Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 8216

1 Monday, 13 May 2002

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 2.32 p.m.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.

6 THE REGISTRAR: Case Number IT-98-29-T, the Prosecutor versus

7 Stanislav Galic.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar. Before calling your next

9 witness, Mr. Mundis, I would like to return to an issue that we dealt with

10 last week, that was the admission of a report which was proposed by the

11 Prosecution to be an expert report and where the Defence objected against

12 using it as an expert report, mainly on the basis that this report was not

13 drafted on the request of the Tribunal or of the OTP, and reference was

14 made by the Defence to the Kunarac case, arguing that in the Kunarac case,

15 the report of Professor Cleiren, which is written, C-l-e-i-r-i-n -

16 although it is wrongly spelled in the Kunarac transcript - that in the

17 Kunarac case, that it would not have been admitted into evidence. Since

18 last Thursday, the Chamber tried to find the exact spot, and we did find

19 the discussion on the admissibility of the testimony and of an expert

20 report of Professor Cleiren on pages 4154 and following, that is -- I

21 think it was the 29th of May - I am not quite sure about that - and then

22 it continued on the 30th of May, of the year 2000.

23 Having looked at it, we do not find any reference to who ordered

24 the drafting of the report. As a matter of fact, we noticed that there

25 had been a great debate on whether the factual basis of the report stemmed

Page 8217

1 from the personal knowledge, the personal observations, of Professor

2 Cleiren, rather than the question whether the report was

3 drafted on the request of the Tribunal or the OTP. And no decision has

4 been taken, as far as I can see, because on the 30th of May of the year

5 2000, finally the Prosecution has withdrawn its intent to call Professor

6 Cleiren as a witness.

7 So, is this the part of the Kunarac transcript you were referring

8 to or is there any other source, because we had some difficulties in

9 linking this part of the transcript to the argument raised by the

10 Defence?

11 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, this was at the time

12 that it was, 29th, 30th of May, 2000, and there was a discussion on the

13 admissibility of the testimony of Professor Cleiren. Formally speaking,

14 there was no decision of the Tribunal. They never reached a decision

15 after the Prosecution withdrew their proposal to tender it. The point of

16 the debate of this discussion was that the Mrs. Cleiren did not give her

17 opinion and findings. It was not done on the request of any party or the

18 Trial Chamber. As far as we understood at the time, Professor Cleiren was

19 supposed to testify on the circumstances as a member of the Bosinas

20 [phoen] Commission, checking the data and gathering the data for a certain

21 period of time, and it was a question of rape. So formally, the decision

22 was never reached. But our stand is that if the Prosecution withdrew

23 their proposal after the debate, I am not sure whether that was Judge

24 Hunt's opinion, but the point is that Professor Cleiren never gave her

25 opinion or findings at anyone's request. And this is -- the Defence

Page 8218

1 accepted this and that was one of the reasons why we didn't object.

2 So in our statement, the reasons, we said that Mr. Zecevic didn't

3 give his opinion, it wasn't his findings.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, that is a different argument from who ordered

5 the report to be drafted, because when I did understand and when the

6 Chamber does understand the argument well, it was mainly on the basis

7 whether the report was drafted on the request of the local authorities in

8 Sarajevo rather than on request -- at the request of the Tribunal. But

9 that is not an issue as far as we can see in the debate before the Trial

10 Chamber presided by Judge Hunt. Judge Hunt was mainly putting questions,

11 but I am corrected to the extent that Judge Mumba was presiding. But at

12 least this is the part of the transcript you relied upon when objecting

13 against the admission of a report of, at least, of an expert -- of the

14 expert Mr. Zecevic testifying in this court. I must say, to testify in

15 this court. Thank you very much.

16 Then having clarified this issue, Mr. Mundis, your next witness we

17 will be Colonel Kolp, is that correct?

18 MR. MUNDIS: That is correct, Mr. President.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Usher, could you please bring the witness into

20 the courtroom.

21 Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

22 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President, there is

23 one question that we are interested in still, more and more: When is the

24 Prosecution going to be able to tell us about the pieces and because there

25 are certain questions we would like to ask every time a witness comes, and

Page 8219

1 we don't know when that is going to be.

2 JUDGE ORIE: When You are talking about the pieces, you are

3 talking about the shrapnel pieces?

4 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] No, I am talking about --

5 JUDGE ORIE: The documents.

6 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] That's right.

7 JUDGE ORIE: What you call the "grattage." You heard the

8 question, Mr. Mundis, but let's first proceed.

9 Good afternoon. Colonel Kolp, as far as I understand?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That is my name, Mr. President, but

11 unfortunately, I am not yet a Colonel. I am a commander.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. From your answer, I take it that you do

13 understand me in a language -- that you hear me in a language you

14 understand, Mr. Kolp .

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I understand. Of course I

16 understand French, that is my mother tongue, but I also understand

17 English and I can speak it, but I would say that if I am speaking about

18 such important things, I would prefer to use my mother tongue.

19 JUDGE ORIE: So you prefer to speak in your own language?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That is correct, Mr. President.

21 JUDGE ORIE: I will express myself in English, usually. Mr. Kolp,

22 before giving testimony in this court, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence

23 require you to make a solemn declaration that you will speak the truth,

24 the whole truth and nothing but the truth. May I invite you to make that

25 declaration, and the text will be handed out to you now by the usher.

Page 8220

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

2 speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you very much. Please be seated.

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

5 JUDGE ORIE: You will first be examined by counsel by the

6 Prosecution. Mr. Mundis, please proceed.

7 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President.


9 [Witness answered through interpreter]

10 Examined by Mr. Mundis:

11 Q. Commander Colonel, you are currently serving in the Belgian army;

12 is that correct?

13 A. Yes, that is correct.

14 Q. How long have you been in the Belgian army?

15 A. I entered the service in 1973, September 1973.

16 Q. In which branch of the Belgian army do you have the bulk of your

17 service?

18 A. It was in the infantry and the military police.

19 Q. Did there come a time when you were assigned under the flag of

20 the United Nations to Bosnia-Herzegovina?

21 A. Yes, I volunteered for this mission. That was at the end of year

22 1992, and I was -- I started in March 1993 and I stayed there November

23 1994.

24 Q. And in which part of Bosnia were you stationed during that period

25 from March 1993 through November 1994?

Page 8221

1 A. In fact, most of my time, I was in the Sarajevo sector which was

2 comprised of obviously the Sarajevo zone and its variants and also central

3 Bosnia, more specifically, the Kiseljak region where I was based.

4 Q. During this period, where was the office that you held, where did

5 you physically go to work in the morning?

6 A. From the second day of my mission, I was working at the HQ of the

7 Sarajevo sector as a liaison officer between the BH command, or for the BH

8 command.

9 Q. And was the headquarters of the Sarajevo sector located in the PTT

10 building in Sarajevo?

11 A. Yes, it was. So the HQ was located in the PTT building and my

12 base was with the HQ at the PTT building.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

14 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I am sorry,

15 but on page 5, line 5, I know that the transcript will be corrected but

16 this witness didn't say that he was based in Kiseljak, but that he

17 depended on Kiseljak. That is what I understood that he said in his

18 mother tongue that resembles mine, so I believe there is an error in the

19 transcript.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Attention will be paid to your observation while

21 working on the transcript.

22 Please proceed, Mr. Mundis.

23 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President.

24 Q. Commander Kolp, what were your primary duties as the liaison

25 officer?

Page 8222

1 A. This was a task of several facets, but the most important task was

2 to have a communication or liaison with the BH command, so with the BH

3 commander, specifically General Morillon, but that didn't go for very long

4 and then General Briquemont, whom I knew for a longer time, and then

5 finally General Rose and the Sarajevo sector, which was on the level of

6 the main staff, was mostly staffed by the French.

7 The second task was to solicit from the municipal Bosnia Serb

8 authorities to ask authorization for a passage of convoys: Military

9 convoys, UN convoys or NGO convoys, humanitarian convoys, and so on. And

10 to this is also added a liaison mission between these two HQS on one side,

11 the sector Sarajevo on the other side, BH command, and also the warring

12 parties. This is at the time of the war. These were my principal tasks.

13 Q. And when you say "the warring parties," which parties are you

14 referring to?

15 A. Most of the time was spent on the Bosnian Serbs but it also

16 happened that I met Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Muslims.

17 Q. How frequently would you meet with authorities of the Bosnia Serb

18 army?

19 A. Since the problem of convoys was very important, to start with, I

20 saw them every day.

21 Q. And where would you meet with the Bosnian Serb authorities, at

22 what physical location would you meet with them?

23 A. The location was Lukavica, where their main staff was, the HQ of

24 the Sarajevo Romanija Corps.

25 Q. Was there one primary Bosnian Serb officer that you dealt with in

Page 8223

1 your capacity as the liaison officer or did you meet with many different

2 authorities at Lukavica?

3 A. No, the main person was Major Indic at the time.

4 Q. How frequently would you meet with Major Indic?

5 A. Practically every day.

6 Q. And what were the primary subject matters that you discussed with

7 Major Indic during these meetings?

8 A. The main subject from my side, of course, was obtaining clearance

9 or authorization for the passage of convoys, mainly speaking, through

10 Central Bosnia, Kiseljak Sarajevo, through two checkpoints, Sierra 1 at

11 Kobiljaca and Sierra 4 at Kasindolska Cesta between Ilidza and Sarajevo.

12 And, of course, as a liaison officer, all specific communications from

13 different commanders, from the BH commander and the sector Sarajevo

14 commander, was then sent to the local commanders, so this went through

15 Colonel Indic.

16 Q. You have referred in your testimony to both Major Indic and

17 Colonel Indic. Is that in fact one and the same person?

18 A. Yes. In fact, I spoke about Colonel Indic because he was rapidly

19 promoted, but I always called him Commander Indic or Major Indic. But he

20 was promoted to Colonel very quickly.

21 Q. Was Major or Lieutenant-Colonel Indic's offices located in the

22 headquarters of the Bosnian Serb army at Lukavica?

23 A. Yes. Exactly. The headquarters of this corps of the 1st

24 Sarajevo Romanija Corps was located in Lukavica, and Major Indic had his

25 office in the building of the HQ, which was located a couple of dozen

Page 8224

1 metres away from the chief of staff.

2 Q. Do you know if General Galic also had his office in the same

3 building?

4 A. Yes, he did.

5 Q. And where was General Galic's office in relation to Major Indic's

6 office?

7 A. At the time when I was there, the office of General Galic was

8 located about 20 metres away from the office of Major Indic.

9 Q. Do you know what Major Indic's responsibilities within the

10 Sarajevo Romanija Corps consisted of?

11 A. Yes. It is a little complex in the sense that the Major Indic

12 was, I think - that is what I believe - he was a key person. He had

13 to coordinate everything that was coming from the outside, meaning the

14 United Nations the UNMOs, the military, the humanitarian organisations,

15 the NGOs. Everywhere that there was a problem or which was particularly

16 sensitive to have problems, everything went through the office of Major

17 Indic. I also believed that he was a coordinator and a direct associate

18 of the commander of the Serbian Army Corps.

19 Q. And which commander are you referring to, when you say, "the

20 commander of the Serbian army Corps"?

21 A. Here we are talking about General Galic.

22 Q. Based on your experience with Major Indic, do you know if he in

23 fact reported to General Galic?

24 A. I think, I believe, that Major Indic depended on General Galic,

25 yes.

Page 8225

1 Q. When you say "depended on General Galic," do you mean to say that

2 he reported information that you provided to him up the chain of command

3 to General Galic?

4 A. Yes. As far as I know, in a part of the Bosnian Serb army, the

5 chain of command was very rigid: A head is a head, a chief is a chief.

6 He would not accept that something else should be done opposite to what he

7 said, although every chief had some initiatives that he could take, but as

8 far as the most important things were concerned, it is clear that the

9 General knew in any case, since Major Indic had to report to him on a

10 regular basis, about what was going on. And I believe, yes.

11 Q. What type of issues did you take to Major Indic for action as a

12 liaison officer?

13 A. These were, to start with, or even throughout the mission, the

14 first point would be asking for authorization for passages of convoys,

15 then various complaints that came from the HQ of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

16 meaning, the UNHQ, which were addressed to the military authorities of

17 the Bosnian Serb when they came from either General Briquemont, General

18 Morillon or General Rose. This was mostly addressed to General Mladic

19 through the chain of command. But also, when there were complaints that

20 came from the Sarajevo sector, the level of the commander of Sarajevo

21 sector, his equivalent was General Galic. This was the first thing.

22 Q. Let me ask you a little bit about the authorization for passages

23 of convoys. Can you give us some concrete examples as to what type of

24 authorisation you were seeking from Major Indic?

