Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 11678

 1                           Monday, 22 February 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.

 5                           [The witness entered court]

 6             JUDGE PARKER:  Good morning.  Please read aloud the affirmation

 7     shown to you.

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

 9     speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

10                           WITNESS:  MOMIR STOJANOVIC

11                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

12             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.  Please sit down.  Mr. Djurdjic has

13     some questions for you.

14             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

15                           Examination by Mr. Djurdjic:

16        Q.   Good morning, General.

17        A.   Good morning.

18        Q.   For the transcript, could you please state your first and last

19     name?

20        A.   My name is Momir Stojanovic.  I was born on the

21     12th October, 1958, in Djakovica, the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and

22     Metohija, the Republic of Serbia.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Before we move on, I would kindly ask you the

24     following:  Given that we use the same language, please pause briefly

25     before answering so as to enable the interpreters to interpret everything

Page 11679

 1     and so that we would have a transcript that would reflect accurately our

 2     conversation.

 3             General, in the Milutinovic case, you testified before this

 4     Tribunal, and in the course of your proofing for today's testimony, you

 5     were able to review that transcript.  If asked the same questions today,

 6     would you provide the same answers?

 7        A.   Yes.

 8             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, could we please have

 9     D010-2614, which is the transcript under seal, have admitted into

10     evidence.

11             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received under seal.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00723 under

13     seal.

14             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, D011-2687 is the

15     redacted version of this transcript.  I seek to tender that as well.

16             JUDGE PARKER:  It too will be received.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00724.

18             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I will acquaint you with the

19     summary of this witness's testimony now.

20             The witness was born in 1958 in Djakovica.  Between

21     1998 and 1999, the witness was head of the intelligence service of the

22     Pristina Corps Command.  He will testify about the organisation,

23     competencies, purposes, and tasks of the military intelligence, focusing

24     on the work and competencies of the security department in 1998 and 1999.

25             He will testify about the engagement of military intelligence and

Page 11680

 1     military police units of the Pristina Corps in investigating and criminal

 2     procedures in co-operation what other bodies and services active on the

 3     territory pursuant to instructions, method, and means of operation.

 4             He will also explain their co-operation with other state bodies

 5     and relevant institutions.  He will explain the relationship between the

 6     intelligence sector of the Pristina Corps and the military corps --

 7     police units of the Pristina Corps.  He will testify about the security

 8     section units, as well as the subordinate commands undertook preventative

 9     measures in keeping with the orders of the Pristina Corps Command

10     concerning crimes committed by members of the VJ in the subordinate

11     units, as well as prosecuting civilians who committed criminal offences

12     against the Army of Yugoslavia.

13             He will testify about the number of criminal reports submitted

14     during the war for different types of crime, and that there were -- there

15     was a number of on-site investigations undertaken and under the direction

16     of the intelligence section of the Pristina Corps.  He will speak about

17     the genesis of the terrorist movement in Kosovo with a particular accent

18     on 1998 and 1999, and the refusal of the leadership of the Albanian

19     separatist movement to accept numerous calls of the Government of the FRY

20     in the Republic of Serbia in order to resolve the political -- the

21     conflict in Kosovo by political means.

22             He will also testify about the choice the terrorist forces chose

23     to use violent means to be successful in seceding Kosovo and Metohija

24     from the rest of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia.  The witness will

25     also testify about the knowledge and information that point out to the

Page 11681

 1     links that existed between the terrorist forces and the

 2     Kosovo Verification Mission and the abuse of authority by the

 3     Kosovo Verification Mission as well as co-operation between the KVM and

 4     NATO forces and the Siptar terrorist movement.

 5             He will also explain the causes of migration for the -- of the

 6     population of Kosovo and Metohija in the abuse of civilians by the KLA

 7     and the Albanian separatist movement as a whole.  He will also testify

 8     about the crimes of the KLA committed against Albanians who were loyal to

 9     the FRY and the Republic of Serbia and other non-Albanian population.

10             He will testify about the engagement of the Army of Yugoslavia in

11     protecting human life and property and securing safety of military

12     traffic, maintaining order and discipline in the VJ.  This witness will

13     testify about the superior commands of the General Staff of the VJ and

14     the 3rd Army, carried out inspections and control of the intelligence

15     section of the Pristina Corps.  He will specifically address control

16     carried out in the intelligence section undertaken by a number of

17     personnel from the security administration of the General Staff, in

18     particular, by General Vasiljevic between the 1st and 7th of June, 1999.

19     He will describe the meeting of the 1st of June, 1999, in the Grand Hotel

20     in Pristina.

21        Q.   Sir, General, can you tell us briefly what is it that you do

22     nowadays?

23        A.   I am a retired general of the Army of the FRY.

24        Q.   Briefly tell us, please, what were your most important positions

25     in the VJ up until 1999?

Page 11682

 1        A.   I was at all the positions there are in the military security

 2     service.  That is to say, the chief of security in the regiment, in a

 3     division, in a corps, in the counter-intelligence group.  My position was

 4     also that of director of the military security service of the

 5     Army of Serbia and Montenegro.  I also performed command tasks and duties

 6     of brigade commander as well as Chief of Staff of a corps and

 7     representative of the deputy commander of the land forces of the Army of

 8     Serbia Montenegro.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  In 1998 and 1999 until the end of the war, what was

10     your position?

11        A.   In 1998 and 1999 until the end of the war, I was head of the

12     security section in the command of the Pristina Corps.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us what is the role of military security

14     organs within the command system of the VJ?

15        A.   Military security service organs are professional organs of the

16     competent commands and institutions of the army tasked with

17     counter-intelligence and general security protection provided to the

18     respective units and institutions as well as their commands.

19        Q.   Thank you.  What are the competencies of the military security

20     service?

21        A.   The organs of the military security service in keeping with

22     Article 30 on the Army of the FRY have the rights, duties, and authority

23     accorded to an organ of the Ministry of the Interior but only inside the

24     framework of the Army of the FRY.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us who performed security tasks in the

Page 11683

 1     Pristina Corps in 1998 and 1999, and what was the organisation of the

 2     security organs in the Pristina Corps?

 3        A.   In 1998 and 1999 in the area of Kosovo and Metohija, there were

 4     military security service organs of the Pristina Corps, as well as

 5     military security service organs of the command of the military district

 6     of Pristina, and the security organs of the 14th Counter-intelligence

 7     Group, which was directly subordinated to the security administration of

 8     the General Staff of the Army of the FRY.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Tell us how was the military security section in the

10     Pristina Corps organised?  What was its structure?

11        A.   The structure of the security organs of the Pristina Corps was

12     such that all corps military security organs were under the chief of

13     security of the Pristina Corps.  In each brigade there was a separate

14     person in charge of security, as well as in each independent battalion.

15     Due to the complex security situation, in mid-1998 the security

16     administration of the General Staff of the Army of the FRY strengthened

17     the security organs of the Pristina Corps.  As of that moment, the organs

18     of the military security service existed in all organisational units down

19     to combat groups and border posts of the Army of the FRY.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Could you tell us about the functional structure of

21     the security section of which you were in charge?

22        A.   The functional structure of the security section comprised the

23     counter-intelligence sector and the security sector.  The

24     counter-intelligence sector would monitor, intercept, and disclose any

25     enemy intelligence activity against the commands and institutions

Page 11684

 1     belonging to the FRY army.  Its task was also to prevent any terrorist

 2     activity against the commands, institutions, and units of the army.

 3             The staff security section dealt with things that had to do with

 4     the day-to-day workings of the staff.  They would also propose

 5     pre-emptive command measures in the security field.  They were also in

 6     charge of technical guidance over the military police units of the

 7     Pristina Corps.

 8        Q.   Could you tell us about the manning levels in the Pristina Corps

 9     security bodies in 1998 and 1999 specifically?

10        A.   As I said a while ago, the security bodies of the Pristina Corps

11     in 1998 and 1999 had manning levels well beyond their establishment.

12     There were the schools and military academies of the FRY.  Some of the

13     students saw their education stopped, come to an abrupt halt, because

14     there was a seconded to the security organs of the Pristina corps to help

15     out.

16        Q.   What are the competencies of powers of the military security

17     service vis-à-vis the military police?

18        A.   The military security service is technically in charge of the

19     military police and its work, the technical aspects of the work of the

20     military police.

21        Q.   What about the security sector and the security organs, do they

22     have the right to order the use of military police units?

23        A.   Security officers have no power to order even a single unit that

24     is part of the Army of the FRY, and that includes the military police

25     units.  The unit commander was the only person who had the right to order

Page 11685

 1     the use of these units, the commander of that unit that the military

 2     police units were part of.

 3        Q.   In the Pristina Corps specifically, which military police unit

 4     was that in 1999, and I believe earlier on as well?

 5        A.   Under the establishment and structure of the Pristina Corps, in

 6     1998 and 1999, the units of the Pristina Corps had an A Class battalion,

 7     more specifically, the 52nd Military Police Battalion.  There were two

 8     Military Police Companies as well, the 549 Motorised Brigade, that's

 9     where it was at, and there was a company of the military police in the

10     152nd Motorised Brigade.

11             Under the war establishment, all A Class brigades of the

12     Pristina Corps each had a military police company attached to it.

13     However, in those brigades where there were no such units prior to 1998

14     and 1999, before a state of war was declared, these were simply mobilised

15     so they were now part of those brigades.

16        Q.   In terms of command, who was the superior or the commander of the

17     52nd Battalion military police?

18        A.   In terms of command, and this applied to all the units, the level

19     of a brigade or independent battalion, and this included the

20     52nd Battalion of the military police, the sole right to command these

21     units was held by the corps commander.

22        Q.   Can you tell us about the specific obligations of the security

23     organs of the units of the Pristina Corps vis-à-vis their commanders?

24        A.   The organs of the military security service in terms of

25     establishment are subordinated to the units of which they are a part.  In

Page 11686

 1     a technical sense, the direct superior of the military security service

 2     of the superior command, superior to the unit in which this body or organ

 3     happens to be, is in charge.  The obligations of the military security

 4     service were to gather intelligence, to make appropriate assessments, and

 5     to analyse.  They were also to propose specific measures to unit

 6     commanders, as well as to document any activity undertaken by the enemy,

 7     as well as to take pre-emptive action in order to keep any negativities

 8     from occurring in the unit.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us this:  What were the fundamental

10     tasks of the military security service in 1998 and 1999 when it came

11     specifically to terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija?

12        A.   Discovering, documenting, and intercepting any terrorist activity

13     in and against the commands, units, and institutions, which applied to

14     both peacetime and war time, and remained throughout one of the three

15     fundamental counter-intelligence tasks in terms of protecting the actual

16     units.  Specifically, speaking of 1998 and 1999, the military security

17     service units of the Pristina Corps were particularly busy detecting,

18     documenting, and intercepting any terrorist activity in and against the

19     commands, the units, and the institutions of the Pristina Corps.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Throughout 1998 and 1999, did the military security

21     service deal with the terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija?

22        A.   Yes, due to the apparent danger posed by the terrorists vis-à-vis

23     the commands of our units and institutions, and particularly when it came

24     to our units in the border belt facing the Republic of Albania.  Another

25     reason was obvious terrorist activity by the Albanian terrorists aimed at

Page 11687

 1     the commands, units, and members of the Pristina Corps.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  What about the security sector of the Pristina Corps,

 3     did it have any obligation to report to its superior commands?

 4        A.   A security sector of the Pristina Corps was under an obligation

 5     to continually report both in a vertical and in a horizontal sense.  When

 6     I say vertical reporting, what exactly do I mean?  The security sector

 7     was under an obligation to continually keep reporting to its own direct

 8     superior, the superior's security organ within the hierarchy, which was

 9     the security department of the 3rd Army.

