Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 10466

 1                           Friday, 29 January 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.06 a.m.

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  Good morning and welcome back, Mr. Djordjevic.

 6             We are about to move to the next witness.  Could I mention a

 7     matter in respect of the decision of the Chamber concerning the witness,

 8     that is our decision of the 22nd of January.  There was a slippage

 9     between paragraphs 13 and 14.  In paragraph 13 we identified paragraphs

10     16 to 19 as not admissible.  In the following paragraph we failed to make

11     again the reference to paragraphs 16 to 19 in line 5.  We identified

12     paragraphs 9, 11, 14, that is, 11 to 14, but we did not mention again 16

13     to 19, and they should have been mentioned there.

14             I hope that that has not produced any confusion or

15     misunderstanding because of the clear reference in paragraph 13, but I

16     think it's best that it be identified and corrected now.

17             We could have the witness.

18                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

19             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, before we begin.

20             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

21             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] We have not redacted the witness

22     statement in this precise way, but we take upon ourselves to do that

23     during the weekend so that everything is put in order.  That is all I

24     wanted to say.  Thank you.

25                           [The witness entered court]

Page 10467

 1             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.

 2             Good morning, sir.

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.

 4             JUDGE PARKER:  Would you please read aloud the affirmation on the

 5     card shown to you.  If you would read it aloud.

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

 7     speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

 8             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.  Please sit down.

 9             Mr. Djordjevic has some questions for you.  Are the earphones not

10     fitting you suitably?

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] They're suitable.  Everything is

12     fine, just for me to adjust a little.

13             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.

14             Yes, Mr. Djordjevic.

15             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] Could I ask the interpreter that

16     my surname is Djordjevic and not Djurdjic.  Thank you.

17                           WITNESS:  SLOBODAN PETKOVIC

18                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

19                           Examination by Mr. Djordjevic:

20        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Petkovic.

21        A.   Good morning, Mr. Djordjevic.

22        Q.   I will be asking you some questions now as part of the Defence

23     case for our client.  Let me first ask you for your first and last name.

24        A.   My name is Slobodan Petkovic.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Tell me where and when you were born.

Page 10468

 1        A.   I was born on the 3rd of December, 1947, in Hum, municipality of

 2     Nis, Republic of Serbia.

 3        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Petkovic.  I would now like to ask you, have you

 4     made a statement beforehand in Belgrade to a certain investigator who was

 5     there to ask you for such a statement, do you remember that?

 6        A.   Yes, I did make a statement for the proceedings of

 7     Mr. Milutinovic et al. in Belgrade.

 8        Q.   Was that a statement of the 23rd of August, 2007?

 9        A.   Yes, I think that is the date.

10             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] Could the court usher, as has

11     already been the practice in this case, to provide the witness a hard

12     copy of the documents we will be showing him.  So could those documents

13     be given to the witness in a binder so that Mr. Petkovic can look at the

14     statement and confirm that that is the statement that he made earlier.

15             JUDGE PARKER:  Have you provided such a binder?

16             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] Yes.

17             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.

18             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

19        Q.   Will you please look at the document, it is marked with the

20     number 1 in the binder before you.  The statement is from the 23rd of

21     August, 2007, and it says that Mr. Ratko Djukanovic, investigator, took

22     this statement from you.  Is that that statement?

23        A.   Yes, it is.

24        Q.   Tell me, Mr. Petkovic, would you add or change anything in this

25     statement, or would you abide by that statement today, would you say

Page 10469

 1     absolutely the same as you said then?

 2        A.   I see that some paragraphs have been darkened, but as far as I

 3     can see at first glance I wouldn't change anything.

 4        Q.   To avoid any confusion, this is the decision of this

 5     Trial Chamber that certain things are unacceptable in this statement,

 6     either because they express an expert opinion or because they are

 7     irrelevant portions of the statement that do not apply to the territory

 8     of Kosovo and Metohija in the narrow sense.  So you absolutely agree that

 9     this is the statement you gave to the investigator in 2007 and that you

10     are familiar with it?

11        A.   Yes, with the observations that I just made.

12        Q.   Thank you.  We heard from you that you gave this statement as a

13     witness in the case against Milutinovic and others.  In the binder at the

14     end you will find a transcript of your testimony in the Milutinovic case.

15     Did you review this statement before coming here?

16        A.   After I was informed that I should come to be a witness in this

17     case, I did review and listened also to the transcript; and it is

18     faithful to what I actually said.  I have nothing to add.

19        Q.   What you find before you in the binder, the transcript, you can

20     confirm that that is what you actually said during your testimony in the

21     Milutinovic et al. case?

22        A.   If it is identical to what I heard and reviewed, then it is.

23             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, this witness

24     statement is marked D011-1661, and the transcript is marked D010-2503.

25     So I would like to tender the witness statement and which we will redact

Page 10470

 1     over -- during the weekend, and I will put it in the e-court.  And also

 2     for this transcript to be admitted into evidence.

 3             JUDGE PARKER:  The best course would appear, Mr. Djordjevic, to

 4     be that the statement will for the moment be marked for identification

 5     until you've been able to make the complete redaction, and it will then

 6     become an exhibit so that there's no confusion about what is admissible.

 7     And the transcript of evidence in the Milutinovic trial will be received

 8     immediately as an exhibit.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, the statement will be Exhibit

10     D00512, marked for identification; and the transcript will be Exhibit

11     D00513.

12             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

13             I shall now present a brief summary of what the witness will be

14     testifying about today.  When the NATO forces attack started against the

15     Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the witness was chief of the

16     administration of the land forces of the Army of Yugoslavia.  And during

17     the aggression and the bombing he was in the staff of the Supreme Command

18     as chief of the ABHO in the department for ground forces.  The witness

19     will testify that at the beginning of 1999 during preparations and

20     elaboration of plans for defence against NATO, the Yugoslav Army

21     undertook steps to intensify training in the area of AB -- nuclear,

22     biological, and chemical defence, and especially with respect to

23     protective masks and providing information as to the location of weapons

24     with uranium -- depleted uranium in the vicinity of Skopje.  The witness

25     will testify that immediately after the beginning of the NATO aggression

Page 10471

 1     ammunition began to be used with depleted uranium.  The witness will

 2     testify that the NATO leadership denied the use of such ammunition with

 3     depleted uranium within the territory of the Federal Republic of

 4     Yugoslavia.  A long time after the aggression, the NATO staff in February

 5     2000 admitted that the use of ammunition with depleted uranium during the

 6     aggression -- the NATO submitted a report with the locations that were

 7     bombed in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the

 8     experts for depleted uranium on the 21st of September, 2000, in Geneva.

 9     The witness will explain that the effects of the use of this type of

10     ammunition against personnel and civilians are fatal because of

11     contamination.  The witness will testify that the use of depleted uranium

12     ammunition in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a

13     violation of the basic principles of international humanitarian law --

14             JUDGE PARKER:  Just a moment, please, Mr. Djordjevic.

15             Yes, Ms. Petersen.

16             MS. PETERSEN:  Sorry, Your Honour, I think the summary -- if the

17     summary is correct, the same type of expert testimony that was the

18     subject of our 92 -- of your 92 ter decision seems to be planned to come

19     in in testimony.  So I'm just a little concerned about that, Your Honour.

20             JUDGE PARKER:  The concern expressed, Mr. Djordjevic, is that

21     something you are saying in your summary is going to be inconsistent with

22     our ruling in respect of admissibility.

23             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I can share your

24     concern but stress to assure that the Defence in the direct examination

25     will not overstep the limits set by the Trial Chamber.  What we will be

Page 10472

 1     asking the witness will be within the framework of his personal knowledge

 2     as a person who was directly responsible for protecting military

 3     personnel and also the population and the inhabitants, the civilians.

 4     That was what the witness has been doing all his life.  We will not ask

 5     him for an expert opinion because he is not an expert, but we will ask

 6     him what he knows about the measures to protect against the nuclear,

 7     biological, and chemical radiation, and this was his field of work until

 8     his retirement.  Your fear that I will go beyond the limits, that I will

 9     be asking him questions about medicine and the consequences on the

10     population, I assure you that I will not be asking any such questions.

11     And should you think that I have turned a deaf ear to the decision of the

12     Trial Chamber, I will immediately stop and act in accordance with your

13     directions and rulings.

14             JUDGE PARKER:  Two observations follow, Mr. Djordjevic.  It

15     appears that your summary may be going beyond the scope of what is

16     contemplated in our decision, and if in that respect you are intending by

17     oral evidence to lead matters that we have excluded from the summary,

18     clearly that is going to be the subject of controversy and decision here.

19     So it should not be included in the summary at this point.

20             I said there were two points, but I think I've wrapped them

21     together.  We will look with great care if it is that you think you've

22     found a way of getting around what was our decision.  So we will not --

23     you will understand at the moment that we cannot give you any direction

24     beyond our decision, but if the course of the evidence exposes

25     difficulties, you would expect that they will have to be the subject of

Page 10473

 1     further deliberation and decision.

 2             Carry on, please.

 3             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

 4             Let me conclude this summary by saying that the witness will

 5     testify the use of cluster bombs and explain in connection with the use

 6     of such cluster bombs that these are not explicitly prohibited, but that

 7     they certainly represent a violation of certain rights envisaged by

 8     international conventions if they are properly interpreted.

 9             Finally, the witness will testify that NATO forces bombed the

10     territory of the Federal Republic, and thereby also Kosovo and Metohija,

11     destroyed industrial installations.  I will leave out number 1.000 from

12     the summary because it is in English and because it applies to the entire

13     territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the Chamber has

14     insisted that we limit our remarks to the territory of Kosovo and

15     Metohija.

16             In more than 60 per cent of cases, the targets were civilian

17     ones, very frequently inhabited areas, and depleted uranium ammunition

18     and cluster bombs were used, though they were aware of the effects of

19     such ammunitions.

20             That would briefly be the summary, with my additional observation

21     that I'm quite prepared to respect the decisions of the Chamber taken on

22     the 22nd of January should I go beyond the scope envisaged by that

23     ruling.

