1 Thursday, 4 June 2009
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.
5 [The witness takes the stand]
6 JUDGE PARKER: Good morning, General.
7 THE WITNESS: Good morning, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE PARKER: Could I remind you that the affirmation you made
9 still applies.
10 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
11 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic. Still -- I'm living in over-eager
13 MS. KRAVETZ: It's still me but not for much longer, Your Honour,
14 I assure you.
15 JUDGE PARKER: Wonderful, Ms. Kravetz.
16 WITNESS: JOSEPH MAISONNEUVE [Resumed]
17 Examination by Ms. Kravetz: [Continued]
18 Q. Good morning, General. Yesterday when he left off we were
19 speaking about the Racak incident and the different meetings you had with
20 the MUP and VJ officials in relation to this incident. Before moving on
21 to a different topic, I would just like to look at one more of the
22 attachments to your statement. This is attachment number 7 which relates
23 to this incident.
24 MS. KRAVETZ: I understand, Your Honours, that this attachment is
25 now Exhibit P863, and I need page 1 in both the English and B/C/S of
2 Q. Do you have the document before you, General?
3 A. Yes, I do.
4 Q. This is a record of discussions of a meeting at the VJ brigade
5 command at Urosevac dated 4th February, 1999, and we see from this record
6 that in attendance in addition to yourself are MR. -- Colonel Kotur;
7 Colonel Krsman Jelic, the commander of the 243rd Brigade; and
8 Pera Petrovic of whom we spoke about yesterday; and other persons who are
9 listed there. Do you recall attending this meeting, General?
10 A. Yes, I do.
11 Q. Now, you speak about this briefly in your statement - this is at
12 paragraph 30 to 32. So I just want to look at some passages here. On
13 the first page towards the bottom, you are recorded as addressing
14 Colonel Jelic and asking him:
15 "Did you order the forces to do this, if not, who was the
16 commander on the ground?"
17 And if you turn to the next page, we have Colonel Jelic who
18 responses - that's on page 2 in the middle of the first paragraph. We
19 see that he is explaining -- giving you an explanation of what happened
20 and he says:
21 "Unit as Stimlje was training and was fired upon," in some
22 sentences down it says, "fired was made on targets between Belince and
23 Racak, provocations came from there."
24 Now, based on the understandings you had at the time of the
25 October agreements were VJ units allowed to conduct training activities
1 outside of barracks and in the proximity of inhabited areas at the time?
2 A. No, they were not.
3 Q. We see here that further down you are asking Colonel Jelic about
4 this operation and he says:
5 "Our operation happened at the same time of the MUP operation,"
6 and you ask him on 15 January between 8 and 9.00 a.m. and he says, "Yes."
7 Do you recall when you left this meeting with Colonel Jelic if
8 you were convinced by the explanation he gave you at the meeting that the
9 unit was simply conducting a training exercise and that this training
10 exercise happened at the same time as the MUP operation was taking place?
11 A. No, I was not convinced at the time.
12 Q. And why is that?
13 A. Well, it could have been because of the -- the emotional stress
14 that I was under having been, you know, having seen the aftermath of
15 the -- of the activity. And it also just did not seem plausible to me
16 that -- that, you know, a coordinated MUP action with VJ, you know,
17 having by happenstance been in that area would make sense.
18 There's no doubt if, first of all, the VJ had been doing some
19 training, that they would have known that the MUP were going to be in the
20 village. And there's no way that, you know, there's no way they would
21 have done this independently without coordinating together.
22 Q. Thank you. I want to now move away from the Racak incident to a
23 different issue, and I want to refer you to paragraph 9 of your
24 statement, where you refer to a meeting you had with Mr. Sainovic, and
25 this is a meeting that took place on one of the occasions when you
1 officially replaced General DZ or Drewienkiewicz, also known as DZ. Do
2 you recall attending this meeting? The one that's referred to at
3 paragraph 9 of your statement.
4 A. Yes, I do.
5 Q. Do you recall approximately when this meeting took place, and
6 what was the purpose of this meeting?
7 A. I don't exactly remember which -- in which of the periods that I
8 replaced DZ which are laid out in my statement here, but I don't remember
9 exactly on which one of those periods that I met with him.
10 The purpose of the meeting was for -- I think it was a regular
11 meeting between Ambassador Keller and Mr. Sainovic.
12 Q. And based on the information you had at the time, what did you
13 understand to be Mr. Sainovic's role in Kosovo?
14 A. I don't know if I remember, you know, I don't know if I knew that
15 exactly at the time, but I obviously since know that he was responsible
16 for Kosovo. I understand since then that he was the minister responsible
17 of Kosovo delegated by the president.
18 Q. And did you understand him at the time to have any authority over
19 either VJ or MUP units that were deployed on the ground at the time?
20 A. Well, that's certainly something that I remember absolutely is
21 that I had no doubt in my mind at the time, and since either, that he
22 had -- he had full authority to control and command and give direction to
23 the units that were deployed within the theatre of Kosovo.
24 Q. And what made you arrive to that conclusion, that he had full
25 authority, if you remember?
1 A. I think it was a combination of the manner in which he behaved,
2 the manner in which he carried himself, the manner in which he responded
3 to the questions by Ambassador Keller. And I don't remember exactly the
4 different issues that were being discussed, but it seemed to me that
5 there were no -- there was no question that he was in charge of the
7 Q. Thank you. I want to now move to a different issue, and this is
8 one of the last topics I want to discuss with you. This concerns the
9 paragraph 56 of your statement and refers to the period when you had
10 already left Kosovo and became the head of the KVM refugee task force.
11 Do you recall approximately when you were appointed head of that
12 task force in Albania
13 A. Yes, it would have been probably the third week of March. I'd
14 been on leave when the actual withdrawal took place, then I rejoined my
15 personnel in Macedonia
16 it was towards the end of March, I believe.
17 Q. And why was this task force created? What was the purpose of
18 this task force?
19 A. Well, at this point there had been reports and, you know,
20 obviously witnessing the pushing out of the personnel, the Kosovars,
21 Albanians, who were being pushed out, some into Albania, some into
23 big issue with those that were coming into Albania, the -- many of the UN
24 and NGOs, the UNHCR and NGOs were deployed in Albania, and were, you
25 know, obviously sending reports and so forth. So there was a
1 requirement, and they were looking for something for the OSCE to be able
2 to support.
3 We are a ready, if you wish, number of personnel that were kind
4 of -- had been -- had been evacuated, and we also obviously had a bit of
5 an emotional tie with Kosovo. So it was thought that we would put
6 together a task force to go and assist the government of Albania with the
7 refugees that were being pushed out from Kosovo.
8 Q. Thank you. I would like you to turn now to attachment 15 of --
9 it's tab 15 there in your binder.
10 MS. KRAVETZ: And this is, Your Honours, Exhibit P874 in our
11 e-court system. We have the document.
12 Q. Do you recognise this document, and if yes, can you tell us what
13 it is?
14 A. Yes, I recognise it. It was produced by my -- by my personnel,
15 the -- in the KVM refugee task force after we -- after we became
16 officially effective in Albania
17 put together these bi-weekly reports specifically on human rights to be
18 able to, kind of, assess and report on the situation as we saw it. And
19 as you can see, this was for our internal use only, or at least a report
20 that we were sending up to -- to the KVM headquarters on the situation as
21 we saw it.
22 So this was based on my verifiers who were deployed throughout
24 organisation that actually had people deployed right across the entire
25 country, so I thought we could give a very good assessment, a good view
1 of what we had witnessed and what we had in fact been able to interview
2 from the different Albanians who were being pushed out into Albania.
3 Q. Now, you referred to the fact that you were conducting interviews
4 with different Albanians who had been pushed out into Albania, and we
5 also see that the document in the first line refers to the ongoing
6 interviewing of refugees since 5th April.
7 Were you personally involved in any of the interviews that were
8 conducted with refugees that had been pushed out of Kosovo into Albania
9 A. Yes, I was. Because I wanted to see and experience what my
10 verifiers were doing daily, of course I was on the ground continuously
11 every day and in contact with refugees in different areas. I tried to go
12 to a different area every single day. And, in fact, I took one
13 statement, I did one interview myself during the -- that time.
14 Q. And can you tell us something about the accounts that you and
15 your verifiers were hearing from the refugees that were coming into
17 recording what was going on in the province?
18 A. Yes. Generally the -- the types of statements that are in the --
19 in the record here, the human rights bi-weekly, were exactly the kinds of
20 things that they were reporting. Reporting being pushed out, being
21 forced from their homes often with just the things that they were able to
22 carry; and at the border quite often having all their papers removed,
23 being sometimes forced to give money. There were reports of killings and
24 of raping and other activities, usually by the authority forces, usually
25 in fact, by the MUP. And this kind of activity seemed to be a
1 generalised -- a generalised activity that was going on at the time, and
2 that was reported by the refugees.
3 Q. Now, you referred to the removal of papers, what sort of papers
4 are you talking about that the refugees were speaking about?
5 A. I'm referring here to their identity papers so that when refugees
6 came across they usually had no identity papers, nothing that could say
7 where they were born, something -- nothing that could say where they were
8 from originally, what they had worked at, any kinds of -- any kinds of
9 those types of papers.
10 And therefore, one of the activities that we were contemplating
11 organising in the future was to do a kind of a registration programme
12 where we would use some of the -- some of the colleagues and cooperators
13 there such as the IOM
14 help us to put together a registration programme where we would create
15 new identity documents for these people who had frankly, you know, no
16 record of where they had been born, et cetera.
17 So this was -- and what was also interesting is as we were -- as
18 the refugee task force stood up, we had very bright orange vehicles and,
19 of course, Kosovars had seen us patrolling throughout the area of Kosovo
20 and so -- with these same vehicles. So when they came into Albania
21 would see bright orange vehicles, they usually were like a magnet and
22 they would come up and start talking to the verifiers that were in there,
23 including many of the local personnel who had been employees of the KVM
24 in Kosovo.
25 So those -- those employees had, you know, obviously, most of
1 them could speak English. We were able to get, I think, good statements
2 and truthful statements from them, so that was useful. So a lot of
3 these -- a lot of these statements and a lot of these activities that
4 they were reporting were able to be corroborated, you know, and able to
5 be discussed at length with them. So including the lack of identity
6 papers, et cetera.
7 Q. And when you spoke to these persons about the lack of identity
8 papers, what did they tell you had happened to them? How had they lost
9 their identity papers?
10 A. No, in fact, all of them said that they were -- these were taken
11 away from them. They were searched, and they were taken away from them
12 at the border when they were pushed across by the local authorities in
13 Kosovo. And there were a couple of them who, you know, at their peril
14 actually hid them inside their clothing very, you know -- in some areas
15 that we won't mention here, but you know, that's -- some of them,
16 actually, that's the only way they were able to actually bring out their
17 papers. But most of them had their papers removed. You know, the
18 authorities would ask to see the papers, they would look at them, and
19 then keep them and just push them along.
20 In fact, I don't know if I mentioned this already, but they often
21 did that with their car licence, they would remove the car licence off
22 the cars so the cars would come across with no licence plate. Nothing
23 that would say the car came from Kosovo.
24 Q. What did you understand was the significance of this, of the
25 removal of identity cards and licence plates from the cars at the time
1 when you were hearing these accounts?
2 A. Well, these accounts kind of, you know, obviously to me it seemed
3 that we -- it seemed to be a way of the local authorities trying to push
4 these people out to ensure they did not return since they had no papers
5 saying they were originally from Kosovo. It would be pretty hard for
6 them to return to their area of birth, et cetera.
7 Q. Thank you. I want to move to one final document, and this is
8 attachment 16 to your statement.
9 A. Mm-hmm.
10 MS. KRAVETZ: Yes. If we could have that up on the screen. This
11 is Exhibit 875 now in the e-court system.
12 Q. Do you recognise this document, sir?
13 A. Yes, I do.
14 Q. Just wait until it's there; we have it in the system. Could you
15 explain what this is?
16 A. Yes, this is a -- this is a progress report that I decided to put
17 together -- that my personnel put together for me to present to the OSCE,
18 to the KVM. It was meant to be an internal, once again, report, and so
19 it was meant to be a report that really was no holds barred, no politics
20 involved, and telling it as it was; that would explain, was kind of an
21 assessment of the situation as we saw it on that day. Because I actually
22 left a couple of days later from the mission area myself, so I wanted to
23 leave with a document that kind of at least tied all the loose ends
24 together and explained the situation as we saw it.
25 As you may have seen, there's an annex for each one of the
1 12 prefectures that tries to really give the specifics of the situation
2 in each one of those prefectures, because the Albanian approach to the --
3 to the refugee situation was that they were bringing the refugees and
4 spreading them out throughout the country, as opposed to Macedonia
5 they were keeping them fairly close to the border with Kosovo.
