Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 8770

 1                           Wednesday, 2 September 2009

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

 5                           [The witness entered court]

 6             JUDGE PARKER:  Good morning.  Please sit down.

 7             I'd remind you that the affirmation you made to tell the truth

 8     still applies.

 9             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.

10             JUDGE PARKER:  And Mr. Djurdjic is continuing.

11             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

12                           WITNESS:  MICHAEL PHILLIPS [Resumed]

13                           Cross-examination by Mr. Djurdjic: [Continued]

14        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, sir, Colonel.

15             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Yesterday we were working with

16     Exhibit P835, so could we please have it on the screens.

17             Could we have item 5 of the English version, or rather, Roman I,

18     subparagraph 5, that's on the first page.

19        Q.   Colonel, please take a look at subparagraph 5 of this agreement.

20     Tell us, were you aware of this provision when you arrived at your post?

21        A.   I was, yes.

22        Q.   You will agree with me then that until the KVM was established,

23     KDOM was supposed to act in place of the verification mission, and then

24     the verification mission would take it over once it was up and running;

25     correct?

Page 8771

 1        A.   What I knew about KDOM and its activities was that I was informed

 2     that we would at some point absorb the KDOM into KVM, and that was as to

 3     the extent of my knowledge with regard to what KDOM's purpose was.  I

 4     didn't what they did in the field.  I didn't know who all their team was,

 5     how many they were.

 6        Q.   That wasn't really what my question was aiming at.  All I was

 7     asking was that this transition period, so before the KVM was

 8     established, the KDOM was supposed to act in their place according to

 9     this agreement, and as we know this agreement was signed on the

10     16th of October, 1998.

11             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now have

12     Roman numeral II, that's the next page of the English version.

13        Q.   Please take a look at subparagraph 1 of Roman II, Colonel.

14        A.   Okay.

15        Q.   Colonel, this subparagraph 1 stipulates that your basic task is

16     to actually verify whether there's compliance with Resolution 1199, but

17     this last sentence, "these reports will also be provided to the

18     authorities of the FRY," could you tell me please how did you go about

19     this relating to this particular aspect?

20        A.   I do not recall how those reports found their way to the

21     Government of the FRY, I just don't recall how that happened.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Did you have occasion to see a single report that was

23     sent by KVM to the FRY in the period while you were in Kosovo in the

24     course of 1998 and 1999, and have you had occasion to see it in -- during

25     any of the proceedings where you testified here before this Court?

Page 8772

 1        A.   I just don't recall.  I don't remember.

 2        Q.   Would you agree with me that KVM then did not comply with its

 3     obligation arising from this subparagraph 1 of item 2 and did not provide

 4     reports to the authorities of the FRY?

 5        A.   I can't answer that or agree with you on that because I don't

 6     know if the mission provided those reports, either some, all, or sporadic

 7     reports to the government.  I just don't know.

 8        Q.   Do you remember whether you reported to OSCE and the

 9     Security Council, in other words, the Permanent Council of the OSCE and

10     the Security Council?

11        A.   I am aware of that, we did report noncompliance issues to the

12     Permanent Council, yes.

13        Q.   Who did?

14        A.   Ambassador Walker typically would do that when he would address

15     the Permanent Council periodically verbally, and then there were also

16     reports that were sent down, I believe they went to Mr. Krasnai in the

17     Permanent Council of the OSCE in Vienna.

18        Q.   Thank you.

19             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now please scroll up the

20     English version to see item 3 of this agreement.

21        Q.   Would you agree with me, Colonel, that this item, Roman III,

22     provides for the special mandates for the KVM, and under 1 we see that

23     there should be verifications whether cease-fire is being complied with.

24     That is its main function.

25             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we scroll down the English

Page 8773

 1     version so we can see the subparagraph 1 of Roman III.  From what I can

 2     see on the screens right now, the Colonel cannot really see the entire

 3     subparagraph.

 4             Yes, so this is where it starts and now, please, let's have the

 5     next page.

 6        Q.   Would you agree with me that this is a special mandate, a

 7     verification whether there's compliance with cease-fire agreements?

 8        A.   Yes, sir.

 9        Q.   Please now take a look at subparagraph 2.  Am I correct, Colonel,

10     that the FRY had the obligation to inform on the movement of its forces

11     in the course of the previous week to inform these KVM headquarters?

12        A.   That was our understanding.  That was the intent, yes.

13        Q.   In other words, this relates to the preceding week, and it is

14     supposed to inform on the movements and where they were.  Did you receive

15     these reports on the preceding week movements?

16        A.   Not always, no, sir.

17        Q.   Did you seek information from the Vienna Secretariat?  Did they

18     receive reports from the FRY authorities relating to the compliance with

19     the agreement which were sent to the Vienna Secretariat?

20        A.   I can't speak or have knowledge of what the Secretariat in Vienna

21     received or didn't receive.  I don't have any insight on that.

22        Q.   Are you aware that the KVM headquarters received daily reports

23     from the MUP -- from the Pristina MUP staff on all events from the

24     previous day?

25        A.   I'm aware that KVM headquarters received some reports.  Those

Page 8774

 1     reports were not always accurate.  For example, can I -- may I elaborate

 2     a bit on that, Your Honour?

 3             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

 4             THE WITNESS:  We would get information that there would be a MUP

 5     movement at 9.00, and in fact the movement took place at 6.30.  So the

 6     timing and the coordination was not always accurate, and we had a

 7     terrible time linking our KVM up with the MUP.  And the MUP would always

 8     give us a reason why they had to depart earlier or later, but it

 9     prohibited us from either accompanying them or following them and

10     sometimes we would arrive in the village even after the fact and they'd

11     already departed.  So the reporting that you refer to here was not always

12     accurate, and I could also tell you that it was not a regular occurrence,

13     it didn't happen as a matter of routine.

14             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Well, first of all, Colonel, you're talking about daily reports

16     or daily reporting that is not really stipulated by this agreement in

17     subparagraph 2.  What we've seen in this subparagraph 2 is that the

18     reports were supposed to be weekly for the preceding week, but here it

19     says that the director of the verification mission and the staff may be

20     invited to accompany or escort the police within Kosovo.  So the

21     headquarters director or head was supposed to ask for this under

22     subparagraph 2 of this agreement.

23        A.   Okay.

24        Q.   But what you've just said a few moments ago, perhaps you received

25     with some delay on the same day that there would be police movements; in

Page 8775

 1     other words, much earlier than the week -- dead-line of a week that is

 2     provided for by this subparagraph 2.  Would you agree with me?

 3        A.   Okay, I can agree that there was a delay on receiving the

 4     movements of the MUP or even the VJ, but I would tell you that often what

 5     we did receive wasn't accurate.

 6        Q.   And how did you verify the accuracy of the information provided?

 7     Did you verify this by receiving information from some Albanian from the

 8     field and then you compared it to the report or did you do it in some

 9     other way?

10        A.   No, when we did get the reports from our MUP liaison officer who

11     was working with the MUP, often the KVM mission would go to a village

12     that we were -- had understanding that the MUP was going to visit, and

13     either they didn't arrive or they went to a different village.  On

14     occasion, the reports would be accurate and the coordination would be

15     good and the KVM would meet up with the MUP as established, but it was

16     not something that we could rely on in all cases.

17        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.  Would you take a look at subparagraph 3 now,

18     please.

19             Would you agree with me that MUP on the basis of subparagraph 3

20     was entitled to set up check-points, traffic check-points, and

21     check-points in order to prevent crime?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Only if those check-points were set up for some other

24     purpose did they have the responsibility to inform the KVM, or rather,

25     the KVM was entitled to ask for an explanation; is that what this

Page 8776

 1     subparagraph provides for?

 2        A.   I did not write this document.  I can assume that that was the

 3     intent of that particular paragraph.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Would you now take a look at subparagraph 4.

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   Colonel, sir, am I correct in saying that the verification

 7     mission did not have the right to control the activities of the border

 8     control units of the FRY in the swath of land 5 kilometres from the

 9     border at the time when this agreement was reached under this

10     subparagraph 4?

11        A.   I would agree that the KVM did not have the authority to control

12     that border area.

13        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.  But at the request of the verification

14     mission and approval from the border unit, the KVM could also visit those

15     areas; correct?

16        A.   Yes.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Would you agree with me that there were

18     misunderstandings where verifiers wanted to go and verify or actually

19     inspect border units without submitting previous requests to that effect?

20        A.   There were many misunderstandings and complications at the border

21     area for transit of our vehicles, but I'm not sure and I don't recall

22     those misunderstandings, why they resulted, or whether or not the KVM

23     mission that was responsible for that particular job had sent requests to

24     the FRY for access at the border areas.  I just don't recall.

25        Q.   Colonel, sir, perhaps I wasn't clear enough.  This

Page 8777

 1     paragraph - and all I'm asking about now is the inspections of the border

 2     units of Yugoslavia.  The verifiers were not allowed to carry out such

 3     inspections without having previously submitted a request for these

 4     inspections, and frequently it was the case that these verifiers would

 5     just show up there without having submitted the prior request and then

 6     they were denied this request and this is what actually led to

 7     misunderstandings?

 8        A.   I have no reason to dispute that.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Please take a look at subparagraph 5 now.  Again this

10     has to do with escorts.

11             Am I correct in saying that the verification mission could submit

12     a request to accompany police units in Kosovo as they performed their

13     normal policing roles or at the invitation of the MUP that they could do

14     so?

15        A.   Yes.

16        Q.   Thank you.

17             Have you ever seen -- did you ever see a request from the

18     verification mission, not necessarily from the headquarters but perhaps

19     also from a coordination centre, so did you ever see a request for

20     accompanying police units as they performed their duties?

21        A.   I never saw a request, but they typically wouldn't come through

22     my office anyway whether they were formal or informal.  We would hear

23     about requests at our staff meeting, that they were submitted, but never

24     saw them.

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 8778

 1             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now please see the next

 2     page of the English version, under Roman IV, subparagraph 2.

 3        Q.   Colonel, sir, would you agree with me that this agreement

 4     provides for 2.000 unarmed verifiers?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   Tell us, please, what is the basis then -- what is the basis

 7     for -- for the procurement of weapons for securing the mission, because

 8     as a mission, as a verifying mission, you were not actually allowed to be

 9     armed.  Would you agree with me that such a request was actually a

10     request to alter the terms of this agreement?

11        A.   I think that you're misrepresenting what the original request was

12     of the OSCE for weapons.  We requested weapons for body-guards for

13     Ambassador Walker, not for the entire mission, so we were talking only

14     about two or three men that would be armed to provide the security for

15     Ambassador Walker.  We were not talking about nor we ever requested that

16     the entire mission be armed.

17        Q.   Colonel, sir, I thought you actually read through the entire

18     subparagraph 2.  It says:

19             "2.000 unarmed verifiers ..." including the staff

20     "... headquarters and support staff ..."

21             And if the body-guards of Ambassador Walker's are support staff,

22     even they would not be entitled to carrying arms under this subparagraph?

23        A.   I don't disagree with that.  I will tell you that

24     Ambassador Walker personally asked for personal security based on

25     incidents that we had confronted once we arrived in Kosovo.

Page 8779

 1        Q.   I absolutely agree, but I'd like to ask you this:  I see that you

 2     cooperated or worked together mostly with Mr. Sainovic, Mr. Loncar, and

 3     other representatives of the cooperation mission.  Do you know whether

 4     any steps were taken with the presiding officer of the OSCE or its

 5     Secretariat to propose to the FRY government to change or amend the

 6     agreement of the 16th of October, so as to enable certain members of the

 7     KVM to carry arms?

 8        A.   I don't have any knowledge of what the Secretariat did with that

 9     information.  We requested to them what the need was for the body-guards

10     to be armed for Ambassador Walker.  Whether they went through formal

11     channels with the FRY government I don't know.  I know that we levied

12     that request to Mr. Sainovic, and he took that request forward to see if

13     he could assist us in meeting that request.

14        Q.   Colonel, would you agree that this agreement in its unchanged

15     form remained valid all the way until the 20th of March, 1999, when you

16     left Kosovo?

