Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 5792

 1                           Wednesday, 10 June 2009

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.

 5                           [The witness takes the stand]

 6             JUDGE PARKER:  Good morning.

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.

 8             JUDGE PARKER:  The affirmation you made to tell the truth still

 9     applies, and Mr. Djurdjic is questioning you.  Yes.

10             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours.

11                           WITNESS:  ALEKSANDAR VASILJEVIC [Resumed]

12                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

13                           Cross-examination by Mr. Djurdjic:  [Continued]

14        Q.   Good morning, General.

15        A.   Good morning.

16        Q.   Let us take it slowly today so as to have everything recorded

17     with as few corrections as possible.  First I'd like to show you a

18     document that we discussed yesterday.  You already provided some answers

19     to it, but I want to stay with it for some time.

20             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please receive

21     document D003-2656.

22        Q.   General, this document is the rules of service of the VJ for

23     1996.  Could you please read out paragraph -- or Article 473.  It starts

24     on this page and spills over onto the next.

25        A.   "Army units may be used to combat outlaw, sabotage, terrorists,

Page 5793

 1     and other enemy groups."

 2        Q.   Let us go to the next page in the B/C/S.  Eventually we'll have

 3     to change the page in the English.

 4        A.   "Or to prevent or eliminate a state of emergency by the state of

 5     the president of Yugoslavia or the Supreme Defence Council, the

 6     Chief of General Staff shall issue the order for the use of the army

 7     pertaining to this article.  In case of an attack by an outlaw,

 8     terrorist, sabotage, or other armed enemy group at a unit or institution,

 9     the commanding or duty officer of the attacked unit, institution, or army

10     facility shall immediately undertake the relevant defence and repelling

11     measures and shall inform his superior thereof."

12        Q.   Thank you.  You will agree with me that this encompasses two

13     situations:  One, when there is an attack; and the other, when the

14     Chief of General Staff makes decisions even if there is no attack.

15        A.   This concerns terrorist groups rather than an armed rebellion

16     which was -- which prevailed in Kosovo in 1998.  You will remember 1972

17     when a sabotage Ustasha group was introduced from Australia.  That was

18     the synonym that was frequently used for the sabotage terrorist groups

19     from that point onwards.

20             As regards Kosovo, we did not have a single terrorist group.  We

21     had what was basically an army there, the KLA.  This was not an

22     individual small group concerning which the Chief of the General Staff or

23     the Yugoslav president could make decisions so as to avoid a state of

24     emergency.

25             But in 1998 as far as I know, there was a state of emergency.

Page 5794

 1     Everything was blocked, traffic, the territory, they established their

 2     own check-points, they mined roads.  It didn't concern a single facility,

 3     say, in Drenica, but the entire territory of Kosovo.  I believe that is

 4     why there was so much discussion about introducing a state of emergency.

 5        Q.   Thank you, General.  You have embarked upon interpreting some

 6     legal regulations, but I would like to stay with the rules of service

 7     only for the time being.

 8             In the second part of this article, I believe the third

 9     paragraph, the issue is that of a unit reacting if exposed to an attack

10     without any -- anyone's orders; am I correct in saying that?

11        A.   You are completely correct.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Let us go back to paragraph 1 of this article.  I

13     don't want to enter any legal debates with you or political debates, but

14     when it says that the general or the Chief of the General Staff can use

15     the armed forces pursuant to the decisions of the Supreme Defence Council

16     and the president of Yugoslavia who presided over the Defence Council.

17     In this article, there is no mention of a state of emergency; am I

18     correct?

19        A.   You are.  However, it also says:

20             "In order to prevent that a state of emergency comes about."

21        Q.   I don't think I find that in there.  I can't see it.  Yes, yes,

22     "in order to prevent," you are right.  Therefore it is possible under

23     those conditions.

24             And then we have paragraph 474 on the use of army -- no, no, that

25     is irrelevant.  Let's move on.

Page 5795

 1             General, you described your view of the KLA.  I would like to

 2     know something more about the ways they were financed.  Was that

 3     something that you were interested in in 1997, 1998, and 1999.  When you

 4     took over duties, did you study that?

 5        A.   No, I was not familiar with the way they were financed in the

 6     course of those few years, and there was no discussion about that when I

 7     came towards the end of April.  Although I know what it used to be like

 8     preceding that period; therefore, I conclude that it was similar.

 9             First of all, they received donations collected by the Albanian

10     lobby which was well off in financial terms abroad.  There were various

11     means of going about that.  It even concerned stealing or robbery, and

12     somewhere around 1985 or 1986, most of the money came from abroad.

13        Q.   Thank you.  In the years immediately prior to the war and

14     immediately after, were you familiar with any drug smuggling as being one

15     of the basic sources of finance?

16        A.   Yes, one can make that conclusion.  Drug trafficking is present

17     even as we speak in Kosovo.

18        Q.   Thank you.  When you took over your duties regarding the KLA,

19     were you acquainted with the importance of foreign aid in terms of

20     equipping and training the KLA?

21        A.   No.  That was not a topic.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know how many VJ former officers, as well as

23     JNA former officers, were among the ranks of the KLA while you were on

24     your duty?

25        A.   We did not view that as a separate issue.  What I knew was that

Page 5796

 1     they had some people from the JNA who joined the KLA.  Basically, all of

 2     NCOs and COs who were the subjects of our investigations later on became

 3     KLA commanders.  Basically all of them, and I have in mind around 15 of

 4     them.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Are you familiar with the period immediately prior to

 6     NATO bombardment and the stay of the Verification Commission, the OSCE,

 7     as well as KDOM, as well as the ways in which they overstepped the

 8     boundaries of their mandate by engaging in counter-intelligence

 9     activities?

10        A.   As I have mentioned already, I seem to remember that some members

11     of that mission were in contact with KLA leaders, but nothing more

12     specific than that.  When I arrived at the service, I know I was briefed

13     on that, and I remember that was from the period before I was reinstated.

14     I also mentioned the photograph of Mr. Holbrooke with some KLA people.

15        Q.   Thank you.  General, I'd like to know what you know about the

16     methods of operation of the KLA in terms of counter-intelligence.  What

17     was characteristic of that?  I'm not so much interested in the military

18     aspects, but the very nucleus of the problem in terms of abusing or

19     misusing civilians.  Did you have any information regarding that?

20        A.   The method of operation was that all reluctant Albanian

21     population in Kosovo that did not line up, that did not rally around the

22     KLA or any of its units, or who did not sign up to the KLA goals, or for

23     whom there was even a shadow of a doubt that they were in one way or

24     another loyal to the Serbian regime or were in contact with the security

25     service, irrespective of the fact that they were ethnic Albanians, most

Page 5797

 1     of them were liquidated.  They were treated extremely roughly.  I know

 2     that some of our collaborators were eventually killed.  That was quite

 3     common, and in such situations they simply put the ethnic affiliation

 4     aside.

 5             Another characteristic was that these terrorist armed groups

 6     mingled usually with local population.  There were several such cases

 7     that we were briefed by various security organs, in the course of which

 8     we learned that fire was opened from say refugee columns on the police

 9     and the army.  And then it was very difficult how to respond to that

10     without suffering casualties, and at the same time not hurting in a sense

11     civilians.

12             I'm a bit familiar with the Albanian mentality since I have

13     studied the problem for a long time.  I learned that families, and entire

14     parts of villages from which KLA terrorists hailed, moved together with

15     them using them as a source of protection in the sense that they were

16     protecting civilians.  And at the same time, the civilians were there to

17     make sure that no fire was opened at the KLA members.  And they moved

18     together as a single group.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Does this mean that on many occasions, the KLA

20     operated wearing civilian clothes?

21        A.   I can't say that.  I don't know.  I didn't pay attention to it.

22     You know, a tradition in Albanians is that there must be a single rifle

23     at least in every household hidden somewhere.  So I cannot exclude the

24     possibility that the civilians who were not officially or formally in KLA

25     uniform and a KLA unit, that they opened fire as well.

Page 5798

 1             It was a general malaise.  I don't know whether they changed

 2     clothes into uniforms, into civilian clothes, I don't know.  I can tell

 3     you only about the methodology they used and their love of weapons.

 4     Almost all male Albanians irrespective of their age always kept a gun or

 5     a rifle.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  A blood-feud has not been eradicated among the

 7     Albanian population, do you agree?

 8        A.   That's correct.  It's still alive.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  What I'd like to know, Mr. General, is whether you

10     have any knowledge about KLA members evacuating certain villages for

11     their purposes in 1998, 1999, and during the war?

12        A.   I know about that as a general information, but I couldn't be

13     specific which village suffered such a fate.  But I know of this

14     practice.

15             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]  I'd like to familiarise you with

16     an exhibit P452.  Rather, D452.  No, it's P452.

17        Q.   General, what we are about to see is a decision of the

18     Chief of General Staff of the KLA Colonel Bislim Zyrapi, dated

19     1st April, 1999.  Please pay attention to paragraphs 3 and 4, and tell

20     us, was this one of the methods for the KLA to infiltrate the civilians

21     while withdrawing from FRY forces?

22        A.   Yes, I've read it.  I'm quite surprised that a person that I used

23     to know, Bislim Zyrapi, became Chief of General Staff.  Well, like

24     commander, like army; he used to be an NCO in Sarajevo, and we used to

25     deal with him in 1986.  In the original text there are four 9s in the

Page 5799

 1     date, and the same has been reflected in the translation.

 2             What he drafted as Chief of General Staff is not of the same

 3     level of quality a JNA sergeant would draft.  Well, this is not

 4     contentious that they moved the population in areas of combat operation,

 5     maybe for protection, but maybe for political interests.  I cannot enter

 6     into speculation.  But the fact stands that the population was moved

 7     around.  From their perspective, maybe for protection.  Women and

 8     children used to be in the woods and the western media took pictures of

 9     them representing them as displaced persons; but in professional terms we

10     can deem that as evacuation, moving the population from one place to

11     another.

12        Q.   Thank you.  General, I would like to go through some documents

13     with you, but rather, let's finish with my yesterday's remark concerning

14     the 25th of May document.

15             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] That would be, I think, P --

16     65 ter number 1459.  1459.  That was 1459 in Milutinovic et al.  We can

17     see it.

18        Q.   General, let's take it from the top, from page 1.  So the date is

19     the 25th of May, 1999.  You said that the long number reflects the

20     3rd Armies.  Do you have the number of copies that this document was

21     drafted in?

22        A.   There may be several copies, but no mark is borne by this

23     document.  Minimum number of copies to be drafted is two; one to the

24     addressee, and the other for the archives of the drafter.  You will see

25     in other documents that this number of copies, if not indicated, doesn't

Page 5800

 1     mean anything.

 2        Q.   Absolutely, I agree with you.  But this is a case where we have

 3     delivery order in terms of who should be -- who should receive that

 4     document.  But let me ask you another thing, this was drafted by

 5     Mr. Pavkovic, bears his signature and the date, but you do not know

 6     whether he drafted that document on that date; am I right?

 7        A.   One cannot say whether this was drafted on the date, but we can

 8     say whether it was entered into the log or the ledger on that date.  The

 9     document might have been drafted a week prior to the date, but what is

10     important is when it is registered in the ledger.  On the 25th of May

11     there is an addendum which is not usual.  94-1-2.  What 94-1 is is worthy

12     of investigation.

13        Q.   This is stated in the stamp of this document, but whether it was

14     registered or not can be determined only by gaining insight into the

15     ledger?

16        A.   That's correct.  Or if it was received by the General Staff and

17     is addressed to the Chief of General Staff personally, then it should

18     bear the stamp, the reception stamp; and this is why I said I could not

19     testify whether this document reached the General Staff because there is

20     no reception stamp of the General Staff.

21        Q.   That's correct, General.  Let me ask you another thing.  Is it

22     true that all General Staff documents were placed into the military

23     archive registered, recorded, and bearing military archive's stamps, so

24     all General Staff documents are in the archives of the VJ?

25        A.   I cannot tell you about the exceptions.  There were documents

Page 5801

 1     whose authenticity I have no reason to doubt, but which do not bear the

 2     archive stamp.  It doesn't mean that all the documents must be in the

 3     archive, but the practice is whenever a document is archived or when

 4     documents are taken out of an archive, whoever is giving them away, they

 5     don't care whether -- who is going to do the triage.

