Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 9197

 1                           Tuesday, 27 October 2009

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.00 a.m.

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  Good morning.  There are protective measures for

 6     this witness which has the effect that members -- in this courtroom, that

 7     members of the public are not able to be present because of the physical

 8     configuration of this courtroom.  The Chamber would mention that a

 9     Mr. van Odijk will by order of the Chamber be able to view the

10     proceedings.  He is a representative from Utrecht which the Chamber is

11     meeting today, and in those circumstances, he will be, by special order,

12     able to view the proceedings in our physical arrangements from what would

13     normally be the public gallery.

14             If the witness could be brought in, please.

15                          [The witness takes the stand]

16             JUDGE PARKER:  Good morning.

17             THE WITNESS:  Good morning, Your Honours.

18             JUDGE PARKER:  Could I remind you the affirmation that you made

19     to speak the truth still applies.

20             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, sir.

21             JUDGE PARKER:  Ms. Kravetz.  Oh, we are well past you,

22     Ms. Kravetz.

23             Mr. Djurdjic.  I had completely lost you in the cloud of the ...

24             MR. DJURDJIC:  [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

25                           WITNESS:  JOHN CROSLAND [Resumed]

Page 9198

 1                           Cross-examination by Mr. Djurdjic:  [Continued]

 2        Q.   Good morning, Colonel, sir.  Before I go on with putting my

 3     questions to the Colonel, I should like to inform the Trial Chamber that

 4     the Prosecution has agreed to redacted proposal regarding exhibits used

 5     in the Milutinovic case except for one which was taken off the list which

 6     I will be using in the cross-examination.  Ms. Kravetz was very fair in

 7     that regard, so that we can continue or should Ms. Kravetz agree to that

 8     as well?

 9             JUDGE PARKER:  We are happy to take your assurance in her

10     presence that she is in agreement.  Carry on.

11             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

12        Q.   Colonel, I should like to ask you in connection with the

13     telegrams that we referred to yesterday, the initials DA refer to whom?

14        A.   The DA is defence attache, which is me.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Now, I should like to ask you a question in

16     connection with a part of your statement yesterday in which you stated

17     that you made some photographs in Donje Prekaze in March 1998.  Did you

18     see those photographs during the proceedings here before this Chamber?

19        A.   I can't remember to be honest whether they came before the Court

20     or not.  As you know, I've made several appearances here, but I cannot

21     verify that they came before the Court.

22        Q.   Thank you.  But they have not been shown to you on this

23     particular occasion?

24        A.   Not as far as I am aware, sir, no.

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 9199

 1             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we have document D005-0657

 2     brought up on the screen.  Paragraph 20 of the statement.

 3        Q.   Colonel, this is the statement which you gave to the

 4     investigators from the 5th to the 7th of December, 2000.  I would kindly

 5     ask you to take a look a paragraph 20, in which it is stated -- was that:

 6             "It's likely that there were paramilitaries such as Arkan's

 7     Tigers in Kosovo, I was never able to make a positive identification.

 8     Members of all units, the VJ, JSO, the PJP and the SAJ, involving in

 9     Kosovo wore bandanas around their heads and other types of non-standard

10     kit to varying degrees.  Under such circumstances, it would not have been

11     surprising for members of these units to be mistaken as members of

12     paramilitaries."

13             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes, Ms. Kravetz.

14             MS. KRAVETZ:  Your Honours, I just want to point out that the

15     protective measures that apply to this witness include the redaction of

16     some personal details on the cover page of the statements that are used

17     during his testimony, and I was just seeing that the version that is

18     being used, at least in the the B/C/S, in the e-court system does not

19     contain those redactions, and the redactions that had been granted by the

20     Milosevic Chamber in 2002 were the redactions of his place of birth and

21     date of birth.  So if my learned colleague is going to be using any prior

22     statements, those details should be redacted from the first page of the

23     statement.

24             JUDGE PARKER:  The issue will be whether a redaction is possible

25     from the e-court version before it comes up on the screen.

Page 9200

 1                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

 2             JUDGE PARKER:  We will deal with the matter by not broadcasting

 3     the exhibit publicly.  Carry on please, Mr. Djurdjic.

 4             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

 5        Q.   Does the passage which I've just read out reflect what you stated

 6     to the investigators in December 2000, sir?

 7        A.   I think so.  What I'm trying to convey is that in this particular

 8     situation there was a room for misidentification of various forces, and I

 9     was, therefore, using my own intelligence and observation to make this

10     particular statement, if you will, in Defence of the Vojska Yugoslavia

11     because there were journalists travelling throughout Kosovo, as you are

12     well aware, who were making claims possibly based on their experience in

13     former Balkan conflicts.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Thank you, Colonel.

15             Colonel, you say that you have direct knowledge of the

16     situation in Kosovo and Metohija, so I should like to ask you kindly

17     to describe for me a village, a typical Albanian village house that you

18     visited, if you visited such houses.

19        A.   I visited many -- most of the villages within Kosovo itself,

20     having spent nearly, from 1996 to 1999, nearly three years in Kosovo.  A

21     typical Albanian village could consist of as many as or as little as

22     three to five houses, or the hamlets or villages could be as many as 100.

23     Some of these houses were what one would call peasant cottages, others

24     were extremely big buildings showing the prosperous nature of trade

25     within Kosovo.

Page 9201

 1        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.  What I'm interested in is these typical

 2     houses in Kosova-Metohija are called towers, so bearing in mind what you

 3     have just said that there would be a couple of houses in a village, were

 4     there any walls encircling those houses, of what material were those

 5     walls and what were they like, generally speaking?

 6        A.   Yes, many of the houses had a walled enclosure in which the

 7     family would live, perhaps many families.  And this was a -- very much a

 8     typical example of Albanian houses.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  And was it customary bearing in mind the fact that

10     the largest percentage of the Albanians were Muslim faith, that as a rule

11     there were no windows facing the streets, or facing a vantage point from

12     which one could see the interior of the house, in other words?

13        A.   I would say some of the houses were like that, sir.  Others had

14     windows facing the street or facing any other direction.  I mean, yes,

15     they were very private houses and very prosperous houses, some of them,

16     as I've already said.  I think man ever since he started has built a

17     house and surrounded himself for normal protection in order to keep his

18     family safe, and this is the particular way that the Albanian people do

19     it, and yeah, very nice for them.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Will you agree with me when I say that also in 1998

21     -- both in 1998 and -- 1998 and 1999 most of the conflict in Kosovo took

22     place in the rural areas between the KLA and the forces of the FRY?

23        A.   No, sir, I can't agree with that.  There were -- there was

24     conflict.  It began in the Drenica area to the west of Pristina about 25,

25     30 kilometres.  It then spread as the conflict grew and the areas of --

Page 9202

 1     in Pec and Djakovica were destroyed, the Albanian areas.  So it came into

 2     the towns, into -- both into the town and the rural areas.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Yesterday you told us that you saw devastated

 4     villages and you never referred to any damaged towns.

 5        A.   I can't recall I was asked to, sir, but as I've just stated, I

 6     went to Djakovica and the entire Albanian market area was destroyed.  If

 7     I remember correctly, in about August, July/August 1998, and the same

 8     took place in Pec.  Also I think in Mitrovica and in Urosevac, to my

 9     memory, yeah.

10        Q.   Thank you.  When resistance was being offered from the houses

11     that is you described, what were they in your perception, in terms of

12     military fortifications?

13        A.   No, these were not military fortifications, sir.  These were

14     normal houses.  If we go back to Donje Prekaze, the Jashari family house

15     was a normal Albanian house with a walled garden around it which if as a

16     soldier you were attacking, yes, it could resemble a fort.  But in fact,

17     it was a normal civilian house as we've been describing.  So to a

18     soldier, yes, it's an objective which he may have been ordered to take or

19     destroy, but in real life, it is another house.  Another person's house.

20        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.  We are talking about civilian houses, but if

21     they are being used for military purposes, if defence and resistance are

22     being offered from those houses, it is in that sense that I ask you

23     whether the facilities were well fortified.

24        A.   No, I disagree.  I mean, to widen the discussion in other

25     conflict areas, Northern Ireland, for instance, we would be shot at from

Page 9203

 1     houses.  If you are going to be shot at, if you are sensible, you tend to

 2     put bricks and mortar between you and the person who is going to shoot at

 3     you to give you protection.  That doesn't mean to say that the house is a

 4     protected house.

 5             So inevitably, houses will get damaged, property will get

 6     damaged if, if a fire fight develops around this objective, so.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Please tell me how did the KLA offer resistance to

 8     the forces or the FRY when there was fighting, and did you ever

 9     eye-witness any combat action yourself?

10        A.   The KLA had fortifications all the way down the road from outside

11     of Orahovac to one of their major headquarters at Malisevo.  These were

12     trenches dug alongside the road on vantage points as normal defensive

13     positions.  Did I observe fighting?  As I've stated in my reports, many

14     times.  I was present when shell fire was being directed at various

15     areas:  Junik, Prilep, Riznik, many other villages around Kosovo.

16        Q.   Thank you.  You mentioned Junik and the shelling of it.  How far

17     were you from Junik when you observed that?

18        A.   I think if I remember correctly, about 1 or 2 kilometres.  I

19     could see the town of Junik.

20        Q.   Thank you.  You've just now told us that you were about a

21     kilometre or two away from it.  What was the time that you are referring

22     to?

23        A.   Do you mean the date?

24        Q.   I mean the month.

25        A.   Sir, I've drafted over 80 reports, I've made several appearances

Page 9204

 1     in front of the court, I would not wish to mislead the Court.  I am

 2     afraid you'll have to refer back to the reports that I made.  I cannot

 3     recall individual reports some 12 years ago.  Junik was probably, in a

 4     guess, sometime between May, June, July of 1998.  But I don't wish to be

 5     specific because I -- much water has gone under the bridge since then.

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we please now have Exhibit D7.

 8        Q.   That will be, sir, a piece of video footage showing the visit of

 9     Mr. Holbrooke to Junik in June 1998.

10                           [Video-clip played]

11             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Top it right there, please, for a

12     minute.

13        Q.   Colonel, is this the kind of wall which is typical of compounds

14     enclosing houses in Kosovo and Metohija?

15        A.   I'd say it's fairly typical, yes.

16        Q.   Thank you.

17             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we go on, please.

18                           [Video-clip played]

19             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Colonel, you notice that this is footage of Albanian television

21     about the visit of Mr. Holbrooke in June 1998.  Am I right when I say

22     that we never saw any devastation in this footage that you refer to?

23        A.   That's correct, yes.

24        Q.   Thank you.  But I shall be fair, and I'm going to show you

25     another video which is from - just bear with me for a second - 16th of

Page 9205

 1     August, 1998.

 2             MS. KRAVETZ:  Your Honour.

 3             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

 4             MS. KRAVETZ:  I'm going to object to the use of this video.  We

 5     have not received any information from the Defence as to the providence

 6     of this video.  We don't know who filmed it, when it was filmed, where it

 7     was filmed.  We have simply been informed of -- given a date and a

 8     locality, but we have no way of verifying that it's accurate.  So I will

 9     object to the use of this video during cross-examination.

10             JUDGE PARKER:  Is this an exhibit already, Mr. Djurdjic?  I think

11     you said it was Exhibit D7.

