Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 14436

 1                           Wednesday, 14 July 2010

 2                           [Defence Closing Statement]

 3                           [Open session]

 4                           [The accused entered court]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

 6             JUDGE PARKER:  Good morning.  We sit today to hear the final

 7     submissions of the Defence in this trial.

 8             Good morning, Mr. Djordjevic.  Is it intended that the accused

 9     have anything directly to say to the Chamber or will you be making

10     submissions?

11             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] We have agreed that I shall be

12     making the submissions, but if the need arises then the accused will

13     address the Court too.

14             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you very much.

15             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, colleagues of the

16     Prosecution, good morning to everybody.  Since the Trial Chamber has

17     already had an opportunity of studying the final brief presented by the

18     Defence, we're not going to deal again with its overall contents.  That

19     is why we're going to use this opportunity of pointing to the erroneous

20     understanding and interpretations in the final brief of the Prosecution

21     and also to point out that viewed as a whole the Prosecution has not

22     proved its case or its charges against Mr. Djordjevic and that the

23     Trial Chamber, therefore, should bring in a judgement of acquittal.

24             Over the past three years in the pre-trial phase and the trial

25     phase, the Prosecution and the Defence managed to reach an accord on

Page 14437

 1     various agreed facts.  In addition to certain facts about which the

 2     parties in the proceedings agreed in the pre-trial phase, they also

 3     managed to reach an agreement on 263 exhibits before the trial even

 4     started.  After that, the two parties in these proceedings on several

 5     occasions managed to reach an agreement on the acceptability of certain

 6     evidence.  However, differences remained in an assessment and

 7     interpretation of the evidence.  The Defence claims that the Prosecution

 8     helped pick up its case to try to adapt it to the picture it tried to

 9     paint and the story it wished to tell in which Vlastimir Djordjevic is

10     guilty of certain acts which he neither committed nor did he know about

11     them nor did he intend any such acts to be committed.  Nor did those acts

12     come under his responsibility as assistant minister of the interior.

13             The Defence is very surprised by the fact and with regret notes

14     that many parts of the Prosecution final brief do not reflect the

15     evidence that was presented during these proceedings, and the conclusions

16     that the Prosecution makes on those grounds are absolutely unfounded and

17     not based on the evidence presented before this Court.  Not only did the

18     Prosecution make the wrong conclusions, but in reading the final brief we

19     ascertained that the evidence listed in the footnotes do not reflect the

20     evidence that the Prosecution wishes to prove and that many quotations

21     were tendentious and erroneous and that quotation marks were put to

22     certain facts which the witness never said, and this can be easily

23     verified by looking at the transcript.

24             When somebody quotes something and when quotation marks are put

25     to a passage, it is assumed that he is quoting word for word something

Page 14438

 1     that an individual said during his testimony or statement.

 2     Unfortunately, in many places of the Prosecution's final brief that has

 3     not been the case.  Furthermore, instead of providing the witness

 4     answers, the Prosecutor is, in fact, quoting his own questions and

 5     thereby giving the answers he wished to hear, not what the witness said.

 6     What was stated in the paragraphs does not reflect what was stated in the

 7     footnotes.

 8             Sometimes that is a half truth or something construed by the

 9     Prosecution.  Sometimes it is completely untrue.  The Defence believes in

10     the Trial Chamber, and it also believes that the Prosecutor will not

11     manage to lead the Trial Chamber astray.  In view of the limited time

12     that the Defence has for presenting its oral arguments, we will not have

13     occasion to analyse each and every paragraph and the erroneously

14     interpreted piece one by one or footnote or quotation, but we shall only

15     quote a few typical examples.  Because of the aforementioned, I should

16     like to ask you that when you come to analyse the final brief of the

17     Prosecution, you pay attention to every quotation and each and every

18     footnote that he uses to support it or where there is lack of support.

19     And therefore, the Trial Chamber should bear in mind three essential

20     points.  First, the SRY was a sovereign state which was made up of Serbia

21     and MontenegroSerbia within its composition had two autonomous

22     provinces, Vojvodina and Kosovo Metohija.  This is of vital importance

23     for understanding the actions taken by the SRJ and Republic of Serbia in

24     all its aspects and understanding the way the MUP functioned with respect

25     to the entire state.  In that sense, the other point that you should bear

Page 14439

 1     in mind is the following, the time-period during which the events took

 2     place.

 3             The Prosecution, to a large extent, relied on events from 1998,

 4     although in the -- if we look at the indictment, it is evident that the

 5     relevant period comprises the time from the 24th of March, 1999, up to

 6     the 20th of June, 1999.

 7             Your Honours, when you come to analyse the evidence and make your

 8     judgement, I'm sure you'll be convinced that Vlastimir Djordjevic in no

 9     way is responsible for deportation, forcible transfer, killings, or

10     persecution as stated in the charges in the indictment.  The third point

11     that you should bear in mind is the following:  All the anti-terrorist

12     actions were undertaken in order to suppress terrorist threats and to

13     neutralise armed combat groups and not against the civilian population.

14     From the evidence you will see that no order, plan, or activity was ever

15     issued, or rather, acted with criminal intent, but in the sense of

16     fighting against burgeoning terrorism in the province of Kosovo and

17     Metohija.  As is now the Prosecutor wishes to prove joint criminal

18     enterprise and you need a criminal element in order to prove that.  What

19     is necessary is that a joint plan for a joint criminal enterprise

20     includes the committing of a crime under statute para 1036, the state of

21     SRY fought against strong terrorist forces who, according to certain

22     assessments, under military control held up to 75 per cent of the

23     territory of Kosovo and Metohija.  They terrorised the civilian

24     population and represented a threat to legitimate state organs.

25             The fact that terrorism had its stronghold in the secessionist

Page 14440

 1     intentions cannot make it acceptable.  The international community did

 2     nothing to help the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in its struggle

 3     against terrorism.  Already at the beginning the SRY was thought to be

 4     the bad guy and the international community portrayed it as such and

 5     tried to tie the state's hands in its struggle against terrorism on its

 6     sovereign territory, allowing terrorist forces to increase and to

 7     manipulate the situation in a way which led to the terrible events which

 8     happened in the course of 1999.

 9             Entering into an analysis of the allegations in this trial, the

10     Prosecution endeavoured to include a highly superficial political history

11     and the history of events which represented a framework for the events

12     that took place in the course of 1998 and 1999.  The Prosecution

13     completely erroneously portrays relevant history and does not base it on

14     objective sources but exclusively on the assertions made by Albanian

15     politicians and journalists.  With respect to historical issues, the

16     Prosecution first of all quotes Fred Abrahams from the Organisation of

17     Human Rights Watch.  Here it is necessary to state that Mr. Abrahams is

18     not an expert nor did the Prosecution call him as an expert in historical

19     matters.  The Prosecution as we see quotes Mr. Abrahams as an objective

20     source; however, he did not have at his disposal facts which would enable

21     him to view the situation in a neutral way.  Without a doubt he confirmed

22     that he didn't even read the constitutional texts and laws which

23     represent the basis for understanding key historical events.  In addition

24     to that, as we stressed in our final brief, Mr. Abrahams stated -- well,

25     gave his version of historical events on the 24th of January, 2002,

Page 14441

 1     several months after he was -- he interviewed Ibrahim Rugova, the leader

 2     of the Secessionist DLK [as interpreted] Party; the Albanian politician,

 3     Veton Surroi; and Albanian journalist, Baton Haxhiu.

 4             A historical overview which was presented without conducting

 5     interviews with Serbian politicians and journalists and without getting

 6     to know the relevant legal texts can be nothing more than a synthesis of

 7     an interview which was published on behalf of the Prosecution in

 8     co-operation with the investigators of the OTP.  Therefore, it is not

 9     surprising that the facts which Mr. Abrahams presents as being historical

10     facts coincide with the statements made by these persons.  Reading and

11     listening to the arguments presented by the Prosecution, everybody who is

12     an observer might think that the Serbs illegally and unlawfully conducted

13     an invasion against a third independent country.  I think that we must

14     all bear in mind that everything that took place took place in Serbia, a

15     state in which its army and its police had every right to be on the

16     territory of its own country.  What would have happened in any other

17     country in the world, I ask you, had burgeoning terrorism, rebellions,

18     secessionist, or whatever we like to call it, movement tried by armed

19     struggle to cut off parts of its sovereign territory?  Every country

20     would respond to that in similar fashion, as did the SRJ and Serbia to

21     save its country and retain its territorial integrity and sovereignty.

22             Whether the emotions of a nation, the emotions it has towards its

23     country and its territory is something unusual, no it is normal that

24     every country in every state of the world has patriotic feelings in the

25     country in which he lives, where he was born, where his forefathers

Page 14442

 1   lived, where his sons live, and to which he belongs.  The initial thesis of the

 2   Prosecution – that the purpose of the joint criminal enterprise was to ensure

 3   lasting Serb control over the autonomous province of Kosovo and Metohija which

 4   is an integral part of Serbia – is completely absurd.  I assume that each

 5   country has the right to have control over its integral part.  What would the

 6   world look like if in every country some group, regardless of how numerous it

 7   is, through armed force, wished to cut off a part of its territory and the

 8   state organs have -- do not have the right to react to those acts of violence?

 9             As the beginnings of the plan to retain lasting Serbian control

10     over the province in paragraph 37, which is to be found in the portion

11     describing the legal changes by which the Serb leadership wanted to place

12     Kosovo under its direct control, mention is made of special measures

13     taken by the Presidency of the SFRY.  The SFRY is not Serbia; it is a

14     Federation within which Serbia, with its two autonomous provinces, was

15     just one of the member states.  The Prosecution forgets or intentionally

16     leaves out the fact that those measures were introduced because of the

17     violence of Kosovo Albanians and that Serbia did not introduce it, but

18     a federal state which was then made up of Slovenia, Croatia,

19     Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and finally Serbia.  Those

20     measures were taken by the Presidency of the SFRY within the frameworks

21     of its constitutional authority and it was supported by the Assembly of

22     the SFRY because they were undertaken in order to safe-guard the

23     territorial integrity and constitutional order of the SFRY, securing

24     public law and order, freedom, life, work, and the normalisation of the

25     overall situation in the autonomous province of Kosovo.

Page 14443

 1             The Prosecution furthermore states in paragraphs 50 and 51 that

 2     the Assembly of the SFRY adopted a programme of preventing the emigration

 3     of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo in January 1990, which condemns the

 4     implementation of the goals of Albanian nationalists for an ethnically

 5     pure Kosovo.  And this quotes an example that the Serbian political

 6     leadership was convinced that the demographic balance of Kosovo had to be

 7     changed in order to retain political control over the province.

 8             We should once again like to stress that this programme was

 9     adopted by the Assembly of the SFRY, that is to say six member states,

10     not the Serb leadership.  Would the National Assembly of the Republic of

11     Serbia and its declaration adopted on the 27th of November, 1992, on

12     human rights and the rights of national minorities, would it observe in

13     point 4 of the declaration - and this is otherwise Exhibit P55 - what it

14     did observe with -- by providing exact information and which is only in

15     part stressed by the Prosecution in paragraph 52 of its final brief that

16     none of this happened.  And finally, in paragraph 53 the Prosecution

17     states and draws the conclusion that this inflammatory rhetoric led to

18     systematic crimes against the Kosovo Albanians stipulated in the

19     indictment.

20             This kind of conclusion is only one completely distorted

21     political construction which the Prosecution wished to present in order

22     to justify its accusations.  No difference is made between the decisions

23     taken by the former SFRY, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and Serbia,

24     and they don't enter into the reasons for which all these states had to

25     undertake certain measures on the territory of the autonomous province of

Page 14444

 1     Kosovo and Metohija.

 2             In 1999, the Republic of Serbia was a component part of the

 3     Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as one of its member, the other was the

 4     Republic of Montenegro.  Kosovo and Metohija as well as the autonomous

 5     province of Vojvodina were integral parts of the Republic of Serbia.

 6     Within the autonomous province of Kosovo and Metohija, you had Albanians,

 7     Montenegrins, Serbs, Turks, and Roma, as well as other minorities living

 8     there.  And regardless of their national affiliation, they had equal

 9     political and other rights just like everybody else in Serbia, all other

10     Serbian citizens.  Since the constitution of the Republic of Serbia

11     passed on the 28th of September, 1990, determined the sovereignty of the

12     Republic of Serbia and that the republic belonged to all its citizens.

13     In the Republic of Serbia, the autonomous province of Vojvodina and

14     Kosovo and Metohija forms a territorial autonomy.  In official use in the

15     Republic of Serbia, you had the Serbo-Croatian language, and in the areas

16     of the Republic of Serbia where nationalities lived, they were able to

17     use their language and script in the manner prescribed by law.  The

18     separatist aspirations of the Albanians have their roots in the mid-1960s

19     of the 20th sentry when the slogan was put forward "Kosovo Republic."

20     And just as Witness Jokanovic in these proceedings explained to us, this

21     slogan represented the call of the Albanian separatists for Kosovo and

22     Metohija from a non-state status to be given the status of a republic,

23     which meant the status of a state, and thereby members of the Federation

24     and the right to self-determination until secession.

25             In the history of Yugoslav federalism Kosovo and Metohija never

Page 14445

 1     had the status of a state, just like the autonomous province of

 2     Vojvodina, with the proviso that the position of the autonomous provinces

 3     changed depending on the will of the ruling political majority which was

 4     manifest through the constitutions of the SFRY and the Federal Republic

 5     of Yugoslavia.  The secessionist demands of the Albanian political

 6     parties did not have as their aim to realise the rights of the Albanian

 7     nation within the frameworks of the Republic of Serbia and Yugoslavia, in

 8     view of the fact that those rights were equal rights enjoyed by all, but

 9     the secession from Serbia and Yugoslavia and the founding of an

10     independent and autonomous state of Kosovo.

11             With the establishment and actions of the KLA, an armed struggle was

12   proclaimed as the sole means of accomplishing the political goal of creating

13   an independent state of Kosovo and secession from the Republic of Serbia.  The

14     Prosecutor's interpretation of the political historical context is mostly

15     incorrect.  Every sovereign country in the world is authorised and takes

16     measures to preserve its territorial integrity and sovereignty.  You

17     cannot have in one state, in addition to legal organs of authority, a

18  parallel system of power and authority in existence because a political group

19  rallied on a national basis which is to secede and conducts illegal elections

20  for these alleged organs and forms their own police and army.  Acts of this kind

21  in all countries are termed anti-constitutional and are punishable.  When such

22  subversive actions take on concrete forms in the formation of a parallel MUP

23  or Ministry of Defence and start anti-constitutional acts, then criminal

24  prosecution is a legitimate response of any state to such phenomena and events.

25  Would a single country in the world tolerate to have in its state schools,

Page 14446

 1     universities, faculties, tuition according to tuitions powers and

 2     programmes of some other state, I ask you?  Isn't it normal that in one

 3     country a teaching plan and programme is applied of the country on which

 4     territory it is and throughout its territory.  In mid-1998, along with

 5     the material and financial assistance from abroad, the KLA undertook

 6     broad-based terrorist activities to cut off Kosovo and Metohija from

 7     Serbia.  Because of attacks against members of the MUP and the Army of

 8     Yugoslavia, kidnapping of civilians and killing of civilians,

 9     non-Albanians and Albanians alike, who did not want to join the terrorist

10     forces, cutting across the main communication routes and preventing

11     normal activity from taking place and taking territory by the KLA, the

12     state was forced to defend the sovereigty and territorial integrity,

13     lives and property of all citizens living on the territory of Kosovo and

14     Metohija.

15             Bearing in mind all of the above, OTP's thesis and conclusions

16     about origins of the JCE are erroneous and especially with regard to the

17     place and role of Vlastimir Djordjevic.  Vlastimir Djordjevic is charged

18     with being a member of the JCE, together with Slobodan Milosevic,

19     Nikola Sainovic, Vlajko Stojiljkovic, Sreten Lukic, Dragoljub Ojdanic,

20     Nebojsa Pavkovic, Vladimir Lazarevic, as well as Radomir Markovic,

21     Obrad Stevanovic, and Dragan Ilic.

22             Vlastimir Djordjevic was a professional member of the MUP and he

23     acted in keeping with the laws and regulations of the Republic of Serbia

24     and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as well as decisions by competent

25     state bodies and he did not participate in the creation of the state

Page 14447

 1     policies.  He undertook measures and actions within the remit of his

 2     position in the republican MUP in keeping with Minister Stojiljkovic's

 3     decisions.  He never attended any meeting where political issues were

 4     discussed or where political decisions were made.  He was not a member of

 5     any political party including even the ruling SPS.  He attended meetings

 6     upon invitation by President Milan Milutinovic and the minister of the

 7     interior Vlajko Stojiljkovic as part of MUP delegations, and at such

 8     meetings the security of the state was discussed.

 9             He never got involved in any discussions at the meetings that he

10     attended.  He didn't report or contributed to any decision-making

11     processes.  Vlastimir Djordjevic did not have any personal relationship

12     with Slobodan Milosevic, and his only contact with him were at official

13     meetings.  Djordjevic did not receive a single task from Milosevic and he

14     did not act pursuant to his orders or tasks and no single evidence to

15     that fact was adduced.

16             In para 18, the OTP alleges that Milosevic had very significant

17     de facto authorities over the MUP without any corroboration.  His

18     allegations that Milosevic implemented control over the Joint Command

19     through Sainovic and Minic, the OTP in paragraph 262, footnote 586,

20     proves, based on the testimony of Witness Vasiljevic.  In 1998

21     Witness Vasiljevic was already retired and he didn't attend a single

22     Joint Command meeting in the course of 1998.  There is no single record

23   establishing that either he or Minic attended either of the meetings in 1999,

24   especially not a meeting with Vasiljevic.  Witness Vasiljevic pointed out that

25   he presented his view of Sainovic's authority over Pavkovic, Lazarevic, and

Page 14448

 1     Lukic, and he never even mentioned Djordjevic.  In transcript that's page

 2     5699 to page number 5700.  He met the president of the Republic of

 3     Serbia, Milan Milutinovic, only at meetings as part of the delegations of

 4     the Republic of Serbia MUP headed by the minister.

