Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 10240

 1                           Tuesday, 26 January 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 2.17 p.m.

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  Good afternoon.  We will have the witness, who is

 6     being brought into court now.

 7                           [The witness takes the stand]

 8             JUDGE PARKER:  Good afternoon, Mr. Jovanovic.

 9             THE WITNESS:  Good afternoon, Your Honour.

10             JUDGE PARKER:  The affirmation you made at the beginning of your

11     evidence to tell the truth still applies of course, and Mr. Djurdjic is

12     now continuing with his questions.

13             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, Your Honour.

14             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

15                           WITNESS:  ZIVADIN JOVANOVIC [Resumed]

16                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

17                           Examination by Mr. Djurdjic: [Continued]

18        Q.   [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Jovanovic.

19        A.   Good afternoon.

20        Q.   Please open tab 21 in your binder.  I would like to retrieve

21     D008-4692.  That would be 65 ter 1046.  This is a note dated 19th of

22     October, 1998 of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  Mr. Jovanovic,

23     this is a note on a meeting of Mr. Sainovic, deputy federal prime

24     minister, and head of the UN mission for Kosovo and Metohija, Mr. Staffan

25     de Mistura.  I would like to ask you to comment paragraph 2 under item 1

Page 10241

 1     on page 1.

 2        A.   Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Sainovic, pointed out to the

 3     representative of the United Nations that segment of problems in Kosovo

 4     and Metohija which are result of involving civilians into the armed

 5     conflict as a result of the pressures exerted by the KLA organisation.

 6     Deputy Prime Minister Sainovic pays particular attention to the fact that

 7     the armed operations of the KLA which civilians getting involved in those

 8     give rise to displaced persons in Kosovo and Metohija in the opinion of

 9     Mr. Sainovic, and on the other hand, the Serb civilians are faced with

10     the hostage crises and he also points out and highlights the abduction of

11     a Tanjug reporter.

12        Q.   Thank you.

13             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I would move to admit this into

14     evidence.

15             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that would be Exhibit D00472.

17             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Now let's see D008-4336.

18        Q.   That would be tab 22 in your binder, Mr. Jovanovic, and 65 ter

19     document 984.  Mr. Jovanovic, could you please briefly comment this

20     document on how our diplomacy acted with respect to the establishment of

21     the KVM.

22        A.   This document shows that two days after the signing of the

23     Jovanovic-Geremek Agreement, the OSCE sent to Yugoslavia --

24        Q.   Could you please turn to page 2, if I may interrupt.  Please do

25     continue.

Page 10242

 1        A.   And that the management of the OSCE two days after the signing of

 2     the Jovanovic-Geremek Agreement sent a technical team to the Federal

 3     Republic of Yugoslavia in order for them to perform certain preparatory

 4     actions in Kosovo and Metohija and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for the

 5     deployment of the so-called Kosovo Verification Mission.  And what is

 6     also evident in this official OSCE report, that the technical team of the

 7     OSCE was met with full co-operation, understanding of the both federal

 8     Yugoslav authorities, the republican Serbian authorities, and the local

 9     authorities in Kosovo and Metohija.

10        Q.   Thank you.

11             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I move to admit this into

12     evidence.

13             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00473.

15             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Let's take a look at D008-4698.

16        Q.   That would be tab 23 and 65 ter 1047.  This is a note dated 4th

17     of November, 1998 on talks between the Deputy Prime Minister of the

18     federal government, Mr. Sainovic, with the Austrian Ambassador, his

19     excellence Mr. Petritsch held on the 3rd of November, 1998.

20             Mr. Jovanovic, let's take a look at page 2 in English, please,

21     and in Serbian that would be page 1, paragraph 2.  It is stated here that

22     Mr. Petritsch broached the issue of the further functioning of the EU's

23     monitoring mission in Yugoslavia, that is, in Kosovo and Metohija.  Could

24     you comment -- respond to those requests, and what did the FRY do in

25     respect of this?

Page 10243

 1        A.   This is a note on the talks of Mr. Nikola Sainovic with the

 2     Austrian Ambassador Mr. Wolfgang Petritsch, and it is evident from this

 3     note that Sainovic briefed Mr. Petritsch on the creation of preconditions

 4     for the return of the displaced persons and to bring the situation back

 5     into normal, and he pin-points the need to do more to liberate the

 6     kidnapped Yugoslav journalists.  With respect to Mr. Petritsch, he mainly

 7     agreed with such assessments, and what is important here is that he asked

 8     representative of the federal government for the ECMM, the European

 9     Commission Monitoring Mission, be allowed to work and to normalise its

10     status in Kosovo and Metohija.  Otherwise, ECMM had its headquarters in

11     Bosnia-Herzegovina in principle.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know who headed KDOM of the European Union?

13        A.   During that period until the withdrawal of the ECMM, the head of

14     that mission in Kosovo and Metohija was a representative of the European

15     Union from Germany, Mr. Dietmar Hartwig, and I know him personally.

16        Q.   Thank you very much.

17             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I move to tender this document

18     into evidence, please.

19             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00474.

21             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Now let's take a look, please, at

22     D010-5395.  That would be 65 ter document 1791.

23        Q.   And, Mr. Jovanovic, that would be tab 24 in your binder.

24             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, we've come to a

25     document that we moved to be additionally added to our 65 ter list.

Page 10244

 1             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.  Mr. Djurdjic, perhaps you can -- is it going

 2     to come up in English?

 3             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Yes, that would be the first page

 4     in Serbian, and we're about to see page 2 in English.  Now we're going

 5     back to page 1 in English.

 6             JUDGE PARKER:  Can you help me, Mr. Djurdjic.  This is a

 7     correspondence in 2007.  How is this relevant in our case and admissible?

 8             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, this letter is one

 9     that Mr. Hartwig, who used to be head of the KDOM of the European Union

10     in 1998/1999 wrote to the then-Chancellor of the Federal Republic of

11     Germany, Madam Angela Merkel.  And the letter contains his information

12     and what he knew about the events in Kosovo and Metohija while he served

13     there as the head of that mission.

14             JUDGE PARKER:  I don't see the name of Mr. Hartwig on your list

15     of witnesses.  Is it proposed to call him?

16             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. Hartwig is not on our witness

17     list, but this is a letter which was delivered to Witness Jovanovic, and

18     Witness Jovanovic -- and this is from his personal archives and is

19     familiar with this letter.

20             JUDGE PARKER:  Can you -- do you mean delivered to the witness in

21     his capacity as minister?  In his capacity -- in what capacity?

22             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. Hartwig and Mr. Jovanovic know

23     each other personally from the time when Mr. Hartwig headed the KDOM of

24     the EU in KiM, and after sending this letter he forwarded the letter to

25     Mr. Jovanovic as can be seen on page 1 of the English version.  It is

Page 10245

 1     seen here that this letter sent to the chancellor of the Federal Republic

 2     of Germany is being forwarded to Mr. Jovanovic.

 3             JUDGE PARKER:  As we understand it, Mr. Jovanovic had been

 4     retired for some time in 2007; is that correct?

 5             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Of course.  After the letter was

 6     written, this copy was forwarded by Mr. Hartwig to Mr. Jovanovic.  So

 7     this must have happened after the date of the letter, but it has been

 8     forwarded to Mr. Jovanovic.

 9             JUDGE PARKER:  I come then to my question:  How is this

10     admissible, this document?  It's a letter not written by a witness.  It

11     is a letter sent to the head of state of another country.  It is a letter

12     that happens to be written by somebody who sent as a personal gesture a

13     copy of it to the present witness, who was then an ordinary citizen

14     living in retirement.  Now, how is the contents of this letter going to

15     be able to inform this Chamber anything about the facts of what occurred

16     relevant to the indictment?  It could be very different if Mr. Hartwig

17     were to be a witness.  We would certainly mark it for identification then

18     if you saw fit, but if he's not to be called as a witness, what possible

19     use can we make of this document in 2007 about events in 1998?

20             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the Defence holds

21     that this document was delivered to Mr. Jovanovic by the author of the

22     letter, and we believe that the contents of that letter are relevant for

23     these proceedings.  Unfortunately, Mr. Hartwig could not respond

24     positively to the request of the Defence to testify in this trial.  We

25     did try, however, to secure him as a witness, and we believe that --

Page 10246

 1     well, I don't know whether you are questioning the authenticity of this

 2     missive, and as to its contents I do believe that it is relevant for the

 3     period when the witness, as an actor in those events, was active.  This

 4     is our proposal and our submission, and it's up to the Chamber to decide

 5     on this matter.

 6             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.

 7             Mr. Stamp, any submission?

 8             MR. STAMP:  Thank you, Your Honours, may it please you.  The

 9     Prosecution submits that the letter is inadmissible.  I had prepared some

10     written submissions on the jurisprudence of the Tribunal in regard to a

11     document of that nature to support the submission that it is

12     inadmissible, but I think the issue has -- we have addressed the issue in

13     a very direct way.  This is a letter dated 2007 in which the person, the

14     maker, relates what he perceived in 1998.  It really amounts to a

15     statement about his perceptions eight years before, and it is only

16     admissible if it can satisfy one of the rules or one of the provisions of

17     Rule 92 bis, or Rule 92 ter, or Rule 92 quater for admission of

18     statements made by persons who do not testify.  There is nothing before

19     the Court which meets that foundation, and therefore it is not

20     admissible.

21             It may well be said that it might be squeezed in, so to speak,

22     under the general provision of Rule 89(C), where the Court may use its

23     discretion to admit any document which is relevant and probative.

24     However, the submission in regard to that is that witness statements, as

25     this document amounts to, falls clearly under Rules 92 bis, ter, and

Page 10247

 1     quater.  Those rules being less lex specialis.

 2             And secondly, to satisfy Rule 89, it would have to be of some

 3     probative value, and it is the submission of the Prosecution that a

 4     statement of this nature of a witness who is speaking in 2007 about some

 5     events in 1999 could have no real probative value as to be admissible

 6     under Rule 89(C).

 7             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you, Mr. Stamp.

 8             MR. STAMP:  Thank you, Your Honours.

 9             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Djurdjic.

10             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Part of the jurisprudence of this

11     Chamber contradicts Mr. Stamp because we admitted a letter sent by Madam

12     Louise Arbour to President Milutinovic, and Madam Arbour was not a

13     witness in this trial either.  This is P1511 in our case.

14             JUDGE PARKER:  What was the purpose of the admission of that

15     letter, Mr. Djurdjic?