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Another thing, since I see that this was the topic of

19     much discussion and waste of time, and that is the issue of helicopters.

20     Does this agreement foresee at all that the verification mission have any

21     helicopters?

22             MR. HANNIS:  Your Honours, I would just like to put an objection

23     on the record that the commentary about a "waste of time" is

24     inappropriate in the question.

25             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes, Mr. Hannis, but it washes over us.  Don't be

Page 8780

 1     alarmed.

 2             Carry on, please, Mr. Djurdjic.

 3             THE WITNESS:  Could you repeat the question again, sir.

 4             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Yes, without the "waste of time" part.  Do you agree that the

 6     agreement did not foresee for the verification mission to have its own

 7     helicopters for medical purposes?

 8        A.   I would agree.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  I won't waste any time any further.  But while we're

10     still on the topic, although we will go through another two documents for

11     which DZ said they were the Bible of the verification mission, but let's

12     skip ahead for the time being.  Do you agree with me that you were

13     completely in the dark as to how to perform the operation of verification

14     based on all the documents we have seen?

15        A.   No, I wouldn't agree with that comment.

16        Q.   What would be your position in terms of applying the documents we

17     just saw?  What was your understanding of them?

18        A.   Those documents are truly a foundation for what the KVM mission

19     would be based on.  Once the mission stood up, the requirements for the

20     safety of our people was a top priority for Ambassador Walker.  And the

21     reason that we requested the helicopter, a medical helicopter, from the

22     Swiss was purely for evacuating potential KVM members that were wounded.

23     So I look at this as a foundational document that we would on occasion

24     ask assistance with.

25        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.  It seems we were speaking at cross-purposes.

Page 8781

 1     I may have jumped the gun a bit, but let's go to P387 next and perhaps

 2     then I'll rephrase this question and put another one that I had in mind.

 3             Colonel, we have a document of the 25th of October, 1998.  In the

 4     preamble we see the position of the FRY government which was attached to

 5     the communique and the military representatives were informed.  The basis

 6     of this document is actually the communique itself, the press release,

 7     hence I'd like to move forward to the next page.  Let's have a look at

 8     Roman numeral II, sub-items 1, 2, 3, and 4.

 9             Colonel, you must have been acquainted with these provisions

10     during your verification mission in Kosovo and Metohija; is that correct?

11     Sorry, I don't mean the data contained therein as such, but the

12     provisions in general.

13        A.   I would agree with that, that our mission had this information.

14        Q.   I'm not discussing the information strictly speaking, but simply

15     whether you had any general knowledge of this statement and its items.

16     Were you familiar with it in the course of verification?

17        A.   I don't recall precisely, but I don't have any reason to dispute

18     it.  I mean, it wouldn't make -- it would be logical to me that we would

19     be aware of this document.

20        Q.   This is one of the basic documents for the verification, by

21     virtue of which the FRY government undertook certain obligations to

22     reduce the levels of police units in Kosovo to the level as it was in

23     February 1998; also they obliged that they would not use any calibres

24     larger than 12.7 millimetres; and that the army will withdraw all

25     equipment that was introduced into Kosovo after February.  Were you

Page 8782

 1     familiar with that?

 2        A.   I can't say that I was familiar with it personally.  I didn't --

 3     I don't recall this document.  I'm sure it was an underpinning and a

 4     foundational document for how the mission stood up, but I'm -- I can't

 5     give you any specifics about what I knew or didn't know about what I'm

 6     reading here.

 7        Q.   What I read out to you was supposed to be the task of the

 8     verification mission, to check whether it was complied with.  Let me ask

 9     you this:  Everything you have been telling us is what you heard from

10     other people because you really did not have a clue what the true task of

11     the verification mission was.  Is that correct?

12        A.   No, I would disagree with not having a clue of what the mission

13     was.

14        Q.   I apologise, I may have been a bit rough, but given the role you

15     had as the Chief of Staff you simply noted down what others heard and

16     said without going into the essence of the matters involved and the -- to

17     the heart of the issue of verification?

18        A.   My role, as I previously testified, as the Chief of Staff was

19     initially to set the mission up, and we did that for about six weeks,

20     until we got into the operational aspects of the mission in December.

21     These documents of verification that you have shown me were in the hands

22     of our operational head of mission director, General DZ, and he was

23     responsible for ensuring that the verification was taking place within

24     the boundaries of the documents that were provided.

25             For me to have detailed knowledge of it, I certainly may have in

Page 8783

 1     the early part of the mission, but I don't recall all the documents and

 2     the scope of the documents that you provided me and how they were applied

 3     in the mission.  We were aware of the boundaries, we were aware of the

 4     mandates, we were aware of the Holbrooke-Milosevic Agreement, we were

 5     aware of the 2.000 verifiers, which I would tell you we never did get

 6     into Kosovo for a number of reasons.  And we were aware that we also had

 7     agreements that we could conduct some no-notice inspections, whether that

 8     be in barracks, which I think primarily where that was aimed.  I can't

 9     speak to the border piece of your earlier questions.

10        Q.   Witness, these documents, as I told you already, were qualified

11     by DZ as being the Bible of the KVM.  Given your function - and I accept

12     what you said - but were you involved in the verification mission only as

13     the Chief of Staff of General Walker, who noted down what others said; or

14     did you take active participation, being familiar with the contents of

15     the documents and providing assessments on non -- of non-compliance and

16     whether something was or was not part of the agreement?  Can you try and

17     answer that because that will determine what my follow-up questions will

18     be.

19        A.   Neither myself nor Ambassador Walker acted in the field as true

20     verifiers; that was left to the operations teams and the RC commanders

21     that managed those regions.  Our purpose in going into the field was to

22     visit the RC commanders, look at their situations, visit with the people

23     in the villages, observe the activities of the VJ and MUP activities.

24     The verifications were done by the ops teams and they reported back to

25     the RCs and back to the OSCE headquarters.

Page 8784

 1        Q.   Colonel, it seems you misunderstand me.  I accept everything you

 2     have said so far, but I want to ask you this:  A decision as to whether

 3     there was a non-compliance or not and a decision to report such

 4     non-compliance to certain bodies of this OSCE, that decision was made by

 5     Mr. Walker and his associates and all of them had to be acquainted with

 6     the provisions of the agreement we have been discussing.  I'm asking you

 7     this:  Did you merely take notes during the meetings, noting down what

 8     others heard about the events, or did you actively participate in the

 9     decision-making process of whether there was or was not a non-compliance

10     issue?  That is why I want to know this because that will determine

11     whether I will continue going through these documents with you or not .

12        A.   I took the note --

13             MR. HANNIS:  Your Honours -- I'm sorry.

14             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Hannis.

15             MR. HANNIS:  -- I would object.  I think this has been asked and

16     answered.

17             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.

18             Carry on, please, Mr. Djurdjic.

19             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Colonel, could you please answer.

21        A.   I --

22        Q.   Did you only keep records of what others said, noting down their

23     opinions, or did you participate in the making of decisions as to whether

24     something amounted to an instance of non-compliance or not?

25        A.   I did not participate in making decisions on issues of

Page 8785

 1     non-compliance or not.

 2        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.  Yesterday on several occasions you said that

 3     the Army of Yugoslavia or the MUP violated or were in breach of the

 4     agreement.  Were you simply conveying what you heard from others during

 5     the meetings with Mr. Walker or was that actually your position?

 6        A.   Those were the positions of Ambassador Walker and General DZ.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Let me ask you this:  Did you know under what

 8     conditions these agreements, the February agreements, came to being?

 9        A.   I'm not sure I understand your question.  What do you mean

10     "conditions"?

11             MR. HANNIS:  Your Honours, I have a question.  I'm not sure which

12     February agreements we're talking about.  Can we refer the witness to a

13     specific document?

14             JUDGE PARKER:  You could help me as well, Mr. Djurdjic.  What

15     February agreements?

16             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] It should have been October

17     Agreements rather than February agreements.  So what were the conditions

18     in which these October Agreements came into being in 1998.

19        Q.   Let's simplify things.  Colonel, we have the agreement on

20     verification, then this agreement, and the Milosevic-Byrnes Agreement of

21     the 25th October.  Do you know what the situation was in the background

22     of these agreements in terms of the political situation which resulted in

23     all of them being signed?

24        A.   I didn't participate in the writing of any of those documents, so

25     I don't know what the backgrounds were before I came on board with the

Page 8786

 1     mission.

 2        Q.   Were you familiar with the fact that NATO issued an

 3     Activation Order to bomb the FRY in October 1998?

 4        A.   I can't recall whether I was aware of that or not.

 5        Q.   During your mandate there, did you know that the decision to bomb

 6     was stayed, but that there was always a possibility that in case of

 7     non-compliance NATO would re-activate that Activation Order to actually

 8     bomb the FRY?

 9        A.   It's really beyond the scope of my knowledge of what NATO would

10     do or wouldn't do.  We were there to form a mission.  The decisions NATO

11     made were clearly out of my hands.  I don't know what was happening in

12     the North Atlantic Council with regard to that decision.

13        Q.   What I'm telling you about did not take place within NATO.  It

14     was a fact which existed throughout your mission.  All reports and

15     controls of yours --

16             MR. HANNIS:  Your Honours, I --

17             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] -- were to the effect to the -- to

18     determine whether the agreement was complied with or not --

19             MR. HANNIS:  I would --

20             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. -- excuse me, Mr. Hannis.

21             Mr. Djurdjic, you are there in a position of giving evidence,

22     which we've discussed before.  You are not putting to the witness whether

23     something was the situation; you are asserting it was and making that, as

24     I understand it, the basis for asking the witness something further.

25     Now, if you want to establish a foundation from the witness, you will

Page 8787

 1     need to get him to tell you what that position was and then proceed from

 2     there.  And he may tell you he didn't know enough about those things to

 3     be able to help you, judging from what he said so far.

 4             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

 5        Q.   Colonel, why was KDOM supposed to perform its mission to carry

 6     out verification until the KVM was set up?  Are you familiar with that?

 7        A.   I have no knowledge of what the political reasons were for why

 8     KDOM was to establish its key mission, but my feeling and opinion is is

 9     that KDOM was to remain in place until the KVM was operational and

10     functioning on its own, at which time we would absorb the KDOM capability

11     into the KVM mission.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Although you were not acquainted with the October

13     Agreements in detail, but once you became a member of the KVM did you

14     know that there were dead-lines before which the FRY was supposed to meet

15     the obligations undertaken under the October Agreements?

16        A.   You know, I don't -- I just don't recall from memory what, if

17     any, dead-lines were required of us.  I knew we had reporting dead-lines.

18     I knew we had -- our ops people were going through verification

19     compliance -- non-compliance documents in detail, learning those.  But I

20     do not -- I don't have a memory for what you're asking there.

21        Q.   I don't know whether you're misunderstanding me or not.  I'm not

22     talking about your verification mission.  I showed you the agreement.

23     Before the KVM was set up and before it became operational, verification

24     issues were supposed to be carried out by the KDOM.  Are you familiar

25     with that?

Page 8788

 1        A.   I'm not familiar what documents KDOM was operating under, no.  I

 2     don't know what KDOM's mission was when I got there, and only learned of

 3     what it was doing shortly after arrival.  What precisely is your question

 4     of me?

 5             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we have P835 on the screen,

 6     please.

 7        Q.   Colonel, sir, on page 1, Roman numeral I, sub-item 5, could you

 8     please read out loud.

 9        A.   "KDOM will act in" --

10             MR. HANNIS:  I'm sorry, Your Honour.  We've already looked at

11     this paragraph.  I don't know why we need him to read it.

12             JUDGE PARKER:  Is there something new you need to put from this

13     paragraph, Mr. Djurdjic?

14             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] That seems to be the question I'm

15     putting that the colonel cannot understand.  I wanted to jog his memory.

16     I asked him three times and did not receive an answer.  The gist of my

17     question is as follows:  Was he familiar with this once he assumed his

18     duties, the thing envisaged by sub-para 5, that is to say that KDOM will

19     act in place of the KVM until it is set up.  That is the question and I

20     do not seem to be able to receive an answer to that.

