090602IT

Page 5321

1 put that forth in any case. I believe this should be treated as it was

2 with the Defence. If this concerns some exhibits from the Milutinovic

3 and Milosevic case, then the transcript should suffice, and I believe

4 some of these were not admitted as exhibits in the Milutinovic case. I

5 believe that was your position.

6 JUDGE PARKER: [Previous translation continues] ... with numbers

7 in due course. Thank you.

8 MS. GOPALAN: Your Honours, we would say that these are

9 associated exhibits to --

10 JUDGE PARKER: I think they've been received.

11 MS. GOPALAN: Thank you, Your Honours.

12 JUDGE PARKER: Now we'll try for the witness once again.

13 [The witness takes the stand]

14 JUDGE PARKER: Good afternoon, Colonel. The affirmation that you

15 made at the beginning of your evidence still applies.

16 THE WITNESS: Right.

17 JUDGE PARKER: And Mr. Djurdjic is continuing with his questions.

18 Mr. Djurdjic.

19 WITNESS: RICHARD CIAGLINSKI [Resumed]

20 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

21 Cross-examination by Mr. Djurdjic: [Continued]

22 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Ciaglinski. I went through the Friday

23 transcript. Could you please give precise and brief answers to my

24 questions so as to be able to save time in that regard, although I wasn't

25 limited per se during my cross-examination by the Chamber as opposed to

Page 5322

1 the previous two cases you testified in, in any case, I'd like to have

2 brief answers to keep matters as efficient as possible.

3 Mr. Ciaglinski, on Friday, we were discussing your position and

4 function you had with the Verification Mission. According to the

5 information I found in some written and other statements, your position

6 was at the headquarters of General DZ. You were coordinator or liaison

7 officer with the VJ, the liaison officer was Mr. Guy Sands, and the

8 coordinator for the KLA were for a while David Wilson; and once he took

9 up another position, it was done by David Meyer. Is the information I

10 gathered from the documents correct? Do you agree with it?

11 A. It sounds right, yes.

12 Q. Thank you. Am I right in saying that General DZ believed that

13 the three of you were too many to submit reports to him, therefore he

14 appointed his assistant from military matters to be your superior,

15 Mr. Sinclair, to whom you reported and he reported to DZ in turn. And

16 then after Sinclair, several people went through that post; is that

17 correct?

18 A. Not entirely, no. When -- Sinclair was there for a very, very

19 short time, and when he left, I wasn't aware that anyone really replaced

20 him.

21 Q. According to the information I had on General DZ, it was

22 David Meyer, then Piers Noble, and then Mr. Lovelock, if I'm pronouncing

23 that correctly and if I took that down correctly.

24 A. All right. Okay. I understand now what you are saying and who

25 you are referring to. Yes, Ben Lovelock was the last one, and this was a

Page 5323

1 function -- a person that carried out this function, whether it was

2 Sinclair or Ben Lovelock or Noble, it was to look after DZ 's office, it

3 was like his personal assistant. And so he controlled the access to DZ.

4 He would do office work for DZ. That was the main function of that

5 person.

6 Q. Thank you. Mr. Richard Heaslip, what was his position or

7 function?

8 A. Well, like all of us, he had different functions at different

9 times of the mission, as I did, so at one time he came into the

10 headquarters for a brief time to take over as head of liaison, but he was

11 then sent to Macedonia to run the evacuation. So he had different

12 functions. And also Heaslip was also the regional commander of the

13 region centred on Gnjilane.

14 Q. Thank you. In the information on DZ, I've found that

15 Richard Heaslip was the main liaison officer appointed by DZ in order to

16 coordinate the three coordinators; do you agree with that or not?

17 A. Yes, for a few weeks, for a very short period towards the end.

18 Q. Thank you. Now to go back to the head of mission, it was

19 Ambassador Walker; am I correct?

20 A. Correct.

21 Q. General DZ was deputy head of mission for operations, and

22 Mr. Giovanni Kesler was deputy head of mission for the police?

23 A. Correct.

24 Q. Thank you. On Friday you said, I don't know whether I'll put

25 this correctly, but I believe you said that the major part of the

Page 5324

1 Verification Mission or the level that concerned the bulk of cooperation

2 with the Yugoslavian institutions was in Belgrade?

3 A. I don't remember saying that. What I think I said was that the

4 highest level of cooperation, the highest level of the

5 Cooperation mission was sitting in Belgrade, but the every-day running of

6 the organisation and the problem solving was done in Kosovo.

7 Q. Thank you. How did you arrive at that conclusion, that the top

8 level of the verification commission of the OSCE was in Belgrade, whereas

9 in fact there were only seven personnel there? Maybe they had the

10 closest ties with the mission in Belgrade, but concerning the meetings of

11 Mr. Walker and Sainovic as well as Loncar, that must have taken place at

12 a higher level than the level of Ms. Phelan who was in Belgrade at the

13 time?

14 A. I don't know.

15 Q. Thank you. Can we agree, nonetheless, that the

16 Kosovo Verification Mission, or rather its head, was Mr. Walker and that

17 you were all answerable to him?

18 A. Of course.

19 Q. Mr. Walker was the only person authorised, based on the reports

20 of the regional centres and his teams, to make decisions on the

21 violations of the agreement and to undertake measures that he deemed

22 appropriate?

23 A. The final decision was always his, yes.

24 Q. Thank you. Save for one occasion when you were also present when

25 he was replaced by his deputies, and it was up to them to decide whether

Page 5325

1 to issue a communique or not?

2 A. Which occasion are you referring to?

3 Q. I mean the report that was sent concerning the incident at Dulje,

4 and the kidnapping in Stari Trg? In any case, if you don't recall that,

5 I will put some documents to you.

6 A. I don't recall it exactly, but I am sure I can be reminded.

7 Q. I certainly will. There is a number of them.

8 I'd like to go back to your arrival. When the Cooperation was

9 discharged by a person by the name of Donna Phelan within the hierarchy

10 of the mission, in your statement you talk about the method planned by

11 Ms. Donna Phelan, it was called the method of maximum confrontation --

12 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: Maximum assistance.

13 Maximum resistance.

14 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] -- to the Serbs. What did the

15 method consist of?

16 THE WITNESS: Sorry. I'm not aware of it being called the system

17 of maximum resistance, so.

18 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. I will read it out. In the English page 3, paragraph 2:

20 "The method we used that had been originally planned by

21 Donna Phelan was to resist to the maximum."

22 A. I think the word I used was confrontational.

23 Q. Very well. It should be the same confrontation in Serbian, I

24 thought it was the same. I'm sorry I failed to mention the exhibit

25 number. It's the statement of the witness.

Page 5326

1 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Djurdjic please repeat the exhibit

2 number.

3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] It was admitted in our case as

4 P832, the statement.

5 THE WITNESS: Sorry, what was the question?

6 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Could you explain Ms. Phelan's method? The method of

8 confrontation, as you called it. What did that entail?

9 A. Well, it was the result of not getting any response back to

10 our -- to Ambassador Walker's letter about our methodology of carrying

11 out the inspections. And so -- and also when we requested permission to

12 inspect the barracks at the Commission of Cooperation, we were told we

13 were not -- we would not be able to do that.

14 So the only way to try and carry out the inspection was to

15 actually turn up at the barracks at the main gates and confront the

16 problem. And, you know, try and get in, try and discuss with the

17 commander, even obstruct the gates if necessary, and to spend as much

18 time as possible at the barracks observing what was going on just outside

19 the barracks, which wasn't appreciated by the VJ; and so, therefore, you

20 can only describe this as a confrontational technique. It's the only

21 option we had left.

22 Q. Thank you. As far as I understood, her method failed, whereas

23 the method you introduced succeeded; am I correct?

24 A. It's possibly because of my diplomatic training that I decided

25 that maybe by talking and agreeing and discussing methodologies we might

Page 5327

1 make more progress, and that's what we tried to do, yes.

2 Q. Thank you. You mentioned your diplomatic training, I believe

3 that you said that you now work for the foreign office; did I gather that

4 correctly?

5 A. I am employed occasionally on a as-required basis by the foreign

6 office, yes.

7 Q. Thank you. Is there a special department that you work for, or

8 do you work for the various sections of it according to the needs at that

9 moment?

10 A. I mainly work for two departments within the foreign office; one

11 is the department for international development, and the other one is for

12 the department that deals with conflicts.

13 Q. Thank you. It means if we see you in the field, there must be a

14 conflict. Thank you.

15 Ms. Phelan eventually left the Verification Mission; she took up

16 a position for centre for intelligence gathering; am I correct?

17 A. I don't know. All I know is that she returned to the state

18 department. She was a state department employee, so the

19 American Foreign Office.

20 Q. Thank you, I know that. In any case, I wanted to learn from you,

21 if you know, what it was that the centre actually did, what is the centre

22 for information gathering or compiling?

23 A. I have no idea how the American system works or what departments

24 it has.

25 Q. Mr. Ciaglinski, this centre for information gathering or

Page 5328

1 compiling concerns the Kosovo Verification Mission. Yes, you said she

2 went to the state department, although my information is different from

3 that. But have you ever heard of the Blue Book or the KVM?

4 A. Sorry, yes, I thought you were referring to the period after she

5 left the mission completely. I didn't realise you were still talking

6 about her moving to what we referred to as the fusion cell, which was the

7 information gathering, collation, and interpretation department of which

8 she headed up for a certain length of time, which created the Blue Book,

9 yes.

10 Q. To the extent that you can recall, could you tell us something

11 about the fusion cell, how it worked, if you know?

12 A. Well, yes, I worked on it for a time, so I probably know a little

13 bit about it.

14 Basically, the information that was sent and all the reports that

15 were sent in from regional centres were collated, brought into the same

16 location; people examined them; they then sort of looked at previous

17 reports dealing with the same topics, and tried to create a picture. So

18 we -- but it wasn't just incidents, it was the whole business of

19 information gathering in Kosovo.

20 So we gathered information about the VJ, what they were doing,

21 where they were; the MUP, what they were doing, what type of units they

22 were; designations on their uniforms if we saw any markings on the

23 uniforms. And then we tried to forecast what might happen in the future,

24 possible of variants of what the outcomes might be of various actions

25 that had taken place. So that's the type of work the fusion cell did.

Page 5329

1 Q. Yes, now I see why you were included as well, because I learned

2 that the cell employed an analyst from the UK, Germany, and the US; and

3 in the jargon it was called the KVM Intelligence Service?

