Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 8673

 1                           Tuesday, 1 September 2009

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 2.16 p.m.

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  Good afternoon.

 6             Mr. Hannis.

 7             MR. HANNIS:  Thank you, Your Honours.  I did want to bring up

 8     some procedural matters before we had the witness in.  The next witness

 9     will be Colonel Michael Phillips.  He is a Rule 70 witness.  Pursuant to

10     your decision of 14 May, Prosecution was granted leave to add him as a

11     witness.  And you ordered certain conditions regarding his testimony.

12             A, was that his testimony be limited to topics that were listed

13     in Annex A to that decision.  B, that cross-examination was limited to

14     the scope of direct, and issues of credibility.  C, that the witness

15     could decline to answer certain questions on grounds of confidentiality.

16     D, that representatives of the Rule 70 provider would be allowed to sit

17     in.

18             And I will indicate that there are two Your Honour, one is

19     Ms. Karen Johnson and Elisa Skibsrud, S-k-i-b-s-r-u-d.  And I believe the

20     arrangements that are Ms. Skibsrud will be sitting next to the witness,

21     and Ms. Johnson will be sitting beside us over here on the Prosecution

22     side.

23             And E - and this a remainder for myself, the Defence, and

24     everyone else - that if there are questions concerning the contents of

25     Colonel Phillips' notebook that those questions should take place in

Page 8674

 1     private session.  Likewise if there's questions concerning his notes of

 2     his interview.  And that any pages of those notebooks, if they are to be

 3     tendered into evidence, they should be tendered under seal.  The Rule 70

 4     provider then would review the transcript of any private or closed

 5     session and any documents tendered under seal with an eye to releasing as

 6     much as possible.

 7             I understand this was the same procedure that was followed with

 8     the witness Shaun Byrnes.  And if there are no questions about that,

 9     Your Honour, then I have three other matters concerning some of the

10     documents I want to use with this witness, if I can raise that now.

11             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

12             MR. HANNIS:  First of all, I would like to seek leave to add

13     seven documents, these are KDOM reports.  The 65 ter numbers are 05354

14     through 05360.  There are a total of seven of them.  And my application

15     would basically echo what Ms. Kravetz presented to Your Honours in

16     connection with some KDOM reports that she sought leave to add at

17     transcript page 8153.  These are contemporaneous reports that were

18     prepared by US KDOM.  They relate directly to the evidence of this

19     witness.  They were all written, I think, in February and March of 1999.

20             JUDGE PARKER:  Are these reports different from those Ms. Kravetz

21     used?

22             MR. HANNIS:  No, they're not.

23             JUDGE PARKER:  They are the same ones?

24             MR. HANNIS:  They're from the same source.  They were published

25     on the website --

Page 8675

 1             JUDGE PARKER:  I mean, are they the same reports, or are they

 2     different reports?

 3             MR. HANNIS:  They're different reports for different days but

 4     from the same source and published on the US Department of State website

 5     and similar in all other fashion.  Also we --

 6             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.  I was going to get Mr. Djurdjic's

 7     reaction to that proposal.

 8             MR. HANNIS:  Sorry.

 9             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.  Let's go

10     one thing at a time since Mr. Hannis raised a number of issues.  I object

11     to the introduction of these documents through this witness.  This

12     witness has nothing to do with the US KDOM, he was a member of the KVM,

13     that is to say the mission founded by the OSCE.  It has nothing to do

14     with any KDOM reports.  And he did not forward any such reports to the

15     State Department.  If I understood properly, he was an international

16     official not a State Department official.  To conclude, I think I have

17     two out of the seven reports which are exclusively State Department

18     reports, not even KDOM reports.  The 6th and the 7th report, that is.

19             We particularly object to those, and it encompasses the period

20     which is not covered at all by the topics you set out.  Also expanding

21     evidence in such a way deviates from your decision and the decision as it

22     stood in the Milutinovic case.  Not even in the summary under 65 ter, the

23     statement summary, mentions some of the things that we received in the

24     e-mail we received yesterday from the Prosecution.

25             If such evidence was supposed to be led and introduced, they

Page 8676

 1     should have used Mr. Byrnes who remained a KDOM member until the end

 2     working for the State Department at the same time.

 3             This witness did not work for his government, and such documents

 4     cannot be tendered through him.  This is what we object to.

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.

 6             Mr. Hannis.

 7             MR. HANNIS:  Thank you.  In reply, I should indicate to my

 8     learned friend that the two he has the strongest objection to are 05361

 9     and 05362; I'm not offering those, Your Honours.  Those were reports for

10     the 31st of March, 1999, and the 5th of April, 1999.  Upon review, I saw

11     that those were not from KDOM, those were State Department.  They were

12     posted after Colonel Phillips had left Kosovo, so I'm not tendering

13     those.

14             As for the others, yes, they are KDOM reports but I think the

15     witness's evidence will be that he did receive these when he was working

16     in KVM, he had a chance to review them.  And what I propose to do with

17     those is I want to show him some of the entries in there about general

18     happenings in terms of activity of the VJ and the MUP in February and

19     March 1999 and ask if that's consistent with what he personally observed

20     and/or what he was getting from his own sources of information in KVM.

21                           [Trial Chamber confers]

22             JUDGE PARKER:  The documents proposed by Mr. Hannis to be added

23     to the list will be added to the Rule 65 ter list.

24             Can I be clear, Mr. Hannis, is it five or seven?

25             MR. HANNIS:  It is seven, Your Honour.  There were originally

Page 8677

 1     nine on my list.

 2             JUDGE PARKER:  The two mentioned by Mr. Djurdjic would have made

 3     it nine.

 4             MR. HANNIS:  Correct.

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  Good.  Well it's seven that are added to your

 6     list, not nine?

 7             MR. HANNIS:  Correct.  Thank you.  I would also seek leave to add

 8     65 ter number 05364.  This is a document which contains excerpts from

 9     Colonel Phillips' notebooks covering the time-period from

10     9 December, 1998, through 12 February, 1999.  It's been disclosed to the

11     Defence.  This was something that we only -- I don't know the date, but

12     we only recently received approval from the provider to us.  I don't know

13     if Mr. Djurdjic has any objection to that.

14             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I think Mr. Hannis knows better

15     than I do what happened with these documents in the Milutinovic case.

16     But since we realise that Mr. Hannis wanted to use these excerpts, we are

17     going to as well.  The Defence in the Milutinovic case used certain

18     excerpts from the notes by Mr. Phillips.  That is during the period when

19     he was in Kosovo before the 19th of February, I think.  That is the

20     period that he is supposed to testify about.

21             JUDGE PARKER:  You are quite correct, Mr. Djurdjic.  Not only may

22     you use this document, but you can use any of the other seven if you

23     think it's of relevance to your case.  They become available in the case

24     being on that list.

25             Yes, Mr. Hannis.

Page 8678

 1             MR. HANNIS:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 2             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be added to the list as well.

 3             MR. HANNIS:  Thank you.  And lastly before we have the witness

 4     in, regarding his prior transcript when application was made to have him

 5     as a 92 ter witness, that transcript -- the full transcript including

 6     some closed-session portions was given the number P1215.  Even though it

 7     has not been admitted yet.  At the time, though, when it was uploaded in

 8     e-court, I think we inadvertently omitted ten pages because of a break

 9     when discussions were taking place during his closed-session testimony.

10     We seek leave to add those ten pages.  And then once I've gone through

11     the appropriate questions with him about whether he can verify whether

12     that's correct, then I will be moving to add P1215 as an exhibit under

13     92 ter.  But that one would need to be under seal because it contains the

14     closed session portions of his testimony.  And then I need to seek leave

15     to add 05343.01 which is a public redacted version of that prior

16     testimony.

17             JUDGE PARKER:  Taking the bit we can deal with right now, the

18     P1215 may have added to it the omitted pages.

19             MR. HANNIS:  Thank you.  And that concludes my --

20             JUDGE PARKER:  Splendid.  Are we ready for the witness?

21             MR. HANNIS:  We are, Your Honour.

22             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.  While the witness is being brought in,

23     could I just be sure that you are aware of our admonition yesterday to

24     Ms. Kravetz that we must finish this witness by tomorrow evening.

25             MR. HANNIS:  Yes, she did bass that on to me, Your Honour.

Page 8679

 1             JUDGE PARKER:  Not by tomorrow evening but by tomorrow at 1.45.

 2             MR. HANNIS:  I understand.  I may go into the second session

 3     today, but not very long, I hope.  I believe that will leave adequate

 4     time for the Defence.

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  You leave plenty of time for Mr. Djurdjic, that's

 6     the message.

 7             MR. HANNIS:  I will.

 8             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

 9             Mr. Djurdjic.

10             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Based on my previous experience

11     with Mr. Hannis, I do not believe the last part of what he said.  In any

12     case, was this disclosed to the Defence?  Was that a mistake concerning

13     the ten pages of transcript which did not make the record?  Did we

14     receive the whole set?  Yes, I guess so.  Thank you.

15             JUDGE PARKER:  You can attempt, if you like, to prove Mr. Hannis

16     a liar over this one, Mr. Djurdjic, but it's in your interest not to, I

17     suggest.

18                           [The witness entered court]

19             JUDGE PARKER:  Good afternoon, sir.

20             THE WITNESS:  Morning, sir.

21             JUDGE PARKER:  Would you please read aloud the affirmation which

22     is shown to you on the card.

23             THE WITNESS:  I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

24     whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

25                           WITNESS:  MICHAEL PHILLIPS

Page 8680

 1             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you very much.  Please sit down.  Now, I see

 2     you have with you the two representatives which have been authorised by

 3     this Chamber's decision.  Ms. Johnson is aware of the procedure.  Could I

 4     just indicate for your assistance that if you feel the need for any

 5     advice or if your advisor feels the need to offer you any advice, that

 6     can be done privately as you are situated.

 7             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.

 8             JUDGE PARKER:  Press the off button on the microphone before you

 9     have that discussion.  And if there is then -- you would then, in

10     accordance with that advice, if there was any objection or difficulty,

11     raise it, and we will then look at what it is and its nature and what

12     role, if any, your visors may then need to play in the resolution of

13     whatever it is.

14             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.

15             JUDGE PARKER:  And with a bit of luck, we won't have a problem.

16             Mr. Hannis has some questions for you.

17             MR. HANNIS:  Thank you, Your Honour.  I would indicate that

18     sitting next to the witness is Ms. Skibsrud and Ms. Johnson is sitting

19     behind us.

20                           Examination by Mr. Hannis:

21        Q.   Sir, could you tell us your name, please?

22        A.   My name is Michael D. Phillips.  Do you want me to wear these

23     head sets?

24        Q.   Thank you.  Since we both speak English, Mr. Phillips, I would

25     ask if you would help me try to remember that we should take a pause

Page 8681

 1     between my question and your answer and between your answer and my next

 2     question so that the interpretation can keep up with us.

 3        A.   Yes.

 4        Q.   Can you tell us what your occupation or your profession is?

 5        A.   I retired from active-duty air force yesterday, so I am currently

 6     an unemployed civilian.

 7        Q.   Congratulations or condolences, as may fit.

 8             How long were you in the air force?

 9        A.   About 28 years.

10        Q.   Okay.  And what was your rank upon retirement?

11        A.   I retired as a full colonel in the air force.

12        Q.   Have you had a -- well, did you previously testify at this

13     Tribunal in connection with the events in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999 in the

14     Milutinovic case?

15        A.   Yes, sir, I did.

16        Q.   And I believe that was in March of 2007.  Have you had a chance

17     to review a transcript of your prior testimony?

18        A.   Yes, sir, I did.

19        Q.   And are you satisfied that it's true and accurate?

20        A.   Yes, sir.

21        Q.   And would you answer those same questions in the same way if

22     those questions were put to you today?

23        A.   Yes, sir, I would.

24        Q.   Okay.

25             MR. HANNIS:  Your Honours, I would at this time like to tender

Page 8682

 1     the full transcript, P1615 under seal, and 05343.01 the redacted version

 2     as a public exhibit.

 3             JUDGE PARKER:  First of all, the transcript itself will be

 4     received under seal.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P01215 under

 6     seal.

 7             JUDGE PARKER:  The redacted transcript will also be received.

 8             MR. HANNIS:  Thank you, Your Honours.  I see I misspoke and

 9     said 1 --

10             JUDGE PARKER:  I wondered where 1615 came from.  And the redacted

11     transcript.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  The redacted transcript will be Exhibit P01303,

13     Your Honours.

14             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you very much.

15             MR. HANNIS:

16        Q.   Colonel, can you tell us how you came to be in Kosovo in 1998?

17        A.   In 1998, I was stationed at pacific command in Honolulu Hawaii,

18     and I had received a phone call in September from the vice-chairman of

19     the joint chiefs of staff, General Ralston, telling me that they had just

20     finished a session with Ambassador William Walker who had just been

21     assigned to be the head of mission in Kosovo.  And in that meeting he was

22     asked is there anything that he needed, and when that question came he

23     said, yes, he needed this air force lieutenant-colonel, I didn't know

24     where he was assigned, that was me.  And then I received a phone call a

25     week later from General Ralston asking if I would be willing to give up

Page 8683

 1     my post in Honolulu to serve a tour with Ambassador Walker in

 2     Pristina, Kosovo.

 3             MR. HANNIS:  Before I proceed further, I understand, Your

 4     Honours, that for 92 ter witness the practice is for the Prosecution to

 5     read a brief summary of the witness's evidence.  And if I may, I would do

 6     that now.

 7             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.  This being a 92 ter witness, that would be

 8     the procedure to follow.

 9             MR. HANNIS:  Thank you, Your Honours.

10             This witness worked as Chief of Staff for William Walker, the

11     head of OSCE's Kosovo Verification Mission or KVM from November 1998

12     until July 1999.  He provides evidence on the role of this mission in

13     Kosovo.  During his tenure in Kosovo, Colonel Phillips attended and took

14     notes of meetings in which KVM head William Walker met various high-level

15     officials of the FRY as well as with representatives of the VJ and the

16     MUP.  He also speaks about the engagement of VJ and MUP units in joint

17     operations in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999.

18             The witness recounts instances when KVM raised complaints with

19     Slobodan Milosevic, Nikola Sainovic, General Loncar, MUP General Lukic,

20     and other officials regarding the conduct of VJ and MUP units during

21     those operations.

22             The witness also provides evidence on the Podujevo incident in

23     December 1998, on the Racak incident in January 1999, and on ongoing

24     violations of October Agreements by the VJ and MUP.

25             Colonel Phillips describes how the Serb forces steadily increased

Page 8684

 1     their presence and the level of their combat activities from January 1999

 2     until the KVM was evacuated in late March.  The witness also details

 3     visits to refugee camps in Macedonia and Albania after the evacuation and

 4     about the information reported to him and KVM from many of those refugees

 5     about how and why they left Kosovo and crimes committed against them by

 6     VJ and MUP forces.

 7        Q.   Colonel, I'd like if you could describe briefly for the Judges

 8     the general purpose of the Kosovo Verification Mission?

 9        A.   Sir, our mandate --

10             MR. HANNIS:  I see Mr. --

11             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Djurdjic.

12             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  The last portion of

13     the summary read by Mr. Hannis has to do with the refugees after their

14     departure from Kosovo.  That part was not within the 65 ter submission we

15     received.  This is an expansion of sorts that Mr. Hannis has just

16     introduced.  I don't know why and how.  I followed closely what he was

17     saying, and it is unclear to me.  We don't find it in your decision

18     either, Your Honours, in the first several points Mr. Hannis enumerated

19     prior to the witness being led into the courtroom did not mention that as

20     well.