24             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.  I see again on your feet,

25     Ms. Petersen.

Page 10474

 1             MS. PETERSEN:  Your Honour, I'm sorry, I really don't mean to

 2     interrupt at this stage.  I just, so we can avoid problems later, to

 3     clarify.  Further in the summary Mr. Djordjevic just stated an intent

 4     that this witness will testify that basically what NATO did was a

 5     violation of conventions.  And I think that's giving a legal opinion.

 6     That's more expert testimony, and that's something that would cause the

 7     Prosecution concern.

 8             JUDGE PARKER:  Well, at the moment your concern is that the

 9     witness in the evidence indicated by Mr. Djordjevic should not go beyond

10     expressing what he knows about the weapons that may have been used and

11     not go so far as to say because of those weapons there was or may have

12     been a violation of international conventions.  Is that the issue?

13             MS. PETERSEN:  Yes, Your Honour.

14             JUDGE PARKER:  Have you absorbed that, Mr. Djordjevic?

15             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] Of course, Your Honour.  But 90

16     per cent of the people who as soldiers were tried at this court were not

17     experts in international law just because of that, because they could not

18     detect and identify -- because they had not been taught that since

19     schools.  Here we have before us a general of the JNA, and of course the

20     Bench will rule and decides on the basis of the facts that they're going

21     to hear from the witness today.

22        Q.   Mr. Petkovic, what is your profession?

23        A.   I'm retired general of the VJ.

24        Q.   Where did you retired?

25        A.   At the 31st of March, 2000 -- 2002 I mean.

Page 10475

 1        Q.   Mr. Petkovic, could you go through your education, when did you

 2     enter the VJ, and could you please explain your path through the

 3     educational system without my questions.

 4        A.   After graduating from grammar school, I enrolled in the military

 5     academy of the land forces in Belgrade.  For the first two years I

 6     studied general subjects in Belgrade.  Year three and four I went to

 7     study in Krusevac.  At the time it was an educational centre of the JNA

 8     on nuclear, biological, and chemical defence, and apart from other

 9     activities, that centre trained future experts in NBC defence.  And to

10     avoid this dilemma, whether we knew anything about this or not, let me

11     tell you that we studied physics, chemistry, some elements of medicine,

12     four or five types of chemistries, and military subjects in terms of

13     detection, dosimetry, detection of radiological materials, which means

14     that I am competent to answer questions put to me in this respect.  As

15     far as how my testimony will be taken by the Bench, the Judges, it is up

16     to them.

17             After graduating from the academy, I also attended technical and

18     military academy in Zagreb, chemical course, and I graduated from the

19     military staff college and war college of the JNA.

20        Q.   You went quite integrated deal of detail what your education was

21     like, but what did you do as a professional soldier?  Did you spend your

22     whole career as a JNA officer, or did you have some other activities?  If

23     you worked exclusively in the JNA, could you please specify what you

24     worked on.

25        A.   After graduating from the academy, I performed basic duties,

Page 10476

 1     commandeering a platoon, commanding a company.  I was Chief of Staff of

 2     the regiment and the chief of the NBC defence personnel.  After I

 3     graduated from staff college, I was in the command of the 1st Army, head

 4     of the NBC defence service.  After that duty, I was transferred and

 5     appointed as chief of the NBC defence in the General Staff of the VJ.

 6     After that I was transferred to the federal defence ministry, where I was

 7     assistant minister for civil defence, and that also concerns the

 8     protection and rescue of civilians.  And in my capacity I was linked

 9     between the VJ and Ministry of Defence and civilians.  We worked on

10     decontaminating the areas contaminated by depleted uranium in the

11     territory of southern Serbia.

12             After my professional career ended, I have been active in working

13     on issues of depleted uranium munitions.  I'm one of the lobbyists who

14     advocates to cleanse the area of Kosovo and Metohija from depleted

15     uranium because it presents a grave danger for those who work and live

16     there.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Mr. Petkovic, in your military career did you do

18     anything else apart from NBC defence?

19        A.   No, no.  As you can judge from what I said, I mainly performed

20     tasks from within that area, and my career in the ministry was connected

21     to this area.  And this is why I went to the defence ministry, to be a

22     liaison officer between that ministry and the civilians, particularly

23     seeing what was going on during the war and after seeing the aftermath

24     and the consequences of such bombings and such munitions.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Where were you when -- which position did you hold

Page 10477

 1     when NATO launched its aggression against Yugoslavia?

 2        A.   Before it started in 1997, I'd been appointed head of the

 3     administration for NBC defence at the General Staff of the VJ, and this

 4     is the post I occupied when NATO started its aggression against

 5     Yugoslavia.

 6        Q.   During the war until June, did you remain on that post?

 7        A.   When the bombing started I was in the headquarters of the Supreme

 8     Command Staff, I was head of the administration for NBC defence in the

 9     land forces, so I was informed about all matters and developments

10     concerning my area of expertise.

11        Q.   Thank you.

12             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] Let's retrieve D006-3372, the

13     B/C/S version, and in English if possible, please.

14        Q.   General, sir, in your binder this document appears under tab 2 in

15     English.  Thank you.  Can you see the date here?  It's -- apparently the

16     document dates from 1999, but before the attack?

17        A.   Yes, that's the 5th of March.

18        Q.   Two weeks before the start, before 24th of March, 1999.  Do you

19     know, General, sir, anything about this document?

20        A.   Yes, it is familiar -- I'm familiar with it.  I drafted it, and

21     my then-superior officer, assistant chief of land forces within the

22     General Staff, General Panic, signed it.

23        Q.   What is it all about?

24        A.   Well, we had intelligence that NATO forces in their arsenals

25     possessed depleted uranium munitions, and that those munitions had been

Page 10478

 1     used in Iraq.  By this document we sought, for the purposes of

 2     assessments of the land forces, the intelligence service of the General

 3     Staff should collect intelligence whether the forces of NATO that had

 4     been deployed in Macedonia and were readying themselves for the upcoming

 5     attack, whether they possessed depleted uranium munitions.  And this

 6     table shows the different types of munitions that contained depleted

 7     uranium.

 8        Q.   Furthermore, this table - if we could zoom in on it, please, in

 9     both versions --

10        A.   This table is an overview of calibres, types of weapons, and the

11     contents of depleted uranium.  For instance, you see here that Bradley

12     machine-gun, that's 25-millimetre cannon, contained 85 grams of depleted

13     uranium.  Then guns on A-10 aircraft, they contain munitions with 300

14     grams.  Then 105-millimetre guns mounted on tanks have munitions

15     containing the respective masses of depleted uranium, including guns,

16     tanks, Abrams.  Those were used by US forces in Iraq; we had intelligence

17     on that.  So we wanted confirmation whether the troops being readied, if

18     land invasion were to be effected, would they use such munitions so that

19     we could prepare NBC defence for the military personnel and civilians

20     throughout Serbia, but also in Kosovo and Metohija because the focus of

21     that operation was Kosovo and Metohija.

22        Q.   In respect to this document, could you explain the claim in the

23     penultimate paragraph.  There's reference made of forces deployed in the

24     territory of Macedonia, et cetera.  Did you have any intelligence as

25     high-ranking military officer who was engaged in NBC defence about such

Page 10479

 1     matters?  Is it why your colleagues mentioned those forces in Macedonia?

 2     What was supposed to mean?  Let's avoid any confusion.

 3        A.   As a member of the General Staff of the VJ, I had information

 4     that the troops that were possibly effect land operations against Kosovo

 5     would be concentrated in Macedonia, and that their introduction into

 6     Kosovo and Metohija was being planned through Macedonia.  Because this --

 7     this area contained the best terrain for tanks to go through.

 8        Q.   And this was why this reference is made here?

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   Let's please take a look at page 2, it's D006-3373 is the marking

11     on the page and in the English version as well, please.

12             Please take a look at page 1, General, sir.  Are you familiar

13     with the -- with this document, the letter-head, et cetera?  But before

14     you answer that, may the usher show page 2 of this document, keep it on

15     the screen for a while, then page 3 of the document, and finally the

16     fourth page containing the signature.  Thank you.  Let's go to page 3,

17     please.  And finally, page 4, containing the signature and the seal and

18     the rubber stamp.  I think -- yes, the English version has one page more.

19     Thank you.

20             Mr. Petkovic, are you familiar with this document and whether

21     this person who signed, do you recognise?

22        A.   Yes, it is a confidential document 77-1 from the 12th of July,

23     1997.  I signed it.  I drafted it.  There is a number of such documents

24     of that nature aimed at familiarising the subordinate unit with the type

25     of ammunition that would be used if the aggression were to be effected,

Page 10480

 1     because in our training we had not trained a lot on such matters because

 2     it wasn't part of our curriculum, but since we expected depleted uranium

 3     munitions to be used in the future we felt the need to inform our

 4     subordinate units about the types of munitions, the consequences of such

 5     munitions if used, and we prepared an instruction - and this is an

 6     excerpt from such instructions - on what to do if such munitions really

 7     come to be used.

 8        Q.   General, you spoke and wrote about the characteristics of such

 9     munitions?

10        A.   Yes.

11        Q.   And you wrote about the danger that this ammunition represented

12     in terms of military doctrine and what you were in charge of in the

13     General Staff?

14        A.   Yes.

15        Q.   Since you dealt with the characteristics of such munitions, we

16     saw that table --

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   -- what were the sources of your information that you

19     disseminated among subordinated units, since you said you expected an

20     attack with such munitions?

21        A.   Basic source of information that depleted uranium munitions was

22     used in the territory of former Socialist Federative Republic of

23     Yugoslavia was the report of an expert panel including people from the

24     NBC defence staff in 1997, and I was part of that administration, who

25     went in 1995 to the territory of the then-Bosnia-Herzegovina, where NATO

Page 10481

 1     forces had used depleted uranium munitions when bombing the area of

 2     Hadzici and some other places in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Large quantities of

 3     such munitions were found, collected, and brought to the Vinca institute

 4     where they were analysed, and it was uncontestably [as interpreted]

 5     determined that it went for depleted uranium munitions, and a

 6     recommendation was then issued on how to proceed with such munitions.