4 A. In the jargon it was known as the KVM Fusion Cell, because it

5 fused the information together. But, you know, what is information

6 gathering? Some people call it intelligence, some people call it

7 whatever, you know.

8 Q. Thank you. Mr. Ciaglinski, you told us that you had three

9 documents that were your Bible and you carried them always with you. If

10 I'm not mistaken. One was the Geremek-Jovanovic Agreement, the second

11 document was the Byrnes-Djordjevic Agreement, and the third was the

12 1199 Resolution. Am I correct? Are these the three documents?

13 A. No. It was the Shaun Byrnes, it was the Djordjevic -- sorry the

14 Djordjevic-Byrnes; it was the Naumann-Clark, not the 1199. So the two

15 you mentioned, but not the 1199. The third one was the Klaus-Naumann

16 document.

17 Q. Correct, Clark-Naumann, you're right. Let me go back to that.

18 Weren't these three agreements the basis for the UN Resolution 1199?

19 A. Certainly two of them were, I don't think -- the

20 Byrnes-Djordjevic was outside that because the -- I think the

21 Resolution 1203 which followed 1199 confirmed the workings of the mission

22 under -- using those two agreements, including those two agreements in

23 it.

24 Q. Thank you.

25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I know it was a long time ago,

Page 5330

1 that's why I'd like to show you the 65 ter document P456. We'll refresh

2 our memories.

3 That's the 1199 UN resolution from September 1998, and you will

4 see that it preceded these three documents, one of which I had gotten

5 wrong. I'd like us to discuss briefly -- there, there it is. It's the

6 23rd September, 1998. This is the preamble.

7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I would like to see page 2 in

8 English, please.

9 I'd like to tell the legal officer, we don't need on the screen

10 the B/C/S version. We need only the English version for the witness and

11 the Trial Chamber.

12 Q. Witness, would you agree that under these items at the bottom,

13 1, 2, and 3, in item 1 a cease-fire in Kosovo is envisaged, a cessation

14 of hostilities. Item 2 envisages an improvement of humanitarian

15 situation and averting the impending humanitarian catastrophe, and a

16 third point deals with the political solution to the Kosovo crisis. Do

17 you agree this is the essence of these three points?

18 A. Yes, I haven't got it on my screen, but that's the essence, yes.

19 Sorry, I have it, I was looking somewhere else. This is why, of course,

20 1199 was superseded by Resolution 1203 in which the -- two of the

21 documents were actually incorporated, in answer to your earlier question.

22 Q. When was the 1203 adopted?

23 A. If you remember on Friday I had a little piece of paper that you

24 wouldn't let me use. I had actually written down the actual date of the

25 Resolution 1203, but it was -- it mentions both -- it mentions both of

Page 5331

1 the Clark-Naumann and the Geremek Agreement to be, sort of, incorporated

2 into the resolution.

3 Q. I agree, that's probably right, but that is after the period

4 relevant to the indictment. During the break, please have a look and

5 tell us after the break the date of the 1203 Resolution. Thank you for

6 this answer.

7 Now, below this --

8 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we look at para 4 on the next

9 page.

10 Q. Could you please look at item 4(a), the language there, and then

11 I'd like to ask you ...

12 Does it demand cessation of all action by the security forces

13 affecting the civilian population and orders the withdrawal of security

14 units only used for civilian repression, only those units that are in

15 contact with civilians? Do you agree?

16 A. I wouldn't use the word "only," but it says:

17 "... withdrawal of security units used for civilian repression."

18 Q. Right. But the other party to the conflict, the KLA, is not

19 mentioned anywhere, no measures are envisaged in application to them;

20 correct?

21 A. This is one of the problems of the agreement. This actually was,

22 if you like, one-sided. But reference had been made, I remember in the

23 Geremek Agreement and possibly in 1199 also, somewhere else, that

24 actually asked both sides to abide by the cease-fire.

25 Q. Thank you. We will briefly go through to all these documents.

Page 5332

1 But this first one, I did not have on Friday and that's why I started

2 with it. Also, it preceded the others.

3 Witness, under items -- sub-items (b) and (c), we can read the

4 provisions about verification, about the return of refugees, and the need

5 to establish dialogue. Now, in para 5, item (d), I would like your

6 comment. Is it right that sub-item (d) concerns measures against

7 peaceful population?

8 A. Sorry, item (d) says:

9 "Unimpeded access to humanitarian organisations and humanitarian

10 supplies."

11 Q. The interpreters did not understand me. Sub-item (b).

12 A. What was the question, sorry?

13 Q. Item (b) also concerns only the civilian population, not the KLA,

14 the other party to the armed conflict; am I right?

15 A. Of course.

16 Q. Thank you.

17 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I'd like to call now for the next

18 page, para 10.

19 Q. Witness, it is the FRY that is primarily responsible for the

20 security of the mission; correct?

21 A. Correct.

22 Q. Whatever happens to any member of the mission, Yugoslavia would

23 be responsible and Yugoslavia has to take steps to ensure your security

24 because you, the verifiers, were unarmed; right?

25 A. Right.

Page 5333

1 Q. And we'll come back to that again later. At the initiative of

2 the KVM sometime towards March, just before you left, an agreement was

3 made that with your consent, in areas affected by conflict with

4 terrorists, you would enter such areas once you signed away Yugoslavia's

5 responsibility, you do it at your own risk; correct? I think it was on

6 the 15th of March.

7 A. You are right.

8 Q. Now, I'd like you to look at para 11. Does this paragraph relate

9 to the financing of the KLA and their gathering of funds to buy arms and

10 bring them into Kosovo and Metohija?

11 A. I'm not a lawyer, but that's what I would assume it to mean, yes.

12 Q. That's why you're a diplomat. Tell me now, did Albania and

13 other countries comply with these provisions of the resolution? During

14 your tenure in Kosovo and Metohija, what was the situation with the

15 supply of arms?

16 A. Well, we were aware that arms were being smuggled across the

17 border from Albania into Kosovo, mainly because, you know, every time the

18 Serbian security forces captured the -- had a confrontation with the

19 smugglers, we were told, so we knew about it.

20 Q. Thank you. And there were several cases involving you once of

21 border incidents on the border with Albania when 35 men got killed during

22 an attempt to illegally enter with weapons. Can you say your answer for

23 the record?

24 A. Well, when you say that I was involved, I wasn't involved in the

25 operation of smuggling the weapons, but I was certainly aware that this

Page 5334

1 had happened because we were informed. And later I was also instrumental

2 in dealing with the prisoners who were held in the prison in Nis, those

3 who had survived the ambush.

4 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, may I tender this

5 document?

6 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.

7 THE REGISTRAR: And that will be assigned D00160, Your Honours.

8 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Let us skip a few documents and

9 go to P838.

10 Q. Witness, do you remember where we left off on Friday?

11 A. Please remind me.

12 Q. Judge Parker asked me at a quarter to 2.00 whether I still have

13 questions for you in cross-examination because we were at the end of our

14 session. I said, Yes; and he seemed surprised. He said, I just asked.

15 Now, about this letter of the 23rd September addressed to

16 Mr. Milosevic by Mr. Walker. I'll get to the point straightaway. You

17 were a continuation of KDOM, and while you were getting settled and

18 starting to work, the agreements were being implemented, the three

19 agreements that we mentioned that you said were your Bible.

20 A. Well, of course, I mean, to get the mission going there had to be

21 concurrent activity. So, for example, the mission was being set up in

22 early October, ambassadors being appointed in October, I think the 17th

23 of October, Ambassador Walker was appointed well before the official date

24 the mission started. Preparatory work and teams were going out to Kosovo

25 and Belgrade to work out where the mission would be best placed and how

Page 5335

1 to operate it. Documents were being written ahead of the mission

2 starting its day-to-day work because you had to do this in order to start

3 the mission. So there was a lot of preparatory work which had to be done

4 to get the mission going as quickly as possible.

5 Q. I'll do my best, but please answer this question: My question

6 was, Before the KVM was formed, the Kosovo diplomatic mission took a

7 certain position on these three agreements and decided whether the FRY

8 was applying them?

9 A. I can't answer that question. I don't know. I don't know of

10 that.

11 Q. All right. If you don't know. You know why I'm asking? Because

12 from the moment when the agreements were activated until you arrived,

13 more than a months elapsed; and there are certain document that I thought

14 you were familiar with because the KDOM were supposed to hand over, and,

15 I understood, handed over to you all the documentary evidence about the

16 application of these three agreements from the beginning.

17 Now, about this letter, you were not in Kosovo or in Yugoslavia

18 when it was written, and that's the reason I asked you this, because this

19 letter refers to certain questions that had already been settled with

20 KDOM.

21 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now call up P836.

22 Q. This is the agreement dated 25th October, 1998, between

23 Mr. Byrnes and Djordjevic. Please look at para 2. Do you agree that

24 this paragraph envisages that in case of incidents or increased tension,

25 the police will have the right to perform patrol duties in armoured

Page 5336

1 vehicles equipped with machine-guns up to 7.9 millimetres on the

2 condition of notifying the KDOM?

3 A. That's what it says, yes.

4 Q. Thank you. And now, regarding para 3, is it correct that the FRY

5 complied with the provisions of para 3 and withdrew its forces from

6 Dragobilje, Ostrozub, Opterusa, Dobrodeljane, Studencani, Samodraza,

7 Pecane, and Klecka?

8 A. You said that they complied with paragraph 2 and 3, I don't

9 remember but you can ask others like DZ later whether in fact the

10 paragraph says "... upon notifying KDOM/OSCE ..." I'm not sure this

11 notification was ever given.

12 In answer to your second part of the question, I believe that

13 those stationary forces were removed from those areas you mentioned, yes.

14 THE INTERPRETER: Would the witness kindly speak into the

15 microphone.

16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. Is it correct that all these areas that the forces of the FRY

18 abandoned were occupied by the KLA?

19 A. It was normal for the -- [B/C/S/ on English channel]. Sorry,

20 yes, it was normal for the KLA to actually pull out -- to replace any VJ

21 or MUP positions upon the withdrawal of the Serbian security forces.

22 Q. Do you consider that a violation of the agreement, regardless of

23 the fact that the KLA was not a signatory?

24 A. Well, it's considering they weren't a signatory, then they

25 probably weren't violating anything, were they? Morally, yes, they were

Page 5337

1 in violation because there should have been a cease-fire, but legally

2 they hadn't signed anything.