25 A. Well, we had to, in principle, address at first verbally and then,

Page 8226












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 8227

1 if it didn't get any better, we would have to do it in writing. It would

2 be 24 or 48 hours in advance. These were always problems with the delays,

3 and in order to have these military convoys, UN convoys, pass, most of

4 them had right of passage without being checked, but that was never

5 enforced. Or the convoys, humanitarian convoys that were bringing either

6 medicine, medical equipment and materiel, perhaps sometimes food, water,

7 because at a certain point Sarajevo, in fact, had no water for four years

8 and also every now and then, but we tried to get the situation to become

9 better. But basically these were -- this was equipment that the Serbs

10 considered to be sensitive and that is why they wouldn't allow it to go

11 through. But what really happened is that there were negotiation, and

12 following these negotiations, the level of the medical materiel, the

13 needs was felt in both parts, camps, in both parties, so these convoys

14 were able to get into the town, at least one part, and then another part

15 of the convoy went to another part, to the hospital between the airport

16 and Lukavica.

17 Q. When you requested assistance from Major Indic with respect to

18 these convoys, was that assistance forthcoming after you made such

19 requests?

20 A. Well, we can say that this depended on the situation. In general,

21 it was always very difficult, very complex, to get authorisation, and this

22 meant that in most of the cases, we saw that there was refusal and we had

23 to send a message through another chain of command to Pale to the HQ.

24 There was one period it happened, there was a short period that -- there

25 were periods which were less difficult than others, but in fact it was

Page 8228

1 never easy.

2 Q. Were there some instances where you requested specific action of

3 Major Indic and that those requests were then met?

4 A. Yes. Following the question that you asked me a few moments ago,

5 I also asked about other requests directly to Major Indic and on several

6 occasions, four or five occasions, we asked for him to stop the shellings,

7 the bombardments, and in particular, in certain locations, to stop the

8 sniping activity which, in general, had as a response the fact that it

9 continued. It was only on one or two occasions after a certain time

10 because it was always a long time needed to go -- to take it through the

11 chain of command and, on two occasions, there were positive results. But

12 that is all.

13 Q. These one or two occasions that you referred to, do they refer to

14 shelling requests or sniping requests or both?

15 A. Well, that pertained to both. I think that it happened a total of

16 five times, both when we are talking about sniping activities and the

17 shelling. Therefore, I intervened every time this was addressed, either

18 to the Sarajevo sector or the BH command. And naturally, when the result

19 was not positive, we had to apply to another level of hierarchy and start

20 negotiations there, be it between sector Sarajevo directly or General

21 Soubirou, or somebody who was a member of his staff, or be it to the BH

22 command. We would apply either to General Milanovic or General Mladic.

23 Q. Do you know if Major Indic had the authority to halt the sniping

24 or the shelling when you requested him to do so?

25 A. [No interpretation]

Page 8229

1 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I have to

2 intervene because if we are to phrase this question in this way, then we

3 will not know actually what geographical area this question pertain to.

4 We know that the armies are divided into sectors and so on, so could Mr.

5 Mundis please make his question more precise?

6 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues]...area, Mr. Mundis.

7 Please proceed.

8 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] And just in order for me not

9 to interrupt Mr. Mundis once again, could he also give a time delineation

10 to his question, because as we were able to see, various military leaders

11 had various -- held various ranks. So could he be more precise, please.


13 Q. Commander Kolp, let's first focus on roughly the first six months

14 that you were in Sarajevo, that is from roughly March through September

15 of 1993. During that period, do you recall whether you made any requests

16 to Major Indic to stop sniping or to stop shelling?

17 A. Yes, yes. Yes, that did happen, especially when it comes to the

18 notorious bombing of Stup. If I remember, it was in October or November

19 of 1993. At that time the negotiations were being held in Geneva, if I am

20 not mistaken, Bosnian or, rather, Muslim delegation was in Geneva, or that

21 could have been New York. I don't remember the name of the person who

22 presided over the Presidency at that time. That person exerted pressure

23 and insisted on stopping the shelling. However, there came about the

24 intervention of General Briquemont, and as a result of that, we had

25 temporary ceasefire, armistice, and as far as I am concerned, on three

Page 8230

1 occasions, I had an opportunity to lodge a complaint with General Indic, a

2 complaint about shelling and sniping incidents.

3 Q. Perhaps it was a translation error, but I heard you refer to

4 General Indic. Again, are you referring to General Indic or Major Indic?

5 A. Major. Major Indic.

6 Q. Do you recall the approximate dates or month during which you made

7 complaints directly to Major Indic regarding sniping or shelling?

8 A. Well, it is quite difficult for me to remember now. I believe it

9 was in late 1993 or early 1994. I would say that during that period of

10 time, this military activity was quite intense. During the entire time I

11 was there, as you know, there were sniping incidents and shelling, so I

12 can't remember exactly whether this was in mid 1993, late 1993 or early

13 1994. It is difficult for me to pinpoint it now.

14 Q. Do you recall what geographic areas your complaints were made with

15 reference to?

16 A. Yes. This was -- first, we had the Nedzarici zone. That area is

17 located behind the Oslobodjenje newspaper building. If I can say between

18 the Stup bridge and behind it. So this is quite an important location.

19 And this also took place in Grbavica and in the Jewish cemetery. I know

20 the southern part much better than the northern because I travelled

21 through the southern part much more often.

22 Q. Were you ever in Major Indic's office when he issued any type of

23 orders with respect to shelling or sniping?

24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

25 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] This question seems to be a

Page 8231

1 leading one to me, Mr. President, and I don't think that it should be

2 allowed.

3 MR. MUNDIS: I will rephrase the question, Mr. President.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, please proceed then.


6 Q. During the time that you were in Major Indic's office, did you

7 ever hear him issue any type of orders to anyone else?

8 A. Actually, that happened on one occasion. I was present when an

9 order was issued. It was not issued in English or French, but rather in

10 Serbo-Croatian. I speak only a few words of Serbo-Croatian, and my

11 assistant who was present at the time interpreted it quickly for me and

12 said that it was an order for shooting. I tried to learn something more

13 about it but the French soldier, who was a member of the Foreign Legion,

14 would not tell me anything more about it. This is simply strictly what I

15 heard myself. However, I couldn't understand what was being said in

16 Serbo-Croatian because I don't speak that language. However, when on

17 another occasion I personally lodged in a request, I heard that a mortar

18 fired -- had fired in the Lukavica area -- in the Grbavica area, I

19 apologise. I was with Major Indic at the time and he at the time told me,

20 "Well, there will be a few Muslims less now." I don't know whether it

21 was a joke or not, however, I thought it was in poor taste.

22 Q. How many times did you hear outgoing mortar fire while you were at

23 Lukavica barracks?

24 A. While I was in Lukavica, I heard only once that rounds had been

25 fired from that area.

Page 8232

1 Q. At any time while you were in Lukavica, were there any incoming

2 mortar or artillery shells of any kind to your knowledge?

3 A. No. While I was present in Lukavica, it never happened.

4 Q. During the times that you were at Major Indic's office, did you

5 ever see any other visitors or guests or people who were coming to see

6 him?

7 A. Yes, there were many visitors.


9 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I hesitated. However, in the

10 French transcript, there is no details concerning the type of artillery

11 shells that were used, and I would like for this to be clarified.


13 Q. Commander Kolp, do you know the approximate time period when you

14 were at Lukavica when you heard the outgoing mortar fire?

15 A. No, I couldn't give you any dates with precision. I don't want to

16 mislead you and therefore I would rather not answer.

17 Q. Commander Kolp, you just indicated a few moments ago that there

18 were many visitors to Major Indic's office. Can you describe for the

19 Trial Chamber what types of visitors and who some of these people were, if

20 you knew?

21 A. Yes. There were many visitors. I have already said that, on one

22 hand, there were many representatives of the United Nations, be it

23 civilian services of the UN or the representatives of the commander of

24 chief of the Sarajevo sector, Colonel Valentin. There were also people

25 from the engineering corps who were in charge of everything that had to be

Page 8233

1 with utilities, energy companies, electrical companies, gas companies, and

2 so on. There were also liaison officers such as myself, and there

3 were also UN observers there.

4 On the other hand, we had soldiers of the VRS, and on many

5 occasions there were members of the paramilitary formations present

6 there as well. Those must have been some special units that had a skull,

7 a human skull design on their badge. On their hats they had this human

8 skull design, however, this doesn't prove anything. My assistant who knew

9 them quite well, told me that -- told me the following: "Major, do

10 not speak to these people, they are very dangerous."

11 Q. Do you know who any of these "very dangerous people" were?

12 A. No, I didn't know them personally. I knew, of course, that such

13 formations existed. In majority of the cases, we called them

14 "uncontrolled elements." We used that term to describe them. However, I

15 suppose that every person in charge had to know what was going on in

16 their sector.

17 Q. Do you recall the approximate time frame when you saw these people

18 in Major Indic's office?

19 A. Well, I think that I saw them on several occasions, and I would

20 say that it was sometime between April or May of 1993 until early 1994 at

21 the latest. I didn't see them afterwards.

22 Q. Can you be more specific with respect to your statement that you

23 saw them on "several occasions." Approximately how many occasions, if you

24 recall?

25 A. Well, I must have seen them some three or four times. But when I

Page 8234

1 say, "I saw them," that means it was just in passing. I did not have any

2 physical contact with them. I did not talk to them. I simply observed

3 them. Of course, when you have any kind of task of this nature, it is up

4 to you to report to your superiors what you had seen and I reported to my

5 superiors that I had seen them, and this was within the scope of my

6 responsibilities.

7 Q. Do you recall if the people that you saw on three or four times

8 were the same people or were they different people?

9 A. No, no. On two occasions, I saw one or two persons from that

10 group, therefore, I think that on two occasions, I saw the same persons.

11 But then on other occasions, there were different persons. However, every

12 time there were people from the same kind of paramilitary formations.

13 Q. What type of clothing were these people wearing?

14 A. Well, I didn't consider them soldiers because soldiers have to

15 wear uniforms or something that is like a uniform. These people had

16 various kinds of civilian clothes on them, perhaps some military jackets

17 on top of it. And then they had a typical cap that one can see in the

18 Slav countries. It was a black cap. And those were typically the clothes

19 of some paramilitary formations. Some had a skull on their caps.

20 However, I did not consider that to be uniform. For me, these people were

21 not soldiers in uniforms.

22 Q. Did these people have any characteristic hair style or facial hair

23 of any kind?

24 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President --

25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

Page 8235

1 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I have to

2 object. The witness just now said something different than what we can

3 see in the French transcript. These people were not soldiers in uniform

4 and this witness said, "For me, these people were not soldiers. They were

5 not soldiers."

6 JUDGE ORIE: That is what my recollection as well, but perhaps,

7 Mr. Mundis, we could clarify the issue so in order to avoid whatever

8 misunderstanding: whether or not they were soldiers in uniforms or

9 whether they are not soldiers and that they had no, I would say, proper

10 uniforms.


12 Q. Commander Kolp, did any of these people wear any type of military

13 uniforms?

14 A. They had parts of uniforms, whether it was a jacket or trousers.

15 In addition to that, they had plain civilian clothes like a jean jacket.

16 So they did not have a full uniform similar to some other uniforms that I

17 saw in other units. So these were not typical real uniforms. However, I

18 have to add that -- that everybody, be it is teenager or an elderly

19 person, had some kind of a weapon and some kind of uniform on them.

20 Q. Did these people that you saw have military-style haircuts or did

21 they have -- can you describe their hair and/or facial hair, if any?

22 A. Well, they did not have what one might call a military haircut.

23 They had long hair and beards.

24 Q. You have described these people as being part of paramilitary

25 formations. How do you know that if they weren't wearing uniforms of any

Page 8236

1 kind?

2 A. Well, the situation there was quite peculiar, as you probably

3 know, in view of the fact that -- that the Serbian army in Bosnia had a

4 large number of artillery weapons and tanks, but had, however, very few

5 infantry troops. Their life was quite difficult. When they tried to

6 gain territory in Sarajevo in order to put that sector under their

7 control, since it is a mountain region, I think that they had to

8 compensate for the insufficiency of their troops with the soldiers that I

9 myself call paramilitary.

10 So it was not militia but what I called paramilitary formations.

11 So from our point of view and not from a Yugoslav point of view, from our

12 point of view, we called these people Chetniks. So they were extreme

13 nationalists, and this is how I would describe them. This is now my

14 personal opinion. I think that they were subordinated to the Sarajevo

15 Romanija Corps. There were some other corps there as well, but let us not

16 go into that now, because that is not what we are focussing

17 on.

18 Q. What makes you think that these people were subordinated to the

19 Sarajevo Romanija Corps?

20 A. These people were what I call uncontrollable elements, or elements

21 out of control. I came to this conclusion based on these

22 visits. As I said, I did not see many of those visits or visitors, but I

23 did see some. The person that was my assistant used to meet them quite

24 often, and these people came regularly visit Major Indic, so I believe

25 that there was some kind of exchange of information between them and it is

Page 8237

1 possible that they received orders, or at the request of their superiors,

2 they engaged in certain tasks. However, I couldn't say more about this

3 because I had no direct contacts with them. I can't tell you that these

4 people went to see such and such in order to get orders.

5 As you know, when -- I know that everybody had -- was armed.

6 Everybody had weapons on them, however, the weapons that they had on them

7 at the time were not something that was typical that one could see

8 anyplace, any time.

