Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 7196

 1                           Friday, 10 July 2009

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  Ms. Gopalan, good morning.

 6             MS. GOPALAN:  Good morning, Your Honours.  The next witness is

 7     Mr. Knut Vollebaek.

 8             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.

 9                           [The witness entered court]

10             JUDGE PARKER:  Good morning.

11             THE WITNESS:  Good morning, Your Honour.

12             JUDGE PARKER:  Would you please read aloud the affirmation that

13     is shown to you now.

14             THE WITNESS:  I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

15     whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

16                           WITNESS:  KNUT VOLLEBAEK

17             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you very much.

18             Please sit down.

19             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, Your Honour.

20             JUDGE PARKER:  Ms. Gopalan has some questions for you.

21                           Examination by Ms. Gopalan:

22        Q.   Good morning, Mr. Vollebaek.

23        A.   Good morning.

24        Q.   Sir, could you please state your full name for the record.

25        A.   My first name is Knut, K-n-u-t, and my last name is Vollebaek,

Page 7197

 1     V-o-l-l-e-b-a-e-k.

 2        Q.   Thank you, sir.  And what is your date of birth?

 3        A.   It's the 11th of February, 1946.

 4        Q.   Sir, what position do you currently hold?

 5        A.   I am the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities.

 6        Q.   And prior to holding this position --

 7        A.   My immediate prior position was Norway's ambassador to the

 8     United States of America.

 9        Q.   And could you briefly set out your previous roles prior to being

10     ambassador to the United States of America.

11        A.   When -- where do I start?

12        Q.   You can begin with your involvement in the foreign ministry 1973,

13     just briefly.

14        A.   Okay.  Yes.  I joined the Norwegian foreign service in 1973, I

15     have been posted to India, Spain, Zimbabwe, Costa Rica; and from 1989 to

16     1990 I was state secretary deputy foreign minister in Norway; and from

17     1997 to March 2000 I was foreign minister of Norway.

18        Q.   Thank you, sir.  Sir, did you testify in the trial of

19     Prosecutor versus Milutinovic in this Tribunal in January 2007?

20        A.   I did.

21        Q.   And have you had the opportunity to review your testimony in this

22     case recently?

23        A.   I have.

24        Q.   Sir --

25             THE INTERPRETER:  Kindly pause between questions and answers for

Page 7198

 1     the sake of the interpreters, thank you.

 2             MS. GOPALAN:

 3        Q.   [Previous translation continues]...

 4        A.   Could you please repeat because I was interrupted and told I that

 5     I should pause between the questions and answers so I didn't hear your

 6     question, if you could repeat.

 7        Q.   I most certainly will, sir.  And just as a reminder, as the

 8     interpreter has mentioned, since we are speaking in the same language we

 9     need to be mindful about pausing between question and answer.

10        A.   I shall pause.

11        Q.   I will repeat my question.

12             Having reviewed your testimony in the Milutinovic et al. case, if

13     you were asked the same questions again, would you provide substantially

14     the same answers?

15        A.   Yes, I would.  I hope I could have changed the English language

16     but otherwise the substance would be the same.

17        Q.   Thank you, sir.

18             MS. GOPALAN:  I now seek to tender the Milutinovic transcript

19     which is 65 ter 05200, Your Honours.

20             JUDGE PARKER:  That will be received.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be Exhibit P01071, Your Honours.

22             MS. GOPALAN:

23        Q.   Sir, did you also testify in the trial of

24     Prosecutor versus Milosevic in this Tribunal in July 2002?

25        A.   Yes, I did.

Page 7199

 1        Q.   And have you recently had the opportunity to review your

 2     testimony in that case?

 3        A.   I have looked at that also, yes.

 4        Q.   Thank you, sir.  And having reviewed your testimony in the

 5     Milosevic case, if you were asked the same questions again, would you

 6     provide substantially the same answers?

 7        A.   Yes, I would.  I understand there were some misunderstandings

 8     with respect to dates that were lately corrected, but otherwise I would.

 9        Q.   Thank you, sir.

10             MS. GOPALAN:  I now seek to tender the Milosevic testimony of

11     this witness, and that is 65 ter 02632.

12             JUDGE PARKER:  That too will be received.

13             MS. GOPALAN:  And --

14             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P01072.

15             MS. GOPALAN:

16        Q.   And finally, sir, did you provide a statement to the

17     Office of the Prosecutor in this Tribunal in January 2002?

18        A.   Yes, I did.

19        Q.   And having -- have you had the opportunity to review this

20     statement recently?

21        A.   I have, yes.

22        Q.   Thank you, sir.  And having reviewed the statement, are you

23     satisfied that its contents are true and accurate to the best of your

24     knowledge and belief?

25        A.   As far as I can recall, yes.

Page 7200

 1        Q.   Thank you, sir.

 2             MS. GOPALAN:  Your Honours, I seek to tender this witness's

 3     statement into evidence and that's 65 ter 02634.

 4             JUDGE PARKER:  That will be received.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P01073.

 6             MS. GOPALAN:  I will now read out a brief in-court summary of

 7     Mr. Vollebaek's evidence, Your Honours.

 8             The witness held a number of offices in the Norwegian

 9     Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1973 to 2000.  From the

10     1st of June, 1993, to the end of that year he was deputy co-chairman for

11     the International Conference of former Yugoslavia, which dealt with

12     Balkan issues.

13             In that year, in 1999, as the Norwegian foreign minister he also

14     served as the chairman in the office of the OSCE.  The witness will

15     describe the OSCE's mandate, origins, and membership.

16             In 1998, the OSCE received a special mandate to deal with Kosovo.

17     The witness will describe impressions of and discussions with

18     Slobodan Milosevic, Nikola Sainovic, Milan Milutinovic, and other

19     officials in relation to Kosovo.  The witness will describe his visits to

20     Kosovo that in March 1999 he observed a build-up of Serbian forces.  The

21     witness also observed a large number of people travelling on tractors.

22     The numbers were greater than he had seen on previous occasions, and he

23     observed that the situation in Kosovo had worsened.

24             The witness had discussions with Milosevic regarding this

25     build-up of forces and the displacement and burning that he witnessed.

Page 7201

 1     The witness met with Ibrahim Rugova several times and observed that

 2     Rugova showed a willingness to negotiate with Milosevic.  On several

 3     occasions, he liaised between Ibrahim Rugova and Slobodan Milosevic.  He

 4     also met with representatives from the KLA.  The witness will testify

 5     about his decision to withdraw the OSCE from Kosovo.

 6             That's the end of the in-court summary, Your Honours.

 7             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.

 8             MS. GOPALAN:

 9             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour, I don't know if this is my business,

10     but could I make one correction to the summary that I think the

11     representative of the Prosecutor as far as I can see says "in that year,"

12     that could lead to a misunderstanding that it refers back to 1993, and it

13     should of course be 1999.

14             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you very much.

15             MS. GOPALAN:

16        Q.   Thank you for that, sir.

17             Sir, as you know, your testimonies and your statement are before

18     the Trial Chamber, and therefore I only have some questions that relate

19     to clarifying and highlighting certain areas of your evidence.

20             Now, let's begin with the OSCE, the Organisation for Security and

21     Cooperation in Europe.  Sir, in your statement at paragraph 5, page 2,

22     you state that you were the chairman-in-office of the OSCE in 1999.

23             That's the same reference in the B/C/S.

24             Now, before we go into the details of your role as chairman,

25     could you provide some background on the OSCE.  What is the OSCE and what

Page 7202

 1     was its role?

 2        A.   The OSCE is a pan-European security organisation.  It was

 3     established on the basis of the Helsinki Declaration of 1975.  It started

 4     as a conference and the organisation itself was established in 1994.  The

 5     system, if I may say, is that there is a rotating chairmanship which is

 6     taken by foreign ministers of each or different participating states.

 7     And in 1999 I, as then-Norway's foreign minister, had the chairmanship of

 8     the organisation.

 9             At that time, if I recall correctly, it was 54 participating

10     states, as we call it, because the legal status of the organisation is a

11     little bit doubtful.  Today there are 56.  But I -- as far as I recall

12     there were 54 in 1999.

13        Q.   Thank you, sir.  Now, you mentioned that you were the chairman of

14     the OSCE in 1999.  Could you tell us what your responsibilities were as

15     chairman.

16        A.   The responsibility of the chairman is to -- I may say to run the

17     organisation.  There is a Secretary-General that has the administrative

18     responsibility; and the chairman-in-office, as it is called - or now the

19     chairperson in office since we have a female foreign minister as --

20     chairing it - is more a political role.  So it's taking on the

21     priorities, the activities, the direction of the organisation, and trying

22     then, since this is a security organisation, to address security issues

23     that come up within the participating states, conflict prevention,

24     conflict resolution.  And in that respect, Kosovo, in my time as

25     chairman-in-office, became of course a very important issue.

Page 7203

 1        Q.   Thank you, sir.  Now, you mention in your statement that the OSCE

 2     received a special mandate in 1998 concerning Kosovo, and this is in the

 3     English page 3, paragraph 4; and in the B/C/S, page 3, paragraph 2.  Now,

 4     could you explain to us, sir, what the OSCE's special mandate in relation

 5     to Kosovo entailed.

 6        A.   The mandate that was given to the OSCE by the Security Council, I

 7     think that relates to two Security Council Resolutions, if I remember

 8     correctly, 1166 and 1190, I think both are from October 1998, but be that

 9     as it may, there were two Security Council Resolutions that asked the

10     OSCE to monitor the situation, to keep the Security Council informed, and

11     then also try to address the conflict in order to find a solution to it.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Sir, you said that in respect to Kosovo in your time

13     as the chairman-in-office of the OSCE, Kosovo was an important issue.

14     Now, could you provide some background on why Kosovo was an important

15     issue at that time for the OSCE.

16        A.   Well, as this Court, Your Honours, is very well aware of, this is

17     a major European problem and a major European issue.  We were then at --

18     when I started as chairman-in-office, we were at the brink of a war

19     because it was obvious that the situation between the Kosovo Albanian

20     population of Kosovo, which was then a part of Yugoslavia, and the

21     leadership in Belgrade was -- well, yes, on the brink of war, so to say.

22     It was a conflict that was a very serious conflict.  And also we saw a

23     situation where one group of peoples, the then-Kosovo Albanians, were

24     harassed, intimidated, persecuted in a way that was contrary to any kind

25     of standards of human rights and particularly then, of course, contrary

Page 7204

 1     to the whole -- whole -- the principles of the OSCE.

 2             As you will recall Yugoslavia at that time, because of its

 3     policies were -- was already suspended from the organisation.  But I had

 4     made it clear also to Mr. Milosevic, whom I met already in 1998 in my

 5     capacity as foreign minister, that I aimed at bringing Yugoslavia back

 6     into the OSCE.  I thought that was very important for Europe and also for

 7     the situation in that region.  And so that's why I took this on as a

 8     major task, in order to see if we could bring Yugoslavia back, defuse the

 9     tension, and make sure that we didn't have a conflict that would have a

10     spill-over effect also for the whole region.

11        Q.   Thank you very much, sir.

12             MS. GOPALAN:  Now I would like to call up 65 ter 00455, please.

13        Q.   Sir, a document will appear shortly on the screen.  Sir, are you

14     able to recognise this document?

15        A.   Well, that's the Security Council Resolution as far as I can see.

16     I can't -- yes, I probably can read it if I can get closer.

17             MS. GOPALAN:  Would you be able to zoom in a little bit, please.

18     Thank you.

19        Q.   So is that more visible?

20        A.   That's right, yes, certainly.

21        Q.   Thank you, sir.  Now, this says:

22             "Security Council Resolution 1160, 31st of March, 1998.

23             Now, the second paragraph beginning:

24             "Welcoming the decision of the Special Session of the

25     Permanent Council of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in

Page 7205

 1     Europe of 11 March 1998 ..."

 2             Could you comment on that paragraph, please.

 3        A.   If you want me to comment on the decision of the Special Session

 4     of the Permanent Council, I don't think I will be able to do that, no.

 5        Q.   Are you able to provide any background to the reference here

 6     without referring to the decision per se?

 7        A.   No, I don't think so.  I guess this must have been a discussion

 8     on the situation in Kosovo, but -- because this was before my time as

 9     chairman-in-office, we had a Polish foreign minister as chairman, I was

10     part of the Troika, I should probably have known, and if I had been able

11     to go through my papers I would probably know; but if you look at the

12     third paragraph, of course, it refers to the situation in Kosovo, and I

13     suppose also then that a Special Session was dealing with the situation

14     in Kosovo.  But I cannot go into detail about what it was all about.

15        Q.   Thank you, sir.

16             MS. GOPALAN:  If we could move on then to paragraph 7 of this

17     same document.  I believe it's in the next page, and if we could zoom in

18     on paragraph 7.  Could we zoom in on paragraph 7, please.

19        Q.   Are you able to see that paragraph, sir?

20        A.   Yes, I am.

21        Q.   Would you be able to comment on this paragraph?

22        A.   Well, as I -- I've already stated, I mean, we have the major

23     efforts to find a peaceful resolution to the crisis in Kosovo, and this

24     then gives us the support of the -- of the Security Council of the

25     United Nations, which we, of course, needed.  As you may know, the OSCE

Page 7206

 1     doesn't have a mandate as such like the United Nations through its

 2     Security Council to take on - what should I say? - conflict resolution.

 3     And so we needed a mandate from the United Nations in order to do the

 4     activities that we wanted to do in order to find a resolution to the

 5     conflict.

 6        Q.   Thank you very much, sir.

 7             MS. GOPALAN:  Your Honours, I seek to tender this document into

 8     evidence, please.

 9             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be an exhibit.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours that will be Exhibit P01074.

11             MS. GOPALAN:  Could I now call up D160, please.

12        Q.   Sir, do you recognise the document on the screen before you?

13        A.   That's another Security Council Resolution.  None of them are

14     from October, I understand, as I said, one from March and the other from

15     September.  But this is 1199, the other one that gave the OSCE the

16     mandate to address the situation in Kosovo.

17        Q.   Thank you.

18             MS. GOPALAN:  If and we could just move on to paragraph 4 of this

19     resolution.

20        Q.   Sir, paragraph 4 which is at the top of the page refers to the

21     earlier resolution that we just saw.  Would you please comment on this

22     paragraph.

23        A.   Well, it -- well, as you see, it says:

24             "Demands further that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in

25     addition to the measures called on under the previous resolution, then

Page 7207

 1     implement immediately the following ..."

 2             And then you have some concrete measures that should be taken:

 3             "Cease all action by security forces ...

 4             "Enable an effective continuous international monitoring...

 5             "Facilitate, an agreement with the others the safe return of the

 6     refugees ..."

 7             Which was another important issue.

 8             "Make rapid progress on the dialogue between the Albanian

 9     community and the authorities in Belgrade ..."

10             So these were the four main activities that I did address as

11     chairman-in-office at that time.