3 Q. I must say that this opinion of yours is very interesting. The

4 FRY, by complying with the agreement, enables the KLA to occupy

5 territories it did not have, and that is called "complying." But if the

6 FRY tries to stop that from happening, despite a cease-fire, then it is

7 in violation of the agreement; would that be right?

8 A. I don't think we ever said that -- that the VJ and the MUP would

9 have no right to defend themselves or the population if the KLA were

10 actually posing any danger to the locals. The fact that they were

11 occupying land that was being vacated by the Serbian forces, as long as

12 it was done peacefully, had no bearing on the situation.

13 Q. Witness, both in your statements and in other evidence I found

14 that the KLA considered it a provocation when in Dragobilje or some other

15 village patrol of the army or the police were patrolling as usual and

16 they would then shoot at the vehicles --

17 THE INTERPRETER: Correction.

18 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] -- the KVM considered it a

19 provocation when the army or the police were patrolling in villages and

20 then the KLA would shoot at them.

21 A. It was more than a provocation, and these Serb security forces

22 had every reason and right to take retaliatory action. But if they were

23 sitting in a position which they had occupied and not bothering anybody,

24 then that's a different situation.

25 Q. Let's take the notorious event in Dulje. The police forces were

Page 5338

1 performing regular patrol duty, and they were bothering the KLA which

2 launched an attack, but that was not what I wanted to say. I enumerated

3 certain areas from which the Yugoslav forces withdraw, and the KLA then

4 took control of these areas. They considered it a provocation when a

5 patrol passed through, and they would attack them. And to that you would

6 say that the Yugoslav forces were in violation and the KLA were not

7 responsible for anything because -- and they were not violating anything,

8 because they were not a signatory?

9 A. I wouldn't support that premise. What I was saying is that the

10 Serbian forces, I'll repeat, had every right to retaliate against any

11 attack upon them or upon the people the Serbian people in Kosovo; and I

12 would also add that the OSCE, the KVM, we spent a lot of time trying to

13 persuade the KLA not to occupy these positions and get off these

14 position. And in fact we had some success in the area of Podujevo where

15 we did keep the KLA a certain distance away and got them to relinquish

16 some of the positions which they had taken overlooking the main road. So

17 we tried pretty hard to keep the KLA out of these positions because we

18 knew what the response would be and what action it would provoke.

19 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please come closer to the

20 microphones. Thank you very much.

21 THE WITNESS: I apologise.

22 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Thank you. Let's make a little digression now. I understood

24 that the Kosovo Verification Mission based its work on reports and

25 observations that were put on paper through which you informed the head

Page 5339

1 of your mission and other agencies, if necessary; correct?

2 A. Whenever possible, yes.

3 Q. Well, tell me, when wasn't it possible for you to write down in

4 your reports whatever you observed?

5 A. Well, when I was in the field and I was staying out in the field,

6 I wasn't able to come back and submit a report. Or there was so much

7 going on that it was virtually impossible to, sort of, write everything

8 down, and quite often my reports would be just verbal reports by

9 telephone, by satellite telephone, by verbal debrief back at the

10 headquarters.

11 Q. Thank you. And when you come back to the headquarters, didn't

12 you have time to put down on paper whatever you had telephoned before or

13 notified verbally and submitted to the fusion cell?

14 A. Not always, no.

15 Q. All right. Let's accept that in cases of emergency and in

16 certain other situations when you simply couldn't do it, you did not

17 submit reports, but these were exceptions rather than the rule; correct?

18 A. I think most of my work was done verbally in the field where I

19 was just used, as I said before, as a firefighter, someone who would go

20 out and try and resolve a problem in the field. And I would report back

21 usually in verbal form because there were only so many hours in a day,

22 and we were already working 18 hours a day if not more sometimes, seven

23 days a week.

24 Q. Thank you. But if you are in the field and you are unable to

25 report, the person you informed, the headquarters in Pristina would pass

Page 5340

1 it on in some material form, wouldn't they?

2 A. What used to happen, I would go back -- come back, if I was back

3 in Pristina, I would go to the fusion cell, then I would debrief the

4 people in the fusion cell as to what had happened, and what had been

5 done, et cetera; and they would then incorporate it into their reports

6 directly from my comments.

7 Q. I'm asking you this because you said in your statement something

8 about the verification of police check-points, despite all the effort and

9 all the documents that I had at my disposal, verification in the

10 February of 1999 is something I haven't been able to find anywhere.

11 A. Well, that doesn't mean you don't have a copy of it. I don't

12 keep copies. But the report was written, I'm not sure whether I signed

13 it or one of my subordinates had signed it because I might have been

14 doing something else, but it was a long detailed report of exactly where

15 all the check-points had been found, the observation posts, who had

16 visited them, and it was a detailed report that was put in. Might not be

17 under my name.

18 Q. Thank you, I wasn't even looking for a report under your name.

19 This is the third time you are testifying. Did you use or show that

20 report in the Milosevic trial or the Milutinovic trial?

21 A. I referred to it in the Milosevic and the Sainovic trial, but I

22 don't have any documents with me. So the only documents would be the

23 documents with the Court or with the various witnesses like DZ, for

24 example, or others.

25 Q. Please, you understand very well what I asked you. Please answer

Page 5341

1 my question. Did you see the document, that report you just mentioned,

2 in the Milutinovic case or in the Milosevic trial? I know it is not

3 under -- I know your name is not on it, but it doesn't matter who

4 authored it.

5 A. I have seen the document, yes. Not in the court, but I've seen

6 it in Kosovo, yes.

7 Q. I'm asking you about the courtroom. Did you see it, perhaps, on

8 Friday, last Friday in the courtroom?

9 A. There might have been reference to it, but I did not see the

10 actual report, no. I don't believe I saw it.

11 THE INTERPRETER: Could all unnecessary microphones please be

12 switched off.

13 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Witness, I have here a chronology of events from the operations

15 HQ where you worked where it says that on the 5th of January, 1999 -

16 that's para 58, Exhibit 65 ter 634, page 353 in English.

17 On the 5th of January, an inspection was carried out of all MUP

18 observation points, and in the comments it says "Mainly used by MUP ."

19 This is dated the 5th of January.

20 Is it possible that this is the report, the event you are

21 referring to?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And you see that in the comments there is no mention of any

24 violation, do you agree? Have you seen -- do you see this document now?

25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I called up document 65 ter P634,

Page 5342

1 if we can see that on the screen.

2 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Ms. Gopalan.

3 MS. GOPALAN: Sorry, Your Honours, I was just going to ask for

4 the document to be called up, since the screen was blank - but I see now

5 that it has appeared - that it would aid all parties to have it

6 available.

7 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.

8 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Page B-3, item 58.

9 THE WITNESS: I can see it. It says:

10 "All 27 OPs inspected. Most occupied by MUP."

11 Which implies that there was a violation because only 9 should

12 have been occupied.

13 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. But you do agree it was the 5th of January?

15 A. Well, DZ was very meticulous with his paperwork, so this is one

16 of his pieces of work, so I wouldn't disagree.

17 Q. Thank you. I don't know if this is the correct translation, but

18 what I see, "Mainly used by MUP" in my version. I don't know if this is

19 the correct translation. Most. Most.

20 A. No, it doesn't -- it means that most of the -- of the OPs were

21 occupied by the MUP. That means nearly all, "most" as in "nearly all."

22 That's the correct translation.

23 Q. Very well, thank you.

24 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now call up 65 ter 659.

25 JUDGE PARKER: You are not tendering that report?

Page 5343

1 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

2 JUDGE PARKER: I'm told it's part of P844, already exhibited.

3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I think we'll have a

4 problem with the admission of this -- of some of the evidence because

5 some exhibits have been admitted more than once, but it's good that this

6 one is already in evidence, because I was going to use it again and I

7 thought I would tender it; but if it's already exhibited, that's even

8 better.

9 Now I'd like 659 from the 65 ter list. That's the daily report

10 for the 4th and 5th of January, 1999. I am sorry, I apologise to the

11 legal officer, it's D156.

12 Q. Witness, could you please look at this report for the period up

13 to the 5th of January, and then read para 1, the first passage in para 1.

14 A. Yes, it says:

15 "Not all OPs were manned."

16 Full details will be to follow. "Not all" means "most."

17 "Possibly" could mean "most."

18 Q. Thank you. That is contrary to what you've just said, that there

19 were violations. How come when not all were even manned, what kind of

20 violation is that?

21 A. I think I've already said on numerous occasions that the

22 agreement, Byrnes agreement, said that one-third of the 27 should be

23 manned at the most, and there were, that means 9 should have been manned.

24 The other report, DZ 's annex, shows that most were maned. This says

25 that not all OPs were manned, which means that there's no number on it,

Page 5344

1 but it's not all. But it's closer to all than not any.

2 Also, there were other OPs that had been set up on top of the 27

3 but there's a report to follow. The report's not here.

4 Q. Nobody has seen that report. You are just telling us about it,

5 but we can't find a document about it.

6 A. And in addition, there are the -- you can see there on the second

7 line of that first sentence, it says:

8 "Full details of the verification are contained in the individual

9 regional centre daily reports."

10 From which the -- we have to get those documents first to then

11 produce the main report.

12 Q. Tell me then, where is that main report containing your

13 assertions? That's what I'm saying. What you are saying is not backed

14 by documents, and what is written here is contrary to what you said, not

15 even to mention the fact that this is a completely different period, a

16 month before.

17 A. I think I've said it before, you know, if you read the English,

18 you can actually understand what it says. It says that most were manned,

19 which means most of the 27 were manned. This one says not all OPs were

20 manned, which confirms what the other statement made. And where the

21 report is, I do not know. I'm not a custodian of documents.

22 Q. I would appreciate it very much if you would read out to us the

23 English version of the first paragraph in item 1.

24 A. The "Verification (2/99) of all the 27 MUP OPs were conducted

25 today. Not all OPs were manned."

Page 5345

1 Q. Thank you. We can move on, and the Court will make its own

2 judgement.

3 While we are still discussing verification, in item 58 we see on

4 the 4th of January an inspection was carried out of three approved

5 positions of the combat team. Do you agree this refers to the army?

6 A. Correct.

7 Q. And again, there is no observation about a violation of the

8 agreement?

9 A. I don't believe there were any violations.

10 Q. Thank you. But tell me now, I don't understand one thing, if

11 your main activity was verification and if you establish that a certain

12 agreement or part of that agreement is not complied with, isn't that a

13 reason to make a protest and tell the Commission for Cooperation, Look

14 here, such an such provision of the agreement is being violated, please

15 do something about it?