12             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honours, it is D7, and

13     it has already been used.  And now we are going to view Junik, the 16th

14     of August, 1998.  It was received from the RTS, radio television Serbia,

15     the other videos, that is.  But this one from the 16th of August, I

16     believe, was used by the Defence -- no, all the remaining three are by

17     RTS, and the 16th of June one.  And they were obtained through the

18     national council for cooperation with the International Tribunal of

19     The Hague.

20             JUDGE PARKER:  Is the one that you have just shown an exhibit in

21     this trial?

22             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.  D7 is the first video

23     that we saw.  It has been tendered and admitted.

24             JUDGE PARKER:  I'm told, Ms. Kravetz, it was admitted on the 30th

25     of January, this year.

Page 9206

 1             MS. KRAVETZ:  Your Honour, I'm not objecting to the use of D7

 2     which is the video we just saw; it's to the use of the subsequent videos

 3     that my learned colleague intends to use which have been listed in his

 4     notification for cross-examination for this witness.  And I'm objecting

 5     on the grounds that I have just stated.

 6             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, all the videos were

 7     on our cross-examination list.  I have not brought any new exhibits now.

 8     They have been entered into e-court and submitted to the Prosecution as

 9     well.

10             JUDGE PARKER:  They haven't previously been tendered, these

11     remaining videos; is that correct?

12             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] No, no, they have not.  That is

13     what I'm about to do.

14             JUDGE PARKER:  Very well.  We will see whether the witness is

15     able to sufficiently identify what is displayed for the Chamber to be

16     able to accept them as an exhibit.  For that purpose, you may show them

17     to the witness.

18                           [Video-clip played]

19             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Colonel, did you recognise Junik from these buildings and streets

21     that were just shown?

22        A.   That's an impossible question to answer.  I mean, that is very

23     typical of the area in Kosova-Metohija, as you well know.  That could

24     have been anywhere within Kosovo.

25        Q.   All right.  Let's continue.  Colonel, you said yesterday that in

Page 9207

 1     mid-1998, 50 per cent of the territory of Kosovo and Metohija was

 2     controlled by the KLA.  Is that correct, did I understand that correctly?

 3        A.   That is correct, sir.  I did qualify it by saying control in what

 4     was, throughout 1998 and 1999, a very moving, fluid situation.  But they

 5     had blocked the three of the main roads across Kosovo, as I indicated

 6     yesterday.

 7             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please see

 8     Exhibit D002-4026.

 9        Q.   Witness, sir, could you please mark that area of Kosovo and

10     Metohija on the map which was controlled by the KLA before the start of

11     the summer offensive.

12        A.   Your Honours, the map is barely readable to be quite honest.  But

13     if this is Pristina here then Mitrovica, I presume, is up in this area.

14     The northern road was blocked roughly in the area of Rudnik, which is

15     about here.  The middle and main route from Pristina to Pec was blocked

16     approximately at Lapusnik, roughly in that area.

17             JUDGE PARKER:  [Microphone not activated] Can I ask you to pause

18     there, and if you could mark the areas that you have identified in

19     progressive numerical order so we start with number 1.

20             THE WITNESS:  Sorry, Your Honour, 1 is at the top here, sir.

21             JUDGE PARKER:  And that is?

22             THE WITNESS:  That is the route from Mitrovica through a place

23     called Rudnik.

24             JUDGE PARKER:  Could you mark with number 2.

25             THE WITNESS:  With great respect, Your Honour, this map is

Page 9208

 1     virtually -- well, is unreadable.

 2             JUDGE PARKER:  To my eyesight, it is not readable.

 3             THE WITNESS:  Rudnik, sir, is roughly in this area here where I

 4     put 2.  Roughly, sir.

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

 6             THE WITNESS:  The next route is from Pristina where I've put

 7     the 2, running through Pristina across the middle of Kosovo with Drenica

 8     to the north and coming towards Pec in the west over here, if that is

 9     Pec.  I think Pec might be further.  It's either there or there,

10     depending -- I mean the scale of this -- with respect, Your Honours, the

11     scale of this map, I have no idea.

12             JUDGE PARKER:  If you could put a 4 against Pec.

13             THE WITNESS:  It's one of these two places here, so either here

14     or here.  This may be the pass into Montenegro beyond Pec itself.

15             The third route, Your Honours, is down to this town here.

16             JUDGE PARKER:  We'll see if the lower half of the map from

17     Pristina down can be brought up to a more visible scale.

18             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, sir.

19                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

20             JUDGE PARKER:  We will receive the map that you have presently

21     marked with the markings you've identified, numbers 1 to 4 as an exhibit.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will become Exhibit D382.

23             JUDGE PARKER:  And now if we can have from the lower half,

24     showing just Pristina and below.  Is that easier for you to follow?

25             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, Your Honours, a little bit easier, yeah.

Page 9209

 1     We have Pristina up here, sir.  Down towards through Lipljan and down to

 2     Stimlje, and the road was blocked in this area here.

 3             JUDGE PARKER:  And if you could mark number 5 against that area.

 4     Thank you.

 5             THE WITNESS:  That was also the area of the Racak incident that

 6     was mentioned yesterday, Your Honour.  And then the last route came down

 7     and then along the southern border here through the mountains of Strpci

 8     and into Prizren itself.

 9             JUDGE PARKER:  If you could mark Prizren with a number 6.

10             THE WITNESS:  There, sir.

11             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.

12             THE WITNESS:  And it was this southern most one that was open

13     through the period that I was being questioned about.

14             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.  Would you like this an exhibit now,

15     Mr. Djurdjic?  It will be received.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will become Exhibit D383.

17             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.

18             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

19             Could we please see this map one more time.

20             JUDGE PARKER:  The one that is on the screen now or the earlier

21     one?

22             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] No, a new map without markings.

23     We have tendered this.  No, the same area that you have shown.

24        Q.   Colonel, could you please mark that one road that you mentioned

25     from Pristina to Prizren?

Page 9210

 1             JUDGE PARKER:  We'll wait until we get an unmarked display.

 2     There it is.

 3             THE WITNESS:  Your Honours, Pristina and the southern -- the two

 4     southern routes, one went to Stimlje and was blocked just to the west of

 5     Stimlje.  The alternative route was to go down further south and to turn

 6     off up into this area here, Strpci, and then on to Prizren as indicated.

 7             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Thank you, Colonel, but let me ask you, is it correct to say that

 9     from Pristina one had to go to Urosevac; and at Nerodimlje you had to

10     deviate to Strpci; and over the Sar Planina, you had to go over the

11     Sar Planina to get to Prizren.  It was the so-called partisan route?

12        A.   That is correct, from history, yes.

13             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I seek to tender this

14     into evidence.

15             JUDGE PARKER:  Is that any different from what we saw on the

16     previous map, Exhibit D383?  The witness marked each of those locations.

17             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Colonel, could you please draw these two, three, lines for us to

19     be able to get to Prizren.  So Pristina, this lower line, and then

20     Prizren, just draw a line so that we can see which rout had to be taken

21     to Prizren.

22        A.   Your Honours, you come south from Prizren, pass Lipljan, on down

23     to Urosevac.  And then you turn west up into the Sar Planina, the

24     mountain area, over and into Prizren which is here.  This is the mountain

25     area which Mr. Djurdjic is talking about.

Page 9211

 1        Q.   And please draw the line up until Prizren.  Finish it.

 2        A.   [Marks]

 3        Q.   Thank you.

 4             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this map into

 5     evidence.

 6             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D384, Your Honours.

 8             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now see Defence

 9     Exhibit D005-0685.

10        Q.   Colonel, can you see in the heading, or the letterhead, this is a

11     conversation that took place on the 25th of June between

12     Mr. Milovan Negovanovic [as interpreted] and you.  Do you know

13     Mr. Milovan Negovanovic?

14        A.   Sorry, obviously I've not seen this document before.

15             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Let us please turn to page 3 for

16     the witness to be able to see it.

17             THE WITNESS:  Yes, Negovan Jovanovic was the colonel who was in

18     charge, Your Honours, of the foreign liaison service to which all defence

19     attaches in Belgrade were accredited through to any interviews with

20     people -- personnel in the Vojska Yugoslavia.

21             MR. DJURDJIC:

22        Q.   Colonel, a little while ago we mentioned that and drew those

23     maps, but here under item 2, Mr. Jovanovic is stating that the so-called

24     KLA, that is, he is quoting your words.  So I would like to know whether

25     your position is reflected there.

Page 9212

 1             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we please go back to that page

 2     where there is item 2.

 3        Q.   Where it says the so-called KLA is increasingly revealing its

 4     fundamental characteristic of a terrorist organisation which has no

 5     qualms in liquidating its members for the slightest disobedience,

 6     something that has become more apparent recently.  However, what is

 7     worrying is that the impression that the terrorists are controlling more

 8     and more territory.

 9     Of particular concern is the information that the following roads have

10     been cut off and are under the control of the following communications:

11     Kosovska-Mitrovica, Rudnik-Pec-Pristina-Komorane-Pec, and

12     Timlje-Suva Reka-Prizren."  Correction, Stimlje.  Is that what you

13     discussed with Mr. Jovanovic?

14        A.   That is correct, sir, and as I've been attempting to imply to the

15     Court that throughout the conflict from the beginning or middle of 1996

16     when I first went down to Kosovo until 1999, I saw my job as the defence

17     attache to report accurately on both sides as the situation developed,

18     and as is written here quite correctly and as I've indicated to the

19     Court, that was the situation which was agreed to by Pukovnik Jovanovic

20     and myself when we were speaking together on the date of this particular

21     document.

22             I think the point I would like to make is that having observed

23     counter-insurgency operations in many areas, the terrorists are called

24     by one man terrorists, by the other men freedom fighters.  And it is up

25     to the states in question as to how they deal with them.  And what one

Page 9213

 1     was attempting to do was to provide correct information on the state

 2     of both sides in this particularly difficult conflict which I was

 3     privileged enough to observe.

 4        Q.   Thank you.

 5             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Let us please turn to page 2 in

 6     both versions.

 7        Q.   Colonel, under item 3 it is stated that you pointed out as a

 8     particular problem the Yugoslav Albanian border and the prevention of

 9     future transfers of NVO, which is armaments and military equipment, and

10     the infiltration of manpower from Albania.

11        A.   That's correct, sir.

12        Q.   Thank you.  And under 4 it is stated:

13             "The main reason why the MZ," which stands for the international

14     community, "failed to characterise the KLA as a terrorist organisation is

15     the impact that the mass media and the reporting from KiM have, which is

16     still in favour of the Albanians."

17        A.   That is I think a correct picture, sir.  And If if you go down to

18     the second paragraph, it says:

19             "This is not the first time that Colonel Crosland has tried to

20     convince us he is doing his utmost to have an objective view..."

21                 And I would maintain that that is exactly what my reports

22     were.  I reported on both sides as accurately as possible, fully

23     respecting that within, then, the sovereign state of the Federal Republic

24     of Yugoslavia, the KLA was a freedom-fighter organisation.

25             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Let us go to page 3

Page 9214

 1     now.

 2        Q.   In the last paragraph, Colonel, it says:

 3             "He reiterated several times that his views were dismissed by the

 4     persons he talked to and the institution he informed, and that he had

 5     thus also, perhaps, jeopardized his career.  He expressed his regrets at

 6     the official stances of the MZ, international community, and pointed out

 7     that it was his impression that the understanding of the KiM problem was

 8     slowly changing, which can be seen from the latest messages the MZ and

 9     NATO forwarded not only to the FRY authorities -- so forwarded not only

10     to the FRY authorities, but also to the Albanians in KiM, regarding the

11     cessation of the KLA's armed actions and the necessity to continue

12     dialogue."