 5             Vlastimir Djordjevic met Nikola Sainovic at meetings within the

 6     framework of the MUP delegations, and in 1998 during the implementation

 7     of the plan for countering terrorism, he participated at meetings in

 8     Pristina attended by politicians, soldiers, and policemen.  However, he

 9     did not receive a single order from Sainovic and there is no evidence to

10     corroborate that.  There is no single piece of evidence that Sainovic

11     issued a single task to Djordjevic, that he was his superior, and that

12     Djordjevic reported to Sainovic.

13             One has to bear in mind that Sainovic was the vice-president of

14     the federal government, and as of October 1998 he was also the president

15     of the commission for cooperation with the KVM.  And that he had

16     contacts with the MUP and the staff of the MUP in Pristina within the

17     framework of his authorities and tasks.  In the course of 1999 during the

18     war, the only meeting that Sainovic took place in the month of May when a

19     report was submitted to the Supreme Command Staff.  Djordjevic had a

20     single meeting with General Ojdanic in May 1999 at the debriefing to the

21     superior command staff.  All the other contacts with -- at the

22     Supreme Command Staff and the Main Staff of the army were by

23     Minister Vlajko Stojiljkovic.  During 1998 and during 1999,

24     General Ojdanic, pursuant to the decision of this Tribunal, IT-05-87,

25     dated 26 February 2009, was not marked as a member of the JCE and the OTP

Page 14449

 1     did not appeal that part of the decision.

 2  Djordjevic met Generals Pavkovic and Lazarevic during the war on 18 April 1999,

 3  in Pristina, where he stayed for one day when Lukic was invited to the PRK, and

 4  when Lukic and Stevanovic learned about the order of the resubordination of the

 5  MUP to the chief of the Main Staff, General Ojdanic.  On the -- as well as on

 6 the 4th of May, 1999, when he attended a debriefing at the Supreme Command Staff.

 7     General Lazarevic, according to the decision of this Tribunal, IT-05-87,

 8     dated 26th February 2009, was not marked as a member of the JCE, and the

 9     Prosecution did not appeal that part of the decision.

10     Vlajko Stojiljkovic was the minister of the interior and Vlastimir

11     Djordjevic's superior.  In keeping with the decisions of

12     Minister Stojiljkovic, in 1999 Djordjevic did not spend any time in

13     Kosovo and Metohija.  He was rather in Belgrade, where he was in charge

14  of the RJB in all of its activities, save for the anti-terrorist activities

15  in Kosovo and Metohija, as that part of the work was entrusted to the MUP staff

16  for the countering terrorism pursuant to the minister's decision.  And unlike in

17  1998, his presence in Kosovo in 1999 was either to escort the minister or on his

18  order, due to activities that were not related to suppression of terrorism.

19             Stojiljkovic was responsible for the work of the MUP in the

20     entire territory of the Republic of Serbia, and in keeping with his

21     authorities he could alter the regular organisation and the authorities

22     of the MUP, which indeed he did when he issued a decision on the

23     establishing of the MUP staff, dated 16 June 1998, and when he

24     transferred the RJB authorities and responsibilities of the RJB chief to

25     the MUP staff, which he had established.  He also transferred some of the

Page 14450

 1     authorities of the RDB and the responsibilities of the RDB chief.

 2     Therefore, when it comes to implementing tasks pertaining to the

 3     competence of the MUP staff, the head of the staff for countering

 4     terrorism is responsible exclusively to the minister and nobody else.

 5             Radomir Markovic, up to the end of November 1998, was the

 6     assistant minister of the interior in charge of the crime police and

 7     analysis, and then pursuant to a decision by the minister, he was

 8     assigned to the position as the chief of the RDB and stayed in that

 9     position throughout the war.  Markovic, as an assistant minister and as

10     the chief of the RDB, received his tasks exclusively from the minister.

11     The minister was his only superior and the department chiefs could not

12     issue tasks to each other.  Pursuant to the ministerial decision on the

13     establishing of the staff for countering terrorism, the task for

14     countering terrorism, a special security task in Kosovo and Metohija were

15     transferred to the MUP staff which comprised members of both the

16     departments and their organisational units in Kosovo and Metohija as well

17     as the police units deployed there.

18             The police chiefs of neither of the departments could issue tasks

19     for the MUP staff for countering terrorism, nor could they issue tasks to

20     the members of their units belonging to their departments who were sent

21     to Kosovo and Metohija for anti- -- to counter anti-terrorist activities

22     and to engage in special security tasks.

23             In the course of 1999 Radomir Markovic and Vlastimir Djordjevic

24     discharged duties as the chiefs of departments within the remits defined

25     by the minister.  General Obrad Stevanovic was the assistant minister in

Page 14451

 1  charge of the line of work of the police administration and the operative centre

 2     of the high school and the police academy.  The Prosecutor's allegation

 3     that Obrad Stevanovic was the chief of the police administration were not

 4  proven, and his function and position cannot be proven by anybody's statement.

 5  And the reference in the Prosecutor's final brief, which allegedly proves that

 6  Stevanovic was the chief of the police administration in 1999, is contrary to

 7  the statement by Witness Cvetic, para 21 of the OTP's final brief, footnote 27,

 8  and in several other places we can find the same thing.

 9    If -- one can see that Stevanovic was the assistant minister in the decision

10  on the establishment of the ministerial collegium, dated 4 December 1998,

11  Exhibit D208, and primarily from the dispatch, dated 4th of June, 1997, Exhibit

12  P263 where the lines of work of the assistant minister are defined.  In all

13  minutes of the MUP Staff where General Obrad Stevanovic was present, he is

14  always mentioned as the assistant minister and not a single time as the chief of

15  the administration of the police.

16             THE INTERPRETER:  Can you slow down for the benefit of one and

17     all, thank you.

18             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] Major-General Sreten Lukic,

19     pursuant to the minister -- the decision of the minister of the interior,

20     dated 16 June 1998, was appointed chief of the staff of the MUP for

21     countering terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija.  Pursuant to a decision,

22     Exhibit P57, the tasks that were given to the Staff derogated the

23     competencies of both MUP departments to the extent that their

24     competencies and responsibilities had been transferred to the MUP Staff,

25     therefore Sreten Lukic could not be answerable to Vlastimir Djordjevic

Page 14452

 1     for his work or be subordinated to him or to the RDB chief, but only to

 2     the minister who had taken that decision.

 3             By its nature, the staff was an inter-departmental body.  It

 4     comprised both the RJB and the RDB as well -- in terms of both the

 5     personnel and the organisation and that's why it was answerable only to

 6     the minister.  The minister entrusted the planning, organisation, and the

 7     management of anti-terrorist activities and special security tasks to the

 8     MUP staff.  Therefore, the head of the staff could be answerable to --

 9     for his work and the work of the Staff only to the minister and the

10     minister was the only person who could give him any tasks or orders.

11             General Dragan Ilic was the chief of the crime police

12     administration.  From the 4th of December, 1998, he was appointed a

13     member of the collegium.  The only chief of the RJB administration from

14     the base of the minister who was appointed a member of the collegium by

15     name was the chief of the UKP and all the other chiefs of the RJB

16     administration attended the collegium meetings upon minister's

17     invitations.

18             I would like to point to an error in the transcript, line 21 on

19     page 16, one word is missing, and that is the MUP staff.

20             When minister general -- when General Radomir Markovic was

21     assigned to the position of the chief of the RDB, pursuant to a decision

22     on the minister, the minister did not appoint the assistant minister in

23     charge of the work of the crime police, and when he appointed him as a

24     collegium member, the minister directly issued tasks to the chief of the

25     UKP, General Ilic, both at collegium meetings as well as during their

Page 14453

 1     personal contacts.  There's no single piece of evidence that

 2     General Dragan Ilic was a member of the joint criminal enterprise.

 3             The OTP persistently insinuates that there was indeed a plan but

 4     that plan simply did not exist.  In its final brief, the OTP continuously

 5     mentions the names of certain persons who were allegedly members of the

 6     joint criminal enterprise, despite the fact that those persons were

 7     tried, and at their trials it was not established that they were members

 8     of any joint criminal enterprise.  All the elements which point to the

 9     existence of guilt have to be proven beyond any reasonable doubt.  The

10     audacious allegations are simply not enough to deprive a person of his

11     freedom.  In no event did the OTP prove beyond any reasonable doubt how

12     could Vlastimir Djordjevic fit into the allegations contained in the

13     indictment, let alone how he can be held responsible for any of those

14     allegations.

15             Vlastimir Djordjevic is sitting in this courtroom today only

16     because he was the chief of the RJB and the assistant minister during the

17     relevant time-period.  There is no evidence about his criminal intent or

18     actions.  The Trial Chamber cannot hold him responsible only because of

19     the fact that during the relevant period he was in a certain position in

20     the Ministry of the Interior.  At that time, a large number of people

21     worked in the MUP and they had all sorts of different authorities.  There

22     were other assistant ministers, but those people are not here today.

23     They are not accused before this Tribunal.  And when I say that, I mean

24     Obrad Stevanovic, Rade Markovic, Dragan Ilic, and let's stop there.

25             The Prosecution alleges that those men were also members of the

Page 14454

 1     joint criminal enterprise.  The Prosecution put those men on their

 2     witness list, but it did not bring them in to provide testimony before

 3     this Trial Chamber.  One thing is certain:  If there were -- if there was

 4     any information about the existence of any plan, this -- these people

 5     would have that information.  So how come they were not invited, they

 6     were not called to testify?  They were not called to testify only because

 7     of the fact that they do not have the information about the existence of

 8     any such plan.  They were not called to testify because they did not have

 9     any information that would charge Vlastimir Djordjevic.  Therefore,

10     people who closely co-operated with Djordjevic were not brought here to

11     testify because they do not have any information that would corroborate

12     the Prosecutor's allegations and there is no such information in the --

13     in the record.

14             The OTP alleges that there was a joint criminal enterprise aimed

15     at committing crimes alleged in the indictment.  According to the

16     Prosecutor's allegations contained in the second paragraph, the goal of

17     that alleged joint criminal enterprise was to secure permanent Serbian

18     control over the autonomous province of Kosovo by way of changing the

19     ethnic balance.  That goal, which is to secure permanent control over

20     one's own territory in its own, is not a criminal goal.

21             During the relevant period, Kosovo and Metohija was part of the

22     territory of the Republic of Serbia, and therefore it was only justified

23     for that territory to be under the control of Serbia.  The problem

24     actually was the fact that that control was being permanently lost under

25     the wave of terrorism and criminal -- crime.  All efforts undertaken to

Page 14455

 1     regain control were aimed against or targeted against the terrorist army,

 2     which according to all the descriptions represented a strong force and

 3     which did not adhere either to the rules of warfare or the rules of the

 4     cease-fire agreed with the mediation of the international community.

 5             In order to prove the existence of a joint criminal enterprise,

 6     one has to prove the existence of the following criminal element, and

 7     that is that at the joint plan of that joint criminal enterprise included

 8     the commission of a crime envisaged by the statute, paragraph 1036.  In

 9     that sense, the Prosecution did not prove the existence of a joint

10     criminal enterprise; on the contrary.  The state organs were duty-bound

11     to provide for the security of their own citizens.  More specifically,

12     the Ministry of the Interior was duty-bound to secure the security of its

13     own citizens which included their protection from terror and violence --

14     acts of violence committed by terrorist forces, as well as to protect

15     citizens from shelling and other extraordinary circumstances.

16             This duty unambiguously arises from Article 1 of the Law of the

17     Internal Affairs and Article 2 of the rules of the internal organisation

18     of the MUP.

19             All crimes alleged in the indictment are part of the plan which

20     allegedly was implemented in -- during the period between the 24th of

21     March and the 20th of June, 1999.  The OTP continuously imposes an

22     allegation that 800.000 Kosovan Albanians were expelled from the

23     province, but they didn't manage to prove why they left.  The numbers are

24     unclear in terms of their ethnicity, and the only thing that

25     Mr. Neil Wright could present was the fact that Albanians from Kosovo

Page 14456

 1     constituted a large majority.

 2             If, according to the estimates, approximately 80 to 85 Kosovar

 3     Albanians lived in the territory, why is it strange then that the large

 4     majority of the people who left the territory were, in fact, ethnic

 5     Albanians?  No one has put in any effort to determine how many members of

 6     other ethnic communities left the territory of Kosovo and Metohija in the

 7     relevant period.  This information would confirm that the percentage of

 8     the people from other ethnic communities that left Kosovo and Metohija

 9     was proportionately greater than that of the Albanian population.  Since

10     no evidence has been adduced as to the way in which this plan was

11     adopted, what it contained, who was in charge of the plan, and what it

12     was supposed to achieve, the Prosecution is trying to show that this plan

13     must have existed, stating in its paragraph 48 -- 458 the following:

14             [In English] "The scale of the crimes, their repetition in

15     village after village throughout Kosovo and the sheer number of victims

16     demonstrate that there was an organised high-level plan to persecute and

17     expel Kosovo Albanians and discourage them from ever returning."

18             [Interpretation] As the Prosecution claims, a conclusion must be

19     drawn to that effect on the basis of crime-base evidence, despite the

20     lack of any evidence that anyone had actually planned or ordered anything

21     of the sort.  Crime-base evidence does not show that the plan even

22     existed, the plan that the Prosecution is trying to show existed.  There

23     was movement of population and there were crimes, but one cannot draw a

24     conclusion from that that there must have been a plan.  This was merely a

25     result of a situation in a war-ravaged area, a situation in which

Page 14457

 1     movement of population was a logical consequence.  The Prosecution claims

 2     that there must have been a campaign of expulsion; however, it is quite

 3     strange that the Prosecution fails to take into account the fact that the

 4     rest of the people left too and the percentage was the same, as

 5     highlighted in the final brief of the Defence and as presented in the

 6     UNHCR data.

 7             It is quite astounding that 17.500 mostly Serbs left Kosovo in

 8     the period of only three days, between the 14th and the 16th of June; we

 9     can see that in Exhibit P737 and at pages 21 to 23.  This was certainly a

10     sizeable percentage of the Serb population that still remained in Kosovo

11     and Metohija and it occurred in the time-period relevant for the

12     indictment.  Those Serbs left the province of their own free will, in the

13     same way in which the rest of the population had done in the previous

14     months, not in line with any plan.  If you have a war in a certain area,

15     then as a consequence the population will flee.

16             Several witnesses in their statements and their evidence before

17     the Court stated that they simply feared the unknown.  There is a very

18     small number of examples that indicates that there was the pattern that

19     the Prosecution is trying to depict as a co-ordinated widespread and

20     systematic.  There are many more examples of people hearing this kind of

21     rumours and leaving because there was a campaign to spread fear.  Some

22     witnesses in their evidence stated that they had been told to leave, but

23     not by Serbs but by KLA members or their village elders.  Whatever their

24     motives, they cannot be represented as a plan to expel the

25     Kosovar Albanians.

Page 14458

 1             A large number of these people left for Montenegro, which was

 2     part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  Many left for Serbia proper,

 3     north of Kosovo, although the UNHCR did not put in a lot of effort to

 4     actually record how many of them and who they were.  There is absolutely

 5     no reason why those people would want to leave to the areas -- to those

 6     areas had they really been fleeing the forces of the FRY or Serbia.

 7     Crime-base evidence adduced by the Prosecution does not corroborate the

 8     conclusion that there was an organised plan or orchestrated efforts.

 9     This evidence confirms quite the opposite.  There was a climate of war,

10     chaos, and confusion.  The Prosecution is trying to show that there was a

11     plan to expel people, but the evidence adduced before this Court confirms

12     that this was, in fact, voluntary movement of people, of population.

13     This evidence shows that people chose, of their own free will, to leave

14     the areas where there was fierce fighting, where bombs rained down, and

15     where they lacked basic means of livelihood.

16             There is virtually no evidence that would fit into this pattern

17     the Prosecution alleges existed to the fact that the Serb forces

18     methodically channelled Albanian refugees to the borders and transit

19     points.  This is at para 512.  Quite the opposite.  The record abounds

20     with evidence of groups moving from town to town within Kosovo because

21     people thought that they should go wherever the group is going.

22             In several situations the Serb forces actually made those people

23     go back.  There is nothing systematic in this kind of movement of people

24     which would amount to evidence of the existence of any kind of methodical

25     plan.

Page 14459

 1             Based on the examination of the crime-base evidence, it is quite

 2     clear that people left for a variety of reasons, mostly boiling down to

 3     their personal choice, to go to safer areas.  It was a matter of personal

 4     choice then and not a widespread and systematic plan, as alleged in the

 5     indictment.  All evidence of all the witnesses should be considered very

 6     carefully in order to discern the real reason for their departure instead

 7     of settling for what the Prosecution is claiming.  In many cases, the

 8     Prosecution indicated that the witness would testify of about how he or

 9     she was expelled and in the course of the cross-examination it would turn

10     out that they had gone because they had heard something was going on or

11     because they hadn't felt safe.

12             For every allegation of deportation or forcible transfer, it is

13     necessary to prove that there was a lack of choice on the part of the

14     alleged victim and the intent to effect the permanent displacement.

15             Mr. President, Your Honour, I would now like us to move into

16     closed session.

17             JUDGE PARKER:  Private.

18                           [Private session]

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 14460











11  Pages 14460-14461 redacted. Private session.















Page 14462

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11                           [Open session]

12             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, we're back in open session.

13             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] In order to prove that within a

14     joint criminal enterprise there was a plan that covered the commission of

15     those crimes, one has to ask how the plan would be implemented without

16     any orders or instructions.  There is no link between the acts committed

17     on the ground attributable to irresponsible individuals and the putative

18     plan made at higher levels simply because there was no any such plan.

