GOPALAN:  No objections, Your Honours.

21             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you, Ms. Gopalan.  They will then be

22     received as Defence exhibits.

23             MS. O'LEARY:  Thank you, Your Honour.  Would you like us to read

24     through them one by one.

25             JUDGE PARKER:  If you have the list with the Court officer, he

Page 5320

 1     can probably do that and apply the number as you go.

 2             MS. O'LEARY:  Thank you.

 3             JUDGE PARKER:  There seems to be a problem.

 4                           [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  We'll save time by a memo to follow setting them

 6     out.

 7             MS. O'LEARY:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 8             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you very much, Ms. O'Leary.

 9             Are we ready now for the witness?  Let's have the witness,

10     please.

11             Ms. Gopalan, you have something?

12             MS. GOPALAN:  Your Honour, we do have some documents that we

13     wanted to tender into evidence in a similar fashion to the Defence.

14             JUDGE PARKER:  Were these tendered as exhibits in the Milutinovic

15     trial?

16             MS. GOPALAN:  Yes.

17             JUDGE PARKER:  And how many are there?

18             MS. GOPALAN:  In the Milosevic trial.

19             JUDGE PARKER:  In the Milosevic trial.  And how many were there?

20             MS. GOPALAN:  And they were referred to in the Milutinovic trial.

21             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

22             MS. GOPALAN:  And those that have not been admitted into

23     evidence, five, Your Honours.

24             JUDGE PARKER:  Five.  There's no objection, I take it, to those?

25             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, no objections.  We

Page 5321

 1     put that forth in any case.  I believe this should be treated as it was

 2     with the Defence.  If this concerns some exhibits from the Milutinovic

 3     and Milosevic case, then the transcript should suffice, and I believe

 4     some of these were not admitted as exhibits in the Milutinovic case.  I

 5     believe that was your position.

 6             JUDGE PARKER:  [Previous translation continues] ... with numbers

 7     in due course.  Thank you.

 8             MS. GOPALAN:  Your Honours, we would say that these are

 9     associated exhibits to --

10             JUDGE PARKER:  I think they've been received.

11             MS. GOPALAN:  Thank you, Your Honours.

12             JUDGE PARKER:  Now we'll try for the witness once again.

13                           [The witness takes the stand]

14             JUDGE PARKER:  Good afternoon, Colonel.  The affirmation that you

15     made at the beginning of your evidence still applies.

16             THE WITNESS:  Right.

17             JUDGE PARKER:  And Mr. Djurdjic is continuing with his questions.

18             Mr. Djurdjic.

19                           WITNESS:  RICHARD CIAGLINSKI [Resumed]

20             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

21                           Cross-examination by Mr. Djurdjic:  [Continued]

22        Q.   Good afternoon, Mr. Ciaglinski.  I went through the Friday

23     transcript.  Could you please give precise and brief answers to my

24     questions so as to be able to save time in that regard, although I wasn't

25     limited per se during my cross-examination by the Chamber as opposed to

Page 5322

 1     the previous two cases you testified in, in any case, I'd like to have

 2     brief answers to keep matters as efficient as possible.

 3             Mr. Ciaglinski, on Friday, we were discussing your position and

 4     function you had with the Verification Mission.  According to the

 5     information I found in some written and other statements, your position

 6     was at the headquarters of General DZ.  You were coordinator or liaison

 7     officer with the VJ, the liaison officer was Mr. Guy Sands, and the

 8     coordinator for the KLA were for a while David Wilson; and once he took

 9     up another position, it was done by David Meyer.  Is the information I

10     gathered from the documents correct?  Do you agree with it?

11        A.   It sounds right, yes.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Am I right in saying that General DZ believed that

13     the three of you were too many to submit reports to him, therefore he

14     appointed his assistant from military matters to be your superior,

15     Mr. Sinclair, to whom you reported and he reported to DZ in turn.  And

16     then after Sinclair, several people went through that post; is that

17     correct?

18        A.   Not entirely, no.  When -- Sinclair was there for a very, very

19     short time, and when he left, I wasn't aware that anyone really replaced

20     him.

21        Q.   According to the information I had on General DZ, it was

22     David Meyer, then Piers Noble, and then Mr. Lovelock, if I'm pronouncing

23     that correctly and if I took that down correctly.

24        A.   All right.  Okay.  I understand now what you are saying and who

25     you are referring to.  Yes, Ben Lovelock was the last one, and this was a

Page 5323

 1     function -- a person that carried out this function, whether it was

 2     Sinclair or Ben Lovelock or Noble, it was to look after DZ 's office, it

 3     was like his personal assistant.  And so he controlled the access to DZ.

 4     He would do office work for DZ.  That was the main function of that

 5     person.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Mr. Richard Heaslip, what was his position or

 7     function?

 8        A.   Well, like all of us, he had different functions at different

 9     times of the mission, as I did, so at one time he came into the

10     headquarters for a brief time to take over as head of liaison, but he was

11     then sent to Macedonia to run the evacuation.  So he had different

12     functions.  And also Heaslip was also the regional commander of the

13     region centred on Gnjilane.

14        Q.   Thank you.  In the information on DZ, I've found that

15     Richard Heaslip was the main liaison officer appointed by DZ in order to

16     coordinate the three coordinators; do you agree with that or not?

17        A.   Yes, for a few weeks, for a very short period towards the end.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Now to go back to the head of mission, it was

19     Ambassador Walker; am I correct?

20        A.   Correct.

21        Q.   General DZ was deputy head of mission for operations, and

22     Mr. Giovanni Kesler was deputy head of mission for the police?

23        A.   Correct.

24        Q.   Thank you.  On Friday you said, I don't know whether I'll put

25     this correctly, but I believe you said that the major part of the

Page 5324

 1     Verification Mission or the level that concerned the bulk of cooperation

 2     with the Yugoslavian institutions was in Belgrade?

 3        A.   I don't remember saying that.  What I think I said was that the

 4     highest level of cooperation, the highest level of the

 5     Cooperation mission was sitting in Belgrade, but the every-day running of

 6     the organisation and the problem solving was done in Kosovo.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  How did you arrive at that conclusion, that the top

 8     level of the verification commission of the OSCE was in Belgrade, whereas

 9     in fact there were only seven personnel there?  Maybe they had the

10     closest ties with the mission in Belgrade, but concerning the meetings of

11     Mr. Walker and Sainovic as well as Loncar, that must have taken place at

12     a higher level than the level of Ms. Phelan who was in Belgrade at the

13     time?

14        A.   I don't know.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Can we agree, nonetheless, that the

16     Kosovo Verification Mission, or rather its head, was Mr. Walker and that

17     you were all answerable to him?

18        A.   Of course.

19        Q.   Mr. Walker was the only person authorised, based on the reports

20     of the regional centres and his teams, to make decisions on the

21     violations of the agreement and to undertake measures that he deemed

22     appropriate?

23        A.   The final decision was always his, yes.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Save for one occasion when you were also present when

25     he was replaced by his deputies, and it was up to them to decide whether

Page 5325

 1     to issue a communique or not?

 2        A.   Which occasion are you referring to?

 3        Q.   I mean the report that was sent concerning the incident at Dulje,

 4     and the kidnapping in Stari Trg?  In any case, if you don't recall that,

 5     I will put some documents to you.

 6        A.   I don't recall it exactly, but I am sure I can be reminded.

 7        Q.   I certainly will.  There is a number of them.

 8             I'd like to go back to your arrival.  When the Cooperation was

 9     discharged by a person by the name of Donna Phelan within the hierarchy

10     of the mission, in your statement you talk about the method planned by

11     Ms. Donna Phelan, it was called the method of maximum confrontation --

12             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction:  Maximum assistance.

13     Maximum resistance.

14             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] -- to the Serbs.  What did the

15     method consist of?

16             THE WITNESS:  Sorry.  I'm not aware of it being called the system

17     of maximum resistance, so.

18             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   I will read it out.  In the English page 3, paragraph 2:

20             "The method we used that had been originally planned by

21     Donna Phelan was to resist to the maximum."

22        A.   I think the word I used was confrontational.

23        Q.   Very well.  It should be the same confrontation in Serbian, I

24     thought it was the same.  I'm sorry I failed to mention the exhibit

25     number.  It's the statement of the witness.

Page 5326

 1             THE INTERPRETER:  Could Mr. Djurdjic please repeat the exhibit

 2     number.

 3             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] It was admitted in our case as

 4     P832, the statement.

 5             THE WITNESS:  Sorry, what was the question?

 6             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Could you explain Ms. Phelan's method?  The method of

 8     confrontation, as you called it.  What did that entail?

 9        A.   Well, it was the result of not getting any response back to

10     our -- to Ambassador Walker's letter about our methodology of carrying

11     out the inspections.  And so -- and also when we requested permission to

12     inspect the barracks at the Commission of Cooperation, we were told we

13     were not -- we would not be able to do that.

14             So the only way to try and carry out the inspection was to

15     actually turn up at the barracks at the main gates and confront the

16     problem.  And, you know, try and get in, try and discuss with the

17     commander, even obstruct the gates if necessary, and to spend as much

18     time as possible at the barracks observing what was going on just outside

19     the barracks, which wasn't appreciated by the VJ; and so, therefore, you

20     can only describe this as a confrontational technique.  It's the only

21     option we had left.

22        Q.   Thank you.  As far as I understood, her method failed, whereas

23     the method you introduced succeeded; am I correct?

24        A.   It's possibly because of my diplomatic training that I decided

25     that maybe by talking and agreeing and discussing methodologies we might

Page 5327

 1     make more progress, and that's what we tried to do, yes.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  You mentioned your diplomatic training, I believe

 3     that you said that you now work for the foreign office; did I gather that

 4     correctly?

 5        A.   I am employed occasionally on a as-required basis by the foreign

 6     office, yes.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Is there a special department that you work for, or

 8     do you work for the various sections of it according to the needs at that

 9     moment?

10        A.   I mainly work for two departments within the foreign office; one

11     is the department for international development, and the other one is for

12     the department that deals with conflicts.

13        Q.   Thank you.  It means if we see you in the field, there must be a

14     conflict.  Thank you.

15             Ms. Phelan eventually left the Verification Mission; she took up

16     a position for centre for intelligence gathering; am I correct?

17        A.   I don't know.  All I know is that she returned to the state

18     department.  She was a state department employee, so the

19     American Foreign Office.

20        Q.   Thank you, I know that.  In any case, I wanted to learn from you,

21     if you know, what it was that the centre actually did, what is the centre

22     for information gathering or compiling?

23        A.   I have no idea how the American system works or what departments

24     it has.

25        Q.   Mr. Ciaglinski, this centre for information gathering or

Page 5328

 1     compiling concerns the Kosovo Verification Mission.  Yes, you said she

 2     went to the state department, although my information is different from

 3     that.  But have you ever heard of the Blue Book or the KVM?

 4        A.   Sorry, yes, I thought you were referring to the period after she

 5     left the mission completely.  I didn't realise you were still talking

 6     about her moving to what we referred to as the fusion cell, which was the

 7     information gathering, collation, and interpretation department of which

 8     she headed up for a certain length of time, which created the Blue Book,

 9     yes.

10        Q.   To the extent that you can recall, could you tell us something

11     about the fusion cell, how it worked, if you know?

12        A.   Well, yes, I worked on it for a time, so I probably know a little

13     bit about it.

14             Basically, the information that was sent and all the reports that

15     were sent in from regional centres were collated, brought into the same

16     location; people examined them; they then sort of looked at previous

17     reports dealing with the same topics, and tried to create a picture.  So

18     we -- but it wasn't just incidents, it was the whole business of

19     information gathering in Kosovo.

20             So we gathered information about the VJ, what they were doing,

21     where they were; the MUP, what they were doing, what type of units they

22     were; designations on their uniforms if we saw any markings on the

23     uniforms.  And then we tried to forecast what might happen in the future,

24     possible of variants of what the outcomes might be of various actions

25     that had taken place.  So that's the type of work the fusion cell did.

Page 5329

 1        Q.   Yes, now I see why you were included as well, because I learned

 2     that the cell employed an analyst from the UK, Germany, and the US; and

 3     in the jargon it was called the KVM Intelligence Service?