16             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] What was the purpose, I don't

17     know.  I think that this was admitted through a bar table motion, not

18     through a witness.  This was something I could find now doing a rush

19     job --

20             JUDGE PARKER:  There are a variety of situations in which a

21     letter may become admissible, but what we are dealing with here is a

22     letter, the only relevance of which could be proof of the contents of the

23     letter as representing the situation in 1998 and 1999.  It's a letter

24     that was not sent at that time to any official in the Government of

25     Serbia.  It was a letter sent some eight, nine years later to the head of

Page 10248

 1     the government of another country.  And it happens that out of personal

 2     relationship, a copy came into the hands of Mr. Jovanovic.  That doesn't

 3     lend any substance or verification to the truth and reliability of what

 4     is set out in the letter by the author of the letter.  That's why I

 5     checked with you that it's not proposed by you to call as a witness the

 6     author of the letter.  In the absence of that, I do not see how this

 7     document could properly be admitted into evidence in this trial.

 8             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, had we been able to

 9     secure the presence of the witness we wanted to bring here very much

10     Mr. Hartwig, then yes we would have tendered this letter into evidence

11     through him, but due to his health condition, he was unable to come and

12     testify for Defence.  And given all the circumstances that you just

13     enumerated, it is our position that you will be able best to assess the

14     value of this -- probative value of this letter.

15             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.

16                           [Trial Chamber confers]

17             JUDGE PARKER:  In the view of the Chamber, Mr. Djurdjic, the

18     document, the letter, in 2007 is not admissible on any present basis for

19     the purposes of this trial.

20             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] D008-4364.

21        Q.   Tab 25, Mr. Jovanovic, for you.  This is 991 Defence 65 ter

22     document.  Mr. Jovanovic, this is a report from a check-point dated 13th

23     of November, 1998, outpost of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, report.

24             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we see the second page of

25     this document.

Page 10249

 1        Q.   Could you please give us your comment -- but it seems that I have

 2     made a mistake.  It should be page 2 in the English.  Could you comment

 3     on item 3.

 4             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we see item 3 from the

 5     beginning, please.

 6        Q.   Yes, please go ahead.

 7        A.   In item 3 they discuss the statement of the OSCE chairman,

 8     Mr. Geremek, who stated that he was concerned for further developments in

 9     Kosovo and Metohija and also estimated that March 1999 would be decisive

10     for Kosovo and Metohija.  And following that, you see the reaction of the

11     Italian Ambassador, Mr. Sessa, who says that he did not understand such a

12     statement of Mr. Geremek because one needed to look at the situation as

13     it was without going into what was going to happen in March.  This

14     statement by Geremek could probably be dated to the first half of

15     November when he said that March would be a crucial month for the

16     situation in Kosovo and Metohija.

17        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Jovanovic.

18             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I tender this document into

19     evidence, Your Honour.

20             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00475.

22             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now see D008-4368, 65 ter

23     992.

24        Q.   Tab 26 in your binder, Mr. Jovanovic.

25        A.   Yes.  This is written communication between the outpost of the

Page 10250

 1     Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Pristina and the headquarters in Belgrade

 2     dated the 14th of November, 1998.  In this letter they convey the request

 3     of the head of the KVM, Mr. Walker, to meet with the president of FRY on

 4     the 15th of November at 1500 hours in Belgrade.  So this request is from

 5     the 14th, and the request was for Walker to be -- to meet with President

 6     Milosevic on the 15th at 1500 hours.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  It would be interesting to have you explain to us who

 8     was the counterpart of Mr. Walker in him discharging his duties in Kosovo

 9     and Metohija.  Who was his counterpart on the Yugoslav side and then who

10     was his superior within the OSCE framework?

11        A.   From the point of view of normal, regular, diplomatic framework,

12     Mr. Walker would communicate in Kosovo and Metohija with the head of the

13     outpost of the foreign affairs ministry in Pristina and also high state

14     officials who were located in Kosovo and Metohija.  As for Belgrade, in

15     accordance with the regular diplomatic practice, he would normally meet

16     with the assistant minister of foreign affairs in charge of multi-lateral

17     relations with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  And as for

18     Mr. Walker's superior, that was the chairman of the OSCE at the time

19     foreign affairs of -- minister of Poland, Mr. Geremek.

20        Q.   Thank you.

21             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I tender this document into

22     evidence, Your Honour.

23             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00476.

25             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] D008-4380, which is 996 on the

Page 10251

 1     Defence 65 ter list.

 2        Q.   Your tab 27, Mr. Jovanovic.  Briefly, please, can you tell me

 3     what steps were taken by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs -- just a

 4     moment, please.  This is a note from the foreign affairs outpost in

 5     Kosovo and Metohija dated the 18th of November.

 6        A.   In this note we can see what was done by the Government of the

 7     Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in order to facilitate the work of the

 8     OSCE mission in Kosovo and Metohija and make it more efficient.  You can

 9     see what elements of the government were involved in this effort to have

10     the OSCE mission deployed as soon as possible and in order to have it

11     operational as soon as possible.  Let me just add that Ambassador Zoran

12     Veljic who was in charge of these talks was prior to that and also later

13     head of protocol within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the federal

14     state.

15        Q.   Thank you.

16             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we have this admitted into

17     evidence, please.

18             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00477.

20             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] D008-4372, please, 1048 on the 65

21     ter Defence list.

22        Q.   Your tab 28, Mr. Jovanovic.  This is a note from the Ministry of

23     Foreign Affairs from the 20th of November, 1998, and it deals with the

24     talks between Mr. Sainovic and Bo Pellnas, head of the OSCE office in

25     Belgrade.  Could you please explain the first paragraph of this letter.

Page 10252

 1        A.   Mr. Bo Pellnas was head of the OSCE liaison office with the

 2     government and authorities of Yugoslavia and Serbia in Belgrade.  And in

 3     the absence of Ambassador Walker, head of the KVM, Mr. Sainovic lodged a

 4     protest with Mr. Pellnas in relation to the latest developments in Kosovo

 5     and Metohija, and he asked him to convey that protest to the leadership

 6     of OSCE in Vienna.  Deputy Prime Minister Sainovic illustrated this

 7     situation, giving the reasons for lodging the protest, and the reasons

 8     were the killings and kidnapping of civilians of Albanian and Serbian

 9     ethnicity as well as constant attacks on policemen, which clearly

10     represented huge losses and also endangered the political process.

11             Sainovic also pointed out that a false balance was being

12     established in various violations of accepted agreements and that law

13     enforcement officials, state officials, were treated in the same way as

14     terrorists who were attacking the state and its organs.

15        Q.   Thank you.

16             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we have this admitted into

17     evidence as well.

18             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00478.

20             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now see D1234, please,

21     which is 504 on the 65 ter list of the Prosecution.

22        Q.   Mr. Jovanovic, this is tab 29 in your binder.

23        A.   This is official informative note of the foreign affairs outpost

24     in Pristina on the talks between William Walker and the Army of

25     Yugoslavia General Loncar.

Page 10253

 1        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Jovanovic.  This is quite a long document, so I

 2     will just ask for certain parts of it.  Page 3 in English and page 2 in

 3     the Serbian version.  Page 2, paragraph 2, somewhere in the middle.

 4     Could you please comment this portion.

 5        A.   Loncar gave a proposal to Ambassador Walker as the head of the

 6     KVM mission to step-up verifications in the Pec, Pristina, Prizren,

 7     Podujevo, and some other places where there is an increased delivery of

 8     weapons from Albania and where also more intensive terrorist attacks were

 9     observed.  He further points out that the terrorists in Kosovo and

10     Metohija receive from abroad, mostly from Albania, standard weaponry plus

11     some modern weaponry including rocket-launchers, black arrows, and

12     similar systems.  He further warns that such weapons delivery goes

13     against the goals and objectives to which the Government of Yugoslavia

14     and OSCE were committed.  This is why it was in the joint interest to put

15     an end to such activities, to put an end to further supply of weapons and

16     other encouragement of terrorists in Kosovo and Metohija which was in

17     accordance with the requests of the Security Council of the UN.

18             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now have page 4 in the

19     English and page 3 in the Serbian version.

20        Q.   Under item 2, Mr. Kotur says something.  Could you comment on

21     this, please.

22        A.   Mr. Kotur emphasized that co-operation with the KVM is ongoing

23     and should be developing in accordance with the signed agreement on the

24     establishment and the terms of reference of the KVM and that the Yugoslav

25     side remains committed to consistent application of the signed agreement,

Page 10254

 1     nothing more or nothing less of what had been agreed upon.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Were there any requests at that time, and you may

 3     know of such on the part of the KVM, which surpassed the agreement or

 4     what was regulated by the agreement?

 5        A.   Yes, there was such requests.  I remember quite well that the

 6     bulk of the energy and the time was spent working on requests to enable

 7     the KVM to use their own aircraft, more specifically helicopters, and to

 8     allow the use, or rather, carrying of weapons for the security detail of

 9     the head of the mission in Kosovo and Metohija.

10        Q.   Thank you very much, Mr. Jovanovic.

11             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] We are going to come to some

12     documents which deal with that, but in the meantime I would like to

13     tender this into evidence, please.

14             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00479.

16             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Let's take a look at

17     document 65 ter 1236.  That would be 507 on the Prosecution's 65 ter

18     list.

19        Q.   Mr. Jovanovic, this is a report dated 25th of December, 1998,

20     coming from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs's outpost in Pristina

21     concerning Mr. Sainovic's talks with Mr. Walker, head of the KVM.  Let's

22     see page 2 of the English version, please, and that would be page 1 on

23     the Serbian.  Please take a look at the segment just below the mid-point

24     line discussing that he was -- he expressed regret about the

25     co-operation, et cetera.

Page 10255

 1        A.   As I already stated, quite a number of meetings, quite a lot of

 2     energy and time were expended to meet the requests of the KVM which

 3     surpassed the framework of the agreement, and this document demonstrates

 4     that Mr. Nikola Sainovic expressed his regrets to Ambassador William

 5     Walker that the co-operation between the KVM and the competent Yugoslav

 6     and Serbian institutions was undergoing in the light and under the

 7     pressure on the basis of such unjustifiable requests such as the requests

 8     to use helicopters and to bear arms on the part of OSCE personnel.

 9        Q.   Thank you very much, Mr. Jovanovic.

10             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I move to tender this document

11     into evidence, please.

12             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be D00480.

14             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Now let's please see D004-0145.

15     That would be 65 ter 1229 on the Defence list.

16        Q.   That would be tab 31 in your binder, Mr. Jovanovic.  This is an

17     outpost report on talks of deputy Federal Prime Minister, Mr. Sainovic,

18     with the Deputy Head of Mission, Mr. Keller, Ambassador Keller, which

19     took place on the 6th of January, 1999, and the report is dated the 7th

20     January 1999.

21             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Let's please move to page 3 in

22     English and page 2 in Serbian.

23        Q.   You see the beginning under the dash on the second page, the

24     first sentence, could you please comment on the state of affairs during

25     that period in Kosovo and Metohija at the time of these talks.