13        A.   You've raised several points there, sir.  My career -- it's a bit

14     of a joke.  I am a professional soldier, I speak as I see it.  I'm not

15     paid -- I'm paid to give proper, correct information.  I made assessments

16     as I saw it on the ground.  I did learn Serbian, so I did understand your

17     language to a reasonable degree.  I, therefore, attempted to put the

18     viewpoint from the Vojska Yugoslavia concerning what then, as I've stated

19     before in court and under oath, the KLA was a terrorist organisation.  I

20     don't think I can be any more fairer than that.

21             That having been said, as my reports have indicated on many

22     occasions, unfortunately the disproportionate use of force throughout

23     Kosova-Metohija resulted in very adverse publicity for the Serbian

24     security forces.  And as events have unfolded, Kosovo is now no longer

25     part of Serbia.

Page 9215

 1        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.  Sir, could you tell us at that time, that is

 2     in mid-1998 and in the summer of 1999, what kind of weapons did the KLA

 3     have?

 4        A.   Again, sir, I've made many reports, and therefore the accuracy of

 5     those initial reports are what I would ask the Court to look at.  If I

 6     remember correctly, in the early stages of this conflict, the KLA were

 7     fairly lightly armed with Kalashnikovs rifles, some rocket-propelled

 8     grenades.  But as I've indicated, they were no match for the fire-power

 9     that could be brought to bear on them by the Serbian security forces.

10             Later in 1998 and early 1999, there was a major improvement,

11     as I've indicated in various reports, that the KLA had been resupplied

12     with more up to date and more powerful, if you will, weaponry.  But

13     that is a summary.  The detail would be in my reports, so.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Did you have information about artillery in the

15     possession of the OVK with the range of 3 to 4 kilometres?

16        A.   I don't recall that being mentioned, no, sir.

17        Q.   Thank you.  And mortars of various calibres?

18        A.   I think there may have been mortars at some stage, yes, sir.

19        Q.   Then RPG 7?

20        A.   As I said to you earlier, sir, there were certainly -- I saw RPG

21     and variants, I think in September or October, yes.

22        Q.   Thank you.  In your statements you say that weapons were brought

23     into the territory of Kosovo and Metohija via Albania.

24             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we again see map D002-4026.

25     Can we see the southern portion of the map, please.  Scroll up the

Page 9216

 1     Pristina part, so down from Pristina as much as possible.  Yes, thank

 2     you.

 3        Q.   Could you mark for us the route via which illegal weapons entered

 4     the territory of Kosovo and Metohija?

 5        A.   Again, Your Honours, this map is not easy to follow, but I'll try

 6     and mark some things.  First of all, Prizren is here.  This is the border

 7     between Albania and Kosovo.  One of the routes was from Kukes down

 8     roughly in this area here, up through the mountainous area of Pastrik to

 9     the north-west of Prizren.  Djakovica is here and again through this

10     entire area across the mountains, there were many routes that would then

11     be directed past Djakovica up towards Klina which is somewhere -- this

12     map is very -- I think that's Suva Reka, up towards the Drenica which is

13     roughly in this area up here, Your Honours.

14             So this was the supply route and through this area here in

15     Pec, to the west of Pec.  Those in rough terms were some of the routes

16     that we understood men and combat supplies were being brought in.  And

17     as I've mentioned in my statement to Pukovnik Jovanovic that this was an

18     area of concern to the international community and to ourselves who were

19     attempting to deal with the problem with the Serbian authorities.

20        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.  Here you have underlined Malisevo.  I should

21     like to ask you in connection with your information about Malisevo in the

22     beginning of summer in 1998.

23        A.   Yes, sir, on what particular point do you want to question me on?

24        Q.   I should like to know whether the weapons which passed via the

25     border was to be directed to Malisevo and then to Drenica, and, in fact,

Page 9217

 1     whether the KLA headquarters was in Malisevo.

 2        A.   As far as I know, sir, that was one of the major headquarters I

 3     visited.  Several of these headquarters in Drenica, Vojcnak [phoen],

 4     Lausa, Mitrovica, Bajgora, and south of Pristina in the area of Magora

 5     [phoen].  So I visited several of the headquarters.  And as to your

 6     specific question of whether the weapons went through Malisevo, I

 7     couldn't possibly tell you.  But one would presume that in any

 8     organisation there was a direction, and we understood the direction was

 9     towards the area of Drenica, just to the west of Pristina.

10             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I seek to tender this

11     exhibit.

12             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D385, Your Honours.

14             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Colonel --

16             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] But can we see Exhibit 927 which

17     is on the 65 ter list.  Could we turn to page 2, please.

18        Q.   Colonel, these minutes from a meeting of the collegium of the

19     General Staff of the 29th of June, 1998.  And in it Major-General

20     Branislav Milovanovic, as you can see at the very beginning, underlines

21     the measures that NATO is planning to put in place or has already

22     executed, a part of which in the context of the resolution of the Kosovo

23     crisis.

24             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now turn to the next page,

25     please.

Page 9218

 1        Q.   Here he gives some NATO data, and on page 3, rather page 2, I'm

 2     sorry:

 3             "The strength of the KLA is about 3.000 men.  It's best trained

 4     section numbers about 500 people, divided into groups of five to six?

 5     They are mostly equipped with light infantry arms and mortars -- and

 6     throwers.  And Most of them brought from Albania.  According to available

 7     information, their combat training is organised in camps in Albanian

 8     territory, more specifically in Bajram Curi, Kukes.  It is conducted by

 9     Albanians, former JNA officers, Mujahedin, and Muslims from Bosnia.

10                 Since the end of 1998, the Kosovo Liberation Army leadership

11     has been taking measures to strengthen the combat power of its units.

12     For the purpose of protecting settlements, the structure of the armed

13     formations has been re-organised on the clan principle."

14             Is this the information that was available to NATO at this

15     particular time, namely in June 1998?

16             MS. KRAVETZ:  Your Honour, I object to that question.  That is

17     outside the scope of knowledge of this witness.  I don't know why he is

18     being asked about information available to NATO at the time.

19             JUDGE PARKER:  First, is this document one dated in 1998?  I

20     thought it was a 1999 document.  It's reporting in the paragraph from

21     which you've just been reading, "since the end of 1998 the KLA leadership

22     has been taking measures," which suggests that it is a 1999 document.

23             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I have to read it

24     the way it is written, but obviously it is a mistake.  The date is the

25     29th of June, 1998, and General Milovanovic is adducing data that are

Page 9219

 1     available to NATO, that are in the possession of NATO.

 2             JUDGE PARKER:  You are suggesting that the document is correctly

 3     identified on the first page as a June 1998 document, and that there is

 4     an error in the date end of 1998 in the last paragraph on the page that's

 5     now open.

 6             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Not only that, Your Honours, but

 7     also in the translation into English.  It is mistakenly misstated 29th of

 8     June, 1999.  That is also a mistake.

 9             JUDGE PARKER:  We seem to be doing very well with mistakes.

10     Whatever the date then, which is a matter of uncertainty, whether it is

11     June 1998 or 1999, the question perhaps for Mr. Crosland is whether he is

12     in a position to verify what is reported as the knowledge of NATO about

13     forces.  Can you help us with that, Mr. Crosland?

14             THE WITNESS:  Yes, Your Honour, I'll try.  In any

15     counter-insurgency operation the ability to accurately state what a

16     terrorist organisation has, its strengths, what we would call its order

17     of battle, I would suggest is usually exaggerated for very obvious

18     reasons, because the security forces would rather be facing slightly less

19     than what they put on paper for the reasons of securing the force with

20     which to deal with the problem.

21             The figures that are mentioned here of -- are hard core of,

22     whatever it is, 3-, 4-, 500, and about 3.000 in total, I wouldn't

23     disagree with.  As I've said, it's always very difficult to tie down

24     counter-terrorist forces because obviously they are very covert and

25     wary of their security and don't really wish to advertise that they

Page 9220

 1     are larger or smaller than is anticipated or is reported in the news.

 2             I don't know whether if that helps Your Honours or not.  But

 3     these figures I would -- I wouldn't disagree with them in principle.

 4     And the two areas mentioned, Bajram Curi and Kukes were forward operating

 5     bases, if that's the correct term, in Albania from where considerable

 6     reinforcement of the KLA took place throughout 1998 and 1999.

 7             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you for that.  Are you able to comment on

 8     whether these numbers or something like them would be known at that time

 9     to NATO?

10             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour, I suspect within the NATO intelligence

11     hierarchy they had good access to what was close to these numbers, yes,

12     sir.

13             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.  Does that help you, Mr. Djurdjic?

14             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Yes, it does, but the colonel is

15     modest here.

16        Q.   What is your contribution to the information that was available

17     to NATO?

18        A.   Sir, as you are well aware, I am but one small pebble on the

19     beach.  I, as I've indicated to you, reported as factually and as

20     accurately as possible, and my assessment from Kosova-Metohija would be

21     placed alongside other intelligence sources, and these would all be mixed

22     together to come out with a possibly more accurate, possibly not so

23     accurate, picture of what was happening on the ground in Kosovo.

24        Q.   Thank you.  In view of your constant contacts as the defence

25     attache with the foreign liaison section of the VJ and of the Ministry of

Page 9221

 1     Defence, do you know that in July 1999 [as interpreted], the chief of the

 2     General Staff requested from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that

 3     measures be taken against the Republic of Albania in view of the

 4     assistance they were rendering to the KLA, logistical assistance in

 5     materiels in terms of expertise, et cetera?

 6        A.   Sir, I recall that I was shown by either Colonel

 7     Negovan Jovanovic, or General Dimitrijevic a map on which the

 8     Vojska Yugoslavia had portrayed the incidents on the border that they

 9     said had happened.  I have no reason to particularly -- I looked at the

10     board, and the number of incidents seem, to me, reasonably true.

11             I was grateful for that information which I relayed back to my

12     Ministry of Defence, as I said, by way of indicating the seriousness of

13     the situation and what might happen in the future.  So that was

14     valuable intelligence from our point of view, and I forwarded it back

15     to my superiors.

16             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, page 25, line 2, it

17     is stated in July 1999, whereas it should be July 1998.

18             JUDGE PARKER:  It appears to be another of those unresolved

19     questions, Mr. Djurdjic.

20             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I would not have

21     intervened, but the infallible Marie O'Leary warned me of this fact.

22        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.

23             Did the Army of Yugoslavia, the VJ, present data that in the

24     first half of 1998 from -- seven soldiers [realtime transcript read in

25     error "747"] had been killed by KLA fire and that over 40 had been

Page 9222

 1     wounded?

 2        A.   You are asking me if I remember that specific detail, I'm afraid

 3     I can't recall.  I was, as I indicated to you just now, I was shown a map

 4     of the incidents that had happened mainly along the border because that

 5     was the primacy of the Vojska Yugoslavia at that particular phase of the

 6     campaign.  As to this -- the particular incident that you speak about, I

 7     can't, in all honesty, recall that.  If I have mentioned it somewhere in

 8     one of my reports, I apologise, but I can't recall it, truthfully.

 9             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Djurdjic, at page 25, line 24, you are quoted

10     as having suggested, "747 members of the VJ killed by KLA fire."  I think

11     your suggestion was much more modest, was it not?  Seven.