21             MR. HANNIS:  Yes, Your Honour.  This is information that we got

22     from Colonel Phillips when we spoke with him during his proofing

23     yesterday.  We sent a supplemental information sheet to the Defence last

24     evening advising them of that additional information.  We had discussions

25     with the provider about whether they viewed this as something that was

Page 8685

 1     covered by the topics we were allowed to raise, and the consensus was

 2     that this related to the non-compliance of the MUP and the VJ with the

 3     Holbrooke-Milosevic Agreements and the consequences of that

 4     non-compliance.  It also relates to the actions of the VJ and MUP and

 5     their general modus operandi.  And although Mr. Phillips would have been

 6     standing outside of Kosovo when he was talking to refugees in Macedonia

 7     and Albania, it does relate to events witnessed in Kosovo during the

 8     period of July -- or, November 1998 through July 1999.

 9             JUDGE PARKER:  But not events witnessed by Mr. Phillips.

10             MR. HANNIS:  No, but as I said, Your Honour, we took our

11     understanding from discussions with the provider about whether or not

12     their view was that this was covered by what they gave us permission to

13     lead evidence on was it did relate to non-compliance of the MUP and VJ

14     with the agreement

15                           [Trial Chamber confers]

16             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Hannis, the Chamber would take the view that

17     what Mr. Djurdjic has advanced has substance on this occasion.  The list

18     of topics which were set out in the annex of this Chamber's decision does

19     not, on its usual understanding, nor on the understanding of the three

20     authors who sit here, extend to secondary evidence the witness may have

21     gathered after he had left Kosovo, even though it may relate to events

22     that he was told had occurred in Kosovo.

23             So I am afraid you need to limit his evidence to the other

24     matters.

25             MR. HANNIS:  All right, Your Honour, I understand.

Page 8686

 1        Q.   Colonel, I think when we took out that intervention I had just

 2     asked you about what was the purpose of the Kosovo Verification Mission?

 3        A.   Yes, sir, it was our understanding with the agreement that we

 4     were there to ensure that there was cease-fire maintenance in place and

 5     adhered to by both sides and which I refer to the KLA and the Serb, and

 6     the VJ and the MUP.

 7        Q.   And when did you first arrive in Kosovo?

 8        A.   I arrived on the 4th of November, I believe.

 9        Q.   Was William Walker already there?

10        A.   No, sir, I arrived with him, we flew in from Warsaw to Pristina

11     airport where we departed the airplane and had an immediate conference at

12     the airport stating what our mission was.

13        Q.   How did you begin to go about your work in terms of contacting

14     the Serbian authorities and trying to implement the agreement?

15        A.   The first few weeks after we arrived were really sent -- or spent

16     trying to build the OSCE operation before we had reached out to any of

17     the officials that were in Pristina representing the FRY.

18             So it wasn't until, I think, early December we had our first

19     meeting, we were invited to the government building where we met at that

20     time Nikola Sainovic, Mr. Loncar, I believe General Lukic, Mr. Slana,

21     Mr. Skoric, and others who introduced themselves to us and they would be

22     assisting us and helping our mission move forward.

23        Q.   We have heard evidence in this case about a Federal Commission

24     for Cooperation with the OSCE, are you familiar with that body or that

25     name?

Page 8687

 1        A.   I'm familiar with the name, but we had no direct meeting with

 2     them.

 3        Q.   Okay.  And the gentlemen you described just meeting, this meeting

 4     was in Pristina?

 5        A.   Yes, sir.

 6        Q.   And how -- do you recall how they introduced themselves to you?

 7     Can you tell us individually how that went?

 8        A.   Mr. Sainovic introduced himself very friendly as a personal

 9     representative of Mr. Milosevic.  He introduced himself first.  Our

10     assumption was he was in charge there.  General Loncar introduced himself

11     as retired general but also as a representative of Mr. Milosevic.  And

12     Mr. Lukic introduced himself as the chief of police, the MUP, and I'm not

13     a hundred per cent certain, but I believe he introduced himself the same

14     way when he was also a representative of the Government of Belgrade

15     referring to Mr. Milosevic.

16        Q.   And after this meeting, did you have regular meetings with this

17     group of men, Mr. Sainovic, General Loncar, and General Lukic?

18        A.   Yes, sir.  We tried to have meetings on a weekly basis.  It

19     didn't always occur that way, but we both had agreed that it would be

20     advantageous to both sides to try and meet regularly to work any issues

21     that had come up that were prohibiting the mission from standing up.

22        Q.   Okay.  And during your time in Kosovo before being evacuated in

23     March, did you and Mr. Walker have any meetings with Mr. Milosevic?

24        A.   Yes, sir.  We had two meetings, I believe one was in November and

25     one was in December.

Page 8688

 1        Q.   What can you tell us about those meetings and how they related to

 2     your mission with the KVM?

 3        A.   The one I can recall, the first meeting, was a late November

 4     time-frame.  We were delivering a letter that Ambassador Walker hand

 5     carried and delivered to him, kind of outlining what our understanding of

 6     the mission for the OSCE was.

 7             And the second meeting that we had in December was a meeting, I

 8     believe Ambassador Miles attended with us.  And that meeting regarded

 9     non-compliance issues that were prohibiting and hindering the OSCE

10     Mission from standing up.

11        Q.   You mentioned Ambassador Miles, can you tell us who he was?

12        A.   I referred to him as ambassador, but at the time he was a

13     charge d'affair for the American Embassy in Belgrade.

14        Q.   Okay.  And you mentioned a letter that was delivered to

15     Mr. Milosevic at that first meeting?

16        A.   Yes, sir.

17        Q.   What can you tell us about that?

18        A.   It was -- it was a letter of outreach.  There was a lot of

19     discussion prior to the November meeting with Mr. Milosevic on the

20     interpretation of the agreement.  Both sides were interpreting it in a

21     different manner, and it was an attempt by Ambassador Walker to achieve a

22     common understanding of the intent of what the mandate was.  And it also

23     had in there, I believe, some request of Mr. Milosevic requesting his

24     assistance to get some things from a security aspect, from a -- we wanted

25     to move the visa process along so from a consulate request aspect to try

Page 8689

 1     and set up the mission.  So we had a few requests and a common

 2     understanding with what the purpose of the mission was, what we were

 3     going to try to do.

 4             MR. HANNIS:  I'd like to put up an exhibit for you to look at.

 5     It's P838.

 6        Q.   It should be appearing on your monitor shortly, sir.  Do you

 7     recognise that document?

 8        A.   Yes, sir.

 9        Q.   What is it?

10        A.   This is a letter that Ambassador Walker carried forward to

11     Mr. Milosevic.

12        Q.   Okay.  On the first page we see there some definitions of the

13     terms that OSCE proposed to be used in interpreting the agreement?

14        A.   Yes, sir.

15             MR. HANNIS:  And if we could go to the second page.

16        Q.   This is in evidence already, Colonel, but we see here there are a

17     request for certain kinds of information from the FRY about the security

18     forces and requests for certain kinds of notifications?

19        A.   Right.

20        Q.   Were all these discussed at that meeting?

21        A.   Yes, they were.

22        Q.   And the last page, just to complete the document.  Well, that's

23     the attachment.  I was looking for the signature page.  I thought it was

24     the third page.

25             MR. HANNIS:  It's 0076-6679.  Yes.

Page 8690

 1        Q.   Recognise that signature?

 2        A.   Yes.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Now, what was Mr. Milosevic's reaction to receiving

 4     this letter some time shortly after the 23rd of November?

 5        A.   As I recall - it's been a long time, it's been ten years - our

 6     first meeting, we arrived and he met us at the car and very friendly.

 7     The first meeting generally went well.  A lot of discussion over

 8     definitions and, as I recall, we really never got an agreement one way or

 9     the other from Mr. Milosevic.  So I believe we kind of walked away with,

10     it was great to have the first meeting, glad that you are here, my

11     representatives in Kosovo will work your needs.

12        Q.   Who did you understand his representatives in Kosovo to be?

13        A.   Mr. Sainovic, Mr. Loncar, and the group that I mentioned earlier.

14        Q.   Were any of them present at this first meeting with

15     Mr. Milosevic?

16        A.   Mr. Sainovic, I believe, was present.

17        Q.   Okay.  Now, the second meeting with Milosevic, do you recall when

18     that occurred?

19        A.   That was in December.  I think December 15th roughly.

20        Q.   I'm sorry, going back to the first meeting, where did that take

21     place?

22        A.   That took place at the White Palace in Belgrade.

23        Q.   The second meeting?

24        A.   At the White Palace in Belgrade.

25        Q.   Who was present for that one?

Page 8691

 1        A.   I believe Mr. Sainovic also, Mr. Milosevic, Ambassador Walker,

 2     and, of course, myself.

 3        Q.   The purpose of the second meeting?

 4        A.   That was a less friendly meeting.  We had delivered information

 5     of non-compliance to Mr. Milosevic.  And that was the purpose of the

 6     meeting.

 7        Q.   And the nature of the information and non-compliance?

 8        A.   We weren't getting -- we weren't receiving our consulate that was

 9     promised to us - we were getting stood up - so we could get the verifiers

10     in on time in a quickened manner.  We had requested some medical

11     helicopter support, and we had requested the body guards for Ambassador

12     Walker, armed body guards for Ambassador Walker, and those were not

13     received well.

14        Q.   After that meeting on the 15th of December, did you continue to

15     have meetings with Sainovic, Loncar, and Lukic in Pristina?

16        A.   Yes, sir, we did.

17        Q.   For how long did that continue?

18        A.   Really right up until about the time of mid-January when Racak

19     took place.

20        Q.   Okay.  And after Racak, any more meetings with those guys?

21        A.   There was a meeting or two with General Loncar, but I can't

22     recall immediately if we had another one with Mr. Sainovic.  I know he

23     was difficult to reach after that.  But the meetings were less regular

24     and were often called in a reactive mode; when something had happened we

25     needed to speak to the government folks immediately, but we did not any

Page 8692

 1     longer have any regular scheduled event after that.

 2        Q.   You've mentioned telling Mr. Milosevic about non-compliance, were

 3     you also telling Sainovic and Loncar and Lukic about non-compliance

 4     issues?

 5        A.   Yes, sir, we did.

 6        Q.   Can you give us a breakdown of some of the general areas of

 7     non-compliance in KVM's view?

 8        A.   Well, there was an agreement that we would be provided some

 9     base-line information which we could verify, and we needed strengths of

10     the MUP and the VJ, weapons counts.  We needed to have our cars brought

11     across the border without delay.  We needed the consulate stood up.  Just

12     the logistics of the mission in general.  We had -- we had asked for some

13     of the more provocative patrols to be reduced.  We had asked for troops

14     in Malisevo to be reduced so we could bring back some of the IDPs.  Those

15     sorts of issues were the bulk of our discussions with Mr. Sainovic.

16        Q.   I want to ask you about something called the Blue Book, are you

17     familiar with that document?

18        A.   Yes, sir.

19             MR. HANNIS:  Could we look now at Exhibit P1029.

20        Q.   While that's coming up, can you tell us what that was, who put it

21     out, what was contained in it, what was its purpose?

22        A.   The Blue Book was a KVM document that was produced by the head of

23     mission for operations referred to as Major-General DZ.  And it was an

24     overview of operational events of that particular day.

25        Q.   And did you see those reports on a regular basis in your position

Page 8693

 1     as Chief of Staff?

 2        A.   Yes, sir.

 3        Q.   Do you recognise the cover page that's on the screen now?

 4        A.   Yes, sir.

 5        Q.   And I would like to ask you about just two or three entries in

 6     this document, if I may.

 7             MR. HANNIS:  First I'd like to look at page 2 in the English.  I

 8     think it's page 3 of the B/C/S.

 9        Q.   Have you seen this one before?

10        A.   I have seen that, yes.

11        Q.   Let me ask you, was -- under the agreement, was there some

12     requirement for MUP and VJ to notify KVM before undertaking certain

13     operations?

14        A.   I don't know that was specifically in the agreement that that was

15     to happen, but we had had that discussion with Mr. Sainovic, the

16     government building, that it was advantageous to both of us to have prior

17     knowledge of an operation so we had some verification of both ongoing MUP

18     and VJ ops in a particular village, and we were generally told - and this

19     is kind of a good example here - generally the time that we got didn't

20     coincide with the actual time of such an operation.

21        Q.   In discussion with Mr. Sainovic about this type of issue, was

22     there an agreement on his part that they would provide that information

23     to you?

24        A.   Yes, there was.

25        Q.   Was this the only time that happened where MUP notified you

Page 8694

 1     apparently after an incident had taken place instead of before?

 2        A.   No sir, this happened on several occasions, and each time we

 3     brought it to General Sainovic's attention he would turn to General Lukic

 4     and ask him, you know, why this wasn't happening.

 5        Q.   Do you recall what Lukic said in those situations?

 6        A.   He didn't often speak English in there, so I didn't get the

 7     direct interpretation of it.  But what I do remember was that he would

 8     look into why the coordination was not happening, but he always blamed it

 9     on it was a coordination problem with the KVM.

10        Q.   Thank you.

11             MR. HANNIS:  If we could look next at page 48 in the English,

12     page 50 of the B/C/S.  I see Mr. Djordjevic [sic] on his feet.

13             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Djordjevic -- Djurdjic.

14             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I do not have this

15     exhibit on my list.  I've been looking for it and I can't seem to be able

16     to find it.  I have organised everything here, and I'm really trying to

17     find it but it's impossible.  Of course, if it's not going to be used any

18     more, that's fine, but we can move on and then get back to this later.  I

19     can't see the 26th of December.  I do have the document of the

20     29th of December.  Maybe it's my error, but I doubt it.  Well, let's move

21     on, I have seen the document and I'm look it up, if you're done with it.

22     If you are not going to use it any more.

23             MR. HANNIS:  I have two more entries from this document I propose

24     to show the witness, I think the problem is that on the initial

25     notification the document was listed as P1028.  We sent a follow-up

Page 8695

 1     e-mail to indicate that should be P1029.  I think the problem before that

 2     the pages were not uploaded in chronological order and a change was made

 3     to get them into chronological order for easier use.

 4             JUDGE PARKER:  You are quoting there Rule 65 ter exhibit numbers,

 5     are you?

 6             MR. HANNIS:  Those are admitted exhibit numbers, I understand.

 7             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.  Well, it seems that there may have

 8     been notification, Mr. Djurdjic.

 9             MR. HANNIS:  I'm informed that 1028 was MFI and 1029 was

10     admitted.

11                           [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

12             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Well, I don't have either 1028 or

13     1029 on my list, that's my problem.  I mean, I only have documents

14     starting with --

15             JUDGE PARKER:  I have been informed that 1028 marked for

16     identification is the whole of the book, was marked for identification

17     because much of it has not been translated.  Exhibit 1029 are those parts

18     that have been translated and they were tendered.

19             MR. HANNIS:  That's my understanding, Your Honour.

20             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I haven't received anything for

21     1029.  And as for P1028, I see that I have it on the list as P407.

22             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Hannis has told us about that, Mr. Djurdjic,

23     that in the notification to you there was an error quoting 1028 and a

24     follow-up e-mail told you it should be 1029.

25             Carry on, please, Mr. Hannis.

Page 8696

 1             MR. HANNIS:  Thank you, Your Honour.  And for the record, that

 2     e-mail went out at 6.06 p.m. last night advising about the number change.

 3             JUDGE PARKER:  I thought it was old history, it's new history is

 4     it.

 5             MR. HANNIS:  Yes, thank you.

 6             JUDGE PARKER:  Very new history.

 7             MR. HANNIS:  Yes.

 8        Q.   Colonel, can you see the page on the monitor now that is -- the

 9     heading is titled "Probable New VJ Unit"?

10        A.   Yes, sir.

11        Q.   It makes reference to a unit wearing black berets?

12        A.   Yes, sir.

13        Q.   Did you see any such unit or soldiers during your time in Kosovo?

14        A.   We did see the VJ on occasion with a few wearing black berets,

15     yes.

16        Q.   What did you learn or what did you know about this unit?

17        A.   We were to understand that they were kind of considered like

18     Special Forces, kind of an elite force, kind of an anti-terrorist unit.

19        Q.   And were you able to learn anything about their equipment or

20     weapons vis-a-vis other VJ units?