19     There's only any attempt on the part of the Prosecution to establish a

20     link between all the tragic incidents that happened during the state of

21     war.  In order to corroborate its arguments, the Prosecution is trying to

22     bring back the images of the Holocaust of the Second World War,

23     especially when it alleges that there was organised transport and the

24     destruction of the personal identification documents in order to wipe out

25     those persons' identities.  However, these allegations are unfounded and

Page 14463

 1     they cannot serve to show there was any kind of a plan.

 2             As regards the organised transport, the Prosecution is trying to

 3     paint a picture of people being rounded up, being put on board trains and

 4     buses and taken away; however, the evidence does not corroborate this

 5     vision painted by the Prosecution.  The only evidence, as regards the

 6     organised transport, pertains to the scheduled departures of trains and

 7     buses and just a few buses.  At the worst there were just a few special

 8     trains and buses added to the regular timetable to accommodate a large

 9     number of people who wanted to leave.  In order to corroborate its

10     argument that people were transported out of the country, the Prosecution

11     relies on the evidence presented by Bajram Bucaliu.  However, Bucaliu,

12     who was familiar with the timetable, actually says that he decided to go

13     to Macedonia on a scheduled train departing at 8.00 a.m.  When they were

14     not allowed to cross the border on that day, and this strikingly

15     undermines the argument that there was a plan to deport those people, the

16     people went back home and the next day they simply returned to the

17     railway station to catch the next train.

18             In addition to Bucaliu, the Prosecution relies for the most part

19     on the testimony of Witness Nazalie Bala.  What is missing from her

20     description of how she went to the railway station is the fact that the

21     Pristina city centre had been fiercely bombed on the 28th and the 29th of

22     March.  It is reasonable to assume that people were panic-stricken when

23     bombs started falling in their midst.  The evidence of this witness is

24     consistent with the evidence of Emin Kabashi, in that they both say they

25     saw a large number of people on the railway station.  However, Kabashi

Page 14464

 1     does not say that people were forced to board the trains.  In fact,

 2     Kabashi waited there for three days before he was able to leave with his

 3     family.

 4             Furthermore, unlike Witness Bala, Kabashi does not say anything

 5     about being forced to cross the border at Djeneral Jankovic.  In fact, he

 6     stayed the next six days there waiting.  Generally speaking, the claims

 7     made by Witness Bala about the armed forces guarding the buses are

 8     questionable as regards their reliability, and her political affiliation

 9     and interests bring into doubt her credibility, especially in light of

10     the fact that she has ties with the Council for the Defence of Human

11     Rights and Liberties and she's a member of the Democratic Party of Kosovo

12     led by Hashim Thaqi, Exhibit P421, transcript page 2176.

13             When there was evidence about the buses in a small number of

14     cases, they were often hired by witnesses themselves because they wanted

15     to leave.  This proved to be the case in Gerxhaliu's case who organised

16     transportation by bus to Montenegro, and in Morine's evidence who says

17     that the buses were hired by civilians, Exhibit P284, transcript page

18     930.  The Prosecution also relies on claims made by Halit and

19     Hyseni Berisha as regards to two buses in Suva Reka.  That's P598, page

20     4, and Hyseni is testifying about the same thing.  The buses were used to

21     transport people who left the town and did not have their own cars.

22             It is not known who actually hired those two buses.  This was not

23     part of any systematic pattern as the Prosecution would like to show.

24     This was just a couple of buses hired by unidentified private persons.

25     These were not elements of a system effecting the expulsion, just

Page 14465

 1     privately hired buses used by the people to leave this area until the

 2     air-strikes finished and until the state of war ended.

 3             This is all the evidence adduced in order to prove there was a

 4     comprehensive plan to transport people out of the country.  However, the

 5     Prosecution simply used the regular transportation system and scheduled

 6     departures to depict them as a system for the deportation.  This was not

 7     sufficient to prove that there was a plan, just as it would not be

 8     sufficient to go to central station here in The Hague.  Let me illustrate

 9     the point in this way where you can see the railway traffic going on.  If

10     you had the state of war in the Netherlands now, there would be armed

11     guards in the station and it would be full of people trying to leave and

12     seek shelter in other areas nearby.  There's absolutely nothing which

13     would show us how the transportation was organised in order to achieve

14     the deportation of the people because there was no such organisation of

15     the transportation, especially not one that could be called widespread

16     and systematic.

17             The same goes for the allegations regarding the confiscation and

18     destruction of IDs.  The Prosecution is trying to show that as a part of

19     a comprehensive, unwritten tacit plan; however, if we analyse the

20     evidence carefully, the Trial Chamber will see that there is virtually

21     not a single case where the witnesses themselves lost their personal IDs.

22     In their evidence they, in most cases, say they heard about that

23     happening or that they thought they saw it happen to other people, and it

24     is quite strange that we are expected to believe that the witnesses who

25     testified before this Tribunal are exceptions who accidentally managed to

Page 14466

 1     keep their documents with them.  It is absolutely impossible to even try

 2     to understand how this could be a part of a widespread and systematic

 3     plan when in the record you have evidence that after their IDs were

 4     checked people received their IDs, were given back their IDs, as Witness

 5     Florim Elmi Krasniqi said at page 631 -- at Exhibit P631, page 6.  In

 6     paragraph 502 the Prosecution notes that Krasniqi and other witnesses

 7     were not left without their personal IDs, which is in full opposition to

 8     the existence of a methodical plan.

 9             The most compelling evidence on the confiscation of personal

10     documents was provided by Gerxhaliu who said the following:

11             "[In English] Those documents that were issued in Albanian

12     language by the Ministry of the Interior of Kosova, then they tore them

13     up and threw them away."

14             [Interpretation] That's transcript page 3120 -- 29.  It is

15     important to mention this, in view of the fact that the Ministry of the

16     Interior of Kosovo did not exist.  That personal documentation was issued

17     by the parallel authority which was unlawfully established on the

18     territory of the sovereign republic of Serbia.  If certain personal

19     documents were confiscated at all, what happened was what usually happens

20     with unlawfully issued personal documents, which are always of course

21     confiscated.  An example of this was provided by Emin Kabashi, who stated

22     that only the IDs of women were checked.  The fact that men's ID cards

23     were not checked shows that there was no consistent plan; and secondly,

24     the ID card of one woman was returned, and that's in transcript 2374.

25     The fact that the unlawful parallel government issued personal documents

Page 14467

 1     explains stories similar to this, where one ID card was returned while

 2     another was confiscated.  Only unlawfully issued personal documents were

 3     confiscated, and this can be seen from the fact that the witnesses

 4     frequently crossed the border with their legal passports and just threw

 5     away the Kosovo ID cards.

 6             It is important to stress that the documents were very frequently

 7     handed over even when not asked for, as we were able to see from the

 8     evidence adduced, the keeping back of lawful documents had no negative

 9     repercussions.

10             The Prosecutor is trying to make a big thing out of the burning

11     of personal documents on the basis of what was stated by

12     General Drewienkiewicz and Ciaglinski.  According to General DZ, he just

13     quickly glanced through six documents which were in a heap of documents

14     that were burnt.  He never confirmed what type of documents they were and

15     it wouldn't be unreasonable to expect that those six documents belonged

16     to Kosovo Albanians, while in that heap of other documents you had

17     documents belonging to other ethnicities.  He does not know who set fire

18     to the documents nor why they were burnt, so that the observation made

19     that this was part of a plan is mere speculation, especially bearing in

20     mind the fact that General DZ himself was not convinced that any plan

21     ever existed.

22             There are several reasonable reasons which could be ascribed to

23     the burning of documents, and one of those reasons is that they -- it

24     meant the destruction of old or archived documents, documents which had

25     expired.  The fact that Ciaglinski saw the burning of a large quantity of

Page 14468

 1     archive material immediately before the MUP left the territory reinforces

 2     this theory.  Ciaglinski saw that various documents were being destroyed,

 3     not only ID cards, and that is to be found on transcript page 5377 to

 4     5378.  He also has a photograph on which you can't see much except for a

 5     bit of smoke, but he has no photographs showing the documents themselves.

 6     In addition to that, he did not show us any burnt documents which he says

 7     he took.  Although he was not able to comment the destruction of the

 8     archive as a routine part of the work of every organisation,

 9     Michael Phillips testified that the KLM did the same before it withdrew

10     from Kosovo and Metohija.  He explained that they did not do that because

11     they wanted to hide that documentation from anyone, but quite simply that

12     they didn't want to leave the documentation behind, so that finally they

13     ended up by destroying large quantities of material, transcript page

14     8748.

15             There is no reason why we should not apply the same rule to old

16     citizens' archives in Kosovo and Metohija.  Witness K54 never received

17     any such orders nor did any member of the Army of Yugoslavia receive them

18     or the MUP, nor did they testify that they'd ever received any orders of

19     that kind.  Witness K54 testified that he was at the border crossings but

20     he never saw that personally taking place, transcript page 4389, 4418 to

21     4419.  Generally speaking, in the records there's no proof or evidence

22     that the checking or confiscation of personal documents was widespread

23     and systematic and that it was a policy.  Moreover, there is no proof

24     that any such policy ever existed or that any of the border authorities

25     were informed of any such plan.  The confiscation of ID cards in order to

Page 14469

 1     wipe out somebody's identity would have absolutely no effects since

 2     citizens, just like in any other country, were able to get new ID

 3     documents at any time.

 4             The basic documents of citizens were never destroyed and all

 5     citizens of Kosovo and Metohija could have issued their birth

 6     certificates and other personal documents.  They could do this on the

 7     territory of Serbia and also in the consular offices of the SRY abroad.

 8     They did that then and they're still doing it today.

 9             When it comes to accusations relating to the crime of murder, the

10     Prosecution has failed to show that those acts were ordered, or rather,

11     that there exists any link between the murders and some sort of plan.

12     Even in cases where the Trial Chamber can ascertain that the crime of a

13     murder took place, these were unfortunate incidents involving individuals

14     and they were acts which were in no way linked to any sort of plan or

15     joint criminal enterprise.

16             Adding incidents in Podujevo into the indictment is something

17     which weakened the Prosecution's arguments most, because this incident is

18     absolutely contrary to the existence of any such plan which would be

19     implemented.  The incident in Podujevo occurred on the 28th of March,

20     1999, and it coincides in the -- within the period, which according to

21     theory -- the theory of the Prosecution, the Serb forces were

22     implementing the forcible transfer of individuals, murder, prosecution,

23     according to a plan, including deportation.  However, in Podujevo there

24     was no plan for expulsion.  If there existed a widespread and systematic

25     plan, why then did not that plan incorporate Podujevo too?  Because there

Page 14470

 1     was no plan and the Prosecution knows full well that the evidence related

 2     to the incident in Podujevo are directly against the grain of the

 3     existence of any all-embracing plan.

 4             Although in Podujevo an act of murder had taken place, it is

 5     clear that it wasn't ordered nor permitted nor accepted, even less so.

 6     Assistance to the victims was given by the doctors of MUP.  The victims

 7     were sent to hospitals in Pristina and Belgrade.  Had there really been a

 8     widespread and systematic plan, none of these measures would have been

 9     taken.

10             The forensic evidence presented by the Prosecution is not

11     convincing enough.  With respect to the incident in Izbica, there is

12     great doubt about where the bodies were found first and under what

13     conditions and how these individuals lost their lives in the first place.

14     There are significant indices to show that instead of a crime there was a

15     montage, and the Court should reach the conclusion that the forensic

16     evidence presented was suspect, fraught with doubt, and therefore cannot

17     be used to support the allegations made by the Prosecution.

18             The same is true for Kotlina, where the site of the crime was

19     contaminated by the villagers much before the official investigating

20     teams arrived on the spot, even during the investigation.  In addition to

21     that, the Prosecution theory does not coincide with the report of the

22     Austrian forensic team either.

23             In numerous cases the forensic evidence quite simply does not

24     tally with the testimony given by witnesses.  As an example Dr. Stankovic

25     testified that the Austrian report on the alleged killings in Kacanik in

Page 14471

 1     no way supports the allegations contained in the statement given by

 2     Witness Hazbi, Loku.  The crime base is not connected with

 3     Vlastimir Djordjevic at all and is difficult for the Defence to respond

 4     because it is so far-fetched and far away from his responsibilities.

 5     Numerous witnesses were called who spoke of the original want -- alleged

 6     wanton destruction, but it is considered that the damage was not seen by

 7     witnesses.  Riedlmayer also couldn't confirm who inflicted the damage,

 8     let alone the intention to intentionally commit damage.  The Prosecution

 9     says that Riedlmayer's findings, as well as what the witnesses saw on the

10     ground, shows that the Serbs intentionally destroyed Albanian cultural

11     and religious sites.  There is no evidence which shows that anybody

12     committed these crimes with the intention coinciding with the crime of

13     persecution.  Riedlmayer has absolutely no qualifications or expertise on

14     which to base his assessments and evaluations.  This area was subject to

15     different combat operations, and therefore collateral damage represents a

16     reasonable explanation for fires and shooting.  Certainly without

17     reliable witnesses, we cannot ascribe this to the SRJ forces in Serbia

18     only on the basis of assumptions.

19             The Prosecution claims:

20             [In English] "The targeted nature of the damage demonstrates that

21     it was the result of deliberate acts by the Serb forces, not NATO

22     air-strikes.  Religious and cultural sites of Serbs and other ethnicities

23     were spared."

24             [Interpretation] Not only is that not true, but on the basis of

25     this one cannot conclude anything about who and why inflicted damages on

Page 14472

 1     those facilities.  We must remind ourselves that there were military

 2     operations underway and that the protection of cultural heritage does not

 3     represent a priority if such facilities are being used for military

 4     purposes.  And there we have a related judgement of the Blaskic trial

 5     judgement, paragraph 185, see also the Second Protocol of The Hague

 6     Convention of 1954, Article 6.

 7             Certain evidence indicates that the damage inflicted was caused

 8     by the NATO bombing as well.  Vlastimir Djordjevic had no knowledge of

 9     the fact that any crime of wanton destruction had been committed, and

10     even if the Court ascertains that in certain cases there was intentional

11     damage, Vlastimir Djordjevic was not in the field, in the area, and could

12     not have seen anything like that taking place.

13             As a summary of all this, the Prosecution attempted to insinuate

14     the existence of some sort of plan on the basis of the crimes committed

15     during a war, whereas there never was any such plan.  In the Federal

16     Republic of Yugoslavia, a state of war was proclaimed precisely at the

17     moment when these unfortunate incidents took place.  The fact that in war

18     ugly things happen does not prove that an all-embracing plan existed for

19     things like that to happen.  The victims and fear were never part of any

20     plan, but the results of these events.

21             The Defence, in its final brief, pointed to ten other reasons for

22     this population movement.  See paragraph 729.  In the absence of any

23     proof and evidence of the existence of a plan, it is sufficient to look

24     at a reasonable reason where we have reasonable doubt with respect to the

25     existence of a tacit plan.  We mentioned reasonable reasons for the

Page 14473

 1     movement of population; and, first of all, we'd like to focus on the

 2     non-selective bombing of NATO forces, the fear of people that they would

 3     be caught up in the cross-fire of combat, manipulation by the KLA,

 4     propaganda by the KLA and NATO.  All these reasons throw great doubt on

 5     the reasons for which 800.000 people moved, for which Neil Wright says

 6     that to a large extent they were Kosovo Albanians, especially bearing in

 7     mind that a similar percentage of the non-Albanian population also left

 8     Kosovo.  But this was recorded in a far less adequate way.

 9             Proof that a plan existed was compiled at top level and that

10     Vlastimir Djordjevic knew about it is something that the Prosecution

11     bases and sets out in paragraph 171 of its final brief.  The allegations

12     made in that paragraph are a drastic example of how the Prosecution makes

13     its conclusions on the basis of incorrectly quoted witness statements and

14     testimony, thereby manipulating the facts in order to prove their case.

15     Paragraph 171 relates to a video recording of the rally of the

16     Serbian Radical Party and Vojislav Seselj's speech at the rally.  The

17     video was compiled by the BBC and it was entitled:  "The fall of

18     Milosevic," and it was Exhibit P1510.  We should like to ask you to focus

19     your attention on that.  Under quotations, the Prosecutor claims that

20     Djordjevic's words, with respect to this video when they allegedly quote

21     him and place quotation marks, they say that Djordjevic said as follows:

22             "The parliament fully supported Milosevic's rejection of the

23     conditions set out in Rambouillet as did the Serbian public.  The Serbian

24     deputy premier uncovered what Milosevic planned to do next.  If NATO --

25     NATO starts bombing and if an American aggression takes place, we Serbs

Page 14474

 1     will suffer significant casualties, but there will be no more Albanians

 2     in Kosovo."

 3             And as a footnote, they mention the transcript of the testimony

 4     of Vlastimir Djordjevic, transcript page 10044 to 10045.

 5             The Defence was highly surprised and assumes that the Prosecution

 6     made a chance error in this particular case and not an intentional one,

 7     placing words into Vlastimir Djordjevic's mouth, something he didn't say,

 8     which is in complete contradiction with his response.  All the words

 9     under quotation -- quoted under quotation marks as being uttered by

10     Vlastimir Djordjevic were, in fact, the words of the BBC narrator from

11     the video shown, and the transcript pages which the Prosecution quotes is

12     from the audio recording of the video.

13             Vlastimir Djordjevic's reply is to be found on the following page

14     of the transcript, 10046, and it is completely contrary to what the

15     Prosecution claims.  This is what he said:

16             "I really don't know anything about this rally of his, and

17     otherwise it is well-known that he uses all -- every misfortunate that

18     befalls the Serbian people for his own political gain, to score political

19     points.  He did not deliver this speech as the vice premier, and this is

20     the first time that I see this.  What he said over there, who was this

21     binding upon?  It is part of Seselj's political story.  He always had

22     some of his own comments to make, but all of them were to promote his own

23     personal gain."

24             Then on transcript page 10145 in response to the following

25     question:

Page 14475

 1             "Did you not know that while you were planning the defence of the

 2     country, certain individuals in the leadership were bent on the expulsion

 3     of the population of Kosovo Albanians from Kosovo as a solution to the

 4     problem in Kosovo?  Were you not aware of the fact that many people in

 5     the leadership expressed these same views?"