10             Likewise, throughout 1998 and up until the point at which a state

11     of war was declared, the security service of the Pristina Corps Command

12     would send telegrams in addition to the security section of the 3rd Army,

13     also to the security administration of the General Staff of the

14     Army of the FRY.  From the beginning of the NATO aggression, the security

15     service would only report to its direct superior which was the security

16     section of the 3rd Army.

17        Q.   Why was there this discrepancy in terms of this chain of

18     reporting which came about in March 1999?

19        A.   Throughout 1998 when it came to the security situation that

20     prevailed in the Republic of Serbia, if you forget about Kosovo, the

21     situation was relatively peaceful.  The security sector of the

22     Pristina Corps Command had received orders from the security

23     administration of the General Staff of the Army of the FRY, in addition

24     to the security sector of the 3rd Army, to also inform about any of the

25     intelligence that it received, the staff administration of the

Page 11688

 1     3rd Command.  The reason probably being the security administration of

 2     the Supreme Command staff wanted to familiarise itself with the security

 3     situation in Kosovo and Metohija over the shortest time possible.  And we

 4     need to bear in mind the fact that the situation was worsening on a daily

 5     basis.  The security sector of the Pristina Corps, ever since the start

 6     of the NATO aggression, no longer reported to the security administration

 7     of the General Staff of the Army of the FRY, as ordered by the

 8     administration itself.

 9             If you want my opinion, the reasons probably were as follows:

10     Firstly, a state of war had been declared.  Secondly, the entire staff of

11     the Supreme Command was now facing numerous problems as well as the

12     security administration itself, therefore, the security administration

13     tried to take things back to what the regulations actually stated.  It

14     would not be receiving reports directly from the Pristina Corps but,

15     rather, through the security administration of the 3rd Army.

16        Q.   Thank you very much.  In addition to the security sector of the

17     Pristina Corps, were there any other players in the field of military

18     security that were reporting to these superior commands?

19        A.   By all means, in addition to the security sector of the

20     Pristina Corps, as I pointed out earlier, there existed also the security

21     organs of the command of the Pristina military district.  In a technical

22     sense, these were also subordinated to the security sector of the

23     3rd Army.  Again, in a technical sense, they reported to the security

24     sector of the 3rd Army.  Likewise, in Kosovo and Metohija throughout

25     1998 and 1999, there was the 14th Counter-intelligence Group which, both

Page 11689

 1     in a technical sense and in terms of hierarchy, was subordinated to the

 2     security administration of the General Staff of the Army of the FRY

 3     because it was one of its components.  The security organs belonging to

 4     the 14th Counter-intelligence Group were permanently reporting directly

 5     to the security administration General Staff of the Army of the FRY.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  How exactly does one report to a superior command?

 7        A.   There are several regulations that are in force describing the

 8     procedure for this.  When it comes to horizontal reporting by a command

 9     organ, this comprises briefing at collegium meetings attended by

10     commanders of the relevant units.  If there is a situation that poses a

11     direct threat to that unit, in that case, the security organs would

12     report to the unit commanders or inform the unit commanders by an

13     Official Note.

14             When it came to vertical reporting, the organs of the military

15     security service, throughout 1998 and in the first half of 1999 up until

16     the cessation of combat activities in Kosovo, every day would send a

17     telegram to the security administration of the General Staff, up until

18     the end of March that is, of the Army of the FRY.  And they continually

19     reported to the security sector of the 3rd Army.

20             Later on what was conveyed in these telegrams would have to be

21     backed by other documents specified by the regulations governing the work

22     of the military security service.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Could you acquaint us with the structure of those

24     reports of the security section sent to superior commands?

25        A.   As I've already mentioned, the security section of the

Page 11690

 1     Pristina Corps Command would daily, by telegram, inform their immediate

 2     superiors in terms of the security hierarchy.  Such telegrams contained

 3     three units, so to speak.  The first one had to do with the security

 4     situation at state borders.  The second had to do with the security

 5     situation in the territory.  And the third concerned itself with the

 6     security situation in the units, commands, and institutions of the corps.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  When did you start working on security matters in

 8     Kosovo and Metohija?

 9        A.   Professionally speaking, I started working on the security

10     situation in Kosovo and Metohija in 1990.  And it went on until I -- for

11     as long as I worked in the military security service of the

12     Army of Yugoslavia in 1999.

13        Q.   Can you tell us what were the key factors influencing the change

14     for the worst in terms of the security situation in Kosovo and Metohija?

15        A.   Many events which took place in Kosovo and Metohija in the recent

16     or more distant past have their cause and effect.  They did not come

17     about as a result of political antagonism and changes in society, but

18     they were, rather, an expression of a century long wish of Albanian

19     separatists to see Kosovo and Metohija depart from the FRY and Serbia and

20     to have it annexed to the greater Albanian state that was supposed to be

21     created in the Balkans.  I will refer to a number of key events which had

22     a direct impact on the worsening of the security situation in

23     Kosovo and Metohija.

24             In 1982, in Germany, several militant political Albanian parties

25     united, such as the Kosovo Party for the Socialist Republic of Kosovo in

Page 11691

 1     the FRY, then the Communist Marxist Leninist Party of Kosovo, as well as

 2     the People's Red Front.  By uniting these illegal extremist Albanian

 3     parties, the national movement for the Republic of Kosovo was created.

 4     In the ore of their political activity was their wish to see

 5     Kosovo and Metohija become a republic of the Yugoslav Federation.

 6     Between 1982 and 1990, there were several isolated incidents in terms of

 7     terrorist activity in Kosovo carried out by small terrorist groups which,

 8     in hierarchical terms, did not share any links between each other.

 9             Another reason for the worsening of the security situation in

10     Kosovo happened on the 2nd of July, 1990.  Albanian separatists in

11     Kacanik illegally proclaimed the Republic of Kosovo and elected its

12     government headed by Bujar Bukosi.  That government was active and

13     working in Germany.  Its task was to provide financial and logistical

14     support for the project that was supposed to be implemented later on in

15     1998 and 1999.  When the illegal assembly of the Republic of Kosovo was

16     elected, it was decided that military and police forces need to be

17     established.  It was their belief that they needed 42.000 armed people in

18     Kosovo to achieve their desired goal.  During that session, the basic

19     outline of the army structure was drawn up with operational zones which

20     coincided with the operative zones from 1988 --

21             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction:  1998.

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- during which time there were

23     extensive activities by the KLA.  Security organs of the FRY managed to

24     arrest 14 people belonging to the so-called Ministry of Defence of the

25     illegal Republic of Kosovo.  In their statements, they acknowledged the

Page 11692

 1     change of the national movement for the Republic of Kosovo and that they

 2     were as of that moment being called the movement for independent Kosovo.

 3     This marked a political change in their agenda.  Kosovo was no longer

 4     supposed to be a separate republic in the SFRY but their new goal was to

 5     see Kosovo completely secede.

 6             Next key moment is in 1994 when the national movement for Kosovo

 7     made certain steps to meet the conditions necessary for what was to come

 8     about in 1998.  They drew up a document called the strategics and tactics

 9     of the liberation war.  In two volumes they worked out in detail their

10     guerilla tactic that were -- that was supposed to be put in place in

11     1998.  One could hear of the KLA for the first time in December 1994.  A

12     communiqué was issued to a number of people in Pristina by which they

13     informed the public in Kosovo that they were behind the assassination of

14     Lutvi Ajvazi, who was a retired member of the security forces.  They also

15     acknowledged that there were other terrorist acts in Kosovo committed by

16     their members.

17             Their first public appearance, so to say, was marked in 1995 at

18     the funeral of Halit Becaj, a killed terrorist in the village of Laus.

19     As of that moment onwards, the KLA became a part of reality in Kosovo and

20     Metohija.

21             I wanted to stress in particular the next key moment.  After the

22     crisis in Albanian in 1996 because of the savings scheme which collapsed,

23     basically all state institutions caved in, including their army and the

24     police.  During that period, basically all weapons depots in Albania were

25     broken into and weapons and equipment of the Albanian army were taken by

Page 11693

 1     bandits in the north of Albania.  There is official data compiled by the

 2     UN on the number of weapons and assets stolen.  By end 1997 and early

 3     1998, those weapons found their way across the border into

 4     Kosovo and Metohija illegally.

 5             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Page 15, line 3, that seems to be

 6     all right in the transcript now.  Thank you.

 7        Q.   General, can you tell us something about the security situation

 8     in Kosovo and Metohija in early 1998?

 9        A.   The key moments which were the cause of the worsening situation

10     in Kosovo-Metohija that year were actually two events.  First, in

11     February 1998, a terrorist group led by Adem Jashari that was active in

12     the area of Drenica and it focused its activities on the villages of

13     Donja and Gornja Prekaze, carried out -- before I go to that, in addition

14     to that terrorist group, there was also a terrorist group in Jablanica in

15     Metohija.  Those two terrorists groups, throughout 1997, were the best

16     known for their brutality and intensity of terrorist activities in Kosovo

17     and Metohija.

18             The terrorist group commanded by Jashari in February in Likosane

19     from ambush attacked a vehicle of the minister of the interior of Serbia,

20     on which occasion they killed four policemen and wounded two.  In the

21     ensuing clash during that night due to poor visibility and general chaos,

22     the attack was repelled.  And then by subsequent MUP activity,

23     Adem Jasari's house was surrounded in Prekaze.  He was liquidated on that

24     occasion.  The liquidation of Adem Jashari is very important because the

25     Albanian separatists chose to use solely forceful means to achieve their

Page 11694

 1     proclaimed goals.

 2             The other event that worsened the situation in 1998 took place in

 3     early March.  The Main Staff of the so-called KLA with its seat in

 4     Switzerland transferred parts of its staff to the north of Albania.  Some

 5     staff members were also brought over the border into Kosovo and Metohija.

 6     Those members were Hashim Thaqi, Ramush Haradinaj, and Kadri Veseli.  The

 7     task of that part of the main staff of the KLA was to organise and unite

 8     the several terrorist groups in Kosovo and to introduce hierarchy and

 9     subordination among them, as well as to set the conditions needed to

10     carry out an armed rebellion of Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija.

11        Q.   Thank you.  What was done by the command of the Pristina Corps in

12     such a security situation in early 1998?

13        A.   Believing that the overall security situation in Kosovo is

14     growing more complex, the command of the Pristina Corps in March 1998

15     issued a decision to use several combat groups which were supposed to

16     leave the barracks in order to provide assistance to the border

17     authorities in order to prevent any further incursions of terrorists from

18     Albania.  Whereas parts of those groups were also supposed to be deployed

19     to different roads between Kosovo -- inside Kosovo and Metohija, so as to

20     prevent any danger to logistics and supplies being brought to the various

21     units of the FRY that were in Kosovo and Metohija.

22        Q.   Thank you.

23             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have D006-3159.

24     Your Honours, could we please provide the witness with a hard copy of

25     this and other documents so that it would be easier for him to read and

Page 11695

 1     this may speed things up.

 2             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

 3             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] This is a 65 ter Defence

 4     document 118.

 5        Q.   It's the first document in your binder.  The date is the

 6     18th of April, 1998.  It's a document of the 3rd Army Command.

 7             Witness, do you recognise this document?

 8        A.   Yes.  This is a telegram of the 3rd Army Command.  It was

 9     dispatched to the 14th Counter-intelligence Group of the Pristina Corps.

10        Q.   You actually received this, didn't you?

11        A.   Yes.

12        Q.   I'm looking at paragraph 2.  Can you comment on the, or, rather,

13     bullet point number 2, item number 2, can you comment on the first

14     paragraph?

