Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 5478

 1                           Thursday, 4 June 2009

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.

 5                           [The witness takes the stand]

 6             JUDGE PARKER:  Good morning, General.

 7             THE WITNESS:  Good morning, Your Honour.

 8             JUDGE PARKER:  Could I remind you that the affirmation you made

 9     still applies.

10             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.

11             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Djurdjic.  Still -- I'm living in over-eager

12     hope.

13             MS. KRAVETZ:  It's still me but not for much longer, Your Honour,

14     I assure you.

15             JUDGE PARKER:  Wonderful, Ms. Kravetz.

16                           WITNESS:  JOSEPH MAISONNEUVE [Resumed]

17                           Examination by Ms. Kravetz:  [Continued]

18        Q.   Good morning, General.  Yesterday when he left off we were

19     speaking about the Racak incident and the different meetings you had with

20     the MUP and VJ officials in relation to this incident.  Before moving on

21     to a different topic, I would just like to look at one more of the

22     attachments to your statement.  This is attachment number 7 which relates

23     to this incident.

24             MS. KRAVETZ:  I understand, Your Honours, that this attachment is

25     now Exhibit P863, and I need page 1 in both the English and B/C/S of

Page 5479

 1     that.

 2        Q.   Do you have the document before you, General?

 3        A.   Yes, I do.

 4        Q.   This is a record of discussions of a meeting at the VJ brigade

 5     command at Urosevac dated 4th February, 1999, and we see from this record

 6     that in attendance in addition to yourself are MR. -- Colonel Kotur;

 7     Colonel Krsman Jelic, the commander of the 243rd Brigade; and

 8     Pera Petrovic of whom we spoke about yesterday; and other persons who are

 9     listed there.  Do you recall attending this meeting, General?

10        A.   Yes, I do.

11        Q.   Now, you speak about this briefly in your statement - this is at

12     paragraph 30 to 32.  So I just want to look at some passages here.  On

13     the first page towards the bottom, you are recorded as addressing

14     Colonel Jelic and asking him:

15             "Did you order the forces to do this, if not, who was the

16     commander on the ground?"

17             And if you turn to the next page, we have Colonel Jelic who

18     responses - that's on page 2 in the middle of the first paragraph.  We

19     see that he is explaining -- giving you an explanation of what happened

20     and he says:

21             "Unit as Stimlje was training and was fired upon," in some

22     sentences down it says, "fired was made on targets between Belince and

23     Racak, provocations came from there."

24             Now, based on the understandings you had at the time of the

25     October agreements were VJ units allowed to conduct training activities

Page 5480

 1     outside of barracks and in the proximity of inhabited areas at the time?

 2        A.   No, they were not.

 3        Q.   We see here that further down you are asking Colonel Jelic about

 4     this operation and he says:

 5             "Our operation happened at the same time of the MUP operation,"

 6     and you ask him on 15 January between 8 and 9.00 a.m. and he says, "Yes."

 7             Do you recall when you left this meeting with Colonel Jelic if

 8     you were convinced by the explanation he gave you at the meeting that the

 9     unit was simply conducting a training exercise and that this training

10     exercise happened at the same time as the MUP operation was taking place?

11        A.   No, I was not convinced at the time.

12        Q.   And why is that?

13        A.   Well, it could have been because of the -- the emotional stress

14     that I was under having been, you know, having seen the aftermath of

15     the -- of the activity.  And it also just did not seem plausible to me

16     that -- that, you know, a coordinated MUP action with VJ, you know,

17     having by happenstance been in that area would make sense.

18             There's no doubt if, first of all, the VJ had been doing some

19     training, that they would have known that the MUP were going to be in the

20     village.  And there's no way that, you know, there's no way they would

21     have done this independently without coordinating together.

22        Q.   Thank you.  I want to now move away from the Racak incident to a

23     different issue, and I want to refer you to paragraph 9 of your

24     statement, where you refer to a meeting you had with Mr. Sainovic, and

25     this is a meeting that took place on one of the occasions when you

Page 5481

 1     officially replaced General DZ or Drewienkiewicz, also known as DZ.  Do

 2     you recall attending this meeting?  The one that's referred to at

 3     paragraph 9 of your statement.

 4        A.   Yes, I do.

 5        Q.   Do you recall approximately when this meeting took place, and

 6     what was the purpose of this meeting?

 7        A.   I don't exactly remember which -- in which of the periods that I

 8     replaced DZ which are laid out in my statement here, but I don't remember

 9     exactly on which one of those periods that I met with him.

10             The purpose of the meeting was for -- I think it was a regular

11     meeting between Ambassador Keller and Mr. Sainovic.

12        Q.   And based on the information you had at the time, what did you

13     understand to be Mr. Sainovic's role in Kosovo?

14        A.   I don't know if I remember, you know, I don't know if I knew that

15     exactly at the time, but I obviously since know that he was responsible

16     for Kosovo.  I understand since then that he was the minister responsible

17     of Kosovo delegated by the president.

18        Q.   And did you understand him at the time to have any authority over

19     either VJ or MUP units that were deployed on the ground at the time?

20        A.   Well, that's certainly something that I remember absolutely is

21     that I had no doubt in my mind at the time, and since either, that he

22     had -- he had full authority to control and command and give direction to

23     the units that were deployed within the theatre of Kosovo.

24        Q.   And what made you arrive to that conclusion, that he had full

25     authority, if you remember?

Page 5482

 1        A.   I think it was a combination of the manner in which he behaved,

 2     the manner in which he carried himself, the manner in which he responded

 3     to the questions by Ambassador Keller.  And I don't remember exactly the

 4     different issues that were being discussed, but it seemed to me that

 5     there were no -- there was no question that he was in charge of the

 6     operation.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  I want to now move to a different issue, and this is

 8     one of the last topics I want to discuss with you.  This concerns the

 9     paragraph 56 of your statement and refers to the period when you had

10     already left Kosovo and became the head of the KVM refugee task force.

11             Do you recall approximately when you were appointed head of that

12     task force in Albania?

13        A.   Yes, it would have been probably the third week of March.  I'd

14     been on leave when the actual withdrawal took place, then I rejoined my

15     personnel in Macedonia, and then the refugee task force was created.  So

16     it was towards the end of March, I believe.

17        Q.   And why was this task force created?  What was the purpose of

18     this task force?

19        A.   Well, at this point there had been reports and, you know,

20     obviously witnessing the pushing out of the personnel, the Kosovars,

21     Albanians, who were being pushed out, some into Albania, some into

22     Macedonia.  Most of the KVM was regrouped in Macedonia, but there was a

23     big issue with those that were coming into Albania, the -- many of the UN

24     and NGOs, the UNHCR and NGOs were deployed in Albania, and were, you

25     know, obviously sending reports and so forth.  So there was a

Page 5483

 1     requirement, and they were looking for something for the OSCE to be able

 2     to support.

 3             We are a ready, if you wish, number of personnel that were kind

 4     of -- had been -- had been evacuated, and we also obviously had a bit of

 5     an emotional tie with Kosovo.  So it was thought that we would put

 6     together a task force to go and assist the government of Albania with the

 7     refugees that were being pushed out from Kosovo.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  I would like you to turn now to attachment 15 of --

 9     it's tab 15 there in your binder.

10             MS. KRAVETZ:  And this is, Your Honours, Exhibit P874 in our

11     e-court system.  We have the document.

12        Q.   Do you recognise this document, and if yes, can you tell us what

13     it is?

14        A.   Yes, I recognise it.  It was produced by my -- by my personnel,

15     the -- in the KVM refugee task force after we -- after we became

16     officially effective in Albania.  And the idea was that we were going to

17     put together these bi-weekly reports specifically on human rights to be

18     able to, kind of, assess and report on the situation as we saw it.  And

19     as you can see, this was for our internal use only, or at least a report

20     that we were sending up to -- to the KVM headquarters on the situation as

21     we saw it.

22             So this was based on my verifiers who were deployed throughout

23     Albania in each of the prefectures, the 12 prefectures.  I was the only

24     organisation that actually had people deployed right across the entire

25     country, so I thought we could give a very good assessment, a good view

Page 5484

 1     of what we had witnessed and what we had in fact been able to interview

 2     from the different Albanians who were being pushed out into Albania.

 3        Q.   Now, you referred to the fact that you were conducting interviews

 4     with different Albanians who had been pushed out into Albania, and we

 5     also see that the document in the first line refers to the ongoing

 6     interviewing of refugees since 5th April.

 7             Were you personally involved in any of the interviews that were

 8     conducted with refugees that had been pushed out of Kosovo into Albania?

 9        A.   Yes, I was.  Because I wanted to see and experience what my

10     verifiers were doing daily, of course I was on the ground continuously

11     every day and in contact with refugees in different areas.  I tried to go

12     to a different area every single day.  And, in fact, I took one

13     statement, I did one interview myself during the -- that time.

14        Q.   And can you tell us something about the accounts that you and

15     your verifiers were hearing from the refugees that were coming into

16     Albania from Kosovo?  What sort of information were they providing you,

17     recording what was going on in the province?

18        A.   Yes.  Generally the -- the types of statements that are in the --

19     in the record here, the human rights bi-weekly, were exactly the kinds of

20     things that they were reporting.  Reporting being pushed out, being

21     forced from their homes often with just the things that they were able to

22     carry; and at the border quite often having all their papers removed,

23     being sometimes forced to give money.  There were reports of killings and

24     of raping and other activities, usually by the authority forces, usually

25     in fact, by the MUP.  And this kind of activity seemed to be a

Page 5485

 1     generalised -- a generalised activity that was going on at the time, and

 2     that was reported by the refugees.

 3        Q.   Now, you referred to the removal of papers, what sort of papers

 4     are you talking about that the refugees were speaking about?

 5        A.   I'm referring here to their identity papers so that when refugees

 6     came across they usually had no identity papers, nothing that could say

 7     where they were born, something -- nothing that could say where they were

 8     from originally, what they had worked at, any kinds of -- any kinds of

 9     those types of papers.

10             And therefore, one of the activities that we were contemplating

11     organising in the future was to do a kind of a registration programme

12     where we would use some of the -- some of the colleagues and cooperators

13     there such as the IOM and, you know, some private companies, in fact, to

14     help us to put together a registration programme where we would create

15     new identity documents for these people who had frankly, you know, no

16     record of where they had been born, et cetera.

17             So this was -- and what was also interesting is as we were -- as

18     the refugee task force stood up, we had very bright orange vehicles and,

19     of course, Kosovars had seen us patrolling throughout the area of Kosovo

20     and so -- with these same vehicles.  So when they came into Albania and

21     would see bright orange vehicles, they usually were like a magnet and

22     they would come up and start talking to the verifiers that were in there,

23     including many of the local personnel who had been employees of the KVM

24     in Kosovo.

25             So those -- those employees had, you know, obviously, most of

Page 5486

 1     them could speak English.  We were able to get, I think, good statements

 2     and truthful statements from them, so that was useful.  So a lot of

 3     these -- a lot of these statements and a lot of these activities that

 4     they were reporting were able to be corroborated, you know, and able to

 5     be discussed at length with them.  So including the lack of identity

 6     papers, et cetera.

 7        Q.   And when you spoke to these persons about the lack of identity

 8     papers, what did they tell you had happened to them?  How had they lost

 9     their identity papers?

10        A.   No, in fact, all of them said that they were -- these were taken

11     away from them.  They were searched, and they were taken away from them

12     at the border when they were pushed across by the local authorities in

13     Kosovo.  And there were a couple of them who, you know, at their peril

14     actually hid them inside their clothing very, you know -- in some areas

15     that we won't mention here, but you know, that's -- some of them,

16     actually, that's the only way they were able to actually bring out their

17     papers.  But most of them had their papers removed.  You know, the

18     authorities would ask to see the papers, they would look at them, and

19     then keep them and just push them along.

20             In fact, I don't know if I mentioned this already, but they often

21     did that with their car licence, they would remove the car licence off

22     the cars so the cars would come across with no licence plate.  Nothing

23     that would say the car came from Kosovo.

24        Q.   What did you understand was the significance of this, of the

25     removal of identity cards and licence plates from the cars at the time

Page 5487

 1     when you were hearing these accounts?

 2        A.   Well, these accounts kind of, you know, obviously to me it seemed

 3     that we -- it seemed to be a way of the local authorities trying to push

 4     these people out to ensure they did not return since they had no papers

 5     saying they were originally from Kosovo.  It would be pretty hard for

 6     them to return to their area of birth, et cetera.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  I want to move to one final document, and this is

 8     attachment 16 to your statement.

 9        A.   Mm-hmm.

10             MS. KRAVETZ:  Yes.  If we could have that up on the screen.  This

11     is Exhibit 875 now in the e-court system.

12        Q.   Do you recognise this document, sir?

13        A.   Yes, I do.

14        Q.   Just wait until it's there; we have it in the system.  Could you

15     explain what this is?

16        A.   Yes, this is a -- this is a progress report that I decided to put

17     together -- that my personnel put together for me to present to the OSCE,

18     to the KVM.  It was meant to be an internal, once again, report, and so

19     it was meant to be a report that really was no holds barred, no politics

20     involved, and telling it as it was; that would explain, was kind of an

21     assessment of the situation as we saw it on that day.  Because I actually

22     left a couple of days later from the mission area myself, so I wanted to

23     leave with a document that kind of at least tied all the loose ends

24     together and explained the situation as we saw it.

25             As you may have seen, there's an annex for each one of the

Page 5488

 1     12 prefectures that tries to really give the specifics of the situation

 2     in each one of those prefectures, because the Albanian approach to the --

 3     to the refugee situation was that they were bringing the refugees and

 4     spreading them out throughout the country, as opposed to Macedonia where

 5     they were keeping them fairly close to the border with Kosovo.

