Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 10827

 1                           Friday, 5 February 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.

 5                           [The witness takes the stand]

 6             JUDGE PARKER:  Good morning.  The affirmation you made to tell

 7     the truth still applies.  Ms. Petersen.

 8             MS. PETERSEN:  Thank you, Your Honours.

 9                           WITNESS:  DJORDJE CURCIN [Resumed]

10                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

11                           Cross-examination by Ms. Petersen:  [Continued]

12        Q.   Good day, General.  Just to make sure that we're on the same page

13     if we could just recap a little bit.  Do you recall that yesterday we

14     talked about your witness statement, paragraph 9, which says that you

15     studied the combat reports and none of them report on such things as

16     taking of identity documents, a tax on the civilian population, mass

17     killings, deportation of the Albanian population, or deliberate

18     destruction of religious and cultural buildings?  Do you recall that we

19     discussed that yesterday?

20        A.   First of all, I'd like to say good morning to everybody.  Yes, I

21     do remember.

22        Q.   Thank you, sir.  And do you also recall that we discussed

23     paragraph 20 of your witness statement which talks about the plans of the

24     VJ and the VJ General Staff and states that there never has been a plan

25     to support terror and violence against the Albanian civilian population

Page 10828

 1     in Kosovo, and I believe you also testified yesterday that there was no

 2     plan to expel the civilian population.  Do you recall us discussing that?

 3        A.   Yes, I do remember, but at the end of that quotation, which you

 4     summarised there, you made a mistake or there was a mistake in the

 5     translation.  Anyway, I didn't put it that way.  It doesn't say that in

 6     the statement.

 7        Q.   Would you -- what I was stating was that -- and yesterday I

 8     believe I asked you a question if there was a plan, if your testimony was

 9     that there was no plan to expel the civilian population, and you agreed

10     that there was no plan, but please state it in whatever way you believe

11     is most accurate.  Your testimony would be on that, sir?

12        A.   That's not the problem, I did say that and I stand by that, but

13     in that free interpretation of yours, towards the end you used an

14     expression two words which I didn't actually say yesterday, so since it

15     was rather long passage, I can't tell you exactly now, but we can take a

16     look at it.  Something about lending support, et cetera, et cetera.  You

17     said something and you used two words which I didn't use, and I'm sure

18     you'll be able to find it in the transcript.

19        Q.   Was that about the expelling of the population or the violence

20     against the population, which part of that did you have -- did you differ

21     with, sir?

22        A.   Well, I'd like somebody to read from the transcript in Serbian

23     what it was and I'll then stop you, stop the person reading when he comes

24     to that passage and then I'll say that's not what I said and that's not

25     in the statement because I can't follow in Serbian otherwise.  And as I

Page 10829

 1     say, it was rather a long passage that you read out, so I'd like us to do

 2     that.

 3        Q.   Okay.

 4             MS. PETERSEN:  If we could go to yesterday's transcript, page

 5     10824.

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Not yesterday, now, what you just

 7     read out now, the passage you read out earlier on a moment ago before you

 8     asked me the question.

 9             MS. PETERSEN:

10        Q.   Okay.  So just to be clear about what I'm going through right

11     now, sir.  I just am trying to make sure that you recall the topics we

12     discussed at the end of the day yesterday so that going forward we are

13     both on the same page right now.

14             So why don't I -- I'll try to simplify this by re-asking the

15     question.  Do you recall yesterday that we talked about paragraph 20 of

16     your statement in which you say there was no plan to - and I'll read

17     this - to support terror and violence against this Albanian civilian

18     population; do you recall that we discussed that yesterday?

19        A.   Is that what it says there?

20        Q.   Sir, I believe that's what it says in your statement.

21        A.   I'd like it to see the statement.  That's what I'm saying.  So

22     that I can read it out loud, read out loud what it says there because

23     that sentence does not stand either in the statement, nor did I say it

24     yesterday, nor did I say it today, nor did I ever say to support terror

25     against the civilian population.  Perhaps it's a question of

Page 10830

 1     interpretation.  I never said that we supported terror.

 2             I'll readily help you if I get the page so that I can read it

 3     slowly and then the interpreters can interpret it slowly.

 4        Q.   We can certainly put this up, sir, but you understand I'm not

 5     saying that you said there was a plan to support terror.  I'm saying in

 6     your statement you say there was not a plan to support terror?

 7        A.   I didn't use the word "terror."  Throughout my statement all my

 8     testimony never did I use the word "terror."

 9             JUDGE PARKER:  Could I suggest that paragraph 20 in Serbian be

10     put on the screen.

11             MS. PETERSEN:  Yes, thank you, Your Honour.  And this is --

12             JUDGE PARKER:  Of Exhibit D553.

13             MS. PETERSEN:  553.  Thank you.  If we could have paragraph 20,

14     please.

15             JUDGE PARKER:  Serbian, please, paragraph 20.

16             MS. PETERSEN:

17        Q.   All right, General.  So if we look at paragraph 20, you can read

18     that --

19        A.   Yes.

20        Q.   You can read that on your own in English.  It says:

21             "I solemnly declare that in the VJ and in the VJ General Staff

22     there has never been a plan, order, or anything like that which planned,

23     prompted, ordered or in any way assisted or supported terror and violence

24     against the Albanian civilian population living in KiM."

25             Do you recall that we discussed this paragraph yesterday?

Page 10831

 1        A.   Yes, I do remember that, but you left out a letter, the letter U,

 2     in the first sentence or perhaps the interpreter did, but it doesn't

 3     change the contents of what is being said, but I remember that we did

 4     discuss that yesterday.

 5        Q.   All right.  Sir, and finally I believe we also discussed that

 6     this last sentence that, the last two sentences:

 7             "No such plan could have existed without me knowing about it.

 8     Plans for the use of the VJ were drawn up and kept in the administration

 9     whose chief I was."  Do you recall that we discussed that?

10        A.   Yes.  That is correct because all the plans that were devised

11     were in the first administration and that's where they were stored and

12     kept.

13        Q.   All right.  So I think we are in the same place now.

14             MS. PETERSEN:  If we could now, please, pull up Defence Exhibit

15     160, D160.

16        Q.   Sir, if we could have a look at a few parts of this and then I'm

17     going to ask a question after we've looked at a few parts.  If we look at

18     the title of this, we can see it's Resolution 119, United Nations

19     Resolution 119, and it's dated 23 September 1998.  If we look down at the

20     6th paragraph down on the first page it starts with the words, "gravely

21     concerned," and I'll just read this so that we have it in the record what

22     we're --

23             THE INTERPRETER:  Please slow down when reading.

24             MS. PETERSEN:

25        Q.   "Gravely concerned at the recent intense fighting in Kosovo and

Page 10832

 1     in particular the excessive and indiscriminate use of force by Serbian

 2     security forces and the Yugoslav Army which have resulted in numerous

 3     civilian casualties and, according to the estimate of the

 4     Secretary-General, the displacement of over 230.000 persons from their

 5     home."

 6             If we look at the paragraph just above it reads:

 7             "Noting further, the communication by the Prosecutor of the

 8     international Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to the Contact Group on

 9     7 July 1998, expressing the view that the situation in Kosovo represents

10     an armed conflict within the terms of the mandate of the Tribunal."

11             And if we look on page 3 in both the B/C/S and the English, it's

12     paragraph 4(a) and (b), if you will just note there, sir, that this

13     resolution demands that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia first cease

14     all action by the security forces affecting the civilian population, and

15     order the withdrawal of security units used for civilian repression, and

16     (b) enable effective and continuous international monitoring in Kosovo by

17     the European community monitoring mission and diplomatic missions

18     accredited to the FRY.

19             Now, sir, do you recall that this resolution was passed at this

20     time in September 1998?

21        A.   Well, I can't actually say that I remember, I wasn't in the

22     General Staff at the time, and this didn't come within the frameworks of

23     what I was interested in occupying my work post at that time within the

24     job that I was doing.

25        Q.   So, sir, is your testimony today that you were not aware of this

Page 10833

 1     UN resolution that had such demands on the Army of Yugoslavia?

 2        A.   That's what I'm saying.  Maybe I did hear that the resolution was

 3     passed through the media, but I certainly didn't see it or read it, and I

 4     can't tell you much about it then.

 5        Q.   So you were aware that it had been passed through the media?

 6     You'd heard about this in the media?

 7        A.   I wasn't informed of it through the media, but I heard that some

 8     such resolution existed, as did many others.  I don't remember this one

 9     in particular or others for that matter except for the 244 one.

10        Q.   Sir --

11             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction:  1244 one.

12             MS. PETERSEN:

13        Q.   And General, in the summer of 1998, KDOM began monitoring the

14     activities of the MUP, the VJ, and the KLA in Kosovo; correct?

15        A.   I can't confirm that either because in the summer of 1998 I had

16     no points in common with Kosovo.  I worked in the command of the 1st Army

17     in Belgrade, and I didn't have occasion to follow that, nor can I confirm

18     that now.  But later on, I heard that this particular mission, KDOM, the

19     American mission was an independent one and never was subordinated to the

20     OSCE Mission.  I happened to hear that somewhere later -- sometime later

21     on when I arrived at the General Staff in January 1999.

22        Q.   Is at some point before the NATO bombing, you were aware that

23     there had been in KDOM monitoring mission, correct?

24        A.   At the he collegium, I heard somewhere that there was a KDOM

25     mission before NATO executed the aggression against my country.  But the

Page 10834

 1     details about its work and its general situation, I did not know and I

 2     don't know to this day.

 3        Q.   Fair to say though that the VJ was aware of KDOM.  Maybe you

 4     personally didn't have detailed information but the VJ knew that KDOM was

 5     monitoring its activities?

 6        A.   Well, probably.  There were quite a few people in the Army of

 7     Yugoslavia whose job that was and who probably knew who was coming, how

 8     many people were coming in, and what their remit was.

 9        Q.   Thank you, sir.  And then after the October Agreements in 1998,

10     in late 1998, the Kosovo Verification Mission of the OSCE began

11     monitoring the activities of the MUP, the VJ, and the KLA in Kosovo;

12     correct?

13        A.   Not quite.  Nobody monitored the KLA nor did they report on their

14     evil deeds, not a single mission, not the OSCE and not KDOM either.

15     Quite simply an agreement was not signed with them, I don't know why, and

16     nobody controlled or monitored them at all.

17        Q.   You will agree, sir, that the KVM monitored the activities of the

18     VJ and the MUP?  Leaving aside the KLA for now.

19        A.   Well, I'd leave MUP to one side because I know very little about

20     that.  And I do know that they monitored the units of the Army of

21     Yugoslavia and the reason being is that we had observers who organised

22     that part of the job, but what I want to tell you is this, I'm not really

23     a good collocutor for this topic.  It wasn't my area.  I didn't follow it

24     in any detail or studiously but just in a peripheral way when I happened

25     to hear something, but my job involved something quite different, so I

Page 10835

 1     can't really say that I'm the proper witness for you to ask these

 2     questions of.

 3        Q.   And, sir, that's fine, I'm really just asking not for details

 4     about it but just whether there is a general awareness that these

 5     existed, that KVM existed and was monitoring?

 6        A.   Yes, and to inform NATO or rather the American government

 7     directly.  They did not submit reports to Walker, the head of the mission

 8     or his deputy, and that was common knowledge.

 9        Q.   Now, sir, at the time of the NATO bombing, so we are now talking

10     March 1999 when this begins, this Tribunal, this Hague Tribunal existed,

11     correct?

12        A.   I really don't know.  We don't put it that way in my country.

13     Everybody says NATO's aggression against the Federal Republic of

14     Yugoslavia without a valid decision on the part of the Security Council,

15     not campaign or bombing or whatever, and I don't know when the court

16     started working, when the Tribunal was set up, when the decision was

17     taken to set it up, I don't know.

18        Q.   Sir, I'm asking you if you are aware that this Tribunal existed

19     in March of 1999, that it was in existence?

20        A.   Well, most probably it was, but I don't really know.  I don't

21     know when it came into existence and when the Security Council made a

22     decision to form it, so I don't know the details, as I say.  I can't

23     remember.  I would like to be able to answer your question, but I'm

24     afraid I really can't.  I'm not challenging the fact that it existed.

25        Q.   Okay.  So just to get your testimony clear, you are saying that

Page 10836

 1     you are not sure in March of 1999 if there was a Tribunal that could

 2     prosecute war crimes in the former Yugoslavia, you weren't aware of that?

 3     Is that what you are saying, sir?

 4        A.   Well, perhaps that would be the proper answer, that I'm not sure.

 5        Q.   Okay.  You recall yesterday we spoke about how you were aware

 6     there was an indictment and arrest warrant for Ratko Mladic from this

 7     Tribunal?  Do you remember we talked about that yesterday?

 8        A.   Yes, you talked about it.

 9        Q.   And you agreed that there was an indictment and arrest warrant

10     for Ratko Mladic?

11        A.   Well, I don't remember that I agreed that there was such a thing.

12     I agreed that I had heard somewhere, probably from the media, that that

13     was in existence, and I say again, I did not see anything like that nor

14     in a public -- nor was that published in our country except that warrant

15     with the picture on the walls that he was being looked for, sought for,

16     and that a reward would be offered for anybody, et cetera, et cetera, who

17     could ...

18        Q.   So in the years preceding the NATO intervention, there had been

19     some high-profile indictments and arrest warrants from this Tribunal,

20     Ratko Mladic, Radovan Karadzic.  Is it your testimony you weren't aware

21     that the Tribunal even existed by this time?

22        A.   No, that is not what I said.  I said that I don't know when it

23     was formed, when it started working, when it became operational.

24        Q.   I'm not asking you if you know the date that it first was formed.

25     I'm asking you if you knew it was in existence by March 1999?

Page 10837

 1        A.   Well, I just answered that question.  I answered it twice this

 2     morning.

 3             JUDGE PARKER:  Would you answer it again, please.

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What question was that?  Was I

 5     aware that the Tribunal existed in March 1999?  Is that it?  Yes.

 6             MS. PETERSEN:

 7        Q.   Thank you, sir.  Now, as Resolution 1199 noted, which we just

 8     looked at, this Tribunal had made clear before the NATO intervention that

 9     the situation in Kosovo was within its mandate, meaning that it could

10     prosecute any war crimes committed in Kosovo; correct?