15        A.   You see that this is a telegram from April 1998.  And the second

16     paragraph identifies the organisers of the import of illegal weapons from

17     Albania into Kosovo.  It also talks about the role of the Haradinaj

18     family in the village of Glodjane.  The information applies to both 1998

19     and 1999 throughout.  Glodjane was sort of a halfway station in this

20     whole business of bringing illegal weapons from Albania into Kosovo and

21     Metohija, and from Glodjane these weapons were transported to other

22     terrorist strong holds across Kosovo and Metohija.

23        Q.   And what about the second to last and last paragraphs of this

24     telegram?

25        A.   The second to last paragraph talks about information that the

Page 11696

 1     security organs received on a number of different occasions.  It talks

 2     about the village of Jablanica which was the second most important

 3     terrorist strong hold in Djakovica municipality.  It tells us there was a

 4     group of 180 Albanian citizens there training the local population.  This

 5     all tells us what would be happening later on and escalating in May and

 6     June 1998.

 7        Q.   What about page 1, could you please comment on paragraph 3 where

 8     it says that some terrorists were being illegally infiltrated from other

 9     places abroad such as Turkey?

10        A.   We had reliable information indicating that among the so-called

11     Kosovo liberation army ranks throughout 1998 and 1999, there were certain

12     mercenaries, as well, fighting from the countries of the Arab world.  I

13     will be talking about other documents which you will probably be using,

14     but here it says that three Arabs and two Muslims from the Kostris region

15     were illegally infiltrated to Kosovo and Metohija.

16             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.  Can we

17     please have this document exhibited?

18             JUDGE PARKER:  Ms. Petersen.

19             MS. PETERSEN:  I just wanted to point out in the English version

20     the date is different.  It says 1996.  So I just wanted to maybe have

21     clarification on that.

22             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes, I've noticed that.  The original appears to

23     be 1998 when it's examined more closely, and the contents seem to suggest

24     1998 rather than 1996, including the date in the third paragraph, which

25     is a 1998 date.  So I think we can take it as a 1998 document, wrongly

Page 11697

 1     translated as 1996 in the English version.

 2             It will be received.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00725.

 4             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I would like to thank my learned

 5     friend and the Chamber too.

 6             Could we please have D008-3706.  65 ter Defence document 573.

 7        Q.   This is tab 1 in your binder, Mr. Stojanovic.  I would like to

 8     know about this position that is being put forward here.  We are talking

 9     about the security section of the Pristina Corps telegram dated the

10     31st of May, 1999 -- 1998.  I want to know your opinion about paragraph 2

11     of this telegram.

12        A.   Paragraph 2 talks about information indicating that the

13     terrorists were fortifying their positions in some of their villages that

14     were ethnically pure Albanian villages.  They were moving women and

15     children out of these villages and taking them further into their

16     territory.  This was the kind of information received on a daily basis.

17     These terrorists were continually manipulating the population and moving

18     them about all the time, the purported objective being to better prepare

19     for their defence.

20        Q.   If you could please just comment on this:  We have

21     Colonel Djindjic who apparently signed the document.  Do you have

22     anything to say about that?

23        A.   Throughout 1998, he was seconded to the security sector of the

24     Pristina Corps as were other high-ranking officers from the security

25     department of the 3rd Army.  In this specific case, the telegram was

Page 11698

 1     signed by Colonel Slobodan Djindjic who was the deputy chief of the

 2     security section of the 3rd Army.  At this point in time, he was seconded

 3     to this unit.  In nine out of ten cases I, as chief, would sign these

 4     documents.  But he was my direct superior, and I was probably elsewhere

 5     at this point in time, so we see that he was the officer who signed this

 6     particular document.

 7        Q.   Thank you.

 8             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May we please have this document

 9     Exhibited.  Thank you.

10             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00726.

12             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] D006-3252.  65 ter Defence

13     document 132.

14        Q.   Tab 2 for you, General.  This is a telegram of the security

15     sector of the Pristina Corps dated the 10th of June, 1998.  Could you

16     please first of all comment on paragraph 5?

17        A.   This is another telegram dealing with intelligence that was

18     indicated in the previous one, the terrorists were moving the women,

19     children, and the elderly out of the villages in the Djakovica

20     municipality leaving only terrorists behind who were preparing for armed

21     actions.  Furthermore, this telegram shows that a secret KLA military

22     police was set up in Djakovica, and they were mobilising people.  The

23     reference here is to groups of men who the terrorists leaders in civilian

24     clothes were sending about town and they were trying to persuade all

25     Albanians to join the terrorists staffs of the KLA.  And if I may,

Page 11699

 1     towards the end of this telegram, there is information indicating that

 2     for one particular battalion of the 549 Brigade, five Albanian soldiers

 3     fled who had previously received a transfer from Valjevo.

 4             Generally speaking, before and during 1998 and 1999, units of the

 5     Pristina Corps were being reinforced by soldiers from training centres

 6     across Serbia.

 7        Q.   Thank you very much.

 8             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May this please be received.

 9             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00727.

11             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have D006-3255,

12     Defence document 133.

13        Q.   This is a telegram of the security sector of the Pristina Corps

14     dated 12th of June, 1998.  Could you please comment on paragraph 3,

15     page 1?

16        A.   Indeed.  I'm looking at Article 3 of the document before us, it

17     tells us that the people of Korenica village in Djakovica municipality

18     were prepared to request protection from the VJ.  They got in touch with

19     the security organs of the Pristina Corps precisely for that purpose.  We

20     conveyed to them our position and said that the condition for their

21     protection, which we would be providing, was them not joining any KLA

22     terrorists units and then handing over their weapons.

23             I know that the action came to nothing.  We are talking about

24     June and July 1998 when several Albanian villages throughout

25     Kosovo and Metohija publicly expressed a desire to issue a guarantee to

Page 11700

 1     the Pristina Corps that they would not be joining any units of the KLA.

 2     However, they requested protection from the VJ.  They wanted the VJ to

 3     protect them and to protect them from any abuse by the terrorists who

 4     sometimes came to those villages.  There were cases like that occurring,

 5     and there were several villages across Kosovo and Metohija that

 6     negotiated with VJ in order to hand over their weapons of their own free

 7     will.  Nevertheless, the terrorists brutally punished some of those

 8     people involved in those negotiations.

 9             You might say that the initiative was nipped in the bud by the

10     actions of the KLA.  Had this got off the ground, this initiative, I'm

11     quite certain that violence in Kosovo and Metohija would never have

12     escalated to begin with.

13             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.  May this

14     please be received.

15             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00728.

17             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Defence document D006-3260.

18        Q.   Tab 4 in your binder, Mr. Stojanovic.  Defence document 134.

19     What we are looking at is a telegram by the security sector of the

20     Pristina Corps, and the date is the 13th of June, 1998.

21             Sir, could you please comment on paragraph 5.  This is page 2 in

22     the English version.  It says the villages around Prizren.

23        A.   I do apologise, I don't have that.

24        Q.   This is tab 4; have you got that?  It reads, the paragraph starts

25     like this:

Page 11701

 1             "Such intelligence as is available indicates ..."

 2             And then it goes on to say villages around Prizren.  Can you see

 3     that?

 4        A.   Yes, yes.  The document talks about the fact that in the villages

 5     around Prizren, the terrorists were seising all-terrain vehicles from the

 6     local population in order to transport their own men.  And then in the

 7     villages of Gjakove municipality, they were looting houses that had been

 8     abandoned.  If I may just add this, we are talking about May and June,

 9     that's the time-frame, the time when the terrorists declared a

10     mobilisation of all able-bodied young men who would then be joining the

11     units of the KLA.  At that point time, the Pristina Corps recorded many

12     cases of torture and inhumane treatment of Albanians who chose to remain

13     loyal to the authorities in cases where these Albanians were refusing to

14     join the terrorist units of the KLA.  So these terrorists were seising,

15     by force, all-terrain vehicles from the locals.  They would break into

16     their homes to tell them that the least they had to do was provide a

17     weapon, a rifle for their purposes, and their family members should be

18     joining the KLA and their units.  So this document talks about precisely

19     that period of time and what was going on.

20        Q.   Thank you very much.  Let's move down the page, a single

21     paragraph down the page, where it talks about the 12th of June.  That one

22     and the last paragraph on this page, please.

23        A.   I understand.  The last paragraph talks about information

24     covering the attacks being carried out by the Albanian terrorists against

25     Serb enclaves in Kosovo and Metohija, the small ones actually, and those

Page 11702

 1     with a mixed population, both Serb and Albanian.  There was a lot of

 2     information indicating that there was a gradual ethnic cleansing effort

 3     of that particular area and primarily of central Kosovo.  The last

 4     paragraph of this document tells us specifically about the village of

 5     Rudnik, continually under the sniper fire of the terrorists, where the

 6     house of recently murdered Blagoje Jovanovic from Leocine was set on

 7     fire.  During that night, another 11 Serbian houses had been set ablaze.

 8     And the fate of four people from that village is unknown.

 9             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  May the document

10     please be received.

11             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, that will be Exhibit D00729.

13             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have D011-3437.

14     It is document 1806 of the Defence.  By your leave, Your Honour, I would

15     like to add this document on our 65 ter list.  It is an information note

16     concerning an event in the Radanovic border post area.

17             JUDGE PARKER:  Have you had time to consider this, Ms. Petersen?

18             MS. PETERSEN:  I don't have an objection, Your Honour.

19             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be added, Mr. Djurdjic.

20             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

21             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] The number of the document is

22     D011-3347.

23        Q.   General, can you you comment on this document briefly?

24        A.   This information note deals with a border incident in the area of

25     the Radanovic border post dated the 15th of June, 1998.  On that

Page 11703

 1     occasion, an illegal entry was prevented of a large group of Albanian

 2     terrorists from Albania.  Among the documents and personal IDs found on

 3     the liquidated terrorists, there were also documents found belonging to a

 4     Norwegian journalist by the name of Pal Refsdal, born 9 September 1963 in

 5     Kongsvinger, as well as a camera.

 6             This indicated that not only terrorists were using illegal

 7     channels to enter Kosovo, but also foreign nationals, journalists, as

 8     well as workers of international humanitarian organisations according to

 9     our information.  This was very difficult to comprehend, having in mind

10     that any journalist could have asked for official accreditation, which

11     could be obtained by -- from Serbian organs in order for them to legally

12     spend periods of time in Kosovo.

13        Q.   Thank you.  According to the information you have from that time

14     concerning journalists and members of humanitarian organisations as well

15     as various NGOs, did you have any information on their subversive

16     activities directed against the FRY and the Republic of Serbia and

17     Kosovo and Metohija in addition to their illegal entries in co-operation

18     with separatist organisations and the KLA?

19        A.   Yes, in our military security service documents, there is a lot

20     of information about such employees of international humanitarian

21     organisations and journalists.  This information concerns their

22     objectivity in work and reporting.  They were quite inclined towards the

23     KLA, and we also have certain information about their activities in the

24     General Staff or the Main Staff of the KLA during that year.

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 11704

 1             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document

 2     into evidence.

 3             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00730.

 5             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we next have D006-3263.  It

 6     is number 135 of the Defence.

 7        Q.   Your tab 6, General.  This will be a telegram of the security

 8     section of the Pristina Corps dated the 16th of June, 1998.  Please

 9     comment on the first paragraph of this telegram.

10        A.   In the first paragraph of this telegram which is related to the

11     first one, we have the following information:  That there was information

12     that the MUP had about the action in the Koranovic [phoen] border post

13     area.  This information indicated that a Norwegian journalist was

14     wounded.  His name is Refsdal Pal who is undergoing medical treatment in

15     the illegal Siptar hospital in the territory of Prizren.