 6             As I said, the refugee task force, we were the only organisation

 7     that had personnel spread out throughout the entire mission area, so we

 8     were able to give a good snap-shot of the situation at the time.

 9             MS. KRAVETZ:  I would ask you to turn to page 7 of this document,

10     and in the e-court system it's page 8 of the English and page 10 at the

11     bottom in the B/C/S.

12        Q.   And we see here under the heading "Refugee Statistics" that there

13     are some number that is are provided, it says 420.000, and then there are

14     different numbers of refugee estimates.  Can you tell us what is this

15     source of the numbers that are contained within this paragraph?

16        A.   Yes, the source is mainly from the government of Albania.

17     Although we were able to every day attend the government of Albania's

18     coordination meeting where, of course, all the NGOs, the UNHCR, and so on

19     were in attendance; and including the NATO Albania force which had

20     deployed a few weeks before.  So we were able to get these numbers and

21     really confirm them with all these other institutions.  So that was --

22     but I'm sure that the main source were the government Albania's estimate.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Turning our way now from the document, just one last

24     question I wanted to clarify an issue you referred to yesterday when I

25     was by asking about the difference in task between regular police units

Page 5489

 1     and Special Police units, you referred to an incident in Rogovo and you

 2     said you seen special police units in the aftermath of the incidents.  I

 3     just wanted to know if you recall when that incident occurred in Rogovo

 4     and if you recall anything about that circumstance of that incident that

 5     you referred to yesterday?

 6        A.   Yeah, I -- the Rogovo incident, if I remember, was, I believe

 7     towards the end of January, beginning of February.  And it involved a

 8     group of, I think they were mostly KLA had crossed the border and come

 9     across and been followed, essentially, by the VJ, but I think took refuge

10     in the city, in the little town of Rogovo in an enclave of a farm.  And,

11     I believe, at this point there was a MUP attack, and they actually caught

12     the -- caught them red-handed, if you wish.  But I think had been over a

13     couple of days and the final kind of incident was in Rogovo itself.  And

14     a number of people, I think it was something like 25, were killed who, as

15     I say, were mostly KLA in the village.

16             MS. KRAVETZ:  Thank you for that.  Your Honour, you will be happy

17     to know that I have no further questions at this stage for the witness.

18             JUDGE PARKER:  You have made my day, Ms. Kravetz.

19             Yes, Mr. Djurdjic, do you cross-examine?

20             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

21                           Cross-examination by Mr. Djurdjic:

22        Q.   Good morning, General.  My name is Veljko Djurdjic, I'm a member

23     of the Defence team for the accused Vlastimir Djordjevic, assisted by

24     Ms. Marie O'Leary, also a member of the Defence team.

25             I have a few questions for you, and I will seek clarification of

Page 5490

 1     certain things that you said.

 2             I have read carefully and analysed all your statements and all

 3     the statements of people who used to be your associates, and in answering

 4     my questions, I would like you to distinguish between your personal

 5     knowledge and the knowledge of your underlings or perhaps superiors,

 6     because you did emphasise in your statement that you have certain

 7     knowledge which is not direct.

 8             I would like to ask you, first of all, about your brilliant

 9     military career.  You joined the Canadian Armed Forces in the early

10     1970s, and in 1976 you graduated from the Royal Military College.  Is

11     that an equivalent of a military academy?

12        A.   Yes, it is.

13        Q.   Thank you.  So that's a four-year course.  Could you tell me what

14     was your major at the academy?

15        A.   Yes, it was in French literature.

16        Q.   I'm taken aback a little.  You said it was a military academy,

17     now you mention French literature, was your graduate paper in French

18     literature?

19        A.   Yes, let me explain a little bit.  The Canadian military academy,

20     the Canadian Royal Military College is actually a military university and

21     we, therefore, have -- we have all academic programs, engineering, arts,

22     science; and the cadets that undergo the training there go to normal

23     university except you go in uniform and you have military training

24     outside of your academic pursuits.  And so, in fact, it's based on four

25     different components, the military components, academic, leadership, and

Page 5491

 1     athletic.  So a graduate comes out with a full bachelor's degree, comes

 2     out with -- as a fully trained officer in the Canadian Forces, well fully

 3     trained, there's bit of more training required at the end, but also as

 4     a -- someone who can do some sports, and bilingual as well in French and

 5     English.

 6             My particular degree, university degree, if you wish, first

 7     degree -- first cycle was in French literature.

 8        Q.   Thank you for this answer.  Now, when you graduated from the

 9     college, what rank did you receive?

10        A.   I was a lieutenant in the -- and my military classification was

11     in the armoured corps in tanks.

12        Q.   Thank you.  This answers several of my questions.  Since I am

13     familiar with your career from your prior statements, I'd like to know --

14     I found somewhere that you were a company commander in France.  Would you

15     tell me what kind of organisation was it in France that you were a

16     company leader, a company commander?

17        A.   Yes.  I was -- I was sent to France on exchange for two years

18     when I was a young officer when both you and I had black hair probably at

19     this point, and we -- I was the commander of a French conscript troop

20     which, as you know France in those days had conscripts, they were doing

21     -- they had service, military service for all -- for all personnel.  And

22     I was given command of a French conscript troop for 14 months out of the

23     two years.  Then I continued -- was promoted to captain and continued to

24     serve there as an officer in -- a staff officer in the regiment.

25        Q.   Thank you.  By the way, we went to school at the same time, you

Page 5492

 1     and I, the same generation.

 2             I see that from 1994 you were chief of the administration of

 3     armoured forces and until 1998 you were chief of the administration of

 4     ground forces.  Did you occupy that position until you left for Vienna?

 5        A.   Yes, I did.  I took over the position in February of 1998 and

 6     went to Vienna in November of 1998, if I recall correctly.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Until you left for Vienna in November 1998, had you

 8     worked previously in any NATO agencies?

 9        A.   No, I had not.  I had not worked in any NATO headquarters.

10        Q.   Were you perhaps a liaison officer on behalf of the Canadian army

11     cooperating with any NATO agencies, or did you have any other direct or

12     indirect contact with NATO agencies?

13        A.   No, I did not.

14        Q.   Thank you.  General, how come that from such a high position, you

15     became a member of the Kosovo Verification Mission?  Could you explain a

16     little bit how that happened.

17        A.   Yes, in I guess it would be the end of October 1998 -- first of

18     all throughout my career I had had several UN deployments, and so I had

19     been -- I had been outside the country on several occasions in different

20     mission area, in Cyprus, also in the former Yugoslavia with the UNPROFOR,

21     and I had also been on, as I said, on exchange in France, and I'd been

22     working with the Americans a few times.  I had a course -- by that time

23     two course, sorry, in the United States.  So I was fairly well versed, if

24     you wish, in international operations.

25             Towards the end of October, Canadian -- the Canadian Department

Page 5493

 1     of National Defence received word that -- it was kind of out of the

 2     blue -- of course, we had heard -- and the current situation in Kosovo

 3     was well in the news by then, and we had heard that there had been the

 4     agreement signed by Milosevic and Holbrooke in the middle of October, and

 5     I believe it was towards the end of October when we received a call

 6     from -- from the OSCE asking if we could provide a one-star, a

 7     brigadier-general level officer to become the head of the KVM support

 8     unit in Vienna.

 9             This was meant to be about a six-week deployment to Vienna only,

10     and, you know, I was asked if I wanted to go and fulfill that mission.

11     And so I accepted.

12        Q.   Thank you.  It was almost a complete description of yourself,

13     brigadier-general with prior experience.

14             Did you have any combat experience at that time?

15        A.   No, I did not.  The peacekeeping missions I had been in were

16     indeed -- certainly the Cyprus missions were peacekeeping missions that

17     were, let's just say, quite stable; although there had been, you know,

18     incidences of firing and so on.  My first tour in the Balkans from 1993

19     to 1994 for one year as chief of operations, I had -- no, I had not been

20     in combat.

21        Q.   Thank you.  What about after 1999, after you left the OSCE.  Did

22     you gain any combat experience?

23        A.   No, I did not.

24        Q.   Thank you.  You've just said that you had left for Vienna for a

25     few weeks, but that turned out to be a few months.  Did you stay within

Page 5494

 1     the OSCE, and what was the legal form of your engagement?

 2        A.   Yes, I did stay within the OSCE.  What happened is when I

 3     deployed to Vienna, I was there for a few weeks, and at this point they

 4     were standing up the KVM per se on the ground in Kosovo.  And they had

 5     decided that different nations would take command of the different -- the

 6     five regional centres.  The first regional centre to open was the one in

 7     Prizren, Regional Centre 1, and they -- I guess someone thought that

 8     Canada should be offered the position and I would, because of my

 9     knowledge, of course, of the KVM support unit, I would be a good person

10     to deploy onto the ground.

11             So I came back to Canada for one week to get my kit, my

12     equipment, and then I deployed directly into Kosovo.  I believe I arrived

13     on the 13th of December, 1998.

14        Q.   I'd like to know, General, did you sign a contract with the OSCE?

15        A.   No, no.  This was, I guess, it was looked at as a -- just a

16     normal mission, and I don't recall signing a contract, no.  I was

17     provided by Canada as one of the members of the OSCE as a, you know, as a

18     voluntary contribution, I guess you could call it.

19        Q.   Thank you.  May I then conclude that you were paid by the

20     Canadian government for the duration of your mission to the OSCE?

21        A.   Yes, that's correct.

22        Q.   Did you then have obligations both to the Canadian government and

23     to the OSCE at the same time while you were a verifier?

24        A.   That's a very good question, and it's an issue, of course, that

25     everyone from any country who has served with any international

Page 5495

 1     organisation has this kind of a split; I won't say split personality, but

 2     split ethical dilemma.  In my case, all my missions with the

 3     United Nations I tried to be the best United Nations officer I could, but

 4     obviously you come from your country and you have some, you know, you

 5     have some attachment, and it's not, you know, it's something that you --

 6     that you feel strongly about.

 7             In the case of my deployment to Kosovo, working with the OSCE,

 8     which was my first time working with the OSCE, I felt a strong attachment

 9     to the OSCE as an organisation because I believed that they were a

10     capable and useful organisation that could actually do a lot of good.  I

11     also felt a very strong attachment and a very, kind of, impartial

12     approach to my mission in Kosovo.  I felt a strong attachment to the

13     people of Kosovo of all ethnic backgrounds, and I really tried to be, you

14     know, to be impartial between the different parties there.  To treat them

15     all equally with dignity, and to in fact, you know, it's a documented

16     fact that I really tried to look after the Serbian people in Kosovo

17     because I felt that there was a real danger to them.  There might be some

18     back-lash if there had been a final agreement on the status of the

19     province.

20             So you are right, it was one of those things where if when you

21     are in one of those missions, you have an attachment and you try to be an

22     impartial and a good member of the organisation, the international

23     organisation, but of course, you are Canadian.  Certainly I can say that

24     I never -- I never, you know, had -- was in a position where I felt I

25     could not do justice to both those loyalties.

Page 5496

 1        Q.   Thank you.  This was an exhaustive answer.  A very detailed one.

 2     The state in whose army you were serving and gave an oath to serve

 3     faithfully was a member of NATO; correct?

 4        A.   Yes, it is.

 5        Q.   And that organisation, the NATO of which Canada is a member

 6     state, did, without approval of the United Nations, commence an

 7     air-strike campaign against Yugoslavia on the 24th of March, 1999;

 8     correct?

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   Thank you.  And from the time when you were seconded to the OSCE

11     until the 24th of March, you, in your loyalty, worked conscientiously and

12     in good faith both for your government and for the organisation to which

13     you were sent on mission; correct?

14        A.   Yes, I worked for the OSCE and tried be the best OSCE officer I

15     could.  But as I say, my loyalty to Canada, was, you know, it was never

16     challenged in terms of the difference between the two.

17        Q.   Undoubtedly, there was no conflict between these two loyalties.

18     But on the 24th when you withdrew -- or rather, no, you were on leave,

19     you were not there at the time.  From that date, the 24th, Canada as a

20     member state of NATO was at war with the FRY; right?

21        A.   I don't think there was actually a legal declaration of war.

22        Q.   How about de facto?

23        A.   I think you are getting beyond my knowledge and my abilities to

24     actually, you know, state what kind of a -- what kind of state existed

25     between the two.  The point is that Canada did participate in the NATO

Page 5497

 1     campaign.  At that time, as I said, I was still an OSCE employee.  I

 2     happened to be on leave.  And when I returned, I returned as an OSCE

 3     employee and carried on until the end of my mission.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Now we are on the subject of withdrawal.  When did

 5     you go on leave in 1999?  And when did you return?  And where to, after

 6     that leave?

 7        A.   I believe it was about the middle of March, so it was a few days

 8     before the withdrawal which I think took place on the 20th of March.  I

 9     believe I left around the 15th of March, and I returned at the end of

10     March or beginning of April.  It might have been the 1st of April,

11     something around there, and I returned to Ohrid in Macedonia where my

12     verifiers had been gathered.

13        Q.   Thank you.  I believe that while you were on leave you did not

14     only rest, you must have been in contact with the Chiefs of Staff of the

15     Canadian army and probably with the Ministry of Defence too, in view of

16     the situation in the world?

17        A.   Actually, I was not.  I was in Paris, and so I was indeed just

18     resting, but obviously watching the news very carefully and knowing that

19     I had a return flight, I was -- our return flights all came through

20     Skopje anyway so I was going to be landing in Macedonia; and I had

21     contact with my verifiers on the ground to make sure someone was going to

22     pick me up when I arrived in Skopje.