6 As I said, the refugee task force, we were the only organisation
7 that had personnel spread out throughout the entire mission area, so we
8 were able to give a good snap-shot of the situation at the time.
9 MS. KRAVETZ: I would ask you to turn to page 7 of this document,
10 and in the e-court system it's page 8 of the English and page 10 at the
11 bottom in the B/C/S.
12 Q. And we see here under the heading "Refugee Statistics" that there
13 are some number that is are provided, it says 420.000, and then there are
14 different numbers of refugee estimates. Can you tell us what is this
15 source of the numbers that are contained within this paragraph?
16 A. Yes, the source is mainly from the government of Albania.
17 Although we were able to every day attend the government of Albania
18 coordination meeting where, of course, all the NGOs, the UNHCR, and so on
19 were in attendance; and including the NATO Albania force which had
20 deployed a few weeks before. So we were able to get these numbers and
21 really confirm them with all these other institutions. So that was --
22 but I'm sure that the main source were the government Albania's estimate.
23 Q. Thank you. Turning our way now from the document, just one last
24 question I wanted to clarify an issue you referred to yesterday when I
25 was by asking about the difference in task between regular police units
1 and Special Police units, you referred to an incident in Rogovo and you
2 said you seen special police units in the aftermath of the incidents. I
3 just wanted to know if you recall when that incident occurred in Rogovo
4 and if you recall anything about that circumstance of that incident that
5 you referred to yesterday?
6 A. Yeah, I -- the Rogovo incident, if I remember, was, I believe
7 towards the end of January, beginning of February. And it involved a
8 group of, I think they were mostly KLA had crossed the border and come
9 across and been followed, essentially, by the VJ, but I think took refuge
10 in the city, in the little town of Rogovo
11 I believe, at this point there was a MUP attack, and they actually caught
12 the -- caught them red-handed, if you wish. But I think had been over a
13 couple of days and the final kind of incident was in Rogovo itself. And
14 a number of people, I think it was something like 25, were killed who, as
15 I say, were mostly KLA in the village.
16 MS. KRAVETZ: Thank you for that. Your Honour, you will be happy
17 to know that I have no further questions at this stage for the witness.
18 JUDGE PARKER: You have made my day, Ms. Kravetz.
19 Yes, Mr. Djurdjic, do you cross-examine?
20 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
21 Cross-examination by Mr. Djurdjic:
22 Q. Good morning, General. My name is Veljko Djurdjic, I'm a member
23 of the Defence team for the accused Vlastimir Djordjevic, assisted by
24 Ms. Marie O'Leary, also a member of the Defence team.
25 I have a few questions for you, and I will seek clarification of
1 certain things that you said.
2 I have read carefully and analysed all your statements and all
3 the statements of people who used to be your associates, and in answering
4 my questions, I would like you to distinguish between your personal
5 knowledge and the knowledge of your underlings or perhaps superiors,
6 because you did emphasise in your statement that you have certain
7 knowledge which is not direct.
8 I would like to ask you, first of all, about your brilliant
9 military career. You joined the Canadian Armed Forces in the early
10 1970s, and in 1976 you graduated from the Royal Military College
11 that an equivalent of a military academy?
12 A. Yes, it is.
13 Q. Thank you. So that's a four-year course. Could you tell me what
14 was your major at the academy?
15 A. Yes, it was in French literature.
16 Q. I'm taken aback a little. You said it was a military academy,
17 now you mention French literature, was your graduate paper in French
19 A. Yes, let me explain a little bit. The Canadian military academy,
20 the Canadian Royal Military College
21 we, therefore, have -- we have all academic programs, engineering, arts,
22 science; and the cadets that undergo the training there go to normal
23 university except you go in uniform and you have military training
24 outside of your academic pursuits. And so, in fact, it's based on four
25 different components, the military components, academic, leadership, and
1 athletic. So a graduate comes out with a full bachelor's degree, comes
2 out with -- as a fully trained officer in the Canadian Forces, well fully
3 trained, there's bit of more training required at the end, but also as
4 a -- someone who can do some sports, and bilingual as well in French and
6 My particular degree, university degree, if you wish, first
7 degree -- first cycle was in French literature.
8 Q. Thank you for this answer. Now, when you graduated from the
9 college, what rank did you receive?
10 A. I was a lieutenant in the -- and my military classification was
11 in the armoured corps in tanks.
12 Q. Thank you. This answers several of my questions. Since I am
13 familiar with your career from your prior statements, I'd like to know --
14 I found somewhere that you were a company commander in France. Would you
15 tell me what kind of organisation was it in France that you were a
16 company leader, a company commander?
17 A. Yes. I was -- I was sent to France
18 when I was a young officer when both you and I had black hair probably at
19 this point, and we -- I was the commander of a French conscript troop
20 which, as you know France
21 -- they had service, military service for all -- for all personnel. And
22 I was given command of a French conscript troop for 14 months out of the
23 two years. Then I continued -- was promoted to captain and continued to
24 serve there as an officer in -- a staff officer in the regiment.
25 Q. Thank you. By the way, we went to school at the same time, you
1 and I, the same generation.
2 I see that from 1994 you were chief of the administration of
3 armoured forces and until 1998 you were chief of the administration of
4 ground forces. Did you occupy that position until you left for Vienna
5 A. Yes, I did. I took over the position in February of 1998 and
6 went to Vienna
7 Q. Thank you. Until you left for Vienna in November 1998, had you
8 worked previously in any NATO agencies?
9 A. No, I had not. I had not worked in any NATO headquarters.
10 Q. Were you perhaps a liaison officer on behalf of the Canadian army
11 cooperating with any NATO agencies, or did you have any other direct or
12 indirect contact with NATO agencies?
13 A. No, I did not.
14 Q. Thank you. General, how come that from such a high position, you
15 became a member of the Kosovo Verification Mission? Could you explain a
16 little bit how that happened.
17 A. Yes, in I guess it would be the end of October 1998 -- first of
18 all throughout my career I had had several UN deployments, and so I had
19 been -- I had been outside the country on several occasions in different
20 mission area, in Cyprus
21 and I had also been on, as I said, on exchange in France, and I'd been
22 working with the Americans a few times. I had a course -- by that time
23 two course, sorry, in the United States. So I was fairly well versed, if
24 you wish, in international operations.
25 Towards the end of October, Canadian -- the Canadian Department
1 of National Defence received word that -- it was kind of out of the
2 blue -- of course, we had heard -- and the current situation in Kosovo
3 was well in the news by then, and we had heard that there had been the
4 agreement signed by Milosevic and Holbrooke in the middle of October, and
5 I believe it was towards the end of October when we received a call
6 from -- from the OSCE asking if we could provide a one-star, a
7 brigadier-general level officer to become the head of the KVM support
8 unit in Vienna
9 This was meant to be about a six-week deployment to Vienna only,
10 and, you know, I was asked if I wanted to go and fulfill that mission.
11 And so I accepted.
12 Q. Thank you. It was almost a complete description of yourself,
13 brigadier-general with prior experience.
14 Did you have any combat experience at that time?
15 A. No, I did not. The peacekeeping missions I had been in were
16 indeed -- certainly the Cyprus
17 were, let's just say, quite stable; although there had been, you know,
18 incidences of firing and so on. My first tour in the Balkans from 1993
19 to 1994 for one year as chief of operations, I had -- no, I had not been
20 in combat.
21 Q. Thank you. What about after 1999, after you left the OSCE. Did
22 you gain any combat experience?
23 A. No, I did not.
24 Q. Thank you. You've just said that you had left for Vienna
25 few weeks, but that turned out to be a few months. Did you stay within
1 the OSCE, and what was the legal form of your engagement?
2 A. Yes, I did stay within the OSCE. What happened is when I
3 deployed to Vienna
4 were standing up the KVM per se on the ground in Kosovo. And they had
5 decided that different nations would take command of the different -- the
6 five regional centres. The first regional centre to open was the one in
7 Prizren, Regional Centre 1, and they -- I guess someone thought that
9 knowledge, of course, of the KVM support unit, I would be a good person
10 to deploy onto the ground.
11 So I came back to Canada
12 equipment, and then I deployed directly into Kosovo. I believe I arrived
13 on the 13th of December, 1998.
14 Q. I'd like to know, General, did you sign a contract with the OSCE?
15 A. No, no. This was, I guess, it was looked at as a -- just a
16 normal mission, and I don't recall signing a contract, no. I was
17 provided by Canada
18 voluntary contribution, I guess you could call it.
19 Q. Thank you. May I then conclude that you were paid by the
20 Canadian government for the duration of your mission to the OSCE?
21 A. Yes, that's correct.
22 Q. Did you then have obligations both to the Canadian government and
23 to the OSCE at the same time while you were a verifier?
24 A. That's a very good question, and it's an issue, of course, that
25 everyone from any country who has served with any international
1 organisation has this kind of a split; I won't say split personality, but
2 split ethical dilemma. In my case, all my missions with the
3 United Nations I tried to be the best United Nations officer I could, but
4 obviously you come from your country and you have some, you know, you
5 have some attachment, and it's not, you know, it's something that you --
6 that you feel strongly about.
7 In the case of my deployment to Kosovo, working with the OSCE,
8 which was my first time working with the OSCE, I felt a strong attachment
9 to the OSCE as an organisation because I believed that they were a
10 capable and useful organisation that could actually do a lot of good. I
11 also felt a very strong attachment and a very, kind of, impartial
12 approach to my mission in Kosovo. I felt a strong attachment to the
13 people of Kosovo of all ethnic backgrounds, and I really tried to be, you
14 know, to be impartial between the different parties there. To treat them
15 all equally with dignity, and to in fact, you know, it's a documented
16 fact that I really tried to look after the Serbian people in Kosovo
17 because I felt that there was a real danger to them. There might be some
18 back-lash if there had been a final agreement on the status of the
20 So you are right, it was one of those things where if when you
21 are in one of those missions, you have an attachment and you try to be an
22 impartial and a good member of the organisation, the international
23 organisation, but of course, you are Canadian. Certainly I can say that
24 I never -- I never, you know, had -- was in a position where I felt I
25 could not do justice to both those loyalties.
1 Q. Thank you. This was an exhaustive answer. A very detailed one.
2 The state in whose army you were serving and gave an oath to serve
3 faithfully was a member of NATO; correct?
4 A. Yes, it is.
5 Q. And that organisation, the NATO of which Canada
6 state, did, without approval of the United Nations, commence an
7 air-strike campaign against Yugoslavia
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Thank you. And from the time when you were seconded to the OSCE
11 until the 24th of March, you, in your loyalty, worked conscientiously and
12 in good faith both for your government and for the organisation to which
13 you were sent on mission; correct?
14 A. Yes, I worked for the OSCE and tried be the best OSCE officer I
15 could. But as I say, my loyalty to Canada, was, you know, it was never
16 challenged in terms of the difference between the two.
17 Q. Undoubtedly, there was no conflict between these two loyalties.
18 But on the 24th when you withdrew -- or rather, no, you were on leave,
19 you were not there at the time. From that date, the 24th, Canada
20 member state of NATO was at war with the FRY; right?
21 A. I don't think there was actually a legal declaration of war.
22 Q. How about de facto?
23 A. I think you are getting beyond my knowledge and my abilities to
24 actually, you know, state what kind of a -- what kind of state existed
25 between the two. The point is that Canada
1 campaign. At that time, as I said, I was still an OSCE employee. I
2 happened to be on leave. And when I returned, I returned as an OSCE
3 employee and carried on until the end of my mission.
4 Q. Thank you. Now we are on the subject of withdrawal. When did
5 you go on leave in 1999? And when did you return? And where to, after
6 that leave?
7 A. I believe it was about the middle of March, so it was a few days
8 before the withdrawal which I think took place on the 20th of March. I
9 believe I left around the 15th of March, and I returned at the end of
10 March or beginning of April. It might have been the 1st of April,
11 something around there, and I returned to Ohrid in Macedonia where my
12 verifiers had been gathered.
13 Q. Thank you. I believe that while you were on leave you did not
14 only rest, you must have been in contact with the Chiefs of Staff of the
15 Canadian army and probably with the Ministry of Defence too, in view of
16 the situation in the world?
17 A. Actually, I was not. I was in Paris, and so I was indeed just
18 resting, but obviously watching the news very carefully and knowing that
19 I had a return flight, I was -- our return flights all came through
21 contact with my verifiers on the ground to make sure someone was going to
22 pick me up when I arrived in Skopje
23 Q. Thank you, General. When you arrived in Macedonia, and later in
1 A. Approximately, I could not -- well, approximately I could
2 probably say that I was aware that there was a -- there was a brigade
3 that was near Skopje
4 was there in case of the requirement to assist the OSCE in withdrawing
5 from Kosovo. But I don't have the details, and I was not actually privy
6 to the information even at the time of the deployment of the NATO forces.