 6        Q.   But if this document was received in the archive, then it should

 7     bear the archive's stamp.  At least that was the practice in 1999.

 8             JUDGE PARKER:  Your eagerness and enthusiasm is being reflected

 9     in the speed of your questioning.  You are getting faster and faster, the

10     interpreters are getting further behind.

11             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I apologise to the interpreters.

12     I'll be mindful of their needs.

13        Q.   So we've come to the importance of this document.  Is this

14     document of such a nature that it would be preserved by the General Staff

15     had they received it?

16        A.   This is an individual issue.  You may ask me whether I would keep

17     it if I were Chief of General Staff, I would have.  But I cannot enter

18     into personal criteria.  I know what you are interested in.  Yesterday I

19     explained quite clearly, the signature is that of the

20     General Nebojsa Pavkovic.

21             The part that bears the date 25th of May, this is drafted eight

22     days after the briefing with the Chief of General Staff where he explains

23     for the first time manifestations that are focused in an official

24     document for the first time concerning problems with the relations with

25     the MUP and conducts of some MUP elements.  I told you that subsequently

Page 5802

 1     wrote what he should have written as early as April, and he is now

 2     seeking from the Chief of General Staff to resolve matters that is he

 3     could have resolved at the Joint Commission level in Pristina.

 4             I cannot tell you whether this document has been fortified by him

 5     and post-dated, and it was not drafted on the 25th of April, 1999, but

 6     25th of April, 2001.  You cannot ask me to explain that.  What I've

 7     testified about are the facts which led to this conclusion.

 8        Q.   You are a fact witness, I'm going to use you as such and then we

 9     can later on determine whether some things are forgeries or not.  You've

10     disappointed me in another thing, I thought that the military followed

11     rules and that there is a rule on archiving the documents, but I have

12     that document so let's proceed.

13             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Let's take a look at the next

14     page, please.

15        Q.   I don't want to know about the contents; I'm interested in the

16     very end of the document.  I think that the contents are not credible.

17             General, do you see who this document was delivered to?  Is there

18     a list of addressees?

19        A.   I don't know what the delivery order is.  It is clear that it was

20     delivered to the Chief of General Staff personally, that's at the

21     beginning below the letterhead.  Each document bears this.

22        Q.   Let me interrupt you, General.  One thing is who the document is

23     addressed to, but the delivery order is an indication who should receive

24     a certain document.  And I've seen this in the military when you deliver

25     documents through telex or teleprinter then there is a note "addressees,"

Page 5803

 1     so this in my terms is the delivery order.  We have the addressee on the

 2     first page, but we do not have any indication on how many copies are to

 3     be delivered to whom.  It's usually customary to say one copy to

 4     security, one copy to department of this or that.  This would be the

 5     delivery order.  This is what I mean by delivery order.

 6        A.   You are not right in this case.  This document was delivered

 7     personally.  And as head of the administration, or in other capacities, I

 8     also delivered -- I also received, personally delivered documents, which

 9     means they should be delivered personally to that addressee and to nobody

10     else.

11             And as I said yesterday, such a document is drafted in two

12     copies.  One copy stays with the author, and the other copy to the

13     addressee.  So there is no note to be delivered to this, that, and the

14     other person.

15             I've encountered many orders, particularly pertaining to the

16     Joint Command without an indication of the addressees.  Those documents

17     had to be delivered to all units that were issued tasks in such an order,

18     and they could be twenty.  But it's certain that such a document was

19     drafted in twenty copies and that each command had to receive copies; but

20     documents drafted to be delivered to somebody in person, it doesn't bear

21     at the end of document a note to be delivered to whom because it is

22     stated in -- on the first page.

23             Believe me, this is not the problem.  The problem is, and as I

24     testified in previous trial, is that it doesn't bear the reception stamp

25     of the General Staff.

Page 5804

 1        Q.   That as well may be, but as a soldier or a policeman, you had to

 2     verify to investigate a document, you see it was drafted but you have no

 3     indication of where it ended up in?

 4        A.   Well, these are general security measures; I was

 5     counter-intelligence.

 6        Q.   Okay.  If this is true as General Pavkovic wrote in this

 7     document, and it was said that he had direct contact with Milosevic,

 8     hadn't he reported on these to Milosevic personally?  Now he is writing

 9     to Ojdanic after all those meetings.

10        A.   Well, I would have to go through the --

11        Q.   No.  What I'm interested in is the Pavkovic-Milosevic direct

12     contact links.

13        A.   The gist of what he described in terms of problems was referred

14     to on the 16th of May to the Chief of General Staff and to

15     President Milosevic on the 17th of May.  But afterwards in this document

16     he drafts a report where he covers his back and he is trying to find

17     justification for some of the problems citing as reasons that MUP didn't

18     want to cooperate and that they were not resubordinated.  And now he is

19     shifting the blame to the Chief of the General Staff and demands from the

20     Chief of the General Staff to resolve those matters together with

21     President Milosevic.  This is one level.

22             So he drafted this document to justify his omissions in

23     April 1999.

24        Q.   Thank you, General.  I'd like to say another thing.  If he had

25     direct links and contacts with Milosevic, he could have briefed Milosevic

Page 5805

 1     orally about these problems.  He did not have to brief anybody else if

 2     Milosevic was deciding on everything; am I right?

 3        A.   I don't think he communicated with Mr. Milosevic in that way.

 4        Q.   Thank you, General.

 5             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May we now have the following

 6     document under 65 ter; it is 4017.

 7        Q.   And these now, General, are the minutes from the collegium of the

 8     Chief of the General Staff, the senior staff meeting.  So may we have

 9     your comments to this first document, please.  There are several that I'd

10     like us to look at, but this is the first collegium.

11             Would you explain to us something about this collegium of the

12     General Staff, when General Ojdanic was there; and do you recognise this

13     general form, the way it's set out, et cetera?

14        A.   I have read this document carefully, or rather, the minutes from

15     this particular collegium, both from the aspects of learning something

16     that I didn't know when I had retired, because this is strictly

17     confidential.  Everything discussed at this highest level is strictly

18     confidential, so I was curious to see what it said, to read the document.

19     And what I can tell you first of all is that minutes of this kind were

20     kept during the JNA, when I was in the JNA myself and when I took part in

21     the work of the collegium.

22             Then we can see that it is a tape recording, that it was the

23     transcription of a tape recording which means that the same practice was

24     applied that had existed in the JNA, that is to say that important

25     collegium meetings were recorded, that was compulsory, and that they were

Page 5806

 1     supposed later on.

 2             So from the aspects of how this was done, what it looks like, and

 3     how the discussion of the participants was done, I think that it is

 4     authentic and correct.

 5             Now, part of the collegium of the General Staff after the theft

 6     of the documents - and I'm sure you know about this - it was processed

 7     by -- well, Vlajkovic was involved because he disclosed a military secret

 8     and he received part of the minutes from the collegium unlawfully.  And

 9     this was -- he was prosecuted later on.  He published it in a book, and

10     then he cave one example to General Perisic, and he in turn sent it on to

11     the US intelligence service.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Now, what about Milos Ladicorbic, captain of this

13     ship, what was his specialty?

14        A.   Well, when he was in the security section of the navy -- well, he

15     was in the security section of the navy and then moved to the

16     intelligence department.

17        Q.   He says here -- do you know about this actually?  That's what I'm

18     asking you.  I know you were already a pensioner, but you might have had

19     some contact with him.  Anyway, the situation with the respect to the

20     NATO forces?

21             MR. STAMP:  Sorry, I'm not objecting, I think maybe something was

22     lost in the translation.  It seems as if Milos was mentioned earlier and,

23     well, that was lost in the translation because I think counsel's

24     reference to Milos is said in such a context that it suggests to me that

25     there was a mention of the Milos earlier in the evidence or by counsel

Page 5807

 1     and we missed it.  So it's just difficult to follow.  I'm sorry to

 2     interrupt.

 3             JUDGE PARKER:  The cause of the problem, Mr. Djurdjic, is that

 4     you can't wait for the witness's answer to finish to come in with your

 5     next question and the interpreters are still some way behind.  So they

 6     miss things.  Perhaps you better clarify this a little.

 7             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Yes, bravo, colleague Stamp;

 8     you're quite right.  You're right, Your Honours, I will do that.  Let me

 9     ask the question again.

10        Q.   What I asked you was this:  Can you tell us, this man, captain of

11     the -- Milos Ladicorbic, what was his specialty, what did he deal with?

12        A.   I said that previously he was in the security organs, that I knew

13     him personally, and afterwards he moved to the military intelligence

14     service.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Now, General, at this time, at the end of 1998 and

16     beginning of 1999, did you have any information about the ground forces,

17     the land forces of NATO packed in Macedonia and Albania, what was

18     happening there?

19        A.   Well, I did know as much as any citizen knew from the media.  I

20     knew that there were those forces over there and that they were grouping

21     and concentrating forces and that there were NATO bases over there,

22     although they weren't constituted in that way and perhaps referred to in

23     that way, but those forces did exist over there.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Now tell me,

25     Lieutenant-General Aleksandar Dimitrijevic, were you on good terms with

Page 5808

 1     him?  Did you have any knowledge about him?  And we can move on if not.

 2        A.   Yes, I'm waiting for you to complete your question.  Yes, I was

 3     on good terms with him.

 4        Q.   Thank you.

 5             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Now, can we look at page 6 of the

 6     B/C/S, and that would be page 7 of the English, para 5.

 7        Q.   And that should be the address made by Mr. Dimitrijevic when he

 8     took the floor.  Did you discuss anything with respect to para 2 on the

 9     Serbian page about verifications that the KLM could know what the --

10             THE INTERPRETER:  KVM.  Interpreters correction.

11             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Were you included in any of that?

13        A.   I'm sorry, I was waiting for the document to come up on my

14     screen.  Yes, I've read it now.  Well, it's like this:  We didn't discuss

15     this topic.  We discussed other subjects.  However, as I knew

16     General Dimitrijevic and as I knew the circumstances and the situation, I

17     don't think there's anything to be challenged here with respect to what

18     he said.  And that he had good information, valid information, because he

19     had good information sources and he knew what was going on in the field.

20        Q.   Thank you.

21             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]  Now, may we have page number 8 in

22     the B/C/S.

23        Q.   And would you take a look at para 2 which begins on the following

24     page.  In English it is page 8, para 3, from the top.

25        A.   Once again let me repeat, I didn't discuss any of this with

Page 5809

 1     anyone.  However, I do know from the entire story and the general mood

 2     that prevailed that everything that is stated here was reflected the

 3     actual situation and the -- that the mission was objective.  So they had

 4     detailed information, detailed information about facilities with all the

 5     coordinates, that is to say, the OSCE.  Not only down there in Kosovo,

 6     but the intelligence organs had very precise information and detail.

 7             So they knew where the zero-point of an explosion was.  They knew

 8     this in Belgrade and so on.  And with the GPS they had all this

 9     information, all the coordinates; they had them in front of them on the

10     table, so they knew all the military facilities, the civilian facilities,

11     their importance, and all the rest of it.  So they were extremely well

12     informed about the targets that needed to be destroyed.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Now, let's move on to the time when you were

14     re-activated, so tell me what you know about that from your service once

15     you were re-activated?

16        A.   Well, may I make a joke.  Everything had already been destroyed

17     by that time, if I can say so, the General Staff buildings in Belgrade,

18     and the bridges, and all the rest of it.  So there were several cases

19     which were uncovered and documented and the perpetrators were arrested, I

20     don't want to mention their names now because some of them have some

21     official functions now.

22             But when I arrived, it was the stage at which all the information

23     had been collected about the effects of their actions.  So all the

24     facilities were filmed and recorded.  And where they weren't satisfied

25     with the results they had achieved, they would repeat their actions.  And

Page 5810

 1     this true of the General Staff building; there was one hit to begin with,

 2     and then afterwards, we uncovered several days later that is, a man who

 3     had filmed it all from the Beogradjanka high-rise building.  So he filmed

 4     the results of that first impact and then there was the second hit and

 5     the second impact.  So it was a stage in which in fact they were

 6     finishing off, if I can use the term, finishing off what they failed to

 7     achieve previously.  And as you know, I arrived on the 27th of April.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  I didn't just mean about the bombing.  What happened

 9     on the ground, what did NATO do there?  The representatives of the

10     various states and your intelligence information about them and

11     experience with them?