23        Q.   Thank you, General.  When you arrived in Macedonia, and later in

24     Albania, do you know approximately what were the NATO ground forces in

25     Albania at the time?

Page 5498

 1        A.   Approximately, I could not -- well, approximately I could

 2     probably say that I was aware that there was a -- there was a brigade

 3     that was near Skopje that was there -- a German brigade, I believe, that

 4     was there in case of the requirement to assist the OSCE in withdrawing

 5     from Kosovo.  But I don't have the details, and I was not actually privy

 6     to the information even at the time of the deployment of the NATO forces.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  On the 20th of March, the diplomatic part of the

 8     Kosovo Verification Mission moved to Macedonia and later to Albania, and

 9     the Verification Mission stayed there for a while in Macedonia and

10     Albania.  At that time there was a liaison officer between the KVM and

11     NATO; do you know that?

12        A.   I believe there had been a liaison even prior to that, but I do

13     believe that did exist.  I had no -- again, I had no contact with that

14     liaison.

15        Q.   And did you know Lieutenant-Colonel Ciaglinski?

16        A.   Yes, I did.

17        Q.   From what you know, what was his job within the KVM until the

18     20th of March?

19        A.   I believe he certainly -- he was need at the OSCE headquarters,

20     in the KVM headquarters in Pristina, and I know he worked for General DZ.

21     He was one, I believe, of the officers from the fusion centre, but I

22     don't know exactly what his position was.

23        Q.   Thank you.  And do you remember that he accompanied you at the

24     time when you stood in for Mr. Drewienkiewicz as chief of operations for

25     the KVM?

Page 5499

 1        A.   He accompanied me where?  I mean, I remember him being in the

 2     headquarters, yes, I do, but accompanying me, I'm not sure.

 3        Q.   Sorry, I did not mean that he accompanied you literally, but he

 4     was with you at meetings which you attending as DZ's deputy?

 5        A.   That's possible, yeah.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  And could you explain to me the functions of the

 7     liaison officer between the KVM and NATO in Macedonia and Albania after

 8     the 24th of March, 1999?

 9        A.   No, I cannot.  I don't know what their function was, but I

10     presume -- I would presume from my military experience that the function

11     of a liaison is to ensure that both sides are aware of what the other's

12     activities are.  That's usually what a liaison officer does.

13        Q.   Thank you, General.  It remains unclear to me who headed and ran

14     the KVM in Macedonia after the 24th of March, 1999, and in Albania.

15        A.   That's -- well, that's quite clear to me.  The entire time that I

16     was with the KVM, I was under the command of Ambassador Walker,

17     William Walker; the deputy head of mission for operations was General DZ,

18     as you know.

19             When I returned from my leave at the end of March, the command

20     arrangements were exactly the same in Macedonia.  The KVM was still

21     there, and the command function was still working, so Ambassador Walker

22     and General DZ were still part of the command chain.  And in fact, that's

23     who I received my orders from to set up, to organise, and to deploy the

24     OSCE/KVM refugee task force into Albania.  And when we deployed to

25     Albania, I was the OSCE head of that KVM refugee task force.  And I

Page 5500

 1     reported, again, to Ambassador Walker and to General DZ, et cetera.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Now, we've come to that subject.  Tell me, how did

 3     your mission end in May 1999?  Did your tenure simply expire or what?

 4        A.   Yes, it did.  In fact, I had been -- the commitment had been for

 5     six months, so from mid-November to mid-May was essentially six months;

 6     and as I left, I handed command over to my deputy, who happened to be

 7     another Canadian.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  General, when you extended your stay in the OSCE in

 9     end 1998 and when it was decided that you should be sent to RC 5, do you

10     agree that -- sorry, RC 1, not RC 5, thank you.  Do you agree that from

11     the moment the UN resolution was adopted and the agreement was signed,

12     which you verified, at least a month and a half elapsed; correct?

13        A.   I know, for example, that the agreement was signed on the -- I

14     think it was the 16th of October, and I deployed into -- into Kosovo, I

15     believe it was the 12th or 13th of December.  I don't know when the

16     UN resolution was voted exactly.

17        Q.   We have two UN resolutions and several agreements between the

18     16th and 25th of October, but in that time the KVM had not yet been

19     established, had not yet started to work.  But your predecessor was

20     working on the ground already, it was the KDOM; correct?

21        A.   Right.  My understanding of the KDOMs, was that they were more

22     like bilateral arrangements between the Former Republic of Yugoslavia and

23     different countries, and again I, you know, I'm kind of out of my depth

24     here how, in fact, these were set up.  But essentially, I saw it as these

25     we were bilateral arrangements with different countries to have -- and

Page 5501

 1     with the EU, which also had a KDOM, I believe.  So these had been --

 2     these were arrangements, bilateral arrangements.  When the final

 3     agreement, let's say, the agreement between Holbrooke and Milosevic was

 4     signed, I believe then that the -- within the agreement, if my

 5     recollection is right, the agreement actually said that the KVM would

 6     absorb the KDOMs when it deployed.  So we would deploy, if you wish, on

 7     top of the KDOMs and absorb them into the KVM structure.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  It seems that your memory is perfect.  I would like

 9     to go back to the following:  In those documents, we have obligations on

10     the part of the FRY as well as the position and role of KDOMs prior to

11     KVM deployment.  I believe it was the end of October when the dead-line

12     was for the FRY to meet the conditions in the aforementioned agreement.

13     If that did not happen, the NATO activation order was already put in

14     place, and the air-strikes were expected to commence, should that happen?

15        A.   That's possible.  I'm not -- you know, I'm not sure about that

16     myself.

17        Q.   Witness, I'm telling you this because when you arrived on the

18     15th of December and when asked about -- by the Prosecutor about the

19     documents you receive and the deployment of troops, you said that you

20     were not familiar with all the details.  I'm now taking you back to the

21     fact that KDOM, prior to your arrival, performed the tasks of the

22     mission, and that you merely continued those tasks.  That is to say, that

23     there was a continuity between the two organisations and the various

24     KDOMs being absorbed by the KVM; was that so?

25        A.   Actually, the way I -- again, I'm a simple military man.  The way

Page 5502

 1     I saw the difference between the two missions is that the KDOM,

 2     Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission, versus the KVM, the

 3     Kosovo Verification Mission, the mission was slightly different.  And

 4     here is the way, in my mind, I made the difference:  To my mind the KDOMs

 5     were observer missions that would observe the situation on the ground

 6     without interfering.  They would observe and report.  They were

 7     diplomatic missions also meaning they were missions that probably had

 8     more diplomats than military personnel in them.  Certainly that's way I

 9     saw it.

10             When I deployed with the KVM, I saw the mission slightly

11     differently.  I saw of it more as a verification mission.  Although we

12     never got to that level, I saw that as our primary mission, i.e., to

13     verify.  To verify to me implies having an agreement in place, having a

14     number of standards that you need to verify, i.e., numbers of troops,

15     patrolling plans, you know, arrangements for different activities.  And

16     that the verifiers would be there and would verify.

17             Also, I saw it as a verification of the human rights situation,

18     i.e., where we would attempt to not just observe, but also confirm and

19     also report and also, I guess I saw it more as an interference type

20     mission, interventionist type mission, than the KDOM had been.  This may

21     not be the correct interpretation, but that's the way I saw it.

22        Q.   Regarding the functions of KDOM and KVM, I believe your

23     interpretations are excellent.  But between the point when the agreement

24     was signed until the moment you took your functions over, the initial

25     preconditions of compliance was supposed to be confirmed by KDOM and

Page 5503

 1     handed over to your mission, and that was one of the reasons why there

 2     were still no air-strikes on the 27th of October when the dead-line was

 3     for the FRY to comply with the agreement.  Are you familiar with that?

 4        A.   No, but it does make sense.

 5        Q.   Very well, thank you.  As far as your memory serves you, did you

 6     receive the archives of the UK and US KDOMs in your territory RC 1 once

 7     they were absorbed by the mission?

 8        A.   I did not receive archives, i.e., papers or, you know, former

 9     reports, et cetera.  But I did take under -- under command, if you wish,

10     I assumed command of the area, of the Pristina -- sorry, the Prizren --

11     the Prizren area.  And when I arrived, there were, I would say, maybe

12     50 UK KDOM members and probably about 12 or 15, I think, US KDOM members

13     that rolled into my organisation.

14             They had kind of operated, if you wish -- certainly the UK on a

15     shoe string, and I was able to actually, when I arrived, issue -- start

16     really putting together some structure to the mission.  And that's when I

17     produced my guidance and so forth to try and, you know, solidify, if you

18     wish, the mission at that time.  But I did not receive any prior

19     documents and so on.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Your prior verification experience probably required

21     no further training of you before joining the KVM; am I correct in

22     assuming that?

23        A.   That's correct, yeah.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Your deputy in RC 1 was the UK KDOM head; am I

25     correct?

Page 5504

 1        A.   Yes.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  The RC 1, can you tell me which municipalities it

 3     encompassed?  What was its area of responsibility, so to say?

 4        A.   I would have to have a map it to show you, but it was basically

 5     the entire Prizren area, so I can't list them for you, but it was the

 6     Prizren area.

 7        Q.   We will move on, and in the meantime try to come up with an area

 8     of responsibility map.

 9             In any case, let's start with the coordination centres.  You had

10     a coordination centre in Orahovac, I believe, and another one in Prizren,

11     and a third one in Suva Reka.  Therefore we can conclude that these were

12     the three municipalities included and that there was Dragas, Dragas

13     municipality towards the border, which also fell within your area; that

14     was the AOR of RC 5; am I correct.

15        A.   RC 1, but I think you're -- I think you're correct, the three

16     CCs, the three coordination centres, were indeed the ones you've laid

17     out, Orahovac, Suva Reka, and Prizren.  And yes, I did cover also the

18     border, and I think that was the Dragas region right in the south of

19     the -- the point -- the south point.

20        Q.   Let me ask you this:  Pec and Djakovica were not within the area

21     of RC 1; am I correct?

22        A.   That's correct.

23        Q.   Thank you.  I guess I'll be right again.  RC 5 also encompassed

24     the municipalities of Pristina and Urosevac?  That's what I'm interested

25     in.

Page 5505

 1        A.   Yes, you are correct.

 2        Q.   Let me ask you this then:  In your area of responsibility within

 3     the AOR of RC 1, which MUP structures or organisation -- organisational

 4     part was within the given area?

 5        A.   Yeah, I could not put a number or a -- or a -- you know, the name

 6     to the structure, but when I dealt with the MUP for my area, I went to

 7     the Pristina -- to the Prizren headquarters of the MUP there, and I

 8     believe it was Colonel Vojnovic and Vukobrat were the two heads of that

 9     organisation.

10        Q.   General, you were a soldier, whereas these men were policemen.

11     In any case, RC 1 had a liaison officer with the police; who was that?

12        A.   That was a former policeman himself, UK man called

13     Les House [phoen].

14        Q.   Thank you.  Did each coordination centre also have a liaison

15     officer for the police?

16        A.   Yes, they did.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Those liaison officers for the police from the

18     coordination centres, did they report to RC 1, that is to say, to you as

19     the main centre in that area?

20        A.   Ultimately, but they reported really to the coordination centre

21     head.  I had -- the three coordination centres each had a head, and the

22     liaison officers reported to them, and then they reported all to me, if

23     you wish.

24             But I -- my approach was always to try and keep the -- to keep

25     the -- each one of the issues the lowest possible.  So if there was a

Page 5506

 1     small issue in a coordination centre that could be dealt with the

 2     coordination centre head and the liaison officer with the MUP in their

 3     area, they would do so.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  I'm interested in the way information was passed

 5     onwards.  Once you received those reports, you would collate them and

 6     send them on to Pristina where the seat of the KVM was?

 7        A.   That's correct.

 8        Q.   Am I correct in saying that General DZ was in charge of that

 9     part, the part that was in charge of KVM operations?

10        A.   Yes, he was.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Within your area of responsibility, that is to say,

12     RC 1, which military organisations and parts were present?

13        A.   I had elements of two brigades within my -- of the VJ within my

14     area of responsibility, plus, of course, the MUP organisation.

15        Q.   For the time being, I'm only interested in the military part.

16     Can you tell me which were the two military units?

17        A.   Yeah, there was a -- one brigade that was based in Prizren, and

18     the numbers are in the papers here, I can't remember what they are,

19     but -- and there were also elements of the brigade from, I think,

20     Urosevac that were in the Dulje heights, what happened to be just inside

21     my area.  That's why I say I had elements of two different brigades of

22     VJ.

23        Q.   Thank you.  General, do you agree that the brigade that was

24     stationed in Prizren was the 549th Motorised Brigade commanded by

25     General Delic?

Page 5507

 1        A.   I know it was commanded by General Delic.  As for the number,

 2     I'll take your word for it.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  As for the other part of the Urosevac brigade, was

 4     the 243rd Mechanised Brigade headed by Colonel Jevic; am I correct?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   Staying with that, there was only one part of that brigade at the

 7     Dulje heights with some of their elements falling within your area of

 8     responsibility; am I correct?

 9        A.   That's correct.

10        Q.   Thank you.  In keeping with the agreement, one of the three roads

11     along which the military could deploy a company was between Pristina and

12     Prizren, or rather, between Stimlje and Suva Reka via Dulje; am I

13     correct?

14        A.   Again this is -- now my recollection is not so good, but I would

15     take your word for that.

16        Q.   We'll get to the documents showing that.  I thought this may have

17     been a quicker way to deal with it though.  I'm asking you this because

18     there were some parts of that brigade in the territory of RC 1, whereas

19     some of its elements were in the area of RC 5; hence, the length of the

20     road was split between the two centres.  In any case, we'll see some

21     documents showing that.

22             General, I see that you attended several meetings with

23     Colonel Delic and Colonel Jelic on one occasion.  Who was the main

24     liaison officer for the military within your area of responsibility?

25        A.   I'd have to refer to my notes with -- for his name, but there

Page 5508

 1     was, indeed, a liaison officer with each of the brigades.