 7     This -- so the first source was the expert group analysis that I had in

 8     my hands and I read.  And of course being a professional in the field, I

 9     studied literature about such munitions, some reference books; then over

10     the internet, in the press, I could find some articles about depleted

11     uranium munitions since it was used in Iraq.  There were a plethora of

12     articles about the munitions, how it was used.  There were texts about

13     the illnesses which followed from the use of depleted uranium munitions,

14     about conflicts in certain Western European armies, Italy, France, Great

15     Britain, whose personnel served in Iraq and who fell ill.  And the

16     suspicion was that being in an area which was bombed with depleted

17     uranium munitions was one of the reasons why they fell ill.  There was

18     some -- certain commissions to determine and look into the matter of

19     people returning from Iraq and Bosnia-Herzegovina following in and trying

20     to find the link between their sojourn there and illness, and since I was

21     person responsible for that, in the General Staff I studied all such

22     sources, so to be prepared for what was awaiting us.

23        Q.   So this -- your actions were preventative actions in terms of

24     what was expected and what ultimately did happen.  But a connected

25     document to this is under tab 3 in your binder, and it's already been

Page 10482

 1     admitted as D174.  I propose, since it is a logical consequence of my

 2     line of questioning that first we admit the document that we discussed

 3     with the witness, and then of course the one that has already been

 4     admitted I will seek that witness speak about it.

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  Does not the document contain precisely the matter

 6     that Ms. Petersen was raising?  I've not had an opportunity to study it,

 7     merely to glance very quickly as it was run through on e-court, but I

 8     thought I identified.  Is that correct?

 9             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, this document that

10     preceded everything that happened and is a reflection of the preventive

11     activities of the officers of the Army of Yugoslavia in that direction,

12     the document can be considered fully relevant or irrelevant depending on

13     its contents.  But that is why I asked the witness to comment on this

14     document, whether he had compiled it, what the sources were.  We heard

15     that this was a finding of a group of experts, therefore, not his own

16     findings.  And you said that those could not be used.  And because of

17     this, I thought that the document was relevant, and I don't think it

18     could in any way violate the ruling of the Chamber.  Of course if the

19     Chamber decides otherwise, it can be marked for identification and then

20     the Chamber can subsequently decide what should be done with it.  But I

21     think it should not cause any problems because these -- this document

22     contains the factual description of the ammunition and that was his task.

23     And it would not be logical in view of what was happening in his country

24     for him not to have carried out his task in this way.  These data about

25     ammunition are accessible on any site of NATO --

Page 10483

 1             JUDGE PARKER:  Sorry.  Our problem is that I'm not clear what

 2     document you're referring to.  There was one document which identified in

 3     a single page a number of possible types of ammunition that might be

 4     used, a document from early 1999.  Is that the document to which you are

 5     presently referring, or is it the next document?  It's not clear to me.

 6             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] These two documents form a

 7     single one in the e-court, and they have been marked as I have just said.

 8     This is what my assistant tells me.  But both documents represent a

 9     logical whole, reflecting the activities of this officer of the VJ before

10     the war that occurred in the territory of the former FRY and in the

11     territory of Kosovo and Metohija.

12             JUDGE PARKER:  I find that I cannot immediately identify what I

13     saw earlier, Mr. Djordjevic.  I'm going to ask for the -- I think the

14     best shot may be to mark it for identification and give us time to look

15     at it, but I see that Ms. Petersen is on her feet.

16             MS. PETERSEN:  Thank you, Your Honour.  I think you're correct in

17     identifying problems in the second part of this document.  If you look at

18     page 4, it does give expert testimony on the chemistry and properties of

19     depleted uranium, and this is exactly the subject of the 92 ter ruling.

20     I think going into detail about his underlying sources and his

21     qualifications is not the point; the point is this person was not noticed

22     as an expert witness.  The expert witness procedures haven't been

23     followed.  So whether he's qualified, whatever his source are, this still

24     should not be admitted.  One option could be to admit this for the

25     limited purpose of showing that this was something that he sent out, but

Page 10484

 1     not for the truth of some of the assertions and the content within the

 2     document.

 3             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you for that.  Until we have had an

 4     opportunity to consider the document, it's not appropriate for us to

 5     attempt a ruling.  We will have it marked for identification; and in view

 6     of the submissions that you have made and any further that may need to be

 7     made in the course of the evidence, we will come to the view about

 8     admissibility of, I suspect, part of the document rather than the whole

 9     of it.  It will be marked for identification.  They should be marked

10     separately.  While they may be in e-court as one exhibit, they are in

11     time and nature quite different and they will be considered quite

12     separately.  So there should be two different numbers given.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, the first document bearing document

14     number D006-3372 will be Exhibit D00514 marked for identification; and

15     the second document starting with D006-3373 will be Exhibit D00515,

16     marked for identification.

17             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you for that.

18             Yes, Mr. Djordjevic.

19             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, before I continue

20     with the examination of this witness, I have to deal with a procedural

21     dilemma that I personally have.  My understanding of the Chamber's ruling

22     was a ruling which says that the witness shouldn't be heard here as an

23     expert because he's not an expert, he's a witness.  And as a witness, I

24     thought that he would speak about his own knowledge as a person in charge

25     of this particular type of protection of personnel and civilians.  So my

Page 10485

 1     question now is:  I know that he cannot speak as an expert or maybe not

 2     even what he did before the Chamber made his ruling.  Could this cause

 3     the concern of the Chamber that the witness engaged in something that he

 4     shouldn't have done, and in his report he's not referring to his own

 5     knowledge but to the knowledge of the institute in Vinca.  We will ask

 6     him what the Vinca institute is, and I believe the Chamber knows that.

 7     So he's not speaking as an expert; he's speaking about what he learned as

 8     an official of the state who gathered the necessary opinions and

 9     information.  If you feel that we should not hear any of this, I will be

10     guided by your decision, but I don't wish to be in a dilemma anymore.

11             JUDGE PARKER:  The Chamber is following a course which is

12     attempting to give to the Defence as much scope as possible to present

13     what it sees to be relevant.  What we are dealing with now, the subject

14     matter, is a long way from the centre of the issues concerning this

15     accused.  There is no question of his involvement in any form of depleted

16     uranium or other nuclear weaponry or munitions.  There seems to be some

17     general appreciation of relevance on the part of the Defence that the

18     nature of the conduct of NATO had some relevance to the actions of the

19     accused.

20             Now, at the moment we're trying to give you as much scope as

21     possible to advance that.  Understand that as a preliminary observation,

22     because on some views the whole of this subject could be seen to be

23     irrelevant, but we're not taking that view at the moment.

24             The witness, so far as his knowledge and experience and

25     activities are relevant to our case, will be allowed to give evidence of

Page 10486

 1     that.  The fact that in the course of his activities he may have come

 2     into contact with some area of expertise and be aware of what an expert

 3     body has done or concluded, A, does not make this man an expert in that

 4     subject; B, does not make the indirect evidence of this witness

 5     admissible about that subject matter of expertise.  It's one thing what

 6     this witness ordinarily does and what he did and what he can tell us

 7     about that.  When he comes to expressing conclusions, as the document

 8     before us does, when he comes to trying to say:  Well, the conclusion of

 9     an expert institute was A, B, and C, he is moving into the field of

10     expertise.  And that is the area where we are not prepared to accept

11     evidence.

12             Now, is that an indication enough for you?

13             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, indeed, but my

14     understanding was that he shouldn't be the one who testifies, but if he

15     says that he received it from an institute this is just a simple fact

16     which we can accept or not.  I shall nevertheless try to explain to the

17     Chamber through the direct examination why this will be relevant,

18     particularly for this case and the indictment against this accused.  So

19     allow me to continue.

20             JUDGE PARKER:  Please.

21             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] We have here a document.  Could

22     it be placed on the e-court marked for D006-3384.  Could you please show

23     us the last page.  Could we have the last page, please.

24        Q.   Mr. Petkovic, this is tab 4 in your binder.  Could you just tell

25     us briefly whether you recognise this document.

Page 10487

 1             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] Can we have the last page of the

 2     document.

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I do recognise the document.

 4     It was compiled in my command, and I signed it.

 5             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   What does this document represent, what is the purpose of this

 7     document?

 8        A.   It was compiled on the 4th of May, 1999, in view of the fact that

 9     there was the possibility of a land operation being launched.  We felt it

10     necessary on the basis of the information we had received of various

11     types and calibres of munitions, for guns with depleted uranium, and

12     therefore as part of measures against ABHO we felt it necessary to

13     instruct subordinated units with the characteristics of these munitions

14     as part of measures to protect and remove the consequences should this

15     ammunition be used.

16        Q.   Thank you.  I won't ask you anything more about this document.

17             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] I should also like to tender

18     this document into evidence, and it discusses the facts of the

19     ammunitions being used.

20             JUDGE PARKER:  Ms. Petersen.

21             MS. PETERSEN:  Your Honours, I think there's the same problem, if

22     you particularly look at the last paragraph of this.  And I'm not sure

23     the exact solution because I would concede that this is admissible for a

24     limited purpose, of showing that this was something that was sent out by

25     the General.  However, the facts contained in that last paragraph are,

Page 10488

 1     you know, an expert opinion.  And so we would state that this should not

 2     be considered for the truth of that content.

 3             JUDGE PARKER:  Is it an issue in this case, in the view of the

 4     Defence, Mr. Djordjevic, that it is a question whether members of the

 5     forces of the FRY were informed that there may be weapons of this nature

 6     used against them?

 7             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, you have asked one

 8     of the questions that will be the subject of my next question, but I

 9     don't mind if the witness answers that question straight away because it

10     is part of the question I intended to put to this witness.

11        Q.   Did you hear the question --

12             JUDGE PARKER:  No, I'm asking you, Mr. Djordjevic --

13             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] Yes.  The answer is yes.

14             JUDGE PARKER:  Is it relevant to your case?

15             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] Please allow me to move on to

16     the next document.  Let this be also marked for identification, and if it

17     is considered to be something that the witness obtained about technical

18     characteristics that any child can find on the internet and is considered

19     an expert report -- specifically I found this same information on some

20     50.000 or so pages on the internet about these munitions.  But let the

21     Chamber rule about this.  I wouldn't keep the Chamber in discussing this

22     because it is absolutely common knowledge.  But my next question will

23     lead to a solution to this problem.