12             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Yes.  I said seven wounded and --

13     seven killed and 40 wounded.  And the interpreters remark it was

14     interpreted as such.

15        Q.   Colonel, we talked a lot about the village of Prilep.  Am I right

16     when I say that in that area there was permanent fighting from 1998 until

17     up to the point when you -- or throughout your stay in the FRY until

18     March 1999?

19        A.   Sir, as I mentioned yesterday to the Court, the road going north

20     from Djakovica to Decani and on to Pec was in all aspects the front line.

21     And yes, the area around Prilep, which was a -- by the roadside there,

22     there was a small MUP position that was probably continuously under fire,

23     or on a daily basis under fire, I should say, from the KLA in that area.

24     I wouldn't -- I've reported that on many occasions.

25        Q.   Am I right when I say that the KLA also opened fire at Prilep

Page 9223

 1     from a distance?

 2        A.   Yes, that's quite correct, sir, yeah.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Will you then agree with me when I say that the area

 4     of fighting between the KLA and the forces of the FRY actually resulted

 5     in the damage to the facilities in between, because both sides were

 6     interested in the road, in the communication which passes through that

 7     particular village?

 8        A.   Inevitably damage was occurred between the two forces with

 9     fighting.  I refer you back to my reports where, again, there were

10     pictures taken of Prilep, and I have no idea where they are now, but

11     Prilep was literally 20 centimetres high.  All the houses had been

12     destroyed.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Tell me, please, Colonel, have you seen the

14     photographs that you referred to just now during the proceedings, during

15     the trial?

16        A.   The reason I'm thinking, Your Honours, is again I've made many

17     visits to the court.  I can't remember that these photographs were sent

18     back to the Ministry of Defence and whether these were handed over along

19     with most of my reports, I'm not privilege to know that action.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Let's leave aside the other cases, the other trials

21     for now, but at this trial you have not seen those photographs?

22        A.   Not on this particular time, no.

23        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.

24             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I see that you are taking a sip of

25     your water, and I believe, Your Honours, it is time for our break now.

Page 9224

 1             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes, it's a convenient time, is it, Mr. Djurdjic?

 2     We will have the first break now and resume at 11.00.

 3                           [The witness stands down]

 4                          --- Recess taken at 10.26 a.m.

 5                          --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.

 6                          [The witness takes the stand]

 7             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes, Mr. Djurdjic.

 8             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

 9        Q.   Colonel, I would like to dwell on Prilep for awhile.  Do you

10     remember that in November MUP members were killed there and that their

11     vehicle was hit by an anti-armour projectile?  Have you heard my

12     question, sir?  Do you remember that in November 1998 a vehicle was hit

13     by an anti-armour weapon which resulted in the deaths of some MUP members

14     in the village of Prilep?

15        A.   Sir, I don't specifically recall this incident where three

16     members of the security forces were killed.  However, as I said in the

17     earlier session, that it was clear there had been a resupply of more

18     powerful weapons to the KLA in October/November, and yes, I saw in one of

19     the headquarters anti-personnel or anti -- sorry, rocket-propelled

20     grenades.

21             This was -- as I indicated earlier to the Court, this road from

22     Djakovica to Celani [phoen] Pec was the front line for many months from

23     March up until the finish of the campaign, so there were many such

24     incidents along this stretch of road.

25             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please see document

Page 9225

 1     D005-0043.  Page 1978 toward the end, and then 1979.

 2        Q.   The Prosecutor's question says:

 3             "On the 20th of November, two Serbian police officers both from

 4     the north-east of Serbia were killed and four were wounded at Prilep near

 5     Decani where their vehicle was hit by an anti-armour weapon."  And on

 6     page 1979, lines 22 and 23 says:

 7             "Their vehicle was hit by an anti-armour weapon, what does that

 8     mean?"

 9             And you are quoted as saying at the bottom of the page:

10             "Very close to this time, I can't exactly remember the date, but

11     I visited the KLA headquarters here at Riznik, close by Riznik, which is

12     the zone of Ramush Haradinaj, and they were very keen to show us off a

13     new range of automatic weapons; sniper rifles; and Panzerfaust, which

14     were anti-tank weapons; sniper rifles which had just arrived on the

15     latest resupply from Albania, through the old corridor I mentioned," et

16     cetera.

17        A.   [Microphone not activated]

18        Q.   Thank you.  And -- but the KLA, when they missed their target and

19     hit a building, do they not demolish buildings with such weapons?

20        A.   Of course there will be damage, sir, yes.  One accepts that.

21        Q.   Thank you.  I would like to ask you something else, something I

22     should have asked you at the beginning, but I didn't remember.  Did you

23     know that the political objective of the KLA was the cessation of Kosovo

24     and Metohija from the Republic of Serbia by means of armed force, that is

25     -- in other words, by force, and the creation of a greater Albania?

Page 9226

 1        A.   When I took up my position as defence attache in Belgrade in

 2     July 1996, I studied as best as I could the very complex history of this

 3     whole area in the Balkans, and the various conflicts that had taken place

 4     going back to Kosovo Polje in 1389, and the claims of Albanians to Velika

 5     Albania, greater Albania.  I can't say I completely understood the

 6     problem, I'm not certain many people did.  It's very complex.  So within

 7     history, there was always this claim that Velika Albania, greater

 8     Albania, might include Kosovo, might also include Macedonia.  And

 9     depending on which set of historical maps you look at, you can see this

10     problem displayed in many ways.  So one presumes that this was part of

11     the KLA's, Kosovo Liberation Army's aims, possibly.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know the first part which matters more to me,

13     that Kosovo and Metohija should secede from Serbia by use of force?

14        A.   Sir, I think I can remember that being a stated aim of the KLA

15     when discussions were carried out with the KLA.  When I met them, one

16     reminded them that Kosovo was a part of the sovereign state, former

17     Yugoslavia, and therefore they had a fairly major problem to achieve this

18     particular aim.  And this had been stated by President Milosevic very

19     forcibly in 1990.

20        Q.   Do you remember, sir, the declaration of the KLA, dated 29 April

21     1998?  It was published in the Bujku paper.

22        A.   It doesn't come readily to mind, no.

23        Q.   Thank you.

24             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please see

25     Exhibit D005-0443, page 1905.

Page 9227

 1        Q.   Colonel, you can see your reply to the Prosecutor's question:  We

 2     can pass over to the report dated 14 April, and I'm interested in

 3     paragraphs 3 and 4.  Sorry, 30th of April.

 4             "The KLA issued a nine-point statement on the 29th of April,

 5     published in Bujku, the mass circulation radically inclined Albanian

 6     language Pristina newspaper, saying that the homeland was in a state of

 7     war and was fighting to liberate and unify Albania's occupied

 8     territories.  The statement called on Albanians," as said, "to review

 9     their stand.  It was a duty of the free part of their homeland to help

10     the occupied part.  The KLA was ready to strike against the enemy at the

11     right time.  However, the KLA was ready to take part in talks with the

12     enemy, but only after the occupying troops had left and with the

13     mediation of a third party.  Any agreement without its presence would be

14     invalid.  The statement appealed to the frustrated and faint-hearted who

15     were trying to plunge the people into defeatism and anarchy and who were

16     trying to remove themselves from the scene."

17             Do you remember that telegram you sent on the 30th of

18     April 1998?

19        A.   With the greatest of respect, sir, as I've said many times, I

20     can't remember every single report.  If that is what was sent then, then

21     that is the statement that I would stand by.  And I think, as I've

22     explained to the Court just now, that these statements were coming out

23     all the time from the Kosovo Liberation Army, and one was attempting to

24     report the progress or lack of it on both sides as various incidents

25     happened.

Page 9228

 1        Q.   Thank you.  In line 16 through 19, the question was:

 2             "Mr. Crosland, just specifically referring to the statement that

 3     the homeland was in a state of war and was fighting to liberate and unify

 4     Albanian occupied territories, did you ever while you were there at the

 5     time come across those kinds of statements from KLA members?"

 6             And you answered in lines 20 through 23, on page 1905:

 7             "Yes, Your Honours.  All the time was the view put forward by

 8     the KLA and other personnel, that this was a mission to retake what

 9     was called by the Serbs Velika Albania, greater Albania..." et cetera.

10             These are your words from the Limaj case.

11        A.   Yes, sir, I don't have any problem with that.  That is a

12     statement which I stand by, and I think I've tried to explain to the

13     Court it was the situation at the time.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Colonel, do you remember what the situation in the

15     field was like in mid-July 1998?

16        A.   As I've said many times to the Court, the situation was very

17     fluid with one side getting the upper-hand and then the other side

18     retaliating all through the area of the period of 1998 until the security

19     forces, as I've said again in many reports, seemed to begin a more

20     concentrated effort to clear the major routes across Kosovo in

21     September/October of 1998.  But during that entire period, as I've tried

22     to make it clear, attacks from the KLA and retaliation from the Serb

23     security forces were a daily occurrence.

24        Q.   In this trial I see that your reports from early June until the

25     7th of August, I believe, are missing.  So there is a gap.  And I think

Page 9229

 1     you said that you were at Malisevo on the 1st of July, 1998, do you

 2     remember that?

 3        A.   It will be in one of my reports, yes.  I think that was the first

 4     time we went into Malisevo, yes.  If I remember correctly.  I apologise

 5     if it's wrong.  The reason there may be a gap is because our eldest

 6     daughter got married in England and notwithstanding the situation in the

 7     Balkans I was ordered home by the boss, my wife, to attend the wedding.

 8        Q.   Colonel, your wife is right, but we have a report that you

 9     returned on the 25th of June, which means that from that date on you were

10     present here.  But you went there, if I'm not mistaken, to verify whether

11     at Malisevo there was the OVK -- sorry, the KLA headquarters at that

12     time.

13        A.   That's correct, sir, yes.

14        Q.   And what did you find out, sir?

15        A.   If that date is correct, and I accept that that may be the date,

16     and forgive me if it's wrong, we drove north from Orahovac out of Serb

17     control into a KLA check-point.  We were stopped and searched.  We were

18     then escorted into Malisevo, and my report of that particular occurrence

19     mentions the facts, some of which I can recall.

20             Along the road there were very minor defensive positions,

21     small trenches, on the way to Malisevo.  In Malisevo I seem to recall

22     there were probably, I don't know, 100, 150 KLA.  Some were dressed in

23     black which appeared to be their police equivalent.  And I was

24     interviewed for, I think, three hours.

25             We were then -- I said if I was not released there would be

Page 9230

 1     problems because I was expected in Djakovica to meet other people, and

 2     eventually the KLA decided to release me and my warrant officer to

 3     continue our journey northwards.

 4        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.  Page 1952 corroborates that you are right.

 5     On pages 24 and 25 you were asked why you had gone to Malisevo on the

 6     1st of July.  You gave the same answer that you have just repeated.  Is

 7     it correct that you were first stopped by a man who looked oriental to

 8     you?

 9        A.   There was one particularly unpleasant individual who, yes, was of

10     Middle East appearance.  I think there were also, and I think in my

11     report it states that there may well have been fighters from other

12     countries from Europe attracted to the area, as we all know, during all

13     the Balkan conflicts.  There have been mercenaries who have come to

14     engage in a cause, which gives them a job to do.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Did you speak to that individual, and if so, in what

16     language did you speak with that soldier who was unpleasant?

17        A.   As far as I remember, sir, he would not engage in any form of

18     conversation, and if I remember correctly, he was the only person who was

19     openly hostile towards myself.