11        A.   If that is what you said a moment ago and quoted earlier on, then

12     it's correct.

13        Q.   All right.  Sir.  Now, in your statement paragraph 18, you state

14     and I'll just read from the statement:

15             "I know" -- and this is, I'm sorry, Exhibit D553.

16             "I know that in late April of 1999 General Ojdanic received a

17     letter from the then-chief prosecutor of The Hague Tribunal Ms. Louise

18     Arbour, and I know what action he took in this connection?"

19             MS. PETERSEN:  Now, if we can look at Exhibit 65 ter 00401.

20        Q.   Now, if you look at the bottom of this letter, sir, you'll see

21     that it's to Colonel-General Ojdanic, and it's from Louise Arbour

22     Prosecutor.  The date at the top if we could in Serbian just -- in the

23     English show it's 26 March of 1999, but it appears in your statement you

24     are saying that General Ojdanic did not receive this until later in

25     April.  Is that your testimony?

Page 10838

 1        A.   Yes.

 2        Q.   All right.  Thank you.  And if we could just look at this letter,

 3     in the first paragraph it says:

 4             "As you will be aware, the failure of the Federal Republic of

 5     Yugoslavia to co-operate with my office regarding the investigation of

 6     war crimes in Kosovo has been reported to the Tribunal's president to the

 7     Security Council of the United Nations."

 8             If we go to the next paragraph:

 9             "In that context and in light of current reports of escalating

10     violence in Kosovo, I'm gravely concerned that serious violations of

11     international humanitarian law continue to be committed."

12             And the first sentence of the last paragraph:

13             "It is my intention to investigate all serious violations of

14     international humanitarian law that merit prosecution in the

15     international forum, particularly those involving attacks on the civilian

16     population."

17             And if you look in the second paragraph it shows that the

18     Prosecutor attached the relevant statutes.

19             MS. PETERSEN:  Now, Your Honour, could I please tender this

20     document.

21             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  It will be admitted as Exhibit Number P01525.

23     Thank you, Your Honours.

24             MS. PETERSEN:  If we could look at P01511.

25        Q.   And we can see from this that this same letter went to the

Page 10839

 1     president of Serbian, Mr. Milan Milutinovic.

 2             MS. PETERSEN:  And finally if we could look at P01513 already in

 3     evidence.

 4        Q.   In this document P01513, we see that this same letter was also

 5     sent to Slobodan Milosevic, the president of the Federal Republic of

 6     Yugoslavia.

 7             So, sir, in light of these documents, would you agree that

 8     leading up to and during the NATO bombing, the VJ and the MUP had been

 9     the subject of a UN resolution; correct?

10        A.   You mean that resolution that you mentioned a few moments ago,

11     yes.

12        Q.   Yes.  They had been being monitored by KDOM and KVM?

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   And they were being scrutinized by this Tribunal in The Hague;

15     correct?

16        A.   Who?

17        Q.   This Tribunal in The Hague, the letters we just read from Louise

18     Arbour, the Prosecutor at the Hague Tribunal.

19        A.   The print is so small here of this text that I cannot see who

20     they are actually after, and I kindly ask you to read that portion out of

21     that paragraph, what you are claiming just now or enlarge the text for

22     me.  As for the other letters, I have not had occasion to see them until

23     now.  I see the 26th of March there and the aggression against my country

24     started on the 24th of March.  So this was allegedly written two days

25     later, but it is stated in the log-book of the communications of the

Page 10840

 1     Chief of General Staff when communications arrived, and it's the end of

 2     April, so I can say that.

 3        Q.   So, sir, you do recall this letter from the Prosecutor of this

 4     Tribunal going to General Ojdanic in late April?  That's what it says in

 5     your statement.

 6        A.   Yes, I remember, except that now after so many years, I can no

 7     longer para-phrase it, but I do know that it did arrive, and I know that

 8     General Ojdanic was upset, was angry, because it was one month late

 9     because it went to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of

10     Justice and wherever else, and it's only then that it arrived in his

11     office, and it was properly recorded that it arrived in his office, and I

12     do know what measures he took after that.  He informed his closest

13     associates, his colleagues about that straightaway.

14        Q.   And, sir, you'll agree at this point the VJ is under scrutiny?

15        A.   I will not agree with you that it is the VJ that someone is

16     after.  Perhaps certain individuals are being -- are wanted because of

17     the possible commission of war crimes.  That is the the interpretation I

18     received and that is not something I can agree with.

19        Q.   I'm not asking if anyone was wanted on charges.  What I'm asking

20     you is, will you agree the VJ was being watched by this Tribunal to see

21     if war crimes would be committed?

22        A.   How carefully this Tribunal watched this, I don't know, but there

23     were verifiers on the ground, there were diplomats, there were

24     intelligence officers who monitored that, and probably for the purposes

25     of this Tribunal, they provided this information.  That I do know.

Page 10841

 1        Q.   Well, sir, you'll agree with me that this letter that reached

 2     General Ojdanic says from Louise Arbour, "It is my intention to

 3     investigate all serious violations of international humanitarian law that

 4     merit prosecution?"  You will agree the letter says that?

 5        A.   Well, if that is what is written, then that's it.  I haven't read

 6     it yet.  I'm not challenging what you are saying right now, but I simply

 7     cannot see it here, I cannot read this.

 8        Q.   All right, sir.  Let me ask you this:  If a combat report stated,

 9     "Today the VJ and the MUP went door to door through a village and

10     expelled all the Albanians from their homes at gun point, on the way out

11     of town we set the mosque on fire."  If a report said that, that would be

12     evidence of a war crime; correct?

13        A.   Yes, but that is not written in a single one of our reports, not

14     in a single one of the reports of the 3rd Army or our reports.

15        Q.   I understand you are saying it's not in any of the reports.  Sir,

16     if a VJ General Staff, if they wrote an order and that order said "Go

17     from house to house and depart all the Albanians," that would be evidence

18     of a war crime; correct?

19        A.   Yes, but in that case, I would like to see that proof because the

20     General Staff had never written any such thing or were they have written

21     any such thing and that would be evidence if something like that did

22     exist somewhere.

23        Q.   I understand you are saying it didn't exist, I'm asking you if a

24     report like that would be evidence of a war crime, and I believe your

25     answer was yes.

Page 10842

 1             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes, Mr. Djurdjic.

 2             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I was sitting and waiting but

 3     there were a lot of hypothetical questions here.  What would have

 4     happened had this happened or what would have happened if things were

 5     this way or that way or some other way, calls for a lot of speculation

 6     and questions like that are being put to the witness.

 7             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.  Ms. Petersen.

 8             MS. PETERSEN:

 9        Q.   General, in light of the scrutiny that the VJ was under, isn't

10     this exactly the kind of thing that no one would put in a written report

11     or order?

12        A.   No, no, that's not right.  Had that happened, that would have

13     been written, and they would have to write it with full responsibility.

14     It would have to be written by all the commanders from brigade level,

15     corps level, army level, General Staff.  We would not hide that.  As a

16     matter of fact, we would take measures against anyone who had done

17     something like that so that they would be punished and properly

18     prosecuted.

19        Q.   Sir, you'll agree it's not hidden if the leadership already knows

20     very well that it's going on?

21        A.   Could you please repeat that once again, I did not understand,

22     and it is a major problem for me is when you say at the very outset of

23     your question you will agree.  Could you please put that question to me

24     very carefully once again so that I would answer it impeccably.

25        Q.   Sir, you said that people would never leave this out of reports,

Page 10843

 1     they would never hide it from the leadership; correct?

 2        A.   Yes, I did say that, that is correct, and that is what I assert.

 3        Q.   And I'm suggesting to you it's not hidden from the leadership

 4     when the leadership already knows that this is exactly what's going on,

 5     correct?

 6        A.   If you know that, that the leadership knows that, then fine.  But

 7     I do not know of our leadership knowing about that, and I assert that our

 8     leadership did not know about that.

 9        Q.   Sir, in this trial, we've had a lot of evidence from witnesses

10     who lived in Kosovo in various villages who were expelled from their

11     homes by the VJ and the MUP.  Is it your testimony that none of this

12     happened?

13        A.   No, I did not state that.

14             MS. PETERSEN:  All right.  I have no further questions for this

15     witness.  Thank you.

16             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you, Ms. Petersen.

17             Mr. Djurdjic.

18             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

19                           Re-examination by Mr. Djurdjic:

20        Q.   Good morning, General.  Let us start from the very end, the last

21     questions that were put to you.  To the best of your knowledge in view of

22     the position that you held, did the military organs take measures when

23     they learned about misdeeds committed by their members?

24        A.   Good morning to you too.  Yes, at all levels officers who were in

25     charge of such matters did take measures and they prosecuted all of those

Page 10844

 1     who violated the law, especially international humanitarian law.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  It is being insisted upon here that no one in his

 3     right mind would write up a plan saying let us expel a certain ethnic

 4     group, let us do something to a particular ethnic group.  And now I am

 5     going to ask you, if there is not a plan, what about you and anyone else

 6     from the Army of Yugoslavia or the Republic of Serbia, did you carry out

 7     any kind of policy of persecution of the Albanian national minority

 8     during 1999?

 9        A.   No.  No plan, none of that.  None of that is correct.

10        Q.   I'm asking you now, if there was not a written plan, if there was

11     a plan that had not been written up in the position that you held, would

12     you have to know of such activity on the part of the Army of Yugoslavia

13     or other security organs?

14        A.   Everything that is called a plan that can look like a plan

15     regardless of whether it is in the form of text, map, or any other form,

16     or quite simply any kind of assignment, any kind of note, no such thing

17     was ever written, was ever compiled, because it would have to be

18     preserved in special storage at the General Staff in the first

19     administration.

20        Q.   Thank you.  In field reports, bearing in mind the system of

21     reporting in the Army of Yugoslavia, did you receive any reports about

22     planned and massive commission of crimes against the Albanian population

23     or the expulsion of the Albanian population?

24        A.   No, and if something like that had happened it would have been

25     included in combat reports.

Page 10845

 1        Q.   Thank you, if we could now explain the system of reporting from

 2     the very base, from the grass roots up to the General Staff headquarters

 3     during the war, could you explain this chain of reporting and filing

 4     reports, but briefly?

 5        A.   At lower levels it is oral, the commanding officer writes it up

 6     and then further up the regiment and the brigade they write reports every

 7     day on the basis of a certain structure as to what happened during the

 8     course of the day.  When the corps collects these reports then they write

 9     up their own report and they send it to the army.  When the army collects

10     all of its reports they study them and they send a report to the Supreme

11     Command staff, and the Supreme Command staff once they study all these

12     reports they send their own combat report to the Supreme Command and then

13     they act as I explained yesterday.

14        Q.   Thank you, no need to elaborate on this further.  From January

15     1999 you were in the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia and you

16     attended collegium meetings.  Do you know who the members of the Kosovo

17     Verification Mission were, professionally speaking, did you discuss that?

18        A.   Well, yes.  What was the name, the Kosovo Civilian Verification

19     Mission?  Yes, I know.  For the most part or practically all of them,

20     they were intelligence security officers from NATO countries who were

21     trained and prepared to collect intelligence and information.  They

22     provided information through regular channels, but we are aware that they

23     submitted other reports for the public.

24        Q.   Thank you.  In the assessment of the General Staff, as it was at

25     the time, tell me in terms of objectivity, how were these reports

Page 10846

 1     assessed?

 2        A.   As far as we know and on the basis of the extent to which we

 3     could see this, we, I mean my colleague and I who worked on this, I could

 4     say that they were not fully objective and particularly they did not

 5     verify cease-fires on the part of the so-called KLA.

 6        Q.   Are you done?

 7        A.   Well, yes, now, perhaps.

 8        Q.   Now I would like to speak of the proportionality of use of force.

 9     To the best of your knowledge, from the beginning of 1999 that is, did

10     you ever receive reports from the 3rd Army, daily reports?

11        A.   Yes, until the beginning of the aggression we would receive daily

12     operative reports and when the aggression started on the 24th of March,

13     we would receive combat reports from the 3rd Army regularly.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Now, General, sir, do you happen to remember whether

15     at the time when you arrived at the General Staff there was a team for

16     co-operation with NATO and the KVM?

17        A.   Yes, my superior.  General Obradovic led the team in the General

18     Staff and co-operated closely with the state commission or rather with

19     the team in Kosovo.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Now, the team, did it receive reports from the

21     corresponding liaison teams from the 3rd Army and Pristina Corps?

22        A.   Yes, on a regular basis, daily reports, weekly reports, so that

23     they became acquainted with all the events on the ground with the support

24     of the people who signed it.

25        Q.   Now, in the reports from the time you were in the General Staff,

Page 10847

 1     that is to say from the 13th of January until the beginning of the war,

 2     to the best of your knowledge, there was any disproportionate use of

 3     force by some units in Kosovo and Metohija?

 4        A.   No, I don't know about that.  I never saw a report to that

 5     effect, and not only me personally, but the entire first administration

 6     scrutinized the reports in detail, and it was our duty to react if there

 7     was anything that was outside the system.  But I'd like to add a

 8     sentence, nowhere did anybody in the world define what indiscriminate use

 9     or disproportionate use of force means.  So just a digression.  Now what

10     was happening -- what is happening in the Middle East and what happened

11     in the Middle East in other countries where NATO launched an aggression

12     wasn't the greatest indiscriminate use of force when 19 of the strongest

13     countries in NATO carry out an aggression without a Security Council

14     decision on a small country.

15        Q.   Thank you.  I'd now like to ask you something else.  Did you ever

16     receive a report saying that any action on the part of the army or other

17     security forces were directed against civilians in Kosovo and Metohija

18     during 1999?

19        A.   I can say with full responsibility that we never received a

20     single report to that effect saying that army unit undertook any action

21     against civilians in Kosovo and Metohija.