24                           [Trial Chamber confers]

25             JUDGE PARKER:  The document presently on the screen,

Page 10489

 1     Mr. Djordjevic, will be marked for identification.  We will continue then

 2     to the next document that you want us to see.  If we're able to reach a

 3     clear decision as we progress about admissibility, we will do so; but if

 4     not, at the end of the evidence when we've got it all and we can look at

 5     it fully in the light of any further submissions that you and

 6     Ms. Petersen wish to make, we will come to a formal decision about

 7     admissibility.

 8             So if you could proceed with your examination.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, the document will be marked as

10     D00516, marked for identification.

11             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

12             The next document is D006-3401, the English and the B/C/S

13     versions.  Could they please be placed on the monitor.

14        Q.   And, General, that would be tab 5 in your binder.  You can see

15     that on the screen as well.  Please take a look at this document and tell

16     me whether you know what it's all about, and that would be the last

17     string of questions concerning this issue that has been a fountain of

18     contention.

19        A.   Yes, in respect of this document I can tell you the following:

20     NATO forces during their aggression denied the use of depleted uranium

21     munitions, although that was apparent from reports received from VJ units

22     and the efforts that the then-leadership of Yugoslavia was doing to

23     disseminate this information and make it available to official organs.

24     But this was not the case.  After the aggression, supported by specific

25     evidence in the field, then the developments of the army -- in the armies

Page 10490

 1     who had personnel in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo and Metohija because

 2     of the health consequences that they suffered, and since the

 3     United Nations decided to send a working party from UNEP, this was the

 4     so-called group for the Balkans to be sent on a fact-finding mission.

 5     And this was the first time that the Secretary-General of NATO on the

 6     17th of January, 2000, officially admits that NATO used depleted uranium

 7     munitions in the territory of Serbia, more specifically in the Kosovo and

 8     Metohija.  And this was prepared by military organs of NATO on the use of

 9     depleted uranium munitions during the action of NATO forces.  And it says

10     here:

11             "I confirm that DU was used during the Kosovo conflict.  They

12     were used -- dropped from A-10 aircraft engaged armoured during Operation

13     Allied Force.  It was used throughout the territory of Kosovo on 100

14     sorties, we recorded 98 of them.  31.000 such rounds was used.  According

15     to my information there were more than 50.000.  The major focus of these

16     operations was in the area west of the Pec-Djakovica-Prizren highway, in

17     the area surrounding Klisa, in the area around Prizren and in the area in

18     the north of a line joining Suva Reka and Urosevac.  But I can tell you

19     that such munitions were used beyond those routes, and it is impossible

20     to indicate precisely every location where DU was used, but for that

21     purpose I am providing a map.  And this corroborated our assumption and

22     information on precise location of each DU munition used.  They're

23     claiming that it was impossible, and we claimed it was possible, and I

24     believe that VJ information was more precise and more useful.  And I

25     hope, finally it says, that this will help UNEP/UNCHS (Habitat) Balkans

Page 10491

 1     Task Force in their further work, and this was the first instance when

 2     NATO admitted that they had used depleted uranium munitions.  In their

 3     communique they just indicate the number of sorties, rough number of

 4     rounds, and a general indication of the area, but in terms of quantities

 5     and the number of locations, they do not match the information that we

 6     had which was more detailed.

 7             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] I move to tender this into

 8     evidence, please.

 9             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be marked for identification.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00517, marked

11     for identification.

12             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13        Q.   Mr. Petkovic, in your statement you discuss that PNHBO measures,

14     I think that was paragraph 5 in your statement which has not been

15     redacted.  What do you mean by this acronym?

16        A.   That would be nuclear, biological, chemical, radiological defence

17     is expert term.  This is a set of measures, steps, and actions that

18     individuals and units and commands and officers of all levels should

19     undertake to detect the threat in terms of nuclear, chemical, biological

20     threat and hazard for individuals and the population to be informed about

21     that, for appropriate measures to be taken to eliminate that threat, or

22     consequences to maintain the combat-readiness of units and save the

23     population from possible use of nuclear, biological, chemical weapons or

24     weapons bearing radiological materials, such as depleted uranium.

25        Q.   Continue.

Page 10492

 1        A.   Well, in this respect we took a number of measures, and I'm

 2     referring to a number of orders that we issued, which governed the issue

 3     of observation, information, reporting to both the civilian population

 4     and the army on the imminent threat so that it would be prevented and

 5     consequences to the soldiers and population to be reduced.  This is why

 6     we issued this instruction to all our units in Kosovo and Metohija,

 7     laying out in precise terms all these issues.

 8        Q.   As a consequence of your information, did it affect the conduct

 9     of the civilians in the area, of course you did it within the army?

10        A.   There were observation posts covering the whole territory and NBC

11     alert was given for the whole territory of Kosovo and Metohija, and of

12     course both soldiers, troops, and civilians were informed of such alerts.

13     Whenever we detected sorties, we would sound sirens.  One could identify

14     A-10 aircraft.  Each of those sorties was observed in detail.  We

15     observed the territory.  We determined the state of affairs in certain

16     areas, and marked locations where depleted uranium munitions were used so

17     that people, soldiers, troops, and civilians would not approach such

18     areas.  There were such locations close to settlements.  It was our duty

19     to notify the population about such threat, and we put up notices, and

20     notices were in Serbian and in Albanian.  This was part of the equipment

21     of our units which was then used.

22        Q.   You mentioned the actions of observation and reconnaissance.  As

23     a person who was in charge of anti-nuclear and anti-chemical defence and

24     protection, could you please explain the equipment that the troops had to

25     detect the presence of agents.  We are talking about radioactivity and

Page 10493

 1     radiation in the field and notices and placards being put in Serbian and

 2     in Albanian close to settlements.  Did you have the equipment?

 3        A.   The system and the conception of the defence at the time from the

 4     SFRY times and during the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia times was that

 5     there was a system that was functioning within the army and there was a

 6     system concerning the protection and defence of the civilian population,

 7     so-called civil defence.  NBC units within the civil defence were

 8     connected with army units for nuclear, biological, chemical defence.

 9     There were a whole.  Everything that the JNA would learn, alternatively

10     civil defence would learn something, they would mutually inform each

11     other.  There were NBC units of VJ and NBC units of the defence -- civil

12     defence.  They had equipment to detect radioactive emissions in the

13     field.  Apart from that VJ units had mobile and stationary radiological

14     labs which could perform quantitative and qualitative tests on samples to

15     obtain the information on the matter being used out in the field, and

16     this is how we obtain such information apart from visual observations,

17     that in the territory in the area of Prizren for the first time on the

18     30th of March, 1999, depleted uranium munitions were used for the first

19     time.

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 10494

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9             JUDGE PARKER:  Now we are getting into an area that is the

10     subject of our ruling.

11             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] I had the intention to interrupt

12     the witness because my next question was going to be -- and of course you

13     will redact whatever you see fit.

14        Q.   My next question concerned the issue:  What is UNEP?

15        A.   UNEP is an official international organisation of the

16     United Nations, working on protection of the environment.  It works

17     within the UN system.  Its task is to -- to act wherever there are cases

18     of environmental threats, threats to health, to the population.  They

19     issue reports on the basis of fact-finding missions, and prompted by what

20     we discussed just minutes ago, a Balkans group was set up in November

21     2000 which came to Kosovo and Metohija to gauge the level of detriment to

22     the environment that those preceding developments had caused.

23        Q.   Do not talk about the nature of that report if it exists, but

24     could you indicate, did that agency produce a report on the issue of

25     depleted uranium in Kosovo and Metohija?  Please tell us whether it

Page 10495

 1     exists or not, whether you know about it or not, without going into the

 2     contents.

 3        A.   I'm going to be brief, but let me utter a brief comment on that.

 4     That report was produced on the February -- in February of this following

 5     year.  I read that report.  I have my opinion, and if you allow me, I can

 6     tell you that it was issued --

 7             JUDGE PARKER:  Sir, no.  Our interest and the question was solely

 8     whether there was a report.  I know from what you said earlier that this

 9     is a very passionate interest of yours, but you'll understand that we're

10     not here to further the concerns you might have at the moment; we're here

11     to learn just so much of what you know that might help us decide whether

12     the person accused is guilty or not of certain offences.  So we have to

13     just stop you at various points in your evidence, and we have the

14     evidence that there is a report on the date that you have indicated.

15     Thank you.

16             MR. DJORDJEVIC:  Your Honour, I'm looking at the watch --

17             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes, so am I --

18             MR. DJORDJEVIC:  -- and I think it's the time --

19             JUDGE PARKER:  And I didn't know whether you had something a

20     little further you needed to put now, but that not being so we need to

21     have our first break now.

22             MR. DJORDJEVIC:  Yes, I will continue after the next session.

23             JUDGE PARKER:  We resume at 11.00.

24             MR. DJORDJEVIC:  Thank you.

25                           --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.

Page 10496

 1                           --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.

 2             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes, Mr. Djordjevic.

 3             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

 4        Q.   We're going to continue with questions.  There won't be too many.

 5     I'm going to respect the decision by the Chamber, so I'm going to skip

 6     many of the documents that I have here because I believe that what we've

 7     already provided is plenty.  My following question to you, General, sir,

 8     is this:  During the combat actions in 1999, did you go to Kosovo?  Were

 9     you in Kosovo?

10        A.   Yes, sometime in April 1999 I went to Kosovo as part of a team

11     which was touring units of the 3rd Army command.

12        Q.   Can you please tell me, did you then only have contacts with the

13     units of the Army of Yugoslavia, or did you also have contacts with the

14     police or some other organs in the Kosovo and Metohija area?

15        A.   The objective of our visits was to tour the units of the VJ and

16     to see what the situation there was and to see what the situation in the

17     field was regarding depleted uranium munitions.  So I didn't really have

18     any contacts with the police.

19        Q.   Very well.  Do you know the accused?

20        A.   Yes, I do.

21        Q.   When you were visiting Kosovo and Metohija during the war

22     operations in the course of 1999, did you ever see him there personally?

23        A.   No, I never saw him in Kosovo and Metohija.  I know him as a

24     police officer.  I never had any personal contacts with him.