21             JUDGE PARKER:  I'm sorry, I thought you had the answer more than

22     once and it is crystal clear, that he did not know anything of the

23     details of the functioning and purpose of KDOM until arrival.  Shortly

24     after the arrival he learned of the essence of KDOM and that he learnt

25     that it and understood that it would be absorbed into KVM when KVM was

Page 8789

 1     fully operational.

 2             Is that a summary of what you've said so far?

 3             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.

 4             JUDGE PARKER:  That's his position.  You're wanting to ask, I

 5     suspect, Mr. Djurdjic:  What was the purpose being fulfilled by KDOM

 6     which KVM took over, was it the same purpose?  I think you're trying to

 7     get to why all this verification was occurring, and the problem is this

 8     witness may not be the right one.  You or your colleague have asked

 9     earlier witnesses who may have known more about that, but if I correctly

10     guess what it is that you're aiming toward, that may help you to frame a

11     question or two.

12             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Witness, am I right in saying that KDOM, until KVM became

14     operational, carried out verification?

15        A.   I have never read the KDOM execution orders on what it was that

16     they were doing.  I never travelled with them on any of their visits.  I

17     don't know what KDOM actually did.  I don't know if they were to assume

18     the same roles that KVM was about to assume.  I don't know if they were

19     just observers.  I don't know if they were called verifiers.  I don't

20     have an answer for you of what the KDOM mission was.

21        Q.   Very well.  Thank you.  When did the KVM become operational?

22        A.   I would have to tell you that KVM became operational the day that

23     Ambassador Walker set foot on the ground, which would have been roughly

24     4 November; however, having said that, we spent four to six weeks just

25     standing up the mission.  And we got into the field for the first time in

Page 8790

 1     about December of 1998.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Does this mean that until December 1998 you did not

 3     know what was going on in the field?

 4        A.   No.

 5        Q.   Are you aware that KDOM up until -- actually handed over its

 6     files up until the take-over by the KVM; and if so, do you know where

 7     those files are?

 8        A.   Yeah, I'm unaware of documents that KDOM gave to our KVM mission.

 9        Q.   Thank you.

10             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now see exhibit -- or

11     rather document D004-4367.  Specifically could we see page 23 of the

12     English version.

13        Q.   Well, this is your handwriting, I believe, your handwritten

14     notes?

15        A.   Yes, sir.

16             MR. HANNIS:  Your Honours, if we're going to talk about his notes

17     we need to go into private session.

18             JUDGE PARKER:  Are you going into their content?

19             Private.

20    [Private session] [Confidentiality lifted by order of Trial Chamber]

21             THE REGISTRAR:  We're in private session, Your Honours.

22             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I'm confused.  I have a typed

23     version.  Could we see a typewritten version.  This should be an entry

24     for the 25th of November.

25             Your Honours, I apologise, are we now in private session?  Can I

Page 8791

 1     move on?  Thank you.

 2        Q.   So I have in mind the 25th of November, 1998, that entry.

 3        A.   I'm sorry, what was your date there, sir?

 4        Q.   November 25, 1998, a meeting of the Executive Board.

 5        A.   Which Executive Board are you referring to, the Permanent Council

 6     or ...?

 7             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we see page 22 of the

 8     English.

 9             Ms. O'Leary tells me that this document should be D004-4455,

10     page 22 of the English version.

11        Q.   Colonel, let's try to do it this way because this is a very brief

12     entry that I would like you to comment on.  This is an entry of

13     November 25th, 1998.  In Serbian it says a meeting of the

14     Executive Board.

15             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] This is not the right document

16     either.

17             "Italian issues:  They're trying to change the nomination.

18             "Call Krasnai - to be in Vienna by Friday.

19             "Where are the Russian representatives?"

20             Is this page 22?  Finally we're there.

21        Q.   Could you please comment on this final paragraph:

22             "They want Russian in the fusion cell ..."

23        A.   From what I can recall, Mr. K rasnai was kind of the point of

24     contact for us in regard to the Permanent Council on what their concerns

25     and desires were, and one of the issues here was the Russian member state

Page 8792

 1     wanted to be sure we had a Russian in the fusion cell.  The position of

 2     the Permanent Council and later Ambassador Walker was because of the

 3     nature of the information that would be in the fusion cell, it might be

 4     best that it only be NATO members only in the fusion cell.  And that was

 5     primarily driven by the reason of having imagery to do the verification.

 6     The imagery was sensitive and so there was some reluctance to have a

 7     Russian in that cell.  I believe that was later resolved and, in fact, we

 8     did have Russians in the fusion centre.

 9        Q.   And when was this approximately?  Do you recall who it was?

10        A.   When was what?  The discussion on this?  25 November is the best

11     recollection of date I have based on what's on my notes.

12        Q.   Well, I just tagged on to your reply, you said that the Russians

13     later on were in the fusion centre.  So my question really was related to

14     that.  When did this happen?  When were the Russians included in the

15     cell?  And do you know the names of the persons who were -- the Russians

16     who were in the fusion cell?

17        A.   Unfortunately, I cannot remember the names of the Russians in the

18     fusion cell.  I don't know precisely when they entered the fusion centre.

19     I would -- it would just be a guess if I told you and I would say

20     probably late December time-frame, maybe January.  I do not know

21     precisely, though.

22        Q.   Thank you.

23             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, during the break I

24     will make sure that the numbers of the documents that I call for are

25     organised, in order, so in the meantime I would like to move on to a

Page 8793

 1     different topic and then I will return to this later on.  I just want to

 2     save time, or would you prefer me -- would you prefer us to take the

 3     break now so that I can do this?

 4             JUDGE PARKER:  I think if you moved on, Mr. Djurdjic.

 5             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] All right.  Could we then go back

 6     to open session, please.

 7             JUDGE PARKER:  Open.

 8                           [Open session]

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  We're in open session, Your Honours.

10             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we see D162, Exhibit D162.

11        Q.   Colonel, looking at the date here, it would seem to me that you

12     were in the US at this time on leave on the 8th of January, 1999; am I

13     correct?

14        A.   I don't remember precisely, but I did take leave at some point.

15     So no reason to dispute it, I was there.

16        Q.   Well, you were for sure, although I see that you don't remember

17     now, but let me try to refresh your memory.  I believe you went on leave

18     for New Year's and I believe you returned on the 10th of January, 1999.

19        A.   Okay.

20        Q.   Well, I see that you can't recall that, but it doesn't really

21     matter.  Just -- I want to ask you this:  Are you aware or were you aware

22     of these press releases while you were away from Pristina or maybe did

23     you learn about them later on?

24        A.   I don't remember.  I mean, it -- you know, what I looked at when

25     I was leave, where I went when I was on leave, I didn't have a

Page 8794

 1     BlackBerry, so I wasn't getting any reporting.  So I would tell you that

 2     while I was on the leave I was unaware of press reporting that was coming

 3     out of the OSCE, so I would have more than likely learned about them when

 4     I came back.

 5        Q.   Well, are you aware of this incident that is reported here in

 6     this report?

 7        A.   Yes.

 8        Q.   Do you know that at the same time, maybe even on the same day,

 9     there was another patrol that was attacked, a MUP patrol that was

10     attacked in Slivovo, near Stimlje, and that a MUP member was killed?

11        A.   I am aware that prior to the 15th of January there were a few

12     incidents where MUP police officers were killed or ambushed by KLA, yes.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Was Mr. Walker away from Pristina at this time, at

14     the time of this incident, and was he maybe in the US?

15        A.   I believe he and I were in the US at the same time, yes.

16        Q.   And it seems to me that you spent more time working than having

17     leisure time at this time, do you recall, while you were in Washington?

18        A.   We made several visits, State Department, Congress,

19     Department of Defence, yes.

20        Q.   Could you tell me, why did you spend so much time in

21     Washington, DC, on these meetings while Mr. Walker was, in fact, the head

22     of the Kosovo Verification Mission?

23        A.   Are you assuming that I was holding these meetings independently

24     of Ambassador Walker?

25        Q.   No, no.  What I said was you were actually accompanying

Page 8795

 1     Mr. Walker when he went to attend these meetings, so you were with him at

 2     the meetings.  And what I'm asking is:  Why did Mr. Walker as head of the

 3     verification mission, why was he attending all these meetings in the

 4     US, in Washington, DC?

 5        A.   Okay, I understand your question now.  Whenever Ambassador Walker

 6     went back to Washington, he had to notify the State Department, number

 7     one, that he was coming home.  And in doing so they put together a

 8     schedule for him that they wanted him to execute while he was in

 9     Washington.  Obviously being an American, being a US ambassador, several

10     people wanted to know what was happening in Kosovo.  So he would brief

11     what he knew at the time and answer their questions.

12        Q.   Thank you.

13             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we please see Exhibit D161.

14        Q.   Do you remember this press release?

15        A.   I remember the incident, but I don't remember the press release.

16        Q.   Yes, and in relation to that incident do you remember that

17     Colonel Ciaglinski was in Decani when this incident occurred, when fire

18     was opened on a KVM patrol on the 15th of January, 1999?

19        A.   Okay.

20        Q.   Do you remember that KVM headquarters, while you were still in

21     the US, issued a press release condemning the KLA because of their attack

22     on a KVM patrol?

23        A.   It would have been a logical event for them to do so.  We -- it

24     doesn't surprise me that we issued that.

25        Q.   Colonel, do you remember that at this time General DZ was

Page 8796

 1     actually standing-in for Ambassador Walker and that Mr. Keller was the

 2     chief of the staff of the KVM?

 3        A.   I don't know that Ambassador Keller ever assumed the

 4     Chief of Staff role, but I know that General DZ was assume

 5     Ambassador Walker's role in his absence, yes.

 6        Q.   Colonel, I did not say that he was the Chief of Staff,

 7     Mr. Keller, but rather that he stood -- was standing in for Mr. Walker

 8     while you were in the United States.

 9             MR. HANNIS:  Well, Your Honour, I object.  I read his question in

10     the transcript.  That is what he said.  Maybe there was a translation

11     issue, but --

12             JUDGE PARKER:  It seems to be a translation issue, Mr. Hannis.

13             The issue seems to be whether you are aware, Colonel, of the

14     activity of Ambassador Keller standing in for Ambassador Walker during

15     Ambassador Walker's absence, if I correctly understand where we've got

16     to.

17             THE WITNESS:  So the -- you're asking me did Ambassador Keller

18     ever assume Ambassador Walker's role or did General DZ ever assume that

19     role?  I'm a little confused on what your question for me is.

20             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Well, let me try and simplify the question.  While you were away

22     from Pristina over the new year holidays, did Mr. Keller stand in for

23     Mr. Walker as the head of the Pristina headquarters?

24        A.   I'm not a hundred per cent certain, but he did on occasion have

25     Mr. Keller perform that role, as did General DZ also would stand in for

Page 8797

 1     Ambassador Walker.  I'm not sure at that time which one it was.  We

 2     typically stayed in touch, when we were away, with General DZ.

 3        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.  New, do you remember that Mr. Walker was

 4     upset because of the press release of -- by the

 5     Kosovo Verification Mission of January 8th, condemning the KLA -- or

 6     rather, the press release of the 15th of January, condemning the KLA for

 7     the attack on the MUP, on the police, and that there was a phone call

 8     where they talked about this being a bit premature.  Do you recall that?

 9             MR. HANNIS:  Your Honour, we need some clarification because the

10     press release we were looking at about the 15th appears to be about KLA

11     attacking or wounding KVM officers.  And this question talks about a

12     press release regarding attacks on the MUP.

13             JUDGE PARKER:  Your question seems to have confused two

14     incidents, one on the 8th and one on the 15th of January, Mr. Djurdjic.

15     Which is it that you're asking about, the first press release?

16             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Yes, I think I've actually

17     confused these two, and I've ended up with the incident of the 21st, but

18     then I also referred to the press release of the 8th of January.  And

19     what I was asking is whether the witness remembered that Mr. Walker was

20     angry because of this condemnation, this denouncement in the press

21     release, and that it was premature because it would actually make the

22     work of the KVM more difficult.