 6             And Vlastimir Djordjevic on that same transcript page replied:

 7             "Never did I hear anything like that from any politician, any

 8     such intent or any such plan or any such activity or anybody who was

 9     supposed to implement that plan if any kind of thing like that existed

10     with respect to the expulsion from Kosovo and Metohija."

11             This quotation I think best illustrates the Prosecution's designs

12     by -- and in which way it quoted witnesses and drew conclusions and tried

13     to prove mens rea with Vlastimir Djordjevic about the existence of a

14     plan.

15             Your Honours, I think this is the right time to take a break.

16             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you, indeed.  We will have the first break

17     now and resume at 11.00.

18                           --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.

19                           --- On resuming at 11.03 a.m.

20             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes, Mr. Djordjevic.

21             MR. DJORDJEVIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

22             [Interpretation] The Prosecutor did not prove how the

23     Joint Command met in the course of 1999, or rather, how it might have

24     co-ordinated the alleged expulsion plan.  Joint anti-terrorist actions

25     took place also in 1999; however, the so-called Joint Command, a task

Page 14476

 1     force which comprised a number of individuals and held regular meetings

 2     with Djordjevic in attendance, had been disbanded in 1998.  Even if it

 3     had existed, Vlastimir Djordjevic could not be a member.  Since paragraph

 4     256 of the Prosecution brief alleges that the Joint Command comprised the

 5     senior MUP and VJ leadership in Kosovo and Metohija, the question arises

 6     as to how could Djordjevic be one of its members who often attended its

 7     meetings, bearing in mind that during the indictment period he was not in

 8     the territory of Kosovo and Metohija, but rather in Belgrade.

 9             Vlastimir Djordjevic personally was unaware of the existence of

10     any JC command which might have continued to work after the October

11     Agreements.  In terms of planning and implementation, the co-ordination

12     of anti-terrorist activities involved the MUP staff of counter-terrorism

13     and the Pristina Corps during the course of 1999 as well.  There was

14     never co-ordination at the MUP and Main Staff of the army of the 3rd Army

15     level when it came to the planning or implementation of anti-terrorist

16     actions.

17             At the MUP level, no plans existed for active combat in the event

18     of war.  All MUP and RJB plans referred only to the preparation of their

19     organisational units for activities in war time circumstances.

20     Instructions provided by the RJB for preparations due to the threat of war

21     were sent to all organisational units in the territory of Serbia which were

22     duty-bound to act accordingly in the same way, both in Kosovo and Metohija

23     and elsewhere.  While the threat of NATO intervention was present in early

24     January 1999, the General Staff of the Army issued the Directive Grom 3 and

25     the 3rd Army an order for its units on the implementation of the General

Page 14477

 1     Staff directive.  The Pristina Corps proceeded to elaborate the directive

 2     and initiated its order on 16 February 1999, and the main - and the MUP

 3     Staff, in view of the coordination achieved with the Pristina Corps command

 4     on 17 February 1999, at its own meeting at the Staff briefed the

 5     attendants about planned activities in case of NATO intervention.  The

 6     record of that meeting shows that the briefing provided only general

 7     information and that further planning and elaboration was to be done with

 8     the commanders of the police units under the MUP Staff command.

 9             There is no evidence that Vlastimir Djordjevic or anybody from

10     the RJB centre had participated in planning actions in Kosovo in case of

11     NATO intervention.  If such a plan had indeed existed at the RJB level,

12     it would apply to the territory of entire Serbia because all RJB

13     instructions uniformly regulated the actions of all organisational units

14     in the territory of entire Serbia.  The Prosecutor tried to demonstrate

15     that Djordjevic on the 1st of June, 1999, went to the meeting of a

16     Joint Command; however, there's no proof that he actually attended such a

17     meeting or that in such a meeting was indeed a meeting of the

18     Joint Command.  With the only exception being Witness Vasiljevic's

19     recollection that Djordjevic attended that meeting, but he didn't take

20     the floor.  However, he did not note Djordjevic's presence in his

21     notebook and no other evidence of Djordjevic's presence at the meeting

22     exist.

23             Stojanovic testified and confirmed that none of the allegations

24     are correct.  Djordjevic himself stated that on that day he was not in

25     Pristina and he did not attend any meetings.  Witness Vasiljevic stated

Page 14478

 1     that he attended the meeting on the 1st of June, 1999, in Pristina

 2     together with Djordjevic and that the meeting had been presented to him

 3     as a Joint Command meeting.  He did not consider himself a Joint Command

 4     member.  Even if Djordjevic had possibly attended that meeting, that

 5     would not constitute proof that Djordjevic was a JC member in 1999.  The

 6     OTP thinks that Vasiljevic doesn't have a motive to testify falsely and

 7     that Witness Stojanovic has such a motive.  One has to bear in mind that

 8     Witness Vasiljevic provided his statements to the OTP as a suspect and

 9     that he had never received a notification that the OTP no longer treated

10     him as such.

11             Witness Stojanovic, on the other hand, was never a suspect.  The

12     OTP allegation in paragraph 1075 that Djordjevic as the highest-ranking

13     MUP officer commanded and controlled MUP units and attached units during

14     combat operations has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.  The OTP

15     did not proffer evidence to corroborate such allegations.  Article 54 of

16     the regulation on the organisation of the MUP prescribes that departments

17     are headed by chiefs of departments.  This was corroborated by Djordjevic

18     during his testimony when he explained the regulation on the internal

19     organisation of the MUP, Exhibit P357.  The notorious fact is that the

20     regulation on the internal organisation of the MUP was passed by the

21     minister of the interior and regulated the command of the MUP.  However,

22     the minister has the authority to change the MUP's competencies,

23     organisation, and even responsibilities in keeping with the requirements

24     and takes decision accordingly.  With a view to provide for the most

25     rational use of all MUP resources for anti-terrorist activities in Kosovo

Page 14479

 1     and Metohija, the minister of the interior on the 16th of June, 1998,

 2     issued a decision on setting up a staff for countering terrorism in

 3  Kosovo and Metohija as an inter-departmental body.  He outlined the Staff’s

 4  authorities and tasks as well as the responsibilities of the Head of Staff

 5  with regard to the Staff activities and the state of security with respect

 6  to the implementation of tasks that he was in charge of in the territory

 7  of Kosovo and Metohija.  By issuing this document, the minister derogated the

 8  authorities of both departmental chiefs onto the newly established staff and

 9  transferred their responsibility and authorities to the Chief of Staff.

10             Sending RJB units to Kosovo and Metohija is part of the

11     implementation of the decision of the minister of the interior.  In the

12     dispatches there is no reference to the task that those units were

13     supposed to carry out.  The deployed units received their tasks from the

14     Staff, to which they reported about the activities that had been implemented.

15             The police units in Kosovo and Metohija were answerable to and

16     reported to the MUP staff about the tasks they had carried out and they

17     are not answerable to the departments from which they had been sent.  The

18     regulation on the internal organisation of the MUP applies only to the

19     organisation of the public security sector.  The minister defined the

20     organisation of the state security sector by a special regulation.  Since

21     these are two completely separate basic organisational units of the MUP

22     whose only head is the minister, when issuing his decision on the

23  establishment of the staff for countering terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija,

24  the Minister Stojiljkovic could not and indeed did not invoke the Rules on

25  the internal organisation of the MUP, which applied to the RJB, Exhibit P357,

Page 14480

 1   or the Rules on the internal organisation of the RDB, Exhibit P1349.

 2             He found the legal foundation in Article 7 of the Law on Internal

 3     Affairs, Exhibit P66, and Articles 433, para 1, and Article 69 of the Law

 4     on State Administration, Exhibit P69.  And thus derogated the provisions

 5     of the regulation on the internal organisation of the MUP and the

 6     regulation on the internal organisation of the RDB in the part providing

 7     for the responsibilities of both chiefs for the implementation of the

 8     tasks which he had transferred onto the MUP staff and established the

 9     responsibility of the staff for the implementation of the tasks.

10             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the counsel please slow down.  Thank you.

11             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] Irrespective of their

12     affiliation to the department --

13             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Djordjevic, this is the second time you're

14     going a little too fast for the interpretation.

15             MR. DJORDJEVIC:  Yes.

16             JUDGE PARKER:  I know there's a time demand, but if -- what you

17     say needs to be recorded so if you could just --

18             MR. DJORDJEVIC:  I was just warned from the interpreters and I

19     heard about that, but I am afraid about the time and all things --

20             JUDGE PARKER:  Well, it's better that you be heard and recorded

21     accurately --

22             MR. DJORDJEVIC:  Okay.  Yes, yes.

23             JUDGE PARKER:  -- and leave some minor stuff, if necessary.

24             MR. DJORDJEVIC:  I will take care of that.  Thank you.

25             [Interpretation] Irrespective of their affiliation, all members

Page 14481

 1     of the MUP in Kosovo and Metohija and all organisational units of the MUP

 2     in Kosovo and Metohija were subordinated to the staff when it came to the

 3     implementation of the tasks of countering terrorism and special security

 4     tasks in Kosovo and Metohija, so that the number of members of one or the

 5     other department in Kosovo and Metohija who were involved in those tasks

 6     are not important.

 7          The MUP staff is a sui generis organ which was founded by the minister,

 8  and as such it acted exclusively on the minister's orders to whom it reported

 9  for the work within the scope of responsibilities that the minister entrusted to

10  it.  Witness Cvetic, the chief of the SUP in Kosovska Mitrovica, confirmed that

11  the task of the staff in anti-terrorist activities and what those tasks were,

12  but he was not familiar with the minister's decision on the establishment of the

13  staff for countering terrorism, Exhibit P57, and the responsibilities of the

14     Chief of Staff and his answerability to the minister and not to the chief

15     of the RJB.  His opinion about the nature and the role of the staff of

16     the MUP in the organisation and management of the MUP are not important.

17     And based on the evidence, the Trial Chamber will make inferences about

18     this disputable issue.

19             About its work and the work of the staff for countering terrorism

20     as well as of all the planned and implemented actions in Kosovo and

21     Metohija, the Chief of Staff reported to the minister.  There is no

22     single piece of evidence that he reported to the chief of the RJB about

23     any of those issues.  If Lukic went to Belgrade every week in order to

24     report back to Stevanovic and Djordjevic and the Prosecution refers to

25     Witness Byrnes in footnote 746 to prove that.  However, the witness heard

Page 14482

 1     all that from Lukic.  He does not have first-hand knowledge about all

 2     that.  In the Milutinovic case he also mentioned that Lukic told him that

 3     Stevanovic was the one who was reporting, and in this case he also added

 4     Vlastimir Djordjevic to that.  Byrnes provided quite a number of

 5     illogical facts in his testimony.  For example, that Lukic took over

 6     the function of the Head of Staff from Stevanovic, who was his

 7     predecessor, and the evidence here has established that the Head of

 8     Staff, created at that time by the RJB Chief, was Aco Vesovic.  Witness

 9     Byrnes had no knowledge about the structure and functioning of the MUP,

10     as he, himself, confirmed.  Therefore, he was not in a position to know

11     who was reporting to whom about what and who was answerable to whom and

12     for what.

13             The way the MUP of the Republic of Serbia received information

14     was regulated by an instruction which regulated the obligation of all

15     organisational units about daily reporting in the territory of Serbia.

16     The Prosecution erroneously interprets Exhibit P1056 which is a dispatch

17     of the then-deputy minister and the chief of the RJB, Radovan Stojicic,

18     dated 19th of April, 1996, Exhibit P1056, paragraph 347, footnote 808,

19     and paragraph 3453, footnote 821, by which he established the obligation

20     to report to the MUP staff in Pristina.

21             The instructions contained in that decision with regard to the

22     informing in the relevant period were not in effect.  They referred to

23     the staff which Stojicic had formed as the chief of the sector whose

24     members were -- whose members were members of one department only and

25     that was the department of public security.  From the moment when the

Page 14483

 1     minister established the MUP staff for countering terrorism on the 16th

 2     of June, 1998, from the members of both of the departments, those

 3     instructions were no longer binding upon the head of the -- or the chief

 4     of the MUP staff for countering terrorism.

 5             The best example of an incorrect interpretation on the part of

 6     the OTP that information was conveyed via the chain of command from the

 7     MUP staff to the MUP centre in Belgrade is paragraph 368, footnote 860,

 8     in which he evokes Exhibit P57, bullet point 3, that minister's decision.

 9     In this bullet point, it says explicitly that the Chief of Staff, when it

10     comes to his work, the work of the staff is answerable to the minister to

11     whom he reports about the security developments, measures taken, and the

12     results of those measures.  For that reason, the Prosecution cannot find

13     reference for its further delegation -- allegations that Lukic was

14     directly answerable to minister -- to the minister and Djordjevic and

15     that he played a key role when it came to collecting intelligence from

16     the organisational units at Kosovo and Metohija and conveying such

17     information and intelligence to the centre in Belgrade.

18             There is no single piece of evidence that Lukic was duty-bound to

19     report to the centre in Belgrade or to the chief of the departments about

20     the tasks that he was given by the minister; the contrary is true.  So

21     the whole thing could be seen from the point of view of the Prosecutor

22     accepting that it's no single piece of evidence corroborating allegations

23     that Lukic was answerable to Djordjevic and that he reported to him.

24             The conclusion of the OTP that Vlastimir Djordjevic as the chief

25     of the RJB issued tasks and instructions to the SUP units to the MUP

Page 14484

 1     staff and special units because he sent dispatches, and we state -- and

 2     he stated by way of examples P132, P1202, P1203, D433, P715, P717, P356

 3     is contrary to the evidence which the Prosecution proffers in

 4     corroboration of all its allegations.  All the dispatches were sent to

 5     all the organisational units to the RJB in the territory of Serbia to SUP

 6     units, and because of the role of the MUP staff that the minister had

 7     established, they were also sent to the staff not to issue staff any

 8     tasks, but also to -- for their information so that the staff could issue

 9     their specific orders within the framework of its own tasks and

10     authorities vis-a-vis the SUP units in KiM.

11             P132, the example of delivering the minister’s decision on the

12     establishment of the 124th Intervention Brigade, which is Exhibit P257, and

13     this cannot be interpreted as an order being issued to the SUP units in

14     Kosovo and Metohija and the staff.  This is merely an implementation of the

15     minister's decision and communication with the organisational units which

16     were supposed to implement the decision in keeping with the decision on

17     the establishment of the PJP units.

18           This dispatch did not mean that a task was issued to the Staff, nor did

19     the Staff have any role in implementing the minister’s decision.  The staff

20   did not have -- play any role in the implementation of the minister's decision,

21     stating the dispatch dated 12 June 1999, P1209, as an example of Vlastimir

22     Djordjevic issuing orders to police units in Kosovo and Metohija is nothing

23     short of absurd, in view of the fact that the state leadership had decided to

24     withdraw the police from KiM with a view to implementing the military and

25     technical agreement, and instructions were issued to the workers and the

Page 14485

 1     organisational units of the RJB which were dislocated from the Kosovo and

 2     Metohija, and instructions were given to them as where they would be employed

 3     and had nothing whatsoever to do with the anti-terrorist activities.

 4             The Defence underlines once again that regular security tasks

 5     across the entire Serbia and in Kosovo and Metohija were under the

 6     authority of the RJB.

 7             The Prosecution has absolutely erroneously understood the

 8     position of Vlastimir Djordjevic in the MUP in the course of 1999, and

 9     that's why the allegations against him are -- cannot be born.

10             The Prosecution has corroborated its allegation that Djordjevic

11     was number two man in charge of the RJB units in Kosovo and Metohija

12     exclusively by quoting military General Vasiljevic in a number of places

13     in its final brief.  Witness Vasiljevic, when he gave his statements to

14     the Prosecution, was not familiar with the MUP documents.  And in the

15     long years in which he was interviewed several times by the Prosecution,

16     he had never been shown the decision of Minister Vlajko Stojiljkovic,

17     Exhibit P57.  That's at page 5887, lines -- line 25, and 5888, 1 through

18     3 in the transcript.

19             Even the Prosecution in fact objected in his cross-examination by

20     the Defence when he was asked about the organisation and functioning of

21     the MUP, noting that the witness was not familiar with the organisation

22     of the MUP, that he only -- as regards the control, saying that he has

23     only general knowledge and that he was asked to speculate.  That's at

24     page 5887, lines 2 through 7 of the transcript.

25             Therefore, his evidence about the role of Vlastimir Djordjevic is

Page 14486

 1     based exclusively on his assumptions and opinions.

 2             The Prosecution's conclusion that the international

 3     representatives identified Djordjevic as the RJB leader in Kosovo and

 4     Metohija is completely inaccurate.  Not even the verifiers who mentioned

 5     many politicians and members of the VJ and MUP in their statements

 6     mention Vlastimir Djordjevic.  Drewienkiewicz, Ciaglinski, Maisonneuve,

 7     Phillips do not mention Djordjevic in their statements to the Prosecutor

 8     or, indeed, in their evidence.  The only international representative who

 9     does mention him and Shaun Byrnes, who speaks about the period when

10     Djordjevic was tasked with representing the MUP, together with Stevanovic

11     and Lukic, in the talks in October 1998.  It is the only instance where

12     Byrnes says quite specifically he remembers he saw him, although he

13     believes there might have been other encounters.  When he met Djordjevic

14     in October 1998, Byrnes assumed on the basis of his appearance and

15     behaviour what his role was.  In the cross-examination in the Milutinovic

16     case, that's Exhibit P1214, transcript page 12230, and in the present

17     case, transcript page 8230 through 8233, Byrnes stated that, in fact, he

18     was unfamiliar with the way in which MUP was functioning and structured.