 4        A.   In the jargon it was known as the KVM Fusion Cell, because it

 5     fused the information together.  But, you know, what is information

 6     gathering?  Some people call it intelligence, some people call it

 7     whatever, you know.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Mr. Ciaglinski, you told us that you had three

 9     documents that were your Bible and you carried them always with you.  If

10     I'm not mistaken.  One was the Geremek-Jovanovic Agreement, the second

11     document was the Byrnes-Djordjevic Agreement, and the third was the

12     1199 Resolution.  Am I correct?  Are these the three documents?

13        A.   No.  It was the Shaun Byrnes, it was the Djordjevic -- sorry the

14     Djordjevic-Byrnes; it was the Naumann-Clark, not the 1199.  So the two

15     you mentioned, but not the 1199.  The third one was the Klaus-Naumann

16     document.

17        Q.   Correct, Clark-Naumann, you're right.  Let me go back to that.

18     Weren't these three agreements the basis for the UN Resolution 1199?

19        A.   Certainly two of them were, I don't think -- the

20     Byrnes-Djordjevic was outside that because the -- I think the

21     Resolution 1203 which followed 1199 confirmed the workings of the mission

22     under -- using those two agreements, including those two agreements in

23     it.

24        Q.   Thank you.

25             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I know it was a long time ago,

Page 5330

 1     that's why I'd like to show you the 65 ter document P456.  We'll refresh

 2     our memories.

 3             That's the 1199 UN resolution from September 1998, and you will

 4     see that it preceded these three documents, one of which I had gotten

 5     wrong.  I'd like us to discuss briefly -- there, there it is.  It's the

 6     23rd September, 1998.  This is the preamble.

 7             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I would like to see page 2 in

 8     English, please.

 9             I'd like to tell the legal officer, we don't need on the screen

10     the B/C/S version.  We need only the English version for the witness and

11     the Trial Chamber.

12        Q.   Witness, would you agree that under these items at the bottom,

13     1, 2, and 3, in item 1 a cease-fire in Kosovo is envisaged, a cessation

14     of hostilities.  Item 2 envisages an improvement of humanitarian

15     situation and averting the impending humanitarian catastrophe, and a

16     third point deals with the political solution to the Kosovo crisis.  Do

17     you agree this is the essence of these three points?

18        A.   Yes, I haven't got it on my screen, but that's the essence, yes.

19     Sorry, I have it, I was looking somewhere else.  This is why, of course,

20     1199 was superseded by Resolution 1203 in which the -- two of the

21     documents were actually incorporated, in answer to your earlier question.

22        Q.   When was the 1203 adopted?

23        A.   If you remember on Friday I had a little piece of paper that you

24     wouldn't let me use.  I had actually written down the actual date of the

25     Resolution 1203, but it was -- it mentions both -- it mentions both of

Page 5331

 1     the Clark-Naumann and the Geremek Agreement to be, sort of, incorporated

 2     into the resolution.

 3        Q.   I agree, that's probably right, but that is after the period

 4     relevant to the indictment.  During the break, please have a look and

 5     tell us after the break the date of the 1203 Resolution.  Thank you for

 6     this answer.

 7             Now, below this --

 8             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we look at para 4 on the next

 9     page.

10        Q.   Could you please look at item 4(a), the language there, and then

11     I'd like to ask you ...

12             Does it demand cessation of all action by the security forces

13     affecting the civilian population and orders the withdrawal of security

14     units only used for civilian repression, only those units that are in

15     contact with civilians?  Do you agree?

16        A.   I wouldn't use the word "only," but it says:

17             "... withdrawal of security units used for civilian repression."

18        Q.   Right.  But the other party to the conflict, the KLA, is not

19     mentioned anywhere, no measures are envisaged in application to them;

20     correct?

21        A.   This is one of the problems of the agreement.  This actually was,

22     if you like, one-sided.  But reference had been made, I remember in the

23     Geremek Agreement and possibly in 1199 also, somewhere else, that

24     actually asked both sides to abide by the cease-fire.

25        Q.   Thank you.  We will briefly go through to all these documents.

Page 5332

 1     But this first one, I did not have on Friday and that's why I started

 2     with it.  Also, it preceded the others.

 3             Witness, under items -- sub-items (b) and (c), we can read the

 4     provisions about verification, about the return of refugees, and the need

 5     to establish dialogue.  Now, in para 5, item (d), I would like your

 6     comment.  Is it right that sub-item (d) concerns measures against

 7     peaceful population?

 8        A.   Sorry, item (d) says:

 9             "Unimpeded access to humanitarian organisations and humanitarian

10     supplies."

11        Q.   The interpreters did not understand me.  Sub-item (b).

12        A.   What was the question, sorry?

13        Q.   Item (b) also concerns only the civilian population, not the KLA,

14     the other party to the armed conflict; am I right?

15        A.   Of course.

16        Q.   Thank you.

17             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I'd like to call now for the next

18     page, para 10.

19        Q.   Witness, it is the FRY that is primarily responsible for the

20     security of the mission; correct?

21        A.   Correct.

22        Q.   Whatever happens to any member of the mission, Yugoslavia would

23     be responsible and Yugoslavia has to take steps to ensure your security

24     because you, the verifiers, were unarmed; right?

25        A.   Right.

Page 5333

 1        Q.   And we'll come back to that again later.  At the initiative of

 2     the KVM sometime towards March, just before you left, an agreement was

 3     made that with your consent, in areas affected by conflict with

 4     terrorists, you would enter such areas once you signed away Yugoslavia's

 5     responsibility, you do it at your own risk; correct?  I think it was on

 6     the 15th of March.

 7        A.   You are right.

 8        Q.   Now, I'd like you to look at para 11.  Does this paragraph relate

 9     to the financing of the KLA and their gathering of funds to buy arms and

10     bring them into Kosovo and Metohija?

11        A.   I'm not a lawyer, but that's what I would assume it to mean, yes.

12        Q.   That's why you're a diplomat.  Tell me now, did Albania and

13     other countries comply with these provisions of the resolution?  During

14     your tenure in Kosovo and Metohija, what was the situation with the

15     supply of arms?

16        A.   Well, we were aware that arms were being smuggled across the

17     border from Albania into Kosovo, mainly because, you know, every time the

18     Serbian security forces captured the -- had a confrontation with the

19     smugglers, we were told, so we knew about it.

20        Q.   Thank you.  And there were several cases involving you once of

21     border incidents on the border with Albania when 35 men got killed during

22     an attempt to illegally enter with weapons.  Can you say your answer for

23     the record?

24        A.   Well, when you say that I was involved, I wasn't involved in the

25     operation of smuggling the weapons, but I was certainly aware that this

Page 5334

 1     had happened because we were informed.  And later I was also instrumental

 2     in dealing with the prisoners who were held in the prison in Nis, those

 3     who had survived the ambush.

 4             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, may I tender this

 5     document?

 6             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  And that will be assigned D00160, Your Honours.

 8             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Let us skip a few documents and

 9     go to P838.

10        Q.   Witness, do you remember where we left off on Friday?

11        A.   Please remind me.

12        Q.   Judge Parker asked me at a quarter to 2.00 whether I still have

13     questions for you in cross-examination because we were at the end of our

14     session.  I said, Yes; and he seemed surprised.  He said, I just asked.

15             Now, about this letter of the 23rd September addressed to

16     Mr. Milosevic by Mr. Walker.  I'll get to the point straightaway.  You

17     were a continuation of KDOM, and while you were getting settled and

18     starting to work, the agreements were being implemented, the three

19     agreements that we mentioned that you said were your Bible.

20        A.   Well, of course, I mean, to get the mission going there had to be

21     concurrent activity.  So, for example, the mission was being set up in

22     early October, ambassadors being appointed in October, I think the 17th

23     of October, Ambassador Walker was appointed well before the official date

24     the mission started.  Preparatory work and teams were going out to Kosovo

25     and Belgrade to work out where the mission would be best placed and how

Page 5335

 1     to operate it.  Documents were being written ahead of the mission

 2     starting its day-to-day work because you had to do this in order to start

 3     the mission.  So there was a lot of preparatory work which had to be done

 4     to get the mission going as quickly as possible.

 5        Q.   I'll do my best, but please answer this question:  My question

 6     was, Before the KVM was formed, the Kosovo diplomatic mission took a

 7     certain position on these three agreements and decided whether the FRY

 8     was applying them?

 9        A.   I can't answer that question.  I don't know.  I don't know of

10     that.

11        Q.   All right.  If you don't know.  You know why I'm asking?  Because

12     from the moment when the agreements were activated until you arrived,

13     more than a months elapsed; and there are certain document that I thought

14     you were familiar with because the KDOM were supposed to hand over, and,

15     I understood, handed over to you all the documentary evidence about the

16     application of these three agreements from the beginning.

17             Now, about this letter, you were not in Kosovo or in Yugoslavia

18     when it was written, and that's the reason I asked you this, because this

19     letter refers to certain questions that had already been settled with

20     KDOM.

21             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now call up P836.

22        Q.   This is the agreement dated 25th October, 1998, between

23     Mr. Byrnes and Djordjevic.  Please look at para 2.  Do you agree that

24     this paragraph envisages that in case of incidents or increased tension,

25     the police will have the right to perform patrol duties in armoured

Page 5336

 1     vehicles equipped with machine-guns up to 7.9 millimetres on the

 2     condition of notifying the KDOM?

 3        A.   That's what it says, yes.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  And now, regarding para 3, is it correct that the FRY

 5     complied with the provisions of para 3 and withdrew its forces from

 6     Dragobilje, Ostrozub, Opterusa, Dobrodeljane, Studencani, Samodraza,

 7     Pecane, and Klecka?

 8        A.   You said that they complied with paragraph 2 and 3, I don't

 9     remember but you can ask others like DZ later whether in fact the

10     paragraph says "... upon notifying KDOM/OSCE ..."  I'm not sure this

11     notification was ever given.

12             In answer to your second part of the question, I believe that

13     those stationary forces were removed from those areas you mentioned, yes.

14             THE INTERPRETER:  Would the witness kindly speak into the

15     microphone.

16             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Is it correct that all these areas that the forces of the FRY

18     abandoned were occupied by the KLA?

19        A.   It was normal for the -- [B/C/S/ on English channel].  Sorry,

20     yes, it was normal for the KLA to actually pull out -- to replace any VJ

21     or MUP positions upon the withdrawal of the Serbian security forces.

22        Q.   Do you consider that a violation of the agreement, regardless of

23     the fact that the KLA was not a signatory?

24        A.   Well, it's considering they weren't a signatory, then they

25     probably weren't violating anything, were they?  Morally, yes, they were

Page 5337

 1     in violation because there should have been a cease-fire, but legally

 2     they hadn't signed anything.

 3        Q.   I must say that this opinion of yours is very interesting.  The

 4     FRY, by complying with the agreement, enables the KLA to occupy

 5     territories it did not have, and that is called "complying."  But if the

 6     FRY tries to stop that from happening, despite a cease-fire, then it is

 7     in violation of the agreement; would that be right?

 8        A.   I don't think we ever said that -- that the VJ and the MUP would

 9     have no right to defend themselves or the population if the KLA were

10     actually posing any danger to the locals.  The fact that they were

11     occupying land that was being vacated by the Serbian forces, as long as

12     it was done peacefully, had no bearing on the situation.

13        Q.   Witness, both in your statements and in other evidence I found

14     that the KLA considered it a provocation when in Dragobilje or some other

15     village patrol of the army or the police were patrolling as usual and

16     they would then shoot at the vehicles --

17             THE INTERPRETER:  Correction.

18             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] -- the KVM considered it a

19     provocation when the army or the police were patrolling in villages and

20     then the KLA would shoot at them.

21        A.   It was more than a provocation, and these Serb security forces

22     had every reason and right to take retaliatory action.  But if they were

23     sitting in a position which they had occupied and not bothering anybody,

24     then that's a different situation.

25        Q.   Let's take the notorious event in Dulje.  The police forces were

Page 5338

 1     performing regular patrol duty, and they were bothering the KLA which

 2     launched an attack, but that was not what I wanted to say.  I enumerated

 3     certain areas from which the Yugoslav forces withdraw, and the KLA then

 4     took control of these areas.  They considered it a provocation when a

 5     patrol passed through, and they would attack them.  And to that you would

 6     say that the Yugoslav forces were in violation and the KLA were not

 7     responsible for anything because -- and they were not violating anything,

 8     because they were not a signatory?

