Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 10605

 1                           Tuesday, 2 February 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  The witness is to be brought in.  Good morning.

 6     Unfortunately our start was delayed by a technical problem, but

 7     apparently it is resolved now.

 8                           [The witness takes the stand]

 9             JUDGE PARKER:  Good morning.  The affirmation you made to tell

10     the truth still applies, and Mr. Popovic is continuing with his

11     questions.  Please sit down.  Thank you.

12                           WITNESS:  BRANKO KRGA Resumed

13                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

14                           Examination by Mr. Popovic:  [Continued]

15        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, General.

16        A.   Good morning.

17        Q.   We will continue.

18             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] I will ask the witness to be shown

19     D180.

20        Q.   It's your tab number 26, General.

21             You can see the document, it's called proclamation to the

22     citizens of Kosovo and Metohija.  Are you familiar with it?

23        A.   I know that a document with these contents was broadcast on the

24     media.

25             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we see the next page in both

Page 10606

 1     languages.

 2        Q.   I'll ask you to look at the last paragraph after the subheading

 3     "Albanians."  It says:

 4             "Only living together without hatred and contempt leads to a

 5     happier future, a carefree childhood for our children, regardless of

 6     religion or nationality.  Let us all together make an effort to restore

 7     peace to our lands.  Return to your homes and your everyday work.  Do so

 8     today."

 9             Was this something that was conveyed as a message to the Albanian

10     minority in all of Serbia and in Kosovo and Metohija and does this date,

11     the 7th of April, 1999, is it consistent with what you recollect?

12             MR. STAMP:  Your Honours, I have been very hesitant to intervene

13     when there have been -- there has been quite a lot of leading questions

14     in chief.  But this one is leading and very badly leading, having regard

15     to what the witness said in the previous testimony.  In any case, in

16     chief, counsel should ask the witness non-leading questions.

17             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Stamp, I can't disagree for a moment with what

18     you say, but Mr. Popovic is quoting a document.  And was -- he then

19     asked, Was this something conveyed to the Albanian minority.

20             How is that leading?

21             MR. STAMP:  Well, I think having regard -- well, he puts it to

22     the witness as it were that it was conveyed to the Albanian minority.  He

23     leads him on that score.  In his previous testimony he was saying that he

24     was not sure that this document was even translated to Albanian.

25             JUDGE PARKER:  Are you speaking of testimony yesterday?

Page 10607

 1             MR. STAMP:  No, Your Honour.  In the 92 ter statement which is

 2     part of the record of his evidence.

 3             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] May I, Your Honour?

 4             JUDGE PARKER:  Carry on, please, Mr. Popovic.

 5             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Without wishing to go into a

 6     debate, I just read out a passage under the subheading "Albanians" and

 7     the text that follows.  If this is not enough in terms of grounds for

 8     such a question, I will rephrase.

 9        Q.   Sir, would you look at this last paragraph and tell me to whom it

10     was addressed?

11        A.   It's obvious that it was addressed to Albanians.

12        Q.   Did what I just read reflect the position of the General Staff of

13     the Army of Yugoslavia at that moment, and did it reflect their attitude

14     to ethnic Albanians?

15        A.   Yes, this is a reflection of the attitude of the General Staff,

16     but it was also quite obvious that only this road leads to proper

17     solutions.

18             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Can I now ask for D006-0287.

19        Q.   Your number 27.  We see a document called "Briefing 27/99."  The

20     date is April 1999.  Could you focus on bullet point 7 under paragraph 2,

21     and it says:

22             "According to foreign ex-pats, the operation of land forces could

23     begin within 15 days, and it could involve around 100.000 soldiers."

24             What was the reaction of the General Staff upon receiving

25     information that a land operation could begin involving 100.000 troops?

Page 10608

 1        A.   We followed closely all the developments concerning the

 2     possibility of lands operation.  I told you that such information

 3     circulated in the media and in some intelligence sources.  Of course, at

 4     that time we were not sure whether the operation would go ahead or not.

 5     We knew that within the NATO various options were being considered in the

 6     war against Yugoslavia including that possibility.

 7             However, we did not manage to learn whether the decision had

 8     actually been made to go ahead with the land operation.  We were,

 9     therefore, forced to carry out preparations for any contingency,

10     including that, because even as non-military experts can understand, the

11     army takes some time to prepare, so we conducted partial mobilisation,

12     training, and deployment of units on the axis where we expected a land

13     operation could go forward.

14        Q.   Thank you.

15             On the same page, the last paragraph reads:

16             "In north eastern Albania, training camps, Bajram, Curri, Has,

17     and Kuks were re-activated to train Albanian terrorists.  Weapons for

18     terrorists were being supplied to Albania and Macedonia."

19             Can you comment briefly?

20        A.   Yes, this is one kind of information we received that such

21     training was conducted in training centres in the north-east of Albania.

22     Of course, we were sensitive to this issue, we monitored what was going

23     on with these men who were being trained there, whether they were going

24     to be sent into our territory, with what kind of objectives and

25     assignments.

Page 10609

 1             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we now see D006-89 and

 2     D006-0296.  The first number in B/C/S and the second number in English.

 3        Q.   It's called land operations -- "NATO Land Operations Against

 4     SFRY."  And here in item 2 it says:

 5             "In both options, the aggressor is reckoning on Siptar forces

 6     from the territory of Macedonia and Albania to spear-head the first

 7     echelon of ground forces.  They are being armed, equipped, and trained at

 8     the moment."

 9             Can you tell us how topical this information was and were you

10     expecting that to take place within a short time?

11        A.   Yes, this is what our information was and we were trying to

12     predict what course it would take, if it happened.  Our information that

13     the first waves of attack across the FRY border would involve forces of

14     Albanian terrorists from Albania and Macedonia.  This was soon followed

15     by an attack in Kosare by strong forces from Albania.  However, they were

16     rather unsuccessful with great losses on both sides and then they moved

17     the focus of attack to the axis of Morina where they again failed to

18     penetrate our territory.

19        Q.   Thank you.

20             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] May I ask to tender this document.

21             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D537, Your Honours.

23             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] P1331 will be our next document,

24     please.

25        Q.   Your tab 28.  General, this is a session of the collegium of the

Page 10610

 1     Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command held on 9 April 1999.  We will look

 2     at page 2 in B/C/S and the same page in English.

 3             You say the proclaimed objectives of the aggression were, first,

 4     to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe, second to neutralise the military

 5     the power of the FRY, three to preserve the credibility of the US and

 6     NATO, while the real objective is punishing the FRY and forcing it to

 7     accept a peace agreement that would ensure the bringing in of NATO forces

 8     into Kosovo and Metohija and seizing that part of the territory from the

 9     FRY.

10             Are these really the objectives as you presented them to the

11     collegium, and did they prove to be indeed part of NATO strategy?

12             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] We have the wrong page in both

13     languages.  Page 2.

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] First of all, let me say that this

15     is one of the collegium meetings where we considered the situation in

16     greater detail.  I told you that during the war collegium meetings took

17     place every day, but two weeks into the war, this was a proper occasion

18     to consider the situation in greater detail.  This presentation made is

19     based on all my information that I gained thus far and the objectives, as

20     I saw them, in their plans.  We received that information from all sorts

21     of sources, our operative intelligence sources, agents, and others.

22             Most of these were -- had been implemented by that time or were

23     being implemented.  When I say that, I mean primarily the resolving of

24     the status of Kosovo and Metohija and separating it from the territory of

25     Serbia.

Page 10611

 1             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we now look at page 5 in both

 2     B/C/S and English.

 3        Q.   On page 5 you say:

 4             "The second option, if combat operations continue, is to bring in

 5     armed Siptars supported by NATO.  This option is increasingly likely

 6     after the prospect of the planned withdrawal of the so-called

 7     Kosovo Liberation Army and the Siptar people from Kosovo and Metohija

 8     which has realistically created a difficult humanitarian situation."

 9             Could you explain this planned withdrawal?

10        A.   We had that information that in the movements of population there

11     was an intent to portray them as a humanitarian catastrophe in the eyes

12     of the international public, and when a large number of people find

13     themselves in a relatively small area, it does look like a humanitarian

14     situation.  Indubitably, there were attempts to manipulate these people

15     with I a view to achieving certain goals that they thought they could

16     achieve that way and those objectives were continued bombardment and

17     infliction of the greatest possible losses on the army and the police in

18     Kosovo.

19             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we now see page 8 in both

20     versions.

21        Q.   On page 8 in paragraph 3 in B/C/S and I believe it will be

22     paragraph 4 in English you say:

23             "Bearing in mind the earlier outlined aims and the cruelty of the

24     aggressor, switching to the peace option would not be easy to achieve,

25     but we are convinced that it is possible, and in that sense if we quickly

Page 10612

 1     make the right moves, there is room for real optimism."

 2        A.   We constantly sought to restore peace and to find a peaceful

 3     solution.  Here I presented a variety of options how the situation could

 4     develop, and I unequivocally favoured the political solution, the

 5     peaceful solution.  However, this did not happen.  Instead, the war

 6     continued for another two months.

 7             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] May I now ask for D183.

 8        Q.   Your tab 29.  It's called "Directive to Engage the Army of

 9     Yugoslavia in Defence Against the NATO Aggression," dated 9 April 1999.

10     On page 1, subheading 2.1, it says:

11             "Aims and tasks of the aggression:  To prevent a humanitarian

12     catastrophe, to neutralise the military power of the FRY, and to maintain

13     the credibility of NATO and the US, while the real objective is to

14     inflict as heavy casualties on the VJ as possible, to force the FRY --

15             THE INTERPRETER:  Could we slow down, please, both the counsel

16     and the witness are going too fast.

17             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   General, I will now ask you what the interpreters are asking us,

19     namely to slow down.  We are both speaking too fast.  After my question,

20     please wait a few seconds before you start answering, and I will try to

21     slow down too.

22             So your answer has not been recorded and you need to give us

23     again your comment on 2.1.

24        A.   I think a comment is almost superfluous because it turned out, as

25     the war went on, that what is written here came to pass.

Page 10613

 1             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we have page 5 of this

 2     document, please.  Page 6, paragraph 1, in English.

 3        Q.   In item 2 we see the concept and idea of strategic defence:

 4             "Engagement and use of the Army of Yugoslavia in defence against

 5     NATO forces should take place in two stages with complete implementation

 6     of the Geneva Conventions on international law of warfare and

 7     humanitarian law."

 8             Do you know that the Army of Yugoslavia developed certain

 9     documents to be given to every soldiers to educate them about the

10     international law of warfare and international humanitarian law?

11        A.   Yes.  Such documents were prepared.  I must say, it was I who

12     proposed at the collegium meeting that they be prepared.  And they

13     contained excerpts from international humanitarian law for officers and

14     for servicemen.  They were prepared in a useful format so that they could

15     easily be carried on one's person in a pocket.

16        Q.   Thank you.

17             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] We will move to the next document,

18     please.  D504.  The number that might be easier is D008-2858.

19             MR. STAMP:  Can I inquire whether this one is notified, or

20     noticed?

21             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, I think you have been

22     notified.  There was an additional notification sent by the Defence on

23     the 31st of January.  Could we please see page 6 of this document.