9 Q. What type of weapons did they have on them?

10 A. Well, they had typical Kalasnikovs, which one can see everywhere.

11 It is a weapon that practically everybody used there at the time.

12 However, they also had very modern rifles. I saw some assault rifles and

13 other quite modern equipment that one cannot encounter easily. We know

14 that in that area there were so much arms trafficking that one could find

15 any kinds of weapons. However, the weapons that they had were not easily

16 obtained even there at the time.

17 Q. Did you ever speak to Major --

18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

19 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I am sorry. The classic

20 type, what I heard the major say was not at all interpreted by the

21 English booth. It is not at all in the English transcript.

22 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues]... Mr.

23 Piletta-Zanin, so I take it that working on the transcript, especially on

24 page 21, line 7, that proper attention will be paid to it.

25 Please proceed, Mr. Mundis.

Page 8238












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13 English transcripts.













Page 8239

1 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Are you in need of the translations of these words,

3 because they are not only not in the transcript, but -- I didn't listen to

4 the English translation, as a matter of fact.

5 Please proceed.


7 Q. Commander Kolp, do you remember if any of these people were

8 escorted by VRS personnel in the Lukavica barracks or if they were simply

9 roaming freely?

10 A. No, they were not escorted. They were moving freely.

11 Q. Did you ever speak to Major Indic about these paramilitary

12 formations?

13 A. No, not specifically.

14 Q. Based on your experience during the time you were in Sarajevo, how

15 much authority did Major Indic have?

16 A. As far as I know or I understand, Major Indic was a key person who

17 was supposed to, as far as I understand, who was supposed to report for

18 all of his actions to his chief, who was the commander of the corps,

19 of the army corps. At the time that was General Galic. However, I have

20 to also say that -- consider that I am a soldier myself. Every chief has

21 a chain of command in his area of action and some initiative; he has some

22 room for some initiative, and Major Indic probably did that. But I think

23 that that was on as far as he could in a very rigid structure, and in

24 spite of a very respectful chain of command of the Serb military, which at

25 that time was their force, their strength, I think that it was very

Page 8240

1 difficult not to report to the chief. And, again, I don't know of any

2 army where you do not do that.

3 Q. Commander Kolp, as part of your duties during the period that you

4 were in Sarajevo, did you also have the opportunity to intermingle with

5 the civilian population of the city?

6 A. Yes, absolutely. I met civilian population everywhere: In the

7 city, on the Serb side, on the Croat side, and where I still know a large

8 number of people. As far as the events are concerned in the city, yes, I

9 met many people. There is one thing that I would like to stress, however,

10 is that the siege of anything whatsoever, of any fortress in the medieval

11 times, and here with a city with 500.000 inhabitants, it is sometimes very

12 difficult, very hard, to see the suffering of the population the way that

13 they have suffered. And personally, this is what I feel, I personally

14 cannot understand how when you are attacking civilians, that you are then

15 -- that you have a fighting between the militaries, that is one thing,

16 and it is true there is no such thing as a clean war. But I have had many

17 contacts with civilians and I have -- through a chain of my own personal

18 acquaintances, I helped people in food - this is not important for this

19 case - but I helped schools and children. I did it everywhere, not just

20 in the city, but also on the Serb side, but much more in the city because

21 the proportions were different.

22 Q. Can you briefly tell the Trial Chamber the effect of the sniping

23 campaign on the population of Sarajevo?

24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

25 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I cannot accept that we ask

Page 8241

1 this -- that this question is asked, "sniping campaign," as we are

2 contesting that there was a sniping campaign. We cannot accept this, the

3 way it is phrased, because of its form. Thank you.

4 JUDGE ORIE: The objection is sustained because, until now, there

5 has been no testimony to any sniping campaign.


7 Q. During the time you were in Sarajevo, did you become aware of any

8 incidents involving snipers?

9 A. Yes, of course. I saw for myself on a regular basis. I can't

10 tell you about their frequency because it was everyday life. After all,

11 to hear an isolated shot in certain parts of the city, well, it is clear

12 that I also saw reports. So I heard and saw for myself these incidents

13 and I was myself on several occasions the target of isolated snipers.

14 They may have been Serb. I am saying a supposed target, because it is

15 very hard to say where it comes from. As far as I am concerned, when I

16 was in the centre of the city, this came from the neighbourhoods that I

17 told you a moment ago. But it was, yes, it was regular. I could say that

18 this was part of everyday life, practically. The reports that were also

19 mentioned, so the reports that arrived to the HQ of the UN also mentioned

20 these incidents. But I have personally lived through them and I can

21 say --

22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

23 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I am sorry, Mr. President, but

24 I have to be very precise with the transcript. What I heard this witness

25 say a moment ago was that "supposedly Serb" because there were several

Page 8242

1 Serbs. But, in English, it says, "a supposed target." This is not at all

2 the same thing. And the witness said, "supposedly Serb."

3 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues]...on the other hand,

4 on page 24, line 7, it says: "They may have been Serb."

5 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, but just afterwards.

6 Just after that, the witness said in French - we can ask him to

7 repeat - "supposedly Serb" because he wasn't sure about it.

8 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues]...but from the

9 other part of the testimony, it becomes clear that the witness had

10 difficulties in identifying those who sniped were of Serbian positions.

11 He just referred, I would say, in rather general words to the areas of the

12 city where, in his view, the sniping came from. Yes.

13 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes. But it is -- it would be

14 helpful if it was more precise in relation to the French transcript.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Very will. Care will be taken of it.

16 Please proceed, Mr. Mundis.

17 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you.

18 Q. Commander Kolp, based on your encounters with the civilian

19 population in Sarajevo, do you have an opinion as to how these sniping

20 incidents affected them?

21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

22 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Again, the question asked by

23 Mr. Mundis [In English] "incidents." [Interpretation] Is Mr. Mundis

24 talking about all the sniping incidents, that we cannot determine where

25 they came from, or one specific incident?

Page 8243


2 Q. Let's start, Commander Kolp, with sniping incidents in general.

3 Are you aware of sniping being conducted by both parties?

4 A. Well, I will try and be clearer. As far as I am concerned, when I

5 was targeted by a sniper, it was impossible to say, in most cases, where

6 this came from. That is as far as I am concerned because -- and this is

7 -- I want to remain honest and say fair that what also existed is that

8 there was provocation to make believe that there was another party that

9 was firing at the UN. And it is important to say that when a sniper

10 really wanted to hit me, I think he would have done it.

11 As far as the local population is concerned -- I have to cut my

12 answer in two. As far as the local population is concerned, the objective

13 was clear, is to create a climate of terror and atmosphere of terror in

14 the centre of the city, to make people feel on the edge. And when this

15 was coming, in particular, as far as I am concerned, from the Grbavica

16 area, it wasn't difficult because that came from the other side of the

17 river, buildings on the other side of the river and the area

18 called the Jewish cemetery; it was clear that we knew where it was coming

19 from.

20 I have to say that there was a team, I was present, that when we

21 wanted, and this happened in 1994, when they wanted to restore the

22 tramline going more or less up to Oslobodjenje building. So, what

23 happened, there was this street that was going there called "the sniper

24 alley" or "the sniper avenue" where it was very easy -- near Nedzarici.

25 It was very easy to have it covered by sniper fire. And Major Indic

Page 8244

1 himself had said that if containers were placed in that location to

2 protect that part of the sniper alley, so the snipers coming from

3 Nedzarici, they would fire. And so we went to place these containers. We

4 had just placed the first container, and "we" meaning the UN force, with

5 the APCs, opposite the Nedzarici, there in that street, and a Ukrainian

6 soldier of the UN was trying to move the crane and he was then targeted.

7 He was fired on. He was very -- he was in a great state of shock. He

8 went underground and there was an order to the French units to fire in

9 order to evacuate the area. The area was evacuated. The containers were

10 never placed, but I can state here that snipers' fire came from the

11 Nedzarici area.

12 Q. Commander Kolp, during the time that you are talking about right

13 now, which party controlled the Nedzarici area?

14 A. You know, I never had a contact with the local commander. That

15 was a local commander who was supposed to, as far as I believe, who was

16 supposed to give orders to the subordinates of the Sarajevo Romanija

17 Corps. I never met him. This was a local commander. And he was

18 reporting, obviously, to this area, of the area of responsibility. It was

19 in the area of responsibility of this army corps.

20 Q. Perhaps my question wasn't clear. Which army controlled the

21 Nedzarici area at the time of the incident you have just described?

22 A. Nedzarici was under the control of the VRS, that is, the Bosnian

23 Serbs.

24 Q. Commander Kolp, as part of your duties and responsibilities

25 particularly with respect to the convoy operations, did you regularly

Page 8245

1 visit the marketplaces in Sarajevo to determine quantities of foodstuffs?

2 A. Yes. It is important to know that at a given time. I had an

3 additional task at the Sarajevo sector area, which was -- to do, and this

4 was my responsibility, to go on a regular basis to take the temperature of

5 the population, so to speak, to check the situation at the markets,

6 meaning to see the prices, the food that is being sold, the material that

7 is being sold, and this was one of the minor elements to have, to be

8 aware of, to be as an indication, first of all, of what is coming into

9 town, how it is going into town, and also to check the morale of the

10 population. These were all elements which helped us establish a view.

11 So I regularly went to check the prices, and these were all little

12 elements, like elements to a puzzle, and it all went towards the top and

13 the top, the leadership, was then able to conduct an analysis, hoping that

14 this was correct, evaluating, assessing the situation in the population,

15 the humanitarian side, to find out what was the state of the spirit of the

16 population. So it did happen, I regularly did it, I regularly did a round

17 of all the markets in Sarajevo

18 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, in light of the late start, were you

19 still intending on breaking at the normal time?

20 JUDGE ORIE: We usually have a break after one hour and a half.

21 Since we started late, I was thinking at about, well, within five minutes

22 to have a break. But if you could find a suitable moment to --

23 MR. MUNDIS: The reason I ask is that perhaps this is a suitable

24 moment. I think the next line of questions will take a little bit longer

25 than five minutes.

Page 8246

1 JUDGE ORIE: Then we will adjourn until a quarter past 4.00.

2 --- Recess taken at 3.47 p.m.

3 --- On resuming at 4.19 p.m.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mundis, please proceed.

5 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President.

6 Q. Commander Kolp, right before the break, you were describing for

7 the Trial Chamber how part of your duties involved visiting various

8 marketplaces in Sarajevo. Were you, in fact, in Sarajevo on the day the

9 Markale market was shelled?

10 A. Yes, yes, I was in Sarajevo at that time and on that day. I was

11 in town.

12 Q. Approximately how far from the Markale market were you at the

13 time of the shelling?

14 A. Well, more or less I could say, as the crow flies, about 200

15 metres -- 300 metres.

16 Q. What were you doing at the time of the shelling?

17 A. Well, it was one of those days when I was doing what I was -- I

18 was doing my town rounds. I had first gone to the market, which is a

19 little bit before Zetra, at the beginning of the road that goes up to the

20 Kosevo hospital. And then I had left for the centre of the city, the

21 town, and I must have been from the wrong -- on the other side of the

22 cathedral, there is a pedestrian area or street actually that goes to the

23 market.

24 Q. Can you describe for the Trial Chamber what you heard on that day.

25 A. What I heard when I was there was a rather strong explosion, but

Page 8247

1 it was a bit muted because you have quite of few buildings apparently

2 between where I now know as the Markale market and where I

3 was. I heard an explosion. But from the buildings, I say as the crow

4 flies, I was some ways away and I was cut off by the buildings. And so

5 it was a more muted sound. But it was a shell falling somewhere, that

6 you could hear, that is what I heard.

7 Q. Do you recall the date or the approximate date of this incident?

8 A. It was in February in 1994, and if I am not mistaken, it must have

9 been the 5th.

10 Q. Do you recall whether you heard one explosion or more than one

11 explosion on that day?

12 A. No. I just heard one explosion.

13 Q. What did you do after you heard that explosion?

14 A. Well, you know, when something happens and you are not very far

15 from what is happening, you see people running in every direction. And so

16 I went over toward where the sound was coming from, the place where the

17 people were coming from. A lot of people were shouting. And I arrived a

18 little bit later. There were bodies spread out just about everywhere.

19 There were wounded people. There was screaming. Anything that could be

20 driven was used as an ambulance, and afterwards, two ambulances of the

21 French forces whose were there on site from the United Nations, they were

22 armoured ambulances, they assisted in transporting the wounded people,

23 those that were the most seriously wounded.

24 Q. Do you recall from the time when you first heard the explosion

25 until you arrived at the Markale market, approximately how much time

Page 8248

1 elapsed?

2 A. Well, it is hard to answer that question because you know at that

3 time, you know time was very -- passing very quickly, but it wasn't very

4 long. I should tell you also that I was being pretty careful when I moved

5 over there because you never know what you are going to come up against or

6 what might happen. Maybe 5, 10 minutes. It is not a lot, but it is a lot

7 at the same time.

8 Q. Do you recall as you were making your way to the Markale market

9 whether you saw any ABiH military formations or military equipment of any

10 kind?