 2        Q.   We needn't know his name, as long as we know he existed.  How

 3     come you knew the entire military structure within your area of

 4     responsibility and at the same time you say you were not familiar with

 5     the MUP organisation there?

 6        A.   That's a good question, and probably related to the fact that I

 7     very easily associate with military structures such as brigades, but not

 8     so easily with paramilitary like the MUP.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  This brings us to the third element, which is the

10     KLA.  Can you tell me which KLA operational zone was within your RC 1

11     area of responsibility?

12        A.   I don't recall the name of it exactly, but I -- from what I

13     understood when I dealt with the -- the zone commander, his zone

14     essentially covered as -- pretty close to the entire Prizren area, and I

15     called with -- I dealt with this -- Drini was my usual contact there.

16        Q.   Your memory serves you correctly.  It is interesting, though,

17     that the entire operational zone of the KLA coincided precisely with the

18     AOR of RC 1:  Orahovac, Suva Reka, Prizren and Dragas.  Was that so?

19        A.   I think it was so, and -- but I believe that, you know, the

20     different municipalities like the regional centre from the OSCE's point

21     of view was meant to cover the one-fifth of the territory, and I don't

22     know what you call it, the province, I guess, within the province of

23     Kosovo.  So it seemed that certainly that that was the idea of the OSCE

24     to give a -- not a municipality, but a number of municipalities to cover

25     an area that had a prefect, et cetera, et cetera, you know, that fit

Page 5509

 1     within that area.

 2        Q.   Let me put that to you again.  The area of SUP Prizren also

 3     coincided with the area of responsibility of RC 1 covering the same

 4     municipalities and the same area?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   I also wanted to ask you about the departments of the interior

 7     which existed as a lower organisational level than the police stations,

 8     but this may not be so important at this point.  Did you hear of the

 9     operational zone of the KLA was called Pastrik, the one that was within

10     your area of responsibility and during your tenure?

11        A.   Yes, I subsequently heard that, yes.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Djakovica municipality as well as Pec municipality

13     were outside your area of responsibility, as we have established.  I'm

14     now interested in another thing:  Do you know what was the name of the

15     operational zone where the 243rd mechanised brigade had its headquarters

16     in Urosevac, Kacanik, and Stimlje; do you know what was that operational

17     zone of the KLA?

18        A.   No, I don't.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know what was the name of the operational zone

20     headed by Ramush Haradinaj?

21        A.   I don't know -- I don't know the name of the operational zone,

22     but I understand that this was the one that included Pec and Djakovica.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Very well.  We have discussed the three

24     organisations.  On top of, that you also communicated with civilian

25     authorities.  You said that the person in charge of that area was

Page 5510

 1     Ms. Branka Furijanovic, which is correct.  On several occasions in your

 2     statement you said that the Chief of SUP Mr. Vojnovic was the prefect

 3     deputy, I'm interested to find out where did you learn of that

 4     information?  Where did you get that from?

 5        A.   I can't recall where I got it from, but certainly it was not me

 6     who actually, you know, found out, I don't think.  I think I was told

 7     that by one of my -- one of my staff.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  I'd like to go back to reporting.  All information

 9     that you received at the level of RC 1, you sent to the KVM in Pristina.

10     In what format?

11        A.   This would have been a daily sitrep format, situation report.

12     And I had taken the habit of -- my staff, first of all, my operation

13     staff would take the reports from each the coordination centres and put

14     them to the format of the report that we would sends to the KVM.  But I

15     had taken the habit - when I was in the headquarters, and when I wasn't

16     there my deputy did it - of trying to provide a general assessment at the

17     last part of each one of those daily sitreps.  So probably about 10.00 at

18     night I would come in and read the sitrep, and because I had been in the

19     area during the day, I had a sense of the atmosphere and what was going

20     on.  So I would try to really give a commander's view of the day's

21     activity, the day's kind of atmosphere, context, environment, et cetera.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Did I understand correctly that all important events

23     were registered and that the seat of the mission was informed of those?

24     On top of that, you also provided your comments and your view of those

25     events?

Page 5511

 1        A.   That's correct.

 2        Q.   I'd like to know this:  Was the reporting done in written form

 3     and sent by fax messages or courier, or was it via telephone, or both?

 4        A.   It was done by fax.  It was sent and faxed to KVM headquarters.

 5        Q.   Did you keep copies of those reports at the RC 1?

 6        A.   Yes, I did.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Your archives, once the KVM and RC 1 left the FRY,

 8     did you take that to Macedonia and Albania?

 9        A.   Yes, I did.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know whether the same thing was done by the

11     seat in Pristina?

12        A.   No, I don't.

13        Q.   Thank you.  All of these important things we have been discussing

14     were contained in your daily reports; am I correct?

15        A.   To the best of my recollection, yes.

16        Q.   Thank you.  General, according to what I know about the KVM, you

17     were all answerable to Ambassador Walker who was the head of mission, and

18     he was the only person authorised to issue official statements and

19     positions as the various events in the field were concerned?

20        A.   I believe so.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Since you stood in for General DZ, and given that you

22     were familiar with the relationship with the FRY authorities, did you

23     know that at the level of the FRY, there was a federal commission for

24     cooperation with the KVM?

25        A.   I know now.  I don't know -- I'm not sure if I knew while I was

Page 5512

 1     on the ground in Prizren.

 2        Q.   We have a few minutes left before the break.  Can you tell me

 3     what information did you have about that while you were in Pristina and

 4     before you went away on the 20th of March, 1999?

 5        A.   I don't think anyone ever told me there is a commission that is

 6     in charge of liaison with the KVM, et cetera, et cetera.  But I did, of

 7     course, meet Mr. Sainovic, and I met with General Loncar's deputy while I

 8     was there once, at least on one occasion, might have been, in fact, two.

 9     So -- but I didn't know that the structure was actually called a

10     commission or a liaison office.

11        Q.   Thank you.

12             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] General, I think it's time for the

13     break.

14             Your Honours.

15             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes, Mr. Djurdjic, we will have our first break

16     now.  We will resume at 11.00.

17                           [The witness stands down]

18                           --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

19                           --- On resuming at 11.05 a.m.

20                           [The witness takes the stand]

21             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes, Mr. Djurdjic.

22             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

23        Q.   General, I have looked through my preparation papers, and I found

24     a note that you stood in for DZ from 28th December, 1998, until --

25             THE INTERPRETER:  Could counsel please slow down with the dates.

Page 5513

 1             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   -- that you stood in for him on three occasions.  And that

 3     meeting where you said you were with Mr. Keller and Mr. Sainovic, that

 4     was on the 6th of January, 1999.  It was such an uninteresting meeting

 5     that I did not take the document to show it to you, but we did use it as

 6     an exhibit earlier.  The discussion was about some helicopters, the KVM

 7     requested helicopters that were to be painted over and used for transport

 8     to Macedonia.  Do you remember that?

 9        A.   That's possible.  I don't remember, I am sorry.

10        Q.   Very well, we'll move on.  I'd like to ask you one more thing

11     about the organisation of the KVM.  Mr. Walker had several deputies

12     covering different areas, one was more operation, that was General DZ;

13     but I also found a note that the deputy chief of mission for the police

14     was Giovanni Kessler; do you remember that man?

15        A.   I don't remember him.  I probably, you know, had some contact

16     with him, but I don't remember him.

17        Q.   Never mind.  I'm interested in the relationship between RC, as

18     the territorial unit of the KVM, and this deputy chief mission for the

19     police.  Did you have any obligation to report to him separately about

20     the police aspects of your contacts in your area of responsibility or

21     not?

22        A.   No, I did not.

23        Q.   Thank you.

24             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May I now call up Exhibit P857,

25     page 4.

Page 5514

 1        Q.   General, there it is.  Do you agree that this was the area of

 2     responsibility of RC 1 which you headed?

 3        A.   Yes, I do.

 4        Q.   Can you confirm what we have discussed so far, that the image

 5     here corresponds to your area of responsibility?

 6        A.   Yes, I can confirm that.

 7             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I would like to

 8     tender this drawing as an exhibit.

 9             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.  I'm told it's already part

10     of Exhibit P857.  The system has got ahead of us, Mr. Djurdjic.

11             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I know it is part of an exhibit,

12     page 4, but I thought that since this was a confirmation of the witness's

13     testimony, this is a sketch of the territory.  If it is superfluous, I

14     accept that.

15             And now I'd like to call for Exhibit D160.

16        Q.   General, I'll now move on to documents that served as a basis for

17     verification.  While we are waiting for this document to be shown on the

18     screen, were you familiar with Resolution 1199 with the agreement

19     Geremek-Jovanovic, the agreement Byrnes-Djordjevic, and the agreement

20     Clark-Naumann, Sainovic-Djordjevic?  Those were the four documents that

21     served as a basis for verification.

22        A.   Yes, I was at the time certainly aware of them and quite familiar

23     with them.

24        Q.   I think you even made an analysis of the obligations and the work

25     of RC 1 based on these documents; correct?

Page 5515

 1        A.   Yes, I did.  In fact, my guidance to my verifiers uses those

 2     documents as the reference.

 3        Q.   Thank you.

 4             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May I now call up page 3, para 4,

 5     and I'd like subparagraph (a).

 6        Q.   I want to discuss with you certain passages from this resolution.

 7     Obligations of Yugoslavia, (a):

 8             "To cease all action by the security forces affecting the

 9     civilian population on order the withdrawal of security units used for

10     civilian repression."

11             Is it correct that this provision does not apply to the KLA?

12        A.   No, I believe those are -- those are FRY obligations.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Now, in (b) and (c) we read obligations of the

14     verification to enable movement and monitoring, the obligation of

15     dialogue; and now in paragraph 5 (b) another obligation is:

16             "Not to carry out any repressive actions against the peaceful

17     population."

18             Only the peaceful population, that's the translation I have and I

19     believe it's correct.

20        A.   That's what I see on my screen as well.

21        Q.   Thank you.  So there is no obligation here not to take any steps

22     against the Kosovo Liberation Army?

23        A.   Presumably, if they are peaceful, I guess there's an obligation

24     not to take any action against the KLA.

25        Q.   And if they are not peaceful, there is no ban on measures against

Page 5516

 1     them?

 2        A.   That's the way I read it as well.

 3        Q.   Thank you.

 4             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May I now call up P836.

 5        Q.   This is an understanding between Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Djordjevic

 6     regarding observation points.  I believe that under item 5,

 7     Stimlje-Dulje, a total of six observation points are envisaged; correct?

 8        A.   That's what I see on my screen as well.

 9        Q.   In your area of responsibility, part of Stimlje-Dulje is

10     included; right?

11        A.   Yes.

12        Q.   You know that area very well, that area of responsibility of

13     yours was up to the border between municipalities Urosevac and Suva Reka;

14     correct?

15        A.   That's correct.

16        Q.   Correct me if I'm wrong, when you go from Stimlje, just before

17     the top is the border between Urosevac and Suva Reka; do you remember

18     that?

19        A.   I haven't been there for more than ten years now, but I believe

20     that that's about right.

21        Q.   I'm asking all this not to test your knowledge, far from it.  I

22     just want to know how many observation points were in your area of

23     responsibility, the RC 1?

24        A.   Yeah, that's a question I can't answer.  I cannot remember, and I

25     don't even think that we ever got to the point where we were able to

Page 5517

 1     identify exactly how many observation points were in any of my area.  And

 2     again, I believe that was a result of the fact that we never received the

 3     specific verification standards that I was mentioning earlier that we

 4     were hoping at some point to receive.

 5        Q.   General, we have an exhibit in this case, P844 --

 6             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Just for your reference,

 7     Your Honours.

 8        Q.   It's a chronology of the main events from the 15th October, 1998,

 9     until 18th of April, 1999.  It's a document created by General DZ as

10     chief of operations.  In this document under -- I'm sorry about this

11     noise.  Items 57 and 58, it is stated in 58 that an inspection was

12     carried out of 27 observation points on the 5th of January.  Do you

13     recall that?

14        A.   Not specifically, no.

15        Q.   Thank you.  And do you remember that on the 4th of January combat

16     positions of combat teams were inspected?  That's page B-3 in English.

17     You see it on the screen now.

18        A.   Yes, I see it.  In fact, I believe that I was involved in those

19     inspections with Colonel Kotur where we were able to go visit the

20     three -- the three VJ positions.

21        Q.   And in your area of responsibility, if you toured VJ positions,

22     there was only one.  We'll reach that document later.  Very well.  Thank

23     you.  Just while we still have this document in front of us, Shaun Byrnes

24     and Djordjevic, do you agree that -- or do you know that this agreement

25     was implemented prior to your arrival, P836.  I believe you have it.

Page 5518

 1     It's your document.  It covers these observation points.

 2        A.   Right.  It was signed, I think, on the 25th of October, so this

 3     was before I got there, yes.

 4        Q.   Thank you.

 5             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May I now call up P835.  Page 3.

 6        Q.   Please look at para 3.  General, would I be right in saying that

 7     this paragraph 3 does not apply to traffic check-points and points

 8     erected for purposes of crime control?  That's the translation I've got.

 9        A.   Correct, they are actually quite specific here.  They are saying

10     for purposes other than traffic or crime control, so that would be a

11     correct interpretation on your part, I believe.

12        Q.   Thank you.  While you were on the ground, did you see those

13     traffic check-points and placements created to check whether there was

14     any arms or drug smuggling or other substances that were banned?

15        A.   Several times.  Now, as for the reasons why these check-points

16     were there, this could be the reason that the authorities believed that

17     they needed to have these check-points.  But in my particular -- in my

18     personal view, some of them were unnecessary and actually stopping too

19     many vehicles in many instances.

20        Q.   Thank you.  And do you agree that all the vehicles that moved on

21     the road were stopped and checked except, of course, your vehicles which

22     had immunity?