12        A.   Well, ever since I worked in the intelligence organs,

13     intelligence service for 30 years, we always knew what kind of

14     individuals were in charge of collecting all intelligence on a given

15     territory and setting the targets, indicating the targets.  And every

16     time they would engage in reconnaissance work, intelligence

17     reconnaissance of course once again, repeated action, they would activate

18     the situation, or rather, that means they would update the changes that

19     had taken place on the ground.  And that's where we engaged in specific

20     warfare where we would serve up erroneous information and things like

21     that.  But it was a continuous activity which is ongoing to the present

22     day, that is, the task of the intelligence services to gather information

23     about potential targets which might come in use at some time.

24        Q.   Thank you, General, I wasn't thinking of the bombing, I was

25     thinking of the situation on the ground in Kosovo.  Did they enter into

Page 5811

 1     the FRY, or where were they?  I'm asking you as of the 27th of April,

 2     that is to say, after you arrive.

 3        A.   I don't know that there were any foreigners of that nature, they

 4     engaged in reconnaissance work from the air and used the information they

 5     collected.  They had drones flying and so on.

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the speakers kindly refrain from

 8     overlapping.  Thank you.

 9             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] First of all, Your Honours, before

10     I forget, I'd like to tender this document.

11             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

12             MR. STAMP:  And there's also the regulation that was used

13     earlier, rules of service, I don't know whether --

14             JUDGE PARKER:  Is that part of an exhibit we've already received

15     or not, do you know?

16             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Just a moment.  Thank you,

17     Mr. Stamp.  First of all, the rules of service --

18             JUDGE PARKER:  While that's happening, we'll receive the minutes

19     of the collegium, which haven't been tendered.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, this document bearing

21     65 ter number 4017 will become Exhibit D166.

22             JUDGE PARKER:  Now, the rules of the VJ?

23             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] That was D003-2656, of the

24     Army of Yugoslavia.  Yes, indeed, of the Army of Yugoslavia.

25             JUDGE PARKER:  That means it's not an exhibit in our trial yet.

Page 5812

 1     We will receive that.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  That will become Exhibit D167, Your Honours.

 3             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 4        Q.   General, were you re-activated when the three members of the

 5     US Army were captured in -- was it on the territory of

 6     Kosovo and Metohija?  I believe so.

 7        A.   I know of that case, it was somewhere down from Macedonia, but it

 8     happened before my arrival.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  And were there any developments while you were in

10     service?

11        A.   No, I don't know about that.

12        Q.   Thank you.  And now, do you happen to remember that other

13     incident linked to a humanitarian worker who was from Price or

14     whatever -- Prite, Prite [phoen]?

15        A.   Yes, that he was engaged in intelligence gathering.  The two or

16     three cases he was one of them, and I think there was some links to the

17     Australian Embassy, unless I'm very much mistaken.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Now, I wanted to ask you, In your

19     counter-intelligence work, did you have any information about whether

20     there were members of NATO, any NATO people in the staffs and units of

21     the KLA?  Did you have any information to that effect?

22        A.   I don't remember.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Do you recall whether there were any Mujahadeen or

24     other foreigners in KLA units?

25        A.   Yes, there's a book I have read recently by an American lecturer

Page 5813

 1     at their naval academy John Simber [phoen], I think, and he discusses

 2     that in detail.  I also something about that from the time of my service.

 3        Q.   Can you tell us a thing or two about that?

 4        A.   If we are discussing this book which has recently been translated

 5     into Serbian --

 6        Q.   Well, let's just stay with the information that the services had.

 7     Let's keep away from books.

 8        A.   The book confirms some information.  In the period between the

 9     27th of April and until the end of the war, we didn't have much time to

10     deal with al-Qaeda.  But I do know that al-Qaeda had its presence in

11     Kosovo throughout that time and that it arrived there from Bosnia.  They

12     simply moved some al-Qaeda activists.  But I can't give you any precise

13     names though.  In any case, there were several cases detected confirming

14     al-Qaeda presence within the KLA.

15        Q.   I am a interested in whether you received such security related

16     information from your junior security organs?

17        A.   When I toured my security organs, no one briefed me on that

18     specifically, probably because it was no longer an issue.

19        Q.   Thank you.

20             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we please see

21     Defence Exhibit D003-3134.

22        Q.   General, this is also from a collegium of the General Staff.  Is

23     this the right format?

24        A.   The format is correct.  At least the cover page.

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 5814

 1             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I seek to tender

 2     this document.

 3             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  The document will become Exhibit D168,

 5     Your Honours.

 6             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could with have

 7     D003-2662 next.

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Based on what I can see, I can only

 9     repeat the previous comment.

10             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I seek to tender this

11     document.

12             JUDGE PARKER:  We have not yet seen this document.

13             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] 003-2662.  It should be the

14     minutes of the 17th of December.

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The 4th session.

16             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Yes.

17             JUDGE PARKER:  We are confused by the numbering here.  The

18     English number is quite different from the original.  Is it the correct

19     English translation?

20             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I can see that the

21     17th of December is also mentioned in the English, and it is certainly

22     there in the Serbian.  It is 1998, the ministers collegium,

23     Biljana Popovic was the typist.  I'm not sure what is the number you are

24     referring to.  Copy is number 1 in both versions.

25             JUDGE PARKER:  D003-2691.

Page 5815

 1             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I see that.

 2             JUDGE PARKER:  [Previous translation continues] ...looking at.

 3                           [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

 4             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] So my number is incorrect?

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  No, we are told that it is the correct document,

 6     the English translation has a quite different number and that was giving

 7     us concern.  So this will be received.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  It will become Exhibit D169, Your Honours.

 9             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could we have

10     D003-3134 next.  It should be dated the 14th of December.  Did we already

11     have that?  Oh, well, then all three ...

12             The first one was 10 December, then 14 December, and the

13     17th of December.  If this one was already admitted, D003-3134, then I

14     would ask for the assistance of the court clerk.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  [Previous translation continues]

16     [Overlapping speakers] ...

17             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Your Honours,

18     concerning these collegium meetings, this would be it.  I will raise an

19     issue later concerning the second session.

20             Next could we please have D003-3085.

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There's nothing to comment on.

22     Everything is in there.  This came from the intelligence administration.

23     It would be particularly interesting if they had captured any of these

24     persons, but as far as I know they never did.

25             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

Page 5816

 1        Q.   Well, it was your task to capture them?

 2        A.   No, they were writing about this and always on the basis of the

 3     information we had, and they don't specify which available information it

 4     was.  Usually one would have a coded source name and an assessment of

 5     accuracy, as well as the reliability of the source.  Each such document

 6     is filled out by an operative, but this is merely an information from the

 7     field.  I can neither deny or confirm it.

 8        Q.   I'm interested in the format, is this familiar to you?

 9        A.   I'm quite familiar with the way operatives reported.

10             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I would now seek to tender this

11     document.

12             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  The document will become Exhibit D170,

14     Your Honours.

15             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could we please have

16     D003-3087.

17        Q.   Witness, again, I'm only interested in the format.

18        A.   Yes, the format is the same, and it was signed for Branko Krga,

19     he was not person signing it, although that is not important.  They were

20     specific in one thing, they had this particular number of 1, 2, 3, 4; but

21     it was not part of the ledger such as would be customary for the security

22     administration.  They merely had reports number this and that.  They

23     would start with the first report that year and then end with the end of

24     the year and this would be their typical way of reporting.

25        Q.   Thank you.  I do see a ledger number on the top.

Page 5817

 1        A.   That's a different thing.  That is the intelligence department

 2     which received that information.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Explain me this please, these numbers are the numbers

 4     of reports forwarded to the Chief of Staff, this report number 37 for

 5     example.

 6        A.   Yes, that's the report number drafted by the intelligence

 7     administration based on the influx of information from the field.  We

 8     would put in the contents and then say what the report refers to.  It

 9     would describe the problem in short terms, and then it is registered in

10     the intelligence department of the General Staff under this number, 06,

11     and so on.

12        Q.   Thank you.

13             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document.

14             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D171, Your Honours.

16             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we please have D003-3089 next.

17        Q.   Again, only the format, Witness.

18        A.   Yes, it's the same.  I'm also trying to compare the number of the

19     report and connect that to the date, and indeed the previous number

20     preceded this one in terms of date.  There is also the stamp of the

21     archive there.

22             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document.

23             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D172, Your Honours.

25             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Next I'd like to have D003-3091,

Page 5818

 1     please.

 2        Q.   General, we come to the 3rd of April.  Is this still the same

 3     template?

 4        A.   I'm still waiting for it.  Yes.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell me what it says underneath the stamp or

 6     below it?

 7        A.   Distribution, commands of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Army and to the

 8     operational strategic formations.  I don't want to comment on the work of

 9     the military security service the --

10             THE INTERPRETER:  Intelligence service.  Interpreter's

11     correction.

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- they used different methods.  In

13     any case, they were forwarding information and with we were supposed to

14     verify it.

15             THE INTERPRETER:  The speakers are overlapping.

16             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Your Honours, I seek

17     to tender this document.

18             JUDGE PARKER:  The report of the 13th of April, 1999, will be

19     received.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  The report will become Exhibit D173,

21     Your Honours.

22             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Next let's have

23     D003-3093, please.

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is a full report as opposed to

25     the short telegraph reports that can be sent a few times a day that we

Page 5819

 1     just saw.  This report collates the information collected from different

 2     sources.  I only had time for a very brief cursory look.

 3             In any case, this is a report on the use of depleted uranium

 4     projectiles.  I do see, however, that the report refers to several

 5     sources, something concerning Germany, and then the international

 6     activity centre, and certain locations where we had operatives abroad.

 7     They forwarded this information to the intelligence administration which

 8     in turn drafted this report.

 9             Based on such a report, the General Staff can -- unless sending

10     it directly to the commanders of strategic formations -- can issue an

11     order from the General Staff or the Supreme Command staff towards

12     subordinate commands, letting them know about such occurrences.

13             I see there the stamp of the military archives, and I believe

14     this is a fully, accurate, and true report.  Authentic.

15             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Let me ask you this, as of the moment you were re-activated on

17     the 27th of April and until the end of the war, did you have any

18     information or knowledge on the use of such means at Pastrik and Kosare?

19        A.   Yes.  Since I was in the ABHO branch, the nuclear and chemical

20     warfare branch, I see that there is a mention of it there requiring that

21     a scouting patrol be sent out in the field, and we even after the war

22     found traces confirming that such ammunition was used and some

23     Italian KFOR members suffered certain symptoms as well.

24        Q.   Thank you.

25             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document,

Page 5820

 1     the report of the 14th of April, 1999.

 2             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D174, Your Honours.

 4             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Please, can we see D003-3096.

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Could we switch to the last page,

 6     I'm interested.

 7             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Please, shall we turn to the

 8     second page in the B/C/S, please.

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

10             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   General, this is dated 4th of May, 1999, at that time you were

12     active duty.  Let's go back to page 1, please.  Paragraph 2 is what I'm

13     interested in, and the whole of paragraph 3.

14        A.   The 4th of May, isn't it, I was in Montenegro on that day.  Well,

15     this is the type of report that intelligence administration sends summing

16     up the developments in a preceding period, organising them into

17     paragraphs, as you can see them.  These are sent to commanders of

18     operative strategic groups, commanders of 1st, 2nd, 3rd Army, navy,

19     air force, et cetera.

20             This is used to assess the situation and it to supplement some

21     orders in terms of what may happen.  I see that they make mention that

22     information received through agents, through operational means as they

23     put it, and the intelligence department had their agents.  We in the

24     security administration before and during that period, and after, we

25     would read or not read such reports.  We had a problem where we received

Page 5821

 1     a large quantity of information from the ground.  We would leaf through

 2     such reports, but it would not specifically concern us in terms of that

 3     we should act upon it.

 4             This as you can see is delivered to operative strategic group

 5     commanders.  You see that there were calculation -- or speculations about

 6     the aggressors' attack, the axis of attacks, et cetera.  Everything had

 7     been done in the military to resist that land invasion.  Particularly in

 8     the area of Kosovo, you know, the defence lines were firm and they never

 9     invaded Kosovo.  But this report highlights possible routes of axis from

10     Montenegro, Albania, Macedonia, so this information as far as I can say

11     it reliable.