11 A. Well, listen, you know, the first thing you have to know is that

12 in the city everybody who was a fighting agent, who could defend the town

13 against the Serbian opposition, had to put on a uniform. Whoever didn't

14 have a uniform on was looked for. That was one thing. What I could tell

15 you is that there were no military unit or armed soldiers, specifically,

16 at that location. And so you should know that the Markale market is a

17 very small place and the shops are right next to one another. It is the

18 place -- well, it is not the largest market, but in terms of people, in

19 numbers of people, it is the largest. Everybody was crowded together,

20 pressed up against one another. To answer your question, I would say

21 there was no specific military -- military objective at that particular

22 point.

23 Q. When you say, "there was no specific military objective at that

24 particular point," what point are you referring to?

25 A. Well, the Markale market is a market like you see everywhere in

Page 8249












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13 English transcripts.













Page 8250

1 the world. I say it is a place where everybody knows exactly that there

2 is a lot -- there are a lot of the people and that is a place you could

3 find some food or something of everything. There was really this and

4 that. And every day the market was overbrimming with people. That

5 doesn't mean that there wasn't a person here or there wearing military

6 clothes or who had gone out to do some shopping. As I said, everyone who

7 was young enough, even young people who could wear the uniform was in the

8 army.

9 Q. Do you recall whether you saw any significant military presence on

10 the market that day when you arrived?

11 A. No. No, there weren't very many soldiers. I wouldn't even say

12 that it happened, but I can tell you there are place where ordinarily you

13 would see soldiers because it was either soldiers who were on leave or on

14 the front line. Ordinarily, they wouldn't be walking around the market.

15 I didn't really see any more people -- any more soldiers at that point

16 than at any other point.

17 Q. Commander Kolp, at the time of the shelling of the Markale market,

18 you had been in the Belgian army for more than 20 years, is that correct?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And as an infantry officer, had you trained and/or worked with

21 mortars during the course of your career?

22 A. Yes. As a military person and an infantry person, I would say as

23 a chief, I wasn't a mortar specialist but I had assistants who were. But

24 I did have to be familiar with certain things, yes.

25 Q. Do you recall on the day the Markale market was shelled, whether

Page 8251

1 you heard any type of mortar being launched as contrasted with hearing a

2 mortar shell landing?

3 A. Well, if you are asking whether I heard from where it came from or

4 heard the part it was leaving, no. If you are asking whether I heard the

5 explosion, then yes.

6 Q. Do you have any knowledge as to where --

7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

8 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I am really very sorry to have

9 to come back to this. But in English it says "from where it came." And

10 he said that the departure, the departure point, which is not the same

11 thing at all. The witness said I didn't hear any departure -- any shots

12 being fired as opposed to where it is.

13 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues]...also the

14 translation should be something like "I didn't hear it being fired" or

15 something like that, but not from where it came. I assume the proper

16 care will be taken with that.

17 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

18 JUDGE ORIE: I have been asked, in order to make more certain that

19 these things are clarified, that I would rather ask the witness to repeat

20 what he -- what his testimony was. So, therefore, Commander Kolp, could

21 you please repeat your answer to the question -- well, you heard the whole

22 discussion about it. But could you nevertheless repeat the answer you

23 gave. You may do it in your own language, of course.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, thank you. I would recall that

25 the explosion, I heard it. I heard it arrive. But its departure, when I

Page 8252

1 say "departure," by that I mean the place where the weapon was fired which

2 was going to project the shell to its target. Therefore, when I say,

3 "depart," departure, that is the point from which the shot was fired, I

4 did not hear.

5 JUDGE ORIE: May I ask you one thing: This is, as far as I

6 understand, not just a repetition of your answer, but it adds

7 something, because, as far as I remember, you said in French that you

8 didn't here "le depart" and now you add something, that you say you didn't

9 hear the "il y a des endroits qui different."

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, but of course if I didn't hear

11 the departure, then I can confirm what I said before. For your

12 information, if I don't hear anything, then it is not possible to locate

13 just like that, right then and there, the very place where the shot might

14 have been -- the mortar shot might have been fired.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I do understand. So your testimony is that you

16 did not hear the mortar being fired and, therefore, hearing nothing. Your

17 ears could not assist you in identifying a spot from where it might have

18 been fired. Is that a correct understanding of your testimony?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. If you permit me, Your Honour,

20 that is what I said. However, you probably know better than I that for

21 months, and even more perhaps, some people continued to have doubts as to

22 the exact departure points, the exact location, from where the mortar shot

23 originated, even though you talk about Markovici. It was north -- the

24 shell was fired north of -- from the north. But there are observers from

25 the United Nations.

Page 8253

1 JUDGE ORIE: You didn't hear it being launched, so your ears

2 cannot assist us. I am not asking for any assistance, but I am just

3 trying to understand your testimony well and what others are thinking

4 about a source of fire is a totally different thing. You have no

5 knowledge about that; is that correct? I see you nodding "yes." For the

6 transcript, nodding is always a bit of a problem, Commander Kolp. So I

7 see you are nodding "yes."

8 Please proceed, Mr. Stamp -- Mr. Mundis.

9 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President.

10 Q. Commander Kolp, were there ever times when -- let me withdraw

11 that. Commander Kolp, during the time you were stationed in Sarajevo,

12 where did you sleep at nighttime?

13 A. I had my bases in the PTT building, although frequently, outside

14 during -- somewhere else during the day and often at night, but my base

15 was at the PTT building in Sarajevo.

16 Q. Were you ever present in the PTT building when that building came

17 under mortar attack?

18 A. Yes. I would have to say, and I maintain what I said, the Bosnian

19 Serbs, that is the Bosnian Serb army, had very good artillery people, and

20 the building was probably more out of intimidation because there was no

21 physical damage or casualties. It was hit exactly where it had to be, and

22 that is why I say -- if I haven't said it, I am going to say it, that is

23 why I say it, that, after all, that when a city is under siege, people --

24 the people who are besieging in the city, they are familiar with it. They

25 know very well where they have to fire, when they have to fire.

Page 8254

1 Q. And as a military person, would there be any advantages that would

2 accrue from being familiar with the city?

3 A. Yes, of course. Of course.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

5 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] When this question is being

6 asked, were the two armies -- well, there are two armies that were

7 familiar with the city. Both the armies were familiar with the city.

8 JUDGE ORIE: You are wondering why the question is asked, or is

9 that what I understood?

10 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] No. What I wanted to know is

11 if we are speaking about one of the two armies or if we are speaking about

12 both of them because both armies were familiar with the city and both

13 could fire. They were in-going and outgoing.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Let's clarify the question. It reads in

15 English: "And as a military person, would that be any advantages that

16 would accrue from being familiar with the city?" So Mr. Piletta-Zanin

17 wonders to whom you are referring, perhaps being both parties that were

18 familiar with the city.


20 Q. As a general rule, Commander Kolp, during the time you were in

21 Sarajevo, what portions of the city or it environs were controlled by the

22 Bosnian Serb army?

23 A. The parts of the city under Bosnian Serb control were, of course,

24 Grbavica, Nedzarici, and specifically Bijuvac [phoen], but now we are

25 outside on the west, outside the city. Specifically, those places were

Page 8255

1 occupied by the Bosnian Serb army.

2 Q. From the locations that you have just mentioned, would the Bosnian

3 Serb army have had any military advantages based on its familiarity with

4 the city of Sarajevo?

5 A. Well, you have to know that from those places, it is clear that

6 one can fire mortars, and that it was probably done. But those were not

7 the best places for using mortars or for using artillery. If you are

8 familiar with the geography and the situation of the city, the city is

9 located in a valley and those neighbourhoods are also in the valley.

10 Everything else is at the foot of mountains and hills, where you find the

11 party that was besieging the city, that is the Bosnian Serbs. But from

12 Nedzarici and Grbavica, it is clear that one can also fire mortars. What

13 I mean is that whatever the place, from the time, from the moment that you

14 are familiar with the place, the place where you have got to fire, once

15 you have lived there, once you have some training, when you are a

16 relatively well-constituted army, which was the case for the Bosnian

17 Serbs, it is clear that the objectives like the national library, like the

18 Old Town, like the mosque, like the market, which were symbols of the

19 former Ottoman empire, for them, they were ideal targets. But any good

20 military person can use that kind of weapon with precision whatever the

21 location he is, if he is familiar with the places.

22 Q. Commander Kolp, when you said at page 36, line 23, "Everything

23 else is at the foot of mountains and hills where you find the party that

24 was besieging the city, that is the Bosnian Serb," from that statement, is

25 it correct that, in general, the Bosnian Serb army controlled the hills

Page 8256

1 and mountains surrounding the city of Sarajevo during the time you were

2 there?

3 A. Yes. The city was being besieged. It was in a valley. It was

4 surrounded by hills and mountains. So that the zone which was Ilidza,

5 Nedzarici and Grbavica, which were enclaves, full of enclaves, in the city

6 which was under Serb control. But the Bosnian Serbs were all around the

7 city, around the hills, the mountains. I, myself, went by there. I

8 met -- I encountered Serbian military people from their positions. I can

9 assure you that you have an undisturbed view from that point.

10 Q. And maintaining positions on the high ground, coupled with a

11 familiarity of the city, would lead to a distinct military advantage for

12 the Bosnian Serb army?

13 A. The fact that one has high positions that one can control

14 everything that was going on, where most of the things that were going on

15 in the town while the city was being besieged, it is clear that that

16 would be a military advantage. There is no question about it.

17 Q. Thank you, Commander Kolp.

18 MR. MUNDIS: Prosecution has no further questions Mr. President.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Mundis.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Ms, Pilipovic, is the Defence ready to cross-examine

21 the witness?

22 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.

23 Cross-examined by Ms. Pilipovic:

24 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Kolp, good afternoon.

25 A. Good afternoon.

Page 8257

1 Q. Mr. Kolp, you told us that before arriving at your mission in

2 Bosnia-Herzegovina and, like today, that you are an army officer in the

3 Belgian army. Could you tell us what functions you performed in the

4 Belgian army before you arrived in Bosnia-Herzegovina for your mission?

5 A. Do you want to know everything from the very start of my career

6 or just before I was assigned?

7 Q. No. Yes, before you accepted your mission to go to

8 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

9 A. Well, right before the mission, I was in command of a company

10 known as a specialised company within the infantry school which trains all

11 the low ranking infantry specialists, and I was the commander of that

12 company for two years. And at the same time, I was the chief of the

13 military -- the military police -- the military academy of the Belgian

14 police.

15 Q. Thank you. Mr. Kolp, when you arrived in Sarajevo, you were a

16 liaison officer, as you said, between the staff of the BH Command and the

17 staff or the HQ of the sector of Sarajevo, the Sarajevo sector at the UN;

18 is that correct?

19 A. That mission, that assignment, was my first assignment, yes, that

20 is right.

21 Q. Could you tell us, at the time when you arrived, which was in

22 March 1993, who was the commander of the Sarajevo sector?

23 A. When I arrived in Sarajevo, at the time I knew Colonel Valentin,

24 who was finishing his mandate as the commander of the Sarajevo sector.

25 Q. Mr. Kolp, if I say to you that the commander of the Sarajevo

Page 8258

1 sector, Mr. Valentin, was on duty in July 1993, would you agree with me?

2 A. Well, I can't really guarantee that Colonel Valentin stayed until

3 July. I don't remember the time -- the date he was relieved. What I can

4 say is that General Soubirou replaced him. Exactly when, I can't say.

5 There was an Egyptian colonel who was the head of the staff and he had an

6 assistant who was a negotiator, particularly, with the 1st Sarajevo

7 Manjaca Corps. That was Debuque [phoen].

8 Q. Thank you. So you cannot confirm with certainty that Mr. Valentin

9 was the commander of the sector until July, 1993?

10 A. No, I can't certify it just like that. I have got a lot of

11 documentation at home. I suppose you do also, if you ask me the

12 question, but I can't tell you just like that out of memory.

13 Q. Thank you.

14 Mr. Kolp, so you told us that your first task and your mission

15 was to be a liaison officer between the BH command and the command of the

16 -- the HQ of the Sarajevo sector. Could you tell us if you had a person

17 who was your superior, and who was that?

18 A. Yes, I did have a superior. My superior, the regulatory one, the

19 official one, was the chief of the staff, and the commander of the BH

20 command. I would like to make it clear, however, that when you say that I

21 was responsible for liaison between the BH command in Kiseljak and the

22 residents in Sarajevo held the Sarajevo section, there was also a liaison

23 mission between the BH command initially and the different parties,

24 particularly in the Sarajevo region. By this I mean the Bosnian Serbs and

25 the Bosnians.

Page 8259

1 Q. Yes. But I asked you who was your superior. Did you have a

2 superior and who was he? Could you tell us his name of that gentleman?

3 A. Yes, my superior to whom I reported was General Briquemont, and

4 the Chief of Staff within the BH command, I know that there was General

5 Hise [phoen]. There were three different ones, and I don't remember the

6 other ones. But I do remember General Hise. But he was the chief of

7 staff of the BH command at Sarajevo and he was detached, that is under the

8 operational control, because we call that in military terms. I would also

9 report to the Sarajevo sector commander. That was either Colonel Valentin

10 or General Soubirou, depending on what period we are talking about.