21        A.   Just from an observation point of view they seemed to look, you

22     know, the weapons they had were clean and new and they looked sharper and

23     uniforms looked new and pressed.  They were a good-looking unit.  Well

24     equipped.

25        Q.   Connected with that, let me ask a general question about MUP

Page 8697

 1     units you saw in Kosovo.  Did you see a difference between various MUP

 2     units?

 3        A.   Yes, sir.  I kind of referred to it as there was the common

 4     beat-patrol MUP that you would see walking the streets in Pristina with a

 5     side-arm.  And then there were what I call combat MUP who you would see

 6     in the field commonly wearing helmets and camouflage blue uniforms, flak

 7     vest, rocket packs on their back, long-barrelled weapons.

 8        Q.   Thank you.

 9             MR. HANNIS:  And the last entry in this document I want to show

10     you is English page 91, I believe it's also 91 in the B/C/S.

11        Q.   You see that entry about "large VJ convoy observed"?

12        A.   Yes.

13        Q.   Appears to be dated the 16th of March, 1999.  What can you tell

14     us about that?  Under the October Agreements, were there any prohibitions

15     on what equipment could be brought in to Kosovo?

16        A.   We were looking for both troop size, strength, and weapons to be

17     reduced to pre-October numbers.  And what we had observed really after

18     the middle of January was a general increase in both VJ strength and on

19     occasion MUP strength.  We did see more armoured vehicles; the convoys

20     were larger than we had traditionally seen in the November/December

21     time-frame.

22        Q.   Was that a regular trend that you saw after December and January?

23        A.   Middle of January the trend was, in my view from what I observed,

24     an increase in those numbers.  The convoys were larger and that sort of

25     thing.

Page 8698

 1        Q.   I see on the comment it makes reference to RC 2.  Can you tell us

 2     what that stood for?

 3        A.   That was one of the five regional centres that we had split

 4     Kosovo up.  We had OSCE commanders, if you will, in each one of the five

 5     with a small contingent of OSCE verifiers in each of the regions.

 6        Q.   Do you recall who was in RC 2?

 7        A.   I don't.

 8        Q.   The last sentence in that comment is:

 9             "Movement of M-84 assets into Kosovo is in clear violation of the

10     base-line agreement."

11        A.   Right.  Those were additional weapons, armoured vehicles that

12     were being brought in that were beyond the mandate.  The idea was to

13     reduce, not to increase, and this was an increase.

14        Q.   Okay.  Do know what the M-84s were?

15        A.   I believe they were tanks.

16        Q.   Thank you.

17             MR. HANNIS:  That's all I have with that document.

18        Q.   And next I would like to ask you about KDOM reports.  The first

19     I'd like to look at is 05354.

20             Were you aware of KDOM reports in 1998 and 1999 when you were in

21     Kosovo?

22        A.   Yes, sir.

23        Q.   And what did you -- briefly, what did you know about KDOM, and

24     how did it relate to KVM?

25        A.   When we arrived we knew that the KDOM -- there was an EU KDOM and

Page 8699

 1     a Russian KDOM and a US KDOM and that they were an American-only

 2     contingent, were not an international force.  And we had no command and

 3     control over them.  We met with Mr. Shaun Byrnes who was leading the US

 4     KDOM, but we did not use their reports to write our reports, but we were

 5     familiar with the KDOM reports.

 6        Q.   Did you share KVM information with them?

 7        A.   I believe we did, yes, sir.

 8        Q.   Did you have occasion to review these reports during your time

 9     there?

10        A.   The KDOM -- on occasion we did.  We didn't make a daily habit out

11     of reviewing them, but Mr. Byrnes made us aware of them and from time to

12     time looked at them but more just as an interest item rather than a

13     reporting item.

14        Q.   Have you seen -- well, the one that's on the screen now is from

15     February 12th.  I have a question for you about the fourth paragraph that

16     says -- I don't think you can see it on the screen --

17             MR. HANNIS:  We'll have to scroll down.  Yes.

18        Q.   "The extensive VJ troop and equipment movements we reported

19     yesterday resulted in about 50 villagers fleeing from their homes near

20     Lapusnik in what the VJ labelled as an exercise.  The troops moved into

21     the villages firing weapons mounted on tracked vehicles."

22             Were you aware of this particular incident?

23        A.   Not this particular incident, but this is consistent with that

24     time-frame about the VJ and MUP moving into villages and creating

25     widespread fleeing of the villagers.  So not uncommon for that

Page 8700

 1     time-period.

 2        Q.   And based on your -- your information and your own observations,

 3     from the KDOM reports that you looked at, did you see any information

 4     that was in direct conflict with your personal observations?

 5        A.   In general they were reflective of being accurate, yes.

 6             MR. HANNIS:  Your Honours, I'd like to tender 5354.

 7             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P01304.

 9             MR. HANNIS:  Thank you.  The next one, please, would be 5355.

10        Q.   Two things on this one, Colonel, dated the 19th of February.

11             MR. HANNIS:  And if we could scroll to the bottom of the page.

12        Q.   The first paragraph under the date mentions Rambouillet, and the

13     second sentence says:

14             "A visible increase in the movement of FRY, VJ, and police units

15     and their equipment has been noted in the past 24 hours."

16             You were aware of the negotiations that were going on in

17     Rambouillet in February 1999?

18        A.   Yes.

19        Q.   And do you recall what the situation was in Kosovo in terms of

20     the VJ and MUP activity?

21        A.   It was a very tense period.  A number of VJ and MUP units were

22     deployed throughout Kosovo resulting in a number of IDPs, displaced

23     persons.  But it was -- I would categorised it as -- try to characterise

24     it as a period of -- it was a desperate period.  We were fearful of

25     losing a peaceful solution for a political solution in Kosovo.

Page 8701

 1        Q.   I think in the last paragraph there's mention of dead-line

 2     approaching in Rambouillet.  And then it said:

 3             "Walker is scheduled to meet with General Loncar today to remind

 4     him of the FRY's responsibility for the safety of OSCE personnel in

 5     Kosovo."

 6             Do you recall what that was about at that time?

 7        A.   We were concerned about our safety from day one, but generally

 8     that was anticipating evacuation of the mission.  And we had built a

 9     contingency plan to evacuate the mission through a number of avenues of

10     departure, and we wanted Mr. Loncar to know that if we did, in fact,

11     evacuate that we were going to be safe in doing so and that he was to get

12     that word out.

13             MR. HANNIS:  Thank you.  I'd like to tender 5355, Your Honour.

14             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes, it will be received.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P01305.

16             MR. HANNIS:  Next, a few days later, 5356.  05356, please.

17             THE INTERPRETER:  Would the counsel please switch off his

18     microphone when not using it.  Thank you.

19             MR. HANNIS:  Thank you.

20        Q.   This is the 22nd of February, Colonel, and the fourth paragraph

21     down, the last sentence:

22             "There are reports also that the FRY is calling up reserve

23     military units and arming some civilians over the past few days."

24             Were you aware of that activity in late February of 1999?

25        A.   Yes, sir.

Page 8702

 1             MR. HANNIS:  And if we could go to the second page of this

 2     document.

 3        Q.   The last paragraph in this report makes reference to KDOM mission

 4     having departed Pristina.  Do you recall when that happened?

 5        A.   I was aware of it, but I don't have any real precise memory of

 6     that particular departure.

 7        Q.   Okay.  And it says:

 8             "... KVM remains on alert stand by status ..."

 9        A.   Right.

10        Q.   Was that a particular --

11        A.   That was an alert stand by to be prepared to evacuate.  The whole

12     mission had been given procedures on what to do to evacuate, how much

13     they could carry out with them, and where they were to meet.  That's what

14     that was about.

15        Q.   Thank you.

16             MR. HANNIS:  I would like to tender 5356.

17             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes, it will be received.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P01306.

19             MR. HANNIS:  Thank you.  And next if we could see 5357,

20     65 ter number.

21        Q.   Colonel, this one is dated the 11th of March, 1999.  The second

22     paragraph mentions reports that Serb VJ forces have conducted extensive

23     sweep operations to the west of the Kacanik to Djeneral Jankovic highway.

24     And mentions that these operations had forced villagers from their homes.

25     Do you know where the Kacanik and Djeneral Jankovic highway was?

Page 8703

 1        A.   I do.  Yes, sir.  It was in a mountain pass area.

 2        Q.   And were you aware of this situation?

 3        A.   Yes.

 4             MR. HANNIS:  Thank you.  I'd like to tender 5357.

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P01307.

 7             MR. HANNIS:  The next one is 5358, 65 ter number.  I need the

 8     third paragraph in English.  Thank you.

 9        Q.   Colonel, this short paragraph says:

10             "Serb force levels have been augmented and remain poised

11     throughout Kosovo for what may be a wider offensive against the ethnic

12     Albanians."

13             Was that consistent with what you observed around the

14     12th of March?

15        A.   Yes, sir, this time-period, late February, early March is

16     consistent with that paragraph.

17             MR. HANNIS:  I would tender 5358.

18             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P01308.

20             MR. HANNIS:  Thank you.  Next is 65 ter 05359.

21        Q.   Colonel, this one is dated the 17th of March.  And the first

22     paragraph mentions:

23             "As the peace talks continue in Paris, the apparent Serb military

24     build-up in and near Kosovo continues."

25             Was that what you were seeing?

Page 8704

 1        A.   Yes, sir.  I have to tell you, I was -- let's see, let me just

 2     read this just for a moment.  I was at the peace talks in Paris during

 3     this time-frame, but this was an issue that was delivered at Rambouillet,

 4     not by me but it was brought up by Ambassador Walker.  We were receiving

 5     reports from the OSCE Mission that was left while we were away, but

 6     that's consistent, yes.

 7        Q.   Thank you.

 8             MR. HANNIS:  I would tender 5359.

 9             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P01309.

11             MR. HANNIS:  And lastly, KDOM reports, 65 ter 5360.

12        Q.   First paragraph mentions:

13             "... reports from the field that the Serbs continue to move

14     sizeable reinforcements in and around Kosovo.  As of yesterday, there

15     were some 18-, to 21.000 troops poised just outside the province."

16             And the second paragraph, the last sentence says:

17             "The number of FRY and Serbian troops now out of barracks and in

18     Kosovo and the introduction of new battle tanks puts Belgrade grossly out

19     of compliance with the obligation it undertook last October."

20             Were you aware of that situation?

21        A.   Yes, sir.

22             MR. HANNIS:  I would tender 5360.

23             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P01310.

25             MR. HANNIS:  Thank you.

Page 8705

 1        Q.   Now, Colonel, I want to talk a little bit about joint VJ and MUP

 2     operations or actions.  Did you have occasion to personally observe any

 3     of that activity during your time in Kosovo?

 4        A.   Yes, sir.

 5        Q.   And in the course of doing that, can you tell us a little bit

 6     about what you observed in terms of the different role of various MUP

 7     units.  You described the difference between what you term the beat cop,

 8     something like the city policemen or the traffic policemen?

 9        A.   Yes, sir.

10        Q.   And the others that appeared to be more combat ready, if you

11     will?

12        A.   Right.

13        Q.   Where did you see combat MUP in Kosovo?

14        A.   Wherever there was a village that was under stress by VJ presence

15     or MUP presence, they were obviously there.  But generally saw the MUP in

16     the village proper and generally saw the VJ on the outskirts of those

17     villages.

18        Q.   And what kind of actions were these MUP combat units

19     participating in, if you can describe?

20        A.   They were managing everything from check-points in and out of the

21     village.  They were house to house searching, in their view, for

22     terrorists.  That was related to us and subsequent meetings of such

23     operations.  They were making arrests.  In general.

24        Q.   And based on those observations, do you know under whose command

25     or direction they were operating -- deploying and carrying out these

Page 8706

 1     operations?

 2        A.   It was our assessment that it was General Lukic who was directing

 3     the MUP activity in the villages of Kosovo.

 4        Q.   Did you have occasion to take any photographs of some of this

 5     activity that you observed?

 6        A.   Yes, sir.

 7             MR. HANNIS:  I'd like to bring up now 65 ter number 02586.

 8        Q.   Can you tell us about this photograph, who took it, when and

 9     where, what's going on?

10        A.   I took that photo.  It was December time-frame in Podujevo.  The

11     blue personnel dressed in the camouflage blue there are MUP and the green

12     is the VJ.

13        Q.   And I think you said this was near Podujevo?

14        A.   Yes, sir, I believe it was near Podujevo.

15             MR. HANNIS:  Okay.  Could we go to the next photograph, I think

16     it's the third page in this exhibit.

17        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ... of this one.  Who took it,

18     where, when?

19        A.   I took the photo.  I'm trying to recall exactly where it was.

20     I'm not a hundred per cent certain, sir, but I believe it was also

21     December time-frame, on the way into Podujevo.

22             MR. HANNIS:  If we could look at the next page, please.

23        Q.   How about this one?

24        A.   Yeah, I took that photo.  I believe it was in Podujevo on

25     December 1998 time-frame.

Page 8707

 1        Q.   And did you write anything on the back of these photographs?

 2        A.   I did, tried to an occasion, it took awhile to get photographs

 3     back so there was always a gap between when I took it and when I could

 4     record where I was with those.

 5             MR. HANNIS:  Can we see the next photograph, K057-7165.  It's

 6     still in this exhibit.

 7        Q.   How about this one?

 8        A.   I don't believe this was near Podujevo.  I want to say this

 9     photograph -- it was taken by me.  I believe it was up near a place

10     called Junik but not a hundred per cent certain on the location.

11             MR. HANNIS:  Could I see page 6 of the exhibit.

12        Q.   How about this one, Colonel?

13        A.   I took this one.  This was a vehicle that had become stuck in the

14     mud.  I believe that was up near Podujevo.

15        Q.   Same time-frame?

16        A.   Yes, sir.  December 1998.

17             MR. HANNIS:  And, next, page 8 of the exhibit, please.

18        Q.   Tell us about this one.

19        A.   I took this photo.  I don't recall exactly where it was but this

20     is the MUP.  I was doing a search of some sort.

21        Q.   The tank that we saw in the earlier pictures, was it nearby when

22     this picture was taken?

23        A.   I don't recall, sir.

24        Q.   Okay.

25             MR. HANNIS:  Can we see the next page.

Page 8708

 1        Q.   Same question.

 2        A.   Yes, sir.  Podujevo, December 1998.  I took this photo.

 3        Q.   All right.

 4             MR. HANNIS:  And two more.  The next page and the following,

 5     please.

 6        Q.   Your photograph?

 7        A.   Yes, sir, I took this photo.

 8        Q.   Same place, same time?

 9        A.   I believe Podujevo, December, yes, sir.

10             MR. HANNIS:  And the last page, please.

11        Q.   Same questions.

12        A.   Yes, sir.  I took this photo, December time-frame.  I don't

13     recall exactly where that was.  I can't remember if that was Podujevo or

14     over near -- near the eastern side of the Kosovo mountain range.

15        Q.   And do these photographs accurately represent the working

16     relationship you observed between the MUP and the VJ?

17        A.   Yes, sir.  Yes, sir, they do.

18             MR. HANNIS:  Okay.  Thank you.  I would tender 2586,

19     Your Honours.

20             JUDGE PARKER:  Is that ten photographs all together?

21             MR. HANNIS:  Your Honours, I believe there are nine photographs

22     and the back side of two photographs with some handwriting on them.  We

23     can look at the handwriting with this witness, perhaps just to be

24     completely safe.

25             JUDGE PARKER:  Perhaps we should now, and then we'll receive the

Page 8709

 1     lot.

 2             MR. HANNIS:  I think that's pages 2 and 4.

 3             THE WITNESS:  That's my writing on that screen, sir.

 4             MR. HANNIS:

 5        Q.   Can you tell us anything about this writing?  The description

 6     doesn't sound like the photograph we looked at.

 7        A.   Yeah, this was a mistake that I had made.  I remember -- I

 8     remember the event, but it's on the wrong photo.