 9        A.   I wouldn't support that premise.  What I was saying is that the

10     Serbian forces, I'll repeat, had every right to retaliate against any

11     attack upon them or upon the people the Serbian people in Kosovo; and I

12     would also add that the OSCE, the KVM, we spent a lot of time trying to

13     persuade the KLA not to occupy these positions and get off these

14     position.  And in fact we had some success in the area of Podujevo where

15     we did keep the KLA a certain distance away and got them to relinquish

16     some of the positions which they had taken overlooking the main road.  So

17     we tried pretty hard to keep the KLA out of these positions because we

18     knew what the response would be and what action it would provoke.

19             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please come closer to the

20     microphones.  Thank you very much.

21             THE WITNESS:  I apologise.

22             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Thank you.  Let's make a little digression now.  I understood

24     that the Kosovo Verification Mission based its work on reports and

25     observations that were put on paper through which you informed the head

Page 5339

 1     of your mission and other agencies, if necessary; correct?

 2        A.   Whenever possible, yes.

 3        Q.   Well, tell me, when wasn't it possible for you to write down in

 4     your reports whatever you observed?

 5        A.   Well, when I was in the field and I was staying out in the field,

 6     I wasn't able to come back and submit a report.  Or there was so much

 7     going on that it was virtually impossible to, sort of, write everything

 8     down, and quite often my reports would be just verbal reports by

 9     telephone, by satellite telephone, by verbal debrief back at the

10     headquarters.

11        Q.   Thank you.  And when you come back to the headquarters, didn't

12     you have time to put down on paper whatever you had telephoned before or

13     notified verbally and submitted to the fusion cell?

14        A.   Not always, no.

15        Q.   All right.  Let's accept that in cases of emergency and in

16     certain other situations when you simply couldn't do it, you did not

17     submit reports, but these were exceptions rather than the rule; correct?

18        A.   I think most of my work was done verbally in the field where I

19     was just used, as I said before, as a firefighter, someone who would go

20     out and try and resolve a problem in the field.  And I would report back

21     usually in verbal form because there were only so many hours in a day,

22     and we were already working 18 hours a day if not more sometimes, seven

23     days a week.

24        Q.   Thank you.  But if you are in the field and you are unable to

25     report, the person you informed, the headquarters in Pristina would pass

Page 5340

 1     it on in some material form, wouldn't they?

 2        A.   What used to happen, I would go back -- come back, if I was back

 3     in Pristina, I would go to the fusion cell, then I would debrief the

 4     people in the fusion cell as to what had happened, and what had been

 5     done, et cetera; and they would then incorporate it into their reports

 6     directly from my comments.

 7        Q.   I'm asking you this because you said in your statement something

 8     about the verification of police check-points, despite all the effort and

 9     all the documents that I had at my disposal, verification in the

10     February of 1999 is something I haven't been able to find anywhere.

11        A.   Well, that doesn't mean you don't have a copy of it.  I don't

12     keep copies.  But the report was written, I'm not sure whether I signed

13     it or one of my subordinates had signed it because I might have been

14     doing something else, but it was a long detailed report of exactly where

15     all the check-points had been found, the observation posts, who had

16     visited them, and it was a detailed report that was put in.  Might not be

17     under my name.

18        Q.   Thank you, I wasn't even looking for a report under your name.

19     This is the third time you are testifying.  Did you use or show that

20     report in the Milosevic trial or the Milutinovic trial?

21        A.   I referred to it in the Milosevic and the Sainovic trial, but I

22     don't have any documents with me.  So the only documents would be the

23     documents with the Court or with the various witnesses like DZ, for

24     example, or others.

25        Q.   Please, you understand very well what I asked you.  Please answer

Page 5341

 1     my question.  Did you see the document, that report you just mentioned,

 2     in the Milutinovic case or in the Milosevic trial?  I know it is not

 3     under -- I know your name is not on it, but it doesn't matter who

 4     authored it.

 5        A.   I have seen the document, yes.  Not in the court, but I've seen

 6     it in Kosovo, yes.

 7        Q.   I'm asking you about the courtroom.  Did you see it, perhaps, on

 8     Friday, last Friday in the courtroom?

 9        A.   There might have been reference to it, but I did not see the

10     actual report, no.  I don't believe I saw it.

11             THE INTERPRETER:  Could all unnecessary microphones please be

12     switched off.

13             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Witness, I have here a chronology of events from the operations

15     HQ where you worked where it says that on the 5th of January, 1999 -

16     that's para 58, Exhibit 65 ter 634, page 353 in English.

17             On the 5th of January, an inspection was carried out of all MUP

18     observation points, and in the comments it says "Mainly used by MUP ."

19     This is dated the 5th of January.

20             Is it possible that this is the report, the event you are

21     referring to?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   And you see that in the comments there is no mention of any

24     violation, do you agree?  Have you seen -- do you see this document now?

25             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I called up document 65 ter P634,

Page 5342

 1     if we can see that on the screen.

 2             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes, Ms. Gopalan.

 3             MS. GOPALAN:  Sorry, Your Honours, I was just going to ask for

 4     the document to be called up, since the screen was blank - but I see now

 5     that it has appeared - that it would aid all parties to have it

 6     available.

 7             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.

 8             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Page B-3, item 58.

 9             THE WITNESS:  I can see it.  It says:

10             "All 27 OPs inspected.  Most occupied by MUP."

11             Which implies that there was a violation because only 9 should

12     have been occupied.

13             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   But you do agree it was the 5th of January?

15        A.   Well, DZ was very meticulous with his paperwork, so this is one

16     of his pieces of work, so I wouldn't disagree.

17        Q.   Thank you.  I don't know if this is the correct translation, but

18     what I see, "Mainly used by MUP" in my version.  I don't know if this is

19     the correct translation.  Most.  Most.

20        A.   No, it doesn't -- it means that most of the -- of the OPs were

21     occupied by the MUP.  That means nearly all, "most" as in "nearly all."

22     That's the correct translation.

23        Q.   Very well, thank you.

24             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now call up 65 ter 659.

25             JUDGE PARKER:  You are not tendering that report?

Page 5343

 1                           [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

 2             JUDGE PARKER:  I'm told it's part of P844, already exhibited.

 3             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I think we'll have a

 4     problem with the admission of this -- of some of the evidence because

 5     some exhibits have been admitted more than once, but it's good that this

 6     one is already in evidence, because I was going to use it again and I

 7     thought I would tender it; but if it's already exhibited, that's even

 8     better.

 9             Now I'd like 659 from the 65 ter list.  That's the daily report

10     for the 4th and 5th of January, 1999.  I am sorry, I apologise to the

11     legal officer, it's D156.

12        Q.   Witness, could you please look at this report for the period up

13     to the 5th of January, and then read para 1, the first passage in para 1.

14        A.   Yes, it says:

15             "Not all OPs were manned."

16             Full details will be to follow.  "Not all" means "most."

17     "Possibly" could mean "most."

18        Q.   Thank you.  That is contrary to what you've just said, that there

19     were violations.  How come when not all were even manned, what kind of

20     violation is that?

21        A.   I think I've already said on numerous occasions that the

22     agreement, Byrnes agreement, said that one-third of the 27 should be

23     manned at the most, and there were, that means 9 should have been manned.

24     The other report, DZ 's annex, shows that most were maned.  This says

25     that not all OPs were manned, which means that there's no number on it,

Page 5344

 1     but it's not all.  But it's closer to all than not any.

 2             Also, there were other OPs that had been set up on top of the 27

 3     but there's a report to follow.  The report's not here.

 4        Q.   Nobody has seen that report.  You are just telling us about it,

 5     but we can't find a document about it.

 6        A.   And in addition, there are the -- you can see there on the second

 7     line of that first sentence, it says:

 8             "Full details of the verification are contained in the individual

 9     regional centre daily reports."

10             From which the -- we have to get those documents first to then

11     produce the main report.

12        Q.   Tell me then, where is that main report containing your

13     assertions?  That's what I'm saying.  What you are saying is not backed

14     by documents, and what is written here is contrary to what you said, not

15     even to mention the fact that this is a completely different period, a

16     month before.

17        A.   I think I've said it before, you know, if you read the English,

18     you can actually understand what it says.  It says that most were manned,

19     which means most of the 27 were manned.  This one says not all OPs were

20     manned, which confirms what the other statement made.  And where the

21     report is, I do not know.  I'm not a custodian of documents.

22        Q.   I would appreciate it very much if you would read out to us the

23     English version of the first paragraph in item 1.

24        A.   The "Verification (2/99) of all the 27 MUP OPs were conducted

25     today.  Not all OPs were manned."

Page 5345

 1        Q.   Thank you.  We can move on, and the Court will make its own

 2     judgement.

 3             While we are still discussing verification, in item 58 we see on

 4     the 4th of January an inspection was carried out of three approved

 5     positions of the combat team.  Do you agree this refers to the army?

 6        A.   Correct.

 7        Q.   And again, there is no observation about a violation of the

 8     agreement?

 9        A.   I don't believe there were any violations.

10        Q.   Thank you.  But tell me now, I don't understand one thing, if

11     your main activity was verification and if you establish that a certain

12     agreement or part of that agreement is not complied with, isn't that a

13     reason to make a protest and tell the Commission for Cooperation, Look

14     here, such an such provision of the agreement is being violated, please

15     do something about it?

16        A.   I'm sure that following the inspection of the MUP points,

17     observation check-points, this issue was raised at the

18     Cooperation Commission in Pristina.

19        Q.   Witness, if such a document existed, I would show it to you and

20     then ask my question.  It's not in the chronology, and it's nowhere in

21     the documents that the police or the army were responsible for any

22     violations; and there is no such document until the very end of your

23     tenure in Kosovo.  There's only one towards the end of December when DZ

24     tried to enter the barracks of the Pristina Corps and he wasn't allowed

25     in, and he wrote in his report that he wasn't allowed in.  There were no

Page 5346

 1     further assertions of any violations.  Would it be right that this is --

 2     this can be explained by the fact that you changed your method of work,

 3     you wrote down the numbers of lorries and tanks --

 4             JUDGE PARKER:  Ms. Gopalan.

 5             MS. GOPALAN:  Could Defence counsel please put a question for the

 6     witness.

 7             JUDGE PARKER:  He has done that.  Carry on, please.

 8             THE WITNESS:  I don't think it was because we changed our method

 9     of work at all.  I mean, I don't know where the documents are.  As I said

10     to you before, there were so many documents, a lot of them have been

11     archived, some people have them in their possession, a lot of documents

12     were destroyed on our, sort of, departure from Kosovo.  We spent three

13     days shredding paperwork in the OSCE building in Kosovo.  Just looking at

14     the question...

15             JUDGE PARKER:  Was it a change in your method of work?

16             THE WITNESS:  That caused the -- well, I mean, we were adapting

17     our method of work continuously, but that wouldn't have been the reason

18     that this wouldn't have been reported.

19             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Witness, there is evidence that all that was done in

21     Kosovo and Metohija by the KVM was transferred on disks to Macedonia

22     during withdrawal and what was not necessary was destroyed.  All this

23     documentation that I'm showing to you, I got from the Prosecution and

24     from the OSCE.  So these are not private documents.  But I'm telling you,

25     we have information from this chronology that on the

Page 5347

 1     20 something December, General DZ went to the barracks of the

 2     Pristina Corps and he wasn't allowed in.  And he also went once to

 3     Pristina to General Delic's office, he was allowed in and had a

 4     discussion.  Those are the only two instances of application of

 5     Mrs. Phelan's method that I could notice, nothing else.

 6        A.   The entry into the barracks General -- into Colonel Delic's

 7     barracks was not Mrs. Phelan's method, it was more the diplomatic way of

 8     entering the barracks, when we were invited in.

 9        Q.   You probably mean some later instance.  This is hardly one I'm

10     talking about, but never mind.  I have more questions.

11             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now call up P835.  It is

12     already an exhibit.

13        Q.   Witness, this is the Geremek-Jovanovic Agreement.  First of all,

14     I'd like to focus on item 3.  These are the general provisions, but under

15     Roman III there is something I'd like to look at.

16             Am I right in saying that the special mandate was for members to

17     maintain a cease-fire?