11 Q. So, if I understand you correctly, your reports, your report as a

12 liaison officer, you sent to the BH command HQ and to the HQ of the

13 Sarajevo sector?

14 A. What I sent as a report was transmitted, of course, in priority to

15 the BH command. I should point out to you that that would go through the

16 local ops, that is the operational command of the BH command in Kiseljak,

17 in which the information was coordinated at the chief of staff level.

18 Q. Mr. Kolp, your task, as you told us, was to be a liaison officer

19 and to establish liaison between these two HQs and the three warring

20 parties. So you had a contact with the Bosniaks, the Muslims, with the

21 Croats and the Serbs; is that correct?

22 A. Yes, that is true, to a less extent. With the HVO militia,

23 initially, because as you must know, at the beginning of my mission, the

24 HVO was fighting alongside the Bosnians and Muslims against the Serbs and

25 then there was a change in alliances at a point when the HVO -- well, I

Page 8260












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13 English transcripts.













Page 8261

1 don't say they made an alliance with the Bosnian Serbs, but we could say

2 that there was no longer engagement as there had been before, except for

3 the HVO brigade in Sarajevo. And then afterwards, things turned around

4 yet again. But I had fewer contacts with the HVO. I can tell you,

5 however, that the liaison officers, that is the Bosnian Croats who were at

6 the PTT building, had to leave when the alliances changed, if I can

7 express myself that way, and were unable to get to the line -- the Bosnian

8 Croat lines in the Kiseljak enclave through the Serbian lines.

9 Q. Thank you, Mr. Kolp. Could you confirm that on the 24th and the

10 25th of April, 1996, you gave a statement to the OTP investigators?

11 A. Would you please repeat that?

12 Q. On the 24th and 25th of April, 1996.

13 A. Yes, that is right.

14 Q. Mr. Kolp, on the first page of your statement, you said that your

15 second task that we spoke about was to establish a liaison between the two

16 already mentioned HQs, that is the HQ of BH and the sector Sarajevo HQ,

17 and the three warring parties, and to get the knowledge of the Bosnian

18 Serbs, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims. So you spoke of the three

19 warring parties?

20 A. Yes, yes, that is correct.

21 JUDGE ORIE: May I just interrupt, just for my understanding,

22 Commander Kolp. Your testimony was that the HVO -- well, you wouldn't say

23 that they made an alliance with the Bosnia Serbs, but you could say that

24 there was no longer engagement with them, with the ABiH. In your next

25 answer, you said in the English translation that the Bosnian Croats who

Page 8262

1 were at the PTT building had to leave when the alliances changed, if I can

2 express myself - these are still your words - that way, and were unable to

3 get to the line, the Bosnian Croat line in Kiseljak through the Serbian

4 lines. Could you explain that to me, because the prior answer suggests

5 that there was less controversy between the Croats and the Serbs.

6 I just try to understand your testimony.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, you are right, Mr. President.

8 When the Croats and the -- well, the Bosnian Croats and the Muslim

9 Bosnians were fighting with one another, it is clear that at some point it

10 was not possible for all three parties at war to fight against one

11 another. So the common enemy for the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats

12 were the Bosnian Muslims except in Sarajevo, where there was a special

13 case because the HVO brigade was incorporated into the General Delic

14 Corps, if I am not wrong. That was a very -- an inextricable situation,

15 but that is how things happened. When I say that the liaison officers --

16 the Croat liaison officers were able to probably escape from prison after

17 that change in the situations, they were in a Bosnian Muslim section in

18 Sarajevo, that therefore of necessity they were threatened and so, through

19 a particular strategy, they were able to get to the Bosnian Croat enclave

20 in Kiseljak and then, in order to get out of Sarajevo, they had to go

21 through the Serbian lines.

22 JUDGE ORIE: You said they were "able" to. The transcript reads

23 that they were "unable" to. That is the reason why I repeated it, and I

24 was listening in French and was reading at the same time the English

25 transcript.

Page 8263

1 So your testimony was that when they had to leave the PTT

2 building, that they were able to join their -- or am I wrong in

3 understanding?

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In fact, maybe I made a mistake

5 here. No. They were not authorised to join up with the Croat lines, of

6 course, but they managed to. It is clear that the Bosnian army that were

7 in Sarajevo would not have allowed them to leave that location just by

8 saying, "goodbye and thanks for the work that you did." They were able to

9 leave.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Your testimony as it reads in English is that "They

11 were unable to get..." Let me just take your own testimony. It

12 reads: "And were unable to get to the line, the Bosnian Croat line in

13 Kiseljak through the Serbian lines." I am not talking about

14 authorisation, but as it reads, your testimony is that were "unable," and

15 I now do understand that whether authorised or not, that they were able to

16 reach their own area again.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In fact, let me state it

18 differently. They were never authorised to leave the city by the

19 Bosnians, that is to leave Sarajevo. But I would say probably, further to

20 some arrangements amongst them, one of liaison officers, the Bosnian Croat

21 liaison officers, had contacts with Major Indic and when there was this

22 problem of changes in -- things happened and escape from Sarajevo was

23 probably organised in order to allow them to flee the city through the

24 Serbian lines.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Finally, they managed to get there and were not

Page 8264

1 unable to get there through the Serbian lines? I am not talking about

2 authorisation but they finally got there, and as it reads in the English

3 transcript, it seems that they finally did not manage to go through the

4 Serbian lines to their own lines. And what you tell us now is that by

5 whatever means, they managed to get there, but finally they got there.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that is right. And I can

7 assure you that they were assisted, but, of course, not by the Bosnian

8 Muslims, but they were assisted, and thanks to that assistance, they were

9 able to join through

10 the -- across the Serb lines without any problems. They could join up

11 with the Kiseljak zone and afterwards to superior in Split.

12 JUDGE ORIE: This clarifies some confusion, I think.

13 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Mr. Kolp, you just told us that the Bosnian Croats from Sarajevo

15 were not assisted by the Bosnian Muslims but that they managed to get

16 through the Serbian positions and get to Kiseljak. Can you tell us whose

17 assistance they had, the Bosnian Croats?

18 A. You are asking me who was helping them, what assistance the

19 Bosnian Serbs got? Is that what you are asking?

20 Q. Yes. No. We are talking about the Bosnia Croats who went through

21 the Serbian areas, through the Serb-held areas.

22 A. I could answer the question, but I would have to ask the Presiding

23 Judge. I don't know whether that can be done in open session because I

24 think that is confidential information.

25 [Trial Chamber confers]

Page 8265

1 JUDGE ORIE: Although no specific protective measures have been

2 asked for, if you think you could answer that question only in closed

3 session --

4 [Trial Chamber confers]

5 JUDGE ORIE: The Chamber is willing to turn into closed session

6 just for this small portion. So if that would make it easier for you to

7 answer these questions, we will turn into closed session.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If you don't mind. If could just

9 take two minutes and then I could answer.

10 JUDGE ORIE: May I then ask to turn into closed session.

11 [Closed session]

12 [redacted]

13 [redacted]

14 [redacted]

15 [redacted]

16 [redacted]

17 [redacted]

18 [redacted]

19 [redacted]

20 [redacted]

21 [redacted]

22 [redacted]

23 [redacted]

24 [redacted]

25 [redacted]

Page 8266












12 Pages 8266 8271-Closed Session-Redacted














Page 8272

1 [redacted]

2 [redacted]

3 [redacted]

4 [redacted]

5 [redacted]

6 [redacted]

7 [Open session]

8 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. Mr. Kolp, did you have any knowledge that civilians, Serb

10 civilians, were victims of crimes in Sarajevo, in the area of Sarajevo

11 called Pogusevac and that there was a pit called Kazani. Did you have any

12 knowledge of that?

13 A. Honestly, I didn't know about that. It is possible but I cannot

14 confirm that to you. I just can't. I do admit to you, honestly, that

15 most of my time I spent -- well, that my contacts were mostly with the

16 Bosnian Serbs. But I cannot confirm that to you. Everything was

17 possible, but I can't confirm it.

18 Q. Thank you. Mr. Kolp, you as a liaison officer, you said yourself

19 you had to liaise with all three warring parties, and that during direct

20 examination, you mentioned your contacts and just now you also confirmed

21 to us that you had many contacts with the Serbian side.

22 Did you as the liaison officer receive protests from the warring

23 parties that were directed to the army of the BH command and the UNPROFOR

24 command and vice-versa? Therefore, did you receive protest that you then

25 directed to the army of BH?

Page 8273

1 A. No. As far as I recall, I am telling you, the part that was in

2 the position of force was the Bosnian Serb party, which meant that the

3 most serious problems for us, us in the UN at that time, were problems of

4 authorisation for passage, sniping, shelling. I had four or five

5 interventions for sniping, if not more. But a great deal for clearance.

6 And anything that happened in the Serbian party, I could tell you -- well,

7 I can say without hesitation, it is true I was a Belgian but I was in the

8 UN, but I was extremely independent in my work, and it is clear that I

9 would go out and that -- on that issue and I had to issue rules in order

10 to get results and results specifically from the Serbs. When I say

11 "results," it means that could bring food provisions, humanitarian

12 assistance to the city. It was to try -- well, maybe not to adopt --

13 well, to get through some requests that might come from various

14 headquarters, but mostly with the Serbs. And so my work mostly was in

15 that zone. It is true that in the beginning I had to negotiate with the

16 three parties, but in the end, with a few exceptions, with the HVO, 80 per

17 cent of my work was work with the Serb side. You do know probably that,

18 in addition, if you really wanted results, you have got to make yourself

19 known. You have got to go speak with those people. You have got to be

20 able -- well, otherwise you are nothing. You are not taken seriously.

21 Q. Thank you.

22 JUDGE ORIE: May I just interrupt again. Looking at the English

23 transcript, I see that the testimony says that the witness had to issue

24 rules in order to get results. But I inferred -- I think I did understand

25 that you did not follow the rule. Is that correct? So that --

Page 8274

1 THE WITNESS: Yes, Mr. President. I had to be outside the rules

2 to be able to do my job.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, please proceed, Ms. Pilipovic.

4 JUDGE ORIE: May I just have one additional question in that

5 respect? If you say, "I had to disobey the rules," could you give one or

6 two examples of what the rule was and how you disobeyed them? I don't

7 know whether you have to turn in closed session again for that.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, Mr. President. The simplest

9 example was the UN rule which said that you could not open the window of

10 your car when you would get to a checkpoint and had to show your ID

11 through the window. If you did that, well, you would be blocked for four,

12 six hours, and I would open the window. I would open the door of the car.

13 I would go without my helmet. I would go without my bulletproof vest,

14 without a weapon, to speak with the militia personnel at the checkpoints,

15 in order to talk to them, to negotiate. That is something which was not

16 authorised. When I say "go outside the rules," go outside the very well

17 set-up rules with some discipline in which everybody has to wear the same

18 kind of uniform. When I say "go out of the rules," that is what I mean.

19 JUDGE ORIE: [Interpretation] So these are technical rules,

20 really?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, technical rules, that's right.

22 Thank you very much.

23 JUDGE ORIE: You may continue, Ms. Pilipovic.

24 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Thank you. Mr. Kolp, you told us that on two or three occasions

Page 8275

1 when there were incidents of shelling and sniping, you sent protests to

2 Mr. Indic. Is that true?

3 A. Yes, that is true. I protested throughout my mandate, four or

4 five times. Yes, that is true.

5 Q. Mr. Kolp, were these protests oral or written?

6 A. As for me, they were always oral. When they were written

7 protests, that was sent to me under -- in closed mail. I would send it to

8 the postmaster and then this would be sent without really enquiring what

9 was inside. So it would be sent to Major Indic, who was supposed to

10 forward it to the authorities. When I received an authority, you know,

11 the Balkan people have certain sensitivities and when the proper level is

12 not reached -- like, coming from a general, it has to go to another

13 general. When it comes to a Chief of Staff, it has to go to another Chief

14 of Staff. And therefore, you have to respect the levels. I could not get

15 mixed in with that problem.

16 So when the General Briquemont, the BH commander, that would go

17 to General Mladic.

18 Q. Thank you. You said that you informed Mr. Indic on three or four

19 occasions about shelling and sniping incidents. So can you tell us who

20 informed you of them?

21 A. When I, myself, went and I verbally informed Major Indic about

22 those incidents, that most of the time it came from the operational branch

23 of the BH command, what in military terms we called branch J-3. Maybe

24 that came from the Sarajevo branch also, but I can tell you well, maybe

25 it was three, four, five or six times. It wasn't very often. It

Page 8276

1 ordinarily would come from the operational branch or from the duty

2 officer. You also have to know that within the Sarajevo sector, of course

3 there were interpreters but communication between the BH command and THE

4 Sarajevo sector, which had a French majority, had problems, linguistic

5 problems, because it wasn't in English, and that is what the liaison

6 officer was used for as well.

7 Q. When you informed Mr. Indic that there is a sniping activity in a

8 certain area of the town, and you, yourself, received this information

9 from the operational branch of the command, can you tell us about some of

10 these incidents of which you informed Mr. Indic, in which part of town

11 they took place, and can you give us some further details about these

12 incidents?