Page 10256

 1        A.   Mr. Sainovic informed French ambassador, Mr. Keller, deputy head

 2     of the KVM, on the detrimental effects to the general climate which were

 3     result of an explosive device being thrown at a cafe in Pristina, which

 4     resulted in deaths of several young men, Serbs.  He demanded that the

 5     OSCE react more promptly and energetically, first and foremost in terms

 6     of them being faster to respond and to arrive to the crime scene whenever

 7     crimes were perpetrated against Serbian civilians or representatives of

 8     Serb authorities there.

 9             Furthermore, Mr. Sainovic highlighted the amassment of weapons

10     and the fact that such weaponry is being modernised in the area of

11     Podujevo, which is close to Albania.  He also states that in other areas,

12     such as the area of Pec and the area of Pristina, there were -- there was

13     unrest there and that the consequences of weapons being amassed are that

14     regular citizens are being more and more upset about the situation,

15     uneasy, and that the conditions for political dialogues were being

16     deteriorating.

17        Q.   Let's going to Serbian page 3 and English page 4.  Under item 2

18     you can see what Mr. Keller said.  I would like to hear what you know

19     about that, and if you could offer your comments.  That would be sentence

20     number three in that paragraph.  The sentence is:

21             "He confirmed that the departure of Serbs ..." et cetera.

22        A.   As a consequence of more frequent terrorist actions, such as the

23     placement of explosive devices in cafes, in other public places, there is

24     more and more Serb civilians in Kosovo and Metohija who leave their

25     settlements, and Mr. Keller characterised that as ethnic cleansing of the

Page 10257

 1     Serbs, and he was deputy head of the KVM.

 2             MR. DJURDJIC: [Microphone not activated]

 3             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone for the Defence counsel, please.

 4             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I move to tender this into

 5     evidence.

 6             Now let's take a look at D008 --

 7             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00481.

 9             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Let's take a look at D008-4547.

10     That would be Defence 65 ter document 1014.

11        Q.   And tab 32 in your binder, Mr. Jovanovic.  Could you please

12     explain what this document represents in terms of the functioning of your

13     organs.

14        A.   Each visit of Yugoslav representatives abroad or to international

15     organisations could have been effected only after the federal government

16     or other institutions had adopted a platform for the Yugoslav

17     delegation's work abroad.  So -- and each such visit would be documented

18     in the form of a note or a report on the talks held by the Yugoslav

19     delegation with representatives of international organisations or foreign

20     states.  This is an information on the talks of the federal government's

21     representatives with the European Commission officials and Belgian

22     representatives.  And this is just one of the activities of the foreign

23     affairs ministry and the federal government and the conclusions of such

24     and results of such meetings.

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 10258

 1             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I move to tender this into

 2     evidence, please.

 3             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00482.

 5             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Now let's take a look at, please,

 6     D008-4495.  That would be 1007 on the 65 ter list.

 7        Q.   This is a report on the visit of Sadako Ogata high Commissioner

 8     for Refugees of the UN.  And that is dated, if we -- this is dated 6th of

 9     January, 1999.  Let's take a look at page number 2 in English and page

10     number 3 in Serbian.  Just a second, please.  Please focus on item 2 --

11     no, that's in English, page 2, that's okay.

12             Item 2, Mr. Jovanovic, could you offer your comments, please, on

13     that paragraph.

14        A.   What is evidence -- evident from this report on Madam Sadako

15     Ogata's meeting is that Serbia sent several types of aid amounting to

16     $150 million US to relieve the grave humanitarian situation in Kosovo and

17     Metohija, and that an additional 87 villages inhabited by both Serbs and

18     others had been ethnically cleansed of Serbs, and those 87 villages had

19     become exclusively Albanian.  It is also said that openness of Yugoslavia

20     and Serbia is reaffirmed for an immediate launch of political dialogue to

21     at least reduce or put an end to terrorist attacks --

22        Q.   Mr. Jovanovic, that would be page -- next page in your binder in

23     the Serbian version.  What I'm referring to are pages in the e-court.

24        A.   Madam Ogata, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, among others,

25     visited Pec, Dragobilje, and Prizren.  What is being stated is that the

Page 10259

 1     number of internally displaced persons had dropped significantly, that

 2     there was no humanitarian catastrophe.  She pointed out that she had no

 3     objection with respect to the freedom and security of movement of the

 4     population.

 5        Q.   Thank you very much, Mr. Jovanovic.

 6             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I move to tender this document

 7     into evidence, please.

 8             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00483.

10             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Mr. Jovanovic, we've seen several documents making reference to

12     requests of the KVM to use helicopters and to carry personal weapons or

13     side-arms.  Was that in keeping with the agreement that you signed with

14     Ambassador Mr. Geremek?

15        A.   That fell outside the scope of the agreement.  The use of

16     aircraft in the territory of any sovereign state is regulated exclusively

17     by an express bilateral agreement or by provisions on that of some other

18     agreements in terms of security aspects, et cetera.  With respect to the

19     side-arms, that also fell outside the scope of the agreement because the

20     OSCE's mission was civilian and there was an express provision that -- to

21     the effect that the federal government of Yugoslavia would be providing

22     security and guaranteeing the security and safety of the verifying

23     officers in its territory.  Let us add that the federal government, since

24     it was feeling constant pressure on the issue of the helicopters, offered

25     to Mr. Walker Yugoslav civilian or other helicopters and Yugoslav airmen

Page 10260

 1     to be available 24/7 to Mr. Walker or to mission personnel for the

 2     purposes of verification.  But despite repeated offers by the Yugoslav

 3     side, Mr. Walker, Mr. Drewienkiewicz, and others kept on insisting on

 4     using their own helicopters and using their side-arms.

 5        Q.   Thank you very much, Mr. Jovanovic.  Who was authorised within

 6     the OSCE to request amendments to the agreement that was reached?

 7        A.   Only one of the signatories was authorised to do that in

 8     accordance with their internal procedures.  So only OSCE or Yugoslavia

 9     could have done it in accordance with their internal regulations.

10        Q.   Did OSCE ever launch such an initiative to amend the agreement?

11        A.   No, it was never done, either in writing or verbally such

12     initiative was never launched.

13        Q.   Thank you.

14             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now see D008-43 -- 4203.

15        Q.   Mr. Jovanovic, this is the foreign affairs ministry note dated

16     the 5th of January, 1999, on the talks between Sainovic and Austrian

17     President Heinz Fischer and minister of foreign affairs, Wolfgang

18     Schussel.  These talks were held in Vienna on the 4th of January, 1999.

19     On the first page of this document, what do they say, what was the

20     situation like?  This is at the end of the page in the English.

21        A.   The assessment of the Government of Yugoslavia at the time was

22     that the leadership of Kosovo Albanians did not accept political dialogue

23     and that it wasn't just their position, as it seemed at first glance, but

24     also that their position of refusing political dialogue was also

25     something that was effected and that came into being under the influence

Page 10261

 1     of international political factors.  In order to stabilise this and to

 2     facilitate political dialogue, Yugoslavia through bilateral contact

 3     attempted to secure a support from other European, American, and

 4     international partners for political dialogue.  This is one of the visits

 5     illustrating this effort on the part of Yugoslavia to win support of

 6     important countries and important partners in order to exert some

 7     pressure on Albanian leadership, to accept political dialogue as the only

 8     avenue for reaching a political solution.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Now, could we, please, turn to the last page in your

10     version, which is page 3 in the English version.  And could you now,

11     please, comment on this portion where Mr. Schussel says that on behalf of

12     the EU he promises to do everything to bring to negotiations the Albanian

13     side.  So please tell us, what was the situation like when it comes to

14     involving the Albanian side in negotiations, and what did Serbia do in

15     order to secure their presence in order to reach a political settlement?

16        A.   Representatives of Kosovo Albanians practically sabotaged all

17     efforts on the part of the Government of Serbia and Government of

18     Yugoslavia to have the political dialogue commence unconditionally and

19     without any further delay.  The assessment was that Kosovo Albanians and

20     their representatives were not interested in a compromise or in a

21     political settlement that would be in accordance with the positions of

22     the Security Council of the UN on sovereignty and territorial integrity

23     of Yugoslavia and Serbia or in the essential autonomy of Kosovo and

24     Metohija.  They simply accepted the tactics of delay, the tactics of

25     rejecting dialogue, awaiting a moment when somebody would bring them

Page 10262

 1     their statehood on a plate, if I may say so.  This is a meeting, this is

 2     a dialogue, in which Austria, as a neighbour of Serbia and as an

 3     influential member of the European Union, undertook a certain kind of a

 4     diplomatic obligation to ensure the presence of Albanians at

 5     negotiations, to convince Albanians that it was in their interest to

 6     accept these urgent negotiations.

 7        Q.   Thank you.

 8             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I move to have this admitted into

 9     evidence.

10             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00484.

12             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we see D008-4524, which is

13     1229 on Defence 65 ter list.

14        Q.   This is tab 36 in your binder, Mr. Jovanovic.  We're interested

15     in chronology.  This is the basic position for the talks held by the

16     federal government.

17        A.   What position and what initiative will be put forward by the

18     representatives of the Yugoslavia in their contacts with representatives

19     of other countries and of international organisations was not a personal

20     matter for them to decide upon personally, no.  These issues were

21     determined by the federal government, and their -- its representatives

22     are duty-bound to use it in their contacts with representatives of

23     foreign government in order to achieve the goals set by the government.

24        Q.   Thank you.

25             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I tender this into evidence as

Page 10263

 1     well.

 2             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, that will be Exhibit D00485.

 4             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now see D008-4711, 1050

 5     on our 65 ter list.

 6        Q.   Which is your tab 35, Mr. Jovanovic.  Briefly, please, this

 7     document is from the 21st of January.  This is a letter sent by the

 8     federal government to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  You mentioned

 9     this in passing just now.  This is binder 35, please -- tab 35 in your

10     binder.

11        A.   This is a conclusion of the federal government which accepted the

12     platform and the programme for the visit of a delegation headed by

13     Sainovic to Sweden and Denmark from 18th to 20th of January, 1999.

14        Q.   Thank you.

15             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we have this admitted into

16     evidence, please.

17             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00486.

19             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] D228, please.

20        Q.   37 in your binder, Mr. Jovanovic.

21        A.   This is a protest note of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs

22     sent to the OSCE mission in Kosovo and Metohija due to an incident at a

23     border crossing caused by the OSCE representatives --

24        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Jovanovic.  We can read that.  I'm interested in

25     this:  So this was a protest that was formally lodged in writing.  Have

Page 10264

 1     you ever received any protest from KVM or OSCE in relation to the

 2     agreement on verification during their stay in Kosovo and Metohija?

 3        A.   No, we never received such protest.

 4        Q.   Thank you.

 5             MR. DJURDJIC: [Microphone not activated]

 6             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

 7             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   I would now like to move to a different topic, namely,

 9     Rambouillet negotiations.  Mr. Jovanovic --

10             JUDGE PARKER:  Are you tendering this last document?

11             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, it's already in

12     evidence in our case, D228.