18        A.   I think the -- it wasn't our mandate to maintain a cease-fire.

19     It was our mandate to verify the cease-fire.  We had no way to enforce a

20     cease-fire.

21        Q.   I agree with you, but the translation I have says:

22             "The Verification Mission shall travel throughout Kosovo to check

23     whether all the participants are maintaining the cease-fire."

24        A.   Sorry, I haven't got it on my screen.  I only have the first

25     line.

Page 5348

 1             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] That should be also page --

 2     English page 3.

 3             JUDGE PARKER:  It's now on the screen.  The problem is, the

 4     paragraph has a line at the bottom of one page and then continues on the

 5     next.  You have the second page now.

 6             Do you have a point about this paragraph, Mr. Djurdjic?

 7             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Yes, I do.

 8        Q.   I want to say that the agreement envisages that you travelled

 9     throughout Kosovo, not that you should inspect the military installations

10     and barracks of the Army of Yugoslavia --

11             JUDGE PARKER:  Well, you are now going to ask the witness if that

12     is his understanding of the paragraph; is that correct?

13             Yes, Colonel.

14             THE WITNESS:  Right.  Well, it says that we have to verify the

15     maintenance of the cease-fire by all elements, and reports -- investigate

16     reports of cease-fire violations.  But it continues with other phrases

17     that, you know, we are to be able to look at -- if you take all the other

18     agreements into consideration, we are checking if the weapons of the

19     12.7 millimetres are around, if everybody is back in barracks, and so on.

20             When it says "freedom of movement and access" if it said "freedom

21     of movement" that means moving around Kosovo, which we had.  Access means

22     access.  It means the entrance into places that we wish to go into in

23     order to verify all aspects of the cease-fire.  And all aspects of the

24     cease-fire are compliance with all the agreements and you can only do

25     that by going into barracks.

Page 5349

 1             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]  Thank you.  I think I raised two

 2     problems, but since it's time for the break, I'd like -- I'll put these

 3     two questions after the break.  It's time, I believe, Your Honour.

 4             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.  We will continue after the normal break at

 5     4.15.

 6                           [The witness stands down]

 7                           --- Recess taken at 3.46 p.m.

 8                           --- On resuming at 4.18 p.m.

 9                           [The witness takes the stand]

10             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes, Mr. Djurdjic.

11             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

12        Q.   Witness, we were still with the Geremek-Jovanovic agreement, and

13     I said that two issues have opened up.  The first one is the issue of

14     interpretation --  interpreting the agreement.  Not only at your level.

15     I also realise that there were issues at other levels such as the level

16     of General Drewienkiewicz and Mr. Walker.

17             Did you ever try to raise that issue to the level of the

18     presiding officer of the OSCE and the Yugoslav president in order to deal

19     with the issue of the way the verification agreement should be

20     interpreted?

21        A.   That's why Ambassador Walker wrote the letter to Mr. Milosevic

22     spelling out exactly how the system would work, and it was mentioned

23     endlessly at meetings of access and verification at the meetings we had

24     between General DZ and General Loncar.

25        Q.   Could you please answer my question.  Mr. Walker drafted a letter

Page 5350

 1     in November.  You had problems in December with verification, that issue

 2     included DZ and Mr. Walker later on.  Did you try to raise the issue with

 3     some higher instances such as the Presidency of the OSCE and the

 4     Yugoslav Presidency in order to deal with the problem of agreement

 5     interpretation?

 6        A.   I am aware that General DZ wrote letters to the OSCE, raised the

 7     issue on many occasions as I don't know for fact, but I understand that

 8     Ambassador Walker did the same.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  The other issue is this:  We touched upon this

10     question, but we haven't completed it, KDOM as of the moment the

11     agreement was signed, conducted Verification Missions until the KVM was

12     formed.  In the the month and a half they were in charge of verifying

13     whether the FRY was meeting the conditions of the agreement, transfer

14     weapons, warehousing of equipment, whether the weapons were being brought

15     out into fields, and various other issues; am I correct?

16        A.   You are correct.

17        Q.   Thank you.

18             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Let us look at page 3 of the

19     agreement, that is to say, item 3.

20        Q.   Witness, am I right in saying that police forces had the right to

21     set up check-points in order to control traffic or to control and prevent

22     crime?

23        A.   Correct.

24        Q.   Did you know that the act of illegally possessing a fire-arm is a

25     criminal offence in Serbia?

Page 5351

 1        A.   I didn't, but I believe you.

 2        Q.   Smuggling of different types of goods which are of limited

 3     supply, drugs, all those are offences.  Why do you believe that setting

 4     up check-points in that regard without discrimination, that is to say

 5     that all persons passing through such check-points would be subjected to

 6     checks, would that be a violation of the agreement?

 7        A.   I believe that the agreement actually said we should be notified

 8     of any such activities.

 9        Q.   But the issue at hand are security in placements and we had

10     check-points and crime control points.  This is regular traffic control

11     and crime control, why would you need to be notified of that?

12        A.   It just says -- I mean, I'm just reading from the document:

13             "We will receive notification should circumstances lead to a

14     establishment of a roadblock other than for traffic or crime control."

15             It's very difficult to differentiate between what the purpose of

16     your roadblock is.  And that's the difficulty; this is where the

17     difficulty came in.  Is the roadblock purely to look for people smuggling

18     cigarettes, or is it something else?  Is it to make the life of the

19     people intolerable?

20        Q.   I fully agree that it is difficult, but according to the

21     agreement, such controls, such check-points were allowed, and you did not

22     need to be notified.  I believe the only criterion that was to be applied

23     was that there was -- they were placed indiscriminately irrespective of

24     people's ethnicity, and that the purpose of such check-points was to

25     exercise control without prejudice.

Page 5352

 1        A.   Sorry, that's a statement.  Do you want an answer from me?

 2        Q.   Yes, I do expect an answer.  I'm asking you whether you agree

 3     that as regards traffic checks and crime control, the

 4     Verification Mission did not need to be notified pursuant to para 3?

 5        A.   According to para 3 that's correct.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Let us move to para 4 concerning the borders.  There

 7     were also interpretation problems whether that needed to be notified or

 8     not.  First we need to see what your interpretation was of the border

 9     belt of 5 kilometres.  Was the Verification Mission allowed to enter the

10     5 kilometre border belt without prior notification?

11        A.   Yes.  I said yes because the Verification Mission had access and

12     freedom of movement.  This paragraph refers to visiting border controlled

13     units and accompanying them on the normal border control roles.  It

14     doesn't say anything about us actually going into the border belt, which

15     as you well know at one point became as wide as 15 kilometres and grew

16     wider by the day as the end of March came closer.

17        Q.   I would not agree with that, but I think it at times was as large

18     as 10 kilometres.  In any case, let us go back to para 4.  It says:

19             "... through areas of Kosovo away from the border."

20             That is the end of the first sentences.  This para concerns the

21     areas away from the border.

22        A.   It doesn't talk about access, it say that we will maintain

23     liaison about border control activities away from the border.  Nothing

24     about access.

25        Q.   Yes, but look at the next sentence, that such missions will be

Page 5353

 1     conducted when invited by the FRY authorities or upon its request.

 2     Therefore, there must have been a request.  There should have been for

 3     you to be able to do that.

 4        A.   Yes, a request was required from either side.  However, it does

 5     say:

 6             "... to visit border control units and to accompany them on their

 7     normal border patrols."

 8             But the border belt, as you say, was enormous and so you couldn't

 9     prevent us entering the border belt to see what was going on.  We went

10     always looking to accompany patrols.

11             I didn't write these rules, and I didn't -- I didn't, sort of,

12     screw up the meaning of these -- of what was actually meant.

13     Unfortunately, many agreements are writing very badly.

14        Q.   You just commented on the second part of the sentence, whereas

15     the initial part, the first part of the sentence it is stated that the

16     mission needed to be invited by the authorities or upon its request.

17     Therefore a request must precede a verification visit, do you agree?

18             JUDGE PARKER:  A visit to a border control unit is the answer

19     given in the beginning.  Mr. Djurdjic, I am getting increasingly

20     concerned at the time you are taking.  You've got points to make.  They

21     can be made far much quicker than they are.  You've got a point here to

22     make about paragraph 4, you've made it.  The witness has given his

23     comment which disagrees with your interpretation.  No further questions

24     are going to change that.  Move on to the next point, please, or we'll be

25     spending the whole day with this witness.  Thank you.

Page 5354

 1             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.  Very

 2     well.  I thought and believe that the witness was interpreting the

 3     provisions fairly.  In any case, I leave it up to you.

 4        Q.   Let us move on, witness.

 5             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I will no longer need this

 6     document.  Could we please have P837 next.

 7        Q.   Witness, this is the Clark-Naumann agreement of the

 8     25th October, 1998.  Do you agree with me that the gist of this agreement

 9     was basically the communique issued by the federal government in terms of

10     its obligations that it had undertaken?  Do you agree with that?

11             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Perhaps we should move on to the

12     communique itself.  That is page 3 in the English.  The Roman

13     numeral III, last sentence:

14             "However, state authorities as the last measure in keeping with

15     the principle of self-defence retain the right to respond appropriately

16     and adequately to any type of terrorist activity and breaking the law,

17     endangering the lives of citizens, and security of a state body's

18     employees."

19             JUDGE PARKER:  Ms. Gopalan.

20             MS. GOPALAN:  Your Honours, I'm not able to see the reference in

21     the agreement that Defence counsel is referring to on the screen.  I

22     think it will assist us to have that.

23             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I would kindly ask the court clerk

24     to show us the Roman numeral III.  It's the last sentence.  It's the last

25     page.  Yes.

Page 5355

 1             THE WITNESS:  Yes, I'm aware of this and the only thing that

 2     doesn't apply is the word "proportionately."

 3             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Where do you find the word "proportionately"?

 5        A.   It says:

 6             "... the State authorities retain the right to respond adequately

 7     and proportionately to any form of terrorist activity or violation of

 8     law, et cetera."

 9        Q.   Thank you.  My question is this:  Was this the basis that the FRY

10     forces could be employed when terrorist activities occur and when the KLA

11     jeopardized the lives and safety of civilians?

12        A.   Absolutely.

13        Q.   Thank you.  You mentioned proportionality.  Did you ever see a

14     single protest that was sent to the Yugoslav authorities because there

15     was a disproportionate use of force?  Did you ever see such a document

16     sent by Mr. Walker?

17        A.   I did not.  But I know it was -- we preached this concept of

18     proportionality at almost every meeting we had with the commission.

19        Q.   Thank you.  However, we said it was only Mr. Walker who could

20     decide, following consultations with you, what a violation was and that

21     it was he who could forward a protest on behalf of the KVM; am I correct?

22        A.   Correct.  Or a delegated member of his team could, yes, on his

23     behalf.

24        Q.   Thank you.

25             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I would kindly ask for

Page 5356

 1     document P -- I think this is a 65 ter document.  00677.  Although, I'm

 2     pretty sure it was admitted into evidence.

 3        Q.   You will recall this document, Witness.  Yes, this is it.  It

 4     says 1(a) "Prizren District."

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   Can you read out the part of the sentence or the sentence that

 7     begins with "EUAG."  Just that one single sentence out loud, please.

 8        A.   "EUAG observed several armed civilians.  An OSCE patrol reported

 9     a shooting in the village.  Two dead male bodies and a wounded woman were

10     found.  Details to follow."

11        Q.   Thank you.  That suffices.  First of all, can you tell us what

12     the acronym EUAG stands for, if you recall?

13        A.   Yes, I've looked at this a few times, and I just cannot at all,

14     unless it observes to -- refers to some sort of EU mission that was based

15     in Belgrade.  I have no idea.  An unknown acronym to me.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Did you know that KLA members also operated in

17     civilian clothes?

18        A.   I do, and they didn't really have a uniform as such, the KLA.

19        Q.   Thank you.  What conclusion do you arrive at based on this

20     formulation when it says the EUAG observed several armed civilians?

21        A.   It's impossible to tell from this whether it refers to Serb or

22     Albanians.

23        Q.   Thank you.  On Friday, when the Prosecutor asked you about this,

24     you said that this referred to some Serbs.  That is why I was asking you

25     this since there was no indication as to who it referred to, and we

Page 5357

 1     didn't see any evidence of that.  In any case, thank you.

 2             Could you tell me something about the acronym SITCEN, what does

 3     it stand for?