 9             MR. HANNIS:  Can we look at page 4.

10        Q.   How about that, whose writing?

11        A.   That is my writing, sir.

12        Q.   And does that accurately depict the second photograph that we had

13     looked at in this series?

14        A.   Yes.

15        Q.   Thank you.

16        A.   Militia -- when I use the term "militia," it's in my notes as

17     well, I'm referring to the MUP.

18        Q.   Thank you.

19             MR. HANNIS:  Now, Your Honour, I would tender that exhibit.

20             JUDGE PARKER:  Can I be sure of that last comment, are you saying

21     that you referred to MUP as militia?

22             THE WITNESS:  On occasion I did, yes, sir.

23             JUDGE PARKER:  Did you refer to anything else as militia other

24     than MUP?

25             THE WITNESS:  No, sir.

Page 8710

 1             JUDGE PARKER:  Those photographs, nine plus the two backs will be

 2     received.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P01311.

 4             MR. HANNIS:  Thank you.

 5        Q.   Now, Colonel, I wanted to ask you about what is referred to as

 6     the Podujevo incident.  Do you know what I'm talking about there?

 7        A.   Yes, sir.

 8        Q.   Can you tell us when that took place approximately?

 9        A.   Roughly December 25th, 1998.

10        Q.   And what was the nature of that event?

11        A.   It was on a sizeable VJ deployment.  We were aware that it was

12     going to happen.  We were given notice.  It was at an airfield location.

13     We were told that the VJ were deploying up there for a normal training

14     event, it was in their cycle.  It was our understanding that they hadn't

15     trained up there in some time, but they now in fact were training up

16     there in good sized numbers with weapons, heavy weapons, artillery such

17     as tanks and artillery.  Also in the same time-period there was a heavy

18     KLA presence in the area there.

19        Q.   And in KVM's view, was this a violation of the

20     October Agreements?

21        A.   I don't know that we necessarily say it was a violation.  We

22     found it odd that it was definitely provocative in nature.  There had

23     been some fire fight sporadic between KLA positions and some of the

24     Serbian position, the VJ positions.  But it was odd to see the -- a large

25     number of VJ and MUP in that area at that particular time for training.

Page 8711

 1        Q.   Do you recall this incident being the subject of discussions in

 2     your meetings with Mr. Sainovic, General Loncar, and General Lukic?

 3        A.   Yes, sir.

 4        Q.   Okay.  We'll come back to that in a minute.  I want to ask you

 5     about something else that happened shortly after Podujevo.  In early

 6     January, do you remember an incident involving certain VJ soldiers who

 7     had gotten captured by the KLA and then eventually KVM being involved in

 8     trying to obtain their release?

 9        A.   Right, there were eight or nine VJ that had strayed from a normal

10     patrol and were captured by the KLA.

11        Q.   And how did KVM get involved in this and what transpired, how did

12     it come out?

13        A.   There was a meeting with Mr. Sainovic and General Loncar about

14     it.  We were asked to assist in getting their release.  KDOM also was

15     involved in getting their release.  If I recall along the same time there

16     were also captured KLA by the VJ, and we were working very hard to get

17     both sides released.

18             I recall meetings that we'd have Mr. Sainovic and then we'd have

19     subsequent meetings but he had had to talk to Belgrade first, then get

20     with us.  And with the help of KDOM, KVM won the release, but I remember

21     that we did not want to have the release appear that there was an

22     exchange of prisoners.  So I believe the VJ were released first by eight,

23     ten days, and then later on the KLA were released and nobody was harmed.

24             It was considered a pretty big victory for KVM, that KDOM helped

25     facilitate.  And I remember Mr. Sainovic and Mr. Loncar being very very

Page 8712

 1     happy and very high that this event had taken place.  There seemed to be

 2     a sense of optimism that, you know, in his view that KVM was worth its

 3     salt.

 4        Q.   Would you characterise that probably as the high point of the

 5     cooperation between KVM and the Serbian authorities?

 6        A.   Yes, sir, I would.  I would.

 7        Q.   And the low point during your time there?

 8        A.   Was the evacuation.

 9        Q.   Okay.  And before the evacuation, was there something else that

10     took place that was a significant drop down from the prisoner exchange,

11     if you will?

12        A.   Right, January 15th with the Racak incident.

13        Q.   Just for right now just tell me briefly what that was and where

14     Racak was?

15        A.   Racak was a village just outside Stimlje, and it was the massacre

16     of approximately 45 Albanian people.

17        Q.   And do you know what Serbian units participated in that event, if

18     any?

19        A.   The VJ was on the a bluff just outside the limits of Racak with

20     heavy weapons, artillery, and tanks.  And the MUP were down in the

21     village and managing check-points in and out of the village.

22        Q.   I don't know if you detailed that before, but in describing the

23     joint VJ/MUP actions, who did what exactly?

24        A.   I observed both the MUP and the VJ at check-points.  The VJ on

25     the 15th had fired into the village with heavy weapons and occupied

Page 8713

 1     homes.  And the MUP had gone -- after the shelling of the village, had

 2     gone in essentially house to house and were rounding up the young men and

 3     they separated them from children and the women.

 4        Q.   Thank you.

 5             MR. HANNIS:  Your Honours, I know it's not quite the time for the

 6     break, but the next and last document I want to go over with this witness

 7     is 65 ter 05364, which are the excerpts from his notebooks which we need

 8     to do in private session, so I'm wondering if we might break a couple of

 9     minutes early.

10             JUDGE PARKER:  Sounds a practical idea, Mr. Hannis.  We will

11     adjourn now, we need to have our tapes rewound, and we'll resume at 4.15.

12             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.

13                           [The witness stands down]

14                           --- Recess taken at 3.44 p.m.

15                           --- Upon commencing at 4.14 p.m.

16                           [The witness takes the stand]

17             JUDGE PARKER:  You may be seated.

18             Yes, Mr. Hannis.

19             MR. HANNIS:  Thank you, Your Honours.  I now request if we could

20     move into private session; I want to look at excerpts from his notebooks.

21             JUDGE PARKER:  Private.

22    [Private session] [Confidentiality lifted by order of Trial Chamber]

23             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, we are in private session.

24             MR. HANNIS:  Thank you.  And this is 65 ter number 05364.

25        Q.   And, Colonel, I don't know, do you have a hard copy of the

Page 8714

 1     excerpts of your notebook?  I think it's a 51-page document.

 2        A.   Yes, sir, I have those.

 3             MR. HANNIS:  And the first one I want to ask you about is at

 4     page 6 of the English, and this is actually at page 9 in the B/C/S.  I

 5     will tell you and the Court that this appears to be from a

 6     9 December, 1998, meeting based on the first page of the excerpt.

 7        Q.   And DZ is speaking and you'll see the next -- the, well, near the

 8     bottom of the page right above where Sainovic is listed as speaking,

 9     someone is saying, I think it's DZ:

10             "Our interpretation is far wider than the FRY interpretation, the

11     definition and compliance is determined by KVM and not the FRY

12     government."

13             Do you remember that discussion at this meeting?

14        A.   I remember that, yes.

15        Q.   Okay.  And let me ask you a general question about these notes:

16     How did you go about taking notes of all these meetings you attended in

17     Kosovo in 1998 and 1999?

18        A.   I would attend the meetings and try and be as verbatim as I could

19     in taking the notes.  At the end of the evening, sometimes I would go

20     back and try and fill in the gaps of those.  But the purpose of the notes

21     was intended for an end-of-evening discussion and for our own personal

22     uses to record some of the past conversations for the next meeting.  And

23     they certainly weren't intended to be in this venue.

24        Q.   I understand.  These -- this document I'm working with is a typed

25     document.  Your original notes, I take it, were not typewritten?

Page 8715

 1        A.   No, sir.  I hand wrote all my notes and these were transcribed.

 2        Q.   Okay.  And did you have occasion to compare what's in this

 3     typewritten document or the typewritten version of your notes with your

 4     original notes to be sure that these are accurate?

 5        A.   No, sir.

 6        Q.   Do you have any doubt having looked at these typewritten notes

 7     about whether or not they accurately reflect what you wrote at the time?

 8        A.   I have no doubt.  They are pretty accurate.  But that's to say,

 9     if I might, sir, that's to say --

10        Q.   Yes.

11        A.   -- that there is not discrepancies which I have found myself in

12     here of meetings and people that were at those meetings and so forth

13     sometimes was not correct.

14        Q.   I understand.  And Mr. Sainovic is quoted or is noted as saying:

15             "The 23 November letter is outside the agreement."

16             Earlier in your testimony we looked at Exhibit P838, the 23

17     November letter from William Walker, is that what Mr. Sainovic is talking

18     about here?

19        A.   Yes, sir.

20        Q.   Do you recall what Sainovic said at this meeting about how or why

21     the 23 November letter was outside the agreement?

22        A.   Well, he had always maintained that the OSCE agreement was the

23     mandate and there was nothing else to supplement that.  And he felt that

24     the 23 November was a supplement to that agreement that hadn't been

25     approved by any body of authority.  So he really dismissed it, he didn't

Page 8716

 1     see it as a letter of any kind of authority.

 2        Q.   Okay.  At the bottom of the English page we see Walker's name.

 3             MR. HANNIS:  And then if we can go to the next page in English,

 4     we can stay on the same B/C/S page.

 5        Q.   Since Walker was the last thing written on the last page, I

 6     assume these next two are comments from him?

 7        A.   Yes, sir.

 8        Q.   Okay.  And he says:

 9             " I will notify NATO, Brussels, Warsaw, and Vienna of your intent

10     to not honour the agreement."

11             Who is he speaking to there?

12        A.   Mr. Sainovic.

13        Q.   What about the next entry, did he say that during the meeting?

14        A.   Which entry are you referring to.

15        Q.   "This meeting was very tension-filled..."

16        A.   Oh, okay.  The first one.  "I will notify NATO, Brussels ..."

17             That's Mr. Walker speaking.  The second entry there, the second

18     meeting there was our -- my comment, not necessarily a word and then

19     Mr. Walker saying that we want a base-line, no-notice inspection, but

20     Mr. Minister, you're saying no.

21        Q.   And we are to verify tension and feeling, what did that mean in

22     the context, if you recall?

23        A.   That meeting was what I would define as a very emotional meeting.

24     There was a level of frustration that had built-up over time.  None of

25     the requests that we had been asking for were being answered.  And, you

Page 8717

 1     know, Mr. Walker was a fairly emotional man, and I think that this is a

 2     result to levy a threat of NATO and a threat of Brussels and of course

 3     the OSCE member states.  And he knew that that was a sensitive point with

 4     FRY government because they wanted to be seen as a cooperative body in

 5     this effort.  And he knew that was a - for lack of a better term - it was

 6     a button he could push to hopefully get some attention on it.

 7        Q.   Do you recall, did he make such a call the next day?

 8        A.   No.  I would have end up probably having to make that call, and I

 9     never made that call.

10        Q.   Let me turn next to page 14 in the English.

11        A.   Sir, if I might just go back, I will say that issue and that

12     meeting did come out in Vienna at an OSCE, I forgot the formal name of

13     the meeting, but it came out when we addressed the member states with an

14     update on how the mission was progressing.

15        Q.   Do you recall when that meeting was, approximately?

16        A.   I don't.  I don't.

17        Q.   Okay.

18             MR. HANNIS:  If we could go next to page 14 of the English and

19     page 15 in the B/C/S.

20        Q.   Colonel Phillips, that is a meeting that's listed as being

21     18 [Realtime transcript read in error "15"] September 1998 Sainovic,

22     Loncar, and Slana.  Who was Slana, if you recall?

23        A.   He was an assistant of Mr. Sainovic that was typically at our

24     meetings at the government building.

25        Q.   Okay.  If you could go to the middle of the page, you have S and

Page 8718

 1     is that Sainovic?

 2        A.   Yes, sir.

 3        Q.   Saying:

 4             "It is in our interest that you chart our deployments of MUP and

 5     VJ units, FT is not a problem to get the data."

 6             Do you know what FT means there?

 7        A.   Trying to find FT.  I might be looking at the wrong paragraph

 8     here.  Where did you say?

 9        Q.   Under B, we have an entry for someone B and then it is a

10     paragraph that's about six --

11        A.   Got it.  Okay.  Yeah, I can't recall what FT refers to, sir.

12        Q.   Future time?  Forward time?

13        A.   I just don't know.

14        Q.   Okay.  Did -- he said that, but did he provide, subsequently,

15     information about the deployments of MUP and VJ?

16        A.   We got -- we got sporadic information on deployments, but

17     Mr. Walker never received the base-line strengths that we had asked for.

18        Q.   Okay.  And on that same page, if you could go to the third

19     paragraph up from the bottom, it's a two sentence paragraph, I think

20     you've got your finger on it there, Sainovic or S:

21             "We don't want you to be surprised about big units going

22     somewhere.  Sainovic will provide copies of additional map with MUP and

23     VJ locations."

24             Did that happen?

25        A.   I believe that our LO, our liaison officer, for the MUP and the

Page 8719

 1     liaison officer for the VJ did get deployment locations on occasion but

 2     it was not consistent.

 3        Q.   Thank you.

 4             MR. HANNIS:  I want to turn next to page 17 in the English and

 5     page 19 in the B/C/S.

 6        Q.   And the name at the top of your page should be "Byrnes."  Do you

 7     have that one?

 8        A.   What page number would that be for me?

 9        Q.   It's page 17 in mine.

10        A.   Page 17 doesn't reflect ... I can refer to the screen, but I

11     don't have a hard copy here.

12        Q.   Okay.  Byrnes is Shaun Byrnes, I take it?

13        A.   Yes, sir.

14             MR. HANNIS:  I note for the transcript that earlier I was listed

15     as saying that the meeting was the 15th of September with Sainovic and

16     Loncar.  That should be the 18th of December in case that's what I said.

17     And it's page 44, line 12.

18        Q.   Sorry, Colonel, Byrnes -- Shaun Byrnes is listed as speaking and

19     the second line says:

20             "VJ battle group; 27 vehicles, nine T-72 tanks, starting to dig

21     in at the crop dusting airfield, 6 kilometres south of Podujevo ... this

22     is a clear and outright violation."

23             Do you recall this discussion?

24        A.   I do.  The words that I transcribed here were directly from

25     Shaun Byrnes.

Page 8720

 1        Q.   And skipping the next two lines, again it's still Byrnes:

 2             "This is a violation - Byrnes wants them out right away.  Clark

 3     will raise immediately."

 4             Do you know what that was about?

 5        A.   Well, in this particular time-frame and location we were very

 6     fearful of a KLA/VJ exchange that would end up being out of hand for us

 7     to handle.  As you know, Mr. Shaun Byrnes was KDOM and, US KDOM, and he

 8     refers to General Clark and his comment about Clark raise immediately

 9     that they needed to de-escalate the situation in Podujevo before it got

10     out of hand.  The tension was very high.  The troop disposition, the

11     heavy weapons that were there, was not going to be good, we were fearful

12     of major problems there.

13        Q.   And at the bottom of the page you'll see an entry for 19 December

14     at 2130 hours.

15             MR. HANNIS:  And in the B/C/S I think we have to go to page 20.

16        Q.   It says:

17             "Call from Shaun Byrnes, situation critical in Podujevo.

18     Recommend we call Ambassador Miles."

19             And the next one is:

20             "Call to Ambassador Miles."

21             How does this relate to the earlier comments from Byrnes?  Does

22     it get even worse than what was noted at the top of the page?

23        A.   Right, KDOM and KVM had been working all day trying to get the

24     de-escalation to occur by meaning pulling back the MUP and pulling back

25     the VJ deployment and that wasn't happening, in fact, it was building.

Page 8721

 1     So hence the call to the embassy to get the information to Mr. Milosevic

 2     to see if he couldn't turn this off.

 3        Q.   Do you know what happened as a result of the call to

 4     Ambassador Miles and efforts to contact Milosevic?

 5        A.   I don't recall exactly right after the meeting, but I do know

 6     over time we did get the de-escalation and we did get the VJ and the MUP

 7     to reduce their numbers up there and not be so -- not be such a

 8     provocative deployment.