24        Q.   We see that it is a combat report; it's number 30 in your binder.

25     It's combat report number 23, dated the 16th of April, 1999.  On page 1

Page 10614

 1     it said:

 2             "Under the guise of a humanitarian operation, the first part of

 3     main forces who should take part in the ground operation against

 4     Kosovo and Metohija are being brought into Albania."

 5             Was there still a real danger of a land operation in the area of

 6     Kosovo and Metohija on the 16th of April?

 7        A.   Yes, at the time, there was still concern on our side that there

 8     might be a land operation.

 9        Q.   Can you please have a look at page 6.  Under item 5, security

10     situation in the Yugoslav army, in the second paragraph it reads:

11             "The enemy attaches exceptional importance to psychological and

12     propaganda activities.  In order to justify the continuation of the

13     aggression, in addition to stressing the humanitarian catastrophe and

14     ethnic cleansing, he now also stresses documentation of mass graves which

15     have allegedly been detected and located by satellites and mass rape."

16             On the 16th of April, did you have any information that there

17     were mass graves in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija?

18        A.   No, at the time, as far as I remember, we did not have any

19     information that would indicate that.  I think that this is another

20     example of how a problem, even if it existed, could be resolved

21     differently through propaganda.  That is to say that the information

22     could be submitted to the state organs of our country, which would

23     certainly take measures to that effect if it was determined that the

24     information was correct.

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 10615

 1             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please see the next

 2     document, it's D006-0300.

 3        Q.   It is your tab 31.

 4             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] But before we move to this

 5     document, Your Honour, I will tender the previous one because the number

 6     is not 3504, but the one I told you, D008-2858, if it could please be

 7     admitted into evidence.

 8             JUDGE PARKER:  Which document is that, Mr. Popovic?

 9             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, it's the document that

10     we just discussed.  It's the combat report number 23, dated the

11     16th of April, 1999.

12             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.  It will be received.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D538, Your Honours.

14             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could we now please go

15     back to document D006-0300.

16        Q.   General, this is the briefing 43/99, the date of this document is

17     the 21st of April, 1999.  Under item 5 it reads:

18             "According to the available information, transport to Albania of

19     24 Apache helicopters and 18 VBR should be completed.  As part of the

20     reinforcements for the enemy forces in our region, around 300 members of

21     the 82nd VPD of the US OS arrived in Albania.  Parts of this division

22     arrived in BH earlier, and the arrival of its members in Macedonia has

23     been announced.  According to our information, the Italian contingent,

24     2500 members, will also be completed today in Albania."

25             So it was on the 21st of April.  Could you please comment on

Page 10616

 1     this.  Does this mean that there was mass bringing in of forces to the

 2     borders of FRY?

 3        A.   Yes, following the reactions of the armed forces in our

 4     surrounding countries.  We learned that the Apaches were moved from

 5     Germany to Albania which was later on confirmed in the media.  The Apache

 6     helicopters are very efficient, and we were certainly afraid that they

 7     might be used because we would certainly have increased losses due to the

 8     attacks of these helicopters.  Other elements of armed forces which are

 9     listed here also caused concern on our part if they were to be directly

10     used in the area of Kosovo and Metohija.

11        Q.   Thank you.

12             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I tender this

13     document into evidence.

14             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D539, Your Honours.

16             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please see document

17     D006-0306.  It's a Defence document.

18        Q.   General, it is your tab 32.  It is a report 47/99, the date of

19     this document is the 25th of April, 1999.  If you could please focus on

20     item 8.

21             "Manipulation with the Siptar refugees are continuing.  They are

22     being sent around in circles on the border between Macedonia and Albania

23     which is organised by the CIA."

24             Just a brief comment?

25        A.   It was another piece of information we received that the number

Page 10617

 1     of refugees was being represented as greater than it actually was.

 2        Q.   Thank you.

 3             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please move on to the next

 4     page of this document.

 5        Q.   Under "proposal," it reads:

 6             "Since we are manipulating the Siptar refugees and using them to

 7     justify the continuation of the aggression to public opinion, it might be

 8     a good idea to call on them again to return to their homes and reject the

 9     'care' that the NATO member countries are providing for them."

10             Here I would ask you to say primarily what was the character of

11     these calls and did you really wish for these people to return to their

12     homes?

13        A.   Firstly, we understood quite well what problems could follow on

14     the basis of this manipulation with a great number of refugees, and that

15     really caused dissatisfaction of the public which is quite normal, so we

16     wanted, through this proposal, to stop this treatment of those people and

17     to call on them once again to return to their homes.  I cannot say

18     whether that really happened or not, whether another proclamation was

19     issued or not because I do not remember that.

20        Q.   Thank you.

21             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] I tender this document into

22     evidence.

23             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D540, Your Honours.

25             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please see the

Page 10618

 1     document D006-0107.

 2        Q.   It is your tab 34, General.

 3             General, it was a briefing held on the 30th of April, 1999, and

 4     under your name on the first page it says:

 5             "Activities were stepped-up for three reasons, the weather has

 6     improved, fuel tanks have been provided, on the eve of Chernomyrdin's

 7     visit."

 8             Could you please firstly explain to us the stepped-up activities;

 9     what does that mean?  And then if you can please explain the third

10     reason: "On the eve of Chernomyrdin's visit;" what does that mean?

11        A.   The stepped-up activities meant firstly that the NATO air force

12     was used and so were the cruising missiles.  It is well known that the

13     numbers differed during the war from 3 to 500 until 1.000 sorties, we

14     noticed that at the time when the nights were clear in Belgrade, which

15     was rare, that the activities were stepped-up.  That meant that the

16     number of sorties increased, as was the number of cruise missiles which

17     were launched.  We believe that this was additional pressure against our

18     side and also against the mediators so that the conditions which had been

19     imposed would be accepted as soon as possible.

20        Q.   Thank you.

21             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I tender this

22     document.

23             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D541, Your Honours.

25             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please see D006-0265.  It

Page 10619

 1     is a Defence document, and it's your tab 35.

 2        Q.   General, this is report number 73, dated the 4th of May, 1999,

 3     under item 3.  It says:

 4             "The military and political situation in Macedonia" --

 5             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] That is on page 2 in the English

 6     version of this document.

 7        Q.   You say the following:

 8             "We have obtained intelligence information that NATO has made a

 9     decision for a large number of Siptar refugees to be transferred to

10     Macedonia, apparently because there are serious problems with the

11     distribution of humanitarian aid due to abuse by local Albanian

12     authorities.  This implies new changes to the ethnic composition of

13     Macedonia in favour of the Siptar minority.

14             "During his recent visit to Macedonia, a senior military leader

15     of the so called KLA, said that NATO leaders had told him that Macedonia

16     is an artificial creation which should be divided and that the Macedonian

17     authorities no longer existed, because the Alliance has a major say in

18     making key decisions.  On that occasion, he instructed Siptar nationals

19     to direct all their activities, including refugees and operations of the

20     so-called KLA, towards Macedonia."

21             First of all, as you were the chief of the intelligence

22     administration in the General Staff, do you know about the

23     greater Albania project?

24        A.   The greater Albania project is well known to every citizen, I

25     believe, because it has been public for a long time.  Several versions

Page 10620

 1     are posted on the internet, and it was certainly familiar to us in the

 2     intelligence administration.

 3        Q.   And did this project of greater Albania include the territory of

 4     Macedonia and the ethnic Albanians who live there?

 5        A.   Yes, on the maps which are available --

 6             MR. STAMP:  It's leading.  I mean, I hesitate to rise, but a lot

 7     of these questions are leading.  I rise in respect to only some that

 8     might be controversial.

 9             JUDGE PARKER:  They are controversial, are they, Mr. Stamp?

10             MR. STAMP:  Most of them are not, but occasionally, including

11     this one, is controversial to a degree.

12             JUDGE PARKER:  If you are aware of that subject matter,

13     Mr. Popovic, if you could be careful not to lead in respect of it.

14     Thank you.

15             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] I will take that into account,

16     Your Honour.

17        Q.   General, I will then ask you to comment on the quotations from

18     this paragraph which we just read out, and if you could tell us whether

19     these predictions were confirmed in future?

20        A.   As for the greater Albania project, I already said a few words.

21     I think this is something well known and generally known.  In the western

22     part of Macedonia, there was really a series of armed incidents between

23     Albanian groups and Macedonian authorities.  After that, peace was

24     established on the basis of the Ohrid Agreement.

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 10621

 1             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] I tender this document into

 2     evidence.

 3             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D542, Your Honours.

 5             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, could we please see

 6     D006-0315.

 7        Q.   That is your tab -- just a second.  37.  You can see that this is

 8     briefing number 64/99.  The date of this document is the 12th of May.

 9     And if you could please focus on item 4, and if we can comment on it.  I

10     wouldn't read it out as it's a lengthy paragraph.  If you can please read

11     paragraph 4 and provide a brief comment, please.

12        A.   Yes.  We presented the data that we obtained about the strength

13     of NATO forces in the surrounding countries.  This was confirmed later

14     on.  As I said yesterday, General Jackson at the Kumanovo negotiations

15     confirmed that they had been in the area for three months already and

16     that they were waiting to enter the territory of Kosovo and Metohija.

17             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we please see the next page

18     both in B/C/S and in English.  If we could see the subtitle "Proposals"

19     which read:

20             "It is necessary to take several steps with good media coverage

21     after talks with one of the international representatives who have good

22     representation in the international community, and these steps need to be

23     taken in a series that would show our willingness for a political

24     resolution of the proposal."

25             And under 2:

Page 10622

 1             "That the commission for the estimate of damage from the

 2     aggression should send a request to the UN and other relevant

 3     international institutions which would -- may enable them to see the

 4     degree of destruction and of the damage done to the civilians."

 5             If you could please make a brief comment.

 6        A.   This was part of our continued resolution to try to find a

 7     peaceful solution and for refugees to return, so we even said that it was

 8     possible for our troops to withdraw.  We wanted to show some goodwill for

 9     resolving the problem.  As for the other proposal, it was the result of

10     really widespread damage caused during this war and the wish that the

11     international factors be involved so that the facts would be established,

12     especially the suffering of the civilian population which was becoming

13     more and more frequent.

14        Q.   Thank you.

15             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] I tender this document into

16     evidence.

17             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  It will become Exhibit D543, Your Honours.

19             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could we please see

20     D006-0262.

21        Q.   General, it is your tab 36.  This is report number 90 on the

22     activities of Albanian OS and Siptar terrorist forces in the border area

23     with Kosovo and Metohija.  We'll only focus on the first sentence which

24     reads:

25             "In the north-eastern Albania in Papaj, Kocanaj, and Ragam,

Page 10623

 1     members of the so-called KLA, 1.500 of them in each of these places, are

 2     undergoing 15-day training under the command of NATO officers.  The

 3     groups have been formed from Siptars, from the diaspora, and refugees

 4     from Kosovo-Metohija."

 5             According to your information, was there a link between NATO and

 6     the members of the so-called KLA?

 7        A.   During the combat operations, we established a number of facts

 8     which testified to this link, and then, later on, in various documents

 9     and materials, it was undoubtedly confirmed.

10        Q.   Thank you.

11             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I tender this document

12     into evidence as well.

13             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D544, Your Honours.

15             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we please see

16     D006-0243.

17        Q.   General, it is your tab 38.  This is report number 23 dated the

18     19th of May, 1999, which reads:

19             "Through an indirect source, who is said to be reliable, we have

20     acquired photocopies of the topographical maps, which the KLA gave to

21     American representatives in Macedonia on the 15th of May, 1999.  Drawn on

22     the maps are the precise positions and co-ordinates of the Yugoslav Army

23     and MUP units and also the areas which they are not allowed to target -

24     areas where KLA units and Siptar refugees are situated."