20        Q.   Thank you.  I asked this question because I know that you were in

21     the Middle East so you may have been able to communicate with that person

22     in Arabic, but it appears that you didn't.

23             Who was the chief of that staff at Malisevo?  Did you identify

24     the person amongst those fighters?

25        A.   Again, sir, it might well be in my report.  You are asking me now

Page 9231

 1     under oath.  I can't, to be honest, remember the names of various

 2     individuals, so I don't wish to make a statement which is not correct.

 3        Q.   Anybody can make a mistake especially after so much time, but if

 4     the Main Staff is at Malisevo, and you went there to establish whether

 5     that was the case, then probably after initial difficulties you wanted to

 6     meet someone who was in charge, a commander of that staff, and were you

 7     able to reach the commander on that occasion?

 8        A.   I think with respect, sir, you are slightly simplifying the

 9     situation.  My warrant officer and myself were -- we carried the

10     licna karta, the identity card of Yugoslavia, which was not recognised by

11     the KLA.  They had, in effect, captured us in their terms.  And I was

12     taken at gun point to the headquarters, which I've identified before was

13     in a black and white building in the centre of Malisevo, and I was

14     interviewed, it was more interrogation if one is quite blunt, and I was

15     more concerned with the welfare of my warrant officer who was on his own

16     outside.  And, therefore, this discussion, if we are going to put it

17     correctly, took place between me and a number of members of the KLA whose

18     names at this, 12 years on, I cannot remember.

19             But the situation was not as peaceful as you suggest.  There was

20     a fair degree of hostility towards us which is understandable if you are

21     dealing with counter-insurgency forces.  They are obviously concerned

22     about their own security and the fact that you may be threatening that

23     security by visiting their location.  So one understands that and you

24     behave in a fairly guarded manner, or both sides behave in a guarded

25     manner.

Page 9232

 1        Q.   Thank you, but you stood up to the challenge and went there.  And

 2     thank God you were released, many weren't.  But you went to Malisevo

 3     again on the 25th of July, what was it that prompted you to do that on

 4     the 25th of July?

 5        A.   As the defence attache accredited to the former Yugoslavia and

 6     the VJ, I was entitled under my accreditation to travel anywhere within

 7     former Yugoslavia apart from areas specifically given to me as being out

 8     of bounds.  I did not recognise the authority of the KLA and, therefore,

 9     insisted that I was totally within my rights to travel on this particular

10     road.

11             Now, I knew the risks concerned, but in order to try and, as I

12     said, report as accurately and as fairly as possible on both sides of

13     the problem, I decided to carry out this particular visit.

14        Q.   Colonel, I haven't interrupted you so far and I don't wish to do

15     so in the future, but for the sake of time economy, I would ask you to

16     give shorter answers.

17              But when you went to Malisevo on the 1st of July to see

18     whether there was a headquarters there, why did you go there again on

19     the 25th of July?  That was my question.  Had you -- whether or not

20     you had established contacts with the KLA in the meantime, it's better

21     for you to explain than for me to elaborate.

22        A.   Sir, I can only repeat.  And Your Honour, a question of time for

23     the sake, I won't repeat it.  I went to Malisevo on the second visit in

24     order to see if there were any changes to the first visit.  And that's

25     part of a principle of gaining intelligence.  You can go and see an

Page 9233

 1     incident on one occasion, and then when you return to that particular

 2     incident or place, the situation can have changed.  And that is why, as I

 3     did around the whole area in the Drenica and around western Kosovo and so

 4     on and so forth, I would go back on repeated times to see what the

 5     situation was, how it had developed.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  And had anything changed on the 25th of July when you

 7     were there?  And who received you at the KLA headquarters?  And what was

 8     the conversation about?

 9        A.   Again, sir, if you are asking specific details, and without

10     wishing to report erroneously to the Court, I must refer you back to the

11     reports that I wrote at the time.  And if you produce those reports, then

12     the Court can see the detail of my reports as and when I wrote them.

13             To ask me to repeat things some like 12 years later on I think

14     is -- does not do anyone's understanding of the situation -- doesn't

15     make it any better, or clearer, rather.

16        Q.   Very well.  Colonel, can I ask you this:  In the area from

17     Orahovac to Malisevo, had the situation changed in any way between the

18     17th of July?

19             THE INTERPRETER:  Sorry, I did not hear the other date.  Sorry.

20             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I shall repeat the question; it

21     wasn't heard.

22        Q.   Colonel, according to your information, had anything happened and

23     had the situation changed between the 17th of July and the 25th of July

24     1998 in the area between Orahovac and Malisevo?

25        A.   Sir, with respect, my reports of those dates, if they are

Page 9234

 1     correct, I'm sure they are, will be what is written in those reports is

 2     the most accurate version I can give.  And, therefore, I can't recall the

 3     specific reports to hand.  As I said, I would ask to you look at those

 4     reports and then we can discuss them, if that is what is required.

 5        Q.   Colonel, do you recall that on the 17th of July Orahovac fell

 6     into the hands of the KLA?

 7        A.   I seem to recall that that was correct.  Orahovac was a very

 8     important area, not least of all because it supplied an awful lot of

 9     [indiscernible] to the whole of Serbia.  So There were a lot of

10     businesses in Orahovac that really didn't want anything to do with either

11     side of the military organisations.  They wanted to get on with their

12     business of making wine and continue their lives without being

13     interrupted.  So if that is the date the city was retaken, then I would

14     accept it, yes.

15        Q.   By the KLA?

16        A.   I think that's correct, sir, yes.

17        Q.   Thank you.  And from the 17th to the 25th, do you also remember

18     other places that were taken by the KLA?

19        A.   Sir, with respect, I've said many times, the situation flowed

20     backwards and forwards.  As one side moved forward, the other side moved

21     back.  And, therefore, the reports that I made at the time would indicate

22     the ebb and the flow of that particular conflict.  But as to specific

23     dates 12 years from the time it happened, I can only refer you back to my

24     reports at the time, sir.

25        Q.   Thank you.  In your statements and your reports you say that the

Page 9235

 1     forces of the FRY on the 25th when you were leaving, i.e., when you left

 2     Malisevo, actually launched an action to liberate Malisevo.  Do you

 3     recall that?

 4        A.   That is in my report, sir, yes, and that is correct.  There were

 5     two, as I've stated, two combat teams on the Lapusnik and Kijevo on the

 6     main Pristina-Pec road, and we came across these two combat groups that

 7     were preparing to carry out an assault on to Malisevo.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember returning again and, I don't think

 9     that I am mistaken, with the defence attache of the United States in

10     September -- in August to Malisevo?

11        A.   If that is in a report, sir, then that report is correct.  That

12     was the one written at the time.

13        Q.   Thank you.

14             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now have on the screen

15     Defence Exhibit D005-0697.  That is a video.

16             MS. KRAVETZ:  Your Honour, I'm going object to this video on the

17     same grounds that I objected to the earlier video.  We have no

18     information as to the providence of this video.  We don't know who filmed

19     it, where it was filmed, when it was filmed, so we are unable to know

20     anything about the locality that's shown on the video.

21             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.  Once again we'll see whether the

22     witness is able to assist.  If not, well, then it can't be an exhibit.

23                           [Video-clip played]

24             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Colonel, did you recognise the place that we just saw in this

Page 9236

 1     video footage?

 2        A.   Yes, I did, sir.  That is the area of Malisevo.  There is a

 3     report of mine that shows the incident of the armoured personnel carrier

 4     being hit by a mine, and that is in one of my reports.  The interview

 5     being carried out by the MUP pukovnik was shown on Dnevnik on the local

 6     television.

 7             I think, if I may suggest, the point you are trying to make is

 8     the village is without damage.  I would say that, yes, this happened

 9     before the incident we are talking about when the Serb forces decided to

10     go in and clear the area of Malisevo.  I would humbly remind yourself

11     that I took around members of the Trojka and the G8, many ambassadors,

12     including Lord Ashdown on two occasions, and they themselves saw massive

13     wanton damage.  But at this particular stage, Malisevo was untouched, but

14     it did not remain so, because the shops where the jewellery and the

15     costume, which I can actually remember since you've shown me the picture,

16     that whole area was subsequently destroyed.  And a further village just

17     outside of Malisevo where there was a school, I picked up 12,

18     120-millimetre shells that had been fired into the school itself.  Thank

19     you.

20        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.  This is the 29th of July news reel, 1998 of

21     course.  And it is true that you were there also subsequently.  You left

22     it on the 25th, and according to your statement, you returned to Malisevo

23     on the 29th to see what it looked like.

24             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I should like to seek to tender

25     this exhibit, Your Honours.

Page 9237

 1             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  The video will become Exhibit D386, Your Honours.

 3             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can I ask the usher for us to

 4     again see the video D005-0698.

 5             MS. KRAVETZ:  And once again, Your Honour, I object to the use of

 6     this video on the same grounds as the earlier video that was shown.

 7                           [Video-clip played]

 8             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]  Thank you.

 9        Q.   Did you recognise this footage, Colonel?

10        A.   That appears to be footage of Malisevo, but, my comments are

11     exactly the same.  When that was taken, I don't know.  If you are

12     questioning the accuracy of my reports, then all I can offer to the Court

13     is that you have to go back to view the original reports.

14             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this exhibit

15     also.  This is the 16th of August, 1998.

16        Q.   Colonel, I obtained this footage --

17             JUDGE PARKER:  The video will be received, but it needs to be

18     made clear, Mr. Djurdjic, that we have no evidence as to the date of the

19     recording of any of these videos.

20             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I apologise, this is

21     a slip-up on my part because I did not bring the material from which it

22     is evident what I ask for and what I received from the archives of the

23     RTS.  But this exhibit was used in the Milutinovic case.  But I shall do

24     so subsequently, rest assured.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  The video will become Exhibit D387, Your Honours.

Page 9238

 1             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Colonel --

 3             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now see Defence document

 4     D176.

 5        Q.   Colonel, this is a directive of the General Staff of the VJ of

 6     the 28th of July, 1998.  GROM-1998.  And you are familiar with this

 7     document, you've seen it before.  In this first passage under 1, Roman

 8     numeral I, the Chief of Staff is providing data on the number of members

 9     of the insurgence, as you refer to them.

10        A.   With respect, sir, that is the estimate of the General Staff of

11     the VJ.  And as I've said, that's their take, their estimate of the

12     problem that they are facing.  And the numbers, as I've already indicated

13     to the Court, could be less or could be larger.

14        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.  In the context that you had with

15     General Perisic, did he reiterate these data that you can see in this

16     directive to you?

17        A.   Again, sir, you are asking me very specific questions and very

18     specific dates that were -- or may have been referred to in my reports at

19     that period.  Therefore, to comment in general terms under oath is not

20     something I'm prepared to do.  If I made a statement, then could I humbly

21     suggest that it's presented, and we can discuss that statement.

22     But you are asking me to make an assertion on events, as I said, 12 years

23     ago where there are or there may be relevant reports which are critical

24     to this part of the trial.

25        Q.   Colonel, I told you that I wish to ask you questions that you

Page 9239

 1     haven't been asked by others, and I ask you this question because the

 2     meeting with the Chief of General Staff at the time in which this

 3     directive was adopted or thereafter was, after all, an event that one

 4     should recall and would recall.  And I know that you have not seen this

 5     directive, but I ask you whether through contacts and conversations - and

 6     you did say that you had conversations with General Perisic - he ever

 7     referred to the kind of numbers that we saw here?  This is the kind of

 8     forces that he referred to.  So do you recall that?