23             JUDGE PARKER:  This is a question directed to the press release

24     of the 8th of January concerning the wounding of or killing of three MUP

25     officers and the wounding of two more and civilians.

Page 8798

 1             THE WITNESS:  I'm -- I do not recall the press report in detail,

 2     what that was about.  But Ambassador Walker, I know, was upset in regards

 3     to the KVM verifiers being shot at.  He was upset with each event where

 4     there was a MUP policeman injured by the KLA, and I remember him saying

 5     on several occasions when he would condemn the KLA for the action that

 6     this was not helpful for them, to continue this kind of action.

 7             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   All right.  I think we will return to this later.

 9             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I believe this is the

10     right time for a break.

11             JUDGE PARKER:  Very well.  Now, how are you going for time,

12     Mr. Djurdjic?

13             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Well, as I said before, I will

14     comply with that.  So whatever time I have left I will try and make my

15     questions a bit briefer and I'm sure that we will complete with this

16     witness questioning today.

17             JUDGE PARKER:  That I take it is a revised expectation.  Last

18     night we were rather given the expectation that you might finish during

19     this first session, so now you see it taking much longer.  Is that right?

20             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Well, we were far more efficient

21     yesterday, and I did not expect that we will take so much time today.

22             JUDGE PARKER:  Is it that you will finish during the next

23     session?

24             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I will do my best.

25             JUDGE PARKER:  We must have our first break now.  We will resume

Page 8799

 1     at 11.00.

 2             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.

 3                           --- Recess taken at 10.28 a.m.

 4                           --- On resuming at 11.04 a.m.

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  Please be seated.

 6             Yes, Mr. Djurdjic.

 7             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.  Could we

 8     move into closed session, please.

 9             JUDGE PARKER:  Private.

10     [Private session] [Confidentiality lifted by order of Trial Chamber]

11             THE REGISTRAR:  We're in private session, Your Honours.

12             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have D004-4455,

13     page 41.  This is not the document.  The 29th of November -- yes, this

14     one.

15        Q.   Colonel, could you please comment this entry of yours of the

16     28th -- sorry, the 29th of November.  What was the cause of it?

17             JUDGE PARKER:  We have on the screen two different documents.

18             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the English document

19     is the right one.  This is what I was looking for.  The one in Serbian is

20     not correct, but it is not all that important.  We actually want to hear

21     it from the witness.  In Serbian it is D004-4504.  However, it is

22     irrelevant.

23        Q.   Could you comment, Colonel, this entry of yours of the

24     29th of November.

25        A.   I'm just waiting for the document.  There we go.

Page 8800

 1             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Please leave the English version

 2     now.  It is fine.

 3             THE WITNESS:  This was a note to myself.  It was a result of

 4     photographs that I had taken on the 27th of November for two Serbian

 5     journalists that we had gone out and that were hostages held by the KLA

 6     and we had won their release.  I took photos of the event.  It was really

 7     one of the first times that we had gone out into a KLA zone.  It was

 8     relayed to me that there was an assessment made that I was working for

 9     the CIA as some sort of a collections officer.  I found it sort of

10     humorous and just made a note of it really for historical purposes.

11             As I mentioned, it's your introduction, I was not a combat air

12     force pilot, but I spent all my years as an intelligence officer in the

13     air force and -- which is why I found what they said to be understanding

14     but it wasn't exactly true.

15        Q.   Thank you.

16             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I would ask for D004-4623, please.

17     Page 2, please, in the English version.  D004-4623.  It should be the

18     4th of December.  In the English page 26.  Let's see if the first page is

19     correct.  This is fine.  Could we next go to page 2, please, that is to

20     say page 27.  It mentions the Russian ambassador.

21        Q.   Do you see that?  I'm interested in the top entry, and then we'll

22     go back to page 26, Colonel.

23             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Let's go to page 26, please, in

24     the English.

25        Q.   There, Russian ambassador.

Page 8801

 1        A.   Can you bring it up so I can read it.  It's too small a print.

 2             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] The bottom of the page, please.

 3        Q.   Colonel, "Russian Ambassador continues ..."

 4             I'm interested in that part.

 5        A.   I believe this references Russians in the fusion centre.

 6             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we go back to page 27, please,

 7     so that you can see the rest of this entry -- but first could we please

 8     go to the bottom of page 26 to see whether there was anything else there.

 9     Yes, it is the bottom of the page.  Okay.

10             Page 27 then.

11        Q.   Colonel, what does this mean:

12             "Our lives could be miserable with Russians on the ground"?

13        A.   This was frank conversation between Ambassador Walker and

14     discussions with NATO regarding the Russian contingent that was going to

15     join us.  As I recall, there were several demands from the Russians about

16     positions that they wanted.  Their issues were time-consuming for the

17     mission.  And I recall we had issues with alcohol with the Russians, and

18     I think that those were the kinds of things that we were worried about by

19     having a Russian contingent alongside of us.

20             Secondly, there was a concern with the imagery that we had that

21     would be part of the fusion centre and how we would have to work that

22     with a Russian representative in the fusion centre.

23        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.  This is a conversation with the

24     Secretary-General Mr. Solano on the 4th of December, 1998?  Perhaps we

25     should go back to page 26 to see the heading.

Page 8802

 1             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Please zoom in for the colonel.

 2        Q.   Am I right, Colonel?

 3        A.   Yes, this was the discussion we had with Mr. Solano in his

 4     office.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  At the end of the entry where the Russian ambassador

 6     is mentioned it says:

 7             "Other confidential information with NATO classification will be

 8     forwarded through other channels."

 9             That is on page 27 again.  The last sub-item at the top of the

10     page, the second one that is.

11        A.   I can't speak to that in this environment here.

12        Q.   This has to do with the work of the verification mission,

13     Colonel.

14             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I don't know how to

15     treat this.

16             JUDGE PARKER:  Well, I don't know what it is you're asking.  What

17     are you wanting?

18             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Two things.  First, it seems there

19     is some classification of information sent by the KVM only to NATO and

20     through other channels which had nothing to do with the KVM.  Which other

21     channels are these and what information did KVM possess that was for NATO

22     only?  That was on the 4th of December, 1998.  I'm not interested in

23     NATO.  I'm interested in the KVM.

24             JUDGE PARKER:  Are you able to throw any light on information

25     gathered by KVM?

Page 8803

 1             THE WITNESS:  The best I could say on the channels was that there

 2     was -- this had to do with imagery, so we had a way -- before we went to

 3     do a verification on a particular site, we had other evidence that we

 4     could look at.  The imagery comes from sensitive sources, and that was to

 5     be channelled in a different way to the KVM verifiers to look at those

 6     sites.

 7             MR. HANNIS:  And, Your Honour, if I may remind counsel that your

 8     order allows Mr. Phillips to decline to answer any questions on the

 9     ground of confidentiality where he feels that's necessary.

10             JUDGE PARKER:  We have, I think, steered around that, Mr. Hannis,

11     but we will see.

12             Mr. Djurdjic, you've had that answer.  Is there any other issue

13     you wish to pursue about this?

14             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I'm not interested in

15     NATO whatsoever.  I'm interested in KVM activities.  I want the Chamber

16     to get a full picture of what the actual objectivity of the KVM was.  I'm

17     not interested in NATO.  What am I interested in?  Who made such

18     decisions.  Who decided which information was NATO-only and was the

19     Secretariat in Vienna notified of this, that is to say the presiding

20     officer of the OSCE, and whether all OSCE member states were familiarised

21     with that.

22             JUDGE PARKER:  The answer given by the witness suggests this is

23     not information coming from KVM to OSCE, but information provided to KVM

24     to assist them in their function of verification.

25             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, in the document it

Page 8804

 1     says:

 2             "Other sensitive information that is NATO-only."

 3             That is to say KVM, not NATO information.  Who decided that some

 4     KVM information can be NATO-only?  It says "NATO-only."

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  I understand this quite differently from you.

 6     Information that has come from NATO that is NATO-only, which they saw as

 7     having a security implication if shared with some others, would come a

 8     different channel and not through the main KVM.

 9             THE WITNESS:  Yes, Your Honour, that's exactly correct.

10             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Then perhaps the translation I

11     have is wrong:

12             [In English] "... that is NATO-only ..."

13             JUDGE PARKER:  Information that is of NATO-only is what I'm

14     reading, not to be shared beyond NATO.

15             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Very well.

16             JUDGE PARKER:  You understand what "imagery" is, do you,

17     Mr. Djurdjic?

18             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I do, but our conclusions seem to

19     differ.  In any case, let's move on.

20        Q.   Colonel, what other channels were those?

21        A.   I can't speak to those channels because they belong to NATO.  It

22     was information that NATO would find a way to get to us.  We were not

23     producing NATO-classified or restricted material from KVM.

24        Q.   I'm not interested in the technical aspect.  It means that there

25     were some special channels between NATO and the KVM, separate from all

Page 8805

 1     others; is that so?

 2        A.   I can't speak for NATO, sir.

 3        Q.   I'm not asking you to.  I'm asking you to speak about the KVM.

 4     What special channel did you use?  Not in the technical sense.  Let's

 5     skip that.

 6             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can I have document D004-4623,

 7     page 36 in English.  Page 36, I'm interested in the part that says

 8     "KVCC" -- yes, "KVCC" - the coordination centre of the verification

 9     mission.

10             "This facility will have all information."

11        Q.   Do you see that?

12        A.   Yes.

13        Q.   Was this within the staff, this facility?

14        A.   No, sir.

15        Q.   Where was the coordination centre of the KVM?

16        A.   This was -- this was in Macedonia, what was referred to as

17     The Shoe Factory.  Brigadier-General Montgomery was the initial general

18     officer in charge of that facility and it was a NATO facility.

19        Q.   Thank you.

20             THE WITNESS:  Excuse me, Your Honour.

21                           [The witness and US Government counsel confer]

22             THE WITNESS:  Sir.

23             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I'd like to address the Court.  If

24     you think I shouldn't or that I'm overstepping the boundaries of what was

25     approved, do let me know and I will move on.  If there are any problems,

Page 8806

 1     perhaps the Presiding Judge should just caution me and then I will filter

 2     my questions.

 3             JUDGE PARKER:  Do understand, Mr. Djurdjic, we know less than you

 4     do.  We've heard what the witness has said in court.  We've heard your

 5     questions.  We do not know what you are getting at, what you're after,

 6     whether that will create a problem or not.  So you are ahead of us.

 7             At the moment we do not appear to have a problem, but my concern

 8     is that you are increasingly straying away from what should be

 9     interesting us in this case, what really matters.  So if you really see a

10     need to pursue something, we'll hear your questions and if necessary

11     intervene.  But it's one thing to see a topic that's interesting because

12     you don't quite know all the answers; it's another thing to see whether

13     that's really going to be important in the hearing of our trial here.  I

14     don't see the latter at the moment.

15             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Colonel, sir, within the verification mission and generally

17     within the OSCE, were special links with NATO approved that would exclude

18     other OSCE member states, such as Russia and maybe some others?

19        A.   What I can say here is we did ask assistance from NATO to provide

20     us a secure link that was honoured.  And they gave us a secure telephone,

21     which I had mentioned earlier, and a secure booth to put that telephone

22     in that was accessible only by Ambassador Walker, myself, and General DZ.

23        Q.   Thank you.  And my question was:  Within the OSCE, did you have

24     approval for that?  Did you have permission for that from Russia and

25     other states, OSCE states, so that did they approve such links where

Page 8807

 1     communications between individuals with NATO were possible?

 2        A.   The Permanent Council was aware of it, did approve of the link

 3     being established, but that doesn't mean that all the member states

 4     agreed with it.  I think Russia did object to it, if I recall.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  You mention that you had access to this, Mr. Walker,

 6     and General DZ; correct?

 7        A.   Yes, that's what I remember.

 8        Q.   Am I correct in saying that the United States and Great Britain

 9     were members of NATO?