25             Could you please comment on this report.  Are you familiar with

Page 10624

 1     it, and do you remember this?

 2        A.   Yes, we received this information from our sources on the ground,

 3     and it confirms what I just said about the co-operation and contacts

 4     between the NATO forces and the Albanians on the ground which was beyond

 5     a doubt.

 6        Q.   General, the following five pages are the excerpts from these

 7     maps.  I wouldn't dwell on each of these because of the time constraints,

 8     but were these maps enclosed with this report, the maps which can be seen

 9     as part of this document?

10        A.   Yes, of course, the maps were enclosed with the report.

11        Q.   Thank you.

12             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] I tender this document into

13     evidence, Your Honour.

14             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D545, Your Honours.

16             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could we please see the

17     document Y016-2926.  To make it easier for my colleagues from the

18     Prosecution, it's number 4030 from their 65 ter list.

19        Q.   General, this is the briefing on the 22nd of May, 1999.  Under

20     item 2 there are quotations of what you said.  And what I'm interested in

21     is where you say that there are four points of this disagreement --

22             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter notes that this cannot be found

23     in the document.  Could the counsel please repeat.

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is well known that at the time a

25     series of peace initiatives had begun in the international community and

Page 10625

 1     various mediators were trying to find some resolution and to end the war.

 2     There were various assumptions and various problems.

 3             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   General, I'm sorry to interrupt you, but because of the

 5     transcript, the question that I asked you was not recorded, so I shall

 6     repeat it.  It is on page 1 under item 2, when the Major-General Krga --

 7     that's dash number 5, and it says there are four key contentious issues,

 8     1, cessation of bombing; 2, composition of forces; 3, withdrawal of VJ;

 9     and 4, raising of indictments.

10             Could you now please continue with your answer.

11        A.   By that time, many initiatives had been raised in the national

12     community to stop the war.  All sorts of mediators raised different

13     contentious issues.  You see that one of them is cessation of bombing,

14     that really meant the conditions that had to be met for the bombing to

15     cease.  Many advocated the idea that bombing should cease and then

16     political negotiations would follow.  On the other hand, NATO insisted

17     that bombing would continue until all the said conditions have been met.

18             Another point here is the indictments to be issued against

19     political and military leaders of Yugoslavia that was already on the

20     agenda, and the issue was debated whether indictments should be issued or

21     not.

22        Q.   At that time, this is the 22nd May, 1999, how did you view this

23     issue of possible indictments, you and the intelligence administration of

24     the Army of Yugoslavia?

25        A.   Well, I must say we did not deal with the possibility of

Page 10626

 1     indictments too much.  It's a legal issue.  We focused on monitoring the

 2     military forces in the region.  But it was clear to us that issuing

 3     indictments while the war was still going on would not contribute to

 4     terminating the war and restoring peace.  It could only cause additional

 5     friction, mistrust, and discontent.  We thought it would be better to

 6     establish an interface with Yugoslav authorities to find a peaceful

 7     solution, and there would always be enough time to raise indictments if

 8     needed.

 9        Q.   You said that issuing indictments was not an issue that you dealt

10     with, but did you deal with -- did you read the indictments to see what's

11     in them?

12        A.   Well, yes, when the first indictments appeared, it was a new

13     development and of course we had to review them to see what's in them,

14     but still the focus of our work were defence issues and monitoring the

15     engagement of NATO forces and such.

16        Q.   Thank you.

17             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] May I ask for this document to be

18     admitted into evidence.

19             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D546, Your Honours.

21             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we now have

22     D006-0320.

23        Q.   Your tab 39.  This is briefing number 77/99, dated 25 May 1999.

24             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we look at para 6.  That's

25     page 2 in B/C/S and in English.  Thank you.

Page 10627

 1        Q.   "Siptar refugees are becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the

 2     treatment they are getting in Macedonia.  A rising number of refugees are

 3     returning.  Yesterday, about 4.000 refugees re-entered Kosovo from

 4     Macedonia through the Djeneral Jankovic border crossing."

 5             Can I have your comment.

 6        A.   This shows, again, the treatment these refugees were getting.

 7     They were coming back to the area held by our forces which means that

 8     they did not have any real fear from us.  They did not fear that they

 9     could be targeted by us.  We accepted that as a hard fact, and to the

10     best of our ability, we tried to help them return to their homes or

11     wherever they wanted.

12        Q.   Thank you.  And then under the subheading conclusion, para 1, it

13     says:

14             "We should not expect that the aggressor would lower the

15     intensity of strikes, regardless of the Russian criticism of the

16     aggressor's latest action.  As long as a political decision enabling NATO

17     to safely withdraw from the conflict is pending, the attacks will

18     continue."

19             Again, can I have a brief comment from you.

20        A.   Of course, already at that time even in NATO member countries

21     there were many initiatives to stop the war.  They were searching for a

22     way to put the best face on it and to save the credibility of NATO, a

23     concern that was present from the very beginning.

24             Of course, there was internal disagreement.  Some member

25     countries advocated the soon-as-possible cessation of attacks, whereas

Page 10628

 1     other countries thought that intensive strikes should continue until the

 2     authorities in Belgrade accept all that was demanded of them.

 3        Q.   Thank you.

 4             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] I tender this document.

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  It will become Exhibit D547, Your Honours.

 7             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] D006-0325 will be our next

 8     document.

 9        Q.   Your number 40.  Briefing number 78/99.  26 May 1999.

10     Paragraph 2, passage number 3:

11             "Up to 1200 hours, a total of about 420 sorties were registered,

12     including about 325 flown by combat aircraft, including long-range B-52s

13     and B-1B bombers, which is more than average, probably due to favourable

14     weather conditions but also to put pressure at a time of intensive

15     diplomatic initiatives.  Announcements that the list of targets will be

16     expanded to include food processing plants and silos were also made, with

17     the aim of putting additional pressure and causing anger among the entire

18     population."

19             Now, can I ask you to clarify what kind of pressures were placed

20     on Yugoslavia at the time of intensive diplomatic initiatives, and

21     explain this reference to a broadened list of targets.  What was that to

22     include?

23        A.   We already noted through analysis that at the time of diplomatic

24     initiatives, the number of sorties always increased.  We saw that as a

25     sort of pressure and a demonstration of the Alliance's readiness to go

Page 10629

 1     full hilt until their conditions are met.  Some of the NATO moves were

 2     indicative of that, such as continuing to bomb a target that had already

 3     been destroyed.  Also, some of them threw bombs into the Adriatic Sea

 4     after a completed assignment.  We thought that that was a sign of their

 5     own displeasure that the war was continuing against the very unequal

 6     enemy.  As for the broadening list of targets, we monitored this

 7     possibility to include civilian targets and references to possible

 8     inclusion of food processing plants and silos which would, of course,

 9     cause an environmental catastrophe.

10             It's a well-known fact that power plants were bombed and there

11     was even mention of possible bombing of the nuclear reactor in the Vinca

12     institute, and we thought that even the possibility of bombing such

13     targets was known to NATO planners to be a sure-fire way of causing

14     outrage among the population.

15        Q.   Thank you.

16             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] I ask for this document to be

17     admitted, please.

18             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D548, Your Honours.

20             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Now may I ask for D006-0258.

21        Q.   It's your number 41, General.  Report number 33 on KLA activities

22     to procure arms.  29 May 1999.

23             "According to information from a reliable source, a Siptar group

24     was in France a couple of days ago to purchase weapons for the KLA.  The

25     group was most probably led by the newly-appointed chief of the KLA staff

Page 10630

 1     for Kosovo, Agim Ceku."

 2             This report is about the purchase of weapons for the KLA from

 3     various sources.  Tell me, at that time, on the 29th of May, was this an

 4     on-going issue, the purchase of weapons for the KLA?

 5        A.   This went on all the time.  They were constantly looking for

 6     modern weapons.  And after the war, all sorts of well-known foreign TV

 7     stations made programmes about this.  We monitored those activities, but

 8     we never managed to detect all their channels and sources.

 9             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I tender this document.

10             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D549, Your Honours.

12             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] D006-0256 will be our next

13     document, please.

14        Q.   Tab number 42 for you, General.  Report number 34 dated

15     31st May, 1999.  In paragraph 2 we read:

16             "According to this source, this well armed and organised group is

17     repressing the Siptar population in order to recruit new fighters for the

18     KLA and to drive the others from their homes and force them to become

19     refugees."

20             Your comment, please.

21        A.   Yes, this is another report that confirms the pervasive efforts

22     to drive people from their homes and make them move out to create this

23     picture of a humanitarian catastrophe.

24             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can the document be

25     received, please.

Page 10631

 1             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D550.

 3             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  D006-0329, please.

 4        Q.   Tab 43 for you, General.  Briefing number 87/99.  June 1999.

 5     4 June 1999.

 6             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Page 2 in B/C/S and English,

 7     please.

 8        Q.   The subheading reads:

 9             "Reaction to our acceptance of the principles."

10             And it begins with:

11             "The Italian Main Staff commented ..."

12             Could you read it to yourself, General, and comment.

13        A.   Yes, in these reactions and comments by the Italian Main Staff,

14     we see confirmation of certain things we mentioned before.  First of all,

15     it is confirmed that many NATO member countries were inclined to stop

16     this war as soon as possible.  Second, it also turned out that there had

17     indeed been a lot of disagreement among the allies concerning the

18     conditions on which the war should be stopped.  And it is very indicative

19     and noteworthy to see this announcement that the situation will change

20     considerably in favour of the Albanians once the Yugoslav security forces

21     withdraw, that is, the MUP, and the KLA will be strengthened.

22             I must say, we did expect that with the army and MUP withdrawal

23     from Kosovo, the KLA would be disarmed and only the KFOR would remain in

24     place.  However, we all know now that this didn't happen.  A protection

25     force was established from these forces, and now the security forces of

Page 10632

 1     Kosovo are taking over.

 2             This has unfavourable repercussions on the peace in the region.

 3     General Jackson who visited Belgrade twice and talked to me in detail

 4     told me that they had opted for this decision in order to keep under

 5     control these armed Albanian groups in the framework of the

 6     Kosovo Protection Corps.  If they had disarmed them, they would not have

 7     complied anyway, and they would have only continued to be a problem.

 8             But we see that this situation continues to be complex to this

 9     day.

10        Q.   Thank you.

11             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] May I ask to -- may I ask this

12     document be received.

13             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, as Exhibit D551.

15             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Now, may I ask for

16     D006-0001.

17        Q.   Tab 44, General.  Here we see, General, that pursuant to a

18     decision of the Assembly of Serbia and after the peace plan of the

19     European Union and the Russian Federation has been accepted, a team of

20     the Army of Yugoslavia is authorised.  We see the members of the team,

21     and your name under number 6.  Then it goes on to say that:

22             "On behalf of the Army of Yugoslavia, the team is authorised to

23     hold negotiations with the authorised representatives of NATO and the

24     armed forces of the Russian Federation on all issues pertaining to the

25     implementation of the European Union and Russian Federation peace plan

Page 10633

 1     and to sign documents relating to the withdrawal plan of units from the

 2     territory of Kosovo and Metohija."