 9        A.   With great respect, in very general terms I've already said, yes.

10     But if you are going to be more specific about it, then we need to get

11     back into the dirt and find these particular reports.  But in general

12     terms, these were the figures that the Vojska Yugoslavia briefed people

13     on and that is their appreciation of the situation at that time.

14        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.

15             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now scroll down to Roman

16     numeral III.  It ought to be on page 2 in both versions.

17        Q.   Colonel, this chapter is about the engagement of the

18     Yugoslav Army, and we have the first stage which is:

19             "In the zone of the Pristina Corps, secure the state border

20     towards the republic of Albania and Macedonia, with both increased

21     intensity and in depth, while in the zone of the 2nd army and navy, with

22     increased intensity.  In the zone of the Pristina Corps, protect the

23     units and military facilities from the operations of the sabotage and

24     terrorist forces and secure that the Yugoslav Army units supply routes

25     are passable.  By quick action in conjunction with the forces of the MUP

Page 9240

 1     of the Republic of Serbia, overwhelm and destroy the sabotage and

 2     terrorist forces in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija according to a

 3     special order from the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army."

 4             My question is, were you familiar or acquainted with such a

 5     role in engagement of the army in the period after the adoption of

 6     this directive in context with members of the Yugoslav Army?

 7        A.   I think, if I remember correctly, sir, it was not until

 8     General Ojdanic addressed the Belgrade Attache Association, I think it

 9     was the 27th of August, where it was made clear for the first time that

10     the Vojska Yugoslavia was engaged in counter-terrorist operations in

11     Kosovo and Metohija.  As I've stated many times, the Vojska Yugoslavia

12     aims in Kosovo were to secure the international border between Albania

13     and Macedonia and Kosovo to a distance of, I think, 2, perhaps 5

14     kilometres, to secure the Pristina Corps bases, their exercise areas, and

15     also to secure the lines of communication throughout Kosovo, which as

16     I've stated many times, was then a sovereign part of former Yugoslavia.

17             I have no problems with any of these particular aims, as I've

18     said to you on several occasions.

19             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I'll come back to what you have

20     just said, but for the sake of continuity, can we see D177 now, please.

21        Q.   Colonel, now here we have an order by the commander of the

22     3rd Army of the 29th of July, 1998.  Do you agree that this is an order

23     which is based on the directives that we saw just awhile ago?

24        A.   That is the normal command process in that the chief of the

25     General Staff gives his orders to his field commander.  In this case, the

Page 9241

 1     commander Nis [as interpreted], and then he would give his orders down to

 2     the operational commander of the Pristina Corps within the operational

 3     area of Kosovo.  And, I think, if I may just add, that this is -- just

 4     backs up what I said sometime ago, that the Serbian security forces were

 5     winding themselves up for a major operation after August time, which is

 6     what I've said on many occasions.

 7        Q.   Thank you.

 8             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I should now like to show you a

 9     document, the number of which is D167.

10        Q.   Colonel, these are the rules of service of the Yugoslav Army

11     which were in force in the relevant period that we are now discussing.  I

12     should like to ask you to take a look at Article 473.  Is it fair to say,

13     Colonel, that according to this article of the rules of service, units of

14     the army may be used to counter outlawed sabotage terrorists and other

15     armed enemy groups, or to prevent or eliminate a state of emergency under

16     a decision by the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or the

17     Supreme Defence Council?

18        A.   Sir, I wouldn't beg to differ on this at all.  All I would offer

19     to the Court is that there is proportionate force and disproportionate

20     force.  How a nation deals with a counter-insurgency operation, as we are

21     currently seeing in some of the troubled areas of the world today, is a

22     matter for the national bodies that control those particular countries.

23             In this particular case, I think without any doubt, there is

24     clear evidence that there was massive destruction and movement of

25     personnel who, on the whole, were not initially engaged against the

Page 9242

 1     Serbian security forces.  I was in the position of having to report

 2     this process which I have attempted to do with very detailed reports

 3     which cover this entire area.  The order from the Chief of the

 4     General Staff is an order that that gentleman must defend, and I'm not

 5     going to comment on a senior general's orders to his troops who are going

 6     to carry out his orders.

 7        A.   Thank you.

 8             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] And I call document D004-3006.

 9     Can we see it on the screen, please.  Sorry, I was just corrected.  It is

10     Exhibit D331.

11        Q.   Colonel, this is a report of the forward command post of the

12     3rd Army sent to the General Staff on the 9th of August, 1998.  Let us

13     skip Roman numeral I and continue with Roman numeral II, the first

14     paragraph.  Am I right when I say that the commander of the 3rd Army

15     reports to the Chief of General Staff about the activities?  Could you

16     tell us where these villages are, Gramocelj, Prilep, Shaptej, and

17     Glodjane, from where fire was opened on MUP and VJ members from infantry

18     weapons, rocket-launchers, machine-guns, mortars, and recoilless guns?

19        A.   Sir, I'd remind you that on the 8th of August, 1998 -- I'll

20     retract that statement.  What would you like me to say, please?

21        Q.   I can see here that KLA activities are mentioned in the villages

22     of Gramocelj, Prilep, Shaptej, and Glodjane, that fire was opened at MUP

23     and VJ members from infantry weapons, rocket-launchers, machine-guns,

24     mortars, and recoilless guns.

25        A.   Sir, we are talking about the same areas that we have discussed

Page 9243

 1     discussed in considerable detail and which I've recognised were under

 2     fire for a lot of the time in 1998/1999.  And these villages of Glodjane,

 3     Prilep, Riznik keep reappearing, which indicates the intensity of the

 4     operations in this area, you know, relatively close to the boarder of

 5     Albania.

 6        Q.   There is this abbreviation BST, that stands for recoilless guns,

 7     which goes to show that the KLA were using such guns.

 8        A.   If that was in the report, sir, then I would accept it.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Let us take a look at item 3.  Am I right when I say,

10     sir, that in this item it is stated that army units support MUP units in

11     accordance with the decision on engagement?

12        A.   If that is what appears in this report, I'm sure it is true.  I

13     just draw the Court's attention to the amount of ammunition fired.

14             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] And could we please show item 5.

15        Q.   Under 3:

16             "The commander of the 3rd Army decided to support MUP units in

17     routing the DTS in the area of the villages of Gramocelj,

18     Prilep, and Glodjane, with the aim of pushing the DTS away from the

19     Djakovica-Decani-Pec main road"?

20        A.   Sir, that's in total agreement what I've been saying throughout

21     this discussion.

22        Q.   Thank you.

23             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please see document

24     D005-0691.  Just a moment.  Ms. O'Leary will immediately say if I got the

25     number right.

Page 9244

 1        Q.   These, sir, are the minutes of a meeting between army command

 2     organs at the forward command post and the commanders of subordinated

 3     units which was held on the 17th of August.  And about Junik, please take

 4     a look at paragraph 6.  The sixth paragraph:

 5             "The army commander stated that Junik had not been destroyed,

 6     that there were no civilian casualties, and that there were no mass

 7     graves of which the world had been accusing us.  These were facts which

 8     the VJ stood by while everything else is either propaganda or politics

 9     that must be opposed by all other members of society and the state

10     organs."

11        A.   Sir, I think I've been trying to explain to the Court that one

12     was attempting to report accurately as possible and that some of the

13     claims that the media and other people were making in the worldwide press

14     were not correct, so I stand by what I've said.  My reports at the time

15     were accurate and correct.

16        Q.   Thank you.  And now -- but do you agree that at that time the

17     commander of the 3rd Army was General Samardzic?

18        A.   Forgive me.  Which date are we now talking about, please?

19        Q.   The 17th of August, 1998.

20        A.   With respect, sir, if this general has signed this paper, then he

21     was presumably the person who wrote it, so I would accept that, yes.

22        Q.   Thank you.  In principle do you know who was commander of the

23     3rd Army from about mid-1998 until the end of that year?

24        A.   Initially I think it was General Pavkovic who had been the corps

25     commander in Pristina.  When exactly he changed over to 3rd Army

Page 9245

 1     commander, I'm not -- I cannot recall.

 2        Q.   Thank you.

 3             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Let us see document D004-2953,

 4     please.  I apologise again, actually it's Exhibit D333.

 5        Q.   Colonel, this is an order issued by the General Staff on the 17th

 6     of August, 1998.  What you see in the first paragraph is the following:

 7             "It is stated that in the period from the 13th to the 15th of

 8     August, a team of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army carried out a

 9     tour of inspection of part of the commands and units."

10             An order is issued with regard to that so let us go to page 2 and

11     take a look at item 4.  Is it correct that the Chief of General Staff,

12     under 4, orders that part of the sabotage and terrorist forces from --

13     should be prevented from spilling over to KiM territory in the area of

14     the Raska Polim district and the Jablanica and Juzma Morava district.

15     Coordination is to be continued and joint action with the MUP forces and

16     in keeping with the assessments, support -- the MUP forces should be

17     supported in destroying the DTG, but without disturbing the carrying out

18     of the main tasks of the VJ units."

19        A.   Sir, if those are the orders given by the Vojska Yugoslavia, then

20     I presume they are correct.

21        Q.   All right.

22             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] All right.  Let us see the last

23     page of this document, please, where you will see the signature.

24        Q.   Can you see that this is signed by the Chief of General Staff,

25     General Momcilo Perisic?

Page 9246

 1        A.   That's correct, sir.  But I think this was, if I remember

 2     rightly, possibly General Perisic's last visit down to the operation

 3     area, but I can't be certain of that.

 4        Q.   I don't know that, but we'll see about that later.

 5             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please see document

 6     D004-2965, please.  I am again being corrected, it's Exhibit D334.

 7        Q.   Colonel, we have before us an order by the commander of the

 8     3rd Army.  In the introductory part it says:

 9             "Pursuant to GS VJ orders, strictly confidential number 02/10-91

10     of 17 August 1998, with the aim of taking measures to raise the level of

11     combat readiness of all command and units engaged in the area of KiM to a

12     level that would ensure the successful completion of tasks, I here by

13     order:"

14             Please take a look at item 4(a)on page 4.  Items 4(a) and

15     4(b).

16             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I'm referring to page 4 of the

17     English version, and in B/C/S the page number is 2, I believe.

18        Q.   Colonel, at the level of the 3rd Army, is this order an

19     implementation of the order of the General Staff, dated 17 August 1998,

20     which we saw a short while ago?

21        A.   It appears to be the normal process of orders down the chain of

22     command, sir, yes.

23        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.

24             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now please see document

25     D179.

Page 9247

 1        Q.   Colonel, this is a directive of the General Staff of the VJ of

 2     the 16th of January 1999.  The heading reads "Directive to engage the VJ

 3     to prevent forced introduction of a multinational NATO brigade in KiM."

 4     I wanted to go through all these documents to cover the period -- let me

 5     ask you what was the political and security situation in mid-January

 6     1999?  Can you enlighten us?  I'm of course referring to Kosovo and

 7     Metohija and Yugoslavia too.

 8        A.   In January 1999 the Court would be aware that a Kosovo

 9     Verification Mission had been in place headed by Ambassador Walker with

10     General Drewienkiewicz, DZ for short.  I think that had been in position

11     since October 1998, or thereabouts.  As we heard yesterday, there was

12     ongoing incidents in the area of Podujevo, and then in the new year there

13     was the serious incident at Racak.