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Now let's move to paragraph 4 of this document.  It

25     deals with the issue of verification and border control.

Page 5519

 1             Would you agree with me that throughout the tenure of the

 2     mission, there was a dispute between the mission and the FRY authorities

 3     about how border control and verification of the border were affected?

 4        A.   I would say -- I would not say there was a disagreement.  There

 5     was a difference of opinion as to the freedom of movement of the KVM in

 6     the border area and the way the FRY authorities saw that same freedom of

 7     movement.

 8        Q.   You as a diplomat phrased it much better than I would.

 9             Now, let me ask you, considering this difference of opinion, were

10     you aware that this difference of opinion between the verification

11     mission and the commission of the federal government was raised to a

12     higher level?  Was the president of OSCE informed, and did he discuss it

13     with the authorities of Yugoslavia?

14        A.   I don't know.

15        Q.   Thank you.  You were in the right place vis-a-vis the border,

16     General.  This difference of opinion concerned the border belt.  One

17     treatment applied to the border belt which had a depth of 5 kilometres,

18     and another treatment applied to the area beyond 5 kilometres.

19        A.   Yes, that was a frequent subject of discussion between the

20     authorities and myself as to, you know, I felt that I was -- I wanted to

21     go and see, verify, observe activities along the border, visit the

22     villages that were within the 5 kilometre area; and often was unable to

23     do so because the authorities always required me to have a liaison

24     officer accompany me.  And quite often, they had no liaison officers

25     available, et cetera, et cetera.  So this was a regular source of -- a

Page 5520

 1     regular issue that came up with the authorities and the mission.

 2        Q.   We'll come to that later.  We have a record of your conversation

 3     with Colonel Delic about the stations in Planeja and notices of

 4     verification.  But the point was that within this border belt, the 5

 5     kilometres, the military authorities required prior notice subject to

 6     approval; and you believed that could you come to that border belt 5

 7     kilometres unannounced and conduct inspections?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   Thank you.

10             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May I now call up P837, please.

11        Q.   General, this is the Clark-Naumann-Sainovic Agreement, and

12     Djordjevic.  What is important in my view is what is one part of this

13     document that pertains to the FRY government communique which took over

14     the responsibility of implementing it.  At page 2, item 2, of the

15     statement, am I right in saying that the FRY took on the obligation to

16     reduce the staffing strength of the MUP and army to the level which

17     existed before the terrorist activities commenced?

18        A.   Yes.

19        Q.   Thank you.

20             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now go to the next page of

21     the document.

22        Q.   General, item 5 --

23             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. Court Clerk, you don't need to

24     put the B/C/S on the screen; the English will suffice since I have a

25     paper copy for my testify.

Page 5521

 1        Q.   General, in item 5, we see that three check-points are referred

 2     to, or three locations at which the VJ had the right to deploy a company

 3     per location in order to protect the traffic and the road?

 4        A.   Yes.

 5        Q.   General, do you remember that the agreement concluded that the

 6     company should number 100 to 120 men including -- plus their equipment?

 7        A.   That is what we understood to be a company.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Under (c) of this item do you see the mention of the

 9     road Prizren-Suva Reka-Pristina which fell partly within the area of

10     responsibility of RC 1 that you were head of?

11        A.   Yes.

12        Q.   If I recall correctly, that company was at Dulje, was that so?

13        A.   That's correct.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Next look at item 7.  Having read the agreement, did

15     you notice item 7 back in 1998 when you probably saw it for the first

16     time?

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   Am I right in saying that the FRY undertook to comply with the

19     obligations by 1200 hours on the 27th of October pertaining to the

20     agreement, and the other part of the item mentions that line of 1200

21     hours on the 29th of October?

22        A.   I believe that's correct.

23        Q.   Pursuant to this article, KDOM was supposed to monitor these

24     withdrawals; am I correct?

25        A.   Yes.

Page 5522

 1        Q.   Some of it even spills over into item 4, but in any case, I

 2     wanted to ask you this:  Do you recall that NATO, or rather,

 3     Mr. Javier Solana had an activation order in place should there be a

 4     non-compliance on the part of the FRY?

 5        A.   Yeah, I'm -- I don't recall, but it's probable.

 6        Q.   There was no bombing, that is not in dispute, but that was

 7     avoided precisely because the FRY met its obligations envisaged in the

 8     documents, in which we can see that the legal predecessor of KVM was

 9     KDOM; is that correct?

10        A.   That's correct.

11        Q.   General, you succeeded KDOM, and when I say "you," I mean the

12     KVM; and you took over their work in keeping with the contents of the

13     verification agreements; am I correct?

14        A.   Yes, that's correct.

15        Q.   From your answer, I gather that you were not familiar with the

16     previous compliance of the FRY that had been verified by KDOM once you

17     resumed that work first in Pristina and then as head of RC 1, you were

18     not familiar with that?

19        A.   Oh, I was familiar, and in fact, I knew that the company position

20     in Dulje heights was an approved and agreed position that was allowed to

21     be in place.

22        Q.   Thank you.  That was your area of responsibility.  There were

23     several obligations that were undertaken, that, for example, 10.000

24     policemen would be left in Kosovo, that all soldiers be returned to the

25     barracks, and that all units that had been deployed to Kosovo before

Page 5523

 1     February, as well as all police units, be returned to Serbia.  There were

 2     several obligations to be met; is that correct?

 3        A.   That's correct.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Roman numeral III, last sentence, please have a look

 5     at that.

 6        A.   Mm-hmm.

 7        Q.   General, the conclusion of para 3, does it authorise FRY

 8     authorities to respond to terrorist activities adequately and

 9     proportionately exercising self-defence?

10        A.   Yes, it does, and to me the operative words are "adequately" and

11     "proportionately."

12        Q.   Thank you.  We will discuss that a bit later.  I'm, for the time

13     being, interested in the right to act against terrorists.  Thank you,

14     General.

15             Speaking of adequacy and proportionality, as a senior military

16     expert, having in mind the time that elapsed since your last verification

17     mission and today, has your position changed on the principal of

18     adequately and proportionately using force?

19        A.   Not really.  As I mentioned yesterday, I believe, in my

20     testimony, the pattern that we often saw happening was that the response

21     would be disproportionately great by the authorities when some of the

22     incidents were, I don't want to say minor, but were of a smaller nature.

23     So the reaction was usually disproportionately greater than the incident

24     itself.  And I guess what has changed, of course on the basis of what is

25     happening now in Afghanistan, in these counterinsurgencies throughout the

Page 5524

 1     world, we see quite often the need for proportional response with respect

 2     to the size of forces.  And, I mean, could go into it in a lot more

 3     detail, but I don't think it's worth doing here.

 4        Q.   I'd like us to discuss the criteria.  I don't know whether you

 5     saw the news on the BBC yesterday, I heard that in Pakistan, three and a

 6     half million civilians left their homes because of the alliance -- allied

 7     forces operation.  That thousands of people were killed, and that 200

 8     million dollars were earmarked by the US government to aid Pakistan, to

 9     deal with the consequences of this operation?

10        A.   I didn't see the news, but it's quite possible that that's the

11     case.  I know there's a major activity going on in the Swat valley.

12        Q.   Do you believe, do you think, that this represents a proportion

13     at use of force resulting in the removal of three and a half million

14     people and 3.000 people being killed, and then let's talk about cluster

15     bombs and depleted uranium ammunition, does that constitute

16     proportionality?

17        A.   No, it does not, in my view.

18        Q.   Thank you.  To go back to you, since you are the expert in terms

19     of the territory where you were, would you agree with me that the

20     conflicts and the incidents which took place during your mandate there,

21     for the most part happened in the country-side in rural areas?

22        A.   On occasion they were in the country-side, but not always.

23        Q.   Thank you.  When I say rural or outside urban areas, I mean the

24     smaller towns ending with villages.  But for me, Racak is no town nor is

25     Randubrava.  Since you visited those places, can you tell me what does a

Page 5525

 1     typical Albanian home look like in those village?  What does it's yard

 2     look like?  And what possibility does one have to access the house?

 3        A.   Right.  These houses are, indeed, they are not built up areas

 4     such as, you know, in the middle of Prizren, for example.  They are not

 5     apartments.  They are usually houses that are dislocated and, for

 6     example, in Rogovo, there was a number of small houses that were joined

 7     together by a fence, kind of in an open area, kind of a yard where you

 8     could come in.  It was kind of a farm-type conglomeration of houses.  So

 9     that was more typical of the -- of Albanian housing in the area.

10        Q.   Thank you.  These yards were behind tall walls which contained a

11     gate?

12        A.   Yes.

13        Q.   General, do you agree that such structures, if used for military

14     purposes, represent well-fortified or well-protected facilities?

15        A.   Yes.

16        Q.   Thank you.  I'd like to ask you something else that you are also

17     an expert in.  What is the proportion or relationship between the

18     attacker and the one defending for the attacker to be able to win?

19        A.   The common planning figure is three to one.  Three attackers to

20     one defender.

21        Q.   What about technical means?

22        A.   I don't know what you mean, in terms of overwhelming force, in

23     terms of?

24        Q.   What you told me in your answer has to do with soldiers.  What

25     about the technical means, equipment, or assets that would be needed?

Page 5526

 1        A.   I believe in a normal attack, say, when we were, you know, in my

 2     staff college days, we would try to have as many of the weapons available

 3     to us, available to put on a particular attack.  Now, it depends, of

 4     course, at what level you are talking about.  When you are talking about

 5     a divisional or brigade level, you usually are talking about some

 6     important and large weapons.  When you are talking about small -- small

 7     section attacks, then we are talking about small-arms weapons, et cetera.

 8        Q.   Thank you, General.  I'd like to ask you this:  If we have a

 9     village which such houses containing 10, 20, or 30 enemy, wouldn't it be

10     normal then, and expected, to have a company to clear the area?

11        A.   Yes.

12        Q.   Thank you.  And do you believe that many legal representatives of

13     authorities need to be killed in order to liberate an area that was taken

14     up by terrorists?

15        A.   No.

16        Q.   Thank you, General.  To go back to the time preceding your stay

17     in Kosovo, you must have heard that after the agreement that was met in

18     full by the FRY by pulling out its army and police forces, taking them

19     outside of Kosovo, returning them to the barracks, that the KLA used that

20     to expand their territory and take up positions in the locations from

21     which the FRY forces had been withdrawn?

22        A.   Yes, I have heard that.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Since your area of responsibility also included the

24     border, and there were some incidents there, would I be right in saying

25     that across that border contrary to the UN resolutions there was constant

Page 5527

 1     arms smuggling from Albania for the benefit of the KLA?

 2        A.   Yes, I was aware of that.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know whether the KVM notified the OSCE on the

 4     violations of the resolutions by the KLA -- or by Albania?

 5             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction.

 6             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Was the Security Council of the UN

 7     informed of Albania as the state contributing actively to the arming of

 8     the KLA?

 9        A.   I don't know whether the OSCE or the UN were apprised of the

10     issue.  Certainly in my area whenever we had evidence of arms smuggling

11     and so on, we would certainly advise the KVM headquarters.  As a matter

12     of fact, I think as you know, when I arrived in Kosovo in December, there

13     had just been an incident where a number of people were killed by the

14     border guards, border security guards, and they certainly seemed to be

15     people of fighting age.

16        Q.   Thank you.  I believe it was also your assessment that it was KLA

17     who were trying to enter illegally smuggling arms, and that they were

18     encountered by the representatives of authorities?

19        A.   That was my assessment.

20        Q.   Thank you.  General, looking at the chronology of events between

21     the 15th of October and the 18th of April, 1999, one would not gain the

22     impression that in your area of RC 1 there were grave problems that were

23     caused by FRY authorities, and that any of such events were reported to

24     the operations department.

25        A.   I can't say whether there were many or not many.  Certainly I

Page 5528

 1     had -- I had, I think, a pretty good grip on events that were going on,

 2     and we had indeed good relations generally with the authorities and with

 3     the KLA; so we were able, I think, to keep events and incidents to the

 4     minimum.

 5             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please come closer to the

 6     microphones.  Thank you.

 7             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   General, you have testified about Racak and Rogovo, both of which

 9     fell outside your area of responsibility; am I correct?

10        A.   Racak for sure.  Rogovo I think was right on the border.

11        Q.   You were at a meeting with Mr. Vojnovic.  In any case, Rogovo is

12     Djakovica municipality rather than Prizren; you recall that?

13        A.   Yes, okay.

14        Q.   Thank you.  General, I'd like to move on to some of your

15     documents and some meetings where you attended.  The first thing I'd like

16     to know is something that has to do with Exhibit P854.  General, this is

17     a note on the handover dated the 5th of December, 1998, I think this is

18     your report or information sheet that you left to your successor; am I

19     correct?

20        A.   I have the wrong document on my screen, but I do believe that

21     that is the one you are referring to.  When I was at the KVM support unit

22     and left those notes for my successor on the 5th of December.

23        Q.   Maybe I misstated the number.  The exhibit is P854.  While

24     waiting for it, we can continue discussing this subject.  That was in the

25     period while you were still not the head of RC 1.  I wanted to read

Page 5529

 1     something out.  In item 3, you say:

 2             "During one of your trips to Skopje, you should visit the KVM C

 3     and meet with Brigadier David Montgomery.  Commander of the KVCC which is

 4     of essential importance to analyse air and land information."

 5             MS. KRAVETZ:  Your Honour, I'm wondering if the document could be

 6     displayed for the witness.

 7             JUDGE PARKER:  It's trying to be located, Ms. Kravetz.

 8             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] It was page 19,

 9     65 ter number 2772, and page 18 in the English.  Could we please confirm

10     the information Ms. O'Leary provided me with.

11        Q.   General, let us not waste any time since you have to travel

12     tomorrow, I believe.  I'd like to give you my hard copy.