 3             First of all, let me ask you, were you indeed on this team that

 4     conducted negotiations on this peace plan?  And then explain the nature

 5     of the peace plan that was eventually signed.

 6        A.   Yes.  As we can see here, I participated in these negotiations

 7     from the 6th to the 9th of June, 1999.  The nature of the document signed

 8     was indicated in its name, military technical agreement.  The members of

 9     the army that took part in the negotiations with the KFOR were not

10     authorised to conduct political negotiations.  Political negotiations had

11     been completed earlier at the level of Mr. Ahtisaari, in the state

12     leadership of Serbia; and the decision to accept this initiative was

13     ratified by the Assembly of Serbia and the Government of the

14     Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  And we soldiers only had to carry out

15     the technical aspect of the agreement.

16             I must say that our counter-parts in the KFOR headed by

17     General Jackson treated us professionally as colleagues with whom an

18     important job was to be done.  They treated us fairly.  They did not push

19     us to the wall to accept any concessions that we had not been prepared to

20     accept.  The first version was not accepted because we insisted some

21     provisions needed to be changed, such as the breadth of the land zone,

22     and that's why negotiations took three days.

23             The greatest stumbling point was the resolution of the

24     UN Security Council.  We insisted on the recognition of that resolution,

25     whereas the KFOR representatives, including General Jackson, tried to

Page 10634

 1     persuade us that we were representatives of a sovereign state and we were

 2     entitled to agree to the entry of international forces in our territory.

 3     The very fact that we were able to insist on certain points is proof

 4     enough that these negotiations, while the war was still going on by the

 5     way, were rather fair.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know how many troops of the NATO Alliance were

 7     on the borders of the FRY at the moment the agreement was signed?

 8        A.   We were able to see these troops because we were on the base

 9     where some of them were deployed.  50.000 were ready to enter Kosovo and

10     Metohija, although at that moment there were not exactly 50.000, there

11     were just over 40.000.

12        Q.   Thank you.  General, did you at any time in 1998 or 1999 learn of

13     or see any plan at the level of the leadership of Yugoslavia, the

14     military leadership of Yugoslavia to expel the Albanian population of

15     Kosovo?

16        A.   With full professional, personal, and moral responsibility, I can

17     say that I have never seen such a document, nor have I ever attended a

18     meeting or a conversation where any of the influential people or

19     officials would have mentioned anything of the sort.  It is well known

20     that dozens of thousands of Albanians were living at the time in

21     Belgrade, the capital, that they still live in the southern areas of

22     Serbia, and neither during the conflict nor at any time before or later

23     was there any intention to drive them out.

24             The only plan was to resolve whatever problems we had in a

25     civilised manner, politically.  This was a constant in our policy.  And

Page 10635

 1     this is still the prevailing sentiment in the General Staff in the army

 2     as far as I know.

 3        Q.   Thank you.

 4             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, this is the end of my

 5     direct examination.  I have no further questions of the witness, and I

 6     see it's time for the break.  And, yes, one more thing before I finish, I

 7     would like to tender this last document.

 8             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, the document will become

10     Exhibit D552.

11             JUDGE PARKER:  We will adjourn now and resume at 11.00.

12                           --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.

13                           --- On resuming at 11.03 a.m.

14             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Stamp.

15             MR. STAMP:  Thank you very much, Your Honour.

16                           Cross-examination by Mr. Stamp:

17        Q.   Good morning, General.

18        A.   Good morning, Mr. Prosecutor.

19        Q.   One of the documents you were shown earlier today is D180.

20             MR. STAMP:  Could it be brought up.

21        Q.   This is a proclamation of the citizens of Kosovo-Metohija.  I

22     think you said you suggested that it be circulated.  I just bring it up

23     to remind you what we are talking about.  Do you remember that?

24        A.   Yes, yes.

25        Q.   Good.  Now, do you remember that you were cross-examined about

Page 10636

 1     that by Mr. Hannis when you came here to testify in 2007?

 2        A.   Yes, I remember that.

 3        Q.   I would just like to refer briefly to what you said about it.

 4             MR. STAMP:  If we now could move to D520.  That's the transcript

 5     of the witness's testimony that was received in evidence under Rule 92

 6     ter.  I should point out now that I'm on my feet and it crossed my mind,

 7     Your Honour, that Defence had tendered two documents, one under seal and

 8     an unredacted version.  And I think D520 is the unredacted version.  In

 9     any case, could we move to page 16904 of that transcript.  That is the

10     number on the transcript itself.  I'm not sure of the e-court number.

11        Q.   Close to the bottom of the page at line 10, Mr. Hannis asked you

12     to look at 3D753.  That was the exhibit number in that case.

13             MR. STAMP:  And, Your Honours, for the record that exhibit is the

14     same as D180 in this case.

15        Q.   And he asked you at line 18:

16             "Do you know when this was created and who created this

17     particular document?"

18             You said:

19             "As far as I know, it was created around that date, and that is

20     the date of the document.  It was broadcast in the media, that can be

21     checked.  But as I said, I can't vouch for the authenticity of the text

22     myself because I didn't work on it myself, so I can't say how authentic

23     it is."

24             And he went on to ask you:

25             "Well, can you you show us or can you point out to us where

Page 10637

 1     there's evidence, hard evidence, that it was actually circulated to any

 2     of the persons that might have an interest in it or be affected by it?

 3     First of all, where is the version in the Albanian language?  Is there

 4     one?"

 5             And you said --

 6             MR. STAMP:  This is on the next page.

 7        Q.   So he asked:

 8             "First of all, where is the version in the Albanian language?  Is

 9     there one?"

10             And you said:

11             "I really wouldn't know that.  Of course there should have been,

12     but whether there was or there wasn't, I really don't know."

13             So that evidence remains -- or it is your evidence today or

14     yesterday that that evidence is true?

15        A.   Yes, yes, of course it's true.

16        Q.   Do you personally know how, if at all, this was circulated?

17        A.   I know that it was circulated in the media, but whether it was

18     distributed in any other way as leaflets or posters on walls, I really

19     wouldn't know that.

20        Q.   You would agree with me, General, that once war begins, and

21     indeed in the build-up during the war, there's a certain degree of

22     propaganda that is created and published by both sides?

23        A.   In principle one might give a positive answer, but I must say

24     with full responsibility that we had absolutely no time to deal with any

25     sort of propaganda, but, rather, all the steps that we proposed and made

Page 10638

 1     were made, frankly, with the intention to resolve the issues that existed

 2     and to resolve everything that our initiatives were focused on.

 3             So as for this document, there was no propaganda intention, no

 4     trick or deception behind this, but really a wish to neutralise what was

 5     very present in the international media about a humanitarian catastrophe.

 6     And for us this would have been the best option had the Albanians

 7     accepted to return to their homes.  By that, this great problem of

 8     humanitarian difficulties that they were faced with would have been

 9     neutralised to a great degree.

10             I agree, and I can confirm that it would be good if this had been

11     published or broadcast in Albanian and in English and in Macedonian so

12     that this would cover all the aspects of the crisis.

13        Q.   I suspect you are telling me that your side did not engage in war

14     propaganda; is that your position?

15        A.   As far as I know, our side did not intentionally engage in war

16     propaganda --

17        Q.   Very well.

18        A.   -- aimed as causing any sort of confusion or anything else.

19             MR. STAMP:  Could we look at D543 briefly, please.  And if we

20     could go to the last page.

21        Q.   D543 is one of these briefings on the 12th of May that you or

22     your staff put together for you, according to your evidence.

23             MR. STAMP:  If we could just look at the last page very quickly.

24        Q.   This proposal 1:

25             "Several moves must be made one after the other with good media

Page 10639

 1     coverage (after talking to some of the international representatives with

 2     good standing in international community) to show our readiness for

 3     political solution to the conflict, the return of refugees, withdrawal of

 4     units, et cetera."

 5             Let me put it this way, you would agree with me that your side,

 6     during the conflict, sought to make use of good media coverage to achieve

 7     its purposes?  Yes, do you agree or not?

 8        A.   I agree that the interest of our side was to be adequately

 9     represented in the media, but that did not necessarily have to imply

10     propaganda.

11        Q.   While we are on this document, I think you told us that these

12     briefings were drafted for you in preparation for your presentations at

13     the collegium meetings and at other meetings of the Supreme Command or

14     the General Staff.  Is my understanding correct?

15        A.   Yes, the briefings were prepared for my presentations at the

16     meetings which were held daily.  These were the meetings of the

17     Supreme Command staff.

18        Q.   And I'd like to just go back to something you said when you were

19     last here, when you were being asked questions by the Prosecutor.

20             MR. STAMP:  And if we could return to that exhibit, the

21     transcript.  I think it's D520.  Page 16855.

22        Q.   Starting at line 17.  Or let's start from line 11 to get the

23     entire question.  You were asked:

24             "You testified yesterday about the various sources of information

25     you had in the intelligence administration.  You've said that that

Page 10640

 1     included communiques from the state officials from the major countries.

 2     You also used partially media reports.  You used sources from military

 3     and civilian diplomacy and various operational sources.  What do you mean

 4     by 'operational sources'?"

 5             You said:

 6             "Well, you probably know that every intelligence service, in

 7     addition to public sources and the technology, has operative sources,

 8     that is, agents of different categories and different levels."

 9             Then you were asked:

10             "And were any of these paid agents, paid by the army

11     intelligence?"

12             Your answer was:

13             "There were all sorts of agents, but the paid ones were easily in

14     the minority because we didn't have much money to pay them."

15             And you were asked --

16             MR. STAMP:  And if we could move on to page 18656.

17        Q.   "Based on your years of intelligence work, would you agree me

18     that some of those sources from whom you got intelligence had to be

19     viewed with a certain amount of skepticism or you would take their

20     information, as I would say in my language, with a grain of salt;

21     correct?"

22             And your answer was:

23             "Absolutely, I think that applies to all intelligence services in

24     the world."

25             And that remains your testimony; correct?

Page 10641

 1        A.   Yes, certainly.

 2        Q.   Notwithstanding that, that some information may be incorrect, I'd

 3     ask you about a couple of these briefings.

 4             MR. STAMP:  Could we look at D524.  D524, please.

 5        Q.   This is a General Staff report on intelligence -- on KLA

 6     intentions of the 9th of March --

 7             MR. STAMP:  Okay.  D524 is the document with Defence number

 8     D008-3977.  We have it here now.

 9        Q.   Let me read from your testimony yesterday in respect of this

10     document, and this is at page 10568, line 8:

11             "Unfortunately, everything that was indicated here actually

12     happened, kidnappings, killings, media propaganda, recruitment of new

13     members, et cetera."

14             The document states that the KLA with foreign assistance had

15     drafted plans for staging a massacre of innocent Albanians and members of

16     the OSCE which would provide a legal basis for activating the forces to

17     extract the verifiers, and thus entry of a NATO KOV into Kosovo and

18     Metohija.  That part of it I had a little bit of concern.  Was there a

19     massacre of members of the OSCE; did that actually happen?

20        A.   There was no major incident such as the one in Racak, but there

21     were individual attacks and murders in various places, but not a major

22     incident such as the one in Racak, as far as I remember.  This did not

23     happen at this period.

24        Q.   Maybe I'm not asking the question with proper focus.  You said

25     yesterday that everything that was stated in this report actually

Page 10642

 1     happened, and I'm looking in the report and seeing -- one moment.

 2        A.   As far as I remember, the Defence counsel asked me about the

 3     first paragraph.