13             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.

14             MR. DJURDJIC: [Microphone not activated]

15             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please, for counsel.

16             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Mr. Jovanovic, did you personally participate in Rambouillet

18     negotiations, Mr. Jovanovic?

19        A.   No.  At the time I was not in Rambouillet, and incidentally there

20     were no negotiations held there anyway.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Tell us, please, how was the delegation of the FRY

22     and Serbia set up for Rambouillet negotiations?

23        A.   It was a joint Yugoslav-Serbian delegation that was set up by the

24     Government of Serbia and Government of Yugoslavia.  It was headed by

25     Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia, Professor Ratko Markovic, and the

Page 10265

 1     delegation comprised officials mostly from Serbian authorities.  As for

 2     the representatives of the federal government, there were two deputy

 3     prime ministers of the federal government, Professor Kutlesic and

 4     Professor Sainovic.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Mr. Jovanovic, can you tell us, please, do you know

 6     what were -- what was the mandate of our delegation?

 7        A.   This Yugoslav-Serbian delegation had a mandate to negotiate

 8     directly with the representatives of the Albanian national minority in

 9     order to achieve a compromise, a political and peaceful settlement which

10     would be based on the resolutions of the UN Security Council and the

11     agreement, final act of the OSCE, and which would be based on the right

12     to equality of all ethnic communities and all citizens in Kosovo and

13     Metohija.  These solutions were to represent the broadest autonomy of

14     Kosovo within the framework of Serbia and based on respect for

15     sovereignty and territorial integrity of Serbia and Yugoslavia.

16             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now please see D008-2666.

17        Q.   Which is tab 38 in your binder, Mr. Jovanovic.  This is a

18     statement of our delegation.  This is D004-2666.  So this is a statement

19     of our delegation from the 11th of February, 1999.  I'm interested in

20     paragraph 1, where it says:

21             "The delegation accepts the following general elements set by the

22     Contact Group ..."

23             Tell me, please, were these ten principles of the Contact Group

24     negotiable, could they negotiate on it?

25        A.   No, this was not negotiable.  The Serbian and Yugoslav delegation

Page 10266

 1     faced a boycott of the negotiations in Rambouillet.  These negotiations

 2     simply failed to commence, and in order to jump-start negotiations and to

 3     make a breakthrough in the stalemate, our delegation proposed that the

 4     two delegations signed to these basic principles set by the Contact Group

 5     and to use this as a basis to commence negotiations in order to implement

 6     them.

 7        Q.   Thank you.

 8             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we have this admitted into

 9     evidence, please.

10             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that would be Exhibit D00487.

12             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Mr. Jovanovic, you told us that you did not personally

14     participate in these negotiations.  Could you tell me what was the role

15     of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in organising these negotiations and

16     implementing them.  Briefly, please.

17        A.   The Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided technical and

18     administrative logistics for negotiations, but as I have mentioned to you

19     they were no negotiations because there were no direct dialogues between

20     the two relevant delegations.  There are some perceptions present that an

21     agreement was reached in Rambouillet.  An agreement presupposes some sort

22     of an accord between the two sides.  There was no accord, which means

23     there was no agreement.

24        Q.   Thank you.  We will have some further documents to look at and to

25     comment upon, but please tell me this:  In this mediation that took

Page 10267

 1     place, was there any effort to link up political agreement and

 2     implementation with the bringing in of foreign troops in the territory of

 3     Serbia and Yugoslavia, and was this something that they negotiated upon

 4     and reached an agreement on?

 5        A.   When it comes to events in Rambouillet, this was a very peculiar

 6     form of shuttle diplomacy under one roof.  The two delegations that came

 7     to negotiate there did not in fact negotiate; rather, the so-called

 8     international negotiators, Mr. Chris Hill, US ambassador; Mr. Petritsch,

 9     the Austrian ambassador; and a representative of the European Union; as

10     well as Mr. Mayorski, the Russian Federation ambassador, served as

11     mediators or facilitators between the two delegations staying in the same

12     palace.  There was no possibility of a breakthrough there of achieving

13     some progress because the two delegations never actually met.  However,

14     the tactics of the two out of three international negotiators was to

15     distribute the text of the so-called agreement to the Serbian delegation,

16     to feed it to them in small doses, to spoon-feed it to them.  So the

17     Serbian delegation, in fact, never received the entire proposal or the

18     entire draft agreement, so-called agreement.  No.  It was given to them

19     in small doses, bit by bit.  What was particularly peculiar was that the

20     two international negotiators practically concealed, until the very end,

21     their texts which pertained to the military presence and the military

22     components of international forces in Kosovo and Metohija, or rather, in

23     the territory of entire Yugoslavia.

24        Q.   Yes, we will come to that.

25             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Let's now take a look at

Page 10268

 1     D008-4567.  That would be 1018 on our 65 ter list.

 2        Q.   Briefly, Mr. Jovanovic, that would be tab 39.  Let's not waste

 3     time.  Please tell us, is this usual method of reporting, and it concerns

 4     report on the visit of Greek minister of foreign affairs, Mr. Pangalos on

 5     the 10th and 11th [as interpreted] of February, 1999?

 6        A.   Yes, this is the usual way of briefing the government on the

 7     results of each international visit received.

 8        Q.   Thank you very much.

 9             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this into

10     evidence, please.

11             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that would be Exhibit D00488.

13             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Now let's take a look at

14     D008-4589.  That would be 1020 on our 65 ter list.

15        Q.   Tab 40, Mr. Jovanovic.

16             These are positions of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs

17     submitted to the president of the federal government, Momir Bulatovic on

18     the 19th of February, 1999.  Could you please tell us the reasons for

19     drafting those positions and to explain those positions briefly, why they

20     were adopted and how?

21        A.   In mid-February 1999, public speculation abounded on military

22     presence by NATO forces in the territory of the Federal Republic of

23     Yugoslavia as a result of the Rambouillet agreement.  Even some alleged

24     accords from Rambouillet were being published in daily newspapers in

25     Albanian in Kosovo and Metohija.  And those texts contained solutions or

Page 10269

 1     proposals for a military presence of NATO in the territory of Yugoslavia.

 2     To curb such speculations and to explain the position of Yugoslavia

 3     against the deployment of NATO forces throughout its territory, the

 4     Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs drafted those positions and the

 5     federal government adopted them.

 6        Q.   Thank you very much.

 7             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I move to tender this into

 8     evidence, please.

 9             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that would be Exhibit D00489.

11             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Let's please take a look at

12     document 1280 on our 65 ter list and that would be 4001 on Prosecution's

13     65 ter list.

14        Q.   And that would be tab 41 in your binder.  Mr. Jovanovic, please

15     explain what this document is, and this is a letter dated the 5th of

16     March, 1999, by the President of Serbia, Milutinovic, and the Deputy

17     Prime Minister Markovic.  I would like you to comment paragraph 3 which

18     starts with the words "unfortunately," with respect to those alleged

19     agreements.

20        A.   As has been noted the head of the Serbian and Yugoslav delegation

21     was Professor Ratko Markovic, vice-president of the Serbian government,

22     but during the delegation's stay at Rambouillet, if I remember correctly,

23     President of Serbia, Mr. Milan Milutinovic, visited that delegation on

24     two or three occasions.  After such a visit, after an assessment had been

25     made that the Albanian side influenced or in concert with certain

Page 10270

 1     influential countries is sabotaging talks at Rambouillet, President of

 2     the Republic of Serbia, Mr. Milutinovic, decided to warn ministers of

 3     foreign affairs of the Contact Group of such things in writing, first and

 4     foremost he addressed the three -- the troika which managed the

 5     negotiations, which would be ministers of foreign affairs of the US, the

 6     UK, and France.  And this letter is the one that President of Serbia,

 7     Mr. Milutinovic, sent to those ministers warning them that the Albanian

 8     side was spreading news and speculations, rumours, that the agreement had

 9     been reached and that was about to be signed in the shortest possible

10     time.

11             Paragraph 3 on page 1 confirms that chapters 2, 5, and 7

12     regulating the military component and military presence of NATO in the

13     territory of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had been hidden away and not

14     disclosed and that the tactics at play boiled down to public pressure

15     being exerted against the Serbian side to accept those chapters which it

16     had not been informed upon at all.

17        Q.   Thank you very much.

18             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I move to tender this document

19     into evidence.

20             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that would be Exhibit D00490.

22             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Let's take a look at D008-4593.

23     That would be 1021 on our 65 ter list.

24        Q.   That would be tab 42 in your binder.  This would be a report on

25     your talks with Mr. Joschka Fischer, German foreign affairs minister,

Page 10271

 1     submitted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the federal government,

 2     talks were conducted on the 8th of March, 1999, in Germany.  Please turn

 3     to page 3, Mr. Jovanovic, of that agreement.  That would be page 7 in

 4     e-court.  Please comment this paragraph:

 5             "On behalf of the EU and the Contact Group," that would be

 6     paragraph 1 on the top of the page.

 7        A.   European Union and the Contact Group through an influential

 8     member, which Federal Republic of Germany was, confirmed that they were

 9     continually committed to peace in Kosovo, but also for Kosovo and

10     Metohija to remain within the boundaries of the Federal Republic of

11     Yugoslavia, that is, within the boundaries of Serbia.  They advocated an

12     opinion that the military presence was necessary.  I personally and my

13     side on that occasion handed over a written aide-memoire, it was a

14     document, that I handed over to Mr. Joschka Fischer, foreign minister of

15     the Federal Republic of Germany, entitled The Activities of Separatists

16     and Terrorists From Within the Territory of the Federal Republic of

17     Germany.  This document contained very specific and precise events and

18     activities which were illegal activities, launched from the territory of

19     Germany aimed at destabilising Serbia and Yugoslavia and to destabilise

20     Kosovo and Metohija through the funding, arming, and training of the

21     so-called KLA.

22        Q.   Thank you very much, Mr. Jovanovic.

23             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I move to tender this document

24     into evidence, please.

25             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

Page 10272

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00491.

 2             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes, Mr. Djurdjic.

 3             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I see that we are past the time

 4     for our break.  I have -- I need five minutes to admit two documents

 5     after the break.

 6             JUDGE PARKER:  We will have the break and you can be sure that

 7     you have not overlooked anything, and we will finish in the few minutes

 8     after we resume.  Thank you, Mr. Djurdjic.  We resume at a quarter past

 9     4.00.

10                           [The witness stands down]

11                           --- Recess taken at 3.47 p.m.

12                           --- On resuming at 4.18 p.m.

13             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Djurdjic.

14             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, before the witness

15     comes in, may I avail myself of this opportunity to say this.  You

16     instructed us yesterday to have this document MFI'd from French into

17     English.  We've done that.  We've requested a translation, and we've

18     repeatedly received an answer that there is no translation from one

19     official language of this Court to another official language of this

20     Court.

21                           [The witness takes the stand]

22             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] If the Chamber wishes to do so,

23     the Defence will take it upon themselves to have the document translated.