7 Q. Thank you. On the 20th of March, the diplomatic part of the
8 Kosovo Verification Mission moved to Macedonia and later to Albania
9 the Verification Mission stayed there for a while in Macedonia and
11 NATO; do you know that?
12 A. I believe there had been a liaison even prior to that, but I do
13 believe that did exist. I had no -- again, I had no contact with that
15 Q. And did you know Lieutenant-Colonel Ciaglinski?
16 A. Yes, I did.
17 Q. From what you know, what was his job within the KVM until the
18 20th of March?
19 A. I believe he certainly -- he was need at the OSCE headquarters,
20 in the KVM headquarters in Pristina, and I know he worked for General DZ.
21 He was one, I believe, of the officers from the fusion centre, but I
22 don't know exactly what his position was.
23 Q. Thank you. And do you remember that he accompanied you at the
24 time when you stood in for Mr. Drewienkiewicz as chief of operations for
25 the KVM?
1 A. He accompanied me where? I mean, I remember him being in the
2 headquarters, yes, I do, but accompanying me, I'm not sure.
3 Q. Sorry, I did not mean that he accompanied you literally, but he
4 was with you at meetings which you attending as DZ's deputy?
5 A. That's possible, yeah.
6 Q. Thank you. And could you explain to me the functions of the
7 liaison officer between the KVM and NATO in Macedonia and Albania
8 the 24th of March, 1999?
9 A. No, I cannot. I don't know what their function was, but I
10 presume -- I would presume from my military experience that the function
11 of a liaison is to ensure that both sides are aware of what the other's
12 activities are. That's usually what a liaison officer does.
13 Q. Thank you, General. It remains unclear to me who headed and ran
14 the KVM in Macedonia
15 A. That's -- well, that's quite clear to me. The entire time that I
16 was with the KVM, I was under the command of Ambassador Walker,
17 William Walker; the deputy head of mission for operations was General DZ,
18 as you know.
19 When I returned from my leave at the end of March, the command
20 arrangements were exactly the same in Macedonia. The KVM was still
21 there, and the command function was still working, so Ambassador Walker
22 and General DZ were still part of the command chain. And in fact, that's
23 who I received my orders from to set up, to organise, and to deploy the
24 OSCE/KVM refugee task force into Albania
1 reported, again, to Ambassador Walker and to General DZ, et cetera.
2 Q. Thank you. Now, we've come to that subject. Tell me, how did
3 your mission end in May 1999? Did your tenure simply expire or what?
4 A. Yes, it did. In fact, I had been -- the commitment had been for
5 six months, so from mid-November to mid-May was essentially six months;
6 and as I left, I handed command over to my deputy, who happened to be
7 another Canadian.
8 Q. Thank you. General, when you extended your stay in the OSCE in
9 end 1998 and when it was decided that you should be sent to RC 5, do you
10 agree that -- sorry, RC 1, not RC 5, thank you. Do you agree that from
11 the moment the UN resolution was adopted and the agreement was signed,
12 which you verified, at least a month and a half elapsed; correct?
13 A. I know, for example, that the agreement was signed on the -- I
14 think it was the 16th of October, and I deployed into -- into Kosovo, I
15 believe it was the 12th or 13th of December. I don't know when the
16 UN resolution was voted exactly.
17 Q. We have two UN resolutions and several agreements between the
18 16th and 25th of October, but in that time the KVM had not yet been
19 established, had not yet started to work. But your predecessor was
20 working on the ground already, it was the KDOM; correct?
21 A. Right. My understanding of the KDOMs, was that they were more
22 like bilateral arrangements between the Former Republic of Yugoslavia and
23 different countries, and again I, you know, I'm kind of out of my depth
24 here how, in fact, these were set up. But essentially, I saw it as these
25 we were bilateral arrangements with different countries to have -- and
1 with the EU, which also had a KDOM, I believe. So these had been --
2 these were arrangements, bilateral arrangements. When the final
3 agreement, let's say, the agreement between Holbrooke and Milosevic was
4 signed, I believe then that the -- within the agreement, if my
5 recollection is right, the agreement actually said that the KVM would
6 absorb the KDOMs when it deployed. So we would deploy, if you wish, on
7 top of the KDOMs and absorb them into the KVM structure.
8 Q. Thank you. It seems that your memory is perfect. I would like
9 to go back to the following: In those documents, we have obligations on
10 the part of the FRY as well as the position and role of KDOMs prior to
11 KVM deployment. I believe it was the end of October when the dead-line
12 was for the FRY to meet the conditions in the aforementioned agreement.
13 If that did not happen, the NATO activation order was already put in
14 place, and the air-strikes were expected to commence, should that happen?
15 A. That's possible. I'm not -- you know, I'm not sure about that
17 Q. Witness, I'm telling you this because when you arrived on the
18 15th of December and when asked about -- by the Prosecutor about the
19 documents you receive and the deployment of troops, you said that you
20 were not familiar with all the details. I'm now taking you back to the
21 fact that KDOM, prior to your arrival, performed the tasks of the
22 mission, and that you merely continued those tasks. That is to say, that
23 there was a continuity between the two organisations and the various
24 KDOMs being absorbed by the KVM; was that so?
25 A. Actually, the way I -- again, I'm a simple military man. The way
1 I saw the difference between the two missions is that the KDOM,
2 Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission
3 Kosovo Verification Mission, the mission was slightly different. And
4 here is the way, in my mind, I made the difference: To my mind the KDOMs
5 were observer missions that would observe the situation on the ground
6 without interfering. They would observe and report. They were
7 diplomatic missions also meaning they were missions that probably had
8 more diplomats than military personnel in them. Certainly that's way I
9 saw it.
10 When I deployed with the KVM, I saw the mission slightly
11 differently. I saw of it more as a verification mission. Although we
12 never got to that level, I saw that as our primary mission, i.e., to
13 verify. To verify to me implies having an agreement in place, having a
14 number of standards that you need to verify, i.e., numbers of troops,
15 patrolling plans, you know, arrangements for different activities. And
16 that the verifiers would be there and would verify.
17 Also, I saw it as a verification of the human rights situation,
18 i.e., where we would attempt to not just observe, but also confirm and
19 also report and also, I guess I saw it more as an interference type
20 mission, interventionist type mission, than the KDOM had been. This may
21 not be the correct interpretation, but that's the way I saw it.
22 Q. Regarding the functions of KDOM and KVM, I believe your
23 interpretations are excellent. But between the point when the agreement
24 was signed until the moment you took your functions over, the initial
25 preconditions of compliance was supposed to be confirmed by KDOM and
1 handed over to your mission, and that was one of the reasons why there
2 were still no air-strikes on the 27th of October when the dead-line was
3 for the FRY to comply with the agreement. Are you familiar with that?
4 A. No, but it does make sense.
5 Q. Very well, thank you. As far as your memory serves you, did you
6 receive the archives of the UK
7 they were absorbed by the mission?
8 A. I did not receive archives, i.e., papers or, you know, former
9 reports, et cetera. But I did take under -- under command, if you wish,
10 I assumed command of the area, of the Pristina -- sorry, the Prizren --
11 the Prizren area. And when I arrived, there were, I would say, maybe
12 50 UK KDOM members and probably about 12 or 15, I think, US KDOM members
13 that rolled into my organisation.
14 They had kind of operated, if you wish -- certainly the UK on a
15 shoe string, and I was able to actually, when I arrived, issue -- start
16 really putting together some structure to the mission. And that's when I
17 produced my guidance and so forth to try and, you know, solidify, if you
18 wish, the mission at that time. But I did not receive any prior
19 documents and so on.
20 Q. Thank you. Your prior verification experience probably required
21 no further training of you before joining the KVM; am I correct in
22 assuming that?
23 A. That's correct, yeah.
24 Q. Thank you. Your deputy in RC 1 was the UK KDOM head; am I
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Thank you. The RC 1, can you tell me which municipalities it
3 encompassed? What was its area of responsibility, so to say?
4 A. I would have to have a map it to show you, but it was basically
5 the entire Prizren area, so I can't list them for you, but it was the
6 Prizren area.
7 Q. We will move on, and in the meantime try to come up with an area
8 of responsibility map.
9 In any case, let's start with the coordination centres. You had
10 a coordination centre in Orahovac, I believe, and another one in Prizren,
11 and a third one in Suva Reka. Therefore we can conclude that these were
12 the three municipalities included and that there was Dragas, Dragas
13 municipality towards the border, which also fell within your area; that
14 was the AOR
15 A. RC 1, but I think you're -- I think you're correct, the three
16 CCs, the three coordination centres, were indeed the ones you've laid
17 out, Orahovac, Suva Reka, and Prizren. And yes, I did cover also the
18 border, and I think that was the Dragas region right in the south of
19 the -- the point -- the south point.
20 Q. Let me ask you this: Pec and Djakovica were not within the area
21 of RC 1; am I correct?
22 A. That's correct.
23 Q. Thank you. I guess I'll be right again. RC 5 also encompassed
24 the municipalities of Pristina and Urosevac? That's what I'm interested
1 A. Yes, you are correct.
2 Q. Let me ask you this then: In your area of responsibility within
3 the AOR
4 part was within the given area?
5 A. Yeah, I could not put a number or a -- or a -- you know, the name
6 to the structure, but when I dealt with the MUP for my area, I went to
7 the Pristina -- to the Prizren headquarters of the MUP there, and I
8 believe it was Colonel Vojnovic and Vukobrat were the two heads of that
10 Q. General, you were a soldier, whereas these men were policemen.
11 In any case, RC 1 had a liaison officer with the police; who was that?
12 A. That was a former policeman himself, UK man called
13 Les House [phoen].
14 Q. Thank you. Did each coordination centre also have a liaison
15 officer for the police?
16 A. Yes, they did.
17 Q. Thank you. Those liaison officers for the police from the
18 coordination centres, did they report to RC 1, that is to say, to you as
19 the main centre in that area?
20 A. Ultimately, but they reported really to the coordination centre
21 head. I had -- the three coordination centres each had a head, and the
22 liaison officers reported to them, and then they reported all to me, if
23 you wish.
24 But I -- my approach was always to try and keep the -- to keep
25 the -- each one of the issues the lowest possible. So if there was a
1 small issue in a coordination centre that could be dealt with the
2 coordination centre head and the liaison officer with the MUP in their
3 area, they would do so.
4 Q. Thank you. I'm interested in the way information was passed
5 onwards. Once you received those reports, you would collate them and
6 send them on to Pristina where the seat of the KVM was?
7 A. That's correct.
8 Q. Am I correct in saying that General DZ was in charge of that
9 part, the part that was in charge of KVM operations?
10 A. Yes, he was.
11 Q. Thank you. Within your area of responsibility, that is to say,
12 RC 1, which military organisations and parts were present?
13 A. I had elements of two brigades within my -- of the VJ within my
14 area of responsibility, plus, of course, the MUP organisation.
15 Q. For the time being, I'm only interested in the military part.
16 Can you tell me which were the two military units?
17 A. Yeah, there was a -- one brigade that was based in Prizren, and
18 the numbers are in the papers here, I can't remember what they are,
19 but -- and there were also elements of the brigade from, I think,
20 Urosevac that were in the Dulje heights, what happened to be just inside
21 my area. That's why I say I had elements of two different brigades of
23 Q. Thank you. General, do you agree that the brigade that was
24 stationed in Prizren was the 549th Motorised Brigade commanded by
25 General Delic?
1 A. I know it was commanded by General Delic. As for the number,
2 I'll take your word for it.
3 Q. Thank you. As for the other part of the Urosevac brigade, was
4 the 243rd Mechanised Brigade headed by Colonel Jevic; am I correct?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Staying with that, there was only one part of that brigade at the
7 Dulje heights with some of their elements falling within your area of
8 responsibility; am I correct?
9 A. That's correct.
10 Q. Thank you. In keeping with the agreement, one of the three roads
11 along which the military could deploy a company was between Pristina and
12 Prizren, or rather, between Stimlje and Suva Reka via Dulje; am I
14 A. Again this is -- now my recollection is not so good, but I would
15 take your word for that.
16 Q. We'll get to the documents showing that. I thought this may have
17 been a quicker way to deal with it though. I'm asking you this because
18 there were some parts of that brigade in the territory of RC
19 some of its elements were in the area of RC 5; hence, the length of the
20 road was split between the two centres. In any case, we'll see some
21 documents showing that.
22 General, I see that you attended several meetings with
23 Colonel Delic and Colonel Jelic on one occasion. Who was the main
24 liaison officer for the military within your area of responsibility?
25 A. I'd have to refer to my notes with -- for his name, but there
1 was, indeed, a liaison officer with each of the brigades.
2 Q. We needn't know his name, as long as we know he existed. How
3 come you knew the entire military structure within your area of
4 responsibility and at the same time you say you were not familiar with
5 the MUP organisation there?