 4        Q.   Very well.  Let me --

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Popovic.

 6             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I'm not sure if there

 7     is a need for me to react, but the witness's answer was not that

 8     everything that is included in this report happened.  In his answer, the

 9     witness stated what did happen and mentioned certain things such as

10     kidnappings and murders and so on, so I believe that the question that he

11     confirmed that everything that is mentioned here happened is not really

12     correct because he did not say that during the examination-in-chief.

13             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.

14             MR. STAMP:

15        Q.   Mr. Krga, during your examination-in-chief referring to this

16     document you said everything -- unfortunately everything that was

17     indicated here actually happened, kidnappings, killings, media

18     propaganda, recruitment of new members, et cetera.

19             Do you see paragraph 1 of this document referring to kidnapping

20     and killings?

21        A.   Yes, I can see that.

22        Q.   And you see in paragraph 2 it says here that "the KLA, with

23     foreign assistance, are drafting plans for staging a massacre of innocent

24     Albanians," --

25        A.   We had --

Page 10643

 1        Q.   No, no, you see, the question now is -- or let me read -- I wish

 2     to ask you about the kidnapping of members of the OSCE.  May I just say

 3     that I see from a clear reading of paragraph 1 of the report that

 4     counsel's intervention was correct, I can see that.  You said here the

 5     KLA with foreign assistance has drafted plans for staging a massacre of

 6     innocent Albanians and members of the OSCE verification mission.  Did you

 7     receive information that the KLA had a plan for massacre of members of

 8     the OSCE?

 9        A.   In the reports which we sent to other users, each passage was

10     written on the basis of some kind of information or report which we

11     received from various sources, including the ones that you just

12     mentioned.  There is not a single sentence here that is not --

13        Q.   Did you communicate that to any member of the OSCE that there was

14     a KLA plan to massacre them?

15        A.   As far as I remember, we did not; but we did inform the organs on

16     the ground, the 3rd Army and Pristina Corps Commands which were in

17     contact with them, but I cannot claim whether they informed them about

18     this or not.

19        Q.   Did you ascertain what is the nature of this foreign assistance

20     for the massacre of OSCE verifiers?

21        A.   We did not continue any investigation to establish whether this

22     was true or not.  It says here that these were the plans, so this does

23     not necessarily mean that every plan will be carried out.  We received

24     information that there were such plans, and this is why we notified those

25     who are listed here to take certain measures so as to ensure that this

Page 10644

 1     plan would not be carried out.

 2        Q.   Yes.  General Krga, please -- thank you for the information, but

 3     can I just ask the question again.

 4             Did you ascertain what is the nature of this foreign assistance

 5     for the massacre of the OSCE verifiers?  Who are these foreign elements

 6     or factors involved in this plan?

 7        A.   From this point in time, I cannot remember with any reliability

 8     whether anyone was mentioned by name or by institution that would make it

 9     more precise.  We just mention it here in general terms, we just said

10     foreign elements, and I really can't remember any more than that now.

11        Q.   Can you remember where you got this information from?  What was

12     the source of this information?

13        A.   We daily received 100 or more reports and I really cannot

14     remember who the source of this one was.

15        Q.   Let's look at D550.  And it's the same question I want to ask you

16     about the source of these reports that entered into your briefings.

17             MR. STAMP:  D550 has Defence number D006-0256.

18        Q.   And this is information that you obtained through what you

19     describe here as intelligence work about the activities of the KLA in

20     Kotlina.  Do you know the source of this information -- the original

21     source of this information?

22        A.   After 11 years, I really find it difficult to remember who was

23     the operative source by first and last name or what was the structure

24     that forwarded this information to us.  I really can't remember.

25        Q.   Well, can I just ask you a couple of questions about the system.

Page 10645

 1     Basically this information might have been received within the system by

 2     a variety of different sources on the ground, maybe an agent who whisper

 3     it, maybe electronic reception devices, it could be a variety of means to

 4     obtain information of this nature; correct?  You can't nod, you have to

 5     answer verbally.  Is that correct what I just said?

 6             THE INTERPRETER:  The witness is waiting for the interpretation.

 7             MR. STAMP:  Sorry.

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm waiting for you to finish, and

 9     then I will answer.  Yes, you are completely right about what you just

10     said that the source is -- the possible sources are very different.

11     There are various.

12             MR. STAMP:

13        Q.   And you had various types of these sources within Kosovo and

14     Metohija itself?

15        A.   Yes.  In Kosovo and Metohija we also had varied sources.

16        Q.   So would field sources, for example, agents in the field report

17     up to a field officer who will report up to a regional directorate that

18     eventually would report up to you in the headquarters in Belgrade?

19        A.   Basically it was just as you now expressed it.

20        Q.   Do you recall generally about how many field agents you had in

21     Kosovo itself?

22        A.   In Kosovo we had an intelligence outpost where there were several

23     agents continually, but we also sent agents from Nis and from Belgrade

24     and they would establish contact with their operative connections, so

25     that the number varied quite a lot from one day to another.

Page 10646

 1        Q.   About how many agents would you have there continually in 1999

 2     during the intervention?

 3        A.   If I remember well, around five.

 4        Q.   And these agents would have various sources of information on the

 5     ground in Kosovo?  Each one of these agents would have various sources of

 6     information on the ground in Kosovo?

 7        A.   Yes, in Kosovo and abroad, in foreign and neighbouring countries.

 8        Q.   But the five agents that were continually posted in Kosovo in

 9     1999, were they responsible for gathering information in places outside

10     of Kosovo, or was their primary focus Kosovo?

11        A.   It was their responsibility to engage operative sources in Kosovo

12     and in south Serbia, to gather intelligence within Serbia and beyond its

13     borders.

14        Q.   Did they submit their reports up to you, or did they submit

15     reports at all in writing?

16        A.   Yes, certainly.  Each of these reports was drawn up based on a

17     written report.  I mean, this report that we wrote at the head office.

18     It was produced based on the reports of our agents.

19        Q.   You also had - I think it's your evidence, tell me if I'm

20     correct - agents who were based in countries, in foreign countries?

21        A.   Naturally like other intelligence services, we had our sources in

22     foreign countries as well.

23             MR. STAMP:  Let's look at a document you were shown, P1333.  This

24     is the minutes of the collegium of the General Staff of Yugoslavia on the

25     2nd of February.  Page 14 in English, 13 in B/C/S.  And you could focus

Page 10647

 1     on the bottom where Major-General Krga speaks.

 2        Q.   You said in a discussion about Russia:

 3             "I would like to add something" --

 4             MR. STAMP:  Counsel is on his feet.

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes, Mr. Popovic.  The pages.

 6             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] The page in B/C/S I don't think is

 7     the right one.  The witness needs to follow.  In the B/C/S version, we

 8     don't see the passage when Mr. Krga speaks.  I believe it's page 12, only

 9     if we scroll up.  I think this is it.

10             MR. STAMP:

11        Q.   You said:

12             "As early as 1991, while I was an envoy there," and that's in

13     Russia, "I said in reports to this effect that we shouldn't fool

14     ourselves that Russia would support us in the manner in which ... Carried

15     away by emotions, the Slavic soul, and so on.  Russia is not ruled by the

16     Slavs or the by the Orthodox people, it is ruled by Jews, who are in

17     collusion with the Americans, and we cannot expect any support from

18     them."

19             Was this opinion which you expressed based on your own experience

20     as an envoy or was it based on a report from intelligence sources?

21        A.   Well, that's my experience from the time when I served there as a

22     diplomat for three years.  Many of our people who visited Moscow in those

23     times of crisis were trying to establish a relationship with the Russians

24     on these grounds that I mentioned here, Orthodox Christianity, common

25     Slavic roots, et cetera.  I was trying to say that all that doesn't

Page 10648

 1     matter, that one should not think in terms of those categories because

 2     Russia had changed and their leaders are guided by their own interests

 3     rather than imaginary categories like Slavic roots, et cetera.

 4        Q.   Yeah, here you said they were ruled by Jews.  That aspect, is

 5     that the result of your experience, or was it intelligence?

 6        A.   Well, members of the Jewish community there had great influence

 7     on the authorities; they had a lot of power.  That's the experience I had

 8     from my tenure in Moscow.  When I said that, I meant primarily the

 9     then-minister of foreign affairs of Russia, Mr. Kozyrev who often times

10     stated publicly and showed in many ways that he was talking to others in

11     regard to the Yugoslav crisis rather than worrying about our interests.

12        Q.   So you would agree with me that this comment of yours, at least

13     to some degree, reflects your attitude towards ethnic issues?

14        A.   No, by no means.  My view when ethical -- ethnic issues are

15     concerned is quite clear.  I do not discriminate on the grounds of

16     ethnicity.  This was just a caution, a warning to those who were

17     expecting that Russians were going to help us as a brotherly Slavic

18     nation as Orthodox Christians.  I was just trying to say that when the

19     Russians are concerned, we have to be more realistic in our expectations

20     of support.

21        Q.   Very well, let's move on.

22             You referred to information you received of Kosovo Albanians

23     returning home, I think, one of the documents you were shown.  There was

24     an indication that there were some 4.000 Kosovo Albanians who had

25     re-crossed into Serbia.  It's a document dated the 25th of May.

Page 10649

 1             MR. STAMP:  D547.

 2        Q.   Can you remember this source, the original source of that

 3     information?

 4        A.   I really can't recall the original source of that information.

 5     11 years later, you will understand, it's not easy to recollect every

 6     detail.

 7        Q.   Did you, while you were in Belgrade during the NATO intervention,

 8     become aware of how many Kosovar Albanians had crossed the border into

 9     Albania and Macedonia in March, April, and May?

10        A.   I don't understand.  Is that a question?

11        Q.   Yes, I'll ask it again.

12             While you were in Belgrade in 1999 during the NATO intervention,

13     did you know how many Kosovo Albanians had left Kosovo to Albania and

14     Macedonia in March, April, and May?

15        A.   As you know, there was all sorts of information and all sorts of

16     figures circulating.  I was not able to know to what extent the media

17     exaggerated the numbers.  I don't think that anybody had real numbers.

18     We were simply that kind of situation.

19        Q.   Did you or anybody in the government at the time make an effort

20     to get information from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees,

21     from the office of the High Commission for Refugees?

22        A.   My service and I did not seek this data.  I'm not sure about

23     others.  Of course, it sounds logical that somebody should have sought

24     that information.  But you will understand that the service I was heading

25     had its hands full monitoring the attacks of the NATO Alliance against

Page 10650

 1     us.  That absorbed all our time and all our attention.

 2        Q.   Do you know, just as a ball-park figure, that by the

 3     25th of March when you referred to some 4.000 refugees returning home,

 4     that by that time approximately 800.000 Kosovo Albanians had left their

 5     homes?  Sorry, withdrawn.

 6             The document you were shown, D547, when you spoke about 4.000

 7     persons returning home, 4.000 Kosovo Albanian refugees returning home,

 8     that was not dated in March, it was the 25th of May, very close to the

 9     end of the conflicts, when there were some negotiations in place.  Will

10     you agree with me that by then, by then some 800.000 Kosovo Albanians had

11     already crossed the border going in the opposite direction?

12        A.   I cannot quite agree because I am not aware of that precise

13     figure, whether it's exact or it's a little less or a little more, I

14     could not confirm.