25        Q.   Thank you.  You told us as part of the measures to protect the

Page 10497

 1     army and the civilians in Kosovo you carried out certain measures, but

 2     also within the SFRY and the FRY system there was something that was

 3     called the territorial defence and civilian protection.  I assume as a

 4     general of the Army of Yugoslavia you are familiar with the defence

 5     doctrine of the country, and can you tell us briefly what territorial

 6     defence is and what the civilian protection is.  Is that one and the same

 7     thing, two terms for the same force; or are they two different groups?

 8        A.   Territorial defence --

 9             THE INTERPRETER:  The speakers are kindly asked to slow down.

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The territorial defence are units

11     whose task was to protect the territory and the population in that

12     territory.  Civilian protection is also a form of protection and rescue

13     in case of accidents, disasters, catastrophes, and their operations cover

14     a given territory.

15             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Thank you very much.  My next question is:  In view of the fact

17     that you said that these measures that you undertook shortly before NATO

18     attacked the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and which you carried out

19     during the NATO action itself, during the war, that these measures were

20     aimed at specific army units as well as territorial defence and civilian

21     protection.  Can you tell us if you noticed whether the population --

22     there were any migrations of the population during the combat activities

23     at that time.  Do you have any information about that?

24        A.   During the Supreme Command Staff stay and in other areas of

25     Kosovo and Metohija, we saw that there was migration of the population

Page 10498

 1     during the war.

 2        Q.   What did this depend on, do you have that information?

 3        A.   In my opinion, it depended on the situation in the field, on the

 4     combat actions.  This had an effect on migration of population from one

 5     area to another in Kosovo and Metohija.  When it was noticed that there

 6     were no rules on the basis of which you could conclude which area would

 7     be the next target, the population then set out to leave the Kosovo and

 8     Metohija area.  They went to Macedonia, Albania, and some other places.

 9             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please ask the usher to

10     place on the ELMO document D-1623 [as interpreted].

11        Q.   We see two maps here.  Can you tell me -- first, can you tell me

12     what the first map represents and the second map.

13        A.   Both maps show one and the same situation, but from different

14     sources.  The first map is a map drafted in the current Serbia based on

15     information and co-ordinates of places that were struck by depleted

16     uranium munitions.  So the top map represents a realistic overview of the

17     quantities of such munition that was dropped in the Kosovo and Metohija

18     area.  There were remarks there saying that over 31.000 munitions were --

19        Q.   We'll stop there.  Second map, please.

20        A.   The second map are probably Western sources, based on NATO

21     information.  Contents are more or less the same.  Once again, it marks

22     the targets that were hit the most with depleted uranium munitions.

23        Q.   Are you able to tell us what the markings on the first map are

24     and what the markings on the second map are, what are these markings in

25     order to make it clear for the transcript exactly what this is about.

Page 10499

 1        A.   I can start with the top map and I can say that it contains a

 2     marking indicating that a place marked like that is radioactive and it's

 3     dangerous, and it should not be approached, and it means that the

 4     radioactivity is present there.  There is radioactive contamination, and

 5     such places should not be approached.

 6             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please ask the usher to

 7     provide the witness with a marker.

 8        Q.   Can you please circle on this map that we see here one of those

 9     signs, indicating a place that was exposed to depleted uranium ammunition

10     fire.

11        A.   [Marks]

12        Q.   Very well.

13             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] Can we now zoom in on the second

14     map.  I can see that you've circled two such locations on this map that

15     we are looking at now.

16                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

17             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] Can we look at the bottom map

18     now, please.

19             JUDGE PARKER:  We will lose the marking.

20             MR. DJORDJEVIC:  Okay.

21             JUDGE PARKER:  We could put both maps on one screen and then have

22     them marked together, if you like.

23             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I would just like

24     to clarify one thing.  The Defence, before it tenders these documents,

25     first we would need to just tender them as MFI documents.  Before we

Page 10500

 1     tender them, we will need to make a submission in order to be able to

 2     deal with this document based on Rule 65 ter.  In order to be able to

 3     tender this document, these two maps, we will need to do that first.  So

 4     it's all right that the markings that the witness just made on this map

 5     are not saved.  I would just like us to look at both maps, and then he

 6     can make the markings on one map and the other map, so that we would have

 7     information about the places that were marked, what the place marked is

 8     on one map and what that is on the other map.  So let us look at both

 9     maps on the screen at the same time and the witness could on each map

10     mark only one spot that was exposed to depleted uranium munitions fire.

11     I'm doing this because of subsequent questions, where I will explain to

12     the Trial Chamber why we're doing this and what the purpose of that is.

13        Q.   Sir, can you circle a location on the top map just once so that

14     we don't have any confusion about that.

15        A.   [Marks]

16        Q.   Would you please do the same on the bottom map.

17        A.   [Marks]

18        Q.   Thank you.  My next question is:  When we look at the first map

19     and the second map, to what extent is the data on the maps identical, the

20     ones from domestic sources and the one from western sources?

21        A.   According to the information entered later, in September 2000 and

22     what we did after we investigated the terrain and during the combat in

23     Kosovo and Metohija and then after combat activities were completed, it

24     is obvious that the data more or less is the same.  There are some

25     inconsistencies.

Page 10501

 1        Q.   I'm going to interrupt you here.  Would you say that the data is

 2     more or less identical?

 3        A.   Yes.

 4        Q.   Which part of Kosovo and Metohija according to these maps was

 5     most exposed to fire?

 6        A.   The southern and south-western sectors of Kosovo were exposed the

 7     most.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  In connection with this, do you have an explanation

 9     why these areas, south and south-western areas of Kosovo and Metohija,

10     were most exposed to this type of fire?

11        A.   It is my personal view that this territory is -- this area around

12     Prizren, Djakovica, and Pec was bombarded the most with depleted uranium

13     munitions; because according to information that we had, in the event of

14     a land forces operation, the land forces of the NATO Alliance was

15     supposed to be introduced from Albania and from Macedonia.  These were

16     the sectors around Djakovica, Prizren, and Pec.  So from that territory,

17     the idea was to expel the civilian population and to only leave the units

18     there so that in the event of land forces, the casualties would be

19     reduced and we would in that way avoid condemnation by the international

20     community which would expect a lot of casualties if the civilians had

21     stayed there.

22        Q.   Since you were by establishment within the Main Staff, the

23     General Staff, did you have any information about the presence of NATO

24     units in Macedonia and in Albania?

25        A.   We did have such data even before the attack was launched, as

Page 10502

 1     well as during the attack, that some units or forces were in Albania and

 2     Macedonia, specifically relating to the matters that I was dealing with.

 3     The data was that the Petrovac airport near Skopje was where a certain

 4     quantity of depleted uranium munitions were being stored.

 5        Q.   Thank you very much.

 6             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this

 7     exhibit into evidence for further clarification of what the witness just

 8     said.

 9             JUDGE PARKER:  The maps will be received as one exhibit, marked

10     for identification.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00517, marked

12     for identification.

13             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   We're coming to the close of the direct examination, so in

15     accordance with your formation duties within the army let me ask you the

16     following:  In the territory of Kosovo and Metohija, were there any

17     chemical incidents?

18        A.   Yes.  In the territory of Kosovo and Metohija facilities were

19     targeted, the destruction of which can be considered a chemical incident.

20     These were warehouses, tanks of chemical products, of crude oil and fuel,

21     and certain chemistry plants, but not to the extent to which these

22     facilities were targeted in Serbia because there weren't that many such

23     installations there.

24        Q.   Do you have any information of the use of the so-called cluster

25     bombs?

Page 10503

 1        A.   Yes, we do have information that in the territory of Kosovo and

 2     Metohija this type of ammunition was used en masse.  A classical example

 3     is the bombing of the column of Albanian refugees who were returning home

 4     after certain period of time, when about 70 or some -- over 70 were

 5     killed and about a hundred wounded, and most of them were women and

 6     children.

 7             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, that brings to an

 8     end the direct examination of this witness, and I would like to thank him

 9     for explaining to Your Honours the questions of interest to the Defence.

10     And I will have to tell the Chamber once again that I'm sorry if you

11     thought that I was going to in any way violate the Court's ruling of

12     January.  All I did was in -- with the intention of clarifying matters.

13     Thank you.

14             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you, Mr. Djordjevic.

15                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

16             JUDGE PARKER:  We are told that the last exhibit should be 518

17     and not 517, a numbering error.  They are as one marked for

18     identification.

19             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] Sorry, I must have made a

20     mistake.

21             JUDGE PARKER:  Not your mistake, Mr. Djordjevic; our mistake.

22             Ms. Petersen.

23             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] It doesn't matter whose it is,

24     it's important that we correct it.

25             MS. PETERSEN:  Just one second, Your Honours, I need to get a

Page 10504

 1     little set up over here once I can.

 2                           Cross-examination by Ms. Petersen:

 3        Q.   Good morning, General Petkovic.  My name is Paige Petersen.  I'll

 4     just be asking you a few questions today.  So you stated you visited

 5     Kosovo in April of 1999.  Other than that, where were you physically

 6     stationed during the war with NATO?

 7        A.   I was stationed in the Supreme Command Staff, in the facility

 8     where the Supreme Command Staff was stationed.

 9        Q.   All right.  And for the record, can you just please clarify

10     physically where that is located.

11        A.   I don't know why that is important for me to say this.  According

12     to establishment, an appropriate facility was used and it was outside

13     Kosovo and Metohija, and it was in the territory of Serbia.

14        Q.   Sir, unless there's --

15             JUDGE PARKER:  Is that sufficient for your purposes?

16             MS. PETERSEN:  I -- if he -- I guess I don't need the specific

17     address, but if he could give the --

18             JUDGE PARKER:  We've actually had it from other leading army

19     witnesses, but I respect the General's concern not to say it for security

20     reasons.  The important thing is it was not in Kosovo.

21             MS. PETERSEN:

22        Q.   Thank you, General.  If we --

23        A.   Yes, that's right.  It was not in Kosovo.  It was on the

24     territory of Serbia.  If you're interested in any further detail, ask me.

25        Q.   All right, sir.  First I'd like to look at the last exhibit that

Page 10505

 1     you were talking about, and I'm sorry, I'm not sure if it was given an

 2     exhibit number.  It was -- okay, I'm told that it was 518.