 9        Q.   Can you explain what you mean by "provocative deployment" in that

10     context?

11        A.   Well, it was a proportionality of force, I mean, we had VJ with

12     heavy weapons and tanks and artillery, and the KLA of course had small

13     arms.  And the fear was was that they would -- the VJ would annihilate

14     the whole village down there where the KLA was supposedly in place.

15        Q.   Okay.  Let's go forward a few days.

16             MR. HANNIS:  Page 19.  At the top it says 24 December, 1998,

17     1245.  I don't know if that's ... Okay.  And it's page 21 in the B/C/S.

18        Q.   And in the English it says:

19             "Podujevo events have unravelled somewhat, VJ units deployed once

20     again to Podujevo and threats were levied against a US KDOM vehicle."

21             Further on in the paragraph:

22             "Ambassador Miles confirmed the report and levied a formal

23     protest with the FRY government."

24             Do you recall this?

25        A.   I do.

Page 8722

 1        Q.   So it sounds like between the 19th and the 24th the VJ might have

 2     backed off a little bit but they returned?

 3        A.   Yeah, there was in general an agreement that some of the MUP

 4     would pull back and the VJ would pull back.  The VJ pulled back not so

 5     much with the heavy vehicles or artilleries as they did with the

 6     personnel.  But they came back, I don't remember exactly the date, and I

 7     have to rely on my notes here that that was the date, but they came back

 8     in its original strength, in -- responding to KLA activity in the area.

 9        Q.   And further down on that page there's another 24 December entry

10     listing General DZ and an update, a single line in the middle there

11     General Loncar says:

12             "DZ said verifiers threaten being shot by VJ."

13             Do you know what that was about?

14        A.   This was a tension-filled time.  Many of us, including myself who

15     had walked past the Pristina barracks were often threatened by VJ

16     soldiers that were standing guard or post outside the walls there.  They

17     didn't want any photographs taken of them mounting up and deploying.  It

18     was a very, you know -- you had to walk on the other side of the road.

19     KDOM was intrusive and KVM was intrusive to the extent of taking

20     photographs of the deployment, radioing ahead to other units that they

21     are leaving and which way that they were headed.  And we were later

22     informed that through the KVM LO for the VJ that they felt that this was

23     a serious issue for their security by advance notification of their

24     deployment.

25        Q.   Did KVM take the position that this was something that you were

Page 8723

 1     entitled to do?

 2        A.   Well we felt that we were entitled to do it especially when we

 3     didn't get advance notice of a deployment which was the agreement which

 4     was sporadic at best, but generally, you know, we would have expected to

 5     get information from the MUP or the VJ of where they were heading the

 6     next day.  We at least wanted 24-hour notice on what those deployments

 7     were.  And because we weren't getting that, we tended to kind of camp

 8     outside those areas and then follow where they were headed.

 9             MR. HANNIS:  Next we could look at page 22 of the English.  It's

10     listed as page number 38 at the top in typewriting, if that helps you

11     find it in your hard copy.  And this would be page 25 of the B/C/S.

12        Q.   And I'll tell you, Colonel, I'm starting kind of in a middle of a

13     meeting that appears to have taken place on Christmas eve,

14     24 December, 1998, at 1850 -- 1815 hours.  Present Sainovic, Loncar,

15     Slana, Gordana, and General Lukic.  Gordana was an interpreter?

16        A.   Yes, sir.

17        Q.   Okay.  Now, on this page 22 in the English in e-court at the top

18     we have S; I take it is Sainovic?

19        A.   Yes, sir.

20        Q.   "We have been cooperative of KDOM and KVM."

21             He regrets that issues about the helicopter and security are

22     rejected and not IAW agreement.  Is that in accordance with?

23        A.   Yes, sir.

24        Q.   And then skipping the next entry:

25             "The result of investigation showed no grenade."

Page 8724

 1             What was that about?

 2        A.   That was an event where Mr. Walker and I had left our apartment

 3     and were walking to work and we were confronted by a drunken policeman

 4     who was out of uniform and we had our Albanian security with us, and he

 5     was verbally abusive to the Albanian security.  The tension escalated

 6     there.  Mr. Walker and I were trying to, you know, separate all of this.

 7     And our security guard saw the drunken policeman have a grenade in his

 8     hand and throw it and the security took Mr. Walker and put him in a car

 9     and he left the scene.

10        Q.   You say he was out of uniform, how did you know this person was a

11     policeman?

12        A.   He called himself a policeman.

13             MR. HANNIS:  And if we could go to the next page in B/C/S, still

14     on the same page in English.

15        Q.   We see Mike, as a the speaker, saying I was never talked to.  Who

16     was Mike?

17        A.   That was me.

18        Q.   Okay.  And Lukic -- before that it said all persons were talked

19     to, is that in connection with investigating this incident?

20        A.   Yes, sir.

21        Q.   All right.  Were you ever talked to or was a statement ever taken

22     from you?

23        A.   No, sir.  And that was a point of contention in that the

24     investigation was incomplete because not all parties who witnessed the

25     scene were talked to, including the Albanian security guards.

Page 8725

 1        Q.   The next to the last -- or two entries above the bottom of the

 2     page, S, Sainovic I assume says:

 3             "Mistake - people of your mission have not given a statement.

 4     I'm asking you to do that right now."

 5             Did any policemen take your statement?

 6        A.   No, sir.

 7        Q.   Walker then talks about this was not a real investigation.  There

 8     was no follow-up?

 9        A.   Not that I am aware of.  There certainly wasn't with me as one of

10     the members there.

11        Q.   Okay.  Did it ever come up again with Sainovic about your

12     personal security in this incident not being fully investigated?

13        A.   It did come up again, but it wasn't in the context of requirement

14     of a full meeting, it was just continually used thereafter as an example

15     of non-cooperation.

16             MR. HANNIS:  Go to the next page in English, page 23, and this

17     will be page 27 in the B/C/S.

18        Q.   Two more pages to talk about relating to Podujevo.  We see DZ

19     speaking in the big paragraph says:

20             "Last Sunday, I saw Loncar in asked him the purpose of the VJ

21     company leaving the Podujevo airfield.  He said it had to conduct

22     training on a training arena, returning on Tuesday."

23             Now, this meeting was on the 24th of December which according to

24     my master calendar would have been a Thursday in 1998.  So the previous

25     Sunday would have been the 20th of December.  Do you recall this

Page 8726

 1     discussion that DZ had with Loncar at this meeting on the

 2     24th of December?

 3        A.   I vaguely recall it.  I'm familiar with the discussion but.

 4        Q.   Okay.  And DZ goes on to say:

 5             "The area was described as 10 kilometres.  It had Podujevo and

 6     many villages in the training area.  It was not an area the way armies

 7     understand training area."

 8             Do you remember that point being made?

 9        A.   No, sir, I don't.

10        Q.   Okay.  Did you have any discussions with anybody in the VJ about

11     what their training areas were in Kosovo?

12        A.   I personally did not, but that was a mission Ambassador Walker

13     had given DZ to understand what their definition of training area was and

14     that's what DZ was up in Podujevo to do.

15        Q.   And that related to part of KVM's job in terms of monitoring the

16     VJ and their activities?

17        A.   Yes, sir.

18        Q.   Okay.  And this sounds like VJ took the position that Podujevo

19     the town itself was within their training area?

20        A.   Yes.

21        Q.   For tanks to drive through?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   Okay.  And then going on a couple more lines it said -- this is

24     DZ saying :

25             "I told him, Loncar, this what a provocative action.  The next

Page 8727

 1     day a column of the unit went to the south of Podujevo and fired machine

 2     fire toward the village.  On the way back a KDOM vehicle was hit by fire.

 3     This was a provocative exercise.  On Tuesday the exercise didn't cease."

 4             Do you recall that?

 5        A.   Yes, sir, I do.

 6        Q.   Did KVM consider this a violation?

 7        A.   We did.  And we did in the context that we refer to as

 8     provocative because at the time the KLA, also in the area, had not fired.

 9     We had a KVM member in the village down there, spent the night with them

10     to ensure that they showed restraint.  And we felt it was provocative

11     because there was an effort to try and get the KLA to fire and return

12     fire.  And that was one of the things I remember DZ was upset about, was

13     that this is going to create problems for us if you continue to do that

14     and we can't help you when that happens.

15        Q.   Okay.

16             MR. HANNIS:  If we could go to page 28 in the B/C/S.

17        Q.   And, sir, at the bottom of this page you'll see it's L speaking,

18     I assume that's Loncar?

19        A.   Yes, sir.

20        Q.   If we could go to 24 in the English, it continues, Loncar

21     speaking, he says:

22             "I told you I am competent to stop firing but not authorised to

23     withdraw forces from Podujevo."

24             So that's Loncar, the VJ representative to this commission saying

25     he is not authorised to withdraw forces?

Page 8728

 1        A.   Yes.

 2        Q.   Do you know who was?

 3        A.   I do not know who was authorised to do that.

 4        Q.   You said sometimes in these meetings Sainovic would call

 5     Belgrade.  Do you know who he was talking to?

 6        A.   I do not.

 7        Q.   Do you have an opinion of who he was talking to based on all your

 8     dealings with him and the context of this KVM agreement?

 9        A.   My view was he was talking to somebody in Milosevic's inner

10     circle to try and get the word to him on what they were going to need to

11     do to resolve the situation.

12        Q.   Okay.  The next entry is DZ speaking again saying he saw a column

13     of 40 vehicles saying proportional rezoned is needed here.  Do you know

14     what that meant, "proportional rezones," or is that a typo?

15        A.   Let me just read the whole paragraph just for a moment.

16        Q.   Sure.

17        A.   Those are DZ's words, sir.  I'm not exactly sure what he meant,

18     what's needed there.  But I know that he was working hard in that period

19     to get the forces that were there dispersed.  So that may have been what

20     he referred -- but it's purely conjecture on my part.

21        Q.   But doesn't this relate to the comment you made before about

22     proportionate or disproportionate?

23        A.   Force size.

24        Q.   He goes on to say:  "Overwhelming force was ..."

25        A.   Yes, it relates to that.

Page 8729

 1             THE INTERPRETER:  Would the speakers kindly not overlap for the

 2     interpreters, thank you.

 3             MR. HANNIS:  My apologies to the interpreter.  We are speaking

 4     too fast after one another.

 5        Q.   DZ said there a major breach of cease-fire by the VJ and MUP.

 6     The next speaker is S, Sainovic?

 7        A.   Yes.

 8        Q.   And Sainovic says:

 9             "I asked for intervention of the VJ units in that spot."

10             You recall him saying that?

11        A.   Right.  Yes.

12        Q.   Okay.  I'd like to have you look at an excerpt from another

13     document -- well, let me ask you this question:  Were you aware of any

14     concerns on the part of the VJ that they were being directed by civilians

15     instead of army commanders?

16        A.   I am sorry, could you --

17        Q.   Were you aware of any concerns by General Loncar or anybody in

18     the VJ that their units were being controlled or directed by civilians

19     instead of VJ commander?

20        A.   I was not aware of any of that concern.

21             MR. HANNIS:  Your Honours, I would like, at this point in the

22     record, like to direct your attention to the 65 ter number 0928.  This

23     was one of the VJ collegiums that I showed Phil Coo when he was here.

24     It's been tendered into evidence subject to any objections from the

25     Defence, which we're waiting to get.  But I'm assuming that it will be

Page 8730

 1     admitted, and if so in connection with this entry in Colonel Phillips's

 2     notebook I would ask you to look at 0928 in the English at pages 13

 3     and 14 where General Dimitrijevic is talking about what he called a

 4     so-called pretend or real planned exercise in the vicinity of Podujevo

 5     and talking about a concern about ensuring that not even Sainovic or any

 6     other Sainovic can solve these problems by lightly deciding to use the

 7     units.

 8             Now, the last -- I think that was the last one I had for

 9     Podujevo.  I have --

10             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Djurdjic.

11             MR. HANNIS:  Sorry.

12             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I have many objections.  First of

13     all, it seems that Mr. Hannis is bringing this to a close.  In my view, I

14     think it would be appropriate for the witness to see the text and have

15     his interpretation.  We now have Mr. Hannis offering his comments,

16     prompting the witness by way of certain remarks.

17             On the other hand, any mention of any civilians commanding the

18     army, we don't find that in the documents and he is now invoking certain

19     evidence that the witness is not familiar with.  Maybe the Chamber is,

20     but the witness has nothing to do with that and he is supposed to state

21     his opinion.

22             I think this way of conducting the examination-in-chief is

23     inappropriate, and we have more of Mr. Hannis's conclusions than the

24     witness's.  He should not be doing so.  It should be the witness who is

25     supposed to offer his interpretation of what he took down.

Page 8731

 1             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Hannis.

 2             MR. HANNIS:  Your Honour, I would be happy to show him the

 3     excerpt from 00928.  My problem was, I don't think that was on my list of

 4     notifications of documents I was going to use with this witness.

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  That might dig you a hole a little deeper rather

 6     than get you out of one, Mr. Hannis.

 7             MR. HANNIS:  I know, but I have to tell you about that.  And I

 8     tried to quote from the document itself, but I'm happy to show it to the

 9     witness, I think that does make sense if the Court is willing to give me

10     leave to do that.

11             JUDGE PARKER:  My problem is that I don't understand or did not

12     understand from your comments that you were seeking to have the witness

13     comment at all.  As I understood it, you were saying please for

14     cross-reference, Chamber take note of a certain document not yet an

15     exhibits but which you hoped would be an exhibit.  You were stretching

16     the role of an advocate very far Mr. Hannis, but I don't think you were

17     doing what Mr. Djurdjic was concerned you were doing.

18             MR. HANNIS:  Well, I'm not sure, Your Honour.  I had -- if we

19     went back in the transcript you may see I had a hesitation when I started

20     to ask him about that because I think I realised that this wasn't on my

21     list so I couldn't show it to him and I was trying to think how to

22     present it, and I did that sort of by the seat of my pants, I guess.

23             JUDGE PARKER:  Well we might leave your pants where they are and

24     when we come to final submissions, no doubt if it is an exhibit by then,

25     this may feature.

Page 8732

 1             MR. HANNIS:  Thank you.  Before I move from Podujevo though, one

 2     last question, Colonel.  We looked at some of your photographs, and I

 3     think you told us those related to Podujevo in December?

 4        A.   Yes, sir.

 5        Q.   Okay.  What date -- I saw a date on one of them was the

 6     27th of December, were they all on the same day or do you know?

 7        A.   No, sir.  They were somewhere on the 25th when we were up there.

 8     We were up there, I think, every day, I can't recall how many days, but

 9     nearly every day we had tensions up there.

10        Q.   So during that sort of whole week proceeding and around the

11     25th of December?

12        A.   Yes, sir.

13        Q.   Thank you.

14             MR. HANNIS:  Now, I want to go to page 43 in the English, and

15     it's page 54 in the B/C/S.  This is listed as a meeting on the

16     22nd of January --

17             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Djurdjic again anxious.

18             MR. HANNIS:  Sorry.

19             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes, Mr. Djurdjic.

20             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21             Mr. Hannis, can you tell me what the date of the meeting is and

22     the time next time you put up a new document.  You did say it's the

23     22nd of December -- no, January it seems for this one.  Thank you.

24             MR. HANNIS:  Yes.  22nd of January, 1999.  It says:

25             "CIO Meeting Part 11."

Page 8733

 1             Can you tell what the acronym CIO is.

 2        A.   That was chairman in office, sir.

 3        Q.   What person did that refer to in this context?

 4        A.   That would have been Mr. Vollebaek the Norwegian chairman in

 5     office at the time.

 6        Q.   Oh, okay.  OSCE?

 7        A.   Yes, sir.

 8        Q.   And we see an entry for, it looks like, AMB,

 9     Ambassador Travik [phoen]?

10        A.   Right.

11        Q.   Who was he?

12        A.   He was Mr. Vollebaek's assistant.

13        Q.   Okay.  It he says:

14             "A sinister activity is ... MUP using orange vehicles."