22        Q.   Thank you.  General, my colleague, the Prosecutor showed us

23     Ms. Arbour's letter, and you explained to us that it reached the Chief of

24     the General Staff at the end of April because of some difficulties in

25     being handed over, but you interrupted when you were saying what the

Page 10848

 1     Chief of the General Staff did upon reception of the letter?

 2        A.   The Chief of the General Staff, or rather, the staff -- the

 3     Supreme Command staff gathered together his associates and gave him a

 4     task of reading the letter carefully, lawyers and other experts, to tell

 5     him what should be done, what he should do, and they proposed, and he had

 6     a similar idea, that he should send a telegram straightaway to General

 7     Pavkovic, the commander of the 3rd Army and to send him the letter too,

 8     and he demanded that he state his views on the letter and each section of

 9     the letter in very clear terms.  Then he also requested that the 3rd Army

10     commander in a written report with a dead-line should write down what

11     measures he took on the basis of our orders and his orders to prevent war

12     crimes from happening and when the dead-line was up, General Pavkovic did

13     send in this detailed report describing all the orders and commands that

14     appeared from the General Staff in the general army to show that he had

15     received them and studied them as well as his own orders following on

16     from those first orders so other orders too that he wrote at his own

17     initiative to prevent war crimes which are now being discussed here

18     today.

19        Q.   Thank you.  According to the reports that you received, was there

20     any knowledge and awareness of civilians being persecuted or any

21     organised crimes being committed against them or anything like that?

22        A.   No.  There was no such case recorded in a written report by the

23     command of the 3rd Army.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Now, according to the reports that you received, what

25     about the individuals who did commit crimes, were steps taken to

Page 10849

 1     prosecute by the military authorities?

 2        A.   Yes, and at one point in time during the aggression, the Chief of

 3     the Supreme Command staff issued an order that within the frameworks of a

 4     daily report, the legislative organs should provide precise data on a

 5     daily basis what they did in the area.  So we could have a daily overview

 6     of how many prosecutions were executed, how many people were sentenced,

 7     tried, and so on and so forth.

 8             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May we get D006-0042, please.  The

 9     next exhibit.  D557 is the number.

10        Q.   Section 4 in your set, General.  Number 4, General.  It's a

11     response from the 3rd Army of the 21st of January, 1990, well, there is

12     a mistake here, it should read 1999.  Maybe it's not a mistake.

13             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I think the translation says 1995

14     too, Your Honours, but it's actually 1999.

15        Q.   Now, let me ask you first, with infantry weaponry, automatic

16     rifles specifically, are there or can they be -- can Tromblon mines and

17     others be used against armoured vehicles?

18        A.   Yes, they can.

19        Q.   Rifle grenades and they are devices against armoured units,

20     right, and when they are used they are considered to be fired from

21     artillery weapons; is that right?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   Now, let's look at point 2.  When regular training is carried out

24     around the village of Rance to 700 metres west, fire was open from

25     artillery weapons, and can you tell us which weapons were used by the

Page 10850

 1     KLA?

 2        A.   As it says here in this report, in addition to what you have just

 3     said, it says, and hand-grenades and from the village of Rance mortar

 4     fire, and it doesn't say which calibre or rather hand-held

 5     rocket-launcher, but it doesn't say whether they were 80 millimetre or

 6     120 millimetre, but they were certainly mortar fire, so mortars were

 7     used, hand-held launchers were used and so on.

 8        Q.   Now, that's page 2 of the English, and it's towards the end of

 9     the first page in your set says from the village of Belince 700 metres

10     south artillery fire was used, et cetera.  Could you tell us what the

11     rest of that is?

12        A.   Belince is a 12/7 millimetre anti-aircraft machine-gun.  It has

13     various effects, inflammatory and so on, but it's considered to be a

14     heavy machine-gun in the west, and the 82-millimetre mortar.  Now, this

15     defines quite precisely that 82-millimetre mortar was used to open fire.

16             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Now, may we have the

17     next document called up, please, P1522.

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Can I stop you here for a moment.

19     On the second page of the telegram here, we have what we were discussing

20     yesterday but did not actually see yesterday, and that is the following:

21     A stamp when this telegram was received and a registered and the

22     registration number in the General Staff.  So apart from the other data

23     that is usually there, here we see that the first administration of the

24     General Staff on the 22nd of January received this particular telegram

25     and entered it in the log-book under the number there, and it was signed

Page 10851

 1     by the colonel who was on duty.  And what's more, in the lower left-hand

 2     corner, he wrote who it was being sent to so that there is a lasting

 3     trace as to what happened with this telegram and proof that it reached

 4     the General Staff, that it arrived in the General Staff.

 5             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Now, General, we are going to look at P1522 now,

 7     please.  Yesterday the Prosecution presented an order, showed us an order

 8     from the General Staff dated the 6th of March, 1999 sent to the command

 9     of the 2nd and 3rd Armies, and you were also shown item 1 of that order

10     resubordination of the 3rd Army -- of the 37th Motorised Brigade on the

11     2nd Army to the 3rd Army Command.  Now, could you comment on the

12     following paragraph.

13             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]  And can we zoom into that,

14     please.  Paragraph 2 of item 1.  Item 1, please.

15        Q.   I'll read it out, General.  It says, "Resubordinations to be

16     carried out in the garrison of the Raska peacetime location on the 7th of

17     March."  What does that mean, General?

18        A.   That means that the unit which is being resubordinated must be

19     ready and that a commanding officer or team would be arriving from the

20     3rd Army to which it is being resubordinated to see whether that

21     particular unit is ready to carry out its assignment.  The unit remains

22     in its barracks on that territory until it receives permission to move

23     on, move elsewhere.  Now, the commander, or rather the team he sent

24     establishes whether the unit is ready to carry out its assignment.  From

25     that moment, it is considered to be resubordinated to the commander of

Page 10852

 1     the 3rd Army or to whom he resubordinates it and carries out his plans

 2     and orders.  And reports are sent out to two persons, to the 3rd Army

 3     commander or the Pristina Corps, resubordinated to it, and the exactly

 4     the same report is sent to the commander of the 2nd Army or rather to his

 5     corps for him to be able to follow the activities of that particular

 6     unit.

 7        Q.   Thank you.

 8             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Now, may we have called up P1328,

 9     please.

10        Q.   This is an order.  It says, Joint Command dated the 15th of April

11     1999, 455-148 is the number.  General, this registration number, to what

12     unit of the Yugoslav Army does it belong?  Which unit uses that?

13        A.   455, that's the Pristina Corps.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Now, we'll come to look at the document in its

15     entirety but it says here that it is map 1:50.000.  Now, can this

16     document be used without a map?

17        A.   No, you must have a map, the specific map written there for the

18     document to be complete.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Now, would you please focus on point 2 of this

20     document.

21             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Lower down in the English or the

22     following page in the English version, please.  Next page.  Item 2 next

23     page, please.

24        Q.   The title there is "Joint Command."  Now, as a layman, I'd like

25     to know the following:  Here we have a task of the Pristina Corps as it

Page 10853

 1     says in item 2; is that right?

 2        A.   Yes.

 3        Q.   And then it says in paragraph 2, the task "Support the MUP forces

 4     in the blockade."  Now, if it's a Joint Command, do all the units which

 5     are being deployed, do they all belong to that Joint Command?

 6        A.   I assume so, but I don't really understand your question and how

 7     you refer to the Joint Command.

 8        Q.   As a layman, if it says Pristina Corps assignment or task it

 9     says, support MUP forces, and we have a command that is in charge of all

10     the units, so both the police and the army units, would this kind of

11     formulation be used, or would it be the task and assignment of all the

12     units?

13        A.   Oh, I understand your question now.  It would be the task of all

14     the units, and that's what it should specify.  It should specifically say

15     that.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Now, yesterday you commented on item 5, the tasks of

17     the units.

18             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May we go to the next page in the

19     English version and in the Serbian, please, so next page, please, point

20     5.

21        Q.   To which unit was this task issued in this order?

22        A.   Well, I suppose there was something that went before, but without

23     a doubt here it says that the task is issued to the 125th Motorised

24     Brigade.

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 10854

 1             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May we have the next page in the

 2     Serbian version, please, so you can see the whole of point 5.  Thank you.

 3        A.   Well, here the task was issued to only this brigade and nobody

 4     else, that's quite certain.

 5             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Now, according to this, could any other unit act upon

 7     this order except the 125th Motorised Brigade regardless of whether it

 8     was a military one or a MUP unit?

 9        A.   No.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Now I want to ask you something else.  Do you

11     remember the first item of point 2 of this order, or rather, paragraph,

12     and it says Pristina Corps supports the MUP for --

13             THE INTERPRETER:  Could counsel repeat that reference, please,

14     thank you.

15             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   In point 5 where it says "tasks," is there any task or assignment

17     for an armed non-Siptar population to undertake?

18        A.   No.

19        Q.   Thank you.  I'll have to repeat my question, I see.  It was point

20     2, and there we see that the Pristina Corps regarding the non-Siptar

21     organisation in --

22             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter cannot follow the text.

23             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Now, bearing in mind point 5, was there any task for an armed

25     non-Siptar population?

Page 10855

 1        A.   When I said no, I considered that there wasn't a task for anybody

 2     else except for the 125th Brigade, so there was no task as far as this

 3     population was concerned.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Now, in the orders, what would item 2 contain in an

 5     order generally?

 6        A.   Item 2 in an order is in fact an item from the order of the

 7     Supreme Command written out again, copied out, so the Pristina Corps

 8     could have received this kind of order and task only from the 3rd Army or

 9     it could formulate its own tasks for itself.

10        Q.   That you.

11             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] And now may we turn to the last

12     page -- last page of the document I mean.

13        Q.   Is there a signature on this document?

14        A.   No, no, there's no signature, and it doesn't say who the

15     commander is and it doesn't say who wrote it, who typed it up.  Yesterday

16     I said several times what my opinion was of unsigned documents.

17        Q.   Thank you.

18             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I would now like to have D104,

19     please.

20        Q.   General, what we have before us is an order, to rout and destroy

21     the STS in the area of Malo Kosovo on the 22nd of March, 1999, and it

22     says in the heading, Joint Command for KiM, Kosovo and Metohija Strictly

23     Confidential Number 455-56.  This registration number, what unit does it

24     belong to?

25        A.   The Pristina Corps.

Page 10856

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have the last page

 3     of this document.  And also if you could just note or remember the number

 4     of this order.

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I haven't got a pen.

 6             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] All right.  We are just going to

 7     use the last number.  Could we please have the last page.

 8        Q.   Has this order been signed?

 9        A.   No, no, there's no signature, and it doesn't say who the

10     commander of this Joint Command is, and it doesn't say who actually wrote

11     this up.  And also, no command can exist without a military commander.

12        Q.   Could you please tell me, sir, according to the rules, who can

13     amend this kind of order?  I mean, once an order is adopted, who is

14     authorised to amend it?

15        A.   Any order including this one can only be amended by the person

16     who passed the order in the first place, who issued the order and who

17     signed it.

18        Q.   Thank you.

19             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Now I would like to ask for

20     document D105, please.  Could we please zoom in on the heading.

21        Q.   General, can you give us the number of this document?

22        A.   Strictly Confidential Number 455-56/1.

23        Q.   "/1," do you remember the number of the order a few minutes ago?

24        A.   Yes, it was 56.

25        Q.   What does "/1" mean?

Page 10857

 1        A.   That this is a continuation of that document, or rather, that

 2     this number is in the same place in the log-book and that both documents

 3     have to be archived one next to the other.

 4        Q.   Can you tell us what the date on this document is?

 5        A.   The 22nd -- now, I cannot see this very well, I cannot see the

 6     month very well.  1999.  It looks like a 5 but, I'm sorry, I'm not sure.

 7     No, no, the 22nd of March, 1999.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Do you see the title of the document, as it were?

 9        A.   Yes.  It is "Amendment to the decision on supporting the MUP

10     forces in breaking up and destroying the STS in the area of Malo Kosovo"

11     and underneath it says which maps should be used when this amendment is

12     being carried through.

13             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could we please have

14     the last page of the document, if possible.  That's right, yes, that's

15     what we wanted to have enlarged, where the signature is.

16        Q.   General, can you see whether this amendment has a signature and a

17     stamp?

18        A.   Yes, there is a clear signature here and a stamp.  This is a

19     legal document and the only right kind.

20        Q.   Whose signature is this?

21        A.   It says that it's the signature of the commander of the Pristina

22     Corps, Major-General Vladimir Lazarevic.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Do you recognise his signature?

24        A.   Yes, I do.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Now, tell me, in view of this document and in view of

Page 10858

 1     the previous document, this is 455-56/1 and the other one is 455-56,

 2     who -- I mean, well, if we have this amendment here, what does that tell

 3     us?

 4        A.   Well, that can tell us the situation had changed, that there was

 5     an indispensable need to make certain corrections in the decision so that

 6     it could be properly carried through and the commander of the Pristina

 7     Corps decided to write up an amendment on the basis of which certain

 8     combat activities will possibly be carried out.

 9        Q.   And who is authorised to amend the basic document?

10        A.   The corps commander, General Lazarevic.

11        Q.   Thank you.

12             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Now I'd like to ask if we could

13     get document D0 -- rather, P1523, please.  Page 3 in Serbian, page 4 in

14     English.

15        Q.   So this is the briefing of the 18th of April, 1999.  The Chief of

16     the General Staff of the Supreme Command is making the concluding remarks

17     and he says one should look into when the telegram was sent to the 3rd

18     Army command, "ask when the telegram was delivered," and you said or

19     rather, you wanted to say a bit more, you wanted to give us a wider

20     explanation.

21        A.   First of all, I would like to ask you kindly if I could have a

22     look at it here, I would like to read this.  I would like to read the

23     actual wording.  I didn't quite catch it.  I mean, the page is here but

24     could we just have a lowered, scrolled up or scrolled down.

25        Q.   Number 6?

Page 10859

 1        A.   That's right, now we have it.  Can I see the next page in the

 2     Serbian version?

 3        Q.   Yes, as far as I know, yes.  Yes, yes, the next page.  "Ask when

 4     the telegram was delivered."

 5        A.   Yes.  Well, I do remember that at the evening meeting concerning

 6     an analysis of the situation on the front line, we were analysing the

 7     situation, the Chief of General Staff gave me the task of checking when

 8     the telegram arrived, when it was delivered, and when it was acted upon.

 9     Actually, the chief of the staff of the Supreme Command was in a hurry to

10     send this telegram hoping that it would yield fruit.  However, the

11     telegram was not delivered properly and on time probably because perhaps

12     that night there had been some heavy bombing and the army commander could

13     not move about freely and a courier couldn't either.  We have precise

14     information on the telegram as to when it was sent --

15             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] And now I'd like to ask if we

16     could have on our screens P1236, please.