 4        A.   That's the situation centre.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Whose situation centre?

 6        A.   Where is the reference to this, sorry, so I can see what context

 7     it's mentioned in?

 8        Q.   It is in the context of the OSCE report.  It says to be delivered

 9     to the deputy head of mission and Mr. DZ, and then it says SITCEN.

10             JUDGE PARKER:  That is not on the screen.

11             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Very well.  We can have that

12     placed on the screen at this --

13             THE INTERPRETER:  Could Mr. Djurdjic please repeat the number of

14     the document.

15             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] It is document 65 ter 00650, last

16     page.

17             JUDGE PARKER:  For the record, the last document the witness

18     commented on was Exhibit P839.

19             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I apologise, the

20     previous document was P389.

21             JUDGE PARKER:  839.

22             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] 839, yes.  Could we please have

23     the last page.

24        Q.   This says distribution.  From the top, the second abbreviation is

25     SITCEN.

Page 5358

 1        A.   Right.  Sorry.  I would have initially guessed that the situation

 2     centre would have been the fusion centre, but there must be another

 3     organisation that slipped my mind completely.  The situation centre is an

 4     organisation, I presume, within the OSCE that monitored the current

 5     situation.  I thought it was the fusion cell, but.

 6        Q.   Was it perhaps the situation centre of the NATO staff or

 7     headquarters?

 8        A.   We didn't have NATO as one of our places that we distributed our

 9     documents to, so I thought it would have said NATO's SITCEN or saying

10     similar, but it doesn't say that.  I don't believe that we sent anything

11     to NATO like this.

12             Also, these -- this would be an internal distribution, otherwise

13     it would say external distribution as well.  So if it's just

14     distribution, it insinuates it's an internal distribution.  Only these

15     people within the organisation, the headquarters of the OSCE, would

16     receive it; liaison, current ops, fusion.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Witness, you are familiar with the statement of

18     Mr. Afrim Aziri from the previous cases.  Can you tell me what jobs, what

19     tasks this Mr. Afrim Aziri performed for the KVM while he was in Kosovo?

20        A.   Mr. Aziri was originally General DZ's driver, and then he became

21     my driver for tasks basically around Pristina.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Is it correct that you enabled him to receive KLA fax

23     messages via your friends who were in Macedonia?

24        A.   The only thing that Mr. Aziri helped us with was before we left,

25     he spent some time giving me the plan and the information of how the

Page 5359

 1     airfield -- military airfield in Pristina was organised.

 2        Q.   I want to ask you about the time after the 24th that you enabled

 3     him to receive fax messages from the KLA in Macedonia?

 4        A.   Are we talking now about the time after the mission had left

 5     Kosovo?

 6        Q.   Yes.

 7        A.   Well, having -- in the last -- in the Milutinovic et al. trial

 8     I've been show the letter that Mr. Aziri had written.  I've already

 9     commented on this.  And I had nothing to do with any fax messages or

10     anything he was doing for anyone while he was sitting in Macedonia.

11        Q.   Thank you.  And do you know whether he was in contact with

12     Mr. David Meyer?

13        A.   Well, Afrim was always trying to do something to help the KLA,

14     and I mean, we had -- we used to sit and have coffee together in one of

15     the hotels in Macedonia, Afrim and David Meyer, and myself, and a few

16     others; and Afrim kept -- often would talk about trying to do something

17     to help the KLA.  But we had no need of that type of help because we had

18     our own ways of finding out what was happening in Kosovo after we had

19     left.

20        Q.   Thank you.  And can you tell us about this own way you had of

21     receiving information about developments in Kosovo after the

22     24th of March?

23        A.   Yes, NATO had its own people in Kosovo throughout.

24        Q.   Do you mean inside the KLA?

25        A.   No, NATO had its own, as anyone would -- I mean, it's a normal

Page 5360

 1     thing you do when you are carrying out a campaign or a bombing campaign

 2     you're going to carry out later on, you'd have somebody on the ground, if

 3     you can, one of our own highly trained NATO soldiers, nothing to do with

 4     the OSCE, who would be actually providing targeting data for NATO,

 5     observing what is on the ground.  Isn't that what good armies do?

 6        Q.   They certainly do, but through forces on the ground, not through

 7     their own soldiers.  But do you know if there was a direct contact

 8     between the KLA headquarters and NATO forces in Macedonia and Albania?

 9        A.   I have no idea.  I mean, I was attached as a liaison officer by

10     the OSCE to NATO.  I wasn't part of the NATO staff.

11        Q.   I understand that, but I asked not about yourself, but in general

12     terms.  Do you know about that?

13        A.   I can't know about that.  I mean, I wasn't in a position to know

14     that.

15        Q.   Can you explain what was the substance of your function as KVM in

16     Macedonia after the war started, after the 24th of March, 1999?

17        A.   Well, I had several functions.  I was work along with the UNHCR

18     and making sure -- looking at the refugees and helping the refugees,

19     helping set up the camps.  I was also as -- in my liaison function

20     between NATO and --

21        Q.   I am sorry, I am sorry, I have to interrupt you.  I'm interested

22     exclusively in your connection with NATO.  I know from your statement

23     about what you did, but I'm interested in the connection between the KVM

24     and NATO and exactly what was the job of the liaison officer.

25        A.   Every day I attended a NATO briefing along with other NGOs where

Page 5361

 1     I was able to take notes of what was going on in general with a mission,

 2     the operation, and I was able to put questions as well if we had any

 3     questions about building refugee camps, helping refugees, and so on.  It

 4     was not a military activity.  It was a coordinating activity.  As at that

 5     time, NATO was spending a lot of its time building refugee camps.

 6        Q.   At the same time it was bombing Yugoslavia.  And you, as a member

 7     of the KVM, an international organisation, were communicating with the

 8     organisation that was at war with the FRY?

 9        A.   I was attending briefing meetings in the morning.  I don't know

10     what you mean I was communicating or collaborating with the -- with NATO.

11        Q.   Well, I asked you to explain to me the substance of that

12     connection.  But tell me, who was the liaison officer?  Who was liaising

13     within the KVM with the authorities of Yugoslavia at that time?

14        A.   I believe there was one contact between the OSCE mission in

15     Macedonia when I think I wrote a letter or, I spoke on the telephone to

16     General Loncar about something, I can't remember what it was, but I don't

17     think there was very much negotiation at our level.  If there was

18     negotiation going on, it would have been at the Vienna level, not at our

19     level.

20        Q.   Thank you.  I'm only talking about the KVM, the

21     Verification Mission, not the Vienna level or the higher levels of the

22     OSCE.  I'm talking about the same level on which you were communicating

23     on a daily basis with NATO.  Did anyone on behalf of the KVM in Macedonia

24     or Albania communicate on a daily basis with the authorities of the FRY?

25        A.   Not to my knowledge.  Not to my knowledge.

Page 5362

 1        Q.   Thank you.  According to the documentation that I have, in your

 2     work you also communicated with Mr. Kotur?

 3        A.   Correct.

 4        Q.   Do you remember recognising on the footage, the equipment and

 5     weapons belonging to the KLA?  Equipment bearing a visible emblem of the

 6     FBI, on caps?

 7        A.   Which footage?  There was a -- I have a vague memory of seeing

 8     somebody once with a -- someone in the KLA with an FBI hat, but I can't

 9     remember where it was.

10        Q.   That was in Pristina, if I may remind you, at the meeting with

11     Mr. Kotur.

12        A.   And what was the footage?  I'm sorry.

13        Q.   I suppose it was actually photographs that were shown to you.

14        A.   Fine.  There is a vague memory of this.

15        Q.   Thank you.  And do you remember the comment, that the message of

16     the photo was clear in view of that emblem?

17             MS. GOPALAN:  Your Honours.

18             JUDGE PARKER:  Ms. Gopalan.

19             MS. GOPALAN:  The witness has already said that he only has a

20     vague memory of these photographs, and he is now being asked further

21     questions about the photograph in question.  I wonder if it's possible

22     for Defence counsel to show the witness the photograph in order to aid

23     him in answering the question.

24             JUDGE PARKER:  Do you have the reference?

25             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I don't have the

Page 5363

 1     photograph.  I've just reminding the witness of a conversation about that

 2     photograph.  He said he had a vague memory, and I am asking him whether

 3     he remembered the conclusion of that conversation, if he remembers what

 4     he --

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  [Previous translation continues] ... the

 6     conversation, Mr. Djurdjic.

 7             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. Ciaglinski and Mr. Kotur.

 8     I've already said that, at the beginning.

 9             JUDGE PARKER:  Are you putting to the witness that he had a

10     conversation with Mr. Kotur in which it was suggested that the presence

11     of an FBI hat was sending a very clear message?  Is that what you are

12     putting?

13             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I only asked if he remembered

14     something like that being said as a conclusion when he was shown the

15     photograph.  He said he remembered vaguely the photograph, now I'm asking

16     if he remembers the conclusion.  I'm not trying to influence the witness.

17     I'm just asking if he recalls it or not, and then maybe later I'll

18     explain.

19             JUDGE PARKER:  You are obscuring completely, as far as I'm

20     concerned at the moment what you are at, but perhaps, Colonel, you can

21     help us.  Do you remember any comment about a hat in that conversation?

22             THE WITNESS:  I can't.  I could probably try and sort of put a

23     meaning on to it now, but I'm not sure if that's the meaning that would

24     have applied at the time, Your Honour.

25             JUDGE PARKER:  Your own interpretation or imagination is not

Page 5364

 1     something we are searching for today.

 2             There you are, Mr. Djurdjic.  Now, do you want to move on from

 3     there?

 4             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] No problem.  I just tried to jog

 5     the witness's memory.

 6        Q.   Is it true that you brought back some, or rather, sent back some

 7     verifiers because they were reporting in a biased way?

 8        A.   I personally didn't, but I believe that a number of verifiers

 9     were sent home for being biased, yes.

10        Q.   Now, when I'm asking you these questions about the mission, I

11     know that you did not personally work in administration, but I'm asking

12     you about some personal knowledge that you may perhaps have.  I don't

13     mean to imply that it was part of your own duties.

14        A.   Yes, I understand.

15        Q.   Witness, would you be so kind as to tell us something about your

16     visit to Decani on the 15th of January and what happened there, who were

17     you with and what happened?

18        A.   It's quite a long story, but I'll try to make it shorter.  The

19     actual plan was that on the -- on that date, the VJ -- sorry, the MUP

20     were going to exchange personnel at a forward observation post between

21     Decani and Jablanica and this was well inside what the KLA considered to

22     be their territory.  And to ensure the safety of the personnel of the

23     MUP, they were going to be supported quite heavily with VJ and other

24     assets.  And this looked as if it was going to become quite ugly, and it

25     could have turned up -- turned into another confrontation, armed

Page 5365

 1     confrontation.

 2             And so I spent the entire day negotiating with the MUP and with

 3     the KLA, with Ramush Haradinaj, personally, to ensure that this thing

 4     went smoothly and try to explain to everyone that it wasn't a

 5     reinforcement but it was a exchange of personnel and the status quo would

 6     remain the same.  All went well until we actually tried to do the

 7     procedure.  After driving down this track for a few of kilometres, two of

 8     my vehicles were leading, I was in the second vehicle, and we were

 9     followed by a truck with a MUP personnel in it, and behind me I had

10     another vehicle belonging to the KVM.  And unfortunately we came under

11     fire.

12             We were attacked and two of my personnel were wounded.  And it

13     transpired that the firers were not Serb, but they were actually KLA

14     fighters who had a personal grudge against the OSCE.  I think originally,

15     it was incorrectly reported as an attack by Serbian forces, but that was

16     later corrected.

17             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May I now call up Exhibit

18     65 ter 00637.  Second page, please.

19        Q.   Witness, is this a press release by the KLA regarding this

20     incident of the 15th of January, you just discussed?

21        A.   Yes.

22        Q.   Thank you.

23             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this

24     document.

25             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

Page 5366

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be assigned D00161, Your Honours.

 2             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  May I now call up

 3     65 ter 00638.

 4        Q.   Witness, this is another press release regarding the events of

 5     the 8th of January at Dulje.  Can you tell me what you know about this

 6     incident?

 7        A.   I think basically what it says on the press release.

 8        Q.   Do you know that?  Were you informed?

 9        A.   I wasn't there, so it was just what I read and what I had heard

10     about it.