12             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Let's tender this document,

13     please.  It was report number 73 from the 4th of May, 1999.

14             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D175, Your Honours.

16             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   I don't want to play general because we are going to see a

18     strategic document later on.  But let me ask you, you know that the KLA

19     performed on the 9th of April a land invasion from Albania between Morina

20     and Kosare, it lasted for almost 2 months?

21        A.   No, this is no doubt an operation by the KLA, they received

22     support and help and assistance in that area.  Let me remind you that on

23     the 1st of June when I attended a meeting of the Joint Command in

24     Pristina when General Pavkovic briefed us that forces are grouped in

25     Albania numbering 2.000, fighters along a 6 kilometre stretch of the

Page 5822

 1     frontline, which is a high concentration of troops, and being supported

 2     by air force, this was nothing new.

 3             Such groups equipped and armed were infiltrated from Albania

 4     throughout the time.  But there were several stages planed for the

 5     execution of that operation.  This is now a stage where, since they

 6     hadn't succeeded in destroying military facilities and military targets,

 7     then the intelligence notifies us that they are going to progress to

 8     another stage and that would be attacks against military target --

 9             THE INTERPRETER:  Civilian targets.  Interpreter's correction.

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- civilian facilities, bridges,

11     trains.  There was a train hit in the south of Serbia once.

12             I believe it reflected their anger and wrath since they had not

13     achieved their military targets, reckoning that the morale of the

14     military and the civilians would be destroyed, and what I -- what they

15     said was borne true later on in April and May.

16        Q.   At the beginning of June or the end of May, a second axis of

17     invasion through Pastrik was used?

18        A.   Well, attacks were constant and continuous.  I never grouped them

19     along axis.  Most probably you can find information about that in those

20     military documents.  Since this is my testimony, give me some liberty.

21     I've read these documents, they are many documents which can be used by

22     the Prosecution and the Defence, and it's just a matter of who is going

23     to use them best.

24             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I believe this is the

25     right time for a technical break, Your Honours.

Page 5823

 1             JUDGE PARKER:  We will have the first break and resume at 11.00.

 2                           [The witness stands down]

 3                           --- Recess taken at 10.28 a.m.

 4                           --- On resuming at 11.04 a.m.

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Djurdjic.

 6             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, before the witness

 7     comes, I would like to move about an issue to the benefit of the

 8     expediency of the trial.  It seems that both the Prosecution and the

 9     Defence have problems in terms of adducing military documents.  And I

10     thought, since I do have the intention of using them -- those documents,

11     but since they are of the same format and they are numerous, it would be

12     ridiculous for me for use 20 or 30 minutes of the collegium meetings and

13     orders - there's a large number of them used by the Prosecutor - it would

14     it be ridiculous for each of them to tender during court time.  And why

15     don't we admit them in batches if they are not contentious so that we

16     don't have to go through each and every one of them with the witness.

17     That would be my respectful submission.

18             JUDGE PARKER:  It sounds a sensible idea.  It is exactly the sort

19     of thing that ought to be decided by agreement between the counsel and

20     would save a lot of time, and we would encourage counsel to reach

21     agreement about those documents.  We will facilitate any such agreement.

22     Thank you Mr. Djurdjic.  Now, are you ready to continue?

23             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

24                           [The witness takes the stand]

25             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

Page 5824

 1        Q.   Witness, let's digress a bit to conclude an issue.

 2             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please see D104.

 3        Q.   Witness, you've seen this document, and you've seen the document

 4     following it.  You know the document 105 is a supplement to this order,

 5     so you are familiar with it.

 6             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please see the last page

 7     of this order signed by the Joint Command.  And in the same document --

 8     of the Pristina Corps, in the supplement to this decision, that

 9     supplement bears the signature of the commander of the Pristina Corps,

10     Major-General Vladimir Lazarevic.

11        Q.   Am I right saying based on the basis of those two documents it is

12     evident that decision-makings and maps, that everything was produced at

13     the level of the Pristina Corps.  With the difference being that

14     sometimes it was signed by the joint commander and sometimes when, in

15     haste, it would bear the signature of the commander of the

16     Pristina Corps?

17        A.   Well, I wouldn't comment on that.  All the document that is I've

18     seen and that bear the phrase "Joint Command," they do not bear the

19     signature of the commander of that command or any other commanders, but

20     just -- there is an indication of the Joint Command standing behind that.

21             And the ledger for such documents was kept at the

22     Pristina Corps Command, and those documents bear the same indication as

23     combat documents and orders of the Pristina Corps commander, that

24     indication being 455, dash, and then the number of the document in the

25     sequence of their production.  But when in haste, they would just put

Page 5825

 1     "Joint Command" in place of the signature.

 2             As I've already explained, what was labelled Joint Command were

 3     people occupying the most responsible positions and the highest

 4     positions.  They would hold a briefing on the most important developments

 5     of the day, and then agree on an order or a decision for the next day.

 6             In case where things were verified by the commander of the

 7     3rd Army, MUP generals, and Deputy Prime Minister Sainovic, when nothing

 8     is contended, then such documents would further be elaborated by the

 9     Pristina Corps.  But since the preliminary decision was taken on a

10     session of the Joint Command, then the signature would bear the phrase

11     the Joint Command.

12        Q.   Let's move on.  Have you noticed if there is any difference --

13     But firstly let's deal with this:  Ledger was kept in a chronological

14     order, the ledger of the Pristina Corps, do you agree with this?

15        A.   Yes.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Furthermore, have you noticed any difference up to

17     the moment of the decision on resubordination, how many decisions had

18     been signed by Joint Command, and what -- and the period after that

19     order?

20        A.   I haven't analysed that particularly.

21        Q.   Excellent.  You know grammar well, and when you read the

22     decisions and orders of the Joint Command, doesn't it seem to you that

23     one of the same organ is issuing orders to another subordinate organ to

24     cooperate and support another organ particularly for 1998?

25        A.   That's strange.  A document and an order of the Joint Command is

Page 5826

 1     produced in essence by the commander of the Pristina Corps, thereby

 2     issuing himself orders taken by that Joint Command.  It's most probably

 3     complicated to understand what was going on.

 4             As I've explained, on the basis of what I saw at that meeting on

 5     that day, what was discussed and deliberated on that meeting, they would

 6     go to have lunch or dinner, and the person staying behind to formulate

 7     that into an order or a decision is the Pristina Corps commander and his

 8     staff, and most probably somebody from MUP had to do the same for their

 9     purposes.

10             I can tell you almost each document may bear the indications of

11     either the Pristina Corps or the Joint Command; all of them are strictly

12     formulated from paragraph 1 to paragraph 13 or 14, drafted obviously by

13     military professionals and not civilians because there were civilians and

14     other personnel in the staff.

15        Q.   I'm not doubting or questioning the professional manner in which

16     those were drafted, but I'd like to ask you as a general and a security

17     officer, and I know that you know other regulations.  In normal times, in

18     peacetimes, without an order on resubordination, without any state of

19     emergency, is it possible for a military unit to issue decisions and

20     orders to gendarmerie or MUP units to follow that order?

21        A.   Yes, they can.  If that unit had been empowered and if that other

22     unit had been resubordinated to it.  So it can.

23        Q.   No, but there's no resubordination, no order on that situation

24     and the state is normal.  In such circumstances, can a military unit

25     issue an order to use a gendarmerie unit or a MUP unit, or conversely, if

Page 5827

 1     it's possible in peacetime without any state of emergency or state of

 2     war, a MUP unit command a military unit to do something?

 3        A.   No, they are of the same rank.

 4        Q.   Can they perform the same functions?

 5        A.   No, this is what they insisted on the 9th of July meeting that

 6     everybody should mind their own business.

 7             THE INTERPRETER:  May counsel slow down a bit because they are

 8     overlapping, please.  Could counsel kindly slow down.  Thank you.

 9             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Now, if both the army and the police are expected to act, then,

11     in the typo, the heading, it always says Joint Command without a

12     signature?

13        A.   I'm not sure I understand you.  I don't follow you.  What is it

14     that you are asking me?

15        Q.   This is what I want to ask you.  There's no extraordinary state,

16     there's no decision on resubordination.  It is obvious that these orders

17     in 1998 right up until the decision on resubordination in 1999 are

18     brought so that the police and army can work together.  Now, since

19     there's no such decision, then both the army and the police could

20     act - could they not? - because they have the army units and police units

21     under them and they are contained in this order, and it says

22     Joint Command because under the law they can't issue orders to each other

23     and deploy them.

24             JUDGE PARKER:  This is no question.

25             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I'm coming to my question?

Page 5828

 1        Q.   "Am I right in saying... "  -- that is what my question was going

 2     to be.  Am I right in assuming that?

 3        A.   I don't think you are right, no.  And here is why:  You are going

 4     to find documents of the Joint Command and after the war officially began

 5     and a state of war officially proclaimed, you'll once again have, well,

 6     not only in 1998, but also in 1999 there are orders of the Joint Command.

 7     And I noticed that there are the code signs and signals with respect to

 8     radio communication and so on, so you are not right in my opinion.  You

 9     can't interpret it that way.  That is my opinion on the basis of all the

10     documents that I've looked through that just because of a fact that an

11     emergency state had not been proclaimed whereas objectively on the ground

12     two are parallel armed forces were being -- were going into action, the

13     army and the MUP, that something should have existed as a Joint Command

14     to issue orders to both these entities.

15             So what is called Joint Command, this Joint Command still didn't

16     have its staff, and that's where it differs to, for example, 1972 when

17     the group was infiltrated in Radosa, a sort of Joint Command was

18     established made up of the MUP, and the army, and the Territorial

19     Defence, and police, and politicians, and state officials, and so on and

20     so forth.  But somebody has to stand at the head, controlling the overall

21     activities.

22             And here, I would say that this was more -- well I saw it more as

23     a staff which is there to coordinate something.  They had very little to

24     do in the military sense by way of issuing orders and compiling

25     documents; but the most responsible persons would sit down together,

Page 5829

 1     decide what they were going to do in the coming period, or what was to be

 2     done in the coming period, and then General Lazerovic who attended the

 3     meeting was given the assignment of putting that into practice.  And now

 4     he's writing, and it says the Joint Command, and he is in this

 5     paradoxical situation in which he himself, in para 5, issues an

 6     assignment to himself, an assignment to the Pristina Corps.  Or rather in

 7     para 4, he makes a decision as commander of the Pristina Corps, which in

 8     fact should be a decision made by the Joint Command and taken by the

 9     Joint Command.

10             So what I'm saying is this:  And I stand by what I say, 1998 was

11     not only a year in which documents appear with Joint Command on them.  We

12     had them in 1999 and even at the time when resubordination took place

13     under the law and so on and so forth.  But in Kosovo in 1998 as

14     well - and you quoted yourself that article, I think it was 173 from the

15     rules of service of the Army of Yugoslavia - once the army is being

16     deployed and always when the army is being deployed in a particular zone

17     or area, everything taking place and acting in that zone objectively is

18     under the de facto command of the army.  So you can't have two commanders

19     in one zone.

20             And the rules of service of the Army of Yugoslavia stipulate that

21     the military commander is in fact the commander in a situation of that

22     kind.  So even when there is no state of emergency, although these are

23     two parallel organs, there is synchronization where in fact one of them

24     has to command -- is in command of all of them.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Now, the first point that I'd like you to tell me is

Page 5830

 1     that after the 18th of April, the major part of the orders come from the

 2     Pristina Corps, and they are far less titled Joint Command.  But let's

 3     leave that alone for the time being, it's not a question for you.  Let's

 4     move on to another area.  To something else.  But let me say that I'm

 5     quite sure that not a single military unit can act pursuant to an order

 6     from the SUP of Pristina; would that be right?

 7        A.   Well, no it can't; that's right.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  I'd now like to move on to another area, General.

 9     Since you became re-activated and informed of the situation and

10     acquainted it, did you ever hear about a plan for ethnic cleansing of

11     Kosovo?

12        A.   No.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Now, on the assumption that such a plan existed at a

14     state level, would at that time the Supreme Command staff had have to

15     have been informed of a plan of that kind had it existed?

16        A.   Well, it's like this:  It's all speculation now and assumption.

17     Firstly, let me say that I don't think the best term is "plan for ethnic

18     cleansing."  I don't think that's a proper phrase.  It would be a more

19     correct to say a decision to implement ethnic cleansing.