6 A. That's a good question, and probably related to the fact that I
7 very easily associate with military structures such as brigades, but not
8 so easily with paramilitary like the MUP.
9 Q. Thank you. This brings us to the third element, which is the
10 KLA. Can you tell me which KLA operational zone was within your RC 1
11 area of responsibility?
12 A. I don't recall the name of it exactly, but I -- from what I
13 understood when I dealt with the -- the zone commander, his zone
14 essentially covered as -- pretty close to the entire Prizren area, and I
15 called with -- I dealt with this -- Drini was my usual contact there.
16 Q. Your memory serves you correctly. It is interesting, though,
17 that the entire operational zone of the KLA coincided precisely with the
19 A. I think it was so, and -- but I believe that, you know, the
20 different municipalities like the regional centre from the OSCE's point
21 of view was meant to cover the one-fifth of the territory, and I don't
22 know what you call it, the province, I guess, within the province of
23 Kosovo. So it seemed that certainly that that was the idea of the OSCE
24 to give a -- not a municipality, but a number of municipalities to cover
25 an area that had a prefect, et cetera, et cetera, you know, that fit
1 within that area.
2 Q. Let me put that to you again. The area of SUP Prizren also
3 coincided with the area of responsibility of RC 1 covering the same
4 municipalities and the same area?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. I also wanted to ask you about the departments of the interior
7 which existed as a lower organisational level than the police stations,
8 but this may not be so important at this point. Did you hear of the
9 operational zone of the KLA was called Pastrik, the one that was within
10 your area of responsibility and during your tenure?
11 A. Yes, I subsequently heard that, yes.
12 Q. Thank you. Djakovica municipality as well as Pec municipality
13 were outside your area of responsibility, as we have established. I'm
14 now interested in another thing: Do you know what was the name of the
15 operational zone where the 243rd mechanised brigade had its headquarters
16 in Urosevac, Kacanik, and Stimlje; do you know what was that operational
17 zone of the KLA?
18 A. No, I don't.
19 Q. Thank you. Do you know what was the name of the operational zone
20 headed by Ramush Haradinaj?
21 A. I don't know -- I don't know the name of the operational zone,
22 but I understand that this was the one that included Pec and Djakovica.
23 Q. Thank you. Very well. We have discussed the three
24 organisations. On top of, that you also communicated with civilian
25 authorities. You said that the person in charge of that area was
1 Ms. Branka Furijanovic, which is correct. On several occasions in your
2 statement you said that the Chief of SUP Mr. Vojnovic was the prefect
3 deputy, I'm interested to find out where did you learn of that
4 information? Where did you get that from?
5 A. I can't recall where I got it from, but certainly it was not me
6 who actually, you know, found out, I don't think. I think I was told
7 that by one of my -- one of my staff.
8 Q. Thank you. I'd like to go back to reporting. All information
9 that you received at the level of RC 1, you sent to the KVM in Pristina.
10 In what format?
11 A. This would have been a daily sitrep format, situation report.
12 And I had taken the habit of -- my staff, first of all, my operation
13 staff would take the reports from each the coordination centres and put
14 them to the format of the report that we would sends to the KVM. But I
15 had taken the habit - when I was in the headquarters, and when I wasn't
16 there my deputy did it - of trying to provide a general assessment at the
17 last part of each one of those daily sitreps. So probably about 10.00 at
18 night I would come in and read the sitrep, and because I had been in the
19 area during the day, I had a sense of the atmosphere and what was going
20 on. So I would try to really give a commander's view of the day's
21 activity, the day's kind of atmosphere, context, environment, et cetera.
22 Q. Thank you. Did I understand correctly that all important events
23 were registered and that the seat of the mission was informed of those?
24 On top of that, you also provided your comments and your view of those
1 A. That's correct.
2 Q. I'd like to know this: Was the reporting done in written form
3 and sent by fax messages or courier, or was it via telephone, or both?
4 A. It was done by fax. It was sent and faxed to KVM headquarters.
5 Q. Did you keep copies of those reports at the RC 1?
6 A. Yes, I did.
7 Q. Thank you. Your archives, once the KVM and RC 1 left the FRY,
8 did you take that to Macedonia
9 A. Yes, I did.
10 Q. Thank you. Do you know whether the same thing was done by the
11 seat in Pristina?
12 A. No, I don't.
13 Q. Thank you. All of these important things we have been discussing
14 were contained in your daily reports; am I correct?
15 A. To the best of my recollection, yes.
16 Q. Thank you. General, according to what I know about the KVM, you
17 were all answerable to Ambassador Walker who was the head of mission, and
18 he was the only person authorised to issue official statements and
19 positions as the various events in the field were concerned?
20 A. I believe so.
21 Q. Thank you. Since you stood in for General DZ, and given that you
22 were familiar with the relationship with the FRY authorities, did you
23 know that at the level of the FRY, there was a federal commission for
24 cooperation with the KVM?
25 A. I know now. I don't know -- I'm not sure if I knew while I was
1 on the ground in Prizren.
2 Q. We have a few minutes left before the break. Can you tell me
3 what information did you have about that while you were in Pristina and
4 before you went away on the 20th of March, 1999?
5 A. I don't think anyone ever told me there is a commission that is
6 in charge of liaison with the KVM, et cetera, et cetera. But I did, of
7 course, meet Mr. Sainovic, and I met with General Loncar's deputy while I
8 was there once, at least on one occasion, might have been, in fact, two.
9 So -- but I didn't know that the structure was actually called a
10 commission or a liaison office.
11 Q. Thank you.
12 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] General, I think it's time for the
14 Your Honours.
15 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Djurdjic, we will have our first break
16 now. We will resume at 11.00.
17 [The witness stands down]
18 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.
19 --- On resuming at 11.05 a.m.
20 [The witness takes the stand]
21 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Djurdjic.
22 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
23 Q. General, I have looked through my preparation papers, and I found
24 a note that you stood in for DZ from 28th December, 1998, until --
25 THE INTERPRETER: Could counsel please slow down with the dates.
1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. -- that you stood in for him on three occasions. And that
3 meeting where you said you were with Mr. Keller and Mr. Sainovic, that
4 was on the 6th of January, 1999. It was such an uninteresting meeting
5 that I did not take the document to show it to you, but we did use it as
6 an exhibit earlier. The discussion was about some helicopters, the KVM
7 requested helicopters that were to be painted over and used for transport
8 to Macedonia
9 A. That's possible. I don't remember, I am sorry.
10 Q. Very well, we'll move on. I'd like to ask you one more thing
11 about the organisation of the KVM. Mr. Walker had several deputies
12 covering different areas, one was more operation, that was General DZ;
13 but I also found a note that the deputy chief of mission for the police
14 was Giovanni Kessler; do you remember that man?
15 A. I don't remember him. I probably, you know, had some contact
16 with him, but I don't remember him.
17 Q. Never mind. I'm interested in the relationship between RC, as
18 the territorial unit of the KVM, and this deputy chief mission for the
19 police. Did you have any obligation to report to him separately about
20 the police aspects of your contacts in your area of responsibility or
22 A. No, I did not.
23 Q. Thank you.
24 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May I now call up Exhibit P857,
25 page 4.
1 Q. General, there it is. Do you agree that this was the area of
2 responsibility of RC 1 which you headed?
3 A. Yes, I do.
4 Q. Can you confirm what we have discussed so far, that the image
5 here corresponds to your area of responsibility?
6 A. Yes, I can confirm that.
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I would like to
8 tender this drawing as an exhibit.
9 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received. I'm told it's already part
10 of Exhibit P857. The system has got ahead of us, Mr. Djurdjic.
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I know it is part of an exhibit,
12 page 4, but I thought that since this was a confirmation of the witness's
13 testimony, this is a sketch of the territory. If it is superfluous, I
14 accept that.
15 And now I'd like to call for Exhibit D160.
16 Q. General, I'll now move on to documents that served as a basis for
17 verification. While we are waiting for this document to be shown on the
18 screen, were you familiar with Resolution 1199 with the agreement
19 Geremek-Jovanovic, the agreement Byrnes-Djordjevic, and the agreement
20 Clark-Naumann, Sainovic-Djordjevic? Those were the four documents that
21 served as a basis for verification.
22 A. Yes, I was at the time certainly aware of them and quite familiar
23 with them.
24 Q. I think you even made an analysis of the obligations and the work
25 of RC 1 based on these documents; correct?
1 A. Yes, I did. In fact, my guidance to my verifiers uses those
2 documents as the reference.
3 Q. Thank you.
4 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May I now call up page 3, para 4,
5 and I'd like subparagraph (a).
6 Q. I want to discuss with you certain passages from this resolution.
7 Obligations of Yugoslavia
8 "To cease all action by the security forces affecting the
9 civilian population on order the withdrawal of security units used for
10 civilian repression."
11 Is it correct that this provision does not apply to the KLA?
12 A. No, I believe those are -- those are FRY obligations.
13 Q. Thank you. Now, in (b) and (c) we read obligations of the
14 verification to enable movement and monitoring, the obligation of
15 dialogue; and now in paragraph 5 (b) another obligation is:
16 "Not to carry out any repressive actions against the peaceful
18 Only the peaceful population, that's the translation I have and I
19 believe it's correct.
20 A. That's what I see on my screen as well.
21 Q. Thank you. So there is no obligation here not to take any steps
22 against the Kosovo Liberation Army?
23 A. Presumably, if they are peaceful, I guess there's an obligation
24 not to take any action against the KLA.
25 Q. And if they are not peaceful, there is no ban on measures against
2 A. That's the way I read it as well.
3 Q. Thank you.
4 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May I now call up P836.
5 Q. This is an understanding between Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Djordjevic
6 regarding observation points. I believe that under item 5,
7 Stimlje-Dulje, a total of six observation points are envisaged; correct?
8 A. That's what I see on my screen as well.
9 Q. In your area of responsibility, part of Stimlje-Dulje is
10 included; right?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. You know that area very well, that area of responsibility of
13 yours was up to the border between municipalities Urosevac and Suva Reka;
15 A. That's correct.
16 Q. Correct me if I'm wrong, when you go from Stimlje, just before
17 the top is the border between Urosevac and Suva Reka; do you remember
19 A. I haven't been there for more than ten years now, but I believe
20 that that's about right.
21 Q. I'm asking all this not to test your knowledge, far from it. I
22 just want to know how many observation points were in your area of
23 responsibility, the RC 1?
24 A. Yeah, that's a question I can't answer. I cannot remember, and I
25 don't even think that we ever got to the point where we were able to
1 identify exactly how many observation points were in any of my area. And
2 again, I believe that was a result of the fact that we never received the
3 specific verification standards that I was mentioning earlier that we
4 were hoping at some point to receive.
5 Q. General, we have an exhibit in this case, P844 --
6 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Just for your reference,
7 Your Honours.
8 Q. It's a chronology of the main events from the 15th October, 1998
9 until 18th of April, 1999. It's a document created by General DZ as
10 chief of operations. In this document under -- I'm sorry about this
11 noise. Items 57 and 58, it is stated in 58 that an inspection was
12 carried out of 27 observation points on the 5th of January. Do you
13 recall that?
14 A. Not specifically, no.
15 Q. Thank you. And do you remember that on the 4th of January combat
16 positions of combat teams were inspected? That's page B-3 in English.
17 You see it on the screen now.
18 A. Yes, I see it. In fact, I believe that I was involved in those
19 inspections with Colonel Kotur where we were able to go visit the
20 three -- the three VJ positions.
21 Q. And in your area of responsibility, if you toured VJ positions,
22 there was only one. We'll reach that document later. Very well. Thank
23 you. Just while we still have this document in front of us, Shaun Byrnes
24 and Djordjevic, do you agree that -- or do you know that this agreement
25 was implemented prior to your arrival, P836. I believe you have it.
1 It's your document. It covers these observation points.
2 A. Right. It was signed, I think, on the 25th of October, so this
3 was before I got there, yes.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May I now call up P835. Page 3.
6 Q. Please look at para 3. General, would I be right in saying that
7 this paragraph 3 does not apply to traffic check-points and points
8 erected for purposes of crime control? That's the translation I've got.
9 A. Correct, they are actually quite specific here. They are saying
10 for purposes other than traffic or crime control, so that would be a
11 correct interpretation on your part, I believe.
12 Q. Thank you. While you were on the ground, did you see those
13 traffic check-points and placements created to check whether there was
14 any arms or drug smuggling or other substances that were banned?
15 A. Several times. Now, as for the reasons why these check-points
16 were there, this could be the reason that the authorities believed that
17 they needed to have these check-points. But in my particular -- in my
18 personal view, some of them were unnecessary and actually stopping too
19 many vehicles in many instances.