11        Q.   Does this press release reflect what you heard at the time?

12        A.   I believe so, and we, I mean, Colonel Mijatovic -- whenever there

13     was such an attack took place would come to the meetings in the morning

14     at 10.00 and brief me about these incidents, yes.

15             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I would like to tender

16     this as well.

17             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be assigned D00162, Your Honours.

19             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May I now call for 65 ter 00643.

20        Q.   Do you know and were you involved in an incident of

21     hostage-taking by the KLA on the 8th of January in Stari Trg?

22        A.   I'm pretty sure I heard about it, but I don't think I was

23     involved in it.

24        Q.   Thank you.

25             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] It's page 3 in this document.

Page 5367

 1        Q.   It says:  10.05 "Lieutenant-Colonel Ciaglinski called up DZ to

 2     inform that verifiers were on the ground only 5 minutes away from VJ

 3     positions."

 4        A.   Sorry, I need to read, I mean, I haven't seen this document for

 5     some time, if ever.  You threw this thing at me, I can't remember

 6     immediately if I was there, involved, knew about it, read about it.  Is

 7     this the incident where the VJ soldiers were captured?  Is this the one?

 8     Right.  Okay.

 9        Q.   It has to do with the eight soldiers.

10        A.   Right.  I remember now, yes, sorry, I was involved, quite

11     closely, intimately.

12        Q.   And I see that you informed General DZ at least twice because you

13     were on the ground?

14        A.   Probably.

15             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I suggest that this document be

16     also admitted into evidence.

17             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be assigned D00163, Your Honours.

19             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   I'd like to refresh your memory now about these inspections of

21     border areas.  Do you remember that, among other things, you spoke to

22     Mr. Tomislav Mladenovic on the Yugoslav side?

23        A.   I can't remember, but it's possible.

24        Q.   According to my information, he was deputy head of the

25     coordination team of the federal government in Pristina.  Did you have a

Page 5368

 1     meeting with him on the 18th of January regarding border inspections and

 2     that this gentleman, or perhaps someone else you don't remember by name,

 3     warned you that verifiers were still coming to the border area without

 4     prior notification, and he said that every such visit needed to be

 5     notified in advance?

 6        A.   We had several such meetings, so it's -- what you are saying

 7     almost certainly happened, but exactly with whom and what date, I can't

 8     remember.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  According to the information I have, you replied that

10     you had your instructions about the procedure for border inspections and

11     that you had agreed a joint inspection with Colonel Kotur, which

12     inspection had been postponed because of the kidnapping of VJ soldiers,

13     and you were engaged personally in attempts to free them.

14        A.   I remember that, yes.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Do you recall that on that occasion you said you were

16     visiting KLA prisoners in jail in Nis, and that you were satisfied with

17     the way they were treated?

18        A.   In general, yes.

19        Q.   Thank you.

20             MS. GOPALAN:  Your Honours.

21             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes, Ms. Gopalan.

22             MS. GOPALAN:  The witness is being referred to previous

23     information, occasions that he spoke or information that the Defence

24     counsel has.  I wonder if it will assist if the source of such

25     information is provided, whether it's a document or statement of prior

Page 5369

 1     testimony.

 2             JUDGE PARKER:  Clearly, Ms. Gopalan is at a disadvantage trying

 3     to pick up if there is a reference to these incidents, Mr. Djurdjic.  You

 4     are simply asking the witness whether he recalls something.  If you have

 5     a particular documentary reference, it would help if you could give that.

 6     Thank you.

 7             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I have my notes of

 8     the conversation, that's why I'm not showing them.  I'm asking the

 9     witness if he remembers the conversation.  The notes originate from third

10     persons, and I'm just asking the witness to confirm whether something is

11     correct or not.  What I have are notes, not witness statements, so I

12     can't use them with the witness.

13             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you, that clarifies the matter.

14             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

15        Q.   We discussed something on Friday, and I told you I found a

16     reference in your documents to the fact that you prepared several times

17     for evacuation from the FRY.  And in something written by Mr. Wilson, I

18     read the recommendation to all verifiers that they should have a suitcase

19     packed at every -- at all times.

20             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May I call up now D003-0860.

21        Q.   I don't know if you know this document.  It's dated

22     22nd January, 1999, and it concerns plans for evacuation of Kosovo

23     verifiers from Kosovo.  Are you familiar with this document?

24        A.   Yes.  Mm-hmm.  I've seen it before.

25        Q.   Thank God at that time there was no need for an evacuation;

Page 5370

 1     right?  On the 22nd of January.  You remained in the territory of

 2     Kosova and Metohija.  Generally speaking, were you happy with your

 3     withdrawal when you made decisions on it on the 17th and the 20th?  And I

 4     have in mind the way you were treated by FRY forces during your

 5     withdrawal.

 6        A.   It's relevant of, you know, what the situation at the time is.

 7     Every international organisation has to have a withdrawal plan from any

 8     theatre.  Recently in Georgia, nobody was threatening us, but we had a

 9     plan to withdraw and how we would withdraw from Georgia as a mission if

10     we had to.  The situation was degenerating things were becoming more

11     difficult, and we believed that it was imperative to have an evacuation

12     plan that everybody was happy with and prepared for, so -- because if

13     the -- once the evacuation was announced, should it be necessary, then it

14     had to happen very quickly, within hours, not within days or weeks.  And

15     we're not dealing with, I told you before, purely military personnel on

16     this mission, there are a lot of the personnel were civilians who had

17     very little experience with missions.

18             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I seek to tender this

19     document, Your Honour.

20             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes, it will be received.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be assigned D00164, Your Honours.

22             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Witness, while you were in Kosovo until the 24th, do you know of

24     any situations in which certain villages were vacant of their Albanian

25     population because that population had joined the KLA?

Page 5371

 1        A.   No, I did not personally, no.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Given that you are very familiar with

 3     Kosova and Metohija during the relevant time, could you tell me this:

 4     Where was the focus of all activity in Kosovo, and I don't mean the

 5     Verification Mission, but the forces of the FRY and KLA?

 6        A.   Well, there were certain pockets, as you well know, of activity,

 7     there was a pocket in Podujevo; and to the west of it, there would have

 8     been pockets in Stimlje, there would have been Orahovac, I mean, all over

 9     the place there were pockets, Jablanica where Haradinaj had his

10     headquarters.  That was a little area to the -- not exactly Jablanica

11     because that's where he was, but on the peripheries of that area.  So

12     yes, there were many areas where the KLA had activity and the VJ and MUP

13     had an interest.

14        Q.   Would you agree with me that for the most part activities took

15     place in the villages?

16        A.   That's where most of the damage and fighting took place, yes.

17        Q.   Can you describe for me the yard of a typical countryside

18     Albanian home?

19        A.   Well, it depends if you are talking about one of the larger homes

20     with a wall around it and a number of dwellings inside.  But normally

21     there were animals, there were haystack, wood piled up, hay piled up.

22     Animals, pigs, chickens -- no pigs, chickens.  What else would you like?

23        Q.   I'm not interested in that.  I'm interested in the walls.  What

24     were the walls made of and of what height were they?

25        A.   Well, they varied a lot but, I mean, some of the bigger

Page 5372

 1     properties had quite tall walls, over 2 metres, and quite solid.  I never

 2     personally examined the wall to see if it was made of rocks or mud, but I

 3     was aware that the walls were there.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  During your preparations to go to Kosovo, were you

 5     told anything about the percentages of Albanian population in the

 6     country-side?

 7        A.   I'm not sure what you mean by country-side, but we were told

 8     where major population areas were, and these were mainly rural people,

 9     agricultural people living off the land, so we knew that they were all

10     over the place.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Witness, do you recall that in February 1999 - and

12     whether you were familiar with it - that there was an incident between

13     Lipovica and Magore which is 20 kilometres from Pristina, a police column

14     was ambushed by the KLA during which 15 policemen were injured?

15        A.   Again, vague recollections.  I can't remember exactly.  But the

16     name Magore is somehow indelibly marked on my brain, so please reminds

17     me.

18        Q.   Yes.  There was a meeting with Colonel Kotur.  He told you about

19     it, and then you checked that over the phone and eventually confirmed his

20     allegations.  The verifiers confirmed that on the spot.  Do you remember

21     that?

22        A.   Vaguely, yeah.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember notifying Mr. Kotur about the visit

24     of Mr. Vollebaek, presiding officer of the OSCE?  During that visit you

25     also acquainted Mr. Vollebaek with the Serb position resulting in

Page 5373

 1     Mr. Kotur being satisfied with the information you shared with

 2     Mr. Vollebaek?

 3        A.   Again, I can't remember exactly what was said or done.  Again, I

 4     remember that there was the -- Vollebaek came occasionally, and I might

 5     have said something about this.  I just can't remember that, I'm sorry.

 6        Q.   Very well.  Do you remember your position that it was possible

 7     that the KLA by provoking wanting to create conditions by a NATO

 8     intervention?

 9        A.   This was something I occasionally heard people discussing, that

10     it would be in their interest to create a situation which would force

11     someone else to intervene in the Kosovo crisis.

12        Q.   Am I right in saying that on that occasion you stated that

13     Great Britain was not a KLA mentor?

14        A.   I always said that, A, we had nothing to do with the KLA and

15     didn't in any way sponsor it or their terrorism, but I also, I believe,

16     mentioned that - and I said this on several occasions - that our

17     defence minister at the time I think it was Lord Robertson said that the

18     UK had no intention of sponsoring or supporting any NATO attack on

19     Kosovo.  So I said if you are considering doing this to entice NATO to

20     come, you are barking up the wrong tree because we have no intention ever

21     of -- well, not me personally, but our UK government has no intention of

22     supporting a NATO action here.

23        Q.   Thank you.

24             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we please have D003-0867 next.

25     This was not translated.  In any case, I wanted to read out a part of it.

Page 5374

 1        Q.   This is an Official Note of a meeting held in Pristina on the

 2     9th of February, 1999.  In attendance was Richard Heaslip I think, if I'm

 3     pronouncing that right, and Major-General Sretan Lukic.

 4             Concerning what we have just discussed here, I wanted to say that

 5     on that occasion, General Lukic informed Mr. Heaslip that the police had

 6     information on the number of policemen at Kosovo that was forwarded to

 7     the American KDOM.  Once the agreement was signed, they had a role in the

 8     OSCE, and they were also involved in the police withdrawal.  They were

 9     also forwarded a patrol map of the police and the different check-points

10     envisaged by the annex of the agreement, were you familiar with these

11     facts?

12        A.   I wasn't aware of that meeting.  I mean, that was a meeting I

13     probably wasn't at.

14        Q.   Sir, there were many meetings, but I'm short on time and I cannot

15     go through all of them.  In any case, such meetings were held between

16     representatives of the Kosovar Verification Mission and the police, and

17     you were not in attendance.  There must be 20 or 30 of them, however, I

18     don't believe they are that important.  Am I right in saying that other

19     people from KVM had meetings with police representatives in Pristina and

20     that you only attended those meetings which involved Mr. Loncar and the

21     army?

22        A.   No, I attended the meetings of the Cooperation Commission daily

23     in Pristina, but I told you before in my evidence that there were

24     meetings between the police, it was Guy Sands, I believe, originally he

25     used to go and have meetings with the MUP; and later on February, March,

Page 5375

 1     I believe General Heaslip was talking to the MUP, yes.  But the official

 2     organ of exchange of information was the Commission.

 3        Q.   Thank you.

 4             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] My infallible associate just told

 5     me that I had wrong information and that indeed we do have a translation

 6     of this document.  Therefore, I seek to tender it.

 7             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be assigned D00165, Your Honours.

 9             JUDGE PARKER:  Do I take it you have more questions,

10     Mr. Djurdjic?

11             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Yes, I have some documents left.

12     I'm going through the documents.  I wanted to show them to the witness

13     and then ...

14                           [Trial Chamber confers]

15             JUDGE PARKER:  Very well.  We must adjourn now for the second

16     break, Mr. Djurdjic.  You may continue after the break, but I hope you

17     use the break to concentrate down to the matters that are important.

18     There must be time for re-examination of this witness so that he finishes

19     today.  Thank you.

20             We resume at 5 minutes past 6.00.

21                           [The witness stands down]

22                           --- Recess taken at 5.37 p.m.