15             Do you know what that was about?

16        A.   Right.  Our KVM had observed some of the MUP, not many, but some

17     of the MUP were using their once blue vehicles now having been painted

18     orange to get access into some of the villages.  And I say "get access"

19     whether they were blue or orange, they had access, but it was a way to

20     lessen their threat initially in the area there because KVM vehicles were

21     orange, KVM was considered, and the orange vehicles, were considered

22     friendly and safe.

23        Q.   And more likely to receive easy entry than a blue vehicle that

24     might be MUP?

25        A.   Right.  Not likely to be fired upon.

Page 8734

 1        Q.   Okay.  Now, this is about a week after Racak.

 2             MR. HANNIS:  And if we could go to the next page, it's 44 in the

 3     English.  And page 54 at the bottom in B/C/S.

 4        Q.   Says:

 5             "Tough week, 2 of our verifiers shot last week."

 6             Do you recall what that was about?

 7        A.   Right, that was two verifiers that as I recall were shot by the

 8     KLA.

 9        Q.   Okay.  And then this event has been a setback, Racak?

10        A.   Right.

11        Q.   "The scene in the village of Racak was the most horrifying thing

12     one can imagine."

13             Who wrote this?  Is this you speaking?

14        A.   Those are my notes to myself.  I believe I usually kind of wrote

15     those things end of the day in the evening.

16        Q.   "A true tragedy, we counted 45 bodies, all were shot in the

17     head?"

18             Next paragraph:

19             "The majority of those killed were older men in their 50s and

20     60s.  We also came across three women and one 12-year-old boy."

21             You were out there on what date.

22        A.   We were out there between 6.30 and 7.00 in the morning on

23     16 January.

24        Q.   Now, did you have at that time information or get information

25     about how that operation had proceeded in Racak, who was involved?

Page 8735

 1        A.   Mr. Gilbertson who was at one time, I believe, a member of the

 2     KDOM, and I'm not sure when, but he was absorbed into our mission as a

 3     true verifier - just want to emphasise, was not dual hatted, not KDOM and

 4     KVM, but did come to KVM - and he notified the head of missions office

 5     that there had been this tragic event at Racak.  I believe

 6     General Maisonneuve, who I believe was at Prizren region, was also

 7     involved in on the scene and was notified of this event.

 8        Q.   What did you know or what did you learn about what forces had

 9     been involved in the action at Racak?

10        A.   We -- you know, this event, from what I can remember, really

11     began to build around the 8th and 9th of January.  There was a couple of

12     MUP policemen that had been killed.  And there was a gradual build-up of

13     VJ forces and an increase in the MUP forces.  The VJ not so much in and

14     around Stimlje or the Racak area but up on a bluff that overlooked the

15     region.  And the MUP were more heavily deployed in Racak and Stimlje

16     proper, setting up check-points and going through the village in good

17     numbers.

18        Q.   In the action in which these 45 were killed, who was involved?

19        A.   The MUP were involved.

20        Q.   Was there any VJ involvement in the incident?

21        A.   The VJ involvement consisted of the shelling into -- into the

22     homes in the village.

23        Q.   Before, during, or after the MUP going in?

24        A.   That was before the MUP went in.  The villages typically, in all

25     of these incidents, the village was typically shelled, softened up, then

Page 8736

 1     these combat MUP spread throughout the village.

 2        Q.   Okay.  Did you -- when you were out there that morning did you

 3     see any VJ presence throughout the area?

 4        A.   Saw them at check-points with the MUP.

 5        Q.   And see any VJ equipment, vehicles, whatever in the immediate

 6     area?

 7        A.   At the check-points.  They were parked there with the MUP

 8     vehicles.

 9        Q.   And in the hills around the area?

10        A.   We could see that there was vehicles up there, couldn't ID

11     exactly what they were, but we knew that it was a VJ deployment location.

12        Q.   All right.  Let me take you down near the bottom the page, you

13     have a question:

14             "What do we do next?"

15             And can you read what you wrote there?

16        A.   I made a question:

17             "What do we do next?"

18             I say:

19             "We will continue our mission, continue to verify until it simply

20     becomes too risky and dangerous to carry out our mandate.  Remember, we

21     are all unarmed here, very tough situation."

22        Q.   That's what you wrote on the 22nd of January, 1999?

23        A.   Right.

24        Q.   That's what you tried to do?

25        A.   That's what we tried to do.  Yes, sir.

Page 8737

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             MR. HANNIS:  I don't have any further questions for the witness.

 3     I would like to tender this Exhibit 0564 under seal.

 4             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received under seal.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P01312 under

 6     seal.

 7             MR. HANNIS:  Thank you, Colonel.

 8             THE WITNESS:  Sir.

 9             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Djurdjic.

10             MR. HANNIS:  Your Honour, if he is not going to talk about the

11     notes, I suppose we can go back into open session now.  As long as he is

12     not talking about the notes of interview or the notebooks.

13             JUDGE PARKER:  I was waiting for Mr. Djurdjic to indicate where

14     he wanted to start.  Do we need to be in private for your commencement,

15     Mr. Djurdjic?

16             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] No, Your Honour.  I would need to

17     organise myself a bit, but we can go back into open session.  I think

18     it's still a bit too early for the break, so we can resume in open

19     session.

20             JUDGE PARKER:  Open.

21                           [Open session]

22             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, we are back in open session.

23                           Cross-examination by Mr. Djurdjic:

24        Q.   Colonel, can I address you as colonel first of all?

25        A.   Yes, sir.

Page 8738

 1        Q.   Thank you.  My name is Veljko Djurdjic, Defence team member of

 2     the accused Vlastimir Djordjevic.  With me is another Defence team

 3     member, Ms. Marie O'Leary.

 4             I wanted to share with you that I read all of your statements and

 5     notes made as well as the transcript of your testimony in the Milutinovic

 6     case, as well as followed what you said today.  I will try to put only

 7     those questions which have not been put to you until now.

 8             Since we are in open session, I would like to start with your

 9     engagement with the verification mission.  You spoke about that today.  I

10     would like to know the following:  Prior to the mission itself, had you

11     ever participated in another verification mission or a mission that would

12     be similar to this one in nature?

13        A.   No, sir.

14        Q.   Thank you.  I made a note here that you said today that you were

15     invited by General Ralston, he made an offer.  Can you tell us why you

16     were recommended, what previous activities of yours made you a good

17     candidate for Mr. -- for General Ralston and to be a team member for

18     Mr. Walker?

19        A.   Sir, I was -- I honestly don't know why General Ralston selected

20     me, although I was grateful for the opportunity.  Ambassador Walker was

21     the one who asked for me when General Ralston asked, Is there anything

22     that you need to assist you?  And Mr. Walker called for me.  General

23     Ralston really facilitated making that happen.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Did you know Mr. Walker from an earlier time?

25        A.   Yes, sir, I did.

Page 8739

 1        Q.   Did you ever work together with him?

 2        A.   Yes, sir, I did.

 3        Q.   At that time, was Mr. Walker a State Department employee?

 4        A.   He was a State Department employee, but he was working at

 5     National Defence University as the vice-president.  And I was working at

 6     National Defence University as an aide-de-camp to the president of the

 7     university.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  There was one other thing I wanted to ask you.  I

 9     know from this trial that American generals, in addition to their

10     military backgrounds, have civilian specialties.  What was your civilian

11     specialty at university?

12        A.   I don't understand the question exactly, but I think you are

13     asking me what did I study at the university?  In my undergraduate work I

14     was studying economics and geography.

15        Q.   Thank you.  What was offered to you when you were asked to work

16     together with Mr. Walker and his team?  What made you accept the offer?

17        A.   I think whenever you are wearing a uniform and you have trained

18     for years to work in environments like this, it's an excellent

19     opportunity to learn.  So I was excited to accept, to be involved in

20     something that I had never been involved in before, but had great

21     interest in international missions.  So I accepted.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Did you apply for a KVM post or were you appointed or

23     sent there, rather, by the US government?

24        A.   I never applied for the job.  I had no idea that I was being

25     looked at for the job.  I accepted the job on a Thursday and had a plane

Page 8740

 1     ticket on Friday to meet Ambassador Walker in New York.  It happened that

 2     fast.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Very well.  Did you ever conclude a contract, and

 4     agreement, with the OSCE Secretariat concerning your engagement with the

 5     KVM?

 6        A.   I'm not sure what you mean by did I "conclude a contract."  When

 7     I was seconded to work for Ambassador Walker, I was still an active-duty

 8     military air force officer sent on what we call temporary duty, initially

 9     the duration was not to exceed 30 days, but upon 30 days, I was asked if

10     I would stay longer and I agreed.  But I never recall signing any

11     contract that made me an employee of the OSCE.  I was always told that I

12     was seconded by the OSCE with the US support to do so.

13        Q.   Can I conclude based on your answer that, speaking in broad

14     terms, you remained a US official throughout your stay in Pristina

15     between the 4th of November, 1999, and until you left the country on the

16     20th of March, 1999?

17        A.   I guess a troubling word there for me there is "official."  I was

18     an OSCE verifier, I considered myself a verifier, I never wore my

19     military uniform during that whole deployment period.  I did not report

20     back to US government officials, I reported through OSCE channels.  So I

21     would tell you that I considered myself a true OSCE verifier although I

22     remained an active-duty military officer with the US government.

23        Q.   That is why I raised this issue.  Were you an employee of an

24     international organisation, which in this case is the OSCE, or were you

25     an employee of the Government of the United States assigned to assist

Page 8741

 1     Mr. Walker?

 2        A.   Sir, I'd have to answer that question both as yes.  Yes, I was an

 3     OSCE employee; yes, I was a US Air Force officer seconded to the OSCE to

 4     perform an international mission.

 5        Q.   Can I conclude then that you continued receiving your salary from

 6     the US Air Force during your stay in Kosovo and Metohija as a member of

 7     the KVM?

 8        A.   Yes, sir, I received my base pay as an air force officer, and I

 9     received per diem from the OSCE for the deployment location.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Can you please expand this further.  Which part of

11     your expenses was borne by the Vienna Secretariat, your expenses, while

12     you were in Pristina?

13        A.   OSCE.

14        Q.   Yes, but which expenses specifically?

15        A.   My per diem expenses for food and rent and that sort of thing.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Could you tell me what was your function in the

17     Kosovo Verification Mission headquarters in Pristina?

18        A.   My original position was to arrive as Ambassador Walker's

19     Chief of Staff and his special advisor.  My Chief of Staff functions in

20     the early part of the mission consisted of helping locate a facility to

21     stand up the OSCE.  It entailed the planning for standing up the mission,

22     getting -- bringing in verifiers.  Standing up a training facility.

23     Getting computer networks and phones and all the basic logistics

24     established.  Establishing an organisational chart on how the mission

25     would be organised.

Page 8742

 1             Later on my duties transferred into the area of being more

 2     operational in orientation in the sense that once we got the mission

 3     stood up, we began to go to the field more often and observe activities

 4     with the verifiers.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  First I'd like you to tell us who appointed you to

 6     the position of Chef de Cabinet and in what way, when Mr. Hannis led you

 7     in his examination-in-chief, you confirmed that you were the

 8     Chef de Cabinet, and now you said so yourself, who appointed you to that

 9     position?

10        A.   Ambassador Walker gave me that title.

11        Q.   When?

12        A.   Before we left the United States in New York, he defined that

13     that would be my role for him.

14        Q.   Was the Secretariat of the OSCE in Vienna informed thereof that

15     you were appointed as Chief of Staff to Mr. Walker?

16        A.   I would have to assume that they were.  I was never myself

17     officially notified that they knew, but when I went and visited Vienna,

18     talk to member states, they knew me as his Chief of Staff.

19        Q.   The simplest way to establish to determine what somebody's

20     position is is to look at the payroll.  Now, did you ever have occasion

21     to see the payroll list, whether it actually identified your position

22     there?  For instance, Mr. Michael Phillips, and then your position, what

23     was it?

24        A.   Yes, sir, I never saw that payroll.

25        Q.   Thank you.  The reason I'm putting all these questions is that I

Page 8743

 1     noticed from what you said, but I think I also observed this in the

 2     transcript, that you were an advisor for military matters to Mr. Walker;

 3     and today we've heard here twice already that you were the

 4     Chief of Staff?

 5        A.   Right.  My opening comment was, to you, that I was his

 6     Chief of Staff and also his advisor.  I was referred as a military

 7     advisor, but my role, as I said, we moved into the operational scene,

 8     consisted of writing speeches for him, to transcribing notes with him,

 9     prepping him for interviews with the press, to visiting military units.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Colonel, sir, when you heard that you were going to

11     deploy on a mission in Kosovo and Metohija, did you undergo any type of

12     preparation for this mission?

13        A.   You mean, medical preparation, or operational preparation,

14     training?  What do you refer to exactly?

15        Q.   No, you are a pilot, an air force pilot, so I'm not referring to

16     medical preparation, but operational, in the operational sense.  Whether

17     you were apprised of where you were going, what the situation was there,

18     what type of situation you can find there?  So did you undergo any type

19     of training?  And I mean more in political terms than historical.

20        A.   Right.  I had not received any preparation for the area, and I

21     must tell you when I was in Hawaii, I was looking -- I was looking east,

22     I was not looking at Europe, and I had to look up where Kosovo was.  And

23     I would also add that my occupation in the air force is not that of a

24     combat pilot.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Well, now I'd like to continue putting questions

Page 8744

 1     along this line but I won't.

 2             Now, tell me, did you have any idea, did you have any picture in

 3     your mind as to what was going on in Yugoslavia, what it was that was

 4     happening there?  In other words, before you were offered this post by

 5     Mr. Walker?

 6        A.   No, sir, I did not.  I was truly caught by surprise to be in the

 7     pacific to go to Europe.  That wasn't my focus.  I had not read a great

 8     deal on what was happening there.  I was aware of Bosnia, but not of what

 9     was happening in Kosovo.

10        Q.   You mentioned Bosnia now.  As far as I understood, you had no

11     business or no missions in operational sense in Bosnia in the 1990s;

12     correct?

13        A.   No, sir, I did not.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Did you have occasion at all to read through some

15     documents that you would be encountering during your verification mission

16     in Kosovo and Metohija, and if so, who provided those documents and which

17     documents were they?

18        A.   I had no documents to read when we arrived.  The deployment came

19     very fast, and I was more concerned of taking care of my family upon my

20     quick departure and getting my personal issues squared away.  So there

21     was no documents to travel with, no documents to read.  My entry into

22     Kosovo really started in Warsaw, Poland, when we met then the Polish

23     chairman in office who acquainted us with the mission prior to entry of

24     4 of November into Pristina.

25        Q.   If I'm not mistaken, this was in early November, the time when

Page 8745

 1     you were in Warsaw.  Could you tell us what Mr. Geremek told you then in

 2     terms of what it was that he expected of you, not necessarily what it was

 3     that he expected of Mr. Walker's mission?

 4        A.   I was a note-taker in that meeting.  He did not address me

 5     specifically.  I was introduced to him as Mr. Walker's assistant and he

 6     welcomed me.  Mentioned that this should be an exciting opportunity and

 7     wished me luck.  That was about the extent of my in-briefing to Kosovo.

 8        Q.   Very well.  And you ended up in Pristina on the 4th of November.

 9     Now, tell us, please, when you arrived there, did you read any documents

10     that you were to comply with or implement during your verification

11     mission?

12        A.   I believe I got ahold of what's referred to often as the

13     Holbrooke-Milosevic Agreement somewhere in the first couple of weeks of

14     our arrival.  The first couple of weeks I will tell you were spent more

15     logistically internal to OSCE requirements than they were of political

16     requirements.  I don't recall exactly, but I would tell you the first

17     discussion we had on the agreement was in early December with

18     Mr. Sainovic and Mr. Walker trying to lay out a broad understanding of

19     really what the agreement said and what the intent of the agreement would

20     be for us to live up to as an OSCE international mission.