15        Q.   I'm giving an approximation.  You knew that somewhere in that

16     region, 7-, 800.000 Kosovo Albanians had left their homes, didn't you?

17        A.   I knew that there were many of them, and to me 1.000 would still

18     have been too many.

19             MR. STAMP:  Counsel is on his feet.

20             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Petkovic -- Popovic.

21             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Just regarding the

22     record and the interpretation, lines 13 and 14 are not quite what the

23     witness said.  The witness exactly said "whether it's exact or it's a

24     little less or a little more," not just "whether it's exact or it's a

25     little more."  We can also check the tape if necessary.

Page 10651

 1             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  We did mention the whole

 2     answer, "whether it's exact or a little less or a little more."

 3             JUDGE PARKER:  Carry on, please, Mr. Stamp.

 4             MR. STAMP:  Thank you, Your Honours.

 5        Q.   You said yesterday in respect to the BBC News report of the 1st

 6     of April that you were shown - which is D532, so maybe you could bring it

 7     up - that these press conferences, instead of being taken seriously, were

 8     usually just one more piece of information which we had to verify and

 9     check it out ourselves.  And very often we found that incorrect data and

10     untruths were being presented.  10596.

11             What sort of checks would you make when or if you heard news

12     reports of massacres committed by Serbian or forces of the FRY in Kosovo?

13        A.   I recall reports that 100.000 people, for instance, were killed

14     in Kosovo, and reports that there was an operation conducted.

15        Q.   We heard that yesterday that there were these reports which

16     weren't true.  And I'm not here saying that everybody report that was

17     issued by anybody during this war is true.  I'm just asking you what were

18     these checks; you said you had to verify and check it out yourself.  What

19     was the nature of the verification process and the checking process when

20     you received reports that there were massive crimes committed by forces

21     of the FRY in Kosovo?

22        A.   I've already said that it was not our principal work to deal with

23     events in Kosovo-Metohija.  Our job was done primarily outside the

24     borders of Kosovo.  And in Kosovo-Metohija we focused on the KLA.  I

25     can't say that we took every report and every press conference someone

Page 10652

 1     held and then ran our own checks.  We couldn't do that.  We had too much

 2     to do with regard to the combat activities of foreign countries against

 3     our country.  Maybe these reports were checked by someone else, I cannot

 4     say for sure.  You know that we also had the security service of the

 5     Army of Yugoslavia that dealt with those internal security issue; we had

 6     the Ministry of the Interior; there were authorities on the ground.  I

 7     suppose they were more involved in that kind of issues.

 8        Q.   Well, for the time being I'm only asking you about what you said

 9     yesterday in respect to the BBC report on the screen before you.  You

10     said:

11             "... press conferences like that being just one more piece of

12     information in which we had to verify and check out ourselves."

13             Can I take it from your answer now that you were not responsible

14     for and you did not participate in checking out these things, these

15     reports?

16        A.   Formally speaking, it was not our job to check such reports.  If

17     we had been able, we, of course, would have checked them.  We checked

18     some information emanating from these press conferences through our

19     intelligence sources in other countries to confirm or to discard, but we

20     did not react to every press conference by launching an inquiry or an

21     investigation.  It would have been impossible with our capacities.

22        Q.   If we look at this one, there is something very important and

23     very concrete referred to in this one that I would imagine that you check

24     it.

25             MR. STAMP:  If could you scroll down this document, please.

Page 10653

 1        Q.   I'll read it:

 2             "Major-General John Drewienkiewicz, former head of the OSCE's

 3     Kosovo Verification Mission, gave moving details of the refugee exodus

 4     from Kosovo.  He said there was evidence that ethnic Albanians had been

 5     beaten, robbed, raped, and murdered all over the Serbian province.  He

 6     added that there were reports of a mass grave near Prizren."

 7             Now, this is not a general thing, this is something concrete, a

 8     mass grave near Prizren.  Did you check and verify that report?  Whether

 9     it was correct?

10        A.   No, we did not engage our resources to check this statement.

11        Q.   You said earlier that you had the Ministry of the Interior, there

12     were authorities on the ground, was it the responsibility of the

13     Ministry of the Interior to check these allegations, especially something

14     as concrete as an allegation of a mass grave in the vicinity of Prizren?

15        A.   It's difficult for me to speak on behalf of the Ministry of

16     the Interior but I suppose if they had been interested -- but I suppose

17     they were interested in this report and wanted to check it, not only

18     they, but the units on the ground, I mean army units.

19        Q.   I mention the Ministry of Interior because you referred to them

20     earlier indicating that they would be the ones interested in checking

21     that.  We have evidence before this Court from some of the people who

22     participated in burying or disentering the bodies of Kosovo Albanian

23     civilians from two mass graves in the vicinity of Prizren.  Did you,

24     during the war, know that these two mass graves existed?

25        A.   No, no, I really didn't know about the existence of those mass

Page 10654

 1     graves.

 2        Q.   We have evidence before the Court that during a joint

 3     police/military operation in Meja in April 1999 upwards of 300 Kosovo

 4     Albanians were killed by Serbian security forces.  Were you aware of that

 5     during the war in 1999?

 6        A.   No, I say once again that my focus of activities was on following

 7     foreign armed forces, rather than the incidents on the ground.

 8        Q.   We have evidence before this Court that on or about the

 9     26th of March, 1999, in the vicinity of Suva Reka -- not in the vicinity

10     of Suva Reka, in Suva Reka town itself, an entire family, but mostly the

11     women and the small children of that family, dozens of them, were

12     massacred by Serbian security forces.  Some of their bodies were

13     transported to Prizren, and later on some of them were found in mass

14     graves in Serbia itself.  Did you, during the war, know anything about

15     this?

16        A.   No, I really did not have any information about the crimes you

17     mention.

18        Q.   What is striking is, one, we have evidence before the Court

19     presented by the Defence that responsible people,

20     Major-General Drewienkiewicz spoke about the mass grave near Prizren; we

21     have evidence from victims that the persons, woman and children mostly I

22     remind you, killed in Suva Reka were killed in broad daylight in the town

23     itself; and we have evidence before the Court that this killing at

24     Suva Reka was also broadcast in the international press.  Whose

25     responsibility would it be to verify and check the truth of these

Page 10655

 1     reports?  Would it not be the MUP of Serbia?

 2        A.   I really cannot talk about who had what legal obligations among

 3     other institutions that were part of the state administration or the

 4     state in general because I don't know the details of all this.  Each

 5     institution had its legal authority and also rules according to which it

 6     behaved during the conflict.

 7        Q.   According to your knowledge and experience as a general formerly

 8     in charge of intelligence and intellectual as well, I say that because of

 9     your education and training, was it not the MUP that was responsible to

10     investigate these allegations, to verify and check these allegations?

11        A.   Well, based on general ideas about this, one could say that the

12     Ministry of the Interior and the organs of power on the ground and

13     whoever was there were all responsible for what you are talking about.

14     But let me say once again, I cannot assert that and, above all, I do not

15     have at my disposal any documents on the basis of which I could say

16     anything of that sort with any reliability.

17        Q.   You testified earlier that you read the MOS indictment -- sorry,

18     withdrawn.  You testified earlier that you read the indictment that

19     become public on the 27th of May against President Milosevic,

20     President Milutinovic, and others; is that correct?

21        A.   I was basically informed about the indictment through the media,

22     but I did not have the document as such at the time.

23        Q.   Didn't you say earlier that you read it?

24        A.   No, as far as I remember, I didn't say that I read it, but that I

25     was made aware of it by the media and in conversation.

Page 10656

 1        Q.   I think you said that when the indictment appeared, you had to

 2     review them "we had to review them to see what's in them."  You recall

 3     that, that you had to review them to see what's in them?

 4        A.   No, I really did not review the indictment as a document.

 5        Q.   Very well.  I'm referring to page 21, lines 22 to 25.  But were

 6     you at least aware at that time that the indictment cited specific

 7     instances of crimes allegedly committed by forces of the FRY and Serbia?

 8        A.   No, I didn't know that at the time either.  I knew that the

 9     subject of the indictment were the crimes allegedly committed by the

10     forces of FRY in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija, but I did not know

11     anything about the specific locations, the number of victims and so

12     forth.  I did not know the details about that.

13        Q.   What, if any -- or, I'll ask a general question so you could

14     speak and describe fully what I want to know about.

15             What were the lines of communications that your department,

16     intelligence gathering, had with the MUP for Serbia?  Did you exchange

17     information with them, and if so, by what means?

18        A.   The information which was presented here shows that when we

19     assessed that the MUP structures could be interested in specific pieces

20     of information, then we would forward that to the MUP organs.  Let me

21     note that at the time within the Ministry of the Interior, there was also

22     the state security service which was later separated and became the

23     security and intelligence agency, so we mainly directed the reports to

24     them.  And occasionally, when there was information that had to do with

25     the army and the units, we would receive that from them, but that was

Page 10657

 1     rare.

 2        Q.   Did you go to Kosovo during the NATO intervention?

 3        A.   No, I did not go there during the war.  I only went once to Nis

 4     which is a town in southern Serbia.

 5        Q.   Did you meet with Mr. Djordjevic during the war?

 6        A.   As far as I remember, I did not.

 7        Q.   Did you know him up to the time of the war?

 8        A.   Mr. Djordjevic was performing a high duty.  He was a public

 9     personality, so to speak, and of course I knew him.

10        Q.   Can I take it from your answer that as a senior member of the

11     army you would, of necessity, have had to have some sort of professional

12     association with him?  You knew him in his capacity as chief of the

13     public service department?

14        A.   Well, I said I did know him as someone who was a public figure,

15     but we did not socialise then or later, simply each one of us had his own

16     preoccupations, and professionally we did not have many contacts.

17             MR. STAMP:  Can we look at D523.  And I'm moving on to something

18     else, Your Honours.  If you could move to page 16 in the English, which

19     is page -- I am sorry, I don't think I have the page in B/C/S.  But if we

20     could find in the Serbian version the last paragraph before

21     paragraph 2.2.

22        Q.   Having read that, General, just the last paragraph before 2.2

23     begins, will you agree with me that by early 1999 - this is a document of

24     February 1999 - the FRY leadership, the Serbian leadership was aware that

25     ethnic tensions were running high in Kosovo and there was a real risk

Page 10658

 1     that Serbs in Kosovo as well as elements within the security forces may

 2     commit crimes against Kosovo Albanians?

 3        A.   From the paragraph you mentioned, there is no crime that would

 4     follow.  It follows that, as I noted, there was a likelihood that the

 5     Serbian and Montenegrin population might organise themselves to defend

 6     themselves, not to commit crimes.  Now, of course, in armed conflicts,

 7     various things may happen.  And this is why I formulated it that way in

 8     order to note that and to remind those responsible to take measures to

 9     ease the tensions so that this would not happen, so that murders,

10     liquidations, kidnappings wouldn't continue because such things then

11     cause reactions, that is, the effect of the spiral of violence in war

12     when one act of violence causes another, and we saw what this led to.  So

13     this was really a sincere intention to do something as a preventative

14     measures so that what I talk about here would not happen or would not

15     keep happening.

16        Q.   But you were aware of the risk of self-organised Serbs as well as

17     security force members attacking Kosovo Albanian people in Kosovo?