16 A. I'm sure that following the inspection of the MUP points,

17 observation check-points, this issue was raised at the

18 Cooperation Commission in Pristina.

19 Q. Witness, if such a document existed, I would show it to you and

20 then ask my question. It's not in the chronology, and it's nowhere in

21 the documents that the police or the army were responsible for any

22 violations; and there is no such document until the very end of your

23 tenure in Kosovo. There's only one towards the end of December when DZ

24 tried to enter the barracks of the Pristina Corps and he wasn't allowed

25 in, and he wrote in his report that he wasn't allowed in. There were no

Page 5346

1 further assertions of any violations. Would it be right that this is --

2 this can be explained by the fact that you changed your method of work,

3 you wrote down the numbers of lorries and tanks --

4 JUDGE PARKER: Ms. Gopalan.

5 MS. GOPALAN: Could Defence counsel please put a question for the

6 witness.

7 JUDGE PARKER: He has done that. Carry on, please.

8 THE WITNESS: I don't think it was because we changed our method

9 of work at all. I mean, I don't know where the documents are. As I said

10 to you before, there were so many documents, a lot of them have been

11 archived, some people have them in their possession, a lot of documents

12 were destroyed on our, sort of, departure from Kosovo. We spent three

13 days shredding paperwork in the OSCE building in Kosovo. Just looking at

14 the question...

15 JUDGE PARKER: Was it a change in your method of work?

16 THE WITNESS: That caused the -- well, I mean, we were adapting

17 our method of work continuously, but that wouldn't have been the reason

18 that this wouldn't have been reported.

19 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Witness, there is evidence that all that was done in

21 Kosovo and Metohija by the KVM was transferred on disks to Macedonia

22 during withdrawal and what was not necessary was destroyed. All this

23 documentation that I'm showing to you, I got from the Prosecution and

24 from the OSCE. So these are not private documents. But I'm telling you,

25 we have information from this chronology that on the

Page 5347

1 20 something December, General DZ went to the barracks of the

2 Pristina Corps and he wasn't allowed in. And he also went once to

3 Pristina to General Delic's office, he was allowed in and had a

4 discussion. Those are the only two instances of application of

5 Mrs. Phelan's method that I could notice, nothing else.

6 A. The entry into the barracks General -- into Colonel Delic's

7 barracks was not Mrs. Phelan's method, it was more the diplomatic way of

8 entering the barracks, when we were invited in.

9 Q. You probably mean some later instance. This is hardly one I'm

10 talking about, but never mind. I have more questions.

11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now call up P835. It is

12 already an exhibit.

13 Q. Witness, this is the Geremek-Jovanovic Agreement. First of all,

14 I'd like to focus on item 3. These are the general provisions, but under

15 Roman III there is something I'd like to look at.

16 Am I right in saying that the special mandate was for members to

17 maintain a cease-fire?

18 A. I think the -- it wasn't our mandate to maintain a cease-fire.

19 It was our mandate to verify the cease-fire. We had no way to enforce a

20 cease-fire.

21 Q. I agree with you, but the translation I have says:

22 "The Verification Mission shall travel throughout Kosovo to check

23 whether all the participants are maintaining the cease-fire."

24 A. Sorry, I haven't got it on my screen. I only have the first

25 line.

Page 5348

1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] That should be also page --

2 English page 3.

3 JUDGE PARKER: It's now on the screen. The problem is, the

4 paragraph has a line at the bottom of one page and then continues on the

5 next. You have the second page now.

6 Do you have a point about this paragraph, Mr. Djurdjic?

7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Yes, I do.

8 Q. I want to say that the agreement envisages that you travelled

9 throughout Kosovo, not that you should inspect the military installations

10 and barracks of the Army of Yugoslavia --

11 JUDGE PARKER: Well, you are now going to ask the witness if that

12 is his understanding of the paragraph; is that correct?

13 Yes, Colonel.

14 THE WITNESS: Right. Well, it says that we have to verify the

15 maintenance of the cease-fire by all elements, and reports -- investigate

16 reports of cease-fire violations. But it continues with other phrases

17 that, you know, we are to be able to look at -- if you take all the other

18 agreements into consideration, we are checking if the weapons of the

19 12.7 millimetres are around, if everybody is back in barracks, and so on.

20 When it says "freedom of movement and access" if it said "freedom

21 of movement" that means moving around Kosovo, which we had. Access means

22 access. It means the entrance into places that we wish to go into in

23 order to verify all aspects of the cease-fire. And all aspects of the

24 cease-fire are compliance with all the agreements and you can only do

25 that by going into barracks.

Page 5349

1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. I think I raised two

2 problems, but since it's time for the break, I'd like -- I'll put these

3 two questions after the break. It's time, I believe, Your Honour.

4 JUDGE PARKER: Yes. We will continue after the normal break at

5 4.15.

6 [The witness stands down]

7 --- Recess taken at 3.46 p.m.

8 --- On resuming at 4.18 p.m.

9 [The witness takes the stand]

10 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Djurdjic.

11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

12 Q. Witness, we were still with the Geremek-Jovanovic agreement, and

13 I said that two issues have opened up. The first one is the issue of

14 interpretation -- interpreting the agreement. Not only at your level.

15 I also realise that there were issues at other levels such as the level

16 of General Drewienkiewicz and Mr. Walker.

17 Did you ever try to raise that issue to the level of the

18 presiding officer of the OSCE and the Yugoslav president in order to deal

19 with the issue of the way the verification agreement should be

20 interpreted?

21 A. That's why Ambassador Walker wrote the letter to Mr. Milosevic

22 spelling out exactly how the system would work, and it was mentioned

23 endlessly at meetings of access and verification at the meetings we had

24 between General DZ and General Loncar.

25 Q. Could you please answer my question. Mr. Walker drafted a letter

Page 5350

1 in November. You had problems in December with verification, that issue

2 included DZ and Mr. Walker later on. Did you try to raise the issue with

3 some higher instances such as the Presidency of the OSCE and the

4 Yugoslav Presidency in order to deal with the problem of agreement

5 interpretation?

6 A. I am aware that General DZ wrote letters to the OSCE, raised the

7 issue on many occasions as I don't know for fact, but I understand that

8 Ambassador Walker did the same.

9 Q. Thank you. The other issue is this: We touched upon this

10 question, but we haven't completed it, KDOM as of the moment the

11 agreement was signed, conducted Verification Missions until the KVM was

12 formed. In the the month and a half they were in charge of verifying

13 whether the FRY was meeting the conditions of the agreement, transfer

14 weapons, warehousing of equipment, whether the weapons were being brought

15 out into fields, and various other issues; am I correct?

16 A. You are correct.

17 Q. Thank you.

18 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Let us look at page 3 of the

19 agreement, that is to say, item 3.

20 Q. Witness, am I right in saying that police forces had the right to

21 set up check-points in order to control traffic or to control and prevent

22 crime?

23 A. Correct.

24 Q. Did you know that the act of illegally possessing a fire-arm is a

25 criminal offence in Serbia?

Page 5351

1 A. I didn't, but I believe you.

2 Q. Smuggling of different types of goods which are of limited

3 supply, drugs, all those are offences. Why do you believe that setting

4 up check-points in that regard without discrimination, that is to say

5 that all persons passing through such check-points would be subjected to

6 checks, would that be a violation of the agreement?

7 A. I believe that the agreement actually said we should be notified

8 of any such activities.

9 Q. But the issue at hand are security in placements and we had

10 check-points and crime control points. This is regular traffic control

11 and crime control, why would you need to be notified of that?

12 A. It just says -- I mean, I'm just reading from the document:

13 "We will receive notification should circumstances lead to a

14 establishment of a roadblock other than for traffic or crime control."

15 It's very difficult to differentiate between what the purpose of

16 your roadblock is. And that's the difficulty; this is where the

17 difficulty came in. Is the roadblock purely to look for people smuggling

18 cigarettes, or is it something else? Is it to make the life of the

19 people intolerable?

20 Q. I fully agree that it is difficult, but according to the

21 agreement, such controls, such check-points were allowed, and you did not

22 need to be notified. I believe the only criterion that was to be applied

23 was that there was -- they were placed indiscriminately irrespective of

24 people's ethnicity, and that the purpose of such check-points was to

25 exercise control without prejudice.

Page 5352

1 A. Sorry, that's a statement. Do you want an answer from me?

2 Q. Yes, I do expect an answer. I'm asking you whether you agree

3 that as regards traffic checks and crime control, the

4 Verification Mission did not need to be notified pursuant to para 3?

5 A. According to para 3 that's correct.

6 Q. Thank you. Let us move to para 4 concerning the borders. There

7 were also interpretation problems whether that needed to be notified or

8 not. First we need to see what your interpretation was of the border

9 belt of 5 kilometres. Was the Verification Mission allowed to enter the

10 5 kilometre border belt without prior notification?

11 A. Yes. I said yes because the Verification Mission had access and

12 freedom of movement. This paragraph refers to visiting border controlled

13 units and accompanying them on the normal border control roles. It

14 doesn't say anything about us actually going into the border belt, which

15 as you well know at one point became as wide as 15 kilometres and grew

16 wider by the day as the end of March came closer.

17 Q. I would not agree with that, but I think it at times was as large

18 as 10 kilometres. In any case, let us go back to para 4. It says:

19 "... through areas of Kosovo away from the border."

20 That is the end of the first sentences. This para concerns the

21 areas away from the border.

22 A. It doesn't talk about access, it say that we will maintain

23 liaison about border control activities away from the border. Nothing

24 about access.

25 Q. Yes, but look at the next sentence, that such missions will be

Page 5353

1 conducted when invited by the FRY authorities or upon its request.

2 Therefore, there must have been a request. There should have been for

3 you to be able to do that.

4 A. Yes, a request was required from either side. However, it does

5 say:

6 "... to visit border control units and to accompany them on their

7 normal border patrols."

8 But the border belt, as you say, was enormous and so you couldn't

9 prevent us entering the border belt to see what was going on. We went

10 always looking to accompany patrols.

11 I didn't write these rules, and I didn't -- I didn't, sort of,

12 screw up the meaning of these -- of what was actually meant.

13 Unfortunately, many agreements are writing very badly.

14 Q. You just commented on the second part of the sentence, whereas

15 the initial part, the first part of the sentence it is stated that the

16 mission needed to be invited by the authorities or upon its request.