20 Q. Thank you. And do you agree that all the vehicles that moved on
21 the road were stopped and checked except, of course, your vehicles which
22 had immunity?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Thank you. Now let's move to paragraph 4 of this document. It
25 deals with the issue of verification and border control.
1 Would you agree with me that throughout the tenure of the
2 mission, there was a dispute between the mission and the FRY authorities
3 about how border control and verification of the border were affected?
4 A. I would say -- I would not say there was a disagreement. There
5 was a difference of opinion as to the freedom of movement of the KVM in
6 the border area and the way the FRY authorities saw that same freedom of
8 Q. You as a diplomat phrased it much better than I would.
9 Now, let me ask you, considering this difference of opinion, were
10 you aware that this difference of opinion between the verification
11 mission and the commission of the federal government was raised to a
12 higher level? Was the president of OSCE informed, and did he discuss it
13 with the authorities of Yugoslavia
14 A. I don't know.
15 Q. Thank you. You were in the right place vis-a-vis the border,
16 General. This difference of opinion concerned the border belt. One
17 treatment applied to the border belt which had a depth of 5 kilometres,
18 and another treatment applied to the area beyond 5 kilometres.
19 A. Yes, that was a frequent subject of discussion between the
20 authorities and myself as to, you know, I felt that I was -- I wanted to
21 go and see, verify, observe activities along the border, visit the
22 villages that were within the 5 kilometre area; and often was unable to
23 do so because the authorities always required me to have a liaison
24 officer accompany me. And quite often, they had no liaison officers
25 available, et cetera, et cetera. So this was a regular source of -- a
1 regular issue that came up with the authorities and the mission.
2 Q. We'll come to that later. We have a record of your conversation
3 with Colonel Delic about the stations in Planeja and notices of
4 verification. But the point was that within this border belt, the 5
5 kilometres, the military authorities required prior notice subject to
6 approval; and you believed that could you come to that border belt 5
7 kilometres unannounced and conduct inspections?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May I now call up P837, please.
11 Q. General, this is the Clark-Naumann-Sainovic Agreement, and
12 Djordjevic. What is important in my view is what is one part of this
13 document that pertains to the FRY government communique which took over
14 the responsibility of implementing it. At page 2, item 2, of the
15 statement, am I right in saying that the FRY took on the obligation to
16 reduce the staffing strength of the MUP and army to the level which
17 existed before the terrorist activities commenced?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Thank you.
20 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now go to the next page of
21 the document.
22 Q. General, item 5 --
23 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. Court Clerk, you don't need to
24 put the B/C/S on the screen; the English will suffice since I have a
25 paper copy for my testify.
1 Q. General, in item 5, we see that three check-points are referred
2 to, or three locations at which the VJ had the right to deploy a company
3 per location in order to protect the traffic and the road?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. General, do you remember that the agreement concluded that the
6 company should number 100 to 120 men including -- plus their equipment?
7 A. That is what we understood to be a company.
8 Q. Thank you. Under (c) of this item do you see the mention of the
9 road Prizren-Suva Reka-Pristina which fell partly within the area of
10 responsibility of RC 1 that you were head of?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. If I recall correctly, that company was at Dulje, was that so?
13 A. That's correct.
14 Q. Thank you. Next look at item 7. Having read the agreement, did
15 you notice item 7 back in 1998 when you probably saw it for the first
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Am I right in saying that the FRY undertook to comply with the
19 obligations by 1200 hours on the 27th of October pertaining to the
20 agreement, and the other part of the item mentions that line of 1200
21 hours on the 29th of October?
22 A. I believe that's correct.
23 Q. Pursuant to this article, KDOM was supposed to monitor these
24 withdrawals; am I correct?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Some of it even spills over into item 4, but in any case, I
2 wanted to ask you this: Do you recall that NATO, or rather,
3 Mr. Javier Solana had an activation order in place should there be a
4 non-compliance on the part of the FRY?
5 A. Yeah, I'm -- I don't recall, but it's probable.
6 Q. There was no bombing, that is not in dispute, but that was
7 avoided precisely because the FRY met its obligations envisaged in the
8 documents, in which we can see that the legal predecessor of KVM was
9 KDOM; is that correct?
10 A. That's correct.
11 Q. General, you succeeded KDOM, and when I say "you," I mean the
12 KVM; and you took over their work in keeping with the contents of the
13 verification agreements; am I correct?
14 A. Yes, that's correct.
15 Q. From your answer, I gather that you were not familiar with the
16 previous compliance of the FRY that had been verified by KDOM once you
17 resumed that work first in Pristina and then as head of RC 1, you were
18 not familiar with that?
19 A. Oh, I was familiar, and in fact, I knew that the company position
20 in Dulje heights was an approved and agreed position that was allowed to
21 be in place.
22 Q. Thank you. That was your area of responsibility. There were
23 several obligations that were undertaken, that, for example, 10.000
24 policemen would be left in Kosovo, that all soldiers be returned to the
25 barracks, and that all units that had been deployed to Kosovo before
1 February, as well as all police units, be returned to Serbia. There were
2 several obligations to be met; is that correct?
3 A. That's correct.
4 Q. Thank you. Roman numeral III
5 at that.
6 A. Mm-hmm.
7 Q. General, the conclusion of para 3, does it authorise FRY
8 authorities to respond to terrorist activities adequately and
9 proportionately exercising self-defence?
10 A. Yes, it does, and to me the operative words are "adequately" and
12 Q. Thank you. We will discuss that a bit later. I'm, for the time
13 being, interested in the right to act against terrorists. Thank you,
15 Speaking of adequacy and proportionality, as a senior military
16 expert, having in mind the time that elapsed since your last verification
17 mission and today, has your position changed on the principal of
18 adequately and proportionately using force?
19 A. Not really. As I mentioned yesterday, I believe, in my
20 testimony, the pattern that we often saw happening was that the response
21 would be disproportionately great by the authorities when some of the
22 incidents were, I don't want to say minor, but were of a smaller nature.
23 So the reaction was usually disproportionately greater than the incident
24 itself. And I guess what has changed, of course on the basis of what is
25 happening now in Afghanistan
1 world, we see quite often the need for proportional response with respect
2 to the size of forces. And, I mean, could go into it in a lot more
3 detail, but I don't think it's worth doing here.
4 Q. I'd like us to discuss the criteria. I don't know whether you
5 saw the news on the BBC
6 half million civilians left their homes because of the alliance -- allied
7 forces operation. That thousands of people were killed, and that 200
8 million dollars were earmarked by the US government to aid Pakistan
9 deal with the consequences of this operation?
10 A. I didn't see the news, but it's quite possible that that's the
11 case. I know there's a major activity going on in the Swat valley.
12 Q. Do you believe, do you think, that this represents a proportion
13 at use of force resulting in the removal of three and a half million
14 people and 3.000 people being killed, and then let's talk about cluster
15 bombs and depleted uranium ammunition, does that constitute
17 A. No, it does not, in my view.
18 Q. Thank you. To go back to you, since you are the expert in terms
19 of the territory where you were, would you agree with me that the
20 conflicts and the incidents which took place during your mandate there,
21 for the most part happened in the country-side in rural areas?
22 A. On occasion they were in the country-side, but not always.
23 Q. Thank you. When I say rural or outside urban areas, I mean the
24 smaller towns ending with villages. But for me, Racak is no town nor is
25 Randubrava. Since you visited those places, can you tell me what does a
1 typical Albanian home look like in those village? What does it's yard
2 look like? And what possibility does one have to access the house?
3 A. Right. These houses are, indeed, they are not built up areas
4 such as, you know, in the middle of Prizren, for example. They are not
5 apartments. They are usually houses that are dislocated and, for
6 example, in Rogovo, there was a number of small houses that were joined
7 together by a fence, kind of in an open area, kind of a yard where you
8 could come in. It was kind of a farm-type conglomeration of houses. So
9 that was more typical of the -- of Albanian housing in the area.
10 Q. Thank you. These yards were behind tall walls which contained a
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. General, do you agree that such structures, if used for military
14 purposes, represent well-fortified or well-protected facilities?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Thank you. I'd like to ask you something else that you are also
17 an expert in. What is the proportion or relationship between the
18 attacker and the one defending for the attacker to be able to win?
19 A. The common planning figure is three to one. Three attackers to
20 one defender.
21 Q. What about technical means?
22 A. I don't know what you mean, in terms of overwhelming force, in
23 terms of?
24 Q. What you told me in your answer has to do with soldiers. What
25 about the technical means, equipment, or assets that would be needed?
1 A. I believe in a normal attack, say, when we were, you know, in my
2 staff college days, we would try to have as many of the weapons available
3 to us, available to put on a particular attack. Now, it depends, of
4 course, at what level you are talking about. When you are talking about
5 a divisional or brigade level, you usually are talking about some
6 important and large weapons. When you are talking about small -- small
7 section attacks, then we are talking about small-arms weapons, et cetera.
8 Q. Thank you, General. I'd like to ask you this: If we have a
9 village which such houses containing 10, 20, or 30 enemy, wouldn't it be
10 normal then, and expected, to have a company to clear the area?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Thank you. And do you believe that many legal representatives of
13 authorities need to be killed in order to liberate an area that was taken
14 up by terrorists?
15 A. No.
16 Q. Thank you, General. To go back to the time preceding your stay
17 in Kosovo, you must have heard that after the agreement that was met in
18 full by the FRY by pulling out its army and police forces, taking them
19 outside of Kosovo, returning them to the barracks, that the KLA used that
20 to expand their territory and take up positions in the locations from
21 which the FRY forces had been withdrawn?
22 A. Yes, I have heard that.
23 Q. Thank you. Since your area of responsibility also included the
24 border, and there were some incidents there, would I be right in saying
25 that across that border contrary to the UN resolutions there was constant
1 arms smuggling from Albania
2 A. Yes, I was aware of that.
3 Q. Thank you. Do you know whether the KVM notified the OSCE on the
4 violations of the resolutions by the KLA -- or by Albania
5 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction.
6 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Was the Security Council of the UN
7 informed of Albania
8 the KLA?
9 A. I don't know whether the OSCE or the UN were apprised of the
10 issue. Certainly in my area whenever we had evidence of arms smuggling
11 and so on, we would certainly advise the KVM headquarters. As a matter
12 of fact, I think as you know, when I arrived in Kosovo in December, there
13 had just been an incident where a number of people were killed by the
14 border guards, border security guards, and they certainly seemed to be
15 people of fighting age.
16 Q. Thank you. I believe it was also your assessment that it was KLA
17 who were trying to enter illegally smuggling arms, and that they were
18 encountered by the representatives of authorities?
19 A. That was my assessment.
20 Q. Thank you. General, looking at the chronology of events between
21 the 15th of October and the 18th of April, 1999, one would not gain the
22 impression that in your area of RC 1 there were grave problems that were
23 caused by FRY authorities, and that any of such events were reported to
24 the operations department.
25 A. I can't say whether there were many or not many. Certainly I
1 had -- I had, I think, a pretty good grip on events that were going on,
2 and we had indeed good relations generally with the authorities and with
3 the KLA; so we were able, I think, to keep events and incidents to the
5 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please come closer to the
6 microphones. Thank you.
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. General, you have testified about Racak and Rogovo, both of which
9 fell outside your area of responsibility; am I correct?
10 A. Racak for sure. Rogovo I think was right on the border.
11 Q. You were at a meeting with Mr. Vojnovic. In any case, Rogovo is
12 Djakovica municipality rather than Prizren; you recall that?
13 A. Yes, okay.
14 Q. Thank you. General, I'd like to move on to some of your
15 documents and some meetings where you attended. The first thing I'd like
16 to know is something that has to do with Exhibit P854. General, this is
17 a note on the handover dated the 5th of December, 1998, I think this is
18 your report or information sheet that you left to your successor; am I
20 A. I have the wrong document on my screen, but I do believe that
21 that is the one you are referring to. When I was at the KVM support unit
22 and left those notes for my successor on the 5th of December.
23 Q. Maybe I misstated the number. The exhibit is P854. While
24 waiting for it, we can continue discussing this subject. That was in the
25 period while you were still not the head of RC 1. I wanted to read
1 something out. In item 3, you say:
2 "During one of your trips to Skopje, you should visit the KVM C
3 and meet with Brigadier David Montgomery. Commander of the KVCC which is
4 of essential importance to analyse air and land information."
5 MS. KRAVETZ: Your Honour, I'm wondering if the document could be
6 displayed for the witness.
7 JUDGE PARKER: It's trying to be located, Ms. Kravetz.
8 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] It was page 19,
9 65 ter number 2772, and page 18 in the English. Could we please confirm
10 the information Ms. O'Leary provided me with.
11 Q. General, let us not waste any time since you have to travel
12 tomorrow, I believe. I'd like to give you my hard copy.
13 A. I have it.
14 Q. And of item 3, the last sentence. I wanted to ask you for your
15 explanation of the acronym KVCC and what is this essential coordination
16 to verify air and land information?