14             It was quite clear then that probably a political solution was

15     not going to be -- was not going to succeed.  And therefore both sides,

16     I would suggest, were considering the very serious position that we

17     were now facing in Kosova-Metohija, and that, as we all know, developed

18     into NATO bombing in March.

19        Q.   Thank you.  But in the introduction we see the mention of a

20     forced introduction of a multinational brigade.

21             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Let us now go to page 2 and item

22     1.3.

23        Q.   And I will read out to you the relevant paragraph.

24             "The introduction of a multinational brigade would be preceded by

25     an ACTORDER by the NATO command."

Page 9248

 1             I would be interested in your comment about this ACTORDER.  When

 2     was it first implemented, and how did things develop?

 3        A.   Sir, with great respect, an ACTORDER is issued by the Supreme

 4     Allied Commander Europe, a four star general, in this case General

 5     Wes Clark.  I think for a mere colonel to offer comment on his orders is

 6     not appropriate.  I believe the ACTORDER -- the ACTORD, was asked for by

 7     General Clark I think in October or November 1998.  And this was a

 8     process of escalating the pressure on the FRY to come to some arrangement

 9     by way that the situation could be salvaged before action took place on

10     both sides of the border.

11             I was in Kosovo when this order was given and part of the order

12     was that the Vojska Yugoslavia would withdraw back to its bases, which

13     again is detailed in one of my reports, and the Vojska Yugoslavia did

14     withdraw back.  And one of the problems that I had mentioned to my

15     superiors was that if the Serbian security forces withdrew from

16     certain areas, then this space could be, maybe, would be filled by the

17     KLA.  And that again is detailed in one of my reports.

18        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.  I don't want to interrupt you, I will

19     continue from where we broke off.

20             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I think it's time for a break.

21             JUDGE PARKER:  It is a convenient time.  We will have the second

22     break.  We resume at 1.00 for what will be a nearly three quarter of an

23     hour session.  1.00 we resume.

24                           --- Recess taken at 12.28 p.m.

25                          --- On resuming at 12.59 p.m.

Page 9249

 1             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Djurdjic, you have some matter to raise?

 2             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.  Let the

 3     witness come in.

 4                          [The witness takes the stand]

 5             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] What we have to do is to -- we

 6     need to have the Prosecution reiterate its agreement to the admission of

 7     the Defence exhibits used by the Defence.  The Prosecution has in fact

 8     agreed, but we also have to seek your leave for its admission into the

 9     case file.  This was the instruction I was given, that I was to seek it.

10             JUDGE PARKER:  You would like to have one or a number of exhibits

11     admitted, Mr. Djurdjic?  A number?

12             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, according to the

13     list that the OTP agreed to.

14             JUDGE PARKER:  Well, if it's by agreement, we will most certainly

15     receive what you propose.

16             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17             JUDGE PARKER:  Are you going to move for them individually, or do

18     you move for them all to be admitted?

19             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Frankly speaking, I do not

20     understand, but I believe that individually is the way we want to

21     proceed, for an individual number to be assigned to each document.

22             JUDGE PARKER:  They will be received.  There are five of them, I

23     believe; is that correct?

24             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] There are four, Your Honours.

25             JUDGE PARKER:  I have a list of five.  Which on that list is the

Page 9250

 1     one which you are not tendering?

 2             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] It is D004-2681.  That is in fact

 3     a book which is on the list.

 4             JUDGE PARKER:  Very well.  The other four will be received.  I

 5     will pass the list to the Court Officer, and the last one on that list

 6     will not be received.  She will now announce the numbers for them.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, exhibit numbers will be assigned as

 8     follows:  65 ter 4012 will become Exhibit D388; 65 ter 2136 will become

 9     Exhibit D389; Defence document D005-0688 will become Exhibit D390; And

10     the last document, D005-0693 will become Exhibit D391.  Thank you.

11             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you very much.

12             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

13        Q.   I apologise, Colonel, but let us latch on to where we broke off

14     before.  So this directive was adopted at a time when there was an

15     impending danger for the FRY of the activation of the ACTORD.  Would you

16     now please look at Roman numeral II, page 2, the use of the VJ, last

17     sentence.  "In coordination with the forces of the MUP of the Republic of

18     Serbia, a block of Siptar forces in broader regions and at axis of

19     introduction, and prevent them from acting in concert with NATO forces."

20     That is the first stage.

21             Am I right when I say that this directive anticipates --

22     foresees the coordinated action of the forces of the MUP and of the VJ

23     forces in the event of the activation of the order?

24        A.   It seems a perfectly reasonable assumption to be made by the

25     forces of Yugoslavia.  If they understood that they were facing a

Page 9251

 1     possible attack from NATO.

 2        Q.   Thank you.

 3             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can I now turn to 3; namely item

 4     3.1.  The tasks of the 3rd Army, that is on page 4.

 5        Q.   Does it say by your request the following units shall be

 6     subordinate to you, BG-252/252, armoured brigade from the 1st Army, the

 7     BG-37/37th Motorised Brigade from 2nd Army, and BG 3 Tactical Group Vihor

 8     from the KSJ special unit corps?

 9        A.   That is what it says, sir, and these are some of the units that I

10     think I reported on being present during the last days of my time down in

11     Kosovo.  So those are correct, as reported in my reports, sir.

12             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we now look at

13     Defence Exhibit D343.

14        Q.   Colonel, this is an order by the commander of the 3rd Army of the

15     27th of January, 1999:

16             "For the use of the 3rd Army in preventing the forceful

17     introduction of a NATO brigade, it's routing, and the destruction of

18     Siptar terrorist forces in Kosova-Metohija?"

19             Would it be fair to say that this was in fact the implementation

20     of measures stemming from the directive of the 16th of January, 1999,

21     which was brought by the Chief of the General Staff of the Army of

22     Yugoslavia?

23        A.   This appears to be following the normal military chain of

24     command, so, yes.

25        Q.   And under item 4, number 4, that is also on page 4, it is also

Page 9252

 1     ordered that in the event this order is put into practice in concert with

 2     MUP forces, DTS should be countered and prevented from linking to or

 3     cooperating with the NATO Brigade.

 4        A.   Again this seems quite standard procedure, and linking with the

 5     MUP would be totally proper and correct.

 6        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.  Now, I should like us to go back to October

 7     1998.  What do you know about the Holbrooke-Milosevic Agreement?

 8        A.   With respect to the Court, I don't see how I can possibly answer

 9     that question.  I mean, I knew that Ambassador Holbrooke was in talks

10     with President Milosevic, but what they said together, I was not present

11     at, so I can't offer any help on that particular question.

12        Q.   But do you know whether any agreement was reached between

13     Holbrooke and Milosevic?

14        A.   Again, sir, the Ambassador Holbrooke was there, if I remember

15     correctly, right up until March the 22nd, 23rd, when it was quite clear

16     that the negotiations had failed, and that's really my only comment.

17        Q.   Thank you.  We shall move on.  Do you know anything about the

18     agreement on the Kosovo Verification Mission and the subsequent

19     October Agreements that were reached in 1998 between the FRY on the one

20     part, and NATO on the other, and the OSCE, naturally?

21        A.   Sir, this is --

22        Q.   Excuse me, to make things short, if you did participate in that

23     and if you have any information, please tell me so; if not, tell me so

24     also so that we do not lose any time over any information that might have

25     been imparted from a third source or second-hand information?

Page 9253

 1        A.   Sir, I will not be rushed in my answers.  You are asking detailed

 2     questions; I'm attempting to give you the correct answers.  I was part of

 3     the -- I briefed the Verification Mission in Belgrade.  I placed them in

 4     position in Kosovo.  But as to other detailed planning that took place

 5     between the Verification Mission, OSCE, I was far too busy doing other

 6     things in Kosovo.  I was obviously aware of these negotiations, and I was

 7     informed as appropriate.  But it was important that the KVM, the Kosovo

 8     Verification Mission, and the OSCE remained apart from the original

 9     parties that had been engaged in Kosova-Metohija, mainly ourselves as the

10     defence attaches and the Vojska Yugoslavia.

11        Q.   I do apologise, it was never my intention to rush you.  I just

12     wanted us to clarify to see whether we can indeed discuss that topic or

13     not.

14             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now see Exhibit P836.

15        Q.   This is an agreement between KDOM and the Ministry of the

16     Interior of the Republic of Serbia which was signed on the 25th of

17     October, 1999, between Messrs. Djordjevic and Byrnes.  Were you

18     acquainted with the content of this agreement?

19        A.   Not as far as I was aware, sir.  I know Mr. Byrnes because we

20     worked quite closely.  But as to this -- as to this document, no.

21        Q.   Thank you.  I should like to now ask you to assist us in one

22     matter and to explain something to us.  Please take a look at item 3,

23     this sentence:

24             "The police will use the Orahovac-Suva Reka-Dulje-Malisevo road.

25     And in the coming 15 days, it will not move along the Malisevo-Orahovac

Page 9254

 1     road.  The Malisevo-Orahovac road must remain fully open at all times for

 2     unimpeded and free traffic of flow of people and goods."

 3             You are familiar with the terrain in question, and therefore I

 4     should like to ask you this:  From Malisevo to Orahovac, as the crow

 5     flies, what is the distance, the direct distance along that road in

 6     kilometres?

 7        A.   I think it's between 12 and 15 kilometres, approximately.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  If we had a better map, I should like you to draw it

 9     for us on the map, but as it is not very good copy, let us at least have

10     it in oral statement.  So during those 15 days, the road would be

11     available for the traffic of policemen from Orahovac to Suva Reka and

12     then to Dulje and Malisevo.  I believe that from your experience,

13     according to what you have stated in your statements, you yourself moved

14     along that road.  How many kilometres was that?

15        A.   From where to where, sir?  From Orahovac to Malisevo?

16        Q.   From Orahovac to Suva Reka, that is what is written here,

17     Orahovac Suva Reka, and then on to Dulje?

18        A.   If you go on the direct route from Orahovac on the cross-country

19     route, it's probably 10 to 15 a kilometres to Suva Reka, and then a

20     further 8, 9 kilometres to Blace.  If you go from Orahovac south down to

21     Zrte [phoen] and then to Prizren and up, I would think it's approximately

22     40 or 50 kilometres.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Did you also factor in the road from Dulje to

24     Malisevo in that distance?  You said Orahovac to Suva Reka and then

25     Suva Reka to Dulje, and then Dulje-Malisevo.

Page 9255

 1        A.   Dulje-Malisevo is approximately 16 kilometres.

 2        Q.   So it would be approximately around 60 kilometres, this

 3     circuitous road, to be precise?

 4        A.   Yeah, approximately so, yes.

 5             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could we now take a

 6     look at P837, please.  It should be there.  It should be in your domain.

 7        Q.   This is page number 1 which is not of the essence because the

 8     substance of the document is on the second and third pages of this

 9     document, and that is what the question refers to.  Do you remember or

10     did you perhaps participate in the visit of General Clark and

11     General Naumann in Belgrade -- to Belgrade in October, one of the results

12     of which was this agreement of the 25th of October, 1998, which deals

13     with army units which remain outside barracks.  As far as I know you

14     participated in those meetings?

15        A.   I helped the American embassy with various meetings, but I don't

16     recall specifically attending this meeting because it's an extremely

17     high-powered meeting with General Naumann and General Wesley Clark there

18     as well.  So, I'm sorry, I don't think I can help you on this.