17 Therefore a request must precede a verification visit, do you agree?

18 JUDGE PARKER: A visit to a border control unit is the answer

19 given in the beginning. Mr. Djurdjic, I am getting increasingly

20 concerned at the time you are taking. You've got points to make. They

21 can be made far much quicker than they are. You've got a point here to

22 make about paragraph 4, you've made it. The witness has given his

23 comment which disagrees with your interpretation. No further questions

24 are going to change that. Move on to the next point, please, or we'll be

25 spending the whole day with this witness. Thank you.

Page 5354

1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. Very

2 well. I thought and believe that the witness was interpreting the

3 provisions fairly. In any case, I leave it up to you.

4 Q. Let us move on, witness.

5 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I will no longer need this

6 document. Could we please have P837 next.

7 Q. Witness, this is the Clark-Naumann agreement of the

8 25th October, 1998. Do you agree with me that the gist of this agreement

9 was basically the communique issued by the federal government in terms of

10 its obligations that it had undertaken? Do you agree with that?

11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Perhaps we should move on to the

12 communique itself. That is page 3 in the English. The Roman

13 numeral III, last sentence:

14 "However, state authorities as the last measure in keeping with

15 the principle of self-defence retain the right to respond appropriately

16 and adequately to any type of terrorist activity and breaking the law,

17 endangering the lives of citizens, and security of a state body's

18 employees."

19 JUDGE PARKER: Ms. Gopalan.

20 MS. GOPALAN: Your Honours, I'm not able to see the reference in

21 the agreement that Defence counsel is referring to on the screen. I

22 think it will assist us to have that.

23 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I would kindly ask the court clerk

24 to show us the Roman numeral III. It's the last sentence. It's the last

25 page. Yes.

Page 5355

1 THE WITNESS: Yes, I'm aware of this and the only thing that

2 doesn't apply is the word "proportionately."

3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Where do you find the word "proportionately"?

5 A. It says:

6 "... the State authorities retain the right to respond adequately

7 and proportionately to any form of terrorist activity or violation of

8 law, et cetera."

9 Q. Thank you. My question is this: Was this the basis that the FRY

10 forces could be employed when terrorist activities occur and when the KLA

11 jeopardized the lives and safety of civilians?

12 A. Absolutely.

13 Q. Thank you. You mentioned proportionality. Did you ever see a

14 single protest that was sent to the Yugoslav authorities because there

15 was a disproportionate use of force? Did you ever see such a document

16 sent by Mr. Walker?

17 A. I did not. But I know it was -- we preached this concept of

18 proportionality at almost every meeting we had with the commission.

19 Q. Thank you. However, we said it was only Mr. Walker who could

20 decide, following consultations with you, what a violation was and that

21 it was he who could forward a protest on behalf of the KVM; am I correct?

22 A. Correct. Or a delegated member of his team could, yes, on his

23 behalf.

24 Q. Thank you.

25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I would kindly ask for

Page 5356

1 document P -- I think this is a 65 ter document. 00677. Although, I'm

2 pretty sure it was admitted into evidence.

3 Q. You will recall this document, Witness. Yes, this is it. It

4 says 1(a) "Prizren District."

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Can you read out the part of the sentence or the sentence that

7 begins with "EUAG." Just that one single sentence out loud, please.

8 A. "EUAG observed several armed civilians. An OSCE patrol reported

9 a shooting in the village. Two dead male bodies and a wounded woman were

10 found. Details to follow."

11 Q. Thank you. That suffices. First of all, can you tell us what

12 the acronym EUAG stands for, if you recall?

13 A. Yes, I've looked at this a few times, and I just cannot at all,

14 unless it observes to -- refers to some sort of EU mission that was based

15 in Belgrade. I have no idea. An unknown acronym to me.

16 Q. Thank you. Did you know that KLA members also operated in

17 civilian clothes?

18 A. I do, and they didn't really have a uniform as such, the KLA.

19 Q. Thank you. What conclusion do you arrive at based on this

20 formulation when it says the EUAG observed several armed civilians?

21 A. It's impossible to tell from this whether it refers to Serb or

22 Albanians.

23 Q. Thank you. On Friday, when the Prosecutor asked you about this,

24 you said that this referred to some Serbs. That is why I was asking you

25 this since there was no indication as to who it referred to, and we

Page 5357

1 didn't see any evidence of that. In any case, thank you.

2 Could you tell me something about the acronym SITCEN, what does

3 it stand for?

4 A. That's the situation centre.

5 Q. Thank you. Whose situation centre?

6 A. Where is the reference to this, sorry, so I can see what context

7 it's mentioned in?

8 Q. It is in the context of the OSCE report. It says to be delivered

9 to the deputy head of mission and Mr. DZ, and then it says SITCEN.

10 JUDGE PARKER: That is not on the screen.

11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Very well. We can have that

12 placed on the screen at this --

13 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Djurdjic please repeat the number of

14 the document.

15 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] It is document 65 ter 00650, last

16 page.

17 JUDGE PARKER: For the record, the last document the witness

18 commented on was Exhibit P839.

19 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. I apologise, the

20 previous document was P389.

21 JUDGE PARKER: 839.

22 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] 839, yes. Could we please have

23 the last page.

24 Q. This says distribution. From the top, the second abbreviation is

25 SITCEN.

Page 5358

1 A. Right. Sorry. I would have initially guessed that the situation

2 centre would have been the fusion centre, but there must be another

3 organisation that slipped my mind completely. The situation centre is an

4 organisation, I presume, within the OSCE that monitored the current

5 situation. I thought it was the fusion cell, but.

6 Q. Was it perhaps the situation centre of the NATO staff or

7 headquarters?

8 A. We didn't have NATO as one of our places that we distributed our

9 documents to, so I thought it would have said NATO's SITCEN or saying

10 similar, but it doesn't say that. I don't believe that we sent anything

11 to NATO like this.

12 Also, these -- this would be an internal distribution, otherwise

13 it would say external distribution as well. So if it's just

14 distribution, it insinuates it's an internal distribution. Only these

15 people within the organisation, the headquarters of the OSCE, would

16 receive it; liaison, current ops, fusion.

17 Q. Thank you. Witness, you are familiar with the statement of

18 Mr. Afrim Aziri from the previous cases. Can you tell me what jobs, what

19 tasks this Mr. Afrim Aziri performed for the KVM while he was in Kosovo?

20 A. Mr. Aziri was originally General DZ's driver, and then he became

21 my driver for tasks basically around Pristina.

22 Q. Thank you. Is it correct that you enabled him to receive KLA fax

23 messages via your friends who were in Macedonia?

24 A. The only thing that Mr. Aziri helped us with was before we left,

25 he spent some time giving me the plan and the information of how the

Page 5359

1 airfield -- military airfield in Pristina was organised.

2 Q. I want to ask you about the time after the 24th that you enabled

3 him to receive fax messages from the KLA in Macedonia?

4 A. Are we talking now about the time after the mission had left

5 Kosovo?

6 Q. Yes.

7 A. Well, having -- in the last -- in the Milutinovic et al. trial

8 I've been show the letter that Mr. Aziri had written. I've already

9 commented on this. And I had nothing to do with any fax messages or

10 anything he was doing for anyone while he was sitting in Macedonia.

11 Q. Thank you. And do you know whether he was in contact with

12 Mr. David Meyer?

13 A. Well, Afrim was always trying to do something to help the KLA,

14 and I mean, we had -- we used to sit and have coffee together in one of

15 the hotels in Macedonia, Afrim and David Meyer, and myself, and a few

16 others; and Afrim kept -- often would talk about trying to do something

17 to help the KLA. But we had no need of that type of help because we had

18 our own ways of finding out what was happening in Kosovo after we had

19 left.

20 Q. Thank you. And can you tell us about this own way you had of

21 receiving information about developments in Kosovo after the

22 24th of March?

23 A. Yes, NATO had its own people in Kosovo throughout.

24 Q. Do you mean inside the KLA?

25 A. No, NATO had its own, as anyone would -- I mean, it's a normal

Page 5360

1 thing you do when you are carrying out a campaign or a bombing campaign

2 you're going to carry out later on, you'd have somebody on the ground, if

3 you can, one of our own highly trained NATO soldiers, nothing to do with

4 the OSCE, who would be actually providing targeting data for NATO,

5 observing what is on the ground. Isn't that what good armies do?

6 Q. They certainly do, but through forces on the ground, not through

7 their own soldiers. But do you know if there was a direct contact

8 between the KLA headquarters and NATO forces in Macedonia and Albania?

9 A. I have no idea. I mean, I was attached as a liaison officer by

10 the OSCE to NATO. I wasn't part of the NATO staff.

11 Q. I understand that, but I asked not about yourself, but in general

12 terms. Do you know about that?

13 A. I can't know about that. I mean, I wasn't in a position to know

14 that.

15 Q. Can you explain what was the substance of your function as KVM in

16 Macedonia after the war started, after the 24th of March, 1999?

17 A. Well, I had several functions. I was work along with the UNHCR

18 and making sure -- looking at the refugees and helping the refugees,

19 helping set up the camps. I was also as -- in my liaison function

20 between NATO and --

21 Q. I am sorry, I am sorry, I have to interrupt you. I'm interested

22 exclusively in your connection with NATO. I know from your statement

23 about what you did, but I'm interested in the connection between the KVM

24 and NATO and exactly what was the job of the liaison officer.

25 A. Every day I attended a NATO briefing along with other NGOs where

Page 5361

1 I was able to take notes of what was going on in general with a mission,

2 the operation, and I was able to put questions as well if we had any

3 questions about building refugee camps, helping refugees, and so on. It

4 was not a military activity. It was a coordinating activity. As at that

5 time, NATO was spending a lot of its time building refugee camps.

6 Q. At the same time it was bombing Yugoslavia. And you, as a member

7 of the KVM, an international organisation, were communicating with the

8 organisation that was at war with the FRY?

9 A. I was attending briefing meetings in the morning. I don't know

10 what you mean I was communicating or collaborating with the -- with NATO.

11 Q. Well, I asked you to explain to me the substance of that

12 connection. But tell me, who was the liaison officer? Who was liaising

13 within the KVM with the authorities of Yugoslavia at that time?

14 A. I believe there was one contact between the OSCE mission in

15 Macedonia when I think I wrote a letter or, I spoke on the telephone to

16 General Loncar about something, I can't remember what it was, but I don't

17 think there was very much negotiation at our level. If there was

18 negotiation going on, it would have been at the Vienna level, not at our

19 level.