12        Q.   Thank you very much, sir.

13             Sir, we've already heard some testimony before this Trial Chamber

14     on the role and function of the Kosovo Verification Mission.  Could you

15     tell us, what is the relationship between the OSCE and the

16     Kosovo Verification Mission?

17        A.   As you will see in this paragraph (b) -- 4(b), it says that we

18     should have an international monitoring or continue the effective

19     international monitoring in Kosovo, and this was done then at the first

20     place through a group called K-D-O-M, KDOM, as far as I recall.  And then

21     in -- well, I guess it must have been in October then, 1998, there was an

22     agreement signed between Milosevic and Richard Holbrooke, to which -- and

23     then later on between Foreign Minister Geremek and President Milosevic,

24     to which President Milosevic then accepted the establishment of what we

25     called the Kosovo Verification Mission.  And the -- so the

Page 7208

 1     Kosovo Verification Mission then was established as an agreement between

 2     the OSCE and the Yugoslav president in order then to continue

 3     verification in Kosovo and strengthen it -- was the aim -- was to

 4     strengthen the monitoring.

 5        Q.   Thank you, sir.  And what was your role in relation to the

 6     deployment of the Kosovo Verification Mission to Kosovo?

 7        A.   Well, the deployment started already before I took over as

 8     chairman-in-office on the 1st of January, 1999.  I think at least some of

 9     the members were in place before Christmas of 1998.  It was in full

10     force, I think, in February 1999, when I -- during my chairmanship.

11     We -- Norway had a lead role in the -- as a lead nation in the

12     implementation of this agreement, and I was, as far as I could recall,

13     not directly involved in the negotiations but my staff was heavily

14     involved.  So Norway was very actively involved in the negotiations for

15     the agreement and the implementation of it also before I took over as

16     chairman-in-office.

17        Q.   Thank you, sir.

18             MS. GOPALAN:  Could we now call up P835, please.

19             JUDGE PARKER:  The last document, it's already an exhibit?

20             MS. GOPALAN:  Yes, that's right.

21             JUDGE PARKER:  The number is?

22             MS. GOPALAN:  D160.

23             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.

24             MS. GOPALAN:

25        Q.   Sir, do you recognise this document on the screen?

Page 7209

 1        A.   Well, I know that there is an -- that there was an agreement.

 2     I -- if you hadn't shown it to me, I wouldn't necessarily have recognised

 3     it.  But, yes, there was such an agreement, yes.

 4             MS. GOPALAN:  Perhaps we could go to the last page of this

 5     document - and this may assist with your recollection.  The second-last

 6     page.  My apologies.

 7        Q.   Sir, at the bottom left-hand corner --

 8        A.   Mm-hmm.

 9        Q.   -- the name chairman-in-office --

10        A.   Office --

11        Q.   Yes, "Geremek" appears above chairman-in-office,

12     Mr. Bronislaw Geremek?

13        A.   Mm-hmm.

14        Q.   Who was Bronislaw Geremek?

15        A.   Bronislaw Geremek was a foreign minister in Poland and he was my

16     predecessor as chairman-in-office of the OSCE.  He was chairman-in-office

17     for the period 1998.

18        Q.   Thank you.

19             MS. GOPALAN:  Could we move on to the first page again, please.

20        Q.   Sir, the paragraph beginning:

21             "The OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission ..."

22             This is below Roman numeral I which is headed "Establishment

23     and Termination" refers to a resolution of the UN Security Council,

24     calling upon the OSCE to establish the mission.  Could you explain what

25     this paragraph is referring to, please?

Page 7210

 1        A.   This paragraph then refers to Security Council Resolution 1190,

 2     as far as I recall, which gave us then the necessary mandate to have a

 3     monitoring mission in Kosovo and asked us to implement that resolution,

 4     which we then did through this establishment.

 5        Q.   Thank you, sir.  I'd now like to move on to another area.  This

 6     is the reporting procedure between the KVM and the OSCE.  Could you tell

 7     us where the OSCE Secretariat was located?

 8        A.   The Secretariat of the OSCE was at that time and still is located

 9     in Vienna.

10        Q.   Thank you, sir.  And could you explain to us what the reporting

11     procedure was, if any, in relation to the verifiers on the ground and the

12     OSCE Secretariat in Vienna.

13        A.   The Kosovo Verification Mission was one, you may say, even though

14     it was special, but it was one of a number of field missions that the

15     OSCE had at that time and still has today.  And these field missions are

16     then requested or are expected to report to Vienna to the

17     Secretary-General, meaning political office of the Secretary-General that

18     will receive these reports.

19             The reporting varies, of course, according to activities and the

20     importance of the situation.  As far as I recall, in the situation in

21     Kosovo there were almost -- at least part of the time there would be

22     daily spot reports.  I don't know if that was for the whole year, but at

23     least to a large extent there would be daily reports because of the

24     seriousness of the situation.

25        Q.   Sir, these daily reports that you mentioned which were then sent

Page 7211

 1     up to the political office of the Secretary-General in Vienna, what would

 2     happen to them after that?

 3        A.   I'm afraid I don't know exactly what happened to them, but they

 4     would probably be analysed and they would, I guess -- I don't know if

 5     they always would, but at least to -- sometimes if they were important

 6     news they would be disseminated, particularly then to the members of the

 7     Troika, the leadership of the organisation that is organised through a

 8     Troika, which is the previous chairman, the present, and the future.  And

 9     then based on this, of course, action would be taken.

10        Q.   Thank you.

11             MS. GOPALAN:  Could we call up 65 ter 00662, please.

12        Q.   Sir, this document on the screen, are you able to comment on the

13     type of document it is, if you know?

14        A.   Well, this would be -- would be a KVM spot report -- or here I

15     see they call it "Interim Report."  But it would be one of these daily

16     reports.  I see it covers the day of the 10th of January, so I suppose

17     then it means that it's a -- it's just for that day.  And it would go

18     through then the different areas of responsibility for the mission.

19        Q.   And if we have a look at the second paragraph, the second line,

20     there is a reference to the situation of the eight VJ prisoners being

21     held by the KLA.  Was this something you were involved in?

22        A.   Yes, I was.  I -- as far as I recall, I visited Belgrade just the

23     following day.  The visit was scheduled in advance because, as I said,

24     Kosovo was such an important issue.  Very soon after I took over the

25     position as chairman-in-office, I wanted to go to Belgrade and also then

Page 7212

 1     on to Kosovo to discuss the situation.

 2             When I planned this visit, I didn't know that this hostage

 3     situation would come up, so a lot of time was actually devoted to that in

 4     my conversation with Milosevic who was, of course, very upset with it,

 5     and also then when I came to Pristina we -- this was followed up and

 6     we -- as far as I recall then, we managed to release the hostages.

 7        Q.   Thank you, sir.

 8             MS. GOPALAN:  I'd like to tender this document into evidence,

 9     Your Honours.

10             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes, it will be received.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P01075.

12             MS. GOPALAN:

13        Q.   Sir, you mentioned this meeting you had with Milosevic in

14     January 1999.  Could you give us other examples, if any, of when you met

15     with President Milosevic?

16        A.   Well, I met with him on several occasions during my time as

17     foreign minister, I already came to Belgrade in 1998.  But during my

18     period as chairman-in-office, as far as I recall, the 11th of January was

19     the first one, but because of the so-called Racak massacre I came back

20     already, if I recall correctly, on the 15th of January.  And then I must

21     have been back one more time, I think, in February or early March.  So

22     those were my visits to -- probably early March, that were my visits to

23     Belgrade.  I spoke with him on then on some other occasions on the phone.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Now, this Racak incident that you mentioned - and

25     that's set out in the statement page 5, paragraph 7; and the B/C/S is

Page 7213

 1     page 5, paragraph 2 - would this have been an example of an incident that

 2     would have been reported via the KVM reporting procedure that we just

 3     spoke about?

 4        A.   Certainly.

 5        Q.   And could you explain how information on Racak was reported from

 6     the ground level verifiers and upwards?

 7        A.   Well, Racak was somewhat special.  I cannot recall that I had any

 8     written information about it because it kind of broke into the -- into

 9     the media through the statements made by the head of the

10     Kosovo Verification Mission, Mr. William Walker, which meant that we had

11     to deal with them immediately.  So there was maybe some kind of an

12     unusual reporting in that case.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Now, if it were more of a usual incident, for

14     example, if it were violation of the Jovanovic-Geremek Agreement that we

15     just saw, how would that information have been passed on?

16        A.   Well, it would have, as we talked about earlier, gone from the

17     mission to the secretariat and then probably some information -- but also

18     then there was a lot, of course, information going on on the phone also

19     between Oslo and Vienna, and Oslo and Kosovo and -- or Pristina, because

20     since this was such an important issue but also a very difficult and

21     dangerous situation.

22             It was important to be more or less continuously updated, which

23     meant that my staff, not myself, but my staff would be on more or less

24     continuous contact with the different parties to the activities, which

25     then was both the secretariat in Vienna, of course, but also then the

Page 7214

 1     government in Belgrade and the mission in Pristina.

 2        Q.   Thank you, sir.  Now, what was your role in relation to the Racak

 3     incident?

 4        A.   Well, my role then was -- or became particularly to try to secure

 5     that we could continue having a head of a verification mission, because

 6     in view of Mr. Walker's statements, President Milosevic wanted to declare

 7     him persona non grata and throw him out, which would have as I saw it --

 8     well, it was a violation of the agreement because I was the one to

 9     appoint the head of the mission, and I was to appoint -- the person to

10     sack one; it was not President Milosevic's prerogative.  And also it

11     would -- it would ruin the whole mission.  I mean, we wouldn't have been

12     able to continue the activities as I saw it.

13             So I went, and urgently, to Belgrade and negotiated with

14     President Milosevic, and after some deliberations I secured his continued

15     presence and position as head of the verification mission.

16        Q.   And what about investigations relating to the Racak incident?

17        A.   That was, of course, very important.  We wanted immediately to

18     have investigators and forensic experts.  Mr. Milosevic was skeptical or

19     reluctant.  As far as I recall, he then said that he would call his own

20     forensic team.  And if I remember correctly, he called some forensic team

21     from Belarus, while the OSCE then engaged a Finnish forensic team -- at

22     least there were some Finnish leadership.  I don't know if it was

23     composed of others also.

24             But because of the problems we had with President Milosevic at

25     that time and the other forensic team that was already engaged in Racak,

Page 7215

 1     it took, as far as I recall, about a week before the OSCE forensic team

 2     could get to the scene and to the site and be involved.

 3        Q.   And what did they report following their visit to the site?

 4        A.   Well, there is an extensive report by the OSCE forensic team that

 5     I -- I'm afraid I do not recall, but I remember that we had discussions

 6     with the leaders of the team, that they were upset or deplored the fact

 7     that they had not been able to come to the scene earlier because, as they

 8     would probably put it, the evidence was tampered with.  And so they had

 9     said that they had problems actually verifying what had gone -- had been

10     going on.

11        Q.   Thank you, sir.  I'd now like to move on to another area.  This

12     is your visits to Kosovo.  Now, you referred to your visits to Kosovo in

13     your statement - that's at page 3, paragraph 6, of the English - and you

14     say you visited Kosovo five times in 1999.  And that was three times

15     before the NATO bombing.  You also described visiting several villages

16     that were totally destroyed in March 1999.

17             Now, if you remember, are you able to name any of these villages

18     that you saw?

19        A.   Well, I'm afraid I can't remember many names, but I remember that

20     we -- in March, I suppose it must have been around the 15th of March

21     because it was close to the withdrawal of the Kosovo Verification

22     Mission, which happened then on the night of the 19th.  And I remember

23     then I visited Racak because I visited the sites; that I remember.  And

24     then we -- as far as I recall, we also went to a village called Podujevo,

25     or a city, that's more maybe a bigger place than just a village.  But

Page 7216

 1     then we saw smaller villages in the neighbourhood particularly that of

 2     Podujevo that were destroyed.

 3        Q.   And could you tell us how they had been destroyed?

 4        A.   Well -- well, they were -- some of them was -- most of the

 5     houses, you may say, had been blown off the roofs, there had been

 6     shelling, there had been fighting, so the houses had been damaged in a

 7     war-like situation, I would say.

 8        Q.   And in addition to seeing these houses, did you also observe --

 9     were you able to observe any people?

10        A.   Well, we spoke with people in the Podujevo, as far as I recall,

11     we went out to the cars on the way and we spoke to some locals there

12     because we were interested in their assessment of the situation and how

13     they also viewed the KVM at that time.  And I also -- by the -- one of

14     the military personnel of the KVM, I was taken both to a KLA post and to

15     one post manned by the army, the Yugoslav Army.

16             They wanted to show me or let me meet with the people that they

17     met with on a daily basis because that was part of their work, so to say,

18     both to monitor and to try to defuse the situation, to talk to both

19     sides.  And also then to see how close the military people on both sides

20     were located actually.  And also then to show the danger to the civilians

21     because they were then to a large extent kept between these fronts which

22     were very close to each other.  And we also then saw, of course, people

23     on the roads, as I have referred to in earlier testimonies.  I mean, that

24     was the time when we saw people that I would say were fleeing from their

25     homes.

Page 7217

 1        Q.   If you recall, are you able to provide an approximate number of

 2     the people you saw?

 3        A.   No, that I couldn't.  But -- but they were many enough that we

 4     clearly noticed them and commented on it, and I referred to them also

 5     later on when I spoke to Mr. Milosevic because they made a great impact

 6     on me.

 7        Q.   And what was his response to the information you conveyed to him?

 8        A.   This -- this information then came at a later stage.  This

 9     came -- when I spoke to him -- when I mentioned this to him was actually

10     on the 24th of March morning before the NATO bombing started.  And to

11     give a little bit of a background, I didn't know that the bombing would

12     start at that time, but since the Rambouillet talks had broken down, I

13     knew that they were imminent.

14             And I had got an agreement with the then-NATO

15     Secretary-General Javier Solano to make a last effort to convince

16     President Milosevic to have a military observation mission because we

17     couldn't only have a civilian one because we couldn't fulfil our mandate

18     with a civilian monitoring mission.

19             And then I had been promised that if I convinced

20     President Milosevic to allow negotiations to re-open for a military

21     presence, the bombing would be postponed.  So this was my offer to him,

22     which he refused because he said there were no problems in Kosovo.  Then

23     I referred to my visit on the 15th of March where I had then seen people

24     fleeing, and I had seen houses burning, and I had also seen an increased

25     number of Yugoslav Army -- or representatives of the Yugoslav Army or

Page 7218

 1     military personnel that was according to then my military advisors in

 2     violation of the agreement because the number exceeded what had been

 3     agreed.  And that he -- I mean, he laughed at me and said that the people

 4     travelling were people on picnic and the houses burning were hay burning

 5     and the military personnel, they were there in order to defend me,

 6     protect me, and that I was watching too much CNN.  So I didn't achieve

 7     anything unfortunately.

 8        Q.   Thank you for that, sir.  Now, you also mentioned that you went

 9     to Kosovo after the bombing twice.

10        A.   Yes.

11        Q.   Are you able to recall where you went on any of these trips?

12        A.   Well, of course, I went to Pristina because we met with -- well,

13     we had -- then the OSCE returned to Pristina, so we had people there.

14     But also then we met with the local authorities.  I also then -- on my

15     first visit, I don't recall the date, but it was soon after the war

16     ended, I went -- made a point of going to the Decani monastery which is,

17     as you may know, a very important Orthodox sanctuary, and I made that a

18     point in order to show that this war and the actions we had taken were

19     not against the Serbs.  We were very adamant that Kosovo should also be a

20     place where Serbs could live.