10        A.   Yes.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Thank you, Colonel.

12             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now please have

13     D004-4623.  In the English version that's page 46.

14        Q.   Sir, Colonel, can you see right there under the heading where it

15     says:

16             "Brief - Nick Turnbull ..."

17             Could you read this to yourself up to "forensic brief."

18             Could you tell me, what was the occasion on December 9 for

19     Mr. Nick Turnbull to brief you on Malisevo and provide this information?

20        A.   I believe it was our request to get an understanding of what had

21     happened in Malisevo.  It had been a village that had been destroyed and

22     burned and the Albanian inhabitants had left and fled to the mountains,

23     and it was an issue that Ambassador Walker wanted to get a better

24     understanding on what Malisevo was, what it looked like, just a general

25     overview brief.

Page 8808

 1        Q.   Thank you.  But there was a lot of activity by the KVM and

 2     Mr. Holbrooke specifically regarding Malisevo in terms of the MUP

 3     decreasing their activities, although Malisevo was the centre of this

 4     movement.  Would you agree with me that a lot of effort was put into

 5     reaching some sort of agreement regarding Malisevo?

 6        A.   There was a tremendous amount of work on Malisevo in terms of

 7     bringing back the Albanian population to Malisevo and decreasing the MUP

 8     presence in the village.

 9        Q.   Doesn't that seem illogical to you, namely, that Malisevo which

10     was the centre of KLA, that one should call for the decreasing of the FRY

11     forces there?

12        A.   The intent of Malisevo was to make an example of success, which

13     is why Ambassador Holbrooke focused on it so much and asked us to focus

14     on it so much.  We had to show in our view, both to the FRY and to the

15     Permanent Member Council, that Malisevo could be KVM's first success

16     story by moving out the MUP, bringing back the Albanians, and then allow

17     us to sort out the KLA.  It was on occasion mentioned to us that Malisevo

18     was the KLA capital.  Whether it was true or not, I don't have any

19     foundation to make that assessment.  That was certainly what was said and

20     what we had heard, but our hope was was to turn it into a success story,

21     both for KVM and for the peace process that we were trying to establish.

22             And our concern was was why there was so many MUP guarding a

23     village that was vacated and burned, and we found no value in that other

24     than being an intimidating factor for the peaceful population to return.

25             I would just like to add, if I may, sir, Mr. Holbrooke had asked

Page 8809

 1     me to build a briefing that mapped out a demilitarised zone in Malisevo,

 2     and that included both the KLA and the MUP, that we had established a

 3     zone, that there were to be absolutely no weapons in that zone.  So we

 4     had an obligation to make sure that the Albanians who returned were, in

 5     fact, peaceful Albanians and not KLA and an obligation to get cooperation

 6     from the MUP to decrease their presence and their weapons in the

 7     Malisevo.  That DMZ concept was taken to Belgrade and briefed to

 8     Mr. Milosevic.  Ambassador Holbrooke did brief that.

 9        Q.   Well, just two matters here.  If the village was in such a

10     condition as you state, then there was nowhere for the people to return;

11     and secondly, how could one make an agreement with those who kept

12     engaging in armed conflict and where Malisevo was there centre -- their

13     training centre?

14        A.   I don't know that it was a training centre.  I didn't say that.

15     But we definitely needed Albanians to come back to rebuild, and without a

16     population there would be no rebuilding or construction underway there.

17     The city needed to be rebuilt because that was the original home of

18     thousands that had fled.

19             The second reason was as you're talking obviously here

20     December of 1998, which was the winter-time.  It was cold and we were

21     certainly worried about the exposure of the Albanian population that fled

22     to the mountains, children, women, that would suffer from such exposure

23     in the mountains.  So we needed to get them back.  A lot of the village

24     was destroyed.  There were some inhabitable structures there, but a lot

25     of work did need to go in to rebuilding it.

Page 8810

 1             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now have Exhibit --

 2     Prosecution Exhibit P1312, page 30 in English and page 36 in B/C/S.

 3        Q.   Colonel, what I would like to talk about is this entry for

 4     January 9, 1999, at 7.45 under item 3 or paragraph 3 I've read and then

 5     onwards.  Could you take a look at that.

 6             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction:  7.34, the entry

 7     at 7.34.

 8             THE WITNESS:  Okay.

 9             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Does this help you refresh your memory, these notes here?  Do you

11     remember what it was that you noted then what it related to?

12        A.   I believe this is related to the Panda Bar in Pec where there

13     were Serbs that were killed.

14        Q.   Okay.  Let me try and help you.  You see that this relates to a

15     press statement of January 8th, 1999.  At the time you were in the

16     United States and this relates to an attack on the police station in

17     Dulje, and I tried to refresh your memory regarding this event on the

18     basis of that OSCE statement.  And now here we can actually see that

19     you've made some notes about this and also what was to be done and

20     there's also mention of Mr. Clark who says:

21             This is an unfortunate press statement made -- could play right

22     into the hands of Belgrade.  Bad precedent for future negotiations.

23             This statement is about Suva Reka and you even mention the

24     location there.  And then underneath you can see the text that follows.

25     I don't to read it out loud.  And at this time Mr. DZ and Keller were in

Page 8811

 1     Pristina.

 2             MR. HANNIS:  Your Honours, is there a question?  And if so, it

 3     certainly seems to be compound.

 4             JUDGE PARKER:  We've had a summary with some liberties of what is

 5     here.

 6             Now, Mr. Djurdjic, what is it that you would like the witness to

 7     assist you with about this?  Are you asking him does he now remember?

 8             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Well, I wish to refresh his memory

 9     because here we see that these are notes of a conversation between

10     Mr. Walker and Mr. Clark in Pristina about this statement because

11     Mr. Walker was unhappy with the content of this statement.

12             JUDGE PARKER:  [Previous translation continues]...  no need to go

13     over it again.

14             THE WITNESS:  I might be able to help here.  There is a word here

15     that I know is a sensitive issue, but I would have to look at the

16     original press release.  If I recall this now the line here that says:

17             "I read the 8 January press statement calling the KLA

18     terrorists ..."

19             That was a major issue for KVM because it was a mandate of

20     Ambassador Walker, Your Honour, not to refer to the KLA as terrorists.

21     Belgrade referred to them as terrorists and the Russians referred to them

22     as terrorists, but we were not making a judgement on who or what they

23     were.  And I think that was the exception of the press release that

24     Ambassador Keller, French deputy, released, and that's what upset

25     Ambassador Walker, and that created problems for NATO because now we're

Page 8812

 1     talking a terrorist faction.  And it's in the KVM press line which means

 2     that we have identified them as terrorists, and that was never our

 3     position.  I think that is the key piece of this line of questioning that

 4     I'm being asked here.

 5             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now see page 31, or

 8     rather, 32 in English and page 39 in B/C/S.

 9        Q.   The excerpt that you will see is an entry for January 10th, 1999,

10     and it's your statement.

11             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please see page 32.  It's

12     the same document, P1312.

13             MR. HANNIS:  That is page 32 of 1312, Your Honour.  If counsel

14     could tell me what he's looking for I might be able to assist.

15             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. Hannis, in the B/C/S version I

16     see Walker spoke with Wes Clark, very concerned, that's what I have in

17     B/C/S but I don't see that -- the corresponding text in English.  Well,

18     let's try page 31.

19             MR. HANNIS:  That English is at the bottom of e-court page 31 in

20     English.

21             JUDGE PARKER:  Do you have a specific question, Mr. Djurdjic?

22             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Yes.

23        Q.   Colonel, you see here you stated that Mr. Walker was worried

24     because the KLA is to blame, because this undercuts NATO authority.

25             JUDGE PARKER:  What is the question?

Page 8813

 1             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   The question is:  Why is Mr. Walker worried if the -- if the KLA

 3     actually breached the agreement and how does this undercut NATO?

 4             MR. HANNIS:  Your Honour --

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  The note speaks of "the press is playing this as

 6     KLA is to blame ..." rather than it being the fact, it's the way it is

 7     being presented in the media, which seems to be the point of this note.

 8             Mr. Hannis.

 9             MR. HANNIS:  I have an objection because I think the question is

10     vague and assumes something that has been established yet about who is

11     worried between the two speakers that are mentioned.

12             JUDGE PARKER:  Fair comment.

13             Yes, Mr. Djurdjic, you are assuming one of the two people is the

14     worried person.  It may be the other one.  But if we get past that, you

15     can then be concerned about what I was saying.

16             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Well, I'm asking for clarification

17     from the Colonel, so perhaps -- well, we see what is written down here,

18     but maybe he can tell us what it was that he wrote down and why.

19             THE WITNESS:  Let me try to give you a comment here.  I don't

20     remember this piece exactly, but I do know one of the worries at this

21     time was the escalation of events on both sides, the KLA and the MUP,

22     that would create an excuse for larger MUP and VJ presence which would

23     continue to escalate the problems that we were trying to de-escalate.

24     The KLA was not helpful in any of this.  And whether -- I think the

25     comment there about the KLA to blame because it undercuts NATO, we wanted

Page 8814

 1     a peaceful process, obviously.  And with the KLA acting we were worried

 2     that, as I mentioned, the VJ would step up and then there would possibly

 3     be NATO action which was something that worried both sides.

 4             So that's about the best I can do to explain that.  I don't

 5     remember it completely.

 6             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Thank you.  And this portion where it says:

 8             "French are playing this to their own advantage ..."

 9             What is that supposed to mean?

10        A.   Well, the French were very pro-Serbian, and we were trying to

11     keep a very unbiassed reporting and an unbiassed capacity in our mission.

12     And Ambassador Walker felt that this was highlighting the Serbian

13     opportunity for increased deployments.  The bottom line there was

14     Ambassador Walker didn't feel this was very unbiassed reporting.

15        Q.   Thank you.  And this is something that he discussed with

16     Mr. Clark, but did he discuss this perhaps later on with Mr. Keller and

17     other deputies or other assistants?

18        A.   He discussed this -- I believe our press lead at the time was a

19     French woman, her first name was Beatrice.  He did discuss this with

20     Ambassador Keller, and I do remember it being a very heated discussion.

21     It was not a pleasant period, and I recall Ambassador Walker saying that

22     he should have seen that press release and approved it before it had gone

23     out even though he was in the United States.

24        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.

25             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now see page 34 in

Page 8815

 1     English, at the very bottom of the page, please.

 2        Q.   Colonel, the P there, what does that stand for?  Is that -- does

 3     that stand for Mr. Pickering I assume?

 4        A.   Yes, sir, that was Mr. Pickering's comment.

 5        Q.   Well, what is confusing here, we also see H, W, P, and R, whereas

 6     it says that there were three participants there, Pickering, Walker, and

 7     Phillips.

 8        A.   Yeah, H is Ambassador Holbrooke and the R is Larry Rossin from

 9     the State Department.  I probably didn't record all of the names that

10     were involved in the call.

11        Q.   Thank you.  What I'm interested in is this last statement here by

12     Mr. P, in other words, Pickering:

13             "Push hard to get them back in compliance ..."

14             How did you understand this?

15        A.   I need to read the context that that was made in because all I

16     have is just a snap-shot.  I don't know what this is in relation to

17     myself without referring to my notes.

18        Q.   Well, you can read it.  This is an entry for the 9th -- for the

19     10th, so read the whole page.

20        A.   I'd like to go back to the pages prior to that.  If you want me

21     to comment on this, I'd like to see the prior two pages to see if I can

22     put this in context.

23        Q.   The question -- this was on the day -- one day after Racak.  We

24     can see the English page that precedes.

25             Does this help to refresh your memory?

Page 8816

 1        A.   Yeah, I'm waiting for the prior page, though, to come up as I

 2     asked for.  If you want me to comment on this, I'd like to have the

 3     opportunity to try and refresh my own memory by looking at what was

 4     there.

 5             MR. HANNIS:  Your Honours, I don't know if I can assist.  I have

 6     a hard copy of what's the prior page from our excerpts dated the

 7     16th of January of conversation with General Clark.  I could hand that to

 8     the witness or we could go back in e-court.