20 Q. Thank you. I'm only talking about the KVM, the

21 Verification Mission, not the Vienna level or the higher levels of the

22 OSCE. I'm talking about the same level on which you were communicating

23 on a daily basis with NATO. Did anyone on behalf of the KVM in Macedonia

24 or Albania communicate on a daily basis with the authorities of the FRY?

25 A. Not to my knowledge. Not to my knowledge.

Page 5362

1 Q. Thank you. According to the documentation that I have, in your

2 work you also communicated with Mr. Kotur?

3 A. Correct.

4 Q. Do you remember recognising on the footage, the equipment and

5 weapons belonging to the KLA? Equipment bearing a visible emblem of the

6 FBI, on caps?

7 A. Which footage? There was a -- I have a vague memory of seeing

8 somebody once with a -- someone in the KLA with an FBI hat, but I can't

9 remember where it was.

10 Q. That was in Pristina, if I may remind you, at the meeting with

11 Mr. Kotur.

12 A. And what was the footage? I'm sorry.

13 Q. I suppose it was actually photographs that were shown to you.

14 A. Fine. There is a vague memory of this.

15 Q. Thank you. And do you remember the comment, that the message of

16 the photo was clear in view of that emblem?

17 MS. GOPALAN: Your Honours.

18 JUDGE PARKER: Ms. Gopalan.

19 MS. GOPALAN: The witness has already said that he only has a

20 vague memory of these photographs, and he is now being asked further

21 questions about the photograph in question. I wonder if it's possible

22 for Defence counsel to show the witness the photograph in order to aid

23 him in answering the question.

24 JUDGE PARKER: Do you have the reference?

25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I don't have the

Page 5363

1 photograph. I've just reminding the witness of a conversation about that

2 photograph. He said he had a vague memory, and I am asking him whether

3 he remembered the conclusion of that conversation, if he remembers what

4 he --

5 JUDGE PARKER: [Previous translation continues] ... the

6 conversation, Mr. Djurdjic.

7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. Ciaglinski and Mr. Kotur.

8 I've already said that, at the beginning.

9 JUDGE PARKER: Are you putting to the witness that he had a

10 conversation with Mr. Kotur in which it was suggested that the presence

11 of an FBI hat was sending a very clear message? Is that what you are

12 putting?

13 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I only asked if he remembered

14 something like that being said as a conclusion when he was shown the

15 photograph. He said he remembered vaguely the photograph, now I'm asking

16 if he remembers the conclusion. I'm not trying to influence the witness.

17 I'm just asking if he recalls it or not, and then maybe later I'll

18 explain.

19 JUDGE PARKER: You are obscuring completely, as far as I'm

20 concerned at the moment what you are at, but perhaps, Colonel, you can

21 help us. Do you remember any comment about a hat in that conversation?

22 THE WITNESS: I can't. I could probably try and sort of put a

23 meaning on to it now, but I'm not sure if that's the meaning that would

24 have applied at the time, Your Honour.

25 JUDGE PARKER: Your own interpretation or imagination is not

Page 5364

1 something we are searching for today.

2 There you are, Mr. Djurdjic. Now, do you want to move on from

3 there?

4 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] No problem. I just tried to jog

5 the witness's memory.

6 Q. Is it true that you brought back some, or rather, sent back some

7 verifiers because they were reporting in a biased way?

8 A. I personally didn't, but I believe that a number of verifiers

9 were sent home for being biased, yes.

10 Q. Now, when I'm asking you these questions about the mission, I

11 know that you did not personally work in administration, but I'm asking

12 you about some personal knowledge that you may perhaps have. I don't

13 mean to imply that it was part of your own duties.

14 A. Yes, I understand.

15 Q. Witness, would you be so kind as to tell us something about your

16 visit to Decani on the 15th of January and what happened there, who were

17 you with and what happened?

18 A. It's quite a long story, but I'll try to make it shorter. The

19 actual plan was that on the -- on that date, the VJ -- sorry, the MUP

20 were going to exchange personnel at a forward observation post between

21 Decani and Jablanica and this was well inside what the KLA considered to

22 be their territory. And to ensure the safety of the personnel of the

23 MUP, they were going to be supported quite heavily with VJ and other

24 assets. And this looked as if it was going to become quite ugly, and it

25 could have turned up -- turned into another confrontation, armed

Page 5365

1 confrontation.

2 And so I spent the entire day negotiating with the MUP and with

3 the KLA, with Ramush Haradinaj, personally, to ensure that this thing

4 went smoothly and try to explain to everyone that it wasn't a

5 reinforcement but it was a exchange of personnel and the status quo would

6 remain the same. All went well until we actually tried to do the

7 procedure. After driving down this track for a few of kilometres, two of

8 my vehicles were leading, I was in the second vehicle, and we were

9 followed by a truck with a MUP personnel in it, and behind me I had

10 another vehicle belonging to the KVM. And unfortunately we came under

11 fire.

12 We were attacked and two of my personnel were wounded. And it

13 transpired that the firers were not Serb, but they were actually KLA

14 fighters who had a personal grudge against the OSCE. I think originally,

15 it was incorrectly reported as an attack by Serbian forces, but that was

16 later corrected.

17 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May I now call up Exhibit

18 65 ter 00637. Second page, please.

19 Q. Witness, is this a press release by the KLA regarding this

20 incident of the 15th of January, you just discussed?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Thank you.

23 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this

24 document.

25 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.

Page 5366

1 THE REGISTRAR: That will be assigned D00161, Your Honours.

2 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. May I now call up

3 65 ter 00638.

4 Q. Witness, this is another press release regarding the events of

5 the 8th of January at Dulje. Can you tell me what you know about this

6 incident?

7 A. I think basically what it says on the press release.

8 Q. Do you know that? Were you informed?

9 A. I wasn't there, so it was just what I read and what I had heard

10 about it.

11 Q. Does this press release reflect what you heard at the time?

12 A. I believe so, and we, I mean, Colonel Mijatovic -- whenever there

13 was such an attack took place would come to the meetings in the morning

14 at 10.00 and brief me about these incidents, yes.

15 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. I would like to tender

16 this as well.

17 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.

18 THE REGISTRAR: That will be assigned D00162, Your Honours.

19 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May I now call for 65 ter 00643.

20 Q. Do you know and were you involved in an incident of

21 hostage-taking by the KLA on the 8th of January in Stari Trg?

22 A. I'm pretty sure I heard about it, but I don't think I was

23 involved in it.

24 Q. Thank you.

25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] It's page 3 in this document.

Page 5367

1 Q. It says: 10.05 "Lieutenant-Colonel Ciaglinski called up DZ to

2 inform that verifiers were on the ground only 5 minutes away from VJ

3 positions."

4 A. Sorry, I need to read, I mean, I haven't seen this document for

5 some time, if ever. You threw this thing at me, I can't remember

6 immediately if I was there, involved, knew about it, read about it. Is

7 this the incident where the VJ soldiers were captured? Is this the one?

8 Right. Okay.

9 Q. It has to do with the eight soldiers.

10 A. Right. I remember now, yes, sorry, I was involved, quite

11 closely, intimately.

12 Q. And I see that you informed General DZ at least twice because you

13 were on the ground?

14 A. Probably.

15 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I suggest that this document be

16 also admitted into evidence.

17 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.

18 THE REGISTRAR: That will be assigned D00163, Your Honours.

19 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. I'd like to refresh your memory now about these inspections of

21 border areas. Do you remember that, among other things, you spoke to

22 Mr. Tomislav Mladenovic on the Yugoslav side?

23 A. I can't remember, but it's possible.

24 Q. According to my information, he was deputy head of the

25 coordination team of the federal government in Pristina. Did you have a

Page 5368

1 meeting with him on the 18th of January regarding border inspections and

2 that this gentleman, or perhaps someone else you don't remember by name,

3 warned you that verifiers were still coming to the border area without

4 prior notification, and he said that every such visit needed to be

5 notified in advance?

6 A. We had several such meetings, so it's -- what you are saying

7 almost certainly happened, but exactly with whom and what date, I can't

8 remember.

9 Q. Thank you. According to the information I have, you replied that

10 you had your instructions about the procedure for border inspections and

11 that you had agreed a joint inspection with Colonel Kotur, which

12 inspection had been postponed because of the kidnapping of VJ soldiers,

13 and you were engaged personally in attempts to free them.

14 A. I remember that, yes.

15 Q. Thank you. Do you recall that on that occasion you said you were

16 visiting KLA prisoners in jail in Nis, and that you were satisfied with

17 the way they were treated?

18 A. In general, yes.

19 Q. Thank you.

20 MS. GOPALAN: Your Honours.

21 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Ms. Gopalan.

22 MS. GOPALAN: The witness is being referred to previous

23 information, occasions that he spoke or information that the Defence

24 counsel has. I wonder if it will assist if the source of such

25 information is provided, whether it's a document or statement of prior

Page 5369

1 testimony.

2 JUDGE PARKER: Clearly, Ms. Gopalan is at a disadvantage trying

3 to pick up if there is a reference to these incidents, Mr. Djurdjic. You

4 are simply asking the witness whether he recalls something. If you have

5 a particular documentary reference, it would help if you could give that.

6 Thank you.

7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I have my notes of

8 the conversation, that's why I'm not showing them. I'm asking the

9 witness if he remembers the conversation. The notes originate from third

10 persons, and I'm just asking the witness to confirm whether something is

11 correct or not. What I have are notes, not witness statements, so I

12 can't use them with the witness.

13 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, that clarifies the matter.

14 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

15 Q. We discussed something on Friday, and I told you I found a

16 reference in your documents to the fact that you prepared several times

17 for evacuation from the FRY. And in something written by Mr. Wilson, I

18 read the recommendation to all verifiers that they should have a suitcase

19 packed at every -- at all times.

20 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May I call up now D003-0860.

21 Q. I don't know if you know this document. It's dated

22 22nd January, 1999, and it concerns plans for evacuation of Kosovo

23 verifiers from Kosovo. Are you familiar with this document?

24 A. Yes. Mm-hmm. I've seen it before.

25 Q. Thank God at that time there was no need for an evacuation;

Page 5370

1 right? On the 22nd of January. You remained in the territory of

2 Kosova and Metohija. Generally speaking, were you happy with your

3 withdrawal when you made decisions on it on the 17th and the 20th? And I

4 have in mind the way you were treated by FRY forces during your

5 withdrawal.