 3             MS. PETERSEN:  If we could have that up on the screen, please.

 4        Q.   General, so I just would like to clarify.  On this map you're

 5     saying this is where depleted uranium was found or this is where

 6     radioactive material was found subsequent to the war with NATO?

 7             JUDGE PARKER:  You're speaking of the upper map, are you?

 8             MS. PETERSEN:  Yes, I am, Your Honour.

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Can I speak?

10             MS. PETERSEN:

11        Q.   Yes.

12        A.   Regarding the upper map I told you, during the war and during the

13     bombing of Kosovo and Metohija, in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija

14     there were observation posts for ABH.  And within the framework of their

15     activity, they observed the territory and noted down the strikes by A-10

16     planes using depleted uranium ammunitions.  You know that A-10 planes

17     have a 30-millimetre gun, and in one sortie - and this was visible by

18     somebody on the observation post - this was a sign that fire from that

19     gun was using depleted uranium.  And after the ending of the bombing and

20     the end of the air-strikes and danger from air-strikes, there were

21     reconnaissance patrols who went to the area; and using appropriate means

22     for radiological detection and dosimetrics, measured whether there was

23     any radioactivity there or not.  If there was any radioactivity, then

24     they would mark that location on the map indicating the co-ordinates, and

25     in subsequent reports those co-ordinates were sent to the appropriate

Page 10506

 1     commands.  And that is how we established these co-ordinates.  This was

 2     done and marked on the maps after the end of the war.

 3        Q.   So -- so would you agree that this basically shows where there

 4     were the heaviest missile strikes that contained depleted uranium?  This

 5     was the area of the heaviest missile strikes from the A-10s?

 6        A.   Yes, that's right.  These were the locations where strikes were

 7     with depleted uranium and places where units established radioactivity.

 8     Furthermore, I didn't say a moment ago, the units endeavoured to find

 9     remnants of depleted uranium munitions --

10        Q.   That's okay, sir.  I'll stop you there.  Thank you for answering

11     my question.

12             I'd like to go back to some of your testimony in the direct

13     examination when you were being questioned by Mr. Djordjevic.  This is at

14     page 32, line 17.  You stated:

15             "During the Supreme Command Staff stay and in other areas of

16     Kosovo and Metohija, we saw that there was a migration of the population

17     during the war.

18             "Q.  What did this depend on, do you have that information?

19             "A.  In my opinion, it depended on the situation in the field, on

20     the combat actions."

21             Now, sir, let me ask you:  At the time that the war was going on,

22     were you aware that masses of people were leaving Kosovo?

23        A.   While staying in the staff, we did have reports that there were

24     population migrations.

25        Q.   So this was reported to you in the Supreme Command Staff, that

Page 10507

 1     there was a migration of people from Kosovo?

 2        A.   Yes.

 3        Q.   And were you aware that this involved hundreds of thousands of

 4     people from Kosovo?

 5        A.   The extent of my activity and interest in those days did not

 6     involve the scope of the migrations.  I was just aware that it took

 7     place, and as head of the service for ABH I focused on to what extent

 8     these strikes can affect the decision of the population to move out.  In

 9     contact with the inhabitants of Serb ethnicity who fled to the territory

10     of Serbia during and after the war, after my retirement, I heard that

11     fear of the effect of radioactive strikes had forced certain families to

12     flee from Stimlje, Pec, Djakovica to the territory of Serbia.  And that

13     was -- and that is one of the factors preventing them from going back to

14     Kosovo because their property is contaminated.  And that is why I said at

15     the beginning that I am an advocate --

16        Q.   All right, sir --

17        A.   -- regardless of the situation of the area being decontaminated.

18        Q.   I'll stop you there, sir.  So you just stated that you spoke with

19     some individuals of Serb ethnicity about why they left Kosovo.  How many

20     people did you speak to?

21        A.   I spoke to members of two or three Serb families.  One of them

22     was a very close friend of mine from Kosovo and Metohija.

23        Q.   Now, were you aware during the time of the war that Kosovo

24     Albanians were leaving from Kosovo from many villages around Kosovo?

25        A.   I was aware of it.  I said a moment ago that a war and any kind

Page 10508

 1     of violence encourages migrations from one settlement to another within

 2     the framework of one territory - in this case Kosovo.  And later on when

 3     it became clear that the uncertainty was widespread and that there was

 4     danger everywhere, they tended to move to neighbouring countries which

 5     were not exposed to the war, and I said Albania, Macedonia, and the

 6     territory of Serbia.

 7        Q.   Sir, at the beginning of your testimony you spoke about your

 8     transcript from the Milutinovic trial.  You recall testifying in this

 9     court on 28th of September, 2007?

10        A.   Yes.

11        Q.   And you said today that you'd read this transcript, everything in

12     it is true, and you would say the same things if asked today; right?

13        A.   I have read it, or rather, I listened to the audio recording.  I

14     would have given a similar answer with a similar meaning.  The meaning

15     would be the same.  Maybe I wouldn't use the same words.

16             MS. PETERSEN:  If we could look at that exhibit, D513, and go to

17     page 29 of that transcript, beginning at line 7.

18        Q.   Now, General, just to save time, I represent to you that at this

19     point you were being asked about cluster bombs.  So that's the context of

20     the following statement.  At line 7.

21             "Q.  How many struck the civilian -- the population?"  Meaning

22     cluster bombs.

23             "A.  I cannot say how many, but I can say that that was one of

24     the factors that influenced the mass movement of the population among

25     other things."

Page 10509

 1             Now moving down to line 14 Judge Bonomy asked you:

 2             "You have done research on this, have you, the movement of the

 3     population as a result of the use of cluster bombs?

 4             "THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I did not deal with that

 5     particular topic, but I believe that as a soldier my estimation can be

 6     relevant, and I stand by what I said that that is one of the factors that

 7     could have led to the population movements.  People flee planes, bombs.

 8             "JUDGE BONOMY:  There's no doubt it could have led to that.  The

 9     question for us whether it did lead to that, which is a different

10     question I think from the one you were answering.

11             "THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If you have more than one answer,

12     then it could have and then putting that together could probably give you

13     the correct answer.

14             "JUDGE BONOMY:  Thank you very much.

15             "THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's as much as I could say."

16             Now General, have you gotten any new information over the last

17     two years about why Albanians left Kosovo other than speaking to a few

18     families who are friends of yours about why they left Kosovo, have you

19     done any research on why Albanians left Kosovo?  Any new information

20     since you gave your testimony in Milutinovic?

21        A.   I think that my statement then and now coincide, only I said that

22     in the meantime, that is, from the time I testified last time and now, I

23     did have the opportunity to get in contact with certain individuals, to

24     discuss this problem, and the question of the return of refugees.  So my

25     answer is:  I have not done any research, and I wouldn't discuss that in

Page 10510

 1     detail, but it is certainly one of the factors that tends to lead to the

 2     population fleeing from various types of ammunitions, bombs, rocketing of

 3     certain territories.  You must admit that anyone who finds himself in

 4     such a territory would flee to the neighbouring village if it hasn't been

 5     hit; if it has, then it would move on to some other territory.  That is

 6     as far as my knowledge goes and my assumptions.  Scientifically I have

 7     not studied these things, but as an expert for ABH and somebody who

 8     warned the army and the civilians of the danger which these documents

 9     which have not been admitted into evidence say, that the use of depleted

10     uranium munitions did certainly prompt people to leave because we marked

11     these places with a warning:  Do not approach, do not touch.  So our

12     advice, our order was that this territory should not be used and the

13     people in that territory should not stay there, they should look for

14     somewhere else.  Therefore, my assertion is and I stand by it that the

15     use of depleted uranium munitions in the territory of Kosovo and

16     Metohija, in the territory along Prizren, Djakovica, Pec, Stimlje, and

17     other places, because of the danger that the people were aware of because

18     they were warned of the danger was certainly one of the factors that

19     contributed to them leaving that territory or Kosovo and Metohija as a

20     whole.

21             MS. PETERSEN:

22        Q.   General, general, general --

23        A.   -- we now have reports from Kosovo and Metohija --

24        Q.   General, I need to cut you off at this point.  It appears that

25     your opinion on this has gotten much stronger over the last two years.

Page 10511

 1     Is that fair to say?  If we could just go through this.  In Milutinovic

 2     when you were questioned by Judge Bonomy you said not that cluster bombs

 3     were the cause, you said that it could have led to population movements.

 4     Do you still agree with that testimony in Milutinovic, what you told

 5     Judge Bonomy, or are you giving us new testimony today that you know, in

 6     the last two years you have become certain, that this is what caused the

 7     population movements?

 8        A.   I stand by what I said regarding cluster bombs and by what I said

 9     here today, but I claim on the basis of the knowledge I have two years

10     later, on the basis of research that I have done with respect to depleted

11     uranium, the number of sick people and the nature of the diseases that

12     occur --

13        Q.   No, no, General, I'm not asking you about research into depleted

14     uranium.  I'm asking you specifically about your knowledge about why

15     Albanians fled Kosovo.  And to be clear, your additional research has

16     been talking to a few ethnic Serb families who are your friends.  That's

17     your additional research, and based on that, you have strengthened your

18     opinion that you know this is why Albanians left Kosovo.  Is that -- is

19     that your testimony today?

20        A.   In addition to this research, I had statistics of the number of

21     people sick in the south of Serbia and in Kosovo and Metohija.  According

22     to the data of the health centre in Kosovska Mitrovica and the statements

23     of Rade Trajkovic, who is head of the medical centre, the number of

24     people suffering from cancer of the liver, kidneys, the number of born

25     children with defects has increased ten or more times.  Now, in Kosovo

Page 10512

 1     and Metohija, one of the reasons, in my opinion, is the use of this type

 2     of ammunition.  And to go back to your first question.  Do you believe

 3     that when a container with a cluster bomb which contains 400 types of

 4     different cluster bombs, incendiary, et cetera, covers a territory of

 5     several hundred kilometres and if this explodes, if you listen to the

 6     fireworks during New Year's celebrations, then it can cause fear among

 7     people in a city.  And when such a quantity of cluster bombs and the

 8     explosions that occur in the air, this certainly does provoke fear --

 9        Q.   Okay --

10        A.   -- and it tends to lead to fleeing.  That is the assessment of a

11     soldier.