23                           --- On resuming at 6.07 p.m.

24             MS. GOPALAN:  Your Honours.

25             JUDGE PARKER:  Ms. Gopalan.

Page 5376

 1             MS. GOPALAN:  While the witness is being brought in, I have a

 2     procedural matter to raise.

 3             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

 4             MS. GOPALAN:  I should have raised this before the break, and I

 5     wasn't sufficiently speedy.  My apologies for that.  This is to do with

 6     the admission into evidence of D00165.  And although it's been admitted,

 7     we would like to object to its admission simply because we believe that a

 8     sufficient basis hasn't been established for the document to be admitted

 9     into evidence.

10             A part of it was read out.  We subsequently were told that an

11     English translation was available, but in terms of the witness's comments

12     on the document, he said he wasn't aware of the meeting in question and

13     that it wasn't a meeting that he probably attended.  That would be his

14     extent of information on that document which is not very much, and that

15     would be the basis of our objection.

16             JUDGE PARKER:  We'll consider this as some later time.  We want

17     to be sure to finish the witness.

18             MS. GOPALAN:  Thank you, Your Honours.

19                           [The witness takes the stand]

20             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes, Mr. Djurdjic.

21             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

22             May I now call for Exhibit P841.

23        Q.   Witness, you recognise this photograph, you said it was your

24     photograph.  I'd like to ask you, What prevented you from filming such

25     documents that we don't see on this photograph?

Page 5377

 1        A.   It was just -- it was a large presence of Serbian security

 2     forces, and I didn't really want to, sort of, annoy or upset people.  I

 3     mean, to give you an example, I already had an experience around this

 4     time where I was threatened by some VJ soldiers with being shot just for

 5     being in the wrong place elsewhere.

 6        Q.   Did you expose yourself to danger when making this photograph?

 7        A.   No, I didn't think so.

 8        Q.   What is your assessment of that documentation that was burnt?

 9     What kind of documents were they?

10        A.   They were all sorts.  I took out several handfuls, and it was

11     application forms, documents, passports, ID cards.

12        Q.   Now, I'd like to ask you, How come you were not afraid to take

13     those IDs and you were afraid to make photos?

14        A.   Because I went behind the vehicle where I couldn't be seen where

15     I was taking those documents out of the pile of rubbish that was still

16     there, that was smouldering.  You couldn't see me.  You notice if I step

17     behind the vehicle, someone from the side here cannot see me.  So I

18     opened the back of the car, you know, to make it look as if I was doing

19     something else, got a few handfuls of paper, and took them with me, put

20     them in the car.

21        Q.   Why didn't you photograph them then?

22        A.   I don't know.  Because it was easier for me to just pick up some

23     handfuls of stuff and put -- at the time I thought it was a good idea to

24     just take some of the documents and put them in the car.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Would you agree that that building was supposed to be

Page 5378

 1     turned over to the successor of the KVM or KFOR, whoever?

 2        A.   Well, I understand that certainly not the KVM - because the KVM

 3     went back into the original building, I believe, where the OSCE was

 4     before, which is up the road from this location - but I believe that some

 5     agreement had been made for NATO to use part of this building.

 6        Q.   Is it normal for archives that are no longer necessary to be

 7     destroyed?

 8        A.   I can't answer that question.  I don't know.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  When the KVM was evacuating from Pristina, did you

10     destroy archived material that you didn't want to carry with you?

11        A.   We destroyed everything that, regardless of what it was, all

12     paperwork was shredded except what we could take out with us on disks or

13     hard drives.  But for a different reason, it wasn't because it wasn't

14     needed, it was impossible to carry it all.

15        Q.   Have you ever seen a single document of those that you took away

16     during any of the proceedings where you appeared as a witness?

17        A.   Do you mean did I look at the documents that I took away?  Yes, I

18     did.  And I discussed it with the interpreter who looked at the documents

19     to tell me what they were.

20        Q.   No, I'm asking you, Were you shown any of those documents that

21     you took away in the Milosevic trial or the Milutinovic trial, or in

22     these past two days in this courtroom?

23        A.   No.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Let's stay on that period.  You said you arrived

25     after the 13th of June.  Do you know how many Serbs left Kosovo after the

Page 5379

 1     NATO arrived in June 1999?

 2        A.   Thousands, I presume.  I don't know exactly, but DZ and I spent a

 3     lot of our time going around Kosovo trying to persuade the Serbian

 4     population to remain.

 5        Q.   Were there any professional officers, professional policemen, who

 6     lived in Kosovo and worked there?

 7        A.   There were.  Of course there were professional policemen and

 8     soldiers who lived in Kosovo, yes.

 9        Q.   Did they have to withdraw from Kosovo when the NATO forces

10     arrived under the agreement?

11        A.   I honestly don't know, but I know that people like Colonel Kotur,

12     who was a professional officer, was trying to get me to help him to

13     retain his apartment in Kosovo.  So I don't know if everybody in the VJ

14     had to leave, including people who actually were living there normally.

15     I don't know.

16        Q.   I can't believe you don't know something like that.  But let me

17     tell you, under the agreement, all the troops and the police of the FRY

18     had to leave Kosovo with a proviso that one day when the conditions are

19     ripe, a thousand of them come back to the border.

20             You said that troops and policemen were carrying looted property

21     on their way out of Kosovo, how do you know that they were carrying

22     looted property?  How do you know that they were not carrying their own

23     property as they would have had to leave Kosovo?

24        A.   Well, because I would have found it unlikely that virtually every

25     vehicle that was leaving was covered in some sort of personal property.

Page 5380

 1     If what you are say is true, then a few of them would have been carrying

 2     personal possessions such as wardrobes, refrigerators, and so on.  But

 3     not every vehicle.  I mean, there were so many vehicles going out with

 4     this type of equipment strapped to the top of it.

 5        Q.   Well, they had to move their entire moveable property from Kosovo

 6     to Serbia, refrigerators, TV sets, furniture, depending on the type of

 7     vehicle they had.  By the way, if you were on the border with Macedonia,

 8     didn't you see Albanians come in with truckfuls and tractorfuls of

 9     possessions when you were there in April 1999?

10        A.   I would say that people who were leaving Kosovo at that time

11     going to Macedonia, most of them came with nothing except a suitcase.

12        Q.   Very well.  Thank you.  I'd now like to come back to one incident

13     you told us about when verifiers were mistreated at the border in

14     contravention to the Vienna Agreement and the other covenants that were

15     signed.

16             Do you know that the FRY lodged in a protest to the mission

17     because of the conduct of personnel at the border with Macedonia on the

18     25th and 26th of February, 1999?

19        A.   Well, there were accusations flying in both directions.

20        Q.   Yes.  But would you agree with me that first in two out of three

21     vehicles of the KVM there were no verifiers, only drivers who were

22     Yugoslav nationals?

23        A.   Well, we used local drivers, whether they were Albanians or

24     Serbs.  It was normal for the mission to use those sort of drivers.  And

25     it's normal in every embassy in the world that it's locals who are

Page 5381

 1     employed as drivers, but the vehicles still have diplomatic immunity.

 2        Q.   Witness, you know very well what I said.  Yugoslav nationals,

 3     regardless of ethnicity.  But in those vehicles there were no members of

 4     the mission, whereas under the agreement at least one member of the KVM

 5     had to be in a KVM vehicle, the vehicle was not supposed to cross the

 6     border with just the driver in it.

 7        A.   I wasn't aware of such a regulation.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know that on the containers carried by those

 9     vehicles, there were no diplomatic markings.  There was no proper

10     inventory as envisaged by the Vienna Convention?

11        A.   If it's a cargo vehicle, then I can understand you talking about

12     inventories, but ordinary diplomatic vehicles normally with diplomatic

13     personnel in them don't require this type of inventory.

14        Q.   And do you know that among other things those vehicles carried

15     optical sights, a case for a pistol, chemical and other substances, and

16     other equipment that were subject to declaration?

17        A.   I am aware of the pistol case being sent because there was always

18     a discussion whether the body-guards for the ambassador or for senior

19     members of the mission should be armed.  And that was never allowed.  And

20     although this pistol case might have come, it's a leather pouch, but

21     there was no pistol, and no one had arms.  Chemicals, what chemicals?

22     Are we talking about Sarin?  I doubt.  Maybe bleach or chemicals for

23     photography or photocopiers, optical sights or binoculars?  I don't know

24     what you mean by this.

25        Q.   Regardless, medical and chemical substances must be declared at

Page 5382

 1     the border.  In this specific case, the persons who were at the border

 2     did not do that.

 3        A.   Well, I'm pretty sure that if the vehicle is coming in with

 4     diplomatic personnel, and in the case of this - I know for a fact - in

 5     the case of this leather holster for the weapon, the diplomats, the KVM

 6     members, were actually in their vehicles.  I don't believe it has to

 7     provide any inventory at all of what is in that vehicle.  The vehicle is

 8     not subject to search.

 9        Q.   Witness, in the introductory part, I told you that two members of

10     the Kosovo Verification Mission were in one vehicle, whereas the other

11     two vehicles held no members of the mission, just Yugoslav drivers; and

12     under the Vienna Convention, the goods in the vehicles needed to be

13     declared, that's why a protest was lodged to the federal commission for

14     the -- for cooperation of the FRY.

15             Never mind.  Do you know that on the 25th of February a KLA

16     action to the south-west of Kacanik was noted and DZ put in his comment:

17             "The first appearance of the KLA in this area."

18        A.   I remember, yes, something about this, yes.

19             JUDGE PARKER:  Ms. Gopalan.

20             MS. GOPALAN:  Your Honours, perhaps the source of this comment

21     could be provided.

22             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Djurdjic?

23             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I just said chronology, item 112,

24     25th February, 1999.

25        Q.   Witness, I'm interested in something else.  This was just a

Page 5383

 1     reference.  Can you explain why the KLA appeared in this area on the 25th

 2     of February, which was followed by a series of other incidents?  I'm

 3     asking you as an intelligence officer.

 4        A.   Speculation again.  There was a void, they were filling a void,

 5     an empty space that provided an opportunity.  Kacanik is a strategically

 6     important area, obviously, so maybe that's the reason they might have

 7     been there.

 8        Q.   Do you know that the Kacanik canyon, the Kacanik gorge, is the

 9     only passage to the FRY and when NATO reaches Urosevac they need not stop

10     before Belgrade anymore?

11        A.   You are assuming of course, that NATO was going to come through

12     Kacanik, and it wasn't going to go straight from Kumanovo and straight up

13     from that way.  Much easier and less troublesome than going through a

14     narrow gorge, if they are heading for Belgrade.

15        Q.   I don't know if I was interpreted correctly.  I meant when they

16     were going from Macedonia when they passed the Kacanik gorge and reach

17     Urosevac there are no more obstacles towards Belgrade and that would be

18     the strategic path for NATO if an aggression occurs.

19        A.   It's certainly one way of NATO entering, but it was the most

20     dangerous and the one that would have caused the greatest number of

21     casualties, and I believe NATO had other options as well.

22        Q.   Thank you.  And do you know anything about Operation Arrow and

23     the cooperation between the KLA and NATO?

24        A.   No.

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 5384

 1             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May I now call for 6D -- sorry.

 2     Never mind.

 3        Q.   Do you remember, Mr. Ciaglinski, the meeting of the 5th of March

 4     with Colonel Ademovic at the MUP headquarters in Pristina?

 5        A.   I think so, vaguely again, but I need reminding.

 6        Q.   That was on the 5th of March.  It had to do with the protest

 7     launched to the Verification Mission claiming that it obstructed passage

 8     on the road Pristina-Pec.

 9        A.   I'm still no wiser at the moment.

10        Q.   Very well.  Thank you.  And do you recall that on the

11     10th of March you spoke to Colonel Kotur and that you told him that in

12     Kacanik and Ivaje some houses were damaged but that was far from what the

13     KLA was claiming and what certain media reported?  And you said there

14     were witnesses on the ground who would deny such claims of the KLA in

15     their reports.

16        A.   I remember it well.

17             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] My last question and my last

18     document:  65 ter 00641.  It's an evaluation of the KLA positions as of

19     15th March, 1999, by Mr. Wilson.