17        Q.   It's tab 27 in your binder but you will see it on the screen as

18     well.  You see?

19        A.   Yes, we did deal with this, and we have here a report of the

20     commander of the 3rd Army sent to the Chief of General Staff when the

21     telegram was sent.

22        Q.   No, I asked you to have a look at tab 26.  You started talking

23     about the sending of the telegram.

24        A.   Yes.  I assume that the question relates to the bottom of this

25     telegram, when it was sent from the Supreme Command staff.  On every

Page 10860

 1     telegram we have a stamp, a signature, and a date like here, the 17th of

 2     April, 1999, and also the hour and minute along with the signature as to

 3     when it was brought for coding and then when it was registered and it was

 4     sent, so it was sent at 2000 hours, 40 minutes.  And then it was fully

 5     handed over at 2155, that is to say there was confirmation received from

 6     Pristina or wherever that it was properly received with no error.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Did you notify the Chief of Staff of the Supreme

 8     Command about what you found out?

 9        A.   Yes, yes.

10        Q.   And now could you look at tab 27, that's the next document, or

11     rather P1449.

12             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we have the last page.

13        Q.   This is a report of the command of the 3rd Army dated the 20th of

14     April, 1999.  General, on the last page could you have a look at the

15     square stamp, and could you you interpret it for us?

16        A.   This is proof of the fact that this telegram was received at the

17     coding department by -- at a certain moment when it was sent on the 20th

18     of April, 1999.  At 1205, that's when it was processed.

19        Q.   And underneath that, underneath the stamp, who wrote that?

20        A.   The part that is typed in Cyrillic where it says "submitted to"

21     that was done by someone at the Supreme Command staff who received this

22     telegram and he wrote who it was sent to.  Since there are several

23     addressees where information was sought, he decided probably to send

24     copies to assistant Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command for operations

25     and staff affairs, and the chief of the operations administration, that

Page 10861

 1     is to me, and to the chief of KoV administration, because it wasn't only

 2     one person who was in charge of everything that was contained in this

 3     telegram.  At the end is the signature of the person who certifies that

 4     this document is authentic, or rather that the photocopy of this document

 5     is authentic, and he signed here, it's Colonel Vujic.

 6             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, General, for having

 7     come to testify in our case.  Thank you, Your Honours.  I have completed

 8     my redirect.

 9             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you, Mr. Djurdjic.

10                           [Trial Chamber confers]

11             JUDGE PARKER:  We will have our break now and resume at 11.00.

12     There are some questions of the Chamber.

13                           [The witness stands down]

14                           --- Recess taken at 10.28 a.m.

15                           --- On resuming at 11.04 a.m.

16                           [The witness takes the stand]

17             JUDGE PARKER:  Judge Baird will ask some questions.

18                           Questioned by the Court:

19             JUDGE BAIRD:  Now, General, you've been giving evidence for some

20     time so I shall try to be as brief as possible.  There are one or two

21     very small points about which I should like some clarification, and I'm

22     confident that you can assist me in that area.  What I shall do, I shall

23     give you an idea of the evidence so that I can put the question in

24     perspective.

25             Now, I'm referring to Exhibit P888, and this is the report from

Page 10862

 1     the 3rd Army forward command post dated 25th May, 1999 addressed to the

 2     Supreme Command staff, Chief of Staff, in person.  It is classified as

 3     military secret, strictly confidential.  Do you recollect this?

 4        A.   I do recollect this document from the courtroom and also from the

 5     proofing session during my last testimony here, but I don't remember it

 6     from the actual time.

 7             JUDGE BAIRD:  All right.  But you stated that during the war you

 8     had not seen that document?

 9        A.   Yes, I did say that I hadn't seen the document and that it did

10     not arrive at the Supreme Command staff.

11             JUDGE BAIRD:  And Mr. Djurdjic asked you to describe the

12     procedure of receipt when a document such as that one was sent to the

13     Chief of the Supreme Command in person, and you gave a brief description

14     of the procedure.  You said that if a document like that were sent to the

15     Chief of Staff, then the office of the chief receives it when it is still

16     sealed, the Chef de Cabinet receives it, puts a stamp at the bottom, as

17     to who received it, where it was sent, later on et cetera.

18             Now, my question to you, General, is this:  Would there ever have

19     been instances when the particular document was so very personal and

20     confidential that the Chef de Cabinet would not open it at all but would

21     pass it unopened to the Chief of the Supreme Staff who in turn would open

22     it, read it, and if he so desires he then passes it back to the Chef de

23     Cabinet; would that be possible at all?

24        A.   Yes, in principle you don't open an envelope of that kind in the

25     office.  It comes sealed to the Chief of the Supreme Command staff,

Page 10863

 1     having passed through anti-diversionary or sabotage control and then the

 2     Chef de Cabinet opens it with scissors, takes it out, and hands it over

 3     to the Chief of the Supreme Command staff.  Only afterwards is the

 4     procedure put in place whereby a stamp it placed on it, registration, so

 5     on and so forth.

 6             JUDGE BAIRD:  So there's never a situation where the letter goes

 7     to the Chief of Staff without being opened by the Chef de Cabinet?

 8        A.   I don't really know whether it ever happened or not.  I can't say

 9     that it actually didn't, but I don't know of any such thing happening.

10             JUDGE BAIRD:  I see.  Okay.  Now, on that very situation, you

11     were asked to describe the procedure when a document of that kind was

12     sent to the Chief of the General Staff, and you said that when the report

13     like that arrived or was handed to him, he would review it and he would

14     invite his closest associates to review it, and at the evening briefing

15     on combat readiness, you all would study it and voice your opinions and

16     proposals.  Do you recollect this?

17        A.   Yes, until the evening briefing we were supposed to examine it

18     and then put forward proposals at the evening briefing.

19             JUDGE BAIRD:  Now, my question is:  Would the Chief of Supreme

20     Command be absolutely bound to invite his associates to review the

21     document and to have it discussed at the evening briefings?  I mean, was

22     he absolutely bound by this procedure, or could he have said to the Chef

23     de Cabinet, Look here, I don't want all my associates to see this, I just

24     want two or three; could that have happened?

25        A.   Well, it's possible, but the style of work, the way in which the

Page 10864

 1     Chief of the Supreme Command staff General Ojdanic, whom I've known for

 2     over 40 years, worked and how he functioned, everybody who was connected

 3     with this document must be informed so that he could hear as many

 4     different opinions and proposals as possible to be able to make the right

 5     decision or issue the right order having heard all that.  So he always

 6     advocated team-work.

 7             JUDGE BAIRD:  I see.  Now, tell me, General, was it ever brought

 8     to your attention as chief of the first operation administration at the

 9     General Staff, that during the war there were frequent altercations at

10     the check-points manned by the MUP and the military police units

11     springing from the fact that the MUP members permitted criminal acts by

12     their fellow MUP members and civilians such as appropriation of motor

13     vehicles, and technical goods and so on, ever at all?

14        A.   I don't know that anything like that happened.  I was never

15     informed about anything like that happening.

16             JUDGE BAIRD:  I see.  Now, Ms. Petersen - and this is my last

17     question - Ms. Petersen asked you about Combat Report Number 28 from the

18     Supreme Command staff.  It's dated 21st April, 1999, and she referred to

19     section 2.4, the second paragraph, where it was stated, I would summarise

20     her, I would summarise here, that between 19 and 20 April 1999, about

21     3.000 people crossed from KiM to Macedonia escorted by the MUP.  She then

22     asked if we conclude from the report that the MUP were walking alongside

23     the column, and you gave your answer and you ended the answer saying that

24     she was right, it was written there and "we did not hide it that this

25     column passed through there and went towards Macedonia, and it says

Page 10865

 1     clearly escorted by the MUP."  And then there was a follow-up question

 2     and you answered that "it did say that the 3.000 people crossed from

 3     Kosovo to Macedonia."  Now, do you recollect this yesterday?

 4        A.   I do recollect it, but I'm not quite sure that I used all those

 5     words since they had crossed from Kosovo to the rest of Serbia and then

 6     across the village of Miratovac, went towards the border which is

 7     something else, and I'm even not sure whether that column ever left

 8     Serbia to go to Macedonia but that it was stopped at the border and sent

 9     back, and we have that in some of the later reports, but yes, I do

10     remember that part.

11             JUDGE BAIRD:  Thank you, thank you.  Now, are you in a position,

12     General, to say why the MUP escorted these 3.000 people?

13        A.   I assume -- I hope you'll understand me, all I can do is to

14     assume why, assume the reason.  There might have been a number of

15     reasons.  One of the reasons was to prevent somebody in the forest, along

16     the road at night, that they should not be fired at by some forces and

17     that that be ascribed to the MUP or the army.  And that the Serbs in

18     retaliation on Serbs in retaliation for certain ill-deeds committed in

19     their own villages perhaps might have ambushed them and massacred them or

20     to prevent them from entering a minefield along the border belt and be

21     killed that way so these are all possible reasons that I can see.  Or

22     they might have been asked by some of the locals to escort them in safety

23     and security and to ensure that they have no problems in crossing the

24     territory.

25             JUDGE BAIRD:  Protection?

Page 10866

 1        A.   Yes.

 2             JUDGE BAIRD:  Thank you very much indeed.  Thank you, thank you.

 3             JUDGE PARKER:  You'll be pleased to know that that completes the

 4     questions.  The Chamber would like to thank you for your attendance, for

 5     the assistance you've been able to give, and you may now return to your

 6     normal activities.  A Court Officer will show you out.  Thank you.

 7                           [The witness withdrew]

 8             JUDGE PARKER:  Ms. Petersen.

 9             MS. PETERSEN:  Yes, Your Honours.  I am offering to basically do

10     the same thing that Mr. Stamp did the other day if it would assist the

11     Court.  We have a comparison of exhibit numbers that were used with this

12     witness in the Milutinovic case and corresponding numbers that have come

13     in that were tendered in this case, if that would assist the Court.  I

14     know that we're working on a more permanent solution to this -- trying to

15     correspond the numbers, but if it would assist, in the meantime I could

16     give the ones right now or we could just wait until we have a more

17     permanent solution.

18             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.

19                           [Trial Chamber confers]

20             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you for your offer, but we think it would be

21     just complicating life to have such details after every witness and it

22     would be better to wait for a co-ordinated overall comparison.  Thank

23     you.

24             MS. PETERSEN:  Thank you, Your Honours.

25             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Popovic, is it you that I look to?  Every time

Page 10867

 1     I turn around I see a different lineup in the team there.

 2             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] That's right, Your Honours.  It's

 3     the youth that are in the front lines today, so we are going to deal with

 4     the next witness in my person, and the next Defence witness is Mr. Rade

 5     Cucak.

 6             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.  Will it be Ms. Kravetz or Mr. Behar?

 7     Mr. Behar, right.

 8                           [The witness entered court]

 9             JUDGE PARKER:  Good morning, sir.

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.

11             JUDGE PARKER:  Would you please read the affirmation that is

12     shown to you now on the card.

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

14     speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

15             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.  Please sit down.

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17             JUDGE PARKER:  Now, Mr. Popovic has questions for you.

18                           WITNESS:  RADE CUCAK

19                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

20                           Examination by Mr. Popovic:

21        Q.   Good morning, Mr. Cucak.

22        A.   Good morning.

23        Q.   First of all, Mr. Cucak, before we begin the

24     examination-in-chief, I'd like to ask you to speak slowly, and since you

25     and I speak the same language, could you make a pause between my question

Page 10868

 1     and your answer, and that will facilitate the work of the interpreters

 2     and they will be able to do their job properly.

 3             Could you start off by giving us your first and last name.

 4        A.   My name is Rade Cucak.

 5        Q.   Where were you born?

 6        A.   I was born on the 28th of November 1947 in a small village along

 7     the banks of the Una River 25 kilometres away from Bihac.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Now, Mr. Cucak, on the 17th of August, 2007, did you

 9     give a statement to the Ojdanic Defence team, and did you sign that

10     statement personally?

11        A.   On that day I did give a statement, and I personally signed the

12     statement.

13             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness be asked to approach the

14     microphones, please.  Thank you.

15             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Thank you.  Now, before this Court -- Mr. Cucak, I'm going to ask

17     you for the benefit of the interpreters so that they can hear everything

18     you say, could you approach the microphone, please.  Get a little closer

19     to the microphones.  Yes, thank you.

20             And I'll repeat my last question.  Have you testified before this

21     Tribunal in the Milutinovic et al trial on the 31st of August and the 4th

22     of September, 2007?

23        A.   Yes, I did testify.

24        Q.   And during the proofing session for today's testimony, did you

25     have an opportunity of reading through your testimony given in the

Page 10869

 1     Milutinovic trial?

 2        A.   Yes.

 3        Q.   And would you give the same answers to all the questions posed to

 4     you and recorded in the transcript, would you give the same answers today

 5     as you did then if you were to be asked those questions?

 6        A.   Yes, I would give the same answers.

 7        Q.   Once again, may I ask you to pause between question and answer.

 8        A.   I'll do my best.

 9             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Your Honours, I would

10     like to tender Mr. Cucak's statement of the 17th of August, 2007, which

11     is Exhibit 006-0883.

12             JUDGE PARKER:  When you gave your statement in August of 2007,

13     when you prepared it and signed it, are the answers that you gave then

14     the answers that you would -- or the evidence that you gave in that

15     statement what you would say today?

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, mostly I would say the same

17     today.  I didn't look at the details of the statement again.  I looked

18     through it, of course.  It was a long time ago when I gave the statement

19     and signed it, but, yes, I would mostly, I suppose, give the same answers

20     that I did then.

21             JUDGE PARKER:  The statement will be received.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D00569.  Thank you, Your Honours.

23             JUDGE PARKER:  The transcript will be received.

24             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, Your Honour, please.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D00570.  Thank you, Your Honours.

Page 10870

 1             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I am now going to read

 2     out a summary of the witness statement.

 3             In his testimony, the witness will speak about the organisation

 4     and methods of the application of the system for marking the state

 5     borders of the FRY towards neighbouring countries and the realisation of

 6     international agreements linked to border questions for the period from

 7     1987 to 2003.