21             And I stayed over night that in order as a -- to whatever extent

22     it had a meaning, an act of solidarity.  And I also then visited Pec,

23     which is the headquarters of the Serbian Orthodox church, and areas in

24     that region.  And as far as I recall, I also visited Kosovo Polje, where

25     we actually saw some graves, if I recall correctly, about close to 20

Page 7219

 1     people maybe or something, 40, and we actually also there met with an

 2     Orthodox bishop or priest that was there and families that were looking

 3     for their -- their dead ones.  They were watching the graves.  I may have

 4     visited other cities or villages, but I must admit, I do not recall that.

 5        Q.   And in relation to the places that you recall visiting, are you

 6     able to comment on the condition of the buildings that you saw there?

 7        A.   Many places we saw destroyed buildings, not everywhere, but many

 8     places.  But our comments at that time and what we also heard from some

 9     of the Kosovo Albanians that we met when they were fleeing and also upon

10     their return was that these houses -- of course, some of the houses were

11     destroyed by bombing, there is no doubt about that, but many of them were

12     actually destroyed by people on the ground blowing up houses.

13             I am not a military expert, but I had a number of military

14     experts and advisors which could show me the effect of the blowing off of

15     roofs of houses which meant that there had been not a bombing from the

16     outside on the roof but from an explosion inside that blew off the roof,

17     which meant that there had been ground activities.

18        Q.   And where did you meet these Kosovo Albanians who were fleeing

19     who gave you this information?

20        A.   Well, we met -- the first group we met on the border between

21     Kosovo and Albania, and that must have been -- it was soon after the war

22     started, so it must have been late March or early April -- I think,

23     actually, it must have been already late March, just some days after the

24     war started, because we could also then hear the planes in Kosovo.  And

25     they told stories about their conditions and why they had been fleeing.

Page 7220

 1     But then when we came back also then we met with those who had already

 2     started returning because some people started returning fairly soon.

 3        Q.   And were they able to tell you who it was on the ground who was

 4     blowing up these houses?

 5        A.   Well, of course, according to the Kosovo Albanians these were

 6     Serbs, there were no doubt about that -- they had no doubt.  I could not

 7     verify that, but according to those who were fleeing, that was their

 8     story.

 9        Q.   Thank you, sir.

10             Now, you referred earlier on to the breakdown of the Rambouillet

11     talks.  Could you provide some background on the Rambouillet talks.

12        A.   Well, this was an effort then when -- when the international

13     community in addition to me as chairman-in-office, one saw that this --

14     the conflict was building up and one was afraid of a war, and also the

15     Security Council Resolution, as far as I recall, also provided for the

16     European Union and others to be involved.  And you had a Contact Group

17     of, if I recall correctly, the United States, France, Britain, Italy, and

18     Russia.  And they met and -- in order to try to organise some talks

19     between the Yugoslav government and the Kosovo -- or local authorities,

20     KLA particularly I suppose.  And -- well, not only KLA because Rugova was

21     there, so it was a broad Kosovo Albanian delegation.

22             And these talks then, as far as I recall, took place in February,

23     started in Rambouillet, went on for a couple of weeks, and then there was

24     a break.  There was a draft agreement or preliminary agreement, to which

25     the Serbs, as far as I recall at that time, were fairly positive but the

Page 7221

 1     Kosovo Albanians were not.  And so there was a recess for about two,

 2     three weeks, and then it was reconvened again in Paris itself, not in

 3     Rambouillet, and broke down immediately afterwards because then the Serbs

 4     had changed their opinion, as had the Kosovo Albanians.  So it -- but it

 5     meant that there was still no agreement on this draft agreement.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Now, you mention a draft agreement.

 7             MS. GOPALAN:  Could we call up 65 ter 474.

 8        Q.   And if you could tell us if you recognise ...

 9             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes, Mr. Djurdjic.

10             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, this document is a

11     book written by a group of authors.  This is not an official document,

12     and I don't believe that it can be used as evidence in this case.  If

13     there had been a draft document, then it should be located.  We shouldn't

14     be doing this by the use of books, particularly since in this case the

15     witness would be required to read the whole book and then comment it.

16     And what he knew about this draft agreement, he already said.  Therefore,

17     this is not the original draft of the agreement, and therefore the

18     witness will not be able to recognise it.

19             JUDGE PARKER:  We will watch that and see what use is intended.

20     Thank you, Mr. Djurdjic.

21             Carry on, please, Ms. Gopalan.

22             MS. GOPALAN:  Thank you, Your Honours.

23        Q.   Sir, this document on the screen, are you able to recognise it?

24        A.   Well, not in this printed version because I don't think I've seen

25     the -- at that time it wasn't printed like this, but I do remember that

Page 7222

 1     there was an interim agreement that was present between the two sides and

 2     that was -- that had been basis for discussion.  And this was how far

 3     they came, yes.

 4        Q.   I have here a hard copy of the full agreement, if it will assist

 5     you to flick through it and confirm that this is the agreement that you

 6     had in mind.

 7             MS. GOPALAN:  With Your Honours' leave.

 8             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

 9             MS. GOPALAN:  If it's necessary.

10             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.  I'm not certain that it will help me

11     too much.  We -- Your Honours, it's a long time ago, so I remember very

12     well, Your Honours, that we discussed this, but I'm afraid I can't

13     remember each and every article of it.  But there is no doubt that it is

14     something called the interim agreement for peace and self government in

15     Kosovo.  That is for sure.

16             JUDGE PARKER:  Is it a signed document that you have there,

17     Mr. Vollebaek?

18             THE WITNESS:  I don't think so, because I don't think it was ever

19     signed.  That was the problem, Your Honour.

20             JUDGE PARKER:  It was -- some may have.

21             THE WITNESS:  Is it a signed document?  Not here.  I don't think

22     it is signed.

23             You know, Your Honour, the -- as I said, the Serbs were fairly

24     positive at that time, but the Albanians were not very positive.  So that

25     was why one took the recess in order to ask the parties to look at it

Page 7223

 1     again and see if there were things that they would -- yeah, to find a

 2     common ground then for an agreement.  Unfortunately, that worked out

 3     maybe differently from what the negotiators had hoped for because the --

 4     the Serbian delegation came back then with a number of changes to what we

 5     perceived or we thought they had agreed to while in Rambouillet.  So I

 6     remember that the negotiators were very upset when the groups met again.

 7             So -- there was a text that they had been working on and a text

 8     that they took with them home, but it was not signed.

 9             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.

10             MS. GOPALAN:  Your Honours, may I tender this document into

11     evidence, please.

12             JUDGE PARKER:  There is a difficulty, isn't there?  The witness

13     doesn't recognise it.  It's not something within his present memory.  It

14     appears he thinks no more than that to be what it says it is.  I think

15     we'll have to wait for some other time.

16             MS. GOPALAN:  Thank you, Your Honours.  We will deal with it some

17     other time then.

18        Q.   Thank you very much, sir.

19             Now, you were talking about the breakdown of the Rambouillet

20     talks and the Paris talks.  Just to confirm, was any agreement reached

21     following these talks between the parties?

22        A.   Following the Rambouillet and the Paris talks?

23        Q.   Yes.

24        A.   Not to my recollection, because that was the problem.  If there

25     had been an agreement, we wouldn't have had a war.

Page 7224

 1        Q.   Thank you, sir.

 2             MS. GOPALAN:  Could I now call up 65 ter 460, please.  If we

 3     could zoom in on paragraph 1.

 4        Q.   Sir, do you recognise this document?

 5        A.   Well, this is another of these daily reports from the

 6     Kosovo Verification Mission, yes.

 7        Q.   And the first sentence describes your meeting with the

 8     President Slobodan Milosevic --

 9        A.   Mm-hmm --

10        Q.   -- as disappointing.  Now, could you provide some background to

11     this sentence.

12        A.   Well, this was in the -- in the -- in the recess period, so to

13     say, after the first part of the talks in Paris, after the Rambouillet

14     and before the Paris talks, where we then was insisting that in order to

15     fulfil the mandate of monitoring and defusing the conflict in Kosovo,

16     there was a need for an international military presence, an armed

17     presence.  And the Kosovo Verification Mission was an unarmed presence

18     and they were not able, as I saw it, to fulfil the mandate.  And in

19     order, then, to be able to fulfil the mandate, we wanted or needed an

20     armed presence, like United Nations would have in a number of countries

21     and situations when there are conflicts.  But President Milosevic refused

22     this.

23        Q.   Thank you, sir.

24             MS. GOPALAN:  Your Honours, I'd like to tender this document into

25     evidence, please.

Page 7225

 1             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes, it will be received.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P01076.

 3             MS. GOPALAN:  Could we call up now 65 ter 461, please.

 4        Q.   Sir, do you recognise this document on the screen?

 5        A.   This is another daily report, yes.

 6        Q.   And could you please comment on the first sentence of this

 7     document.

 8        A.   This was then after my visit to Belgrade, I went to Pristina, as

 9     I often did, and met then with the -- with members of the Albanian

10     negotiating team, probably then Mr. Rugova, and some others I suppose.

11        Q.   Thank you, sir.

12             MS. GOPALAN:  I'd like to tender this document into evidence,

13     Your Honours.

14             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P01077.

16             MS. GOPALAN:

17        Q.   Sir, I'd now like to move on to another topic, the withdrawal of

18     the KVM, and this is set out in your statement.  It's the last paragraph

19     of the English, and in the B/C/S it's page 12 as well and it's

20     paragraph 2.  Now, in relation to withdrawing the KVM on the

21     20th of March, 1999, you say that the decision to withdraw the KVM was

22     yours.  Could you tell us why you took this decision?

23        A.   Well, I took the decision because it was then obvious for me that

24     the KVM didn't have a role any longer to play.  It was a difficult

25     decision, and I had prolonged it for a long time because, as you will

Page 7226

 1     recall then, the Kosovo Verification Mission was composed of

 2     representatives of a number of countries.  And while the KVM at the early

 3     stages of its -- of the implementation of the mission had a lot of

 4     confidence from the local community, as they realised that the mission

 5     could not fulfil their expectations, could not defend them, could not

 6     protect them from the harassment and intimidation that they suffered, of

 7     course they turned against because they were frustrated and they were

 8     upset with this.  Which also meant -- it meant two things:  One was that

 9     the -- well, the view of the mission was deteriorating, but also, then,

10     that members of the mission were, again, harassed by the local

11     population.

12             So I had some ministers of foreign affairs indicating to me that

13     we should withdraw because they had problems in their parliaments and

14     with their local constituency, that their young men and women

15     participating in the mission were in danger.  And I then convinced them

16     that we -- as long as there was a possibility or a hope for a peaceful

17     settlement, we should be there.  And to me then my personal dead-line, so

18     to say, was the talks in Paris.  I said to myself and also to those with

19     whom I spoke, that as long as we have ongoing discussions, we should keep

20     the verification mission there because otherwise it would be a gap

21     between the political activities in Paris and the on-the-ground

22     situation, so to say.  And that could -- if the situation on the ground

23     deteriorated, it could also have a bad effect on the political

24     negotiations.

25             As the talks broke down, and it was -- the two parties went home

Page 7227

 1     and it was obvious that there were no possibility to have, as I saw it, a

 2     peaceful settlement, I then felt that I had no option but to take the

 3     decision to withdraw -- the withdrawal.  Again, based both then on the

 4     situation with respect to the safety and security of the members of the

 5     KVM, and I was personally responsible for their safety and security; and

 6     also then because of the situation of the view or the perception of the

 7     OSCE in Kosovo.  We have had, as you may recall, in fairly fresh memory,

 8     the situation in Srebrenica, and I would not in any case like to have had

 9     a similar situation where we -- as then the OSCE in this case would be

10     standing idle watching atrocities going on.

11        Q.   Thank you, sir.

12             Now, in general, could you describe how successful the KVM was in

13     fulfilling its mandate, bearing in mind the time-frame from

14     January to March 1999.  Was there change in the success?  Are you able to

15     comment on how successful the KVM was generally?

16        A.   We were obviously not very successful since we ended up in war,

17     so we didn't fulfil the mandate, which was in a peaceful settlement.  As

18     I said, I felt when I visited -- the two first visits I made to Kosovo I

19     felt there was a very good atmosphere between the population and the

20     monitors.  There was -- when we were travelling in the OSCE cars there

21     were nice signs, people were happy to see us.  When I came on my last

22     visit, which I think that must have been around the 15th of March, the

23     situation had changed, it was a negative attitude.  People were angry.

24     And so it was obvious, as I said, that there was a frustration,

25     disappointment, with the mission from the local community side.

Page 7228

 1        Q.   Are you able to provide a specific reason or reasons as to why

 2     the situation had changed by March 1999?

 3        A.   Well, there were, of course, large or great expectations from the

 4     Kosovo Albanian side that we would be able to find a peaceful settlement

 5     and find a political -- political solution to the problem, which we

 6     didn't.  And at the same time there was, I think - and maybe more

 7     importantly - an experience on the ground that the situation for the

 8     local population was deteriorating, meaning that there were an increased

 9     number of incidents where the local population then was harassed.  And I

10     then said to Mr. Milosevic that that I felt was, at least in part, due to

11     the increased number of military personnel that we had seen in Kosovo.

12        Q.   Thank you, sir.  Now I'd like to move on now to what you saw in

13     the border, and this is set out in your statement - page 13, paragraph 3,

14     of the English; and page 12, paragraph 4 of the B/C/S.  You say you were

15     surprised that at the border there was a large number of people expelled

16     and you saw a stream of tractors coming.

17             Now, to begin with, which border were you at?

18        A.   This was, as far as I recall then, my first visit to the region

19     after the war had started, and as I recall it must have been late March

20     or very early April, but I think it was late March.  That was the border

21     between Kosovo and Albania.  We also had a number of refugees in

22     Macedonia, although in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, but

23     that -- and I visited them afterwards, but my first visit was to Albania.

24     Because we knew -- or we heard then from the UNHCR and from Albanian

25     authorities that people were coming out.

Page 7229

 1             And -- so I was at the border fairly early in the morning.  I had

 2     come up from Tirana to -- I'm afraid I cannot recall the name of the

 3     border post.  And we were looking in to Kosovo and there was a narrow

 4     winding road with the largest number of tractors I ever seen in my life.

 5     I didn't know that there were so many tractors in the world.  And these

 6     were people then that had, according to their stories which we heard as

 7     they crossed the border, been expelled and forced to leave their homes

 8     and properties in Kosovo.

 9        Q.   And how did you get this information from these people?

10        A.   Well, I got it from the people themselves.  I'm afraid, I speak

11     neither Serbian nor Albanian, but I normally had very good interpreters.

12     So I had interpreters with me, and I could -- most of these people

13     were -- some had been walking, apparently, but most of them were on

14     tractors or hangars of tractors.  And it -- there was a process then on

15     the border.  So as they were waiting both -- we developed a system where

16     they got a bottle of water immediately and then a loaf of bread next and

17     then the third station was registry because that was very important for

18     us.  And while they were waiting then in this line, I could walk up to

19     these people that were waiting and ask, Where are you from?  What had

20     happened to you?  And who are you?  And all that.