13 A. Yes, I could. I can remember two. The first was a shelling and

14 that was in the -- the zone that came under shelling was the Stup zone and

15 the east side in relation to the Sarajevo Visoko, Vogosca Visoko.

16 Therefore, the east part, there is a hill between Sarajevo, there was a

17 hill there. We would call it Stup, the Stup forest. And that is a place

18 which resembled more or less the shelling that had taken place during the

19 First World War near Verdun, where all the forest had been destroyed. And

20 the sniping took place -- well, it came from Grbavica. And I was there.

21 I don't think that anybody was hit, but there was sniping. And as I said

22 a little while ago, if I was the one who was being aimed at, I can tell

23 you that had I been the target, I wouldn't be here to be talking about it

24 now. But I was a witness.

25 Q. Therefore, Mr. Kolp, you are telling us that you directed a

Page 8277

1 protest to Mr. Indic, due to the shelling of the Stup area. During

2 your mandate, did you receive information that the Stup Brdo was

3 controlled by the BH army and that there was 102nd Motorised Brigade

4 there?

5 A. You are asking me a lot now. But I can tell you that it is clear

6 that that place was a strategic location, the ABiH army was in fact there,

7 and it was an objective, yes.

8 Q. When you talked about the protest that you sent to Mr. Indic

9 regarding Grbavica and gave us an example that you, yourself, was also

10 targeted by the sniper, can you tell us whether during your stay there,

11 you ever went to Grbavica?

12 A. I did have the opportunity to go there twice, with a great deal of

13 difficulty. And if I was able to get through, it was thanks to my

14 adjudant from the Foreign Legion that spoke the language very, very well.

15 And it wasn't because he came from there because, in fact, he came from

16 Hungary. But he had a lot of attachments with the Serbs. And it was

17 thanks to him that I had the opportunity to go to Grbavica two or three

18 times, and then I was regularly prevented from going there. It was very,

19 very difficult to access that. It was very dangerous. That is how I

20 would answer your question.

21 Q. During your contact with Mr. Indic and during your conversations

22 with him, did you ever receive protest directed to you regarding the

23 sniping activity in the Grbavica area that originated from the other side,

24 from the front line controlled by the BH army? Did you receive protest

25 to the effect that snipers are shooting at Grbavica from the Muslim side?

Page 8278

1 A. As far as I am concerned, no, but it is possible. But I think

2 that you have the opportunity to ask other people. It may be that UN

3 observers who were on site permanently at certain observation points might

4 be able to confirm that to you. Admittedly, it is not impossible. But as

5 far as I am concerned. I never had any complaints - I am answering your

6 question - any complaints from Major Indic, but it is possible that there

7 were.

8 Q. Did you receive information that in the part of the town

9 controlled by the BH army, there was sniping shooting that originated from

10 the town itself? Did you ever receive such information?

11 A. I don't understand your question very well. Would you repeat it,

12 please?

13 Q. Yes, I will clarify that.

14 Did you receive information that in the part of the town that was

15 controlled by the BH army, there existed snipers who belonged to the BH

16 army and who were shooting throughout the town?

17 A. What I can say that it concerns me directly and I think that I

18 have already said, if I didn't do -- if I didn't then, it was an

19 oversight, is that there was provocation. I mean that it is most

20 probable, and that was stated in various reports, that at certain points

21 it was possible, even probable, that in order to provoke or to make

22 people believe that there had been an intervention from the Serbs, that

23 snipers in the town, in the city, would choose as targets either equipment

24 or people, but I don't think so. But in any case, you take as targets UN

25 personnel, that is possible. At some points I had some doubts when I was

Page 8279

1 again on the road to the airport between Stup and Kasindolska Street. At

2 some point, I was taken at a target.

3 It is improbable to say where it came from because there were

4 enclaves. There was a front line which was like a snake. It is difficult

5 to say. It is possible, and at some point, I would have said there was

6 provocation. As regards myself, I can tell you one thing: When Major

7 Indic told me, "Major Kolp, if you are going to go up to that line, and if

8 you cross the line, we are going to fire on you." But so long as I never

9 crossed that line, I was never fired on. When I did, I was fired on. So

10 long as I didn't cross the line, I wasn't fired at. I did cross it.

11 Q. Mr. Kolp, according to you, as a military person, is the front

12 zone a legitimate military target?

13 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I am sorry for intervening

14 against my colleague, but this is rather important. The witness says, "We

15 will fire on you." [French phrase] "We will fire on you," which isn't

16 quite the same thing as "we." "On" is not the same as "we."

17 JUDGE ORIE: You heard the intervention, Commander Kolp, so I

18 think it is more or less a request for a clarification.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. I was speaking in Belgian.

20 When Major Indic said that to me, he said "we." They would determine

21 lines by themselves, that is very clear. It was clear. It was "we."

22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Piletta-Zanin, you interrupted Ms. Pilipovic, who

23 was at about to ask a question.

24 Would you please proceed, Ms. Pilipovic.

25 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

Page 8280

1 Q. Mr. Kolp, my question was as follows: According to you, is the

2 front zone a legitimate military target?

3 A. Yes. I am sorry, but I don't think that you have asked the

4 question very well. The front line is a line in which you have got two

5 party -- warring parties who are confronting one another. It is clear

6 that when one of the parties wants to gain some territory, obviously that

7 takes place on the front line. Therefore, either the ABiH wanted to hold

8 on to the territory, hold the ground and to hold on as long as possible

9 and they would have to defend it, and these are assumptions. If the

10 Bosnian Serb army were to want to take over the city, then obviously that

11 they would be fighting at the front line, by necessity. Therefore, the

12 front line is where the two parties come up against one another. It is a

13 party held by both parties. That is how it happens.

14 Q. Mr. Kolp, perhaps I should have asked another question prior to

15 this one. Does the front have its depth and its length?

16 A. Yes, the front, in this case, it had a length. I don't have a map

17 with me, unfortunately, but if we had the chance to look at a map, you

18 would see that there is a line which is drawn. The line goes around the

19 town at certain points, Nedzarici, that was -- that is the front line.

20 The line as it was determined by the UN forces and which considered to be

21 the line at by the UN forces, but that is what we call the front line.

22 It was at a certain depth. Depth, well, in that case, it was defence of

23 an urban area, defence of an urban area to prevent an enemy to penetrating

24 into that urban area and to take over the city through street combat or to

25 prevent the enemy to take over certain strategic points like Stup, which

Page 8281

1 would allow an advance, a very serious, significant advance, a

2 breakthrough, but then you had have to have infantry. As regards to

3 depth, I am not quite sure what you are getting at or that you are asking

4 me.

5 Q. Mr. Kolp, my question concerning the length and the depth of the

6 front is linked to my previous question, which is: Is the front in its

7 length and depth something that we call the front zone that can be assumed

8 to be a legitimate military target?

9 A. You know, I put myself in the position as a military person on

10 the Bosnian Serb side. If I want to take the town, of course the front

11 line is an objective. Don't forget that the front line, as this is an

12 inhabited area, there might be civilians there, and that is the problem.

13 Therefore, a front zone, when you are fighting in valleys and woods,

14 soldiers fighting soldiers, then there was no problem. But when the issue

15 is a town where there are civilians living there and therefore who are

16 mixed in with the soldiers defending the city, that creates problems.

17 The front line is an objective for the party which wants to take

18 the city.

19 Q. When you spoke to us now about the front line or about the front

20 zone in its depth and length and also spoke about street combat or urban

21 combat, do you believe that it is allowed to have civilians reside in the

22 front zone?

23 A. Listen, when you have 400.000, 500.000 people living in the city

24 and from one day to the next, or almost one day to the next, is being

25 besieged, are you going to put all the people in a stadium and wait for a

Page 8282












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 8283

1 shell to hit the stadium? That is not a solution. You can't put 400.000

2 or 500.000 people outside the city. And those people who are in the city,

3 they had an objective, to defend their positions against the enemy which

4 wanted to take this town.

5 Sarajevo, I know, was by necessity also a symbol in the eyes of

6 the international community. Therefore, it was resistance against the

7 aggressor, as simple as that.

8 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, my colleague is

9 telling me that there is a problem in the transcript --

10 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] The witness spoke about

11 people in general who were in the -- remained in the city, who wanted to

12 defend their positions. That is not in the transcript. It must have not

13 been included in the transcript; it wasn't picked up.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I was asked to ask you Commander Kolp, to

15 repeat perhaps the part just referred to by Mr. Piletta-Zanin, so that

16 it will appear in the transcript.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. You want me to

18 repeat what I just said; is that what you are asking me?

19 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps you might have noticed that Mr. Piletta-Zanin

20 has referred to that part of your answer that people in general who were

21 in the remaining -- who were -- I think it was remaining in the city and

22 wanted to defend their positions. That was part of your answer. But I

23 have some difficulties in reconstructing it, as a matter of fact. But do

24 you recall that part where you were referring to the

25 people in general?

Page 8284

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] When I said that the people wanted

2 to remain to defend their city, the inhabitants don't want to leave their

3 tone. And so the civilian population, for the most part, wanted to remain

4 in the town and to get back to what they call a normal situation.

5 Clearly, Sarajevo was the largest centre occupied with a -- by

6 Bosnian Muslims. And there were military forces, in this case, the ABiH

7 army, defending the city. But when I say that inhabitants wanted to

8 defend their city, inhabitants wanted to stay in their town, as my -- that

9 is my interpreter who didn't want to leave there because he was born there

10 because that is what it is.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Pilipovic, looking at the clock, I know it is

12 time approximately to have a break. I don't know whether this would be a

13 suitable moment.

14 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour, we can have a

15 break now.

16 JUDGE ORIE: May I nevertheless noted that I am violating my own

17 suggestions. May I just ask one question relating to the testimony up to

18 this point.

19 When asked by Ms. Pilipovic on the -- whether the front lines or

20 the front zone would be an acceptable military target, you

21 repeatedly stated that it -- of course you had to attack the front line of

22 the front zone if you wanted to take the city, or as you said, "on devait

23 prendre la ville," would your answer be the same if one of the parties who

24 did not intend to gain any ground would fire at those at the front line,

25 those from the other party at the front line? I mean, how important is

Page 8285

1 that part of your answer which states that it would be an acceptable

2 military target if you want to take the city?

3 Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

4 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] I understand that the witness

5 is having some difficulty was listening to the French interpretation,

6 because maybe we don't have enough detail. Perhaps we could ask the

7 question again.

8 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues]...[Interpretation]

9 Let me ask the question in French. It is not easy for me but I will try.

10 You answered and part of your answer was "that the front line or the front

11 zone was a military target when you want to take the town." What is the

12 significance of that last part of your answer? Does that mean when you

13 don't want to take the town or when you don't want to progress or gain

14 ground, would firing even on soldiers who are in the front line or the

15 front zone, would that also be a military target, in your opinion?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My opinion, Your Honour is, first,

17 that every front line is an objective, a target, for the person seeking

18 together further. In this particular case of a town, where there are

19 civilians, a city under siege as this one was, it is unquestionable that

20 if there were military people fighting there, then that is a front line

21 with soldiers attacking and defending it. But at the point that there was

22 civilians living in that zone and who are not parties because they have no

23 choice that the enemy, that is if the enemy -- the besieging doesn't leave

24 them a choice. It is difficult to say that that is a military objective.

25 That is what I meant.

Page 8286

1 JUDGE ORIE: [Interpretation] Your answer then depends only on

2 the presence of civilians? When one does not intend to gain ground, that

3 is, when there is a front, a stable front line, when -- well, there would

4 be many reasons for not wanting to move forward. Does that mean that the

5 people -- those who were on the front line were of military objective? Is

6 it permissible to attack them even if one does not want to change the

7 line?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. If one does not want to

9 change the line, if you want to maintain it, there is no reason for it to

10 be a military target.

11 JUDGE ORIE: [Interpretation] Thank you very much for your

12 answer. [In English] I know that I am to blame for having a late break.

13 We will have a break until a quarter past 6.00.

14 --- Recess taken at 5.49 p.m.

15 --- Upon resuming at 6.17 p.m.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Pilipovic, please proceed.

17 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.

18 Q. Mr. Kolp, when you were talking about the front zone, do you have

19 any knowledge on whether during your stay in Sarajevo, was it -- were the

20 civilians banned from leaving the city of Sarajevo by the authorities in

21 Sarajevo in the area under the control of the BH army?

22 A. I think so. I think so, and the reason was -- the question was

23 asked and the reason given was that it was better for their safety to

24 stay in the city than to risk being killed crossing the front line. But I

25 think that it was the civilian population was advised not to leave the

Page 8287

1 city.

2 Q. Mr. Kolp, when we are talking about the city of Sarajevo, could

3 you tell us whether you know how many municipalities made up the city of

4 Sarajevo?

5 A. I did know it. I had a lot of maps. At the time I knew, and in

6 the next two years I might have been able to answer, but now it is more

7 difficult for me. I could tell you that there was Kosnorici [phoen],

8 Sergonici [phoen], Boskic [phoen]. There are others, but I really could

9 not right now tell you that.