16        Q.   Thank you.

17             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we go to page 2 in the

18     English.

19        Q.   Could you comment please on the penultimate paragraph of this

20     document?

21        A.   In that paragraph, it is stated that there was an exchange of

22     information with the Prizren SUP about armed terrorists who have appeared

23     in the area of Sopot village and that they have pressured locals - and I

24     need to mention here that it was an ethnically pure village - they

25     pressured locals into leaving the village.  And the Djakovica SUP has

Page 11705

 1     information that terrorists are planning to set ambushes in the very area

 2     where the 52nd Military Police Battalion is deployed.

 3             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, I seek to tender this

 4     document.

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00731.

 7             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Next could we please have

 8     D006-3155.  It is Defence number 117.

 9        Q.   And your tab 7, General.  It's another telegram of the security

10     section of the Pristina Corps dated the 23rd [as interpreted] of June,

11     1998.  At the bottom of your page 1 - which in English should be page 2 -

12     the one before last paragraph, please comment.  It begins with the words

13     "using electronic surveillance."

14        A.   The last paragraph of the first page states certain information

15     about something we have already referred to, that is, the five Muslim

16     soldiers who fled their unit after being relocated to Kosovo from

17     Valjevo.  By using electronic surveillance, we learned that those

18     soldiers were in the terrorist stronghold in the village of Drenovac,

19     Orahovac municipality.  They made some phone calls to their relatives in

20     which they were trying to talk their relatives into relocating to the

21     Republic of Albania.  Also, instruction was given to them to tell the

22     authorities there that the Army of Yugoslavia had forced them to kill

23     innocent civilians.  This was in order to claim political asylum.  This

24     was yet another propaganda activity of which there were many in 1998.

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 11706

 1             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I don't know whether

 2     we have the right date for this document.  It is the 28th of June, 1998.

 3     I apologise if I misspoke.  I seek to tender this document into evidence.

 4             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00732.

 6             JUDGE PARKER:  Is that a convenient time, Mr. Djurdjic?

 7             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] You are quite right, Your Honour,

 8     as always.

 9             JUDGE PARKER:  We will have the first break now, and we resume in

10     half an hour.  A Court Officer will assist you during the break.

11                           [The witness stands down]

12                           --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.

13                           --- On resuming at 11.03 a.m.

14                           [The witness takes the stand]

15             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Djurdjic.

16             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

17        Q.   General, were you informed in early July about the situation in

18     Metohija, especially in the municipality of Orahovac?  Did you have any

19     knowledge about that?

20        A.   Yes.  In several zones in the area of Kosovo and Metohija, the

21     overall security situation was quite grave.  One of such areas was the

22     general area of Malisevo and Orahovac.  During 1998 and especially in the

23     first part of that year, Orahovac as a town was completely surrounded by

24     Albanian terrorists and there was this constant danger that the town will

25     remain completely blocked by the Albanian terrorists.

Page 11707

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have D006-2501.

 3        Q.   It is your tab 8, General.  Defence number 106.  This document is

 4     dated the 8th of July, 1998, by the speaker of the Municipal Assembly of

 5     Orahovac, Mr. Andjel Kolasinac.  Did you know that this letter was sent

 6     and were you familiar with its contents in 1998?

 7        A.   No.

 8        Q.   Thank you.

 9             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have D008-3730.

10        Q.   This is a telegram of the security section of the Pristina Corps

11     dated the 17 July 1998.  Please comment paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 5 on this

12     page.

13        A.   In this telegram there is information about an event which took

14     place on the 16th of July, 1998, when our border authorities in the area

15     of Kosare prevented an attempt of illegal entry by a group of civilians

16     and armed terrorists from Kosovo to Albania.  What is particularly

17     noteworthy is that among those arrested on that occasion, there was a

18     foreign national, Sally Becker, born 29 March 1960.  She introduced

19     herself to the police as a person belonging to a humanitarian

20     organisation.  She had a Motorola, a two-way hand-held radio, on her and

21     according to her statement, she was in contact with representatives of

22     the humanitarian organisations present in the north of Albania.  She also

23     admitted to having spent some time in terrorist headquarters in the

24     villages of Junik, Nivokaz, Dobros, and Smonica.  She also had a piece of

25     paper we are the names of Naim Maljoku and Lum Haxhiu who were well-known

Page 11708

 1     commanders of the terrorist headquarters.  In addition to representatives

 2     of the media in 1998, there were illegal crossings between Albania and

 3     Kosovo by members of international humanitarian organisations.  Although,

 4     according to my information at the time, there was no prohibition for any

 5     international humanitarian organisation staff which would limit them to

 6     enter Kosovo and Metohija, provided they had legal permission by our

 7     authorities.

 8             The way they tried to enter Kosovo territory raises certain

 9     doubts as to their intentions.

10        Q.   Thank you.

11             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Page 2 in the English.

12        Q.   It is the bottom of page 1 in your version, please comment on it.

13        A.   In one of the paragraphs of this document it is stated that on

14     the 17th of July, Albanian terrorists attacked a Serb village called

15     Zociste, exclusively populated by Serbs in the municipality of Orahovac.

16     At the moment when this report was written, one could hear shots from

17     Orahovac itself according to the report.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Please turn to your page 2 towards the middle,

19     application of electronic surveillance measures.  It is the last

20     paragraph in English.  Please comment.

21        A.   Here it is stated that by the application of electronic

22     reconnaissance measures, information was received that in Bajram Curi, a

23     town in the north of Albania, there were two known terrorists who are

24     planning to cross the state border and introduce 100.000 Swiss francs

25     into Kosovo as well as 11 radio sets, uniforms, medicine, and equipment

Page 11709

 1     for the terrorists and the territory of Stimlje municipality.

 2        Q.   Thank you.

 3             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have the next page

 4     in the English version, which is also your page 3, Witness.

 5        Q.   Please comment.  In the English, it is the last paragraph of

 6     page 3, and in your version it is the third from the top, "the latest

 7     information," it says.

 8        A.   Yes, we received this information as an exchange of information

 9     procedure with the security service in Kosovo and Metohija.  It is

10     indicated that medical supply for the use of terrorists in the so-called

11     Baranski Lug which is between the municipalities of Decani and Djakovica,

12     that said supplies are being transported by vehicles using -- the

13     vehicles belonging to the Medecines Sans Frontieres and the ICRC through

14     Grabovica where they were taken over by members of the terrorist forces.

15             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, I seek to tender this

16     document into evidence.

17             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Djurdjic, what has this document to do with

18     the case we are trying?  Now, this is part of a bigger question, that is,

19     the amount of time that is being spent on matters that aren't central to

20     our case.  Could you assist us with what you see is important about this

21     document in the case we are trying, which is an indictment concerning

22     events commencing some nine months after any of this.

23             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the year of 1998 is a

24     period that has to do with knowledge of what happened and how things came

25     about.  Much of the OTP case was about that.  We, the Defence, are now

Page 11710

 1     trying to show how the reporting was done in Kosovo and Metohija starting

 2     back in 1998.  There are some important elements there.  For example,

 3     regarding the way the security forces worked and the disproportion use of

 4     force; how the rural republic public was being made aware of going on in

 5     Kosovo; and then later the Kosovo Verification Mission, how it went about

 6     its work, what it had to do with the Kosovo Liberation Army, and how it

 7     misused its mandate, all of which, I believe, is evidence that must be

 8     evaluated by the Trial Chamber in this case.

 9             We also have to look at the media, how the media worked.  We have

10     to look at how civilians were misused in 1998 and 1999.  Who was in

11     charge of that and how exactly was this done?  I believe this constitutes

12     knowledge that is relevant in this case in terms of evaluating evidence

13     that we have seen so far and evidence that is still to be produced in

14     this trial.

15             We have had a long sequence of exhibits in relation to this

16     period, the five-stage plan, and everything that when on later on before

17     reaching October and the arrival of the Kosovo Verification Mission.

18     These same persons then testified about what they did later on in Albania

19     and Macedonia and were offering up witnesses who would be making

20     statements to the ICTY.  I do believe that this is highly significant in

21     terms of actually judging the evidence in this case.

22             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. --

23             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I do apologise, there is another

24     thing.  Most of these documents were used previously in the Milutinovic

25     case, some of these documents.  And some, especially those in relation to

Page 11711

 1     later on, are documents that are being used for the very first time in

 2     this trial.

 3             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Djurdjic, we are not persuaded by what you

 4     say, that the material you are presently canvassing is important in our

 5     case.  We have received, and are prepared to receive from you, a limited

 6     amount of general background information.  We have certainly been

 7     prepared and will need to look more closely at what is being advanced

 8     concerning the activities of the Kosovo Verification Mission, but those

 9     activities did not start until much later in 1998 and our primary

10     interest will be in 1999.

11             Now, what you are dealing with here are documents which are

12     painting a picture about events that are of no interest in the trial we

13     have to deal with at all.  You have spent some minutes dealing with this

14     last interest that some medical supplies were being brought in to a dig.

15     That is just completely irrelevant to anything we have to deal with.

16             What we are becoming very concerned about is the perception of

17     the Defence as to its case is losing sight of the indictment in this

18     case.  This Chamber is not going to try the rights and wrongs of the

19     battle that seems to have been fought over a year and a half or so

20     between the Kosovo Liberation Army, as it came to be known, and the

21     forces of the Government of Serbia.  We are going to be focusing on those

22     events which are in the indictment.

23             Now, we will not confine you to giving evidence only about the

24     period of the indictment, but every time you are dealing with matters

25     9 or 12 months earlier, which this witness has done now for over an hour

Page 11712

 1     and a half, you need to ask the question, how is this important to the

 2     Defence case?  And the Chamber, for its part, is not persuaded that the

 3     importance of what you have dealt with is of such significance in this

 4     case that it can't have learnt all about these matters from the

 5     transcript in the Milutinovic case which is already an exhibit.  You have

 6     spent an hour and a half dealing with detail which is all canvassed in a

 7     much shorter time in the Milutinovic case.

 8             Now, what I'm saying is not to stop you dealing with these

 9     matters at all, but it is to put to you that you are giving to them an

10     importance and an emphasis and you are spending time way beyond their

11     possible relevance in our case.

12             Now, if you would, as you look at your case from now on, try and

13     be more clear as to whether a particular document or a particular event

14     is going to advance your case in answer to this indictment, and if you'll

15     answer to yourself, Well, it's part of the background picture; then ask

16     yourself very carefully, is it adequately dealt with in the transcript

17     already?  And if it is, there's no need to repeat it.  If it is not,

18     there might be something more that you need to deal with, deal with that,

19     but don't go over the whole story again.

20             Thank you very much.

21             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

22             May this document please be received, the last one that the

23     witness commented on.

24                           [Trial Chamber confers]

25             JUDGE PARKER:  The Chamber does not see that it is sufficiently

Page 11713

 1     relevant, Mr. Djurdjic.

 2             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I do apologise, Your Honour, this

 3     is a document from the Milutinovic trial.  It was exhibited there.  I was

 4     merely trying to point out a number of matters that didn't have anything

 5     to do with what preceded it.

 6             JUDGE PARKER:  You realise, Mr. Djurdjic, we are not trying the

 7     accused that are on trial in the Milutinovic case; we are trying

 8     Mr. Djordjevic.  And it is an indictment focused on his conduct and

 9     focused on his conduct over a period of time which is over nine months

10     later than this document.  There may be, in the events of this period in

11     1998, a general picture that you want to paint for us and which it will

12     be important for us to understand, but this document that you are

13     offering doesn't tell us anything of relevance to the indictment against

14     Mr. Djordjevic.  So just because it was used in the Milutinovic trial,

15     doesn't mean that it's going to help us try the case against your client.