 8             The witness was appointed to hold various posts in the JNA and

 9     Yugoslav Army until 2003 when he retired with the rank of colonel.  From

10     1987 onwards, he was the chief of the department within the frameworks of

11     the first administration of the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia

12     which dealt with border questions.

13             While he occupied functions closely linked to matters of the

14     state border, the witness was a member of many state and international

15     commissions and other bodies dealing with the establishment and adoption

16     of international rules and regulations linked to borders.  The witness

17     will explain to us what a border regime means, a border incident means,

18     violation of border incidents, border belt, and the establishment and

19     delineation of the border belt.

20             He will explain what actions and procedure were undertaken within

21     the border belt in order to protects the borders of the FRY and protect

22     the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the FRY.  He will also

23     explain that it was the basic task of each army, including the Army of

24     Yugoslavia, and is its task to secure the borders of its country in

25     peacetime.  The witness will quote legal acts and documents regulating

Page 10871

 1     the issues that we are discussing, and he will go on to explain that the

 2     situation along the state border was constantly monitored by the

 3     department for state borders which was a component part of the operative

 4     department of the sector for operative staff affairs of the General Staff

 5     of the Army of Yugoslavia.

 6             The witness will provide essential data linked to the border with

 7     the Republic of Albania.  He will confirm that from the first half of

 8     1995 members of the VJ dealing with border issues started to observe and

 9     notice increasing numbers of armed civilians on the territory of the

10     Republic of Albania right along the border, or rather that during this

11     same period of time, the number of border incidents began to increase,

12     which culminated with the killing and wounding of Yugoslav border

13     officials.  He will also speak about the joint commissions of Yugoslavia

14     and Albania, established to deal with border incidents, however, because

15     the Albania state organs refuse to co-operate, such commissions

16     completely lost all importance.  The witness will also speak about border

17     incidents which took place during 1998 and 1999 and which were a direct

18     consequence of the activities of the KLA.

19             The witness will confirm to us how many members of the Army of

20     Yugoslavia lost their lives and how many members of the border units who

21     were securing the border towards Albania and how many were wounded during

22     terrorist attacks.  He will confirm that the protection of lives of the

23     members of the VJ who were carrying out their duties along the border

24     with Albania and Macedonia was the only reason for the re-establishment

25     of the border belt.  After the border belt was established in accordance

Page 10872

 1     with the situation on the ground, it made it possible for members of the

 2     VJ to apply different tactics of securing the state border in an effort

 3     to preserve the sovereignty of the FRY.

 4             The witness will confirm that the units that were securing the

 5     border did not get any special instructions related to refugees.  They

 6     were careful when there were attempts to cross the border illegally, and

 7     if such persons were captured, they were handed over to appropriate

 8     institutions.  The witness is going to speak of what happened during NATO

 9     bombing and joint activities of NATO and the KLA along the border of the

10     FRY and the Republic of Albania.

11             He is going to speak about a document that was issued by the

12     Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs which registers all the incidents

13     that occurred on the border of the FRY during 1998 and 1999 and that are

14     a result of the activities of terrorists along the border with the

15     Republic of Albania.

16             The witness is also going to speak to us about the way in which

17     reports were compiled when the state of war was proclaimed and the

18     information that he received on the situation along the border.  That

19     would be a summary of this witness's statement.

20        Q.   Mr. Cucak, were you a member of the Army of Yugoslavia, and if so

21     until when?

22        A.   Yes, I was a member of the Army of Yugoslavia from the date when

23     I entered the military academy.  That was a long time ago in 1966.  And I

24     was a member all the way up until 2003 when I was pensioned off.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Tell me, what rank did you hold at the moment when

Page 10873

 1     you were pensioned off?

 2        A.   I was a colonel at the time.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Can you explain to us briefly which positions you

 4     held within the Army of Yugoslavia during the course of your military

 5     career?

 6        A.   During my military career I started with the lowest ranking

 7     positions such as platoon commander and company commander, then I was an

 8     officer in the escort of the supreme commander of the Army of Yugoslavia

 9     Josip Broz Tito, then Comrade Josip Broz Tito.  Then I worked as an

10     operations officer in the organ for operations in training, then I was

11     battalion commander, then the brigade commander.  I also did different

12     types of work in border affairs, starting off as desk officer and I ended

13     up as a chief of that service in the VJ and the last few years I spent as

14     head of the state border service in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and

15     I dealt with different questions related to international treaties and

16     other border related matters.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Since the state border is going to be the main topic

18     of your testimony today, tell us first and foremost what are the laws

19     that regulate the state border?

20        A.   I will be able to say what the basic law in this field is and

21     that is the law on crossing the state border and movement within the

22     border belt.  There are other bylaws that regulate details on the basis

23     of the aforementioned law.

24        Q.   Thank you.  We will probably be speaking a bit outside the period

25     of 1998 and 1999 as well, but could you tell us what your duties were in

Page 10874

 1     the VJ in 1998 and 1999?  I'm primarily referring to the situation when a

 2     state of war was declared during the aggression of NATO against the FRY.

 3        A.   At that time I was head of the department for the border in the

 4     first administration of the General Staff.  That was a department that

 5     dealt with organising the functioning of the system of the state border.

 6     That is to say, the organisation and functioning of securing the state

 7     border of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  That is to say, the

 8     overall border of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  Of course,

 9     including that particular part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

10     border.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Before we move on to a more detailed analysis of the

12     situation along the border, can you explain to us as laypeople what the

13     border regime means, also what does the border belt mean and what is a

14     border incident?

15        A.   First of all, although that was not a question that was put to

16     me, can I first say what the border actually is?  The border is a line

17     that cuts across the territory of a country.  Also it includes the air

18     above it and the land below it.  It separates the territory of one

19     sovereign country from another.

20             As for the border belt, the border belt is part of the territory

21     or the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in relation to that border-line

22     that goes in-depth in the territory and that is a belt within which the

23     security organs exercise the rights vested in them by the law and that

24     means exercising control over the situation at the border.

25        Q.   The border regime?

Page 10875

 1        A.   The border regime.  That is a set of legal and other regulations

 2     setting the rights of citizens in the border belt in relation to border

 3     units and make it possible for them to function in the system of securing

 4     the state border within the border belt.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  What about a border incident?

 6        A.   Well, a border incident, that is any violation of the state order

 7     which excludes an infringement upon the territorial integrity and

 8     sovereignty of a state.  That is to say that borders incidents are

 9     actions that take place at the border but without infringing upon the

10     sovereignty of the state concerned, that is what a border incident is.

11     Or rather, bringing into question - perhaps that would be a better way of

12     putting it - of the sovereignty of the other state involved.

13        Q.   Very well, thank you.  A special part of your testimony is going

14     to pertain to the border belt.  You told us what the border belt is, and

15     could you also tell us now according to law how big is the border belt

16     and how is it defined?

17        A.   Well, you see, the law on crossing the state border and moving

18     within the border belt stipulates that the border belt runs along the

19     state border of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 100 metres from that

20     particular line.  And if necessary, it can go even further in-depth, so

21     basically it is 100 metres but it can be even bigger.  So that is the

22     belt that makes it possible for the organs in charge to exercise their

23     duty along the state border.

24        Q.   Tell us, when you say 100 metres, does that mean that at each and

25     every point at the border that is 100 metres from the border there is a

Page 10876

 1     marking of the border belt, and how is it marked?  In metres or how do

 2     you do it?

 3        A.   The border belt is not marked in terms of metres.  There are sign

 4     posts at roads in the area that say, Attention, border belt.  So persons

 5     entering the border belt have to have the right kind of documents for

 6     entering the border belt.

 7             Now, the border belt is only marked on different landmarks and

 8     that's how it's defined.  So it's not only 100 metres away from the

 9     border, no.  It depends on the terrain itself.  So whoever gets that

10     decision that has to do with the state border and that is published in

11     the Official Gazette of the state, everyone can see where this border

12     belt actually is.

13        Q.   Thank you, however, I'd like to check whether I'm actually

14     understanding what you are saying.  If the state border is marked with

15     particular objects on the ground, does that mean that in certain places

16     the border belt can be narrower or wider than those 100 metres, or is 100

17     metres the rule that has to be observed?

18        A.   I said that according to law, it was 100 metres in the case of

19     the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in relation to the state border, but

20     it also run further in-depth in relation to the state border, only when

21     it would so be proposed by the appropriate state organ or institution.

22     Rather, it would be proposed by a different organ, but then the

23     government would have to pass a decision to that effect, that the border

24     belt is bigger than 100 metres from the state border.

25             So it is only the government that could pass that kind of

Page 10877

 1     decision ultimately.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  In relation to the powers of the members of the Army

 3     of Yugoslavia, tell me, what authority did they have in the border belt,

 4     and what authority did they have outside the border belt?

 5        A.   Well, you see, the members of the Army of Yugoslavia secure the

 6     border in the border belt, that is to say, they served within the border

 7     belt outside built-up areas, and also apart from border crossings.

 8     This -- these other parts that I referred to just now were under the MUP

 9     or rather, other organs that exercised their duties in the area.  For

10     example, the customs office.  And outside built-up areas and apart from

11     actual border crossings it was the Army of Yugoslavia that exercised its

12     duties.  They had the right to stop persons, take their IDs, and even

13     bring them into custody if they did not have appropriate weapons and they

14     could even use fire-arms if it had to do with armed individuals or armed

15     groups that were putting point up resistance.

16             If they were chasing persons in the border area, they had the

17     right to pursue these persons until this activity would be taken over by

18     the Ministry of the Interior.  Outside the border belt, the members of

19     the VJ only had the right to intervene if they came across an armed group

20     that fired at them, but not in other cases.  They didn't have the right

21     to respond in that way either.

22        Q.   Thank you.  We'll deal with border belt a bit more when we go

23     through the documentation that I'm going to show you.  However, in order

24     to move on, could you tell me briefly what the situation was like between

25     the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Albania in the beginning of 1998

Page 10878

 1     and during 1998?

 2        A.   Well, let me tell you, the border towards the Republic of Albania

 3     was not only burdened -- or rather, it became burdened as it were in 1998

 4     when there was a coup or a revolution in the territory of the Republic of

 5     Albania, I don't know what it was called then, that is when all border

 6     facilities on the Albanian sides were held by persons unknown.  We could

 7     see from our border, observers did see this that unknown individuals were

 8     taking position of weapons and facilities on the Albanian side, and after

 9     that a large number of persons appeared on the border with Yugoslavia but

10     they were moving in the border belt on the Albanian side.

11             Also when our border officials would see armed persons moving

12     about in civilian clothes but with heavy weapons when you see that they

13     did not have say hunting guns or something like that, this was something

14     that was experienced as a burden as it were.

15        Q.   Could you please speak slower.

16        A.   I will do my best.  I get carried away.

17        Q.   Tell me, what problems did you have mostly linked to the border

18     with the Republic of Albania, and what were the border incidents which

19     happened mostly?  What type of incident?

20        A.   Well, allow me, first of all -- well, to answer the question of

21     what these border incidents were, I have to say, first of all, that the

22     border existed, or rather, the border became burdened with this vast

23     quantity of weapons, and at the time a large number of individuals

24     attempted to cross the border illegally, and go to Albania, either

25     individually or in smaller groups.

Page 10879

 1             Next there were some individuals, and this was established, had

 2     the necessary papers to cross into Albania legally, and then with weapons

 3     and military equipment, they attempted to come back across the state

 4     border illegally and come back to the territory of the FRY.  And next

 5     there were registered a large number of cases, I don't know the exact

 6     number now, but anyway, many cases where individuals loaded up horses

 7     with weapons and military equipment belonging to the FRY, they were

 8     caught that way, and some people loaded up some animals and set them free

 9     on the territory of Yugoslavia, and usually animals and horses go back to

10     the home they have come from.

11             So the border was being closed down and then there were terrorist

12     actions coming from Albanian territory more and more with this

13     restriction of border crossing, and they used various weapons, mortars,

14     and so on, machine-guns, anti-aircraft cannons, and so on directly from

15     Albanian territory, so the FRY came under threat from Albanian territory

16     and on the other hand, there was open aggression with assistance from

17     Albania's allies and so on, so those were mostly the kind of incidents

18     that took place in 1998 and 1999.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Now, when we speak of the expansion of the border

20     belt, and I'm referring to 1998, tell us, please, when was the border

21     belt first expanded?

22        A.   Well, when at the beginning of 1998 border incidents started

23     happening and when they had serious consequences and needed fire support,

24     the General Staff border service that I headed proposed to the officers

25     in the General Staff and the Chief of the General Staff and the chief of

Page 10880

 1     the first administration and through him the Chief of the General Staff

 2     of course, that given the situation and given the fact that there were

 3     firing incidents along the border belt, that the need arose for expanding

 4     the border belt, so that the organs that were positioned along the border

 5     with the 100-metre depth should withdraw and prevent themselves from

 6     being targets for these groups.

 7             So at the time there were mountains in the Pastrik area in

 8     general, that in that section, the border belt should be expanded

 9     somewhat.  The General Staff gave its permission and we prepared a

10     decision put through the Ministry of Defence and put to the government,

11     and the decision was taken, don't hold me it to the exact date, but I

12     think that it came into force in April or mid-April, I'm not sure of the

13     exact date.  If I had the decision in front of me, I could see what the

14     exact date of that was.  In 1998 of course.  I'm referring to 1998.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Now, let me ask you this:  Was it acted upon, as you

16     have described to us thus far, did they pin-point points along the border

17     belt?

18        A.   Yes, the border belt was defined on the ground straightaway and

19     even minor roads and paths that entered the border belt would -- there

20     would be a notice warning citizens that they were entering a border belt.

21     And the citizens were informed of the decision taken by the information

22     media and a proclamation stating that a border belt was in existence.

23     And the citizens already knew what their rights and duties were with

24     respect to movement around the border belt.

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 10881

 1             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] May we now have Defence Exhibit

 2     D006-1273 called up, please.  Thank you.  And with the Trial Chamber's

 3     permission, could the witness be handed the binder with the documents

 4     that we shall be dealing with during this session.  Thank you.

 5        Q.   Now, Colonel, you will find the document under number 1, and it

 6     is dated the 17th of April, 1998.  It is the Pristina Corps Command to

 7     the security administration of the Army of Yugoslavia, the security

 8     department, and it reads as follows:

 9             "On the 16th of April, 1998, at 0145 hours, a group of terrorists

10     (an estimated 50 to 60 men) in the Morina border post sector, near C-7,

11     crossed from the territory of the Republic of Albania into the territory

12     of the FRY with 12 horses loaded up with weapons and military equipment.