10 Q. Mr. Kolp, if I tell you that parts of the city of Sarajevo under

11 the control of the army of Republika Srpska were parts of the city called

12 Grbavica, Rajlovac, Alija, Vogosca, Ilijas, Hadzici, Pale, and Trnovo,

13 would you agree with me that these were the parts of the city of Sarajevo

14 that were under the control of the army of Republika Srpska?

15 A. Let me tell you the following: As a former UN person, the

16 so-called Republika Srpska, because it was not recognised officially,

17 this has to be known, of course, Ilidza, yes, of course, but when I talk

18 about the city, Ilidza, yes, it is part of greater Sarajevo, yes.

19 Ilidza was right after the Stup bridge. Rajlovac, the part which was to

20 the west Rajlovac, Vogosca road, up to a certain part in the west was

21 under Serb control. And when one got a little further and one would take

22 the road to the east, the right, where there was a weapons factory, that

23 was completely in the Serbian section.

24 Ilidza was the same thing, Hadzici, of course. Blazuj, Hadzici,

25 yes, yes, that is right. Yes, I agree absolutely with you.

Page 8288

1 Q. Mr. Kolp, would you agree with me if we analysed the parts of

2 Sarajevo that were under the control of the BH army and the parts of the

3 city that were under the control of the army of Republika Srpska, would

4 you agree with me if I said that Sarajevo was a divided city?

5 A. You know, I could agree with you when you used the word "divided"

6 or"` shared" but absolutely not in identical proportions. You know that

7 the neighbourhoods to a large degree outside where the municipalities were

8 to a very large extent outside or on the very edges of what one could call

9 the Sarajevo entity. Of course, that was under VRS control. But I

10 can see that when in the centre of the city, perhaps which you are

11 familiar with, which had between 400.000 and 500.000 inhabitants, it is

12 difficult -- well, yes, divided, yes. But not proportion -- not a 50-50

13 division. Proportionally, yes, but not 50-50.

14 Q. When you say "50-50" and --

15 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Pilipovic, we have heard a lot of testimony about

16 what parts were under control of the Bosnian Serb forces and what parts of

17 the municipality and the town were under the control of the opposing

18 forces. What is the use of asking the witness whether it was a divided

19 city? I mean, of course, we get the answer we could all imagine

20 that we could get. The relevance is totally unclear. It is a matter of

21 opinion. I would rather stick to the facts.

22 Please proceed.

23 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the relevance of

24 this question is in the answer that Mr. Kolp gave when he was answering

25 the question of the Defence. He was talking about the aggressors. And my

Page 8289

1 question was phrased regarding this particular word. So the reason why I

2 would ask the question whether Mr. Kolp would agree with me whether part

3 of Grbavica was --

4 JUDGE ORIE: I notice that he used the word "aggressor" but not as

5 a term far, as far as I remember, but we could look it up, but that he

6 considered one part the aggressor but that this was felt by the population

7 a such. That was my recollection, but I could easily look it up. So --

8 but please proceed. Let's --

9 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

10 JUDGE ORIE: -- ask the witness why he thinks that one party is

11 the aggressor. Yes, please.

12 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Actually, I was meaning to ask this question, Mr. Kolp. When you

14 were talking about the population and that they believed that one side

15 was the aggressor, could you clarify this for us? Could you tell us

16 which side did this or whether both sides, looking at a divided city,

17 believed that the other side was the aggressor. So the question of

18 aggression and the attitude of the population.

19 A. The point of view of the population and possibly my own -- well,

20 not mine, the population: First of all, when I was in the city and again

21 in a city under siege, without water, without electricity, without food or

22 medicine, 400.000 to 500.000 civilians, for them, the aggressor was the

23 people besieging the city and preventing the entrance of all food and

24 other provisions, medicine included. When I talk about the Serbs, or the

25 Serb side, when I talk about with Serbs, and some of them I got along very

Page 8290

1 well. There are good people everywhere. They would tell me, "There is

2 nothing to be done. I think it is a question of history." And the

3 Serbian people know its history and the Serb people has never digested,

4 and I have frequently referred to me -- they spoke about invasions, the

5 Ottoman invasions and what happened at that time, and they thought that

6 that territory was Bosnian, well, that the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina

7 was theirs, and that for the entire Serb people. And they told me that

8 Milosevic said this: Milosevic says, "I would say that the population --

9 the majority of the Serbian population I met would say that where there is

10 one Serb, I consider that that is Serbian territory." That is it.

11 Period.

12 Q. Mr. Kolp, did you speak to the population of Grbavica, Nedzarici,

13 and Ilidza? Was this population also suffering the fact that there was no

14 electricity, water or medicines?

15 A. It is clear, to be completely honest, that Grbavica once again, I

16 told you, it is on the front line, the situation was not bearable for the

17 civilians, whatever their ethnic group was. That is clear. I am not

18 going to say the opposite, because you wouldn't believe me if I did. As

19 regards Nedzarici, I think that is the same thing because it was a

20 Serb enclave of people who were relatively isolated, even though they did

21 have some regular contacts with Lukavica. Because by necessity there were

22 orders that had to be given. But I did not have any contact with

23 Grbavica. But when you would go out of those two very specific

24 neighbourhoods, and there I agree with you, when you would go out and you

25 would go on the Serb side, I would say that you would get -- you would

Page 8291

1 find everything you wanted. There was meat. Anything. Everything you

2 wanted. Maybe not all the necessary medicines, and that is why the

3 humanitarian organisations agreed to share when the Serb authority would

4 grant passage, there was a proportional distribution of medicines and

5 dialysis machines. A part would go to the Serbs and part would go to the

6 centre of the town of Sarajevo. But I am now answering your question

7 honestly that it must not have been very good in Grbavica or Nedzarici,

8 that is true.

9 Q. Thank you. Mr. Kolp, when you were answering the question asked

10 by my learned colleague about the artillery emplacements and the mortar

11 positions, you said that the Serbs had an advantage, and you also said

12 that under control -- or that hills and mountains were under the control

13 of the Republika Srpska; is that correct, in relation to the city of

14 Sarajevo?

15 A. Yes. In the majority of the controlled zones, the heights were

16 controlled by the VRS. As regards weapons, it is clear, you know, all

17 reports say that. All the observers say it. I saw the reports, and I

18 don't think that you could deny the fact that in respect of tanks and

19 artillery - I didn't mention rocket launchers - that's artillery, tanks --

20 tanks and artillery, the VRS was unquestionably superior. You can't ask

21 me how many pieces of equipment there was. I think the reports would say

22 that. You could find that without any problem.

23 Q. Mr. Kolp, you personally, during your stay and your mandate in

24 Sarajevo, did you visit Serb positions?

25 A. You know, I had the opportunity to travel to various locations.

Page 8292

1 For instance, I had the opportunity to go on several times to Pale via the

2 Lukavica road. And when I said a while ago that we had a superb view of

3 the city, there were Serb positions, there were people with rifles which

4 we called sniper rifles. That is in every army. I didn't see them

5 firing, I can tell you that right off. I had the opportunity see

6 artillery positions and tanks.

7 Unfortunately, I never went to the north side of Sarajevo --

8 maybe that is the other side of the front line, but I did have the

9 opportunity to go to Rajlovac, it was dangerous. To go across the bridge

10 to go to Visiko, where it was also extremely dangerous, and where I did

11 see artillery pieces and tanks. I saw artillery pieces in Ilidza near the

12 Roman bridge, a artillery piece which was directed at the city at 130

13 millimetres, and the team that was firing shots, that I did see, yes.

14 Q. Mr. Kolp, as you were now talking about the positions of the

15 army of Republika Srpska, that you went to Pale and Rajlovac and Ilidza,

16 during your stay, did you visit the positions of the BH army?

17 A. I would have to tell you honestly that I had less -- fewer

18 occasions to go because 80 per cent of my work was to liaise between the

19 parties. But I worked much more -- I was too busy with the Serb side. So

20 I did have the opportunity to see certain of the ABiH positions. They

21 also had some mortars, some artillery pieces, not much, but they did have

22 some. I spoke to you about provocations. There were provocations. I am

23 not denying that. And when the Bosnian Serbs fired on the Kosevo

24 hospital, it is clear that at least on one occasion a mortar position

25 fired from that hospital on to Serb positions. That did happen. I am

Page 8293












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 8294

1 honest and frank with you. But, ultimately, what are the proportions that

2 we have to accept?

3 Q. Mr. Kolp, you were now telling us about the positions of the

4 Republika Srpska army and the BH army positions. In your statement, on

5 page 6, you said that the army of Republika Srpska had some military

6 targets around Sarajevo and you were talking about the Zuc hill, Zuc

7 mountain. Could you tell us is Zuc a mountain or a hill that was under

8 the control of the BH army?

9 A. Yes, yes, it is Zuc. There were military forces of the ABiH

10 and, yes, those forces -- well, I told you that was a strategic point. It

11 was a place which was frequently shelled by the Serb artillery. It was a

12 military target.

13 Q. Mr. Kolp, would you agree with me that in the part of the city of

14 Sarajevo under the army of BH, there was Stup hill and Brijesce hill and

15 Mojmilo hill and Hum hill and the hills Colina, Kapa Velika and Mala, so

16 in the period from March 1993 to October 1994, were these hills that in

17 that period were under the control of the BH army?

18 A. Honestly, if you were to show me a map, I could answer. But I

19 just can't answer out of my head like that without a map. I know that you

20 must feel that is extremely important if you are asking me that question,

21 but I don't remember all those places eight years afterwards. I would

22 have to look at some maps. I can't remember things just like that.

23 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the Defence would

24 like to request, with your leave, if the witness can be shown a map.

25 This is the map that we have used here before, of my learned colleagues

Page 8295

1 from the Prosecution. I believe that is the map 3644.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Before doing so, Ms. Pilipovic, I would like to

3 understand the answer of the witness well. He said, "It is eight years

4 ago; I couldn't do it without a map." Did he mean a blank map where he

5 could indicate exactly during this period where the -- well, which hill

6 was under the control of which party or would he mean, I don't know, that

7 he would need a map with already the findings of that time illustrated on

8 it. It is not quite clear to me, giving him a blank map, if he couldn't

9 draw it on, that seems to be rather useless. But I am not quite sure

10 about his position.

11 Mr. Kolp, could you --

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, it is clear that on

13 site we had maps on which the front line, which it changed from time to

14 time, was indicated and on which the positions were also marked. This is

15 the kind of map that we worked with over a period of two years. I think

16 that at some point or another they might have been available to the

17 Tribunal or to another authority. They were UN maps. That type of map.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Would you be able to reproduce the front lines or at

19 least those part of the hills under control by which party, if you would

20 be given a blank map, just hills on it?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I could try. I can't

22 guarantee the results, but I am willing to try.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mundis, you are willing to make an observation, I

24 think.

25 MR. MUNDIS: For the record, Mr. President, we would object on the

Page 8296

1 grounds that we have much evidence adduced with respect of various

2 locations, hills, mountains and front lines, during the course of the

3 trial. Simply, we object on the grounds that it is accumulative.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Pilipovic, would it be any use to give the

5 witness a chance to see what he could reproduce, if there is a lot of

6 evidence already on this issue?

7 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, let me just confer

8 with my colleague.

9 [Defence counsel confer]

10 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

11 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the Defence would

12 like to have the map shown to the witness so that we can check how -- to

13 what extent the witness can find his bearings on a map and to point the

14 location that he is certain about on the map, and I would also like to ask

15 the question about the mountains. Mr. Kolp said that mountains were under

16 the control of the army of Republika Srpska. Perhaps the witness would be

17 able to tell us about Mount Igman and under whose control was it while he

18 was on his -- on his duty in Sarajevo.

19 JUDGE ORIE: If it is just a global matter, Ms. Pilipovic, first

20 of all, do you have any unmarked copies of the map with you and available

21 to the Court as well so that we can follow the testimony? I mean, just

22 showing the one we have would not be enough. We would need to have a

23 blank copy of this map as well. We should. Of course, as you know, we

24 always follow the testimony of the witness by writing on it as well.

25 But perhaps if you could say -- if you could just mention a few

Page 8297

1 hills, that perhaps we would find out whether the witness is aware of it.

2 You started already with Mount Igman. So I don't want to interrupt you.

3 But if you insist on using the map, of course, you should have brought

4 one, copies for everyone.

5 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, at this moment, I

6 don't have an unmarked map because we agreed that we would be using one

7 map for the witnesses, that is, the map that was used by my learned

8 colleagues.

9 JUDGE ORIE: We need clean copies in order to follow the markings

10 of the witness, but let me just first confer.

11 [Trial Chamber confers]

12 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

13 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour. Your Honour, the

14 Defence will not insist on having the map shown to the witness because

15 since it is a question of how much the witness will be able to tell us,

16 and we would not like to waste any more time, I can ask a few more

17 questions.

18 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues]...on questions

19 without using a map. Please proceed, Ms. Pilipovic. I also note that

20 there is not much time left for cross-examination.