 9             THE WITNESS:  Actually I just got it here, sir.

10             MR. HANNIS:  Which is page 33 in e-court.

11             THE WITNESS:  Okay.  If I can go to the original page, sir.

12             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Page 34, please.

13             THE WITNESS:  And your question of me was reference to:

14             "Push hard to get them back in compliance - we must initiate

15     ACTORD."

16             And you want me to tell you what I think that means?

17             JUDGE PARKER:  That as I understand it is what's asked of you.

18             THE WITNESS:  When Racak went down this was obviously a major

19     event and a major turning point for the KVM mission because it was up

20     until this point probably the worst event that we had faced as a mission.

21     Ambassador Walker was informing Ambassador Holbrooke and Pickering on

22     what ought to happen next, and Ambassador Pickering was very concerned

23     about de-escalating the event at Racak and getting Serbian armoured

24     vehicles and personnel and MUP out of the area, to calm it down, and back

25     into their barracks.  That's what I recall that statement meaning.

Page 8817

 1             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Thank you.  I was asking you about your contribution.

 3             "We must initiate Activation Order."

 4             That was my question.

 5             MR. HANNIS:  Your Honour, that came translated as he's asking

 6     about this witness's contribution.  There's nothing to indicate that this

 7     witness made a contribution.  P has been identified as Pickering, not

 8     Phillips.

 9             JUDGE PARKER:  Have you got a further question, Mr. Djurdjic?

10             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] No, but it's all in the notebook.

11     There are perhaps one or two contributions by the witness; everything

12     else was said by other people.  It seems then we cannot ask him about it

13     at all.  I'm asking him about what it means, what it means to launch the

14     Activation Order.  In English it says "initiate ACTORD."

15             I'm asking him whether -- or rather, what was his interpretation

16     of Mr. Pickering's words.  This is what he wrote down, the witness, and

17     I'm asking him for an explanation.

18             JUDGE PARKER:  Can I say, Mr. Djurdjic, that we have your

19     explanation now of what you're asking, which is quite different from what

20     the transcript says you're asking and that's happened several times and

21     it's becoming most confusing.

22             Colonel, the last four words on that page against the speaker P:

23             "We must initiate ACTORD."

24             Can you give us any understanding of the meaning of that?

25             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.  We knew when Racak occurred that our

Page 8818

 1     mission was in jeopardy.  The Activation Order was a NATO Extraction

 2     Force that was in place to get us out safely.  Ambassador Pickering was

 3     worried about obviously all the Americans has -- were the Permanent

 4     Council and their member states.  It was agreed upon that NATO would be

 5     the Extraction Force for all of the member states, and when he refers to

 6     the Activation Order that's what that was about:  Put them in Macedonia

 7     to receive us or to assist us in exiting Kosovo.

 8             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.

 9             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.

10             JUDGE PARKER:  Now, Mr. Djurdjic, we have gone over an hour into

11     this further session.  It's been very slow progress and very little

12     substance.  Can you please concentrate your attention sharply on any

13     further questions that you have for their relevance and importance.

14             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Witness, where were you on the 15th of January, 1999, if you

16     know?

17        A.   In Pristina.

18        Q.   Were you perhaps in Montenegro visiting Mr. Djukanovic?

19        A.   We visited him.  I'd have to look at my notes to see exactly, but

20     my point of being in Pristina, I was not in the United States is what I

21     referenced that to.  We were back in the theatre, in the mission area.

22        Q.   Thank you.  When was it that you heard of Racak for the first

23     time?

24        A.   I believe it's in my notes, but I would have to tell you that it

25     would have been on the 15th, shortly after it occurred.

Page 8819

 1        Q.   Do you know when the event took place?

 2        A.   We visited, I believe, the site on the 16th, at 7.00 in the

 3     morning, and I believe Racak occurred between the hours of 0700 and 1530

 4     on the 15th.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know that Mr. Walker came into his office on

 6     the 16th at 9.00 and that Mr. DZ said that around noon they set off for

 7     Racak?

 8        A.   I was there at Racak in the morning, and there was frost on the

 9     ground so it was early morning.  Ambassador Walker was with me.  We

10     visited in the morning.  It was very, very cold that day.  You know, I

11     can't speak to what Mr. DZ had said.  My recollection is is we visited

12     the site in the morning.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Was DZ with you at that time?

14        A.   I'm not sure if he was or not.  I don't recall, and if he was, he

15     didn't go up into the ravine with us where the bodies were.  But I don't

16     recall if he went with us or not.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Was General Maisonneuve with you?

18        A.   I believe he was at Racak, yes, the morning of the 16th.

19        Q.   Were you notified that the police had informed the KVM that there

20     was to be an operation in Racak?

21        A.   I don't remember if we were notified or not, sir.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Did you know that two KVM vehicles were supposed to

23     go to Racak village concerning that announcement?

24        A.   I don't have any knowledge of that, sir.

25        Q.   Thank you.  When on the 16th of January you arrived in the

Page 8820

 1     village, were there any KLA in the village?

 2        A.   I believe we were met by the KLA.  In fact, one of them

 3     identified himself as the commander and we met with him, yes, sir.

 4        Q.   Does it mean that the village was under KLA control when you were

 5     there?

 6        A.   It was our understanding that the village was a logistics depot

 7     for KLA for food and blankets and that sort of thing, yes.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Did you know that in and around the village there

 9     had -- there were 40 KLA members as of November 1998?

10        A.   I don't know what the numbers were.  It was our understanding

11     that the KLA did not use the village as a stronghold, but as a supply

12     depot.  They were -- they were out in the field and would come back.  The

13     women and children remained in the village, but they would come back to

14     Racak for supplies.

15        Q.   What were the bunkers and trenches around Racak for?

16        A.   Probably to protect the village I would imagine.

17        Q.   Thank you.  You spoke about some elderly people yesterday.  You

18     concluded they were civilians.  Did you know that Sadik Mujota, aged 61,

19     and Mehmet Mustafa, aged 62, were members of the KLA, having lost their

20     lives in Racak on the 15th?

21        A.   I don't know those two individuals you mentioned personally no,

22     or their ages.  I don't know of them.

23        Q.   Did you know that in the village of Malo Poljica [as interpreted]

24     that those killed in Racak were buried there as KLA members?

25        A.   I don't know whether they were or not.  I don't have any

Page 8821

 1     information on what you're telling me on that.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Where did you get information to the effect that

 3     three females were killed -- that there were three woman in the 45

 4     killed?

 5        A.   It was a KVM assessment from the team that had gone in there and

 6     counted the dead.  There was also a 12-year-old boy that had been shot.

 7     I believe that those were the final reports from KVM.

 8        Q.   Yes, but why did you not wait for a few days for an investigation

 9     to determine what the facts were and then issue a press release?

10     Instead, you issued a press release the very same day.

11        A.   I didn't issue the press release; Ambassador Walker did.  And

12     what he did I had no control over.  We did ask for an immediate

13     investigation and we did ask the Serbs for the names of those that

14     participated in shelling the houses of the -- that contained women and

15     children as well as young Serbian men and elder men.  I think we

16     requested an investigative team from Finland, and I believe we asked for

17     Judge Arbour to come immediately, and of course that was met with many

18     obstacles from the Serbian side.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Did you know that only on the 18th of January there

20     was an on-site investigation in Racak?

21        A.   Investigation by whom?  The Serb side or ... ?

22        Q.   Yes.

23        A.   So three days after the event an investigation took place; is

24     that what you're asking me?

25        Q.   Did you know that only after three days an investigating

Page 8822

 1     magistrate was able to go into Racak to carry out on on-site

 2     investigation?

 3        A.   I knew there was investigations taking place, but I also heard

 4     that they were incomplete and not satisfactory the way KVM understood

 5     investigations should proceed.  I know Ambassador Walker wasn't happy

 6     with the manner that the investigations were taking place.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Did you know that between the 15th in the afternoon

 8     and until the 18th KLA had control in Racak?

 9        A.   I'd have to be -- I'd have to read the reports.  I'm not sure

10     what the status of Racak was.

11        Q.   Thank you.  During the meeting with the commander, do you

12     remember him saying to you that at 5.00 p.m. on the 15th Racak again fell

13     under control of the KLA?

14        A.   I don't remember.  I don't dispute it.  Again, I'd have to refer

15     to my notes, to trust my notes at that time.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Do you recall the commander acquainting you and

17     Mr. Walker during that meeting that on the 15th of January he used

18     mortars to attack Serb positions, Serb forces?

19        A.   I don't remember precisely, but I'll take your word for that.

20        Q.   Thank you.  A journalist who was in Racak on the 16th with

21     Mr. Walker and other KVM members was Mr. Franz Josef Hutsch.  According

22     to his words, when you arrived in Racak there were about a dozen KLA

23     there.  Do you recall them being there once you arrived?

24        A.   I do recall seeing some KLA.  Some were wearing a uniform.

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 8823

 1             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I apologise.  I

 2     forgot to go back into open session and we have been in closed session

 3     for a while now.

 4             JUDGE PARKER:  Open.

 5                           [Open session]

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  We're in open session, Your Honours.

 7             JUDGE PARKER:  Can the notes be taken from the screen, please.

 8             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Do you agree that at the time when you visited Racak and its

10     environs, the location was not secured for an on-site investigation?

11        A.   Secured by -- by KVM or secured by the MUP?  Secured at all?

12     I'm ...

13        Q.   There was no MUP in Racak, that is -- that would mean that it

14     would either have to be done by the verifiers or other members of the KVM

15     who were in Racak.  Did they secure the scene of crime in your knowledge

16     when you were there?

17        A.   I guess if you're asking me were there MUP around, no; was KVM

18     there, yes.  We had a number of verifiers that were taking reports of

19     what events had occurred.  Whether the site was secured or not as a crime

20     scene, that wasn't in KVM's charter to do that.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Did you notice the bodies of those killed being moved

22     and that the spent shells, cartridges, were being taken away as

23     souvenirs?

24        A.   I'm aware of a couple of families that retrieved their loved ones

25     from where they were killed and moved back into their -- into their homes

Page 8824

 1     for the bodies that were up in the ravine, they were -- we were told they

 2     were never touched or never moved, that was, they were shot and killed

 3     where they lay.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Did you know that on the 18th of January, 1999, there

 5     was an investigative magistrate of the district court in Pristina

 6     accompanied by Gil Gilbertson and a Mr. Sullivan who was an OSCE

 7     representative -- actually, both of them were?

 8             MR. HANNIS:  Accompanied where exactly?

 9             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   To accompany the scene of crime team headed by the investigative

11     judge of the district court in Pristina, her name is Danica Marinkovic.

12        A.   I do remember Ms. Marinkovic very, very well, and I am aware that

13     the OSCE brought her to the scene.

14        Q.   Did you know that the autopsies were also attended by OSCE

15     representatives, Mr. --

16             THE INTERPRETER:  Could Mr. Djurdjic please repeat the two names

17     of the OSCE representatives.

18             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   It seems I have to repeat the question.  Colonel, did you know

20     that the autopsies were also attended by OSCE representatives

21     Ian Robert Hendrie from England and Mr. Pedersen from Denmark?

22        A.   I don't remember if we attended those autopsies or not.  There's

23     no reason to dispute your claim there.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Did you know that members of the KLA kidnapped

25     certain representatives of the Democratic League of Kosovo and they

Page 8825

 1     actually killed some of them?

 2             JUDGE PARKER:  Is this on the same day or at some other time?

 3             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   I am leaving the topic of Racak, Colonel.  This is an unrelated

 5     question to that topic.

 6             MR. HANNIS:  Can we have some indication of when, what year, what

 7     month?

 8             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Yes, in the fall of 1998.

 9             THE WITNESS:  I was aware that the KLA had committed acts of

10     kidnapping and other violence.  I'm not specifically aware of this

11     particular event.  They were certainly no saints.

12             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Thank you.  You don't recall any activities by Mr. Walker and

14     other members of the verification mission aimed at having those kidnapped

15     by the KLA who were from Mr. Rugova's party released?