13     A state border security organ opened fire, dispersing the group of

14     terrorists.  The terrorists returned fire during the pullout and at the

15     same time fire was opened on our state border security organ from the

16     territory of the Republic of Albania."

17             First of all, may we have your comments.  Is that an example of

18     the sort of incidents that took place along the border belt in 1998, that

19     is to say between -- the border between Albania and Yugoslavia?

20        A.   This is unfortunately only one such incident that took place

21     along the state border with -- the border with the Republic of Albania

22     facing Kosovo and Metohija.  There were many more such incidents which

23     were far more serious than this particular one, and of course, there were

24     some minor incidents as well, but we are dealing with the beginning of

25     1998 or rather the first half of 1998 when there were extensive border

Page 10882

 1     incidents along the borders between Albania and Yugoslavia threatening

 2     Yugoslavia's security and integrity.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Now, we see the date there as being the 17th of

 4     April.  You said that the first time the border belt was extended was

 5     when?

 6        A.   Sometime during April.  It came in to force in mid-April, so this

 7     extension of the border belt -- well, this is an indicator telling us

 8     that we had to extend the border belt, had to take that measure for the

 9     army to be able to exercise its right under the law to protect and

10     safe-guard the countries territory and integrity.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Now, let's just be very precise.  This extension of

12     the border belt from April 1998, what part of the border of the Federal

13     Republic of Yugoslavia did it refer to?

14        A.   The April border belt expansion related to the entire stretch of

15     the border with Albania, from the Bojana River estuary into the sea with

16     a point that was not precisely established at the time but anyway was

17     bordering on the Republic of Macedonia.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Would you focus on the last sentence in that

19     paragraph where it says:

20             "The superior command was immediately informed.  A report was

21     sent to LMK-4 local mixed commission, and requests were made for

22     announcement of a border incident, a meeting with LMK-4 and joint on-site

23     investigation."

24             What does this LMK-4 mean in actual fact?

25        A.   Well, let me explain.  The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

Page 10883

 1     vis-à-vis neighbouring countries had signed an international agreement on

 2     state borders, that's what it was called, and it regulated many issues,

 3     many questions related to the border.  So it was on the basis of this

 4     international agreement that mixed commissions were set up at the level

 5     of states to deal with violations of the border regime and border

 6     incidents as a more severe form of that.  And also other questions linked

 7     to the state border.

 8             Now, in addition to this main mixed commission, or let me say

 9     that the main mixed commission did not come under the authority of the

10     state -- state organs appointed by the government, but in addition to

11     these mixed commissions, there were local commissions too and they

12     covered part of the territory, or rather, adapted to individual sectors

13     and entrances to Albania.  So along the border with Albania there were

14     five sector commissions, one of which was along the coast dealing with

15     questions of the sea.  The third was in Potkovica, the fourth was in

16     Djakovica and Prizren.  And every local commission, the leaders and

17     officials of which were from the Ministry of the Interior and from the

18     border units that provided security for that belt usually there was a

19     commander of the border battalion, and their task was when any untoward

20     event occurred along the border with Albania, that they should issue a

21     warning to the Albanian side and ask them to make an on-site

22     investigation and established facts to try and establish what had

23     happened, what kind of border incident had taken place.  And if not, then

24     they could leave the task to the international mixed commission to do the

25     job.

Page 10884

 1        Q.   Thank you, now, for the transcript, the main mixed commission,

 2     where did that come, under whose authority was that?

 3        A.   The main mixed commission was under the state organs.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  I think that's what you said but it was wrongly

 5     recorded.

 6             MR. POPOVIC:  [Interpretation] Anyway, now let's turn to page 2

 7     in both versions, the Serbian and the English, or rather the B/C/S.

 8        Q.   It says their members of the 53rd Border Battalion did not return

 9     fire but warned LMK-4 that fire had been opened on members of the VJ from

10     the the Albanian side and asked that the chairman of the Albanian LMK-4

11     side Mr. Selim Demusi go to the territory of Albania and prevent fire

12     from being opened on members of the VJ from the territory of Albania.

13     Having contacted the attackers Selim Demusi said that he could not

14     control them because they were a gang and asked that the LMK-4 return

15     without completing their mission because as a member of the Albanian

16     LMK-4 side, he could not guarantee the safety of VJ members and the

17     Yugoslav LMK-4 side.  May we have a brief comment to what I've just read

18     out?

19        A.   This is a case I'm particularly familiar with.  It was one of the

20     rare times when the Albanian side agreed to go out with a local

21     commission to carry out an on-site investigation of the territory where

22     the border incident had occurred.  This was a very rare occasion.  They

23     went on site while both sides did.  The Joint Commission made up of

24     representatives of both sides, and at that point the organs providing

25     security for the state borders provided security on that occasion.  So as

Page 10885

 1     to secure the people and ensure their safety, the people conducting the

 2     on-site investigation from -- at that point they were opened fire on from

 3     the Albanian side, and our member of the mixed commission intervened and

 4     asked the Albanian representative to calm the situation down, and he did

 5     indeed go to the territory of Albania where this had happened.  He came

 6     back sometime later and said what he said, that they were terrorists

 7     bands or gangs or whatever, moving around the border belt area.  So that

 8     is the substance of this particular incident, and I could add some

 9     things, perhaps I could do so now.

10        Q.   How would you assess the co-operation between the state organs

11     and organs in general who were supposed to take part on the Albanian side

12     in these Joint Commissions dealing with these issues?

13        A.   Well, here is my assessment.  I'd like to make an observation and

14     that will indicate to you what kind of co-operation that was.  Well, the

15     Albanian side, the mixed commission sat every year, met every year, once

16     on the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the next time

17     on Albanian territory.  The last such session that was held of this mixed

18     commission, took place on the territory of the FRY.  And that was in

19     1996.  I think it was held in Potkovica, and ever since that meeting was

20     held, there were no other meetings because the Albanian side was supposed

21     to host the following meeting and they did not wish do so.  They did not

22     wish to implement the agreement that we had whereby annual meeting would

23     be held.  They did not schedule any such meeting and the initiative taken

24     from -- by the General Staff through the foreign ministry to offer the

25     Albanian side, or rather, for the FRY to host a new meeting to resolve

Page 10886

 1     the incidents, there was that kind of proposal because the incidents had

 2     become more and more prevalent.  Minor ones and more serious ones.

 3             MR. POPOVIC:  [Interpretation] I'd like to tender this document

 4     into evidence now, please.

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  It will be received as Exhibit D00571.  Thank

 7     you, Your Honours.

 8             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  May we have D006-1358,

 9     a Defence document to be called up next, please.  It is document number 2

10     in your set, Witness.

11        Q.   As we can see, we have the 53rd Border Battalion command and an

12     assessment of endangered areas and, or rather, axes and the estimate of

13     forces required for full heightened security, and in point 1 it lists the

14     most endangered axes from 1 to 11.  I won't go into that in detail, but

15     anyway, on the last page which is page D006-1360 in the B/C/S version and

16     D006-1363 for the English.  It says in the last sentence there:

17             "At present for providing security along the line we have 540

18     soldiers and 68 officers which means that we're lacking 960 soldiers and

19     62 officers."

20             Now, linked to what I have just read out, the most threatened

21     axes and the number of officers and soldiers needed and lacking along

22     those axes.

23        A.   Could I please go back a bit, particularly in relation to this

24     document.  When it became obvious that after the first -- the border belt

25     was extended for the first time, the situation became even more serious.

Page 10887

 1     As soon as -- there were a large number of incidents that were actually

 2     discovered.  So the professional service of the Army of Yugoslavia asked

 3     for an assessment to be made of threats to the border belt.  I see here

 4     that it was the Pristina Corps that asked the 53rd Border Battalion to

 5     carry this out.  They were located in Djakovica.  They were asked to see

 6     where the threats were along which axis.  And it was the 57th in Urosevac

 7     that also received such orders.  They were supposed to see which axes and

 8     which roads were threatened and the question was whether we really had

 9     sufficient forces to deal with the situation.  It wasn't only lighter

10     violation, but very serious violations that were at hand, seriously

11     violating the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country.  On

12     the basis is of these documents, thought was given how to prevent these

13     terrorist incursions from the territory of the Republic of Albania.

14             MR. POPOVIC:  [Interpretation] Thank you.  I'd like to have this

15     document admitted into evidence, please.

16             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  It will be admitted as Exhibit Number D00572.

18     Thank you, Your Honours.

19             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation]  In relation to what you said when

20     you finished answering the last question, could we please have document

21     D320 on our screens now.  It's number 3 in your binder.

22        Q.   It's a letter.  A piece of information of the Chief of General

23     Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia dated the 16th of July, 1998.  He is

24     sending it to the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs Mr. General

25     Jovanovic who was federal minister at the time.  And it says here, "In

Page 10888

 1     order to launch a diplomatic initiative in international organizations

 2     and institutions, the OSCE and the United Nations in particular, we are

 3     hereby forwarding to you a report on the involvement of the Republic of

 4     Albania in events in Kosovo and Metohija, a list of border incidents that

 5     occurred on the border with the Republic of Albania between the 1st of

 6     January 1998 and --"

 7             JUDGE PARKER:  The poor lady interpreting needed to catch a

 8     break.

 9             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] I do apologise to the interpreters.

10     We are trying to catch up in terms of time because we seem to be lagging

11     behind this week, but of course we don't want to do it at the expense of

12     the interpreters, so I will slow down.

13             JUDGE PARKER:  Could I point out that we do have the document,

14     you do not need to read large parts of it aloud.  That could save time.

15             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] I take that into account, Your

16     Honour.  This is where the part that I wanted to read out actually ends.

17        Q.   Colonel, you heard what I read out to you, and could we please

18     have a brief comment from you?

19        A.   This was a regular thing that the General Staff of the Army of

20     Yugoslavia or rather, the first administration and the department -- the

21     border department inform the appropriate organs about the situation at

22     the state border, not only in Kosovo, but in relation to all states that

23     the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had a border with.  However, this

24     indicates a serious violation that borders on aggression, if you will, in

25     view of their characteristics.  All of these were armed provocations or

Page 10889

 1     attempted incursions by armed groups bringing in large quantities of

 2     military equipment as well.  This was rightly interpreted as a type of

 3     aggression against the state without a declaration of war.  I looked at

 4     this survey, I happened to see it now -- I saw it a long time ago but --

 5        Q.   Colonel, we'll get to that, but let's do things in the right

 6     order.

 7             MR. POPOVIC:  [Interpretation] First of all, I would like to have

 8     page 5 called up, please, in English and in B/C/S.

 9        Q.   You see this is a survey of border incidents along the border

10     with the Republic of Albania between the 1st of January, 1998 and the

11     30th of June, 1998.  I don't want to dwell on it any longer, but I did

12     notice something.  If one were to analyse this survey you would see that

13     up until mid-April there were 14 violations from the 1st of January until

14     the 15th of April and from the 15th of April until the 30th of June, so

15     it's the same period of time, there were 46 incidents.  Can you give us

16     your comment on this?  You spoke about the extension of the border belt.

17     Does that have anything do with that, and if so, what is it exactly?

18        A.   Well, when we extended -- no, not extended, that would not be the

19     right term to use.  It is people who are not very knowledgeable about

20     borders that use that term.  It was actually establishing the border belt

21     that went beyond 100 metres.  And it's the federal government that

22     decides on that.  When we were to establish the border belt we had to

23     deal with these different violations coming from the Republic of Albania.

24     When we went further in-depth in term of our own territory, then more

25     organs could be engaged in the area of their activity.  They could deal

Page 10890

 1     with inaccessible areas, areas that are not accessible even on horseback,

 2     only on foot.

 3             Then there was an increase in captured -- in the number of

 4     captured individuals carrying equipment, et cetera, on the border.  When

 5     groups were discovered in that area, then this -- that had a reflection

 6     on the number of groups coming from the Republic of Albania.

 7             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Page 13 in B/C/S please now.  I

 8     don't think that this page does not exist in the English version.  We did

 9     send it to the translation service to have that page translated and the

10     next one.  I'm going to deal with this page very briefly.

11        Q.   It is a list of weapons that were seized.  What we see on our

12     screens now is page 9, and I had asked for page 13.  Or rather, it's the

13     next page, the one after this one, the one after this one is the one that

14     I'm talking about.  So that is a list of seized weapons and other

15     military equipment on the border with the Republic of Albania between the

16     1st of January and the 8th of June, 1998.

17             Colonel, very briefly, a comment on this table.  I would be

18     interested in more -- I would be interested in heavy weaponry, we see

19     that there are small arms here as well.

20        A.   Let me say straightaway that you don't have to be a military

21     expert to draw the right conclusion on the basis of this list of seized

22     weapons.  You can see that the quantity of weapons recorded here is

23     sufficient to arm two battalion strength units at least.  So this is

24     military equipment and weaponry for combat activities.  It is obvious

25     that this is intended to arm units that are supposed to engage in combat,

Page 10891

 1     if you look at everything that is listed here, so these are stronger

 2     manoeuvring forces for activity in the area of Kosovo.

 3        Q.   Four -- three recoilless guns, right?

 4             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter did not hear the witness.

 5             MR. POPOVIC:  [Interpretation] Number 16, or rather, 16 mortars.

 6        A.   Yes, 16 mortars.  So these would be sufficient for two

 7     battalions.  Only in terms of mortars, and look at how many hand-held

 8     rocket-launchers, 927, that's the number here.  It shows that the

 9     intention of those who carry these weapons was the establishment of

10     groups for destroying facilities not only in the border belt but probably

11     throughout the territory of Kosovo and perhaps even beyond that.

12             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation].  Thank you.  Now I'm going to like

13     to ask for D006-1261.

14             JUDGE PARKER:  Are you -- [Microphone not activated]

15             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone for Judge Parker, please.

16             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, D320 was the document

17     we saw previously.

18        Q.   Colonel, the Official Gazette of the Federal Republic of

19     Yugoslavia dated the 21st of July, 1998, and the decision of establishing

20     the border belt adjacent to sections of the state border of the Federal

21     Republic of Yugoslavia.  So this is what you've been insisting upon,

22     establishing the border belt, not extending it?