17 A. The KVCC was an organisation that had been set up in Skopje
18 I believe it was as a result of the first -- the first agreements between
19 the FRY and the OSCE and the FRY and the UN, et cetera. The KVCC I
20 believe was there to coordinate particularly air forces, in the case of,
21 as you said, an air campaign in Kosovo. I believe that that is what the
22 KVCC was. So for us, it was important to, as we were standing up, the
23 Kosovo Verification Mission, that we have at least the head of the
24 support unit in Vienna
25 critical activity that he needed to undertake, and that's why I suggested
1 that he visit this place.
2 Q. Thank you, General. Am I right in saying this: Pursuant to the
3 Clark-Perisic [as interpreted] Agreement, I believe, air verification was
4 to be done by NATO?
5 A. Yes, I believe that's correct.
6 Q. And when there is a mention of coordination, it has to do with
7 the collation of both land and air data?
8 A. Correct.
9 Q. Given that you are an expert in that, when there is air
10 surveillance in place, can't you see any movements of troops? For
11 example, on Google, I can follow what is going on right now in Ottawa
12 A. I believe that there is a possibility to be able to observe. The
13 issue is, of course, how time sensitive is it, and I think unless you
14 have persistent observation, it's very difficult to actually tell
15 movement of troops. And it also depends on the cover from the air,
16 et cetera, et cetera. There's a whole bunch of technical issues to that.
17 But generally, the idea is to ensure that you are coordinating
18 the land -- ground verification and air verification. Usually what can
19 happen is the air verification can take place with the confirmation on
20 the ground.
21 Q. But you will agree with me that FRY forces used roads, and they
22 were easy to observe wherever they were, and they were easy to follow?
23 A. I could not really agree with you that they would be easy to
24 observe. Those that are on the roads, of course, are easy to observe.
25 But, you know, there's -- as a military man, I know you can hide pretty
2 Q. But with your mobile patrols, as far as I heard, you changed the
3 method of verification, you wrote down the numbers of vehicles of the FRY
4 and gradually established their bases, their movements, et cetera.
5 A. Yes, when we were able to observe movement and so on, my
6 verifiers actually did as much reporting as they could in terms of
7 details, et cetera.
8 Q. Thank you very much. Does the name Donna Phelan ring a bell?
9 A. No.
10 Q. All right. We'll move on then.
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, Ms. O'Leary was
12 right about the number of the exhibit, she just did not mention page 4.
13 Can I now call up again -- it's again 854, but we'll come to that
14 later. Let's take 860.
15 Q. General, this is about your 26 December, 1998 meeting with
16 Colonel Delic. What I'd like to know here is on page 3, I hope.
17 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] If we can just scroll down a
18 little -- sorry, scroll down. I don't need the signature, go on, please.
19 Q. Colonel Delic tells you the normal procedure here is for teams
20 going into the field to announce themselves to the Major at 4.00, or to
21 give four hours notice where and when they are going because we are
22 answerable for their safety.
23 A. Right.
24 Q. We've already discussed this, General, so I won't dwell on it.
25 I'd just like to ask you: Are you aware that sometime on the
1 15th of March discussions started and it was agreed that you, the
2 verifiers, may enter territories engulfed in the fighting at your own
3 peril; do you know that?
4 A. I was not aware of that, no.
5 Q. All right. Thank you. Now, about the installation of your
6 mission in the border belt and in Planeja village. Didn't Colonel Delic
7 say that he was not authorised to decide about that, that only the
8 superior command could decide?
9 A. That's correct, he did say that.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can I now have P864, please.
12 Q. This is your conversation on the 16th of January with
13 Lieutenant-Colonel Petrovic from the 243rd Mechanised Brigade. I'd like
14 to know one thing: Where does it say that the army may not conduct
15 training outside barracks? In which document would we find that?
16 A. I believe in one of the previous documents that you showed me,
17 this was only allowed with prior coordination with the KVM. This was in
18 one of the agreements, I don't recall which one, but that was my
20 Q. I'll now read out to you something on page 2, item 1, in the
21 B/C/S version. I don't know if I'll be able to find the English
22 reference. It must be on the first page. It says:
23 "P," that must be Petrovic. "We received authorisation for these
25 Did Petrovic inform you that these drills outside the barracks
1 were authorised, allowed? The second part of the sentence is:
2 "My commander is coming back Sunday night."
3 A. I have it in front of me here, and I understand what you are
4 saying. This is what Petrovic was saying that night that they had been
5 authorised. But as you know, I was at that meeting with Gil Gilbertson
6 who was the deputy head of the RC from RC 5, and he was confirming to me
7 that they had not had authorisation to move from the barracks, and that
8 they had been, indeed, at the time deployed for several days outside.
9 And that's why I was saying to them that it was an unauthorised
10 [Realtime transcript read in error "authorised"] move and it was -- and
11 that they were ready to fire towards Dulje, et cetera, and trying to find
12 out what was going on.
13 Q. Thank you, General. Maybe Gilbertson told you that, I don't know
14 when, but we don't have his response, his reaction to this statement by
15 Mr. Petrovic. Your meeting -- that meeting was at 10.37 in the morning?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Is it right that Mr. Gilbertson did not react to this statement
18 by Mr. Petrovic?
19 A. That's correct.
20 Q. Thank you.
21 JUDGE PARKER: Could I ask, General, if you look on the screen in
22 front of you, page 55, line 11, it suggests that at the end there that it
23 was an authorised move, if you can pick up the line.
24 A. An unauthorized, Your Honour.
25 JUDGE PARKER: That's what you said, yes. Thank you. So that
1 line 11 needs to be unauthorised, not authorised. Thank you.
2 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. I am not
3 in a position to follow the transcript at the same time.
4 Q. On this document, one more thing: Below the point you were
5 looking at, there's another one where again Lieutenant-Colonel Petrovic
7 "The KLA provoked an attack on MUP in Dulje heights, problems in
8 Javor and Luznica, but to the best of my knowledge, no fire from tanks on
9 14th of January occurred."
10 A. Yes, I see where that is, yes. Is he referring there, of course,
11 to the ambush by the KLA of the MUP convoy, I believe took place on the
12 8th of January; so a few days before this meeting, that's what he is
13 referring to there.
14 Q. Thank you. But he also mentions there was no fire on the
15 14th of January?
16 A. Yes, he did mention that too.
17 Q. Thank you.
18 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now have P869.
19 Q. We'll move on, General, to the incident in Racak of the
20 15th January. It's right, isn't it, that Racak is not in the area of
21 responsibility of RC 1, is it correct that on the 15th of January, you
22 were at a meeting in Pec with General Drewienkiewicz and other chiefs of
23 regional centres?
24 A. Yes, that's correct.
25 Q. Is it correct that after your luncheon, you received the first
1 information about something that happened in Racak, and at DZ's request,
2 you set out towards Racak?
3 A. That's correct.
4 Q. Thank you. Bearing in mind how long it takes to travel from Pec
5 to Racak and the time when you set out, you arrived at dark; and the only
6 contact you had was in Stimlje concerning some people who were wounded?
7 A. That's correct.
8 Q. Later on, going through some documents that you created, we'll
9 look at some more details. Is it the case that on the
10 16th of January, 1999, when DZ and General Walker arrived, the bodies
11 were moved to the mosque?
12 A. You mean Ambassador Walker. I believe that some of the bodies
13 were moved to the mosque, but many of them were still in Racak,
14 particularly in the -- in the ravine area.
15 Q. All right. I got what I just said from the witness statement of
16 General DZ that at that time when he came, together with Ambassador
17 Walker and yourself, the bodies were moved to the mosque.
18 But let me ask you this: Is it the case that Racak was not under
19 the control of the FRY forces from the afternoon of the 15th until the
20 time when you arrived on the 16th January, 1999?
21 A. If you define "under the control" by meaning that there was no
22 authority presence in Racak, I believe you would be correct.
23 Q. Yes. I don't know if you know this, but the -- you must have
24 found out later, the on-site investigation by FRY authorities was carried
25 out only on the 17th of January after failed attempts on the 15th and
1 the 16th?
2 A. I'm well aware. In fact, I was on the ground on the morning of
3 the 17th when the investigation took place.
4 Q. Thank you, General. Am I right in saying that at the time when
5 Ambassador Walker -- but he is also a general, isn't he?
6 A. I don't think so.
7 Q. All right. I thought he was. But never mind, he was certainly
8 an ambassador. When Ambassador Walker and General DZ were there, the
9 local KLA commander was also in Racak and on the 16th Ambassador Walker
10 spoke to him?
11 A. I believe that's the case, yes.
12 Q. And is it right that not a single person who perished in Racak
13 was killed from heavy weaponry?
14 A. That would be my -- that would be my assessment.
15 Q. Thank you. I'm not going to ask you this one, because I know you
16 did not see that, but let me ask you something else. You saw the terrain
17 around Racak and the high ground on which you stood, you say in your
18 statement you did not see any casings around trenches?
19 A. That's correct.
20 Q. Well, General, you said yourself you were not an expert in
21 ballistics, but as a military man; if there are no casings around the
22 bodies, that means that they were hit from a great distance; is that
23 right? Do you agree?
24 A. Yes, either that or the casings were picked up.
25 Q. Thank you. But it's the KLA that had control over the site, not
1 the FRY authorities. But let's move on.
2 Since there were trenches there and the persons who were a party
3 to the conflict were in trenches, wouldn't it be logical that in the case
4 of a skirmish, any wounds would be to the head, or at least the upper
5 part of the body?
6 A. I think Mr. Milosevic asked me that question about seven years
7 ago, and my answer was the same as it is now, and that is that when we
8 learn how to shoot, we always aim for the centre of mass. We never aim
9 for a particular part of the body, we aim for the centre of mass, that's
10 the best way to ensure that the soldier hits the target. So in this
11 case, obviously if there's only part of the body that's exposed, the
12 centre of mass would be that, you know, the centre of that part of the
13 body that is exposed.
14 Q. Thank you, General. That's the rule of the bull's-eye on the
15 chest in target practice.
16 Have you ever seen the video made by the Verification Mission
17 when they were there in Racak on the 16th of January?
18 A. I don't believe I've seen it, no.
19 Q. Did you see in the course of trials and court proceedings any
20 report by your verifiers from RC 1 or RC 5 about the Racak incident?
21 A. You mean out of this court? I believe I -- I believe I've only
22 seen what I have in my depositions, et cetera. I don't think I've seen
23 anything from any others.
24 Q. I just said reports by verifiers, you were at too high a level
25 and you just summed up the reports of your subordinates. You sent your
1 own report on the 16th and the 17th. Were you shown any reports by
2 individual verifiers in this case, in this courtroom?
3 A. I can't recall if I was shown any in this courtroom, but I can
4 tell you that on the ground, before preparing my own reports, et cetera,
5 I may not have seen any written reports by my verifiers, but I certainly
6 talked to all of them that were there, and I kept in very close contact.
7 And so I developed my assessments based on my discussions with them.
8 Q. Please focus on my question. I asked you about yesterday and
9 earlier today. Did you see any such document created by one of your
10 verifiers, or verifiers from RC 5?
11 A. No.
12 Q. You told me that the complete archives of the OSCE were moved
13 from Pristina, that is the regional centres, to Macedonia and Albania
15 A. I don't know if I said that; I'm not sure they were. I know that
16 I took my personal archives such as the sitreps, et cetera, through my
17 deployment further.
18 Q. I'm sorry, you are right. You were talking about yourself, not
19 the entire mission.
20 Now, General, were you aware, at the time or later, that Stimlje,
21 Racak, and Urosevac were within the Nerodimlje operation zone of the KLA.
22 A. I wasn't aware of the name of the operation zone, I knew it was
23 outside of my, I'll just say, the commander of my operational zone within
24 my area. I knew it was outside of his area.
25 Q. Excellent. You've anticipated my next question. When you spoke
1 to Mr. Drini, you spoke about the area that was not in his territory;
3 A. Yes, I did, knowing that it was not in his territory.
4 Q. Now, after so much discussion about Racak, would I be right in
5 saying that in Racak itself and the environs, KLA members were present on
6 the 15th when the operation in Racak began?
7 A. I think you would be right. I never had any contact with them
8 myself in Racak or Stimlje, but my verifies indeed did have some contact.
9 Q. Thank you, General. One more thing, the KLA also confirmed that
10 a certain number of their members were killed in Racak, but let's put
11 that aside.
12 When you talked to Mr. Drini - I believe it was, on the 17th of
13 January, 1999 - he told you that the wounded members of the KLA, a number
14 of them, were placed in hospitals that he had on his territory and his
15 area of responsibility; correct?
16 A. That's possible. It's probably in the record of meetings, but I
17 don't recall exactly.
18 Q. We'll come to that meeting.
19 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] 869, please.