13        A.   I have it.

14        Q.   And of item 3, the last sentence.  I wanted to ask you for your

15     explanation of the acronym KVCC and what is this essential coordination

16     to verify air and land information?

17        A.   The KVCC was an organisation that had been set up in Skopje, and

18     I believe it was as a result of the first -- the first agreements between

19     the FRY and the OSCE and the FRY and the UN, et cetera.  The KVCC I

20     believe was there to coordinate particularly air forces, in the case of,

21     as you said, an air campaign in Kosovo.  I believe that that is what the

22     KVCC was.  So for us, it was important to, as we were standing up, the

23     Kosovo Verification Mission, that we have at least the head of the

24     support unit in Vienna have visited there, and I thought it was a

25     critical activity that he needed to undertake, and that's why I suggested

Page 5530

 1     that he visit this place.

 2        Q.   Thank you, General.  Am I right in saying this:  Pursuant to the

 3     Clark-Perisic [as interpreted] Agreement, I believe, air verification was

 4     to be done by NATO?

 5        A.   Yes, I believe that's correct.

 6        Q.   And when there is a mention of coordination, it has to do with

 7     the collation of both land and air data?

 8        A.   Correct.

 9        Q.   Given that you are an expert in that, when there is air

10     surveillance in place, can't you see any movements of troops?  For

11     example, on Google, I can follow what is going on right now in Ottawa?

12        A.   I believe that there is a possibility to be able to observe.  The

13     issue is, of course, how time sensitive is it, and I think unless you

14     have persistent observation, it's very difficult to actually tell

15     movement of troops.  And it also depends on the cover from the air,

16     et cetera, et cetera.  There's a whole bunch of technical issues to that.

17             But generally, the idea is to ensure that you are coordinating

18     the land -- ground verification and air verification.  Usually what can

19     happen is the air verification can take place with the confirmation on

20     the ground.

21        Q.   But you will agree with me that FRY forces used roads, and they

22     were easy to observe wherever they were, and they were easy to follow?

23        A.   I could not really agree with you that they would be easy to

24     observe.  Those that are on the roads, of course, are easy to observe.

25     But, you know, there's -- as a military man, I know you can hide pretty

Page 5531

 1     well.

 2        Q.   But with your mobile patrols, as far as I heard, you changed the

 3     method of verification, you wrote down the numbers of vehicles of the FRY

 4     and gradually established their bases, their movements, et cetera.

 5        A.   Yes, when we were able to observe movement and so on, my

 6     verifiers actually did as much reporting as they could in terms of

 7     details, et cetera.

 8        Q.   Thank you very much.  Does the name Donna Phelan ring a bell?

 9        A.   No.

10        Q.   All right.  We'll move on then.

11             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, Ms. O'Leary was

12     right about the number of the exhibit, she just did not mention page 4.

13             Can I now call up again -- it's again 854, but we'll come to that

14     later.  Let's take 860.

15        Q.   General, this is about your 26 December, 1998 meeting with

16     Colonel Delic.  What I'd like to know here is on page 3, I hope.

17             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] If we can just scroll down a

18     little -- sorry, scroll down.  I don't need the signature, go on, please.

19        Q.   Colonel Delic tells you the normal procedure here is for teams

20     going into the field to announce themselves to the Major at 4.00, or to

21     give four hours notice where and when they are going because we are

22     answerable for their safety.

23        A.   Right.

24        Q.   We've already discussed this, General, so I won't dwell on it.

25     I'd just like to ask you:  Are you aware that sometime on the

Page 5532

 1     15th of March discussions started and it was agreed that you, the

 2     verifiers, may enter territories engulfed in the fighting at your own

 3     peril; do you know that?

 4        A.   I was not aware of that, no.

 5        Q.   All right.  Thank you.  Now, about the installation of your

 6     mission in the border belt and in Planeja village.  Didn't Colonel Delic

 7     say that he was not authorised to decide about that, that only the

 8     superior command could decide?

 9        A.   That's correct, he did say that.

10        Q.   Thank you.

11             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can I now have P864, please.

12        Q.   This is your conversation on the 16th of January with

13     Lieutenant-Colonel Petrovic from the 243rd Mechanised Brigade.  I'd like

14     to know one thing:  Where does it say that the army may not conduct

15     training outside barracks?  In which document would we find that?

16        A.   I believe in one of the previous documents that you showed me,

17     this was only allowed with prior coordination with the KVM.  This was in

18     one of the agreements, I don't recall which one, but that was my

19     understanding.

20        Q.   I'll now read out to you something on page 2, item 1, in the

21     B/C/S version.  I don't know if I'll be able to find the English

22     reference.  It must be on the first page.  It says:

23             "P," that must be Petrovic.  "We received authorisation for these

24     tasks."

25             Did Petrovic inform you that these drills outside the barracks

Page 5533

 1     were authorised, allowed?  The second part of the sentence is:

 2             "My commander is coming back Sunday night."

 3        A.   I have it in front of me here, and I understand what you are

 4     saying.  This is what Petrovic was saying that night that they had been

 5     authorised.  But as you know, I was at that meeting with Gil Gilbertson

 6     who was the deputy head of the RC from RC 5, and he was confirming to me

 7     that they had not had authorisation to move from the barracks, and that

 8     they had been, indeed, at the time deployed for several days outside.

 9             And that's why I was saying to them that it was an unauthorised

10     [Realtime transcript read in error "authorised"] move and it was -- and

11     that they were ready to fire towards Dulje, et cetera, and trying to find

12     out what was going on.

13        Q.   Thank you, General.  Maybe Gilbertson told you that, I don't know

14     when, but we don't have his response, his reaction to this statement by

15     Mr. Petrovic.  Your meeting -- that meeting was at 10.37 in the morning?

16        A.   Yes.

17        Q.   Is it right that Mr. Gilbertson did not react to this statement

18     by Mr. Petrovic?

19        A.   That's correct.

20        Q.   Thank you.

21             JUDGE PARKER:  Could I ask, General, if you look on the screen in

22     front of you, page 55, line 11, it suggests that at the end there that it

23     was an authorised move, if you can pick up the line.

24        A.   An unauthorized, Your Honour.

25             JUDGE PARKER:  That's what you said, yes.  Thank you.  So that

Page 5534

 1     line 11 needs to be unauthorised, not authorised.  Thank you.

 2             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.  I am not

 3     in a position to follow the transcript at the same time.

 4        Q.   On this document, one more thing:  Below the point you were

 5     looking at, there's another one where again Lieutenant-Colonel Petrovic

 6     says:

 7             "The KLA provoked an attack on MUP in Dulje heights, problems in

 8     Javor and Luznica, but to the best of my knowledge, no fire from tanks on

 9     14th of January occurred."

10        A.   Yes, I see where that is, yes.  Is he referring there, of course,

11     to the ambush by the KLA of the MUP convoy, I believe took place on the

12     8th of January; so a few days before this meeting, that's what he is

13     referring to there.

14        Q.   Thank you.  But he also mentions there was no fire on the

15     14th of January?

16        A.   Yes, he did mention that too.

17        Q.   Thank you.

18             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now have P869.

19        Q.   We'll move on, General, to the incident in Racak of the

20     15th January.  It's right, isn't it, that Racak is not in the area of

21     responsibility of RC 1, is it correct that on the 15th of January, you

22     were at a meeting in Pec with General Drewienkiewicz and other chiefs of

23     regional centres?

24        A.   Yes, that's correct.

25        Q.   Is it correct that after your luncheon, you received the first

Page 5535

 1     information about something that happened in Racak, and at DZ's request,

 2     you set out towards Racak?

 3        A.   That's correct.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Bearing in mind how long it takes to travel from Pec

 5     to Racak and the time when you set out, you arrived at dark; and the only

 6     contact you had was in Stimlje concerning some people who were wounded?

 7        A.   That's correct.

 8        Q.   Later on, going through some documents that you created, we'll

 9     look at some more details.  Is it the case that on the

10     16th of January, 1999, when DZ and General Walker arrived, the bodies

11     were moved to the mosque?

12        A.   You mean Ambassador Walker.  I believe that some of the bodies

13     were moved to the mosque, but many of them were still in Racak,

14     particularly in the -- in the ravine area.

15        Q.   All right.  I got what I just said from the witness statement of

16     General DZ that at that time when he came, together with Ambassador

17     Walker and yourself, the bodies were moved to the mosque.

18             But let me ask you this:  Is it the case that Racak was not under

19     the control of the FRY forces from the afternoon of the 15th until the

20     time when you arrived on the 16th January, 1999?

21        A.   If you define "under the control" by meaning that there was no

22     authority presence in Racak, I believe you would be correct.

23        Q.   Yes.  I don't know if you know this, but the -- you must have

24     found out later, the on-site investigation by FRY authorities was carried

25     out only on the 17th of January after failed attempts on the 15th and

Page 5536

 1     the 16th?

 2        A.   I'm well aware.  In fact, I was on the ground on the morning of

 3     the 17th when the investigation took place.

 4        Q.   Thank you, General.  Am I right in saying that at the time when

 5     Ambassador Walker -- but he is also a general, isn't he?

 6        A.   I don't think so.

 7        Q.   All right.  I thought he was.  But never mind, he was certainly

 8     an ambassador.  When Ambassador Walker and General DZ were there, the

 9     local KLA commander was also in Racak and on the 16th Ambassador Walker

10     spoke to him?

11        A.   I believe that's the case, yes.

12        Q.   And is it right that not a single person who perished in Racak

13     was killed from heavy weaponry?

14        A.   That would be my -- that would be my assessment.

15        Q.   Thank you.  I'm not going to ask you this one, because I know you

16     did not see that, but let me ask you something else.  You saw the terrain

17     around Racak and the high ground on which you stood, you say in your

18     statement you did not see any casings around trenches?

19        A.   That's correct.

20        Q.   Well, General, you said yourself you were not an expert in

21     ballistics, but as a military man; if there are no casings around the

22     bodies, that means that they were hit from a great distance; is that

23     right?  Do you agree?

24        A.   Yes, either that or the casings were picked up.

25        Q.   Thank you.  But it's the KLA that had control over the site, not

Page 5537

 1     the FRY authorities.  But let's move on.

 2             Since there were trenches there and the persons who were a party

 3     to the conflict were in trenches, wouldn't it be logical that in the case

 4     of a skirmish, any wounds would be to the head, or at least the upper

 5     part of the body?

 6        A.   I think Mr. Milosevic asked me that question about seven years

 7     ago, and my answer was the same as it is now, and that is that when we

 8     learn how to shoot, we always aim for the centre of mass.  We never aim

 9     for a particular part of the body, we aim for the centre of mass, that's

10     the best way to ensure that the soldier hits the target.  So in this

11     case, obviously if there's only part of the body that's exposed, the

12     centre of mass would be that, you know, the centre of that part of the

13     body that is exposed.

14        Q.   Thank you, General.  That's the rule of the bull's-eye on the

15     chest in target practice.

16             Have you ever seen the video made by the Verification Mission

17     when they were there in Racak on the 16th of January?

18        A.   I don't believe I've seen it, no.

19        Q.   Did you see in the course of trials and court proceedings any

20     report by your verifiers from RC 1 or RC 5 about the Racak incident?

21        A.   You mean out of this court?  I believe I -- I believe I've only

22     seen what I have in my depositions, et cetera.  I don't think I've seen

23     anything from any others.

24        Q.   I just said reports by verifiers, you were at too high a level

25     and you just summed up the reports of your subordinates.  You sent your

Page 5538

 1     own report on the 16th and the 17th.  Were you shown any reports by

 2     individual verifiers in this case, in this courtroom?

 3        A.   I can't recall if I was shown any in this courtroom, but I can

 4     tell you that on the ground, before preparing my own reports, et cetera,

 5     I may not have seen any written reports by my verifiers, but I certainly

 6     talked to all of them that were there, and I kept in very close contact.

 7     And so I developed my assessments based on my discussions with them.

 8        Q.   Please focus on my question.  I asked you about yesterday and

 9     earlier today.  Did you see any such document created by one of your

10     verifiers, or verifiers from RC 5?

11        A.   No.

12        Q.   You told me that the complete archives of the OSCE were moved

13     from Pristina, that is the regional centres, to Macedonia and Albania;

14     correct?

15        A.   I don't know if I said that; I'm not sure they were.  I know that

16     I took my personal archives such as the sitreps, et cetera, through my

17     deployment further.

18        Q.   I'm sorry, you are right.  You were talking about yourself, not

19     the entire mission.

20             Now, General, were you aware, at the time or later, that Stimlje,

21     Racak, and Urosevac were within the Nerodimlje operation zone of the KLA.

22        A.   I wasn't aware of the name of the operation zone, I knew it was

23     outside of my, I'll just say, the commander of my operational zone within

24     my area.  I knew it was outside of his area.

25        Q.   Excellent.  You've anticipated my next question.  When you spoke

Page 5539

 1     to Mr. Drini, you spoke about the area that was not in his territory;

 2     correct?

 3        A.   Yes, I did, knowing that it was not in his territory.

 4        Q.   Now, after so much discussion about Racak, would I be right in

 5     saying that in Racak itself and the environs, KLA members were present on

 6     the 15th when the operation in Racak began?

 7        A.   I think you would be right.  I never had any contact with them

 8     myself in Racak or Stimlje, but my verifies indeed did have some contact.

 9        Q.   Thank you, General.  One more thing, the KLA also confirmed that

10     a certain number of their members were killed in Racak, but let's put

11     that aside.

12             When you talked to Mr. Drini - I believe it was, on the 17th of

13     January, 1999 - he told you that the wounded members of the KLA, a number

14     of them, were placed in hospitals that he had on his territory and his

15     area of responsibility; correct?