16        A.   I don't recall the incident.  I know we worked -- we worked a VJ

17     release and we worked a KLA release, but I don't recall exactly who the

18     kidnapped were.  I know we had Serbian journalists and we had Serbian VJ

19     that had been released.  I don't recall the specifics of everyone that

20     was kidnapped.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Colonel, sir, did you know that the KLA, after the

22     signing of the October Agreements and the withdrawal of the VJ forces,

23     took up positions which it had held before the summer operation?

24        A.   Yes.  Yes.  I'm aware of that.

25        Q.   Do you agree that the road between Pristina and Podujevo and then

Page 8826

 1     to Prokuplje used as the main vein to supply Kosovo and Metohija for both

 2     the civilians and the Army of Yugoslavia?

 3        A.   Yes, I am aware that the Prokuplje road was a key line of

 4     communication and line of transfer.

 5        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.

 6             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I think ...

 7             JUDGE PARKER:  Is that the end of your questions?

 8             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I'll finish the sentence.  I'll

 9     tell you that after the break I wanted to ask Mr. Hannis if he could send

10     me a bit more time and then after that conversation I'll be able to

11     answer your question right after the break.

12             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Hannis, are you in a position to know how long

13     your re-examination might be?

14             MR. HANNIS:  I think about 30 minutes, between 20 and 30 minutes,

15     Your Honour.

16             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

17             If we break now, that's the time that is available for you,

18     Mr. Djurdjic.  I suggest we continue for another five minutes for you to

19     finish.

20             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21        Q.   Colonel, sir, the Yugoslav forces in the Podujevo area react to

22     this by securing the area for further supplies and was this simply a

23     reaction on -- to the KLA actions in that period and in that area?

24        A.   We were briefed that they were concerned about losing control of

25     that particular strategic point to KLA control.  And that briefing that

Page 8827

 1     we received was a verbal briefing in Podujevo from a VJ soldier I recall.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Did you know that the KLA, in addition to side-arms,

 3     also had anti-tank weapons?

 4        A.   Yes.

 5        Q.   Do you know that they also had guns that had a range of up to

 6     3 to 4 kilometres?

 7        A.   I was aware that they had weapons that went beyond 7.62

 8     millimetres, yes.  Precisely the kinds of weapons -- we're going through

 9     all this.  I knew they had some mortar packs available to them, 7.62; I

10     was aware of -- I never saw them but was aware that there was some

11     anti-tank weapons available to them.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Since you were able to move around Kosovo, could you

13     tell us, based on your experience, your military experience, what kind of

14     fortifications did the Albanian houses in villages have?  What types of

15     walls and gates were there around them?

16        A.   In my experience, I didn't see anything out of the ordinary.  I

17     stayed in some of those homes.  I'm not precisely sure what you're asking

18     here.  I mean, for me, it was a regular apartment and a regular home that

19     had a -- typically had a gate to enter.

20        Q.   What about the compounds themselves, were they surrounded by high

21     walls?

22        A.   When you refer to "compounds," what are you referring to?  Are

23     you referring to the normal living and housing areas in Pristina or are

24     you talking about in the Drenica valley?  What do you mean by

25     "compounds"?

Page 8828

 1        Q.   Well, what I said was the village homes, Albanian village homes;

 2     in other words, in villages, not in towns and cities.  The walls that

 3     surrounded these houses, village houses, did you see how high they were

 4     and did you see them, the walls?

 5        A.   When we visited KLA strongholds such as a facility we called the

 6     Ice House out of Drenica valley, what I observed in those areas was a

 7     fair number of KLA, armed.  I don't recall the heights of the walls in

 8     general around any of their facility.  That's not to say they weren't

 9     there, I just didn't -- I just don't remember them.  I remember that it

10     didn't seem -- wherever we went, it didn't seem like it was a fortified

11     bunker or position of KLA soldiers.  It just seemed like a normal living

12     arrangement, a normal house, from what I can remember.

13        Q.   Witness, on the topic of meetings with Milosevic, would you agree

14     with me that you attended more of those meetings than Mr. Walker?

15        A.   I attended one meeting without him.  I believe that was in

16     December.  I attended one in November.

17        Q.   Would you take my word for it that Mr. Walker only mentions one

18     meeting toward the end of October while you were -- when you were not

19     there yet and another meeting with Mr. Milosevic on November 16th; and

20     second, the chronology, the time-line that Mr. Drewienkiewicz drew up,

21     there was only one meeting with Mr. Milosevic where Mr. Walker attended,

22     jotted down, and that's the same meeting of November 16th.  So there is

23     no mention anywhere of any meeting in December, and I couldn't find any

24     such mention in your notes either, and I read them through very

25     carefully.

Page 8829

 1        A.   Right.  I attended a meeting with Ambassador Holbrooke and

 2     Ambassador Miles that did not include Ambassador Walker.  I thought that

 3     meeting was on December 15th.  I attended a meeting with

 4     Ambassador Walker to see Mr. Milosevic in November, and I'm not sure if

 5     that was between the 23rd, 4th, or 5th, or on the 16th, but I was with

 6     Ambassador Walker on one of those visits.

 7        Q.   Very well, Colonel.  On the 15th of December you attended a

 8     meeting with Milosevic, that was the meeting with Mr. Holbrooke.  That

 9     was on December 15th, 1998.  And let me just say one more thing and this

10     is even in your notes.  The letter of Mr. Walker's of November 23rd was

11     not actually taken and submitted at this meeting, but it was sent only

12     later on, on the 25th.  And let me also remind you that you had a couple

13     of meetings with Mr. Sainovic where you discussed this meeting?

14             MR. HANNIS:  Your Honour, I'm sorry, objection.  That doesn't

15     sound like a question; that sounds like testimony from Mr. Djurdjic.

16             JUDGE PARKER:  Same old problem, Mr. Djurdjic.  If you want the

17     witness to agree that the letter was not handed over at the meeting, you

18     need to put that to him and he'll say yes or no.  You can't put it to him

19     as a fact.

20             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] No.  What I'm trying to do is just

21     refresh his memory regarding some of these circumstances, but I can also

22     ask him whether I'm correct or not.  I think in the final analysis it

23     comes down to the same thing.  So I was just trying to jog his memory

24     because the witness said that this letter was actually handed in to

25     Milosevic at this meeting on the 23rd, but in fact it was on the 24th or

Page 8830

 1     the 25th.  And I even have your notes here, but I can't find the exact

 2     spot to show that this letter was actually handed in on the 25th well,

 3     never mind.  Just tell us, Witness, do you remember this or not?

 4        A.   I remember the letter.  My memory serves me that it very well may

 5     have been that we gave that letter up through embassy channels and it

 6     went through officially and Ambassador Walker carried his own copy of the

 7     letter.  My recollection is is that he gave him that letter and discussed

 8     that letter.  It's possible that I could be wrong, but I know that we

 9     talked about that letter in there and I remember Ambassador Walker saying

10     it was going to be the purpose of his visit.

11        Q.   Thank you, Colonel, for answering my questions.

12             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours for

13     allowing me additional time for my cross-examination.

14             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you, Mr. Djurdjic.

15             We need to have a break now with those tapes, Mr. Hannis, but

16     what we will do is resume at ten minutes past and hope you'll be able to

17     finish in the 20 minutes, which was the lower end of your estimate.

18             MR. HANNIS:  I'll do my very best, Your Honour.

19             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you, Mr. Hannis.

20             We resume at ten minutes past.

21                           --- Recess taken at 12.42 p.m.

22                           [The witness stands down]

23                           --- On resuming at 1.11 p.m.

24             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Djurdjic.

25             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I will be very brief,

Page 8831

 1     Your Honours, and this has to do with the exhibits, or rather, the

 2     documents that we propose to be admitted into evidence, D004-4172 and

 3     D004-4175, they should be admitted into evidence without a stamp, and all

 4     the other documents that were on the list should be admitted under seal.

 5                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

 6             JUDGE PARKER:  Well, if that's the agreement of counsel they will

 7     be admitted and exhibit numbers will be assigned and you'll be informed

 8     by memo.

 9                           [The witness takes the stand]

10             JUDGE PARKER:  Please sit.

11             Mr. Hannis.

12             MR. HANNIS:  Thank you, Your Honour.  My first questions are

13     regarding the notebook, so if we could go into private.

14             JUDGE PARKER:  Private.

15      [Private session] [Confidentiality lifted by order of Trial Chamber]

16             THE REGISTRAR:  We're in private session, Your Honours.

17             MR. HANNIS:  Thank you.

18                           Re-examination by Mr. Hannis:

19        Q.   Colonel, I'd like to look at your notebook which is P1312 and I'd

20     first like to look at page 30 of the English.  It's page 36 in the B/C/S.

21             Colonel, this will be up on the screen in a minute, but it's

22     referring to your notes dated the 9th of January.  And I want to ask

23     about some points under the heading at 0734 hours.  Now, I note that this

24     January 9th is one day after we saw that press release this Exhibit D162

25     about some MUP that were killed and injured between Suva Reka and

Page 8832

 1     Stimlje.  Do you remember Mr. Djurdjic showing you that one?

 2        A.   Yes, sir.

 3        Q.   And the second entry here says:

 4             "KVM going back to negotiate the release of at least two VJ

 5     soldiers."

 6             You told us earlier in your testimony about this group of eight

 7     or nine VJ soldiers that had wandered off and been captured.  Is that --

 8     do you know when they were released approximately?

 9        A.   They were released before the 15th of January.

10        Q.   Okay.  And the next entry says:

11             "I read the 8 Jan 99 press statement calling the KLA terrorists

12     for the taking of eight VJ as POWs."

13             That's a different press release than the one we saw in D162,

14     which was about the killing of MUP.  And I don't think you saw that press

15     statement while we were in here in the past couple of days, did you?  I

16     haven't seen it?

17        A.   I haven't seen it, no, sir.

18        Q.   The next entry says:

19             "Unfortunate statement from KVM and it could play right into the

20     hands of Belgrade."

21             Is that referring to the press statement calling the KLA

22     terrorists for capture of the eight VJ?  Or for the killing of MUP or --

23        A.   That refers to the KLA terrorists, and again the key word there

24     was "terrorists."

25        Q.   Okay.

Page 8833

 1        A.   That was what was unfortunate.  We didn't want that in our press

 2     releases because we had made a judgement what they were.

 3        Q.   Okay.  And the next entry says:

 4             "Call Wes Clark and pass to NATO - mention this is an unfortunate

 5     press statement and made by our French deputy."

 6             I think you told us that was Ambassador Keller?

 7        A.   Keller, yes, sir.

 8        Q.   Did he make one statement or two statements where he referred to

 9     KLA as terrorists, if you --

10        A.   Ambassador Keller?

11        Q.   Yes.

12        A.   He always referred to the KLA as terrorists.

13        Q.   Okay --

14        A.   Whenever it was --

15             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the speakers kindly pause between

16     questions and answers for the interpreters.  Thank you.

17             THE WITNESS:  To follow-up, Ambassador Keller always referred to

18     the KLA as terrorists.  He was cautioned by Ambassador Walker that

19     whether it be in written statements, press statements, or verbal

20     statements, that was not our position to take, and he and

21     Ambassador Keller had words on that issue several times.

22             MR. HANNIS:

23        Q.   The next line says:

24             "This is a bad precedent for future negotiations."

25             Was that refer -- did that have any reference to negotiations

Page 8834

 1     about releasing the VJ hostages or was it in a broader -- broader

 2     context?

 3        A.   I would have to tell you, sir, that that would be in a broader

 4     context.  If KVM was calling the KLA "terrorists," it wasn't likely we

 5     were going to get any progress or negotiation progress with them.  So it

 6     was in a broader context.

 7        Q.   But were negotiations about the VJ eight or nine going on at this

 8     time?

 9        A.   Yes, sir.

10        Q.   Thank you.

11             MR. HANNIS:  I'd like to go to the next page in English, page 31,

12     and that's page 38 in the B/C/S.

13        Q.   You'll see this is from a meeting on the 10th of January at 0740.

14     I had a question about this because it's unclear to me about when you

15     were on leave in the US and when you were back.  This says a meeting with

16     Sainovic.  Do you recall, were you back in Kosovo?

17        A.   If I took these notes, I was definitely back.  So I'm not sure of

18     the hour that we arrived, but I would have been back by the 10th, having

19     taken these notes.