21        Q.   And did you learn who had expelled them?

22        A.   Well, according to these people that came, there were Serbs, as

23     they said, and there were some then military, some police, there were

24     different stories.  Also then some claim that they had been out walking

25     in the afternoon and when they came home their apartment was occupied by

Page 7230

 1     another couple and protected by the police.  So there were different,

 2     different stories, but they were all unison in their version of the story

 3     that they were forced to leave and they had been told that they were not

 4     wanted in Kosovo any longer.

 5        Q.   And your reference to registering these individuals, that it was

 6     important for you, why was that important?

 7        A.   According to their stories and what we saw, they had no

 8     identification documents.  And -- so that had been what we were told,

 9     that had been taken from them early -- at an early stage.  And they --

10     their tractors did not have number plates.  And apparently that were cut

11     off later in the process, but during -- on the road during -- on the way

12     to the border they were also -- they had lost or they were taken away

13     from them.  So according, again, to their stories then, they had been --

14     this had happened in order for them to not be able to return.  So for us

15     it was very important then to make sure that we had a proper registry of

16     these people.  So we asked everyone to state their name and address and

17     date of birth and number plates of their tractors and all that.

18        Q.   Thank you for that, sir.

19             Now, in your statement you also say - this is the last sentence

20     on page 13:

21             "My impression was that when I met the refugees nobody complained

22     about KVM or NATO but it was the Serb forces that were the problem."

23             Now, in the B/C/S that's page 15, paragraph 3.

24             Sir, the sentence that I just read out to you, that nobody

25     complained about KVM or NATO but it was the Serb forces that were the

Page 7231

 1     problem, could you explain for us what you mean by that?

 2        A.   No, I mean by that that when -- in connection with the war, there

 3     was, of course, a discussion on the effect of the bombing.  War is

 4     terrible always; bombing is horrible.  And there is no doubt that also

 5     the war in the bombing did some damage.  But I was surprised then that

 6     these people, none of them, as I stated that time and as I repeat today,

 7     none of them actually blamed NATO or the bombing for their leaving

 8     because that, of course, was Mr. Milosevic's story later on, that these

 9     people had been fleeing because of the bombs.  And I didn't meet anyone

10     that claimed that.  But they had a number of stories then about military

11     and civilian and police that had harassed them and had forced them to

12     leave.

13        Q.   Sir, you've already mentioned that you had occasion to meet the

14     refugees at the Albanian border?

15        A.   Mm-hmm.

16        Q.   Did you meet refugees elsewhere around this time?

17        A.   Also at the Macedonian or the border between Kosovo and the

18     former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.  The situation there was different

19     because they -- they were in a kind of no man's land and we built a camp

20     for them there and -- but I also met with a number of refugees there.  As

21     far as I recall -- yeah, different organisations, but also NATO actually

22     bought -- or built a military camp for them.

23        Q.   And the stories that you heard about the reasons for fleeing,

24     where did you hear them?

25        A.   Well, I heard them both places.  I mean, they were consistent

Page 7232

 1     everywhere.

 2        Q.   Thank you very much, sir.

 3             MS. GOPALAN:  Your Honours, at this stage I have no further

 4     questions for this witness, and I apologise for going over time.

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you, Ms. Gopalan.

 6             Mr. Djurdjic, is it going to be more efficient for us to have the

 7     necessary break now and let you start after the break or can you continue

 8     for the next 12 minutes or so?

 9             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I think it is better that we have

10     the break now so that I can be more prepared and continue in one go.  In

11     any case, I will do as you please.

12             JUDGE PARKER:  Very well.  We will do that.  We must have a

13     half-hour break for the tapes to be rewound now, Mr. Vollebaek, and we

14     will continue at ten minutes to 11.00.  A Court Officer will assist you

15     in the break.

16                           --- Recess taken at 10.19 a.m.

17                           --- On resuming at 10.53 a.m.

18             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Djurdjic.

19             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

20                           Cross-examination by Mr. Djurdjic:

21        Q.   [Interpretation] Mr. Vollebaek, my name is Veljko Djurdjic,

22     Defence team member of the accused, Vlastimir Djordjevic.  With me is

23     Ms. Marie O'Leary, another team member.

24             First of all, I would like to ask you how to address you, whether

25     you'd like to be addressed with your excellency, ambassador, sir, since

Page 7233

 1     I'm not completely familiar with the rules and the protocol given the

 2     function you now hold.

 3        A.   I am very easy on protocol, so you can call me Mr. Vollebaek or

 4     if the Judges allow you could even say "Knut."

 5        Q.   Thank you.  For the umpteenth time you have provided another

 6     testimony before this Court and that one lasted one hour and 15 minutes

 7     up to now.  I intend to ask you questions that you have not yet been

 8     asked or to offer us a deeper insight into some of the things you have

 9     been asked before.

10             Ambassador, in 1998, you were the ambassador of the

11     Republic of Norway -- excuse me, the minister of foreign affairs.

12        A.   Yes, I was.  First of all, I think it's important that Norway's

13     not a republic.  The king will be very upset if we didn't correct that.

14     So Norway's a monarchy, a constitutional monarchy, and I was

15     His Majesty's foreign minister, yes.

16        Q.   I apologise for this grave mistake.  In that capacity, you were

17     appointed a member of the Troika that presided over the OSCE?

18        A.   That's right.  The OSCE had decided before I came in, actually,

19     as foreign minister that in 1999 the -- whoever was foreign minister of

20     Norway would be the chairman-in-office of the OSCE.  And we had a change

21     in government in 1997, in which I then became minister of foreign

22     affairs; and in that capacity, I joined the Troika of the OSCE as of

23     1st of January, 1998.

24        Q.   Thank you.  The chairman-in-office of the OSCE at the time was

25     Mr. Geremek, minister of foreign affairs of Poland.  Who was the third

Page 7234

 1     member in 1998?

 2        A.   You ask a difficult question.  That was -- in 1998 it was whoever

 3     had been chairman-in-office before Professor Geremek, it was Denmark,

 4     Denmark, the Danish foreign minister.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  What about 1999, who was appointed as the third

 6     member, since you and Mr. Geremek were still on board?

 7        A.   It's not an appointment.  It's an election by all participating

 8     states, it's a consensus.  Austria took over from me.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Ambassador, when you provided your statement in 2002,

10     you pointed out that you had no access to any documents that had to do

11     with the testimony you provided.  Did you, in the meantime, review such

12     documents?  Did you acquaint yourself between then and now with those

13     documents, and I mean to say your notes?

14        A.   Well, as you know, I was called back to witness in the case of

15     Mr. Milutinovic.  And when I was called back then, I did -- well, first

16     of all I looked at my -- and I was confronted, so to say, with my

17     testimony in the Milosevic case, and I looked at my statements.  And I

18     also have looked at some of my notes and I have recently also then spoken

19     to some of my staff members in order to help my memory, yes.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Speaking about corrections, let us try immediately

21     and do two corrections.  I think that it was recorded in the transcript

22     that you came to Serbia on the 15th of January, 1999.  I'm not sure about

23     that date because I think that the first meeting you had in Serbia was on

24     the 11th of January concerning military troops and the second one was on

25     the 21st of January, of the same year.  Would you agree with that?

Page 7235

 1        A.   If you say so, yes, probably, if you've seen reports on that.  I

 2     thought it was earlier, but -- because I know that I came back very

 3     quickly afterwards, I felt it was too quickly, but it could be the 21st.

 4     I wouldn't object to that.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  And one more date.  We have here an exhibit

 6     containing the chronology of major events relating to the

 7     Kosovo Verification Mission, and as you said today on the

 8     2nd of March, 1999, you paid a visit to Pristina.  After that date and

 9     until the departure of the KVM - and that was on the

10     20th of March, 1999 - there is no mention, as far as I could see, of any

11     visit of yours to Pristina, especially not on the 15th of March.  I find

12     it impossible for you to have visited Pristina on the 15th of March

13     without that being recorded.  Do you agree that this happened before the

14     war?

15        A.   If you say so -- again, you may probably be right.  As I said

16     earlier, this happened ten years ago.  I remember some of the events.  I

17     remember the impressions it made on me, but I am -- I stand to be

18     corrected when it comes to dates.

19        Q.   Thank you.  I'm not trying to correct you.  I'm just trying to

20     remind you of certain things.

21             Now I'd like to move to the portion of your statement that

22     concerns OSCE.  You said that in 195 -- 1998 the OSCE had 54 members and

23     that it grew in 1994 from the European Conference and became an

24     organisation; is that correct?

25        A.   Well, what I tried to say was that the establishment of the OSCE

Page 7236

 1     is based on this conference on security cooperation Europe which is

 2     established on the Helsinki Declaration of 1975.  In order, then, to make

 3     it more efficient and an organisation, it changed its name and its status

 4     in 1994 to an organisation.  And then, as far as I recall, in 1999 then

 5     when I was chairman-in-office there were 54, we call them participating

 6     states since it's not really a membership organisation as such with

 7     Yugoslavia suspended.  Today, I know there are 56 participating states.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us, please, what was the fundamental

 9     mode of operation of the OSCE in terms of decision-making process?

10        A.   The OSCE is based on consensus.

11        Q.   Thank you.  But you said that the FRY was suspended at the time.

12     Were there any other rules and regulations governing the internal

13     decision-making within the OSCE or was this the sole rule that you

14     mentioned, the rule of consensus.

15        A.   I'm not sure that I understand your question, sir.

16        Q.   A minute ago you said that the decisions were made by consensus.

17     I'm asking you:  Were there any other rules and regulations that would

18     amend this rule when it came to decision-making?

19        A.   There were a number of rules and regulations, but if you mean

20     that the organisation didn't have the right to take a decision because

21     there was one participating state suspended, we -- that was not perceived

22     as the case.  So the organisation was definitely perceived as being able

23     to take decisions with the 53 present participating states.

24        Q.   In other words, the consensus was not a sine qua non?

25        A.   Well, there was a consensus among those who then did participate

Page 7237

 1     then and were present, and -- but one state had been suspended and --

 2     but, that didn't stop us from being actively engaged and that was the

 3     view of the 53 participating states.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  So once a certain number of participating countries

 5     in the organisation reached an agreement, this is deemed to be a

 6     consensus and you just disregard the rest; or do you need a majority to

 7     reach a consensus?

 8        A.   Well, consensus is a consensus, sir.  But it had been agreed by

 9     the others that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia violated the

10     fundamental principles of the organisation, and as such could not

11     participate at that time.  I may also remind you, sir, that the

12     Security Council of the United Nations, of which Russia is a

13     Permanent Member, and all the other members, accepted that the OSCE was a

14     legitimate organisation that had the right to operate, and as such gave

15     us the mandate.  So there was no doubt in the international community of

16     the legitimacy of the organisation and its operations.

17        Q.   Thank you.  I know that the United Nations shall not interfere

18     with how the OSCE operates.

19             Now, I would like to move to Security Council Resolutions that

20     laid down the terms of reference for the Kosovo mission mandate.

21             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] For that purpose, can I please

22     have Exhibit P1074.

23        Q.   Ambassador, if you would be so kind to take a look at this

24     beginning -- or more precisely, paragraph 3 which starts with:

25             "Condemning the use of excessive force ..."

Page 7238

 1             Would you be able to comment this particular part of the

 2     resolution, your own comment?

 3        A.   Well, it states -- it states clearly that we -- or the

 4     international community at that time condemned any kind of violence that

 5     had or did take place in Kosovo.

 6        Q.   Yes, but it says here that the Serbian police forces are being

 7     accused of applying excessive force not in -- proportionate --

 8             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the counsel please repeat.  The

 9     interpreter didn't understand his statement.

10             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Djurdjic, there was some difficulty

11     experienced by the interpreters following your meaning in your last

12     question.  Would you find reformulating it.

13             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Very well.

14        Q.   Ambassador, in this paragraph, an excessive use of force by the

15     Serbian police forces is being condemned against civilians, but also that

16     applies to all terrorist acts undertaken by the Kosovo Liberation Army as

17     well as any support to terrorist activities in Kosovo, including finance,

18     arms, and training.

19        A.   Yes.

20             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now please move to item 2,

21     if possible.  That's on page 2, the next page.

22        Q.   With respect to this item, I would like to ask you whether you

23     are aware that the leadership of the Kosovo Albanians had condemned

24     terrorist acts?

25        A.   If I understand you correctly, sir, you referred to paragraph 2,

Page 7239

 1     where it says:

 2             "Calls upon the Kosovar Albanian leadership to condemn terrorist

 3     action."

 4             I know that there was disagreement, as you know, as well as I do,

 5     probably better, there were different political parties and factions on

 6     the Kosovo Albanian side and there were some that were more - what should

 7     I say? - willing to accommodate with President Milosevic and other.

 8     Mr. Rugova was one of those who were looking for a compromise, while

 9     others did not want such a compromise.

10        Q.   Thank you.  But my question was:  After this resolution was

11     passed, did any political party of the Kosovo Albanians condemn these

12     terrorist actions?  Are you aware of that?

13        A.   That could be, but I cannot recall that.

14        Q.   We can now see Exhibit Number D160.

15             Ambassador, we are now going to look at Resolution 1199.  Would

16     you agree with me that this actually represents a basis and a legal

17     basis, actually, for the introduction of the Kosovo Verification Mission

18     and all the subsequent legal instruments that were adopted at a later

19     stage?

20        A.   If it was the basis for all the subsequent legal instruments, I'm

21     not certain, but it was definitely the resolution that we used as a basis

22     for establishing the KVM, yes.

23        Q.   Thank you.

24             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we please now look at page 2.

25        Q.   Ambassador, if we look at item 1 we see that the Security Council

Page 7240

 1     is actually requesting a cease-fire to be implemented.

 2        A.   That's correct.  That's what we tried to achieve, sir.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Then in item 2 they demand that the humanitarian

 4     situation be improved in order to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe.

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   Then in item 3 they call upon the parties to establish a

 7     political dialogue in order to seek a solution, a negotiated political

 8     solution; am I right?

 9             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] And now can we turn the next page

10     in English.

11        Q.   Mr. Vollebaek, as regards item 4, I'd like us to comment

12     sub-item (a).  Do you agree that, pursuant to this item, the FRY forces

13     were requested to halt all actions only with respect to the civilian

14     population, and that there is no mention here of any terrorist forces?

15        A.   I guess that this (a) mentions the security forces, yes, that

16     must be the Yugoslav Army, yes, I suppose so.

17        Q.   Yes, but only with regard to the civilian population but not

18     terrorist forces?

19        A.   It -- yes, it looks like that's the case, yes.  But -- yes.

20        Q.   Thank you.

21             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we please have Exhibit P835.

22        Q.   Let us clarify one thing, Ambassador, and I think that it's been

23     there from the beginning of this trial.  I may be wrong but you were, at

24     the time, a witness and a participant in those events.  In the aftermath

25     of the Resolution 1199, the US launched a diplomatic initiative through

Page 7241

 1     Mr. Holbrooke, who held talks with the president of the FRY as a

 2     Special Representative; do you remember that?  And as far as I know --

 3     just can you say yes for the first part of my question?

 4        A.   Well, if the first part of the question is whether I remember

 5     that there were talks between Ambassador Holbrooke and

 6     President Milosevic, the answer is yes.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  According to the evidence in file and some other

 8     indicators, we have never heard of any document signed by Mr. Holbrooke

 9     and Mr. Milosevic, but that - if I'm not wrong - the outcome of these

10     talks was an agreement for the Kosovo Verification Mission between

11     Mr. Geremek, the chief office of OSCE, and Mr. Jovanovic, who was the

12     foreign minister of the FRY, and I think that took place on the

13     16th of October, 1999 [as interpreted]?