16        A.   That's possible.  It's probably in the record of meetings, but I

17     don't recall exactly.

18        Q.   We'll come to that meeting.

19             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] 869, please.

20        Q.   To finish with the meeting you had with the chief of

21     SUP Urosevac, Mr. Janicevic.

22             THE WITNESS:  I have it here.

23             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   You'll agree with me, General, that unlike the conversation with

25     Mr. Petrovic where you were involved in the discussion, this time it was

Page 5540

 1     Mr. Gilbertson who took the chair and you made just a few remarks;

 2     correct?

 3        A.   That's correct.  We had agreed that that would be the procedure.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Is it right that Mr. Janicevic briefed you on the

 5     situation including the events in Racak?

 6        A.   Yes, he gave us his account.

 7        Q.   Yes.

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   His account.  But since it was not your territorial

10     responsibility, you did know that on the 8th of January in Sljivovo -- or

11     rather, you didn't know that a police patrol was attacked in Sljivovo on

12     the 8th of January, you didn't know about the kidnappings of Albanians in

13     that area, it was not your area, and did you not have any prior knowledge

14     of these things; correct?

15        A.   That's correct.

16        Q.   Thank you.

17             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Now, can we look at page 2; I

18     believe it's page 2 in English as well.

19        Q.   Is it correct, General, that the chief of SUP told you that the

20     action was approved by the staff, and he led about 100 policemen who took

21     part?

22        A.   Yes, he did tell me, indeed, that he was in charge of the 100

23     policemen, and I don't know what you mean about that this was an agreed

24     -- oh, you are probably referring to the part where he talks about

25     Article 3 being fulfilled, is that what you are referring to?

Page 5541

 1        Q.   And here we see the line where he tells you, Even at the position

 2     of chief of the police, we cannot make final decisions, it's the staff

 3     that has to decide because they issued the order.  Is this a correct

 4     interpretation, a correct account of your discussion?

 5             MS. KRAVETZ:  Your Honour, just to assist, I believe the passage

 6     my learned colleague is referring to is at page 7 of the English.  This

 7     document has three versions and the operative one is the last one.

 8             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.  That may assist to find the correct

 9     page.

10             THE WITNESS:  I've lost sight of the question.  Would you repeat

11     your question?

12             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Okay.  You've seen the document.  I asked you two things at the

14     same time.  One, that this chief of the police told you that it was the

15     staff that approved the operation and issued the orders; and two, that he

16     led the 100 policemen who carried out the operation?

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   It's time for the break, General, but just one brief question:

19     Is it correct that Mr. Janicevic denied at this meeting that any members

20     of the Army of Yugoslavia participated in the action?

21        A.   That's correct.

22             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, General.  I

23     believe it's time for the break, Your Honours.

24             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.  We will have the second break now.  And we

25     resume at 1.00.  You are on target for time, Mr. Djurdjic?

Page 5542

 1             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] You have decided so, and that's

 2     how it will be.  And I would like to thank the General who is giving me

 3     very brief and very precise answers.  I hope he will keep up in the same

 4     vein.  And then at the end, I'll have an objection.

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.

 6                           [The witness stands down]

 7                           --- Recess taken at 12.33 p.m.

 8                           --- On resuming at 1.01 p.m.

 9                           [The witness takes the stand]

10             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes, Mr. Djurdjic.

11             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

12        Q.   General, were you aware, at the time when you were a part of the

13     Verification Mission in Kosovo, that the KLA had 60 millimetre mortars

14     and 80 millimetre mortars?

15        A.   That had been reported.

16        Q.   In this document that should be in front of you, I see that

17     Mr. Janicevic also told you at this meeting of the 16th of January, that

18     the KLA did use the 60 millimetre mortar and the 80 millimetre mortar;

19     right?

20        A.   Possibly.  I don't see it on my -- on my record of meeting here,

21     but I believe that they did indeed mention that.

22        Q.   It's on the first page of the record.  In your Regional Centre 1,

23     you had a certain David Wilson; do you remember him?

24        A.   Yes, I do.

25        Q.   He was the liaison officer with the KLA for your regional centre;

Page 5543

 1     correct?

 2        A.   No, actually, he was the chief liaison, so the liaison officer

 3     for the KLA and the liaison officer for the authorities reported to him

 4     as the chief of the liaison.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know that he attended the conference in

 6     Rambouillet?

 7        A.   Yes, I do, because I sent him there.

 8        Q.   Could you tell us then about his mandate in Rambouillet?

 9        A.   Yes, he was in Rambouillet to actually keep us informed of the

10     progression of the negotiations.  The idea was that the KVM had -- I had

11     suggested to General DZ that KVM should be represented there to get a

12     sense of what was going on and so his mandate was, if you wish, I had

13     loaned him to KVM headquarters, and his mandate was to report back on the

14     progression of the negotiations.

15        Q.   Thank you.  And did he help the delegation of the

16     Kosovar Albanians during the conference?

17        A.   Not to my knowledge.

18        Q.   May I ask you now if it is the same David Wilson --

19             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we have document 65 ter 641.

20        Q.   General, you will see that this is a report by David Wilson of

21     15th March, 1999.  Evaluation of KLA positions on the

22     15th of March, 1999.

23        A.   I see it, yes.

24        Q.   Let me just ask you, is that the David Wilson you had on your

25     team?

Page 5544

 1        A.   I believe it's the same one, yes.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  In sub-item (d), do you remember that on the

 3     14th of March, the KLA renewed its attack, its ambush attack in Dulje?

 4        A.   No, I'm not aware of that.

 5             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] And now can I call up P870.

 6     Sorry, I don't need that one.  We don't have time for it.  P872.

 7        Q.   General, this is a meeting of the 17th January, 1999, you had

 8     with Mr. Drini.  Let me just draw your attention to bullet point 8 from

 9     the top.  "D" means "Drini."  Speaking of exposure to special fire, he

10     spoke of the need to acquire indirect fire weapons, maybe Katyusha

11     rockets?

12        A.   Yes, I see that.

13        Q.   Can you share with us any details about this?

14        A.   No, I can't.  Actually, it happened quite often that there was a

15     lot of bluster from the KLA about how they were going to get these

16     weapons and these weapons and this came totally from left field.  I was

17     very surprised, and as you can see, I don't think it was brought up again

18     this that meeting or subsequently.

19        Q.   Can you now look at line 5.

20        A.   Mm-hmm.  Yes.

21        Q.   It's in between quotation marks here, it says:

22             "Some were released, some are in serious condition and still in

23     my hospital."

24             And he was talking about the wounded from Racak and Petrovo Selo?

25        A.   Correct.  And that should be in "military" hospital.  M-i-l is,

Page 5545

 1     certainly in the English, in the original, means "military," in military

 2     hospital, which I was not aware there were KLA military hospitals, but.

 3        Q.   Now, on page 2 of this document, please look at point 4 and give

 4     us your comment.  While you are reading, let me read it out:

 5             "We are going to continue talking to US KDOM, although they are

 6     cowboys, they can get the job done with their bulldozer policy."

 7             "Bulldozer."  Tell me, what did Mr. Drini tell you about this?

 8        A.   Well, one of the issues was that within my zone, my regional

 9     centre, I often received reports that there was -- that the US KDOM,

10     those portions that had not integrated into my regional centre, were

11     operating.  And I found that frustrating at times because of course they

12     would meet with different parties, and I was not aware of the subjects of

13     those meetings or the reports or what had been decided, et cetera.

14             So this was, for me, a bit frustrating, and I was then talking to

15     Drini about this and saying that, you know, I found it frustrating and

16     that's the point at which he said that he would continue to talk to the

17     US KDOM for that -- for the reason, I guess, that he has got there.

18        Q.   But I want to know what this meant:

19             "They can get the job done with their bulldozer policy."

20             What was it that he told you that prompted the person who made

21     this record to write something like this?

22        A.   Well, I think Drini said exactly that, is that he would continue

23     to talk to the US KDOM because in his view even though they were not as

24     controlled as we in the OSCE were, that, of course, they had the

25     political weight of the United States and therefore presumably would

Page 5546

 1     continue to get the job done.  I didn't know what job he was speaking

 2     about, but all I know is that I found it very frustrating.

 3        Q.   Thank you, General.  Perhaps I don't need to show you a document,

 4     but I'd like to ask you whether the KLA was against you establishing a

 5     station in Planeja?

 6        A.   Whether the KLA was against?  I am not sure whether the KLA were

 7     against it.  I don't recall asking their permission, so I'll leave it

 8     there.

 9        Q.   I have a -- minutes of a meeting here where you didn't mention

10     the KLA per se, but you were wondering why people in the field would be

11     against a Planeja office or an office in the field.  Does that ring a

12     bell?

13        A.   Well, I had several discussions with the authorities about the

14     Planeja.  My sense was that Planeja was, inside -- indeed, inside the

15     5 kilometre border boundaries; but I still felt that it would be

16     important to set up a field office there to enable us to monitor, if

17     indeed there were infiltrations through the border, that would allow us

18     to see firsthand these infiltrations to be able to report them to KVM

19     headquarters.  And if they were, you know, facilitated by the Albanian

20     authorities, that would again put pressure on the Albanian authorities.

21             On the other hand, it would also allow us to verify, to observe,

22     the behaviour of the authorities and be able to report on their good

23     behaviour or their bad behaviour as the case may be.  So this would have

24     been, to my sense, an important field office to set up.

25             And that was, you know -- the entire time I was in Kosovo, that

Page 5547

 1     was the idea, to be able to have a good coverage of the area, to be able

 2     to observe properly, to be able to report, to verify in an impartial

 3     manner.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  I have here the minutes of a meeting you had with

 5     Commander Drini on the 26th of February.  I am interested in something he

 6     says here.  He says that "the 12-year-old boys conveyed the message."

 7        A.   I don't have that document in front of me, so.

 8             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] It is 873, I believe.  In the

 9     English, page 2.

10        Q.   To make it easier for you, I'll read out the B/C/S translation:

11             "If they shoot tomorrow, we will return fire, but we will not

12     open fire first."

13             Then there is a mention of Praga and Pirana.  And then it says:

14             "12-year-old boys conveyed the message."

15        A.   Where in the meeting report is that, Mr. Djurdjic?

16        Q.   The 12th capital letter from the top.

17             "Boys of 12 years passed ..."  [In English] "If they" --

18        A.   If they fire tomorrow, I see it.

19        Q.   Yes.  So the last sentence:

20             "Boys of 12 years passed message."

21        A.   Okay now you've made the thing so big -- okay.  There it is.

22     Okay.  Could you go back up please, a little bit.

23             Yeah, I don't know what he's -- I have no recollection what he

24     was referring to there, I'm sorry.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Did you know that KLA members operated in civilian

Page 5548

 1     clothes without uniforms as well?

 2        A.   Yes.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Today you said that your source in Albania on the

 4     number of refugees was the Albanian government concerning your report of

 5     the 18th of May.  The Albanian government saw it as in their interest to

 6     have the number of refugees as large as possible to receive more aid,

 7     wouldn't that be correct?

 8        A.   Yes, what I actually stated was that the government of Albania

 9     was at the source of the reporting, but also they were -- the UNHCR were

10     on the ground, a number -- the ICRC, a number of NGOs also.  And we had

11     contact ourselves with all these agencies.  And there was a systematic

12     manner of reporting the number of refugees.  As they crossed the border,

13     they were counted, et cetera.  And so I have a -- quite a bit of

14     confidence in the figures that are in the report.

15        Q.   Thank you.  General, you also said that you received great

16     technical assistance from the staff that transferred from Kosovo to

17     Albania, those of them who crossed over from Kosovo to Albania on the

18     24th of March and that they spoke good Albanian and could therefore take

19     good quality statements.  Am I right in saying that you are there

20     referring to Albanian nationals or people of Albanian ethnic origin?

21        A.   Yes, I mean, the approach we took, of course, when we went

22     into -- when we went into Albania at the end of March to look after the

23     refugees, we brought with us some folks who were able to speak Albanian,

24     but we also recruited local employees in Albania, per se, that we used as

25     interpreters.

Page 5549

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know who was the driver of Mr. Drewienkiewicz

 2     and Walker during their stay in Kosovo?

 3        A.   No, I don't.

 4        Q.   I apologise.  I sometimes may pronounce things incorrectly, but I

 5     think his name was Hajziri [phoen], and apparently he was a link between

 6     the Kosovo Verification Mission in Macedonia and the KLA, and that he

 7     forwarded all KLA information to the KVM.  Do you know anything about

 8     that?

 9        A.   No, no, I don't.

10        Q.   Thank you.  The first report we saw which is P874, encompasses

11     the period between the 2nd and the 15th of April, 1999, whereas your

12     staff went in the field on the 5th of April, according to the report.

13        A.   Okay.

14        Q.   Therefore the information was retroactive; it was gathered before

15     their stay in the field.

16        A.   Right.  And as I've mentioned before, the collation of this

17     information was actually done by -- through our contact with the NGOs

18     that were already deployed on the ground, those that had been there since

19     the 24th of March and before.  And the OSCE presence in Albania as well,

20     direct contact.

21             So the idea was to report on the two-week period, but you are

22     right, some of that information had been gleaned and gathered from those

23     that were on the ground before that we had -- that we cooperated with.

24        Q.   Thank you, General.  Did you ever see a list of persons that were

25     killed in Racak?

Page 5550

 1        A.   No.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Can I conclude then that you don't know the age

 3     breakdown of the victims?

 4        A.   Not specifically.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  I have one last question for you:  Do you know

 6     Mr. Richard Vabit or Wabit [phoen] who is also a Canadian and was in Pec?

 7     Have you ever heard of him?

 8        A.   No, I have not.  But I might have known him at the time; it's

 9     possible.