19        Q.   Please take a look at item 5.  I didn't mean that you

20     participated in the making of this agreement in it's -- but that you

21     participated later in its realisation, in its adoption, and that you are

22     familiar with this particular item 5.  It is stated here, Colonel, that

23     except for VJ units currently re-enforcing border guard units, all other

24     elements of the VJ remain Kosovo will return to garrisons except for

25     three company-strength teams which will remain deployed there.  Each will

Page 9256

 1     be tasked with protecting lines of communication between, A, Pec,

 2     Lapusnik, Pristina; B, Djakovica, Klina; and under C, Prizren, Suva Reka,

 3     Pristina.  These three company-strong groups will return to garrison not

 4     later than one week after the signature of the political agreement."

 5        A.   I've already told the Court that I monitored these three company

 6     battle groups moving back to their barracks as detailed, and I think at

 7     that particular time I passed the information direct to General Clark's

 8     office, so I saw that they, as I've stated already, that the

 9     Vojska Yugoslavia had complied with the order that they would withdraw

10     back to their barracks as detailed.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Colonel, do you agree with me when I say that the FRY

12     honoured the October Agreement and that the ACTORDER was never activated?

13        A.   The initial ACTORD was never activated, no, because the FRY

14     [realtime transcript read in error "never"] complied with what was

15     required.

16        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.  And then you assisted in the introduction of

17     the Kosovo Verification Mission, that's what you said.  I would now like

18     to go through some reports of the Kosovo Verification Mission to see

19     whether you have any knowledge about some interesting events, and

20     therefore I would like to call Exhibit D157.

21             JUDGE PARKER:  Before you move on, Mr. Djurdjic, page 59,

22     line 24, the answer of the witness is said to conclude because the FRY

23     never complied with what was required.  I thought his answer was the

24     opposite, that they did comply?

25             THE WITNESS:  That's correct, Your Honour.  Sorry.

Page 9257

 1             JUDGE PARKER:  Just so that that is noted.  Thank you.

 2             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

 3        Q.   Colonel --

 4             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] This doesn't seem to match.  I

 5     said D157.  That's it.

 6        Q.   The first paragraph under the heading KLA, General Jankovic, it

 7     says:

 8             "The most significant activity by the KLA was in the

 9     General Jankovic line.  Prior to the fighting this week, this region had

10     been quiet; only the strategic [indiscernible].  The KLA activity has

11     been limited to a small and insignificant inactive militia.  Although

12     support could always be found from across the border in Tetovo, It would

13     appear that over 100 KLA crossed the border and encouraged the locals to

14     leave.  The incentive to move into the region is unclear, although a

15     number of possibilities exist.  By encouraging" --

16             Now, the following item reads:

17             "By encouraging the movement of internally displaced persons,

18     IDPs, the international media was able to claim a Serb offensive was

19     underway."

20             Colonel, we are speaking about the end of February and the

21     beginning of March.  Are you familiar with the activities of the KLA

22     in the territory of the Kacanik municipality, I believe?  And the

23     villages are Kotlina, Livelja [phoen], and that area.

24        A.   I think, sir, there was an attack in that area at this particular

25     time and one or two MUP were killed, and hence the comments in this

Page 9258

 1     Kosovo verification paper, which as it says is a draft paper laying out

 2     what they think the situation is at the time.

 3        Q.   Thank you.

 4             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now please go to page 2

 5     in the English version.

 6        Q.   It says here:

 7             "The KLA forces in the Podujevo area were able to carry out an

 8     attack in the town itself - effectively beating the Serbs."

 9             Were you familiar with that, and were you in Kosovo and

10     Metohija at that period?

11        A.   Again, sir, there is a report of mine, I believe, on this

12     particular instant that the -- one of the KLA headquarters by Mitrovica,

13     by Gora and Bradas, a village closer to Podujevo, and the KLA had carried

14     out an assault because this -- this main route going north from Pristina

15     through Podujevo to Kursumlje and on to Nis was the main supply route for

16     the Vojska Yugoslavia and all forces in there, and therefore not

17     unnaturally, the VJ and the MUP required to keep this route open, and

18     therefore a threat by the KLA to their main logistic supply route was

19     critical to their operations.

20        Q.   Thank you.  But here the victory of the KLA in the town of

21     Podujevo is alleged.

22        A.   Sir, as I've said many times, the one force would gain the

23     upper-hand and then some days later the other force would retake it.  So

24     if the KLA called it a victory, that is entirely up to them.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Unfortunately we broke off because it was time for a

Page 9259

 1     break, and you were speaking about your apprehension that after the

 2     October Agreement, once the military withdraws, the vacated areas would

 3     be taken by the KLA which eventually happened.  Did I understand you to

 4     say that, sir?  Or is it, did I actually correctly understand you to say

 5     that?

 6        A.   That is correct, sir.  And I've given that in evidence to the

 7     Court, and I believe it's in several of my reports, again attempting to

 8     make my seniors understand the difficulties of this particular scenario,

 9     situation.

10        Q.   Thank you.

11             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we see D002-4026.  It's a map.

12        Q.   Let me first ask you, Colonel, to tell me which territories those

13     are that were taken by the KLA when the VJ and other security forces

14     withdrew and all that after the signing of the October Agreements in

15     1998?

16        A.   You are asking a totally unanswerable question.  My reports at

17     the time specified the changes of occupation, and this happened

18     throughout Kosovo.  You are quite right in saying that the KLA attacked

19     Podujevo.  They were then driven out of Podujevo.  When the VJ combat

20     groups withdrew under the NATO ACTORDER, the KLA followed up, and several

21     MUP were killed, I think, on the main Pristina-Pec road in the area of, I

22     think, Lapusnik Kumeranje [phoen].  So wherever there was a movement of

23     Serbian security forces out of an area, the KLA would come back in.  I

24     mean, this happened all over Kosovo and Metohija.

25        Q.   Thank you, but we have information that the military withdrew to

Page 9260

 1     the barracks apart from those three companies under the agreement, and

 2     that the police continued to engage in their activities in accordance

 3     with the agreement.  Mr. Zurapi who was Chief of Staff of the

 4     Supreme Command of the KLA said that the KLA had occupied a greater

 5     territory than it had held before the summer offensive in 1998.

 6        A.   I'm not quite sure on how to answer that question.  I've

 7     indicated that during 1998, and I have stated in reports that

 8     approximately 70 per cent of the area was under KLA command, and that

 9     flowed backwards and forwards.  If this gentleman has stated that, then I

10     can't raise any comment on that, I'm afraid.

11        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.

12             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Let us now return to Exhibit D157

13     and go to the end of page -- or to the bottom of page 4 of the English

14     version, please.

15        Q.   Summary of events prior to 28 February 1999:

16             "KLA appeared to have moved into the region in force and combined

17     with a militia to a total force of 120 to 160.  Locals heard some

18     shooting from the village of Stremce, EM 1968."  These must be the

19     coordinates.  "This village is virtually cut off during to a heavy fall

20     of snow, and therefore any suspected activities cannot be confirmed by

21     the locals, making them susceptible to rumour.  The KLA told the

22     villagers in the region to move out, nearly all of whom obliged by the

23     27th of February, leading to an IDP report on the 28th of February,

24     1999."

25             Colonel, did you know at the time that the KLA was misusing

Page 9261

 1     civilians?

 2        A.   This is an OSCE KVM report.  At that particular time I think I

 3     was probably one of the very few defence attaches still down in Kosovo,

 4     so if I was not in that area, then I can't confirm or deny this

 5     particular report, so I'm sorry, but you will have to ask people

 6     concerned with the KVM OSCE.

 7        Q.   Colonel, these reports are just a tool for me to ask you whether

 8     you -- about your knowledge.  Did you know at the time that the KLA was

 9     misusing civilians to their ends to create an apparent humanitarian

10     disaster?

11        A.   I think with respect, sir, there was a human disaster, and there

12     had been for several weeks.  There had been many reports of internally

13     displaced persons, as I indicated already in the Pagarusa valley, and one

14     had seen villages on the move carrying all their worldly wealth in carts.

15     I think what I've said answers the question.

16        Q.   Colonel, the question is simple, it follows from these reports

17     that the KLA drove out people from their settlements and thus creating an

18     apparent humanitarian disaster, invited journalists who kept reporting

19     about that.  Did you have knowledge of that at the time or not?  I don't

20     think that's a difficult question to answer.

21        A.   What you are inviting me to say is that the KLA was responsible

22     for the internally displaced personnel.  They may well have contributed

23     to it.  It was not a one-sided effort.  The actions of the Serbian

24     security forces had also contributed to it.  The media was now growing in

25     strength in Kosova-Metohija, and therefore, whoever could get the

Page 9262

 1     headlines got the credit.  And it's simply a question of public relations

 2     on both sides, which, as we know, is very powerful with the media able to

 3     flash this -- these incidents around the world in a matter of seconds.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Let us just go through one more document.  I believe

 5     there's enough time left.  Do you know, sir, that toward the end of 1998

 6     and in 1999, the objective of the NATO member states was to be present in

 7     Kosovo as a military Verification Mission?

 8        A.   Sir, if I understand your question, the Kosovo Verification

 9     Mission was suggested to be used as a tool in order to give all parties

10     time to have a breathing space and to attempt to come to some peaceful

11     solution in this area.  And, therefore, the Kosovo Verification Mission,

12     I believe, was accepted by the FRY authorities and headed, as I've said,

13     by Ambassador Walker and General DZ, and they carried on their duties

14     until early 1999 when they had to withdraw, on March 19th, I think.

15        Q.   Thank you.  You have mentioned a number of soldiers who were

16     involved in the verification and who were members of the KVM as a

17     civilian mission.  And I have here a statement by Mr. Vollebaek which

18     says that in March of -- in March 1999, Mr. Milosevic was opposed to the

19     presence of NATO forces in Kosovo for the purpose of the completion of

20     the verification.

21             MS. KRAVETZ:  Your Honour, I would kindly ask my learned

22     colleague if he could indicate the source of this statement that he is

23     reading out, and if it could be displayed to the witness so he can review

24     it before he is answering that question.

25             JUDGE PARKER:  I am afraid we've run out of time for both of

Page 9263

 1     those things to occur.  That will have to be taken up tomorrow.  If you

 2     can get that documentation organised to assist the witness tomorrow.

 3             We must now adjourn to resume tomorrow at 2.15 p.m.

 4             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour, with respect, I'm sorry to interrupt.

 5     I had heard, or I was informed that I would be released today.  If I'm to

 6     be kept tomorrow, sir, and it's 2.00, then I'm going to have logistic and

 7     business problems back in the United Kingdom.  I appreciate this is minor

 8     request with Mr. Karadzic and other people around, but ...

 9             JUDGE PARKER:  I am sorry, it's not a minor request, and I don't

10     know the source of your information that you would be finished today.

11     The cross-examination is continuing.  It needs to finish.  My present

12     expectation is that it will finish tomorrow and re-examination, so that

13     you can expect to be free after tomorrow.  But we cannot do anything

14     about that.  We are programmed to sit either morning or afternoon, and we

15     have been programmed tomorrow to sit in the afternoon at 2.15 so we can't

16     -- there are no spare courtrooms, so we can't sit in the morning.  I'm

17     sorry about that.  I hope you will be able to re-organisation in some

18     way.

19             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, Your Honour.

20             JUDGE PARKER:  We adjourn now until tomorrow at 2.15.

21                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.46 p.m.,

22                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 28th day of

23                           October, 2009, at 2.15 p.m.