21        Q.   Could you please tell us what the Holbrooke-Milosevic Agreement

22     was, and how and where did you see it?  What form did you see it in?

23        A.   I saw it in a paper copy.  And my interpretation of it was, was a

24     mandate that essentially was to help us arrive at a peaceful solution for

25     some sort of a co-existence between the Serbian and Albanian people in

Page 8746

 1     Kosovo, and cease-fire maintenance, until a political solution process

 2     could run its course.

 3             I do not have the actual agreement in front of me.  I could refer

 4     to it if you like.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Could you tell me where you saw this document and who

 6     it was who showed it to you?

 7        A.   I saw it for the first time in Pristina, and I can't recall who

 8     showed it to me.  I think it might -- I don't think anybody specifically

 9     showed it to me.  It was just kind of in a stack of papers on my desk

10     that I -- that I had gotten ahold of.  I don't recall specifically how I

11     got it.

12        Q.   Can you tell me then something about the substance of that

13     document.  Who signed it, did you see the signatures on the document, and

14     what it was about?

15        A.   In general I think the document listed how many verifiers were to

16     come into the mission.  I think 2.000 was the number.  I don't recall the

17     signatures on the document.  Although it was called the

18     Holbrooke-Milosevic Agreement, I don't recall ever seeing Mr. Milosevic's

19     signature on the document.

20             I can't recall specifically the content of the document, haven't

21     looked at it in over ten years, so.

22        Q.   Tell me then, did you see Mr. Holbrooke's signature on it?

23        A.   I don't recall his signature, sir.  Not that it wasn't there, I

24     just don't remember if it was there or not.

25        Q.   Thank you.  What did you do with this document when you left

Page 8747

 1     Kosovo and Metohija?

 2        A.   I don't recall what I did with it.  It might be part of my own

 3     archives somewhere.  I don't know what I did with the document.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Did you have a personal archive, your own personal

 5     files, or did you have an official file as the personal assistant to

 6     Mr. Walker?

 7        A.   Just some personal files.  I never turned any of those files over

 8     to any government official or State Department or Department of Defence.

 9     Those were, I considered them kind of academic papers, experience papers,

10     that I hope to write about one day.

11        Q.   Mr. Witness, I am not going to ask you about your private files,

12     nor do you need to speak about that.  All I'm interested in is the

13     official files and archives that you had to keep as the Chief of Staff.

14     What I would like to know is, first of all, whether such files existed at

15     all?

16        A.   I kept papers that Mr. Walker wanted to maintain.  I would

17     consider those official papers.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Could you tell me whether these were the official

19     documents of the Kosovo Verification Mission, or?

20        A.   They would have been documents of the

21     Kosovo Verification Mission, yes, sir.

22        Q.   Did you hand over those documents to the OSCE Secretariat in

23     Vienna when you left the Kosovo Verification Mission?

24        A.   No, sir, I did not.

25        Q.   Could you tell us why not?

Page 8748

 1        A.   Because we shredded them when we evacuated our mission, except

 2     for just a handful of documents which were really KVM reports that the

 3     OSCE in Vienna had anyway.

 4        Q.   If I'm not mistaken, we've heard the testimony of Mr. DZ who told

 5     us that the entire archive of the OSCE was taken out during the -- or

 6     withdrawal of the OSCE Verification Mission, that it was taken to

 7     Macedonia when they left.  Did Mr. Walker treat the documents, the files,

 8     in a different manner than they were treated or held in the OSCE KVM?

 9        A.   I can tell you the papers that I collected, I shredded,

10     Mr. Walker had papers.  Some documents he gave to me, very casual matter

11     to keep on file, but the papers that I collected consisted of everything

12     from press statements, newspaper articles, KDOM reports, some Blue Book

13     reports, some KVM reports.  It was not necessary for me to take all of

14     those out because they were already in Vienna.  So -- and because we were

15     only allowed to take a certain amount out with us pound-wise,

16     weight-wise, in the evacuation, I shredded a lot of that material.  It

17     wasn't shred to keep from anyone, it was shredded just to reduce the

18     load.  We didn't -- obviously didn't want to leave them all behind.

19             I would add that I cannot speak to General DZ.  I'm quite certain

20     that he would have responsibly taken many of his operational papers with

21     him.  But I can't speak to what he did with his archives.  And I guess I

22     would be careful to call - and I use this term archives, I realise

23     that - but I would be careful to call my desk drawer an archive.  It was

24     just some papers that we had collected.

25        Q.   Well, this reminds me, General DZ actually delivered these

Page 8749

 1     documents at the Whitehall, and as far as I can see what did you with

 2     your files is you handed them over to the State Department; correct?

 3        A.   I never said that I handed anything over to the State Department.

 4     The documents that I had were shredded.  Reports, I didn't take with me

 5     because, as I say, Vienna already had those on file.

 6        Q.   Colonel, sir, the notes that were shown to us by Mr. Hannis, what

 7     did you do with those notes?  Where did you file them when you left the

 8     KVM?

 9        A.   When we left the KVM, I had my personal notes and I turned those

10     over to the ICTY upon request along with photos in Macedonia and those

11     notes first were allowed to be transcribed for me.  And I do believe

12     Helena who was Ambassador Walker's secretary who did work for the

13     State Department actually typed those notes out and gave me the copy

14     because I turned the originals over to the Tribunal.

15        Q.   Then it was my misunderstanding.  Because I read this to mean

16     that your notes were turned over to the OTP by the US, but you told us

17     that this is how it transpired.  Now, when was this happening?  Was this

18     in 1999?

19        A.   Yes, sir, this would have been 1999.  I want to clarify:  When we

20     left Kosovo and went to Macedonia, I was interviewed a number of times by

21     the ICTY --

22        Q.   Thank you.  I just wanted to know about the notes.  But obviously

23     it was my erroneous conclusion.

24             JUDGE PARKER:  Is that a convenient time then?

25             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I apologise, I've already gone

Page 8750

 1     over the time.  Yes, Your Honours.

 2             JUDGE PARKER:  I was waiting for some logical break in your line

 3     of questioning.  We will have our second break now and resume at 5

 4     minutes past 6.00.

 5                           [The witness stands down]

 6                           --- Recess taken at 5.35 p.m.

 7                           --- On resuming at 6.04 p.m.

 8             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Djurdjic.

 9             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, while we are waiting

10     for the witness to be brought in, I would like to propose something, and

11     I've already discussed this with Mr. Hannis, but we have addressed this

12     to the Trial Chamber.  What I'm talking about is the exhibits that were

13     admitted into evidence in the Milutinovic case relating to the notes

14     prepared by this witness that were put forth to him individually and then

15     admitted into evidence in this case.

16             So my proposal is, and Mr. Hannis has agreed to it, that the list

17     of documents that I provided to the Trial Chamber be admitted into

18     evidence in total so that we don't have to waste any time here by putting

19     them to the witness one by one.  So this is my proposal to both

20     Mr. Hannis if he agrees and of course to the Trial Chamber.

21             MR. HANNIS:  Your Honour, I have no objection to that.  Those

22     exhibits on the list though that are excerpts from his notebooks, I

23     request be entered under seal, and I think there are I think two or four

24     on his list which are not from Phillips' notebooks, I have no problem

25     with them being in the open.  But all of those in the notebooks under

Page 8751

 1     seal.

 2             JUDGE PARKER:  Is the Court Officer in a position to know which

 3     is which at the moment?

 4                           [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

 5                           [The witness takes the stand]

 6             JUDGE PARKER:  Please be seated.

 7             Mr. Djurdjic and Mr. Hannis, the proposal you make is a sensible

 8     one, but you will need to provide the Court Officer with a list of the

 9     exhibits identifying which are to be under seal so that we get it right.

10             Please carry on, Mr. Djurdjic.

11             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

12        Q.   Colonel, sir, when you took up position at the verification

13     mission in Kosovo, I understand that it was in the very earliest days of

14     the mission.  Could you tell me how the headquarters of the KVM in

15     Pristina were set up.  I'm not interested in the regional centres, but

16     just the headquarters, how was it set up and did you participate in its

17     setting up?

18        A.   Well, the Norwegians had the responsibility to bring in the

19     computer network to network all of our systems together.  We established,

20     I believe, five sections in the organisation underneath the head of

21     mission.  I don't recall them all, but one was a political office, and

22     one was an operations office, one was a press office.  One was kind of a

23     mission support or logistics office.  Human rights office.  Each

24     component had a job description that was written for its

25     responsibilities.

Page 8752

 1             We were hiring and interviewing both national and international

 2     staff to work in the mission.  I did some of the hiring for the national

 3     staff in the press room, the security guards, drivers, things like that.

 4     So it was a period of time that was just, you know, building the

 5     necessary logistical requirements to sustain the mission.  There was a

 6     transportation office, that sort of thing.

 7             My role was helping Ambassador Walker build a functional

 8     organisational chart that would make his work most efficient.  He had

 9     asked me on several occasions to cut layers of bureaucracy, so he could

10     be in the field and not be in the office that much.  He wanted to be out

11     and about Kosovo.  So I looked for ways to organisation a mission that

12     way that would enable him to do that.

13             I would say that my role in doing that, really establishing job

14     descriptions for those that we brought in, probably lasted for a good six

15     weeks before we transitioned to more operational sorts of activity.

16        Q.   And what was the fusion centre?  Was that something that you set

17     up or somebody else?

18        A.   Ambassador Walker asked that I help establish the fusion centre.

19     It's a very good point.  It was the kind of, I guess, the heartbeat of

20     the organisation.  It's where all of our reporting would go into.  It's

21     where reports would be written and compiled and disseminated to the OSCE

22     in Vienna.  It represented Russians, Americans, Norwegians, various

23     countries.  Not all were represented in there.  It was sort of an

24     intelligence cell - for a lack of a better word - to pull together

25     information and data and get it disseminated.

Page 8753

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Could you now tell us who of the Russians was a

 2     member of the fusion cell or who was there?

 3        A.   I can't recall any of the names of any of the personnel that

 4     worked in the fusion centre.  I know that there were no restrictions on

 5     the countries that were to be represented in there and participating.  As

 6     I mentioned, I knew of the Russians, I knew of the American, I knew of

 7     the British, I knew of the Norwegians.  And that rotated out

 8     periodically.  People would come four to six months and rotate back and

 9     then others would be brought in.  So it was the director of the fusion

10     centre, I believe, early on was an American.  He left after a short time

11     and a another American came in behind him.  I think the deputy in there

12     was a Russian.

13        Q.   Thank you.  I'll get back to the Russian representative a little

14     later, because it seems to me from your notes that there were different

15     positions on whether there should be any Russians at the fusion centre or

16     not because of the information that was shared with NATO, do you recall

17     that?

18        A.   I do.  That was a large issue.  There was imagery that we were

19     concerned about sharing in there.  Ambassador Walker was concerned about

20     a Russian contingent in there.  There were secure phones in there that

21     were US in nature.  We found ways to work around those problems to

22     accommodate the Russians.  It was important, and Ambassador Walker knew

23     it was important, to have the Russians represented in there.  Again, I'm

24     not sure of all of their levels of responsibility or actual capacities

25     and whether they were just reporters or they had true positions of

Page 8754

 1     responsibility, but they were a part of the process in the fusion centre.

 2        Q.   What I would like to know is what profile, what kind of experts

 3     actually worked at the fusion centre?  And I don't mean the personnel at

 4     large, I mean the people who did the core functions, who performed the

 5     core functions at the fusion centre?

 6        A.   I can't speak to all the members in the fusion centre.  I do know

 7     that some of them had intelligence backgrounds.  Some of them had

 8     collection -- intelligence collection backgrounds.  Some of them had

 9     Special Forces background.  In general, that's what I can recall.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Who carried out the selection of that cadre?

11        A.   From what I can remember the Secretariat put out the

12     advertisements for the positions, and they would, you know, people that

13     were interested would fill out an application and the Secretariat would

14     select the fusion centre.

15             Sometimes we would get mission members on board and recognise

16     their writing skills or their communication skills and sometimes we would

17     take them from the mission, from say from the political office, human

18     rights office, and ask them to come to the fusion centre to work because

19     they wrote well and they could articulate and interpret well.  But for

20     the most part, I believe it was the Secretariat, Mr. Krasnai [phoen], I

21     think, down there had a role on selecting how the fusion centre and other

22     fields would be populated.  We generally put out what our needs were back

23     to the Secretariat and they would go out and recruit what we needed.

24        Q.   Thank you.  So you were not the person who ultimately decided on

25     who it was to become a member of the fusion cell?

Page 8755

 1        A.   Me personally?

 2        Q.   You and Mr. Walker?

 3        A.   No, sir.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  A thing just came to my mind.  Ms. Donna Phelan, did

 5     you know her?

 6        A.   I don't remember that name, no, sir.

 7        Q.   Then I may be wrong.  In January 1999, who was appointed as the

 8     head of fusion cell?

 9        A.   I believe at the time it was a civilian who was an American.  I

10     can't be sure, but I believe it was an American.

11        Q.   I'm certain that up to that time that person was an American by

12     the name of Andy Isruk [phoen].  Do you recall that name?

13        A.   Army -- army background, I do remember him, yes, you are correct.

14        Q.   And I just recalled that it was actually Ms. Donna Phelan who

15     replaced him.  At the beginning of your mission, she was or she had been

16     tasked with operations.

17             Another interesting thing is this:  I wanted to ask you about the

18     method of total or complete confrontation.  Have you ever heard of such a

19     thing?

20        A.   No, sir.

21        Q.   Thank you.  And you don't seem to recall Ms. Donna Phelan?

22        A.   I sure don't.  I'm sorry.

23        Q.   Very well, many years have gone by and many people were involved,

24     Colonel.

25             If I'm correct, perhaps you can correct me if I'm not, but I

Page 8756

 1     believe the fusion cell contained two parts; one part was supposed to

 2     with summarising the most important events of the day from the reports

 3     they received and to provide a collective report to Mr. Walker and his

 4     deputies.  Am I correct in saying that that was one part of the fusion

 5     cell?

 6        A.   Yes, sir.

 7        Q.   Or better yet, you tell us what the segments of that work were,

 8     because I may go astray and risk you misunderstanding me.  So one job to

 9     do was to collate a report for a day, have it in one place, and what were

10     the other activities of the fusion cell?

11        A.   It was to -- dissemination to the OSCE in Vienna, what was

12     happening in the field.  They wanted reports and the fusion centre was

13     providing that because the member states were asking for it.  So we had

14     an internal and an external requirement for the fusion centre.

15        Q.   Did it also do something related to security assessment, say,

16     what is going to happen?

17        A.   I don't recall security assessments.  You know, from what I can

18     remember, there -- on the reports there was an assessment.  I don't know

19     if it was called security assessment, but it was based on the day's

20     events.  There were assessments made and analysis done on what we could

21     expect for the next day or the week and sometimes the idea was was to

22     trigger us to bring those things up in meetings as Mr. Sainovic when we

23     were concerned about them.

24             I guess the best way to say is that they conducted some trend

25     analysis.

Page 8757

 1        Q.   Thank you.  In addition to yourself, who was in the immediate

 2     circle in Mr. Walker's cabinet?

 3        A.   Well, each of his deputy heads of mission, which would have been

 4     a German and a French, a British, Norwegian, I believe there were five.

 5     Then of course his inner office was myself, Albanian and Serb

 6     interpreter, and an American secretary from the State Department, and

 7     that was generally who was in his staff meetings.

 8             Fusion centre director early on attended those staff meetings,

 9     which helps me define the inner circle, but that didn't sustain itself

10     for very long.  And I'm referring -- I'm referring only to the fusion

11     centre director.  The staff meetings were regular occurrences for

12     Ambassador Walker.

13        Q.   Thank you.  What sort of decision-making mechanism existed in the

14     KVM headquarters?

15        A.   Mr. Walker really made the final decisions.  His -- he would take

16     the inputs from each of his deputy heads of mission.  There were, you

17     know, inputs from each member regarding everything from a press statement

18     to where humanitarian needs were needed, to where KVM operations needed

19     to be focused, to how we handle missing Serbs and missing Albanians.