6 A. It's relevant of, you know, what the situation at the time is.

7 Every international organisation has to have a withdrawal plan from any

8 theatre. Recently in Georgia, nobody was threatening us, but we had a

9 plan to withdraw and how we would withdraw from Georgia as a mission if

10 we had to. The situation was degenerating things were becoming more

11 difficult, and we believed that it was imperative to have an evacuation

12 plan that everybody was happy with and prepared for, so -- because if

13 the -- once the evacuation was announced, should it be necessary, then it

14 had to happen very quickly, within hours, not within days or weeks. And

15 we're not dealing with, I told you before, purely military personnel on

16 this mission, there are a lot of the personnel were civilians who had

17 very little experience with missions.

18 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. I seek to tender this

19 document, Your Honour.

20 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, it will be received.

21 THE REGISTRAR: That will be assigned D00164, Your Honours.

22 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Witness, while you were in Kosovo until the 24th, do you know of

24 any situations in which certain villages were vacant of their Albanian

25 population because that population had joined the KLA?

Page 5371

1 A. No, I did not personally, no.

2 Q. Thank you. Given that you are very familiar with

3 Kosova and Metohija during the relevant time, could you tell me this:

4 Where was the focus of all activity in Kosovo, and I don't mean the

5 Verification Mission, but the forces of the FRY and KLA?

6 A. Well, there were certain pockets, as you well know, of activity,

7 there was a pocket in Podujevo; and to the west of it, there would have

8 been pockets in Stimlje, there would have been Orahovac, I mean, all over

9 the place there were pockets, Jablanica where Haradinaj had his

10 headquarters. That was a little area to the -- not exactly Jablanica

11 because that's where he was, but on the peripheries of that area. So

12 yes, there were many areas where the KLA had activity and the VJ and MUP

13 had an interest.

14 Q. Would you agree with me that for the most part activities took

15 place in the villages?

16 A. That's where most of the damage and fighting took place, yes.

17 Q. Can you describe for me the yard of a typical countryside

18 Albanian home?

19 A. Well, it depends if you are talking about one of the larger homes

20 with a wall around it and a number of dwellings inside. But normally

21 there were animals, there were haystack, wood piled up, hay piled up.

22 Animals, pigs, chickens -- no pigs, chickens. What else would you like?

23 Q. I'm not interested in that. I'm interested in the walls. What

24 were the walls made of and of what height were they?

25 A. Well, they varied a lot but, I mean, some of the bigger

Page 5372

1 properties had quite tall walls, over 2 metres, and quite solid. I never

2 personally examined the wall to see if it was made of rocks or mud, but I

3 was aware that the walls were there.

4 Q. Thank you. During your preparations to go to Kosovo, were you

5 told anything about the percentages of Albanian population in the

6 country-side?

7 A. I'm not sure what you mean by country-side, but we were told

8 where major population areas were, and these were mainly rural people,

9 agricultural people living off the land, so we knew that they were all

10 over the place.

11 Q. Thank you. Witness, do you recall that in February 1999 - and

12 whether you were familiar with it - that there was an incident between

13 Lipovica and Magore which is 20 kilometres from Pristina, a police column

14 was ambushed by the KLA during which 15 policemen were injured?

15 A. Again, vague recollections. I can't remember exactly. But the

16 name Magore is somehow indelibly marked on my brain, so please reminds

17 me.

18 Q. Yes. There was a meeting with Colonel Kotur. He told you about

19 it, and then you checked that over the phone and eventually confirmed his

20 allegations. The verifiers confirmed that on the spot. Do you remember

21 that?

22 A. Vaguely, yeah.

23 Q. Thank you. Do you remember notifying Mr. Kotur about the visit

24 of Mr. Vollebaek, presiding officer of the OSCE? During that visit you

25 also acquainted Mr. Vollebaek with the Serb position resulting in

Page 5373

1 Mr. Kotur being satisfied with the information you shared with

2 Mr. Vollebaek?

3 A. Again, I can't remember exactly what was said or done. Again, I

4 remember that there was the -- Vollebaek came occasionally, and I might

5 have said something about this. I just can't remember that, I'm sorry.

6 Q. Very well. Do you remember your position that it was possible

7 that the KLA by provoking wanting to create conditions by a NATO

8 intervention?

9 A. This was something I occasionally heard people discussing, that

10 it would be in their interest to create a situation which would force

11 someone else to intervene in the Kosovo crisis.

12 Q. Am I right in saying that on that occasion you stated that

13 Great Britain was not a KLA mentor?

14 A. I always said that, A, we had nothing to do with the KLA and

15 didn't in any way sponsor it or their terrorism, but I also, I believe,

16 mentioned that - and I said this on several occasions - that our

17 defence minister at the time I think it was Lord Robertson said that the

18 UK had no intention of sponsoring or supporting any NATO attack on

19 Kosovo. So I said if you are considering doing this to entice NATO to

20 come, you are barking up the wrong tree because we have no intention ever

21 of -- well, not me personally, but our UK government has no intention of

22 supporting a NATO action here.

23 Q. Thank you.

24 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we please have D003-0867 next.

25 This was not translated. In any case, I wanted to read out a part of it.

Page 5374

1 Q. This is an Official Note of a meeting held in Pristina on the

2 9th of February, 1999. In attendance was Richard Heaslip I think, if I'm

3 pronouncing that right, and Major-General Sretan Lukic.

4 Concerning what we have just discussed here, I wanted to say that

5 on that occasion, General Lukic informed Mr. Heaslip that the police had

6 information on the number of policemen at Kosovo that was forwarded to

7 the American KDOM. Once the agreement was signed, they had a role in the

8 OSCE, and they were also involved in the police withdrawal. They were

9 also forwarded a patrol map of the police and the different check-points

10 envisaged by the annex of the agreement, were you familiar with these

11 facts?

12 A. I wasn't aware of that meeting. I mean, that was a meeting I

13 probably wasn't at.

14 Q. Sir, there were many meetings, but I'm short on time and I cannot

15 go through all of them. In any case, such meetings were held between

16 representatives of the Kosovar Verification Mission and the police, and

17 you were not in attendance. There must be 20 or 30 of them, however, I

18 don't believe they are that important. Am I right in saying that other

19 people from KVM had meetings with police representatives in Pristina and

20 that you only attended those meetings which involved Mr. Loncar and the

21 army?

22 A. No, I attended the meetings of the Cooperation Commission daily

23 in Pristina, but I told you before in my evidence that there were

24 meetings between the police, it was Guy Sands, I believe, originally he

25 used to go and have meetings with the MUP; and later on February, March,

Page 5375

1 I believe General Heaslip was talking to the MUP, yes. But the official

2 organ of exchange of information was the Commission.

3 Q. Thank you.

4 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] My infallible associate just told

5 me that I had wrong information and that indeed we do have a translation

6 of this document. Therefore, I seek to tender it.

7 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.

8 THE REGISTRAR: That will be assigned D00165, Your Honours.

9 JUDGE PARKER: Do I take it you have more questions,

10 Mr. Djurdjic?

11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Yes, I have some documents left.

12 I'm going through the documents. I wanted to show them to the witness

13 and then ...

14 [Trial Chamber confers]

15 JUDGE PARKER: Very well. We must adjourn now for the second

16 break, Mr. Djurdjic. You may continue after the break, but I hope you

17 use the break to concentrate down to the matters that are important.

18 There must be time for re-examination of this witness so that he finishes

19 today. Thank you.

20 We resume at 5 minutes past 6.00.

21 [The witness stands down]

22 --- Recess taken at 5.37 p.m.

23 --- On resuming at 6.07 p.m.

24 MS. GOPALAN: Your Honours.

25 JUDGE PARKER: Ms. Gopalan.

Page 5376

1 MS. GOPALAN: While the witness is being brought in, I have a

2 procedural matter to raise.

3 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.

4 MS. GOPALAN: I should have raised this before the break, and I

5 wasn't sufficiently speedy. My apologies for that. This is to do with

6 the admission into evidence of D00165. And although it's been admitted,

7 we would like to object to its admission simply because we believe that a

8 sufficient basis hasn't been established for the document to be admitted

9 into evidence.

10 A part of it was read out. We subsequently were told that an

11 English translation was available, but in terms of the witness's comments

12 on the document, he said he wasn't aware of the meeting in question and

13 that it wasn't a meeting that he probably attended. That would be his

14 extent of information on that document which is not very much, and that

15 would be the basis of our objection.

16 JUDGE PARKER: We'll consider this as some later time. We want

17 to be sure to finish the witness.

18 MS. GOPALAN: Thank you, Your Honours.

19 [The witness takes the stand]

20 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Djurdjic.

21 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

22 May I now call for Exhibit P841.

23 Q. Witness, you recognise this photograph, you said it was your

24 photograph. I'd like to ask you, What prevented you from filming such

25 documents that we don't see on this photograph?

Page 5377

1 A. It was just -- it was a large presence of Serbian security

2 forces, and I didn't really want to, sort of, annoy or upset people. I

3 mean, to give you an example, I already had an experience around this

4 time where I was threatened by some VJ soldiers with being shot just for

5 being in the wrong place elsewhere.

6 Q. Did you expose yourself to danger when making this photograph?

7 A. No, I didn't think so.

8 Q. What is your assessment of that documentation that was burnt?

9 What kind of documents were they?

10 A. They were all sorts. I took out several handfuls, and it was

11 application forms, documents, passports, ID cards.

12 Q. Now, I'd like to ask you, How come you were not afraid to take

13 those IDs and you were afraid to make photos?

14 A. Because I went behind the vehicle where I couldn't be seen where

15 I was taking those documents out of the pile of rubbish that was still

16 there, that was smouldering. You couldn't see me. You notice if I step

17 behind the vehicle, someone from the side here cannot see me. So I

18 opened the back of the car, you know, to make it look as if I was doing

19 something else, got a few handfuls of paper, and took them with me, put

20 them in the car.

21 Q. Why didn't you photograph them then?

22 A. I don't know. Because it was easier for me to just pick up some

23 handfuls of stuff and put -- at the time I thought it was a good idea to

24 just take some of the documents and put them in the car.

25 Q. Thank you. Would you agree that that building was supposed to be

Page 5378

1 turned over to the successor of the KVM or KFOR, whoever?

2 A. Well, I understand that certainly not the KVM - because the KVM

3 went back into the original building, I believe, where the OSCE was

4 before, which is up the road from this location - but I believe that some

5 agreement had been made for NATO to use part of this building.