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   Can you tell us the basis of this decision, for which sections

25     was the border belt established, how was it done?  Could you please

Page 10892

 1     answer that first and then we'll look into the reasons.

 2        A.   The decision on establishing the border belt or rather this

 3     decision pertains to the state border towards the Republic of Albania.

 4     Let me put it this way, from the mouth of the Bojana River up to the

 5     tri-lateral border with the Republic of Albania -- of -- that hadn't been

 6     regulated yet.

 7        Q.   Towards the Republic of Macedonia, that's what it also says, so

 8     does it pertain towards -- to the border towards the Republic of

 9     Macedonia as well?  Number 2 on the right.

10        A.   I don't see that.

11        Q.   On that a same page that you are looking at, on the right-hand

12     side, it says the border belt is being extended and then it says --

13        A.   Yes, yes, yes, but it's the first part that I've been speaking

14     of.  I thought you asked me about that.  If you are referring to the

15     entire area, so it is from the mouth of the Bojana River to the

16     tri-lateral border with Macedonia that hadn't been established yet, and

17     then Macedonia from the tri-lateral border with Albania all the way to

18     the border with Bulgaria.

19        Q.   Thank you.  In relation to what you said to us about April, that

20     was the establishment of the border belt facing the Republic of Albania,

21     now we are talking about establishing the border belt facing the Republic

22     of Macedonia.  What is the reason for that decision?

23        A.   I'll tell you.  Again I have to go back a bit.  When the border

24     belt was extended the previous time, the deployment of forces on the

25     border belt for securing the state border was far more favourable and

Page 10893

 1     more concealed so they could apply different tactics in the system of

 2     securing the state border which made it possible for them to capture many

 3     illegal border crossers and to capture large quantities of equipment.

 4             It also made it possible for us to further strengthen the forces

 5     engaged in securing the state border precisely because it was realised

 6     that this was a major threat.  If I can call them that, these terrorists

 7     forces from the Republic of Albania realised that that was the case and

 8     then they changed their methodology.

 9             Equipment was taken from Albania to Macedonia and then from

10     Macedonia across Mount Sara [phoen] and Gora into the territory of the

11     Federal Republic of Macedonia.  That's where we first captured those

12     horses on the Macedonian border with guides.  Large quantities were

13     involved.  They tried to smuggle in large quantities of equipment, so

14     obviously this involved a change of tactics in order to make it easier

15     for them to bring military equipment from Albania into Kosovo and

16     Metohija.

17             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours, I'd like

18     to tender this.

19             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit Number D00573.  Thank you, Your

21     Honours.

22             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   While this document is still on our screens, Colonel, how was the

24     border belt established, in which way?

25        A.   Like all others it relate -- it was set by a decision regarding

Page 10894

 1     the actual situation on the ground, the landmarks on the ground.  400,

 2     500, 700 metres, some were even 1.000.  It's not like I read in the media

 3     where various individuals said it would only be 500 metres and that would

 4     be it.  We wanted to cover different roads leading into villages so that

 5     people could communicate normally between and among various villages and

 6     towns that were their homes.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Just a moment, please.

 8             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] D168.

 9        Q.   Colonel, this is the first special session of the collegium on

10     the 14th of December.

11             MR. POPOVIC:  [Interpretation] I'd like to have page 18 in B/C/S

12     and page 22 in English.  We will deal with this document very briefly.

13        Q.   We see what Major-General --

14             MR. POPOVIC:  [Interpretation] No, this is page 17 in B/C/S and I

15     would like to have page 18, please.  Yes, that's the page in B/C/S.

16        Q.   Major-General Spaso Smiljanic is speaking here and he is saying:

17             "General, sir, on the basis of an order issued by the Chief of

18     the General Staff on the 16th of November, 1998, the 3rd Army Command on

19     the basis of an order of the Chief of General Staff, set up an expert

20     team which inspected the security system and the functioning of the

21     security system on the state border with Albania."

22             My question for you is:  What expert team is this?  What is it

23     that General Spaso Smiljanic is talking about?

24        A.   In order to make things clear to all, I have to go back a bit.

25     After the border was established more in-depth in April, there were

Page 10895

 1     masses of individuals who were trying to cross the border illegally that

 2     were captured, individuals and groups.  When we saw that in that part of

 3     the border it was more difficult to get into the territory.  There were

 4     situations when various forces from the territory from Kosovo and

 5     Metohija tried to fire at security organs in the border belt in order to

 6     distract their attention from the border, and in that way make it

 7     possible for large quantities of weapons to be smuggled in from Albania.

 8     Then the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia took measures.  They

 9     asked for a further strengthening of forces in securing the state border

10     and further improving the system in order to raise its efficiency to a

11     higher level.  And that was done, now, I don't remember exactly on which

12     date.  I think it was sometime in the beginning of November when this was

13     discussed by the General Staff.  Mr. Momcilo Perisic, General Momcilo

14     Perisic who was Chief of General Staff at the time, he took note of that,

15     but he personally went to Kosovo and Metohija to see what the situation

16     was.  I don't know who received him down there, and they reported to him

17     and when he returned from there, or rather, it was while he was still

18     down there that he issued an oral commander to -- oral order to the

19     commander of the Pristina Corps to have the entire security system in the

20     border belt analysed.  So this expert team was established on the basis

21     of his order.

22             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  May we have Exhibits

23     D006-1259, Defence document, called up on our screens, please.

24        Q.   Colonel, you can look at your screen, it will be simpler for you.

25     Anyway, it refers to the organisation of the security system facing the

Page 10896

 1     Republic of Macedonia?

 2        A.   I don't have it on my screen.

 3        Q.   It will appear in just a moment.

 4             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] May we zoom into the map which we

 5     can now see.

 6        Q.   Are you familiar with this map, and if so, who compiled it and

 7     can you explain to us what the yellow line means and the red dots along

 8     it?

 9        A.   I am familiar with this map.  This map existed during

10     preparations for additionally expanding the border belt.  The yellow

11     colour denotes the existing border belt.  Now, the service in the General

12     Staff in charge of borders --

13        Q.   Let's just try and be more precise here, Colonel.  The yellow

14     line was the border belt, shows the border belt on the basis of a

15     decision of the 21st of July, 1999, is that it?

16        A.   Yes, that's right.

17        Q.   Thank you, please continue.

18        A.   Let me just remind you of one point, the security organs were

19     highly efficient but there were quite a lot of victims and attacks

20     carried out along the border in attempts to introduce weapons both

21     through Macedonia and through Albania into the country.  So these axes

22     were closed off and additional measures needed to be taken to expand the

23     border belt, or rather, to create the proper conditions for border units

24     to provide security to the country and the border belt.

25        Q.   What about the red dots?  What do they represent?

Page 10897

 1        A.   Well, you didn't ask me, I would have answered had you asked me.

 2     When my service made a proposal to an organ, it had to submit a detailed

 3     proposal substantiated in fact.  Now, the red dots here, yes, I can see

 4     it now, the red dots are where there was incursion action along the

 5     border belt at the various observation posts.  And you can see that there

 6     was firing from different calibre weapons along these points, along the

 7     border belt.  That's what these red points show, the firing points,

 8     points from which the country was fired at.

 9        Q.   Thank you.

10             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] May I tender this document into

11     evidence now, please.

12             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  It's admitted as Exhibit D00574.  Thank you, Your

14     Honours.

15             JUDGE PARKER:  We must have our next break now, and we'll resume

16     at 1.00.

17                           [The witness stands down]

18                           --- Recess taken at 12.32 p.m.

19                           --- On resuming at 1.01 p.m.

20                           [The witness takes the stand]

21             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes, Mr. Popovic.

22             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  May we have called up,

23     please, P1343.

24        Q.   And, Witness, it should be document number 8 in your set.  It is

25     the minutes from the 8th session, document number 7, minutes of the 8th

Page 10898

 1     session, of the Supreme Defence Council held on the 25th of December,

 2     1998, and on page 1 under item 1, we see that the agenda says:

 3             "Discussion of the situation on the state border with the

 4     Republic of Albania."

 5             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we look at the next page in the

 6     Serbian and B/C/S.

 7        Q.   Colonel, towards the end of that page it says that the border

 8     organs of the Army of Yugoslavia in the period from 1st to the 24th of

 9     December, 1998, at the Yugoslav Albanian state border, apprehended 676

10     persons crossing the border illegally.

11        A.   What page did you say?

12        Q.   It's on the second page, the first page is titled "minutes" where

13     it is in fact the documents of the minutes of the Supreme Defence Council

14     session.  There you are, on the next page, fine, that's it.

15             It says that they apprehended 676 persons crossing illegally,

16     about 80 sabotage and terrorists groups were stopped which tried to cross

17     into FRY territory in an organised and violent fashion with quantities of

18     weapons and military equipment, and in the following paragraph it says

19     the Albanian side this year committed 122 border incidents or violations,

20     99 of which directly infringed upon the sovereignty of the FRY.

21             May we have your comments to that.

22        A.   The regular reports were sent to this body for its sessions, and

23     one of the subjects discussed was the situation along the state border

24     and here we wanted to inform the top leadership about the situation along

25     the border.  We wanted them to be held -- kept abreast of the situation

Page 10899

 1     so that they could take steps to enforce security along the state

 2     borders.  Now, the number itself indicates that this was a massive influx

 3     and many incidents taking place along the state border without counting

 4     other incidents that took place elsewhere.

 5        Q.   Thank you.

 6             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Now may we take a look at the next

 7     document which is Exhibit P1017.

 8        Q.   It is document number -- well, actually you could look at the

 9     screen, and the document will be called up there.

10             This is a report covering two pages mentioned in Major-General

11     Drewienkiewicz's report dated the 23rd of June, 2000.  You don't have

12     that document in your binder in actual fact, so please follow it on your

13     screen.

14             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] And may we turn to the next page in

15     B/C/S and in English, please.  So the next page.  Yes, thank you.

16        Q.   Colonel, I'm going to try briefly to focus your attention on what

17     I'm interested in.  Background information is under number 1 and it says,

18     Even if the KLA were instantly disbanded and completely disbanded, the

19     lack of law and order in Albania and the lack of proper Albanian border

20     controls -- have you found it?

21        A.   Yes, I have now.  Thank you.

22        Q.   The lack of proper Albanian border controls will force the legal

23     authorities of Kosovo to secure its frontiers.  That's the end of that

24     sentence.  And another sentence I'd like you to focus on is under item 4

25     and the subtitle is, Boarder Area, and it says as follows:

Page 10900

 1             "There are 32 [Realtime translation read in error "3"] boarder

 2     posts or observation towers.  The towers are not usually manned as the

 3     Albanians use them for target practice.  FRY patrols rarely patrol along

 4     the actual border as they are shot at.

 5             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] And for the transcript, the

 6     beginning of the sentence reads, "There are 32 border posts, not three.

 7     There are 32 border posts is the beginning of that sentence.

 8        Q.   May we have your comments?

 9        A.   Well, this was clear even before that date, it was clear to all

10     of us dealing with the security service at the borders, the observation

11     post after the general chaos in Albania when they stormed the barracks,

12     took away weapons and military equipment, the border observation posts

13     never existed anymore, they existed as features, and they were fired at.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Just slow down for the benefit of the interpreters,

15     please.

16        A.   As I was saying, those facilities, the observation towers ceased

17     to exist not when this was stated, but far before, that is to say in 1997

18     they were no longer manned, and they had been damaged, the glass,

19     protective glass was shattered, precisely because they were targeted from

20     Albanian territory.  Because they were in the best possible area giving

21     very good vantage point to the Serb side of the Albanian side.

22        Q.   Thank you.

23             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Now may we have Exhibit D523 next,

24     please.  It should be document number 8 in your set.

25        Q.   Colonel, it is titled "Assessment of the Intelligence and

Page 10901

 1     Security Situation and Danger to the Security of the Federal Republic of

 2     Yugoslavia," dated February 1999.

 3             MR. POPOVIC:  [Interpretation]I want us to look at page 18 in the

 4     B/C/S, which is page 20 -- it's the document you just turned.  Page 18 of

 5     the B/C/S and page 24 of the English.  Page 24.  And can we look at

 6     section 5, item 2.  So page 24 for the English, please.  That's the right

 7     English page, but for the B/C/S could we have page 18 and not 14, which

 8     is on the screen now.

 9        Q.   At any rate, under item 4 it says:

10             "The state border towards Albania and Macedonia continue to

11     reinforce in-depth security along the state border and to the best of

12     your ability prevent the infiltration of weapons and terrorists into

13     Kosovo and Metohija.  Consider the possibility of providing appropriate

14     forces to prevent the forced entry of strong terrorist forces and moving

15     the security line deep into the border belt."

16        A.   Yes, this was considered and discussed in case there was a

17     peaceful solution that conditions should -- could allow for normal work

18     and life and security of the border belt.  And that the border

19     authorities should be further away from the border line because their

20     presence along the border line itself would not be visible.

21             Now, as to the number of border organs, the situation in Kosovo

22     was considered to be unstable for a long period of time and that it was

23     necessary to have rapid intervention forces, not only to cover the border

24     belt, but generally.  Thank you.

25        Q.   Yes, thank you, Colonel.  Now, the last few documents that we've

Page 10902

 1     looked at talk about different incidents and different ways in which

 2     problems occurred and the kinds of problems that existed along the border

 3     belt between Albania, Macedonia, and the FRY.

 4             Now, what steps were taken to prevent incidents of this kind from

 5     happening?

 6        A.   I said something about this previously.  The latest incidents

 7     that occurred in the area at the time meant that there was firing from a

 8     broad area and from Macedonia too on Mount Sara, so that part of the

 9     border came under fire and was under threat, and along the whole border

10     belt with Albania.  And at that time the General Staff or rather its

11     professional services, once again gave its consideration to these issues

12     and to stepping up efforts to create the necessary conditions for people

13     to be able to live normally in the border belt.  So that was their

14     intention, not to suffer losses and to have an efficient service

15     satisfying the security needs of the state border.

16        Q.   Thank you.

17             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Now, can we look at D006-1347 the

18     next Defence document, please.  D006-1347 is the number.  That's right,

19     1347.