20     Discussion and strategy was laid out.  He was given advice and then

21     Mr. Walker would make a decision based on that input.

22        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.  I'd like to focus on the most important

23     thing, which is verification as the most important role of the mission.

24     When a meeting takes place and Mr. Walker decides that there was a

25     violation of the agreement, what was the procedure after that?  In simple

Page 8758

 1     terms.  So everything is concluded, it is determined that a certain event

 2     amounts to a violation.  What follows?  What is the procedure?

 3        A.   From what I can remember, it was documented, it was forwarded to

 4     the OSCE Mission in Vienna, and we also advised Mr. Sainovic of the

 5     violations, of non-compliance.

 6        Q.   Who was supposed to implement or put his decision in practice, if

 7     anyone?  Was it you perhaps?

 8        A.   On occasion I would be asked to make a phone call, but we had a

 9     mechanism where the reports were disseminated out of the OSCE KVM to

10     Vienna automatically on a daily basis.  On occasion, I would be asked to

11     call Ambassador Travik who was the assistant to Ambassador Vollebaek,

12     CEO.  I worked more with him than I did in the early going Mr. Geremek, I

13     believe was his name, in Poland, primarily because we -- when he stood

14     down the mission became operational.  So he would inform the chairman of

15     office directly and I often did that through his assistance.

16        Q.   Colonel, save for such verbal reports, when there was a

17     violation, was there an office that would draft a protest and forward it

18     to the OSCE, or did you forward such a protest letter to anyone in

19     particular?  Are you familiar with any of that?

20        A.   Our political office, I think, sometimes got involved in that.  I

21     don't recall ever writing such reports and sending them off in a

22     unilateral fashion.  That was what the staff was to do.  I don't recall

23     all of the activities at the political office, but it seems to me they

24     had a role in wording that properly to send it off.

25        Q.   If such a document existed, was Mr. Walker supposed to sign it?

Page 8759

 1        A.   I don't recall if he ever had to sign those or not, sir.  I'm

 2     sorry.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  When you testified in the Milutinovic case, do you

 4     recall being shown a document of that nature?  It was an official letter

 5     of protest signed by Mr. Walker?

 6        A.   I do remember him with letters of protest.  I don't remember that

 7     specific document, but I do remember letters of protest.

 8        Q.   Thank you.

 9        A.   And they were [Overlapping speakers] ... presented to

10     Mr. Sainovic.

11        Q.   Colonel, the problem is that we have to put questions to

12     witnesses and this concerns material --

13             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction:  This concerns

14     witness's opinions.

15             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   -- if we had all the documents, things would be pretty clear.

17     But if a decision was made that there was non-compliance and we don't

18     have a letter that would show that such protest letters were indeed sent,

19     for example, there was an event that was protested and a letter was sent

20     to Mr. Milosevic, but we don't actually have a letter of protest that I

21     could show you.  Are you familiar with any such instances in which

22     occurrences of this nature happened?

23        A.   Familiar with letters going to Mr. Milosevic?  Or just letters of

24     protest?

25        Q.   Letters of protest?

Page 8760

 1        A.   I remember some documents that Mr. Walker wanted on the record

 2     that clearly defined non-compliance issues.  One of those was in the form

 3     of a letter that went in December, verbally, primarily to Mr. Milosevic.

 4     We often took them to the government building and spoke to Mr. Sainovic

 5     and Mr. Lukic and Mr. Loncar.  They were also incorporated into some of

 6     the KVM reporting where there was non-compliance as interpreted by the

 7     KVM.

 8        Q.   Let's simplify things.  There was a thing on the border on the

 9     25th of February concerning some KVM vehicles, when they were crossing

10     from Macedonia into the FRY.  On that occasion, the minister of foreign

11     affairs of the FRY sent a letter of protest to the KVM headquarters in

12     Pristina.  It was sent by Mr. Jovanovic.  Are there any such letters

13     issued by the KVM headquarters that would resemble situations such as

14     this one that would be sent to the other party, and if so, do you know

15     where we could find that.

16        A.   Sir, I cannot answer that easily.  I'm not a hundred per cent

17     certain of a formal stand-alone letter of protest that might have been

18     presented by Ambassador Walker.  I know that it was documented, and I

19     know that it was in reporting, and I know that it was in a letter to

20     Mr. Milosevic on occasion, but as far as stand-alone letters of protest,

21     I'm just not a hundred per cent certain to be able to tell you that there

22     in fact was.

23        Q.   While we are on the topic of reports, KVM reports, do you recall

24     any problems that the Yugoslav authorities asked that the reports you

25     sent to Vienna and to Mr. Vollebaek as the presiding of the OSCE should

Page 8761

 1     be sent to the Yugoslav authorities as well?

 2        A.   I think there was some discussion on that in the government

 3     building with Mr. Sainovic.  I don't remember what the disposition was as

 4     a result of that discussion.  I honestly don't know if we did agree to

 5     send those to the FRY or not.  I suspect not though.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Staying with the issue of reports, were there

 7     differences in the level of protection or coding of certain documents,

 8     were some documents unprotected and some others could only be copied to

 9     certain addressees, and I mean the KVM headquarters?

10        A.   Are you referring was there NATO restricted documents that were

11     not authorised for all member states to see versus unrestricted

12     documents?

13        Q.   Yes.  Was there a difference in the degree of confidentiality or

14     restriction, and if so, what were the levels and to whom did they apply?

15        A.   We -- we did request a desire to be able to handle NATO

16     classified documents.  NATO had lots of trouble with that.  Putting it in

17     the international mission like that.  So what instead was arrived at was

18     a secure phone capability that was in a sound-proof booth that was put in

19     the fusion centre and it was a secure line that -- that the Americans

20     could access and use and NATO member countries could use.  I don't think

21     that we ever received the clearance to publish and classify specific

22     documents with NATO classifications.  But we did have a secure phone to

23     be able it to discuss issues of that nature.

24        Q.   Thank you.  You've explained that in relation to NATO and how it

25     was used.  What about the other users, say, the member states and the

Page 8762

 1     presiding officer of the OSCE as well as its Secretariat, or perhaps

 2     within the mission itself, were there any restrictions in that regard?

 3        A.   I don't recall any specific restrictions on documents that you

 4     are referring to.  I think Ambassador Walker had, you know, I guess I

 5     would refer to him as eyes-only documents that were met for just his

 6     senior staff that weren't meant for the review of the KVM mission at

 7     large.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Given that you were Mr. Walker's closest associate,

 9     do you recall whether there were any problems in the drafting of reports

10     sent to the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna, that is to say, that the reports

11     of certain verifiers were not being forwarded to Vienna, but rather kept

12     in Pristina only?

13        A.   I am not aware of any reports that were purposely held back by

14     Ambassador Walker not to go to Vienna.  I'm unaware of anything like

15     that.

16        Q.   If my memory is correct, on the 12th of February, 1999, you were

17     with Mr. Walker during his visit to Moscow; is that correct?

18        A.   Yes.

19        Q.   Do you recall whether the Russian side had any objections to make

20     as to the reports of their verifiers and their reports being sent to the

21     headquarters in Pristina complaining about those reports not being sent

22     to Vienna, it was actually sent to the Vienna Secretariat directly by the

23     Russian side as a result of that?

24        A.   I don't recall that kind of thing or discussion on that.  And if

25     you're looking for was there disagreements in the mission about various

Page 8763

 1     events intent of an operation, results of an operation, there was

 2     discussion with Ambassador Walker and his staff, there were contentious

 3     arguments with the French ambassador, Ambassador Keller and

 4     Ambassador Walker on interpretation.  So there were certainly issues.

 5     Ambassador Walker did have the final say on contentious issues and how it

 6     would be worded and how it would go out.

 7        Q.   Well, you know, I was confused when I learned that, in addition

 8     to the verifiers sending their reports to the headquarter, they also sent

 9     reports to their respective states.  Was this also a practice in the

10     Kosovo Verification Mission?

11        A.   Yes, this was occurring on a frequent basis and concerned

12     Mr. Walker greatly.  He was not happy that there were member states that

13     work international mission were sending things home to their member

14     states, to their home office, if you will.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Colonel, could you tell us which were the basic

16     documents you applied in the process of verification?

17        A.   I can't recall the documents.  I know one of the documents of

18     course was the agreement.  I believe there were others, but I don't

19     recall their name or their title.  It's just been too long ago.

20        Q.   I apologise.  When I say "you," I don't mean you personally but

21     the verification mission, you should know that.

22             Would you agree with me that the basis of the verification

23     process was laid down by Resolution 1199 by the Security Council of

24     the UN?

25        A.   Yes, sir.

Page 8764

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we have Exhibit D160 on the

 3     screen.  Can we see page 2, please.

 4        Q.   Witness, in the third paragraph from the top, am I right in

 5     saying that violence exerted by any of the sides, as well as terrorism

 6     committed by individuals or groups in order to achieve political goals is

 7     condemned as is any such activity in Kosovo coming from outside of the

 8     country, including the supply of arms and training for terrorist

 9     activities in Kosovo?

10        A.   And the question, is that correct?

11        Q.   Well, the question is this:  In view of this paragraph in the

12     preamble to the resolution, what actions did the mission take in order to

13     prevent, to stop, the supply of arms and training for terrorist

14     activities in Kosovo and Metohija?

15        A.   I know that it was a deep concern to Ambassador Walker.  He

16     wanted assets and money frozen so they couldn't procure weapons.  We did

17     not want the KLA to have new weapons or more weapons.  It was a concern

18     that was delivered to us from Mr. Sainovic.  And it was a concern that we

19     agreed with and that we delivered to the OSCE Mission in Vienna.

20             I think we also raised this issue with Ambassador Holbrooke that

21     it needed to stop, it wasn't helping us.  We also raised it with the KLA

22     in meetings at a place called the Ice House that this was not helpful

23     for -- our advantageous to them to be doing this.  We had no major to

24     turn off funds.  All we could do was to carry that.  We could levy the

25     protest with the KLA and give that to the OSCE to help us with.

Page 8765

 1        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.  During your stay in Kosova and Metohija, did

 2     you have any information or knowledge that the Republic of Albania was

 3     providing logistical support to the Kosovars in terms of providing

 4     training and assisting them in supplying weapons, running weapons, to

 5     Kosovo and Metohija?

 6        A.   We had knowledge that this was occurring.  We had knowledge that

 7     there was an Albanian in Switzerland that was funding the acquisition of

 8     weapons.  I think they knew the individual's name.  I can't recall off

 9     the top of my head, but we had knowledge that this was moving to

10     Albanian.  And we also knew that there were Albanians wanting to come

11     back to Kosovo to join family and that the KLA was their ticket to get

12     back into Kosovo, and the cost of doing so was to have them carry weapons

13     across mountains and into Kosovo to provide to the KLA.

14        Q.   Thank you, Colonel, but my question related to the government and

15     bodies, government bodies of the Republic of Albania that they actually

16     facilitated this and provided logistical support on their territory to

17     the KLA?

18        A.   I have no idea what the Government of Albania knew or didn't

19     know.  I just had knowledge that it was occurring, but I don't know what

20     the government knew in Albania.

21        Q.   And the Yugoslav authorities did not inform you of this?

22        A.   Yugoslav authorities did.  It was a discussion that we had with

23     Mr. Sainovic.  It was a great concern of theirs, and so we were aware of

24     their concerns.  But as for the government, if you are asking me if the

25     FRY had information from the Albanian government, I don't know that.

Page 8766

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Did the KVM staff conclude that the KLA actually

 2     engaged in whatever their activities were on the territory of Albania

 3     without the knowledge and support of the Albanian government?

 4        A.   I think -- if you are asking me my opinion here, my opinion is is

 5     that I believe the Albanian government was aware of KLA activities.  And

 6     naturally being the case, what their stated goals were, the Albanian

 7     government was fairly passive in what the KLA was doing.  They neither

 8     stopped it or came out and publicly supported it.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Well, my question to you is, because you were a

10     witness, you actually attended the meetings of the highest leadership,

11     the top leadership of the KVM in Pristina, and my question really relates

12     to whether there was any position taken by the KVM on these complaints

13     that were raised by the FRY?

14        A.   We agreed with the FRY; it had to stop.  It was not helpful for

15     us, for our mission, it was not helpful to the FRY.  And it was hurting

16     the KLA.  And so we were in full agreement that this funding of weapons

17     needed to stop.  We suggested that both within the OSCE member states and

18     when Ambassador Walker and I went back to Washington, that that was an

19     issue that needed to be curtailed.

20        Q.   Thank you.  And did you inform the president of the OSCE, the

21     OSCE Secretariat, and perhaps the Security Council, the

22     UN Security Council thereof?

23        A.   My memory says to me that we -- we did inform the OSCE member

24     states in a briefing to all members.  I can tell you that we did inform

25     Secretary Albright.  We did inform Mr. Walt Slocum who was

Page 8767

 1     Department of Defence for policy.  And we did inform members of congress.

 2     As for the United Nations, I don't recall -- I would be surprised if we

 3     didn't on that issue.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Are you aware of any practical steps taken to cut

 5     these channels through which the weapons were funnelled into

 6     Kosovo and Metohija from Albania while you were there?

 7        A.   From a KVM perspective or from a policy perspective of the

 8     United States?  I'm unaware of -- how best to word this.  It was clearly

 9     something we didn't want to happen.  We sought help from the OSCE member

10     states, but I'm -- I'm unaware of any actual steps that were taken to

11     prohibit that.  It was very hard, being a small mission, we never grew to

12     2.000 people to get us out on the border.  And so I'm unaware -- in the

13     case of KVM the practical steps would have been, you know, we go to the

14     primary LOCs and have our own check-points and prohibit those weapons

15     from coming in.  The best we could do was to speak to the KLA commanders

16     that this needed to stop.  It was provocative and not helping.  So we did

17     give some verbal warnings.  We did that at the Ice House to people like

18     Sokol Bashota, Krasniqi, other KLA members.

19        Q.   Thank you.

20             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now see the next page of

21     this document, please.

22        Q.   Colonel, sir, would you please look at 4(a).  Paragraph 4(a).

23     Would you agree with me that this paragraph calls on the

24     Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to cease all action only in relation to

25     the civilian population and to withdraw its security units that are used

Page 8768

 1     for civilian repression?

 2        A.   I would agree with that, yes.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Would you now look at 5 -- item 5, sub-item (b).  Am

 4     I correct that the Republic of Yugoslavia is called not to carry out any

 5     repressive actions against the peaceful population?

 6        A.   That's what the document says, so, yes, I agree with that.

 7     Peaceful population.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Would you agree with me that this Security Council

 9     document was the document underpinning the next document, the

10     verification mission document of the OSCE, I'm not sure whether we have

11     time to see the other document.

12             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we just pull it up on the

13     screen, P835, to jog the witness's memory.

14        Q.   Unfortunately, Colonel, based on the format, perhaps you can't

15     recall this document, but do you recall its content?

16        A.   Yes, sir.

17        Q.   Colonel, this is a document dated 16 October 1998 signed by the

18     minister of foreign affairs of the FRY, Zivadin Jovanovic, and

19     Mr. Bronislaw Geremek who at the time was the presiding of the OSCE, and

20     this was the document that facilitated the verification mission, would

21     you agree with me?

22        A.   Yes, sir.

23        Q.   Thank you.

24             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I think this is the

25     time when we should end for the day because I have a few more questions

Page 8769

 1     remaining.

 2             JUDGE PARKER:  You have run your time indeed, Mr. Djurdjic.  We

 3     must adjourn, and we continue tomorrow morning at 9.00.

 4             We must ask you to return tomorrow at 9.00.

 5             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.

 6             JUDGE PARKER:  Court Officer will assist you and those advising

 7     you when we rise.  Now adjourn.

 8                           [The witness stands down]

 9                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.01 p.m.,

10                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 2nd day of

11                           September, 2009, at 9.00 a.m.