24     It would be no problem for us, an authorised translation, not a draft

25     translation.

Page 10273

 1                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 2             JUDGE PARKER:  We will not step on the corns of authority,

 3     Mr. Djurdjic.  We will read the document for ourselves in French.  Thank

 4     you.

 5             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.  There is

 6     a pot of money available to us, and we can make use of it to fund this

 7     translation into English.  That would be no problem.

 8             JUDGE PARKER:  No, don't bother.  Keep the pot of money for more

 9     useful purposes.

10             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

11             Let's take a look at document D008-4612.  That would be 1022 on

12     the Defence 65 ter list.

13        Q.   And tab 43 in your binder, Mr. Jovanovic.  These are minutes of

14     the 52nd meeting of the federal government, dated the 19th of March,

15     1999, and it is evident from the minutes that you attended that meeting

16     and makes reference to an information that you provided on the talks

17     about the Kosovo and Metohija situation at Rambouillet, Paris.  So please

18     briefly tell us something about your report and what was the main point

19     thereof.

20        A.   The gist of that report which I submitted to the federal

21     government is that the Serbian-Yugoslav delegation departed for

22     Rambouillet and Paris to achieve a peaceful political solution for Kosovo

23     and Metohija, but that the negotiations or, in other words, the meetings

24     or activities were discontinued against the wish of the Serbian and

25     Yugoslav delegation.  Here in my report what is laid down are an

Page 10274

 1     understanding of the reasons why no negotiations practically took -- had

 2     taken place in Rambouillet, and there is a section of the report on the

 3     withdrawal of the KVM from the territory of Kosovo and Metohija.  An

 4     important assessment is contained therein to the effect that the end of

 5     the meetings at Rambouillet and Paris were a result of developments which

 6     could not be ascribed in any way to Serbia and Yugoslavia and that those

 7     hinder the achievement of a political solution.  And on the other hand,

 8     those represented enormous public endorsement of separatism and terrorism

 9     of the KLA in Kosovo and Metohija.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Please go to page 2.  That would be page 5 in e-court

11     in the English version.  Mr. Jovanovic, please comment item 3.

12        A.   This item makes reference or is -- has to be construed in the

13     light of the so-called Act. Order, an unveiled threat against Yugoslavia

14     because of the Serbian-Yugoslav delegation is now being blamed for

15     failure to accept -- or that it has tried to dispute the Rambouillet

16     agreements.  I have to highlight the fact that no agreement was reached

17     at Rambouillet or Paris.  There were no negotiations.  There was not a

18     single working meeting of the two delegations, and I would like to say

19     that the international mediators were continually hiding the key elements

20     of the agreement from the Serbian-Yugoslav delegation, those which

21     concerned the deployment of NATO forces throughout the territory of the

22     Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

23        Q.   Let me interrupt you here and ask you about this Annex B in the

24     chapters 2, 5, and 7 of the implementation of the alleged agreement.

25     What that annex referred to and what kind of powers did it bestow upon

Page 10275

 1     NATO?

 2        A.   The chapters 2, 5, and 7 were virtually expressly empowered NATO

 3     to occupy the entire territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

 4     Let me cite you, if you allow me, Your Honours, two or three

 5     illustrations concerning that alleged agreement from Rambouillet.  One is

 6     that NATO is given the right to carry out manoeuvres, to bivouac, to

 7     transit through the territory, to use all transport communications and

 8     infrastructure for waterways, air traffic, road traffic, and railway

 9     traffic without seeking prior consent from the Serbian or Yugoslav

10     authorities and without any compensation for possible damage resulting

11     from the manoeuvres, exercises, or the presence of NATO troops in the

12     territory.

13             The second provision was that members of NATO or so-called

14     international military forces would be entitled to put behind bars any

15     citizen of Serbia or Federal Republic of Yugoslavia without any consent,

16     any decision by competent authorities, and that provision makes reference

17     only to the following situation.  Shortly after an arbitrary arrest of a

18     Yugoslav citizen, NATO would hand such persons over to the competent

19     authorities.  Such a provision entitling members or representatives of

20     foreign countries in the territory of federal Yugoslavia to more rights

21     than enjoyed by the domestic population is what can be deemed or termed

22     capitulation in international legal framework.

23             The third provision was that international military forces or

24     NATO in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would be

25     expressly entitled to take over and manage for an unlimited period of

Page 10276

 1     time of the overall electro-magnetic spectrum in Yugoslavia, which

 2     practically means that without prior announcement or without seeking

 3     anybody's approval or consent to use the installations of civilian TV,

 4     civilian radio network without limitation in time or space, to use the

 5     frequencies of the Ministry of the Interior, of the military, of the

 6     health system, of the utility companies.  So the entire electro-magnetic

 7     spectrum of the country, which is a national resource, may be taken by

 8     NATO without prior announcement, without seeking consent, without any

 9     limitations in space or time.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Just very briefly, item 4, the penultimate and

11     ultimate sentence, namely that the negotiations are being postponed if

12     FRY declared that they will not accept the agreements.

13        A.   This is a contradiction.  The first part says that the talks are

14     being postponed, and the second part says that the talks would not

15     continue unless - and this is a very interesting provision - because they

16     say the "Serbs," not Serbia or Yugoslavia, so unless the Serbs declare

17     that they accept the agreements.  So this is effectively an ultimatum.

18        Q.   Thank you.

19             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I ask that this document be

20     admitted into evidence, please.

21             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00492.

23             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now see D008-43629 --

24     4629, which is 1029 on the Defence list.  Could we see page 2, please.

25        Q.   We have conclusions of the federal government from the 19th of

Page 10277

 1     March.  Let me just repeat the number, D008-4629, 1025 on our 65 ter

 2     list, which is your tab 44.  Item 1 of the conclusions.  Were you

 3     informed about the evacuation of the KVM?

 4        A.   No.  The agreement was signed jointly by the OSCE and the Federal

 5     Republic of Yugoslavia.  This is an international legal document which

 6     was implemented by Yugoslavia bona fide.  So even though the agreement

 7     was an expression of accord between the two sides, we see here in this

 8     provision that this agreement was signed unilaterally without even

 9     notifying the other signatory.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Could you please comment on item 4 as well.

11        A.   Yes.  This is the position of the federal government that it

12     would protect the OSCE property in its territory in accordance with the

13     Vienna Convention on diplomatic relations.

14        Q.   Thank you.  And did the FRY and Serbia ensure safe withdrawal of

15     the KVM from the territory of Kosovo and Metohija?

16        A.   Serbia ensured all conditions and all -- provided all safety

17     measures for the work of the KVM and ensured that they could withdraw

18     without any hindrance, which is what they did.

19        Q.   Thank you.

20             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I tender this document into

21     evidence as well.

22             JUDGE PARKER:  Before we receive it, Mr. Djurdjic, the witness

23     may be able to help the Chamber.  This purports to be conclusions reached

24     by the federal government at a meeting, yet the report does not give the

25     date of the meeting.  It seems to be something that is prepared in

Page 10278

 1     anticipation.  It's a session held on blank March 1999.  Could you assist

 2     the Chamber with that, please, Mr. Jovanovic?

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, it is hard now to

 4     remember all the details, especially concrete dates, but knowing the

 5     situation at the time and the urgency of everything that was happening I

 6     think that this meeting was held either at the 19 -- either on the 19th

 7     or 20th at the latest.

 8             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Mr. Jovanovic, if I can assist, would you please look at the

10     first page.  There is a stamp there.  Can you see a date there?  Perhaps

11     that could assist us.

12        A.   The copy is illegible in the part where the date is and it's hard

13     for me to see it.  However, Your Honour, there is no doubt, if I may,

14     that this draft of conclusions or this proposal for conclusions was sent

15     to the federal government, as it says in the introductory portion on the

16     19th of March, most likely, 1999; and that the government received the

17     draft which is certified by the received stamp on the first page of the

18     document.

19             JUDGE PARKER:  The document will be received.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00493.

21             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now see D008-4783, 1058

22     on our 65 ter list.

23        Q.   Very briefly, during the aggression against the FRY, were there

24     any attempts, and what do you know about efforts to maintain contact with

25     representatives of the Albanian political parties which had not been

Page 10279

 1     engaged in terrorism?

 2        A.   Even though the war was on, the federal government and the

 3     Republic of Serbia did not abandon their efforts to achieve a peaceful

 4     political settlement with the representatives of Albanian minority in

 5     Kosovo and Metohija on the basis of compromise and abiding by all the

 6     principles of the Security Council.  This information on the talks held

 7     between Nikola Sainovic, Deputy Prime Minister of the federal government;

 8     and the political leader representing the moderate political option in

 9     Kosovo and Metohija, Ibrahim Rugova, is yet another illustration of these

10     constant efforts by the Government of Yugoslavia and Serbia.

11        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Jovanovic.

12             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] For the transcript, this is a

13     joint communique following the meeting held in Pristina between deputy

14     Federal Prime Minister, Sainovic, and Dr. Ibrahim Rugova from the 5th of

15     April, 1999.  I tender this into evidence, Your Honours.

16             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that would be Exhibit D00494.

18             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] D002-1730, 1251 on the 65 ter list

19     of the Defence.

20        Q.   This is a joint communique of the federal government and Serbian

21     government from the 6th of April, 1999.  Just very briefly,

22     Mr. Jovanovic, what can you tell us about it?

23        A.   This joint communique, even though it was joint, had been adopted

24     at the separate sessions of the federal government and Serbian

25     government.  It was previously harmonised between the two governments,

Page 10280

 1     and this reflects the constitutional relations between two subjects of

 2     the Yugoslav Federation in accordance with the constitution.  This

 3     communique is yet another example of efforts made during NATO aggression

 4     as well aimed at finding a peaceful political settlement.  And at finding

 5     an agreement with the representatives of the moderate factions, among

 6     whom was Ibrahim Rugova, yet again trying to reduce tensions and find a

 7     peaceful political settlement.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Thank you, Mr. Jovanovic.

 9             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I tender this document into

10     evidence, Your Honours.

11             JUDGE PARKER:  Do we know its date?

12             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I think that I said that it was on

13     the 6th of April, 1999.  That's the last page of the document, if we can

14     turn to that page, please.

15             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.  It will be received.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00495.

17             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Mr. Jovanovic, thank you for responding to the invitation of the

19     Defence to come and testify.

20             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] And, Your Honours, thank you for

21     allowing us to conclude our examination-in-chief.  I have no further

22     questions for Mr. Jovanovic.

23                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

24             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you very much, Mr. Djurdjic.  We will wait a

25     few moments while a technical problem with the transcript is dealt with.