20        Q.   But that's not what I want to ask you.  I'm interested in item

21     4(a).  4(a), do you see this passage:

22             "In the course of preparations for the operation, brigade

23     commander of the KLA for this area did not allow the UNHCR to evacuate

24     displaced persons.  This was interpreted as a cynical attempt to use

25     Albanian civilians as human shields."

Page 5385

 1             Do you remember this?

 2        A.   No.

 3             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]  All right.  This is already an

 4     exhibit.  I would in fact have a lot more to discuss with you, Colonel,

 5     but thank you for your answers.  I must leave some time for the

 6     Prosecution as well.  Thank you, Your Honours, for your patience.  I have

 7     completed my cross-examination.

 8             May I just tender 65 ter 650.

 9             JUDGE PARKER:  Which is that one?  What is that?

10             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] That's the document dated

11     26 February -- [in English] 26 February 1999 to 14 March 1999.

12     Organisation for Security and Cooperation.  [Interpretation] That's lines

13     -- sorry, pages of the transcript 40 and 41.

14             JUDGE PARKER:  The reference you have seems to be a document

15     dated the 23rd of December, 1998.  Is that the one that you meant?

16             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Yes.  My infallible assistant is

17     correcting me again.  I was wrong.  In any case, I don't want to take up

18     any time.  Let's leave this to Ms. Gopalan, and I will seek to tender

19     this particular document through another witness.

20             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.

21             You re-examine, Ms. Gopalan.

22                           Re-examination by Ms. Gopalan:

23        Q.   Good afternoon, sir.  I have a few questions for you arising from

24     Defence counsel's cross-examination.  I'd first like to begin with

25     document P839.  In the interest of time, I don't think it's necessary to

Page 5386

 1     call up the document, but just to remind you, you were referred to a

 2     section in this document that spoke about armed civilians.  That was in

 3     today's transcript at page 39, 16.  And in response to Defence counsel's

 4     questions, you responded that from this reference in the document, it was

 5     impossible to tell if this reference was to Serbs or Albanians.  Do you

 6     recall that, sir?

 7        A.   I do.

 8        Q.   Now, taking a step back from this document, just speaking about

 9     armed civilians generally, you had testified last week about armed

10     civilians whom you saw in Kosovo, and for the Court's reference, this is

11     at page 5284.  And just to remind you, you were asked about the arming of

12     Serb civilians, and you said that this was discussed at the Commission

13     with Colonel Mijatovic, General Loncar, and Kotur.

14             Now, in relation to these armed civilians, the ones you discussed

15     with General Loncar, and General Kotur, and the ones who you say you also

16     saw in the field, are you able to help us with whether these were

17     Albanian armed civilians or Serb armed civilians?

18        A.   Although it was impossible to tell, you know, from that statement

19     who they were, as it was an area where there were Serbs.  It was a

20     Serbian area.  It's more than likely that they would have been Serbs as

21     opposed to Albanians.  Albanian civilians were not normally armed.  The

22     only people in the KLA -- sorry, on the Albanian side would have been the

23     KLA; and although they had no uniform, they usually had some vestige of

24     uniform whether it was a white band wrapped around their arm indicating

25     which sort of group they belonged to or so on.  So if you saw somebody

Page 5387

 1     without any of this, then it was probably a civilian.  And in this case

 2     it was more likely -- the probability was more likely to be a Serb than

 3     it was to be an Albanian.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  And just to clarify, if you recall, where was it you

 5     saw such civilians in Kosovo?

 6        A.   Well, usually in the Serb villages.

 7        Q.   And if you recall, are you able to name any such villages?

 8        A.   Many.  Top of my head I can't, no.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  And in terms of time-frame, again if you recall, when

10     did you see these civilians in Serb villages, as you say?

11        A.   This would have been in the final part of our, sort of, stay in

12     Kosovo.

13        Q.   Would you be able to clarify the time-frame for that, please?

14        A.   Well, it was certainly in the last three, four weeks, there

15     about, four or five weeks.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Are you able to provide any information on how these

17     Serb civilians obtained their arms, if you know?

18        A.   I was told by the members of the Commission that they were issued

19     the weapons.

20        Q.   And who issued them with these weapons, sir?

21        A.   I believe -- I don't know -- I can't remember exactly, it was the

22     VJ or the MUP; but they were issued locally in the local villages.

23        Q.   Thank you very much, sir.

24             I'd now like to move on to another topic.

25             MS. GOPALAN:  If we could call up P836, please.

Page 5388

 1        Q.   Sir, you will see on your screen shortly that this is the

 2     Shaun Byrnes Agreement.  And I would like to take you to paragraph 2 of

 3     this document.  This is in relation to the process of notification.

 4     That's what paragraph 2 is referring to.

 5             Now, in relation to paragraph 2 and the notification requirements

 6     set out in this paragraph, could you tell us, please, what was your

 7     understanding of how this process of notification would operate?

 8        A.   Well, there would be some official document, probably following a

 9     meeting with the Commission or directly between the MUP and our

10     representative who would first of all inform us and then give us a

11     written document explaining why and what they were intending to do and

12     where, which never happened.

13        Q.   And in terms of time-frame, are you able to provide any

14     information on such meetings, if such notification was ever provided?

15        A.   Well, to my knowledge, no such information was ever provided.

16        Q.   Thank you, sir.

17             MS. GOPALAN:  I'd now like to call up P837, and that's the

18     Clark-Naumann Agreement.  And if we could go to page 4, please.

19        Q.   And you were shown this paragraph by Defence counsel today.  I'm

20     interested in the sentence that refers to the right to respond adequately

21     and proportionately to any form of terrorist activity.  When you were

22     asked about this paragraph, you responded saying that the only thing that

23     doesn't apply is the word "proportionality," what do you mean by your

24     statement when you said "proportionality did not apply"?

25        A.   Well, if gunmen are sitting in the house, the sniper are sitting

Page 5389

 1     in the house and shooting at the Serbian security forces and causing

 2     injury and death, then obviously the legal authorities have the right to

 3     deal with him.  And you can deal with him in any number of ways,

 4     including totally destroying the building in which he is sitting.  That's

 5     quite fair.  It's extreme, but it's fair.  But it's unfair to shell the

 6     entire village, you know, in order to try and flush him out of the

 7     village.

 8             And this we know -- we saw a number of times where this sort of

 9     thing was happening, including the, sort of, the, again, west of Podujevo

10     and Lapastica, and those sort of areas there where extreme force was used

11     by the MUP against a doctor's house which was, you know, totally

12     destroyed, ransacked and everybody in the area was killed, wiped out.

13             That that was disproportionate, and we did preach

14     proportionality.  And that's why when Defence counsel spoke about the

15     area to the south near the salient coming into Kosovo.  The reason that

16     the action there carried out by the Serbian security forces was

17     proportionate is, I think, they were beginning to sort of listen to what

18     we were saying because it was, A, giving them bad press.

19             I mean, the terrible thing about disproportionality is the press

20     lives on this, and we were try to say, Look, if you want a better image,

21     if you want to, sort of, be seen as defending yourself against

22     terrorists, then, you know, behave proportionately and appropriately.

23     And I believe that there was a phase when that was happening.  And Racak

24     was an example, after Racak, the funeral, as was Kacanik.

25        Q.   Thank you sir.  And in terms of conveying such information on

Page 5390

 1     proportionality to the commission, could you comment on how such

 2     information was provided, if at all, to the commission?

 3        A.   In endless discussions on how we sort of dealt with these types

 4     of problems, for example, from our experience working in Northern Ireland

 5     which is a sort of similar situation with terrorists and urban warfare

 6     with people with no uniforms.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Are you able to provide a rough figure on how often

 8     such issues arose during the meetings that you had with the commission,

 9     discussions about proportionality that is?

10        A.   I would say right from the very beginning.  It was started even

11     earlier on when General DZ was leading the meetings, and it went on

12     throughout the entire time we were there.  It never stopped.

13        Q.   Thank you.  You mentioned that there was an improvement from the

14     time Racak occurred.  Are you able to give an example of an extreme case

15     where proportionality wasn't adhered to as a contrast?  If you recall.

16        A.   Yes, I mean, the -- I mean, we saw an extraordinary thing one day

17     where the troops were -- this is VJ was carrying out a live-fire exercise

18     but against a village.  There were two villages down range of the

19     artillery and tanks, and they were just firing, and we said, you know,

20     Why are you doing this?  They said, Well, we are training.  I said,

21     Aren't the villagers -- aren't there villagers?  They said, Yes, but we

22     told them to leave, but they decided that they were going to take these

23     villagers out and just shell the entire area.

24        Q.   In terms of time-frame, do you recall when this was?

25        A.   In the new year.  That was the new year.

Page 5391

 1        Q.   In the new year.  And the names of the villages, if you recall,

 2     or if not, the general vicinity?

 3        A.   It's the Vucitrn area again.

 4        Q.   Thank you, sir.  Moving on to my final topic, this is the UN

 5     resolution that was shown to you today by Defence counsel.

 6             MS. GOPALAN:  Could I call up D160, please.

 7        Q.   Sir, you were asked a number of questions today about this

 8     UN resolution.  Could you tell us, if you know, what were the background

 9     circumstances that led to the adoption of this resolution in

10     September 1998?

11        A.   Well, it was a whole series, a whole period of worsening

12     situation in Kosovo, and various, sort of, cease-fires, various lulls.

13     But it got worse and worse and eventually there were a series of

14     activities by the Serbian security forces which hit the headlines and,

15     you know, they have now, sort of, gone into almost Albanian folklore as

16     to what happened in these areas, the deaths that were caused.

17             And they were just, sort of, NATO got involved and as with

18     activation order for the bombing threatened Mr. Milosevic, and that's how

19     it just developed.

20        Q.   Thank you.  And this whole period of the worsening situation in

21     Kosovo, are you able to provide a rough time-frame of what this period

22     encompassed?

23        A.   It was several years it went over, two or three years.

24        Q.   Thank you.  And these incidences that hit the headlines that were

25     caused by the Serbian security forces, again, if you recall, when did

Page 5392

 1     this happen?

 2        A.   I've just gone out of my mind, but I think they were somewhere in

 3     the area of Klina and that was the sort of area this happened.

 4        Q.   When did this happen?

 5        A.   In the year before, I think, we came in.

 6        Q.   Okay.

 7        A.   Sorry, brain is drained.

 8        Q.   That's fine.  It's been a long day.  Thanks for that, sir.

 9             MS. GOPALAN:  I do not have any further questions for you sir,

10     thank you very much.

11             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you, Ms. Gopalan.

12             You will be pleased to know, Colonel, that we have finished, that

13     you will be able to get away.  We thank you once again for your

14     attendance and for the assistance you've been able to give.  We are sorry

15     that you had to be -- continue today over the weekend.  The court officer

16     will show you out, but we thank you again for your attendance.

17             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour, thank you very much, indeed, for your

18     indulgence as well.

19                           [The witness withdrew]

20             JUDGE PARKER:  Clearly no point in contemplating a fresh witness

21     at this hour.  So we will adjourn until tomorrow, but before doing so,

22     could I mention, Ms. Gopalan, or Ms. Kravetz, a concern the Chamber has

23     that the witness notifications for the next two weeks following this week

24     are each for only four witnesses, and they are in each apparent case

25     witnesses with which the Prosecution will not be long.  In most cases

Page 5393

 1     half an hour, at the most I think an hour.  It ought to be possible with,

 2     other than extensive witnesses, to finish at least five witnesses in a

 3     week, and if we are to keep this Prosecution proceeding at a reasonable

 4     pace, we need to set that sort of general objective.

 5             There will be longer witnesses unquestionably, and time, as

 6     usual, will be allowed.  There will be times when witnesses may even be

 7     shorter, and we can think of six or seven in a week.  But to be setting

 8     for relatively routine witnesses, a programme of only four in a five-day

 9     week, is in the Chamber's view not an adequate rate of progress.  So that

10     if you could convey that to Mr. Stamp and try and ensure that there is

11     some attention to that.

12             And we would ask all counsel to bear in mind our growing concern

13     that we are not making an adequate rate of progress, and the Chamber will

14     therefore become more insistent about the rate at which we progress

15     through the witnesses.

16             Thank you for that.  We now adjourn until tomorrow morning at

17     9.00.

18                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6.54 p.m.,

19                           to be reconvened on Wednesday the 3rd day of

20                           June, 2009, at 9.00 a.m.