20 Q. To finish with the meeting you had with the chief of
22 THE WITNESS: I have it here.
23 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. You'll agree with me, General, that unlike the conversation with
25 Mr. Petrovic where you were involved in the discussion, this time it was
1 Mr. Gilbertson who took the chair and you made just a few remarks;
3 A. That's correct. We had agreed that that would be the procedure.
4 Q. Thank you. Is it right that Mr. Janicevic briefed you on the
5 situation including the events in Racak?
6 A. Yes, he gave us his account.
7 Q. Yes.
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. His account. But since it was not your territorial
10 responsibility, you did know that on the 8th of January in Sljivovo -- or
11 rather, you didn't know that a police patrol was attacked in Sljivovo on
12 the 8th of January, you didn't know about the kidnappings of Albanians in
13 that area, it was not your area, and did you not have any prior knowledge
14 of these things; correct?
15 A. That's correct.
16 Q. Thank you.
17 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Now, can we look at page 2; I
18 believe it's page 2 in English as well.
19 Q. Is it correct, General, that the chief of SUP told you that the
20 action was approved by the staff, and he led about 100 policemen who took
22 A. Yes, he did tell me, indeed, that he was in charge of the 100
23 policemen, and I don't know what you mean about that this was an agreed
24 -- oh, you are probably referring to the part where he talks about
25 Article 3 being fulfilled, is that what you are referring to?
1 Q. And here we see the line where he tells you, Even at the position
2 of chief of the police, we cannot make final decisions, it's the staff
3 that has to decide because they issued the order. Is this a correct
4 interpretation, a correct account of your discussion?
5 MS. KRAVETZ: Your Honour, just to assist, I believe the passage
6 my learned colleague is referring to is at page 7 of the English. This
7 document has three versions and the operative one is the last one.
8 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you. That may assist to find the correct
10 THE WITNESS: I've lost sight of the question. Would you repeat
11 your question?
12 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Okay. You've seen the document. I asked you two things at the
14 same time. One, that this chief of the police told you that it was the
15 staff that approved the operation and issued the orders; and two, that he
16 led the 100 policemen who carried out the operation?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. It's time for the break, General, but just one brief question:
19 Is it correct that Mr. Janicevic denied at this meeting that any members
20 of the Army of Yugoslavia participated in the action?
21 A. That's correct.
22 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, General. I
23 believe it's time for the break, Your Honours.
24 JUDGE PARKER: Yes. We will have the second break now. And we
25 resume at 1.00. You are on target for time, Mr. Djurdjic?
1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] You have decided so, and that's
2 how it will be. And I would like to thank the General who is giving me
3 very brief and very precise answers. I hope he will keep up in the same
4 vein. And then at the end, I'll have an objection.
5 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
6 [The witness stands down]
7 --- Recess taken at 12.33 p.m.
8 --- On resuming at 1.01 p.m.
9 [The witness takes the stand]
10 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Djurdjic.
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
12 Q. General, were you aware, at the time when you were a part of the
13 Verification Mission in Kosovo, that the KLA had 60 millimetre mortars
14 and 80 millimetre mortars?
15 A. That had been reported.
16 Q. In this document that should be in front of you, I see that
17 Mr. Janicevic also told you at this meeting of the 16th of January, that
18 the KLA did use the 60 millimetre mortar and the 80 millimetre mortar;
20 A. Possibly. I don't see it on my -- on my record of meeting here,
21 but I believe that they did indeed mention that.
22 Q. It's on the first page of the record. In your Regional Centre 1,
23 you had a certain David Wilson; do you remember him?
24 A. Yes, I do.
25 Q. He was the liaison officer with the KLA for your regional centre;
2 A. No, actually, he was the chief liaison, so the liaison officer
3 for the KLA and the liaison officer for the authorities reported to him
4 as the chief of the liaison.
5 Q. Thank you. Do you know that he attended the conference in
7 A. Yes, I do, because I sent him there.
8 Q. Could you tell us then about his mandate in Rambouillet?
9 A. Yes, he was in Rambouillet to actually keep us informed of the
10 progression of the negotiations. The idea was that the KVM had -- I had
11 suggested to General DZ that KVM should be represented there to get a
12 sense of what was going on and so his mandate was, if you wish, I had
13 loaned him to KVM headquarters, and his mandate was to report back on the
14 progression of the negotiations.
15 Q. Thank you. And did he help the delegation of the
16 Kosovar Albanians during the conference?
17 A. Not to my knowledge.
18 Q. May I ask you now if it is the same David Wilson --
19 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we have document 65 ter 641.
20 Q. General, you will see that this is a report by David Wilson of
21 15th March, 1999
22 15th of March, 1999.
23 A. I see it, yes.
24 Q. Let me just ask you, is that the David Wilson you had on your
1 A. I believe it's the same one, yes.
2 Q. Thank you. In sub-item (d), do you remember that on the
3 14th of March, the KLA renewed its attack, its ambush attack in Dulje?
4 A. No, I'm not aware of that.
5 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] And now can I call up P870.
6 Sorry, I don't need that one. We don't have time for it. P872.
7 Q. General, this is a meeting of the 17th January, 1999, you had
8 with Mr. Drini. Let me just draw your attention to bullet point 8 from
9 the top. "D" means "Drini." Speaking of exposure to special fire, he
10 spoke of the need to acquire indirect fire weapons, maybe Katyusha
12 A. Yes, I see that.
13 Q. Can you share with us any details about this?
14 A. No, I can't. Actually, it happened quite often that there was a
15 lot of bluster from the KLA about how they were going to get these
16 weapons and these weapons and this came totally from left field. I was
17 very surprised, and as you can see, I don't think it was brought up again
18 this that meeting or subsequently.
19 Q. Can you now look at line 5.
20 A. Mm-hmm. Yes.
21 Q. It's in between quotation marks here, it says:
22 "Some were released, some are in serious condition and still in
23 my hospital."
24 And he was talking about the wounded from Racak and Petrovo Selo?
25 A. Correct. And that should be in "military" hospital. M-i-l is,
1 certainly in the English, in the original, means "military," in military
2 hospital, which I was not aware there were KLA military hospitals, but.
3 Q. Now, on page 2 of this document, please look at point 4 and give
4 us your comment. While you are reading, let me read it out:
5 "We are going to continue talking to US KDOM, although they are
6 cowboys, they can get the job done with their bulldozer policy."
7 "Bulldozer." Tell me, what did Mr. Drini tell you about this?
8 A. Well, one of the issues was that within my zone, my regional
9 centre, I often received reports that there was -- that the US KDOM,
10 those portions that had not integrated into my regional centre, were
11 operating. And I found that frustrating at times because of course they
12 would meet with different parties, and I was not aware of the subjects of
13 those meetings or the reports or what had been decided, et cetera.
14 So this was, for me, a bit frustrating, and I was then talking to
15 Drini about this and saying that, you know, I found it frustrating and
16 that's the point at which he said that he would continue to talk to the
18 Q. But I want to know what this meant:
19 "They can get the job done with their bulldozer policy."
20 What was it that he told you that prompted the person who made
21 this record to write something like this?
22 A. Well, I think Drini said exactly that, is that he would continue
23 to talk to the US KDOM because in his view even though they were not as
24 controlled as we in the OSCE were, that, of course, they had the
25 political weight of the United States and therefore presumably would
1 continue to get the job done. I didn't know what job he was speaking
2 about, but all I know is that I found it very frustrating.
3 Q. Thank you, General. Perhaps I don't need to show you a document,
4 but I'd like to ask you whether the KLA was against you establishing a
5 station in Planeja?
6 A. Whether the KLA was against? I am not sure whether the KLA were
7 against it. I don't recall asking their permission, so I'll leave it
9 Q. I have a -- minutes of a meeting here where you didn't mention
10 the KLA per se, but you were wondering why people in the field would be
11 against a Planeja office or an office in the field. Does that ring a
13 A. Well, I had several discussions with the authorities about the
14 Planeja. My sense was that Planeja was, inside -- indeed, inside the
15 5 kilometre border boundaries; but I still felt that it would be
16 important to set up a field office there to enable us to monitor, if
17 indeed there were infiltrations through the border, that would allow us
18 to see firsthand these infiltrations to be able to report them to KVM
19 headquarters. And if they were, you know, facilitated by the Albanian
20 authorities, that would again put pressure on the Albanian authorities.
21 On the other hand, it would also allow us to verify, to observe,
22 the behaviour of the authorities and be able to report on their good
23 behaviour or their bad behaviour as the case may be. So this would have
24 been, to my sense, an important field office to set up.
25 And that was, you know -- the entire time I was in Kosovo, that
1 was the idea, to be able to have a good coverage of the area, to be able
2 to observe properly, to be able to report, to verify in an impartial
4 Q. Thank you. I have here the minutes of a meeting you had with
5 Commander Drini on the 26th of February. I am interested in something he
6 says here. He says that "the 12-year-old boys conveyed the message."
7 A. I don't have that document in front of me, so.
8 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] It is 873, I believe. In the
9 English, page 2.
10 Q. To make it easier for you, I'll read out the B/C/S translation:
11 "If they shoot tomorrow, we will return fire, but we will not
12 open fire first."
13 Then there is a mention of Praga and Pirana. And then it says:
14 "12-year-old boys conveyed the message."
15 A. Where in the meeting report is that, Mr. Djurdjic?
16 Q. The 12th capital letter from the top.
17 "Boys of 12 years passed ..." [In English] "If they" --
18 A. If they fire tomorrow, I see it.
19 Q. Yes. So the last sentence:
20 "Boys of 12 years passed message."
21 A. Okay now you've made the thing so big -- okay. There it is.
22 Okay. Could you go back up please, a little bit.
23 Yeah, I don't know what he's -- I have no recollection what he
24 was referring to there, I'm sorry.
25 Q. Thank you. Did you know that KLA members operated in civilian
1 clothes without uniforms as well?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Thank you. Today you said that your source in Albania on the
4 number of refugees was the Albanian government concerning your report of
5 the 18th of May. The Albanian government saw it as in their interest to
6 have the number of refugees as large as possible to receive more aid,
7 wouldn't that be correct?
8 A. Yes, what I actually stated was that the government of Albania
9 was at the source of the reporting, but also they were -- the UNHCR were
10 on the ground, a number -- the ICRC, a number of NGOs also. And we had
11 contact ourselves with all these agencies. And there was a systematic
12 manner of reporting the number of refugees. As they crossed the border,
13 they were counted, et cetera. And so I have a -- quite a bit of
14 confidence in the figures that are in the report.
15 Q. Thank you. General, you also said that you received great
16 technical assistance from the staff that transferred from Kosovo to
18 24th of March and that they spoke good Albanian and could therefore take
19 good quality statements. Am I right in saying that you are there
20 referring to Albanian nationals or people of Albanian ethnic origin?
21 A. Yes, I mean, the approach we took, of course, when we went
22 into -- when we went into Albania
23 refugees, we brought with us some folks who were able to speak Albanian,
24 but we also recruited local employees in Albania, per se, that we used as
1 Q. Thank you. Do you know who was the driver of Mr. Drewienkiewicz
2 and Walker during their stay in Kosovo?
3 A. No, I don't.
4 Q. I apologise. I sometimes may pronounce things incorrectly, but I
5 think his name was Hajziri [phoen], and apparently he was a link between
6 the Kosovo Verification Mission in Macedonia and the KLA, and that he
7 forwarded all KLA information to the KVM. Do you know anything about
9 A. No, no, I don't.
10 Q. Thank you. The first report we saw which is P874, encompasses
11 the period between the 2nd and the 15th of April, 1999, whereas your
12 staff went in the field on the 5th of April, according to the report.
13 A. Okay.
14 Q. Therefore the information was retroactive; it was gathered before
15 their stay in the field.
16 A. Right. And as I've mentioned before, the collation of this
17 information was actually done by -- through our contact with the NGOs
18 that were already deployed on the ground, those that had been there since
19 the 24th of March and before. And the OSCE presence in Albania
20 direct contact.
21 So the idea was to report on the two-week period, but you are
22 right, some of that information had been gleaned and gathered from those
23 that were on the ground before that we had -- that we cooperated with.
24 Q. Thank you, General. Did you ever see a list of persons that were
25 killed in Racak?
1 A. No.
2 Q. Thank you. Can I conclude then that you don't know the age
3 breakdown of the victims?
4 A. Not specifically.
5 Q. Thank you. I have one last question for you: Do you know
6 Mr. Richard Vabit or Wabit [phoen] who is also a Canadian and was in Pec?
7 Have you ever heard of him?
8 A. No, I have not. But I might have known him at the time; it's
10 Q. Very well. But I'd still like to hear your comment regarding
11 something. The organisation -- the type of organisation resembles the
12 Italian mafia, that is to say, by families. The male family members stay
13 close to their homes every day, digging trenches, making bunkers, and
14 carrying out tactical training. Their food is prepared and brought to
15 them by the female members of the family. In a family, there is one main
16 person, a capo. The family members working abroad have their monthly
17 payments due to be sent to the family. All that money can be channeled
18 into purchasing weapons freely because food and medication is provided
19 for --
20 JUDGE PARKER: May I interrupt, Mr. Djurdjic.
21 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Does this ring a bell?