19             In paragraph 1104 of its final brief, the Prosecution states for

20     the first time that Vlastimir Djordjevic and the minister of the interior

21     worked in tandem.  To support this claim, the Prosecution quotes our

22     dispatch, Exhibit P702.  The conclusion that Minister Vlajko Stojiljkovic

23     worked in tandem with Vlastimir Djordjevic is erroneous.  The minister of

24     the interior is the only person who has original powers stipulated by the

25     law and sub-laws.  Two basic organisational units in the MUP were the RJB

Page 14487

 1     and the RDB.  The chiefs of the RJB and the RDB were subordinate to the

 2     minister, and they did their job exclusively in line with the decisions

 3     of the minister.  The minister and the department chiefs did not in any

 4     way work in tandem.

 5             The minister made all the decisions and they were implemented

 6     through the departments.  The manner in which control was exercised in

 7     the MUP depended on the person of the minister.  As for the relationship

 8     between Minister Stojiljkovic and Vlastimir Djordjevic, the only

 9     conclusion that can be drawn was that this was a relationship between a

10     superior and his subordinate.  The evidence has shown what kind of

11     manager Vlajko Stojiljkovic was, the methods in which he exercised

12     control.  In the relevant period, there was no deputy minister.  From the

13     time he was appointed the minister, Vlajko Stojiljkovic had four

14     assistants for lines of work in the public security sphere; and as of

15     December 1998 when General Markovic was appointed the chief of the RDB,

16     he had three assistants.

17             Assistant ministers were in charge of lines of work in the public

18     security sphere and acted in accordance with the orders and instructions

19     of the minister, which was in line with the law, and this served to

20     reduce the powers of the RJB chief who was one of the assistant

21     ministers.  The assistant ministers had only one superior, the minister,

22     and there was no subordination among them.

23             The collegium, as a management method in the ministry in the

24     tenure of Vlajko Stojiljkovic, shows that the minister took all the

25     decisions, and this was made formal on the 4th of December, 1998, when

Page 14488

 1     the minister's collegium was established.  The composition of the

 2     collegium indicates that formally it comprised the assistant ministers,

 3     the chief of the crime police administration, and the chief of the

 4     Belgrade SUP, and one assistant chief of the RJB; whereas in the actual

 5     fact, its meetings were attended by all RJB administration chiefs.

 6             The direct control over the MUP operations without consulting the

 7     RJB chief is illustrated by the appointment of the Belgrade SUP chief

 8     Branko Djuric, the dismissal of the Vranje SUP chief, Stojmenovic, the

 9     disbanding of the SAJ unit in Novi Sad, the direct issuing of tasks to

10     administration chiefs in the MUP headquarters and to the SUP chiefs, and

11     the establishment of the MUP staff for the suppression of terrorism.

12             To illustrate his manner of address and management and how he

13     issued tasks, let me quote from a dispatch dated the 25th of March, 1999,

14     Exhibit D784 in which Vlajko Stojiljkovic says, inter alia:

15             "You received the orders what to do from me personally."

16             Then goes on to say:

17             "Arrest persons without recourse to a judge and keep them in

18     prison until I decide otherwise.  If you allow these occurrences, you

19     will face the same consequences."

20             All the RJB instructions sent to the organisational units and

21     SUPs in Serbia had been approved before they were sent by the minister,

22     and that is why in the dispatch dated the 24th of March, 1999,

23     Exhibit P702, where he orders measures referring to an RJB dispatch of

24     the 18th of February, 1999, as our dispatch.  Obviously, given lack of

25     evidence, the Prosecution wants to use this language used by the minister

Page 14489

 1     to suggest to the Chamber that Minister Stojiljkovic and Djordjevic

 2     worked in tandem.

 3             Now I would like to say something about Annex E of the

 4     Prosecution, that is Exhibit P1037, it's a chart showing the structure of

 5     the Republic of Serbia MUP.  The chart does not reflect the organisation

 6     of the MUP in the Republic of Serbia in 1999, in the period relevant for

 7     the indictment.  It's merely wishful thinking on the part of the

 8     Prosecution.  This is what they wished the MUP organisation had been.

 9     The chart accurately shows that Minister Vlajko Stojiljkovic was at the

10     head of the ministry and that Radomir Markovic was chief of the RDB and

11     Vlastimir Djordjevic, chief of the RJB.  It also reflects accurately the

12     relationship between the minister, the MUP staff, and the deployed and

13     detached units in Kosovo and Metohija, as well as the SUPs in Kosovo and

14     Metohija.  What is missing in the chart, however, is the RDB centre and

15     the RDB branches in Kosovo and Metohija, which as organisational units

16     were subordinate to the staff in performing their tasks in the

17     suppression of terrorism.

18             There can be no single chart showing the MUP chain of command

19     vis-a-vis the regular security tasks and vis-a-vis the anti-terrorist

20     activities and special security tasks in Kosovo and Metohija.  And that

21     is why the chart incorrectly shows that the police administration was the

22     chief of the -- was headed by Obrad Stevanovic, that the police

23     administration was in control of the PJP units in Kosovo and Metohija,

24     that the RJB was in charge or exercised control over the MUP staff, and

25     the SAJ units in Kosovo and Metohija, and again erroneously the OPGs

Page 14490

 1     were -- are shown as separate units, whereas in fact they were part of

 2     the PJPs.

 3             Another error is that the RDB is shown to have exercised control

 4     over the units of JSO in Kosovo and Metohija and that those units in

 5     Kosovo and Metohija were under the control of the MUP staff.  At the same

 6     time, we would like to highlight the contradictions and inconsistencies

 7     in the table whose author is unknown to the Defence because the RJB

 8     linked with the MUP staff in Kosovo and Metohija and the RJB units, yet

 9     there is no link established between the RDB and the MUP staff in Kosovo

10     and Metohija while the JSO, as their unit, took part in the

11     anti-terrorist activities in Kosovo and Metohija and was subordinate to

12     the MUP staff.

13             Disarming the Albanian villages and arming of non-Albanian

14     civilians are two completely separate processes.  The illegal importation

15     of weapons and the arming of the Albanian population in order to achieve

16     their secessionist goals is entirely illegitimate and illegal.  First of

17     all, it is contradictory if you apply common logic to say that Albanian

18     villages were being disarmed.  Who, when, and how armed the Albanian

19     villages and how could they have armed them in contravention of the

20     existing laws and without the knowledge of the legal state authorities?

21     Possession of rifles is a crime and possession of side-arms and hunting

22     weapons without a proper permit is also a crime.  The Serbian Assembly

23     issued a decision to amnesty the Albanian civilians who had obtained

24     their weapons illegally and surrender them.  The MUP staff for the

25     suppression of terrorism ran the action to collect all those weapons, and

Page 14491

 1     there is no decision issued from the RJB headquarters dealing with this

 2     issue.

 3             The SUPs in Kosovo and Metohija were in touch with the staff and

 4     reported to it as to the implementation of those activities, and they

 5     acted in accordance with the tasks they received from the staff.

 6     Confiscating weapons from the separatists, the KLA, is standard

 7     procedure.  Any state in the world would do the same thing.  It is only

 8     natural to prevent armed secession by severing routes used to bring

 9     weapons in and by seizing weapons that are already there.  Those

10     activities taken in 1998 cannot have anything to do with the time when

11     NATO attacked the FRY and the period relevant for the indictment.

12             If the Prosecution argument were to be accepted, then it would be

13     illegal to seize weapons from the terrorists in Afghanistan or anywhere

14     else in the world and it would be unacceptable to prevent procurement and

15     illegal importation of weapons.

16             The Prosecution has distorted an event in the village of Istinic

17     that Vlastimir Djordjevic and Defence Witness Vukmir Mircic testified

18     about.  Their evidence shows that the security organs of the FRY and

19     Serbia insisted on the voluntary surrender of weapons in order to avoid

20     clashes with heavily armed KLA terrorists, which would result in numerous

21     casualties among the many civilians who were in the village at the time.

22     The Prosecution has presented an act that saved the lives of thousands of

23     Albanian civilians as disarming in order to facilitate their expulsion

24     six months later.

25             In paragraph 246, the Prosecution says that the decision to

Page 14492

 1     establish and to arm the reserve police squads, the RPOs, was taken at

 2     the level of the MUP headquarters in Belgrade, yet fails to provide any

 3     evidence to that effect because such evidence does not exist.  No such

 4     evidence has been shown in the course of this case.

 5             RPOs were never discussed in the MUP headquarters, nor were any

 6     decisions taken.  And the fact that the assistant minister, Stojan Misic,

 7     was unfamiliar with the term and with their existence illustrates the

 8     point.

 9             There is not a single shred of evidence that MUP from Belgrade

10     sent any kind of instructions relating to the arming of the non-Albanian

11     population.  All defence tasks in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija

12     were done within the VJ, the Yugoslavia Army, and the MUP staff and the

13     Prosecution erroneously quoted Djordjevic in its paragraph 1110 to the

14     effect that MUP provided logistical support to the RPOs, whereas he

15     stated that the MUP staff did those jobs and that Blagoje Pesic was the

16     staff member in charge of those tasks.  The documents that the

17     Prosecution refers to are in fact the correspondence between the MUP

18     staff and the SUPs in Kosovo and Metohija regarding the RPOs, and there

19     is no other evidence that MUP sent any other kind of instructions.

20             The minutes from a meeting of the staff of the 17th of February,

21     1999, where the minister is informed about the RPO shows -- show that

22     those tasks were within the jurisdiction of the MUP staff and Djordjevic

23     could have no influence over them at all.

24             The Prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that

25     Vlastimir Djordjevic had effective control over the MUP forces in Kosovo

Page 14493

 1     and Metohija.  Based on the incident in Racak, one cannot conclude that

 2     in 1999 Djordjevic took direct part in combat activities of the MUP in

 3     Kosovo and Metohija and in the planning and co-ordination of joint combat

 4     operation of the MUP and the Yugoslav Army.

 5             In its final brief, the Defence explained the time and role of

 6     Vlastimir Djordjevic in Racak, that's in paragraph 73 through 93, and

 7     Exhibit P869, page 3, the last three items, entries for the 16th of

 8     January, 1999, about the conversation and the visit by

 9     General Maisonneuve to the Urosevac SUP chief shows that on the day after

10     the action to arrest terrorists in the village of Racak, Chief Bogoljub

11     Janicevic, when asked who commanded the units, replied that it is general

12     knowledge who issued orders to the police to fight criminals and that not

13     even he as chief of the police could take final decisions.

14             The staff has to decide.  The staff issued the order.

15             Defence Witness Mitic confirmed that Djordjevic was not in Racak

16     on the 15th of January, 1999, and remained adamant even when the

17     Prosecution showed him the transcript from the Milosevic case where

18     Janicevic says that Djordjevic was in Stimlje on the 15th of January,

19     1999, at 11.00 a.m. and that he was in the staff on the 12th of January,

20     1999, and approved the arrest action.

21             General Maisonneuve note on the conversation with Janicevic was

22     made a day after the action in Racak.  It was drafted by Maisonneuve's

23     associate and Janicevic then confirmed that the staff approved the

24     action.  Six and a half years after the event, Janicevic testified as a

25     Defence witness, stating for the first time that General Djordjevic was

Page 14494

 1     also present in the staff.  There is no reason for Janicevic to neglect

 2     to mention on the 16th of January, 1999 that Djordjevic had approved the

 3     action and to designate the staff as the body that actually issued the

 4     task.  It is obvious that it was in somebody's interest to involve the

 5     RJB chief in the process of issuing the task to carry out the action in

 6     Racak more than six years after the event.  None of the witnesses heard

 7     in this case confirmed Djordjevic's presence in Kosovo and Metohija

 8     before the 15th of January, 1999, and his arrival from the Pristina

 9     airport to the MUP staff on the 15th of January, 1999, was described by

10     Witness Cankovic.  The Prosecution did not call or examine

11     Witness Janicevic in this case about this event and did not put it to

12     Djordjevic in its cross-examination in order for him to be able to say

13     something about it.

14             Witness Mitic, who was in constant communication with the SUP

15     chief Janicevic and who was heard by this Chamber, said that Janicevic

16     never mentioned Djordjevic regarding the approval of the plan to take

17     action in Racak and Janicevic actually told him that the MUP staff had

18     planned the action.

19             Vlastimir Djordjevic was never in Racak.  The only role that

20     Vlastimir Djordjevic had, vis-a-vis the qualifications of the event in

21     Racak, was to go to Pristina on the orders of the minister on the 17th of

22     January, 1999, to provide assistance to clear up the whole situation in

23     Racak.  When he arrived in Pristina in the MUP -- in the MUP staff

24     headquarters, he was told that a plan was made to put Racak under the MUP

25     control and that the plan had to be implemented on the 18th of January,

Page 14495

 1     1999.  On the 18th of January, 1999, Vlastimir Djordjevic went to the

 2     police station in Stimlje, where Janicevic, the chief of the Urosevac SUP

 3     was, as was the chief of the police department Radomir Mitic,

 4     investigative judge Danica Marinkovic, deputy public prosecutor, the

 5     pathologist Dobricanin and the crime scene technicians from the Urosevac

 6     SUP.  When Racak was placed under the police control, Janicevic, the SUP

 7     chief, was told that and the investigation team, headed by investigative

 8     judge Danica Marinkovic, went to Racak to carry out an on-site

 9     investigation.

10             The allegations made by the Prosecutor in paragraph 160, to the

11     effect that the investigating judge conducted an investigation not to

12     uncover the truth of what happened in Racak but rather to deflect and

13     shift the responsibility from MUP and not supported by anything,

14     investigating judge Danica Marinkovic did her best to conduct an

15     investigation on the 15th, 16th, and 17th of January, 1998.  But because

16     of the KLA action, she was not successful in that.  And the fact that the

17     on-site investigation only took place on the 18th of January, 1999,

18     cannot be ascribed to any ill intent on her part.

19             On the 15th of January, 1999, the Government of the Republic of

20     Serbia scheduled a government meeting in Pristina at which, at the

21     invitation of Minister Vlajko Stojiljkovic, Vlastimir Djordjevic went

22     with members of the government -- he flew to Pristina on the 15th of

23     January, 1999.  In the previous days, Vlastimir Djordjevic was otherwise

24     in Belgrade.  On that same day, the 15th of January, 1999, in Belgrade,

25     he signed a dispatch, Exhibit P1205, which was sent to all the SUPs and

Page 14496

 1     others on the territory of Serbia to inform the recipients of the

 2     government decisions of the SRJ and RS with respect to supplies on Kosovo

 3     and Metohija measures to prevent weapons smuggling goods in short supply

 4     on the territory of Kosovo and Metohija.

 5             On one single occasion Vlastimir Djordjevic was in the police

 6     station in Stimlje on the 18th of January, 1999.  He was just there once.

 7     And he confirmed just like witnesses Mitic, Mladenovic Danica Marinkovic,

 8     who explained how the events took place during those days.  Their

 9     testimony is clear, truthful, accurate, and corroborate each other.  All

10     the Prosecutor's allegations are based on the testimony of Witness K86,

11     who, for a number of reasons, cannot be thought to be a reliable witness.

12     And we said more about that subject in our close -- final brief.  And

13     that he adjusted his story to suit the Prosecution and to implicate and

14     to involve Vlastimir Djordjevic in at least one operation.

15             Therefore, the Prosecutor has not shown beyond reasonable doubt

16     that in 1999 Djordjevic took part in any kind of planning and commanding

17     of MUP actions in Kosovo and Metohija, during which period crimes were

18     committed stipulated in the indictment which represented a means for

19     accomplishing the joint criminal enterprise.

20             Vlastimir Djordjevic was not broadly involved arrest implicated

21     in the ordering and co-ordination of the operation to hide bodies.

22     Djordjevic did not have a leading role in covering up the killings that

23     the SRJ committed against Kosovo Albanians.  Before we begin to analyse

24     each of the paragraphs which the OTP stipulates in its final brief, it is

25     important to repeat a sentence uttered in his defence by

Page 14497

 1     Vlastimir Djordjevic.  He said:

 2             "I did not know whose bodies were in the truck which was found.

 3     I did not know who the people who had lost their lives were.  I did not

 4     know where they had lost their lives or in what way.  I did not know

 5     whether they were buried, nor did I know where they were from and in what

 6     way they were transported, let alone who organised the transport."

 7             This sentence directly speaks about the knowledge of

 8     Vlastimir Djordjevic and his role in the uncovering of bodies on the

 9     territory of Serbia.  The knowledge he had which stems from the 6th of

10     April, 1994 [as interpreted], and lasts for about 20 days, Djordjevic

11     exhaustively explained in his defence before this Trial Chamber, and, in

12     that way along confirmation by numerous witnesses who were direct

13     participants in the events, he explained that he did not know of the

14     existence of any plan or task issued to cover up the bodies, that he

15     didn't have any knowledge or information that any bodies existed -- or

16     rather, that not a single shred of evidence was presented to indicate

17     that Djordjevic had a reasonable reason to assume that any such idea ever

18     existed.

19             Explanations contained in the final brief of the OTP which relate

20     to points 527, 532, Berisha massacre Suva Reka 533-535, Izbica, 536-546,

21     Djakovica-Meja, 547, 551 other cases cannot in any way be linked to

22     Djordjevic.  During proceedings not a shred of evidence was presented

23     which would beyond reasonable doubt indicate that Djordjevic had any

24     knowledge whatsoever that the people in Suva Reka, Izbica or Meja had

25     lost their lives, let alone when, where, and how they were buried.

Page 14498

 1             The discovery of the refrigerator truck in Tekija municipality,

 2     Kladovo, is linked to the first knowledge that Vlastimir Djordjevic had

 3     about the existence of corpses of the territory of the Republic of Serbia

 4     outside Kosovo and Metohija.  His first knowledge stems from the 6th of

 5     April, 1999, after 2000 hours.  He was surprised when the chief of SUP of

 6     Bor, Caslav Golubovic, informed him about the fact.  This surprise was

 7     explained by Golubovic.  Witness Golubovic said that he had called up

 8     Vlastimir Djordjevic as chief of the department, but had he been unable

 9     to reach him he would have conveyed the information to someone else in

10     MUP which shows that there was no previous plan or agreement linked to

11     informing Vlastimir Djordjevic in situations of this kind.