20             Now, faced with that kind of situation, you wouldn't have to

21     write any document and then devise a plan and say in the first ten days,

22     Let's deal with these three villages, for example.

23             What we are talking about here is whether a decision was ever

24     made and whether this process evolved on the ground according to

25     somebody's decision up there or whether it was spontaneous and whether

Page 5831

 1     that was reacted to or not.  So those are all the theories and

 2     speculations.

 3             But let's stay with your question.  First of all, had that come

 4     to the General Staff, I'm sure that the Chief of the General Staff,

 5     because I knew him personally as a human being, he would have reacted to

 6     it, and he would ask to have been received by the supreme commander to

 7     clear this up and say that the army is not there to do things like that.

 8     So no such plan existed.  No such order existed in the General Staff, at

 9     least I don't know about it.  But when I was in the field for those seven

10     day, when I was in Kosovo, then I had -- they were -- people reported to

11     me and briefed me about certain activities that were taking place down

12     there, people being expelled from their homes, but that transports were

13     being organised or people loaded up or the times of departure and so on

14     set.  I really don't know about any of that.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Now, we've come to the area of your practical work.

16     Down the security chain of command, did you have intelligence and

17     information telling you that organised or any other kind of expulsion of

18     the Albanian population was being conducted by the FRY?

19        A.   Well, I have no knowledge about that, that this was done by the

20     authorities and the knowledge of the authorities of the

21     Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  However, I've always -- I've already

22     given you examples of people being expelled.  And one such example was in

23     Kosovska Mitrovica.  That's one case.  But I know of another case too

24     where a column of some kind, a column of refugees moving from Kosovo

25     towards Montenegro, that behind this group of -- this -- of the

Page 5832

 1     population, and I can't say whether there might have been any terrorists

 2     or armed persons in that column, anyway, they were being expelled up to

 3     Rozaj to Montenegro.  It wasn't a document in the Slobodan Milosevic

 4     trial; it wasn't exhibited because it wasn't in the indictment, the area

 5     of Montenegro.

 6             Now, the other case I know of was that the MUP asked why the

 7     organs of the army were turning back columns from the border, and there

 8     were reactions to that.  So that's another case in point.  So these --

 9     this one group was moving out, and I'm not saying whether the MUP was at

10     their rear; there were people who fled from Kosovo -- most of the people

11     were fleeing from Kosovo just as they fled from Belgrade during the

12     bombing for instance.  However, the question is why the army was stopping

13     them at the border and sending them back, and I can only conclude that it

14     was welcome that they were leaving.

15             Now, the next part, why at the border, were these people who were

16     going out -- complete -- entire families, I'm not saying whether there

17     were terrorists among them who had changed their clothing, anyway, all

18     these people were leaving, they were going out, taking all their personal

19     documents, their IDs, and everything that later on could prove that they

20     were who they were if they wanted to return.

21             So those are three parameters that I as a human being would like

22     to present to you regardless of how anybody is going to interpret it.  So

23     I draw the conclusion from that that there were phenomena of that kind.

24     But as to any decision that that should be done, I do not know of any

25     such decision especially not with the army.

Page 5833

 1        Q.   And do you know that there was a decision made that this should

 2     be tolerated?

 3        A.   No, there was no discussion or decision at all.  Nothing at all.

 4     There wasn't any meeting that I attended when this question of the

 5     people's departure was raised and discussed or the fleeing of Albanians

 6     to -- from Kosovo to Montenegro, Albania wherever; and then we put this

 7     on the agenda to say whether we're going to stop this or not.  No, it was

 8     just what happened on the ground down there, and there was no reaction in

 9     any organised form.

10             THE INTERPRETER:  Could counsel please slow down and refrain from

11     overlapping.

12             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Did you inform anybody about that?

14        A.   Yes.

15        Q.   Where and when and whom?

16        A.   On the 8th of May when -- or rather, 8th of June when I returned

17     from touring Kosovo, we wrote a piece of information about all the crimes

18     and all everything that was going on, this was handed over to the chief

19     of the administration Geza Farkas, and then he handed that document over

20     to the Chief of the General Staff, and he handed it over in turn to

21     Slobodan Milosevic.

22        Q.   Thank you.

23             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Djurdjic, you'll have to pause.  You come

24     straight in at the end of a long answer and it gives the interpreters no

25     chance to catch up.

Page 5834

 1             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I -- well, I seem to be doing all

 2     sorts of things here.

 3        Q.   Did you complete your answer?  You gave the document to

 4     Geza Farkas, and he handed it over to the chief the General Staff, and

 5     then it went up to Slobodan Milosevic; was that the end of your answer?

 6     Had you completed your answer?

 7        A.   Yes.

 8        Q.   You have nothing further to add?

 9        A.   Well, after that, I left.  I went to Nis to organise security

10     measures for pulling the army out of Kosovo.

11        Q.   All right.  Fine.  I just wanted to make sure that I hadn't cut

12     you off in your answer.

13             I just wanted to ask you now that you mentioned you're going down

14     there and receiving information, the information that you received, you

15     received it from the security office on the ground.  Now, do you know

16     later on whether that information was checked out and verified, the

17     information that was given to you?

18        A.   As the chief of security attending those meetings, of the

19     3rd Army that is, Colonel Antic from Nis, when we returned to Belgrade we

20     had a meeting in Nis on our way back, and I gave him the task of looking

21     at everything that we had observed down there, and all the notes I made

22     in my working diary, that he should turn this into an official document,

23     file an official document on the basis of that.  And as far as I know,

24     that's what he did.

25             Now, with respect to verifying the information and data.  Perhaps

Page 5835

 1     the most characteristic piece of information is the one in

 2     Kosovska Mitrovica.  I didn't issue the task of that being checked out

 3     because ultimately it wasn't a problem that was linked to the army.  It

 4     was the problem that we came across as it stood as a byproduct, if I can

 5     use that phrase, of the work of an intelligence officer in Prizren.  So I

 6     didn't order that information of that kind be checked out.  Thank you.

 7             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have D003-2985.

 8        Q.   Just one more thing before I move on to this document.

 9             General, when one loses an ID or a passport, what do you do?

10        A.   I report that to the organs of the MUP to be issued with a new

11     one.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Am I correct that registers are kept in terms of all

13     citizens of the Republic of Serbia?

14        A.   I suppose so.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know whether all registers, birth registers,

16     death registers, and registers of citizenship were preserved and still

17     exist in the Republic of Serbia?

18        A.   I know that they were moved.  I have some family members born in

19     Gnjilane and they are now being issued with new passports.  They need to

20     get their original documentation in Vranje because that's where their

21     registration was moved to.

22        Q.   Did you know that most of the Albanians, after the 26th of June,

23     came to Serbia to be issued with ID cards and passports before the KFOR

24     documents were introduced?

25        A.   I don't know about that.

Page 5836

 1        Q.   Thank you.  By virtue of losing a document, can one lose one's

 2     identity?

 3        A.   Well, it shouldn't be so.

 4        Q.   Thank you.

 5             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] We are still waiting for

 6     D003-2985.

 7        Q.   General, we will move to directives.  If I understood properly,

 8     these are strategic documents; we see one such document dated the

 9     28th of July 1998.  It is a General Staff of the Yugoslav Army directive.

10     Can you please comment briefly on this directive.

11        A.   Based on what I can see on the screen, which is the first page,

12     which is in full accordance with standard templates with standard

13     procedure, to tell you anything more, I would have to read the whole

14     document.

15        Q.   Have you not had opportunity to see this document during your

16     proofing?

17        A.   No.

18        Q.   Let's look at the Roman numeral I, we see information about the

19     enemy there.

20             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] And then if we go to the next

21     page, please.

22        A.   Could we please zoom in?

23             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we go to page 5, please.

24        Q.   As you can see, the last page contains some information about an

25     attachment on the strength of combat groups.  Am I right that the

Page 5837

 1     directive was signed by the Chief of the General Staff,

 2     Colonel-General Momcilo Perisic?

 3        A.   Yes.

 4        Q.   At the end of the directive, we see in how many copies it was

 5     printed, and who it was distributed to; is that correct?

 6        A.   Yes.

 7        Q.   I don't want to go into any deeper discussions about this

 8     directive, but let me ask you this:  Did you know at the time that

 9     according to the military information, KLA held over 30 per cent of the

10     territory?

11        A.   Yes, I knew that.

12        Q.   Did you know that at that time or at the period preceding that

13     the road Pristina-Pec was blocked, as well as the road Pristina-Prizren?

14        A.   I don't know the specific roads, but I do know, since there was

15     some journalists in Kosovo who were taken prisoner by certain KLA members

16     at check-points, that there were roadblocks along different routes.  And

17     if one would get off a highway after two 2 or 3 hundred metres, one would

18     encounter a barricade directing you in one particular direction.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Do you recall that people went from Pristina to Pec

20     via Rozaj and Kula?

21        A.   I'm not familiar with such details.

22        Q.   Thank you.

23             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document,

24     please.

25             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

Page 5838

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D176, Your Honours.

 2             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we next have D003-2591 next.

 3        Q.   While waiting for it, can you tell me whether you remember the

 4     date of the previous directive?

 5        A.   The one we just saw?  I think it was the 20th of July, 1998.

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, a correction for the

 8     transcript.  It should be --

 9        Q.   Well, witness, which day in July was it?

10        A.   I think the 28th.

11        Q.   Thank you.

12        A.   The 29th?

13        Q.   No, no, the previous one, the 28th.  This is a new document.

14     First of all, this is an order to break-up DTS forces and armed rebellion

15     forces in Kosova and Metohija sent by the 3rd Army commander on the 29th

16     of July, 1998?

17        A.   Yes.  When a directive is issued as a strategic document, then

18     operational strategic groups, that is to say, subordinate units of the

19     army, further develop their own orders based on that directive.  This is

20     standard procedure.

21        Q.   Let us go to chapter 4 in --

22             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction:  The fourth

23     paragraph.

24             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   -- in both versions.  Does this confirm what you told us

Page 5839

 1     yesterday?

 2        A.   Yes, it does.  I did mention the other element or a stage.

 3     Reference is made of members of the former provincial Kosovo MUP who

 4     joined the KLA thus creating a parallel set of institutions or government

 5     in 1990 and 1991.  They separated their part of the MUP, forming their

 6     own organs.  The same happened with education.  I spoke more about other

 7     organs and institutions yesterday rather than the MUP.  In any case, this

 8     is correct.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  What is mentioned here are former JNA members, then

10     we have former members of the provincial SUP, and then political

11     convicts, and people from earlier battle-fields in Bosnia and Croatia.

12        A.   Yes, this is what I referred to.  I stated the names of some

13     officers who were released from prisons by a general pardon that took

14     place, then I also mentioned the names of those officers who were

15     prosecuted in Zlatar, in the Zlatar Operation, and released subsequently.

16     As well as people who fought previously in Bosnia and Croatia.

17        Q.   Thank you.  In the last part of the sentence, we find among the

18     terrorists, there is a number of mercenaries, first and foremost from the

19     Islamic countries.  Can you comment that?

20        A.   Yes, I but I only have general knowledge of that such as the one

21     I shared with you concerning the persons who came from Bosnia or Croatia

22     or those who used to be members of the JNA.  I know them by their names.

23     However, this piece of information is something that I only have general

24     information about, and I have no reason to doubt it.

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 5840

 1             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we go to page 2,

 2     paragraph 1, of the English.

 3        Q.   And you, Witness, should look at the last paragraph in the

 4     Serbian version of this page concerning weapons.

 5             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I'll do my best.  I apologise.

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] So will I.

 7             I had no information about types of weapons, but while reading

 8     orders and reports we went through in the documents you showed me, these

 9     calibres are frequently referred to, and I mean hand-held rocket

10     launchers, mortars.  I came across many of those in the documents I

11     viewed.

12             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   The information you have concerning their weapons, does this

14     confirm what they had in 1999, or did they have any modern -- more modern

15     systems?

16        A.   It was within the remit of the intelligence administration.  It

17     was not of any particular interest to me and the people I worked for.  In

18     any case, they could have only received more modern weapons by that time.

19     This takes me back to General Lazarevic's intervention when he said that

20     some equipment was parachuted in the night.