Page 10281

 1                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

 2             JUDGE PARKER:  I am told the technical problem is affecting other

 3     courtrooms as well, so we will wait a few moments in the hope that it

 4     will be corrected.

 5             We are advised it may be some five minutes or so.  The Chamber

 6     will rise temporarily and return as soon as the equipment is functioning

 7     again.

 8                           --- Break taken at 4.48 p.m.

 9                           --- On resuming at 4.57 p.m.

10             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Stamp.

11             MR. STAMP:  Thank you very much, Your Honours.

12                           Cross-examination by Mr. Stamp:

13        Q.   And good afternoon, Mr. Jovanovic.

14        A.   [In English] Good afternoon.

15        Q.   In the course of your testimony here today you spoke about some

16     United Nations Security Council Resolutions, and it seemed that you're

17     advocating that they ought to be respected and complied with.  Is that

18     your position, that the United Nations resolutions ought to be respected

19     and complied with?

20        A.   [Interpretation] Yes.

21        Q.   One of them that you referred to specifically was Security

22     Council Resolution 1199 of September 1998, and that is D160.  And could

23     we go straight to paragraph 13 in both the English and the B/C/S.  You

24     see that paragraph calling upon the authorities of the FRY, among others,

25     to co-operate fully with the Prosecutor of this Tribunal?

Page 10282

 1        A.   Yes.

 2        Q.   What was your -- well, I could take it that your position is that

 3     this provision ought to be respected and complied with?

 4        A.   Yes.  The resolution -- according to the resolution of the

 5     Security Council, all decisions need to be implemented in their entirety.

 6        Q.   Do you recall giving a speech on the occasion of the 11th

 7     anniversary of the Socialist Party of Serbia in July 2001?

 8        A.   I don't remember the details.  At the time there were numerous

 9     speeches that I held, there were numerous occasions when I gave

10     statements.  And despite all my efforts, I'm unable to remember that

11     particular speech from July that you are mentioning.

12        Q.   Very well.  But in July 2001 you recall that you were the

13     president or acting president of the SPS?

14        A.   Yes.  For some time I was acting chairman of the SPS.

15             MR. STAMP:  Could we look at 65 ter 06021.  This is taken from

16     the official ...

17             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Djurdjic.

18             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, my learned friend,

19     Mr. Stamp, asks that we see a document which was put on the list after

20     the witness started his evidence, or rather, after the Defence was banned

21     from having any communication with the witness.  So the witness is

22     completely unaware of this document.  And as for this first document, I

23     don't think we even have the Serbian translation, this particular

24     document that Mr. Stamp has just announced.  So we received in the night

25     between Sunday and Monday some two documents, and then yesterday while

Page 10283

 1     Mr. Jovanovic was testifying and today we received two documents as well.

 2     I have no objections to Mr. Stamp putting questions to Mr. Jovanovic in

 3     this manner, but putting such documents to the witness, especially

 4     untranslated documents, I think is improper.

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you, Mr. Djurdjic.  Clearly, untranslated

 6     documents are not usually convenient or fair.  We will see whether the

 7     witness has difficulty understanding the document; and if that is the

 8     case and that can't be overcome by oral quotation from it in the course

 9     of the hearing, we will have to make some other arrangements.  But for

10     the moment, please continue, Mr. Stamp.

11             MR. STAMP:  Thank you.

12        Q.   Mr. Jovanovic, do you read and speak English?

13        A.   I do.

14        Q.   The speeches including -- or in particular speeches delivered by

15     yourself as acting president of the SPS, the Socialist Party of Serbia,

16     were published on the official web site of the party.  You recall that

17     was the practice in 2001?

18        A.   No matter how I try, I cannot give you an affirmative answer to

19     that question because to tell you the truth, I never followed web sites.

20     Now, even though everything is hardly legible, very small font, I have to

21     tell you that this is not an official document, either an official

22     political or state document, nor is it an official SPS document.  And

23     please look at what's written under the heading.  It's a document of a

24     certain Miroslav Antic.

25        Q.   Mr. -- very well, very well --

Page 10284

 1        A.   And understandably, I do not want to be drawn into commenting on

 2     the documents which do not have a clear provenance.

 3        Q.   Very well, Mr. Jovanovic.  This document, I represent to you, was

 4     taken from the official web site of your party, and I want you -- and it

 5     purports to be a record of a speech you gave on that day.  And I'd like

 6     to show you a part of it and ask you if you recall making those

 7     statements.

 8        A.   By your leave, would you please take a note of the fact that this

 9     is a private document of Mr. Miroslav Antic, who I'm totally unfamiliar

10     with, either as a member of the SPS or either as a member of the

11     diplomatic corps.  I simply do not know this person.  I do not think it

12     would be fair from you to attempt to draw me into commenting upon the

13     content of the document, whose character and provenance are not entirely

14     clear.

15             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Djurdjic.

16             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] My learned friend, Mr. Stamp,

17     insists for the second time that this is a document of the Socialist

18     Party of Serbia.  I would kindly ask him to point us to a place in the

19     document where this can be seen.

20             JUDGE PARKER:  That, I suggest, is not going to be a useful use

21     of our time.  The course Mr. Stamp proposed is a proper and usual one, to

22     see whether the witness recalls saying words that are quoted in this

23     document.  If he does, there will obviously be some questioning

24     following; if he does not, the matter comes to an end for the moment.

25             Carry on, please, Mr. Stamp.

Page 10285

 1             MR. STAMP:  Thank you, Your Honours.

 2             If we could look at page 8 of the -- of this document.  Perhaps

 3     we could just go to the last two lines of page 7 and then return to page

 4     8.  And if it could be -- if we could pan in a little bit.  And then if

 5     we could move to page 8 at the top.

 6        Q.   In reference to Slobodan Milosevic and the fact that he was sent

 7     here for trial, this records you as saying that:

 8             " ...  the so-called trial they are preparing, whose farcical

 9     beginning indicates how it will proceed, cannot fool most people.

10     Virtually all Serbian people and a vast part of the real international

11     community knows that this stage-managed affair aims to justify the crimes

12     of NATO's leaders, especially the leaders of the former American

13     administration, crimes against peace and humanity."

14             Can you recall saying that, and speaking in particular to your

15     reference to the proceedings before this Tribunal as farcical and

16     stage-managed?

17        A.   No, I don't recall that.

18        Q.   Can you remember at any time describing the proceedings in

19     respect to Mr. Milosevic as stage-managed or farcical?

20        A.   No, I don't remember that.

21        Q.   Very well --

22        A.   May I observe something?  If I may, please.  It is true,

23     Mr. Prosecutor, that I would like to believe that I speak and write

24     English quite well, but that doesn't mean that I always believe in

25     translation of texts from Serbian in to English.

Page 10286

 1        Q.   Very well.  That's -- you had it in front of you in English and I

 2     read it so it was translated to you in Serbian.  You said -- your answer

 3     is you never -- or you have no recollection of saying that the -- these

 4     proceedings were stage-managed.

 5             MR. STAMP:  Could we look at page 15 of the same document.

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I would kindly ask

 7     that portions of this text not be quoted as a document.  This is a text,

 8     what I have in front of me, and from what I can see, it has 18 or so

 9     pages.  For me, this is no document, but rather a text of an

10     unestablished provenance.  And I'm afraid that it is not proper to quote

11     from that text.  It is not entirely proper.

12             MR. STAMP:

13        Q.   I'm only asking you if you remember.

14             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Jovanovic, the Chamber is well aware of the

15     point you have made or the points you have made, that this is not your

16     document, you say it is not an official document, it is a document on its

17     face prepared by somebody you do not know, it is a document in English

18     rather than what I would expect to be the language in which any speech of

19     this nature that you may have made would have been.  We're well aware of

20     all those things.  Nevertheless, what Mr. Stamp is doing is in accordance

21     with our normal and proper procedures, and we will take into account the

22     matters you've mentioned if any point emerges from what is now being

23     pursued that is of relevance to our decision in this case.  So if you

24     could please listen to Mr. Stamp's questions and answer them.

25             MR. STAMP:  Thank you, Your Honours.

Page 10287

 1             If we could just expand the top half a little bit.

 2        Q.   The question is simple.  Can you recall saying while you were

 3     president of the party in a speech, in any speech at any time, words to

 4     this effect:

 5             "Above all, this applies to persistence in demanding that

 6     responsibility be established for those who violated the Constitution,

 7     laws, moral and international rules in connection with the abduction of

 8     President Slobodan Milosevic.  The vast majority of Yugoslav people also

 9     demand abolition of The Hague Tribunal as an extended hand of NATO."

10             In particular, that the Yugoslav people were demanding the

11     abolition of this Tribunal, can you recall at any time saying that or

12     words to that effect?

13        A.   I cannot recall that.

14        Q.   Did you ever advocate the abolition of this Tribunal?

15        A.   No.

16        Q.   Very well.

17             MR. STAMP:  Your Honours, could this document be marked for

18     identity.

19             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be marked.  It will not be received as an

20     exhibit, Mr. Stamp.

21             MR. STAMP:  Very well, Your Honour.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P01517, marked

23     for identification.

24             MR. STAMP:

25        Q.   Do you recall saying at any time that the circumstances

Page 10288

 1     surrounding the transfer of Mr. Momcilo Krajisnik to this Tribunal were

 2     such that the Tribunal should be abolished?

 3        A.   No, I don't remember that.

 4        Q.   Could we quickly, just to see if it might refresh your memory,

 5     look at 65 ter 0602 -- 06020, I think.  This is a press report, as you

 6     can see, Mr. Jovanovic.  And it says that you sent a letter to the UN

 7     Security Council around April 2000 in which you said that this Tribunal

 8     should be abolished as "a creation unfounded in law."

 9             Firstly, do you recall sending a letter to the Security Council

10     in 2000?

11        A.   I cannot remember sending such a letter because during the NATO

12     aggression against Yugoslavia, the ministry which I headed sent dozens

13     and dozens of letters and various written initiatives, if not hundreds of

14     them --

15        Q.   Very well --

16        A.   -- we sent it moth to the Security Council and --

17        Q.   [Previous translation continues]...

18        A.   -- numerous international organisations.  I have in front of me a

19     piece of news by the Belgrade television B92.

20        Q.   Yes, we understand that in your official capacity you would have

21     sent many letters.  I'm just asking you if you recall sending one in

22     which you said that Mr. Momcilo Krajisnik should be released?

23        A.   No, I have already replied that I do not recall that.

24        Q.   Very well.  Well, is it possible that you might have sent such a

25     letter and not remember?

Page 10289

 1        A.   I have replied by saying that I do not remember, and it's not an

 2     issue of being -- that being possible or not.  I simply do not remember

 3     sending such a letter to the Security Council.

 4        Q.   Very well, Mr. Jovanovic.

 5             MR. STAMP:  Your Honours, could this document also be marked for

 6     identity?

 7             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P01518, marked

 9     for identification.