16     It might have had some relevance to some of the other accused in that

17     case.  We don't see it as having a sufficient relevance in this case to

18     assist us.

19             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour, but I

20     would like to receive further instructions from you.  We had Mr. Crosland

21     here who testified to this time-period and the period that preceded this

22     period, fields being set on fire, internal displacement, disproportionate

23     use of force; the whole period up to the 28th of March.  One of the

24     witnesses, who I believe is relevant in terms of what the Prosecution put

25     forward, in 1998 and those periods of time, one of the sources of

Page 11714

 1     information to counter Mr. Crosland's evidence, and provide the Chamber

 2     with a different perspective, this is the witness we are dealing with

 3     today, and we are not just talking about how KDOM continued to work.

 4     They came before the Kosovo Verification Mission, but a lot of other

 5     evidence about internally displaced people, about the disproportionate

 6     use of force in 1998, and so on and so forth.  We have seen the evidence

 7     of the OTP, and now we are trying to counter their evidence by our own

 8     evidence.  That's what we are trying to achieve.  Had we not spoken so

 9     much about 1998 in the Prosecution case, then I hardly think we would be

10     giving it so much attention in our own case, had we only stuck to 1999 to

11     begin with.  But we have the Human Rights Watch, Witness Abrahams who

12     testified about what went on in Albania from 1996 onwards; I can't

13     remember each and every one ever the OTP's witnesses, but they testified

14     to these circumstances.  And then particularly the international media,

15     how they covered the situation, international humanitarian organisations,

16     plenty of documents have been admitted in various ways showing us how

17     they worked, the representers of these international humanitarian

18     organisations.  That is the reason that we -- well, I don't know, how are

19     we could counter such evidence produced by the OTP unless we reflects on

20     1998 as well?  We lost a lot of time during the OTP's case discussing

21     1998.  I do feel I have to point that out.

22             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Djurdjic, you are misunderstanding the thrust

23     of our comments.  We are not saying that there is no relevance to your

24     case of events in 1998.  Very early in this trial the view was urged on

25     us by both counsel, that is Prosecution and Defence, that the events in

Page 11715

 1     1999 could not be viewed in isolation and we had to be aware of the

 2     events particularly in 1998 that had led to the time in the indictment.

 3             For that reason, out of respect for the views urged on us by

 4     counsel, we have heard evidence both from the Prosecution and from the

 5     Defence about the period in 1998 and even earlier.  We have done so,

 6     though, if you look at it, in a general overall perspective.  We have not

 7     gone into a detailed history of what may have been the struggle or events

 8     in 1998 at all.  We have been looking at the general picture.

 9             Our constant call both to the Prosecution and to the Defence has

10     been to concentrate on the period of the indictment, and to be not misled

11     by the possible relevance of the general picture into thinking that we

12     are going to be determining the guilt or innocence of your client by

13     trying all the events that occurred a year, or more even, earlier than

14     the events with which he is charged.

15             Now, this particular document to us is reaching down to trying to

16     look at detailed events over nine months before the indictment period.

17     The fact that a group of civilians came across a border, the fact that

18     among them was one woman who claimed to be a member of an humanitarian

19     organisation, the fact that there may have been a member of the

20     international media crossing a border without normal customary

21     formalities, the fact that an international organisation or two may have

22     been providing medical supplies to a dig, how are any of those matters

23     going to help us determine the guilt or innocence of your client as

24     charged in this indictment?

25             The thing that comes nearest to anything of relevance in this

Page 11716

 1     document is that there was an attack on the village of Zociste, I'm not

 2     sure of the pronunciation.  A Serb village.  That's the nearest to

 3     anything of relevance in this case.  And the point is that without the

 4     document we've heard about that attack, what this witness knows about it.

 5     So we ask again, how is this document going to help us?

 6             I've stopped you here because it's just clearly that you are

 7     going to be going through every document this witness might talk about,

 8     about events in 1998, and the point we are making is that some or many of

 9     those documents are not going to help us at all.  This witness, no doubt,

10     will be able to tell us some matters that are of some relevance to us.

11     We want to hear those.  But we don't want to canvass the whole history of

12     1998 as this witness knows it, because it's just going too far into

13     matters of little or no relevance.

14             Does that help you?

15             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I hope I understood, Your Honour.

16     I will be dealing with some documents very swiftly.  I will be skipping

17     some and I will be addressing some that I believe might contribute.

18     Thank you.

19             Could we please have D006-3163.

20        Q.   I'm interested in the first paragraph, Witness.  It is your

21     tab 10, another telegram of the Pristina Corps Command dated 18 July.

22     Can you comment on the first paragraph, please.

23        A.   This telegram has do with the action undertaken by the terrorists

24     against Orahovac between the 17th and the 18th of July, 1998, when they

25     occupied most of the town and took 30 Serb locals in an unknown

Page 11717

 1     direction.  They also seised a large quantity of medical material.

 2        Q.   Thank you.

 3             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document.

 4             JUDGE PARKER:  We are trying to understand the right-hand top of

 5     the document which appears to have in handwriting 19 of February, 1998.

 6             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] If I may be of assistance, it is

 7     rather the 19th of July, 1998, the handwritten note.  It is a 7.  It was

 8     sent on the 18th of July and received by the General Staff of the VJ on

 9     the 19th.  I don't know if you can see it in the English version, maybe

10     it's typed out there.  Oh, it says 19 February.

11             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you for that.

12             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I think it's a 7.

13             JUDGE PARKER:  We'll receive the document.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, that will be Exhibit D00733.

15             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we next please have

16     Prosecution document 4188 on the 65 ter list.  This is an information

17     note of the security service and its Prizren centre in 1998, the

18     1st of August, concerning the attack on Orahovac.

19        Q.   General, did you used to receive such information from the state

20     security administration in 1998 and 1999, and did you have any exchanges

21     of information between your intelligence section of the Pristina Corps

22     and the state security service?

23        A.   During 1998 and 1999, we regularly exchanged information with the

24     state security service in Kosovo and Metohija, although I'm not familiar

25     with this document.

Page 11718

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have D006-3170.

 3        Q.   It is the 14th tab in your binder.  Defence number 120.  This is

 4     a letter that was sent as a telegram by the security section of the

 5     Pristina Corps on 24 July 1998 to the General Staff security

 6     administration in the VJ, security department of the 3rd Army, as well as

 7     the security organ of the 14th Counter-intelligence Group.  What is this

 8     document, and why was it drawn up?  What was the situation like at the

 9     time?

10        A.   This telegram of 24 July 1998, it was drafted following a request

11     of the security head in the Pristina Corps Command.  It gives an overview

12     of security in late July 1998.  Among other things, there is an assessed

13     number of 25.000 armed terrorists.  We can also find the security

14     section's opinion as to what their further plans will be.

15             At that time, regular life and work in Kosovo and Metohija ground

16     to a halt when all of the roads were basically blocked by the terrorists.

17     At this point in time, the situation was the most complex and difficult

18     one.

19        Q.   Thank you.

20             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document.

21             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D00734, Your Honours.

23             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have D011-3348.

24        Q.   Witness, can you tell us what this map represents?  Please

25     comment.

Page 11719

 1        A.   At the level of the security section, we kept a working map

 2     constantly plotting locations and information we had on the whereabouts

 3     and numbers of terrorists, as well as the territory under their control.

 4     On this map that was created in late June 1998, which I personally

 5     created, we can see precise locations of the terrorist groups in

 6     Albania -- in Kosovo and Metohija, as well as the locations of their

 7     brigades and operational zones in which those brigades were active.  We

 8     also see the disposition of combat groups of the Pristina Corps in

 9     Kosovo and Metohija.

10        Q.   Thank you.

11             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Please -- could we please have

12     this document admitted.

13             JUDGE PARKER:  Can you help me a little more there.  The

14     locations of the combat groups, how are they depicted on the map?  That

15     is, of the Pristina Corps.

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, they are in red.

17     Those are the combat groups of the Pristina Corps.  In blue we have the

18     terrorist forces.

19             JUDGE PARKER:  I'm seeing roughly 14, then, combat groups of the

20     Pristina Corps; is that correct?

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I didn't have time to count them,

22     but these were their precise locations.

23             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you very much.

24             Yes, that will be received.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D00735, Your Honours.

Page 11720

 1             JUDGE PARKER:  Ms. Petersen.

 2             MS. PETERSEN:  Just one thing.  We don't have a translation of

 3     the text at the top, and I was wondering if the witness could assist with

 4     that so we know what it says at the top of the map.

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  Do you mind reading aloud the text at the top of

 6     the map.

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] On the top of the map it says:

 8             "Disposition of the combat groups of the Pristina Corps and

 9     terrorist formations of the KLA in Kosovo and Metohija in mid-1998."

10             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.

11             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

12             And I'd like to thank my learned friend.

13        Q.   Could we also have you read out the key.

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The key of this map says, in red,

15     it says:  "The forces of the VJ."  And in blue:  "Siptar terrorist forces

16     and operational zones."

17             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] It seems that my learned friend

18     had the same question as I did.  Very well, let us move on then.

19        Q.   General, after this period, we know that there were certain

20     anti-terrorist activities that took place which were completed by late

21     September and early October of that year.  Can you tell us what the

22     security situation was like in late September and early October 1998?

23        A.   Based on the assessment we saw a moment ago, as well as on the

24     assessment of other professional bodies between late July and late

25     September 1998, there were several phases planned to carry out

Page 11721

 1     anti-terrorist operations carried out by security forces and the Army of

 2     the Republic of Yugoslavia.  During that large operation, basically all

 3     significant Albanian terrorist strongholds were eliminated that we can

 4     see on the map.  We also managed to completely break-up the terrorist

 5     composition of the KLA, and they were reduced to a number of small groups

 6     scattered about the mountainous terrain in Kosovo and Metohija.

 7             Since there were negotiations under way on the 13th of October,

 8     the Milosevic-Holbrooke Agreement was signed, which, among other things,

 9     envisaged for all units which were brought in as reinforcements of the

10     Pristina Corps be withdrawn from the area of Kosovo and Metohija.  This

11     was done.  It was also envisaged that parts of combat groups be returned

12     to their home garrisons, and that in the territory there should only be

13     several combat groups in the border belt to the Republic of Albania with

14     the task of assisting border units in order to prevent en masse entry of

15     terrorists and weapons, as well as three combat groups along the road

16     Pristina and Prizren at Dulje pass, which was a critical point, and

17     another group on the road between Pristina and Pec in the Volujak region,

18     and the third combat group which was I believe was in the area of

19     Stimlje.  All other forces under that agreement were withdrawn to the

20     barracks of the VJ in Kosovo.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us whether this concluded any

22     anti-terrorist measures by Serb forces and the army once the agreement

23     was reached?

24        A.   Yes.  All anti-terrorist actions stopped after the

25     Milosevic-Holbrooke Agreement was signed.

Page 11722

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Did the KLA also cease its activities following the

 2     signing of the agreement?

 3        A.   Immediately after the agreement was signed and the MUP and army

 4     forces were withdrawn, and I also forgot to mention, I believe, that

 5     parts of MUP units also returned to their respective areas of deployment

 6     and that they only left a few check-points along certain roads.

 7             In this newly created situation, as we can see from numerous

 8     reports by command organs and the security section of the Pristina Corps,

 9     the terrorists used that situation to resupply and take up all positions

10     in Kosovo and Metohija from which the security forces had withdrawn.

11     They also continued unhindered supply of weapons and equipment.  It can

12     be seen from numerous intelligence section telegrams that they were

13     preparing themselves for a spring offensive.  In a way, the agreement

14     enabled the terrorist staffs to consolidate and resupply for a renewed

15     action against security forces.