12             Witness Golubovic told him on that occasion that on the banks of

13     the Danube river in the area of Tekija there was a refrigerator truck

14     with about 20 bodies and that the municipal prosecutor's office had been

15     informed of the fact and that the investigating judge and operative of

16     MUP Kladovo had gone out on site.  And when the prosecutor and judge saw

17     the number of bodies they left the site and said they would inform the

18     competent district prosecutor's office, which they did.

19             About this event, the district prosecutor's office and judge in

20     Negotin were informed about this by the duty service of the OUP of

21     Kladovo, and this was confirmed by Witnesses Golubovic and Radojkovic.

22     The fact that the judge and prosecutor were informed of the event is

23     something that the OTP fails to mention in its final brief.  After

24     hearing information conveyed to him by Golubovic, Djordjevic told

25     Golubovic that as far as any further proceedings were concerned that he

Page 14499

 1     should wait because he had to inform the minister about the events and to

 2     consult him to see what would be done next.  He did inform the minister

 3     about everything that he had learned from Golubovic, and then the

 4     minister issued instructions whereby the bodies, after the necessary

 5     procedure, should be buried nearby where they were found and that the

 6     chief of the secretariat should be informed that all conduct be closed to

 7     the public and that the press should not write too much about this event.

 8             After 10 to 15 minutes, Djordjevic called Golubovic and told him

 9     that the minister had instructed that the bodies after the procedure be

10     conducted should be buried in the vicinity where they were found, which

11     Witness Golubovic resolutely confirms in his statement, both in the

12     Milutinovic trial and before this Trial Chamber as well.  Despite all the

13     evidence shown and testimony, the only two participants in the

14     conversation who -- which identical, logical, and convincing, the OTP in

15     paragraphs 558, 559, 1189, and 1190, states that Djordjevic ordered the

16     bodies to be buried in Kladovo with the proviso that everything should

17     remain confidential, therefore completely contrary to the evidence

18     presented and the statement and testimony of the witnesses.  Obviously,

19     it was intentionally omitted to state that Djordjevic was conveying the

20     minister's instructions and that he told Golubovic of this.  Certainly

21     Djordjevic would not have needed to call Golubovic 10 to 15 minutes later

22     had he known of the existence or organisation of any bodies on the

23     territory of Serbia, but would have issued instructions instantly

24     himself.

25             Djordjevic certainly would not have been surprised to hear

Page 14500

 1     information conveyed to him by Golubovic if he had organised or knew of

 2     the existence of any corpses on the territory of Serbia.  It is also

 3     certain that Djordjevic told Golubovic that he was conveying instructions

 4     from the minister of the interior whom he had previously informed about

 5     the event and been given instructions about what should be done next.

 6             At that point in time, Vlastimir Djordjevic did not know whose

 7     bodies were in the truck which was found.  He doesn't know who the people

 8     were who had lost their lives, he did not know where they lost their

 9     lives or in what way.  He doesn't know whether they were buried not does

10     he know where they came from or how they were transported, let alone who

11     organised the transport.  Having forwarded the minister's instructions,

12     Vlastimir Djordjevic once again goes to see the minister and proposes the

13     formation of a commission or team of experts to establish how it came

14     about that these bodies were found where they were found.  When he saw

15     that General Djordjevic was resolute in investigating the whole matter,

16     the minister intimated that he was behind the whole story and that

17     certain incidents did take place in Kosovo and Metohija and that

18     something needed to be done to prevent the knowledge of these bodies

19     because of NATO propaganda and justification of the overall aggression

20     and bombing.

21             Therefore, this was the moment when Vlastimir Djordjevic learned

22     what was going on, on the 6th of April, 1999, after talking to Golubovic

23     and after receiving information and having a discussion with the

24     minister.  Vlastimir Djordjevic then learned that on the territory of

25     Serbia there was a truck containing the bodies of people who were the

Page 14501

 1     victims of certain individual acts in Kosovo and Metohija.  After that,

 2     Vlastimir Djordjevic had two more telephone conversations with

 3     Caslav Golubovic.  In those conversations, Golubovic insisted that in

 4     view of the number of bodies and in view of the lack of capacity on the

 5     territory of the secretariat, that the transport of the bodies should be

 6     organised to Belgrade or Nis for autopsy and burial.

 7             General Djordjevic conveyed that information to the minister.

 8     The minister told him to convey the information to the chief of the

 9     secretariat in Bor and to find a vehicle to load up the bodies and that

10     that truck should set out in the direction of Belgrade and should convey

11     the message to Golubovic to ensure that they had the telephone number of

12     the driver of the truck with the bodies as well as the fact that the

13     truck in which the bodies were found should be destroyed.

14             The place and method of where they were to be transported and how

15     this was to be resolved was up to the minister; it was the minister's

16     concern, and that's what happened.  And after that, Djordjevic had

17     nothing -- no more information about what happened to the trucks from

18     Tekija.

19             When he -- in commenting these parts, the OTP in paragraphs 561,

20     1190 and 1191, states that Djordjevic, when he heard that they could not

21     complete this by the morning, ordered Golubovic to load up the bodies

22     into a new truck and send it to Belgrade; again, quite contrary to the

23     statements made by witnesses and the evidence produced.  It is clear that

24     Djordjevic once again conveyed the minister's orders, but of course that

25     is nowhere to be found in the Prosecutor's final brief.  The fact that

Page 14502

 1     Djordjevic had no further information, nor was in any way involved in the

 2     truck's further journey with the bodies, is accepted by the OTP in a way

 3     when in paragraph 1191 they state that Golubovic was called up by

 4     somebody from the minister and asked about the licence plates and

 5     telephone number so that Ursuljanovic could be seen off to the final

 6     destination.  The logical conclusion is that had Djordjevic known

 7     anything about the destination to which the minister would have sent the

 8     truck he would have told Golubovic that.  Had he known the destination

 9     and further decided where the truck was to go, he would have --

10     Djordjevic would have called him up personally and not somebody from the

11     ministry.

12             If we bear in mind furthermore everything I have stated thus far,

13     Djordjevic's statement is very convincing and logical.

14             During his last talk, Djordjevic told the minister that up until

15     then he had nothing to do with any of the case and that he did not wish,

16     in any way furthermore, to be involved in any of it.  On that occasion,

17     the minister warned him and said that the matter was serious and that he

18     should mind what he was doing.  The minister claimed that these were

19     individual incidents and that they should be treated as such and resolved

20     as such.  Golubovic no longer had any contact with Djordjevic, and best

21     proof and evidence that Djordjevic had no knowledge of the further

22     transport of the bodies from Tekija is the fact that the Prosecution

23     notes in its final brief as well when, as the man who ordered Witness K93

24     to go and pick up the bodies with the truck in Tekija, and states

25     Petar Zekovic, assistant minister, completely corresponds to what

Page 14503

 1     Djordjevic said, who claims that the minister took over all further

 2     action after talking to Golubovic.

 3             In paragraph 566, it says that Golubovic told Sperlic that

 4     everything concerning the refrigerator truck should be kept closed and

 5     that all dispatches in that regard should be destroyed.  In this

 6     paragraph, the contents of the statement is suspect which was not based

 7     on the evidence adduced or information obtained from any witness about

 8     the destruction of any dispatches, and also the fact that as proof and

 9     evidence of this Exhibit P386 is quoted, that is to say an Official Note

10     by the Working Group on an alleged conversation with Vukasin Sperlic.

11     Apart from the Official Note, information of this kind contains no other

12     elements which would make them an official act of any kind or document.

13     They were compiled in contravention with police procedure and rules that

14     were in force when an Official Note is written.  They lack the basic

15     elements which an Official Note must always have in order to be

16     considered an Official Note.  That is to say there's no reference number,

17     there's no date or location where the interview was conducted.  There is

18     no signature on the part of the person compiling the Official Note or the

19     person responsible for the contents of the Official Note.  And with

20     respect to the statement made by Vukasin Sperlic, as in most cases, there

21     is no signature by the person compiling the information contained in the

22     Official Note.

23             Now, the fact that information of this kind does not and must not

24     have any weight as proof or evidence in any court proceedings is something

25     that all the witnesses said, policemen who know what an Official Note looks

Page 14504

 1     like and what form it must take and what information it must contain. 

 2     Golubovic, Radojkovic, and even Witness K84 himself, claiming that they

 3     were only for local use, confirmed that the papers which were compiled by

 4     the Working Group and were titled Official Note, could not be used for

 5     any official purpose, least of all as a piece of evidence in court.  And

 6     I refer you to Article 83 of the ZKP.

 7             Despite all the weaknesses with respect to what the witnesses

 8     said regarding the Official Note, K87 and K93 said that the statements

 9     contain large number of untruths and that 90 per cent was the free

10     interpretation of Witness 84, whereas for certain serious accusations

11     they termed them as lies and said that they had never uttered them.

12     These two witnesses were precisely the witnesses who spoke about the

13     bodies and the way in which Djordjevic acted with respect to the bodies

14     in Serbia.  And it is not by chance that these untruths are to be found

15     precisely in their Official Notes.

16             And referring in paragraph 1194 about Djordjevic's order for

17     the -- to destroy the refrigerator truck found in Kladovo, the Prosecutor

18     fails to mention that it was the minister's order which Djordjevic merely

19     conveyed on to Golubovic.  In paragraph 1195, a reference is made to the

20     district prosecutor Krstimir Nestorovic who told the task force that the

21     case was proclaimed a secret and that the general public should not have

22     been informed about anything, and that was based on the hearsay testimony

23     of Witness K84.  The task force and Witness K84 were never interviewed by

24     the aforementioned prosecutor, and there is no single piece of evidence

25     that points to the case being in any way proclaimed a secret.  When

Page 14505

 1     Prosecution witnesses were interviewed about this, the following is what

 2     is said about the matters.  Witness Golubovic confirmed that the

 3     information on what had happened was never classified; on the contrary,

 4     statement of judicial bodies were not even warned not to talk about what

 5     they had seen.  Classified information primarily referred to the state of

 6     war which had been proclaimed in the vicinity of the Romanian border and

 7     that was to prevent the onset of panic among the population and the

 8     traffic being interrupted on the main road.

 9             When it comes to the allegation in paragraph 1195 that the

10     investigation was stopped and that the instruction came from the highest

11     level in Belgrade, which at that moment were minister -- the minister and

12     Djordjevic, we did not hear any testimony or see evidence to corroborate

13     such allegations.  Again, these are uncorroborated statements and

14     unfounded conclusions, and not only that.  The Prosecutor completely

15     ignores K84's testimony and his answer to the question as to how come

16     that during his two previous testimonies he failed to mention that

17     Djordjevic had said to Prosecutor Nestorovic that all should be

18     classified.  He answered this:

19             "Actually, those were rumours.  Rumours had it that it all had

20     come from the highest level.  In the way I see it, why would Djordjevic

21     call the prosecutor in Negotin?  He would have called Golubovic.  That

22     would have been the chain of command, the appropriate chain of command,

23     but those were rumours."

24             In transcript page 2119.

25             Thus, based on rumours, the Prosecutor in his final brief in

Page 14506

 1     paragraph 1195 draws its conclusion, failing to mention rumours about

 2     Djordjevic contacting Prosecutor Nestorovic in Negotin from the highest

 3     level in Belgrade and ordering him to keep everything a secret.  Such an

 4     inference is inappropriate and malevolent.  A huge injustice would be

 5     done to anybody who was convicted based on the evidence and

 6     interpretation of evidence of this kind and charges brought against the

 7     accused in this way.

 8             Witness Golubovic stated -- Witness Golubovic stated that the

 9     district judge and prosecutor were informed, they were informed by the

10     municipal judge and the prosecutor who were at the site, and they were

11     also informed to the duty -- through the duty service in Kladovo which

12     informed the judge in Negotin.

13             Witness Radojkovic stated that it was impossible for the police

14     to force the judiciary to come to a crime scene.  They could also not

15     park the truck full of bodies by the road and wait for the judiciary

16     bodies to turn up.  An analysis of the evidence and the witness

17     testimonies clearly demonstrate that the Prosecutor's conclusion in

18     paragraph 1199 is not founded on the evidence presented during the trial

19     and also that such a conclusion cannot be made beyond reasonable doubt.

20     It cannot be claimed that Vlastimir Djordjevic, the minister, or anybody

21     else for that matter, had no intention to perform post mortems in keeping

22     with the procedure.  Vlastimir Djordjevic did intend for the procedure to

23     be followed at the moment when he learned from Caslav Golubovic about the

24     existence of the bodies.  At the moment when he learned about the

25     existence of the bodies, he ordered a team to be set up to investigate

Page 14507

 1     the facts.  At that moment, Vlastimir Djordjevic didn't know who the

 2     bodies belonged to, he didn't know who the people were who had lost their

 3     lives, he didn't know where they had lost their lives, how, he didn't

 4     know whether they had ever been buried, and he didn't know where they

 5     were being transported from and how and let alone who the transport was

 6     organised by.

 7             The investigating judge and the prosecutor of the municipal court

 8     came to the crime scene, together with a pathologist.  When they left the

 9     crime scene, the district prosecutor and the investigating judge were

10     informed about everything, both by the MUP, the duty service, as well as

11     by their colleagues from the municipal court.  The MUP could not force

12     the judiciary bodies to come to the crime scene.  At that moment, the

13     aggression of the NATO forces and the shelling are under way.  The state

14     of war had been proclaimed.  Everything was happening close to the

15     Romanian border by a very busy road and the lorries by the road and an

16     unbearable stench was coming from it.

17             Something had to be done, even if the judiciary bodies had not

18     come to the crime scene.  Thus, they were informed, but they didn't turn

19     up and there was no way for the MUP to force them to go to the crime

20     scene.  The story about the secrecy of the matter is based on the

21     testimony of Witness K84 about rumours, whereas the eye-witnesses present

22     an entirely different story.  Clearly, the OTP's wrong when they allege

23     that Djordjevic's only intent was to cover up the whole matter.  The

24     exact was opposite.  Djordjevic did not do anything to cover up the facts

25     about the refrigerator truck being found in Tekija.  Just like the

Page 14508

 1     allegations in paragraph 1199 is not correct, one cannot accept the

 2     allegation that the actions to cover up the bodies in Batajnica continued

 3     for the next two months.

 4             It has been clearly demonstrated through the trial, which was

 5     corroborated by Witnesses K87, 88, and Djordjevic himself.  The burials

 6     went on for no longer than 20 days.

 7             No single piece of evidence adduced during the trial points to

 8     the conclusion proffered by the Prosecution in paragraph 1200 when they

 9     claim that it was either Djordjevic himself on his own who organised the

10     transport of the bodies from Tekija to Batajnica or in concert with the

11     minister.  This conclusion is based on assumptions and it certainly

12     cannot be drawn beyond reasonable doubts as the evidence shows that

13     somebody else from the ministry and not Djordjevic participated in the

14     transport of the bodies, and that it was somebody else from the ministry,

15     and not Djordjevic, who spoke to Golubovic and driver Ursuljanovic about

16     the transport of those bodies.

17             It can be clearly concluded that Witness K93 was sent to Tekija

18     and later on to Batajnica by Assistant Minister Zekovic and not

19     Djordjevic.  This all tallies with the moment when Djordjevic said to the

20     minister, "I no longer wish to participate in all this," and the moment

21     when the minister said that, the transport of the bodies was his concern

22     from then on.

23             The same paragraph brings another conclusion, and that is that it

24     is not realistic to believe that Djordjevic distanced himself from the

25     whole matter at that moment, and that only a few days later he

Page 14509

 1     participated in the burial of the bodies in Batajnica.

 2             There is a very clear explanation for this erroneous conclusion

 3     on the part of the OTP.  The OTP fails to state the fact that the

 4     minister called General Vlastimir Djordjevic to his office in April 1999,

 5     a few days after he received information from Perucac lake and told him

 6     that the trucks which transported the bodies from Tekija was then in

 7     the area where the special anti-terrorist unit had its own shooting range

 8     and that the bodies were supposed to be buried there.  That was the 13th

 9     May centre in Batajnica.  What ensued was a discussion involving

10     General Djordjevic and the minister, and then the minister said to

11     Djordjevic -- reminded him, rather, that the latter had already refused

12     to carry out his direct orders on two occasions and that was with regard

13     to Tekija and Perucica but the situation was very serious, that the war

14     was going on, that the entire territory of Serbia is subject to major

15     destruction, and that at that moment that was the way to deal with the

16     bodies in Batajnica.

17             General Vlastimir Djordjevic at that moment, bearing in mind the

18     situation in Serbia, the shelling and destruction across the entire

19     territory, he caved in and he accepted to carry out the minister's order.

20     That is why seven to ten days later after the discovery of the

21     refrigerator truck in Tekija, Vlastimir Djordjevic participated in the

22     burial of the bodies in Batajnica.  That was the moment when

23     Vlastimir Djordjevic actually learned that the bodies from the

24     refrigerator truck in Tekija were to be found in Batajnica, and that was

25     the moment when Vlastimir Djordjevic learned about the true intentions of

Page 14510

 1     the minister.  That was the moment when Vlastimir Djordjevic accepted to

 2     participate in the burial of the bodies in the area of the 13 May centre

 3     in Batajnica, not before, no way.

 4             The Prosecutor, in paragraph 1202, concludes that Djordjevic, in

 5     his defence, tried to pass on the entire responsibility onto the

 6     minister; however, that that was entirely unimportant with regard to the

 7     indictment, since together with the minister and some other key

 8     political, military, and police figures he's charged with having

 9     committed the crimes so that the participation of any other person does

10     not deny his individual responsibility.  This paragraph shows the essence

11     of the erroneous and intentional interpretation of Djordjevic's defence

12     and evidence presented during the case in order to support the

13     Prosecutor's allegation.

14             In paragraph 567 of the OTP, there is no reference or evidence

15     with regard to the bodies which appeared in Perucac lake.  In the second

16     sentence it is stated that the bodies were collected and buried under

17     Djordjevic's command.  An entirely different situation can be found in

18     paragraph 1203, where the OTP's trying to use the statement of

19     Djordje Keric, who was at the time the chief of SUP in Uzice.  He

20     presented several contradictory statements in order to explain his own

21     role and the role of Vlastimir Djordjevic in the whole chain of events.