20        Q.   It's document number 9 in your set, Colonel.  It is dated the 3rd

21     of March, 1999, and it is a report concerning a border incident.  Now,

22     without going through the whole document, I'd just like to ask you to

23     focus on what it says tonight at 0015 hours from the territory of the

24     Republic of Albania from the region of their border post at Pogaj a fire

25     was opened targeting -- a fire was opened from artillery weapons.

Page 10903

 1             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Nothing has come up on our screens

 2     as yet.  May I just take a moment to check the number.  That's the right

 3     document, yes.  We see that it goes on to 0045 hours when there was

 4     repeated fire from the Albanian side targeting the Gorozup observation

 5     post and its crew.  So in March 1999, is the situation the same?  What

 6     was happening along the border?

 7        A.   Well, let me tell you, in March 1999 there was intensive fire

 8     coming in from Albania and here the Yugoslav side tried to inform the

 9     Albanian side of the incident through the local mixed commission.

10     However, by this time, the Albanian side did not respond at all.  The

11     border still came under fire, and there were a lot of border incidents

12     with serious repercussions, artillery weapons were used to fire at the

13     FRY from Albania, and also terrorist groups infiltrated from Albania or

14     from Kosovo Metohija into the border belt opening fire at the border

15     forces so as to ensure, well, conditionally speaking, free territory for

16     infiltrating manpower and weapons.

17        Q.   If I understood you correctly, what you are saying is this:  That

18     terrorist groups could storm the border belt from Kosovo and Metohija but

19     also from Macedonia?

20        A.   That's right, there were small groups that appeared, and we

21     weren't able to say straightaway whether they were coming in from Kosovo

22     and from Macedonia and whether they infiltrated the border belt from them

23     to open fire at the forces along the border belt which detracted the

24     forces, and this also helped create conditions for groups from Albania,

25     on groups from Albania from infiltrating the country.

Page 10904

 1             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] I'd like to tender this document

 2     now, please.

 3             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  It will be admitted as Exhibit Number D00575.

 5     Thank you, Your Honours.

 6             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Now may we have D006-1278 next,

 7     please, which is document number 11.

 8        Q.   And while we are waiting for that document to appear on our

 9     screens, let me say that it is a copy of the Official Gazette.

10             Colonel, we have heard all the problems raised before the higher

11     state organs in the course of November, December, and January -- November

12     December 1998 and January 1999, and we see the problems that have

13     occurred on the basis of this report.

14             The Official Gazette of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on

15     Friday, the 5th of March, 1999, decision on amending the decision

16     defining the border area in certain parts of the state border of the

17     Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  Does this decision have anything to do

18     with the events that we witnessed before that?

19        A.   First of all, let me say that on the basis of -- that this

20     decision -- that there was a profound analysis of the situation and the

21     functioning of the state security border system before this decision was

22     written, not only in this area, but in Montenegro and the area facing

23     Macedonia, Bulgaria, Romania, and so on.  So these border organs at one

24     of their collegium meetings discussed border proposals and came to the

25     conclusion that the security system needed to be improved and that was

Page 10905

 1     the opinion of the expert group set up at the request of the General

 2     Staff.  So we accumulated all this knowledge, gathered all the knowledge,

 3     put it down on paper and saw that the border belt needed to be

 4     additionally expanded so as to create the necessary conditions to provide

 5     proper security for the border and the country to be able to stand up to

 6     external aggression.  They weren't only incidents by that time, they were

 7     actual acts of aggression.

 8             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] I'd like to tender into evidence

 9     now --  I'd like to tender this document into evidence.

10             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit Number D00576.  Thank you, Your

12     Honours.

13             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.  Now let's

14     look at D574, a Defence document once again.  It's the map that we were

15     looking at earlier on.

16        Q.   Looking at this map, can you explain to us, and linked to the

17     decision of the 5th of March, 1999 and the establishment of the boarder

18     belt and the amendment to the 21st of July decision, what border belt

19     reflected this March decision?  What colour on the map?

20        A.   On this map -- well, I can't say which colour but the darker

21     colour anyway.  Is it dark pink or is it -- it's not a very clear colour,

22     anyway, the darker area, shaded area, and I'd like to say that this was

23     conditionally speaking an expansion of the border belt, or rather

24     establishing the border belt at a greater depth within the FRY facing

25     Albania and Macedonia.  That was the proposal that was submitted to the

Page 10906

 1     government, and the government later adopted it.  And according to that

 2     proposal and decision, the border belt was established in this fashion.

 3        Q.   Colonel, let's clear one thing up, there were some documents that

 4     were mentioned talking about a 5- or 10-kilometre expansion of the border

 5     belt.  Now, according to the markings here, we see that the depth of the

 6     border belt is different at different parts of the border.  So what does

 7     it mean when we say to establish and fix the border belt?  How is that

 8     done?

 9        A.   Let me say at the outset that fixing the border belt is something

10     that the highest organs of the government carry out at the proposal of a

11     professional body to ensure that the life and work of the people at the

12     border, the soldiers and everybody else, the MUP and the people in the

13     area are secure or can secure the border crossings.  This included the

14     customs services, the customs also had their tasks with respect to the

15     border crossings.  So it was fixed at a deeper depth.

16             The border belt was never established at a 5- or 10-kilometre

17     depth.  It depended on the facilities and features on the ground, and

18     here, if you look at this map carefully, we see that we avoided having

19     larger settlements such as Djakovica, Prizren, and Urosevac thrown

20     outside the border belt because the object was to ensure normal life for

21     the people in that area, in those larger towns.  The others had to stay

22     within the belt so that the security organs could perform their duties

23     properly.

24             And I have to repeat and stress once again, the population living

25     within the border belt where they reside, there was no -- there were no

Page 10907

 1     obstacles to these people moving around.  All they needed was an ID

 2     saying that they were from such and such a village if they were stopped

 3     and asked by anybody.  Whereas anybody else coming from the hinterland

 4     into the border belt had to have extra permission for moving around the

 5     border belt.  That is the substance of this issue.

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Now may we have Defence Exhibit

 8     006-1352.

 9        Q.   And, Colonel, it is document number 10 in your set.  Before the

10     document comes up on our screens, tell me this, please, do you know that

11     the observation mission, observer mission during 1998 and 1999, visited

12     the territory of Kosovo and Metohija, that they were there, and if so

13     what was your relationship with them and how did they, in fact, carry out

14     their work of observation?

15        A.   Yes, I do know about that and our relations were, for the most

16     part, well, there was nothing untoward or improper.  Conditions were good

17     and we didn't have any problems with respect to their stay and work in

18     the border belt.  There weren't any special problems.  And at some

19     meetings, they even raised that question, they said they were satisfied

20     with the treatment and so on.

21        Q.   Thank you.  And what was the regime like?  What did the members

22     and did the members have to do anything when they entered this border

23     belt, and how were they enabled to go about their duty?

24        A.   It was like this:  In the border belt, we had some terrible

25     things happening and we've already mentioned some of them today.  Now,

Page 10908

 1     when it came to the members of the mission, we insisted, the observer

 2     mission, we insisted that they had to request and be given permission to

 3     move around for the border belt, not for just one day, but for five days,

 4     ten day, a month, to have a valid pass and permit to move around the

 5     border belt.  They had to have this permit so that we could provide

 6     security for them in the performance of their duties, and frequently, we

 7     were afraid that -- well, we were afraid that they would be fired at and

 8     have the border units providing security for the state borders accused of

 9     that.  So the sole condition was that they had a permit to move around

10     the area, and if they had anything urgent, they could contact the liaison

11     officer allowing them special permits to move around because they might

12     have to visit some observation tower, 20 or 30 kilometres away and not be

13     able to return.

14             So whenever the possibility existed, we would ask them to

15     announce their intentions 24 hours before they needed to go.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Now let's look at the next document, which is one

17     from the Pristina Corps Command dated the 2nd of March, 1999, and it says

18     there that the representatives of the OSCE expressed their satisfaction

19     with the co-operation they had and the changes in approach to the mission

20     by the organs and units of the Army of Yugoslavia.

21             They pointed out that the problem of access to the border area

22     was resolved and that communication was established between the mission

23     and the liaison officer which guarantees co-operation.  They were told

24     that they could submit a seven-day plan of visits that they would then

25     later have to observe, and that they should announce similar visits 24

Page 10909

 1     hours in advance.  They accepted that, and this will make it possible for

 2     us to prepare and organise ourselves better for access to the border

 3     area.  Could we please have your comment?

 4        A.   I've already given my comment basically.  The essence of this is

 5     to truly make it possible for them to be active in the border area as

 6     stipulated by the international agreement.  So they would submit this

 7     plan to the organ who was their host, as it were, in charge of

 8     co-operation with them, and then they would make it possible for them to

 9     move about so they wouldn't have to make -- wait for this person to come

10     because these people had other things to do as well.  For example, the

11     border area, this person cannot sit in his office all the time.  He can

12     be moving about.  It's a large area after all.  That's the point.

13             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, could it please be

14     tendered.

15             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  It's admitted as Exhibit Number D00577.  Thank

17     you, Your Honours.

18             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Could you please repeat part of your answer.  What was the

20     length -- for the transcript.  What was the length of the border with

21     Albania?

22        A.   No, not with Albania.  The length of the border between Albania

23     and Serbia was 332 kilometres and the area of Kosovo and Metohija from

24     Globocica to the tri-lateral border with Macedonia was 127 kilometres.

25             MR. POPOVIC:  [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could we please have

Page 10910

 1     D006-1355.  It's number 12 in your binder.

 2        Q.   This is the command of the border battalion on the 14th of March.

 3     They are submitting this to the Pristina Corps Command, and it says in

 4     paragraph 5 in the area of Globocica, three members of the OSCE with a

 5     vehicle, et cetera, asked for permission to visit the villages of

 6     Gorance, Globocica, Kotlina, Dragomance, and Straza.  They were granted

 7     permission to visit.  So this is the 14th of March.  After the border

 8     belt was established on the 5th of March, could you please give us your

 9     comment how this functioned?

10        A.   I cannot see that document here.  There is a completely different

11     document under number 10 in my binder but I can say something.

12        Q.   It's 12.

13        A.   Oh, 12, sorry, I was looking at 10.  That's right.  Now, this

14     is -- you were asking me about 8.5, yes.  It's the area of Globocica.

15     It's the border towards Macedonia.  Globocica is actually one of the

16     boarder crossings from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  It was

17     Macedonia.  There were several towards the Macedonian border, but this is

18     the one that is on the extreme west.  There was no impediment for them to

19     work.  We just wanted to take the necessary measures to prevent accidents

20     of any kind or heaven forbid something even worse.  We wouldn't want any

21     representatives of the international community to be killed in the

22     territory of Kosovo and Metohija at that time.

23        Q.   Thank you.

24             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have this admitted

25     into evidence.

Page 10911

 1             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  It's admitted as Exhibit Number D00578.  Thank

 3     you, Your Honours.

 4             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Now I'd like P1339,

 5     please.

 6        Q.   You have it under number 13.  Colonel, this is the collegium of

 7     the Chief of General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia on the 18th of May,

 8     1999 -- 18th of March rather, 1999.  I would like to have page 18 in

 9     English and --

10             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter did not hear the page in B/C/S.

11             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Colonel --

13             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] It is 15 in B/C/S.

14        Q.   Colonel-General Djordje Curcin provides some information here.  I

15     don't want to read it to you.  It's rather long.  At any rate, it is a

16     meeting held at the request of the head of the OSCE delegation, the 15th

17     of March, 1999, and it was held on the premises of the office for

18     liaising with foreign missions, and you were present as well as Colonel

19     Memisevic and representatives of the first administration.  Can you tell

20     us what was discussed and who attending this meeting?

21        A.   Yes, the meeting was held in Belgrade at the request of Mr. Bo

22     Pelmaz I think his name was, if I'm not mistaken.  Bo Pelmaz.  This

23     meeting was convened.  It so happened that I was sent to attend that

24     meeting.  The meeting started and Mr. Bo Pelmaz first asked why the

25     border belt had been expanded and what were the legal regulations that

Page 10912

 1     made it possible to do that.  Also he asked for permission to move about,

 2     or rather, he asked for a document on the basis of which this border belt

 3     was expanded.  And thirdly, he asked us to give us a map with the broader

 4     border belt marked on it.  He asked whether that would have any

 5     repercussions on the work of the organs of the OSCE.  That is to say,

 6     whether their work put would have been affected.

 7             As I was the professional there who was familiar with the

 8     regulations concerned, I responded to his questions saying that the

 9     border belt document was adopted in accordance with the law and that such

10     things were done by all countries in the world.  Also, I told him as for

11     the decision on the expansion of the border belt, I said to him that we

12     would give him the Official Gazette of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

13     as an official document that will specify exactly where the border belt

14     is.  We also told him that he already had a topographic map.  I

15     personally saw that he had it.  He had a map on a scale of 1:50.000, and

16     his officers could then mark the border belt on that map.

17             Also we added that they could still have unhindered access to the

18     border plan but it was just their duty to provide a plan of their visit.

19     I would also like to add one more thing that Mr. Pelmaz said there and

20     then, that they would not honour that decision.  I was surprised.  I

21     didn't know how to react.  I'm an official, and I know that the laws and

22     regulations of a country have to be respected.  Of course, I informed my

23     superiors in Belgrade when I returned about this, and a decision was made

24     that the organs of the MUP and the military organs in charge of the

25     border and representatives of the foreign ministry should convene and

Page 10913

 1     discuss the matter.  In order to avoid any repetition, all of this was

 2     communicated to the foreign ministry, and they took it upon themselves to

 3     inform the appropriate organs in the OSCE about what happened.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Did anything change in relation to the OSCE before

 5     and after the border belt was established on the 5th of March, 1998?

 6        A.   No, on the contrary, the relations remained the same, and their

 7     officials could have unhindered access in the border belt and they could

 8     move about freely unimpeded.  The only condition was that they announce

 9     where they were going and when, but for one sole reason, to make sure

10     that they were provided with the necessary security.

11             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] D006-1267.  Could we please have

12     that document called up now.

13             JUDGE PARKER:  I am afraid, Mr. Popovic, we'll have to stop you

14     there.  I know it's a bit early, but we will continue on Monday.  We must

15     adjourn over the weekend now.  We continue the evidence on Monday.

16                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.42 p.m.

17                           to be reconvened on Monday, the 8th day of

18                           February, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.