10             MR. STAMP:

11        Q.   What's your present occupation, Mr. Jovanovic?

12        A.   I have been retired for several years now.  I work in certain

13     not-governmental organisations, however.

14        Q.   Are you still a member of the SPS?

15        A.   I am.

16        Q.   Do you occupy any position in the party?

17        A.   No.  No, I don't have any position.  I'm just an ordinary SPS

18     member.

19        Q.   Would I be correct in summarising your activities over the past

20     decade as being dedicated to defending the policies and activities of the

21     government that was in power in Serbia and in the FRY in 1999?

22        A.   Understandably, you can summarise at your own discretion these

23     activities that you are mentioning.  However, I wish to point out that in

24     all the offices I held, be it state or political offices, in my work I

25     was solely guided by the legitimate interests, state and national

Page 10290

 1     interests of Yugoslavia and members of the Yugoslav Federation.

 2        Q.   But you have spent the last ten years or so writing and giving

 3     speeches in which you have defended the conduct and the management of the

 4     Yugoslav government and the Serbian government in 1999?

 5        A.   It is true that I served as a minister of foreign affairs until

 6     December of 2000.  From that date on, I have not held any state office.

 7     I was a member of the parliament elected at the multi-party parliamentary

 8     elections.  I was a member of the parliament in the Federal Assembly of

 9     Yugoslavia, and I left that position at least five years ago.  From that

10     time on, I have held no political state offices and the activities that I

11     engage in, I do so in my capacity as an ordinary citizen, as a member of

12     non-party associations of citizens -- non-partisan and non-profit NGOs.

13        Q.   And the -- for the third time I'm going to ask you.  And the

14     activities that you're engaged in over the last few years involve making

15     statements in defence of the conduct of the Yugoslav government in 1999?

16        A.   I've defended and advocated the policy of the government in which

17     I was a minister understandably.  I was minister of foreign affairs, and

18     particularly I was engaged and responsible for the implementation of

19     Yugoslavia's foreign policy.

20             MR. STAMP:  Could we turn to another aspect of your persona.  If

21     we could have a look at D454.  This is the record of his testimony in the

22     Milutinovic case.

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 10291

 1   (redacted)--

 2             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Just a moment, Mr. Jovanovic.

 3             Your Honours, I have a very important procedural matter to

 4     discuss.  That section Mr. Stamp started discussing was provided in

 5     private session at the Milutinovic trial.  Shall I sit down or continue

 6     to explain the situation?

 7             JUDGE PARKER:  You say this passage is still the subject of an

 8     order of its -- Mr. Stamp is checking.

 9             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] If I may explain.  It goes for

10     questions about an investigation, and that stage of investigation is

11     secret pursuant to Yugoslav Criminal Procedure Act, and this is why the

12     testimony was given in private session.

13             MR. STAMP:  Yes, Your Honour, I do apologise.  It seems that that

14     is correct and that --

15             JUDGE PARKER:  Should we go into private session, and should we

16     redact?  Mr. Stamp?

17             MR. STAMP:  Very well.  Thank you, Your Honour.

18             JUDGE PARKER:  Two questions:  Should we go into private session

19     and should we redact?

20             MR. STAMP:  Yes, Your Honour.  Thank you very much.  I thought

21     these were statements or decision that had been made.  We should go into

22     private session.

23             JUDGE PARKER:  Am I to understand that perhaps from page 51, line

24     19 onward there should be redaction?

25             MR. STAMP:  Yes, Your Honour.

Page 10292

 1             JUDGE PARKER:  I think that's the passage that starts to quote

 2     from the transcript.  19 to 21 I think should be redacted.

 3             We will now then go into private session if you have further

 4     questions about this subject.

 5             MR. STAMP:  Yes, Your Honours.

 6             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.

 7                           [Private session]

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 10293











11 Pages 10293-10296 redacted. Private session.















Page 10297

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10                           [Open session]

11             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, we're back in open session.

12             JUDGE PARKER:  We will adjourn now and resume at 20 minutes past

13     6.00.

14                           [The witness stands down]

15                           --- Recess taken at 5.52 p.m.

16                           --- On resuming at 6.21 p.m.

17             MR. STAMP:  Your Honours, while the witness is being brought in,

18     might I just indicate that in the break I checked in respect to the

19     evidence that was given, that was given in private session in the

20     previous case, and it was not and it really should have been in open

21     session.  I had made a hasty check in court and I didn't realise -- I

22     didn't see where they had returned to open session before this testimony

23     was taken.

24                           [The witness takes the stand]

25             JUDGE PARKER:  Have you showed this to Mr. Djurdjic?

Page 10298

 1             MR. STAMP:  Yes, Your Honour.

 2             JUDGE PARKER:  Do you accept that position, Mr. Djurdjic?

 3             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I only wanted to warn

 4     the Chamber that that portion of the trial in the Milutinovic et al. case

 5     was private, and Mr. Stamp just told me that it was in relation with the

 6     documents used then.  If we can see what was being adduced and what was

 7     given in response to questions pertaining to those documents, whether

 8     that was under seal or not, I cannot say.  I just wanted to warn the

 9     Bench that some portions were under seal or in private session.  If

10     testimony can be given without publicating [as interpreted] the

11     documents, then I have no objection to that.

12             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Stamp, the Chamber would make orders reversing

13     the private session and making it public if we can be assured that there

14     is no infringement of the protective order made in the Milutinovic case.

15     Is that something that you would like to check overnight?

16             MR. STAMP:  Your Honours, I did check it and I thought it had

17     been resolved.  However, it is a matter of record because it is part of

18     the -- it is evidence of the witness which was received by 92 ter.  So I

19     could sort it out very clearly by another communication with the Defence

20     and we could advise the Court -- the Chamber --

21             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you very much.

22             MR. STAMP:  -- tomorrow.

23             JUDGE PARKER:  In the meantime, we will continue in public

24     session.

25             MR. STAMP:  Thank you, Your Honours.

Page 10299

 1        Q.   In October, I think on or about the 19th of October,

 2     Mr. Jovanovic, you were involved in talks with Mr. Geremek, and you

 3     signed an agreement with him, that is the -- that's October 1998.  Do you

 4     recall that?

 5        A.   Yes, in October 1998.

 6        Q.   Now, shortly after that, a few days after that, on or about the

 7     24th/25th of October, do you recall there being further negotiations with

 8     Mr. Milosevic, Mr. Wesley Clark, General Wesley Clark, General Naumann,

 9     and Mr. Milutinovic, resulting in an agreement sometimes referred to as

10     the Clark-Naumann agreement?

11        A.   No.

12        Q.   Do you know or recall that on or about the 24th or the 25th of

13     October 1998, Mr. Milosevic was involved in discussions with General

14     Clark and General Naumann?

15        A.   I personally do not recall when that was, but it is known to me

16     that the meeting between Milosevic and Clark did -- and Naumann did take

17     place.  However, as far as I'm concerned, those were talks with military

18     representatives which did not involve any particular obligation for me or

19     my ministry.

20        Q.   So you were -- you did not participate in those talks; is that

21     what you're saying?

22        A.   To be frank, I do not recall.  I do confirm that the

23     Milosevic-Clark-Naumann meeting did take place, but I cannot recall

24     whether I attended that meeting or not.

25        Q.   Well, do you recall that Mr. Djordjevic was present at those

Page 10300

 1     meetings?

 2        A.   For your information, I did not know Mr. Djordjevic at the

 3     time --

 4        Q.   Yes, but not whether you knew him.  Did you know of him?

 5        A.   No, no.  By the very nature of my position in the government, I

 6     was never involved in any military or police negotiations or

 7     arrangements, neither was my ministry involved in any way in such

 8     negotiations.

 9        Q.   Firstly, you knew that Mr. Djordjevic was the chief of the

10     police, the RJB, the public service department of the police, in 1998 and

11     1999?

12        A.   Yes, I do know that Mr. Djordjevic was head of the public

13     security department --

14        Q.   And --

15        A.   -- service.  But frankly, I cannot pin-point the period --

16        Q.   Very well --

17        A.   -- during which he held that position.

18        Q.   When did you first meet him, can you remember that?

19        A.   Excuse me, have you been listening to me while I was testifying?

20     I said that I do not know Mr. Djordjevic, neither did I know

21     Mr. Djordjevic at the time.

22        Q.   That's what I see here.  You said at line 23, page 60, that you

23     did not know Mr. Djordjevic at the time.  So I'm asking you whether at

24     any time thereafter you met him?

25        A.   No.  There were no official needs for us to meet.  I personally

Page 10301

 1     have never tried to establish private contacts and relations with anybody

 2     from the government structures.

 3        Q.   Very well.  So can I take it from your answer that you would not

 4     be able to tell us what his -- or let me ask you the question this way:

 5     Do you know what role he played in those negotiations in respect to the

 6     military and police deployments in Kosovo in October 1998?

 7        A.   I can only limit myself to the fact that from the public and from

 8     the media I knew that Mr. Djordjevic was the chief of the public

 9     security, but I really did not follow nor was it my duty in my capacity

10     as the foreign minister what were the negotiations in which

11     Mr. Djordjevic took part.

12        Q.   Very well.  We could move on then rather quickly to another

13     topic.  You -- did you visit Kosovo in 1998?

14        A.   No, I did not.

15        Q.   In 1999?

16        A.   No.

17        Q.   Okay.  We could move to another topic.  You said in your evidence

18     yesterday that as far as you were concerned or your conclusion as to why,

19     according to you, the representatives of the Kosovo Albanians rejected

20     negotiations in 1998 or rejected the call of President Milutinovic to

21     negotiate in 1998 was because they only were concerned about secession,

22     and you were shown a declaration of President Milutinovic dated the 18th

23     of March, 1998, that's D456, and also a statement of President

24     Milutinovic dated April 1998, that's D460, in which he made invitations

25     to them to participate in talks.  Can you recall that about the time when

Page 10302

 1     Mr. Milutinovic issued these public statements, there had been an assault

 2     by Serbian security forces on the home, the compound, of Adem Jashari?

 3        A.   I remember the Jashari incident, yes; however, I cannot establish

 4     a connection in time between the statements of the President of Serbia,

 5     Mr. Milutinovic, and the events relating to the Jashari incident.  I do

 6     not remember what happened before, what happened after, because my duty

 7     was to follow the positions of the constitutional institutions and the

 8     positions of the institutions and the president of the republic --

 9        Q.   Very well --

10        A.   -- that was politics for me.

11        Q.   Very well.  But, I mean, you expressed your opinion as to why the

12     leadership of the Kosovo Albanians did not answer or did not treat his

13     call to the table favourably was because they were interested in

14     secession.  Would you agree with me that if - and this is a hypothetical

15     question, but I'm sure that you can deal with it - that it would have

16     been difficult for the leadership of the Kosovo Albanians to be involved

17     in negotiations while at the same time there were serious allegations of

18     the security service -- security forces of the FRY killing women and

19     children or Kosovo Albanian women and children?