22             A further analysis will show that Witness Keric, in an entirely

23     unconvincing way, tried to explain how come that under oath before the

24     Trial Chamber of the district court in Belgrade he provided a statement

25     which was totally contrary to the statement that he also under oath

Page 14511

 1     provided to -- before this Trial Chamber.

 2           In paragraphs 1203, 1204, and 1205, based on parts of the statement of

 3     Djordje Keric in different proceedings, the OTP again proffers half truths,

 4     and even those half truths are contradictory and are not – do not tally with

 5     the presented evidence.  For example, in paragraph 1205, it is stated that

 6     Djordjevic had ordered Zoran Mitricevic, chief of crime police of the SUP in

 7     Uzice, to be sent to the crime scene, although even Witness Keric in all of

 8     his statements said that it was he who had sent Mr. Mitricevic there and

 9     that Djordjevic's order was to check what was actually going on there.

10             After several similar constructs in paragraph 1208, the OTP accept

11     that Witness Keric on the 8th of June, 2005, provided a statement under

12     oath to a judge of the war crimes chamber, at the District Court in Belgrade,

13     Judge Dilparic, Exhibit D316, and that in that statement, he stated that

14     in the absence of other instructions, a decision had been made by Mitricevic

15     to bury the bodies in the immediate vicinity of lake Perucac where they had

16     been found.  In this paragraph the Prosecution accept that the testimony of

17     Witness Keric given before this Trial Chamber is legally completely

18     irrelevant as it contradicts previous testimonies.

19        If we remember the testimony of Djordje Keric, provided in July 2009, and

20     his comport and conduct before the Trial Chamber, one could clearly conclude

21   that he was not telling the truth and that he was not in a position to explain

22 the numerous contradictions that he was faced with during the cross-examination.

23   Despite that, in the same paragraph, the decision on the burial of the clothes

24  [as interpreted] in the vicinity of Perucac lake is thus -- is ascribed only to

25   Mitricevic, which is contrary to the Exhibit D316 presented during the trial.

Page 14512

 1             And this is what the evidence shows.  A few days after the events

 2     in Tekija and Kladovo, General Vlastimir Djordjevic received an

 3     invitation from the chief of the secretariat in Uzice, Djordje Keric, who

 4     had informed him that some bodies may have appeared on Perucac lake and

 5     that they were floating on the surface of the water.  When he received

 6     that information, General Djordjevic was taken by surprise and he ordered

 7     the former to check the information and to come back to him.  Keric did

 8     come back to him and told him that in addition to the bodies there is

 9     also part of the trailer which can be seen and that it also contains some

10     bodies.

11             Vlastimir Djordjevic received the information and conveyed the

12     information to Minister -- to the minister.  Keric did not issue any

13     order or instruction [as interpreted].  When he conveyed the minister --

14     the information to the minister, he also shared his position with the

15     minister.  He said that his position is unchanged and he didn't wish to

16     have anything to do with the whole matter.  The minister didn't provide

17     any comments and didn't issue him any tasks or instructions.

18             A couple of days later, Keric again called General Djordjevic and

19     informed him that he had buried the bodies near the dam, and this is all

20     that Vlastimir Djordjevic knew about the bodies in Perucac lake.

21             Djordje Keric confirmed in his statement that everything was

22     exactly as General Vlastimir Djordjevic stated.  Djordje Keric stated

23     under oath on 8 June 2005 before the district court in Belgrade, the

24     Trial Chamber for war crimes and investigative Judge Milan Dilparic which

25     can be seen in Exhibit D316, in his statement, Witness Djordje Keric in

Page 14513

 1     six different places to the questions put to him by the investigative

 2     judge about the role of Vlastimir Djordjevic in the burial of the bodies

 3     by the lake stated the following:

 4             "For a while, Zoran Mitricevic and I talked about what to do and

 5     finally we decided that we would recover the bodies from the water and

 6     that we would bury them close to the Perucac dam.  Zoran, himself,

 7     suggested that and I don't think that we had any other possibility at the

 8     time.  The chief of the department did not provide us with any

 9     instructions.  We did not have any other way to act.  We decided to

10     recover the bodies from the water and to burry them.  We had consulted

11     with Zoran, we asked him what to do.  His suggestion was for the bodies

12     to be recovered and buried.  I agreed with that.  We didn't have any

13     other possibility.  Your Honour, nothing else could be done at the time."

14             Further on he says:

15             "We didn't have any other solution that would have come to us

16     from Belgrade.  We ourselves decided what to do with the bodies.  There

17     were no suggestions on the part of the department chief with regard to

18     the bodies.  The only thing that happened was what the chief said what

19     happened is really wrong, is really bad.  I said that since there was no

20     clear position taken by the department chief, the bodies should be

21     recovered and interred until further notice, until the investigation is

22     completed, until it can be determined who did it and what was actually

23     done."

24             When you compare statements that Witness Keric gave to the war

25     crimes chamber in Belgrade and before this Tribunal, it is clear that

Page 14514

 1     this witness cannot be trusted and that everything he stated before the

 2     ICTY, which is completely contradictory to what he had said before the

 3     war crimes chamber in Belgrade, is untrue, to put it in simplest terms.

 4             Witness Keric obviously knowingly tried to play down his role in

 5     the whole event and to falsely accuse Vlastimir Djordjevic for his

 6     actions regarding the bodies found in the Perucac lake.

 7             The statement made by Vlastimir Djordjevic regarding the bodies

 8     found in the Perucac lake is consistent, life-like, convincing, and based

 9     on other evidence.  The allegations that Djordjevic had instructed Keric

10     not to inform the public prosecutor and the judge are inaccurate and are

11     designed to play down Witness Keric's personal responsibility and show

12     his intent to levy unfounded accusations against Djordjevic which he

13     tried to do directly before this Tribunal in his testimony.

14             Unlike Keric, the accused Djordjevic stated in his evidence

15     clearly and unequivocally that he had never told Keric not to relay the

16     information that had been given to him to the investigating judge and the

17     prosecutor.

18             Any comparisons between the situation with the truck found at

19     Tekija and the bodies found in the Perucac lake is inappropriate and

20     unfounded.  Djordjevic's actions in his conversations with the Bor SUP

21     chief Golubovic were completely different and occurred in completely

22     different circumstances than those when he dealt with the Uzice SUP chief

23     Keric.

24             In order to analyse everything that is said in the Prosecution

25     final brief in paragraphs 568 through 581, and the conclusions made

Page 14515

 1     regarding the events in the 13th May centre in Batajnica, in paragraphs

 2     1217 through 1226, we will try to explain the facts as they have been

 3     presented in the course of the proceedings here.

 4             The facts say that the minister invited General

 5     Vlastimir Djordjevic to his office in April 1999 a few days after the

 6     information had come in regarding the Perucac lake and told him that the

 7     trucks used to transport the bodies from Tekija were now located in the

 8     training area of the special anti-terrorist unit and that the bodies

 9     should be buried there.  This was the 13th of May centre in Batajnica.

10     There was a discussion between General Djordjevic and the minister, and

11     when minister told Djordjevic that he had twice refused to obey a direct

12     order from him regarding Tekija and Perucac and that the situation now

13     was quite serious.  He warned him that there was a war going on, that

14     there was a lot of destruction in the territory of the whole of Serbia,

15     and that this was what needed to be done with the bodies in Batajnica.

16             The order was to inform the people from the SAJ who were in

17     charge of the training area to bury the body in their centre.  He told

18     him that he should relay to them that those were the bodies of the

19     victims of NATO air-strikes and the terrorists and that after the war

20     ended there would be an exhumation and regular procedure would be

21     followed.

22             General Djordjevic then contacted Witness K87, who in turn tasked

23     Witness K88 with burying the bodies.  The minister informed Djordjevic

24     about each and every truck that arrived in the 13th of May centre in

25     Batajnica, and Djordjevic would in turn relay the information to

Page 14516

 1     Witness K87.  Djordjevic never knew the time and the point of departure

 2     of the trucks that arrived in the 13th of May centre in Batajnica.  These

 3     facts have been determined based on the hearing of the immediate

 4     participants, direct participants, in the burial of the bodies,

 5     Witnesses K87 and K88 and the Witness K93 and General

 6     Vlastimir Djordjevic, himself.

 7             In paragraph 576, the OTP quotes the evidence of Witness K87

 8     regarding the broken trailer.  Yet, on that occasion the OTP fails to

 9     quote from the evidence of Witness K87 where he speaks about his

10     conversation with General Djordjevic, where general told him to mark in

11     some way the spot where the bodies were buried in order for an exhumation

12     to be carried out when the time came for that.  The trailer truck was

13     left there to mark the spot where the bodies were buried.

14             When the Prosecution speaks about the testimony of Witnesses K87

15     and K88 in paragraphs 571 and 572 and the conclusions about the role of

16     Lipovac and Basanovic in paragraph 1223, the Prosecution fails to quote

17     what Witness K87 said about the event described by K88.  Lipovac's only

18     role was to bring the fuel that was put into the trucks on several

19     occasions.  So two witnesses say completely different things about the

20     same event.  And Witness K87 says that Lipovac never had anything to do

21     with this whole thing, apart from bringing fuel for the trucks.  In

22     paragraph 577, it is stated that Witness K88, upon his return from

23     Kosovo, took part in a number of additional burials.  The Defence is in

24     the dark as to where the Prosecution has come across this claim.  This is

25     an arbitrary claim and it contradicts the evidence of Witness K88, who

Page 14517

 1     confirms in all his statements that he was present in the period of 20

 2     days -- over the period of the 20 days when the trucks arrived in the

 3     13th of May centre in Batajnica and that he had gone -- and that he went

 4     to Kosovo after that.

 5             [In English] I will take just a minute more.

 6             [Interpretation] When it comes to the number of trucks brought to

 7     Batajnica, the Prosecution states there were six of those, referring to

 8     the evidence of Witness K88, but neglects to mention that in his

 9     statement, Witness K87, and in his evidence, Witness Djordjevic, claimed

10     that there were three or four.  Witness K88 states that K87 told him

11     about the arrival of each and every truck, so this is his source of

12     information.

13             In paragraph 1220, the Prosecution is trying to determine when

14     the first truck came to Batajnica and concludes that this was on the 8th

15     of April, 1999.  On that day Vlastimir Djordjevic did not have any

16     information to the effect that there were any trucks in the 13th of May

17     centre in Batajnica, least of all that there were any bodies in those

18     trucks.  The minister informed Vlastimir Djordjevic about the existence

19     of those trucks a few days after the events at the Perucac lake, so it

20     was sometime between the 15th and the 20th of April, which is consistent

21     with the evidence of Witness K87, that General Djordjevic contacted him

22     about a month after the war started, sometime between mid- and late

23     April.  This is yet another piece of evidence that shows that

24     General Djordjevic learned at that time that the trucks with the bodies

25     were actually in the 13th of May centre in Batajnica.  As soon as he

Page 14518

 1     learned about that, and as soon as he accepted the orders from

 2     minister -- from the minister, Djordjevic contacted K87.  Had he known

 3     about the existence of the trucks with the bodies and had he organised

 4     the arrival of those trucks to the centre in Batajnica, as the

 5     Prosecution alleges, certainly those trucks would not have been standing

 6     there at the training area for days, as Witnesses K87 and 88 say in their

 7     evidence, but Djordjevic would have contacted them earlier.  This

 8     evidence by those witnesses confirm the Djordjevic defence case, that the

 9     whole process of burying the bodies in the 13th of May centre in

10     Batajnica took 20 days at the most and not two months, as the Prosecution

11     claims in several places in its final brief.

12             I think this would be an appropriate time for the break,

13     Your Honour.

14             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.  We will resume just after 1.00.

15                           --- Recess taken at 12.34 p.m.

16                           --- On resuming at 1.05 p.m.

17             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes, Mr. Djordjevic.

18             MR. DJORDJEVIC:  Thank you.

19             [Interpretation] Before we continue, I would first of all like to

20     thank the interpreters for bearing with me and for following me at my

21     rate of speed, but there are two minor mistakes in the transcript.  I

22     think they need to be corrected and then I would like to say for the

23     record that at page 76, line 7, [In English] And instead of "dresses," it

24     should be in the record, "bodies."

25             [Interpretation] So instead of the word "dresses" there would be

Page 14519

 1     the word "bodies."

 2             At page 76, line 21, the interpretation is wrong because it says

 3     that Keric never issued orders and it should read that orders were never

 4     issued to Keric.  So now I will continue.

 5             If one reads carefully not only what the witnesses spoke about,

 6     but what the OTP has written in its final brief in chapter 3(B), item 5

 7     [as interpreted], it is quite clear that these are events that took place

 8     in the period from the beginning and until the 29th of April, 1999, at

 9     the latest.  And this corresponds to the time-period in which the bodies

10     were buried in the 13th of May centre in Batajnica and it also tallies

11     with what witnesses K87, K88, K93 spoke in their evidence and what the

12     accused Djordjevic himself said in his defence.

13             Our next topic is Petrovo Selo.  Vlastimir Djordjevic does not

14     have any knowledge or information about the bodies buried in

15     Petrovo Selo.  In the course of the trial, no evidence has been adduced

16     to establish any ties between Vlastimir Djordjevic and this event in any

17     way.  The allegation the OTP makes in paragraph 1185 and 1230 that in the

18     same time-period MUP covered up the bodies in the SAJ base in

19     Petrovo Selo and that this was part of the same operation is entirely

20     arbitrary and is not based on any facts or evidence adduced in the course

21     of this trial.  There is not any piece of evidence adduced in the course

22     of the trial that would establish any link between Vlastimir Djordjevic

23     and the events in Petrovo Selo.

24             The first untrue claim made here is that the base in Petrovo Selo

25     was an SAJ base.  That is simply not correct.  In the course of the trial

Page 14520

 1     the evidence of the witnesses clearly show that this was a PJP base.  In

 2     the course of the trial it was likewise determined who directly

 3     participated in the burial of the bodies in Petrovo Selo.  Witness K93

 4     testified about that and identified persons who issued the tasks to him

 5     and persons that he communicated with.  Vlastimir Djordjevic is not among

 6     them, and he even went a step further to state clearly:

 7             "I never communicated with Vlastimir Djordjevic and I never

 8     received any orders from him."

 9             Witness K93 testified about the transportation of the bodies to

10     Petrovo Selo, stating that he received all the instructions related to

11     the departure for Kosovo and the transportation of the bodies directly

12     from the assistant minister, General Zekovic, and that once he was in

13     Kosovo and Metohija he spoke on the phone with General Sreten Lukic, who

14     was the head of the staff for the suppression of terrorism in Kosovo and

15     Metohija.

16             In paragraph 1233, the OTP starts a sentence with the following

17     claim:

18             "Djordjevic was also with Lukic, his direct subordinate, involved

19     in certain talks regarding the cover-up with Witness K93."

20             As regards the conversation in Lukic's office between K93 and

21     Lukic, Djordjevic was there for just a few minutes of it.  The proposal

22     that K93 should go to Bujanovac was given by Lukic before Djordjevic ever

23     entered the office.  At the time Djordjevic was already retired, and he

24     was not in a position to agree or disagree with the decision taken by

25     General Sreten Lukic, who was the chief of the RJB at the time.

Page 14521

 1             In its final brief, OTP accepts the evidence of Witness K93, but

 2     when he speaks about the return of Witness K93 from Petrovo Selo, that's

 3     paragraph 592, they, the OTP, says in quotation marks "because they

 4     needed it."  That's what they say, quote/unquote, because they needed it

 5     when the OTP speaks about the truck that was used to transport the bodies

 6     to Petrovo Selo.

 7             If you look at the evidence quoted as the source for this claim

 8     or quote, since there is -- there are quotation marks here, it is not

 9     clear which document was actually used as a source for this claim.

10     Witness K93 never stated that in his evidence before this Chamber or in

11     his statement.  That's Exhibit 1065 at pages 3 through 4, as indicated in

12     the footnote 1433 in the final brief.

13             Paragraphs 599 and 1232 are quite unclear.  In those paragraphs

14     the OTP states that three persons were found in Petrovo Selo, they were

15     identified as the Bytyqi brothers, and that they had been transferred

16     from the prison in Prokuplje to Petrovo Selo on Djordjevic's orders.  If

17     those allegations are made because the Prosecution failed to adduce any

18     evidence in the course of the trial to link Djordjevic with Petrovo Selo

19     and the grave sites found there, the Defence sees it as a desperate move

20     and would not stoop to comment.  If this is the way to prove Djordjevic's

21     involvement in the murder of the Bytyqi brothers, we would like to note

22     that proceedings are under way in Serbia in this case and that some

23     persons are accused and Djordjevic only appeared as a witness in that

24     trial.  The names of the Bytyqi brothers, or any incidents related to

25     them, are not covered in the indictment against Djordjevic before the

Page 14522

 1     ICTY and their names, the names of the Bytyqi brothers, are not listed in

 2     any of the annexes to the indictment.

 3             Any insinuation on the part of the OTP that the link between

 4     Vlastimir Djordjevic and the grave in Petrovo Selo is based on the fact

 5     that the refrigerator truck was found in the Danube near Tekija was based

 6     on the fact that the refrigerator truck found in the Danube near Tekija

 7     was destroyed there is completely unfounded and is contrary to the

 8     evidence adduced in the course of the trial.  Witness Golubovic confirmed

 9     that he had relayed to his subordinates the order that the truck should

10     be destroyed and not the location where the truck should be destroyed.

11     Witness Radojkovic confirmed that after receiving an order from Golubovic

12     he decided to destroy the truck in Petrovo Selo.  He chose the location.