20        Q.   Okay.  And the notes from the day before, on the 9th, were those

21     notes you made pursuant to phone calls that were going back and forth

22     from where you were in Kosovo?

23        A.   It could have been, yes, it could have been.

24        Q.   Okay.  At the bottom of the page in English on this one --

25             MR. HANNIS:  And I think we have to go to page 39 in the B/C/S.

Page 8835

 1        Q.   -- this entry about "Walker talked with Wes Clark."

 2             It says:

 3             "Very worried the press is playing this as the KLA is to blame

 4     because it undercuts his NATO authority."

 5             Who were you referred to as being worried there?  Was it Walker

 6     or Clark or somebody else?

 7        A.   This would have been Wes Clark being worried.

 8        Q.   I say it says "his authority."  I assume Walker had no authority

 9     in NATO or over NATO?

10        A.   No, sir, not.

11        Q.   Thank you.

12             MR. HANNIS:  Next if we could go to page 34 in the English,

13     that's page 41 in the B/C/S.

14        Q.   This is 16 January at 1634 hours.  This is right after Racak.  I

15     see the second line says:

16             "This event and the Decani incident are not related."

17             Now, I think that relates to the press release we saw in

18     Exhibit D161, which was also something that took place, I think, on the

19     15th of January, where KVM personnel were shot at?

20        A.   Yes, sir.

21        Q.   And do you know what the information was to show that that was

22     not related to Racak?

23        A.   I don't -- I don't recall what caused me to link the -- you know,

24     the two events.  I believe it was the RC commander, isolated event.

25        Q.   Okay.  I can see why that connection might be drawn that --

Page 8836

 1     didn't you tell us before that some components of the KLA thought that

 2     KVM was responsible in part for what happened at Racak?  Or am I

 3     misremembering?

 4        A.   No, I'm trying to remember.  I remember the discussion.  I

 5     remember being, you know, being blamed by the KLA for in part what

 6     happened.  I'm having trouble trying to remember why, but I do remember

 7     that discussion, that we were being blamed for what had happened and that

 8     we weren't there in large numbers and we weren't protecting that village,

 9     we didn't have a presence; and had we been there, that might not have

10     happened.

11        Q.   And I think you said Racak was sort of the low point in the

12     mission's history up to that point?

13        A.   Right.

14        Q.   And it was particularly painful because it was on the heels of

15     your high point in getting those VJ --

16        A.   -- released.

17        Q.   -- soldiers released?

18        A.   Yes, sir.

19        Q.   Which is the next entry about:

20             "Three to four days ago KLA released eight ... and this is the

21     result."

22             If you could go down to the first entry for letter H which I

23     think you told us stands for Holbrooke --

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   -- in this context.  It says:

Page 8837

 1             "Press for immediate release of KLA POWs."

 2             Do you know what that refers to?

 3        A.   Yes.  The VJ had captured eight KLA, and we were trying to win

 4     their release unharmed.  We struck a deal with Serb authorities, but the

 5     Serb authorities did not want the release appear to be connected to the

 6     VJ release, although it was, but it was a quid pro quo, but the Serbs

 7     wanted to maintain an image of strength and wanted the two completely

 8     separated to appear that they weren't linked.

 9        Q.   I understand.  So this was the delayed release to avoid the

10     appearance that Serbia was negotiating with what they deemed terrorists?

11        A.   Yes, sir.

12        Q.   And now, in light of what had happened in Racak, Holbrooke is

13     suggesting:  Release -- make Serbia release them now?

14        A.   Right.

15        Q.   To, what, calm down KLA --

16        A.   Just to get the situation under control and get people to calm

17     down.

18        Q.   Okay.  Thank you.

19             MR. HANNIS:  If we could go to the next page, 35 in English and

20     page 42 in the B/C/S.

21        Q.   It's still the same meeting and Holbrooke is the speaker.  The

22     first entry:

23             "Need to do a formal report to NATO/OSCE on non-compliance."

24             Mr. Djurdjic asked you some questions about a provision in the

25     agreement about reporting.  Do you recall, was there a formal report that

Page 8838

 1     was written and sent to OSCE after this?

 2        A.   There was.  It went to the Permanent Council.  I think that

 3     Ambassador Walker even flew down there to brief it.

 4        Q.   Okay.  And while we're still in private session, I wanted to

 5     follow-up on those reportings.  You were asked yesterday by Mr. Djurdjic

 6     about reporting, and in one of your answers where you were talking about

 7     letters of protest about non-compliance you said at page 84, line 16:

 8             "I remember some documents that Mr. Walker wanted on the record

 9     that clearly defined non-compliance issues.  One was in the form of a

10     letter that went in December, verbally, primarily to Mr. Milosevic."

11             When you say "verbally, primarily," how does that work with a

12     letter?  Do you understand?  I see letter as something written.  Do you

13     hand it to him and tell him what's in it or ...?

14        A.   Ambassador Walker would often make his notes and what he wanted

15     to say.  If -- you know, about the letter that's in question here -- he

16     certainly may have given a letter of non-compliance to make

17     Ambassador Miles in the embassy and of course State Department aware of

18     it through that channel, as he would the Permanent Council but also

19     delivered verbally his unhappiness with the non-compliance issues that we

20     were struggling with to Mr. Milosevic.  So I would tell you that it would

21     be both written and it would be verbal.

22        Q.   Thank you.  And near the end of your testimony you were asked

23     about the letters being delivered to Mr. Milosevic, and it was suggested

24     to you that one was delivered to him in December, I think on the 15th,

25     when you and Miles and Holbrooke met with Milosevic?

Page 8839

 1        A.   Yes, sir.

 2        Q.   And I think you testified that you recalled that Walker had also

 3     delivered that 23 November letter about definitions and sort of broad

 4     parameters of the KVM mission sometime in late November, when you and he

 5     met with Milosevic; correct?

 6             MR. HANNIS:  I see Mr. Djurdjic on his feet.

 7             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Djurdjic.

 8             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I'll be brief.  I was referring to

 9     the letter of November 23rd, and I never mentioned any letter of

10     December.

11             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.

12             MR. HANNIS:  Neither am I.

13        Q.   My question is --

14             JUDGE PARKER:  Carry on, please, Mr. Hannis.

15             MR. HANNIS:  Thank you.

16        Q.   My question is:  Is it possible that the letter of the

17     23rd of November was delivered on both dates, first by Mr. Walker in late

18     November and later on by Holbrooke and Miles?

19        A.   It's possible.  When Mr. Holbrooke came into town he took a lot

20     of information with him, the DMZ, Malisevo map, some KVM reporting, I

21     wasn't in the room when he delivered a lot of that material, but it

22     definitely would be possible.  That would be typical of Mr. Holbrooke.

23        Q.   And by doing so, that's a more formal presentation than it coming

24     from Mr. Walker?

25        A.   Which is why Mr. Walker wasn't present.

Page 8840

 1        Q.   And based on your experience in dealing with the federal

 2     commission for cooperation with the OSCE, did sometimes Sainovic and the

 3     others insist on strict technicalities and formalities when you were

 4     running into obstacles about getting them things resolved?

 5        A.   Constant technicality issues, yes.

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7             MR. HANNIS:  We can go back into open now, Your Honours.

 8             JUDGE PARKER:  Open.

 9                           [Open session]

10             THE REGISTRAR:  We're in open session, Your Honours.

11             MR. HANNIS:  Thank you.

12        Q.   Just a few more, Colonel.  You were asked about what the KVM did

13     in relation to stop weapons smuggling.  Did KVM have any authority to

14     deal with weapons being smuggled into Kosovo?

15        A.   No, sir.

16        Q.   Who was that a job for in Serbia, if you know?

17        A.   I would think that the border guards would be in large part

18     responsible for those weapons that were coming in.

19        Q.   Next you were shown yesterday at page 92, line 10, Exhibit D160,

20     which is UN Resolution 1199.  I won't pull it up.  I'll read.  You were

21     shown paragraph 4(a) and Mr. Djurdjic asked you if you would agree that

22     that only called on Yugoslavia to cease all action.  And his question

23     was:

24             "Q.  Only in relation to the civilian population and to withdraw

25     security units."

Page 8841

 1             I would indicate to you that the document -- the UN Resolution

 2     says:

 3             "Cease all action by the security forces affecting the civilian

 4     population."

 5             My question is:  Those joint VJ and MUP actions that you saw in

 6     Kosovo, even though they may have been directed at KLA, in the manner in

 7     which they were carried out were those actions affecting the civilian

 8     population?

 9        A.   They absolutely were.  They were, in general, sweep operations.

10     And by "sweep" I mean they included all personnel, all people,

11     population, in the village.  It didn't discriminate between the two.

12        Q.   All right.  Thank you.  And the last one I want to ask you about,

13     Exhibit 835, which is the agreement about the KVM mission.  Mr. Djurdjic

14     made the point that the primary purpose was to maintain the cease-fire?

15        A.   Yes, sir.

16        Q.   And I have a question.  In your efforts to verify whether there

17     was compliance with the cease-fire, did KVM requests from Mr. Sainovic

18     and that group that you met with that you be advised in advance when

19     there were going to be movements of MUP or VJ in carrying out some of

20     these anti-terrorist actions?

21        A.   Yes, we had asked for advanced notice.  At least 24 hours we had

22     asked for.

23        Q.   And did Mr. Sainovic agree to do that?

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   Was that important to you in being able to carry out your job?

Page 8842

 1        A.   Very much important to us, yes, sir.

 2        Q.   Because if you were only going to be notified a week after that

 3     occurred, how would that help you do any verification?

 4        A.   It was one of the frustrations of the mission.  We just didn't

 5     get timely coordination for being able to be in front of some of these

 6     operations or accompany these operations.

 7        Q.   Okay.  And if you only got reports a week after they happened,

 8     you might as well have been in Hawaii as Pristina?

 9        A.   Yes, sir.

10        Q.   Thank you.

11             MR. HANNIS:  I have no further questions, Your Honour.

12             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you very much for that, Mr. Hannis.

13             You'll be pleased to know that that's the end of the run.

14             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, sir.

15             JUDGE PARKER:  We would like to thank you for coming once again,

16     for the assistance you have been able to give.  You are free to return to

17     your normal activities.  The Court Officer will show you out.  We would

18     thank those who have assisted you in your time here.

19             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, sir.

20             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you very much.

21             THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.

22                           [The witness withdrew]

23             JUDGE PARKER:  We are at the point of an adjournment for some two

24     weeks.  We hope in that time, A, Mr. Hannis, the Prosecution will be able

25     not only to review its case and its position to be sure and have clearly

Page 8843

 1     in its mind what else needs to be done so that there is no further hiccup

 2     in the presentation of the Prosecution case.

 3             MR. HANNIS:  I'll convey that to the team, Your Honour, and we'll

 4     make our best efforts.

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  Good.  And efforts are made to ensure the

 6     witnesses are here.  In the last couple of weeks we've been slipping

 7     fairly badly on performance and losing time.  We would hope that can be

 8     behind us now and things will move along.

 9             While this break will be of immediate assistance to the

10     Prosecution, it's also one that should assist the Defence a great deal in

11     collecting your thoughts and finalising your preparation with a view to

12     the steps that need to be taken when the Prosecution case finishes, and

13     if necessary to -- looking ahead to the preparation and presentation of

14     the Defence case.  As we have indicated that should that be the course

15     taken, it will -- should not be expected that there'll be a long break

16     between the end of the Prosecution case and the start of the Defence

17     case.  We want to keep the trial moving, so we would encourage Defence

18     counsel to be giving thought ahead during this fortnight's break.

19             With those words of encouragement, we hope that the break is of

20     assistance to all parties and we resume again on Tuesday afternoon, the

21     22nd, I think, Courtroom I, I'm told.  So we look forward to seeing you

22     then.

23                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.36 p.m.,

24                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 22nd day of

25                           September, 2009, at 2.15 p.m.