14        A.   In one way, sir, if I may say so, I'm to a certain extent happy

15     that you haven't seen the document between Mr. Holbrooke and

16     Mr. Milosevic either because I haven't and I was very upset at that time

17     that I hadn't seen it because it was referred to at numerous occasions by

18     Mr. Milosevic when he disagreed with me.  So I was very upset about not

19     having seen it.

20             But that be as it may because we did have a basis for the

21     establishment of the KVM in the agreement that you just referred to, sir,

22     which was a signed agreement between the Government of the Federal

23     Republic of Yugoslavia and the OSCE through its chairman-in-office, and I

24     would say that whatever agreement there might have been between

25     Ambassador Holbrooke and President Milosevic then opened the way and

Page 7242

 1     prepared a basis for this agreement that we -- that we had.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  It's been ten years now, or rather, 11 years now.

 3     Over this period of time, have you ever seen this

 4     Holbrooke-Milosevic Agreement or not?

 5        A.   I haven't, and I still feel a little bit stupid by not having

 6     that, so as late as yesterday I called my then-Chief of Staff who is now

 7     Norway's ambassador to NATO to ask if he had ever seen it and he hadn't.

 8     And that, to a certain extent, comforted me.

 9        Q.   I think you're wrong.  This document doesn't exist, the

10     Holbrooke-Milosevic document.

11        A.   Well, then President Milosevic was lying to me on a number of

12     occasions.

13        Q.   Everybody's talking about these discussions and they believe that

14     it was translated into this agreement.  Now, let's move to the agreement,

15     Mr. Ambassador.  I'm talking about the Geremek-Jovanovic Agreement signed

16     on the 16th of October, 1998.

17             Can you please look at paragraph Roman numeral I, item 1.

18     Ambassador, based on this agreement was there any establishment of the

19     Kosovo Verification Mission envisaged?

20        A.   Yes, I mean, we started very quickly.  I mean, as you see, it

21     says that we should be able to establish a mission, and we did.  And as I

22     said earlier today also, we had people in place already before Christmas

23     of 1999 -- 1998, sorry, sorry, sorry.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Can you please now look at item 5.

25             Ambassador, do you recall that the KDOM was set up sometime in

Page 7243

 1     midyear, or rather, late June/beginning of July, and that it compromised

 2     the diplomatic monitoring missions of Great Britain, European Union, USA,

 3     France, and I think the Federal Republic of Germany, I'm not sure.  And

 4     this item provides until your verification mission becomes operational

 5     they were going to conduct these affairs?

 6        A.   I'm afraid, sir, that I cannot confirm the composition of KDOM,

 7     but I agree with you that KDOM was established before KVM; and KVM was

 8     the successor to KDOM.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  I would like now to move to chapter --

10     Roman numeral II, and that's on the next page.  Roman numeral II, item 1.

11             In your view, what was the principal task of the verification

12     process for the mission that had just been established?

13        A.   Well, we should verify, as it says, in compliance with all

14     parties of the Security Council's Resolution and report on.

15        Q.   Thank you.  And can you please now look at Roman numeral III,

16     item 1.

17        A.   I just got the first line, I'm afraid.

18        Q.   Yes, you'll get the next page shortly.  Am I right in saying that

19     in separate mandate, under 1, one of the tasks is to verify how

20     cease-fire is being maintained.

21        A.   That's certainly so, and I -- the mission also did that.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Under item 2, does it provide for information about

23     the movement of forces in the previous week be handed over or dispatched

24     to the Kosovo Verification Mission?

25        A.   It says so in the agreement, yes.

Page 7244

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Let me just ask you this:  Were you familiar with

 2     this agreement in 1998 and 1999 when you were --

 3        A.   Of course I was familiar with --

 4        Q.   -- chairman-in-office of the OSCE?

 5        A.   That was the basis for my activities.  So I wouldn't have done my

 6     job if I hadn't familiarised myself with the document, sir.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Could you please now look at item 3.

 8        A.   Yes, I already did.

 9        Q.   Now, let's see how you understand item 3.  Did you have any

10     discussions with Mr. Walker concerning the application of this item 3 of

11     this separate mandate?  Were there any issues between the two and did you

12     discuss them?  Were you encountering any problems?

13        A.   Not to my recollection.

14        Q.   Thank you.  And then regarding item 2, were there any discussions

15     and problems between the two of you, do you remember that?

16        A.   Not to my recollection.  Of course you will know, sir, that I did

17     not receive all the reports that were sent to KVM.  I was not the

18     recipient of all KVM reports to Vienna either.  I got the reports that my

19     staff considered it was necessary for me to see.

20        Q.   Thank you, sir.  Given that we have established that Mr. Walker

21     was at the head of the verification mission and that all decisions in the

22     name of the mission were taken by him and you were the highest-ranking

23     officer in the OSCE who had sent this mission, I'm interested in how this

24     flow of information went between Mr. Walker and you as a political

25     figure.

Page 7245

 1             Now, in that respect, would you please look at item 4.

 2     Concerning item 4, were you being informed by Mr. Walker about certain

 3     problems in terms of their applying or employing the mission on the

 4     ground?

 5        A.   Well, I -- I was informed when there were problems, yes, and I

 6     was informed, for instance, as I referred to earlier today the question

 7     of the Racak massacre, that created a problem between the

 8     Government of Yugoslavia and the mission.  But I would like to remind you

 9     also, sir, that of course there was a leadership team of the KVM mission.

10             You refer to Mr. Walker as a kind of -- the only one.  He was

11     definitely the head of the mission, and I of course related to him, since

12     I had appointed him; but when I visited Pristina and visited the mission,

13     we were also sitting together with a whole leadership team where there

14     were a number of different persons from different nations responsible for

15     different parts.  So this was a team-work and not a one-person activity.

16        Q.   Thank you, Ambassador.  What I told you about is something I

17     learned from the various members of the mission, such as General Javier

18     and Mr. Ciaglinski and Mr. Drewienkiewicz.  I was referring to some

19     information they provide during their testimony on the work of the

20     Kosovo Verification Mission and its seat in Pristina.

21             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have P837 next.

22        Q.   Ambassador, are you familiar with this document?

23        A.   Not to my recollection, no.  But I may have seen it but I cannot

24     recall it.

25        Q.   This should be, or rather, it is the minutes of a meeting.  The

Page 7246

 1     document was signed by Mr. Nikola Sainovic, Mr. Vlastimir Djordjevic,

 2     General Klaus Naumann, and General Wesley Clark.  As we will see, it has

 3     to do with Resolution 1199 mentioned in paragraph 2 and the position of

 4     the federal government, which agreed to its implementation since its

 5     official signed it.  I just wanted to acquaint you with this page of the

 6     document, and perhaps now we can move to the next page.

 7             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have the English

 8     version as well.

 9        Q.   Ambassador, in late 1998 and early 1999, and in the course of

10     that year, were you familiar with this document and its contents?

11        A.   I cannot recall having seen this document, but I was familiar

12     with an agreement or an understanding between -- well, us, the

13     international community being represented by NATO and the Yugoslav

14     government on the level of numbers of military presence or security

15     equipment -- or security presence in Kosovo.

16        Q.   Thank you.  I'm asking you about this for the following reason:

17     I was wondering whether there is any reason for me to go through this

18     document if you were not familiar with it and if you were not

19     implementing it at the time.

20        A.   Well, I cannot judge that, sir; that must be up to you.  But I

21     may have seen it but I cannot recall it.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Let's try then and go through it briefly.  In para 1,

23     under that paragraph in its second part, in its second paragraph, did it

24     envisage for the FRY to take on the obligation of reducing or down-sizing

25     its security presence in terms of personnel in Kosovo and Metohija?

Page 7247

 1        A.   Well, as I said, I was not privy to this negotiations, that was

 2     not my task.  I had -- first of all, as I recall, this document was

 3     already signed in 1998 during the previous chairman-in-office.  So it may

 4     be that the then-chairman-in-office was more involved than -- in it.  So

 5     I was only informed at a later stage that there were certain limits to

 6     the presence of the -- or to the number of the security forces present in

 7     Kosovo and that there were an agreement on that number.  And as far as I

 8     recall, that was not disputed in my conversations with

 9     President Milosevic.

10        Q.   Thank you.

11             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we next look at item 7.

12        Q.   I won't go into any other details since I realise that your

13     knowledge of this document is only general, because you had a very senior

14     position in 1998 as well.  In any case, am I correct in saying that in

15     item 7 it was envisaged that the withdrawals and deployments of the FRY

16     forces will be terminated by noon on the 29th October, 1998, and at the

17     latest until --

18             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction:  By noon the

19     27th of October --

20             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   -- and at the latest by noon on the 29th of October the KDOM will

22     be notified on the new structures and numbers.

23        A.   I see that from the exhibit on my screen, sir, but I -- and I

24     cannot recall those dates.

25        Q.   The dates are not so important.  I'm interested in contents.  Do

Page 7248

 1     you remember that NATO issued an order to attack the FRY which was

 2     suspended subsequently, and the FRY was expected to meet the obligations

 3     envisaged by the document that we have before us?

 4        A.   I'm not certain that I understand your question, sir.  This

 5     document was dated in 1998, and to my knowledge there was no order by

 6     NATO to attack Serbia in 1998.

 7        Q.   NATO did issue an order.  By virtue of Mr. Solana's decision, it

 8     was stayed.  All of these agreements had dead-lines that had to be met in

 9     that respect.  Perhaps you do not recall that NATO Activation Order?

10        A.   No, I obviously do not.

11        Q.   Thank you.  However, given what we just saw, and this served as

12     the basis for verification, there were dead-lines set and it was also

13     determined that the KDOM was to notify those in charge on the compliance.

14     Do you remember that the FRY indeed complied of which both the OSCE and

15     the UN were informed?

16        A.   I do not recall, but -- no, I don't -- but I -- but since we were

17     working on this and there was a process with the implementation of the

18     Security Council Resolution and the implementation of the

19     Kosovo Verification Mission, I -- my understanding was -- or I got

20     information that the basis for the implementation of our activities was

21     in place.  So that -- I guess that means that it was by those who should

22     have or should do the verification they were satisfied that we could go

23     ahead with the implementation.

24        Q.   Ambassador, please have a look at Roman numeral III of this

25     document, its last sentence.  That sentence begins with:

Page 7249

 1             "However, as a last resort ... the State authorities ..."

 2             And so on.

 3             Do you agree with me, Ambassador, that the signatories of the

 4     agreement agreed that the FRY had the right to respond to terrorist

 5     attacks directed against the authorities and citizens in such

 6     circumstances in which the lives and safety are jeopardised?

 7        A.   Yes, I do, but if you, by that, imply that the activities taken

 8     by the Yugoslav government in Kosovo were proportionate and designed to

 9     do that and that we overreacted by withdrawing the KVM and the war, I

10     would refute that, sir, and say that I disagree with you.

11        Q.   Thank you.  We haven't reached that period yet.  We're still at

12     the beginning.  We're now merely reading through the agreement.  I wanted

13     to know when it was signed and what was signed.  We are about to move to

14     the process of verification.

15             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we next have Exhibit P836.

16        Q.   My first question in this regard is this:  Were you familiar at

17     all with this agreement reached in late 1998 and during your mandate in

18     1999?

19        A.   No, and I don't think I should have been.

20        Q.   Very well.  It is one of the documents that the KVM was supposed

21     to implement.  In any case, let us move on.

22             Ambassador, did you actively participate in the formation of the

23     verification mission following the decision on its establishment?

24        A.   Not in -- on a daily basis.  I took it upon myself to assist the

25     then-Foreign Minister Geremek in the implementation of this agreement,

Page 7250

 1     and Norway became a lead nation in the establishment.  So I know that my

 2     staff was very much actively involved, but I was not.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  I will not go into any details then, but I wanted to

 4     ask you something about the status of the different members of the

 5     verification mission on a general level, and I don't mean their

 6     international status as diplomats in the FRY but their status within the

 7     OSCE itself.  Were they international officials within or working for the

 8     OSCE as the representatives, or were they the representatives of their

 9     states, or both perhaps?  Basically, who did the members of the

10     Kosovo Verification Mission work for?

11        A.   They, of course, worked for the OSCE and they were responsible to

12     me and to nobody else, as all international civil servants are supposed

13     to be.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Who paid the members of the KVM?

15        A.   Well, sir, you ask difficult questions.  Now, I guess they

16     were -- some came probably from the OSCE budget, but most of it was extra

17     budgetary funds I would think because this was an extremely costly

18     operation, and -- so a number of us paid.  I know that Norway paid quite

19     a bit.  So I guess one went around begging for funds as international

20     organisations normally do and -- in order to be able to finance it.

21             But to make it clear, the salaries of course to my knowledge came

22     from -- well, came from Vienna, but I have to correct myself there.

23     Maybe we have a system in the OSCE of secondment.  So it could be that

24     some of the members were actually seconded.  That could very well be.

25     But still, they would be employed by the OSCE and then, in this case, for

Page 7251

 1     instance, Mr. Walker by me, appointed by me.  But it could be that some

 2     of their salaries were -- for some of them were seconded.  I don't -- I

 3     cannot recall the situation, actually, at that time.  Today we have a

 4     system where some people are seconded and some are not.  In my office,

 5     for instance, here in The Hague, I have some seconded people and some

 6     that are paid directly by the organisation.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  If I understand you well -- well, let's try to use

 8     the example of the relationship between Norway and the OSCE.  Norway, as

 9     a state, made payments to the OSCE funds, and then the OSCE made use of

10     those funds as needed?

11        A.   That is correct.  But in addition to this kind of membership fee

12     that we pay into the budget, the OSCE is also heavily dependent upon

13     extra budgetary funds.  That means that countries pay to a specific

14     project in addition to what is their membership fee.  And I know that in

15     the case of KVM we needed extra budgetary funds in order to make that

16     operation possible because the OSCE didn't have budget that would allow

17     for such a costly and big operation.  But in -- and so it is partly then

18     coming from the ordinary budget of the OSCE and partly coming from extra

19     budgetary funds from the different participating states.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Let us go back to reporting.  Was the OSCE and its

21     staff in Pristina duty-bound to --

22             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction.

23             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Was the KVM and its staff in Pristina duty-bound to report to the

25     OSCE, i.e., to you in Vienna since you were the chairman-in-office?

Page 7252

 1        A.   They were -- they were reporting to the OSCE, yes.  They were not

 2     reporting directly to me.  They were reporting, as I said earlier, to the

 3     secretariat; and then I was informed on a need basis.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  During the relevant time, were you informed that

 5     reports were being sent outside the OSCE from the Pristina headquarters?

 6        A.   I was not, and that would have been a violation of the rules.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Do you have any knowledge of what the criteria

 8     used -- what was the criteria used to select those working for the OSCE

 9     in terms of their nationality and qualifications?

10        A.   Well, we, first of all, tried to get the best people possible to

11     meet the requirements of the position that they're going to fulfil;

12     secondly, one is also then looking for a balanced representation from the

13     different areas or different regions of the -- from where the

14     participating states come.