12        Q.   Okay --

13        A.   -- in --

14        Q.   -- thank you, General, thank you, General.  You've said a lot

15     there.  Just to deal with the first thing.  So now you've said you've got

16     a second piece of new information, which is that people were sick, people

17     have gotten sick.  You can agree, General, that this does nothing to

18     explain why people would have fled -- why Albanians would have fled

19     Kosovo in March of 1999, in April of 1999, in May of 1999, this data that

20     later subsequently people have gotten sick.  Those two things are not

21     related; can we agree on that?

22        A.   This confirms our assertion and our knowledge and our warnings to

23     the population which we gave in March and February 1999 to units in

24     Kosovo, units of the army, the civil defence, and the population of the

25     dangers threatening in the event of the use of depleted uranium

Page 10513

 1     munitions.  Do you believe that any normal person would wait --

 2        Q.   Sir --

 3        A.   -- and stay in a radioactive area --

 4        Q.   General, I need you to answer the question that I am asking you.

 5     Can you agree with me that evidence of later sickness of people does

 6     nothing to tell us whether people were fleeing bombs in March of 1999, in

 7     April of 1999?  It may have some relevance as to whether your fears were

 8     true, but it doesn't tell us why people were leaving.  Can we agree on

 9     that and move on?

10        A.   I cannot agree with that because I begin -- the beginning of the

11     exodus was linked to the method, intensity, and type of bombing by NATO.

12     This couldn't be done in a couple of days, as planned.  Then they

13     launched a general offensive and used all available munitions they had.

14     And I claim in this court - whether you will admit it as evidence or

15     not - that both use of cluster bombs and depleted uranium munitions were

16     factors which prompted the population to flee --

17        Q.   Okay --

18        A.   -- whether there were other reasons you will establish during the

19     proceedings.  I will not go into that, but I'm claiming that these two

20     factors certainly contributed to the beginning of the population

21     migrations.

22        Q.   And just to be clear, what you said to Judge Bonomy is true,

23     other than what you've told us today about talking to Serbian families

24     and looking at data that people have gotten sick.  What you told Judge

25     Bonomy in the Milutinovic trial is true when he asked you:

Page 10514

 1             "You have done research on this, have you, the movement of the

 2     population as a result of the use of these cluster bombs?"

 3             And you told him:

 4             "I did not deal with that particular topic."

 5             Can you -- is that true, what you said to Judge Bonomy?

 6        A.   That is true.  That is what I said to Judge Bonomy, that is what

 7     I said.  But today we are going further in the discussion, and I'm

 8     explaining.  So I stand by what I'm saying now.  These are my assessments

 9     and I stand by them.  Now, whether from your standpoint or the standpoint

10     of the Chamber, this is acceptable, it is up to you to decide.

11        Q.   Now, also in Milutinovic at that time you were careful to say

12     that there could be other things, other causes, or other factors.  You

13     stated:

14             "It is one of the factors that could have led to the population

15     movements."

16             Do you stand by that testimony today, or are you also changing

17     this testimony?  Do you stand by the testimony that there could have been

18     other factors?

19        A.   I was talking about an assessment that I'm making here and that I

20     stand by.  This was one of the segments that could contribute to the

21     movement of the population.  I didn't enter into others.

22        Q.   Okay.  If we could just turn back to Exhibit 518, briefly,

23     Defence Exhibit 518.  So looking at this exhibit, by your own testimony

24     you can see, we can see, that the heaviest missile strikes were right

25     along the border with Albania.  And, General, you've also conceded that

Page 10515

 1     people from all over -- Albanians from all over Kosovo, from many

 2     villages were fleeing out of Kosovo and many of them fled into Albania.

 3     My question to you is:  Why would civilians flee bonds only towards -- to

 4     head straight towards an area of heavy missile strikes?

 5        A.   As far as I know, the directions of the departure of civilians

 6     from Kosovo were not across the Prokletije mountains, but through Pec and

 7     Macedonia.  So the areas that were struck were marked, those territories

 8     are still there and NATO forces, but they're not entering that area.

 9     They're haunted area.  So these areas were marked, indicating:  Warning,

10     dangerous, risky.  And as a unit there's a rule that you have to make a

11     detour of these areas without crossing them because they're dangerous for

12     survival.  So if an inhabitant sees that this territory has been marked,

13     he doesn't go across that territory, but in a round-about way, which will

14     still make it possible for him to reach his destination as soon as

15     possible.

16        Q.   Now, General --

17        A.   -- a peasant -- a peasant doesn't think in the way a soldier

18     does --

19        Q.   General, assuming that after a strike has occurred and your units

20     come in and they seal it off and they say "contaminated," assuming that

21     that happens and that's the case, there is still a fair amount of time

22     when these missiles are falling, the missiles with being shot.  So is it

23     your testimony that people -- this is a pretty large area of land.  Is it

24     your testimony that based on your information people did not flee through

25     that area?  Is that your knowledge of Albanians leaving Kosovo?  Or --

Page 10516

 1     I'm not sure I'm understanding what you're saying.

 2        A.   I did not deal with the routes that the population took to

 3     withdraw from the territory of Kosovo to other countries; I was dealing

 4     with contaminated areas and tried to make it accessible, this information

 5     about contamination to all people, troops and civilians.  But you have to

 6     go back into the mentality of the people of the time and think like they

 7     did.  Nothing can help me here.  I'm going to get to that area over there

 8     because it's safer there, and nothing's going to hold me back.  This is

 9     how they thought.

10        Q.   Okay.  If we could look at the transcript today, page 36, line

11     11, I just wanted to clarify something with you.  You said:

12             "So from that territory," meaning this territory that you've

13     marked as radioactive, "the idea was to expel the civilian population and

14     to only leave the units there so that in the event of land forces, the

15     casualties would be reduced and we would in that way avoid condemnation

16     by the international community which would expect a lot of casualties if

17     the civilians had stayed there."

18             So are you -- is it your testimony today that there was a plan to

19     expel the civilian population from this area by the VJ?

20        A.   I'm not -- well, what I said was in this context.  It was NATO's

21     assessment that the favourable routes for the incursion of their land

22     forces in the territory of Kosovo would be from Albania, maybe two or

23     three routes; and many more from the territory of Macedonia.  And if they

24     were to launch such an operation, they would first to remove the civilian

25     population because when the tanks started rolling in and when Serbian

Page 10517

 1     forces are engaged, civilian population should be saved from harm, and

 2     this was one of the ways to do so.  I'm not talking about plans on the

 3     part of the VJ.  This was my presumption that this was one of the ways

 4     for NATO forces to clear the area without major casualties, so as to make

 5     that territory more favourable for the advance of NATO troops.  Because

 6     had victims been effected in their launch, then that would lead to

 7     international condemnation of their actions.

 8        Q.   All right.  Thank you for clarifying that.

 9             And just briefly, did NATO bomb locations in Belgrade?

10        A.   By what?  Belgrade was bombarded.  You know, the MUP building,

11     the state security department, Ministry of Defence, bridges in Novi Sad.

12     Civilian targets were hit in Belgrade, in other towns, and settlements in

13     former Yugoslavia and Serbia.

14        Q.   And do you agree that there was not a mass exodus of civilians

15     from Belgrade like the ones seen in Kosovo?

16        A.   Yes, there was.  At the time I resided close to the facilities --

17             MR. DJORDJEVIC:  Your Honour.

18             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes, Mr. Djordjevic.

19             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] At this point my learned friend

20     asked a question which is irrelevant, absolutely, concerning the bombing

21     of Belgrade because we are discussing the territory of Kosovo and

22     Metohija.  I do believe that this in no way can be subject matter for her

23     cross-examination.

24             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.  As I understand the point being put to

25     the witness is that bombing in the Belgrade area did not cause mass

Page 10518

 1     evacuation.  And if that is the point, it may have some relevance.  And

 2     the General was dealing with that point as I recall.

 3             MS. PETERSEN:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 4        Q.   You can proceed with your answer.

 5        A.   Well, when we realised that NATO was not choosey about its

 6     targets and that apart from their -- what they saw as legitimate targets

 7     as the Ministry of Defence building, they were --

 8        Q.   Let me -- let me just re-pose the question so we're clear.  My

 9     question is a very simple one.  Do you agree or not that there was not a

10     mass exodus of civilians from Belgrade like the ones seen from Kosovo?

11        A.   There was no mass exodus, but there were civilians fleeing

12     Belgrade, relocating to other towns and to other countries.  At the

13     General Staff of the VJ, we had a plan to evacuate Belgrade if the

14     nuclear institute of Vinca were targeted because we were aware of the

15     hazard in the aftermath of such a bombing.  So there was some movement of

16     people, not en masse, but individual cases were recorded that people

17     moved out of the areas that were targeted at the time.

18        Q.   Okay.  So you'll agree, there was not movement en masse, some

19     individual people may have left, but it was not en masse.  Your testimony

20     today is not that people left Belgrade to the same degree as Albanians

21     left Kosovo; can we agree on that?

22        A.   I will agree with you and say yes, but Belgrade was not bombarded

23     to the same level as Kosovo was bombarded.  Had it been bombarded at the

24     same level, then it must -- it would have resulted in mass exodus.

25        Q.   So based on that, you would agree then that one cannot say as a

Page 10519

 1     rule:  If bombs fall, civilians flee.  You have to look at other factors,

 2     the degree of the bombing, for example.  Just because bombs fell in

 3     general, civilians don't just flee.  Would you agree with that?

 4        A.   I wouldn't agree that the only impetus comes from bombs falling.

 5     It's all about intensity of bombing.  If the feeling of uncertainty is

 6     higher because of being somewhere, if the arsenal used is more diverse,

 7     if the level of security is lower then people will flee.  Of course I'm

 8     not excluding other factors which may influence the movement of

 9     population, but this is one of the primary factors in my opinion.

10        Q.   So there are many factors that could come in to play, and one

11     would actually need to really look into those factors, do some research

12     into it before one could conclude exactly why a population fled.  Would

13     you agree with that?