13             In paragraphs 1227 to 1229 the OTP attempts to prove that the

14     burial of the bodies in Batajnica was part of a greater plan devised at a

15     higher level and that Djordjevic was in charge of the operation to cover

16     up the bodies.  The OTP bases its whole construction on a statement made

17     by Zivko Trajkovic, the former SAJ commander, who -- to whom Djordjevic

18     said in 1999 something along the lines of:  That is the decision taken by

19     people who are much more important than you and I, so don't ask me too

20     much about it.  And this formulation something like -- when he said

21     "something like," is not by chance because that's what Witness Trajkovic

22     said, that's how he put it when he recounted what Djordjevic had told him

23     11 years ago.  So Trajkovic himself is not quite sure that Djordjevic

24     said this, but the OTP has taken this as being certain evidence of it

25     being a plan devised at a much higher level.

Page 14523

 1             Djordjevic in his statement clearly explained that the words

 2     quoted by Trajkovic is not what he actually said to him, and that's quite

 3     all right because Trajkovic himself does not claim that he remembers the

 4     authentic words uttered by Djordjevic, the accused Djordjevic, said that

 5     somebody above him decided about that and that is true.  And that was the

 6     then-minister of the interior Vlajko Stojiljkovic.

 7             During the proceedings and Prosecution case, not a shred of

 8     evidence was presented to back up the existence of any plan at a higher

 9     level.  During the proceedings, not a shred of evidence was presented to

10     speak about the holding of a meeting at which assignments or roles were

11     assigned in order to carry out the burial of bodies all over Serbia.

12     During the proceedings, not a shred of evidence was presented to back up

13     the OTP's assertion that the plan to cover up the bodies, in addition to

14     the minister and Djordjevic other leading political military and

15     political personages took part.

16           Vlastimir Djordjevic was in Kosovo and Metohija in the summer of 1998,

17     and there were also operations underway at that time.  But as to the bodies

18   that are alleged to have been buried then beyond regular procedure – no, there

19     was nothing of the sort going on, nor were any bodies transported anywhere.

20     Vlastimir Djordjevic had no reason to assume that anything like that would

21 happen ten months later because we assure that unless you take part in something

22   like that it is difficult to assume that anybody in his right mind would think

23   of such an idea, let alone put such an idea into practice.  There is no plan,

24  there is no previously issued task, there was no information or knowledge about

25   the existence of bodies, there was no reason to assume that any such idea

Page 14524

 1     existed.  And the next step was to organise transport from Kosovo and

 2     Metohija to the territory of Serbia proper and the question is:  What

 3     role did Vlastimir Djordjevic play in that.

 4             An answer to that question is quite a simple one and can be

 5     summarised in Vlastimir Djordjevic's own words.  In his defence he said:

 6             "I didn't know whose bodies were located in the truck that was

 7     found.  I didn't know who those people were who had lost their lives.  I

 8     did not know where they had lost their lives and in what way.  I did not

 9     know whether they were buried nor did I know where they were from or in

10     what way they were transported, let alone who organised the transport."

11             The Trial Chamber was told quite sincerely that his -- Djordjevic

12     told the Trial Chamber sincerely when he received the knowledge.  He

13     described in detail what his role was in the so-called cover-up of the

14     bodies on his part and what his relationship was towards this act and how

15   long everything lasted.  The obvious surprise that he experienced when he heard

16   for the first time of the existence of any bodies in the territory of Tekija

17   is something that Witness Golubovic spoke about when he was heard before this

18   Tribunal, this Trial Chamber.  When he heard of the existence of any bodies on

19   the territory of Uzice he was surprised, and he said, "What happened is not

20   good at all," and that is something that Witness Keric said.  Perhaps the best

21   proof of Djordjevic's position in relation to everything that was happening at

22   the time is something that K87 said during his testimony.  He said:

23             "I felt that everything that was happening was happening against

24     the will of General Vlastimir Djordjevic, and I gained the impression

25     that he hoped that everything would come to an end, that it would all be

Page 14525

 1     over."

 2             And then he goes on to say:

 3             "The general was nervous and deep in thought.  That's the

 4     impression I gained.  He told me that there was an assignment which we

 5     had to carry out and that that was our duty.  Then he told me what it was

 6     about.  He said that those people had to be buried.  He said that they

 7     were the victims of NATO bombing and that we shouldn't talk too much

 8     about it, but that we should wait until the end of the war to carry

 9     identity the identification of those people so that they could be buried

10     properly and that it was important to mark the spot where they were

11     buried so that everybody would know where this was done and how it was

12     done.  It is clear," he concludes, "that Vlastimir Djordjevic was taken

13     by surprise when -- about information on bodies in Serbia coming from

14     Kosovo and Metohija.  And it is clear that he had no information, nor did

15     he, in any way, participate in the transport of bodies from the territory

16     of Kosovo and Metohija to the territory of Serbia proper.  We can clearly

17     deduce that he never took part in any meeting in which he discussed the

18     cover-up of Kosovo Albanians."

19             Furthermore, the Prosecutor has failed to prove beyond reasonable

20     doubt that Djordjevic, by deploying volunteer and paramilitary units,

21     contributed significantly to implementing the joint criminal enterprise

22     by allowing their deployment and attaching them to the MUP units in

23     Kosovo and Metohija.  Vlastimir Djordjevic did not have any knowledge and

24     could not have sent other units except the RJB units to Kosovo and

25     Metohija pursuant to the minister's decision.  There is no proof in

Page 14526

 1     evidence whereby Vlastimir Djordjevic had knowledge that in Kosovo -- to

 2     Kosovo and Metohija paramilitary units were sent outside the RJB.  In

 3     these proceedings it has been established that only one group of

 4     reservists was attached to the SAJ units during the war, whereas the

 5     Prosecution claims that it is -- which the Prosecution claims is a

 6     paramilitary unit.

 7             Without entering into the question of whether the Skorpion units

 8     were added and attached to the SAJ, we must first look whether a unit was

 9     formed to protect the oilfields in Slavonia and whether it was a

10     paramilitary units during the time of its formation and existence.

11     Prosecution Witnesses K92 Stoparic and Trajkovic confirmed that the

12     government decision and the Ministry of Defence decision of Slavonia,

13     Baranja, and Western Srem that a unit was formed to protect the oilfields

14     and the borders at the end of 1992, which was included into the

15     Territorial Defence of Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem and placed

16     under the command of the Army of Srpska Krajina in 1995.  The unit was

17     disbanded, it handed over its weapons and equipment to the Army of

18     Yugoslavia and ceased to exist.  Members of the unit which called itself

19     the Skorpions, after being disbanded up until the 25th of March, 1999,

20     were never rallied into any unit whatsoever and did not undertake any

21     activities at all.

22             The second question which can be posed is what the composition of

23     the reservists was who were attached to the SAJ, or rather, were they

24     former members of the disbanded unit which provide security for the

25     oilfields in Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem.  Once again, on the

Page 14527

 1     basis of Prosecution witness testimony, we can just conclude that a small

 2     number of the reserve force that was accepted were members of the

 3     disbanded unit from Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem.  Most of the men

 4     taken into the reserve formation had nothing to do with this disbanded

 5     unit.

 6             The next question which begs an answer is:  How can a

 7     paramilitary unit exist without any equipment and arms?  And we consider

 8     that it is not contested that the equipment and weapons were given to the

 9    reservists only once they had become part of the reserve force.  There was

10    no knowledge about the crimes committed by the members of the reserve of

11   the MUP who were former members of the unit to secure the oilfields carried

12    out during the war on the territory of the former SFRY at the time they

13     were engaged in 1999, and this was confirmed by Prosecution and Defence

14     witnesses alike and this -- knowledge about this was gained many years

15     later.

16             As to the earlier -- the criminal past and the events of the

17     crime in Podujevo and members of the reserve force of MUP attached to the

18     SAJ, there was more talk in the closing brief of the Defence.  Djordjevic

19     cannot be held responsible for sending any volunteer or allegedly

20     paramilitary units to Kosovo and Metohija which was outside the RJB.

21     Djordjevic just simply carried out decisions taken by the minister to

22     deploy men to RJB units.  All other paramilitary units mentioned by the

23     witnesses, if they were sent, were not sent to units of the RJB nor were

24     they sent by Vlastimir Djordjevic nor did he have knowledge of any

25     sending of paramilitary units to Kosovo and Metohija as he clearly stated

Page 14528

 1     in his testimony.

 2             Now, why the reserve force was engaged in the first place and

 3     attached to SAJ units was explained in the Defence final brief.  By way of

 4     speculative conclusions, the Prosecution charges Djordjevic with approving

 5     the taking in and engagement of the reserve forces in Kosovo and Metohija,

 6     both for the first time and the second time.  If that allegation by the

 7    Prosecution were correct, then Djordjevic, at the request of Trajkovic, would

 8    have taken the decision straight away and there would be no need to defer any

 9    decision taking.  After much discussion, Djordjevic told Trajkovic that

10    reception into the reserve force and their deployment had been permitted, and

11   Trajkovic testified before this court and said that the decision to engage the

12    reserve force was something that only the minister could have taken and the

13     person that he authorised would put the minister's decision into practice.

14             This was confirmed by a number of other witnesses as well, and we

15     can conclude this by reading the law governing the internal affairs.

16     At the time when the reserve force attached to the SAJ was taken in and

17     engaged, Vlastimir Djordjevic had no knowledge about any crimes which the

18     members of this reserve force had committed on the territory of the former

19     SFRY.  Vlastimir Djordjevic had no knowledge of the fact that any individual

20     members of the reserve force were ever on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina

21    during the disintegration of the SFRY.  He had no knowledge that these persons

22     were members of units in Croatia which were called the Skorpions, nor did the

23     name Slobodan Medic mean anything to him at the time when persons from

24     the reserve force were taken in and deployed.

25             Vlastimir Djordjevic had no knowledge nor is there any proof of

Page 14529

 1     that, whereby the members of the reserve force, members of the SAJ, were

 2     ever a paramilitary unit.  His only knowledge was that some of these

 3     individuals were known to the SAJ commander Trajkovic, and K92 from Slavonia,

 4     Baranja, and Western Srem, and that there were people from Novi Sad, Sid,

 5     Ruma, and the surrounding parts.

 6             Zivko Trajkovic, the commander of the SAJ unit, found and

 7     selected people to make up the reserve force.  As there is lack of

 8     evidence, the Prosecutor relies on a statement made by K92 on the 29th of

 9     June, 2005, which is not an exhibit in these proceedings and it is cited

10     in reference 3168 of the OTP's final brief.  In footnote 3228, at the end

11     of paragraph 1178, the OTP once again quotes from document P1595, without

12     saying that the document was not admitted but just MFI'd and then links

13     it with Vasiljevic to whom this document was never shown.  The

14     Prosecution, in the absence of evidence, is using documents which were

15     not admitted into evidence in this case and upon which there -- a

16     decision cannot be based.

17             Paragraph 231 where they say that notorious paramilitary groups

18     in 1998 went to Kosovo and during the period of the indictment they quote

19     Vasiljevic, who, apart from the Skorpions, has no knowledge whether any

20     other groups went to Kosovo and Metohija and Stoparic who exclusively

21     talks about the Skorpions as being a reserve force which was attached to

22     the SAJ and everything -- all this referred to 1999 and not 1998.

23             Furthermore, as to the quotation the paramilitary units

24     replenished the MUP units, there's no reference about that in that same

25     paragraph.

Page 14530

 1             Paragraph 203 presents more constructs about special operations

 2     units and its alleged satellite units.  Footnote 447 and 448 to

 3     corroborate the allegations, the Prosecutor quotes Witness Stoparic.

 4     However, the witness did not speak about Kosovo and Metohija, but rather

 5     about Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia.  And his testimony was

 6     unrelated to the special operations unit's structure and the indictment

 7     period.

 8             In paragraph 234, footnotes 519, 520, and 522, the Prosecution

 9     refers to Stoparic's witness, but that does not refer to Kosovo and

10     Metohija but rather to Slavonia and Djeletovci.  Footnote 523 in

11     reference to official RDB and IDs, the Prosecutor refers to Vasiljevic's

12     assumptions.

13             In footnote 521, with regard to the presence of Arkan's Tigers in

14     Kosovo, the Prosecutor quotes Witness K82, who, on page T8457, says that

15     he personally doesn't know whether they were ever in Kosovo and Metohija.

16     In paragraph 236, in footnote 527, the Prosecutor quotes Cvetic in

17     respect of bullet point 7 of the dispatch dated 18 February 1999, Exhibit

18     P356; however, the Prosecutor fails to refer to the transcript page

19     T6679, i.e., the witness's explanation of the police jargon term "to put

20     under operative control."

21             In footnote 529, paragraph 236, the Prosecutor misquotes Witness

22     Vlajkovic who, quite contrary to what the Prosecution alleges, says on the

23     cited pages of the transcript that he has no knowledge of the use of

24     paramilitaries by the MUP.  No person's criminal past cannot -- can be

25     established based on any witness statements, regardless of that person's

Page 14531

 1     position or function, especially bearing in mind that the evidence in

 2     question is supported by official records which are accessible.

 3             More specifically, when talking about MUP reserve forces and their

 4     members attached to the special anti-terrorist unit in Kosovo in 1999 who

 5     were charged with and convicted for the Podujevo crime, the RS MUP records do

 6     not contain information about their criminal records in the territory of the

 7     Republic of Serbia up to the moment when they were engaged, and those were

 8     the only records available to the MUP.  When it comes to persons who were

 9     born outside of the territory of the Republic of Serbia, the MUP could not

10     obtain their criminal records from their country of birth.  It could only be

11     done via the Ministry of Justice for individuals against whom criminal

12     proceedings had been instituted in Serbia.

13             I will apologise to the Trial Chamber and I will ask for a little

14     bit more time if that is granted, I will be able to finish very quickly.

15           In paragraphs 1183 and 1184 there is a reference to establishing a link

16   between the SAJ unit and the attached reserve forces and the alleged PJP crimes

17  and ethnic cleansing of Albanian villages.  This is a result of the Prosecutor’s

18   erroneous conclusion and failure to include evidence on the alleged crimes by

19   the SAJ and attached units of reserve forces, from the statement of the OTP

20    Witness Stoparic.  The only conclusion based on Witness Stoparic's evidence is

21  that they participated in anti-terrorist activities and that they -- that he did

22   not see any civilians anywhere nearby.  This is on page 2875 of the transcript.

23             In paragraph -- just a moment.  Please bear with me.

24                           [Defence counsel confer]

25             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] In terms of the sentencing,

Page 14532

 1     which is something that Defence has to present its position.  As the

 2     counsel for the defendant, it is -- has been clear from the very beginning

 3     that Defence pleads for acquittal for the aforementioned reasons.

 4             We have tried to present the briefest possible summary of the

 5     reasons why the Defence believes that that would be appropriate, although

 6     this closing brief could go on much longer if we were to deal with

 7     everything that we couldn't tackle in the closing brief.  The procedure

 8     is such that the Defence, just like our learned friends from the

 9     Prosecution, always have to deal with the matters that they need to

10     explain themselves.  We've tried to do that at this time in order to be

11     able to clarify as many facts as possible.

12             Therefore, once again, I would like to repeat that the Defence

13     believes that acquittal is an appropriate decision for the defendant

14     Djordjevic.  The Defence, with all due respect, claims that even if all

15     the allegations presented by the OTP, the proposed range would not be

16     adequate.  And bearing in mind that the Prosecution has not proven its

17     allegations, the sentence range is not appropriate and when analysing the

18     presented evidence, the honourable Trial Chamber will see that the

19     allegations were not proven by the Prosecution beyond any reasonable

20     doubt, which is quite appropriate because Vlastimir Djordjevic is not

21     guilty of any accounts.

22             We would like to bring our final argument to the end, and we

23     would like to thank you for having read our final brief, based on which

24     we would propose for Mr. Djordjevic to be acquitted on all counts.  We

25     would like to thank to the entire technical staff of this Tribunal.  We

Page 14533

 1     would like to thank the Chamber's staff, the Registry staff, and all of

 2     those who have supported us in these proceedings.  We would like to thank

 3     our colleagues from the Prosecution for their fair conduct and

 4     co-operation that has been extraordinary and contributed to these

 5     proceedings.

 6             I will also like to correct something in the record.  On page 72,

 7     line 25, where it should say -- just a moment, please.  Bear with me.  I

 8     will have to consult my legal assistant.

 9                           [Defence counsel confer]

10             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] During the receipt of those

11     persons and their engagement.

12             That would be all, Your Honours.  Once again, I would like to

13     thank you for your patience and we apologise for having tried to say as

14     much as possible, and that's why we have had a problem with the

15     interpretation and the interpreters -- but means most and that's how we

16     acted.  Thank you very much.

17             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you, Mr. Djordjevic.

18             The Chamber would like to thank counsel, both for the Defence and

19     the Prosecution, for the way in which the case has been conducted, their

20     attention to timeliness which has enabled us to finish the case in a

21     faster time than most would have anticipated, and which I think from the

22     quality of the written submissions that we have received and now the oral

23     submissions, makes it clear that attention has been able to be focused

24     primarily on the important matters of fact and law.  All of that the

25     Chamber appreciates and it will assist us in the task that lies ahead.

Page 14534

 1             Given that the evidence and submissions have now concluded, the

 2     hearing will be formally closed.  The Chamber must reserve its decision

 3     and give consideration to the evidence and the submissions it has

 4     received.  That, of course, is no short or easy task.  We must apply

 5     ourselves conscientiously to that.  We will deliver our decision as soon

 6     as we are clear in our ultimate finding about the matters in dispute and

 7     have prepared our written decision.  We will attend to that with the same

 8     conscientious attention and attention to time that we know has been

 9     displayed throughout the trial by all.

10             So thank you in the courtroom for your support.  We will mention

11     later how much the contribution of those assisting the courtroom has

12     been.

13             We now, therefore, reserve our decision and will deliberate in

14     due course.  You will be informed of the date of when we are ready to

15     deliver.

16                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.42 p.m.