15        Q.   Thank you.  You mentioned several times towards the close of your

16     examination-in-chief that this was a civilian verification mission not a

17     military one, and that in your view it should have been a military one.

18     Don't you think that a civilian mission has greater weight than a

19     military mission or a military presence in a given territory would have,

20     particularly since it had to rely on its civilian verifiers representing

21     the international community?

22        A.   Well, I don't think that I said that I wanted the KVM as such to

23     become a military mission, but I wanted it to change its position in

24     February when it became obvious that President Milosevic didn't respect

25     the agreement and the mandate of the mission, and the mission, being a

Page 7253

 1     civilian mission, could not fulfil its mandate.

 2             I agree with you that there are many -- many advantages to a

 3     civilian mission, but that, of course, requires that both sides comply

 4     with it.  It doesn't have a cloud.  It doesn't have -- it doesn't have

 5     power to implement its mandate if the two sides or whatever sides you

 6     have don't cooperate with the mission.

 7             And we saw then that the sides, also the KLA, did not respect the

 8     mission.  So we, of course, had to address that on several occasions

 9     also.  But -- so we lost power.  We couldn't fulfil the mandate, and in

10     that way, I could not accept to have a mission continuing without

11     fulfilling its mandate.

12        Q.   Ambassador, according to the agreements and the resolution we

13     saw, the basic and primary task of the verification mission was to

14     monitor the cease-fire and eventual violations of it.  Having in mind the

15     way the mission worked and implemented that, it started being very

16     efficient as of January in that regard.  Do you agree with that?

17        A.   Yes, I agree.  I -- as I said earlier, I felt that when I visited

18     the -- Kosovo, particularly maybe the second time -- you know, when I

19     came at the first time, it was at the beginning of its mission and they

20     had not deployed everywhere.  So I got the impression at that time that

21     maybe they were not in full force yet.

22             But then when I came there the second time, I felt it was fairly

23     efficient, it was well received.  And then when I came back the third

24     time, and that may have been the 2nd of March as you say -- I'm sorry

25     that it was that early because it proved then that the agreement that we

Page 7254

 1     had really were undermined very quickly.

 2        Q.   Thank you, Ambassador.  I will try to jog your memory a bit since

 3     we are on that topic.  You were in Belgrade for the first time to attend

 4     the talks with the FRY president on the 11th of January, 1999.

 5     Unfortunately, no substantial matters were discussed at that point in

 6     time.  What was discussed heavily at that point in time were the

 7     kidnappings that were occurring in Kosovo at the time.  Am I correct?

 8        A.   That's correct.

 9        Q.   The second time there were any talks in Belgrade was on the

10     20th of January, 1999, when the FRY government decided to proclaim

11     Mr. Walker persona non grata, and it was because of that that you arrived

12     in Belgrade to express your disagreement, stating that this was meddling

13     with the OSCE policy.  Is that correct?

14        A.   Sir, I think it was more than expressing my disagreement.  I was

15     telling President Milosevic that he was violating an agreement and that

16     it was none of his business, actually, to withdraw the head of the KVM;

17     that was only by business.  And also explain to him that the whole

18     mission would fall.  It was not just changing the head of a mission.

19             So -- but that's true, we -- that was the main issue at that

20     time, yes.

21        Q.   I just wanted to remind you about the dates, and I may have gone

22     a bit more widely.  But do you agree that it all had to do with Racak

23     basically?

24        A.   Certainly.  No, the visit on the 20th of January, as you say, was

25     because of Racak and the serious situation then that happened with the --

Page 7255

 1     or occurred or resulted in the -- President Milosevic's desire to declare

 2     Mr. Walker persona non grata.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  You will agree with me that you said that at that

 4     time, irrespective of the Racak problem that we will discuss separately,

 5     that the situation was otherwise satisfactory and that people trusted the

 6     KVM as well as that it was successfully implementing its mandate, that

 7     was in late January 1999.  Is that correct?

 8        A.   I wouldn't say that the situation was satisfactory and that we

 9     were fully implementing; I think that is to go too far.  But it's true

10     that the -- there were confidence in us from the local population and

11     that we -- that we felt that we could do -- or else I was told and I saw

12     for myself also that there was a good relationship and that we could do

13     the job that we were supposed to do.  That doesn't mean that they were

14     not reporting along the way about skirmishes and disagreements and

15     problems on -- with both sides, but we felt that we did a useful job,

16     yes.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Today you mentioned a rather unusual way that

18     Mr. Walker informed about Racak regarding yourself.  You said that you

19     learned about that actually from the newspapers.  Am I correct in

20     concluding that?

21        A.   As far as I recall, yes, it was -- anyway, as you say, an unusual

22     way of information.  I -- this broke through the media, and as far as I

23     recall, I also learned it through the media.

24        Q.   Ambassador, don't you think that you, as a chairman-in-office,

25     when talking about this event which has been characterised by many,

Page 7256

 1     including yourself, as a massacre, a report should have first been sent

 2     to you urgently; and then as a political head or political leader of the

 3     OSCE to take a stand on that, instead of Mr. Walker, chief of the staff

 4     in Pristina, doing that?

 5        A.   Yes, I agree with you.  And I told Mr. Walker that very clearly,

 6     that I was not very happy with this incident or the way that he handled

 7     it.  And I also told Mr. Milosevic, because he, of course, wanted to use

 8     this for whatever it was worth and even quite a bit more as I saw it,

 9     that was right.

10             But at the same time, the mishandling of a report system cannot

11     defend or diminish the gravity of what happened in Racak.  And it was, of

12     course, irrelevant for whatever happened.  There are two different

13     questions there of totally different proportions.  And so it didn't

14     excuse what happened, nor President Milosevic's reaction to it, nor his

15     denial of the forensic mission that the OSCE wanted to send; rather to

16     the contrary, at least in my mind.  It strengthened my suspicion that

17     something really wrong had gone on since Mr. Milosevic would not allow

18     the OSCE forensic team to come to the scene immediately.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Let me just ask you this:  On what day did you find

20     out about the Racak incident; do you remember?

21        A.   No, I do not recall.

22        Q.   Well, allow me to remind you.  The incident in Racak took place

23     on the 15th of January, 1999.  Mr. Walker was in Racak on the

24     16th of January, 1999, and held a press conference in Pristina on that

25     same day.  You yourself learned about this from the media, so that could

Page 7257

 1     have been the 16th, on the evening, or the next day, on the 17th, if this

 2     story was covered by the media?

 3        A.   Well, if it is correct what you say, that Mr. Walker had a press

 4     conference on the 16th, I suppose I would have been informed about it on

 5     the 16th; it would have been strange otherwise.

 6        Q.   When was the first time that you had a contact with Mr. Milosevic

 7     after this event?

 8        A.   I do not recall, but I know that I was on the phone, maybe not

 9     with Mr. Milosevic, but with the Foreign Minister Jovanovic very soon

10     because this became then a problem.  And as a result of that, I went as

11     quickly as possible to Belgrade.

12        Q.   A short while ago you told us that you talked to Mr. Milosevic

13     about the OSCE forensic team.  So I would like to know, When was it that

14     you discussed this particular subject with Mr. Milosevic?

15        A.   Well, I discussed it, I remember very clearly when we had this

16     meeting where we also discussed the situation with Walker, but then it

17     was already clear that the OSCE forensic team had not been allowed in.

18             Again, the establishment of a forensic team is not my business.

19     This is, of course, the organisation's business.  And as I said, I spoke

20     to Foreign Minister Jovanovic and I also called Mr. Milosevic on the

21     phone, but if this was then the 17th or the 18th or the 19th, I am not

22     able to recall.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know at all whether the OSCE team ever arrived

24     in Pristina; and if it did, on which date?

25        A.   I cannot tell you the date, sir, but my -- at least I have seen a

Page 7258

 1     report from an OSCE forensic team under, as far as I recall, a Finnish

 2     leadership.  And I think I even, if I recall correctly, spoke to the

 3     person at that time.  So I suppose they arrived.

 4        Q.   We'll come to that document later.  On the 21st January, 1999,

 5     Ambassador, you attended talks in Belgrade.  According to the report that

 6     we are going to see now, I believe that the forensic team on that day was

 7     already in Pristina and was working together with the team who had

 8     already started work there.  Did you know anything about this at that

 9     time or even today?

10        A.   It could very well be.  I know that they worked together with the

11     Belarus team, that there was a contact.  I don't know when they started

12     working or when they finished working, but I know the Finns were -- or

13     the head of the team who was a Finn and, as I said, was dissatisfied and

14     regretted that they could not have been there earlier.  And they claim

15     that the report was not as good as it could have been if they had been on

16     the scene earlier and without having this team from Belarus arriving at

17     an earlier stage and being active there before they came.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know that Mr. Walker was in Racak on the

19     16th January, 1999?

20        A.   Well, he had been to Racak and he had seen -- that was, of

21     course, the whole -- the reason why he had a press conference because he

22     was shocked and he was -- he was very moved.  And that was also what I

23     explained to Mr. Milosevic when I saw him then on the 20th, that -- I

24     mean, whatever you say about reporting procedures, I would say that

25     Mr. Walker's reaction to a certain extent was a very sane one, a normal

Page 7259

 1     one, from any human being that is witnessing something like what had

 2     happened in Racak.  At the same time, you might expect that from head of

 3     a mission and a seasoned ambassador that there are -- that you control

 4     your reactions.  But I -- and, again, to a certain extent I have great

 5     sympathy for Mr. Walker in spite of the fact that I -- this -- criticised

 6     him for the way he had handled it.  But I understand his reaction, so

 7     I -- I think it was a normal reaction from his side, in spite of the fact

 8     that it may not have been very helpful at that time.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  According to some estimates, he headed off towards

10     Racak on the 16th of January, accompanied by 50 journalists and TV crews

11     altogether, and that is when he left Pristina.  Did you know that?

12        A.   I didn't know the number of TV crews or anything like that, but I

13     suppose he was accompanied by some people, yes.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Did Mr. Walker inform you that the KLA were in Racak

15     on the 16th of January and that he talked to the commander of the KLA for

16     the Racak zone?

17        A.   I cannot recall that, but he may very well have done that, but I

18     cannot recall it.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember being informed that as early as on

20     the afternoon of the 15th of January Racak was in the hands of the KLA,

21     that they had control over it?

22        A.   Not that I recall, but visiting Racak later -- and as I mentioned

23     earlier today, I saw that there was no problems, seeing that there had

24     been fighting, so there was obviously fighting that had been going on in

25     that area.  But I'm not now able to testify to any dates.

Page 7260

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Ambassador, were you informed that during the visit

 2     to Racak on the 16th of January, bodies were removed -- moved around,

 3     that casings were picked up as souvenirs, and that the crime scene was

 4     not secured, which resulted in its being polluted?

 5        A.   I was informed, as far as I recall, that the crime scene was not

 6     secured but I was not informed about any of the other details that you

 7     refer to.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Were you informed as to when was it the first time

 9     that the police forces of Republic of Serbia entered Racak and when the

10     crime scene investigation was conducted?

11        A.   That could be, but I cannot recall it.

12        Q.   Thank you.

13             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now please have

14     Defence Exhibit D003-0947 on our screens, please.

15        Q.   Ambassador, I would just like to inform you about one single

16     fact, and that is that the scene-of-crime investigation report was

17     compiled by the investigating judge of the court in Pristina on the

18     18th of January, 1999.  Now I would like to ask you if you knew that

19     Mr. Gil Gilberson and Ed Soleven from the OSCE were present at the scene?

20        A.   I cannot recall that I have been informed about that.

21             JUDGE PARKER:  Ms. Gopalan.

22             MS. GOPALAN:  Your Honours, we do not have a translation of this

23     report, but it would assist us if we are provided with a description of

24     this document.  I'm not sure if the information provided in the question

25     suffices to inform us of what this document is.  So perhaps Defence

Page 7261

 1     counsel could tell us at the very least what this document is.

 2             JUDGE PARKER:  First, Mr. Djurdjic, is there a translation of

 3     this document?

 4             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] It does exist, Your Honours, only

 5     I wasn't aware of that.  And it's D003-0 --

 6             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the counsel please repeat the last four

 7     digits.

 8             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] D004-0035.

 9             JUDGE PARKER:  It appears to be on the screen now, Ms. Gopalan.

10     That should meet your needs.

11             MS. GOPALAN:  Thank you, Your Honours.

12             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I just wanted to

13     emphasize that I'm using this document to put the questions.  I am aware

14     that the ambassador is not familiar with this document.  I only wanted to

15     know whether he know that two OSCE members, Mr. Ed Soleven and

16     Mr. Fantini [as written] Giovanni were present in the course of the

17     on-site investigation in Racak on the 18th of January, 1999, which is to

18     say, on the fourth day after the event.

19        A.   As I said, sir, I do not recall.  But it wouldn't surprise me, so

20     to say -- I mean, this was, of course, a very important event and I would

21     expect the KVM to follow this up very actively.

22        Q.   Thank you, Ambassador, but as I understand, the KVM made all

23     efforts in order to inform you about everything that was going on and

24     then four days after the event, the Serbian authorities entered Racak.

25     Did they inform you why that happened that way?

Page 7262

 1        A.   That could very well be but, sir, again these are actually some

 2     years ago and I do not recall every sequence of this.  I recall very well

 3     when the news broke.  I recall my conversations and negotiations with

 4     Mr. Milosevic.  I recall my later visit to Racak.  All that made a great

 5     impression on me.  Every single detail of what happened in between,

 6     despite of the fact that it was serious and important, I do not recall

 7     because there were other people between me and the actual implementers

 8     that dealt with those on a day-to-day basis.

 9        Q.   I fully understand that, but I perceive you as man number one in

10     the OSCE at the time.

11             Let me ask you one more thing:  Had you ever been informed that

12     the KLA had imposed, or rather, requested a precondition that the Serbian

13     investigating judge should be allowed to enter the scene without any

14     security guards except in the presence and accompaniment of OSCE

15     representatives?

16        A.   That could very well be, sir, but I do not recall.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember that you had received information

18     about the presence of the KLA in Racak and that fighting had been going

19     on?

20        A.   As I said, when I visited Racak later on there was no doubt that

21     there had been fighting going on.  At what time I was informed about that

22     fighting, I do not recall.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Did you ever receive a report from the verifiers that

24     the Serbian forces had reported to the Kosovo Verification Mission that

25     an operation against terrorist forces was going to be launched in Racak?

Page 7263

 1        A.   Not to my recollection.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Did you ever receive a report that former members of

 3     the Kosovo Diplomatic Mission from the United States were supposed to be

 4     at a certain place in Racak on the 15th of January and to observe the

 5     action that was to be taken against the Kosovo Liberation Army and they,

 6     however, did not fulfil that task?

 7        A.   No, I was not and I didn't even know that Kosovo had a diplomatic

 8     mission at that time nor in the United States nor anywhere else.  It was

 9     not an independent state as far as I recall.

10        Q.   Apparently there was a mistake.  The Kosovo Diplomatic Mission of

11     the US.

12        A.   Well, the United States did not have a diplomatic mission in

13     Kosovo either.  I guess they may have had some representatives covering

14     Kosovo from Belgrade, but, as you know, we were all accredited to

15     Belgrade and covered Kosovo from Belgrade and we travelled back and

16     forth.  So I guess the only diplomatic mission that the United States had

17     in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was in Belgrade, but they might

18     have had people looking after the situation in Kosovo, which we otherwise

19     did at that time.