21        Q.   Thank you, since we are short with time, tell us immediately then

22     what it is that is your direct knowledge, otherwise we'll just move on.

23             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Let's have page 2 in the B/C/S.

24        Q.   Look at paragraph 2, General, in the B/C/S.  It is the third

25     paragraph in the English.

Page 5841

 1        A.   Yes.

 2        Q.   Do you know anything about these forced mobilisations; do you

 3     have any information concerning that in the time you were re-activated?

 4        A.   Nothing beyond what I've already told you.

 5        Q.   Thank you.

 6             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Let us go to the last page of this

 7     document.  It is page 12 in the B/C/S.  In the English, page 14.  No,

 8     page 13.  Sorry, this is the last page.  I need the penultimate page.

 9     This is the addendum on the composition and strength of groups.

10        Q.   General, am I right in saying that the 3rd Army commander at the

11     time was Lieutenant-General Dusan Samardzic and that he issued this

12     order?

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   Thank you.  There were five copies of this document distributed

15     to the addressees mentioned here?

16        A.   Yes, these were his immediate subordinate units.

17        Q.   Therefore it was the command of the Pristina Corps, the Nis

18     Corps, command of the 203rd --

19        A.   Mixed artillery brigade.

20        Q.   What about number 4?

21        A.   Command of the logistics base, 202nd base.

22        Q.   What about number 5?

23        A.   The military district of Pristina.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Yesterday we didn't touch upon the topic of

25     organisation of the Federal Defence Ministry in the territory of the FRY.

Page 5842

 1     How did they function territorially speaking?  Were they completely

 2     independent, in an independent formation answerable only to the

 3     Secretariat for National Defence, or did they have any links to the army?

 4     I mean specifically the civil protection and civil defence.

 5        A.   They were fully under the minister of defence.

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document

 8     into evidence, please.

 9             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D177, Your Honours.

11             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please see D003-2645.

12        Q.   General, is this another 3rd Army commander's order with the

13     purpose of operationalising the directive that we saw?

14        A.   It says here pursuant to the order of the

15     Chief of the General Staff number, date, so and so dated the

16     24th of July.  And in the directive we had the 27th of July.  But this is

17     not contentious.  There must have been an order pursuant to which this

18     order, brief order follows -- sent through a dispatch means.

19        Q.   Thank you.

20             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document

21     into evidence, please.

22             JUDGE PARKER:  It too will be received.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  The document will become Exhibit D178,

24     Your Honours.

25             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could we please see

Page 5843

 1     exhibit -- or document -- 65 ter document 04053.

 2             THE INTERPRETER:  04035.  Interpreter's correction.

 3             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   But while we are waiting for the document to appear, General,

 5     please, can the military wait for the country to be attacked to start

 6     preparing for its defence, or would it, on the basis of the information

 7     available, prepare itself to be ready when the aggression starts?

 8        A.   Whatever the military does in peacetime is prepare for the

 9     possibility of an overall aggression against the country.

10        Q.   Thank you.  See we have the 16th of January 1999 directive of the

11     General Staff of the VJ.  Did you have occasion earlier to see this

12     document?

13        A.   No.  I've noticed it.

14        Q.   Thank you.

15             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] If we can see, please --

16     Mr. Stamp, are you trying to tell me something, or?  Okay then, let's

17     move on.

18        Q.   Would you agree that this directive was adopted at a time when

19     there was a threat of activating a NATO order on the aggression against

20     Yugoslavia?  I believe that that dated from October 1998.

21        A.   I do not have the date of this directive, but I see that it

22     contains elements of a war plane because now it has a code-name GROM-3 or

23     Thunder-3.  Grom, thunder.

24        Q.   I do believe that you can see now, Witness, the date of the

25     directive.  Can you see it?  I can.

Page 5844

 1        A.   I presume that's the 15th of January.

 2        Q.   16th of January?

 3        A.   Well, January 1999 anyway.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Judging from your experience, I would like to use

 5     that experience to take a look at an item in this directive.

 6             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] On page 3 of the B/C/S version,

 7     please.  At the end of Roman numeral II.  This is page 2, please turn to

 8     B/C/S page 3.

 9        Q.   Please take a look at the paragraph above the Roman numeral II,

10     the routes.

11        A.   You see, this is a classical directive as been prepared within

12     war plans.  On the basis of all the relevant information, an assessment

13     is made of the state of affairs on the goals and possible axis of

14     operations and the grouping and concentration of the forces.  See here

15     the axis of expected activities and then pursuant to this a unit will be

16     issued with orders to prepare themselves and be ready.

17        Q.   Thank you.  What I'd like to ask you, the expected NATO axis of

18     aggression, Kacanik Gorge, and the Vrbnik axis, do you know anything

19     about that?  Do you know anything about this being mentioned in any

20     plans?

21        A.   Well, in military geography, as taught in military schools, there

22     are estimated axes and routes for certain operational units for strategic

23     activities.  These are known.  There are no -- there is no third option.

24     They may launch parachuters, but lands forces cannot pass anywhere else.

25        Q.   From the moment when you were re-activated, although this was not

Page 5845

 1     your area of expertise, did KLA step up their activities along the axis

 2     which were expected routes of land aggression, the Kacanik Gorge and

 3     Morina and Vrnmica and Capusa [phoen] along the border?

 4        A.   Cafa Pruse and Cafa Sani [phoen], yes.  Well, the army was

 5     grouped along their axis, and the focus of the military's activities

 6     pursuant to this directive, and of course they moved along the axis where

 7     the army forces were concentrated.  It would not be worth while to act

 8     and operate on hill tops where there was nobody else.  They worked along

 9     the axis as advanced troops of a possible invasion or aggression.

10        Q.   Thank you very much.

11             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this into

12     evidence, please.

13             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  The document will become Exhibit D179,

15     Your Honours.

16             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please see document

17     D003-3127.  D003-3127.  Can we turn to page 2, please, of this document.

18     Please let's zoom in on the stamp and show it to the witness, please.

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I've seen this stamp.

20             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Is this announcement recorded at the staff of the

22     Supreme Command, the office of the Chief of General Staff,

23     General Staff of the Yugoslav Army?

24        A.   No, this was registered and recorded in the office of the

25     Chief of the General Staff; and this is the announcement drafted in the

Page 5846

 1     Serbian language.

 2        Q.   Thank you.

 3             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Do we have the English version as

 4     well?  I would like to tender it into evidence, please.

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  Is it the evidence to your knowledge, General,

 6     that this announcement was ever made?

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know that.  I see it for

 8     the first time here.  I notice that the date until which the KLA should

 9     abandon their arms has been introduced.  This looks as a draft of a text

10     which later on would be finalized.  And the other thing is that it's

11     drafted in Serbian, whereas most of the population there were Albanians

12     in Kosovo and this appeal had to be addressed to them.

13             This seems as a conceptual draft, but I'm not sure and I'm not

14     aware whether this was sent down to the ground.  I don't know what were

15     the channels of this announcement, maybe through the radio or over the

16     television, but also as leaflets.  But at the time leaflets could not be

17     dropped because our air force could not -- air force aircraft could not

18     fly over there.

19                           [Trial Chamber confers]

20             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D180, Your Honours.

22             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]  Although it's not in the proper

23     order, but given your answer can we see document D003-2553.

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

25             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

Page 5847

 1        Q.   This is another order by the Supreme Command staff and concerns

 2     military territorial detachments; is that right?

 3        A.   Yes.

 4        Q.   What I'm interested in is paragraph 5 or item 5, and please offer

 5     your comment on it.

 6        A.   I don't know what to comment, it's very clearly stated in the

 7     text.  I can read it out loud.  What is being done is that units should

 8     be strengthened by persons living in Kosovo of Albanian ethnicity.  This

 9     is dated 31st of March.  I'm not sure what the question of yours is.

10        Q.   Well, the question is the Supreme Command staff counted on

11     Albanian population to strengthen the ranks?

12             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Djurdjic, I think I see Mr. Stamp's problem.

13     It is our problem.  The document on the screen doesn't contain what you

14     are describing.

15             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I'm discussing

16     paragraph 5 or item 5, but it seems we have the wrong document in

17     English, and this is why you don't have that.  I'm very sorry, I did not

18     take heed.  The B/C/S version is the correct one, but the English version

19     is not.  And you can see the English document bears the date of the

20     2nd April, 1999, and the Serbian the 31st of March, 1999.

21                           [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

22             JUDGE PARKER:  At the moment we can have no ready solution

23     because this is the translation that is attached in e-court.  We would

24     have to hunt through to try and find the correct translation attached to

25     some other document.  So maybe the witness could read item 5.  It can

Page 5848

 1     then be -- appear in translated version in the transcript, and you can

 2     ask your question.

 3             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   General, please read out paragraph 5 into the microphone.

 5        A.   "The military territorial detachment will be brought up to

 6     strength by the command of the military district of Pristina by the

 7     non-allocated conscripts of Albanian, of Siptar, and other ethnic

 8     background who live in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija."

 9        Q.   Thank you.  General, my question is:  Am I right in saying that

10     the Supreme Command staff reckoned with the able-bodied reservists of

11     Albanian and other ethnic affiliation in the war activities that started

12     on the 23rd of March, 1999?

13        A.   I don't know about this order.  This is the first time I see it.

14     But what I'd like to say is that during my tour of security organs in

15     Kosovo, I received briefs from security organs who were Albanians

16     themselves who in the peacetime had been appointed -- selected and

17     appointed as security officers and who had graduated from the

18     Pancevo school.  So not all of them had been excluded.

19             However, something is strange here.  The command of the military

20     district in Pristina, as any other military district command, has a

21     certain number of military territorial detachments.  I have to ask this

22     question:  Why in March when the war had started would they issue an

23     order for them to be included into the ranks?  It would have been logical

24     that they be included in to military territorial detachments in 1998, way

25     before that.

Page 5849

 1             May I remind you that I know about the order whereby the command

 2     of the 3rd Army ordered for weapons to be distributed only to the Serbs

 3     within the ranks, so I cannot deny that there had been some obstruction

 4     dating from 1991, 1992, in terms of including Albanians into the ranks of

 5     conscripts and the others.  Because objectively there were security

 6     concerns with their presence in military units because they had started

 7     terrorist attacks, thefts of military equipment, and arms; so I believe

 8     that military territorial detachments were 99 per cent Serb.

 9             I do not know about this order.  I have no grounds to doubt its

10     credibility and authenticity.  It bears all the stamps, but it has had no

11     effect.  I know of detachments comprised of Albanians, Turks, and Romas,

12     I wouldn't know about any of that.  It would not be politically correct

13     to establish such a military unit.  All our units were always ethnically

14     heterogenous.  And I don't see any reasons why such an ethnically

15     exclusive detachment would be formed.

16        Q.   I apologise, but I'm not interpreting para 5 as detachments being

17     mono-ethnic, but that they be brought up to strength with the ones who

18     existed but who weren't organised in any units, not the formation of new

19     ones.

20        A.   It's like this:  It says to form a military territorial

21     detachment in the war, and three territorial companies.  So this means

22     the formation of a new detachment which has a territorial companies and

23     detachments and they have territorial platoons.  And this is a new

24     territorial detachment.  Before that, the territorial detachments were

25     already in existence in the Nis Corps, the Pristina Corps, and in every

Page 5850

 1     other military district as well; and it was composed of the military

 2     territorial detachments, not a territorial company.

 3             But military territorial company and military territorial

 4     platoons.  So I have the impression that this was written in haste to put

 5     right something that had not been previously done.

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I'd like to tender this document

 8     into evidence, or rather should it just be MFI'd before we have the

 9     English translation or is it sufficient to tender the document as it

10     stands with the interpretation received?

11             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be marked for identification with a view

12     to the correct translation being included at some time.

13             You found the correct number, I see, Mr. Djurdjic.

14             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Yes, indeed, Your Honour.

15     Everything is possible when we have Ms. O'Leary here.  I see it up on my

16     screen here, and I'm sure it will come up on e-court very soon.  Then I'd

17     like to tender it into evidence.

18             JUDGE PARKER:  Have you given the correct number to the court

19     officer?

20             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, it's still not in

21     e-court, but we do have the translation.  Well, we can leave it MFI'd

22     until it comes up in e-court.