14        A.   You will most probably gather the big picture and the complete

15     picture in this trial.  I'm discussing one segment:  The bombing of

16     Kosovo and Metohija by certain -- with certain types of ammunition,

17     hitting chemical plants and tanks and cluster bombs.  I'm sure that you

18     will find that what I said was one of the major influences in people

19     moving around Kosovo and later on outside the territory of Kosovo.

20        Q.   Thank you very much.

21             MS. PETERSEN:  I have no further questions.

22             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you, Ms. Petersen.

23             Mr. Djordjevic.

24             MR. DJORDJEVIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.  I will be very short

25     and brief.

Page 10520

 1                           Re-examination by Mr. Djordjevic:

 2        Q.   [Interpretation] One of my questions, since we've broached the

 3     subject of the bombing of Belgrade, in that direction.  General, sir,

 4     since you were in charge of ABH defence and then N, nuclear defence, if I

 5     may, during your examination-in-chief you confirmed that you notified

 6     subordinate units but also the civilians defence and the Territorial

 7     Defence on the threat that depleted uranium munition use would be posing.

 8     My specific question, since I believe that this parallel is inappropriate

 9     and useless, let me ask you:  During the NATO aggression was there any

10     case of depleted uranium or depleted uranium rounds were used in the

11     territory of Belgrade?

12        A.   We had information that NATO forces had available Tomahawk cruise

13     missiles and in the stabilising mechanism they contained 4 kilogrammes of

14     uranium.  But as I said in the case of Kosovo and Metohija we did have

15     observation posts throughout Serbia.  We found depleted uranium south of

16     the 44th parallel in the areas of -- municipalities of Bujanovc, Presevo,

17     et cetera.  But in the territory of Belgrade, we did not find or confirm

18     the presence of depleted uranium, either through laboratory tests or

19     otherwise.  And since the building of our General Staff was hit by cruise

20     missiles, we tried to analyse samples there, but we have no proof that

21     territory north of the 44th parallel was hit by depleted uranium.

22        Q.   Had you had such information you would have notified civil

23     defence, Territorial Defence?

24        A.   Yes, by virtue of our position and duties, we had to do so.  I

25     explained that we worked intensively on preparing the population of

Page 10521

 1     Belgrade in the case the nuclear reactor within the Vinca institute,

 2     there are two of them, were bombarded, there is a certain amount of

 3     either used, spent, or stockpile of nuclear fuels there.  Thank God this

 4     did not come about, but we had certain announcements that this may

 5     happen, and we prepared plans to notify the population.  We prepared

 6     certain transport effects to take in place a plan to evacuate people if

 7     the institute had been bombed.  And we had some estimates on the

 8     aftermath of the bombing of that institute.  It -- had it been bombed,

 9     the results would be as if a 50-kilo tonne bomb had been detonated.  Of

10     course we made plans depending on the prevailing wind directions,

11     et cetera, to evacuate people if that came about.

12        Q.   Thank you very much.  You just answered part of my questions that

13     I wanted to direct to you during -- concerning the cross-examination of

14     my learned colleague.  I have no further questions, and I thank you for

15     your arrival here.

16                           Questioned by the Court:

17             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.  Can I just be clear, I think you were

18     trying to make clear your concern at the possibility of an attack on the

19     Vinca institute was because of a stockpile of -- that Serbia had of

20     nuclear fuels in the institute; is that correct?

21        A.   If you can repeat the first portion of your question.

22             JUDGE PARKER:  You've expressed clearly a number of contingency

23     plans that you had and the General Staff had in the event of an attack on

24     the Vinca institute.  Is it Vinka or Vinca?

25        A.   It's nuclear institute Vinca, that is the name place, Vinca, next

Page 10522

 1     to Belgrade.  Yes, we did have contingency plans and we thought what to

 2     do in case NATO bombarded the territory where the institute was located.

 3     And as I said, because of the character and the type of radioactive

 4     materials on that location, it would have resulted in a major disaster, a

 5     major catastrophe.  And we had preparations for that, we notified the

 6     population what to do; but thank God this never occurred.

 7             JUDGE PARKER:  Serbia had a nuclear reactor in that institute; is

 8     that correct?

 9        A.   There were two nuclear reactors in that institute.  One was

10     operational and one was stopped and conservated.  The one which was

11     operational was used in fundamental research in terms of protection,

12     detection, dosimetry, as far as I knew from the contacts I had with those

13     people working in the institute.

14             JUDGE PARKER:  And the concern that you are expressing about such

15     an attack was because of the stockpile of nuclear fuels that you had in

16     the institute?

17        A.   For your information, there is -- there are uranium bars which

18     are nuclear fuel within the reactor which are unspent.  Then there is

19     some fuel for the next stage on stockpile, and the third type of fuel was

20     spent nuclear fuel which had to be stored in special warehouses.  There

21     was the official warehouse for radioactive waste for the whole

22     Yugoslavia, which received radioactive medical spent fuel and other

23     radioactive materials.  And all the materials that were collected in

24     Kosovo and Metohija during the war activities and from other parts of

25     Serbia once war operations were over, we used that nuclear fuel warehouse

Page 10523

 1     to store those samples as well.  So we -- threats came from both nuclear

 2     waste and nuclear fuel which was kept in that official nuclear materials

 3     warehouse at the institute.

 4             JUDGE PARKER:  And that institute was not bombed or the subject

 5     of attack?

 6        A.   The institute was not bombed, but it was subject to manipulations

 7     in terms of announcement that it would be bombed.

 8             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.  I wanted to get clear what was the

 9     basis of the concern you expressed.

10                           [Trial Chamber confers]

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Sir, earlier today you told us that you at least

12     once went to Kosovo during the war to visit units of the 3rd Army and

13     that you didn't have any contact or police units at that time.  Could you

14     be a little bit more precise, when exactly have you been in Kosovo during

15     the war?  What were the dates?  And was it the only time, or have you

16     been there several times?

17        A.   First of all, this was the only time.  I do not remember the

18     dates.  Trust me.  I don't know that this would be a question put to me.

19     I would have checked.  It was in April.  I visited units stationed in the

20     area of Pec, and in that area -- this is the area I visited primarily

21     because it was targeted heavily with DU munitions, and I found some

22     vehicles that had been hit and marked as radioactive on the Djakovica-Pec

23     road.  Then I visited the front line units in the area of Kosara towards

24     the Albania border.  During my stay in Kosovo I did not encounter

25     policemen or their officers or command staff.  We visited the 3rd Army

Page 10524

 1     command post in Pristina.  When we arrived there, people were then issued

 2     with tasks and missions and I was given the mission to go to Pec.  I went

 3     there, went back to Belgrade, and reported back.  During my stay there, I

 4     had no contacts with policemen.  The only contacts I had were with troops

 5     in the area of Kosare close to the Albanian border.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.  And did you have any contact with the

 7     civilian population?

 8        A.   No, at the time I had no contacts with civilians.  I dealt with

 9     problems of military nature prevalent in the units there.  I did not have

10     any time to spend on any civilian issues or issues of the civilian

11     population.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Did you see any columns or groups of people

13     leaving the villages in any direction?

14        A.   No.  During our arrival to Kosovo and en route from Kosovo to Pec

15     and to the locale that we were supposed to visit, I did not see any

16     columns of civilians during that trip and the trip back and while I

17     stayed there.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Did you get, during your stay in Kosovo, any

19     information from people from -- you said you had contact to members of

20     the army.  Did you get any information about the reasons why people left

21     their villages, their homes, and at least at the end, the country?

22        A.   No, I did not.  Subject matter of my interest was what I was

23     dealing with, and certain issues concerning control and command of units.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

25             JUDGE PARKER:  You'll be pleased to know, sir, that that

Page 10525

 1     concludes the questions for you.  The Chamber would like to thank you for

 2     your preparedness to come to The Hague, for the assistance that you've

 3     been able to give, and you may of course now return to your normal

 4     activities.  And a court officer will show you out.  Thank you indeed.

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you for giving me this

 6     opportunity.

 7                           [The witness withdrew]

 8             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Djordjevic.

 9             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] Unfortunately, this is the last

10     witness for today.  Since, due to a misfortune at the beginning of last

11     week, we had a witness ending up in ER concerning some cardiological

12     problems.  Our next witness, Mr. Krga, is going to be here on Monday and

13     the Defence will be able to continue presenting its case on Monday, not

14     earlier than that.

15             JUDGE PARKER:  Early in the case as it is and given the

16     difficulties you've had, we accept what you say with a smile,

17     Mr. Djordjevic, and we will continue the evidence on Monday.  The

18     Chamber, though, would draw attention to the fact that we have not only

19     lost the whole of the three days available last week, but we have this

20     week made very slow progress.  The programme indicated by the Defence for

21     its witnesses indicated that there would be five called, only three have.

22     The programme indicated that two of the witnesses would be dealt with by

23     an examination-in-chief of some two hours for each witness, and this

24     witness for some one and a half hours.  This witness went fairly quickly,

25     but the two previous witnesses, their evidence stretched over four days

Page 10526

 1     rather than what might have been anticipated of less than two days.  We

 2     bring this to attention now because if this rate of progress continues,

 3     this case will go to near the end of the year, and that's just not

 4     satisfactory.  So we need to start moving quickly with Defence witnesses,

 5     just as we had to move quickly with Prosecution witnesses.

 6             Now, I'm sure that this is a matter that you will take under

 7     consideration, Mr. Djordjevic, and that efforts, effective efforts, will

 8     be made to deal with this and ensure that we really get moving through

 9     the case.  Care needs to be taken that we only hear evidence that's

10     really relevant and not waste time on incidental and [indiscernible]

11     issues.  And that if your questions and those of Mr. Djurdjic and your

12     other colleagues are to the point, it will assist the Prosecution to be

13     equally to the point in their cross-examination and we can see the

14     progress starting to move as it should.

15             If that can be the subject of attention by yourself and your

16     colleagues as you move into the defence more seriously, we'd be very

17     grateful.  We've got to get the case moving again quickly in fairness to

18     your client and everybody.

19             We now adjourn, to resume tomorrow -- on Monday morning at 9.00.

20                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 12.19 p.m.,

21                           to be reconvened on Monday, the 1st day of

22                           February, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.