20        Q.   I'm talking about the 15th of January when these people became

21     members of the Kosovo Verification Mission.

22        A.   I'm afraid I don't understand your question, sir.

23        Q.   All right.  Ambassador, what I have just put to you is a

24     statement of one of the verifiers from the KVM.  I wanted to ask you

25     this:  Are you sure that you received accurate and true information about

Page 7264

 1     any situation in general and the situation in Racak in particular?

 2        A.   Yes, I'm fairly certain -- because, you know, we were not only

 3     dependent upon the information from one source, our information and the

 4     information I received came from different sources.  And when we assessed

 5     the overall situation with respect to what had happened in Racak, I think

 6     the sources that I could rely upon and the information that I received

 7     indicated that there had been an action or that had taken place that was

 8     a clear violation of basic human rights and that it was actually carried

 9     out by military forces against civilians.

10             I understand, for instance, that there were found elderly people

11     in the grave and there were found very young, almost children, and so

12     there were not to my understanding -- and there were no -- I was told

13     there were no military uniforms or anything like that on the people.  So

14     it was not -- it could not be put as a result of a military action

15     between two sides.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Ambassador, this very same verifier told us, or

17     rather, stated in his statement that the FRY army was not in Racak.  But

18     let me ask you something different.  Did the report that you saw contain

19     the details of the victims as to their gender, sex, age, et cetera?  Did

20     you see any details of that kind?

21        A.   It's, again, difficult to remember, but I remember, as I just

22     said, that I was told that the -- or the information I received indicated

23     at least that the group was not a typical military group.  And so I was

24     told about the age of the people and also about the sex of some of them.

25     So -- but exactly how old they were and how many there were under each

Page 7265

 1     gender, I was not -- well, I may have been told, but I don't recall it.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  There was only one female aged, I believe, 19,

 3     perished in this incident, and I think she's been buried at the cemetery

 4     of the KLA.  And there was one young boy, 15 to 16 years of age.  All the

 5     rest of them were adult males.  Has anyone ever told you this what I just

 6     told you, or did you possibly have this information at the time?

 7        A.   I had the impression -- I don't recall the number of females and

 8     males.  I remember -- I was told that there were -- may have been just

 9     one female then.  I also was told that there was a young boy.  But I also

10     was told that there were elderly men that one was -- didn't think would

11     be in any kind of military service.  But the number and the age, I may

12     have been told, but I do not recall.

13        Q.   Now you have put me into a very uncomfortable situation.  What do

14     you mean when you say "elderly" people?  Please, where do you draw the

15     line when you say this person is fit for military service age-wise?

16        A.   I can assure you, sir, that that line has changed considerably

17     over the years.  So the elderly become older and older according to me.

18     But -- so I can't remember exactly at that time 11 years ago I --

19     probably the line was somewhat lower than what it is today.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Let's move on.  We still have a little time before

21     the break, so I'll ask you about Racak.

22             Tell me, how come that Mr. Walker decided on his own, without

23     your consent, to hold this press conference and to provide the

24     information that he did?  So he didn't obtain prior consent from you as

25     the chairman-in-office of the OSCE?

Page 7266

 1        A.   Well, I guess you have to ask Mr. Walker about that to get the

 2     real answer.  What he told me and what I accepted and understand was that

 3     he was so outraged about what he saw and he was so upset that he -- he

 4     could not wait, so to say, to make this known.  He felt that this was

 5     very important.  So it was, as he explained it, a human reaction to

 6     something that he found was outrageous.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Ambassador, do you know that trenches had been dug

 8     around Racak, that there were fortifications there of military type?  Did

 9     you know that?

10        A.   That could be, but I must admit that I don't recall that now, but

11     there -- I don't know.  I don't recall it.

12        Q.   Thank you.  I believe that General Maisonneuve and

13     General Drewienkiewicz was photographed -- the whole area of Racak was

14     photographed on the 16th.  Have you ever seen this footage of Racak?

15        A.   As far as I recall, I saw some pictures, yes.  Whether those are

16     the pictures you refer to, I don't know, but I saw some pictures, yes.

17        Q.   Thank you.

18             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours --

19             JUDGE PARKER:  Is that a convenient time, Mr. Djurdjic?  We will

20     have the second break now, and we will resume at five minutes before

21     1.00.

22             THE WITNESS:  Your Honours, may I just -- I hope the

23     representative of the Defence knows that I have only today.  I'm afraid I

24     can't make many more days available, so that you may inform him that he

25     has to put the important questions to me during the course of today.

Page 7267

 1             JUDGE PARKER:  You'll be pleased to know that was done yesterday.

 2             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 3             JUDGE PARKER:  And we will finish at 1.45 today.

 4             THE WITNESS:  Thank you very much, Your Honour.

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  And that, of course, will allow some time to

 6     Ms. Gopalan.

 7                           --- Recess taken at 12.29 p.m.

 8                           --- On resuming at 12.57 p.m.

 9             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes, Mr. Djurdjic.

10             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

11        Q.   Ambassador, I'm so sorry to hear that you have to leave because I

12     need to speed things up, but let's finish with the topic of Racak.  Were

13     you informed by anyone that the KVM representatives, Mr. Henry and

14     Mr. Pedersen were present when the bodies were exhumed and once the

15     autopsies were under way?

16        A.   I remember the name Mr. Pedersen.  That could be, but I -- again,

17     I must admit that I do not recall.  You know, to repeat myself, I was not

18     informed about all the details with this respect.

19        Q.   Thank you.  You were informed by Ms. Helena Ranta who was the

20     head of the forensic team from Finland.  Did you know that she said that

21     there were no signs of mutilation on the bodies?

22        A.   I don't exactly remember what she said, but what I remember from

23     the report was that they regretted that they had come in late and that

24     there were -- they had problems in part of the verification because of

25     that.

Page 7268

 1        Q.   Thank you.  I absolutely agree because one needs certain other

 2     elements in addition to the autopsy to have a complete expertise.  Did

 3     you know that the bodies were transferred from the location to a mosque

 4     and the investigating judge found the bodies in that mosque and that

 5     subsequently the corpses were transferred to the Forensic Institute?

 6        A.   I'm not certain about the mosque.  I heard that the bodies were

 7     transferred, if they were, to this Forensic Institute, whether that was

 8     via a mosque or not, I am not able to confirm that I knew.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Just one brief question:  Did you know that

10     Mr. Walker threw a pencil at Ms. Helena Ranta during their conversations

11     when he found -- when he saw the findings of the forensic team?

12        A.   That he threw a pencil at her?  No, I was not informed about

13     that.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Did you know that he exercised pressure as well as

15     the Finnish foreign minister exercised pressure on her in order to change

16     the findings of her forensic team?

17        A.   No, I was not informed about that.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Have you read the book she wrote concerning Racak and

19     the work of the team?  It goes a few years back.

20        A.   No, I haven't.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Let's move on.

22             Ambassador, am I right in saying that the Yugoslav delegation in

23     Rambouillet accepted the agreement that was tabled by the Contact Group?

24        A.   The first -- the draft agreement that we saw earlier, that I was

25     shown earlier, that was tabled on the 20 -- or that we had then

Page 7269

 1     discussions on February -- I guess it was dated the 23rd of February.

 2     That -- to my knowledge, that was accepted or not accepted, but it was

 3     positively received by the delegation.

 4             As you will know, I was not part of the Contact Group, so I

 5     didn't participate in the day-to-day negotiations.  I was called in

 6     twice, once then in Rambouillet and once later on in Paris, to sit with

 7     the members of the Contact Group and the two delegations.  But when it

 8     was decided then to have this recess, my understanding was that the

 9     Yugoslav delegation was fairly positive to the draft, yes.

10        Q.   Do you agree that the talks were interrupted because the members

11     of the Kosovo delegation belonging to the KLA had to consult with the

12     commanders in the field first before signing the agreement in

13     Rambouillet?

14        A.   Whether they wanted to consult with the commanders in the field

15     or not, I don't know exactly, but they wanted to have consultations, yes.

16     But my understanding was also that the Serb or the Yugoslav delegation

17     needed to confirm or to have an approval that they -- I'm not certain

18     that they have the full mandate to sign there and then.

19        Q.   Thank you, Ambassador.  You know very well that any agreement

20     that is originally signed subsequently needs to be ratified by the state

21     assembly.  In any case, let us move on to another topic.

22             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have D157 next.

23        Q.   Ambassador, we will see a KVM report of the 26th of February for

24     the period until the 4th of March, 1999.  The first page, the first two

25     paragraphs under the heading "KLA," were you informed about the fact that

Page 7270

 1     in the Djeneral Jankovic area a hundred KLA members crossed the border,

 2     entering it?

 3        A.   Yes, probably -- I don't know.  I can't remember if there were a

 4     hundred and all that, but I was informed about different violations, yes,

 5     yes.

 6        Q.   Have a look at bullet point 1.  Were you -- did you know that

 7     they were actually supporting a mass movement of refugees so as to have

 8     that portrayed as one of the consequences of the Serb offensive?

 9        A.   Well, I -- well, I was informed about violations.  As I said, if

10     I was in detail informed about exactly what was going on, I'm not

11     certain.  And as I said earlier, I was not actually privy to all these

12     reports because they went to Vienna.  But there is no doubt that there

13     were violations on both sides, and we opposed both sides in that respect.

14        Q.   Thank you, but I believe this is an important point.  The KLA

15     first acted and then manipulated the internal displaced persons so as to

16     paint a picture of a humanitarian catastrophe and to persuade the

17     international community that the FRY were in violation of the agreement,

18     hence providing an excuse for the international forces to intervene.  In

19     my view, that is very important.

20        A.   Well, sir, they were not very successful then because according

21     to this report we knew what they were doing.  So that was not any reason

22     for any kind of international intervention because they were -- this

23     is -- as you told me, this is a KVM report and it clearly says that there

24     is manipulation by the KLA.  So if the KLA wanted to manipulate us, they

25     were unsuccessful in manipulating us.

Page 7271

 1        Q.   I think they were successful because on the 1st or 2nd of March,

 2     when you arrived in Kosovo, that the situation had deteriorated

 3     significantly, that you saw many IDPs, and that you believed that the KVM

 4     was no longer able to fulfil its mandate?

 5        A.   Well, sir, with all due respect, even though this may have been

 6     the case, and I don't doubt that because I say we knew there were

 7     breaches of the agreement on both sides, we -- I mean, I had with me

 8     experts and people from the mission that actually could distinguish who

 9     was doing what at what time and where, so we were not that easily fooled.

10        Q.   Very well.  But the world media carried the information they

11     received from Albanian sources, and that is how the world public opinion

12     was being created.

13        A.   Well, I did not base my decisions on public opinion, sir, and you

14     will know that the world media misinforms us every day, so that's nothing

15     new.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Did you know that the staff of the KVM as one of the

17     sources of information used the media, i.e., the people working for the

18     various media?

19        A.   Of course we used media as a source of information in Kosovo, but

20     we also, as you will know, as long as we managed with -- as long as we

21     could have people out in the field, we had field representatives.  That's

22     the strength of the OSCE.  That's the situation even in Kosovo today.  So

23     it means that we have people in the local villages that can inform us

24     directly, so we're not dependent upon second-hand sources for our

25     information.

Page 7272

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Page 2, please.  There should be

 3     something saying:

 4             "On other locations ..."

 5             Can we go back to page 1 in the English version, the first page,

 6     please.  The second page.

 7        Q.   The part that reads:

 8             "On other locations the KLA forces in the Podujevo area managed

 9     to carry out an attack in the town itself - effectively taking the fight

10     to the Serbs ..."

11             Do you see that part?

12        A.   No, sir, where are you?

13             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note, the heading is actually

14     "Elsewhere."

15             THE WITNESS:  Yes, I see that, mm-hmm.

16             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Ambassador, it was precisely at the time of your visit in

18     Pristina and when you were taken to Podujevo.  At that time, the KLA

19     liberated the city, the town, from their point of view, of course.  Did

20     you know that at the time when you were in Pristina on the 2nd of March?

21        A.   I think even on the 2nd of March I went to Podujevo, as far as I

22     recall, and I think that the reason why we went there was they had

23     been -- that the KVM had been very actively involved there.  And also

24     that this was the time, as far as I recall, that we also saw the KLA

25     position and the VJ position.  So I visited both sides and we were told

Page 7273

 1     about the military activities in that area as far as I recall.

 2        Q.   Such activities in which the KLA attacked and took over Podujevo?

 3        A.   Well, I'm not certain that I understand your question, whether I

 4     was informed about KLA activities; is that the question?

 5        Q.   You just read the part in which it is stated that the KLA managed

 6     to enter Podujevo.

 7        A.   Yeah -- well, yes, I -- again, I know that we visited Podujevo

 8     because -- because that was an important area for the KVM and they wanted

 9     to show me that area and the activities.  What I was told, with all due

10     respect, ten years ago or even more than ten years ago, I must admit, I

11     do not recall.

12        Q.   Thank you.  And it is then that you saw the destroyed roofs of

13     houses?

14        A.   Yes, then and on later occasions, yes.

15        Q.   Thank you.

16             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Page 5 of the document, please.

17        Q.   Can you please look at the part titled "Assessment" and then what

18     follows.  Am I right in saying that the subheading is:

19             "KLA:  Exploiting the media."

20             And that from this KVM report it is clear that:

21             "... ethnic Albanians will continue to work on international

22     sympathy for their cause.  The plight of the IDPs remain their strongest

23     weapon ..."

24             Were you familiar with that?

25        A.   Yes, I suppose I was.  I can't remember that sentence, but we

Page 7274

 1     were, of course, very well informed that KLA used the situation for their

 2     cause and this was also one of my arguments when I spoke to

 3     President Milosevic, that he should be cooperating with us because I

 4     couldn't see that he had anything to lose from working with us and

 5     accepting our cooperation.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Please look at the last sentence in this conclusion:

 7             "The KLA are unlikely to wish to provoke another Racak.

 8     Therefore, the provocations will be in areas they are confident of either

 9     defending or at least free of retribution."

10             Were you informed of that, that is to say that there was

11     information available to the effect that Racak was a provocation to be

12     exploited with the media?

13        A.   I may have been told about this report.  I don't recall that.

14     But even if there was a provocation, which I think happened quite often

15     from the KLA side, I think a proper army or a proper police force, like

16     the Yugoslav Army and the Yugoslav police cannot use provocation as an

17     excuse for attack on civilians.

18        Q.   Very well.  When the KLA does that and when they say it was done

19     by the FRY forces, it seems that, again, it was upon the FRY to deal with

20     that.

21             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] In any case, could we please move

22     on to P847, item 4, please.

23        Q.   Ambassador, this is a KVM report of the 15th of March, 1999.

24     Please look at item 4, sub-item (a).  Did you know that after the KLA

25     entered the area of Kacanik the KLA commander prohibited the UNHCR to

Page 7275

 1     evacuate the IDPs there and the KVM interpreted that as an attempt to use

 2     the Albanian civilians as a live shield, human shield?