23             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be marked for identification.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  The document will become Exhibit D181 marked for

25     identification, Your Honours.

Page 5851

 1             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Now, document under

 2     65 ter 01480 next, please.

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I've read it.

 4             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Is this something you are aware of?  It is preparatory order for

 6     a directive; right?

 7        A.   Yes.

 8        Q.   And the date is the 9th of April, 1999; right?

 9        A.   Yes.  Let me just comment.  When this is addressed personally to

10     the Chief of Staff, then you don't have delivered to such-and-such or

11     so-and-so that we were talking about earlier.

12        Q.   Very well.  But I don't see what this Roman I is up there.

13     What's the Roman I?  Can we see top of the document, please.

14        A.   That is the abbreviation for the first administration, if I'm

15     right.  First directory to administration.  Yes, that was the first one

16     in the JNA.  Perhaps I'm right, perhaps not, I don't really know.

17     Occupations administration.

18             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I'd like to tender

19     this document now.

20             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D182, Your Honours.

22             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Now, the next document

23     under 65 ter is 1481, please.

24        Q.   Am I right in saying, General, that this is a directive of the

25     Supreme Command staff of the 9th of April that was announced previously.

Page 5852

 1     And this is copy number 1, as we can see.

 2        A.   Yes.  It's interesting to note here, as far as I'm concerned,

 3     well, was this archived or not?  I don't see a stamp from the military

 4     archive.  And that's true of the previous documents as well.  As the

 5     Supreme Command staff.

 6        Q.   Yes.  DT number 22-1?

 7        A.   Well, yes, that's state secret.

 8        Q.   Now, what is this 1 -- copy 1?

 9        A.   This is the first copy of this document, and I suppose at the end

10     we'll see who it was sent to, delivered to, at the end of this directive;

11     and it was supposed to go to all operative and strategic groups, which

12     means that there's copy number 1, 2, 3, and so on.

13        Q.   So is the first document where we see in the heading the copy

14     number.  I'm asking you about the left-hand side, DT number 22-1.

15        A.   Ah, I see, that says state secret.  That's quite a different

16     protocol.  It's not a protocol of the Supreme Command staff.  It's a

17     separate protocol for documents relating to a war plan and state secrets.

18        Q.   I see.  Thank you for that explanation.

19             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May we have page 2 of this

20     document displayed, please, because I'm interested in looking at

21     para 2.2.

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

23             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   So, General, we are dealing with a time of war; am I right in

25     saying that what is expected is that from the territory of Macedonia, the

Page 5853

 1     aggressive forces have about 20.000 men, and from Albania 10.000 men; is

 2     that what this is?

 3        A.   Well, those are estimations.  Now, how -- what the situation was

 4     like in practice as far as I know, there were more of them in Macedonia,

 5     more troops than there were in Albania, more men.

 6        Q.   Now, if we look at Albania, what is the estimate there?  Did your

 7     information tell you about that?

 8        A.   That was under the intelligence administration, but unless I'm

 9     wrong, there were 15.000 men before that.  So it oscillated, it varied.

10     But this is a sort of schematic that we use in compiling these documents

11     for orientation purposes.  Whether these are the exact figures, we only

12     see later on during the action itself, so this is an estimation of those

13     forces.

14        Q.   Thank you.

15             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May we have page 12 called up,

16     please, of this document.  It's page 12 of the English as well, please.

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I can see that.

18             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   We have a stamp there of the Supreme Command staff and the

20     signature of the Chief of Staff?

21        A.   Yes.  Yes, there is a stamp and there's General Ojdanic's

22     signature there; and as I said, we see where the copies were sent to.

23     Copy number 1, copy number 2, so everything is in order.

24        Q.   Thank you.

25             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May I tender this document into

Page 5854

 1     evidence now, please.

 2             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D183, Your Honours.

 4             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] The next document under

 5     65 ter is 01483.

 6        Q.   General, we are now going to see a supplement to the previous

 7     directive on the 12th of April, 1999.  Am I right, is that what it is?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   Thank you.

10             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I'd like to tender

11     this document as well.

12             JUDGE PARKER:  It too will be received.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D184, Your Honours.

14             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I'm moving on to

15     another area now, and as we are coming up to the break, I would like to

16     suggest that we take our break now and then begin with a new topic after

17     the break.

18             JUDGE PARKER:  We will adjourn now to resume at 5 minutes

19     to 1.00.

20                           [The witness stands down]

21                           --- Recess taken at 12.25 p.m.

22                           --- On resuming at 12.57 p.m.

23                           [The witness takes the stand]

24             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes, Mr. Djurdjic.

25             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

Page 5855

 1        Q.   General, we managed to go through all these documents that I call

 2     combat documents, as a layperson.  You went through a number of

 3     directives and orders from the Pristina Corps, the 3rd Army, and the

 4     various brigades.  Did you see in any of those documents that it contains

 5     something that would be against Albanian civilian population or any other

 6     civilian population for that matter?

 7        A.   No.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  During your active service, did you hear or have

 9     information about the army participating in any actives directed against

10     civilian population?

11        A.   No.  Perhaps I can clarify further.  In a great many documents in

12     the item stipulating security measures and moral in the army, which would

13     be standard items within an order, there were strict orders to

14     subordinate units that entering premises is prohibited, that they should

15     bear in mind that they only engage terrorists and protect civilians.

16     Some documents also contain provisions on how and where people should be

17     assembled in order to protect them.

18             The treatment of any captured Siptar terrorist members is also

19     prescribed as well as points of assembly of such prisoners and the way

20     they should be handed over to the MUP.  I think one order, military order

21     of the Pristina Corps command, we also find that reference is made to a

22     refugee population from an Albanian village in which there probably had

23     been terrorist acts and they fled to the woods.  In that order, the

24     military unit is ordered to assist those civilians to return to their

25     settlement.

Page 5856

 1             I think I saw 2 or 3 MUP dispatches for Kosovo.  But as regards

 2     the military orders, some of them were linked to certain MUP dispatches

 3     on how and where to return that civilian population.  In all of those

 4     documents, emphasis was placed on civilians being excluded from any war

 5     activities, combat activities.

 6        Q.   As a very senior official, did you ever receive an order to the

 7     effect that you should either tolerate or implement -- that you should

 8     either tolerate or not institute procedure against people who

 9     participated in, say, arson and destruction of religious objects?

10        A.   No.  No one has a right to issue such an order.

11        Q.   Am I also right to say that you never issued such an order to any

12     of your subordinates?

13        A.   I never did.  First of all, I could not issue orders.  And I know

14     for certain that no trained officer would do that.  First of all, there

15     would be violating the law, and their subordinates were not expected to

16     implement such an order.  And they would have to notify their superiors

17     about the existence of such an order.  Otherwise they would be committing

18     a criminal offence.

19        Q.   Thank you.  The military police was also within your domain and

20     they have great powers in terms of prosecuting -- investigating military

21     personnel who committed crimes.  I wanted to ask you something in

22     relation to that.  Irrespective of the chain of command in terms of

23     orders, have you ever heard of procedures not being instituted against

24     perpetrators of crimes, and that such acts were being tolerated in any

25     way?

Page 5857

 1        A.   As I've already said, I know of only one case during the seven

 2     days of my stay in Kosovo when a crime was committed.  It was the crime

 3     of murder, and certain corpses were disposed of in Gornja Klina.  It was

 4     the only case that was not prosecuted.  When the military police were

 5     supposed to carry on -- carry out on-site investigation, by that time the

 6     terrorists had taken up the area of Gornja Klina; and therefore, there

 7     was no investigation undertaken.

 8             But the lieutenant-colonel in whose unit the three volunteers

 9     charged with that crime had them arrested and they were eventually

10     brought before the Nis military court.

11        Q.   Thank you for that answer.

12             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Let us move on to a document.

13     This one I believe already has its P number.  Well, let's see P679.

14        Q.   General, I wanted to show you a few documents that have to do

15     with volunteers and their treatment.  Therefore, I'd look to discuss

16     them.  As briefly as possible, can you tell us something about this

17     document?

18        A.   I saw this document during its preparation, and I also know how

19     it was implemented.  In all wars that took place in the

20     former Yugoslavia, I conclude based on that that there is a standard

21     procedure of how volunteers could be introduced into units, which

22     conditions need to be met, and how they should be treated once deployed.

23             I said that there were two assembly points for volunteers, one

24     was in Grocka and I believe since this is an introductory order -- sorry,

25     not Grocka, Bubanj Potak.  And the other one was near Nis; I can't recall

Page 5858

 1     the exact centre name.  In any case, given that NATO aviation targeted

 2     Bubanj Potak, the centre was moved to Grocka.  This document envisaged a

 3     certain procedure in terms of receiving and checking the background of

 4     any volunteers as well as their health status and cooperation with the

 5     MUP concerning any background information on those volunteers.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Let me ask you this.  Let's cite and example.  If I

 7     were a military reservist, I have been assigned to a certain unit but

 8     never received a call to report there, could I go to Nis and introduce

 9     myself as a volunteer, would I be accepted?

10        A.   You could go there, but you wouldn't be taken in.

11        Q.   Thank you.

12             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Let us see P680 next, please.

13        Q.   I think you saw this document as well.

14        A.   Yes.

15        Q.   General, am I right in saying that the staff of the supreme corps

16     command reacted immediately upon being notified of a problem?

17        A.   Yes.  There was one single problem with certain volunteers.  The

18     order envisaged that they cannot stay as a group representing a separate

19     unit.  What should have taken place instead was that they be deployed

20     among various units pertaining -- depending on their military

21     specialties.  They were supposed to fit in as reserve soldiers of the VJ.

22             However, in some cases such as the 37th Brigade in Glogovac, some

23     50 or 60 of them arrived, and the commander, instead of putting them into

24     various units, he left them as a separate unit, appointing a Stevan Jekic

25     for commander.  This was not supposed to happen, but in practice it did,

Page 5859

 1     and most problems came from such groups.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  But here we see that the Supreme Command staff acted

 3     as early as the 20th of April?

 4        A.   Yes, that was prior to my arrival, but that practice continued

 5     later on since we kept pointing out the problems.

 6        Q.   And senior bodies always insisted on preventing such occurrences

 7     in subordinate commands.  However, we all know what life may be like.

 8        A.   Yes.

 9             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have

10     65 ter document 4016.  I may have gone wrong in terms of chronology in my

11     binder.

12        Q.   General, the date is the 14th of April, whereas the one before

13     that was the 7th of April.  This was the next step taken by the Supreme

14     Command staff in terms of chronology?

15        A.   The previous document was the most complete one since it set out

16     the criteria.  This is a document of the staff, but some reception

17     centres did not function at all, say the one in Montenegro, since there

18     was general obstruction on the part of Montenegro in the war effort.

19     This is only to confirm that having learned from previous experience with

20     volunteers not being deployed properly, that the Supreme Command staff

21     tried to act appropriately in any following situations.

22        Q.   Thank you.

23             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document

24     into evidence.

25             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

Page 5860

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  The document will become Exhibit D185,

 2     Your Honours.

 3             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we have D003-3032.

 4        Q.   This document is not directly related to the previous one, but

 5     I'm interested in the issue of mobilisation, hence I find item 1

 6     interesting.  Could you please comment on it?

 7        A.   Could we please zoom in.  Yes.

 8        Q.   Could you please read out item 1 of this document since I believe

 9     it is very important.

10        A.   You want me to read it out?

11        Q.   No, just comment on it.

12        A.   I laughed a bit, and I'll explain why.  There's nothing strange

13     in having psychologists in war units per establishment and even in some

14     peacetime units.  What is suggested here is that at the level of brigade

15     command and higher up, such psychologists had to be employed because of

16     the various trauma encountered in such war situations.  The part that I

17     laughed at was this, it says "platoons for psychological and propaganda

18     activities," citing several strategic formations.

19             Perhaps I can go back to what I was asked once, something about

20     opera.  "Opera" was shorthand for a particular body which had to do with

21     psychological and propaganda warfare.  In any case, this may not be

22     directly related to this.

23        Q.   I believe it would be far more interesting to learn something

24     about the opera case, but I would still like to stay with these

25     documents.

Page 5861

 1             In any case, joking aside, this was a prevention measure so as to

 2     avoid any excesses due to the war trauma suffered.