6 Q. Is it normal for archives that are no longer necessary to be

7 destroyed?

8 A. I can't answer that question. I don't know.

9 Q. Thank you. When the KVM was evacuating from Pristina, did you

10 destroy archived material that you didn't want to carry with you?

11 A. We destroyed everything that, regardless of what it was, all

12 paperwork was shredded except what we could take out with us on disks or

13 hard drives. But for a different reason, it wasn't because it wasn't

14 needed, it was impossible to carry it all.

15 Q. Have you ever seen a single document of those that you took away

16 during any of the proceedings where you appeared as a witness?

17 A. Do you mean did I look at the documents that I took away? Yes, I

18 did. And I discussed it with the interpreter who looked at the documents

19 to tell me what they were.

20 Q. No, I'm asking you, Were you shown any of those documents that

21 you took away in the Milosevic trial or the Milutinovic trial, or in

22 these past two days in this courtroom?

23 A. No.

24 Q. Thank you. Let's stay on that period. You said you arrived

25 after the 13th of June. Do you know how many Serbs left Kosovo after the

Page 5379

1 NATO arrived in June 1999?

2 A. Thousands, I presume. I don't know exactly, but DZ and I spent a

3 lot of our time going around Kosovo trying to persuade the Serbian

4 population to remain.

5 Q. Were there any professional officers, professional policemen, who

6 lived in Kosovo and worked there?

7 A. There were. Of course there were professional policemen and

8 soldiers who lived in Kosovo, yes.

9 Q. Did they have to withdraw from Kosovo when the NATO forces

10 arrived under the agreement?

11 A. I honestly don't know, but I know that people like Colonel Kotur,

12 who was a professional officer, was trying to get me to help him to

13 retain his apartment in Kosovo. So I don't know if everybody in the VJ

14 had to leave, including people who actually were living there normally.

15 I don't know.

16 Q. I can't believe you don't know something like that. But let me

17 tell you, under the agreement, all the troops and the police of the FRY

18 had to leave Kosovo with a proviso that one day when the conditions are

19 ripe, a thousand of them come back to the border.

20 You said that troops and policemen were carrying looted property

21 on their way out of Kosovo, how do you know that they were carrying

22 looted property? How do you know that they were not carrying their own

23 property as they would have had to leave Kosovo?

24 A. Well, because I would have found it unlikely that virtually every

25 vehicle that was leaving was covered in some sort of personal property.

Page 5380

1 If what you are say is true, then a few of them would have been carrying

2 personal possessions such as wardrobes, refrigerators, and so on. But

3 not every vehicle. I mean, there were so many vehicles going out with

4 this type of equipment strapped to the top of it.

5 Q. Well, they had to move their entire moveable property from Kosovo

6 to Serbia, refrigerators, TV sets, furniture, depending on the type of

7 vehicle they had. By the way, if you were on the border with Macedonia,

8 didn't you see Albanians come in with truckfuls and tractorfuls of

9 possessions when you were there in April 1999?

10 A. I would say that people who were leaving Kosovo at that time

11 going to Macedonia, most of them came with nothing except a suitcase.

12 Q. Very well. Thank you. I'd now like to come back to one incident

13 you told us about when verifiers were mistreated at the border in

14 contravention to the Vienna Agreement and the other covenants that were

15 signed.

16 Do you know that the FRY lodged in a protest to the mission

17 because of the conduct of personnel at the border with Macedonia on the

18 25th and 26th of February, 1999?

19 A. Well, there were accusations flying in both directions.

20 Q. Yes. But would you agree with me that first in two out of three

21 vehicles of the KVM there were no verifiers, only drivers who were

22 Yugoslav nationals?

23 A. Well, we used local drivers, whether they were Albanians or

24 Serbs. It was normal for the mission to use those sort of drivers. And

25 it's normal in every embassy in the world that it's locals who are

Page 5381

1 employed as drivers, but the vehicles still have diplomatic immunity.

2 Q. Witness, you know very well what I said. Yugoslav nationals,

3 regardless of ethnicity. But in those vehicles there were no members of

4 the mission, whereas under the agreement at least one member of the KVM

5 had to be in a KVM vehicle, the vehicle was not supposed to cross the

6 border with just the driver in it.

7 A. I wasn't aware of such a regulation.

8 Q. Thank you. Do you know that on the containers carried by those

9 vehicles, there were no diplomatic markings. There was no proper

10 inventory as envisaged by the Vienna Convention?

11 A. If it's a cargo vehicle, then I can understand you talking about

12 inventories, but ordinary diplomatic vehicles normally with diplomatic

13 personnel in them don't require this type of inventory.

14 Q. And do you know that among other things those vehicles carried

15 optical sights, a case for a pistol, chemical and other substances, and

16 other equipment that were subject to declaration?

17 A. I am aware of the pistol case being sent because there was always

18 a discussion whether the body-guards for the ambassador or for senior

19 members of the mission should be armed. And that was never allowed. And

20 although this pistol case might have come, it's a leather pouch, but

21 there was no pistol, and no one had arms. Chemicals, what chemicals?

22 Are we talking about Sarin? I doubt. Maybe bleach or chemicals for

23 photography or photocopiers, optical sights or binoculars? I don't know

24 what you mean by this.

25 Q. Regardless, medical and chemical substances must be declared at

Page 5382

1 the border. In this specific case, the persons who were at the border

2 did not do that.

3 A. Well, I'm pretty sure that if the vehicle is coming in with

4 diplomatic personnel, and in the case of this - I know for a fact - in

5 the case of this leather holster for the weapon, the diplomats, the KVM

6 members, were actually in their vehicles. I don't believe it has to

7 provide any inventory at all of what is in that vehicle. The vehicle is

8 not subject to search.

9 Q. Witness, in the introductory part, I told you that two members of

10 the Kosovo Verification Mission were in one vehicle, whereas the other

11 two vehicles held no members of the mission, just Yugoslav drivers; and

12 under the Vienna Convention, the goods in the vehicles needed to be

13 declared, that's why a protest was lodged to the federal commission for

14 the -- for cooperation of the FRY.

15 Never mind. Do you know that on the 25th of February a KLA

16 action to the south-west of Kacanik was noted and DZ put in his comment:

17 "The first appearance of the KLA in this area."

18 A. I remember, yes, something about this, yes.

19 JUDGE PARKER: Ms. Gopalan.

20 MS. GOPALAN: Your Honours, perhaps the source of this comment

21 could be provided.

22 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic?

23 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I just said chronology, item 112,

24 25th February, 1999.

25 Q. Witness, I'm interested in something else. This was just a

Page 5383

1 reference. Can you explain why the KLA appeared in this area on the 25th

2 of February, which was followed by a series of other incidents? I'm

3 asking you as an intelligence officer.

4 A. Speculation again. There was a void, they were filling a void,

5 an empty space that provided an opportunity. Kacanik is a strategically

6 important area, obviously, so maybe that's the reason they might have

7 been there.

8 Q. Do you know that the Kacanik canyon, the Kacanik gorge, is the

9 only passage to the FRY and when NATO reaches Urosevac they need not stop

10 before Belgrade anymore?

11 A. You are assuming of course, that NATO was going to come through

12 Kacanik, and it wasn't going to go straight from Kumanovo and straight up

13 from that way. Much easier and less troublesome than going through a

14 narrow gorge, if they are heading for Belgrade.

15 Q. I don't know if I was interpreted correctly. I meant when they

16 were going from Macedonia when they passed the Kacanik gorge and reach

17 Urosevac there are no more obstacles towards Belgrade and that would be

18 the strategic path for NATO if an aggression occurs.

19 A. It's certainly one way of NATO entering, but it was the most

20 dangerous and the one that would have caused the greatest number of

21 casualties, and I believe NATO had other options as well.

22 Q. Thank you. And do you know anything about Operation Arrow and

23 the cooperation between the KLA and NATO?

24 A. No.

25 Q. Thank you.

Page 5384

1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May I now call for 6D -- sorry.

2 Never mind.

3 Q. Do you remember, Mr. Ciaglinski, the meeting of the 5th of March

4 with Colonel Ademovic at the MUP headquarters in Pristina?

5 A. I think so, vaguely again, but I need reminding.

6 Q. That was on the 5th of March. It had to do with the protest

7 launched to the Verification Mission claiming that it obstructed passage

8 on the road Pristina-Pec.

9 A. I'm still no wiser at the moment.

10 Q. Very well. Thank you. And do you recall that on the

11 10th of March you spoke to Colonel Kotur and that you told him that in

12 Kacanik and Ivaje some houses were damaged but that was far from what the

13 KLA was claiming and what certain media reported? And you said there

14 were witnesses on the ground who would deny such claims of the KLA in

15 their reports.

16 A. I remember it well.

17 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] My last question and my last

18 document: 65 ter 00641. It's an evaluation of the KLA positions as of

19 15th March, 1999, by Mr. Wilson.

20 Q. But that's not what I want to ask you. I'm interested in item

21 4(a). 4(a), do you see this passage:

22 "In the course of preparations for the operation, brigade

23 commander of the KLA for this area did not allow the UNHCR to evacuate

24 displaced persons. This was interpreted as a cynical attempt to use

25 Albanian civilians as human shields."

Page 5385

1 Do you remember this?

2 A. No.

3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] All right. This is already an

4 exhibit. I would in fact have a lot more to discuss with you, Colonel,

5 but thank you for your answers. I must leave some time for the

6 Prosecution as well. Thank you, Your Honours, for your patience. I have

7 completed my cross-examination.

8 May I just tender 65 ter 650.

9 JUDGE PARKER: Which is that one? What is that?

10 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] That's the document dated

11 26 February -- [in English] 26 February 1999 to 14 March 1999.

12 Organisation for Security and Cooperation. [Interpretation] That's lines

13 -- sorry, pages of the transcript 40 and 41.

14 JUDGE PARKER: The reference you have seems to be a document

15 dated the 23rd of December, 1998. Is that the one that you meant?

16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Yes. My infallible assistant is

17 correcting me again. I was wrong. In any case, I don't want to take up

18 any time. Let's leave this to Ms. Gopalan, and I will seek to tender

19 this particular document through another witness.

20 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.

21 You re-examine, Ms. Gopalan.

22 Re-examination by Ms. Gopalan:

23 Q. Good afternoon, sir. I have a few questions for you arising from

24 Defence counsel's cross-examination. I'd first like to begin with

25 document P839. In the interest of time, I don't think it's necessary to