 3        A.   If I was particularly informed about this incident, I am not

 4     certain but that could very well be.  I was briefed on a daily basis on

 5     the deterioration of the situation.  And as I said earlier, this was a

 6     deterioration that was caused by a lack of -- lack of cooperation with us

 7     from both sides.  But we were there partly to monitor the situation but

 8     also partly to protect the civilians.  And because of this lack of

 9     cooperation, we could not protect the civilians and the whole reason for

10     our withdrawal was that we could not fulfil our mandate.  So this only

11     underlines my decision to withdraw.

12             And also, if you allow me, sir, this was one of my arguments when

13     I had my conversation and discussions with President Milosevic.  Why

14     couldn't he cooperate with us?  If the culprits were KLA, if the culprits

15     were on the other side and the perpetrators, then of course it could be

16     in his interest to open up the Kosovo region to an international military

17     observer force.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Am I not right in saying that it was in the interests

19     of the KLA to have the situation destabilised in order for international

20     forces to enter Kosovo?  That was their goal in view of their ultimate

21     goal of having an independent Kosovo, since having a foreign military

22     presence there would basically be a statement to the effect that this was

23     no longer territory of the FRY?

24        A.   But if, with all due respect, President Milosevic did not

25     [Realtime transcript read in error missing word "not"] want an

Page 7276

 1     independent Kosovo, it should have been definitely in his interests to

 2     cooperate with us in order to have the international force there because

 3     then we could have avoided the war and we could have also, I think,

 4     avoided an independent Kosovo.

 5        Q.   Ambassador, I don't want to go into politics.  I'd like to stay

 6     with the facts during that time.  Conclusions are then left to the Court.

 7     I especially want to steer clear of any political conclusions.  The

 8     situation on the 1st of March was destabilised.  You see from the

 9     documents I showed you that the KLA wanted to provoke a destabilisation.

10     To corroborate that, I would like to move to P1076 and this will have to

11     do with your response having to do with the military presence.

12        A.   But, please, if you allow me, sir, one comment before we move on.

13        Q.   Be brief, please.

14        A.   I will be very brief, but you -- with all due respect, you speak

15     to politician -- I was a politician at that time.  I'm not a politician

16     any longer.  So my -- I was not a monitor.  My task was to find a

17     political solution to this conflict, and, of course, I used political

18     arguments in my conversation with Milosevic.

19        Q.   I agree with that.  You were the most prominent political figure

20     at the time in Europe.  Ultimately it was you who decided to withdraw the

21     KVM.  Let's look at this document of the 1st of March, 1999, when you

22     were in Belgrade.  In item 2, have a look of what the KVM report was on

23     the results of your visit to Belgrade.

24             Ambassador, am I right in saying that you insisted on NATO forces

25     entering Serbia in your discussions with Milosevic at least according to

Page 7277

 1     this KVM report, NATO, military forces, that is to say?

 2        A.   I insisted on -- I don't think it says NATO -- well, deployment

 3     of NATO-led military force.  That was what we wanted.  Yes, that is true.

 4     Of course I insisted on that because that was the only solution we saw to

 5     avoiding a war.  And I explained to Mr. Milosevic that it would be upon

 6     his invitation and it would be a situation which was similar to other

 7     countries where you have an international military presence.  So it would

 8     not be any kind of undermining his authority or anything like that, but

 9     it would be assisting him in keeping law and order and in avoiding the

10     conflict that we saw looming.

11        Q.   Why NATO forces?  Why didn't you turn to the UN so that it could

12     define the mandate of these international military forces?  You insisted

13     on the NATO forces.  To cut things brief, Norway was at the time a member

14     of the NATO Pact and it was implementing both NATO policies and

15     OSCE policy?

16        A.   Sir, with all due respect, I think I managed to keep the two hats

17     separately.  I was very consistent and concerned that I should be the

18     OSCE chairman-in-office when I -- when I acted as the

19     OSCE chairman-in-office and not the foreign minister of a NATO country.

20     It is quite right that Norway is a member of NATO.

21             At that time, and even today, you will know that the

22     United Nations do not have capacity to be very actively involved

23     militarily, and it was agreed that the most likely and the only realistic

24     military force available on short notice - and we needed a force on short

25     notice - would be NATO forces.  So this was not undermining the

Page 7278

 1     United Nations.

 2             You would also remember that both the chairman of the national --

 3     of the Assembly of the United Nations and also the Secretary-General

 4     referred to this as a viable solution.

 5        Q.   Doesn't it strike you as cynical -- well, on the 24th when you

 6     had a telephone conversation you said, Invite NATO forces and then we

 7     will not bomb you, then that would constitute a voluntary invitation so

 8     as to prevent the war from taking place?

 9        A.   No, sir.  With all due respect, I did not find that cynical at

10     all.  I found it a moral obligation.  Mr. Milosevic had over the years --

11     and even harassed, intimidated, misused his power against a people in

12     Europe.  We could not, as European states, watch this going on without

13     losing our -- any kind of moral authority.  So we were forced by

14     Mr. Milosevic's lack of willingness to cooperate with us to do what we

15     did.

16        Q.   Who decided that the FRY should be attacked?

17        A.   Well, that -- well, first of all, there were discussion in the --

18     what you would call the international community because there was a

19     discussion in the United Nations about this.  We did not reach, as you

20     will know, a Security Council Resolution on that, which I do regret.  I

21     think there should have been a proper UN mandate for this.  We did not

22     reach that.

23             At the same time, there were what we call Chapter 7 language in

24     the UN both and by the Secretary-General and the Chairman of the Assembly

25     of the United Nations, which in my view gave the necessary basis for

Page 7279

 1     the -- to start the war.  And the reason for that was that we were afraid

 2     that this could spread to the region.  This was not any longer just an

 3     internal Yugoslav matter; it was a matter of regional dimension, which

 4     then gives, according to the UN Charter, the right of the international

 5     community to intervene.  So it was an intervention based on the fear of a

 6     major catastrophe for the whole region.

 7        Q.   Ambassador, that was a very comprehensive answer.  If I

 8     understand correctly, it was not the UN that decided the -- that the FRY

 9     be attacked.  They actually opposed it.  So who was it precisely who

10     decided that the FRY be attacked?

11        A.   The decision to go to war was, as you very well know, sir, taken

12     by NATO.  But I would not say, when you have the statements by the

13     Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Chairman of the Assembly,

14     I would not say that the United Nations was opposed.  As you know, there

15     were different views and Russia is a permanent -- and China are

16     Permanent Members of the Security Council and they can lay down vetoes.

17     And it was not possible to get a Security Council Resolution for this.

18     But to say that the UN, as such, was opposed, I would beg to disagree

19     with you, sir.

20        Q.   Contrary to the UN Charter - I don't mean you, but rather NATO -

21     decided to launch an attack on the FRY; am I right?  Just yes or no so

22     that we can move on.

23        A.   No.

24        Q.   Thank you, thank you.  So you worked in compliance with

25     international law.  Let's move on.  Did Mr. Walker used to inform you

Page 7280

 1     about his meetings with some international figures such as the

 2     Chief of Staff of the KLA?

 3        A.   Not that I recall, but I suppose he had meetings with a number of

 4     actors on the ground and should; that was why he was there.  He had

 5     meetings with the representatives of the federal Yugoslav government and,

 6     of course, local authorities and KLA.  It was part of his job.

 7        Q.   That's not what I'm asking you.  I'm asking about officials

 8     outside the FRY, representatives of Russia and other countries.  So that

 9     which went beyond the mission's mandate in the FRY?

10        A.   That he had meetings with the Russia government; is that what you

11     are meaning?  Yeah, well -- no, not -- well, that could be.  I must

12     admit, I don't recall with whom he had meetings.  He might have had a

13     number of meetings.  He was of course an interesting person at that time

14     and we had a number of delegations coming to Kosovo, governmental

15     delegations, and there would probably be governmental representatives

16     from a number of countries.  So I wouldn't be surprised if he also met

17     with Russian representatives.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Did he inform you about his meeting with

19     General Ivashov who, at that time, I believe was at the head of the

20     political department of the Russian Ministry of Defence?

21        A.   Not that I recall, sir.

22        Q.   Do you remember at all that there were objections raised by

23     Russian officials concerning the way in which the KVM wrote its report

24     and also that Mr. Walker was liaising and maintaining contacts with

25     members of the KLA?

Page 7281

 1        A.   Not particularly links with KLA.  That -- I can't remember that I

 2     heard that.  I had discussions and meetings with then-Foreign Minister

 3     Igor Ivanov, the Russian foreign minister, where he complained about

 4     Walker, yes, and he was dissatisfied with the way he was running the

 5     mission.  And we had discussions with that which I then took up also with

 6     Walker.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  When the KVM left Kosovo and Metohija on the

 8     20th of March and the war started, they did have liaison officers for

 9     NATO; right?

10        A.   There were maybe some liaison officers for NATO in the KVM, I

11     don't know, but that -- yes, I guess -- well, I must admit, I don't

12     recall exactly that but that would not be so surprising maybe.

13        Q.   And do you know what was their assignment?  I'm talking about

14     these liaison officers who liaised between the KVM and NATO?

15        A.   Well, I suppose their assignment was what any liaison officer's

16     assignment is, to keep links open between one organisation and another.

17        Q.   Do you know that the KVM liaison officers used to hand over

18     information received from the KLA to NATO for the purpose of prosecuting

19     a war against the FRY?

20        A.   No, I'm not informed about that.

21        Q.   Do you know people -- a man called Richard Ciaglinski and

22     David Meyer from the KVM?

23        A.   I can't recall those names, no.

24        Q.   Have you ever heard that a letter from the KLA was dispatched and

25     sent to General Clark from the Main Staff of the KLA through the liaison

Page 7282

 1     officer at the KVM?

 2        A.   Not that I recall.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Ambassador, do you know that during the war, members

 4     of the KVM used to go back to their respective home countries and hold

 5     press conferences there?

 6        A.   No, I was not -- I suppose that they would go home to their home

 7     countries from time to time, but I was not informed about press

 8     conferences that I can recall anyway.

 9        Q.   Did you ever allow anyone in your country to hold a conference --

10     press conference during the war in your capacity of the

11     chairman-in-office?

12        A.   Anyone from the KVM to come and hold a press conference in

13     Norway?  Well, as foreign minister you like to hold the press conferences

14     yourself.

15        Q.   You didn't understand me, Ambassador.  Did you allow any member

16     of the KVM to go back to their home country, Great Britain, Germany,

17     et cetera, and hold a press conference there in their Ministry of Defence

18     or whatever?  Do you know of any such case?

19        A.   No, I don't know that I gave that permission ever.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Let me now read certain portions from a press

21     conference, and I would like you to tell me whether you are familiar with

22     that at all.

23             "As you know, 12 days ago we were ordered to leave.  Up until

24     then we maintained contact with the KLA.  The air-strikes have positive

25     effects on the ground.  The attack launched by the Serbs two days ago

Page 7283

 1     near Malisevo has been seriously hampered by air-strikes because four

 2     tanks and one artillery placement were destroyed ..."

 3             Did you have any of this information at your disposal while you

 4     held your position as a chairman-in-office?

 5        A.   I'm not certain that I understand what you refer to, sir, but if

 6     you say "12 days ago we were ordered to leave ..." of course then this

 7     was not during the KVM presence and activity this was afterwards.  So I

 8     don't know exactly when people were released of their duty.  But I would

 9     say it's quite different if you hold a press conference after you have

10     left mission or while you are on mission, so I think your argument, with

11     all due respect -- well, I don't understand it.  But, yeah -- I don't

12     understand it is my short answer.

13        Q.   Ambassador, you have understood perfectly.  These are speaking

14     notes of Mr. Drewienkiewicz for his press conference in the

15     Ministry of Defence in London, either on the 31st of March or the

16     1st of April, 1992 -- 1999.

17             Thank you very much for answering my questions, and I'm very

18     sorry that I had to shorten it due to your other commitments.

19             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.  With

20     this I conclude my cross-examination.

21             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you very much, Mr. Djurdjic.

22             Ms. Gopalan.

23             MS. GOPALAN:  Just a few questions, Your Honours.

24                           Re-examination by Ms. Gopalan:

25        Q.   Sir, I have a number of clarificatory questions arising from

Page 7284

 1     Defence counsel's cross-examination.  This relates to your visit to

 2     Kosovo in March 1999.  You were asked about the date on which you went to

 3     Kosovo during that period.  Now, when the question was put to you,

 4     reference was made to a chronology of events by Defence counsel.  I

 5     wonder if I could show you that chronology of events and perhaps that

 6     might assist you in remembering when it was you went to Kosovo in

 7     March 1999.

 8             MS. GOPALAN:  I believe Defence counsel was referring to P844, if

 9     we could have that up on the screen, please.  And if we could go to

10     page 6.  If we could zoom in on that.  I believe this page sets out the

11     chronology of events from February onwards and also the early part of

12     March.

13        Q.   If you could glance at the document and let us know if this helps

14     you remember when it was you made your visit to Kosovo in March 1999,

15     before the war.

16        A.   Well, this ends on my screen with the 5th of March, but it says

17     clearly that I visited on the 2nd of March, visit of the

18     chairman-in-office of review planning for the new mandate.

19        Q.   So I take it, then, that your visit to Kosovo was on the

20     2nd of March?

21        A.   I suppose so, yes -- well, it doesn't -- these dates don't go

22     further than the 5th, so I don't know if it says anything about my visit

23     later on --

24        Q.   We can go on to the next page if that helps you.

25        A.   Since I'm not mentioned at all here, I suppose that the

Page 7285

 1     2nd of March must have been my last visit before the war.

 2        Q.   Thank you, sir.  And just to clarify, you gave some evidence on

 3     what you saw during your visit to Kosovo in March in relation to villages

 4     around Podujevo and civilians, et cetera.  Did you view, observe, these

 5     incidents during this trip that we just spoke about, the one on the

 6     2nd of March?

 7        A.   That is correct.

 8        Q.   And am I correct that your subsequent visits to Kosovo in March

 9     were after the bombing?

10        A.   Yes, and they were not then in March, they were later on, because

11     as you know the bombing started on the 24th of March.  So I came back

12     then after the war, and I must admit I don't know exactly when.  It could

13     have been in July.

14        Q.   Thank you, sir.  Sir, I don't have any further questions for you.

15     Thank you very much for coming to testify.

16             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you, Ms. Gopalan.

17                           [Trial Chamber confers]

18             JUDGE PARKER:  Could I mention for the transcript that perhaps in

19     fairness to the memory of President Milosevic, page 79, line 1, a word

20     "not" has been omitted.  I think what was being said by the witness was:

21             "If President Milosevic did not want an independent Kosovo ..."

22             It would be problematic if we left the transcript uncorrected in

23     that material matter.

24             May I thank you, Ambassador, for your attendance once again, for

25     the assistance that you have been able to give, and, of course, you may

Page 7286

 1     now return to your normal activities.

 2             THE WITNESS:  Thank you very much, Your Honour.

 3                           [The witness withdrew]

 4             JUDGE PARKER:  I would thank counsel for their attention to time

 5     today.  We continue on Monday with the videolink evidence that has been

 6     arranged.  I think it's sitting in the afternoon, 2.15.  We now adjourn.

 7                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m.,

 8                           to be reconvened on Monday, the 13th day of

 9                           July, 2009, at 2.15 p.m.