10        Q.   Very well.  But I'd still like to hear your comment regarding

11     something.  The organisation -- the type of organisation resembles the

12     Italian mafia, that is to say, by families.  The male family members stay

13     close to their homes every day, digging trenches, making bunkers, and

14     carrying out tactical training.  Their food is prepared and brought to

15     them by the female members of the family.  In a family, there is one main

16     person, a capo.  The family members working abroad have their monthly

17     payments due to be sent to the family.  All that money can be channeled

18     into purchasing weapons freely because food and medication is provided

19     for --

20             JUDGE PARKER:  May I interrupt, Mr. Djurdjic.

21             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Does this ring a bell?

22             JUDGE PARKER:  Ms. Kravetz.

23             MS. KRAVETZ:  Your Honour, I see that my learned friend is

24     reading from a document.  I really -- he has not indicated what is the

25     source of this passage he is reading, he has also put quite a lot of

Page 5551

 1     information to the witness, I'm not sure that there is a question here in

 2     the passage that he is.

 3             JUDGE PARKER:  He was interrupted before he reached the question,

 4     Ms. Kravetz, but the source of the document, Mr. Djurdjic?

 5             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] It is our exhibit -- rather

 6     document, it's not an exhibit, D003-1006.  I would like to hear from the

 7     witness whether he is familiar with the contents of this document and

 8     whether he would agree with it.  I believe the answer may be short.  We

 9     don't have a translation, otherwise I would have put it up on the screen.

10     The gentleman does not read that language, that's why I read it out.

11             JUDGE PARKER:  General, you are asked whether you are familiar

12     with this document and its contents.

13             THE WITNESS:  I am not.

14             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]  Thank you, that is the answer I

15     expected to receive.  General, thank you very much.  It was a pleasure to

16     speak to you.

17             Your Honours, Defence concludes its cross-examination pursuant to

18     your order.  I have an objection to make though.  It happened on several

19     occasions that the Prosecutor brings witnesses whose testimony is limited

20     in terms of time.  This witness was at our disposal as of yesterday

21     morning.  Before him, we had a witness who was not limited in terms of

22     time as opposed to this witness.  We used most of yesterday with his

23     testimony prior to reaching this witness to be put at our disposal by the

24     Prosecutor.

25             I do not believe that should be the practice we should follow in

Page 5552

 1     the future, and I would still like to thank the Chamber for considering

 2     that.

 3             JUDGE PARKER:  We will discuss the matter you raise at some time

 4     when we are not pressed.

 5             Ms. Kravetz.

 6             MS. KRAVETZ:  Thank you, Your Honour.  Could I please have

 7     Exhibit P837 back up on the screen, and I would like page 3 of the

 8     English and also page 3 of the B/C/S, paragraph 8.

 9                           Re-examination by Ms. Kravetz:

10        Q.   General, you were asked several questions about this document

11     that's going to appear on the screen, this is the

12     Clark-Naumann Agreement.  You were asked about the paragraph that

13     precedes paragraph 8.  And my questions relate to paragraph 8

14     specifically.

15             We see that this paragraph says that:

16             "In order to ensure verification of these provisions, VJ and MUP

17     providers will provide ..." and if we read the second part of this

18     paragraph, it says:

19             "... will provide immediate notification to KDOM/OSCE of any

20     deployments contrary to these provisions and will explain the

21     circumstances regarding such deployments?"

22             Now, you have told us that you were familiar at the time with

23     this agreement.  In your understanding, this expression

24     "any deployments," would that have included deployment outside of

25     barracks for the purpose of conducting training exercises?

Page 5553

 1        A.   Yes, it would have.

 2        Q.   So in your understanding -- and you were answering a question

 3     from my learned colleague with regard to what was the source of you

 4     saying that prior authorisation was required for conducting training

 5     exercises, you said that in your understanding you required prior

 6     coordination with the KVM and that was in one of the agreements that was

 7     shown earlier.  Is this what you were referring to?

 8        A.   Exactly.

 9        Q.   Now, we see the first part of this paragraph also refers to

10     another requirement:

11             "VJ commanders and MUP commanders will provide KDOM and OSCE with

12     detailed weekly reports of manning, weapons, and activities of their

13     forces."

14             Was this a requirement that during your tenure in Kosovo was

15     complied with?

16        A.   Never in my experience.

17        Q.   Thank you.  And what about the second part that we were just

18     discussing, the immediate notification of deployments contrary to the

19     provisions of this agreement, was that something that was complied with?

20        A.   Not normally.

21        Q.   Okay.  And in which circumstances was that complied with?

22        A.   Well, there were circumstances in which we understood that they

23     would not be able to comply.  For example, if they were provoked -- if

24     the authorities were provoked by a particular incident, then we felt in

25     the KVM that it was understandable that they would not have preplanned

Page 5554

 1     their deployments outside to react to a particular incident.

 2             So when that happened, we understood that, you know, it was part

 3     of their, you know, their reaction that they would do this, and then so

 4     we did not actually, you know, hold it against them from that point of

 5     view.

 6             But it happened quite often that they would take, for example,

 7     their tanks on the road and would really instill fear in the population,

 8     and we would go and protest, go and find out why they were doing this;

 9     and they would say it's driver training.

10             Now, obviously if we had been warned ahead of time that this kind

11     activity was going to be taking place, we could have warned the local

12     population, we could have ensured that we were in different villages to

13     reassure them that this was an agreed activity.  So we never really got

14     any of that prior notice.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Could we now turn to the next page.  And this is

16     Roman numeral III.  My learned colleague asked you a couple of questions

17     in regard to this, and while you were being asked these questions - this

18     is at transcript page of today 45, lines 18 and 19 - you said that the

19     operative terms in the last part of this paragraph were the words

20     "adequately and proportionately."  Can you explain what you meant by that

21     statement?

22        A.   Yes.  In my view when I mean -- when I say adequately and

23     proportionately, I guess I felt that definitely there were times when the

24     Serb authorities would be provoked into taking certain actions, into

25     reacting.

Page 5555

 1             For example, the incident, I believe, on the 8th of January,

 2     where a convoy of MUP vehicles was ambushed by the KLA, two policemen

 3     died on the scene, I believe, and one later.  And the reaction by the

 4     Serb authorities was to bring a tank out of the Dulje position and to

 5     start firing into a village.  And, you know, I just -- I had a hard time

 6     kind of calling that a proportionate or adequate response to an activity

 7     that, you know, wasn't really linked.

 8             And so this was kind of the type of incident that -- or the type

 9     of reaction that, to me, went against this adequately and proportionately

10     operative words in this accord.

11        Q.   Now, this paragraph refers to UN Security Council Resolution 1199

12     and you were asked some questions about that.  And specifically, my

13     learned colleague asked you about a phrase that refers to not carrying

14     out any repressive actions against a peaceful population - and he asked

15     you this is at transcript page 38, lines 7 and 8 - if the populations

16     were not peaceful, was there no ban on any measures taken against them,

17     and you said that's the way you read it as well.

18             Now, based on the answer you just provided us, to your

19     understanding of this Roman numeral III, would there have been

20     restrictions on the way Serb authorities could react when provoked or

21     when perceived to be provoked?

22        A.   Yes, I would think that the restriction is exactly those three

23     words "adequately and proportionately."  So meaning that the restriction

24     would be that the reaction would be in proportionality to the level of

25     the attack or the provocation, i.e., if you are fired by a small arms,

Page 5556

 1     you know, a couple of small arms shots from a particular village, you

 2     don't deploy an entire company to go do it, to go and react to that.

 3             On the other hand, if you're -- if you're attacked from a village

 4     by 20 or 30, I think as the counsel spoke earlier, then obviously the

 5     reaction by a company might be appropriate and adequate.  So this to me

 6     were the kinds of -- the kinds of restrictions that formed part of this

 7     accord.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Now moving on to a different topic.  My learned

 9     colleague asked you today when you were speaking about military

10     structures and MUP structures and your familiarity with both of them, he

11     asked you why you knew military structures in your area better than you

12     did MUP, and you said that you variously associated with military

13     structures such as brigade more than you -- and not so easily with

14     paramilitary like the MUP.  This is at page 30, line 21.

15             What did you mean when you were referring to the MUP as a

16     paramilitary structure?

17        A.   What I'm referring to here is that I see, I certainly assessed in

18     my own mind the MUP as being not just a police force, but also a kind of

19     a police force with more, if you wish, much like a Gendarmerie in France

20     where they're able to do almost infantry type tactics, they're able to --

21     they have armoured vehicles, they are equipped with some heavier weapons

22     than just a straight pistols that you would find in, say, a strictly

23     police type force.

24             So to me they were, if you wish, between the police and the

25     military, they were kind of an in-between organisation, so that's why I

Page 5557

 1     call them paramilitary.

 2             In my country, we don't have such forces.  Our police are, you

 3     know, don't usually travel in armoured vehicles.  They don't do infantry

 4     tactics.  In fact, when they try to do infantry tactics, they don't do so

 5     well.  And there have been incidents of deaths and so on of police who

 6     tried to do this kind of thing.

 7             So we have a more, if you wish, a clearer definition between

 8     police forces, military forces, and so to my mind my assessment is the

 9     MUP was somewhere in middle.

10        Q.   Thank you for that.  And just one final issue I wanted to get to

11     before this session ends today.  I would like to refer you to attachment

12     13A of your statement, and this is Exhibit P870.  Now, today you were

13     asked -- well, I'll first let you get to that document.

14        A.   Okay.

15        Q.   Can you tell us what this document is?

16        A.   This is -- this is kind of a -- an assessment, a report that I

17     put together after the incidents of Racak and Stimlje on the -- I

18     believe, the evening of the 16th of January.  That's a report I wrote

19     myself.

20        Q.   Now, today at page 60, you were asked by my learned colleague

21     about whether you had been shown any reports prepared by verifiers in

22     relation to the Racak incident, and you said that you didn't recall

23     seeing any in this courtroom but you referred to preparing your own

24     reports and having spoken to verifiers for that purpose.

25        A.   Yes, I did.

Page 5558

 1        Q.   Is this the report that you were speaking about when you were

 2     providing that answer to my learned colleague?  Or were you speaking

 3     about another document?

 4        A.   No, this is certainly, this is certainly one of the -- one of the

 5     documents I was referring to, and I don't recall exactly, but there must

 6     have been a daily sitrep also prepared by my regional centre and sent up

 7     to the KVM, but I don't recall it immediately at this point, so.

 8        Q.   Now, we see the second bullet point below the date 16th January,

 9     this is like in the middle of the page.  It says:

10             "Head RC 1 Prizren arrived on the scene at 9 a.m. and was briefed

11     by head CC 3."

12             I take it the reference to head RC 1 Prizren, that would be a

13     reference to yourself?

14        A.   Yes, it is.

15        Q.   And when you were speaking and responding to my learn colleague

16     and said that you had been in close contact and had discussions with the

17     verifiers, would this paragraph be -- this paragraph be an example of the

18     type of information you received from the verifiers on the ground that

19     you later included in your report?

20        A.   That's exactly it.

21        Q.   If we look at bullet point 3 from the bottom, it says:

22             "Head RC 1 proceeds further into the village..."

23             And you referred to bodies you observed and the ages of -- and

24     the sex of the bodies that you observed.  Would this report have also

25     contained your personal observations on-site in Racak?

Page 5559

 1        A.   Sorry, are you down in the third bullet before the bottom of the

 2     page?

 3        Q.   Yes, where it says:

 4             "Head RC 1 proceeds further into the village..."

 5        A.   Yes, that is exactly -- that was me, head RC 1, and I did proceed

 6     into the village, and I observed the bodies of four more individuals as

 7     stated here.

 8        Q.   Okay.  Thank you.

 9             MS. KRAVETZ:  Your Honours, I see we are nearing the end of this

10     session so those are my questions for the witness; I'll stop at this

11     stage.

12             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you very much.

13             General, you'll be pleased to know, A, that is the end of the

14     questions; B, we finished within time; C, you are clear to go.

15             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, Your Honour.

16             JUDGE PARKER:  We would like to thank you for your attendance

17     once again and for the assistance that you've been able to give us in

18     this matter.

19             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, Your Honour.

20                           [The witness withdrew]

21             JUDGE PARKER:  Dealing very quickly with the matter you raised,

22     Mr. Djurdjic, there may be a problem, and we have mentioned it where

23     there is a witness who is under a time limitation, ensuring that that is

24     known as the time for that witness to give evidence approaches or as the

25     witness is giving evidence so that we can adjust time proceedings to

Page 5560

 1     accommodate that.  Equally though, the situation in this case was due

 2     partly to the time taken with the two witnesses before that, which was

 3     longer than might reasonably be thought necessary, so that this witness

 4     was reached later in the week than could have been reasonably

 5     anticipated.  Even so, we were, I believe, careful to make it known to

 6     both counsel that there was a time limitation, and we went to some

 7     lengths to ensure that you had a reasonable time for your questions,

 8     which is the course we would take.

 9             As I have mentioned to counsel before, the Chamber is not

10     inclined to impose strict time-limits.  If it did so, this particular

11     sort of problem might rarely, if ever, arise.  But if it did so, counsel

12     would find themselves much more limited than they are now with virtually

13     every witness.  We prefer to allow it to the judgement and responsibility

14     of counsel to adjust time to what is really necessary.

15             In view of those matters, I don't think there was anything out of

16     proper management in the timing of this witness.  It seems to the Chamber

17     that there was a reasonable opportunity given to Defence, a time probably

18     much longer than might have been available before some other

19     Trial Chambers.  And we continue, though, to urge the Prosecution to make

20     known if a witness has a particular time limitation in time for any

21     adjustment that might be necessary to be made.

22             We adjourn now.  We continue tomorrow at 9.00 in the morning.

23                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.48 p.m.,

24                           to be reconvened on Friday, the 5th day of June,

25                           2009, at 9.00 a.m.