22 JUDGE PARKER: Ms. Kravetz.
23 MS. KRAVETZ: Your Honour, I see that my learned friend is
24 reading from a document. I really -- he has not indicated what is the
25 source of this passage he is reading, he has also put quite a lot of
1 information to the witness, I'm not sure that there is a question here in
2 the passage that he is.
3 JUDGE PARKER: He was interrupted before he reached the question,
4 Ms. Kravetz, but the source of the document, Mr. Djurdjic?
5 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] It is our exhibit -- rather
6 document, it's not an exhibit, D003-1006. I would like to hear from the
7 witness whether he is familiar with the contents of this document and
8 whether he would agree with it. I believe the answer may be short. We
9 don't have a translation, otherwise I would have put it up on the screen.
10 The gentleman does not read that language, that's why I read it out.
11 JUDGE PARKER: General, you are asked whether you are familiar
12 with this document and its contents.
13 THE WITNESS: I am not.
14 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, that is the answer I
15 expected to receive. General, thank you very much. It was a pleasure to
16 speak to you.
17 Your Honours, Defence concludes its cross-examination pursuant to
18 your order. I have an objection to make though. It happened on several
19 occasions that the Prosecutor brings witnesses whose testimony is limited
20 in terms of time. This witness was at our disposal as of yesterday
21 morning. Before him, we had a witness who was not limited in terms of
22 time as opposed to this witness. We used most of yesterday with his
23 testimony prior to reaching this witness to be put at our disposal by the
25 I do not believe that should be the practice we should follow in
1 the future, and I would still like to thank the Chamber for considering
3 JUDGE PARKER: We will discuss the matter you raise at some time
4 when we are not pressed.
5 Ms. Kravetz.
6 MS. KRAVETZ: Thank you, Your Honour. Could I please have
7 Exhibit P837 back up on the screen, and I would like page 3 of the
8 English and also page 3 of the B/C/S, paragraph 8.
9 Re-examination by Ms. Kravetz:
10 Q. General, you were asked several questions about this document
11 that's going to appear on the screen, this is the
12 Clark-Naumann Agreement. You were asked about the paragraph that
13 precedes paragraph 8. And my questions relate to paragraph 8
15 We see that this paragraph says that:
16 "In order to ensure verification of these provisions, VJ and MUP
17 providers will provide ..." and if we read the second part of this
18 paragraph, it says:
19 "... will provide immediate notification to KDOM/OSCE of any
20 deployments contrary to these provisions and will explain the
21 circumstances regarding such deployments?"
22 Now, you have told us that you were familiar at the time with
23 this agreement. In your understanding, this expression
24 "any deployments," would that have included deployment outside of
25 barracks for the purpose of conducting training exercises?
1 A. Yes, it would have.
2 Q. So in your understanding -- and you were answering a question
3 from my learned colleague with regard to what was the source of you
4 saying that prior authorisation was required for conducting training
5 exercises, you said that in your understanding you required prior
6 coordination with the KVM and that was in one of the agreements that was
7 shown earlier. Is this what you were referring to?
8 A. Exactly.
9 Q. Now, we see the first part of this paragraph also refers to
10 another requirement:
11 "VJ commanders and MUP commanders will provide KDOM and OSCE with
12 detailed weekly reports of manning, weapons, and activities of their
14 Was this a requirement that during your tenure in Kosovo was
15 complied with?
16 A. Never in my experience.
17 Q. Thank you. And what about the second part that we were just
18 discussing, the immediate notification of deployments contrary to the
19 provisions of this agreement, was that something that was complied with?
20 A. Not normally.
21 Q. Okay. And in which circumstances was that complied with?
22 A. Well, there were circumstances in which we understood that they
23 would not be able to comply. For example, if they were provoked -- if
24 the authorities were provoked by a particular incident, then we felt in
25 the KVM that it was understandable that they would not have preplanned
1 their deployments outside to react to a particular incident.
2 So when that happened, we understood that, you know, it was part
3 of their, you know, their reaction that they would do this, and then so
4 we did not actually, you know, hold it against them from that point of
6 But it happened quite often that they would take, for example,
7 their tanks on the road and would really instill fear in the population,
8 and we would go and protest, go and find out why they were doing this;
9 and they would say it's driver training.
10 Now, obviously if we had been warned ahead of time that this kind
11 activity was going to be taking place, we could have warned the local
12 population, we could have ensured that we were in different villages to
13 reassure them that this was an agreed activity. So we never really got
14 any of that prior notice.
15 Q. Thank you. Could we now turn to the next page. And this is
16 Roman numeral III
17 in regard to this, and while you were being asked these questions - this
18 is at transcript page of today 45, lines 18 and 19 - you said that the
19 operative terms in the last part of this paragraph were the words
20 "adequately and proportionately." Can you explain what you meant by that
22 A. Yes. In my view when I mean -- when I say adequately and
23 proportionately, I guess I felt that definitely there were times when the
24 Serb authorities would be provoked into taking certain actions, into
1 For example, the incident, I believe, on the 8th of January,
2 where a convoy of MUP vehicles was ambushed by the KLA, two policemen
3 died on the scene, I believe, and one later. And the reaction by the
4 Serb authorities was to bring a tank out of the Dulje position and to
5 start firing into a village. And, you know, I just -- I had a hard time
6 kind of calling that a proportionate or adequate response to an activity
7 that, you know, wasn't really linked.
8 And so this was kind of the type of incident that -- or the type
9 of reaction that, to me, went against this adequately and proportionately
10 operative words in this accord.
11 Q. Now, this paragraph refers to UN Security Council Resolution 1199
12 and you were asked some questions about that. And specifically, my
13 learned colleague asked you about a phrase that refers to not carrying
14 out any repressive actions against a peaceful population - and he asked
15 you this is at transcript page 38, lines 7 and 8 - if the populations
16 were not peaceful, was there no ban on any measures taken against them,
17 and you said that's the way you read it as well.
18 Now, based on the answer you just provided us, to your
19 understanding of this Roman numeral III
20 restrictions on the way Serb authorities could react when provoked or
21 when perceived to be provoked?
22 A. Yes, I would think that the restriction is exactly those three
23 words "adequately and proportionately." So meaning that the restriction
24 would be that the reaction would be in proportionality to the level of
25 the attack or the provocation, i.e., if you are fired by a small arms,
1 you know, a couple of small arms shots from a particular village, you
2 don't deploy an entire company to go do it, to go and react to that.
3 On the other hand, if you're -- if you're attacked from a village
4 by 20 or 30, I think as the counsel spoke earlier, then obviously the
5 reaction by a company might be appropriate and adequate. So this to me
6 were the kinds of -- the kinds of restrictions that formed part of this
8 Q. Thank you. Now moving on to a different topic. My learned
9 colleague asked you today when you were speaking about military
10 structures and MUP structures and your familiarity with both of them, he
11 asked you why you knew military structures in your area better than you
12 did MUP, and you said that you variously associated with military
13 structures such as brigade more than you -- and not so easily with
14 paramilitary like the MUP. This is at page 30, line 21.
15 What did you mean when you were referring to the MUP as a
16 paramilitary structure?
17 A. What I'm referring to here is that I see, I certainly assessed in
18 my own mind the MUP as being not just a police force, but also a kind of
19 a police force with more, if you wish, much like a Gendarmerie in France
20 where they're able to do almost infantry type tactics, they're able to --
21 they have armoured vehicles, they are equipped with some heavier weapons
22 than just a straight pistols that you would find in, say, a strictly
23 police type force.
24 So to me they were, if you wish, between the police and the
25 military, they were kind of an in-between organisation, so that's why I
1 call them paramilitary.
2 In my country, we don't have such forces. Our police are, you
3 know, don't usually travel in armoured vehicles. They don't do infantry
4 tactics. In fact, when they try to do infantry tactics, they don't do so
5 well. And there have been incidents of deaths and so on of police who
6 tried to do this kind of thing.
7 So we have a more, if you wish, a clearer definition between
8 police forces, military forces, and so to my mind my assessment is the
9 MUP was somewhere in middle.
10 Q. Thank you for that. And just one final issue I wanted to get to
11 before this session ends today. I would like to refer you to attachment
12 13A of your statement, and this is Exhibit P870. Now, today you were
13 asked -- well, I'll first let you get to that document.
14 A. Okay.
15 Q. Can you tell us what this document is?
16 A. This is -- this is kind of a -- an assessment, a report that I
17 put together after the incidents of Racak and Stimlje on the -- I
18 believe, the evening of the 16th of January. That's a report I wrote
20 Q. Now, today at page 60, you were asked by my learned colleague
21 about whether you had been shown any reports prepared by verifiers in
22 relation to the Racak incident, and you said that you didn't recall
23 seeing any in this courtroom but you referred to preparing your own
24 reports and having spoken to verifiers for that purpose.
25 A. Yes, I did.
1 Q. Is this the report that you were speaking about when you were
2 providing that answer to my learned colleague? Or were you speaking
3 about another document?
4 A. No, this is certainly, this is certainly one of the -- one of the
5 documents I was referring to, and I don't recall exactly, but there must
6 have been a daily sitrep also prepared by my regional centre and sent up
7 to the KVM, but I don't recall it immediately at this point, so.
8 Q. Now, we see the second bullet point below the date 16th January,
9 this is like in the middle of the page. It says:
10 "Head RC 1 Prizren arrived on the scene at 9 a.m.
11 by head CC 3."
12 I take it the reference to head RC 1 Prizren, that would be a
13 reference to yourself?
14 A. Yes, it is.
15 Q. And when you were speaking and responding to my learn colleague
16 and said that you had been in close contact and had discussions with the
17 verifiers, would this paragraph be -- this paragraph be an example of the
18 type of information you received from the verifiers on the ground that
19 you later included in your report?
20 A. That's exactly it.
21 Q. If we look at bullet point 3 from the bottom, it says:
22 "Head RC 1 proceeds further into the village..."
23 And you referred to bodies you observed and the ages of -- and
24 the sex of the bodies that you observed. Would this report have also
25 contained your personal observations on-site in Racak?
1 A. Sorry, are you down in the third bullet before the bottom of the
3 Q. Yes, where it says:
4 "Head RC 1 proceeds further into the village..."
5 A. Yes, that is exactly -- that was me, head RC 1, and I did proceed
6 into the village, and I observed the bodies of four more individuals as
7 stated here.
8 Q. Okay. Thank you.
9 MS. KRAVETZ: Your Honours, I see we are nearing the end of this
10 session so those are my questions for the witness; I'll stop at this
12 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you very much.
13 General, you'll be pleased to know, A, that is the end of the
14 questions; B, we finished within time; C, you are clear to go.
15 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.
16 JUDGE PARKER: We would like to thank you for your attendance
17 once again and for the assistance that you've been able to give us in
18 this matter.
19 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.
20 [The witness withdrew]
21 JUDGE PARKER: Dealing very quickly with the matter you raised,
22 Mr. Djurdjic, there may be a problem, and we have mentioned it where
23 there is a witness who is under a time limitation, ensuring that that is
24 known as the time for that witness to give evidence approaches or as the
25 witness is giving evidence so that we can adjust time proceedings to
1 accommodate that. Equally though, the situation in this case was due
2 partly to the time taken with the two witnesses before that, which was
3 longer than might reasonably be thought necessary, so that this witness
4 was reached later in the week than could have been reasonably
5 anticipated. Even so, we were, I believe, careful to make it known to
6 both counsel that there was a time limitation, and we went to some
7 lengths to ensure that you had a reasonable time for your questions,
8 which is the course we would take.
9 As I have mentioned to counsel before, the Chamber is not
10 inclined to impose strict time-limits. If it did so, this particular
11 sort of problem might rarely, if ever, arise. But if it did so, counsel
12 would find themselves much more limited than they are now with virtually
13 every witness. We prefer to allow it to the judgement and responsibility
14 of counsel to adjust time to what is really necessary.
15 In view of those matters, I don't think there was anything out of
16 proper management in the timing of this witness. It seems to the Chamber
17 that there was a reasonable opportunity given to Defence, a time probably
18 much longer than might have been available before some other
19 Trial Chambers. And we continue, though, to urge the Prosecution to make
20 known if a witness has a particular time limitation in time for any
21 adjustment that might be necessary to be made.
22 We adjourn now. We continue tomorrow at 9.00 in the morning.
23 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.48 p.m.
24 to be reconvened on Friday, the 5th day of June,
25 2009, at 9.00 a.m.