21 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Mr. Kolp, do you know or would you agree with me, in fact, that

23 Mount Igman was under the control of the BH army while you were in

24 Sarajevo?

25 A. No, I don't agree completely in the sense that I wanted to be

Page 8298

1 clear that when we talk about Igman, for me, that represents the entire

2 mountain chain near -- above the village of Butmir. Maybe I am wrong

3 because there is Bjelasnica on the other side. However, to tell you that

4 I still have the sense of direction, when you leave there, you have the

5 airport road, which was closed from Kazindolska, up to the part under Serb

6 control. A little bit further going now toward Vojdmir [phoen] and then

7 to the right of the road driving to the Serb side is the airport. On the

8 extension of the -- from the airport moving toward Igman is the village

9 of Hrasnica and the village of Butmir, if my geography is right. And then

10 after Butmir, there is a road which goes up toward Igman and which made it

11 possible to join Pazarici and the road from Tarcin in order to get to

12 Konarc [phoen]. That was under the ABiH army control, but I went further

13 than that. I went further. I went up, much further toward Trnovo to the

14 mountains, and there I saw Serb troops that were withdrawing and -- well,

15 and burning the villages. So there was fighting.

16 I did not witness the fighting. I saw the withdraw, that is, the

17 policy of the scorched earth. I might have mentioned it when I talk about

18 the heights there. That part of what I call "Igman" was under ABiH

19 control and that is how I got up my clandestine convoys and that is why I

20 am so familiar with that region. And I came out of the roads by following

21 those -- out of the lines by following the roads. But if you go too far

22 to the right, that is, too much to the east, you would get to Blazuj. And

23 if you went too much to the west, I would again be in Serb zone. But you

24 are right. You go too far to the right, that is too much. There the ABiH

25 was under the control and it was the only possible road for the ABiH to

Page 8299

1 bring in ammunition, weapons and supplies. Along that road, up to

2 [inaudible] and to go through the tunnel because now everyone knows there

3 was a tunnel. At the time, you couldn't say so, but now you can, and to

4 get into the city, yes, that is right.

5 Q. So, Mr. Kolp, you are telling us that across Mount Igman to

6 Sarajevo, on the way to Sarajevo, through the tunnel under the airport,

7 there were weapons that were transported for the BH army in Sarajevo in

8 the part of town that was under the control of the BH army?

9 A. You know, well, I don't know if you had the opportunity to visit

10 that tunnel. You know, when I say, "tunnel" it is not a tunnel as we

11 think of a tunnel in our own language. When I say, "tunnel" that is

12 something practical. There, a tunnel was a mine tunnel. And that was

13 the way that the wounded would be brought out for treatment outside. And

14 it's true that that is how the small amount -- the small arms and food

15 was sent was possible, that could be transported, and that was how that

16 would go through, running many risks. But I do agree with you, these

17 weapons were used by the defenders of the city, yes, by the ABiH.

18 Q. Mr. Kolp, would you agree with me that the 1st Corps of the BH

19 army in the part of town under the control of the BH army, was comprised

20 of 11 brigades?

21 A. That is possible. That is quite possible. But I think that --

22 when we talk about brigades, that is not the equivalent of the brigade

23 what we have in our countries. In our countries, there are infantry

24 regimens, there are brigades. Their brigade could be 200 men. It is

25 possible, very possible. I don't remember, but it is possible that in the

Page 8300

1 first army, I don't know whether that was General Delic or General Divjak

2 or someone else who was in command, but it is very possible there were 11

3 brigades, but that is relative.

4 Q. Mr. Kolp, could you tell us about the BH army in Sarajevo. Were

5 all members -- did all members of the BH army had uniforms or were there

6 uniforms apart -- uniforms in part civilian clothes?

7 A. Not everybody was wearing a standard uniform. Why? As I said to

8 you, all those who were of fighting age apparently to defend the city - I

9 don't want to speak about military targets - they bore arms, had to bear

10 arms in order to defend the city.

11 Now, I can assure you that with that type of a siege, and the

12 Yugoslav army, which was still at the barracks, they brought everything

13 with them to find uniforms or to make uniforms for all the fighters from

14 one day to the next. Whereas the town was under siege, I think that

15 would be typical. So to answer your question, I would say, no, not

16 everybody was wearing a uniform.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kolp, when you answer the question, it often

18 happens that you are also giving your opinion on whether it would have

19 been difficult to given uniforms or not. The question was just whether

20 they were wearing uniforms or civilian clothes. May I ask you to perhaps

21 keep it a bit more strict to the facts and listen carefully to the

22 questions.

23 Ms. Pilipovic, I know that I took one minute of your time, but you

24 are already close to the same time as examination-in-chief.

25 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I will try to finish

Page 8301

1 my cross-examination soon.

2 Q. Mr. Kolp, would you agree with me that in the part of town under

3 the control of the BH army, as we were talking now about uniforms and how

4 BH army was dressed, was it difficult to tell civilians and soldiers

5 apart? You can just answer by "yes" or "no."

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Mr. Kolp, when you were telling us today during the

8 examination-in-chief, you mentioned the destruction of cultural buildings.

9 Could you tell us how many mosques were destroyed in Sarajevo, do you

10 know, since you were telling us about mosques?

11 A. No.

12 MS. PILIPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, my learned colleague

13 has -- my learned colleague would like to ask two questions, with your

14 leave, and then we would finish the cross-examination.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Two questions. I will allow two questions.

16 That means the first question is the first one and the second question is

17 the last one.

18 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.

19 Cross-examined by Mr. Piletta-Zanin:

20 Q. [Interpretation] Good evening, witness. Did you ever hear or

21 speak about General Galic? Did you ever hear him giving orders in terms

22 of snipers?

23 A. No.

24 Q. Did you hear General Galic give any type of orders about

25 shelling?

Page 8302

1 A. No.

2 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you very much

3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mundis?

4 MR. MUNDIS: No need for re-direct examination.

5 JUDGE ORIE: No need for re-direct. That brings me to another

6 issue - we have to strictly finish at 7.00 today - whether there are any

7 questions from the Bench? Judge Nieto-Navia would like to put one or more

8 questions to you.

9 JUDGE NIETO-NAVIA: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

10 Questioned by the Court:

11 JUDGE NIETO-NAVIA: [Interpretation] I would just like "yes" or

12 "no" answers, please. When you spoke about paramilitaries, you said, and

13 now I am quoting, "They were not soldiers because a soldier wears or has a

14 uniform." You said that?

15 A. Yes.

16 JUDGE NIETO-NAVIA: [Interpretation] You said that the Bosnian Serb

17 army, by -- through military intimidation, attacked the PTT building. You

18 said that?

19 A. Yes.

20 JUDGE NIETO-NAVIA: [Interpretation] How many times?

21 A. Twice, maximum.

22 JUDGE NIETO-NAVIA: [Interpretation] Thank you, that is all.

23 A. You are welcome.

24 [Trial Chamber confers]

25 JUDGE ORIE: Judge El Mahdi has also one or more questions to you.

Page 8303

1 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

2 As regards what you call "paramilitaries," you said that these are

3 uncontrollable elements. What exactly do you mean by "uncontrollable"?

4 Does that mean that they were not subject to the commands of the military

5 hierarchy? Were they volunteers doing what he wanted? Or were they part

6 of a global strategy?

7 A. In my opinion, they were part of an overall strategy. Despite

8 everything, they were elements -- I don't say uncontrollable, but not

9 controlled or difficult -- controlled with difficulty. They would work

10 -- they would act on their own accord, but when an issue was an operation

11 of a greater scope, they were also involved in the operation. But I can

12 assure you that those elements could do certain things without the

13 hierarchy being aware of everything going on.

14 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Yes. Still, they did fall under

15 the command of the army, that is the impression you have?

16 A. As regards the Bosnian Serb army, it was an army where -- where

17 the well-established chain of command, a very rigid one, which did not

18 accept any kind of the discussions and which demanded, in my opinion, to

19 be informed about what was going on, and that is why probably those

20 people, those groups, moved to Lukavica.

21 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Now, as regards to their

22 authority, their main jurisdiction encompassed, do you know what it is

23 they did?

24 A. You know, I was never in direct contact with those people. They

25 were the types of groups, they were extreme nationalists who are prepared

Page 8304












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Page 8305

1 to do anything they can do in order to destroy the enemy, whether that

2 enemy is a civilian or military. That, in my opinion, is the difference

3 between them and soldiers.

4 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] You spoke about a shelling which

5 targeted the library.

6 A. Yes.

7 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Could you assert the origin of

8 that of that shelling, from which army?

9 A. You know, I myself did not witness this, but on several

10 occasions, I saw reports on STV, which was a Bosnian Serb propaganda, in

11 where you see General Mladic giving orders, in Serbo-Croat, that was

12 translated for the staff, as the people who were in charge of the

13 Sarajevo sector, and it was translated by -- not by local translators, but

14 by the official translator of the General and, apparently, General Mladic

15 himself in person directed that manoeuvre and ordered that shots be fired

16 on the old city and the library. Those orders came from General Mladic.

17 Ordinarily, it was the supreme command of the army.

18 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Did those orders go through the

19 military hierarchy?

20 A. You know, I assume that General Mladic when he would say to one of

21 his assistants - I don't know which one, one of those who was with him -

22 "Go ahead." When he would say "go ahead," by definition, it was the

23 chain of command. But what that chain of command was, I don't know. Did

24 Mladic give the orders himself to his battle commanders to fire, I don't

25 know. It is difficult to say, but it is possible.

Page 8306

1 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Perhaps one final question. You

2 said that it was a well-trained army. In your opinion, the

3 professionalism and this training, did it allow the army to target a

4 market surrounded by buildings with a single shot? Because we

5 did hear testimony, according to which, for such a fire, there had to be

6 two or three. So with one shot, can one say that in light of the

7 professionalism of that army, could it hit a market?

8 A. I think so. However, I do have to tell you that for a long time

9 there was some hesitations about who had fired because it came from the

10 front line. And so -- well, that is my second question, in fact. Now,

11 when it comes to telling you that an artillery person, a Serb, that it

12 was a Serb, it would be very difficult. I can say it was not the only

13 shot. If it was just a shot on to the market, one would have to be a very

14 skilled specialist. But there were several previous shots on to the city.

15 So the shooting plans were well-established. I can tell you this: In

16 terms of artillery, they were very experienced specialists and, of course,

17 you would need a team capable of being so exact in order to shoot that

18 way. Yes, you are right.

19 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] In your opinion, the direction

20 from where the fire originated, these positions were under the control of

21 what party?

22 A. Well, you know, when you talk about the front line, if you put

23 yourself to the -- well, the shell was fired from the north of Sarajevo,

24 not far from Markovici, around there, maybe a little bit more to the south

25 or front line. If you are south of the front line, you have Bosnian

Page 8307

1 positions. If you are north of the front line, on the other side, then

2 those were the Bosnian Serb positions.

3 Now, as a military person, if I am right south of the front line,

4 what would I do with 120 millimetre mortar near the front line in order to

5 fire on soldiers right on the other side, not very far away? I think

6 that, in military terms, that wouldn't be so justified. Or perhaps in

7 order to fire in other targets that were further away, I wouldn't be able

8 to tell you that. Therefore, in my opinion, it is more likely that the

9 shot was fired from the front line, but from the Serb side, probably. I

10 emphasise it was probably.

11 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] My last question is: You spoke

12 about firing coming from the Kosevo hospital. Was that before or after

13 the hospital was targeted by the shelling?

14 A. You know, it was a kind of cat and mouse game. The hospital had

15 already been fired on. You know, all you need is one time in order to put

16 -- on a single occasion, a mortar position from the ABiH was installed

17 there in order to say, "Well, you see, they are even firing from the

18 hospital without having it -- without being seen." But once it has been

19 done once in one's mind they would say, "Well, why wouldn't they do it

20 several times?" But I would say that, according to UN sources, the

21 hospital had already been shot on several times but not destroyed, Your

22 Honour, but several shots had been fired from the Serb side. But, you

23 know, that is always a very difficult game to define specifically.

24 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.

25 JUDGE ORIE: May I ask you one question? Your travel

Page 8308

1 arrangements, are they such that you would leave this evening or by

2 tomorrow? I am just wondering --- we wanted to stop strictly at 7.00. We

3 didn't manage to do that. I have a few question, not many, to you. Was

4 it intended that you leave today or would you stay anyhow until tomorrow?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. When I came here I was planning

6 to do what had to be done. So if you like, I will be here tomorrow.

7 JUDGE ORIE: I am just wondering, do you intend to travel back

8 home this evening or -- ?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, Your Honour.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Then, may I ask you, I want to take into

11 consideration your position as well, and it will only be for a very short

12 time, but, nevertheless, I will have to ask you to come back tomorrow at

13 a quarter past 2.00, since we had to stop as a matter of fact at 7.00.

14 And it is already 10 minutes past 7.00. So may I also thank especially

15 the interpreters because I did not ask their specific permission to

16 continue for 10 minutes. Thank you very much for your cooperation. We

17 will adjourn until tomorrow at a quarter past 2.00.

18 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at

19 7.10 p.m., to be reconvened on Tuesday,

20 the 13th, day of May, 2002, at 2.15 p.m.