16             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could I please have

17     Defence number 586.

18        Q.   Your tab 18.

19             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  We didn't catch the number

20     of the document.

21             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] D008-0749.  Item 2 and item 3,

22     please.

23        Q.   It is on your page 2, General, as well as in the English.

24        A.   It is stated in this item that terrorists also attacked business

25     facilities in Kosovo and Metohija in addition to attacking security

Page 11723

 1     forces.  In this document, an incident is mentioned where workers of the

 2     Bilacevac [phoen] mine were attacked as well as certain workers being

 3     kidnapped from that area.

 4        Q.   Thank you.

 5             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document.

 6             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00736.

 8             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have D008-0762.

 9     It is Defence number 587.

10        Q.   Your tab 19.  This is a document of the 20th of October, 1998, a

11     telegram by the security section of the Pristina Corps.

12             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have item 2 in

13     both versions.  I believe it is your page 2, General, and the same in the

14     English version.

15        Q.   Can you see 2.2?  Can you comment briefly, please.

16        A.   This corroborates my previous assertion.  Two terrorist staffs

17     leaders in Kosovo and Metohija who were active in the

18     Dukadjin operational zone, Ibrahimaj [phoen] and Ramush Haradinaj,

19     regrouped their terrorist formations, formed a number of smaller groups,

20     and carried out abuse and intimidation of Albanians loyal to the Serb

21     state as well as follow the activities of our security services focusing

22     on roads.

23        Q.   Thank you.

24             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document.

25             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

Page 11724

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00737.

 2             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] D008-0774.  Defence document 589.

 3        Q.   This is tab 20, sir.  Could you please tell me about paragraph 4

 4     and paragraph 1.

 5        A.   Paragraph 4.1 tells us as follows:  According to verified

 6     information, a member of the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission,

 7     Nick Turnbull, and an unidentified member of the observer team on the

 8     21st and 22nd October this year established contact for the purpose of

 9     persuading them to accept the provisions of the agreement on resolving

10     the Kosovo problem, previously signed by representatives of the federal

11     republic of Yugoslavia and the special envoy.  The OVK for the time being

12     is refusing to accept the provisions of this agreement.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Paragraph 5, please.  The last portion of

14     paragraph 5.

15        A.   The very end of this paragraph tells us that the political

16     representative of the OVK abroad Balema Kute [phoen] believes that the

17     Kosovo Liberation Army did not take up its rifles in order to stay under

18     Serbia, this being the message impressed upon the Albanian population.

19     This hard-line wing says, Regardless of any difficulties - meaning

20     difficulties the KLA are facing - we shall never surrender; this is a

21     sacred war; it's now or never.

22             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, may this be received.

23             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00738.

25             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  D008-0801.

Page 11725

 1        Q.   This is a telegram by the security sector of the Pristina Corps,

 2     the date is the 5th of November, 1998.  2.6, please.  That's page 2 in

 3     both versions of the text.

 4        A.   2.6 talks about the meeting at Sion in Switzerland.  There was a

 5     meeting of KLA members in supporters in connection with the current

 6     situation in Kosovo and Metohija following of the signing of the

 7     Milosevic-Holbrooke Agreement.  It indicates that the agreed joint NATO

 8     KLA tactic is being fully implemented with regard to the withdrawal of

 9     our forces, after which they take the territory, link up their forces,

10     and again take control of the territory.  It was also said at the meeting

11     that the terrorist activity on the ground should further be stepped-up

12     and new terrorist groups set up and that the enlisting of volunteers

13     should continue.

14        Q.   Thank you.

15             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May this please be admitted.

16             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00739.

18             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] D008-810.  D008-0810.

19        Q.   This is a telegram by the security sector of the Pristina Corps

20     dated the 8th November, 1998.  2.1, please.  If you can.  Just hold on a

21     second until we see the English on our screens.  2.1.

22        A.   This paragraph of the telegram indicates that there were efforts

23     being made by the international community to deal with the Kosovo crisis

24     in a peaceful way.  Along these lines, it tells us that on the

25     6th of November, 1998, the US ambassador to Macedonia Christopher Hill

Page 11726

 1     together with the chief of KDOM Shaun Byrnes established contact with

 2     representatives of the Kosovo Liberation Army who were then shown a

 3     US plan for a peaceful solution of the Kosovo issue.  In terms of

 4     time-line, this is perhaps the earliest situation showing that important

 5     international players were establishing contact with this terrorist

 6     organisation, the KLA, trying to promote or upgrade this terrorist

 7     organisation as a party to the conflict.

 8             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.  May this

 9     please be received.

10             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00740.

12             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] D008-0814.

13        Q.   Briefly, please, paragraph 2.1, Defence number 597.  Tab 23 for

14     you, sir.  Paragraph 2.1, please.

15        A.   2.1 talks about the fact that despite the apparent lull that

16     lasted throughout September following the signing of the agreement, there

17     were again acts of retaliation by the terrorists against both

18     non-Albanian and Albanian people in the area.  In the Djakovica area,

19     they are some of the MUP members to go to their villages in order to

20     protect them from terrorists.  The same thing was done by people from

21     Decani municipality.

22        Q.   Thank you.  2.5.  This is page 2 in the English.

23        A.   2.5 --

24        Q.   Hold on a second, we'd like to see it in English on our screens

25     too.

Page 11727

 1        A.   Many of the Albanian inhabitants in Kosovo and Metohija, an

 2     enormous number of those, in fact, were loyal to the existing

 3     authorities.  This paragraph shows that they started reporting cases of

 4     robbery, property being seised by the terrorists.  Their own property.

 5     They started reporting this to the MUP.  An assessment is presented here

 6     which is quite accurate given the escalation of terrorism, that the state

 7     did not do everything within its power to protect the Albanian population

 8     not involved in any KLA activity.

 9        Q.   Thank you very much.

10             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May this be received, please.

11             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00741.

13             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] D008-0820, please.  Thank you.

14        Q.   This is a telegram dated the 11th of November, 1998.  Security

15     sector at the Pristina Corps again.  Sir, could you please do 1.2 for us,

16     comment briefly, please.

17        A.   1.2 describes the fact that members of the so-called

18     Kosovo Liberation Army were taking up positions along the roads gradually

19     controlling the passing traffic, checking travelers, mistreating citizens

20     as well as detaining them, seising vehicles and goods, which led to

21     disquiet on the part of the population.  It also says that they were

22     kidnapping some non-Albanians, all of which caused unrest among the

23     non-Albanian population of Kosovo and Metohija.  The idea was the first

24     voice for people to try and organise the defence of their own villages.

25        Q.   Thank you very much.

Page 11728

 1             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May this please be received.

 2             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00742.

 4             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] D008-0827, please.

 5        Q.   This is a telegram by the security sector of the Pristina Corps

 6     dated the 17th of November, 1998.  Sir, briefly, please, 2.2.

 7        A.   Again, this describes attacks being carried out by the leaders of

 8     the KLA against their own fellow Albanians.  They were going about

 9     villages trying to explain to the people there that it was necessary to

10     immobilise for the war that would come the next spring.

11             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, that's

12     sufficient for our present purposes.

13             May this please be received.

14             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00743.

16             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] D008-0838.  Thank you.

17        Q.   Let us wait for the English to come up on our screens first.

18     2.1, please.  That's the next page in the English.

19        A.   Again, this talks about the arrogance displayed by the leaders of

20     the KLA, specifically Ramush Haradinaj and his group, visiting Albanian

21     villages, firing barrages and bursts of gun-fire, seising goods, putting

22     across the message that they would kill all those who betrayed them,

23     meaning handing over their weapons to the legal authorities and those

24     working with bodies of the Ministry of the Interior.

25        Q.   Thank you very much.

Page 11729

 1             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May this be received, please.

 2             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00744.

 4             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] D008-0867, please.  Defence

 5     document 607.

 6        Q.   Tab 28 for you, sir.  The 15th of December security sector of the

 7     Pristina Corps telegram.  Sir, just briefly, what does it say?

 8        A.   It describes a large-scale incident on the border to the

 9     Republic of Albania, the Liken border post, specifically.  A large number

10     of terrorists were prevented from illegally crossing the state border

11     there.  Under the procedures that had been agreed with the OSCE Mission

12     from the moment the agreement was signed on, the Pristina Corps was to

13     report these things to the OSCE.  Their mission went to the scene of this

14     incident and photographed the scene, but they refused to sign the Serbian

15     and English records saying that this was not part of the procedure that

16     that their orders were different.  General Loncar was the president of

17     the commission for co-operation with the OSCE Mission was informed about

18     this.

19        Q.   Thank you very much.

20             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May this be received.

21             JUDGE PARKER:  Indeed.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00745.

23             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] D008-0875.  Tab 29,

24     Defence number 608.

25        Q.   A telegram by the security sector dated the 15th of December,

Page 11730

 1     1998.  2.1, please, if you can, sir, briefly.

 2        A.   Again, this is the intelligence gathered by the state security

 3     service.  They arrested terrorists Bajrami, Gazmend.  They interrogated

 4     him and obtained information indicating that orders by the staff of the

 5     KLA, several small terrorists groups, were infiltrated into towns across

 6     Kosovo, the idea being to carry out several acts of terror across Kosovo

 7     specifically in order to intimidate people and targeting catering

 8     establishment including those owned by Albanians who continued to

 9     operate.  Because these terrorists believed that these Albanians by

10     continued to operate were expressing their support of the authorities.

11        Q.   Thank you very much.  Next page 2.8, please, briefly.

12        A.   This picks up where the previous paragraph left off.  It

13     describes the terrorist incident in the town of Pec it itself on the

14     14th of December, 1998.  The terrorists attacked a cafe by opening random

15     fire, wounding several Serbian youngsters who happened to be in the cafe

16     at the time.

17        Q.   Thank you very much.

18             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May this be received, please.

19             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00746.

21             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have D006-3178.

22        Q.   General, can you tell us whether illegal arms continued arriving

23     from Albania in late 1998 as well as the training of KLA terrorists in

24     Albania?  Did that continue?

25        A.   Yes.  This telegram indicates that the terrorist training camps

Page 11731

 1     in the north of Albania resumed their work and that terrorists are being

 2     introduced from Albania after having been trained there.  Also, some of

 3     the training curriculum, so to say, is addressed in this document.

 4             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I seek to tender this.

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00747.

 7             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could I please have D008-0883.

 8     It's a telegram of the security section of the Pristina Corps dated

 9     18 December 1998.  Defence number 609.  Your tab 31.  Could we please

10     have 2.6 displayed in the English.

11        Q.   It is your page 2, General.

12        A.   In this item, there is information of the state security

13     administration that there had been a meeting of the Government of the

14     Republic of Kosovo chaired by Bujar Bukoshi in Bonn, Germany, where the

15     work of the ministry of the interior was discussed.  It was concluded on

16     that occasion that there was a need to carry out more complex terrorist

17     actions against command personnel of the state security and other

18     high-ranking state officials, stressing that the forces of the Serbian

19     MUP were no longer capable of confronting organised terrorism in

20     Kosovo and Metohija and were not able to intervene due to the presence of

21     foreign representatives.

22        Q.   Thank you.

23             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document.

24             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00748.

Page 11732

 1             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I would kindly asked for

 2     D006-3237.  It is Defence number 129, tab 32 in your binder.

 3        Q.   A telegram by the security section of the Pristina Corps dated

 4     19 December 1998.  A short comment only of items 2.5 and 2.7 on your

 5     page 2.

 6        A.   In 2.5, it is stated that the head of the US KDOM Shaun Byrnes,

 7     after having talked to the political representative Adem Demaqi

 8     accompanied by him and his personal secretary, went to conduct talks with

 9     members of the so-called Main Staff of the KLA, and that such a meeting

10     was also head on the 17th of December.