 3        A.   This was not only a measure of prevention.  Such platoons were

 4     also charged with counterpropaganda, they were there to oppose the enemy

 5     propaganda having their own experts from various professions.

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we see, please, document

 8     003-2550 but before we work on it, I move to admit this previous document

 9     into evidence.

10             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D186, Your Honours.

12             MR. ZIVANOVIC:

13        Q.   General, this, I think, is a general document on reporting.

14     Could you be concise in commenting on it, I believe that you touched upon

15     it yesterday or the day before.

16             MR. STAMP:  Were we notified of this, Your Honour, or if you

17     could help me to find it, please.

18             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] My learned friend, yes for both.

19     But the wrong document was shown on the screen.  Maybe I misspoke.

20     D003-2550 is the one that I'm seeking.

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The first document was clear.  It

22     warns of the need of regular reporting and verification of the

23     information being reported.

24             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]  Thank you.  I'm not sure.  If

25     this document has not been tendered, I now move to tender it.

Page 5862

 1                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 2             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D187, Your Honours.

 4             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we see now,

 5     please, D003-2648.

 6        Q.   Witness, this is supposed to be a combat report by the

 7     Pristina Corps dated the 3rd of April, 1999.  It is recognisable as such

 8     to you by its format?

 9        A.   Yes.  This is supposed to be a daily report sent to the operation

10     centre; and if you noticed in the last item of the order, this was

11     item 11, it's always stated regular daily reports should be submitted by

12     this hour every day, and irregular reports or interview reports were

13     never ...

14        Q.   Thank you.  In peacetime, these would be daily reports and in

15     wartime these would be combat reports; is that correct?

16        A.   Yes.

17        Q.   Can you confirm?

18        A.   Yes, I've said yes.

19             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I move to tender this document

20     into evidence, please.

21             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D188, Your Honours.

23             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Another document of a similar

24     format, D003-2585.

25        Q.   General, is this the same format of such report, this time dated

Page 5863

 1     the 4th of April, 1999, sent by the Pristina Corps to the commander of

 2     the 3rd Army?

 3        A.   Yes, this went through teleprinter as well.  They have the same

 4     format.  First item about the enemy, the second is neighbouring units,

 5     the tasks of similar units, and this is a format prescribed for all

 6     command.

 7        Q.   Thank you.

 8             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Now I move to tender this document

 9     into evidence, please.

10             JUDGE PARKER:  It too will be received.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D189, Your Honours.

12             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Now, D003-2633 to be shown,

13     please.

14        Q.   And before we see it on the screen, General, this is going to be

15     a report one step higher from the commander of the 3rd Army to the

16     General Staff it is a combat report dated the 13th of April, 1999.  Am I

17     right in saying so?

18        A.   Yes.  Those reports coming from army commands, different from

19     corps level or brigade level, are far more fleshed out in terms of data

20     and information, which is only normal because they are compiled on the

21     basis of subordinate units, daily reports.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Am I right in saying that army command reports in

23     this case, 3rd Army's report, consolidate all the important developments

24     in the area of responsibility of the 3rd Army based on the subordinate

25     units reports delivered to the command of the 3rd Army during the day?

Page 5864

 1        A.   There may be slight differences.  You said with respect to all

 2     the information submitted to -- during the day.  It is not a mechanical

 3     copy paste.  Information must be triaged and consolidated, but in essence

 4     all important developments and events have to be reported on for the

 5     whole of the territory and for all units.

 6        Q.   Now.  Let me ask you, if something is not contained in a report

 7     of the commander of the 3rd Army concerning operational events or matters

 8     down there, does that mean that the Supreme Command staff will not be

 9     notified of such things?

10        A.   Yes, it does mean, but the Supreme Command staff has also other

11     mechanisms which they used.  And that would be to send professionals to

12     the ground and match the reported facts with --

13             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this into

14     evidence.

15             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction:  Yes, but this

16     previous witness's answer was that the Supreme Command staff had other

17     instruments meaning that they would send their own professionals on the

18     ground to match what was being reported with the state of affairs on the

19     ground as they find them.

20             JUDGE PARKER:  This will be received.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D190, Your Honours.

22             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I keep returning to the

23     25th of May have document by General Pavkovic.

24        Q.   There is an intervention that the transcript does not reflect.

25     Witness's answer to my question, Am I right in saying in respect of my

Page 5865

 1     previous question?

 2        A.   Yes, you are.

 3        Q.   The content of the complaints of General Pavkovic dated the

 4     25th of May, should they have been contained in the preceding periods,

 5     daily reports, that were submitted to the Supreme Command staff?

 6        A.   I'm going to be brief.  They should have been, but I will most

 7     probably be in a situation to try to explain that.

 8        Q.   Thank you.

 9             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we see document D003-3102

10     [Realtime transcript read in error "D003-3012"].

11        Q.   General, this is another daily report dated 29th of April, 1999,

12     sent by the commander of the 3rd Army.  Is this the prescribed format of

13     daily reporting?

14        A.   Yes.

15             MR. STAMP:  Are we notified of this, Your Honour?  A few

16     documents have been coming through which we just can't find in our

17     records.

18             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I apologise, it is

19     not [as interpreted] D003-3102.  It is reflected erroneous in the

20     transcript.  While the general is taking a look at it, Mr. Stamp, we

21     received it in our notification.

22        Q.   General, is this the same format but with a different date?

23        A.   I don't have anything on the screen.

24        Q.   Neither do I.

25        A.   Yes, this is the same format.

Page 5866

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I move to tender this document

 3     into evidence, please.

 4             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D191, Your Honours.

 6             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Now I would like to see D003-3004,

 7     if the usher can assist us, please.

 8        Q.   General, is the format of this document authentic?  Have you had

 9     an opportunity to see it in practice?

10        A.   No.  I haven't had an opportunity, but this is a land army sector

11     issuing an instruction regulating in greater detail certain matters.

12        Q.   Thank you.

13             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we move to page 4 of this

14     document, and there is a ledger number.  That page.  Can we see the stamp

15     bearing the ledger number.

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, let me first explain that the

17     POV number differs from the others.  In the others there was a strictly

18     confidential -- there is a ledger for strictly confidential and

19     confidential documents, and that is a protocol of the land forces sector.

20     I see that the military post is 1122.

21             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   I would start with page 4, but you see, General, we see the

23     Chief of the General Staff Dragoljub Ojdanic signing this instruction?

24        A.   That's in order.  He would verify and approve such an

25     instruction.  And you see a corner of the Military Post 1122-1 which

Page 5867

 1     would be the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia.  This is their

 2     stamp.

 3             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I move to enter this

 4     document into evidence, please.

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D192, Your Honours.

 7             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we see now

 8     65 ter document 1475.

 9        Q.   Hence we know what is written here, could we please hear your

10     comments on items 4 and 6 briefly.

11        A.   This regulated the procedure on capturing POWs in combat and how

12     they are to be treated.  In item 4, they are -- this deals with commander

13     saboteurs, paratroopers, Special Forces operating within Yugoslavia, and

14     it spells out that they should become prisoners of war when they are

15     surrender, if they are wearing uniforms.  This is in compliance with laws

16     in force.

17             And item 6 regulates the need to provide wounded and ill

18     prisoners with adequate assistance.  Now this has been highlighted and

19     spelled out.

20             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, I move to tender this

21     document into evidence, please.

22             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D193, Your Honours.

24             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] The next document under

25     65 ter is 1486, please.

Page 5868

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, now, it's interesting to see

 2     what he is warning them about.

 3             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   It is about this two week period and the Supreme Command staff to

 5     the subordinate units?

 6        A.   Well, I don't see anything lower down on the document where it

 7     says "I hereby caution ..."

 8             May we have the bottom of the document in B/C/S or the next page

 9     and in English, please.

10             He is actually reminding them of the order he issued earlier on

11     and says warning and says that it's urgent.

12        Q.   Thank you.

13             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I'd like to tender this document

14     into evidence now, please.

15             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D194.

17             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

18             JUDGE PARKER:  I'm told that it is a single-page document.  There

19     was a reference in the transcript to a second page, but I think it's a

20     lower part of the first page.

21             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Yes, that's right.  The end of the

22     first page; the bottom of the first page.  Quite right.  For the time

23     being, let it remain that way, Your Honour.

24             I should now like -- just a moment, please.  Let's move on and

25     we'll come back to that.  Now, under 65 ter document 1944 next, please.

Page 5869

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I can confirm from what it

 2     says here with respect to international law of war, when I was

 3     re-activated, I received all these booklets regulating these matters.

 4        Q.   Thank you.

 5             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] And I'd like to tender this

 6     document into evidence as well, please.

 7             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D195, Your Honours.

 9             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] The next document under

10     65 ter is 1902.

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.  The document is in order.

12     The same questions are highlighted and an assignment is given to the

13     security organs and command organs that they shall collect information

14     about these incidents and inform others about them.

15             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could this be tendered

16     into evidence as well, please.

17             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D196, Your Honours.

19             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] The next document is D003-2742, a

20     Defence document.

21        Q.   General, this date here, the 10th of May, and this is the

22     administration for morale?

23        A.   No.  It is for recruitment, mobilisation, and system related

24     affairs, but we have the legal department within that as well.

25        Q.   And in point 1 is insistence made upon the application of

Page 5870

 1     international war law once again?

 2        A.   Yes, indeed and commanders and komandirs are asked to take all

 3     necessary measures to prevent violation of those principles.

 4             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I'd like to tender

 5     that document.

 6             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  It will become Exhibit D197, Your Honours.

 8             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] The next document is a Defence

 9     document D003-3001.

10        Q.   General, here we have an order from the Pristina Corps command

11     dated the 16th of April, 1999, referring to security for the civilian

12     population; am I right?

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   Could you please give us the basic characteristics contained in

15     this order?

16        A.   Well, I have to read it first because I haven't seen it.  Yes,

17     this order is very precise.  It defines everything in very precise terms,

18     what should be done, the tasks.  It's a task to the army and the MUP

19     organs to work jointly and to inform the civilian population on time

20     about the efforts, or rather, attacks that are to follow, whether they be

21     NATO attacks or Siptar forces, and to give assistance for evacuation to

22     the most suitable areas.

23             And everything follows those general lines.  And I've always

24     mentioned that in one of the combat reports I notice that the population

25     had taken shelter and then after the action was over, the officers tried

Page 5871

 1     to return them.  Whereas there was a dispatch from MUP that the local

 2     population be returned to the villages.  I can't remember the number of

 3     document, but it's linked to this order.  And we can see on the basis of

 4     that that people did act upon the order.  Now whether anybody did, I

 5     can't say.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  I think I have time for one more question; it is

 7     this:  Did you ever hear that army force or police forces surrounded a

 8     village where there were no members of the KLA present in order to shell

 9     it or launch action against it?

10        A.   No, and judging by the documents that I've read, there were

11     always, among the casualties, terrorists casualties.

12             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, General.  Your Honours,

13     I think our time is up for today, and of course, I'd like to tender the

14     previous document into evidence before we close.  Thank you.

15             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  The document will become Exhibit D198,

17     Your Honours.

18             JUDGE PARKER:  Now, Mr. Djurdjic, what is your state of progress?

19             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I'm nearing the end.  I'm not at

20     the very end, but I'm sure that Mr. Stamp and I will get through this

21     witness tomorrow.  There's no doubt about that, Your Honours.  So rest

22     assured.  I have a few more documents to get through, but I think we've

23     been through a large number of documents.  I'll have another 10 to 15

24     minutes of documents, and then I'd like to sum up my cross.

25             JUDGE PARKER:  Well, I hope we do better than merely concluding

Page 5872

 1     the evidence of this witness tomorrow, but I hope you'll both bear in

 2     mind the witness has been sitting here pummeled with documents for some

 3     very considerable length of time now; it must be very demanding and

 4     tiring.

 5             We will adjourn now to resume tomorrow at -- Mr. Djurdjic.

 6             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Yes, I do apologise for

 7     interrupting, but the MFI D181 is now D003 -- that was a correction to

 8     the transcript -- 3200.  That's the correct number for the record.  And

 9     that's the English translation.  The correct English translation of the

10     document.

11             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.  We adjourn now to resume tomorrow at

12     9.00 in the morning.

13                           [The witness stands down]

14                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.47 p.m.

15                           to be reconvened on Thursday, the 11th day of June,

16                           2009, at 9.00 a.m.