18             JUDGE PARKER:  Do you have an answer?

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.  Firstly, the security

20     services do not do this self-organisation.  They are state services which

21     are precisely organised.  And when we talk about citizens, I noted here

22     the possibility that they might organise themselves in order to defend

23     themselves to put up resistance, so as a reaction to crimes against them

24     or any other activities that might jeopardise their lives and property.

25     And my assessment was, as you can see in the last part of the sentence,

Page 10659

 1     that this might further complicate the existing situation in

 2     Kosovo-Metohija and make it more complex, and that was why I brought this

 3     up.

 4             MR. STAMP:

 5        Q.   General Krga, I suggest to you that the leadership of the FRY in

 6     Serbia took advantage of this prevailing situation, this obvious danger,

 7     to put in place a plan to expel the Kosovo Albanian population or a

 8     substantial portion of that population as a solution to the problems they

 9     were having there.

10        A.   Was that a question?

11        Q.   Yes.  I suggest that to you.  Do you accept that or do you reject

12     that?

13        A.   I cannot accept your claim, because I said that I have not seen a

14     single document that would indicate anything like that, nor was I ever

15     present during a single conversation that would point to an intention to

16     expel the Albanian population.  I really believe that there is no

17     authority with any responsibility that could ever presume to expel a

18     million and a half Albanians or whatever their number was without the

19     international community reacting to that.  I believe that something like

20     this really did not exist.  And never in a single document, and I have

21     seen thousands of documents, did I see anything of the kind that you are

22     saying now.  And I'm telling you that with full responsibility, with my

23     moral and professional responsibility.  So that is what I assert to you.

24        Q.   You wouldn't, would you, General, expect such an illegal plan to

25     be documented, would you?

Page 10660

 1        A.   Well, in principle, there could be some virtual plans, but I'm

 2     telling you that I never saw a written document nor did I ever hear a

 3     conversation to that effect.

 4             MR. STAMP:  Thank you, Your Honours, I have nothing further in

 5     examination.

 6             Your Honour, may I just indicate that the Prosecution, of course,

 7     relies on the evidence which is part of the evidence in this proceedings,

 8     that is the evidence in the previous proceedings tendered under Rule 92

 9     ter, in particular the cross-examination of this witness, as with any

10     other.  There are documents that were used in the cross-examination

11     which, when one reviews the evidence, these documents are noted with the

12     exhibit numbers of the prior case.  All of them that the Prosecution

13     wants the Court to take cognizance of have already been entered into

14     evidence, so I will not be seeking to enter -- or tender any of them, but

15     they have different exhibit numbers now in this case.

16             I could read them to the Court, but I think, as a general

17     principle, maybe a system could be found to facilitate the review of this

18     material by the Court when it comes to review the totality of the

19     evidence.

20             Maybe I should just ask if it's necessary at this point to read

21     out the present exhibits numbers of those document that were used in

22     cross in the previous case?

23             JUDGE PARKER:  As to the general question, Mr. Stamp, clearly a

24     cross-referencing of exhibit numbers would be of benefit both for final

25     addresses and for the Chamber's deliberation, and a table of that

Page 10661

 1     cross-referencing would be, therefore, very helpful.  I do not know if

 2     counsel have discussed this between them because you could also

 3     facilitate cross-examination and examination.  I suggest there should be

 4     some discussion and the matter then raised again.

 5             The second part of your question is the particular exhibits

 6     today.  If you plan to rely on particular exhibits today, it would help

 7     us and it could well help Mr. Popovic if you could read into the

 8     transcript now those documents upon which you rely with the two exhibit

 9     numbers.  Thank you.

10             MR. STAMP:  I see counsel on his feet.  I don't know if --

11             JUDGE PARKER:  I am sorry, Mr. Popovic, I thought you were

12     standing there nodding agreement.

13             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour, I certainly agree

14     with some points.  But, first of all, I think that my colleagues from the

15     Prosecution and we as a Defence should make an agreement about how to

16     continue doing this.  This sort of practice would cause some problems for

17     the Defence, primarily because the exhibits which were used during the

18     cross-examination of the witness in the Milutinovic case would not be

19     presented here, which was the practice with all the documents that were

20     used for the cross-examination of Prosecution witnesses when the Defence

21     tendered each document that was used during the cross-examination at the

22     time.  For the simple reason that this Trial Chamber would have insight

23     into these documents, and also that we could present these documents to

24     the witness again so that he would give every answer to each of these

25     documents.

Page 10662

 1             And in addition to this, there is another problem with this, and

 2     it is that the cross-examinations and then the redirects of witnesses

 3     which already testified in different cases were conducted by counsels for

 4     the Defence by six Defence teams, and if this system was accepted, then

 5     the Defence would also need to submit a number of other documents which

 6     represented the redirect or response to the documents which the

 7     Prosecution used during their cross-examination.  And I think that

 8     thereby some confusion would be created in the case in connection with

 9     the exhibits and the weight they have and how the Trial Chamber would

10     weigh them.

11             So I think that during the break it would be best if we could

12     consult with our colleagues from the Prosecution and then see what

13     position we might take on this.  Thank you.

14             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.  Could I make it clear that the

15     transcript has been received in evidence in this trial and is popularly

16     relied on by both Defence and Prosecution for their respective purposes,

17     and where relevant will be referred to by the Chamber in its

18     deliberations and decision.

19             In this case, we are told that all exhibits relevant to this

20     case, all documents relevant to this case that were the subject of

21     cross-examination and examination in the previous evidence are already

22     exhibits before us.  So there is no problem of exhibits not being before

23     us that are relevant.

24             That, at least, is what I understood from Mr. Stamp.  Whether

25     that was confined to cross-examination or whether it extended beyond that

Page 10663

 1     to re-examination, I do not know, and that certainly could be the subject

 2     of discussion between counsel.

 3             We would take the view, to make it clear, that, A, it would be

 4     helpful to have a cross-referencing between exhibit numbers in this trial

 5     and documents that are referred to in the transcript of witnesses.

 6     Secondly, that if there is a document dealt with in the previous trial

 7     that is considered to be material by either party, they should consider

 8     whether or not it is tendered in this trial.  If it is not, we will not

 9     be taking it into account.

10             Is that enough to help you in your discussions?  We have reached

11     a time now for the second break.  We will adjourn and resume just after

12     1.00.

13                           --- Recess taken at 12.33 p.m.

14                           --- On resuming at 1.03 p.m.

15             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Stamp.

16             MR. STAMP:  Thank you, Your Honours.  As indicated by the Court

17     or directed by the Court, it would only be the documents that are

18     exhibited in this case that would be considered by the Chamber.  What I

19     propose to read now is just a cross-reference of the documents that are

20     associated with this testimony in MOS that were used by the Prosecution

21     in MOS which are already exhibits in this case.

22             JUDGE PARKER:  Do you mean Milutinovic?

23             MR. STAMP:  Sorry, forgive me.  When I say "MOS," I mean the

24     Milutinovic case.

25             JUDGE PARKER:  It would be fancier if you used Milutinovic.

Page 10664

 1             MR. STAMP:  Thank you very much, Your Honours.  I'm so sorry.

 2             So this is a cross-reference of the Milosevic trial case numbers

 3     or exhibit numbers to the case numbers, exhibit numbers in this case for

 4     the documents used in cross-examination of this witness.  The document

 5     Milutinovic et al. Exhibit 3D934 is D539.  Milutinovic et al. document

 6     3D898, is D528 in this case.  Milutinovic Exhibit P941, is P1341 in this

 7     case.  Milutinovic et al. Exhibit P935, is P965 in this case.

 8     Milutinovic et al. Exhibit P939, is P902 in this case.

 9     Milutinovic et al. P938, is P1339 in this case.  Milutinovic et al.

10     P1878, is P1328 in this case.  Milutinovic et al. P1487 is P1236 in this

11     case.  Milutinovic et al. P1966, is D00104 in this case.

12     Milutinovic et al. P1999 is P933 in this case.  And Milutinovic et al.

13     3D692 is D219 in this case.

14             I think that's it, Your Honours.  But may I just have a moment to

15     cross-check one thing.

16             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

17             MR. STAMP:  Lastly, Your Honours, Milutinovic et al. document

18     P1967 is D -- is D00105 in this case.  Thank you, Your Honours.

19             In due course, Your Honours, what is proposed is that the

20     Prosecution will give a full cross-reference which we will provide to the

21     Defence for their cross-check and subsequently file for the record.

22     Thank you very much, Your Honour.

23             JUDGE PARKER:  That will be most helpful, thank you, Mr. Stamp.

24             Now, Mr. Popovic.

25             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, this position of the

Page 10665

 1     Prosecution sets some tasks before the Defence because there were

 2     redirects in the Milutinovic case, and in these redirects, certain

 3     documents were are used that have different numbers in our case.

 4     Therefore, we will submit to the Trial Chamber the numbers, the documents

 5     used in the Milutinovic case that we should focus on when redirect

 6     transcripts are read from the Milutinovic case, and we will submit these

 7     in writing after we conduct redirect examination of this witness.

 8                           Re-examination by Mr. Popovic:

 9        Q.   [Interpretation] Sir, in connection with your evidence today, I

10     would like to show you D532 on the screen.  [No interpretation]

11             JUDGE PARKER:  We are not getting interpretation at the moment.

12             THE INTERPRETER:  Technical error.

13             JUDGE PARKER:  It's been corrected now.  Thank you.

14             THE INTERPRETER:  If the question could begin again.

15             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   I will repeat.  How did you treat information that you received

17     through press conferences such as the summary you received in this

18     document?

19        A.   I've said already that we've had all sorts of experiences

20     regarding information presented at press conferences.  Often times,

21     information presented at press conferences turned out to be inaccurate,

22     and we lent less credence to sources of information like this as a

23     result, less than we would have given them if they had proven to be

24     correct.

25        Q.   So you are speaking based on your -- on the basis of your past

Page 10666

 1     experience with information presented at press conferences, that's your

 2     first sentence in the previous answer.  Could you be more precise.  Based

 3     on what experience and for what reason did you treat this information in

 4     that way?

 5        A.   I believe I've already mentioned that there were all sorts of

 6     stories that at the beginning of the war 100.000 Albanians had been

 7     killed, that there were widespread rapes; and it was quite clear that

 8     this information and the numbers were exaggerated.  And this led us to

 9     adopt the view of such information that we adopted.

10        Q.   Thank you.  General, on page 54 of your testimony today, lines 1

11     through 5, the Prosecutor stated that the FRY and its leadership had a

12     plan to expel ethnic Albanians in whole or in part to solve their problem

13     there.  And you give an exhaustive answer in the passage that follows.

14     However, line 9 is a bit controversial in my view, maybe because of the

15     way it was interpreted into English.  Your answer in English begins with

16     the words, in interrogative form, I don't know whether it's correct or

17     not.  The transcript reads "Can I not accept ..."  That's why I want your

18     answer to be given again, to avoid confusion.

19        A.   As far as I can remember, in response to that question, I said

20     quite positively that I have never seen a document or attended any

21     meeting where anyone mentioned expelling Albanians.

22        Q.   Thank you, General.

23             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] These were all my questions,

24     Your Honour.

25             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.