11        Q.   Thank you.

12             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document.

13             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00749.

15             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have D008-0900.

16     Tab 33.

17        Q.   General, it's a telegram of the security section of the

18     24th of December, 1998.  2.1, please comment.  Just wait for the English

19     version, please.  2.1 is on the second page at the top.

20        A.   In 2.1, we see information of the 14th Counter-intelligence Group

21     indicating that the leadership of the national movement of Kosovo decided

22     at a meeting held in Switzerland to have the KLA in Kosovo and Metohija

23     put under its control at any cost parts stated here in order to create

24     conditions for the secure supply of weapons from the air by NATO

25     airplanes and helicopters.

Page 11733

 1        Q.   And tell us what we can see in the last paragraph of 2.1?

 2        A.   At that meeting in relation to that it was stated at the meeting

 3     that the Americans instead of a frontal attack suggested the

 4     concentration of greater forces at key intersections and roads, as well

 5     as in the area specified therein.

 6        Q.   What about the last paragraph?

 7        A.   Well, we see here that there is a connection between this

 8     information and the assistance of the KVM, representatives on the full

 9     withdrawal of VJ forces and the forces of the MUP from the municipalities

10     of Kacanik, Malisevo, Glogovo, Klina, and Orahovac, which directly

11     correlates with the conclusions of the meeting of the Kosovo national

12     movement.

13             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document.

14             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00750.

16             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] D006-3187.

17        Q.   It is a telegram of the 27th of December, 1998, by the security

18     section of the Pristina Corps.  Defence number 122.  Your tab 34.

19             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have in English

20     page 2, item 2.6.

21        Q.   That is at the end of page 1 in your copy.  Please comment.

22        A.   We see here information by the SDB concerning a comment by a

23     member of the OSCE Verification Mission, Jean-Pierre Quinton, a Belgian

24     diplomat, that much time will be needed in order to convince individual

25     countries of the correctness of our positions, thus alluding to the USA

Page 11734

 1     and Great Britain.  The Belgian diplomat considers that there are enough

 2     objective reports on the situation in Kosovo and Metohija, having in mind

 3     the reports of the Kosovo Verification Mission, but that two of the three

 4     people at the top of the mission make a selection among them and send

 5     them on according to their country's needs and interests.

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document.

 8             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00751.

10             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have D008-0913.

11     It is Defence number 614.  It is a telegram of the Pristina Corps

12     security section dated the 28th of December, 1998.

13        Q.   Comment briefly upon items 2.1.

14        A.   Item 2.1, it is stated that the latest terrorist acts and

15     killings of Serbs in territory of the municipality of Podujevo caused the

16     remaining Serbs to move out from the few villages inhabited by Serbs in

17     that area.

18        Q.   Thank you.

19             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document.

20             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D00752, Your Honours.

22             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have D008-0916.

23     It is Defence document 615.

24        Q.   Tab 36, General.  I'd like to hear your comment of item 2.1.

25        A.   In 2.1 of this document, we see information obtained through the

Page 11735

 1     application of electronic reconnaissance measures indicating the

 2     preparations of terrorists for a spring offensive as well as information

 3     about increasing numbers of Albanians moving to Albania and on to some EU

 4     countries.

 5        Q.   Thank you.

 6             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document.

 7             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00753.

 9             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have D008-0920.

10     Defence number 616.

11        Q.   This is a telegram of the Pristina Corps security section dated

12     the 9th of January, 1999.  Please comment item 3.4.  Page 3 in the

13     English as well.  3.4.  It begins on this page and then it spills over to

14     page 3.  The top.

15        A.   In 3.4, there is mention made of talks under the auspices of

16     members of the OSCE Mission between the terrorists and ourselves in order

17     to have eight military police members released who had been kidnapped

18     during an on-site investigation.  There were taken to the terrorist staff

19     in the village of Bare.  Richard Ciaglinski participated in on those

20     investigations and upon his return he stated that he was told by the KLA

21     that the KLA will start carrying out attacks against VJ and MUP members

22     in the whole territory of Kosovo and Metohija.

23        Q.   Thank you.

24             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document.

25             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

Page 11736

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00754.

 2             JUDGE PARKER:  We are doing much better.  Keep it up.

 3             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I suggest we take the

 4     break.

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes, we will now and resume at 1.00.

 6                           [The witness stands down]

 7                           --- Recess taken at 12.32 p.m.

 8                           --- On resuming at 1.02 p.m.

 9                           [The witness takes the stand]

10             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes, Mr. Djurdjic.

11             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

12     D008-0926.  Number 38.

13        Q.   Tab number 38 for you, sir.  It's a telegram by the security

14     sector of the Pristina Corps dated the 13 of January, 1999.  Paragraph

15     2.4, please.

16        A.   2.4 of this document talks about information obtained from

17     several sources to the effect that families of Albanians from Kosovo and

18     Metohija living and working abroad were making suggestions to their

19     relatives in Kosovo and Metohija and warning them in a dramatic fashion

20     to get out of Kosovo and Metohija because soon large-scale terrorist

21     attacks would be launched on the MUP and the VJ.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Were you, yourself, involved in the events described

23     in paragraph 3.3?

24        A.   Yes.

25             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we have the English, please,

Page 11737

 1     3.3.  That's the next page.

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, this is the development that I

 3     talked about a while ago.  Mr. Richard Ciaglinski from the OSCE was there

 4     and together we liberated eight members of the military police.  This

 5     says that on the 13th of January, following several days of negotiations,

 6     these men were set free by the KLA.

 7        Q.   Thank you.

 8             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May this please be received.

 9             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00755.

11             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] D008-0932.

12        Q.   Tab 39, sir.  Defence document 618.  A telegram by the security

13     sector of the Pristina Corps dated the 19th of January, 1999.  Could you

14     please have a look page 2, paragraph 2.6.

15             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] If we could have that in English

16     as well.  Slowly, please, until we see that on our screens.

17        Q.   Just a minute, sir, we don't have that yet.

18             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Page 2 in the English, please.

19     Paragraph 2.6.

20        Q.   Please go ahead, sir.

21        A.   2.6 of this document tells us about information suggesting that

22     the OSCE Verification Mission members were making visits to some fringe

23     areas in Kosovo and Metohija, specifically Vitina municipality in this

24     case.  They wanted to know about the quality of the bridges in that area

25     and possible landing areas for helicopters.  At the time, this caused

Page 11738

 1     people to suspect that preparations were referred for the arrival of

 2     NATO.  There was another source indicating that, as opposed to the

 3     previous period of time, the OSCE members were renting flats for 15-day

 4     periods which indicated that the OSCE might soon be leaving Kosovo and

 5     Metohija.

 6             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we have the last page of the

 7     English and the Serbian as well.

 8        Q.   General, sir, same document last page.  3.2.

 9        A.   I don't see 3.2 in my document.

10             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I do apologise.  May this be

11     received, please.  I was looking at the next document already.  Thank

12     you.

13             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00756.

15             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we please move on to

16     D008-0943.  Tab 40.  Defence document 620.  A telegram dated the

17     21st of January, 1992 [as interpreted].  Security sector of the

18     Pristina Corps.

19        Q.   Sir.  Can we focus on 2.2, page 1.

20        A.   2.2 talks about information having to do with shedding light on

21     the crime of kidnapping of Serbs, Albanians, Roma people, and other

22     nationalities in the area of Prizren.  There was an interview with

23     Mazreku, Luan, from Malisevo, he was shown some evidence, photographs,

24     and such, whereupon this person admitted that, along with other members

25     of the KLA from Klina and Orahovac municipality, he had been involved in

Page 11739

 1     executing 34 persons from the Prizren area, burning them -- burning them,

 2     as the document states.

 3        Q.   3.2, the last passage, please, if you can.  Can we have that in

 4     English, please.  That's the last page.  3.2.

 5        A.   This portion of the document talks about the fact that there was

 6     a meeting in the Prizren barracks, our rank commander, representatives of

 7     the OSCE Mission, and we know that each unit had liaison officers.

 8             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could you please pull down the

 9     part where it says the Prizren garrison, like that, thank you.

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] A representative of the OSCE

11     Mr. Mijhalo Krasnosekov admitted to our own liaison officer that he had

12     gone with Walker to the village of Racak and that he had personally

13     counted a total of 26 dead bodies in civilian clothes but with weapons

14     and KLA insignia.  He said that we had won that battle in the military

15     sense but that we had lost in a political sense, meaning that NATO would

16     be bombing us.

17        Q.   Thank you.

18             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May this please be received.

19             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00757.

21             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] D008-0958.  The

22     20th of February, 1998.  Defence document 622, tab 41.

23        Q.   It's a telegram by the 14th Counter-intelligence Group, the

24     22nd of February, 1999, dispatched to, among others, the security sector

25     of the Pristina Corps.  Could you please briefly comment on the first two

Page 11740

 1     paragraphs in the briefest possible terms.

 2        A.   This is a period that coincided with the negotiations at

 3     Rambouillet.  This shows that the terrorist organisations, specifically

 4     the KLA as the political wing over in Switzerland, had no intention of

 5     giving up, putting up armed resistance in order to try and achieve their

 6     goals.  Therefore, volunteers are still being dispatched to Albania's

 7     north; the leaders of the KLA found it unacceptable that the Albanian

 8     delegation at Rambouillet would accept the disarming of the KLA, and they

 9     would not allow Kosovo to remain in Serbia.

10        Q.   Thank you.  If you could just briefly comment on the last

11     paragraph on this page.

12        A.   This confirms that the terrorists were carrying out preparations

13     for an offensive and was going on across all the village Kosovska

14     Mitrovica municipality, those inhabited by Albanians.  There was a curfew

15     that was imposed --

16        Q.   I'm sorry, I'm sorry, sir.  I'm talking about the previous

17     document, the last paragraph.

18        A.   The last paragraph on page 1 talks about Azem Vllasi's position;

19     he was one of the leaders of Kosovo Albanians, that the Albanian

20     delegation in Rambouillet could not make sure that autonomy was achieved

21     in keeping with the 1974 constitution, let alone independence in any

22     shape or form.  He was, however, convinced that NATO would be arriving in

23     Kosovo and Metohija but as peacekeeping forces, or else their arrival

24     would be preceded by air-strikes against the Republic of Serbia.

25             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May this document please be

Page 11741

 1     received.

 2             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00758.

 4             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] D008-0961.  Defence document 623,

 5     tab 42, sir.

 6        Q.   A telegram received by the security sector of the Pristina Corps

 7     and dispatched by the 14th Counter-intelligence Group on the

 8     25th February, 1999.  If you can, sir, please, at paragraph 3, in

 9     relation to the 23rd February, 1999.

10        A.   Indeed.  It talks about terrorists groups from the Drenica area

11     which was the strongest -- the major extremists' stronghold throughout

12     the clashes in Kosovo.  They ordered all Albanians in the village of

13     Brusnik to leave the village by the 24th of February, Brusnik was

14     predominantly Albanian, because they planned to conduct combat operations

15     in that area over the following days.

16        Q.   Thank you very much.

17             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May this please be received.

18             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00759.

20             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have D008-0964.

21     65 ter number 624.

22        Q.   A telegram by the 3rd Army Command security department dated the

23     1st of March, 1999.  Could you please comment on paragraph 1.  Just to

24     make sure we have both on our screens -- that's right, thank you.

25        A.   The paragraph talks about the fact that late in February 1999

Page 11742

 1     there were Albanians gathering around the Djeneral Jankovic border

 2     crossing to the Republic of Macedonia.  They asked the border police to

 3     allow them to cross into the Republic of Macedonia, saying that there was

 4     an imminent outbreak of large-scale hostilities between the terrorists

 5     and the VJ along the border.