20        A.   Well, understandably you do not expect me to repeat an assessment

21     which I have already expressed, namely, what I said was not only my

22     personal assessment, it was an assessment of the government whose member

23     I was.  And if you allow me, let me just recall that separatism of the

24     Kosovo Albanians did not appear in 1998 nor in 1999.  The separatism has

25     deep roots in Kosovo and Metohija, roots that go back almost 100 years;

Page 10303

 1     and therefore, I can understand the arguments that you used and why it

 2     would be a very sensitive issue for Albanian representatives to accept at

 3     a certain moment --

 4        Q.   No, no, no, Mr. Jovanovic, please understand me, I'm making no

 5     argument, none at all.  I'm only asking a couple questions.  So please.

 6     Were you aware, Mr. Jovanovic, that just at about the time when

 7     Mr. Milutinovic made those calls for talks, Human Rights Watch had

 8     recorded grave crimes being committed against Kosovo Albanian civilians

 9     in the areas of Cirez and Likosane in Kosovo?

10        A.   I'm not aware of that assessment of Amnesty International --

11        Q.   Human Rights Watch --

12        A.   Human Rights Watch, yes, I'm not aware of that assessment, but of

13     course I cannot exclude that such an assessment was made.

14        Q.   And did you know Colonel Crosland from Britain?

15        A.   I did not know him personally, nor did I ever meet him.  But I

16     did hear that he participated as a witness in one of the cases before

17     this Tribunal.

18        Q.   Very well.

19        A.   You know, foreign military representatives in any country are

20     dealt by the defence ministries, and these foreign military

21     representatives have no regular contacts with the ministries of foreign

22     affairs except accidentally and sometimes not even accidentally.

23        Q.   Well, he observed, according to his testimony here, in the

24     summer -- that in the summer of 1998 the forces of the FRY and Serbia

25     were engaged in attacks which involved the use of excessive force against

Page 10304

 1     Kosovo Albanian civilians and their property.  Was that type of

 2     information, that type of protest, brought to the attention of the

 3     Ministry of Foreign Affairs?

 4        A.   It is possible that Mr. Crosland as a military envoy of his

 5     government intervened through the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs;

 6     however, I was not aware of his assessment of these events until now.  So

 7     as I understood, Mr. Crosland assessed that the forces of Yugoslavia in

 8     Kosovo used excessive force.

 9        Q.   Very well.  If you could bring up D361 or 388.  This was a

10     document that was shown to you yesterday.  This is just the document in

11     which -- or a document whereby the FRY government established the

12     commission of the federal government for co-operation with the OSCE

13     mission, which included or was headed by Mr. Sainovic and the other

14     members included yourself, Pavle Bulatovic, Momcilo Perisic, Mihalj

15     Kertes, Zoran Andjelkovic, Vlajko Stojiljkovic, to name a few persons who

16     are of interest to us.  Did this commission meet weekly?

17        A.   No.  I'm not aware that it would meet so frequently.  Actually,

18     apart from the setting up of the commission, my deputy, Ambassador Zoran

19     Novakovic, actually stood in for me in this commission.  He was the

20     deputy of the federal minister, and I wish to clarify that the minister

21     really has too many other obligations to -- he has to attend government

22     sessions and so on and so forth --

23        Q.   Yeah --

24        A.   He did not week meet on a weekly basis -- at least I think he did

25     not meet on a weekly basis.

Page 10305

 1        Q.   Your deputy Zoran Novakovic, he's also called Slana?

 2        A.   Zoran Novakovic.  No, Slana was one of my representatives in

 3     Kosovo and Metohija.  It is possible that Slana participated, but Velimir

 4     Slana was a member of the outpost of the Federal Ministry of Foreign

 5     Affairs in Kosovo and Metohija.

 6        Q.   So -- but you are saying that it's possible that he attended

 7     these meetings on behalf of the ministry?

 8        A.   Velimir Slana did not take part in these meetings because I

 9     suppose that the meetings were held in Belgrade, and Velimir Slana was in

10     Kosovo.  He was in Pristina.

11        Q.   Did your representative, Mr. Novakovic, Mr. Zoran Novakovic,

12     bring to your attention that there were protests being made by the KVM

13     about the use of excessive or indiscriminate force by the police and the

14     army in Kosovo?

15        A.   In principle, my deputy, Zoran Novakovic, reported to me about

16     the most important issues which were raised at the federal government

17     meetings, where he stood in for me, as well as in other working bodies of

18     the federal government, such as this commission.  The commission was a

19     working body of the federal government.

20        Q.   I know.  But you know Minister Stojiljkovic was here, and he was

21     the head of the -- or the political head of the police; and Mr. Perisic

22     was here from the army.  I'm just asking you:  Was it communicated to you

23     in foreign affairs that the police force and the army in Kosovo were

24     committing acts involving excessive force against the Kosovo Albanian

25     civilians?

Page 10306

 1        A.   You see, as for protests, in diplomacy that means primarily

 2     written protests and notes.  Written protests are always sent whenever

 3     there is anything of importance, whenever anyone wishes to emphasize the

 4     importance of an event or a fact.  If it is the excessive use of force,

 5     if there is violence committed against civilians, these are certainly

 6     important issues which fall under the category of formal protests, and in

 7     previous testimony we said that there were no protests from the

 8     verification mission, which was the key factor for the monitoring of the

 9     overall situation in Kosovo and Metohija.

10        Q.   All right.  Let me ask you the question a different way.  Did

11     Mr. Novakovic, is it, did your representative who attended these meetings

12     of this commission tell you that they discussed issues of the police

13     engaging in conduct that involved excessive force against Kosovo Albanian

14     civilians?

15        A.   No, I'm not aware of that.

16        Q.   You -- but you are aware, I take it, that in the Security Council

17     Resolutions that you were shown earlier in your testimony, the -- there

18     was reference to the excessive and indiscriminate force by the police and

19     army or the Serbian police and the VJ against Kosovo Albanian civilians?

20        A.   Yes.  I am aware of the complete contents of the resolutions of

21     the Security Council, including the item which you quoted.  I may add

22     that I was also aware of such accusations and such assessments that force

23     had been used excessively and that the Serbian leadership, including

24     President Milutinovic and the government, as well as other political

25     institutions, were aware of the criticism that force had been used

Page 10307

 1     excessively, but that there was no agreement about this issue.  There

 2     were various positions within the leadership of Serbia and Yugoslavia

 3     about what excessive force was.  So there was no single position of the

 4     international factors and the local domestic Serbian and Yugoslav

 5     factors.

 6        Q.   Very well.  Let's move on.  During the NATO campaign, were there

 7     meetings that you attended with Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Milutinovic on a

 8     weekly basis at Beli Dvor in Belgrade?

 9        A.   The meetings were held, I know that, and I did take part in most

10     of these meetings or I attended them.  I cannot confirm whether they were

11     held every week or not.

12        Q.   And did General Ojdanic attend?

13        A.   The composition was extensive, which means about ten leaders.

14     Whether General Ojdanic was there or not, I cannot remember --

15        Q.   But can you recall whether or not they had representatives of the

16     VJ or the MUP present at these meetings?

17        A.   Yes, I can tell you this.  The meetings with the representatives

18     of the army and the Ministry of the Interior were held separately from

19     these meetings.  These were separate meetings.

20        Q.   Very well.  In that period did you attend any meeting where

21     Mr. Stojiljkovic was present, that's the period of the NATO bombing?

22        A.   I have tried to answer your question.  I do not remember the list

23     of people who attended, the officials.  The only thing I can confirm is

24     that at all meetings that I attended were also attended by the President,

25     Slobodan Milosevic, and President Milan Milutinovic.

Page 10308

 1        Q.   Well, did you attend any meeting where the security situation in

 2     Kosovo was discussed and policy decisions made?

 3        A.   At the time the agenda most often included the military

 4     situation, the situation in the theatre of war, if I may put it that way,

 5     who was supposed to do what from within their area of responsibility.

 6     And of course I was always in charge of the obligations of the Yugoslav

 7     diplomacy, and I was not interested in the obligations of any other

 8     department.

 9        Q.   Can I take that as a yes, that you participated in meetings where

10     the situation in Kosovo - and that is what I'm asking you about - Kosovo

11     was discussed and policy decisions made with respect to the security

12     situation there?

13        A.   I'm afraid that this is an interpretation that is somewhat wider.

14     Political decisions concerning Kosovo and Metohija were only made at the

15     government meetings, primarily those of the Serbian government, because

16     in the Yugoslav system and practice, Kosovo was primarily linked with

17     Serbia.  So if you are suggesting that some strategic decisions were made

18     at informal meetings with President Milosevic, then I could not agree

19     with that.

20        Q.   Yeah, I think maybe by your answer, the way it is that you think

21     I'm suggesting or I'm arguing, I'm not.  I just want to know whether you

22     know about the decision-making apparatus of government in respect to the

23     use and application of force in Kosovo.  Did you participate in that?

24        A.   Am I to understand, Mr. Prosecutor, that you believe that the

25     government took decisions on using force against the civilian population?

Page 10309

 1     I wish to confirm that the government's policy, the policy of the

 2     governments of both Yugoslavia and Serbia, was to find a solution in

 3     Kosovo and Metohija only by peaceful, political means, through dialogue,

 4     and by respecting all human and all other rights of all minorities.  So,

 5     Mr. Prosecutor, I can only interpret what was the official policy because

 6     I was involved with the official policy.

 7        Q.   Yes, I know that.  There were thousands of police and army

 8     personnel in Kosovo.  Leadership decisions had to be taken in how they

 9     were supposed to be used.  I only want to know if you participated in

10     those decisions.  If you say yes, I have more questions; if you say no, I

11     would move on.

12             When decisions at a political level were being made in respect to

13     the use and deployment of troops and police in Kosovo, were you a

14     participant?  And I'm speaking about 1999.

15        A.   No.  That is a chain of command which goes from the Supreme

16     Command and the subordinate commands, whether that was the army or the

17     police.  So the minister of foreign affairs did not participate in making

18     any decisions relating to military or police aspects of the situation.

19        Q.   Thank you very much.

20             MR. STAMP:  Your Honours, I would like to move on to something

21     else, and I could wrap up in 10 to 15 minutes on our return tomorrow.  I

22     had hoped to complete the witness today, but there are just one or two

23     things.

24             JUDGE PARKER:  I think we should break now.  We can't go on

25     beyond 7.00 for physical reasons that you know here.  So we must adjourn

Page 10310

 1     and we continue tomorrow.  We sit again at 9.00 tomorrow morning, not in

 2     this courtroom, I believe.

 3             So we adjourn now until 9.00 tomorrow morning.

 4                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6.59 p.m.,

 5                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 27th day of

 6                           January, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.