Page 10667

 1                           Questioned by the Court:

 2             JUDGE BAIRD:  Mr. Krga, there are a few questions I wanted to ask

 3     you to clear certain things up in my mind, you understand.  In answer to

 4     Prosecution counsel a while ago, you said that you were basically

 5     informed about the indictment through the media but you did not have the

 6     document as such at the time.  You recollect this?  Now, he asked you

 7     whether you had said earlier that you had read it and your reply was:

 8             "No, as far as I can remember, I did not say that I read it, but

 9     I was made aware of it by the media and in conversation."

10             Do you recollect this?

11        A.   Yes.

12             JUDGE BAIRD:  I want to direct your mind, Mr. Krga, to the

13     evidence you gave yesterday when you said that:

14             "When the first indictment appeared, it was a new development."

15             And, of course, you had to review them to see what was in them.

16     And my question to you now is what did you mean by review them to see

17     what was in them?

18        A.   If I remember well, I believe that related to the first

19     indications that there is an indictment and that there are indictments.

20     I had reports that indictments were being prepared, and I believe that's

21     what my answer pertains to, reports that there were indictments in

22     preparation, but I really didn't see any indictments at that time.

23             JUDGE BAIRD:  You reviewed them to see what was in them, did you?

24        A.   No, no.  At that time, when the indictments were issued, I did

25     not see them.

Page 10668

 1             JUDGE BAIRD:  I see.  Now, again, counsel for the Prosecution

 2     asked you earlier that while you were in Belgrade in 1999 during the NATO

 3     intervention, whether you knew how many Kosovo Albanians had left Kosovo

 4     for Albania and Macedonia in March, April, and May.  And your reply was

 5     that as far as you knew there were all sorts of information and all sorts

 6     of figures circulating.  You were not able to know to what extent the

 7     media exaggerated the numbers, and you didn't think that anybody had real

 8     numbers.  You recollect this?

 9             Now, then, let me direct your mind to your evidence yesterday

10     where you said in answer to Mr. Popovic that, as far as your proposal to

11     set up admission points for refugees, you had previously recorded:

12             "Their departure from the FRY and their return.  They were moving

13     in circles.  And so we came to the conclusion that it would be good, a

14     good idea ... to take back these people."

15             Now, what did you mean that "we had previously recorded their

16     departure from the FRY and their return"?

17        A.   As far as I remember, I didn't say that we recorded their

18     departure or return, and we, I mean, we in our service really didn't do

19     that; it wasn't our job.  And the idea that they should be admitted back

20     in an organised manner when they came back was first of all to relieve

21     their suffering, and secondly to improve the image of Yugoslavia which

22     was predominantly negative at the time in terms of treatment of refugees.

23             JUDGE BAIRD:  Thank you.  Let me get it quite clear, you are

24     saying that you did not say "we had previously recorded their departure

25     from the FRY and their return" yesterday?  You didn't say that?

Page 10669

 1        A.   I did not say that yesterday, and we did not do that.  I don't

 2     know how it was --

 3             JUDGE BAIRD:  Thank you very much indeed.  Thank you.  Now, one

 4     last question, Mr. Krga, you said yesterday that depleted uranium was

 5     used in Kosovo in the NATO bombing and it was also used outside of Kosovo

 6     and the rest of Yugoslavia.  You said that outside of Kosovo there were

 7     five locations where it was used, and, as Chief of the General Staff, you

 8     personally went there to evaluate the situation.  Now, do you recollect

 9     this?  Yes.

10        A.   Yeah.

11             JUDGE BAIRD:  Now, can you tell us what were those five locations

12     outside Kosovo?

13        A.   Those five locations were villages around the town of Vranje.

14     One of them was Borovec I remember.  I can't remember exactly those

15     micro-locations, but they are in the immediate vicinity of the town of

16     Vranje, between Vranje and Bujanovac.

17             JUDGE BAIRD:  Was there any mass exodus on account of those

18     munitions there?

19        A.   Those locations that we registered as locations where depleted

20     uranium was used, we marked them and cordoned them off prior to

21     decontamination so that citizens were aware of these locations.  In most

22     cases, those micro-locations are outside villages, outside populated

23     areas, so that as far as I know there was no mass exodus on that account.

24             JUDGE BAIRD:  Mr. Krga, I thank you very much indeed.  Thank you.

25             JUDGE PARKER:  Just to follow-up on that last question, it's not

Page 10670

 1     clear to me when you are saying that the five locations, they were

 2     followed up, cordoned off, and marked, are you saying that happened as

 3     the weapons fell or at some time later?  Can you help me there?

 4        A.   Generally speaking, during the war, we checked every location

 5     that was bombed by radiological detectors to see if there was any

 6     radiation; and if we found that depleted uranium munitions had been used

 7     we would mark it, we would mark such locations and cordon them off.  And

 8     I cannot tell you now precisely whether it was on the same day or within

 9     three or five days, we tried to do it as promptly as possible, to the

10     extent that we were able to in the conditions of air-strikes, continuing

11     air-strikes.

12             Now, detailed study and establishing the numbers, all that was

13     done after the war.  Cordons were put in place, the micro locations were

14     isolated, and then we made plans for decontamination.  It usually

15     concerned territories where tanks or armoured combat vehicles were

16     stationed because NATO tended to use this ammunition on these locations.

17             JUDGE PARKER:  What, then, led you as Chief of the General Staff

18     to visit the five locations in Serbia but outside Kosovo?  That would

19     have been some three to four years later, if I understand your evidence

20     correctly.

21        A.   Yes, we began decontamination later.  We could not organise

22     ourselves immediately because this is a quite complex technological

23     process.  So in agreement with the civil authorities, the Ministry for

24     the Protection of Environment and the institute of nuclear technology in

25     Vinca we set up teams which then carried out the decontamination.  And at

Page 10671

 1     the time when I was the Chief of General Staff, this task was not yet

 2     completed.  But it was almost completed and so I visited the members of

 3     the army who were charged with these tasks.  I remember that I once went

 4     there together with the Minister for the Protection of Environment, that

 5     was Ms. Andjelka Mihajlov, I was on a visit together with her.  So I was

 6     not directly charged with this; I was just visiting the area and

 7     supervising the work of our professional teams which were involved in

 8     this work.

 9             JUDGE BAIRD:  Mr. Krga, I do apologise, but I have a question, a

10     bit tangential to the one my brother just asked you.  Now, you said the

11     refugees were returning to Kosovo which meant that they do not have any

12     real fear that they would be targeted by the authorities.  Now, did they

13     have any fear of depleted uranium at all?

14        A.   I cannot say how much they knew about the use of depleted

15     uranium, whether they were informed about this or not.  It depends what

16     part of Kosovo and Metohija they were returning to.  What we managed to

17     record, and we couldn't do all that precisely because we had to leave the

18     territory of Kosovo, was that not all parts of the territory of Kosovo

19     and Metohija were hit with this sort of ammunition, so that I really

20     don't know to what extent the people who were returning were informed

21     whether their village or town included any spot that was hit by this kind

22     of ammunition.

23             JUDGE BAIRD:  So they wouldn't have left Kosovo because of

24     depleted uranium, would they?

25        A.   I couldn't say that.  I could not answer with either yes or no.

Page 10672

 1     It is certain that they were aware at the time, both these people and the

 2     people living around the town of Vranje, what were the dangers of the

 3     ammunition with depleted uranium.  Had they been fully aware that, they

 4     would probably have sought some short of shelter and wouldn't have

 5     remained close to that area.

 6             JUDGE BAIRD:  Thank you so much.  Thank you.

 7             JUDGE PARKER:  You will be pleased to know that that completes

 8     the questions for you.  The Chamber would thank you for your attendance

 9     here and for the assistance you've been able to give us.  You are now, of

10     course, free to go, and the Court Officer will assist you from the court.

11     Thank you.

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13                           [The witness withdrew]

14             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Popovic.

15             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, Mr. Djurdjic will

16     examine the next witness in the examination-in-chief, and I think he will

17     have some proposals in connection to that.

18             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.  Yes, Mr. Djurdjic.

19             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.  I think

20     that my colleague Mr. Popovic should first propose the documents which

21     the Defence has in its mind in connection with cross-examination in

22     agreement with Mr. Stamp and inform the Chamber about the documents just

23     like Mr. Stamp did.  And I think that as we have gone this far in terms

24     of time, my proposal would be to begin the examination-in-chief of the

25     next witness tomorrow.

Page 10673

 1             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Popovic, you are asked to fill in time.

 2             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] I will do my best, Your Honour.

 3     Now I will tell you what are the documents which the Defence used in the

 4     Milutinovic case during its redirect of this witness and which they noted

 5     during the examination.  So we have a document which is 3D692 in the

 6     Milutinovic case, it is now the document D219.  The document which has

 7     the number P1966 in the Milutinovic case is now Exhibit of Defence D104.

 8     Prosecution Exhibit from Milutinovic case P1967 in this case is

 9     registered as D105.  Exhibit of the Prosecution P938 is in this case

10     number P1339.  And we still have one more exhibit, it's Exhibit 3D685 in

11     the Milutinovic case, which is now registered as D523 in this case.

12             I just don't know -- during the break the Prosecution and the

13     Defence discussed this manner of tendering documents into evidence and we

14     agreed that it should be so in this case, but I did not realise whether

15     Mr. Stamp wishes this to be practice and that we should go on doing it

16     that way or if it was only the case now, because as Defence we would have

17     some difficulties with this as there is a great number of documents that

18     have been used and also considering the facts that we don't have access

19     to the documents in the same way that the Prosecution does in the sense

20     of what is in e-court from the Milutinovic case.

21             And, therefore, perhaps if lists were prepared in advance, that

22     might facilitate things and allow both the Prosecution and the Defence to

23     do this more easily.  Now, whether at the beginning or at the end, I

24     guess this should also be a matter of agreement, but I think we should

25     reach some sort of consensus if this is a proposal on how to act in

Page 10674

 1     future.  This is the only thing that was not quite clear to me at the end

 2     of our discussion.

 3             JUDGE PARKER:  From the Chamber's point of view, we accommodate

 4     what is convenient to counsel, but our present understanding is that

 5     there will be a composite list prepared cross-referencing the numbers of

 6     the exhibits in this trial which are also used in the Milutinovic trial

 7     in the course of material parts of the examination, cross-examination, or

 8     re-examination of a witness who is called here.  So that if reading the

 9     transcript of the previous trial, counsel or the Chamber wishes to look

10     at a document being referred to, the Chamber will have a cross-reference

11     table to identify the number of the exhibit in this trial.

12             Underlying that understanding are two propositions:  First, if it

13     is not an exhibit in this trial, the Chamber will not be referring to it,

14     even though it may be referred to in the transcript in the Milutinovic

15     trial.  Second, it, therefore, follows that if either Prosecution or

16     Defence want a particular document for the purposes of this trial, they

17     will need to tender that document in the course of examination-in-chief

18     or cross-examination so that it becomes an exhibit in this trial.  And

19     I'm sure, Mr. Popovic, that you can discuss with Mr. Stamp and overcome

20     any inconvenience you may have in obtaining access to a document that was

21     used in the Milutinovic trial and which may not presently be readily

22     available to you.

23                           [Trial Chamber confers]

24             JUDGE PARKER:  The majority of the Chamber is persuaded to

25     Mr. Djurdjic's eloquence and takes the view that we should adjourn at

Page 10675

 1     this point rather than commence the next witness.  With that great

 2     indulgence, we will adjourn now and resume tomorrow at 9.00.  That humour

 3     not masking the fact that we are already getting concerned about the

 4     progress of time in this case.  We adjourn now until 9.00 in the morning.

 5                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.39 p.m.,

 6                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 3rd day of

 7                           February, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.