 6        Q.   2.5 of the same document, please.

 7        A.   This paragraph talks about continuing acts of provocation by the

 8     Albanian terrorists targeting the local security members in the village

 9     of Osek Hilja.  As you know, there were attempts being made to overcome

10     the crisis from July 1998 on, and then a multi-ethnic police force was

11     established in some villages across Kosovo meant to reduce tensions and

12     regain the trust of the local Albanian population by having their

13     representatives in the authorities.  But they refused to go along with

14     that.  Instead, they attacked some members of this multi-ethnic police

15     force.  That's what the paragraph tells us.

16        Q.   Very well, thank you.

17             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May this be received.

18             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00760.

20             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] D008-0968.  Defence document 625.

21        Q.   For you, sir, tab 44.  A telegram by the security sector of the

22     3rd Army dated the 2nd March, 1999.

23             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have 2.6.

24        Q.   Page 2 in your document, sir.

25        A.   2.6 tells us that there was pressure being exerted by the

Page 11743

 1     terrorist forces of KLA on Serb villages of Podujevo in the municipality,

 2     forcing people to leave their homes.  The intention being to set those

 3     homes ablaze once the people left.  We are talking here about the village

 4     of Pirane and other Serb inhabited villages.

 5        Q.   Excuse me, 2.6.  I'm not sure if we are looking at the same

 6     document.  I'm talking about the 2nd of March, 1999.

 7        A.   44, right?

 8        Q.   Yes.  Can you please read 2.6, how it begins?

 9        A.   Following an order by the terrorists of the so-called KLA on the

10     27th of February this year, a large number of residents of the village of

11     Pirane, presently [indiscernible] left their homes, leaving at least some

12     30 families behind.

13        Q.   Can you just comment?

14        A.   Well, one can see here that in addition to expelling

15     non-Albanians, the terrorists did not shy away from driving out some

16     Albanians from their own villages in order to achieve their own goals.

17     They also burned down some homes which shows that they were certainly not

18     averse to looting, themselves.

19        Q.   Thank you.  2.7, please, if you could have a look.  That's the

20     next page in English.

21        A.   We had several sources suggesting that members of the

22     Verification Mission, primarily those from the US contingent, to a large

23     extent were providing the logistical assistance for the benefit of the

24     terrorists in terms of sharing information with them.  And they were in

25     charge of monitoring the overall situation in Kosovo and Metohija.

Page 11744

 1     Therefore, that is the information presented here.  They were also

 2     adamant that the terrorists should reduce their activities before the

 3     Rambouillet conference on the 15th of March in order to avoid them being

 4     blamed for an escalation -- for a potential escalation.

 5        Q.   Thank you very much.

 6             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May this document please be

 7     received.

 8             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00761.

10             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we have D008-0974.  It is

11     Defence document 626.

12        Q.   Your tab 45.  Yes, 45.  Can you comment on this telegram of the

13     14th Counter-intelligence Group dated 5 March 1999 sent, amongst others,

14     to your intelligence section.

15        A.   This telegram is about a meeting held in Macedonia between

16     Robert Dole, an American congressman, and a delegation of Albanian

17     political parties, as well as the KLA terrorist organisation delegation.

18     The meeting was attended by the leaders of Albanian political parties,

19     but what we can note is that Hashim Thaqi was not there on behalf of the

20     KLA.  As we see later, he was the only person against the signing of that

21     agreement.  Ibrahim Rugova, as well as the Democratic League of Kosovo,

22     as a moderate wing in favour of a peaceful solution to the Kosovo crisis,

23     left open the possibility for the Kosovar delegation in Rambouillet to be

24     able to sign such an agreement but that such an agreement would not be

25     binding on the KLA to accept any disarmament.  There's also an assessment

Page 11745

 1     provided that Naim Jerliu, one of the political leaders, stated his

 2     suspicion for Hashim Thaqi not being present because he knew that there

 3     would be some pressure exerted upon him to sign it.  It says here,

 4     literally, He is an American player and as such will not accept the

 5     agreement.

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this.

 8             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00762.

10             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we have D006-3247.

11     Document number 181.

12        Q.   Tab 46.  This is a telegram of the 2nd Army intelligence

13     section -- sorry, the 3rd Army, dated the 5th of March, 1999.  Could you

14     comment item 2.2.

15        A.   In this item we have information about terrorist preparations in

16     the area of Drenica for an offensive.  This is dated the

17     5th of March, 1999.  What is also mentioned is that there would be a

18     general mobilisation of all able-bodied Albanians who were to be armed

19     and dispatched to different KLA units.

20        Q.   Thank you.  A brief comment of 2.3 as well, please.

21        A.   Here we have information gathered by the SDB about a multi-member

22     delegation of the Albanian lobby on the 3rd of March, 1999, attended a

23     meeting in the White House where, apart from the US state top political

24     leaders, there were also people present from national security and armed

25     forces.  This concerns the talks in Rambouillet.  The Albanian delegation

Page 11746

 1     received guarantees that, in the political part of the agreement, nothing

 2     will be changed.  What is key is that the Albanian delegation required

 3     guarantees that after the signing of the agreement, there will be no

 4     changes concerning the disarmament of the KLA.

 5        Q.   Thank you.

 6             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document.

 7             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00763.

 9             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have D008-0981.

10        Q.   This is a telegram of the 6th of March, 1999, by the security

11     department of the 3rd Army Command.  Could you please comment item 2.2.

12        A.   There is mention made of illegal incursions of foreign

13     mercenaries from Albania into Kosovo and Metohija from Islamic countries.

14     There is information that one such group was in the area of Kacanik.

15     What was characteristic of the situation throughout 1998 and 1999 was

16     that the terrorist staffs collected financial aid from the Albanian

17     population by force as well as required that they be supplied with

18     foodstuffs.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Could we next go to 2.1.

20        A.   According to operative data collected all terrorist headquarters

21     in Kosovo and Metohija were ordered to carry out intensive liquidations

22     of Albanian individuals who are members of the local police.  I've

23     already referred to the multi-ethnic police force.  This is the police

24     force referred to.

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 11747

 1             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document.

 2             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00764.

 4             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Document D008-0985, tab 48.

 5     Defence document 629.

 6        Q.   It is a telegram by the security section of the 3rd Army Command

 7     dated 13 March 1999.  Please comment on item 2.2.

 8        A.   This document also points to the aggressive approach of KLA

 9     members towards their ethnicity in order to force them to mobilised.

10     This concerns the villages in the surroundings of Prizren.  Terrorists

11     entered houses and issued threats due to which certain locals were forced

12     to flee, since some of them wanted to avoid being mobilised or

13     liquidated.

14        Q.   Thank you.  What about item 2.3?  Tell us something about that.

15        A.   Information contained in 2.3 has to do with

16     OSCE Verification Mission members organising transportation of food

17     articles for the KLA as well as their wounded to certain locations, in

18     particular the village of Ljubovac in Srbica municipality.

19        Q.   We can see, I believe, that your security section of the

20     Pristina Corps sent daily reports to the security section of the 3rd Army

21     in relation to Kosovo and Metohija and the three items you mentioned?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   What we see in these reports is the information you had forwarded

24     to the security section of the 3rd Army?

25        A.   I can't say that exactly, sitting here today, because in addition

Page 11748

 1     to receiving information from us, they also received information from the

 2     security organs of the military district of Pristina.

 3             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document.

 4             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00765.

 6             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have D008-0990.

 7     It is tab 49, 65 ter number 630.

 8        Q.   Item 2.3, please comment.

 9        A.   In item 3.2 [as interpreted] we have information about

10     representatives of the KVM in Suva Reka insisted in getting regional

11     terrorist leaders to use new code-names as well as numerical codes in

12     their internal communications with members of the mission.  And in

13     contact with the verifiers about the whereabouts of certain terrorists

14     groups.

15        Q.   Thank you.

16             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document.

17             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00766.

19             JUDGE PARKER:  Ms. Petersen.

20             MS. PETERSEN:  I'm just noticing with this document, it's from

21     the command of the 3rd Army security department, and I thought the

22     specific paragraph we're talking about was information from the state

23     security service.  So I'm just wondering if, in this one, if this witness

24     has personal knowledge of the contents of this document.

25             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

Page 11749

 1        Q.   You've heard my learned friend.  Can you please address that.

 2        A.   There was always an exchange of information between us and the

 3     3rd Army security section and back, as well as including the state

 4     security service in their exchange of information with my service and the

 5     3rd Army.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Please look at item 2.2 on the second page.  In the

 7     English as well, please.

 8             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I apologise, I ran ahead of

 9     myself.  It's the next document.  First I'd like to tender this document.

10             JUDGE PARKER:  I believe it's an exhibit now.

11             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, I apologise.  D008-0994,

12     please.  It is Defence number 631.

13        Q.   Tab 50 for you, Witness.  This is another telegram of the

14     3rd Army Command security section dated 22 March 1999.  Please look

15     at 1.1.

16        A.   In 1.1 there's information by the Nis Corps and their security

17     organ about the village of Lojane which is in Serbia proper -- or, sorry,

18     in the territory of the Republic of Macedonia that there had been a

19     collection centre formed for NATO intelligence analysis where Albanian

20     individuals are being interviewed who had crossed into Macedonia.

21        Q.   Thank you.

22             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document.

23             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00767.

25             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Document D008-1695.

Page 11750

 1        Q.   Tab 51.  Defence document 642.  It's a telegram dated

 2     29 March 1999 by the security section.  Sorry, 3rd Army Command.

 3     Item 1.1, please.

 4        A.   It is a combat report of the 3rd Army Command sent to the

 5     General Staff of the Yugoslav Army dated 29 March.  There is information

 6     about the complex security situation in the country.  In item 1.1, it is

 7     stated that the border units of the neighbouring countries remain at full

 8     combat readiness levels in the general area of Bajram Curi and Tropoja

 9     where there is a group of NATO officers conducting training of Siptar

10     terrorist groups as well as creating lists of Siptar volunteers that are

11     dispatched to the territory of Kosovo and Metohija.

12        Q.   Thank you.

13             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document.

14             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00768.

16             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we please have

17     Prosecution document 02811 on the 65 ter list.  It is a report of the

18     Pristina Corps Command dated the 30th of March, 1999.

19        Q.   It is tab 52, witness.

20             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] It's already an exhibit.  P1466.

21        Q.   Sir, I'm interested in item 1.1(b).

22             "During the 29th of March ..."  Can you see that part?

23        A.   Yes.  During the 29th of March, a strong terrorist group was

24     inserted from the Republic of Albania into the sector of the

25     Mitar Vojnovic border post.  It was detected and broken up, in the course

Page 11751

 1     of which 13 terrorists were killed.  Part of the terrorists had NATO

 2     uniforms.

 3        Q.   What about item 5, security situation?  Can you comment upon

 4     that?

 5        A.   Item 5, security situation.  It is stated that in the units

 6     within the area of responsibility of the Pristina Corps detected an

 7     increase in crime levels caused by an increase in the number of

 8     reservists and people from Territorial Defence detachments.  There is

 9     also information there on criminal reports submitted per personnel

10     category.

11        Q.   Thank you.

12             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document.  I

13     am sorry, it's already been admitted.

14             JUDGE PARKER:  What is the correct exhibit number for that

15     document?  Is it P466?

16             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] P1466.

17             JUDGE PARKER:  Transcript had it as P2466.  I think that needs to

18     be a convenient time, Mr. Djurdjic.  Now, we sit tomorrow afternoon at

19     2.15, so we must adjourn until then.  We now adjourn.

20                           [The witness stands down]

21                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.48 p.m.,

22                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 23rd day

23                           of February, 2010, at 2.15 p.m.